Citation: Silvestri, S. (2014). Religion and Social Cohesion at the Heart of the Intercultural Debate. Anna Lindh Foundation.

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The Anna Lindh Report 2014
Intercultural Trends and Social Change in the Euro-Mediterranean region
The Anna Lindh Report 2014

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The opinions expressed by the authors in the publication are personal and professional assessments, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the European Union, the League of Arab States, or the Member States of the Union for the Mediterranean.
FOREWORD

Štefan Füle

EU COMMISSIONER FOR ENLARGEMENT AND EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The building of Europe has always been more than a purely economic and political endeavour. It has been, and remains, based on a vision of an ever closer union among Europe’s peoples and its citizens. Still today, the European Union continues to draw inspiration from this vision of its founding fathers, and the importance they attached to values of pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women.

It is these values, which are shared by the Anna Lindh Foundation, that guide our interactions with our partners in the various regional cooperation frameworks that the EU is promoting. Our partnership with them is one of the most enduring. Since 2011 political and social landscapes in the region have undergone profound transformations. We have witnessed the fall of despots, the dismantling of repressive regimes, the death of fear and the birth of hope. We have seen the emergence of a determined civil society; a brave civil society demanding that they participate in the political process and have an input in decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods.

This second edition of the Anna Lindh Report, the first since the historic Arab uprisings, builds and follows on from the pioneering edition of 2010. It is the first Survey of its kind to gage opinions from citizens from both sides of the Mediterranean following those uprisings. For policy makers in the EU this report is an invaluable tool as we continue to adapt our strategies and programmes to take account of the new regional realities. The Report’s findings can help shape our debates and policies and also assist us to move from the abstract to the realities of intercultural relations in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

A key finding for political leaders on both sides of the Mediterranean is that their citizens are looking for new and alternative ways to participate in their societies. This represents a challenge we should all - institutions and politicians - face in adapting to new and emerging mechanisms for civic participation. In our policies, programmes and projects it is people who should be at the core of our consideration. Only then can we say that we are adhering to our values, that we are responsive to people’s real needs.

The Anna Lindh Report also highlights worrying trends in Europe about the increase in intolerance, which commentators attribute partially to the economic crisis. This should act as another wake-up call for Europe, even if the Report also highlights a renewed mutual interest among citizens from both shores of the Mediterranean who recognise in today’s interdependent world that common challenges must be met by common approaches.

It is fitting that this report is published in a landmark year, when the Anna Lindh Foundation, launched in 2004 as the first Euro-Mediterranean common institution, will celebrate its tenth anniversary. The findings of the Report have proved to be a validation of the Foundation’s programmes embedded in civil societies - among them the Dawark-Citizens for Dialogue and Young Arab Voices - and focused on education, culture and media, those sectors where perceptions are shaped and civil society participation is vibrant.

The Foundation has been an invaluable friend and ally in breaking down walls built on misperceptions and discrimination, and in building bridges of tolerance, respect and friendship throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region. The Foundation can continue to play a crucial role in this regard with its hybrid status as an intergovernmental organisation rooted in the region’s civil societies.

While the Report draws our attention to certain regressions in the region, it also helps us to look forward with a sense of optimism. I recommend the Report as essential reading for all those interested in the region, in its people and in Europe’s regional alliance and aspirations.
I would like to congratulate the Anna Lindh Foundation for its valuable Report on ‘Intercultural Trends and Social Change’. This effort has succeeded in bringing the Mediterranean region into the spotlight with a view to foster cultural mechanisms and bridges between the people of the region.

The fieldwork of the Report’s polling targeted the public opinion across the Euro-Mediterranean region, including four Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco), with a principal focus on important cultural issues. The Anna Lindh Foundation has successfully demonstrated that divergence in certain views regarding a number of ideas and beliefs does not change the fact that communities across the two shores of the Mediterranean share common cultural heritage.

It is important to get the full benefit from the findings of the Report, especially on how to turn the Mediterranean into a more harmonious cultural zone. The Survey has indicated that tourism and internet are imminent tools to ensure continued social interactions and regular contacts between communities across the shores. It has also shown that the image of the region is not the same according to the different countries of the Poll; while Europeans link the region to certain life styles, Arab citizens from the four countries included in the Poll are more likely to associate the region with insecurity.

The Anna Lindh Report’s findings regarding the ultimate effect of the ‘Arab Spring’ on the European-Arab Relations show degrees of uncertainty. Such findings indicate the important role that European countries may play in helping Arab economies to face their challenges. Not to forget at the same time that hope in the future depends as well on ending the long standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict through ending the Israeli occupation and helping in creating a viable Palestinian State.

Interestingly, the Report illustrated the different perceptions regarding the ability of the citizens of the Mediterranean region to solve the problems of their societies. The Survey findings have confirmed that such perception is not based on geographical nor cultural basis. Joining political parties or supporting social movements should be the fundamental way to develop our contemporary societies.

I am certain that different Arab and European institutions related to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will benefit from the Anna Lindh Report and its findings. The League of Arab States would like to express its appreciation for this highly valuable Report.
# Foreword

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OVERVIEW
The Euro-Mediterranean region is experiencing the most challenging and hazardous situation of the last two decades. Twenty years ago, in the aftermath of the Oslo Peace Accord, which was intended to solve the most complex conflict of the region, the European Union, most of the Mediterranean Arab countries, Turkey and Israel jointly launched the Barcelona Process. It was the most ambitious multilateral project of cooperation the region had ever known, ultimately aimed at creating a shared space of peace, stability and prosperity.

None of the three goals have been attained. There have of course been positive developments. Among them, the most important is probably the awakening of the civil society in the last years and its renewed capacity to become a player for social change in the region. Since 2010, we have observed converging demands of freedom, dignity and social justice that constitute a powerful and exciting reality. As a matter of fact, there are new and stimulating reasons for hope, but there are also perturbing causes for concern. On both shores of the Mediterranean.

**An instrument for intercultural action**

The second edition of the Anna Lindh Report tackles this paradoxical situation with scientific data and in-depth analysis on the evolution of values and perceptions in the region. Conceived from the very beginning as a tool for knowledge but also as an instrument for the intercultural action of the Foundation and its Networks, the Report confirms that, within most of the countries and in the region as a whole, the values-set is experiencing a positive and converging evolution. It tells us about the complexity of the current context, with cultural trends showing new opportunities for dialogue and coexistence and others which might fuel exclusion and sectarianism if they are not reversed.

As Claire Spencer underlines in her contribution, the Survey carried out by Gallup in 13 Euro-Mediterranean countries shows that ‘there is a growing appetite for mutual knowledge and understanding’. This renewed appetite, which is in line with the growing demand for exchanges, mobility, and personal contact we perceive from the Anna Lindh Foundation is a very encouraging trend. It shows that despite the scarce results of the process of regional integration, and the political tensions existing at the sub regional level, what prevails at the bottom of the societies is a movement in favour of knowing more about the others and sharing with them concerns and possible solutions. This interest in approaching the other is particularly relevant in the religious field where the Survey shows a growth of mutual interest in the religious beliefs of those living on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean.

This conclusion confirms one of the main findings of the first Report which established that the region is not victim of a ‘clash of civilisations’ but rather a ‘clash of ignorances’ based on historical stereotypes and the ‘culturalisation’ of social and political conflicts promoted by some media and political discourses. As Mohamed Tozy says ‘the result of the Survey carried out in 2013 (...) reinforces the idea of convergence of the representations which erodes the thesis of the clash of cultures and shows that it is the religious variable which continues to inspire social inclinations towards a normalisation’.

Nevertheless, this ‘growing appetite’ for interacting with the other appears beside another data which might constitute a challenge for fostering dialogue and cooperation. It is the fact, identified by Sara Silvestri, that ‘half of the population of the entire region thinks that diversity is a threat for social stability’. Such a result, which seems to have increased slightly in the last years, on both shores of the Mediterranean, is particularly worrying bearing in mind that diversity is a growing reality in all the region, fuelled by human movements, technological changes and social and cultural transformations. Considering diversity a peril will make more challenging the work of those, like the Anna Lindh Foundation, who are trying to present diversity as a potential richness. The perception of diversity within the societies as a threat is a reality in some European countries, fuelled by the lack of common and efficient policies to manage migration flows, and by the rising of populist approaches which are exploiting the complexity of migrant’s integration. It is also a growing reality in most of the southern countries of the Mediterranean basin, which are becoming net receivers of migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa. Attitudes against the other who lives in our neighborhood and communities are on the rise on both shores, and they affect not only migrants, but also other minorities, ethnic, religious or cultural.

Both trends, the positive one, expressing the desire of more cross Mediterranean interaction, and the one which shows suspicion and fear about the neighbour who is different, should be read carefully by the Foundation for adapting its strategy and programme to the evolving
cultural context. The Foundation should leverage the mentioned ‘appetite’ of knowledge, multiplying its support to any kind of cross cultural exchange in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The existence of such a desire for meeting the other should be the basis of the Anna Lindh Foundation programme in the coming years.

But the Foundation should not avoid the fact that intercultural dialogue starts in the neighborhood. Without this ‘local’ dimension, intercultural dialogue will lack coherence and credibility. As Amin Malouf said bluntly, ‘it is with those closest to us that we fight most bitterly’. In 2004, the ‘founding fathers’ of the Anna Lindh Foundation anticipated this challenge stating that the relationship with the other is most problematic with those who are closest. Now, in light of some of the data of the Anna Lindh Report on Intercultural Trends, their advice is more important than ever: ‘The question of cultural relationship in the Euro-Mediterranean area begins for each individual at his own door, for the southern as much as the northern countries’.

Impact of the Arab movements

To what extent what we call the awakening of the Arab societies might have affected both trends: the positive and the regressive? The Gallup Survey gives us some clues, which are in general constructive. It seems that the perspective of social and political changes in many Arab countries impacted positively the will of interaction and facilitated a cultural rapprochement. What happened in 2011 and 2012 in the southern shore of the Mediterranean eased such a rapprochement, in both directions: the European public opinion discovered that the values which are at the core of the European project where exhibited by millions in the Arab streets and squares. The perspective of a democratic evolution in many Arab countries, either through changes or reforms, challenged the traditional and deeply rooted orientalist perception about the incompatibility between Islam and democracy. In the South, the initial uprisings stimulated the logic of exchanges with Europe based on democratic values that were no longer perceived as imposed by foreign powers, but home grown. As Larbi Sadiki points out, in a region coming to grips with values associated to freedom, rights, and gender roles, societies seem to be marching, slowly but surely, towards acceptance of attitudes integral to learning democracy and citizenship.

Are those conclusions still valid in 2014? We know from other polls that the first positive impact has been overshadowed by the difficulties of the Arab democratic transitions. After considering the results of the Survey in Egypt ‘particularly positive’ regarding the confidence and independence shown by the majority of the people pooled, Dina El Khawaga raises the question of the impact of what happened since then in this country on the public opinion, anticipating that an updated Survey will most probably reflect less serenity and openness than in 2012.

It is too early to conclude about how the current skepticism about short term achievements of the transitions will impact on the values set and mutual perceptions across the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, most of the observers agree that sectarianism as a political tool has developed, threatening the capacity of leaving together in many Arab countries. The situation affecting Syria and the danger of contagion of its extreme sectarian conflict in countries like Lebanon might reinforce the idea that diversity – even diversity within Muslim societies – is a threat. For the Anna Lindh Foundation, such a menace raises the urgency of promoting, at the community level, and particularly among young people, a culture of dialogue and citizenship, based on valuing cultural diversity as a richness. Programmes like ‘Young Arab Voices’ and ‘Dawark-Citizens for Dialogue’, launched during the last two years, and oriented at building open and plural societies are more convenient in light of the conclusions of the Report and the evolution of the situation in the region.

Challenges of diversity

And what about Europe, in comparison with the Survey of 2009? The good news of the first Survey are confirmed, in terms of a noticeable interest for the realities of the southern countries, which seems to have been reinforced by the appreciation of the changes happening in the Arab countries. Nevertheless, some analysts like Antoine Messara concluded, suitably, that the Europeans appear uncertainly fearful. ‘Afraid (to lose) their well-being, security and peace in everyday life, their democratic achievements, their rights in terms of social benefits, leisure and vacation’. This conclusion, which finds some correlation in the political field in terms of manipulation of the identities (mistakenly endangered by the migrants or by loss of sovereignty in favour of the EU), might have an impact on the prioritisation of values (increase of religion in the scale of value priorities) and on the perception of the other. Quoting Solzhenitsyn, Messara alerts about the danger of a ‘moral collapse’ and observes what he calls ‘the regression of courage’ among the European elites and societies.

Such a pessimistic diagnostic should be balanced by the positive trends which appear also in the Survey, in terms of a value-set which still gives a great importance to the acceptance of diversity, and by the adherence of the majority to the values which are at the core of the European project. In any case, the results of the Survey should be put in the context of the political and social changes and the cultural transformations. In this regard, there are plenty of reasons for the Anna Lindh Foundation, to reinforce its projects and activities oriented at facing the danger of any cultural regression.
As it happened in 2009, the Survey shows that the appraisal for a common Euro-Mediterranean project will depend on its capacity for enhancing cultural diversity and fostering innovation and entrepreneurship. The conclusion is of utmost importance for increasing the ownership of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) among the public opinions of the region. The UfM will be assessed by our societies according to its capacity for promoting innovation and entrepreneurship and for making our societies a place to live together in diversity. A conclusion which is of great importance for the two institutions of the Union, the UfM Secretariat and the Anna Lindh Foundation. In order to increase the ownership among the societies of the UfM, the challenge is to respond to what Claire Spencer calls the ‘the end of top-down visions and frameworks designed by intergovernmental committees’.

**Orientations for the intercultural dialogue agenda**

Complemented by local and action-oriented perspectives of some of the Anna Lindh national coordinators, this second edition of the Report should contribute to adapt the Foundation’s programme to the new realities of the region in the coming years. The data offered by the Survey about intercultural trends and social changes are the basis for understanding better the societies we live in, and the plurality of perspectives and analysis of the Report will foster a necessary debate about how to respond to such a volatile environment.

The global picture of the societies of the region which emerges in the Survey and its analysis is better than the one we get every day through the mainstream news. There are motives for been concerned but also reasons for hope. It seems that citizens‘ values are resilient enough to respond judiciously to the winds of political uncertainty and social upheaval which are blowing across the region. As Juan Diez Nicolas notes, social values and attitudes usually have a great stability and the changes which might happen in three years should be analysed carefully. There are no major variations in the opinion of the majorities, in relation to the Report of 2009, but even if it is still supported by minorities among the public opinion, the emergence of regressive attitudes should be followed carefully and taken into account for any strategy of cooperation and intercultural dialogue. On the other hand, the extreme complexity of the current situation advises not to support a one-size-fits-all interpretation. In the last three years, the region became more varied, both in Europe, as a consequence of the economic crisis, and in the Arab countries, as a consequence of transitions and the Syrian conflict.

The inaugural edition of the Report, carried out on the eve of the Arab uprisings, told us about the inquietude existing in the Euro-Mediterranean societies and it somehow helped the Foundation to be better prepared to react to what happened a few months later in the Arab countries and to adapt our programme to the new context. Do we get a common message from this second edition of the Report, valid for all the region? If there is one, it is probably that intercultural dialogue should be based, more than ever, on bringing together the people of the region, providing them with spaces for dialogue and opportunities for action. The citizens resilience is an asset which should be leveraged against any regressive cultural trend, and the will of knowledge, curiosity and exchange which appear in the Report, is the best asset for making civil societies sharing democratic values.

For the Anna Lindh Foundation - which marks a coming of age in 2014 with its tenth anniversary - the Report has proved a validation of the bold decision of our institution’s forefathers to anticipate the centrality of civil society in Euro-Med cooperation. The same findings must now be the basis for leveraging on an even greater scale the next decade of the Foundation’s work, to provide a space to tackle those issues that have undermined previous attempts to build a partnership among citizens. And for the Union for the Mediterranean whose creation, in the end, succeeded in provoking a new conversation about how to construct a sustainable partnership based on real co-ownership without double standards, there are lessons here. Top-down solutions will not work, as the Report findings underline, and the union must be built on the cultural and aspirational convergences between the citizens of the Mediterranean.

**André AZOULAY** is President of the Anna Lindh Foundation. **Andreu CLARET** is Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation.
Inside the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll

It was the second time that a large, representative survey used the tools of modern social sciences to provide a snapshot of the public opinion in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The first Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll was conducted in August and September 2009, in several European countries and countries bordering the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM). The first wave of the Poll included eight European countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and five SEM countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Turkey). The current Poll is the second of its kind and was specifically designed to monitor changes since the Arab Spring.

The Survey was carried out on the basis of the Gallup methodology through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) on landlines and mobile phones with a sample of 1,000 individuals representative of all parts of each country, including rural areas. The target population included all individuals aged fifteen and above, with the opinion poll questionnaire translated into the major languages of each country, and quality control procedures used to validate that the correct samples were selected and that the correct person was randomly selected in each household, according to the Random-Digit-Dial (RDD) sampling method. The fieldwork captured the opinions in the autumn of 2012, three years after the initial Survey. Some of the countries were the same in both studies, while others changed in order to provide as wide a coverage as possible. About 13,500 interviews were conducted with citizens in eight European countries (Albania, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Spain) and five SEM (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey). Two European countries (Germany and Spain) and three countries from the SEM (Egypt, Morocco and Turkey) were included in both the first and second Anna Lindh/Gallup Polls.

The present paper summarises the most important indicators monitored and based on questions asked among the general population in every country on their interest in issues like cultural diversity, perception and knowledge of cultural differences, spaces of encounter, religion, and mutual perceptions. The results hopefully contribute to bridge the gap in perceptions and to understand the existing differences and divergences between people and communities across the two shores of the Mediterranean. Some of the results of the study will also help tackle misperceptions and rebuild human and cultural bridges in the Mediterranean region and ultimately facilitate the actions of civil society, decision-makers and opinion-leaders. The solution can be dialogue with the long-term perspective of shaping the Euro-Mediterranean space as an area of cooperation, exchange, mobility and peace as expressed in the ambitious but humanist core values and objectives of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

Representations of the Mediterranean

Respondents on both sides of the Mediterranean shared an overall positive image of the Mediterranean region: when presented with several associations that people may have when thinking about the region, respondents from both country groups tended to choose positive characteristics over negative ones. The Mediterranean evokes first of all a strong common heritage – feelings and

Survey Question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas/images that may come to the minds of different people, and please tell me, if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. Base: % of all respondents % of sum of ‘Strongly characterises the region’ and ‘Somewhat characterises the region’ by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>European countries</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean way of life and food</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common cultural heritage and history</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic participation in democratic transition</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to change</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turmoil, insecurity</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of conflict</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
associations that go much deeper and beyond the daily political news. About nine in ten interviewees in Europe and about eight in ten in SEM countries associated the Mediterranean region with a common cultural heritage and history, a Mediterranean way of life, and hospitality. However, while both the self-perception and the general judgment about the region acknowledges the openness to the stranger as it appears from the emphasis given to hospitality (towards the other) as a key characteristic of the Mediterranean region, this space was also perceived as a source of conflict by about seven in ten respondents, (Chart 1.1, 1.2).

Despite sharing many common images in their representations of the Mediterranean, respondents from the two country groups differed characteristically in their responses as well. For Europeans, the Mediterranean region is more often linked to a certain type of lifestyle and food compared with respondents from southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (91% vs. 79%), and the first are the ones who are more likely to associate the region with turmoil and insecurity (78% vs. 71%).

At the same time the question can be asked: are people in Europe and in SEM countries referring mentally to the same countries in their concept of ‘Mediterranean’? The image of the Mediterranean region is partly different because people are associating different countries to the region. For Europeans, the Mediterranean means overwhelmingly Italy – seven out of ten respondents are saying that it is the country that comes to their mind when hearing about the Mediterranean region. Greece is the second most often mentioned country, followed by Spain and France. The top three country associations among the respondents in SEM are Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. Indeed a very different mental map – where Greece is mentioned only by 7% of respondents for example, compared to every second mention in Europe. The common definition and understanding of the region is associated with different country stories and the associated narratives are reflecting this as well. The list of countries mentioned is affected also by the countries surveyed since, especially smaller countries, like Croatia or Albania, are more easily known and recognised as Mediterranean in Europe, where 17-14 % of respondent mentioned them while in SEM only 1 and 2 % mentioned

Survey Question: Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas/images that may come to the minds of different people, and please tell me, if you think these characterise the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all. Base: % of all respondents % of sum of ‘Strongly characterises the region’ and ‘Somewhat characterises the region’ by country (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).
them spontaneously.

Despite sharing many common images in their representations of the Mediterranean, respondents from the two country groups differed characteristically in their responses as well. For Europeans, the Mediterranean region is more often linked to a certain lifestyle and food than for respondents from SEM (91% vs. 79%), and the first are the ones who are more likely to associate it with turmoil and insecurity (78% vs. 71%). When talking about the perceptions in the two regions, it is clear from the above comparisons that the similarities are more striking than the differences. The rank order of the mentioned ideas/images are almost the same. The notable exception is the stronger emphasis on the common cultural heritage and history in the South and the relatively higher mention of the way of life and the food in the North. The politically related associations in both regions are the least mentioned. But beyond the general similarities the country by country differences in the North are also worth noting.

The timing of the Survey as well as the different political developments at the time of its implementation also impact on the different perceptions. For example, while roughly eight in ten respondents Morocco (83%) and in Tunisia (77%) agreed that the Mediterranean region was characterised by a resistance to change slightly less shared this view in Egypt (about seven in ten respondents), Jordan and Turkey (67%-70%). Similarly, 85% of Moroccans and 81% of Tunisians associated the Mediterranean region with civic participation in democratic transitions; among respondents in Turkey, Jordan and Egypt, this proportion varied at a slightly lower level: between 68% and 76%.

One of the persistent misconceptions about the Mediterranean region, especially in Europe, is that a large proportion of citizens would like to leave their country of birth in order to live somewhere else. The economic and social crises that affected societies everywhere were definitely reflected in the aspirations of people in Europe as well. Only a minority (40%) in Europe said that if they had a choice they would start a new life in their own country. The proportion in SEM is much higher – 58%. The country by country differences in the proportion of those who prefer to start a new life in a different country from the one they currently live in stimulate reflections on the perceived frustrations of the given society. One striking difference however is clear: contrary to the dominant perception it is citizens of the European countries who would rather live in a different country then their own. In Ireland – a country deeply affected by the crisis, only 18% would start their new life in Ireland and in Albania practically everybody would
choose another country (82%).

Among the five countries surveyed in the South it is only Jordan where the majority would rather live somewhere else. Over one third of the people surveyed in Jordan would start their new life outside their current region.

**Meeting and getting information on the other**

Looking at the possibilities of dialogue between the regions, we find that interactions occur much more commonly in European countries. On average, 41% of interviewees in Europe answered that they had some contact with people from SEM over the past year; this figure ranged from 26% in Poland to 55% in Belgium and 59% in Albania. In SEM, in line with the results from three years ago, respondents in Morocco most often had been in contact with people from Europe (57% in 2012 - 38% in 2009), while only a minority of respondents in Turkey met or talked to Europeans during the previous year (2% in 2012 - 24% in 2009). (Chart 1.3) As in 2009, respondents in European countries who met people from SEM did so most often for business reasons (35%).

**Chart 1.5**

*Interest in news and information about SEM / European countries*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural life and lifestyle</th>
<th>European countries</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
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**Political change**

<table>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>58</td>
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</table>

**Survey Question**: Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea / European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their …? *Base:* % of all respondents % of sum of ‘Very interested’ and ‘Somewhat interested’ by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).
The importance of internet as a tool of communication is striking. It is especially important for those living in the SEM countries. As to any interaction there is a need for two sides, and in principle surveys, if based on valid representative samples should be similar in distributions when talking about mutual interactions, actions that are basically one-sided must be suspicious. While tourism gives a chance mainly to Europeans to interact, chatting over the internet is more a tool to keep social interactions and regular contacts with those members of the social network who are living abroad.

As to the content of the interactions the Poll reveals differences as well. As a general observation, we can say that the overall level of interest in news and information related to the other region is higher in Europe. But this does not mean that there is no openness and general interest in news and information about Europe among people in SEM. The majority reports in every subject that they are at least ‘somewhat interested’.

According to the responses, the majority of respondents in both country groups were at least somewhat interested in news and information about the other countries’ cultural life and lifestyle, economic conditions, political changes, and religious beliefs or practices. For example, 78% of respondents in Europe said they were somewhat or very interested in political changes that had occurred in SEM; the corresponding figure for SEM respondents’ interest in news and information on political changes in European countries was 68% (Chart 1.5). But within the relative rank order of interest it is SEM citizens who are the most interested in this aspect of life in the other region, while Europeans are mainly interested in the cultural life and lifestyle of the South.

The lowest interest was reported when it came to the religious beliefs and practices. This is the single largest dividing line between the mostly secular Europe and the overwhelmingly religious SEM countries. The nature of interest is also driven by this underlying difference. Only a slight majority in SEM countries was at least somewhat interested in how Europeans practice (or not) their religion. On the other hand, even if religious aspects proved to be the area of least interest for Europeans towards SEM, about two thirds of respondents expressed some interest in this particular regard.

Among respondents from SEM, those in Morocco were the most likely to consistently report being interested in news and information from European countries (for example, 76% in Morocco said they were interested in political changes in European countries and 84% were at least somewhat interested about news related to the European economy). Even if interviewees in Egypt - each time - were the least eager to learn more about European countries, they can still be counted among a majority at least somewhat interested in the political and economic developments in Europe (Chart 1.6).

**Values underpinning behaviour**

Referring to the differences in terms of the relative interest levels on matters of religious beliefs and practices, related values are also very instructive on this fundamental underlying value differences (Chart 1.7). A good example is the tendency of the majority of Europeans to doubt about the existence of absolute moral guidelines. The tendency to believe that what is considered good or bad is not predetermined but can change according to circumstances, a relativist moral standpoint, is probably the most revealing on the different ways that different societies observe and judge the events and the world in general.

The belief in an absolute truth was by far more widespread in SEM: 53% of respondents from that region believed that there were absolute guidelines to what is good and
bad, and 37% thought that such guidelines depended on the circumstances. A majority (70%) of respondents in Europe, on the other hand, advanced the view that truth was rather relative; only a quarter of Europeans (26%) believed in an absolute truth (Chart 1.8).

The role of women in society, and perspectives for the future

Attitudes and social norms that are rapidly changing are mainly related to women’s role in society. On average, across Europe and on both shores of the Mediterranean, roughly six in ten interviewees thought that women now play a more important role in their society than five years before, while about three in ten respondents answered that nothing had changed in this regard. Respondents in SEM countries, however, were more likely than their European counterparts to think that the role of women in their society would become even more important in the next five years (66% and 56%, respectively).

Among respondents in SEM countries, Moroccans were the most likely to believe that women would play a more important role in their society in five years’ time (89%). The proportion expressing this view was also high in Tunisia (63%), Turkey (75%), Jordan (78%), and Egypt, where 48% of respondents thought that women’s role in their society would become more important in the next five years. In most of the European countries surveyed, the proportion of interviewees who answered that women would play a more important role in their society in the years to come remained below 60%; the most important exception being Albania, where 73% of respondents selected this response.

Expectations for the future are always coloured by the perceptions of the past and the present. A good illustration of this is that compared to the past the perception of change that led to the present situation is much more positive in the South than in the North of the Mediterranean. A slim majority of respondents in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries said that, taking everything into consideration, their present life situation was better than five years before; just 15% of interviewees in these countries stated that life had

In Morocco, 80% of respondents said they believed in an absolute truth, and 19% answered that what was true or false depended on the circumstances. Respondents in Jordan, Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt were divided in their views – although 44%-52% of the population in these countries believed that truth was absolute, almost the same proportions (34%-49%) believed that what was true or false depended on the circumstances. The case of Egypt has to be looked at carefully – as the timing of the Survey reflected also on the responses. While the respondents in each of the other SEM countries choose one of the offered response alternatives, one-fifth of the Egyptian respondents avoided to answer. If we assumed that the majority of the 22% who did not answer the question in reality also believes in the existence of absolute guidelines (an assumption that is supported by other survey results by Gallup and others) we could have different results, (Chart 1.8).
become worse. But the mood is most definitely shaped by the expectations for further improvement. Here, a majority of respondents were optimistic about the future: between 60% of respondents in Egypt and 82% in Morocco expected that their life situation would further improve in the coming five years.

The Survey results document a far less positive picture when looking at Europeans’ own life evaluation. Overall, 27% of respondents reported that their life situation had deteriorated in the past five years; but this perception is significantly higher in the Mediterranean European countries – at the time of Survey, autumn of 2012, this proportion in Italy and Spain reached 39%-40% (Chart 1.9). Looking ahead, to the next five years, countries that were in the worst situation are the ones that can see possibilities of progress. Albania (where most almost 9 out of 10 people wish they could start a new life somewhere else) are hoping that life will be better in the future. Countries where the economic crisis impacted most on the life situation of respondents (Ireland, Italy, Spain) are the ones where about half of the people hope that things will turn to the better (Chart 1.10).

In this respect southern and eastern Mediterranean countries are definitely more optimistic – on average two-third of the population have high expectations towards the future life conditions. Again, this is partly driven by the perceived changes compared to the last five years, but at the same time this level of energy and pressure toward changing personal life conditions are also building up pressure toward rapid social change. In Europe about one in every five people expect that the crisis is not temporary, that it has not even reached its bottom, and that the worse is still to come. In southern and eastern Mediterranean countries only a tenth of the population is expecting a possible deterioration of their life situation, (Chart 1.10).

The future of the region and the impact of the ‘Arab Spring’

Personal life expectations are not unrelated to the overall perception of general social and political changes in the Arab world. At the time of the Survey the significant changes that Arab countries were experiencing, and which started with social movements that have been
called an ‘Arab Spring’ were very much part of the general discussions about the future of the region. This future was also related to the expectations for the future of North-South relations. In the European countries surveyed, nearly half (45%) of the respondents thought that the ultimate effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Arab relations would be positive, while almost 30% held an opposite view (10% did not expect any consequences in this regard and 15% could not tell what could be expected).

A rather similar picture emerged in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries; although it should be noted that the proportion of ‘no effect’ responses in this country group was somewhat higher (14% vs. 10% in Europe), at the expense of the proportions expressing a positive view (42% vs. 45% in Europe) (reference to Chart 1.11). Among respondents in the southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, those in Morocco were the most likely to think that the effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Arab relations would be positive (52% of ‘positive’ responses). In Turkey, on the other hand, just 35% of respondents expected such a positive outcome, while 37% thought that there would be negative effects following the Arab Spring and another 21% expected no effects at all. Nonetheless, in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, the largest proportion of ‘negative’ responses was measured among the population in Tunisia (36% ‘negative’responses) (Chart 1.12).

Respondents in Belgium and Poland appeared to be as negative in their evaluation of the Arab Spring as their counterparts in SEM countries; 39% answered that the effect would be negative. This result was in sharp contrast to the majority of respondents in Denmark who believed that the ultimate effect would be positive (68%).

Emerging ways to contribute to social development

When asked about how they could personally contribute to solving problems in their society, 20% of respondents in European countries answered that joining a social movement would be most efficient to this purpose, followed by 12% who thought about joining or supporting a political party or an NGO. In southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, joining or supporting a political party (15%) was considered a more efficient way to contribute to solving problems than joining a social movement (13%) (Chart 1.13).

Interestingly, across many countries, a considerable proportion of respondents had confidence in their own
individual actions to solve problems in their society (e.g. 43% in Denmark and 38% in Tunisia). In Germany and Turkey, on the other hand, very few respondents selected this response (9% and 1%, respectively). At the same time, a substantial proportion of the population in several countries – on both shores of the Mediterranean – felt that there was no efficient way for them to be in a position to contribute to solving the problems in their society. For example, 29% of respondents in Italy, 35% of those in Egypt and 27% in Turkey feel incapable to participate, or contribute to, problem-solving at the level of their communities and societies.
EUROMED INTERCULTURAL ANALYSIS
In Search of the Mediterranean Core Values

Mohamed TOZY

The unique approach - and associated risks - taken by the Anna Lindh Foundation in its pioneering polling on the Euro-Med region is explored in an opening article by Tozy. The author exposes the evolution of trends in perceptions of values, based on analysis of the 2009 and 2012 surveys, with a particular attention to the current socio-political context. Increased mutual interest and interactions between the region’s citizens offer, according to Tozy, the most relevant basis for a long-term union across the Mediterranean.

In a previous work, we had the opportunity when analysing the results of the Poll to raise some epistemological and methodological issues related to the practice of this type of Survey. These questions remain valid for this second exercise. The construction of a sample for a Euro-Mediterranean comparison is arbitrary insofar it brings together the Mediterranean and Europe thinking that the familiarity we have with the concept absolves us from having a critical or cautious approach. We cannot emphasise enough the riskiness of this undertaking for which we took the decision to think Euro-Med and investigate an area promoted to the rank of object of social science. To decide to create a sample with over 25,000 citizens from 18 countries and hope for its representativeness of a Euro-Mediterranean population is more an act of faith than a scientific act. This is a bet on the future and a quest to provide solid basis to a project that has barely started and is facing multiple barriers: the bad will of each other, the nationalist reactions, the burst of new conflicts leading to a climate of political instability (Libya, Mali, Syria, Ukraine more recently). This bias – even if arbitrary - has a rational intentionality and shared belief, at least among the promoters of this project, and it is supported by the responses given to the first Survey. This re-ensures us on the performative qualities of such work.

Uniqueness of the exercise

The notion of narrative identity borrowed from P. Ricoeur (Ricoeur, 1985) permits us to think elegantly and accurately about this process of identity-building which this observatory of values under construction refers to. This is a space at the centre of a scheme for shared narratives that avoids a fixed concept that is usually associated to the concept of identity. The story has the advantage of accepting pluralism, supporting the sedimentation, and playing at the same time the dynamics of forgetting and remembering, of similarity and difference. The elements outlined in this text allow fixing a frame that unfolds as boundaries defining what is outside and inside, and shapes interior layouts that help in organising the plurality providing a spectrum of shades and colors and offers a grammar of elective affinities. Beyond the differences, the frame presents us with an air of Mediterranean family and reassures us about the option of a rapprochement between the European Union (EU) and its southern shore and eastern border.

Even considered as a contribution to the consolidation of a narrative identity, the Anna Lindh Report about representations must maintain a degree of reflexivity that largely determines its level of credibility. A caution which also allows us to practice the nuance, to curb the certainties around ‘surveys’ and to open the space for reasoned and modest work whose main ambition is to maintain a dynamic where the knowledge of representations is only a minor aspect. In this second article (Tozy, 2010), I am not going back to methodological issues discussed within the Scientific Committee. Things that seem evident in the practices of major pollsters or responsibles of European barometers should be questioned also in this particular case especially since we have the ambition to create a preceident. The mode of administration of the polling, the wording of questions, the choice of options provided for the answers of respondents, including the options to identify priority values, are as important as the issues related to the investigation, and they correspond to the issues we raised in the previous Anna Lindh Report. We refer especially to all matters related to the categorisation and the production of typologies, including the option of minimising national traditions and singular trajectories of states in favor of subgroups, as the European countries and the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEM). We should not forget that for the first subgroup, European barometers hold a series of sub-categories that are meaningful and translate degrees of integration and particular identities (formerly the EEC, the Schengen countries, countries of the Euro, Anglo-Saxon countries, countries with Catholic tradition, the Latin countries the countries of southern Europe, the Europe of 28). Things are more complicated.
even if the complex reality of SEM countries has no story to tell to the extent and that the tradition of the barometer for this set should be constructed from scratch. SEM do not even exist as a subset of the World Values Survey. We will not repeat enough that data processing from a single sample, from national or intermediate samples (European Group/SEM group) is an issue that we cannot solve with only sociological arguments. We noted earlier that the question of types and angles of readings is crucial in this work and there is no legitimate choice.

The context framing the analysis

The second Survey conducted by the Anna Lindh Foundation takes place in a particular context: a few months after the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ but also with all the difficulties related to the start of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) project which has lost in this context of change some driving force both on the northern and the southern shore. In the North because of a change by means of presidential elections (N. Sarkozy), in the South by means of a popular uprising (H. Moubarak) which brought to power a new regime at the antipodes of the first at least for its values, and which was taken away by means of a coup acclaimed by a large part of the Egyptian population.

The current investigation took into account the complexity but also the richness of the historical moment by expanding the sample in view of a consolidation of the 2009 Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll results but also by nurturing the ambition to measure consequential changes to the Arab Spring. These changes related to freedom, religion and democracy, recorded by dozens of researches, emerge as a very likely hypothesis and encouraged the integration into the sample of the current Survey previously polled countries (Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Germany and Spain). Consequently, the problem is to answer questions raised by the 2010 Report: Is the Mediterranean a popular and social reality? Can we talk about convergence of values or conflict of values? What is the nature of interactions between Euro-Mediterranean citizens? But the question is also to respond to other issues related to the ongoing story on the southern (Arab Spring) and northern shore (Euro crisis). We ask indeed whether the values of progress came out enhanced from these crises. What is the impact of the current events on religion? A very legitimate question when different sequences of the revolutionary cycle are observed: fall of dictators, free elections that led Muslim Brotherhood to power and even Salafist groups, who are at odds with the values promoted by the Euro-Mediterranean project, and the opposite - as we learned from the history of the time of Solon, Pisistratus and Clisthene – by questioning the course of democracy even before reaching any compromise, still open on unfathomable ways.

### Chart 2.1

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<td>Palestine</td>
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</table>

**Survey question:** Could you please name all the countries which come to your mind when you hear about the Mediterranean region? **Base:** % of all respondents, % of mentions by regions (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Sharing the Mediterranean

The second edition of the Survey confirms the 2009 results regarding the issue of countries linked to the Mediterranean and the answers bear no surprise. The most visited countries topped: Italy, Greece, Spain and Morocco. The order is however not the same for European and SEM respondents. Only Morocco remains among the top five countries mentioned by both groups, while Italy which is the first for 70% of the citizens of the Europe group, ranks only in sixth position for southern and eastern Mediterranean countries with 23% (Chart 2.1).

Regarding the perception of the Mediterranean region, the positive image is confirmed, even if, as it happened in the first Survey, there is a certain ambivalence.

The Mediterranean is mainly associated with positive values: hospitality (50.5%), food and Mediterranean lifestyle (56.4%) and a common history (49.5%), with higher percentages than in 2010. At the same time the
The Anna Lindh Report 2014

The Mediterranean is scary. It is considered as a source of insecurity and restlessness even if comparatively this appreciation is lower with 32% of Europeans and 27% of SEM considering a source of conflict.

The interest for the Mediterranean varies both with the level of development and according to membership or not to the EU or the SEM countries. Europe is primarily interested in cultural life (more than 80% in 2012 - 76% in 2009) and the economy in the South (80% in 2012 - 60% in 2009). The interest in economic life is shared by SEM respondents although to a lesser degree (around 70% in 2012 – 59% in 2009). Egyptian and Moroccan respondents prefer to associate their interest towards European neighbours with economic opportunities (between 70 and 80%) and with political change (between 65 and 70%).

Both sets, Europeans (48%) and SEM (44%) believe that the Arab Spring will have a positive impact on the southern Mediterranean-Europe relations, but in Europe 10% think it will not have an impact (Albania, Poland and Spain) and 24% even think the impact will be negative (mainly Poland and Belgium), while 19% in the South (mainly Turkey and Jordan) think it will have no impact and 21% think the impact will be negative (mainly Tunisia and Jordan). Europeans and SEM see positive effects of the UfM in particular for the potential increase in innovation and entrepreneurship (85.5%), respect for cultural diversity (85%) and respect for the environment (about 83%).

Interaction processes are also confirmed by the 2012 Survey. The number of Europeans who reported being in contact with SEM people in 2012 reached 43%, 8 points higher than in 2009 (35%), but it is slightly lower than the percentage of SEM people interacting with Europeans (22% in 2012 - 24% in 2009). The effects of the crisis which started to fade since 2012 are offset by the obstacles to mobility related to conflict zones and transit areas in the southern shore, including Libya and Tunisia. Opportunities and modes of interaction between the North and South are largely determined by the standard of living and the legal possibilities of movement. Principal modes of interaction that arrive first in the Poll are business and tourism for Europeans (35%) while for SEM citizens the interaction is mainly virtual, and the Internet is the tool for 19% of them.

Politically speaking, the results confirm the idea that democracy is a shared horizon and carries the same values for all. It means freedom (50% SEM), freedom of expression (38% SEM), free elections (15% SEM), respect of human dignity (15% SEM) and prosperity mainly for SEM (13%). But the opportunities of its implementation are not the same, as civic commitment to solve problems of society for Europeans is considered the best way to achieve efficiency, including integrating social movements (19%), while SEM respondents prefer individual action (22%).

**Mediterranean in use: interactions and diversity**

These general remarks related to the use of polling averages must be tempered, knowing also that we are unable to restore typologies from sorting. We opted for a reflection on the influence of the gender and age variables on the outcome of the investigation. Our challenge is twofold: on the one hand, to test the hypothesis defended in the history of the Mediterranean by anthropologists like Germaine Tillon, among others, on the ‘conservative function of the Mediterranean woman embodying the status of mama’, regent of the patriarchal family, on the other, to focus on the role that young people can play in developing the foundations of this shared horizon, knowing that many commentators of the Arab Spring attributed to ‘Generation 2.0’ the responsibility of the earthquake that followed the immolation of Bouazizi by fire.

Regarding the issue of interaction, young people interact more than adults over thirty: 11 points in Europe and 5 points higher in the SEM, but men interact more than women: 4 points in Europe and 6 more in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (Chart 2.2). The mode of interaction as expected is virtual.

For the very specific question related to perceptions on the role of women in society, the results of the Survey contradict stereotypes. SEM citizens believe more in women’s role than European citizens, and men more than women (+4 points), this is what separates the two sets. The same applies to youth, we observe some convergences between Europe and SEM countries. Regarding the increase of women’s role in society in the next five years, SEM people believe in it more than Europeans, women as much as men to a point of difference. But SEM women are more optimistic than European women: 12 points of difference. In relation to this matter, age is not as a relevant variable in Europe as...
The relation to pluralism is another real test for individuals seeking new social relations, negotiated in a civic space that guarantees freedom in all its forms, including freedom of conscience which was at the center of political issues in Tunisia, in Egypt and Morocco. The question of pluralism which we will comment on later is closely linked to the question of truth. It is important to note that the response of most of SEM citizens to the question of the existence of an absolute truth varies between 44% (Egypt) and 80% (Morocco), the average being 53%, while in European countries it varies between 38% (Poland) and 11% (Albania), the average being 26%.

We should note that the theory of the link between the status of truth (Revelation) and Islam is contradicted by the results of the Survey: Albania, with half of its population Muslim, has the lowest score (11%) while the Catholic Poland has the highest score in the Europe group (38%).

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**Chart 2.3**

Views about political, cultural and religious diversity by gender and age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>European countries</th>
<th>SEM countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life</td>
<td>Male: Agree 89, Disagree 9, Don't know 3</td>
<td>Male: Agree 87, Disagree 9, Don't know 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society</td>
<td>Male: Agree 80, Disagree 17, Don't know 3</td>
<td>Male: Agree 85, Disagree 10, Don't know 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society</td>
<td>Male: Agree 49, Disagree 48, Don't know 3</td>
<td>Male: Agree 47, Disagree 48, Don't know 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey question: Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Base: % of all respondents, % by socio-demographics, where Agree: “Strongly agree” + “Agree somewhat”, and Disagree: “Disagree somewhat” + “Strongly disagree” (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

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it is in SEM countries; however overall hope for the future is stronger for SEM (+10 points difference). These results call for some comments because they are surprising. Women’s optimism about their future contrasts to their current situation, especially in some of SEM countries. Social movements related to the Arab Spring, as well as some heroic acts for civil rights by women (the Tunisian activist Amina Sboui, the Egyptian feminist Aliaa Magda Elmahdy or the Soualilizes in Morocco) showed that the determination of some women to contribute to the establishment of a new covenant is explained by both the scandalous nature of their social and legal status and the enormous hope for change they bear.

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We should note that the theory of the link between the status of truth (Revelation) and Islam is contradicted by the results of the Survey: Albania, with half of its population Muslim, has the lowest score (11%) while the Catholic Poland has the highest score in the Europe group (38%).
To return to the issue of diversity and pluralism, we find that it does not always have a direct correlation with the belief in one absolute truth. The historical experiences of each country sometimes correct the rigidity of belief, and we see that Moroccan and Tunisian citizens (81%) for instance outperform the Egyptians (78%) regarding their appreciation of diversity in relation to prosperity while 80% of Moroccans believe that there is only one truth against 44% of Egyptians.

The relationship diversity/prosperity registers a score up to 80%, and when we link these results to gender and age, we find that the gender variable plays moderately. SEM women have 5 points of difference with SEM men (-5 and -7 with European men) in their appreciation of diversity and (-4) compared to European women. Youth believes a little more in the benefits of diversity for public debate compared to adults (+5 points in SEM and +1 in Europe) (Chart 2.3). The relationship that respondents establish between diversity and stability is relatively low. Ethnic and religious conflicts in progress can explain this distrust linked more to the absence of regulatory mechanisms than to a lack of appreciation of the virtues of diversity. 47% of the respondents of any category agree with the idea that diversity is a threat to the stability of their country. The gender variable is not significant as well as the age group, even if adults in SEM countries show a slightly higher perception of threat (+3 points).

Another paradoxical result concerns the assessment of the current and future personal life. The level of satisfaction is higher among SEM countries and gender does not play a significant role. Totally, the SEM group is 12 points higher compared to Europe, and we should note that France was not included in this group during this polling round, which could have made decrease the EU average even more, taking into account that skepticism is high in France. The theory of frustration developed by Samuel Stouffer (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams, 1949) could provide some answers about the relationship between the satisfaction of basic needs and the level of frustration. Paradoxically, it is with youth that we observe a higher level of satisfaction within the SEM group, the gender has no influence. Youth across the region declare a level of satisfaction in their personal life of around 50%, with more than 10 additional points within the SEM youth group. European adults are very pessimistic (-7) compared to younger people, while adults of SEM are far more optimistic than European adults (+26). They are only slightly more pessimistic than youth of SEM countries by a point of difference.

**Expectations about the future**

About the future, we note a strong belief in the expectations of improvement with more than 10 points compared to the previous question concerning the current life situation. Women believe in it more than men (+2) and SEM women more than the others, in fact only 5% of SEM women are pessimistic against 17% of European women, 25% of European men and 10% of SEM men. According to the age variable age, young people are generally confident in the future with 66% and a difference of +12 points between the current and expected level of satisfaction among SEM youth. European adults are far more pessimistic than their SEM peers (22% against 8%). One feels here the effects of the economic crisis more than those of the Arab revolutions. Nevertheless, on the question regarding the effect of the Arab Spring on the future of Euro-Arab relations, young people think that they are positive (compared to adults’ perceptions +7 points in the Europe group and +5 points in the SEM group).

Another indicator to consider a credible bet on youth is related to modes of action to change things and solve problems of society. We had noticed the skepticism of SEM citizens about the virtues of collective action, through both civic activity and political parties (41%), compared to 57% of Europeans. Almost one in four people in SEM said that individual action is more effective compared to one in five in Europe. The variable age is playing a role, with European youth strongly believing in it. More than 22 points separate them from their SEM peers. There are plenty of reasons for this disaffection: lack of freedom, risk of associative action. We cannot avoid to draw parallels between these results that remind us of some observations made by several studies on the crisis of traditional forms of political participation (the party crisis, the crisis of the traditional elite) and the emergence of other forms of participation through civil society or social networks. These new dynamics stimulate a new assessments of civic action but their development also generates strong opposition from the states trying to confront, recover or to neutralise them. We understand therefore why in SEM countries one in three citizens does not believe in civic action while in Europe it is one in eight. We should also link this to the importance given by youth in SEM to the freedom (82%) as an important value and expected results of closer cooperation across the Mediterranean.

I will avoid dealing with responses by sub-regional averages and focus on the contrast between national traditions within each category. Taking the case of Spain, Ireland, Belgium and Germany for the European group of countries. To qualify my remarks, I will choose from the six proposed values according to an implicit categorisation developed by pollsters between values of ‘progress’ (curiosity, independence, freedom and respect for other cultures) and values of conservatism (obedience, commitment to family, religion). When we look at the results in each country (Chart 2.4), we feel...
Most important values to respondents when bringing up their children

Chart 2.4

Survey question: In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I'd like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? Base: All respondents, % of sum of 'Most important' and 'Second most important' by country (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

a certain discrepancy in thoughts and judgments that people bear between their perception of values which are dominant in the other and the reality. A resurgence of confrontation is observed between countries that share a common history or present including through current interactions through tourism or migration.

It is indeed possible that the answers to these questions which define the perceptions we have on others refer to the national views of each country. This idea is influenced by the ratio of emigration, the colonial past and sometimes the long-term historical memory. So if we look closer at the score of Spain and Belgium compared to Ireland, we realise that the point of view of Spanish respondents is based on a rather negative bias (in the scale of values ranging from tradition to modernity) when considering the differences between European and SEM values. Respondents think that the SEM people are less curious than the European by 4 points and almost twice as obedient and more than four times more attached to religion (58% SEM - 13% Europeans), three times less independent (31% SEM - 14% Europeans), almost twice less respectful of diversity. The only value that is reversed is the one of family solidarity, since Spanish respondents believe that Europeans are more supportive in terms of family than SEM (52% Europeans - 33% SEM). This value is very important or at least highly considered as such in Spain and in many countries of the North as a positive value (Chart 2.5).

We can say the same thing about Belgium, a country with a less confrontational experience with the southern Mediterranean in its distant past, but which has a rather difficult relationship with migration groups originating from Morocco (making up to 30% of the Brussels population). The integration model developed by the Belgian State on the basis of its own rather powerful multinational experience has not prevented the Belgian respondents to be within the European average. They think that SEM are less curious by 8 points than Europeans, more attached to religious values (11% Europeans - 35% SEM), less independent (23% Europeans - 16% SEM) and more supportive in terms of family (40% Europeans - 44% SEM). Ireland in its relationship with the southern
Chart 2.5
Most important values to parents raising children in European and SEM countries: actual values vs. perceived values

Survey question: Which one of these six do you think is the most important to parents raising children in Europe? And the second most important? And to parents raising children in the SEM societies? And the second most important? Base: % of all respondents, % of the sum of ‘Most important’ and ‘Second most important’ answers by country (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

The Anna Lindh Report 2014
shore has a different sensitivity compared to other European countries which have a strong interaction with the Mediterranean through tourism or migration. The Irish perception about SEM is more neutral. The Irish see very little difference between SEM and European countries in terms of the values transmitted. The difference in relation to the appreciation of curiosity, obedience, commitment to a religion, independence, respect for other cultures and family solidarity does not exceed five points.

Regarding SEM countries, it is difficult to interpret the answers because the interviewees’ understanding of the Poll questions is not the same across the countries. We see three different categories of responses: in some cases responses about preferred values in other SEM countries correspond to those that interviewees identify as priorities for themselves, in other cases they correspond to those they consider would be thought by European citizens and in others by other SEM citizens. Morocco develops a relatively negative view of SEM countries. For the Moroccan citizens surveyed, SEM people are less curious and three times more obedient, three times more religious, five times less independent, a little more supportive in family relationships (12 points) and especially two times less respectful of other cultures than Europeans. This view represents almost the perspective of Spanish about SEM. Morocco, which is in a strong interaction with Europe, oddly thinks like Spanish and Tunisians who show a similar pattern aiming to keep the difference within the same group of belonging and to get closer to a reference group for expressing their representation. While for Turkey, which considers itself European, the differences with European perceptions of SEM are less marked, between 7 and 2 points based on the different values.

**Concluding reflections**

The 2012 Survey results confirm those of the previous Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll. We can at the risk of over-interpretation think that the combination of factors related to the 2008 crisis and the Arab Spring strengthens the idea of a convergence of representations that increasingly erodes the thesis of the clash of cultures and that the religious variable, which continues to inspire social movements, tends to stabilise. In other words, one cannot deny that the experience of Islamists in power, especially in Egypt, will impact on future choices.

I cannot conclude this opening overview without admitting that the enthusiasm that accompanied the processing of data, as a source of hope, was often mixed with an enormous sense of helplessness and depression. It sometimes appears almost futile to devote so much effort to explore the labyrinths of representations and values in conflict in a period when every day we have to see unbearable images of an unnamed war that has lasted four years in Syria; at a time when the Syrian people who also represent one of the most beautiful expressions of the Mediterranean culture is in the process of becoming the first refugee people of the World.

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Religion and Social Cohesion at the Heart of the Intercultural Debate

Sara SILVESTRI

Social cohesion is today at the core business of intercultural relations. Through the prism of religious beliefs and cultural diversity, Sara Silvestri analyses the quality of interactions among the citizens of the Euro-Mediterranean region, as well as potential areas of convergence around key values and sensitive topics. She reflects on the evolution of trends between the two Anna Lindh/Gallup surveys, positively observing a coming together around the importance of family solidarity, and openness to pluralism within societies.

It is commonly assumed that religious and cultural identities matter in the Euro-Mediterranean region and that growing cultural and religious diversity poses a challenge to national identities, social cohesion, and political and economic stability. The wealth of fresh information provided by the Anna Lindh/Gallup Opinion Polls opens precious insights into themes that are at the heart of intercultural relations.

**Chart 3.1**

Interest in news and information about SEM and European countries in 2009 and 2012

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Survey question: “Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea/European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their Economic conditions; Cultural life and lifestyle; Religious beliefs and practices; Political changes?”  
Base: All respondents, % of sum of ‘Very interested’ and ‘Somewhat interested’ by regions. Chart compiled by S. Silvestri using data from Anna Lindh/Gallup Polls 2009 and 2012 (© Silvestri, Anna Lindh/Gallup 2012).

Faith: Coexistence of convergences and divergences

It is commonly thought that religion has a central place in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries’ societies, and that it is increasingly irrelevant North of the Mediterranean. Instead, the ALF/Gallup Polls reveal unexpected results. Partial convergence, as well as divergence, is visible across the region when considering attitudes to either religious beliefs and practices, or to the value of religious and cultural diversity, as well as when comparing and contrasting the two.

Both in the 2009 and 2012 polls, the least amount of respondents in each set of countries declared to be interested in the religious beliefs and practices of the other group, compared to the number of those attentive to cultural life or economic conditions (Chart 3.1). Yet, in the course of those three years, this theme increased dramatically in importance in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region. The religious beliefs and practices of the other side of the Mediterranean mattered to only 45% of the SEM respondents in 2009. By 2012, this figure rose by six points (to 51%). In Europe, 68% of people held it significant, versus the previous 57% (that-is-to-say an increase by 11 points). What are the causes and implications of these upward shifts? And how do they relate with the relevance of religious beliefs and the phenomenon of cultural and religious diversity, in each group of countries and on a domestic level?

On the one hand, religious beliefs and practices are at the bottom of the list of potential mutual interests in the whole region. This could indicate a certain level of widespread secularist-inspired indifference to the topic of religion. Such a reading would be justified by the common assumption that European societies are highly secularised. The ensuing expectation would be that the recent democratic transitions in SEM countries have opened the way to secularisation and the dissemination of atheistic beliefs there too. On the other hand we noted a general increase in interest in others’ religious
beliefs between the 2009 and 2012. This result could therefore be interpreted as a sign of close – perhaps even intensifying – attachment to individual (as well as group) faith identities. This dynamic would demonstrate the on-going process of ‘de-secularisation’ of the world (reference to Berger, 1999) and potentially could entail in the on-going process of ‘de-secularisation’ of the world (Chart 3.2). The number of respondents favourable to teaching religious beliefs to their children increased in Europe – both as a total average (from 14% to 18%) as well as in some individual countries, but decreased in SEM countries (from 62% to 49%).

In Europe, Germany experienced the most dramatic shift, with a rise of 15 percentage points (26% compared to 11% in 2009). As a result, this country rocketed from bottom to top of the European list, even above the predictably religious Catholic Ireland and Poland (which scored 17% and 19%). This contrasts with 2009, when Germany was among the least interested in this topic (11%), just before Sweden. Belgium scored 9% in 2012, which is not far from the 12% of France in 2009, a country with whom it shares various commonalities (such as language and level of secularisation). In Albania, 11% of respondents found religious values important. The atheist legacy of the country’s Communist past has certainly contributed to a high level of secularisation, which puts Albania in line with the findings for France, Belgium and Spain. Spain showed a slight decrease in interest in faith values (from 13% to 11%) in 2012, which may be due to growing leftist and anti-clerical views in the country. In general, the Spanish findings diverge slightly from those for Italy (15%) and Poland (19%). These three countries are supposed to share an equally strong Catholic heritage, and yet they appear to align with countries with which they do not share religious similarities. For instance, exactly the same percentage of respondents (19%) in Hungary (2009) and in Poland (2012) stated that religious values are important for the education of their children. The views on this topic in Bosnia-Hercegovina (2009) and in Greece (2009) were very similar (20%), while Italian participants in 2012 replied like those in Great Britain three years before.

We can deduce from the above that the characteristics of specific religious traditions (e.g. Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam) cannot be considered the only and central factors determining the actual relevance of religious values in individual societies and how people relate to the reality of religious and cultural diversity. Instead we should pay attention to the political cultures, historical trajectories, and socio-economic challenges of the countries that we analyse. All these factors together are likely to impact attitudes to religion and diversity.
The Poll results about the relevance of religion for Europe’s inhabitants are fascinating. They demonstrate that, on a personal intimate level, there remains considerable interest in faith issues, even though the role of organised or institutional religion has declined. In particular we note that attachment to religious values in 2012 has either remained stable compared to 2009 or has increased. The direction of the trend cannot be clearly identified because the 2012 poll included only two countries from the previous round and the results from these countries go in opposite directions. Spain lost two points, but Germany experienced a huge increase of those focused on religious values. As a result the average for the whole region has been affected by this shift.

This eagerness to transmit one’s religious values to future generation could be concerning to some, especially if seen in tandem with the German results about the theme ‘respect for other cultures’: the respondents in favour of this fell from 54% in 2009 to 35% in 2012. A less accentuated drop is also visible in Spain (from 67% to 61%). This alarming trend points to the spectres of racism and nationalism. But then it is alleviated when we look at how people answered, in the same countries, to the question of whether cultural diversity is beneficial for societal society: Germany in 2012 ranked like Italy, towards the top (84%) and Spain was midrange (79%). Simultaneously, we note contradictory and ambiguous attitudes to the topic of cultural and religious diversity. The number of those willing to teach respect for other cultures to their children decreased from 58% to 51% in Europe from 2009 to 2012. Yet, in the same period we noted a rise in the interest in the cultural life and religious beliefs of the other shore of the Mediterranean.

Regardless of whether respondents felt a strong or weak attachment to their own and their country’s faith traditions, they may have been triggered to become…
interested in these issues due to the realisation that their own societies – and the world – are changing, are becoming culturally and religiously more diverse. Hence, whether out of curiosity or by fear, they wish to know more about other societies religious beliefs and practices and, simultaneously, they increasingly treasure their own religious values. In the SEM, on the contrary, support for handing down religious values declined drastically: from 62% in 2009 to 49% in 2012. The most marked shifts concern Turkey where respondents thinking that religious values are important in raising their children dropped from 65% to 39%, and Morocco which went from 62% to 30%. Egyptian views also fell significantly, from 72% to 63%, equal with Tunisia. Simultaneously, views about respect for other cultures improved, attracting 28% of 2012 respondents versus the previous 18% (Chart 3.3).

All these changes sound exceptional but some are more surprising than others. Egypt is one of the SEM countries most renowned for its traditionalist attitudes and strong attachment to religion. In fact Egypt was top of the poll in 2009, with 72% of its respondents declaring that religious values were the most important thing in the education of new generations. But now it appears that Egyptian views have become identical to those of one of its most secularised and Westernised neighbours, Tunisia. The general decline in the number of those supporting religious values in the SEM is not immediately clear and would require additional research in order to be better understood. In Turkey, the shift may be related to recent intense public debates on the role of Islam in Turkish politics and society. The drop in attachment to religious values in Morocco and Egypt is somewhat more surprising but is consistent with the drop in the number of their respondents believing in the existence of ‘absolute guidelines’ (which is an implicit way to measure belief in supra-natural authority): 80% in Morocco in 2012 compared to the previous 88%, while Egypt went from 71% to 44%.

These findings are somewhat unanticipated, considering that both countries have seen an increase in political mobilisation on the part of Islamist movements recently. The latter, in theory, could have impacted (i.e. increased) on societal attachment to religious traditions, reinforcing in-group identities, and in the long term causing intolerance of diversity. There are undoubtedly societal tensions and competing values in Egypt and Morocco at this delicate time of transition; this may explain why the two countries were last in the SEM scale of those believing in the benefit of religious and cultural diversity for societal prosperity (Egypt 78%, Morocco 82%) in 2012. Still, these percentages were higher than for instance those for some European countries (Chart 3.2).

The coexistence of high attachment to religious values with respect for other cultures in countries with active Islamist parties may be surprising to the lay reader but it confirms the research conducted by Moataz Fattah (Fattah, 2006) at the beginning of the 2000s in a large number of Muslim countries. He showed that support for political Islam did not automatically generate anti-women or anti-minority attitudes and that there were ‘no statistically significant difference between Islamist and non-Islamist attitudes towards democratic institutions in any of the cases’ he studied. These percentages are nevertheless quite high if taken individually, in line with the European average and actually even above Denmark (76%) and Belgium (72%). Additionally, when looking at the value ‘respect for other cultures’, both Moroccan and Egyptian attitudes raised considerably between 2009 and 2012: Egypt rose from 9% to 22%, Morocco from 13% to 42%, while Turkey lost 3 points (from 31% to 28%). Hence we can say that diversity is a complicated and divisive issue in all these countries but the situation is improving.

In 2009, 51% and 59% respectively of participants in Syria and Lebanon were favourable to passing on religious beliefs. These averages are lower compared to their SEM neighbours in the same year. Such lukewarm interest in religious values could be associated with the particular government approaches and constitutional arrangements of these two countries, which have promoted secular attitudes and lifestyles in order to manage their multi-ethnic and multi-confessional societies and prevent conflict. In fact these two countries were, together with Turkey (a country with a markedly secular constitution), the most open to religious and cultural diversity among the SEM in 2009: 15% Syria, 20% Lebanon, 31% Turkey.

One wonders what the results of the poll for Syria and Lebanon would be now, in the midst of a prolonged civil war in Syria and with all its ramifications, domestically and internationally, from armed violence, to humanitarian assistance, to migration, to regional balance of power. The closest data we have is for a neighbour, Jordan: 81% of its respondents in 2012 stated that religious beliefs are important for the upbringing of their children and 23% selected respect for other cultures. This data puts Jordan at the top of the SEM for religious values (just after Egypt) and towards the bottom (just before Egypt for the value of cultural and religious diversity that year.

**Cultural and religious diversity: ambiguities and contradictory attitudes**

Further insight into Euro-Mediterranean perceptions of faith and cultural and religious pluralism can be drawn from those sections of the poll that explicitly address the significance of religious diversity per se. The 2012 Poll introduced a new set of questions in an attempt to seize nuances within views about the value of cultural and
religious pluralism. The results are especially interesting as they reveal considerable – perhaps higher than expected – similarities between the two shores of the Mediterranean, as well as the existence of contradictory trends within societies.

The percentage of those who regard cultural and religious diversity as important for the prosperity of their own society is almost identical in the SEM (83%) and in Europe (82%), whereas those who disagree are mostly located in Europe (15%, while 10% are in the SEM). The two sets of data combined show that overall SEM populations are more favourable than Northern ones towards religious and cultural diversity. This finding counters many assumptions and will surprise observers. It may be an indication of the democratisation dynamics taking place in the South, especially the new emphasis on freedom of opinion and of religion. However, when asked whether diversity is specifically important as a value in the education of one’s children, it emerged, in 2012, as a priority for European countries (51%) but not for the SEM, where this theme attracted only 28% of the respondents.

It is striking that individuals that are strongly in favour of diversity in rather abstract terms are not necessarily ready to implement this in their own lives. This shows that attitudes are not always good indicators of actual behaviours. Still, we should acknowledge that the figure 28% is a considerable improvement from the earlier 18%. When attitudes to diversity are translated into views of actual participation in public life on the part of groups with a different religious or cultural background, support for diversity remains indeed high on both shores; but then Europe appears slightly more open (90%, versus 84% in SEM), and the percentage of those in disagreement becomes equal (9% on both sides). An explanation could be this: acceptance of political pluralism is a key characteristic of consolidated democracies and cannot be expected to happen from day to night after a prolonged period of authoritarianism. Additionally, acceptance of diversity in the European context may have been facilitated by high levels of secularisation, while this process has not taken place in the same way in the SEM, although it is not absent there (for an elaboration of the varieties of secularism: Asad, 2003).

Taken together, all these answers about the value of cultural and religious diversity within individual societies could suggest future positive relations across and within the multifarious group of peoples living in the Euro-Mediterranean space. However, the picture becomes darker, when examining the next section of the opinion poll. Nearly half of the participants across all the countries polled in the Euro-Med believe that religious and cultural diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society (48% in Europe, 46% in the SEM). It is striking to note that fear of diversity coexists side by side with the positive attitudes just mentioned above, as well as in parallel with the earlier responses concerning interest in the culture and religion of the other shore of the Mediterranean. How is this contradiction possible and what are its implications?

To make sense of this it may be useful a) to consider how the same countries fared in relation to attitudes to religious values (see above), and also b) to contextualise these results by bringing into the picture other dimensions such as recent (and on-going) migratory movements, the emergence of faith-based politics, and the return of ethno-nationalist feelings all across the region. The so-called ‘Arab awakenings’ have brought to the fore religiously inspired political parties, such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and An-Nahda in Tunisia, as well as a number of other political actors with strong faith identities, both in these countries and in Syria and Libya. While bringing new opportunities for freedom of opinion and of religion, the political transitions have also uncovered ethnic and religious divisions and competition between groups within societies. So, this could explain the ambivalent positions towards diversity among the inhabitants of the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Immigration from the MENA into the EU grew steadily in the course of the 1990s and 2000s. This issue has often been exploited by populist right-wing movements in their political campaigns (Mudde, 2007). Influxes generated by the Arab uprisings since 2011 have added to the normal trend into Europe but have especially significantly affected the neighbouring states in the SEM. The difficulties in absorbing and caring for people that are fleeing situations of fear and instability – as well as simply looking for better opportunities to start a new life – are especially vivid in the context of a global economic crisis and in a weakened Eurozone. In the absence of growth and handicapped by spiralling rates of unemployment, the countries that constitute the migrants’ first ports of call in the Mediterranean Sea (e.g. Greece, Spain, Italy) have found it especially hard to face population influxes, despite having also experienced high emigration rates lately (OECD, 2013).

Convergence around family solidarity

From a normative perspective, European countries are highly supportive of the value of diversity: together with family solidarity this variable attracted in 2012 the largest percentage of responses (51% respect for other cultures, 60% family solidarity). Respondents in Italy, Denmark, Spain and Belgium valued most respect for other cultures when raising their children (scoring respectively 65%, 63%, 61% and 61%), while Poland and Ireland were midrange (51% and 59%). Albania, and Germany
were the least interested (with respectively 30%, 35%). Positions reversed, though, when considering if religious and cultural diversity is important for the prosperity of society. The latter three countries scored top of the list of those in favour (87% Albania, 85% Ireland, 84% Germany, equal with Italy); Belgium and Denmark ended up bottom (72% and 76%) while Poland and Spain were close to each other in an in-between position (80% and 79%).

A rather unexpected result for the SEM concerns attitudes towards cultural and religious diversity. Although the SEM respondents did not consider diversity as a priority in the education of their children, compared to Europe, they had more positive expectations from diversity for the prosperity of society, scoring 83% versus 82%. Turks were the most favourable (88%), followed by Jordan (85%). Egypt was the least favourable (78%) in the SEM but it is important to note that this percentage is actually higher than the views coming from Belgium (76%) or Denmark (72%), two countries that are normally considered to be very liberal and open to diversity. Favourable respondents in Tunisia and Morocco were 81%. The ranking of SEM countries in terms of most/least supportive of diversity, however, changed slightly when the question reverted around the scenario of passing values onto children. Again, we have Egypt at the bottom (22%) and Turkey towards the top (28%) but respondents from Morocco (42%) appeared actually those valuing most respect for other cultures. The remaining SEM countries scored in the middle (Tunisia 25%, Jordan 23%).

In SEM countries, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon have been the main recipients of people fleeing Syria, experiencing, like European countries, economic and social difficulties associated with rising inflows of refugees as well as economic migrants (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012). Egypt too, besides going through a hard time domestically, on the political and economic fronts, has also faced immigration from Syria and from Libya in the past few years. In turn these latter two countries were previously recipients of Iraqi refugees and African migrants. We should thus interpret negative attitudes to diversity not just as value statements; but try to understand them through the specific contexts in which they are expressed.

Perhaps unexpectedly, family solidarity is a value around which there is convergence across the whole Euro-Med region. This value featured as number one both in the SEM (52%) and in Europe (60%) during the 2012 Poll. The second position went to: respect for other cultures in Europe, and to religious beliefs in the SEM. These findings do confirm the (predictable) importance of religion in SEM societies. Yet they simultaneously indicate, in line with the results analysed above regarding the role of religion there is not as dominant as one would expect. In addition, it is somewhat surprising to note that family values are appreciated in Europe more than in SEM countries.

Each round of surveys consistently shows that those countries that are more attached to religious values are less interested in respect for other cultures, and vice versa and diversity slightly decreases in importance in Europe as we move from 2009 to 2012 but simultaneously acquires more significance in the SEM. We note a considerable convergence across the Euro-Med region around key values and very sensitive topics. As we go from 2009 to 2012 we note a reduction of polarisations in terms of values among countries. Median figures begin to prevail instead of very high or very low peaks. The common importance attributed to family values by all the people of the Euro-Med suggests that basic and intimate human relations associated with kindness, solidarity, mutual care and respect count more in the region than ideological or theological positions. Overall we have observed that religious values are a hidden but central theme running through the lives and concerns of the people living in the Euro-Mediterranean space.

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Respect for Cultural Diversity on the Basis of Ethical Standards

Antoine MESSARRA

Diversity cannot be understood as a factor of wealth and prosperity unless it is associated with a humanistic culture that adopts the respect for human rights. Antoine Messara argues that raising awareness of the diversity across our communities and Mediterranean region should be complemented by the implications of its management within society. From this perspective, the author traces a roadmap based on the concepts of normativity, religious diversity, and immunisation against the exploitation of fear and security.

The best sample survey, with the most developed questionnaire requires multiple interpretations that sometimes go beyond the interpretation of numerical results and the crossing of data. In the second Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll on intercultural trends in the Euro-Mediterranean area (2012), there are complex notions of diversity, civic engagement, social connection and commitment to the values of friendship and democracy. In a world ravaged by the tyranny of the opinion, what people say and declare to think is not necessarily indicative of a thought, an actual behavior and a full awareness of a problem. Think, from the Latin etymology (pensare) is ponder, think, judge, with the highest level of clarity. The values of diversity and harmony between freedom and public order are deployed today in a world ruled by fear, fear of safety, security blackmail and manipulation of fear in various ways in the Euro –Mediterranean area.

Pluralism and Diversity, from the perspective of perception and management

The requirement of respect for cultural diversity reached a high and almost equal score for the entire Euro-Mediterranean area (84% in European countries and 82% in SEM countries). It is significant that this score is strongly associated with the requirement of freedom and rule of law (respectively: 75% and 79%). Indeed, a collective and several centuries long heritage of conviviality can be disrupted if fundamental rights are violated. This entails the avoidance of a purely culturalist approach to cultural and religious pluralism. The legal dimension of diversity shall include religious freedom, the exercise of worship, religious education, the management of cultural spaces. American, European, African and Arab constitutional jurisprudence is explicit on these issues to reconcile the practice of faith with the requirements of religious freedom and public order. It is also significant that family solidarity reaches a priority score of 60% in European countries and 52% in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region, which indicates the need to revitalise the social link, which is what makes a society. The requirement of ‘respect for other cultures in the transmission of values to future generations’ reached a higher score in Europe (51%) than in SEM (28%), which is explained by a tendency to closure on the self in the latter area. Religious beliefs is another element of differentiation between Europe and the SEM countries with only 18% of Europeans compared to 49% of the southern and eastern Mediterranean considering this a priority (reference to Chart 4.1).

Survey Question: In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I’d like to know which one of the following six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? Base: % of all respondents, of sum of ‘Most important’ and ‘Second most important’ by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).
Further differentiation is found about the belief in the existence of universal norms governing human and social relationships and social structures. Certainly, this kind of question is unambiguous, because universality and relativity are not opposed, but consequential having the universality of principles to cope with the relativity of implementing rules. For example, the universal principle of the separation of powers in democracy is absolute, otherwise the system becomes tyrannical, but the modality of application of the principle are multiple.

What does the bias on the issue of universality between European countries (only 26%) and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (53%) signify? Is the contribution of humanity, the great philosophers, international conventions on human rights, international jurisprudence ignored, forgotten, denied under the eventual pretext of ‘diversity’ and ‘respect of diversity’? Here we come to the heart of the problem of diversity and we need stop there (Chart 4.2), and to explore the related principles, rules, and standards.

What is different, from the Latin *diversus*, opposite, has several faces, several appearances. It is heterogeneous, disparate, multiple, mediocre, incoherent, in opposition... When does diversity become variety, richness, harmony? When you discover through diversity complementarity, upper and profound unity that ensures the harmony of the whole. In a tree, no-leaf is completely similar to another, by the size, shape, colour... What gives unity and harmony to this diversity, which appears at first sight chaotic, is the trunk that supports the tree, the sap that rises in the branches, soil, sun and other elements that feed together differently the whole tree. When we teach diversity, only to raise awareness about diversity without glimpsing through it that which gathers and unites, we help to understand certain religious and cultural phenomena but we do not bring people closer together. In the research and explanation of any form of diversity and of any unity, the sentence of Terence (Carthage, v. 190-159 av. J.-C.) must constantly inspire the work: ‘I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me’ (*Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto*).

### Between universal norms and diversity

The value of obedience, that reached a low score of 22% for Europeans and 26% for SEM, raises a concern. At least, we may arise many questions about the diversity of understanding of this concept through the translation of the questionnaire in several languages. Obedience can be interpreted as submission, but also as the respect of the rule, the norm and public order. The code, the norms, the benchmarks are a condition of the social link, of living together, of diversity as experienced and assumed, whether you are a believer, atheist, agnostic. Humanity, especially since the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the international charters of human rights, the international constitutional jurisprudence has developed a set of standards that are rather the fruit of experience, the requirements for living together in an organised society. We speak boldly about diversity, custom, specificity, dialogue, recognition of differences and other considerations in fashion. We should refer to practices that arise, such as in France where policy decisions are expected to manage diversity: the case of women burqa (full-face veil), of female circumcision for religious or customary considerations, surrogate mothers, the homosexual unions ... Are we in the realm of the all permitted, liberalisation without limitation, anarchy, Nihilism, the denial of the very social reality, of what makes society? When respondents answer that the peoples of different cultures should have the same rights and opportunities to participate in public life, with a score of 90% in Europe and 84% in SEM, does this contradict the low score on the universal principles? Can we believe in the existence of universal and shared legal rules without believing in the religious, moral and ethical basis of these rules? Respondents with realism...
and while considering that cultural and religious diversity is a factor of stability apprehend that diversity that could be a threat to social stability, with 48% in Europe and 46% for SEM. (Chart 4.3) Unlike a dominant perception of young people without a compass, without reference, but basically thirsty for meaning, they become easy prey to clever manipulators and deceivers that provide the loan to think and eat. What is being done, as a family, in schools, universities and in the Euro-Mediterranean area, to cultivate critical thinking, the spirit of freedom, but freedom governed by law and social cohesion, to say nothing about morality or spirituality that may provoke the challenge or surprise. We are accustomed to road traffic. But everything else? The speed of gradient of this descent into the hell of obscurantism, oratorical silences, cautions of the analysis and white writing have their first source in family education, school, university, media that have apprehended too much the tradition to rush unreservedly in a wild relativism. It is customary in university education and in prestigious universities in the world, to seek, analyze, criticize, to show intellectualism and learning. The time has come to have the audacity to think about questions of meaning, reference and purpose. When what was once called the ‘Humanities’ recede in school and university education, it is the ready-made intellectual that spreads the tyranny of opinion, intellectual and field terrorism. This is the trivialization of crime, of the attacks and the victims. It is the loss of the compass and landmarks that we live painfully. This is the age of manipulators who know how to fill the emptiness left by the bureaucrats of knowledge.

Democratic means primarily for respondents freedom in Europe and SEM, with a score of 46% and 49%. However, it is surprising that the rule of law is not seen as a priority, with a score of only 10% in Europe and 9% in the SEM. Also a decline is sensed in civic engagement. Joining social movements, political parties and support associations achieved an average total score 57% in Europe and 41% SEM. As for differentiation according to gender is not significant. The survey shows the increasing role of women in
society over the last five years and the growing perception of that role, especially in SEM (63% for current role and 66% for that role in 5 years from now). Democracy means primarily for respondents freedom in Europe and SEM, with a score of 46% and 49%. However, it is surprising that the rule of law is not seen as a priority, with a score of only 10% in Europe and 9% in the SEM. Also a decline is sensed in civic engagement. Joining social movements, political parties and support associations achieved an average total score 57% in Europe and 41% SEM. (Chart 4.4) As for differentiation according to gender is not significant. The survey shows the increasing role of women in society over the last five years and the growing perception of that role, especially in SEM (63% for current role and 66% for that role in 5 years from now).

**Universal principles of human rights**

We will focus on three issues that merit action in light of the Survey results and of the environment that explains the results. These are problems of normativity, religious diversity, and immunisation against the exploitation of fear and security.

Normativity: Diversity cannot be understood as a factor of wealth, harmony and prosperity unless it is associated with a humanistic culture that recognises and adopts the universal principles of human rights. The problem of universality and relativity deserves in the future more attention and to be understood through concrete practical cases.

Religious diversity beyond diversity: For the future there is a wide route to help religions find their soul (‘faith’ problem), to manage the public space where religion is expressed in the respect of liberties and public order (problem of ‘law’), and to understand politics both as a game of power and management of general interest (‘political’ problem). Christianity is undergoing today a de-christianisation without reference in the name of a secularism often misunderstood. Islam, for historical reasons, has not thought enough about the practices of faith in the common public and shared space. Judaism must be distinguished from his Zionism ideology. Faith, law, politics, are not distinct in the mental structures, facing a popular academic trend that spreads confusion among atheists, believers, unbelievers, clerical, ant clerical, secularist intellectuals and citizens, the clash of civilizations will be around the corner with a wild and unbridled manipulation of the sacred.

Fear, safety and manipulation: There is the recognition and respect for differences, but there is also - in political mobilisation - a strong prosperous market, that of the ideology of difference. What to do to better immunise against the ideologies of difference? The obsession with security, as a prerequisite for national and interstate peace has setbacks. You have to study and renounce techniques of manipulation, exploitation and safety blackmail and engage in opposition to manipulation techniques. How the conflict becomes controversial? The debate is often falsely about identity. The identity skin is often an exploited cover. We have to seek common space just to move forward on intercultural dialogue. Certainly we cannot detect intentions, but we can renounce the manifestations of bad faith.

Populations of so-called consolidated democracies are afraid. Afraid for their well-being, security and peace in everyday life, their democratic achievements, their rights to social benefits, the leisure and vacations. A state and interstate grouping terrorism manipulate fear and the lack of courage and of democratic involvement of people and of wealthy governments to expand and make of their neighboring states satellites and to generate overcautious democracies. Behind terrorism, that is the visible front, there is the blackmail to which more and more timid and frightened democracies submit to. The universality of human rights is threatened today despite all the achievements of civilization and globalization of justice and its normative jurisprudence, and this is mainly because of the extension of fanatism, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the identity folds of the spread of terrorism and cultural relativism propagated by supermarket values.

It is the academic and social actors’ task to focus more on the techniques of manipulation by governments and tyrannical interstate groups, authorities and contractors of security so that dialogue and mediation become more perceptive, lucid, focused and, therefore, more operational. To save the achievements of civilization requires courage. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his commencement address delivered at Harvard University in 1978 criticizes the Western world deploring its moral collapse, excessive industrialization, the mercantile bazaar, especially the regression of courage. After the Second World War Albert Camus said so presciently “Each generation doubtless feels doomed to remake the world. Mine yet knows it will not do it. But its task is perhaps greater. It is to prevent the world from coming undone.’ (Camus, 1957)

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Recent dramatic events in Ukraine support the assumption that the fundamental crisis of democracy we face cannot be defined and confined by the boundaries of the nation state and national politics. The nation state is no longer the exclusive unit of analysis or framework for civic participation. National governments are proving increasingly less capable of delivering on promises to national constituencies, and do not have the capacity to defend, protect or support their societies vis-a-vis uncontrolled global markets, environmental catastrophes, legal and illegal migration or organised international crime. As a consequence of this, people feel less and less safe in the world.

**Governance, globalisation and civic participation**

There is, therefore, much need for what is called regional and global governance. The weakness and ineffectiveness of international and global organisations is well known. The EU was seen as a model for regional governance up until it, too, came under pressure from severe and interdependent crises. Paradoxically, it has remained a magnet for outsiders, especially in its southern and eastern peripheries. The democratic promise of the EU is associated with a better life, a more just economy and society, with less corruption, where citizens can take part as active stakeholders in policy making for a brighter future. There is notable agreement, as evidenced in the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll, between European and SEM countries regarding the content and meaning of democracy: freedom, including freedom of speech and elections top the lists.

Another paradox is that while old and new national democracies face crises of confidence, legitimacy and capacity to deliver, there is an ongoing and increasing need for further democratisation and participation in different regions of the world, such as the Mediterranean, the Arab world, Eastern and Southern Europe. The mismatch between century-old legal and political frames and post-national, globalising local realities creates new social, political, cultural and religious tensions. Some of these tensions and conflicts, if they do not lead to violence, may provide the seeds for a new thinking about democracy and participation. Transgressing national boundaries, as many social movements or waves of migrants do, demanding similar rights and conditions of wellbeing, security and...
human dignity, signal unrestrained momentum for the regionalisation and globalisation of democracy and participation. These new orientations, demands and aspirations need institutional and instrumental responses, legitimation and recognition on the part of major players at all levels. Reality is always far ahead of existing rules, legal regulations and the bureaucratic imagination during periods of fundamental transformation.

Europe towards a bottom-up approach

A new consensus needs to be brokered through the confrontation and management of positive, concrete examples. The crisis of Ukraine can serve as such a progressive case if all of the major players (protestors and their opponents, political representatives, the EU, Russia and the US) understand their interdependent responsibilities to set up new rules and frames. What is clear and unique, in this immediate and striking example, is a new configuration and potential synergy for local, national, regional and global needs and aspirations for governance and civic participation (reference to Chart 5.1).

Social scientists – for good reasons - have been criticised for their failure to anticipate or foresee the fundamental economic, political and social upheavals of the past decades, or the outbreak of the global financial and debt crisis. Along with politicians and their experts, they were unprepared for the waves of democratic aspirations and spontaneous mass demonstrations for change of the past years from the Middle East via the US and Europe to Turkey and most recently Ukraine. The waves of protests and unrest across the regions of the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe or the emergence of ‘Occupy!’ movements in western countries did not fit the conventional mindset or analytical frameworks. Caught in the logic of ‘unlimited’capitalist development and the archaic nation state paradigm, social scientific analysis has remained largely confined and reduced to options within the boundaries of the nation state. What analysis does exist has not sufficiently addressed the relationship between globalisation and democracy, governance and globalisation, globalisation and civic participation.

The pervasive nature of new citizen activism inside and outside of Europe in a wide variety of environments necessitates more careful and complex consideration of new approaches, new frames and architectures of analysis. (Charts 5.2, 5.3) It may in fact mean addressing the last taboo that is democratic governance itself. The Austrian writer, Robert Menasse (Boesler, 2012), proposes that democracy in its present forms may no longer be the answer for Europe; that ‘the present crisis and the way it is being addressed touches on the last taboo of democracies which believe themselves to be enlightened. This taboo is democracy itself...Can it be that democracy as we have laboriously and inadequately learned it since 1945, and as we have become used to it, simply cannot function at the supranational level?’

It may be that Europe is redefining itself at its peripheries. Aspiring democracies, like the Ukraine, may be able to give new content to a notion of democracy that has become not just static and dysfunctional, but also corrosive and unresponsive, easily coopted and corrupted by economic interests. One European
observer to the Tunisian uprising proclaimed ‘If you want to see and feel what democracy is really like, go to Tunisia.’ Complacency, cynicism and often arrogance of the European core have not encouraged the successful engagement of citizens at the regional level. No one can explain or rectify the increasing gap between active citizenship at the grassroots level and lack of political agency.

As long as a pro-active demos is missing from European governance, citizens will not be able to affect the top-down, technocratic, closed, unresponsive and opaque policies and policy-making structures that are the EU today. There is a call for an institutional response to the protests and policies that have been the official response to the crisis in Europe. Since its foundation as an elite project of politicians and experts, the EU’s legitimacy has rested on output, not input, that is – democracy; and wider publics have not been afforded the opportunity to act either in defense of or in opposition to specific EU policies. This is because national political elites, who were supposed to provide the institutional channels for citizen input to policy, have systematically kept EU policies outside electoral politics (Schmitter, 2012).

Many, often contradictory, causes have been put forward for the recent events in Greece, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Turkey, and now in Ukraine and Bosnia: economic (unemployment and neo-liberal economic austerity measures), political (institutionalised corruption and failure of education), cultural or ideological. It is clear that European countries have unevenly experienced and suffered the impact of the crisis, and generally the tensions are building at European peripheries over different problems that have driven the activism (Pianta, 2013). The multitude and diversity of mobilisations seem to agree that the fundamental causes of the crisis lie in the neoliberal policies and practices of the past decades that became increasingly virulent and destructive to large portions of societies. They also lead to a sense of at least uncertainty, if not of hopelessness as populations and generations look towards the future.

**Civic movements as a wake-up call**

The most prominent reaction to street protests on the part of political and economic elites and in the mainstream media has been one of incomprehension (also contempt and suspicion) because the framing of what needs to be done and how to do it appears to be fragmented along national, thematic and ideological lines. This was and is a major criticism of the ‘Occupy!’ movements in Europe and the U.S. There is no one political center or organisation directing the insurrections, no single ideology motivating them, no overwhelming demand put forward. The persistent question, ‘What do they want?’ often leads to the conclusion that the events are not political because they cannot be integrated into existing analytical frameworks. What seems to unite the protesters is simply refusal: ‘No more, enough is enough.’ A stubborn negativity has characterised these insurrections. Is this a new type of politics after the decay of democracy? − Insurrection and righteous ‘indignation’ as a human immune system response to a failing system? When a biological system is jeopardized, the system begins to link more of itself to itself. This could be what we are seeing in emerging and expanding networks of protest, like ‘Occupy!’ and other global protest and democratic movements. In addition to the insurrection that results from economic injustice, political invisibility and disempowerment, unregulated capitalism is charged by these movements with creating wealth but not effectively distributing it and that it takes no account of what it cannot commodify, neither the social relationships of family and community nor the environment, which are vital to human wellbeing and survival, and indeed to the functioning of the market itself. There has been a surprisingly sustained character to the protests over time and an expansion of protests to unanticipated countries and regions that could signal a new impetus for civic participation and input in future debates on governance.

It is relevant that the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll supports the evidence that people in Europe and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEM) feel that joining social movements can effectively address problems in societies (20%, 13% respectively), although in SEM joining a political party is viewed as more effective. In Europe, where trust in traditional forms of democratic institutions and participation has significantly decreased, party affiliation is viewed as less effective. This is also expressed in Europe by the equal response (12%) for joining or supporting an NGO that is viewed as much less effective in SEM countries (2%). It may be that current events have led the SEM to lead in the belief that individual action can efficiently contribute to solving social problems (20%), but personal action is also important in the European context (17%) (Chart 5.4). Europe has received another wake-up call, or rather alarm, from its margins and not for the first time. European peripheries have been in motion for decades. The robust and unexpected outburst of Ukraine’s pro-Europe – pro-dignity revolution has significantly stirred up the apathetic and inward looking European political spectrum, forcing politicians and institutions to speak out and act in the name of democracy and solidarity. It is as if Europe’s heart has begun to beat faster and her disembodied soul is beginning to gain shape and substance in the present. One protestor at the Euro-Maidan, a young police officer and father of two young children, testified that ‘We want to build Europe here; we don’t want to go to Europe.’ Some are even calling the uprising the ‘East European Arab Spring’. Global transformation, in social terms, can be observed by the growing interdependence of local,
national and regional levels. The growing challenges of cross-border migration and demands for new structures for democratic participation and decision-making do not mean that the nation state has become irrelevant.

On the contrary, nation states have been given new significance in a complex structure of relations. As Guy Lachapelle (2013) stresses in the World Social Sciences Report, the reorganisation and restructuring of state power remains an eminent challenge. If states aspire to play a progressive role in global and regional transformations, they need to become more receptive to the social consequences and dimensions of globalisation. In other words, they need to redefine their role and find effective ways for new partnerships with representatives of multilevel governance and global markets, and with an engaged, active and empowered civil society.

**Survey question:** How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? **Base:** % of all respondents by region (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

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Nuances and Differences in the Meaning of Democracy and Citizenship

Larbi SADIKI

While democracy is principally associated with tolerance and respect for diversity, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is not perceived as a strong driver towards these values, in particular due to its institutional nature. Larbi Sadiki explores the differences in the understanding of democracy by citizens from the diverse areas of the Mediterranean. In this context, the author highlights positive trends in the position of women as actors of social change, and the acceptance of attitudes integral to citizenship learning.

Proposing an analysis of the quantification and measurement of issues concerning the appeal and perception of democracy and citizenship, equally elastic concepts that defy fixity of meaning and interpretation, is a challenging endeavour in the context spawned by the ‘Arab Spring’ which offers an arch of possibilities and attendant stirrings and openings (Sadiki, 2014). This is the tenor of this article, which is guided by a minimalist analytical agenda: assessing the reception and perception of democracy and citizenship in ‘Arab Spring’ states, with special reference to Southern Mediterranean states, very often lumped under the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) rubric.

Whilst aware of definitions of democracy that hesitate to pin it down to universally applicable norms and institutions or an idealistic template, the understanding of democracy here is simplified to stress the provenance of authority (who), the procedural mechanisms of forming government (how), and the norms and values to be pursued by a democratic government (why) (Huntington, 1991). Similarly, citizenship is defined here as the quality of belonging within an ‘imagined’ political community and the status of equality supposed to accrue from such membership and refer to political, civil and social aspects as in T. H. Marshall’s holistic interpretation (Marshall, 1950).

The attitude of tolerance

Contextualisation is vital for the sake of a credible exercise that unlocks ‘readings’ – which do not write off ‘mis-readings’ at a time of fluidity. It is therefore the binary quality in the figures at hand, in relation to the question of democracy and citizenship, which impresses most. The open-ended nature of the historical moment, the brevity of the time span along with the twists in the very élan, universally termed as the ‘Arab Spring’, now nearly three years in gestation, dictate against over-confidence in taking too much stock of the set of the Surveys conducted for the 2013 Anna Lindh Foundation Report, namely, in relation to democracy and citizenship.

Concomitantly, the figures enlighten and obfuscate, reveal and hide, and clarify and confuse. Indeed, a great deal has changed; and yet more needs to be transformed so that democracy and citizenship land on terra firma, especially in countries of the Southern rim of the Mediterranean where the Arab Spring’s uprisings ‘exploded’, unravelling hunger for ‘freedom’ (hurriyyah) and ‘dignity’ (karamah). The two notions were, across a vast geography stretching from Tunisia, the Arab Spring’s birthplace, to Syria, still mired in unabatedly tragic blood-letting over contested imaginaries of democracy and citizenship, reflective of wide-based idealisation of norms that can readily be associated with democracy and citizenship.

However, will these countries withstand the test of time and space when the next set of surveys is recorded in 2015? Or have they been tattered by the reverses of the Arab Spring itself? What shape is going to take the democratisation process in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia? What will be the impact of the Arab Spring on Euro-Arab relations? The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll registers similar perceptions among most of Europeans and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM) interviewees with an average of 40% believing it will have a positive impact, with a pick of optimism among Danes with 70.5% and 30% assessing it will have influence negatively future relations, with Belgians and Turkish among the most sceptical (39%), (Chart 6.1).

The Survey confirms one thing: the presence of various publics whose predilections for democracy and citizenship suggest nuance. The figures do not indicate solid majorities for any of the values measured. Indeed, there are majorities but by no means can they be taken as firmly behind anything in particular – with qualified exceptions as shall be pointed out below. The results are fraught with ambiguity and even weighed down by tensions in a fashion that point to extremely hesitant publics, torn between ascriptive attachments and cosmopolitan aspirations.
In this vein, what is one to read from respondents who highly value freedom and freedom of speech, given 48.5% and 36.6% in SEM countries, as readily available associations made with democracy (pertaining to what might be termed a cosmopolitan ethos that refuses determinacy as the basis for politics) yet at the same time believe in the existence of absolute guidelines with scores as high as 79.6% in Morocco, a country with extensive European links, and 50% in Turkey, with territory in Europe? The perception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ seems to be still underpinned by ascriptive moorings. In this regard, the contrast between the number of Europeans believing in the existence of absolute moral guidelines (25.5% for 2012) and SEM countries (52.5% for the same year) is put into sharp focus and it is significant the difference of six percentage points between the highest scoring European country Poland (38.3%) and Egypt (44.4%) with the lowest average among SEM. The opinion poll results in Egypt show a substantial shift with regard to this value, with a drop of 27 points since 2009 that it is worth flagging up especially in an area where change is often progressive and spans a long period of time.

Whilst on the score of the associations made with democracy, freedom and freedom of speech feature high in the responses by SEM countries’ respondents, other constitutive democratic traits do seem to be as impactful yet. Free elections, an important democratic institution, scores a mere 15.3%, the rule of law 8.8%, participation in political decisions 3.3% (incidentally the latter two are almost identical to European responses), recognition of diversity 6.5%, rule of the majority 2.5%, having a parliament where people are represented 0.7%, political accountability and separation of powers, equally integral to democratic institution-building, feature equally low in the respondents’ democratic priorities, close to 0%!

One dissonance with the above comes to the fore in respect to the strong agreement across both rims of the Mediterranean on cultural and religious diversity. This to an extent serves as a corrective to the aforementioned scores on values associated with democracy. Both European and SEM participants strongly agree on the need to ensure equal rights and opportunity within society to people from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds – respectively 59% and 48%. Similarly, they valorise cultural and religious diversity as conduits of prosperity – with the Poll registering strong agreement among 50% in SEM countries and 47% for their northern Mediterranean neighbours. There is however, hesitation as to whether cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to social stability. Taking into consideration the above mentioned variables, the data register a positive understanding of democracy – even if that is reduced to two predominant features: freedom and freedom of speech.

Women’s role as an indicator of democracy

Gender equality as an important norm instrumental to engendering equal citizenship and democratic identities gives additional clues as to the standing of democracy in the minds of European and SEM participants. Generally, the benefit of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in relation to gender equality for both sets of respondents seems to be more positive than negative; the lowest scores recorded in Poland 22% and Turkey 12.7%. An interpretation of Turkish results could be found in the uneven political process underpinning Turkish membership in the UfM. The scores in Albania (55%) and Morocco (53%) are close. So are those scored by the Irish participants (48%) and their SEM counterparts in Egypt (46%). Furthermore, considerations around the position of women in society constitute an important indicator on the pace of democracy within any given context and the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll shows a positive trend in the perception of both Europeans and SEM who...
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record a better role for women today compared to five years before (60%). Scores recording future expectations concerning women’s role in five years from the 2012 survey project an outcome of solid majorities, with 73% of Albanians, 89% of Moroccans, 75% of Turks, 63% of Tunisians and 48% of Egyptians affirmatively behind stronger role for women. These trends are in line with trends identified in Northern Mediterranean countries.

The scores on gender, across the board, drop when the data concerning the present and future situation of women in society are merged to obtain a result as close as possible to the foreseeable reality: a noticeable decrease in the exceptions on women’s role in society is found in the two leading Arab Spring countries, registering 30% in Egypt and 47% in Tunisia and a similar trend can be traced in Denmark scoring 35% and Germany with 32%. Expectations from the Union for the Mediterranean

On the whole, respondents from SEM countries moderately rate the benefits which will be definitely bought about by the UfM: this is the case when

Survey Question: When someone is referring using the word DEMOCRACY, what are the words that come to your mind (what do you think they are referring to)? 
Base: % of all respondents, % of mentions by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012).
considering the potential benefits with regards to the increase in the respect for cultural diversity (Egypt: 60.6%; Jordan: 60%; Morocco: 57%; Tunisia: 48%), the improvements for the environment (49%), the increased possibilities for young people (44%), the increase of individual freedom and the rule of law (39%). Still, it must be noted that the latter value is higher than in 2009 when an average of 37% was recorded and that the rule of law did not appear as a priority association to people’s mind when asked about the meaning of democracy but when coupled with freedom, a highly valued associate of democracy, the ratings went up. The highest benefit that SEM see in the UfM is in relation with innovation and entrepreneurship, ranging between 63% in Egypt, the highest percentage amongst SEM countries, and 19% in Turkey where in 2009 45% of respondents considered this a potential benefit. This might be self-explanatory since Turkey has already passed, with flying colours the learning curve of close association with the EU, and Turkish respondents indicate that their country is now quite capable of self-regeneration without heavy reliance on the Europeans.

Finally, when looking at the association that respondents in SEM countries make between the Mediterranean region and civic participation in democratic transition we realise that this is a reality only for 34% of SEM male and 29.1% of SEM female respondents, in line with Europeans’ responses. The figures are impressive for what they say and they do not say. In Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that up to 2012 when the survey was conducted, changed the face of the Arab region through their revolutions and were poised to join the ranks of fledgling democracies, only 40% of Egyptians and 25% of Tunisians associated the Mediterranean region with civic participation in the democratisation process. Even more worrying could be the percentages of people who said that this association was ‘somewhat’possible with respectively 29% and 56%. These results might be read as a questioning to the UfM leadership in the field of democratic transition. Whether this reflects the not too distant past when the EU might have been blamed, rightly or wrongly, for supporting authoritarian regimes or inertia as the US seemed to be taking the lead in democracy promotion is a moot point.

The scores discussed above depict a synoptic picture of a region still coming to grips not only with the Arab Spring – thought of fairly highly as a progenitor of positive change – but also, and more importantly, with the representations and values of democracy mainly associated to gender roles, equality of rights and opportunity, and freedom. What can be gleaned very generally from the above is that democracy in the minds of participants is not interpreted through institutional features (e.g. parliaments, rule of law, separation of power, etc.). Rather, it is expressed in attitudinal norms of tolerance, namely towards de-gendered societies and citizenship and toleration of diversity, culturally, religiously and politically. On this score alone, despite noted ascriptive attachments, SEM participants seem to be marching, slowly but surely, towards acceptance of attitudes integral to learning democracy and citizenship.

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Locally-Rooted Youth and Social Movements in the Southern Mediterranean

Aissa KHADRI

The social uprisings across the Arab region were to be anticipated, according to Aissa Khadri. Driven by youth, they emerged as a natural result of the state of the economy and labour market, which could not accommodate the large groups of highly qualified graduates with insufficient work opportunities and new needs of social emancipation. What characterises many of these movements, the author argues, is the way they are rooted locally, less ideological in their nature, and directed to the solution of specific issues.

Social movements that affected the southern countries of the Mediterranean did not appear as a thunderbolt in a serene sky. They are part of a long-term perspective with new social categories at the forefront of the scene which were ignored because of the failures of nationalist developmentalism. These social movements are driven by youth, who are the central part of these societies and have benefited since the independence from the growth, consolidation and diversification of the educational system, but who have not harvested fruit because of the weakness of their insertion in the labour market with certifications of no value. These movements reveal new modes of action, new practices and new representations that these social groups have developed in relation to their societies, authorities, to others and generally to the work, to the body and to the future. These new practices and representations based, for the majority of these young people, on feelings of exclusion, injustice, lack of recognition manifested in a more or less assertive and violent way in a context of inequality emphasised by the effect of structural economic crises and unstable adaptation of national economies to unequal globalisation.

Diversity in education and social media patterns

The expansion of schooling is to be credited to the public policies of post-colonial states but it has also led to non-mastered effects. These include the massification of education taking place in a context where social hierarchy impacts on recruitment and teaching processes, the ideologisation of content and methods of education, and the unstable economic and social systems themselves, with low productivity. In the public sphere, this contributed to the emergence of an increasing number of cohorts of unemployed graduates and people with low qualifications and widely indoctrinated. If these features can be, in a parallel development perspective identified for all southern countries of the Mediterranean, it is nevertheless important to note that this trend has grown asynchronously and its rhythms as well as its forms have varied from one country to another, which explains the different modes of entry of these social categories into the protests and the social movements.

We observe that the Algerian and even more the Libyan youth, in contrast to those of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, are more fragmented and less made aware during their academic path. Thus it is noted that contrary to countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt who knew pretty early the development of a high level private or semi-public education system open internationally which offered to middle class and upper working-class children an alternative to both public mass and asphyxiated education and to studying abroad which was becoming more and more inaccessible. Algeria came late, and with timid and indecisive attempts to deinstitutionalise universities in which student bodies are framed by clientelist unions. This did not allow the affirmation of young elites establishing new ways of social and political participation. At the same time, Libya remained closed to any interrelation with universities in the North Mediterranean.

Similarly, access to modern means of exchange and dissemination marks a difference between these countries. Algeria and Libya are more lagging behind in terms of access. Although the penetration of Facebook in Algeria has increased in recent years, it remains far behind that of its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia. The dynamism of the ‘20 February’ movement in Morocco is explained largely by the youth-led development of the Facebook network. This movement managed to mobilise on the same day across thirty cities in Morocco thousands of protesters through social media. Similarly in Egypt are the middle-class children educated in private universities and abroad who are leading the social movements. Certainly in Egypt, modern means of communication have played an important role in the mobilisation process. Bloggers like Tamer Mabrouk, Wael Abbas ‘Affendi’ social networks like ‘We are all Khaled Said’ have anticipated, raised awareness, participated and fed the protest movements. At the same time, Egyptian ‘breaks’ had their basis in the contradictions at the core of Egyptian
society which allowed the emergence of new actors, gathering through these new structures and responding to the contemporary logic of the new social dynamics.

Breaking with the ‘classic’ modes of protest and political action, through movements such as ‘Kifaya’ or the one of the Moroccan and Tunisian bloggers in the earlier days, these young people mobilised through modern means of communication, are largely disconnected from political affiliations and more pragmatic. They follow a variety of new opposition modalities closer to underlying social demands, focus more on the local, regional and national level and appear further and less interested in the global geopolitical and ideologically-driven issues which led the protests of their elders. This raises the question of articulation of these youth protests with the categories that may support and give them meaning to pass to a more qualitative level. The translation of the local into the national occurs in Tunisia and Egypt through the backing of the intelligentsia and those left out by the State. In Algeria and Libya these intelligencias remain largely stapled to the State, and the social movements have moved from the national to the local. As a matter of fact, the riots and social movements anticipatory of the 2011 winter events were mainly locally rooted and directed by more politicised vanguard as ATTAC Morocco in Sidi Ifni and a working-class lead at Rdeyef in Tunisia. Thus in Tunisia protests developed in connection to a labour movement locally rooted and not entirely delegitimised, and, in Morocco, the emergence of labour unions, influenced by migrants-related associative life, has allowed the sustainability of the grass-root opposition of parts of the working class and intellectual intelligentsia.

In Algeria, where the combined effect of the royalties, subservient unions, the weakness of associations, fractures between the social basis and a manipulated and partly appointed intelligentsia are sharper. Protests thus appear unbridled and since ’88, they take the form of riot, reactive demonstrations, not articulated in meaningful groups. This demonstrates a double blockage: blockage in the assertion in the political arena of a less ‘ideological’ and more ‘pragmatic’ youth, and blockage on the other hand in the process of individuation, where individuals are deprived of opportunities to give meaning to their social life, to build, to feel, to assert themselves, to be recognized as such.

Youth new practices, new representations, new commitments.

Actually, protests could take a qualitative leap only through the support of categories with high socio-cultural capital. If we put in perspective the importance of social networks, we can ultimately identify the causes and reasons for civic engagement in the modes of socialisation and the inclinations of the actors rather than in their often very publicised technical tools. It is thus important to return to the cultural matrix which plays a determining role in the social use of new media and communication technologies, and thereby relativise the role of the latter in the process of social change in the long-term. In this way, without getting carried away by what is falsely identified as a ‘democratic spring’, we can observe the low weight of these small active minorities, these swallows, and the small signs of hope that these
elites send.

Undoubtedly youth is not a homogeneous category and differences within it should be made: rural youth, those excluded from the education system, youth of the middle classes, young women and young men, unemployed youth, young students, young people who are active in the informal sector and those who create their own business. All these groups relate to different social environments. Yet they have a common generational mark, participating in the same generational moment and revealing something common in their relationship to the world and the future. They are part of the same generational time that breaks with the past, which is here defined as nationalism in its various forms, including national-developmentalist, Arab nationalism, Arab-Islamic, and Islamic nationalism. They carry and express new ways of relating to politics, to the increased impoverishment of large segments of societies, to criminality, and to the excesses of the financialisation of the world today, and they present other methods for citizen participation that are at odds with the ‘traditional’ ways of doing politics and of existing, which have availed so far.

Here we can state, without forcing history, that the death of Bouazizi was the founding event which translated the refusal and was the breaking point of a young generation, supported by modern communication and media means and through new practices codes and new rites, marching towards its emancipation from national affiliations, and finding a place in the world or for certain categories, in another space, the Edenic city to find here and now.

We are not talking anymore of students whose demonstrations developed on a political basis all throughout the decades of the sixties and the eighties. The youth of today are more pragmatic, less ideological, and more utilitarian. The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll shows that young people interviewed put forward the economic dimension as the most important dimension in Euro-Mediterranean relations, as well as innovation and entrepreneurship as activities and important aspects to develop internally and in the dealings with other countries (reference to Chart 7.1).

The economy and business appear to be the main themes that stimulate their interest and characterise their exchange. Pragmatic, they do not deny that conflicts are an important issue to consider but they are optimistic and think that the Euro-Mediterranean relations have somewhat improved. Open to the world and the others they give more prominence to women and they envisage a greater for them in the participation of the life of the city. We should consider that we are referring to categories and largely feminised movements in which young women assert themselves as actors in their own right (Chart 7.2). Young people are probably the most radical in their engagement in the public sphere and social networks since they put forward, as primary requirements, freedom of speech, the expression and realisation of elections free. Distant from the political parties, they prefer individual action as a guarantor of political commitment. Thus young people appear in collision with state nationalism. Belonging to their time and society, their references are no longer exclusively national, they dream of another space, they are in search of dignity for themselves and others, of finding a meaning to their lives, of building, of gaining recognition of facing

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Survey Question: Do you think that women in your society today play a greater role, the same, or lesser role than they did 5 years ago? Base: % of all respondents by socio-demographic; sby age group (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

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EUROMED INTERCULTURAL ANALYSIS

The Anna Lindh Report 2014

Authoritarianism, as free individuals (Chart 7.3).

The public space and social networking offer ways for a large part of young people to affirm and express freedom of expression through a choice of styles, from subversive humour, to provocation, denunciation and self-reporting as new forms of expression, which are at odds with traditional communication. We find examples such as the ‘Non-Fasters’, ‘Fataras’ or ‘Massayminch’, which call for breaking the fast during the day in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or the ‘public kiss’ as a reaction to the prohibitions and fatwas of traditionalists and fundamentalists, or the emergence of new issues related to the private sphere of sexuality (i.e. the Facebook page ‘ZAK’ of the Algerian homosexual or virtual gay pride in the Maghreb, or the phenomenon of ‘Harlem Sheke’in Egypt and Tunisia).

These are also ways that affirm the emergence of the individual hitherto standardised, excluded and grouped. These actions also mark the questioning of the relationship to authority as illustrated by the example of the young Amina in Tunisia. Under unstable circumstance, the ‘civic pact’ for the affirmation of youth and women as agents of change puts on top of the social struggles agenda those conditions that can give meaning to the requirements of freedom and participation: the status and role of the individual and his responsibility.

Aissa KADRI is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Maghreb Europe Institute at Paris University VIII.

Survey Question: In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only, I’d like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children? Base: % of all respondents, % of sum of ‘Most important’ and ‘Second most important’ by regions. (© ALF/Gallup Opinion Poll 2012).

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<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>Independence</td>
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<td>Obedience</td>
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<td>Curiosity</td>
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Chart 7.3

Most important values to respondents when bringing up their children by age group.
Humanity has developed significantly in the sphere of rights, justice and freedom, yet the issue of gender equality remains out of focus in the process of social modernisation. Mahasen Al Eman suggests that part of the problem is the type of image that women, and in particular Arab women, receive in the media. While the latest Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll results signify a positive trend in the perception of women’s current and future roles in Mediterranean society, the author argues that there is still much to be done.

The gender issue is central in the process of social renaissance and modernisation as it touches upon various aspects of civic life from the sphere of freedom, to development and participation in decision-making processes. In a context of scientific and technological progress characterised by a revolution in the field of media and information and by a climate dominated by the rise of human rights issues and concepts of justice, equality and freedom, we reflect: Have women benefited from this progress in terms of improving their status in the professional and social field? Or do societal conditions still cause qualitative inequalities between men and women?

Despite the recognition and protection of women’s rights and their equality with men by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the inclusion of Arab women’s development issues in the context of bilateral and international assistance agreements, such legislative covenants could remain a dead letter without a change in the current social and economic conditions which see practices of power and rigid traditions leading to discrimination. Perhaps the clearest example showing the extent of disparity between both sexes can be found in the media and media institutions.

The image of women in the media

Women’s image in the media does not reflect the progress they have reached at the Arab level and it does not reflect the cultural and social diversity experienced by women today. That image in some media – readable, audible or visible – is often distorted and in some cases completely erroneous, tending to focus excessively on negative stories. At the same time, there is potential: media could contribute to the achievement of comprehensive social development policies and address the change of prevailing concepts, traditional legacies and misconceptions about women and their role by working in collaboration with academics to raise society’s awareness of the role that women play for its progress, monitor the changes that have affected women recently and present relevant role models.

Statistical studies show that the percentage of business women is increasing in the Arab society, yet it is still small if compared to business men and producers. The media production field was for many years among the areas attracting the least interest of women until they acquired the literary and financial ability to carry out production, projects and movie financing, publishing house management and press on their own account. Despite the success of several production experiments in the visual, audible and readable media recently, these were only individual and distinctive experiments of women who were either famous or extremely wealthy or absolutely daring and willing to present a new, surprising and distinct intellectual and artistic work. Sometimes, female authors of TV series scripts do not get the direct credit on the final production and the failure or success is attributed to the whole production team. Having said that, we cannot deny the change of women’s image in the media and the increased awareness of the cause of women, not only at the official level but at the grass-roots level supported also by the work of non-governmental
Perspectives on women’s role in society

Women are one of the underlying sources of change and energy in the Arab countries and in the current geo-political context. The results of the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll mark a positive trend among population of the North and South Mediterranean shores in the perception of women’s current and future role in society over a five-year period (Charts 8.2, 8.3).

Results are here examined according to the gender and age distribution of respondents (people between 15 to 29 years old and people over 30 years of age). In answering the question whether people believe that the role of women in society today is the same, larger or smaller than five years ago, 59% of the European men said that women play a larger role, while 57% of the European women said the same. This was the opinion of 60% of the respondents aged 15 to 29 years old; while this was mentioned by 57% of the respondents aged 30 years old or older in Europe. 65% of men in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) region also said so, versus 61% of women; while this point of view was often mentioned by 63% of the respondents aged 15 to 29 years old versus 64% of the respondents aged 30 years old or older. It is noted that there are close percentages between population of the Northern and Southern Mediterranean; however, percentages are higher in the population of the SEM countries, regardless of their gender and age. This can be explained in light of the large progress achieved by women in SEM countries due to the rise of university education ratio among women and the rise of their political participation in parliament, parties and higher governmental positions, in addition to their increased contribution to economic development.

Looking at the responses of those who believe women’s role is the same as five years ago, we find that this is the opinion of 33% of European men and 35% of European women, of 60% of young Europeans and 34% of people over 30 years of age. In SEM countries, 22% of men said that women have still the same role versus 24% among women, and 25% of respondents aged 15 to 29 years old and 20% of older respondents. In answering the question whether women’s role today is lesser than five years ago, the percentage is lower among Northern Mediterranean population, as 6% of men mentioned so versus 7% of European women, 4% of respondents aged 15 to 29 years old and 7% of older respondents. However, 10% of men of the Southern Mediterranean population believed...
that the role of woman in their societies declined vs. 9% of women who said so and 9% of youth vs. 10% of over 30 years of age.

Looking to the future, nearly 58% of European men said that women will have a bigger role during the coming five years versus 54% of European women, while 34% of European men believed that the role of woman will not change during the coming five years versus 37% of women and 4% of men considered it will decline versus 5% of women. By age, 57% of Europeans from respondents aged 15 to 29 thought that women’s role will grow; in line with the view of Europeans aged 30 years or older, 37% of respondents aged 15 to 29 and 35% of older respondents consider it will stay the same, 3% of respondents aged 15 to 29 and 5% of respondents aged thirty years or older consider it will deteriorate. Of the same view 4% of European men versus 5% of women.

As for population of SEM countries, 67% of men thought women will have a bigger role in the society during the coming five years versus 66% of women who said so. By age, 66% of respondents aged 15 to 29 and 67% of respondents aged 30 or older believed so, while 17% of men thought that woman role will not change versus 19% of women. 10% of men believed that woman role will decline versus 6% of women. By age, 66% of respondents aged 15-29 thought that woman role in the society will grow during the coming five years, vs. 67% of respondents aged thirty years or older. However, 20% of respondents aged 15-29 thought that woman role will not change versus 16% of respondents aged thirty years or older, and 9% of respondents aged 15-29 believed it will decline vs. 7% of respondents aged thirty years or older. Overall, the future expectations concerning women’s role in the Euro-Mediterranean region during the coming five years are positive, particularly among SEM countries (Charts 8.4, 8.5).

**Hinders to Arab women march**

The obstacles in front of true equality do not only stem from the official ratification of international covenants, but from our own societies as well as deep historical, psychological and social leavings which still control our reality either consciously or unconsciously. Legislations governing the movement of our societies still stem from old frameworks and do not completely recognise women as a separate unit in many Arab countries, thus leading to gender gaps in the personal status, labor, retirement and social security laws as well as other laws. Besides, there is an invisible ceiling for the access of women to decision-making positions.

The limited number of effective and influential civil society organisations has had a negative impact on the woman emancipation movement. In an active civil society, women can find contexts framing their work and structures in which they can play their role first through training, then through the practice and then in leadership positions.
Furthermore, the traditional distribution of roles confines women to the house and men to public life and attitudes have not been modified in most Arab societies even if the economic life requirements, the family well-being, women’s education and awareness of their new roles call for a change. Arab women themselves have not identified yet a balance among their several roles since they consider that the family occupies the first place in the social structure and women are its mainstay and protector and in this way the guarantor of social stability while on the other hand they are haunted by the negative consequences on the family caused by women labour outside the house in previous years without the necessary legislative and support measures. Many educated women work while considering it as a temporary stage between study and marriage. This drives them away from true professionalism, seriousness, continuity and commitment. Besides, this impacts on their image as influential active partners who are equal to men in rights and duties, and thus casts a dark shadow on their acting as leaders in the decision-making positions and their existence as independent persons having rights, hopes and will.

**Jordanian women in focus**

The number of female lawyers registered in the syndicate increases significantly every year, and in 2002 it reached 886 members. In 1974, Jordanian women obtained the electoral and running rights for parliaments and, in 2003, for the first time in the history of the Jordanian parliamentary elections, six women were elected and were able to enact laws that would strengthen women current status. In 1983, they were granted to participate in municipal councils. As for the treatment of gender issues within political party programmes, despite the presence of spaces for women, these programmes reflect a conventional understanding of the women’s roles and most of them do not propose effective mechanisms to overcome the obstacles. Moreover, most of the parties do not focus in their political and media discourses on attracting and inviting women to join them with the same attention offered to men and they grant women marginal membership roles, linked to secondary affairs such as distributing leaflets, organising training courses and participating in sit-ins and marches. Female illiteracy has decreased from 48.2% in 1979 to 20.7% in 1994 but the rate is still much higher compared to males whose illiteracy rate in 1994 was only 7.5%. With the increase of female primary and higher education, a higher presence of women teaching university staff was registered. In terms of the concentration of female workers according to economic activities, the female workforce centers in the public administration and defense sectors followed by the industrial sector. Despite the rise in their overall contribution to economic activities this represents only around 7%.

Addressing gender issues in the Arab countries means paying full attention to women’s fundamental rights, reviewing school curricula in relation to the values they present, raising social awareness of men and women alike, and re-considering the administrative practices and traditional templates of work. This will enable women to carry out their multiple roles and achieve the balance required among them, to reform legislations that hinder the recognition of women as separate beings and their multi-faceted role, and to take advantage of the general international climate and its resulting studies and recommendations pushing forward gender issues.

**Mahasen AL EMAM** is Founder and Director of the Arab Women Media Center (AWMC) in Jordan.
Euro-Mediterranean Relations through Youth and Women’s Eyes

Eleonora INSALACO

Despite the challenges young people and women face in their societies, the latest Anna Lindh/Gallup polling exposes optimism to the future. Eleonora Insalaco presents regional analysis from the point of view of these two central groups, highlighting how youth dynamism and intercultural openness are supported by the importance attached to curiosity, independence, and cultural diversity. At the same time, the author tackles the diminishing confidence in traditional institutions to address social problems, in contrast to growing citizen participation.

Statistics can help overcome North-South and East-West divides across the Mediterranean and identify points of convergence and difference between social groups, whether students, women, or people with different kinds of occupation, level of education or religious affiliation, regardless of their geographical origin. Based on new data, and an analysis of emerging trends in the region, we are now in a position to reveal the views of young people and women on the prospects for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the future of its people and societies.

Sharp reality and positive outlook

Looking at the place that women and youth occupy in the professional and political sectors can help us setting the context of our analysis: on the southern shore of the Mediterranean female participation in the labour force, in 2011, was 20% while male was 72% (World Bank, 2012) and 46% in Europe in 2009 (UNECE, 2012), in Europe the salary gap between men and women for the same type of job is 17%, and 28% in the Middle East and North Africa, in Europe only 30% of women are in managerial positions while in Arab countries women have only recently begun to join the ranks of managers (Jmaali, Sidani, and Safieddine, 2005), and in 2012 only 14% of them were member of parliament, in Europe rates of women in politics are not much higher with only 23% of women in governments, in 2008, and 23% members of parliament, in 2010. The picture about youth employment is not rosier since, in 2012, the rate of unemployment was 27% in the Middle East and North Africa and of 21% in Europe (ILO, 2012) and because of the economic crisis between 2008 and 2011 the increase of youth unemployment in Europe jumped of 26% compared to the adult unemployment increase of 4%. The crisis also led to the increase of temporary and non-standard jobs and the dependence of youth on their families.

Despite this reality, when looking closer at the opinion of young people and women expressed when interviewed for the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll a more positive image takes shape. In fact, in 2012, a majority of young people and women consider that their personal life situation is either the same or has improved compared to the previous 5 years and are even more optimistic when

Chart 9.1  
Personal life evaluation by age group

Survey Question: Taking everything into consideration, what would you say, compared to 5 years ago your present life situation, is? And how do you expect it will change in 5 years?  
Base: % all respondents, % by socio-demographics (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
looking at the future, since around 65% of youth, both in Europe and in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM), and 66% of women in SEM countries believe their life will improve in the coming 5 years, only European women show a higher degree of scepticism with only 47% expecting an improvement of the situation and 17% even foreseeing a worse scenario. A majority of women and youth also assess that women’s role in society has already improved compared to the last years. This corresponds to the view of 54% of women in Europe and 66% in SEM countries, 57% of young Europeans and 66% of young people in SEM countries (reference to Chart 9.1).

The more positive view expressed by people in SEM rather than their European counterparts might be the outcome of the window of opportunities people felt since the beginning of 2011 with either the fall of long established political regimes or the beginning of constitutional revisions while Europe is living through a tough economic crisis.

Both women and young people reckon that relations between Europe and Arab countries will improve as a result of the so called Arab Spring such a positive outlook especially from the European side might originate from the new image which is spreading in the western world about Arab populations. 50% of youth and 41% of women in Europe and 45% of youth and 39% of women in SEM countries share this view, against and an average of 30% in both groups of respondents who think there will be negative consequences (Chart 9.2).

On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, people, young people, women since the beginning of 2011 went to the streets and called for freedom, respect for their dignity, better economic conditions for themselves and their children, and a fair political, judicial and social system. These social movements corresponded in time and typology to what was happening in Europe and other western countries and contributed to the understanding that people living on the two shores of the Mediterranean have much more in common than what distinguishes them. The strength of these movements managed to put in question the stereotyped image about Arab population which had been built up since September 2001 and the “War on Terror” and which homogenised people as diverse as Moroccans and Egyptian, Tunisian and Lebanese, doctors and engineers, women and men, youth workers and pensioners into one big block “A threat to be careful about”. Of course this statement constitutes also a generalisation of Western and European thinking but tries to expose a perception which has been quite wide spread and which the Arab uprisings have managed to shake.

Social movements on the rise

Women and students participating in the demonstrations have acquired more self-confidence and exercised a right of expression and social participation probably never experienced before and which will be a driving force for change within Arab and European societies. This might explain why on both shores of the Mediterranean women and young men show a certain level of disillusionment with the traditional ways of doing politics and a low level of trust in political parties as vehicles of social expression and development. They appear to trust first and foremost themselves and their individual action as a basis for positive social change: this is a belief for 21.4% of youth and around 18% of women in SEM countries (percentages raise for Arab youth to 30% when we do not include Turkey among SEM) and 17% in Europe, compared to 14% of youth and 16% of women in SEM countries relying on traditional political parties and
around 10% in Europe (Chart 9.3).

Besides their individual commitment to make their society a better place to live, young people and women confer their trust to emerging forms of participation such as social movements (for 12% of women and youth in SEM countries and 21% of youth and women in Europe) and NGOs (for 2% of women and youth in SEM countries and 10% of women and 16% of youth in Europe), and social media (for 6% of women and youth in SEM countries and 9% of women and 10% youth in Europe), (Chart 9.3). On the last point related to social media, it is worth mentioning however that in SEM countries it is the highest percentage of adults compared to young people who consider this a useful tool to bring about social improvement: a possible explanation could be found in the high use youth, especially in the Arab countries, made of facebook, twitter and mobile applications, to mobilise people in the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations, and as a source of mutual information, and that they became aware of its limitations and of the need to explore new ways of organisations to impact in the long term change of their societies.

Differences, however, can be noted at the country level with 18% of young Tunisians and 19% of young Jordanian considering this as a good trigger for social action and only 5% of young Egyptians agreeing. Also interesting comparisons could be made in relation to the belief in party politics that is the first form of participation for young Turks (32.2%) and quite high also among Danes (26.9%) who however rate very important also their individual action (34.8% of Danes compared to 0.6% of Turks registering the lowest rate among SEM). Young Polish are those who believe the most in NGOs as vectors for social change together with Spanish (30.4%), Irish (27.3%) and Germans (26.1%) while 15% of Tunisians, 16% of Moroccans, 11% of Jordanians attach more importance to the adherence to new social movements. According to recent studies (European Social Survey 2006, Eurobarometer 2007, Eurostat Report 2009) about young Europeans’ social engagement, political parties are a way of social participation for a very small number of people as compared to recreational groups or organisations, churches, religious associations and NGOs. Young Europeans also show a low level of interest in politics and little trust in political parties and politicians even though the level of trust has risen towards their national parliament and international institutions. It is worth noting at the European level also the relatively low

**Chart 9.3**

*Most efficient ways to contribute to solving problems - by age*

**Survey Question:** How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? Base: % of all respondents by age group.

Chart compiled by E. Insalaco using data from Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll (© Insalaco, Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
level of trust of women in traditional party politics (11%) and the higher belief in the potential of social movements (21%). This may be due to the relatively low number of women in politics and the bigger space of action women are now finding through non-traditionally-structured social action.

**Curiosity and openness to diversity as a basis for future cooperation**

The Euro-Mediterranean value map emerging from the Poll as well as the level of mutual interest among people from the two shores of the Mediterranean constitute a strong social basis for future cooperation around the region.

Besides the central importance recognised to the family (especially for 54.6% of women in SEM countries and 60.8% in Europe), young people and women identify respect for other cultures as the second most important value for Europeans and third for SEM. What is interesting to remark is that respect for other cultures has a slightly lower importance for European youth compared to adults and the other way round for SEM youth. This could reflect the fact that diversity is a reality in the lives of European youth who experience it since their early school stages and through the new technologies while older generations having fewer opportunities for intercultural encounter consider it an aspiration-driven value. On the other hand, SEM younger generations could be motivated by their awareness of the diversity in the region and within their societies and wish to see more social integration (86%). This view is consolidated by their largely positive response to the guarantee of equal rights to minority groups within society and the awareness that diversity is a source of prosperity for their society (86%); however, 48% of youth from SEM countries and 45% of European youth also consider that diversity might have a negative impact on the stability of society. The highest level of youth skepticism was registered in Germany 59%, Ireland 50% and Poland 48% Turkey 71%, Morocco 52%.

Youth dynamism and openness also emerges from the value they put on curiosity and independence and the high level of interest they have in news and information about countries on the other shore of the Mediterranean. Young Europeans expressed a major interest in the cultural life and lifestyle of SEM countries (84% in 2012 compared to 75% in 2009). This data is further supported by other studies (Eurostat, 2009) underlining young Europeans’ inclination to engage with foreign cultures mainly through foreign cuisine, reading foreign-language newspapers or books, watching foreign television or movies, making friends and travelling. Younger people in SEM countries show a higher relative interest than adults in all aspects of life in Europe ranging from its economy (70% in 2012 - 63,2% in 2009), to the political life (68,5% of youth), to culture (68% in 2012 - 62% in 2009) to religion (52,4% in 2012 - 47% in 2009).

Women emerge a bit more introverted since in comparison to men they show less cross cultural interest; however, their overall level of interest has increased between 2009 and 2012 (of 4% for SEM women towards European culture, 5% for religious trends and of 9% about the economy; while European women's interest in SEM cultural life and lifestyle has increased of 6%) . Compared to youth and men women are also less exposed to intercultural exchanges and this may expose an inverted correlation between these two dimensions.

The analysis reveals two social groups socially committed, optimistic about the future but pragmatic in their approach since they maintain a level of realism when assessing the challenges ahead and the current systems in place.

A final wake-up bell is addressed to the international and national communities because despite the relatively important numbers of individuals believing in the potential of social action a strident minority (~20%) thinks that there is nothing which could be done to improve their society neither at the institutional nor at the individual level and a majority shows an important lack of knowledge of others’ priorities.
The latest Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey reveals a growing appetite for better knowledge and understanding, brought on by exchange among the actors of the region. Claire Spencer analyses the Mediterranean as one coherent body, explaining how the southern ‘Arab Spring’ might have inspired the ‘indignados’ and other movements in Europe. The author also calls upon policy-makers to acknowledge that the time has come to end the top-down frameworks, which risk to continue being at distance from the citizens who they serve.

Opinion surveys are extremely useful for capturing a moment in time to confirm, or even confound, schematic images of public opinion seized in more tangential and circumstantial ways. What the 2012 Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll Survey reveals about the current state of Euro-Mediterranean intercultural trends is also of more immediate relevance to what comes next than its predecessor of 2009. Conducted after the events of 2011 in the latter half of 2012, this survey necessarily reflects a region, to the North and South of the Mediterranean, that is in a state of flux as well as open to new forms of self-expression.

This means that the views expressed are unlikely to remain static, representing instead an insight into the process of adjusting to new circumstances. They may also, in part, indicate longer-term trends. How the responses are interpreted, however, assumes that there is a common context within which the questions are posed and responded to. In reality, there are many more contexts now than in 2009 which objectively and subjectively shape the way people view the world around them. Whether this contributes to forming a shared vision of the Mediterranean remains in doubt; what it may do is enrich and diversify the debate about what matters to people in and beyond the Mediterranean space, and perhaps most importantly, why.

**Mobilisation across the region**

This Survey apart, not many examinations of what is now variously referred to as the Arab Awakenings or ‘Arab Spring’ have encapsulated the sub-regional, or trans-Mediterranean, effects of change and protest witnessed on both sides of the Mediterranean. The protest movement of ‘los indignados’ in Spain, for example, has more often been analysed in the context of the Eurozone crisis than as an offshoot of the protests that arose earlier across North Africa. Even if the focus of Europe’s protest movements have been primarily national, and only residually European in target when they spread among European countries affected by austerity and high levels of unemployment (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013),

the example set by events in Tunisia and Egypt from late December 2010 inspired the form that youth-led street protests took in Spain, Greece and beyond.

European protesters have also been focused as much on demands for political inclusion and participation as on the economic demands of whole populations excluded from the perceived financial self-interest of current political establishments (see Manifesto of ‘Movimiento 15’). While these demands and the challenges they highlight have yet to be fully met or resolved on either side of the Mediterranean, the idea that societies can act in new ways outside formal political structures is likely to inspire, and re-inspire, similar movements in coming years. Whether they take place within a more consciously defined Euro-Mediterranean space, however, remains to be determined.

The renewed debate about trans-Mediterranean migration, unleashed by the tragic death-toll of sub-Saharan migrants off the Italian island of Lampedusa in

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**Survey Question:** Thinking about SEM / European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their ... ? **Base:** % of all respondents ; % of sum of ‘Very interested’ and ‘Somewhat interested’ by regions © Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012.)
October 2013 (BBC news, 2013), suggests that existing obstacles to establishing more intensified links between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are likely to remain. Alternatively, and now that the problem of sub-Saharan migration has become a domestic as well as external challenge for transiting states, there may be new opportunities to build on the cooperation that has already been established, albeit only at an inter-governmental level so far to police and control illegal migration flows (i.e., RFI, 2014). What has been clearly recognised now is the need for more imaginative, and humane, ways of addressing the movements of people within and beyond the Mediterranean region.

In respect of the evolution of Euro-Mediterranean relations since 2011, the survey data certainly demonstrates that there is a growing appetite for mutual knowledge and understanding. This is in keeping with what might have been expected from a period in which the Mediterranean region has come under a fresh spotlight, given the youth-based and ‘new generational’ outlook of the region’s core protest movements. The 2012 polling data registers high levels of personal interest, including across generational divides, in receiving news and information about political and economic developments on the other side of the Mediterranean. (Chart 10.1) What this means in practice is hard to discern from the figures alone – which range from 88% interest in Germany to 62% (interest in economics) and 58% (interest in politics) in Egypt. It would require further qualitative analysis to ascertain whether this reflects a greater preoccupation with local developments in the case of Egypt, or whether other factors – including European anxiety about the consequences of developments in the southern Mediterranean - come into play.

Social changes and mutual perceptions

The Survey also confirms that positive images of the other have prevailed since 2010, and have even increased as information flows have expanded. The image of the Mediterranean as region of insecurity and turmoil is consistently lower in Europe and the southern Mediterranean (31% and 23% respectively) than the positive attributes accorded to the region of hospitality (50.5% overall) and a distinct way of life and food (56% overall).

Despite official European assurances from 2011 that South-North visa regimes would be reviewed in favour of greater mobility within Europe, the opportunity to interact directly with others remains skewed in favour of the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Europeans (41% overall) typically register most contacts through business and the tourist destinations of the southern Mediterranean, such as Morocco, which are reflected
in the higher numbers of Moroccans (57%) than other southern Mediterraneans (averaging 20%) to have interacted with their European counterparts (Chart 10.2, Chart 10.3).

Even though the image of the Other remains more positive than negative, assessments of whether the Mediterranean’s citizens are more engaged in democratic transitions than in resisting change remained evenly balanced on both sides of the Mediterranean. This perception may have changed since the removal of Egypt’s President Morsi from office in July 2013 and the setback to electoral politics might be seen in the context of setbacks which ought to be expected in long-term democratic transitions.

The disappointments of the ‘Arab Spring’ only gained real currency over the course of 2013, prompted by the ongoing instability in Libya, the Mali crisis from January 2013, swiftly followed by the In Amenas gas-plant attack in Algeria, and the wider tragedy of the Syrian conflict, all of which brought the threat of al-Qaeda-inspired jihadism back to the centre-stage of regional security concerns.

How these events have subsequently impacted on European images of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) societies and/or distinguished them from the dynamics which now appear to be governing developments in the Levant and Gulf further east would provide an interesting prism through which to gauge how synergies are changing within, as well as across, the Mediterranean region. The much feared fragmentation, or indeed intangibility, of the Mediterranean Basin as a framework for enhancing North-South cooperation might now, in fact, be better evaluated through its sub-regional alternatives, encompassing both littorals of the Mediterranean.

The most relevant polling data to explore in this respect are the mutual perceptions of Mediterranean societies in closest proximity to each other, such as Morocco, Spain and Portugal, where trade, investment and labour market links have been rising in recent years. More Spaniards consider the ‘Arab Spring’ to have had a positive (47%) than a negative effect (25%) on European-Arab relations, while 28% combined think it has had no impact, or gave no view on the issue. This suggests that sub-regional cooperation has been growing as much out of the economic crises on both sides of the Western Mediterranean prior to 2011 as from opportunities to identify new areas of common interest arising since the Arab Spring. The Straits of Gibraltar may remain closed to the free circulation of peoples for now, but proximity, as well as necessity, do not always translate into greater animosity or closure to the other despite prevailing cultural and socio-political differences.

**Chart 10.4 Ultimate effect of the ‘Arab Spring’ on the Euro-Arab relations**

Survey Question: Most of the Arab countries are experiencing significant changes started with social movements which have been called an ‘Arab Spring’. What do you think, will be the ultimate effects of these changes on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries? Will these changes be [...] Base: % of all respondents, by regions (© Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2013).

**Implication for the future of the UfM**

What this kind of development means in turn for the future of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is really a function of how well known and visible the impacts of its regional and project-led initiatives prove to be. The polling data only captures the potential for the UfM to increase respect for cultural diversity and innovation and entrepreneurship, which register positive scores (up to 85% support) on both sides of the Mediterranean; the realisation of these aspirations remains outside the scope of the questions posed (Chart 6). Even in Euro-Mediterranean policy-making circles, one received wisdom - which the latest generation of UfM officials and staff have worked hard to dispel - is that the UfM is a mere shadow of the ambitions espoused by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or ‘Barcelona process’) which preceded it from 1995. Like many inter-governmental processes and agencies, the UfM risks being at a distance from the citizens whose lives its various mandates – on regional energy, infrastructure and water cooperation, as well as youth and women’s employment and education – seek to improve. It is dependent on raising private sector backing as well as public funding for its initiatives and is likely to succeed only insofar as its importance is recognised by its key stakeholders as well as its target audiences. In troubled times, it is easy to overlook the importance of regional initiatives to galvanise new ways of stimulating cooperation; even where they are making progress – as in the UfM’s role joining up regional transport infrastructure such as the Trans-Maghreb Highway project across North Africa (UfM, 2012) – they only work if the local political and economic conditions permit and actors other than the UfM also engage in supporting them.
The total sum of efforts made by those now active on the Mediterranean arena, both virtual and tangible, are likely to be the best measure of whether the Mediterranean, as a region, has a future relevant to the peoples who live there or are just passing through. Most attempts in the past to create a template or vision for the Mediterranean have been swiftly disappointed by the lack of sustainable leadership to see such visions materialise and prevail. The plurality of the Mediterranean has always been one of its characteristics, woven through by the common virtues captured by the survey, of openness, hospitality and the joie de vie of its coastal lifestyles and cuisine. In an era when pluralism, inclusion, justice and mutual acceptance have been at the forefront of protest movements across the Mediterranean region, we may be nearing the end of top-down visions and frameworks designed by inter-governmental committees. If the alternatives play to the Mediterranean’s historical strengths of cultural and linguistic exchange and the gradual integration of diversity, then so much the better. The varying, and variable, results that emerge are more likely to meet the needs and aspirations of respondents actively shaping their own new contexts than a ‘one-size-fits-all’ umbrella or plan.

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TRENDS IN FOCUS
Youth Dynamism and Regional Exchange as a Priority for Egyptian Citizens

Dina AL KHAWAGA

The timing of the latest Anna Lindh/Gallup polling was of upmost significance for Egypt, with citizens living a particular moment of transition. Dina Al Khawaga exposes the interest that Egyptians show towards enhanced cooperation in the Euro-Med area as a source for dynamism and openness to the cultural diversity of the region. At the same time, the author highlights how people exhausted by a prolonged climate of change have reverted to certain values such as the family as a space for stability.

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll conducted in 2012 among Egyptians about their perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean space provides valuable data about the common representations concerning the national and regional issues of Europeans as near and distant others. The year 2012, after the advent of what has been called for ease or Euro-centrism ‘Arab Spring’, in reference to the spring of ‘1848 people’, is particularly relevant as an in-between year, both in relation to time and to policy changes. It is a period which saw the first parliamentary and presidential elections, laying the basis – even if it was only in the rhetoric – for a new democratically and freely elected political regime. On another level, it was also a ‘moderate’ year compared to the preceding one which was more colourful, if not to say euphoric, with all the hopes and enthusiasm that it sparked, as opposed to the following year which was more pessimistic, blurred and marked by multiple conflicts.

2012 as an ‘in-between year’

It is in this context that the citizen - which is the focus of our investigation - is found. As all the circumstances appear precarious, he prefers to hide in calm waters. This tendency is supported by the central emphasis on family solidarity (+12 points, compared to the 2009 Survey), (Chart 11.1). This retreat to the organic links, which can seem unexpected in the context of national and regional mobilisation, is symbolic of marking a distance from the immediate political scene. This interest in the family is therefore quite significant because it illustrates how any public space feels fluid and uncertain, polarised and fragile, if not corrupted by various internal and external levels of manipulation. One could not yet speak of environmental alarmism as the interviewed continue to find that their country occupies a central place in the Euro-Mediterranean region (+7 points than in 2009) and it continues to be a nice place to live in, even more than the rest of the southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. It remains to be seen whether this voice is individual, representative of national or social trends. The general framework of the asked questions addressed at the same time the two components of the interviewees’ identity.

According to the answers provided by Egyptian respondents, the Euro-Med area appears benevolent, with interest in the future of the SEM countries, including Egypt. The answers gathered also reflect a net increase in professional exchanges, even though tourism continues to struggle in Egypt as everywhere else in North Africa during the last years. These types of exchanges are more concrete by nature, far from the mutual stereotypes or the enunciation of otherness (13 points more for professional exchanges and 3 points less for communication through the internet compared to the 2009 Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey), (Charts 11.2, 11.3).
This backdrop, which illustrates the growing reciprocal interest of the peoples of the two shores of the Mediterranean, is reaffirmed by an additional series of answers on values. 17 additional points, in comparison with the previous 2009 Survey, are awarded by Egyptians to the tolerance of the European socialisation of their children (Chart 11.4). The constant worry of rejection or racism, which the Arab press denounces all day long, disappears and gives way to the expression of shared values. On the other hand, we can observe a society that found the meaning of politics and that is discovering the virtues of revolt and of change. The net drop in the valorisation of obedience as the central value of socialisation in the Egyptian and European families is a perfect illustration: 19 points less compared to 2009.

Exchanges with Europe as a gain for youth

It is also a society which wants to be practical and rational. The attention granted to the potential common objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean space, where youth dynamism and entrepreneurship are among the priority themes, would appear to affirm this trend to openness and exchanges among the Egyptian citizens, and does not reveal identity bitterness or political denunciation of the former colonisers. At the same time, an ‘idealisation’ of Europe is not in evidence. It is rather the voice of practical reason and hope to consolidate the beneficial economic exchanges between both poles.

This positive and detached perception of identity or religious otherness is particularly pronounced through the replies regarding the interests of the interviewees to closely follow the European economic context (62% in 2012 compared to 54% in 2009), with 53% of those who lingered on the European culture and lifestyles and only 34% who appear interested in knowing information about the beliefs and religious practices. The Euro-Mediterranean area is first and foremost a space of economic exchange and for learning new skills necessary for future generations.

Due to the above mentioned areas of interest, Europe does not appear as a space which arouses the cultural or religious curiosity. This political realism and this serene outlook to the cultural and religious diversity that characterises the Euro-Mediterranean area is sustained in the responses concerning the potential benefits that Egypt could gain from this regional space. The ecological challenges come on top of the list, followed by dynamism for the new generations and the spirit of entrepreneurship, advancement of common interests related to tolerance, freedoms, the rule of law and gender equality. In other words, the classic themes of otherness come only after issues promoting interaction, innovation and openness.

Survey Question: In the last 12 months have you personally talked to or met with any person (or persons) from European countries? Base: % of all respondents (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Survey Question: If yes, how did you meet or talk to that person? Base: % of those who talked to or met with persons from European countries (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
to go much further than the analysis of structured and formal policies. It is in this perspective that policy will be debated in the coming years and decades.

The displayed results are especially positive having in mind that they were gathered during the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, noting that the arrival of the so-called ‘Islamists’ to power did not affect the rational and logical outlook towards the Euro-Mediterranean space as an area of action and interaction. Several explanations are plausible in this regard. The arrival to power of the most important component of the political Islam comforted Egyptians in their relation to the religious factor and therefore to otherness; the advent of the revolts - throughout the Arab countries - fostered a sense of proximity and similarity to the peoples of Europe, who had emerged themselves from a long democratic transition with the Central and Eastern European countries; the year 2012 was an in-between year and maybe answers in 2014 would be different; or finally that consultations carried out with the lay people, and not with targeted officials, remain an inexhaustible source of optimism and complexity as the Survey analysed here shows.

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Inside the German Experience of Cultural Pluralism

Caroline ROBERTSON-VON TROTHA

Policies for cultural pluralism are relatively recent in Germany, despite the fact that the waves of migrants are long-standing. The author explains how the attitude of citizens to cultural diversity varies between the different regions of the country due to the different levels of exposure to groups with migrant backgrounds. While the Anna Lindh/Gallup polling shows respondents' scepticism towards diversity in relation to social instability, there is a definite support for the equality of rights to all minorities in the country.

Perceptions of the Mediterranean region in Germany should be discussed taking the changing attitudes and roles of the state and society towards cultural pluralism into account. Further framework conditions include the engagement of civil society within the so-called Partizipative Wende (participatory turn), economic development and lifestyle in an aging society, media reportage and general attitudes towards cultural diversity. Perceptions also differ according to local neighbourhoods, multicultural encounters, involvement in local projects, the federal structure and in particular remaining divergences between east and west.

Major challenges of cultural pluralism in perspective

In Germany, major changes in the migration strategy are fairly recent as a short historical reflection shows. In the 1982 coalition contract between CDU / CSU and the liberal FDP, 27 years after Germany signed the first labour agreement with Italy, it was stated by the governing parties that ‘the Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country. For that reason, all humanitarianly acceptable measures are to be taken to prevent the immigration of foreigners’ (Depesche, 1982). Immigration of families with German descent from eastern European countries and from the former Soviet Union was at its highest at the end of the eighties. This highlighted severe differences in inclusionary measures since migrants with German descent, the so-called Aussiedler were given immediate full political rights of citizenship and comprehensive support from the communal authorities including free language courses, while second generation migrants from non-EU countries still had to apply for the right of residence when they became sixteen, a law which was changed in 1990 when Wolfgang Schäuble as Minister of Home Affairs, introduced first reforms with further changes following over past years. The present status of immigration and citizenship law however remains restrictive.

Studies (Kalb, 2010) show that half of the largest group of migrants in Germany – the Turkish community – migrated as a consequence of the family reunification laws and as a reaction to the ‘migration-stop’ of 1973. This illustrates the unintended and discriminatory effects of political practice (Robertson-von Trotha, 2011). The lack of a ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor, 1994), in particular with reference to the contribution of migrants of the first generation to the economic recovery of Germany in the postwar phase and of a clear formulation of active integration policies contributed to the development of emotionalized extremist views both within the host country and, at a later stage, within migrant groups. More importantly, within a broader and general societal context, a discourse on cultural pluralism on the basis of human rights was marginal.

Levels of awareness and active efforts to develop and support inclusionary politics of cultural pluralism have however increased substantially over the past years. In many regions, especially in the South and the South-West of Germany, in the Ruhr and in the large metropolitan areas, social contacts with persons with migrational backgrounds or experience has increasingly become the norm and it would therefore appear that the contact-thesis reinforces positive effects on attitudes over time (Robertson-von Trotha, 2010). A recent comparative study verifies the gap between Western and Eastern Germany with regard to prejudices and Islamophobia (Yendell, 2013). It concludes that Germany as a whole is more skeptical towards Islam than France or the UK. Language, cultural barriers and lack of social contacts are identified as negative promoters. This also reflects the fact that only 2% of the Muslim population lives in the five East German states (Haug, Müssig, Stichs, 2009) and supports the need for continued efforts to organize informal and formal spaces of social contact both at the institutional and civil societal levels. Substantial and important shifts of opinion can be identified over the past 15 years. In 1999 the German Bundestag formally recognised the Status of Einwanderungsland (Robertson-Wensauer, 2000); at the communal level, many cities have developed integration strategies, integration issues are amongst the most important topics.
on the agenda of the Deutsche Städtetag, ministries at the state level have developed policies (The National Integration Plan, 2007) and also ministries for integration have been initiated in several states; sport associations support active concepts of inclusion and central events such as the Football World Cup held in Germany 2006 encouraged the visibility of international hospitality and intercultural tolerance (Merx, 2006). Important new institutions to further support integration at all levels were introduced and at the end of 2008 renowned foundations launched the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration to give research-based practical recommendations. (Chart 12.1)

Simultaneously the development of small extremist groups and the potential of populist sentiment in the midst of society cannot be overseen (Robertson-von Trotha, 2012). The relationships between intolerant extremist views and politically motivated right-wing crime and violence are complex and led to the underestimation of the rising threat. The failure of police and state institutions which first uncovered the neo-Nazi terror group National Socialist Underground (NSU) in 2011, genuinely shocked the public; its origins and activities go back to the 1990s in East Germany and culminated in the trio responsible for a series of murders mostly of Turkish migrants between 2000 and 2006. The effects on the population with a Turkish migrant background show a loss of trust in the German state although a majority of 78% does not attribute the murder series to a more general German societal context. Only 7% hold this to be the case (Koordinationsrat der Muslime, 2012).

The growing Salafi movement in Germany causes imminent problems as its rules and demands are in many cases contradictory to human rights and the law of constitutional democracy. With its action distributing free copies of the Quran in a German translation, it came into the public eye. In a representative study of Turkish migrants almost two thirds of the group of over 50 years old – many belonging to the first migration generation - clearly do not support the Salafist action. In contrast 20% of the 15 – 29 year olds find it ‘very good’and 43% find it ‘rather good’and many are also willing to financially support it (Umfrageinstituts Info GmbH, 2012).

Further underestimated challenges to cultural diversity and the constitutional state include the development of organized crime and mafia. Both the uncovered realities of this problem and undifferentiated public attributions to migrant circles have a strong potential for the exploitation of negative populist impacts on attitudes towards migrants (Spiegel Online, 2012).

Perception of diversity in the Anna Lindh Survey

It is within this complex and dynamic background that the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012 must be analyzed. The response to some questions show noticeable or even significant changes in comparison to the survey in 2009.

Present perceptions of diversity in the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll are similarly ambivalent as in the already mentioned sociological surveys on cultural pluralism. On the one hand a majority of respondents are skeptical with regard to diversity: 61% agree with the statement ‘cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society’ and can be positively interpreted as recognition of the challenges involved. Negatively however the effects of polarization processes have to be taken seriously. On the other hand there is a very high consensus on the issue of equal rights. 88% of respondents agree that equality before the law applies to everyone independently of their cultural, political or religious affiliations (Chart 12.1). This commitment is also obvious in the placement of the statement, that ‘respect for other cultures’ is the second most important value (35 %) to be taken account of in the upbringing of children. In comparison to 2009 (54%) the percentage has however diminished and this cannot easily be accounted for.

Asked which set of ideas and images characterize different people in the Mediterranean region, the categories common cultural heritage and history (91% in 2012 and 87% in 2009), resistance to change (90% in 2009 and79% in 2012) and source of conflict (86% in 2012 and 83% in 2009) all show an increase in the percentage of respondents agreeing strongly or somewhat with these categories (Chart 12.2) Whereas resistance to change is ambivalent and can reflect a positive relationship to a common cultural heritage it can also be interpreted as the perception of more deep-rooted opposition to cultural change and political institutional transformation.

Supplementary questions included in the 2012 Anna Lindh Survey support this interpretation: with 92% civic
participation in democratic transition was widely seen to be an important characteristic of current processes of change in the Mediterranean region. Simultaneously, 88% of respondents agreed that turmoil and insecurity characterise present conditions of instability and this applies to the European countries. The most often named countries which, according to the survey come to mind when asked about the Mediterranean region, are Italy (61%), Greece (51%) and Spain (42%), (Chart 12.3).

Within this regional context there has been considerable media coverage on economic instability, high unemployment, most especially with youth unemployment reaching up to over 50% in Spain, and political protest due to the financial crises in the Euro Zone. France (35%) is named in fourth place and this can be explained by the German/French friendship and mutual responsibility for the future development of the European Union due both to their geopolitical centrality and particularly in the German case – their role as economic motor. A further cultural aspect in German/French relations is their historical role in the aftermath of two World Wars and the ensuing political importance of European integration.

In this respect, the SVR migration barometer 2013 in which 2,200 respondents were questioned on their attitudes to Europe and on mobility within the EU Freizügigkeit, a robust identification with Europe was prevalent. An interesting aspect of the results is that there is almost no difference in attitude according to migration background: 54.2% with and 54.7% without migration experience defined themselves as ‘strong’Europeans.

The higher the educational level, the higher the European identification is. The strong economic position and low unemployment levels in many German regions may also be a reflection of more than 70% agreement that unemployed persons from within the EU area should be accorded social benefits if they are unemployed. This also applies to the non-EU Turkish population, with 1,575,717 (2012) the largest migrant group in Germany. A further conditioning aspect is the increasing recognition that demographic development in Germany is clearly leading to an aging society. From this angle, younger and larger migrant families are welcomed as a guarantee for future development and well-being and German industry has initiated campaigning and training programmes to actively encourage new migration with particular emphasis on the southern EU countries. This puts questions of migration and integration at a functional-pragmatic level back onto the political agenda but also leads to new challenges and further debate. It is important to ensure that the mistakes of the earlier
guest-worker era are not repeated.

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Polls show an increased personal interest in cultural life and lifestyle (90% in 2012 and 84% in 2009), economic conditions (88% in 2012 and 71% in 2009) and in religious beliefs and practices in the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (Chart 12.4). This can be seen as a positive indicator of the - albeit slow - normalisation of cultural pluralism within German civil society.

While diversity mainstreaming is still in many areas not a recognised goal of action, important steps in this direction have been taken. Mediterranean lifestyle is popular and will support the general trend toward the recognition of the beneficial effects of cultural diversity. A further conditioning aspect is the positive role of younger and larger migrant families, now welcomed as a guarantee for future development and well-being of German industry in an increasingly aging society. With the simultaneous effects of ‘old’ and ‘new’ migration, Germany remains a country reflecting the ongoing impacts of multiculturalism and interculturalism. Within a changing society with its complex dynamics of inter- and transcultural contexts, adequate models of inclusionary politics within an overall strategy of human-rights rooted cultural pluralism require to be further developed.

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The Interest of Moroccans toward their Euro-Med Neighbours

Fadma AIT MOUS

In analysing the trend variations between the previous and most recent Anna Lindh/Gallup polling, Fadma Ait Mous tackles the hopes and perspectives of Moroccan citizens about the coming years, and their perceptions towards their European and Southern Mediterranean neighbours. The author highlights the expectations of Moroccans towards the Union for the Mediterranean process, as well as the emergence of a renewed level of Euro-Med engagement principally as the result of new migratory trends in the region.

As part of the 2014 edition of the Anna Lindh Report, this text presents a comparative analysis of the results of the two waves of the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll carried out in Morocco in 2009 and 2012, with a underlying common question: ‘Do the ruptures/convergences in the region have an impact on relations between societies and within in the region?’

The Poll enquiry is centered on a set of issues classified into four main areas: identification and perception of the Mediterranean, importance of mutual learning, interactions in the region and finally perceptions about values. This paper describes the evolution of the results of Moroccans surveyed in 2009 and 2012 in relation to these issues and attempts, to the extent possible and with the limitations of the method used, to interpret the stagnations and developments.

Perceptions of the Mediterranean region: identification, characteristics and uses

With respect to the issue of countries linked to the Mediterranean, the responses of Moroccans in 2012 confirm the 2009 results. Asked about the countries that come to mind when thinking about this region, Moroccans respondents identify Spain (81%) and Morocco (80%) clearly in first place as countries of the region. In 2009, they identified their neighbors in the Maghreb in the third and fourth position, while in 2012, even if Algeria was again identified on third position (61%), Tunisia ranked only in fifth position (57%). Italy is identified in fourth position (47%) and France in sixth position (39%). Always at the end, the two least cited countries, less associated in the minds of the Moroccans surveyed as part of the region are Turkey and Greece - despite the current cultural and tourist attraction of Turkey among Moroccans (IEMed, 2013). Knowledge of the Mediterranean by Moroccans respondents appears to be related more to the geographical proximity to Spain, and the Maghreb neighbors, Algeria and Tunisia, than to countries such as Egypt, Turkey and Greece.

In general, respondents maintain a good image of the region: and associate it with hospitality (86% in 2009 and 89% in 2012), history and common cultural heritage (88% in 2009 and 89% in 2012). To these positive features is to be added also the ‘Mediterranean lifestyle and gastronomy’ which is still widely cited with a net increase in 2012 (81% from 72% in 2009).

Despite highlighting these positive values, which are also at the core of the collective image about neighboring countries, the Mediterranean is also referred to as an ‘unsettling’ area. The countries bordering the southern Mediterranean shore experienced a turbulent year in 2011 in terms of regime change (Tunisia, Egypt, etc.) and constitutional changes (Morocco), as a consequence Moroccan respondents seem wary facing these evolutions and disillusioned about their impact as they insist on resistance to change as an important feature.
of the Mediterranean with a sharp increase since 2009 (from 72% to 81% in 2012).

The other feature, negative if we can say, is to perceive the region as a source of conflict. The mention of this trait has increased significantly since 2009 (from 69% to 81% in 2012).

Wide expectations vis-a-vis the Union for the Mediterranean

When asked about the contribution to their country of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), still in an embryonic state, the Polled Moroccan expressed broad expectations both in the socio-economic, cultural and political field. Thus, they consider that the UfM will inspire more energising aspects for their society at the cultural level for increase respect for cultural diversity and commitment to spiritual and moral values; at the socio-economic level in terms of social solidarity, innovation, entrepreneurship, concern for the environment, dynamism of youth; finally, at the political level, for greater freedom (individual, gender equality, consolidation of the rule of law). These high expectations are prioritized as follows: respect for cultural diversity comes first (93%) with a slight increase over the 2009 results (87%); social solidarity which is cited by 92% (89% in 2009) and innovation and entrepreneurship (with almost the same percentage in the two waves: 92% in 2012 and 93% in 2009). Thus, Moroccan citizens think that the UfM will contribute to make their economy more innovative and dynamic.

The expectation which seems a little shifted with respect to the dynamics of social movements that took place in Morocco, particularly in late 2010 and all 2011 (examples of unemployed graduates, ‘20 February movement’) is linked to youthful dynamism. Moroccan respondents consider that the UfM will have positive effects on youthful dynamism in their society (90% in 2012 and 86% in 2009). Expectations related to freedoms and to the rule of law are cited in 2012 (90%) with a same percentage as concern for the environment, marking an increase of 4% since 2009 (86%). The attachment to spiritual and moral values also had an increase of 3% (89%) compared to 2009 (85%) reflecting Moroccans expectations towards the UfM also in relation to these values. Finally, another variable related to the realm of freedom, is the expectation for gender equality which remained at the same level (88%) since 2009.

The interest and attraction of Europe

The most significant change: Europe is identified as the first place to start a new life. Moroccans have identified this destination with a sharp increase in 2012 (45% compared to only 19% in 2009); while destinations in other SEM countries seem not to interest Moroccans as much as they did in 2009 (from 68% in 2009 to 45% in 2012). In various studies on the perceptions of Moroccans, the attraction to Europe always dominates. If it has decreased somewhat during the ‘economic crisis’ with the issue of ‘return of immigrants,’ from the Poll results it would appear that Moroccans return to their first choice attractive destination. The remaining destinations (America, Golf, Asia, Africa etc.) do not seem as interesting to Moroccan citizens. Thus, America that was preferred in 2009 by 8% of respondents, decreased in 2012 to only 6%. Gulf countries have gained 3% since 2009 (from 2% to 5%). Moroccans are interested in news about European countries since they represent their first ideal destination to rebuild a new life. The clear change since 2009 concerns the interest in the religious and economic aspects. Thus, the level of interest in information related to religious beliefs and practices has evolved significantly of 16% from 46% in 2009 to 62% in 2012. Similarly, interest in economic conditions has also increased by 14% from 60% in 2009 to 84% in 2012. Finally, the interest in the Europeans’ lifestyle and cultural life saw an increase from 70% in 2009 to 82% in 2012. This interest reflects the information needs about countries to potentially build a new life in. This is why the cited religious, economic and cultural aspects seem more
interested in the extent that these are the areas that usually cause problems (integration and others) once in Europe. On the other hand, political information does not appear, according to these results, as a priority interest.

**Process of Interactions in the EuroMed region**

According to the 2012 Poll, Moroccan respondents claimed to have interacted extensively with people from Europe (57%), a clear evolution compared to the 2009 Poll (38%). On the other hand, their answers about the ways and places of interaction do not seem to give us clear and decided results. Indeed, the choice of 27% of respondents in 2012 (against 3% in 2009) for the ‘others’ options in their response does not help in the identification of the methods and space of these exchanges. The only type of interaction that clearly evolved is within the same neighborhood: from 10% in 2009, it increased to 21% in 2012. This result is significant insofar as it provides information on important sociological evolution, namely the Europeans settlement in Morocco, going from the profile of expatriation to the one of emigration.

Beyond gentrification processes of old medinas and riads purchased by retired Europeans, and associated more to the ‘neocolonial’ profile, it is currently the profile of the ‘middle class migrant’ and ‘illegal’ migrant that is visible in the so-called ‘popular’ neighborhoods of several Moroccan cities (Tangiers, Casablanca, Marrakech, Essaouira, etc.). This visibility in these areas makes the interaction possible and identifiable by Moroccan respondents.

We can take as an example the emigration of Spaniards to Morocco, driven by the economic crisis and the high unemployment rate that increased by 32% between 2008 and 2012 (Tchounand, 2013). According to the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (SNI), the number of Spaniards officially registered as residents on Moroccan soil quadrupled between 2011 and 2013 (Garcia, 2013). Over the past two years, 62% of Spanish workers, were sent to Morocco by their companies, corresponding to the ‘middle class migrant’ profile including managers and workers in general. Beyond that, there is a high ‘illegal’ immigration of unemployed Iberians who try their luck in Morocco, doing small jobs (waiter in cafes, mechanic, artisan, cook, mason, etc.) and settling in popular neighborhoods.

Other modes of interaction (meeting in the street, public space, internet, tourism) actually went down. The popularity of social media in Morocco since 2010 and especially since 2011 with a yearly growth of 3G internet subscribers of 70.44% between late 2010 and 2011, according to figures by the National Agency of Telecommunications Regulation, does not appear to influence the virtual interaction with Europeans. In general terms, Moroccans have interacted more with Europeans in 2012 than in 2009.

**Perceptions of the similarities and differences in values related to children education**

For the identification of priority values that parents focus on in the education of their children a choice among six values was offered to respondents (curiosity, obedience, independence, respect for other cultures, religious beliefs and family solidarity). Respondents were asked to identify and prioritize those that seem important to them personally, and those they think European societies would prioritize and finally the priority for southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.

Brought to choose from this list of six core values for their children education, Moroccan respondents identified first of all independence. This value increased from 23% in 2009 to 52% in 2012 as an important value. In second position came respect for other cultures that evolved significantly since 2009 when it was last in the list of the personal preference as most important values (29%) and reached 48% in 2012. This constitutes a clear change since 2009 when these two values were not considered the most important in children education.
Another very significant development was the decline of religious beliefs as an important value in children education compared to 2009 (63%). In 2012, only 30% of respondents said that religious belief was, for them personally, the most important value to be emphasized in the education of their children. But even with this decline, religious values are always emphasized as they ranked in the third position as well as the value of family solidarity mentioned by 33% of respondens in 2009 and 30% in 2012. Values considered less important are obedience (which fell sharply from 40% in 2009 to 23% in 2012) and curiosity (also decreased in responses from 22% in 2009 to only 16% in 2012).

In terms of values to be conveyed to children in Europe, the perception among surveyed Moroccans highlights again independence (59%), with little change since 2009 (58%), followed by respect for other cultures (48%) that was in third position in 2009 (29%) and was in second position in 2012. A significant difference regards family solidarity which was classified as last in 2009 (8%) and which was promoted to the third most important values in 2012 (27%). Another significant change in this ranking exercise of the educational values in Europe concerns the decline of the value of curiosity in 2012 (ranked 4th with only 21%) while in 2009 it was the second most important value (52%). Finally and without big surprises, the values of religious belief and obedience ranked last.

In terms of Moroccans’ perception about priority values that people in other SEM countries wish to convey to their children, no significant changes in answers can be observed in 2012 compared to 2009. Thus, the value of religious beliefs is clearly ranked first (63%), followed by obedience (from 41% in 2009 to 52% in 2012), and family solidarity (from 28% in 2009 to 39% in 2012). Independence, respect for other cultures, and curiosity, which are considered fundamental in the Moroccans and Europeans upbringing of their children, are classified here last.

**Survey Question:** Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I’d like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? **Base:** % of all respondents, % of the sum of ‘Most important’and ‘Second most important’answers are shown (© Anna Lindh /Gallup Poll 2012).

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Openness to Diversity Beyond the Spanish Economic Crisis

Juan DIEZ-NICOLAS

Despite the economic crisis in Europe, and historic social changes across the Arab region, trends in Spanish public opinion on intercultural affairs and values have not changed dramatically since the first Anna Lindh/Gallup poll. At the same time, Juan Diez Nicolas highlights how there has been a relevant change related to the perception of Spaniards’ to the values of the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The author also exposes a continued openness to cultural diversity, despite the changing context of the last years.

Spain is one of the five countries that have been studied in 2009 and 2012 – along with Egypt, Germany, Morocco, and Turkey – and a comparison of the responses to the eight questions asked on both occasions demonstrates almost identical results. It is this finding that illustrates the great stability of social values and attitudes over time, in particular a short period such as three years as in this case, a period in Spain in which there have been no exceptionally significant economic, social or political changes.

Spain as a representation of the Mediterranean

In both 2009 and 2012, more than three quarters of Spaniards referenced spontaneously to Italy and Spain when asked about countries in the Mediterranean region (only Greece and France were also mentioned in around 50% of their samples). Spain was the third Mediterranean country most mentioned by respondents in European countries (behind Italy and Greece), and the fourth country most mentioned by respondents in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEM) behind Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, highlighting that it was the European country most referenced by non-European countries.

For Spaniards, hospitality, ‘Mediterranean way of life and food’, and common cultural heritage’ were cited by more than 85% in 2009 and more than 90% in 2012 as the characteristics that best describe the Mediterranean region. Turmoil and ‘source of conflict are the two less mentioned characteristics in Spain, in European countries, and in SEM countries, but nonetheless around 70% of respondents in each country or region answer that the two characteristics strongly or somewhat characterise the Mediterranean region. European countries strongly or somewhat agree (around 80%) more than SEM countries (around 66%) that civic participation in democratic transition and resistance to change characterise the Mediterranean region. At the same time, Spain ranks third and fourth, respectively, among the thirteen surveyed countries, almost with the same proportion as the average for the eight European countries (reference Chart 14.1).

Around three out of four Spaniards, in both surveys, would start life again in one European country if they had the choice, compared to only around 15% who would choose an American country. The majority of respondents would start a new life in their own country, though the proportion who provides that answer is below 50% in all European countries with Germany (47%) and Spain (42%) ranking the highest in Europe, and Albania the lowest (6%), and above 50% in almost all SEM, with Morocco ranking the highest (66%). There is a slight increase in Spanish citizens’ interest in news and information from SEM countries with respect to the 2009 Survey, especially regarding economic conditions.
in addition to cultural life and lifestyle, although there is no increased interest about religious beliefs and practices; more than three quarters of the survey sample are very or somewhat interested in the first two issues, but only one in two in religious beliefs and practices. Interest on receiving news on economic conditions and political changes about SEM countries in Spain, Belgium and Denmark is lower in comparison with all the other European countries surveyed, but higher than in all the SEM countries (Chart 14.2).

There is also a slight increase (from 38% to 44%) in the proportion of Spaniards who have personally talked or met with any person or persons from countries bordering the southern or eastern shore of the Mediterranean, while the reasons for meeting them remain the same in both Surveys, ranging from less than 40% who met because of business or work, to 2% who did it through chatting on the Internet. The proportion of Spaniards who have interacted with persons from SEM countries is slightly above the average for all European countries, but nevertheless it ranks more or less in the middle (44%), and certainly above the proportion of respondents in SEM countries who have interacted with Europeans, except Moroccans (57%).

**Stable value trends and changes in perceptions**

The last three questions repeated in the 2012 Survey deal with perceived key values when bringing up children. Respondents were firstly asked about the most important and the second most important value when bringing up their own children. More than 60% of Spaniards mentioned in either first or second rank the importance of family solidarity and respect for the other in both Anna Lindh/Gallup Surveys, although the order was reversed in 2009 (reference Chart 14.3).

The same two values were mentioned by more than half the respondents from European countries, while even though half the respondents from SEM countries also concurred that family solidarity is the most important value when bringing up their children, about the same proportion mentioned religious beliefs. More generally, Spain ranks third among the countries that give the greatest importance to family solidarity, behind Albania and Turkey, and also third regarding the importance attached to respect for other cultures behind Italy and Denmark.

Yet Spain ranks particularly low concerning the importance given to ‘curiosity’, only higher than Albania, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, as well as to ‘religious beliefs’, only higher than Belgium and Denmark, and to ‘independence’, the lowest importance given by any of the eight European countries and only higher that four of the SEM countries, all but Morocco.

The same two values, though in proportions around 50% were mentioned, and also in reversed order in 2009, when asked about the values that were more important to parents in Europe when raising their children. But there is a great difference when Spaniards were asked their opinion regarding the values that were more important to parents raising their children in SEM countries. In 2009 more than 40% of Spaniards mentioned ‘respect for other’ and ‘family solidarity’ as the values that, in their opinion, parents in SEM countries considered more important in raising their children. However, in 2012 Spaniards’ opinions have changed dramatically, with
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Spaniards seem to be highly relativists, as only 18% agree that there are absolute guidelines to what is good and bad and what is truth, while 80% think there are no absolute guidelines. This relativism is confirmed through the acceptance of cultural diversity. Thus, 91% of Spaniards agree that ‘people from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life’, 79% agree that ‘cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of Spain’, and 72% disagree with the assertion that ‘cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society’. (Chart 14.5) More than 50% of respondents in SEM countries (80% in Morocco) believe that there are absolute guidelines (except in Egypt, 44%), while the proportion in European countries is in all cases below 40%, and the proportion in Spain is the second lowest of all countries, only a little higher than in Albania. More than 80% of respondents in European and SEM countries also agree, like Spaniards, that ‘people from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life’, and that ‘cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of their country’, but the opinions on the assertion that ‘cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society’ are divided by half among those who agree and who disagree in both regions.

On the whole, Spaniards are also optimistic. It is true that since the commencement of the financial crisis in 2007 the appraisal of Spanish citizens about the national and personal economic situation has been quite negative (40% answered in 2012 that it was worse than 5 years before), but they remain nonetheless optimistic about the future (48% said that it would be better five years afterwards) (Chart 14.6). It should be underlined that Spain and Italy are the two countries that evaluate worse their present compared to their past, and that SEM countries in general evaluate positively and in a

### Chart 14.4
Key values to parents raising children in SEM countries, according to Spaniards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>% of all respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family solidarity</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for other cultures</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curiosity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Question: Which one of these six values would you say is most important to parents raising children in the societies of SEM countries? And the second most important? **Base:** % of all respondents of the sum of ‘Most important’ and ‘Second most important’ answers shown (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

almost 60% thinking that parents from SEM countries give more importance to ‘religious beliefs’ and 44% to obedience, and only around 30% to ‘family solidarity’ and ‘respect for other’ (Chart 14.4)

In this way, while the values and attitudes of Spaniards have practically not changed between 2009 and 2012, there appears to be a more significant change with respect to their perception of the values that parents in SEM countries give in raising their children. One might attribute this change in Spaniards’ perception to the greater emphasis that media has attached to religion in the information provided about SEM countries. Most news regarding those countries make some reference to religious beliefs and practices in politics, in social movements, in social conflicts, in lifestyle, and therefore religion occupies a central place in the opinions and images Spanish citizens hold about SEM countries.

### Openness to cultural diversity

Apart from those questions repeated in the two Survey editions, Spaniards in 2012 appear to be very positive about the gains that would result from a project for the UfM. More than 60% of respondents think there would be gains in relation to spiritual and moral values, individual freedom and the rule of law, while more than 70% expect gains in gender equality, youthful dynamism, social solidarity and concern for the environment, and more than 80% believe there would be gains in innovation and entrepreneurship and in respect for cultural diversity. Respondents in European and SEM countries seem to agree with the same four gains that would result from the project of a UfM. The only major difference, specifically in the order of preferences, is that in SEM countries concern for the environment is the most mentioned gain, together with respect for cultural diversity.

Spaniards seem to be highly relativists, as only 18%

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**Survey Question:** Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? **Base:** % of all respondents, where ‘Agree’: sum of ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree somewhat’ answers, and ‘Disagree’: sum of ‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Disagree somewhat’ answers (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

### Chart 14.5
Views about political, cultural and religious diversity in Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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greater proportion to European countries the present in comparison with the past, although this may also be due to the fact that the financial crisis has affected the European economies relatively more. More than 40% of respondents in all countries, with the exception of Italy and Spain, believe that the future will be better than the present, and the optimism is greater in all SEM countries compared with all European countries, except from Albania.

With regards to the role of women in society, two thirds of Spaniards think that women play a greater role in Spanish society in 2012 than they did five years before, and almost the same proportion believe they will play a greater role in five years. Once again, respondents in SEM countries are more optimistic about the present and the future role of women in their societies than respondents in European countries, with the only exception of Egypt that is the only country where the proportion is below 50% in both evaluations.

Hopes for the future

As a final point, Spaniards' political values are very clearly in favour of democracy, and are also optimistic. Thus, 47% thought in 2012 that the ultimate effects of the social movements generally known as the 'Arab Spring' will be positive on the relation between Europe and the Arab countries, and only 25% expect them to be negative. There are no differences in this opinion between Spaniards, Europeans and respondents in SEM countries. Democracy for Spaniards means mainly 'freedom', 36% specifically and spontaneously answered freedom, 24% replied freedom of speech, and 11% answered free elections. A second dimension seems to refer to relativism and acceptance of diversity with 20% answering respect and dignity for everybody, and 12% mentioning equality and equal treatment. Other responses about the meaning of democracy were mentioned by less than 10% of respondents in each case. Again, no significant differences appear on the meaning of democracy between Spain, European and SEM countries.

Spaniards seem to be departing from the more traditional meaning of democracy, linked to political participation through voting and political parties, and supporting the new models of democratic orientation, more based on civil society. To illustrate, when asked about what would be the most efficient way to contribute to solving social problems in Spain, 26% answered through joining social movements and 16% through their individual action, while less than 15% replied joining or supporting an NGO, a political party, a religious association, a faith based initiative, or using social media to express their political views. At the same time, while Europeans rely more on joining social movements and on their individual action, respondents in SEM countries prefer their individual action and joining or supporting a political party, something that is probably due to the fact that these countries are now beginning to experience democratic practices based on political parties, while Europeans are becoming more skeptical about them.

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While theorists from Marx to Nietzsche predicted that religion would decline parallel to modernisation, religion and spiritual beliefs have not faded (Inglehardt and Baker, 2000). Instead, in many societies there can be observed a return of religion and spirituality. Quite often this does not mean however a departure from, but rather an adaptation to modernity. In Turkey, transition to a post-industrial age, induced by the shift to liberal market economy in the 1980s, triggered a revival of spirituality. Rapid urbanisation, unbridled capitalism, unequal socio economic transformation, corruption, and the influx of new lifestyle-images in the course of globalisation have been factors which enhanced the feeling of many Turkish citizens that moral and values are in erosion. There emerged a call for the restitution of the moral order of an idealised past which seemed more protected and less complex. Two surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007 revealed that the most important demand for change among the Turkish population was a return to a revered moral past (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). Since Turkish secularism had failed to produce a secular moral and ethical code, in times of crisis, the demand for values fell back on tradition and Islamic conceptions.

Key values in perspective

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll on Intercultural Trends of 2012 reveals that a huge majority of the Turkish interviewees (72%) regard family solidarity as the most important value when it comes to bringing up children (Chart 15.1). While 39% of the participants highlighted ‘religious beliefs’ as the second most important value this was followed by 29% mentioning obedience and 28% emphasising respect for other cultures. 17% highlighted independence whereas only 11% stated curiosity. Although there are differences between the poll made in 2012 and that made in 2009, as there is a rather radical decrease of people who mentioned ‘religious beliefs’ as an important value for bringing up children (from 65% in 2009 to 39% in 2012), there is a rather clear emphasis on ‘conservative’ values. The emphasis on ‘the family’ or the ‘religious community’ as key values should be seen against the background of a conscious shift in the social and cultural policies of the Turkish state. Guided by the ideas and concepts of rightist intellectuals the generals of the military coup of 1980 had been determined to recalibrate Kemalism. They had regarded the political polarisation in the 1970s as a consequence of the corruption of Turkish moral and values by ‘divisive foreign’ ideologies (Atasoy, 2009). Starting out from the analysis that the Kemalist Revolution had failed to transmit religious values they set about conciliating Turkish nationalism with social conservatism. According to the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis the nation was redefined following the concept of the community of believers (cemaat). The state used its

In Turkey, as in other countries going through a process of transformation, modernity does not necessarily mean a shift away from spirituality and religion. Cengiz Gunay explores the development over the last three decades of the concept of Turkish identity, between traditional and secular values as well as in relation to the emergence of new social actors and demands. Building on the most recent Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll findings, the author also explores the potential impact of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on Turkey.
very own secular institutions to ‘re-traditionalise’ political society, according to the new Republican state ideology.

**A renewed sense of Muslimhood**

One of the characteristics of the post-1980 era was the multiplication of identity positions and their struggle for inclusion in the public sphere (Baban, 2005). Religious and ethnic origins began to gain notoriety in the public discourse as well as in the rhetoric of politicians (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). Competing discourses on ethnic and religious identities, replaced economic struggle as the defining factor in political organisations and protest movements (White, 2002). From the 1980s on, the programmes of political parties have increasingly emphasised identity issues and characteristics of an imagined Turkishness, Islamicness or Secularism.

The fact that the wars in the Balkans had the taste of the clash of Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism gave rise to a feeling of growing solidarity with the Muslim brethren in ex-Yugoslavia. Anti-Islamic discourses and discriminations against Muslims in the wake of 9/11, the US-led Iraq War and the negative discourses emanating from Europe against Turkish membership caused an erosion of trust in the ‘West’. The culturalist arguments against Turkish membership revived deeply entrenched fears and suspicions of Western conspiracies aimed at partitioning Turkey (Günay, 2007).

The re-definition of the West as the ‘other’ strengthened a feeling of Muslim solidarity. A new sense of Muslimhood does not refer to an increase in religious practice or religious spirituality, but rather to the feeling of belonging to a common Muslim sphere of culture. These politics of identity were also reflected in the evolving consumer culture. Objects and practices associated with an Islamic identity have come to be dislodged from their religious moorings and become available via the marketplace and media, also to those who would not primarily identify themselves as religious, but who are interested in demonstrating that they are Muslim (White, 2005). In that sense, Muslimhood has been open to secular as well as non-secular parts of society. Growing sensitization for the situation of Muslims abroad and particularly for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its perception through culturalist eyes has been one of the results of the increasing importance of a revived Islamic identity. While the feeling of belonging to an imagined Islamic cultural identity provided outward differentiation, the question which role religion should play in in the public sphere has been domestically highly disputed. Secularists and Islamists have battled over the role religion should play in public life. This battle has also embodied elements of a competition over economic and cultural dominance (Günay, 2007). Both sides have claimed that their own nostalgic interpretation of the past should determine the nature of legitimate politics in contemporary Turkey (Özyürek, 2006).

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll’s question on the perceptions about the existence of absolute guidelines aimed at detecting whether there is a strong belief in something such as absolute truth, referring to religious beliefs that are guiding people’s value judgements. The increase of people who declared thinking that there are absolute guidelines defining good and bad from 27% in 2010 to 50% in 2012 can hardly be explained by the extreme rise of Islamic conservatism over the last two years, but rather by the wording of the Turkish text. (Chart 15.2). As the Turkish translation of the question refers to absolute principles and rules defining what is truth, good or bad, the results rather point out that while 50% of the interviewees believe that there are absolute principles, 46% think that what is good or what is bad may vary according to the circumstances. In the context of high political polarisation, the results can be interpreted as an indication for strong political alignments along political parties, rather the entrenchment of conservatism and religiosity.

**Belief in institutions and social participation**

Turkish society has been deeply divided along identity questions. Whereas for many years center-periphery tensions, representing the dichotomy between secular culture and Islamic tradition, dominated Turkish politics, these patterns are not suffice to explain the dynamics of a more diverse and more pluralist post-industrial, mainly urban society. Not only the Islamism movement, but also other ethnic and confessional identities such as Kurds, Alevis and Roma have increasingly challenged the corset of a unitarian understanding of Turkish nationalism. Moreover, also other social, sexual, environmental or
local identities have become openly displayed and found representation in civil society.

The Gezi-protest movement which unfolded in June 2013 revealed that, under the surface of constant economic growth, there had also grown discontent among representatives of the urban middle class. Although, the protest movement that emerged was all but homogeneous, there are some lessons to be taken from these developments. The mass rallies unearthed that Turkish politics cannot be simply seen through the lenses of polarisation between secularists and Islamists. The protests carried by young people, principally with a university background, also displayed, that the young generation often blamed to be apolitical, was actually highly politicised. At the same time, however, their slogans and demands were less ideological, rather libertarian. Secular in spirit, their messages were not directed against conservatism or Islam, but against authoritarianism and paternalism.

According to the insights gained from the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012, 27% of the interviewees think that joining a political party is the most efficient way to contribute to solving problems in society. This is much higher than the average in European countries (12%) and in SEM countries (15%). While another 19% believe that joining social movements would contribute to solving problems in society, only 1% think that they could change something through individual action and 0% believe that joining or supporting an NGO would change things. These results can be interpreted in a way that despite dissatisfaction with the current situation, there is still a clear majority of people who tend to believe that political parties are the most efficient way to solving problems in the country (Chart 15.3).

The Poll also highlights the doubts of Turkish citizens about the relevance of political and economic changes in European countries. While 66% declare that they are interested in economic developments and 75% state that they are interested in political changes in the Mediterranean region, a closer look at the results reveals that in both cases only 12% of those who stated that they are very interested, whereas 54% are somewhat interested in economic developments and 63% are somewhat interested in political changes (Chart 15.4). In this regard, Turkey is bottom placed among all countries taking part in the Poll. The fact that the number of those who are somewhat interested is relatively high can be interpreted in the way that there is an increased interest in the developments in Europe, but that only a few – those who are very interested – think that these developments have relevance for Turkey and their own lives.

Due to high political polarisation in the country, Turkish media has a particularly strong domestic focus. Foreign policy issues are all too often presented as projections of inner-Turkish dynamics and tensions. This is particularly true for developments in the Middle East. Similarly, while compared with the 2009 Anna Lindh/Gallup Syrvey - a larger number of people (80%) think that Turkish society could gain from cooperation within the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ in regard to individual freedom and the rule of law, as well as in regard to respect for cultural diversity (79 %), concern for the environment (74%) or gender equality (71%), again a closer look reveals that the number of those who strongly believe so is the lowest among all countries, whereas the number of those who think it might affect is the highest. If we set the number of those who think it would ‘definitely affect’equal with those who think it is relevant, this enables an easier interpretation of the results, (reference to Chart 15.5).
Survey Question: Which of these aspects do you think your society can gain from such a shared project? **Base:** % of all respondents, % of the sum of ‘Strongly characterize’ and ‘Somewhat characterize’ answers are shown (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Turkish dynamics and tensions. This is particularly true for developments in the Middle East area. For example, when asked, what they could gain from cooperation within the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, Turkish respondents in 2012 are generally positive: (80%) of people think that Turkish society could gain from this cooperation project, in regard to individual freedom and the rule of law, as well as in regard to respect for cultural diversity (79 %), concern for the environment (74%) or gender equality (71%). In comparison with the 2009 Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey, the number of respondents who consider joining the Union for the Mediterranean beneficial is larger, yet a closer look reveals that the number of those who strongly believe in these benefits is the lowest among all the countries polled.

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VIEWS FROM THE GROUND
Albania: Perspectives and Perceptions of the Mediterranean

Kosta BARJABA

Albania is a Mediterranean country oriented towards Europe in its value system and lifestyle. At the same time, as Kosta Barjaba highlights, the economic crisis in Europe is stimulating inclinations of Albanian citizens towards the USA and Canada. The author also draws a parallel between the country’s democratisation process and the ‘Arab Spring’ movement, suggesting it will have a positive impact on Euro-Arab relations, while the Union for the Mediterranean is considered a tool to strengthen the acceptance of diversity.

The perceptions of Albanians towards other Mediterranean countries are affected by ethnocentrism and geographic vicinity. These links explain the fact that, in addition to their home country, Italy and Greece are the countries Albanians have mostly in their minds while hearing about the Mediterranean. Italy remains the most typical Mediterranean country because of its location on the other side of the Adriatic and because during the last fifty years it has been perceived by Albanians as a symbol of Europe and the West. Both Italy and Greece are found at the top of the list as the most popular receiving countries of Albanian migrants, important tourists’ destinations and rich of cultural and historical heritage. However, Albanians’ perceptions reflect the consequences of the recent economic crisis and political instability in both countries, and, in the case of Greece, episodes of tensions between the two countries related to Albanian migration to Greece, the Greek minority in Albania and the Greek-Albanian sea border/continental issue.

Optimism despite the regional crisis

For Albanians three traits mainly characterise the countries of the Mediterranean region: firstly, their natural and cultural heritage; secondly, their democratic transition; and thirdly, the implications of political changes. The traditional image of the area as a place of hospitality, good food, colourful and interesting life, and admirable history still has a strong and visible impact on contemporary views. However, these associations are competing with the impact of turmoil, instability and political changes the region experienced recently. Meanwhile, among the identified common features of the Mediterranean region, we do not find development, trade and economic cooperation despite the historical role that the region played as a space for commerce. The intensity of political changes over the recent period has superseded any other association (reference to Chart 16.1).

Albanians are optimistic by nature and this is reflected also in the responses concerning their personal life expectations. We note, in fact, a difference between the perception of the present life compared to five years ago and the very positive expectations for the future that mirrors a natural trend of social changes during a period of transition. They are also positive about the prospects of the role of women in society, declaring an improvement in comparison to some years before and counting on a similar pattern for the future.

At the same time, however, this assessment does not mirror the actual situation of women, their role, their level of employment and unemployment, differences in wages, social exclusion rate, and particularly their segregation and segmentation at work. Women represent less than 40% of the workforce in Albania and respondents’ estimations reflect the fact that gender equality has recently dominated the political communication and dialogue in the country. The expectations from the Union for the Mediterranean

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are all positive and very little differences can be found among the potential benefits however the order of priority reflects the scale of priorities within the country and the aspects most needed rate the highest: liberty, justice, diversity, solidarity come first, while respect for the environment, gender equality, innovation and entrepreneurship appear as secondary expectations.

In general, citizens anticipate the improvement of Euro-Arab relations after the Arab Spring because from their experience, they remember EU-Albanian relations improved in parallel to the democratic progress in the country (Chart 16.2). Democratic performance drives the barometer of EU attitudes towards countries in transition. Albanians rank among the most important characteristics of democracy freedom of speech, free elections, and the rule of law and prosperity. Strong family ties traditionally characterise the Albanian society. This value is still vital, as it is ranked the first among other values to pass on to children. Independence is ranked the second and obedience, as a norm of social behavior, ranks on a lower position, proving a kind of democratisation within the family, especially in the parents-children relationship (Chart 16.3).

**Attitude to diversity**

Albanians do not make any distinction between their values preferences and those of parents in other European countries showing an alignment of Albanian values to those of the rest of Europe. While they assign a higher level of importance to religion in the upbringing of children in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. The interest of Albanians in SEM countries is motivated and influenced by their economic and financial situation.

In Albania, one of the poorest countries of the region, with a poverty level of around 62% (measured by Purchasing Power Parity), people judge the world around them economically and financially. This explains why their interest in SEM countries is focused primarily on the economic conditions of these countries and the quality of life of their people. Political changes rank as the third interest and religious beliefs as the fourth. The underestimation of religion stems from the fact that living in a multi-religious country, Albanians do not have much curiosity for the religions around them.

**Survey Question:** Most of the Arab countries are experiencing significant changes started with social movements which have been called an ‘Arab Spring’. What do you think, will be the ultimate effects of these changes on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries? **Base:** % of all respondents, where the ‘Positive’ effect: sum of ‘Very positive’ and ‘Positive’ answers, and the ‘Negative’ effect: sum of ‘Very negative’ and ‘Negative’ answers (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

**Survey Question:** Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I’d like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children? And the second most important? **Base:** % of all respondents % of the sum of ‘Most important’ and ‘Second most important’ answers are shown (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

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Belgium: Civic Action Centered on Social Integration

Ahmad AMINIAN and Marjon GOETINCK

While all of Europe was watching as the Arab Spring broke to fruition, the expectations of how developments may impact on North-South relations are not necessarily positive. The authors explain the limited knowledge of Belgian citizens about the Mediterranean, associating their southern neighbours mainly with immigration. Despite Belgium’s diverse population and openness to cross-cultural dialogue, insufficient information on the Mediterranean other presents a challenge for civil society working against prejudice.

Since 2011 the images of crowds in Tunis and Cairo spread around the world. The uprising which occurred on the southern shore of the Mediterranean had raised hopes; yet the uncertainty today surrounding the continued movement stimulates a feeling of uneasiness in European public opinion. This apprehension is essentially structured around the political consequences the impact on migratory flows that these events will have.

**When the Belgians see the Mediterranean**

When analyzing the Survey results of the Anna Lindh Foundation on Intercultural trends and societal changes in Belgium, we find that there is some coherence among the answers given and what we just said. Expectations of Belgians regarding democracy and their relationship with the Arab Mediterranean countries following the Arab Spring rather demonstrate their concern. Most of the Belgians interviewed (39%) think that the consequences of the changes are negative for relations between Europe and the Arab countries. Another part of Belgium, similar percentage (37%) believes that these changes are positive for the future of Euro-Arab relations. It is also remarkable that 12% of respondents have no opinion on this issue, which shows a lack of knowledge on the significant changes occurring in the region (Chart 17.1).

Interviewees link the Mediterranean mainly to Spain, Italy and France, followed distantly by the southern and eastern Mediterranean (SEM). Less than half of the Mediterranean countries are indeed mentioned (10 of 23 countries) by the Belgian respondents. This reveals once again a lack of basic knowledge on the Mediterranean. In addition, the Survey results show that the interaction of the Belgians with SEM populations is mainly the result of a tourist and business displacement. Thus, the interaction does not produce a significant knowledge of these countries and is limited to food and the testimony of lifestyle. On the other hand, (24%) of those questioned said that they have met or talked to one (or more) person(s) from a country bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea in another frame. In fact, one must think about contacts between immigrants from SEM countries and their countries of origin as over the last decade, Belgium saw the arrival of a net entry of immigrants of nearly half a million people, i.e. 4.5% of its population.

**Issues of migration and social cohesion**

Concerning the characteristics of the Mediterranean region, respondents cite the first positive characteristics such as lifestyle and Mediterranean food, hospitality, history and common cultural heritage before citing the most negative characteristics (resistance to change, agitation, insecurity, source of conflict). But Belgians still appreciate the importance of family solidarity, spirituality and ethics in these countries. It is interesting to see that Belgians choose mostly the Western or European area rather than the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries to start a new life.

It was in the context of migration after World War II that
migration flows of Turks and Moroccans in Belgium, developed forming the main non-European communities in Belgium. In 17 February 1964, Belgium concluded a bilateral agreement with Morocco on the recruitment of Moroccan workforce for the needs of the Belgian economy. In 2014, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary and the celebration of all immigrations and of living together takes place.

Migration and the issue of integration are the center of many public debates in Belgium and Europe. Problems rise about religious radicalism, discrimination, unemployment and rejection are within a society profoundly influenced by the diversity of origins of the individuals who compose it. In the context of respect for other cultures, the vast majority of Belgians (86%) think that people from different cultural backgrounds, political or religious should have the same rights and the same opportunities to participate in public life. In their view, the cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of their society. However, it should also be noted that (46%) of Belgians consider cultural and religious diversity as a threat to the stability of society (Chart 17.3).

Indeed, if a lot of difficulties of specific social integration of living together are reported, the promotion of cultural diversity for creating wealth and the development of information and collaboration networks within the Belgian society deserve to be accentuated. Identity recovery of migrants and youth immigrants in a context of cultural diversity is an essential action in a country where diverse cultural expressions coexist. Starting from their own identity resources, cultural actors of foreign origin can develop various strategies to circumvent the obstacles and reach a valuable expression. Cooperation projects between young Belgians and young immigrants help to deconstruct mutual stereotypes. A significant challenge in these projects is to ensure that a wide public has access and is not limited to the public already aware of the cause of diversity. It is therefore necessary at any cost to make collaborations with the mass media.

The projected image on SEM countries and their history demonstrates the dominance of an exotic vision tinted by prejudice due to certain ignorance and a distinct lack of information. This finding highlights the need for a critical and dynamic work on diversity and equality in the field of learning and media to raise awareness, provoke thought and action, and to strengthen the deep mutual knowledge of Euro-Mediterranean countries.

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Denmark: A Growing Appetite to Know the Arab Societies

Anne HERHOLDT

Danish citizens have a limited knowledge about the Mediterranean, but developments during the last decade – from September 11th to the ‘Cartoon Crisis’ – have provoked interest in the MENA region. Anne Herboldt draws on the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll to highlight the fact that Danes are also interested today in political changes in the region. The author presents several significant dialogue initiatives that have been successfully launched in recent years, against the backdrop of various episodes of intercultural conflict.

Increased awareness in times of conflict

The Mediterranean region is geographically far away from Denmark and often thought of as a holiday destination. Awareness among the average Dane of the Mediterranean region should therefore not be mistaken for increasing dialogue with the Middle East and North Africa. Beaches and holiday relaxation are probably more likely to be associated with the word “Mediterranean” than actual intercultural dialogue and development efforts are. Nevertheless, from a perspective of the Danish civil society, the intercultural relation between Danes and people of the SEM has gone through several significant steps of increasing intercultural understanding. It has evolved from intensified conflict resolution towards increasing intercultural dialogue, and a focus on socio-political progress. The millennium began with the 9/11 polarisation. In the case of Denmark the fear of migration dominated the political scene at this point, despite a limited amount of migrants actually residing in Denmark. The cartoon crisis in 2005 further fuelled a trend of creating enemy images. Analysis, however, has later shown that in spite of a climate of intercultural conflict, a general interest in the SEM region grew with the need for Danish-Arab dialogue. More people for instance began to buy the Quran in Denmark and among youth the cartoon crisis resulted in an increased curiosity for learning Arabic and studying religion. Governmental and non-governmental institutions, organisations and people in Denmark began increasingly to turn their efforts for social change towards collaborative projects with migrants and people from the South-Eastern Mediterranean.

The Danish government had already in 2003, before the cartoon crisis, launched the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme. Since 2003 the programme has supported reform and democratization processes through dialogue, partnerships and mutual understanding between Denmark and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The programme, which celebrated its 10-year anniversary in 2013, continues to facilitate the establishment of long-term collaborative projects between artists, lawyers, union-workers, students, bloggers and many more. The more direct contact between Danish and Arab organizations, institutions and people has resulted in a simultaneous process of increasing intercultural understanding, among the wide range of actors involved, and a process of professionalization of these actors and their projects as well.

Blogging for change

One among the aforementioned successful projects is the Arab women blogger network. Among the learning from this project is the acknowledgement that female bloggers from the Middle East have nothing obvious to learn from Denmark, as they are in many ways much stronger and more focused in their communication than Danish bloggers. Yet through public meetings, debates, workshops and exhibitions, the ‘Danish-Arab Blogger’ project has challenged a climate of intercultural conflict and stereotyping between Denmark and the SEM and has simultaneously supported the development of an Arab network of female bloggers and their struggles for gender equality and democratic reform. This intercultural dialogue and development project, however, captures an important specificity in the process of increasing intercultural dialogue in Denmark and between Denmark
and the SEM countries - the simple importance of direct contact, collaboration and a mutual belief in socio-political progress. The course of events, from a stage of escalating conflict between Danes and Arabs to increased direct contact and collaboration, represent steps of increasing dialogue. The most significant step, however, has most recently been taken by the emancipatory social movements of the region itself putting socio-political progress at the top of the agenda.

The new agenda of socio-political progress

Danes may most often encounter people and cultures of SEM countries through vacations. (Chart 18.1) Yet they are, according to the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll of 2012, just as interested in political changes. The Poll reveals that Danes are remarkably optimistic with regards to the ultimate effects of the recent developments in the region. Almost 70% regards the significant changes as having a positive effect on the relations between Europe and the Arab countries. Taking into consideration the geographical distance and limited contact between the average Dane and people from the South-Eastern Mediterranean, it is particularly noticeable that alongside hospitality and turmoil, civic participation in democratic transition is among the ideas and images that come to mind among the polled Danes as particularly distinctive for the Mediterranean (Chart 18.2).

The continuous pressure of the democratisation movements in the wake of the Arab uprisings for social and political progress has pushed forward this new agenda to be embraced by the ongoing collaborative efforts for dialogue, democratization and development in Denmark. Yet the aforementioned course of incidents from polarisation and conflict to more direct contact and collaboration between Denmark and the MENA-region follow the stages identified in the global models for conflict resolution management. Within these models, there are clear steps for the up-scaling and the down-scaling of conflicts going from the polarisation, to the creation of enemy images, to direct contact, collaboration and the willingness to participate in a conflict resolution process. Taking the step to meet and deal with prevalent conflictual differences between the Danish and Arab cultures has been a crucial step for intercultural dialogue. From this perspective several significant initiatives to promote dialogue have been taken place over the last decade, in spite of the existence of various episodes of intercultural conflict.

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Egypt: The crucial role of civil society in transition

By Ayman OKEIL

Countrywide actors of the Arab Spring have now found themselves in a transitional period, and Egypt is no exception. Ayman Okeil shares the experience of the Egyptian Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation, with its particular focus on contributing to social development through promoting dialogue and protecting cultural diversity. This will provide a basis, the author argues, for a renewed intercultural dialogue among civil societies to the South and North of the Mediterranean, touching upon equality and democratic rights.

To understand the context of the current situation in the Arab countries today we need to refer to the changes brought about by the popular mobilisations and revolutions provoked by the absence of public freedoms and social justice, and the high rates of poverty and marginalisation, along with violations of human rights and human dignity. Despite the fact that almost three years have passed since the eruption of the first revolution in Tunisia with the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the Egyptian Revolution of 25th January 2011, and the revolutions in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, stability and the popular revolutions objectives have not been achieved yet.

In Egypt, immediately after the stepping down of former President Hosni Mubarak, the country entered a transitional period characterised by parliamentary and presidential elections, the rehabilitated right to establish political parties and organisations, but also extreme political polarisation. The one-year rule of President Mohammed Morsi ended with his overthrow on 30th June 2013 on the back of a ‘popular revolution’ according to many people, and a ‘military coup’ according to others. For many, the recent events increased polarisations and the social tension in the Egyptian streets, taking the country back to square one and prolonging the transitional period with people calling for the same demands voiced since 2011: bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity (Chart 19.1).

The evolution of the Anna Lindh Network

The situation in Egypt during the past three years has demanded an active role of civil society organizations (CSOs), which in Egypt are registered as volunteer, not-for-profit, and non-partisan entities, with regard to their internal and international action. The first pertaining to the capacity of CSOs to directly contribute to the

Chart 19.1

Words that come to mind when thinking about democracy in Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom of speech</th>
<th>41</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect and dignity for everybody</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and stability</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality, equal treatment</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety, security</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for other opinions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy does not exist in general</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights, civic rights</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey Question: When somebody is using the word democracy, what are the words that come to your mind? Base: % of all respondents (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).

Chart 19.2

Most efficient ways of solving problems in Egypt

| Through my individual action | 27 |
| Joining or supporting a political party | 8 |
| Joining social movements | 7 |
| Using social media to express political views, to join or support causes | 5 |
| Joining a religious association or a faith based initiative | 5 |
| Joining or supporting an NGO | 3 |
| None | 35 |
| Don’t know | 12 |

Survey Question: How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? Base: % All respondents (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
achievement of the popular revolution demands, to advance the democratic transition process, and promote social cohesion by spreading the values of dialogue and acceptance of the other. The second dimension relates to those CSOs that have established cooperation schemes with neighboring Euro-Mediterranean countries and are able to exchange experiences and tools to promote social, economic, and political mobilisation in Egypt. At this historic juncture, it is particularly important to benefit from the acquired adequate CSOs knowledge of the cultural background of other Arab and European countries to establish fruitful exchanges and collaborations (Chart 19.2).

Within this context, and the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation’s region-wide civil society Network, the role of the Egyptian National Network stands out with its 152 CSO affiliates, and growing membership. Since its beginning, under the initial coordination of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, the Network has been working to achieve the Foundation’s objectives for the promotion of understanding and dialogue between the people of the Euro-Mediterranean region in fields related to social and human dialogue, committed to the Foundation’s governing values, represented by the acceptance of pluralism, cultural diversity, mutual respect between societies, religions, and beliefs, the acknowledgment of the rule of law and basic freedoms. This continues today with the support of Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights that was elected to become the Head of Network in Egypt in June 2013.

Based on deep discussions and several meetings with the Egyptian members and an understanding of the current country’s reality, Maat has developed a clear vision to what could be offered to the Network during its coordination and the role that could be played by members to serve the transition towards a more democratic community that respects the values of dialogue and acceptance of the other (Chart 3). Since its establishment, the Network has been facing key challenges, ranging from the low level of community awareness about the importance of this agenda, to the negative impact of media and opinion-leadership on international cooperation. This included the growing sensitivity to foreign funding of Egyptian CSOs, with some accused of having established headquarters and practiced activities illegally in the country, an issue fuelled by media coverage and political handling which led to a question of public opinion on the existence of CSOs in general.

Social dialogue and Euro-Mediterranean dimension

The Network shall continue to focus on being an active partner and positive contributor to the democratic transition process through its focus on the required social dialogue among the Egyptian population, protecting the political and cultural diversity in the country (Chart 19.3). The current network setup, the capabilities of its member organisations, its geographical spread, and accumulated experiences allow it to play this role on a basis of neutrality and objectiveness without taking sides or getting involved in politics.

The Network will also make sure that the Euro-Mediterranean dimension is strongly present in the intended reform process at the national level to strengthen the basis for mutual collaboration and cultural, economic, social, and equal partnership to further social integration without compromising the principles of independence, and cultural and religious identity. The Survey results shall guide the efforts to achieve those goals, especially when the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll provides valuable information on issues strictly related to our goals and that refers to the best ways for citizens to contribute actively to the solution of their countries issues, and their perspectives on the traditional role of CSOs, as well as the benefits of cooperation with the other Euro-Mediterranean countries.

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Germany: Evolving Forms of Citizen Activism

Caroline Y. ROBERTSON-VON TROTHA, Swenja ZAREMBA and Marco IANNIELLO

Germany has a significant tradition of association life, as evidenced in the latest Anna Lindh/Gallup survey findings. The authors argue that, nowadays, many people choose to support social movements based on more flexible working structures and often originating as a response to specific issues. Against a backdrop of increasing cross-border interest but limited knowledge of the Mediterranean, the German Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation is tapping into civic engagement as a tool to broaden mutual understanding.

The year 2010 ended with a protest movement in Tunisia which would spread in the following months over most countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East. Further down the road, protesters all over the world demonstrated against the power of the banks and their role in the financial crisis, followed by protests against stringent cost-cutting measures implemented as political sanctions. It seems that since 2011, the global society has increasingly been in a state of mobilization. How does the German civil society fit into this pattern? What about its commitment? With a look into the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012, the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation tries to find answers to these questions.

Commitment in the German Civil Society

Associations can be regarded as a dominant form of organization in German civil society, a form of social commitment that has its origins in German history and as early as 1910, Max Weber stated that the people of his time were ‘association people’, with a ratio of one association per 100 citizens, or 20 family men, (Weber, 1988). Today, every year sees the founding of 15,000 new associations across Germany, and activism through associations accounts for approximately 50% of total civic engagement (Robertson von-Trotha, 2009). A fact also reflected in the Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey, when respondents rated the most efficient ways to contribute to solving problems in the country, with the three top positions in the ranking occupied by diverse forms of group participation: joining social movements (25%), joining or supporting a political party (20%), joining an NGO (13%). All of these rank higher than using social media to express political views, to join or support causes (11%), a more modern form of participation. This may also reflect the older age structure of the German population. (Chart 20.1). While traditional associations show a strong focus on both the local context and the group as the center of activities, many of the more recent civil society organizations are more open. As a result, membership in traditional associations has been declining, while the attractiveness of other groups based on the idea of voluntary work and cross-border cooperation has increased.

Thus Germans’ preference for joining social movements suggests that many people do not intend to dedicate themselves to one group for a lifetime or even bequeath their membership. Instead they seem to wish to join a movement which meets the values and needs of their current situation at a given point in time – regardless of the fact that these movements tend to dissolve or change from their original course after a while, and are therefore not bound to offer lifelong orientation. While, according to German law, associations have to be long-termed, citizens’ initiatives are based on flexible and fast reactions to actual political decisions. This is one of the possible reasons for the rise of citizens’ initiatives founded in response to current events such as ‘Stuttgart 21’, in protest against a controversial railway project or the protests against the establishment of a national park in the Black Forest, to name only two. The role of the protesters is highly controversial. Their critics call them Wutbürger /Kurbjuweit (‘angry citizens’) and accuse them...
of rigid thinking, anti-progressive action, and of ignoring fundamental democratic decision-making processes. Further accusations facing these initiatives include those that their interest is limited to local issues, and that they wish to preserve their private surroundings (‘not in my backyard’) while failing to take into consideration the greater social context. In contrast, supporters of these initiatives have dubbed their members Mutbürger (‘courageous citizens’) (Supp, 2010) and are speaking out for more civic participation, referendums, and more opportunities for civic involvement. The nature of such citizens’ initiatives could offer a possible interpretation to the high agreement rate (88%) in the Survey question, asking whether ‘people from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunities to participate in public life’.

Understanding shared opportunities and challenges

The survey shows that in Germany the Mediterranean primarily carries connotations from the tourism sector, as it appears, by the first characteristics respondents ascribe to the Mediterranean: Mediterranean way of life and food (95%) as well as Hospitality (94%) (Chart 20.2). Furthermore, when thinking about the Mediterranean, Germans tend to associate it with the Northern Mediterranean countries. They have a strong tradition of dreaming of and – when affordable – of travelling to the European South, which practice has led to coining the notion of the so-called Italiensehnsucht (‘desire for Italy’) (Waetzoldt, 1927). Today, also the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean shore are popular travel destinations. This fact is reflected in the question about the main method of personal intercultural interaction for Germans, who answer: ‘through tourism’ (48%) (Chart 20.3)

In consequence, the German network of the Anna Lindh Foundation has set itself the objective of focusing its activities on spreading the knowledge and the visibility of this region among the German public, – be it about the shared cultural heritage, the current political situation of states and their interdependencies with others, or the particular situation of the region’s youth – with all aspects involved: both challenges such as migration, poverty reduction or the consequences of the financial crises, as well as the considerable opportunities offered by intercultural dialogue across this area in a political, cultural, and civic respect.

Caroline Y. ROBERTSON-VON TROTHA is Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Foundation Network in Germany. Swenja ZAREMBA is Co-Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Network in Germany. Marco IANNIELLO is an editor at the ZAK - Centre for Cultural and General Studies at the Karlsruhe Institute.
As a result of a changing attitude towards the Catholic Church in Ireland, the family has taken over the role of the guardian of traditional values. Ann Luttrell underlines how Irish citizens consider cultural and religious diversity important, while retaining a certain reserve towards unfamiliar values. Despite the fact that the economic crisis affects the present life situation, the author highlights how people remain generally hopeful about the future, and eager to resolve through their individual action problems faced by the community.

It is interesting to see through the Anna Lindh/Gallup findings the convergence in the priority values of Irish people with those of southern Mediterranean populations. In the past, the Catholic Church would have been seen as a significant guardian of traditional values in Ireland, but this has now changed and is demonstrated in the low rank given by respondents (17%) to the importance of religious beliefs in the upbringing of children and the higher reliance on the family as a guardian of traditional values (43%) (Chart 21.1).

The dramatic change in recent times in the attitude to organised religion is due to a number of reasons, most notably the revelations of clerical sex abuse and increased prosperity in Ireland, while religion is now beginning to be a priority value by some small reactionary groups who see that a huge vacuum has been created by the eroding of the power of the Catholic Church. The most ‘traditional’ value that has been debated in Ireland over the past 30 years is the issue of abortion. Five referendums have been held on the topic during those years. While abortion remains illegal in the country, a law was passed in 2013 allowing abortion under certain circumstances. As a result of their opposition to this law and their expulsion from the governments’ parliamentary party, a new political group, the ‘Reform Alliance’ has been created, and it is generally believed that this group will form a political party before the next elections.

Respecting other cultures

Irish people also attach a significant importance to teaching future generations the value of respecting other cultures (59%); however, when considering the concrete implications of diversity within their country, a slight majority consider that religious diversity can be a threat (Chart 21.2). One reason for this is the lack of education and knowledge about other religions, particularly Islam, where extremist views are considered the norm. As a result, people are afraid and feel threatened. It is important to note also that Irish history has demonstrated how religion can be used as a tool to create division between people.

The evolution of Ireland from an emigrant society into an immigrant one reached its peak in 2006 at the height...
of Ireland’s economic boom, with Ireland showing the highest net inward migration level in Europe at 22.2 per 1,000 people (The Irish Times, November 2013). The multicultural model which Ireland espouses is ‘interculturalism’, seeing integration as a two-way process with consultation with minority ethnic groups and their representatives being a crucial part of this process. Interculturalism further outlines key cultural diversity management practices for improving inter-personal and inter-cultural relationships within contemporary Irish society.

**Impact of the financial crisis**

In view of the large financial debt owed by the country, it is unsurprising that people have a negative evaluation of their current financial situation with 32% considering their current situation worse than in the previous five years (34% consider it unchanged). The situation regarding high unemployment among youth and the fact that emigration from Ireland is reaching famine-time proportions (Ireland in the mid 1800s) constitute reasons for concern. Yet, 59% of Irish are hopeful and believe the situation will improve in the future. Possibly a reason for this is that they feel things can’t get worse and also that slight improvements can be seen. And yet some feel that the situation for women will worsen in the next years. A possible explanation is that in the competition for jobs and promotions, women always lose out, and also that lack of affordable child care provision will mean that more women will have to stay at home and this will affect their economic, social and education prospects.

An interesting finding that emerges from the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll is that only a minority of people sees the advantage of joining associative life and a majority points to his/her individual action as the best way to solve social problems (Chart 21.3). While this can be seen as a positive trend with people taking responsibility for their own decisions and actions and no longer rely on religious leaders, politicians or educators to make their decisions for them, it has brought with it a huge deal of cynicism and suspicion towards associative life on all levels - political parties, banks, financial institutions, big business, and more recently, charitable organisations.

**Call for action against intolerance**

Events over the past few years in Ireland and globally have brought some very worrying scenarios to the fore. One is the rise of racism in Ireland as ‘foreigners’ are being blamed for ‘stealing’ jobs and benefiting from the generous Irish social welfare system; another is the lack of tolerance for differences – in clothing, customs, culture and religion. Efforts are being made to address intolerance through government policies towards inclusiveness and through the education system.

**Chart 21.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most efficient ways of solving problems in Ireland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through my individual action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining social movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joining or supporting a political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using social media to express political views, to join or support causes</td>
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<td>Joining a religious association or a faith based initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joining or supporting an NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey Question:** How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? **Base:** % of all respondents (© Anna Lindh/ Gallup Poll 2012).

Civil society has an important role in this as reports show that when people have a better understanding and familiarity through travel, exposure to cultural events (cinema, music, art, theatre), and more especially, when they have been given opportunities to meet face to face and get to know one another, the barriers break down. All of the recent happenings in the Arab countries, together with the availability of instant communication, have created a great interest in hitherto little known cultures. The challenge is to use this interest as a way of creating better understanding and appreciation of other cultures, and not as a way of causing greater alienation, and to build greater trust in the institutions that are addressing the issues.

Ann LUTTRELL is Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Foundation Network in Ireland and a member of the ALF Advisory Council.
Italy: The Tragedy of Lampedusa and the Centrality of Mediterranean Affairs

Elisa ADORNO and Michele CAPASSO

The latest Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey confirms that while knowledge of Southern Mediterranean countries in Italy remains limited, interest in related issues of diversity and universal rights is growing. The authors reveal how the Lampedusa tragedy brought home to Italians the particular place their country occupies on the intercultural map. Through initiatives promoted by the Italian Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation, civil society organisations are focused on deepening knowledge of the other and combatting prejudices.

The perception of the Mediterranean area that emerges from the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll carried out among the Italian survey sample is very interesting and influenced by the geographical location of this country, at the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Most respondents identify the Mediterranean region with Italy (81%), while just a small number of them associates it to other countries, especially with those on the southern Mediterranean shore, such as Egypt (11%) for example. This data reveals something interesting about the conceptual framework that Italians have of “the Mediterranean area”. It can be assumed that many people associate the Mediterranean with Europe and perceive the Maghreb and the Mashreq areas, which also border the same sea and which, in the specific case of North Africa, constitute our direct neighbors, as others and distant.

Diversity as a value and as a threat

As it appears from the Survey, the interest in the Maghreb and the Mashreq primarily refers to the socio-cultural aspects of this area but this interest appears to be characterized by an “exotic” approach, a sort of “orientalism”, to quote Edward Said. Among the origins of such a biased perception about the southern Mediterranean neighbors we could find news media but also a certain kind of tourism to North Africa and the Middle East which does not allow for in-depth cultural understanding of the visited places; and we should note that tourism accounts for the second most mentioned modality that Italians had to meet people from the other shore of the Mediterranean in 2012 (30%). In total 44% of respondents declared they had an intercultural encounter in 2012, and this was mainly through business (40%), tourism, meeting in the street, a public place (28%) or in the same neighborhood (25%) and only a minority by chatting through the internet (6%).

The relative high level of exposure to other cultures can offer also an explanation to the importance that Italians recognize to cultural diversity and the need to convey the respect for other cultures as a central value in the upbringing of their children (57%) (Chart 22.1), and also to the fact that 87% of Italians think that the same rights should be guaranteed to cultural, religious or ethnic minorities in the country. Nonetheless, even...
if this population is aware of the positive impact of cultural diversity for the prosperity of the country (85%), half of the population (48%) reckons that this could also constitute a threat to internal stability (Chart 22.2). Lastly, with reference to the so-called “Arab Spring”, many respondents (44%) believe that it will have a positive impact on the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations for its implications for the promotion of democracy and the respect of human rights. The concept of democracy for the majority of Italians (66%) seems mainly identified with “freedom”, in a broad sense, but very little with the participation of people in the political decision making process (2%). This observation is further supported by another Poll result which reveals how little Italians trust in political parties to effectively solve the problems of their society (6%) and attach much more importance to what they can do through their individual action (25%) and joining social movements (13%) (Chart22.3).

Civic engagement to combat stereotypes

Today, it is very easy to get news about Mediterranean and Arab Countries. In particular, after the Arab Spring, information concerning the southern shore of the Mediterranean has become frequent. Everybody, through the media - printed or electronic - can access it. However, the perception of these countries, and of the Mediterranean in general, does not always corresponds to reality. It is often the result of clichés or beliefs that create false stereotypes. Therefore, the fieldwork in the intercultural context, as international cooperation and counter or correct information, appears nowadays urgent and necessary. Those who work professionally in this field face complex issues, often related to a superficial knowledge of the region.

It’s geographical location makes of Italy a “natural intercultural laboratory” and the island of Lampedusa is an emblematic example of this. Lampedusa is a bridge between Europe and Africa and has become in recent years the “door to life,” as migrants refer to it. The island is also, however, the scene of personal and collective tragedies. Thousands have died in the Sicilian Channel as a result of shipwrecks and many have been buried on the island, often nameless. Lampedusa is also a crossroads of peoples and stories, and centuries of culture. Because of the importance that the Island has taken in the contemporary history of migration, the Italian Anna Lindh Foundation Network, newly constituted as RIDE Rete Italiana per il Dialogo Euromediterraneo, organized, in 2012 and 2013, a series of international debates and cultural activities “Mediterranean networking. Step one Lampedusa,” directly coordinated by Arci - Independent Association of Social and Civil Promotion, to promote reflection and identify, new strategies for the integration of migrants, the respect of their rights and the re-launch of Lampedusa, as a land rich of culture and opportunities, and not only as the first harbor for people in search for a better future in Europe.

Within the overall scope of deepening the knowledge of other cultures, Paralleli – Euro Mediterranean Institute of the North West, initiated “An inquire about the veil across the Mediterranean.”. The project created a space for dialogue and debate between Italian citizens and Muslim women, resident in Italy and in countries of the southern Mediterranean, on the issue of the veil benefiting from the direct experience related and analysed by these women, as users or not of the veil. Another positive example of dialogue work is represented by the “Dialogue for Peace” Workshops organized by Fondazione Mediterraneo to identify and reflect on practices based on dialogue and non-violence for conflict resolution, both in case of armed conflicts and in case of social, ethnic or political conflicts. The above mentioned projects are meant to give only an idea of the variety of activities that the members of the Italian Network implement through an “open” and “bottom up” methodological approach to raise people’s knowledge and interest about the complex socio-cultural issues of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Elisa ADORNO and Michele CAPASSO are Coordinators of the Anna Lindh Network in Italy.
As a result of recent social developments in the Arab region, civil society activism tends to be associated to electoral processes or street riots. Meanwhile, the authors argue, CSOs in Jordan have been working intensely, and with visible results, on issues such as gender equality, youth participation in the public sphere, and contributing to economic wellbeing for the society. Economic growth in the country impacts favourably on people’s expectations for the future, and offers new opportunities for scaling-up civil society activities.

Civic participation is at the centre of discussions on the changing nature of politics in the Arab world, and Jordan is no exception. Social activism in the region, particularly in relation to the region-wide uprisings, is often understood in terms of its ability to bring about democratisation or regime change. Consequently perceptions of civil society are two-fold, referring either to election-related activities or to contentious events such as strikes and protests. The result is a stereotyped image of social activism in Arab countries labeled as either weak and ineffective or as riotous and erratic.

**Belief in social participation**

Despite this, civil society organisations (CSOs) in Jordan expend a large amount of resources to address a wide range of social and political issues through persistent and conventional associational activity. Promoting and advertising these activities, as does the Anna Lindh Foundation, is therefore critical to the substantive impact of the organisations themselves and to breaking stereotypes of political participation in Jordan and the region. Jordanians generally feel empowered to ameliorate problems facing the country. In the 2012 Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll, 78% of Jordanian respondents identified ways in which they could efficiently contribute to solving the country’s challenges. At the same time, only 10% of respondents find conventional civil society like non-governmental organisations (3%) and faith-based initiatives or religious associations (7%) to be the effective channels for these endeavors. Compared to participating in social movements (13%), social media activism (15%), and individual actions (34%), organised civil society is not seen as a primary vehicle for confronting the country’s problems (Chart 23.1).

Why is there skepticism over whether Jordanian CSOs are a useful medium for solving problems? As the arena outside the family and the state where group interests are formulated and expressed, civil society is fundamentally a public and independent enterprise. But like many southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, the pervasiveness of the family and the state in Jordan poses challenges for independent associational activity. As primary relations (personal and familial) constitute a large amount of communal activity, active membership in secondary associations like CSOs is a relatively recent phenomenon. Alternatively, the state is prevalent in societal life through onerous bureaucratic requirements and the sponsorship and direct funding of many societal organisations, raising questions about their independence. Foreign donors are the primary alternative to government support, but this poses its own set of challenges for Jordanian CSOs. Foreign sponsorship engenders a similar perception problem over the independence of activities and agendas.

The question of civil society effectiveness is also answered, in part, by the bounded nature of civil society in Jordan. The civil society sector in the Kingdom often resembles a society of its own in which the stakeholders, partners, and participants are composed of a relatively fixed population. Within this community of the civically engaged, however, remains atomisation among using social media to express political views, to join or support causes

**Chart 23.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most efficient ways of solving problems in Jordan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through my individual action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using social media to express political views, to join or support causes</td>
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<td>Joining or supporting an NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>None</td>
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<td>Don’t know</td>
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*Survey Question: How do you think you could most efficiently contribute to solving the problems in your country? Base: % of all respondents © Anna Lindh / Gallup Poll 2012.*
organisations with little direct collaboration toward shared agendas. Competition among organisations vying for scarce resources impedes coordination among potential partners working on similar initiatives. This is also a geographic issue as CSOs have little reach outside of the capital Amman and other select towns. This condition is changing, however, as organisations direct their work toward the governorates.

**Economic growth: a basis for people’s optimism and civil society opportunities**

Despite social challenges requiring the work and attention of civic groups, the survey suggests that Jordanians observe an upward trajectory in their quality of life. A majority of respondents report progress in their life situations and hope for future improvement. Specifically, 58% say that they live in better conditions than in preceding years while 77% have a positive outlook on their situation five years in the future. These observations mirror the feelings of Jordanian respondents on the role of women in society as 78% perceive an expanding role for women both in the recent past and in expectations for the future. This general optimism is an important resource to be tapped by societal organisations, and it suggests that respondents observe viable options for personal and social progress.

The survey must also be understood in the context of the Kingdom’s economic development. King Abdullah, like the late King Hussein, has called for a “white revolution” linking progress toward modernisation with increased political participation. Despite underlying economic hardship, the growth of Jordan’s private sector and entrepreneurship creates an environment ripe for renewed and sustained civil society activity. The surveyed Jordanians report that obtaining information about European economies is of paramount interest (71%) over other areas of European life. Innovation and entrepreneurship ranks second, only behind respect for cultural diversity, for what Jordanian society could gain from cooperation with other Euro-Mediterranean countries and business or work (36%) constitutes the leading way for Jordanians to interact with Europeans. (Chart 23.2)

The focus on economic conditions reflects Jordanians’ interest in the growth of the national economy. Alongside the growing Jordanian private sector, civil society has opportunities for increasing its impact. Particularly in the framework of corporate responsibility, a model to be furthered in the country, businesses serve as both potential sources of funding and targets of initiatives related to consumer advocacy and employee rights. The boom of Jordanian entrepreneurship increases collaborative possibilities for civil society organisations and even models for efficient organisational management.

**Chart 23.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic conditions</th>
<th>Cultural life and lifestyle</th>
<th>Political changes</th>
<th>Religious beliefs and practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survey Question:** Thinking about the European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their...? **Base:** % of all respondents, by country, % of the sum of ‘Very interested’ and ‘Somewhat interested’ answers are shown (© Anna Lindh/ Gallup Poll 2012).

The extensive amount of civil society organisations and activities in Jordan bode well for building social capital and an appreciation for diversity. The Jordanians polled demonstrate an appreciation for civil equality (95%) and cultural and religious diversity (85%) in society. Underlying social differences – whether ethnic, religious, or socio-economic – remain a concern for some respondents (34%) and are best ameliorated through sustained civil interactions guaranteed by active citizenship.

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll sheds light on the status and trends of social development in Jordan. Escalating in recent years, civil society activities are a vibrant part of Jordan’s reform and attracts the most important segment of Jordanian social progress – its youth. Infusing the values of civil society – dialogue, cooperation, participation, and equal opportunity – in the next generation of Jordanians lies at the heart of incubating both national and regional culture.

Andrew SPATH is a Fulbright research fellow in Jordan. Zina ISHAQ is Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Foundation National Network in Jordan. Juan CARABALLO-RESTO is a visiting Professor at the University of Puerto Rico.
Morocco: Group Affiliations and Individual Actions at Play

Jamal KHALIL

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey findings demonstrate closer bounds with Europe, which may explain in part the cautiousness with which Moroccans judge the consequences of the Arab Spring. Jamal Khalil reveals a society divided, with citizens preferring to choose individual action to collective social acts, despite shared values of respect for others. In this context, the Moroccan Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation is focused on bringing civil society leaders closer to their southern neighbours, from whom they have drifted apart.

It is surprising that when we speak of the Mediterranean region to a Moroccan it is Spain that comes to mind on reflex. Borders provide the explanation: to the North - Spain and to the East - Algeria. It is easier to identify those who are in the North than those in the South, those who are closer to us geographically more than those who are historically closer and with whom we even think of sharing the same cultural heritage. Social bounds are more logical when based on economic interests and cultural interests come second. Political changes do not provoke the same level of interests, and beliefs and practices even less. It is worth noting that around 57% of Moroccans had the opportunity to directly interact with Europeans and did it mainly in their country by living in the same neighbourhood or meeting in the public sphere, or through business.

Individual priorities and social beliefs

As soon as it comes to the identification of priority values in the education of children in the European context, Moroccans recognise two recurring values: independence and respect for other cultures. The concepts of solidarity, religious beliefs and obedience are present but not decisive. It is interesting to note that Moroccans identify the same priority values for their own children (independence 52%; respect for other cultures 42%; and religious beliefs 30%) and when it comes to identifying the key values of other Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries, the order changes completely, with traditional values - which indicate control over children education - being placed first (Chart 24.1).

Despite the priority value scale presented, a large majority of Moroccans believe in the existence of absolute guidelines and this may denote a certain determinism when considering the position to take towards traditional norms (Chart 24.2). Moroccan society remains individualistic, since with regard to effective ways to solve the problems of the country, Moroccans state that their individual action would be the most appropriate. Collective actions, regardless of their nature, seem to be ineffective, and for some – who demonstrate a rather fatalistic approach - there is no solution. Cultural diversity perspectives are nonetheless disparate, seeing that it is believed that the participation of different cultural, religious and political groups is a right and important for society, while on the other hand people consider that this diversity may pose a threat to society (51%).

When the Survey was carried out (September to October 2012), respondents declared that their life situation was better than 5 years ago and that they expect it will get even better in the next 5 years. They also recognised an improvement of women’s role in society, a role that is considered important but whose meaning role is not specified. (Chart 24.3)

The Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll offers various elements of reflection. On initial review, opinions may seem contradictory, but if we look more closely we realise that some points appear as non-negotiable and that on some questions people show a certain level of closure as if the experience of several Arab countries does not
yet offer real opportunities for hope. It seems even that we share non-identical hopes and that people remain attached to their position waiting for tangible changes and changes which can be understandable according to their background and wishes. The analysis of the situation in other countries leads to the comparison with our own situation, and, since the beginning of the Arab Spring, a sort of mirror game started so that we wait for the implementation of a certain scenario elsewhere and observe its outcomes before deciding to adopt or reject it. We recognise the fact that there has been change, but we do not interpret it in the same way or understand it according to the same background and since we have become accustomed to waiting, we are willing to wait.

Understanding different levels of positioning

Observing the Moroccan society under the prism of the current situation on the ground, some personal attitudes may seem paradoxical: we want alpha and omega, and the two cannot work together. Looking closer, we see that they follow a certain logic. The postures are two levels of positioning. The first concerns the social actor itself that can be located and makes a representation of society without referring to his/her group membership, regardless of the shape, orientation and size of this group. He can say for example that he/she is for freedom of expression. The second level of positioning just frames and wraps the first. Group affiliations generate multifaceted influences to varying levels. The social actor, as soon as a practical implementation of a concept, a representation can see the day, finds himself forced to review his first perception so that it is consistent with that of the group and sometimes even dissolved. He/she may be for freedom of expression but as far as it does not touch on traditions or alter the beliefs proclaimed by his/her affiliation group.

The two levels of positioning bring the ointment needed to live without internal conflicts. They can be activated simultaneously or diachronically. Only the individual perceives things in a certain way and he/she can adapt within the group. He/She can build an environment where he/she is neither within the group or alone. This leaves the possibility of becoming elusive. The social dynamics that may be created by a social movement are not immune to this variety of positioning. Positional instability of individuals can transform any collective dynamics in a status quo.

Jamal KHALIL is a sociologist and Vice President of the South North International Cooperation Center CICSN.
One of Poland’s most beloved myths is that of the Polish Commonwealth, so deeply rooted in our consciousness: the myth of a multiethnic and multi-religious world, which ended with the outbreak of World War II. What lies behind the word ‘Commonwealth’? To put it most briefly, we could say that the word means the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of many nations and religions, a Commonwealth of many cultures – to use contemporary terms and categories. The Commonwealth of Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Tatars, Hauländers, Armenians, Karaim, Roma, Czechs and others. The Commonwealth of Roman Catholics, adherents of Judaism and Islam, the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church, Old Believers, and Protestants of various denominations.

From cultural homogeneity to multiculturalism

Multicultural Poland was destroyed as a result of World War II. A new society emerged – ethnically and religiously homogeneous, with all differences relegated to the margins and deprived of the right to their own voice. A situation in which the living presence of representatives of other religions or nations is minor and a real test for society. In this case, the beginning of a dialogue with otherness is inevitable – and otherness here is often more internal than external. Thus, this must lead to a dialogue with the self, and to acceptance of our own otherness.

1989 was a breakthrough not only due to the political revolution across Central Europe, but also because it opened Polish society up to a new multiculturalism, which manifests itself through the presence of a whole spectrum of ‘othernesses’ in public life. The traditional definition of multiculturalism proves insufficient in today’s pluralist, mobile society that changes incredibly quickly; in the present conditions multiculturalism must not boil down only to respecting national or religious differences. The new multiculturalism is a search for the ‘Other’ in all kinds of otherness, on the peripheries of the dominant discourses and absences, in representatives of sexual minorities, the elderly, people with disabilities, women.

Civic engagement to accept otherness

We believe that openness and acceptance of various kinds of ‘otherness’ among Poles is the only way to create a harmonious society. The need for the discovery of a new order is confirmed by various activities undertaken by the Polish network of the Anna Lindh Foundation which today comprises of over a hundred organisations and institutions from all over the country. We know that our role is to present and engage ourselves in those areas where our local dilemmas concerning otherness and dialogue manifest themselves most prominently. In this way we want to realise the goal of the international networks of the Anna Lindh Foundation that consists in identifying and addressing problems related to dialogue in a given country.

When Poland entered the European Union in 2004, its borders were extended to reach the Mediterranean Sea. However, if we look closely at the cultural landscape of the contemporary Mediterranean region, and especially its southern and eastern part, dominated by Arab-Muslim civilisation, it would be difficult not to notice that the elements creating this landscape are predominantly absent from our local and Polish culture, no matter how
broadly conceived. At the same time, the process of mutual permeation or meetings between the two cultures seems slow and, furthermore, is encumbered with a historical, political and psychological burden.

A lack of knowledge and optimism in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This view is supported by the results of the Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey. According to the Survey, for the majority of the Poles ‘the Mediterranean’ region still means the countries of southern Europe: Italy, Greece, Spain and France, not the ones that lie on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea (SEM). For us, the heart of the Mediterranean still beats in Rome and Athens, not in Cairo or Tunis. The Survey also reveals our limited knowledge of the countries of the South as only 26% of those polled confessed to having personally met or talked to a person from countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea (Chart 25.1). And the dominant modes of interaction are tourism, business and work. Only 15% (out of 26%) confirmed that they encountered a citizen of the South in the public space. This result may suggest that we sometimes do travel and visit the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, but the Southern Mediterranean people are hardly present in our everyday reality.

As already stated, the Poles know very little about the Mediterranean region (and primarily associate it with food); we have limited interest in news and information from the countries of the southern shore (between 70 and 88% have little or no interest in lifestyle, economic conditions, political changes or religious beliefs that characterise the citizens of the southern and eastern Mediterranean) (Chart 25.2), and are doubtful about the potential gains from the “Union for the Mediterranean” project. Finally, out of all countries that participated in the survey, Poland is the least optimistic about the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ on the European-Arab relations.

Despite a positive image of this social movement in the Polish media and the support offered by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was generally portrayed as a specific southern variant of the Polish Solidarity movement, the majority of the Poles believe that the relations between Europe and the Arab countries will suffer from the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Chart 25.3).

This concern of the Poles with the future of the Mediterranean region should definitely be further analysed and it encourages us to intensify our work in the field. The kind of work that provides information about the region, promotes tolerant attitudes and valorises otherness. We speak of work here since tolerance is not a quality we are born with but an attitude that must be worked on. It is a kind of activity that aims to tame the natural human proclivity for distrust and often hostility towards other human beings. In light of the Report, this work remains the priority of the Polish Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

Robert KUSEK and Joanna SANETRA-SZELIGA are the Coordinators of the Anna Lindh Foundation Network in Poland.
Spain: The Evolution of Associative Life and Shared Networking Spaces

Maria-Angels ROQUE

Civil society organisations in Spain played an important role in the democratic transition process that took place in the 1970s, but their position diminished with the development of government institutions. The author highlights how Spaniards today have begun to realise the importance of self-organisation, even though the financial crisis has resulted in a severely underfunded third sector. In this context, the Spanish Network of the Foundation is working towards creating a far-reaching platform for shared projects.

The path of associative life in Spain is broad and fertile, although this phenomenon has been paralysed during the period of repression and dictatorship until its rebound in the 1970s when the authoritarian government was much weaker than before and civil society played an important and necessary role in the process of transition to democracy (Chart 26.1).

A peculiar connection can be noted between the late arrival of democracy and the state of wellbeing that has marked the most recent history of Spanish associative life. This is the brain drain which took place between the late 70s and early 80s when a large proportion of civil society managers and executives became active members of political parties or integrated in the public administration considering that these streams of influence would be most appropriate to achieve their goals of social transformation and to improve the quality of life of citizens. As a matter of fact, with the arrival of democracy, citizens began to feel represented by government institutions with a consequent loss of leadership of associations in their role of representing collective interests. Since then, the militancy and the ability to mobilise have declined dramatically, in addition to the loss of critical content and objectives within the organisations because of the confusion generated by the primary role of democratic institutions.

The working model of social organisations

In Spain, organisations strongly depend on the State and autonomous governments and municipalities, since they get almost all of their grant budgets from the public administration. This dependence often leads to the prioritise the relationship with the donors over a clear political positioning of the organisations or dealing with the most sensitive affairs of the country. In addition, the bureaucratic requirements of the administration increased the difficulty to report about the grants obtained and generated a disproportionate burden of work on associations reducing their capacity for action.

During the years of plenty, the subsidies provided by the state budget reached 4,351 million Euros, as in 2009. This was the result of a constant and committed race towards the goal of devoting 0.7% of the Gross National Product to official development assistance (after the resolution of the United Nations in 1972), which produced an exponential increase in chances for funding and implementation of projects. The civil society sector has been professionalised, and volunteer workers have become paid workers. The constant demand for professionals has popularized the sector replacing in this way the old altruistic militancy. This model based on the transfer of resources and strongly influenced by the demand created a strategic fragmentation. In addition, the lack of visibility in the political sphere and a management based on obtaining public funds has

Survey Question: When somebody is using the word DEMOCRACY, what are the words that come to your mind (what do you think they are referring to)? Base: % of all respondents; % of the 10 most frequent mentions are shown (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
significantly reduced the consolidation of a social base and impacted on the public imaginary which considers civil society organisations quite insignificant as a tool for social transformation.

The consequences of the crisis

Since 2010 - the year following the burst of the global financial crisis - development aids in Spain have been decreasing exponentially every year. Because of this lack of funding, we are witnessing a restructuring, reduction or disappearance of several entities of the third sector. Public and social austerity policies imposed by Brussels generated reactions among citizens. In this regard, it should be noted that the social perception of loss of sovereignty of the State compared to the markets that now run the world order or to supranational institutions such as the European Parliament has led to an unmatched surge of political disaffection among citizens. Spanish society, for the first time since the beginning of democracy, is perceptive of the weakness of the system to provide to its basic necessities and this is making it difficult for citizens to relate with their governors.

As a consequence one might as well talk of a resurgence of organized social mobilisation. One of the most emblematic expressions of this trial is the Indignatos Movement, which gathers people of different origin, track and social status. These people are organised according to common interests: raising political, economic and social changes, taxing the government works, or else requiring the guarantee of basic human rights. These new expressions of citizen mobilization, which are building up citizen platforms, in many cases, revolve around the idea of giving the decisional power to the people and not the elite of governors. In addition, these movements endorse the concept of voluntary collaboration between people who organise themselves to reach a specific objective, independently, without conditioning their action in order to obtain public funds to cover their expenses. (Chart 26.2)

The importance of networking

We are in an era full of social upheaval and reorganization of social action practices. Today, the importance of networking is becoming increasingly important, as it is institutional leadership with the ability to create a discourse, to bring positions closer together and give coherence to a group of actors. In this sense, the need to strive towards a common goal, to look for ways of articulation and collaboration among entities and countries, through platforms, meetings for dialogue and major projects, is central.

It is important, therefore, that the Spanish Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation has the ability to develop a working model for networking based on horizontal relationships between its members on the basis of egalitarian ties. The future challenge is to overcome the limitations identified by network members and to adapt to a very complex new scene, full of opportunities and strengths, where old forms associative life, marked by clientelism, and new forms ones, much more autonomous, will coexist. Areas for improvement, according to the data collected through the latest Survey carried out among the members of the Spanish Anna Lindh network (June 2013) highlight the participation and visibility of member organisations. Members called for greater articulation, more unifying criteria, more spaces for debate and more frequency of information exchange. This implies a long-term cultural and political work where the challenge lies in linking movements, citizenship and associations. Working through a network and building a common project involve the development of shared identities and common engagements.

Maria-Angels ROQUE is Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Foundation Network in Spain.
In the post-2011 Tunisian context, a proliferation of civil society associations has laid the basis for the reclaiming of public space for the country's citizens. Building on the recent Anna Lindh/Gallup polling, the authors highlight the progress made for women's equality and an established belief among Tunisians in their individual action to pursue the common good. A high level of interest among citizens towards people on the northern Mediterranean shore also offers a renewed perspective for Tunisia in its Euro-Med relations.

Three years have passed since the first revolutionary movements that have invaded the area and shaped the geo-strategy of the Euro-Mediterranean region, allowing the emergence of several societal and political movements. Some are conservative currents, and others are liberal. Some are ideological and others are more pragmatic. Some seek to ensure a level of societal continuity and others are calling for a model that breaks with the entire post-independence heritage. It is important that in light of this dynamism and the bewildering change that some events are undergoing, we can understand the dynamics that led to the current landscape in Tunisia that many observers might describe as the most successful country in its different steps towards democracy.

**New spaces for dialogue and associative life**

The involvement of some political, social and other civil society groups in the scene led to the development of a constitution qualified as one of the most modern and vanguardist in the whole Arab region, providing equal rights to women and introducing a system based on universal principles of human rights and the respect of freedoms.

The day after the exit of the dictator, Tunisians found themselves facing a country in need of healing from its wounds, required to join forces against the dangers they may encounter and boost the economy, but also break with a system that has marginalised the majority of Tunisians to the benefit of a mafia family and a corrupt, oppressive system.

At that time, a large and spontaneous impulse began, led largely by Tunisian youth throughout the country. Indeed Tunisia has witnessed a significant associative boom since the revolution, with the creation of more than 5,000 associations in the different governorates of the country and in various fields: civic engagement and governance, cultural and artistic creativity. These associations have led to the development of the situation on the ground, breaking the passivity experienced by most Tunisians before, allowing an unprecedented appropriation of public space for dialogue and mutual respect, and setting in motion the civic engagement process.

**Openness to cultural diversity**

The cultural openness of Tunisia to its Euro-Mediterranean environment has allowed the emergence of some very open debates, focusing on current and urgent issues. The desire for a democratic and pluralistic socio-political model is more motivated among a population, increasingly educated and informed about the debates taking place on the northern shore of the Mediterranean. 70% of respondents are interested in cultural aspects and political exchanges in Europe. Only 47% are interested in religious aspects, and this says a lot about the priorities of Tunisians. The openness of Tunisians is even clearer through other Survey results indeed 93% of respondents believe that people of different ethnic and religious orientations should have the same rights to participate in public life. (Chart 27.1)

![Chart 27.1](chart.png)

**Survey Question:** Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? **Base:** % of all respondents, where ‘Agree’: sum of “Strongly agree” and “Agree somewhat” answers, and ‘Disagree’: sum of “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree somewhat” answers. (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
Dynamics and openness to others has led over time to a more remarkable professionalisation of different components of civil society. A major presence of Tunisian women, who rich in achievements but feeling threatened, were mobilised to defend their rights and those of Tunisian society also. Tunisian women were present during the most important phases that the nation went through, side by side with their country men. One of the major battles fought by the Tunisian woman was particularly the mobilisation about the draft Article 28 of the Tunisian constitution stipulating that women were complementary to men. Its elimination is the greatest proof of activism in favour of gender equality in Tunisia.

This is well and truly expressed through statistics. In fact 65% of respondents believe that women have had and will have a big role in Tunisian society. (Chart 27.2)

**A determination for civic engagement**

The gender advocacy battle was not separate from that carried out by activists for the cause of the rights and freedoms through the defense of universal human rights. An example is the mobilisation for the constitutionnalisation of the Tunisian pact of rights and freedoms that brought more than 50,000 signatures from across the country. This link of the Tunisian cultural with universal human rights finally resulted in a clear reference in the Tunisian constitution of belonging to the principles of universal human rights crowning a long process of advocacy and mobilization led by Tunisian civil society and controlled by large organisations with major presence in the field of civic struggles namely the UGTT Trade Union Center, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, CAWTAR, Arab Institute for Human Rights, which constitute a basis for Tunisian associations newly created.

All this dynamism and the movements that Tunisia has witnessed since 2011 are now safeguards against a return to the dictatorship pre-uprisings, and this explains the optimism of those interviewed with 71% of respondents optimistic about the future of the country. Also 44% of respondents believe that the Tunisian revolution will have a positive effect on the European neighbour.

Despite the important role of civil society in shaping the new democratic and free Tunisia, this movement remains fragile given the lack of group organization, noting that 38% of respondents believe in individual action (Chart 27.3). Thanks to the commitment of hundreds of Tunisians through their civic activities, a constitution enrolling in the principles of freedom and dignity was approved. Even if still much remains to be done by Tunisians to confirm the stability of institutions and the rule law as guarantor of freedom, walking through the streets of Tunis, one can notice the presence of many young people full of life and hope for a better Tunisia, but also more determined than ever not to go back in time.
Turkey: Growth and Expansion of the Third Sector

Necdet SAGLAM and Tevfik Başak ERSEN

Turkish imaginary towards Mediterranean culture is strongly influenced by the country’s geographical position, and their rich history of cultural diversity. The author draws upon the Anna Lindh/Gallup Survey findings to highlight how Euro-Med relations and exchanges have increased in recent years, also thanks to the growth of Turkey’s voluntary and community sector. Drawing on complementary polling evidence, the author also highlights the expectations of Turkish citizens for on-going improvements in the future.

When asked about the countries associated with the Mediterranean region, 30% of Turkish respondents in 2009 and 50% in 2012 mentioned Turkey. Such an answer could be effected by the country’s geographical position. At the same time, one of the reasons for the 20% increase could be Turkey’s economic growth and power in the region, when many Mediterranean countries are living through an economic crisis.

Perceptions of the Mediterranean region

In the Turkish imaginary Mediterranean culture combines a diverse and heterogeneous set of elements that have been derived from the cross-fertilisation of the Byzantine, Ottoman, European, Middle Eastern and Arab traditions. However, in recent years, conflicts in the Middle East have increased people’s sense of insecurity and instability stimulating aspirations to emigrate to the northern shore. However, this trend is not wide-spread among Turkish people who state that if they could start a new life they would do it either in their own country or in one of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries. This rate increased by 5% compared to the previous period, keeping Europe as a second desired destination. (Chart 28.1)

Despite the various levels of cooperation between Turkey and Europe, only 2% of Turkish respondents met people from European countries and this might be due to the strict requirements for visas to Europe, a chief grievance for many young Turks who feel discriminated in their freedom of movement. This reality clashes with the number of outbound trips forecast to reach 16 million in 2016, increasing by a compound annual growth rate of 8% in line with the expected growth in consumer expenditure, and thus leisure and recreation. Between 2009 and 2012, Turks and Europeans met mainly for business or work, through tourism, by living in the same neighbourhood, or by chatting on the internet, and the rate of business or work-related interaction rose from 15% to 43% in 2012.

Social satisfaction and expectations for the future

Today, Turkish women are bank managers, doctors, lawyers, judges, journalists, pilots, diplomats, police officers, army officers. However, the participation rate of Turkish women in the work force is 30.1% less than half of the EU average, and the number of women in the Turkish Parliament today is much smaller than in 1937, when the number of female parliamentarians amounted to 18 - 19% of the total MPs. Meanwhile, the number of crimes committed against women is on the rise, as is the number of girls forced into marriage at a young age (all this despite the positive developments in the legislation on violence against women). In recent years, changes have been applied to Turkey’s penal code, which now foresees life sentences for honour crimes, regardless of whether they were committed by a minor or not.

When asked about personal life satisfaction, 62% of respondents consider their life better today than 5 years ago and are confident that it will improve even more in
the next 5 years. Negative outlooks constitute around 32% of the answers. According to the Life Satisfaction Survey conducted by Turkstat in 2012, the percentage of individuals in Turkey declaring happiness was 61%, compared to 62.1% in 2011, with 9.9% of individuals declaring unhappiness in 2011 and 10.2% in 2012 (with a slight drop of happiness among the female population). On average, a growing level of education, brings about an increase in people’s perception of happiness, registering positive results for 60% of primary school graduates happy in 2012 compared to 67.4% of higher education graduates. According to the Survey, family life and being healthy are the values that made individuals most happy. The overall satisfaction from public services, social security, education, transportation and judicial services increased between 2011 and 2012.

Expansion of the third sector and openness to diversity

For Turks, democracy denotes freedom, free elections, equality, equal treatment and freedom of speech, a stable country, prosperity, peace and stability, recognition of diversity, self-determination, and the rule of law, a definition limited to its formal aspects and which takes no direct account of considerations of respect for civic, human and minority rights (Chart 28.2). It has, however, the advantage of being both unambiguous and measurable, and offers a chance for securing and maintaining those other rights. An explanation of the relative success of democracy in Turkey, could be traced back to the Islamic and Ottoman heritage that might well have been conducive, in favourable circumstances, to the functioning of free institutions and respect for human rights. There are still issues that need to be resolved to improve democracy in the realm of the freedom of thought, freedom of demonstration, restrictions on the media etc., but some other initiatives have been launched in favour of democracy, as is the case of a conflict resolution and peace building initiative with Kurdish people. This is reflected by the Poll results, which show that Turkish people believe that people from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life, even if they consider that diversity constitutes a threat to the stability of society.

Throughout history, the Abkhaz, Armenian, Bulgarian, Azerbaijani, Greek, Jewish, Kurdish, Laz, Pomak, Romani and Zazas ethnic and religious groups lived together respecting one another.

Over the past twenty years, Turkey’s third sector has taken on a heightened momentum of growth and expansion and civil society organizations (CSO) have taken on a new role as a critical element in an emerging democratic society. The number of emerging CSOs continues to grow and these operate with increasing sophistication. Although there exist various models of engagement, such as platforms and initiatives, the legal framework only recognizes associations and foundations as CSO legal entities. According to data from January 2014, there are 99.029 associations and 4.734 Foundations in Turkey. Civic engagement has a narrow yet deep nature in Turkey, where different social groups and regions only participate to varying degrees in civil society activities. As such, despite going through an era of transition and expansion, the civil society movement in Turkey has remained detached from the strive of a large portion of the population. Regional comparisons reveal differences in the extent of civic engagement, where urban and developed centres enjoy a more vibrant civic life.

---

Survey Question: When somebody is using the word DEMOCRACY, what are the words that come to your mind? (what do you think they are referring to?) Base: % of all respondents; % of the 10 most frequent mentions are shown (© Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll 2012).
ANNEXES
Annex I
Opinion poll questionnaire

The following Questionnaire was administered by Gallup Europe during September and October 2012, to a sample of 13,000 people of 13 countries, namely Albania, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Poland, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Methodology of the Survey

The polling methodology centred on interviews conducted via Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) on landline and mobile phones, in line with the Gallup survey philosophy, that-is-to-say:

• the sample represents all parts of each country, including all rural areas;
• the target population includes all individuals aged 15 and older;
• the questionnaire is translated into the major languages of each country;
• quality control procedures are used to validate that correct samples are selected and that the correct person is randomly selected in each household;
• random respondent selection uses either the latest birthday method or the Kish grid.

The Survey used a random sample with 1,000 completed interviews per country among the general population. For telephone interviewing, Random-Digit-Dial (RDD) was used (one-stage sampling). In select countries where mobile phone penetration was high, a dual sampling frame was used (fixed and mobile telephones). For the Anna Lindh/Gallup Poll the margin of error has been +/-1.4% at a 95% of confidence interval.

The Questionnaire started with the following introduction: “We are interested in how people in different countries are living their life, how they think about each other, and what they think about the Mediterranean region”.

1. Representation of the Mediterranean region

1.1 Could you please name all the countries which come to your mind when you hear about the Mediterranean region?

1.2 Different people have different thoughts about what the Mediterranean region represents. I will read out a set of ideas/images that may come to the minds of different people, and please tell me, if you think these characterize the Mediterranean region strongly, somewhat or not at all.

| Strongly characterize | 1 |
| Somewhat characterize | 2 |
| Not characterize at all | 3 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused] | 9 |

A - Mediterranean way of life and food
B - Source of conflict
C - Civic participation democratic transition
D - Common cultural heritage and history
E - Hospitality
F - Resistance to change
H – Turmoil, insecurity

1.3 If you could start a new life, in which country of the world would you start it?

AFRICA
AMERICA
EUROPE
ASIA
ETC. LIST OF COUNTRIES
1.4 Your country, with other European countries and the countries on the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean, has decided to establish closer political, economic and cultural exchanges, within a project called ‘Union for the Mediterranean.’ Which of these aspects do you think your society can gain from such a shared project?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definitely</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Don’t know]</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Refused]</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A - Innovation and entrepreneurship 1 2 3 8 9
B - Attachment to spiritual and moral values 1 2 3 8 9
C - Individual freedom and the rule of law 1 2 3 8 9
D - Social solidarity 1 2 3 8 9
E - Gender equality 1 2 3 8 9
F - Concern for the environment 1 2 3 8 9
G - Youthful dynamism 1 2 3 8 9
H - Respect for cultural diversity 1 2 3 8 9

2. Mutual Interest

2.1 Thinking about the countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea/European countries, how much interest would you say you personally have in news and information about their (READ AND ROTATE TOPICS A-D)?

Would you say you are:

| Very interested | 1 |
| Somewhat interested | 2 |
| Not interested | 3 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused] | 9 |

A - Economic conditions 1 2 3 8 9
B - Cultural life and lifestyle 1 2 3 8 9
C - Religious beliefs and practices 1 2 3 8 9
D - Political changes 1 2 3 8 9

3. Interaction

3.1 In the last 12 months have you personally talked to or met with any person (or persons) from countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea/European countries?

| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
| [Don’t know] | 3 |
| [Refused] | 4 |

[IF YES IN 3.1]

3.2 How did you meet or talk to that person?

| Business or work | 1 |
| Through tourism | 2 |
| Chatting on the Internet | 3 |
| They live in the neighbourhood | 4 |
| Just met in the street/public space | 5 |
| Other | 6 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused] | 9 |
4. Values and mutual perceptions

4.1 In bringing up their children, parents in different societies may place different emphasis on different values. Assuming that we limit ourselves to six values only I’d like to know which one of these six would you say is most important when raising children?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curiosity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family solidarity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the other cultures</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Don’t know]</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Refused]</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And the second most important?

<table>
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<tr>
<td>[Refused]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.2 And which one of these six do you think is the most important to parents raising children in Europe in European societies?

<table>
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<tr>
<td>[Don’t know]</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Refused]</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 And which one of these six would you say is most important to parents raising children in the societies of countries bordering the southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Obedience</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the other cultures</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Don’t know]</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Family solidarity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for the other cultures</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Values and mutual perceptions

5.1 Do you think that women in your society today play a greater - the same – or lesser role than they did 5 years ago?

| Greater role | 3 |
| The same     | 2 |
| Lesser role  | 1 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused]    | 9 |

5.2 Compared to their present role in your society what do you think: in 5 years from now women will be playing a greater - the same – or lesser role?

| Greater role | 3 |
| The same     | 2 |
| Lesser role  | 1 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused]    | 9 |

6. Expectations for the future

6.1 Taking everything into consideration, what would you say, compared to 5 years ago your present life situation, is...

| better       | 3 |
| the same     | 2 |
| worse?       | 1 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused]    | 9 |

6.2 And how do you expect it will change in 5 years? It will be …

| better       | 3 |
| the same     | 2 |
| worse?       | 1 |
| [Don’t know] | 8 |
| [Refused]    | 9 |

7. Expectations for democracy

7.1 When somebody is using the word DEMOCRACY – what are the words that comes to your mind? (what are they referring to?)
8. Challenges of diversity

8.1 Could you please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree somewhat</th>
<th>Disagree somewhat</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>[Don’t know]</th>
<th>[Refused]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Cultural and religious diversity constitutes a threat for the stability of society

B. People from different cultural, political or religious backgrounds should have the same rights or opportunity to participate in public life

C. Cultural and religious diversity is important for the prosperity of your society?

9. Civic engagement

9.1. How do you think you could contribute in solving the problems in your country the most efficiently?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joining or supporting a political party</th>
<th>Joining or supporting an NGO</th>
<th>Joining social movements</th>
<th>Joining a religious association or a faith based initiative</th>
<th>Using social media to express political views, join causes</th>
<th>Through my individual action</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>[Don’t know]</th>
<th>[Refused]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>
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Annexes


Annex 4

Biographies

Elisa ADORNO
Trainer in the field of social and European planning on behalf of various Italian organisations. Runs several projects, in collaboration with the Euro-Mediterranean Institute of the North West – ‘Parallel’, including the coordination of the web platform www.mediteu.org. With a degree in archeology and a Master for cultural projects management, she is an expert in international development cooperation, managing international projects and involved in intercultural mediation.

Fadma AIT MOUS
Professor and project manager at the ‘Ecole de Gouvernance et d’Economie de Rabat’ (EGE). She holds a PhD in political science from Hassan II University in Casablanca on the emergence of Moroccan nationalism from local to national networks, with research experience on issues related to social movements, socio-political transformations, citizenship and migration. Recent publications include ‘Le métier d’intellectuel. Dialogues avec quinze penseurs du Maroc’ (With D. Ksikes, 2014).

Nabil AL-ARABI
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. A trained judge and diplomat, he was formerly Foreign Minister of Egypt, Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations, and head of the Egyptian delegation to the Taba dispute negotiations. Previously, El-Arabi took part in the Camp David negotiations, and was appointed Chairman of the UN Special Committee on Enhancing the Principle of the Prohibition of the Use of Force in International Relations.

Mahasen AL-EMAM
Founder and Director of the Arab Women Media Centre (AWMC) in Amman, Jordan. She is a media specialist and expert on women issues in the Middle East, with extensive experience as a journalist and chief editor working at various weekly newspapers. Al-Emam is also certified as an UNESCO media training consultant, chairman of the secretary council for Free Media Union, a free-lance writer and editor, and was among the first women to be elected to the JPU general assembly.

Ahmad AMINIAN
Islamologist, religious historian and philosopher. He is school mediator at the City of Brussels and researcher at the Interdisciplinary Center for Studies of religions and secularism at Free University of Brussels (FUB). He is also co-founder and President of Omar Khayam Cultural Centre. Aminian worked for several years on the dialogue among civilizations delivering training courses in philosophy of intercultural education, mediation between cultures, and philosophy of teaching non-violence.

André AZOULAY
President of the Anna Lindh Foundation. As Counselor of His Majesty the late King Hassan II of Morocco and of His Majesty Mohammed VI, he played a central role in the economic reform process and foreign investments growth. Azoulay is also President of the executive committee of the ‘Foundation of the Three Cultures’, and is well-known for his input to give real chances to a last and just peace in the Middle East and the many initiatives for deepening reconciliation between Jews and Muslims.

Kosta BARJABA
Professor of Sociology and Public Policies at the European University of Tirana. He received a Master in Public Administration from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in 2005, and has been an elected Associate Member of the Academy of Sciences of Albania since 2011. Professor Barjaba has authored 12 and co-authored 13 books, published in Albania and internationally, on migration, ethnic relations, youth, unemployment, poverty and social exclusion.
Anis BOUFRIKHA

Founder of the international ‘We love’ association network, and founder and president of the Tunisian division ‘We love Sousse’ which is a project that aims to improve the living environment in the city of Sousse through outreach projects and volunteer activities. Boufrikha is the Head of the Tunisian national civil society network of the Anna Lindh Foundation and coordinator of two of its regional programmes in Tunisia; ‘Young Arab Voices’ and ‘Dawrak: Citizens for Dialogue’.

Michèle CAPASSO

President of Fondazione Mediterraneo in Napoli, Italy. He has worked as a photographer, painter, architect and engineer, carrying out more than 500 projects in various countries of the world, before taking the decision to devote himself to the promotion of intercultural dialogue and peace in 1994. Since then Capasso has been organising different programmes and social projects, and has also published many articles and books on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Juan F. CARABALLO-RESTO

Visiting Professor of Cultural Anthropology at the University of Puerto Rico, and has worked as a Research Associate at the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in Jordan. His research is focused on the anthropology of religion with particular interest in the Muslim communities living in—and migrating throughout—the Middle East, Western Europe, and Latin America. His work has increasingly engaged different approaches to religious experience, fundamentalism and secularism, and questions of power.

Andreu CLARET

Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Foundation since July 2008. As a former journalist he has been Director of the Spanish News Agency (EFE) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and Catalonia. Claret was also Director of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), based in Spain, and as an analyst of international affairs has specialised in North-South relations and Mediterranean cooperation. He is also a member of the Board of Directors for the Foundation for the Future.

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Director of the Chair for Research in Social Sciences and Security at the European University of Madrid. Over 35 years he has chaired the Universities of Malaga, Autonomous of Madrid, UNED, and the Complutense of Madrid. At present he is Deputy chair for the Arab Trans-Social and Political Transformations in the Arab World (FP-7 program of the European Union). He was also a member of the 2003 High-Level Advisory Group on Intercultural Dialogue, chaired by Romano Prodi.

Dina EL- KHAWAGA

Professor, with graduate degrees from Cairo University and the Institute of Political Studies in Paris. She spent almost a decade working in international cooperation organisations, including the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundation, and directed the unit of political sciences at CSELD. Joined the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), a research center based in Paris where she now runs two programmes: Social Movements Working Group; and the Arab Research Support Program (ARSP).

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Secretary General of Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV), between 2008-2011, he served as a Council of Foundations member. Aside from providing his expertise on association and foundation legislation to different entities, he has written a significant number of articles and reports on subjects such as capacity building in the non-profit sector, public sector-civil society partnership, legal reform and lobbying for NGOs, tax legislation improvement, and social entrepreneurship development.

Štefan FÜLE

EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. He previously has held several positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, serving as First Secretary of Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN, the Ministry in Prague, and as Czech Ambassador to Lithuania. He had served as the nation’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom before being appointed as the Permanent Representative of his country to NATO.
Coordinator of the Belgian national civil society network of the Anna Lindh Foundation, and Project Manager at The European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDA). She holds a masters degree in ‘Studies of Languages and Cultures of the Middle East and North Africa’, and has worked on programmes during the past years in the domain of youth and culture, including in Belgium and in Palestine.

Cengiz GÜNAY
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Anne HERHOLDT
Project Coordinator at the Danish Centre for Culture and Development and the Danish co-Head of Network for the Anna Lindh Foundation. She has a background within the studies of cultural encounters and international development from Roskilde University in Denmark. Since 2009 her studies and interest turned towards the Middle East, and in the wake of the historic Arab uprisings, she decided to do her master thesis on the new forms of creative activism in Egypt.

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Eleonora INSALACO
Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Report on Intercultural Trends, and Programmes manager at the international headquarters of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Working at the Foundation since its inception in 2005, she is charge of the strategic cultural, education and media programmes and the monitoring and evaluation of its operations. She is a graduate of the College of Europe, with academic expertise in the fields of Euro-Med cooperation, Islamic studies and global citizenship education.

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Jody JENSEN
Senior research fellow at the Institute of Political Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and assistant professor in international economics at the Corvinus University of Budapest. Founder of the Institute of Social and European Studies, she directs the programme on international relations and European studies. Her major fields of research and publication include globalisation, global governance, transformation of the nation state, governing global markets and global civil society.

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ANNEXES

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Paris 8. His academic research focuses mainly on educational systems and migration within the Maghreb region, in particular on the issue of intellectuals and intelligentsia, social movements, and human rights. He currently coordinates the ‘Arab Spring’, a European programme of excellence in a consortium comprising 7 universities, dealing with social movements in the Arab world.

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Professor of Sociology at the University of Hassan II Casablanca. His main academic focus lies in the fields of sociology and social sciences, while his research interests also include culture, art, symbolism, exclusion, migration, insecurity, disability, sexuality and social movements. Khalil works as an expert with international organisations, and has recently published several studies, including: ‘Vivre déscolarisé à Casablanca, la violence dans la ville où la vulnérabilité des ouvrières’.

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Responsible for education and outreach events at Triskel Arts Centre, Cork, Ireland, and programmer for the Cork World Book Festival held in April each year since 2005. Her prior experience includes working in the nonprofit sector in the U.S. Her projects there involved setting up sister city relationship between cities in the U.S. and China and project managing international seminars. She is also currently coordinator for the ALF Ireland Network and is a member of the Advisory Council.

Robert MANCHIN

President and Managing Director of Europa Nova think tank and consulting organisation. He began his career at the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences after finishing the Karl Marx University of Economics and the Ferenc Liszt Academy of Music, and has co-authored a number of books. From 1990 till 2014 he was Senior Vice President of Gallup Organisation, Princeton, and then Chairman and Managing Director of Gallup Europe.

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Professor at the Lebanese University and Saint-Joseph University (1976-2010) and founder of Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace. He is a Constitutional Council member in Lebanon and a member of the Anna Lindh Foundation’s Advisory Council. As journalist Messara worked for Le Jour, L’Orient-Le Jour, among others, and is a coordinator of a Master in a francophone journalism, a cooperation between the Lebanese University,

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