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**Citation:** Georganas, S., Tonin, M. and Vlassopoulos, M. (2015). Peer pressure and productivity: The role of observing and being observed. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 117, pp. 223-232. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.014

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# Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed\*

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June 2015

## Abstract

Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper, we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we randomize subjects into three groups: in the first one subjects are observed by another subject, but do not observe anybody; in the second one subjects observe somebody else's performance, but are not observed by anybody; in the last group subjects work in isolation, neither observing, nor being observed. To assess the importance of payoff externalities in the emergence of peer effects, we consider both a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on the performance of other team members. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed increase productivity at least initially when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see when compensation is based only on own performance.

*JEL Codes:* D03, J24, M52, M59

*Keywords:* Peer effects, Piece rate, Team incentives, Real-Effort Experiment.

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\*We thank Theodore Alysandratos for research assistance. This work was supported by the British Academy. The code implementing the slider task is based on the code developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a).

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# 1 Introduction

In a recent survey of the insights for labor economics obtained in the lab, Charness and Kuhn (2011) define “pure” peer effects as applying to “a situation where workers work, side by side, for the same firm but do not interact in any way (except that they observe each others’ work activity)” (p.205). An example of such a situation is the real effort experiment by Falk and Ichino (2006), in which subjects work in pairs and each subject can see what the other is doing and at the same time knows that the other subject is seeing what she is doing, that is, a worker is both observing and being observed. Kandel and Lazear (1992) underline that observability plays a central role for peer pressure. They distinguish between internal pressure (or guilt) and external pressure (or shame), with observability being the discriminant between the two, as “[a] worker feels shame when others can observe his actions. Without observability, only guilt can be an effective form of pressure” (p.806). These two feelings can also be present in settings with anonymous interaction, as discussed in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). The distinction between observing and being observed is also prominent in the work of Mas and Moretti (2009). They use data from a supermarket chain and exploit the spatial orientation of the cash desks to provide evidence that the positive productivity spillovers due to the introduction of highly productive cashiers into a shift come from other workers being observed by a high productivity worker and not from observing one.<sup>1</sup>

The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the behavioral mechanisms behind peer effects by disentangling the contribution of these two channels of peer pressure: observing a colleague’s work and being observed by a co-worker. We do this in an anonymous setting where, unlike in Mas and Moretti (2009), there are no social interactions among workers outside the experiment, thus measuring “pure” peer effects as defined above. The advantage of an anonymous setting is that it allows us to understand whether peer effects emerge out of the mere observation of someone else’s work or by the mere knowledge that someone else is observing our work, without the confounding effect of some unobserved interaction that may be taking place in the background. Indeed, with ongoing social interactions, peer effects could emerge out of strategic considerations, while in our setting only the behavioral mechanism is active. The presence of an ongoing relationship is particularly important in Mas and Moretti (2009), as in their setting there are also externalities among workers. Externalities are of course empirically relevant, but not ubiquitous, and, to assess

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<sup>1</sup>Another paper highlighting the effect of being observed is Corgnet et al. (2013). They allow all subjects to split their time between work, leisure and monitoring (observing others remotely). They find that when subjects are aware of when they are monitored, performance under team incentives increases to the same level as under individual incentives, while this is not the case when subjects are only aware of the possibility of being monitored. Note that unlike in our design, here the roles of observer and observed are not exogenously assigned, as all subjects can monitor and be monitored by their peers.

their importance for the emergence of peer effects, in this paper we implement two treatments, with and without payoff externalities.

We take the standard setting used to study peer effects, that is, we have subjects perform a computerized task and place the digital equivalent of a “one-way mirror” between them so that only one side can see what the other is doing. In particular, in our experiment subjects work on the slider task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a). After two rounds in which we measure baseline productivity, we randomly split subjects into three treatments. Subjects in the *Control* treatment do not observe and are not observed by anyone. The rest of the subjects are in treatment *Observed*, in which their performance is observed by another subject, or in treatment *Observer*, in which they observe another subject’s performance. These roles are kept for the remaining 14 rounds, with the pairs of Observer-Observed rematched in each round using a random matching protocol. Notice that the only difference between the Control and Observed treatments is that someone is anonymously observing the performance of those in the Observed treatment. By comparing productivity in these two treatments, we can establish what is the impact of being observed by a peer. Moreover, we can identify whether observing another subject’s performance has an impact on own performance. To do this, we look at whether what they observe has an impact on productivity of those in the Observer treatment. The fact that those in the Observed treatment never receive information about anybody else’s performance means that in our design there is no reflection problem (Manski, 1993).

Regarding what to expect in terms of impact, the literature suggests that peer pressure can have both a positive and a negative effect on productivity. The worker observing might try to conform to high performers and raise effort (Bernheim, 1994) or feel discouraged by them and hold back from really applying themselves. Both types of effect are found in the literature on performance feedback. Performance feedback is closely related to our Observer treatment, but not necessarily the same, as in our setting subjects actually observe the working activity of their peers in real time and thus receive information not just about their performance, but also about their working process and effort. In this literature, papers like Bellemare et al. (2010) or Barankay (2012) find a discouragement effect, while studies like Delfgaauw et al. (2013), Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) find positive effects. Both Beugnot et al. (2013) and Eriksson et al. (2009) have a treatment where feedback is provided in a continuous way, thus more closely resembling workers working side by side. In the treatment with continuous feedback, the first study finds positive peer effects for men, while the second study finds evidence of a negative effect on quality, but not on quantity. Both positive and negative forces can also be at play for observed subjects who might feel ashamed if they put too low effort or might internalize their impact on observers and refrain from working too hard

or might even under-perform due to a “choking under pressure” effect (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009). What type of motivation prevails within each condition is, therefore, an empirical question and in the conclusions we will discuss how our results relate to the findings of some of the papers introduced above.

As mentioned, we start by distinguishing the role of observing and being observed in a pure peer effects setting, where compensation is on the basis of a piece rate, so there are no payoff externalities across workers. We then extend the analysis to consider peer effects when compensation depends on team performance. In this way, we can assess the importance of payoff externalities in the emergence of peer effects, with the expectation that peer effects are stronger when compensation is interdependent across subjects, as in the analysis by Kandel and Lazear (1992).<sup>2</sup>

When looking at overall performance, we do not find evidence of peer effects. This suggests that pure peer effects may be rather weak and that peer effects may emerge in the field only when embedded within a richer social context, though even in the field peer effects are far from being pervasive (e.g. Waldinger, 2012). When focusing on performance in the initial rounds, we find that subjects who are observed raise productivity initially, as compared to the control group, when compensation is team based. Following this initial response the control group eventually catches up with the observed, suggesting that in our experiment being observed spurs subjects to reach a higher level of productivity faster. This is not the case when compensation is not interdependent across subjects and suggests that the presence of externalities is important for the finding in Mas and Moretti (2006) of an effect of being observed. We also find that subjects observing react to what they see when compensation is based only on own performance. Specifically, there is a U-shaped relationship between own and observed productivity.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section describes in detail our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports the results, while the last session offers a discussion and concludes.

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<sup>2</sup>In a recent and related paper, Babcock et al. (2012) compare individual and team incentives in a pay-for-studying experiment. In their setting, there is no free riding, as both team members need to reach a certain performance threshold for a bonus to be paid. The randomly assigned teammate could be either known or anonymous. They find strong positive effects on performance of being assigned to a team with a known partner in the pay-for-study intervention. Individuals assigned to the anonymous team treatment performed about as well as the individual treatment despite a high risk of default by the counterpart. They also find smaller but similar effects in a pay-for-exercise experiment.

## 2 Experimental Design and Procedures

The experiment was conducted at the Royal Holloway Experimental Lab between January 2012 and June 2013. The participants were graduate and undergraduate students at Royal Holloway, University of London. Subjects were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Each session was divided into 16 periods and the experiment lasted approximately 75 minutes.

At the beginning of each session detailed instructions (available in the online Appendix) appeared on the computer screens and were read aloud. The instructions provided details about the real effort task at hand and the compensation. In particular, we used the computerized slider task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a).<sup>3</sup> The task involves a screen showing 50 sliders, which can be moved using the computer mouse and positioned anywhere between 0-100. Each slider is initially placed at 0 and the objective is to position as many sliders as possible at exactly 50. Each slider had a number to its right showing its current position. A screenshot of the task is provided in figure 1. There was no limit in how many times a slider could be moved. Subjects were instructed that their “points score” in the task would be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 90 second period.




Figure 1: Screenshot of Slider Task.

<sup>3</sup>Gill and Prowse (2011) provide details of how to implement the task and discuss its advantages. This task has been used in many experiments, listed in Gill and Prowse (2012b).

After the end of the second period new instructions were provided for the second part of the experiment consisting of the remaining 14 periods.<sup>4</sup> In particular, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: Observed, Observers and Control (we used neutral language in the instructions), and kept such roles for the remaining periods of the session. From that point on, periods consisted of two stages of 90 seconds each. In stage A subjects in the Observed and Control treatments were working on the task, while the observers were seeing on their screen a copy of their (observed) partner’s screen. In Stage B the observers were performing the task, while the other players were seeing a time-out screen. All participants were informed of the procedure for all types, before being informed of their own type. While subjects were performing the task, they could see their current score, the time remaining and their type. In addition, the observers’ screen reported the number of points their partner scored in stage A of the same period.

Our experimental design also involved two conditions: the piece rate condition and the team compensation condition. In the first condition, subjects received 0.35 pence for each point they scored and subjects in the Observed and Observers treatments were randomly matched with each other in each period. In the team compensation condition, in each period - from period 3 onwards - one observer, the subject that she observed and one subject in the control group formed a team. They were informed that their payments for the period would be based on the average performance of their team in that period, with the piece rate applied to the average being the same as the piece rate in the individual treatment, i.e. 0.35 pence. Participants were informed about the treatment type of the other team members, but no information regarding their identity was provided at any point and the triplets were re-matched in each period.

To summarize, in the first 2 periods of the experiment all subjects worked in isolation and were paid a piece rate. We use these periods as a gauge of individual ability on the task. From period 3 onwards, we implement a 3 x 2 between-subject design, whereby subjects are either in the role of control, observed or observer and are compensated either on an individual or a team basis. We conducted 10 sessions of the piece rate condition and 7 sessions of the team compensation condition, with a total of 179 participants (the number of participants per session ranges from 7 to 15). In particular, in the piece rate condition we had a total of 107 subjects (38 observed, 38 observers and 31 control), while in the team condition we had a total of 72 subjects (24 of each type).<sup>5</sup> At the end of the experiment, one period was randomly selected to determine experimental earnings,

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<sup>4</sup>To have a clean measurement of baseline productivity, we did not inform subjects at the outset that a new set of instructions would be presented after the second period. We believe that this constitutes a minor surprise and no participant questioned it.

<sup>5</sup>In one of the team condition sessions, a subject assigned to the role of observed did not engage at all with the real effort task in any of the rounds (he completed 0 sliders), so we have dropped him from the analysis.

which averaged £10 per person.

### 3 Results

#### 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Nonparametric Analysis

We begin the presentation of our experimental results with some overview of the data. Average productivity across all periods and treatments was 27.5 and 28.4 sliders in the piece rate and team condition respectively. A histogram of the per period productivity by condition is provided in Figure 2, which illustrates that the bulk of observations lies in the range of 20-35 sliders per period.




Figure 2: Histogram of productivity by condition

We next examine the baseline productivity by treatment, defined as the average productivity in periods 1-2, that is, before assignment into treatment took place. Table 1, columns 1-2, contains this information by treatment and condition. Baseline productivity in the control treatment appears to be slightly lower in both conditions. However, when performing pairwise comparisons between control and each of the two treatments within each condition using a two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test we find no significant differences, except between observed and control in the piece rate condition (p-value=0.072). There are no significant differences in initial productivity between observed and observer in either condition according to the same test.



Table 1: Summary Statistics of Baseline Productivity and Productivity Improvement

	Baseline Productivity		Productivity Improvement I				Productivity Improvement II			
	Piece Rate	Team	Piece Rate		Team		Piece Rate		Team	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Observed	23.9 (0.57)	25.7 (0.97)	1.18	1.18	1.16	1.15	1.12	1.11	1.09	1.08
Observer	23.7 (0.59)	26.3 (0.69)	1.23	1.21	1.17	1.16	1.14	1.13	1.10	1.09
Control	21.2 (0.83)	23.7 (0.89)	1.56	1.30	1.17	1.13	1.30	1.12	0.98	1.02
Subjects	107	71	107		71		107		71	

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) contain average productivity in periods 1-2 (Standard deviations in parentheses). Columns (3) and (5) contain the average of the ratio of productivity in periods 3-16 over productivity in periods 1-2. Columns (4) and (6) contain the ratio of average productivity in periods 3-16 over average productivity in periods 1-2. Columns (7) and (9) contain the average of the ratio of productivity in periods 3-4 over average productivity in periods 1-2. Columns (8) and (10) contain the ratio of average productivity in periods 3-4 over average productivity in periods 1-2.

We next consider productivity after assignment to treatment - periods 3 onwards. To gain some sense of how productivity on the task evolves, Figures 3 and 4 plot average per-period productivity in the two conditions by treatment. What is evident in these two figures is the steep increase in productivity that takes place in the course of the experiment, in particular in periods 1-7, while subjects seem to reach a plateau in later periods. We compute for every subject a productivity index: the ratio between their mean productivity in the last 14 periods and their mean productivity in the baseline two periods, and then compute the average index across subjects (see columns 3 and 5 of Table 1). Note that for the control group in the piece rate condition the average productivity improvement is 56%.<sup>6</sup> In the team condition the average productivity improvement is much less dramatic (17%) and the difference between the two control groups is statistically significant (MW-

<sup>6</sup>We note that in this particular group there is an extreme outlier who improves productivity more than nine-fold. In fact, the median productivity increase is a more moderate 27%. If we exclude the outlier, average productivity improvement is 30%.

test;  $p$ -value=0.005). In Table 1, columns 4 and 6, we also report the improvement in average productivity, that is, average productivity in the last 14 periods divided by average productivity in the first two periods. There are no perceptible differences across the two improvement measures except for the case of the control group in the piece rate condition, also highlighted in footnote 6.




Figure 3: Productivity over time in condition piece rate




Figure 4: Productivity over time in condition team

For a visualization of the distribution of this productivity improvement by treatment see the box and whisker plots in Figure 5. In the piece rate condition, the difference in productivity improvement between observed and control is significant (MW-test;  $p$ -value=0.03). Our interpretation

for this difference, when combined with the fact that the observed are somewhat more productive initially, is that subjects in the control catch up in the course of the experiment. In the team condition, productivity improvement is very similar across the three groups, in fact the difference between each of the treatments and the control is not significant (MW-test p-value is 0.52 and 0.36 for observed and observer respectively).




Figure 5: Differences in the productivity ratios. Left panel is treatment piecerate, right panel treatment team. The scale of the y-axis has been restricted.

The initial increase in productivity we see in figures 3 and 4 is reflecting the fact that learning is an important determinant of performance on the task. The subsequent flattening out, that is common across treatments, might be indicative that there is a ceiling in subjects' ability to perform the task, which is reached after a few periods of learning. In the last period average productivity in the three treatments is indeed remarkably similar.

The evidence so far is not supporting the presence of any peer effects. However, given that learning appears to be quick and important for this task and may be dominating any treatment effects, it is of interest to examine the initial response to treatments in early periods. We measure the productivity improvement in the early periods by computing a similar productivity ratio as above, using only the first two periods after assignment to treatment (see Figure 6 and columns 7 and 9 of Table 1). What we see this time is that the performance of the control group in

the piece rate condition improves by 30%, whereas this is not the case in the team condition.<sup>7</sup> This difference is statistically significant (MW-test; p-value=0.02) and suggests that early on some free-riding takes place in the team condition. In order to check for whether assignment into the observed group impacts productivity, we compare productivity improvement across observed and control within each condition. In the piece rate condition we do not find significant differences, whereas, in the team condition, both observed and observers increase productivity by 10% and are significantly different from control (MW-test; p-value is 0.04 and 0.01 respectively).<sup>8</sup>




Figure 6: Differences in the productivity ratios, using only the first two treated periods. Left panel is the piecerate condition, right panel condition team. The scale of the y-axis has been restricted.

To summarize, behavior of subjects on the task is characterized by significant learning, with subjects reaching their capacity in later stages of the session. This makes of particular interest to look at early periods, to see whether treatments have an impact on how fast subjects learn. In the piece rate condition we find no evidence of peer effects, either in the short run or the long run. In the team condition, there is some evidence of free-riding taking place in the short run, captured by the fact that the control group in this condition improves performance less than their counterpart group in the piece rate condition. Furthermore, in the team condition subjects in both the observed

<sup>7</sup>Again, this 30% increase is influenced by the presence of the earlier-mentioned outlier. The median increase is 12.5%, while excluding this subject the average increase is 7.5%.

<sup>8</sup>If we look at productivity improvement beyond period 4, convergence between observed and control takes place. In particular, average productivity improvement in periods 5-6 is 12.6% and 7.5% for observed and control respectively, with the difference not being statistically significant (MW-test; p-value is 0.29).

and observer treatments improve productivity in the short run relative to the control group. As mentioned above, in the long run subjects reach their capacity, so that learning overcomes any treatment effects.

In the next subsection, we look closer at individual behavior using regressions.

## **3.2 Regression Analysis**

We split the presentation of regression results into two parts. We first replicate the nonparametric analysis above and investigate whether there are differences in the productivity of the observed treatment relative to that of the control, for each condition separately. We then turn attention to the behavior of the observers and ask whether their productivity is influenced by the productivity of the observed they are being matched with.

### **3.2.1 Behavior of those being observed**

The analysis here focuses only on subjects in the observed and control conditions. Table 2 presents OLS regressions of productivity on a dummy for being in the observed treatment, focusing on the post treatment part of the experiment (periods 3 onwards). We consider three alternative specifications: one in which the dependent variable is the number of sliders, a second in which the dependent variable is the difference in the number of sliders relative to baseline productivity (average productivity in periods 1 and 2) and a third one in which the dependent variable is the percentage change in productivity relative to the baseline productivity. The second and the third specification account for differences in starting ability to perform the task. The regressions also include a full set of unreported period and session dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.

Table 2: Effect on productivity of being observed: Piece rate Condition

	Periods 3-16			Periods 3-4		
	Sliders	Change	% Change	Sliders	Change	% Change
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Observed	1.014 (1.59)	-2.28** (1.10)	-0.333 (0.20)	4.575** (1.74)	1.281 (0.94)	-0.073 (0.18)
Intercept	28.1*** (3.36)	5.58*** (1.62)	0.332*** (0.12)	24.9*** (3.06)	2.402* (1.23)	0.174 (0.12)
Obs	966			138		

Notes: \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies are included in all columns.

What we see in column 1 is that for the piece rate condition there is an overall positive but insignificant effect on the productivity of the observed. If we consider changes in productivity over the baseline in absolute and relative terms (columns 2 and 3, respectively) the coefficient of being observed becomes negative, but is statistically significant only in the case of absolute difference. When we focus on the initial response to the treatment, in columns 4-6, we see a positive effect of being observed on the number of sliders, however, there is no statistically significant difference in the reaction of the treated group relative to the control when we consider productivity change in columns 5 and 6. These regression results thus confirm the lack of a significant overall peer effect on the observed also found in the nonparametric analysis.

Results for the team condition are presented in Table 3. For this condition again there is no evidence of an overall treatment effect. We do see a positive and significant effect if we concentrate in periods 3-4. In those periods, being observed is associated with a productivity improvement that is 11% larger than that of being in the control. Again these regression results confirm the pattern of an initial positive effect on productivity of being observed also highlighted in the previous analysis.

Table 3: Effect on productivity of being observed: Team Condition

	Periods 3-16			Periods 3-4		
	Sliders	Change	% Change	Sliders	Change	% Change
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Observed	2.647 (1.73)	0.669 (0.84)	-0.004 (0.05)	3.576* (1.85)	1.597* (0.81)	0.110** (0.05)
Intercept	19.913*** (4.60)	0.819 (1.64)	0.167 (0.13)	20.07*** (5.20)	0.976 (1.92)	-0.141 (0.19)
Obs	658			94		

Notes: \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies are included in all columns.

We have also investigated whether being observed leads to a “choking under pressure” effect (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009), whereby a person’s performance may deteriorate when scrutinized. To do this we define a measure of the “accuracy” of a subject’s effort on the task: the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 over the number of sliders positioned between 48 and 52. Using this measure we find no evidence that the observed’s accuracy suffers in either condition.

### 3.2.2 Behavior of those observing

We next consider the behavior of those assigned to the role of observer. In particular, in Table 4 we present OLS regressions of the observer’s productivity on a linear and a quadratic term of the matched observed’s productivity, plus a full set of period and session dummies. We report results for three specifications: number of sliders in levels, absolute change in number of sliders over the baseline and percentage change relative to baseline productivity. In the piece rate condition, there appears to be a significant nonlinear relationship between the productivity of the observed and that of the observer. In particular, the effect of observing somebody whose productivity is higher by 1 slider is -0.14 at the 10th percentile of the observed’s productivity, at the median it is -0.03 and at the 90th percentile it is 0.08, from column 1. In the team condition, we find no evidence of a

significant relationship between the productivity of the observed and that of the observer.

Table 4: Effect of productivity of observed on matched observer

	Piece Rate			Team		
	Sliders (1)	Change (2)	% Change (3)	Sliders (4)	Change (5)	% Change (6)
Observed Prod.	-0.421*** (0.129)	-0.451*** (0.108)	-0.020*** (0.006)	0.168 (0.146)	0.182 (0.124)	0.007 (0.004)
Observed Prod. <sup>2</sup>	0.007*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.0001* (0.000)
Intercept	28.5*** (2.189)	7.04*** (1.782)	0.328*** (0.104)	23.4*** (3.465)	0.626 (2.027)	0.058 (0.087)
Obs Subjects	532	532 38	532	336	336 24	336

Notes: \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies is included in all columns.

The pattern that emerges regarding the reaction of observers' in the piece rate condition is therefore one of responding to extreme observations, with a slight tendency to respond more strongly to low values. The next section provides some interpretation for the findings reported so far.

## 4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Peer effects may arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper we disentangle the role played by observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of effort. We look at both a piece rate and a team compensation scheme. When looking at overall performance, we do not find evidence of peer effects. This is not an uncommon finding in the lab and even in the field peer effects are far from being pervasive (e.g. Waldinger, 2012). This suggests that pure peer effects, as



defined in Charness and Kuhn (2011), may be rather weak and a richer social context is needed for peer effects to emerge. Understanding what features of the social context are driving peer effects is a complex but promising venue for future research and may be able to reconcile the current divergent findings in the literature, with some papers reporting positive and some papers reporting negative effects.

When focusing on initial productivity, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed work harder when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see when compensation is based only on own performance. An increase in productivity when being observed is consistent with what was postulated by Kandel and Lazear (1992), namely, that subjects work harder to avoid feeling shameful about low performance when others are observing them. The fact that we find this in the team compensation condition, but not in the piece rate one, is also consistent with the idea that peer effects are stronger when compensation across subjects is linked and suggests that the presence of externalities is important for the finding in Mas and Moretti (2006).

In the piece rate condition, we find a non-linear effect of peer pressure on the observer, with a U-shaped relationship between own productivity and observed productivity. A positive effect of observing high productivity could be due to conformism, where there is a cost to the worker of differing from his/her peer's performance. The positive effect of observing low productivity is more puzzling and could be due, for instance, to competitiveness, with some subjects being encouraged to beat a low performer. Bellemare et al. (2010) also find evidence of non-linearity in peer effects, albeit only in their fixed wage condition and not in their piece rate one. In contrast to our results, in their case the observation of both high and low productivities induces a negative effect on males. In the conclusions, the authors argue that peer effects may be difficult to find under a piece rate condition as people work at their maximum level of effort and focus their attention on the piece rate, disregarding other information about the performance of peers. One feature of our design that could explain why we do instead find evidence of peer effects in the piece rate condition, albeit only in the initial rounds, is that in our setting observers actually see the screen of the observed, while she is working, observing each single movement of the slider. In the Bellemare et al. (2010) setup and in the other papers on performance feedback, instead, subjects are just informed about the other subject's score. Being able to see another subject's work activity, and not just the outcome, may be more conducive to the emergence of peer effects in the lab.

On the other hand, in the team compensation condition we do not find any effect, while, as mentioned above, one could have expected the effect to be even stronger. This could be due

to some form of income targeting (Camerer et al., 1997; Fehr and Goette, 2007). Recall that the compensation is calculated on the basis of a randomly selected round. When paired with a high performer, an observer knows that in any case the compensation will be adequate if that round is selected for compensation and this could counteract the heightened feelings of guilt when slacking. On the other hand, when paired with a low performer, the desire to make up for this low performance (and thus insure for herself a minimum level of experimental earnings) could counteract any reduced feeling of guilt (or enhanced feelings of spite) arising from the low performance of the team mate. We should also underline that we simply look at the impact of performance that has just been observed. This is of course a very relevant and prominent measure, particularly in the team compensation condition, where that productivity will contribute to determine pay in case the round is selected. Potentially, however, there could be some persistency, and a subject may be influenced by the whole history of what has been observed so far. Because of random matching and insufficient number of periods, we cannot explore this convincingly in our setting and we leave this issue for future research.

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