Why Do Companies Delist Voluntarily from the Stock Market?

Kashefi-Pour, E. & Lasfer, M. (2013). Why Do Companies Delist Voluntarily from the Stock Market?. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(12), pp. 4850-4860. doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.08.022

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Abstract

We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange. We show that firms that delist voluntarily are likely to have come to the market to rebalance their leverage rather than to finance their growth opportunities. During their quotation life, their leverage and insider ownership remained very high, they didn’t raise equity capital, and their profitability, growth opportunities, and trading volume declined substantially. They also generate negative pre-event and announcement date excess returns. These results hold even after controlling for agency, asymmetric information, and liquidity effects, and suggest that firms delist voluntarily when they fail to benefit from listing. Overall, these firms destroyed shareholder value and they shouldn’t have come to the market.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Uncontrolled Keywords: Small firms; AIM; London Stock Exchange; Leverage; Delisting; IPO
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Cass Business School > Faculty of Finance
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/11854

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