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On the persistence of strategic sophistication

Georganas, S., Healy, P.J. and Weber, R. A. (2015). On the persistence of strategic sophistication. Journal of Economic Theory, 159(A), pp. 369-400. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012

Abstract

We examine whether the “Level-k” model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions at the individual level. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: Level-k; Cognitive hierarchy; Behavioral game theory
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Arts & Social Sciences > Economics
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/12715
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