- Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 6 October 2017.
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To understand how firms create and maintain long term relationships with consumers, or how procurement relations evolve over time, this paper examines a dynamic variant of the classical two-type-buyer contract with commitment in mechanism design. The utility determinant (or utility type) is not fixed nor completely random, and fair assumptions are that it evolves stochastically, or it is given by a distribution whose parameters are common knowledge. The second approach is pursued in this paper, and the distribution of the utility type is determined by a private information buyer type. With two possible types of buyers, the buyer more likely to have a high utility type will receive the first-best allocations, while the other will receive the first best only if he has the high utility type.
|Additional Information:||The final publication is available at Springer: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||asymmetric information, dynamic contracting, mechanism design, information structure|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics|
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