Chapter Nineteen

Humanitarianism, Communications, and Change

Final Reflections

Glenda Cooper and Simon Cottle

When Michael Buerk revealed to the world the extent of famine in Korem, Ethiopia, in 1984, his startling report became perhaps the biggest story that the BBC did in the 1980s until the fall of the Berlin Wall (Simpson, 1998). His seven minute report contained only his own voice and that of a white doctor (Cooper, 2007); the video rushes were carried back to London, as Buerk wrote and rewrote his script on the night flight from Kenya. The result however was astonishing. As Franks writes: “In an era before satellite, social media and YouTube, the BBC report went viral—being transmitted by more than 400 television stations worldwide” (Franks, 2013).

The iconic imagery of the Buerk report still overshadows humanitarian reporting today. But the world in which one man told an amazing story, able to keep it as an exclusive as he travelled back across the world, has changed. Today, as this collection shows there are many more channels for such stories to be told through, and many different types of storytellers. Journalists and aid agencies are no longer the sole gatekeepers to such information.

Instead we have seen how citizens have taken on the role of witness, how NGOs have transformed themselves into storytellers, and how journalists such as CNN’s Anderson Cooper have abandoned traditional approaches of objectivity in order to intervene themselves. Edited highlights of Cooper’s career on YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aosNAGt3AxQ) show him rescuing a small boy from a mob in Haiti, taking on a US senator during Hurricane Katrina, and being attacked on the streets in Egypt; Cooper himself wrote in a blog about his actions in Haiti of stepping outside the journalist role: “No one else
seemed to be helping him [the boy]" (http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/18/anderson-in-the-midst-of-looting-chaos/).

These arguments are nothing new: the debate about journalists as objective onlookers (or not) was discussed at the time of Buerk, and reach back to Frederick Forsyth’s coverage of Biafra in the 1960s. User-generated content—that most current of media obsessions—can be traced back to events such as the Kennedy assassination or even letters to the editor.

But what differs today is the volume and the speed of information that can be relayed to a globalized audience. How does that affect the kind of story told—and crucial for humanitarian issues, how does that affect help given or donations made to those in the most desperate of conditions?

The increased use of innovation and innovative partnerships between technology companies and humanitarians offers a real chance to reveal to the rest of the world who needs relief and when. So the widespread cover up of the Bengal famine of 1943–1944, in which 10 million are believed to have died is almost unthinkable in an interconnected world like today’s—although not quite.

Many of the chapters in this collection focus on the breakthroughs that such technology has achieved. In this new media ecology, significant new players have been introduced. Some of the most exciting developments, analysis of tweets, and other social media information help accelerate the assessment of disaster damage and needs during real time (Meier, chapter 15), while a simple mobile phone message can be a fast, cheap, effective way to convey the most vital of basic information (Wall and Reid, chapter 18).

For those whose role is to help tell the stories of those caught up in humanitarian crises, the consequence of such changes in the NGO-journalist space have opened potential access to international news (Sambrook, chapter 3; Conneally, chapter 4; Abbott, chapter 13); the use of wide-ranging tools such as Pinterest, Instagram, and Storify have helped explain to more diverse audiences the issues at stake (Wardle, chapter 17). Start-ups such as Radar (Klein, chapter 16) have made real efforts to put the power of storytelling in the hands of citizens rather than ‘fireman’ reporters or even NGOs with their own agendas, empowering ordinary people to describe what is important to them. At the other end of the scale, WITNESS, with its celebrity backers such as Peter Gabriel and VH1, and YouTube channel can challenge social injustice on a worldwide stage (Allan, chapter 14).

Yet it would be wrong to write off traditional journalism, which has evolved and adapted to this new media ecology. Journalists, too, have learned to use social media to their advantage: like NGOs, smartphones and Twitter are increasingly used in the field to send back instantaneous reports, while more sophisticated verification methods and use of social media news agencies have given journalists access to more material that they can use as part of their role to explain and set information in context (Wardle, chapter 17). For many NGOs and citizen
journalists, using social media to make a traditional media outlet take notice of their campaign has been vital.

Despite these new developments, there are still old tensions. The internal NGO opposition between fundraising and development remains as acute as it was back in 1977 when Lissner first described it (Cooper, chapter 5)—if anything ‘Consumer Aid’ appears to be on the rise. The work that Dogra, Orgad, and Seu (chapters 8, 9, 12) describe in this volume shows that NGOs often still depend on traditional images of suffering to ‘sell’ stories—and we as the public still respond to them, although only in the short term (Franks, chapter 11). And an increasingly competitive marketplace, in a world suffering an economic downturn, means that twenty years after the Red Cross Code was first implemented to ensure dignity in portrayal of the suffering, we still see advertisements today from multinational, reputable NGOs which are transgressing, if not the letter of the code, certainly the spirit. And wider cultural shifts in how we, the public, respond to such images in a ‘post-humanitarian age’ also diminish our capacity to empathise and respond in ethical, in contrast to self-focused, ways (Chouliaraki, chapter 10).

So what can we take from this collection of chapters which cover academic, practitioner, and journalistic outlooks? What do they suggest that we need to consider about the future of humanitarian communications?

1. Humanitarianism in a global context is changing

Humanitarianism in the twenty-first century has become an increasingly contested terrain. Its ideals, ethos, and practices now encompass differing positions of principle and a growing myriad of organisational aims and perspectives (Cottle, chapter 1; Kent, chapter 2). Humanitarianism also overlaps but sometimes exists in some tension with human rights advocacy and the wider analysis of human security in a globalising world. The mega-trends of globalisation, including economic interdependency and market meltdowns, environmental despoliation and climate change, as well as late modern forms of conflict such as ‘new wars’ in failed and failing states, transnational terrorism and Western interventionism all contribute to or cause humanitarian crises and catastrophes. These violent conflicts, further, have positioned humanitarians (as well as journalists) at increased risk and deliberately in targeted harm’s way.

Today’s global challenges converge in many current humanitarian crises, exacerbating the abuse of human rights and contributing to the contemporary condition of human insecurity around the globe (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Kaldor, 2007; Beck, 2009). It is also essential, we think, to keep the multidimensional and mutating character of humanitarian crises and catastrophes clearly in view if we are to avoid dissimulating the complex local-global interconnections and inequalities involved. We are thereby in a stronger position to recognise and respond to the
different roles and responsibilities of different media within humanitarian crises as they spill across borders and unfold over time. These and other processes converging in new humanitarian crises will become exacerbated if remedial actions are not forthcoming in the global future (Kent, chapter 2).

It is also important to properly ground and theorise the current deployment and future potential of humanitarian communications within today’s global context if we are not to fall into the unthinking trap of technological (communications) determinism—proffering simple technological fixes to deep-seated and complex world problems. New technologies of communication are deployed and shaped in humanitarian practice and they can be directed at different ends for diverse political reasons. They are put to work and conditioned by, for example, professional practices, organisational logics, and available resources. Their increased centrality and exciting capabilities have yet to be fully recognised and leveraged across global-local contexts and in respect of the often complex dynamics of humanitarian crises’ reactions and responses.

2. Communications enter into humanitarian disasters through and increasingly complex and overlapping global media ecology

Whether produced by poverty, climate change, food and water shortages, population movements, virulent pandemics, or new wars and terrorism, humanitarian crises today become signalled in (and variously shaped by) their representations in today’s complex media and communications ecology—an ecology that is itself increasingly globalised and encompassing (Cottle, 2009, 2011). Satellites in space can monitor acts of inhumanity and atrocity around the globe, as can social media on the ground in interaction with telephony, the Internet, and 24/7 news broadcasters. This global communication ecology can thereby play its part in the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), alerting the UN and the world’s nations to their obligation to safeguard populations from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

But contemporary media and communications can also perform a less progressive or benevolent part in communicating humanitarian crises (Cottle, chapter 1). They can, for example, shape the “new Western way of war,” (Shaw, 2005) in which democratic governments, sensitive to Western public opinion and images of their maimed or dead military in national news media, seek to transfer risks (e.g., via high-altitude bombing) and thereby increase civilian casualties and deaths—so-called collateral damage. The media’s ‘silent moral scream’ also unwittingly facilitates the deliberate killing of civilians under the blanket of news media invisibility in hidden wars and conflict-based humanitarian crises. And so too can today’s interconnected
global communication networks be put to morally repugnant ends when deployed in 
image wars deliberately enacting atrocious acts against humanitarian hostages.

Today’s media and communications ecology we also contend is not usefully interrogated 
through an anachronistic dualism of ‘old’ and ‘new’ media because both are now intimately 
interconnected in and through today’s new communication networks. If we are to better 
appraise communication performance and capacity and leverage their future potential in 
respect of humanitarian crises (anticipating, signalling, coordinating, mobilizing, responding, 
militating, rebuilding) we need to understand these interconnected capabilities and also to 
innovate when useful new communication tools—as was demonstrated, for example, in the 
Haitian earthquake disaster response (Nelson, Sigal, & Zambrano, 2011, Crowley, & Chan, 
2011). This is no time, then, for unhelpful position taking or dualistic thinking (Cottle, 2013),
whether in respect of ‘old’ and ‘new media’, or indeed a bifurcated politics that remains 
unremittingly critical of ‘mainstream’ media representations on the one hand, and 
uncritically celebratory of ‘alternative’ communications and their enhanced capacity for 
connectivity, on the other. Both the complexity of today’s global communication ecology and 
the complexity of contemporary humanitarian crises played out at a global-level demand 
that we fully appraise communications in their interrelated and fast-moving capabilities.

3. New technology will help deliver aid—but there are limitations

The growing connectivity via mobile phone networks and the use of new technologies such 
as the Micromappers’ microtasking platform during Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan (Meier, 
chapter 15) undoubtedly means that user-generated content and new technologies can help NGOs to pinpoint where aid is needed and the type of relief may be increased.

Meier points out that traditional means of gathering data in crisis situations often have 
inherent biases, inaccuracies, and misinformation in them—so suspicion of user-generated 
content as unreliable in comparison may be misguided. Using the case study of Typhoon 
Yolanda, even if 0.25% of tweets were useful and accurate and 3.5% of images posted to 
Twitter, that still represented 600 geotagged tweets and 180 geotagged images.

Volunteers helped to map these tweets and images in real time, leading to better 
information being deployed more rapidly. Meanwhile people are helping themselves as Wall 
and Reid illustrate in chapter 18: turning to their phones to try to contact friends, families, 
and authorities in emergencies, to access official sources of information and also—
important—using the devices to send money to where it is needed quickly.
But many of these computer models are still very much in their infancy technically speaking. The best of models will not work without strong leadership and enlightened policymaking. Meier talks of the issue of finding a ‘needle in a haystack’ when sifting through tweets and social media updates; as more people use social media, more sophisticated algorithms will be needed.

Issues around privacy and security remain unresolved for those who do wish to tweet or SMS information about their situation during disasters—although one of the biggest problems may simply be encouraging the public of the need to provide user-generated content when a disaster happens. At present many of these tools are simply not well known enough to have the required impact.

It is also easy to forget in a developed world that while the use of phones, particularly smartphones, has increased dramatically in recent years, there is still a sizeable population who do not have access to phones. While using phones to communicate messages quickly is something that should be encouraged, it will not be able to reach everyone, and those without telephonic access should not be discriminated against.

4. More diverse voices will be heard but that does not mean more diverse stories

Tom Glocer of Reuters admitted after the 2004 tsunami that none of Reuters' correspondents or stringers were on the beach when the wave hit—they were dependent on the stills and videos of ordinary people for eyewitness accounts of the event (Glocer, 2006).

Nearly a decade on, the photograph sharing app Instagram logged nearly 1.3 million pictures of Hurricane Sandy either tagged #sandy, #hurricanesandy, or #Frankenstorm. It's been argued there's been a massive paradigm shift “in which once the media was the center of the universe and now the user is the center of the universe” (Robinson & De Shano, 2011, p. 977).

The use of Twitterfeeds by mainstream media, replication of blogs by newspaper websites, and use of tweets both in newspapers and broadcast media means that the eyewitness role once taken as a right by journalists is no longer necessarily the case. The success of start-ups like Radar (Klein, chapter 16) and the combination of NGOs and beneficiaries to tell stories (Scarff, chapter 7) has led many to believe that we are increasingly hearing from more diverse voices.

Undoubtedly in many cases this is true; Buerk’s Korem piece speaking only to an MSF doctor is unthinkable these days. As Robinson (2009) details in her work on Hurricane Katrina, and Russell (2007) in her work on the 2005 French riots, citizen journalists and bloggers have acted as a corrective to mainstream media coverage of disasters and crises. The use of channels such as WITNESS’s YouTube channel has encouraged abuses of human rights to be aired in ways that they simply could not have been done before (Allan, chapter 14).
Yet social media has its drawbacks too. For journalists the benefits of using such material are often clear: it is usually donated for free. The problem is that the sheer volume can leave them overwhelmed as to where to turn to in order to access the most useful material. As Malachy Browne of the social media news agency Storyful sums up the problem: “[It] is like being Superman, you can hear everyone’s voices, but you need to know which ones to listen to” (Hanska-Ahy, 2013, p. 436).

For journalists under time pressure and with limited verification resources the result can be that the voices that they tend to listen are those who already occupy a privileged position. A recent paper by Lin, Keegan, Margolin, and Lazer, who looked at tweets around the US election, concluded despite the potential for social media to create larger public squares with more diverse voices speaking, “occasions for large-scale shared attention appear to undermine this deliberative potential by replacing existing interpersonal social dynamics with increased collective attention to existing ‘stars’” (2014).

Added to that the kinds of disasters that are privileged by the use of social media tend to be the rapid onset disasters: exactly the ones that NGOs have complained for years that journalists spend too much time on already. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Flickr lend themselves to the dramatic over the chronic; the earthquake over the long-term famine—it is not an accident that the disasters we have seen framed through the lens of user-generated content and social media are Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda and the Haitian earthquake rather than the East Africa famine.

NGOs are aware of this. For example, the Save the Children UK campaign #hiddencrisis tried to counter this by setting up a Twitter event for the West African hunger crisis with the then Sky News digital media editor Neal Mann and Storyful, to plot Mann and Save’s journey across Burkina Faso, while Oxfam GB authorised a “Twitter takeover” of their feed in March 2013 by Hasan, who had taken refuge in the Zaatari camp in order to focus attention on the long-time plight of displaced people in the Syrian conflict (Cooper, 2013).

But the fact remains that ‘famine’ tweets are rare—and user-generated content in long-running conflict, which does not relate to a sudden event does not get into the mainstream media (apart from rare projects such as the Guardian Witness project). The very technology which can bring hidden disasters to a connected world may militate against such disasters being heard in the maelstrom of online traffic.

5. raising money is easier—but the continuing rise of consumer aid raises worrying questions

Back in the 1960s, charities had a rather diffident attitude to fundraising. It's hard to imagine it now, but Oxfam used to send out only two mailings a year to its circulation list, one at Christmas and it was considered impolite to ask for money in the same letter as saying thank you (interview with Elizabeth Stamp, cited in Benthall, 1993, p. 57).
Compare the situation now where donations can be made by PayPal or sending a SMS in seconds. According to one Twitter-tracking service, 2.3 million tweets included the words ‘Haiti’ or ‘Red Cross’ between 12 and 14 January 2010. The Twitter account for the Red Cross, which had been adding 50–100 followers a day before the quake, added 10,000 within three days and during that time, donations to the Red Cross had exceeded $8 million (Evans, 2010). It wasn’t just Twitter. Oxfam America’s Facebook fan base jumped from 35,000 to 250,000 during Haiti. This resulted in $1.5 million raised within 48 hours (Byrne, 2010).

The Disasters Emergency Committee put out a press release during their 2013 Syria appeal stating that for the first time more than half of donations had come via digital sources (http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/syria-crisis-appeal/press-release/record-digital-gifts-to-dec-syria-crisis-appeal). Although this is likely to reflect the fact that it was early in the appeal, it makes clear the importance of PayPal—the ease with which donations can be made without reaching for a wallet.

The growth of online does not mean conventional means of donation should not be overlooked, however; the final figures for the DEC Philippines appeal later that year showed 25% of donations coming via the DEC website, 9% via PayPal and only 3% via SMS (personal communication, 2014).

While the mode of giving may be more diverse than ever, selling a solution as an actual physical product is a new one. The closer relationship between charity and consumerism has led to some uncomfortable situations for some agencies, whether Save the Children UK defending itself against too cosy a relationship with its sponsors, or the relative taste of Product RED objects (an iPod Air case, a red skateboard, a Galaxy bar) or even whether Make Poverty History wristbands were made in factories with poor labour records (McCormack, 2005).

If charities become just another product to sell, not only do they become competitive with each other (which charity is fashionable to support), the communitarian ethos is diluted.

6. imagery remains a problem

In 2013, the DEC appeal for the Philippines centred on a single boy, “Joshua”, alone, bearing scars from the typhoon, and with a scene of devastation in the background. Brendan Paddy of the DEC had said he felt uncomfortable about the use of such an image but that “Joshua”, when approached by a journalist, had felt empowered by the use of such an image (Kageura, 2013).

As Paddy Coulter (chapter 6) makes clear, from many years ago the imagery and approach of NGO advertising was often patriarchal and based on shock factor, after the intervention of Cecil Jackson-Cole and Harold Sumption. These two imported commercial business practices into fundraising and the result was often
crass, without due respect for the dignity of those involved. The emphasis was on striking images and punchy copy.

Coulter goes on to describe how increasing concern over the approach to fundraising and the need for public education post-Ethiopia culminated in the writing of the Red Cross Code in 1992.

But what has improved since then? Coulter is concerned that contemporary advertisements for some of the best-known agencies are falling into old habits—that intervention is risk-free, with easy solutions which do not point out the important contribution that partners on the ground make. This is echoed in Dogra's content analysis (chapter 8) which found many agencies in the year 2005–2006 relied on pictures of children (an infantilisation of the majority world experience) and gave the impression that the developed world held the answer to the problems the survivors of such disasters faced. Is that so far different from Sumption's adverts of the 1950s and 1960s?

Seu's research (chapter 12) found that while audiences were initially arrested by striking and dramatic images—and might very well donate—without educative information as well, this could lead very quickly to a disconnect and a feeling that all the charity/charities were after were donations, particularly if the fundraising materials were thought to be manipulative to evoke an emotional response. Advertisements that could induce empathy in viewers were far more likely to be successful, as did those which offered solutions and actions.

Many NGOs are unhappy about the complexities and there are ongoing tensions, contradictions, and lack of coherence in their communications with the public, as Orgad points out (chapter 9). Reassurance and comfort take precedence over disruption of the social order with the result that there is often a lack of clarity and truthfulness about the very factors that may lead a humanitarian crisis to come about.

7. The use of social media has been harnessed destructively as well as constructively in humanitarian crises

Wide use of mobile phones has fuelled normative expectations of communication in a crisis. In many situations this has beneficial effects as outlined by Meier, and Wall and Reid (chapters 15 and 18).

But these new technologies have also been widely used in humanitarian crises to promulgate violence and fear. This phenomenon was documented widely at the time of the 2007–2008 Kenyan elections in which SMS and blogs in particular were used to spread inter-tribal hate speech. The crowd-sourced website Ushahidi (Swahili for witness) was set up in response to this in order to collate eyewitness accounts of post-election violence.
Coverage of the Arab Spring and then of the Syrian conflict was often heavily reliant on user-generated content because journalists had limited access to the areas where the news was happening. Verification processes had to be quickly professionalised to deal with the sheer volume of content, and at times the propaganda element of such content was not fully appreciated by journalists. Activists also learned how to manipulate the story for their own benefit; an arresting 2012 report by Channel 4 News from Homs about the video activist Omar Talawi revealed how the veejays were embellishing a report by burning a tyre behind them (http://www.channel4.com/news/syrias-video-journalists-battle-to-tell-the-truth).

But the growth of social networking and smartphones with high quality video has altered the way that those with a message of terror to spread now have increasing ways to do so.

In the early days after 9/11, “martyrdom” videos were seen as a key part of the process of preparing an act of terror and making sure its effect spread. There was widespread debate—and often condemnation—if broadcasters such as Al Jazeera transmitted those messages.

Twitter, text, and video changed this. Here in the UK, after the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013, one of the killers, Michael Adebolajo, handed out a pre-prepared written statement at the scene and also made remarks filmed on a mobile phone by a bystander in the hopes that this would go viral via social networks such as YouTube and Twitter, as well as being scooped up by the mainstream media. Instead of engaging journalists, they engaged passersby and got them to do their work for them.

The media regulator Ofcom later warned the major broadcasters to learn lessons after “looping” mobile phone footage, showing one of the killers (Sweney, 2014). But the perpetrators had achieved what they set out to do: this was a murder committed in the public eye to be spread via social networks.

It has often been said that when the mainstream news media is absent from a field of conflict, the most inhumane acts can pass unnoticed. However, recent coverage by news media is not a guarantee that dreadful acts will not happen again. What has been particularly concerning is the use of social media in order to ensure mainstream media cover the most grim of stories—in particular the deliberate targeting of humanitarian workers and journalists.

At the time of writing (September 2014), Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL, has released three professionally edited videos purporting to show the beheading of two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and David Haines, a British aid worker—while using another hostage, freelancer John Cantlie to seemingly present videos espousing their cause.

Unlike previous videos emanating from militants of hostage killings of humanitarian workers, journalists and civilians—such as Margaret Hassan, Daniel Pearl, and Ken Bigley—the Islamic State videos are increasingly slick with high
production values. The videos of Foley, Sotloff, and Haines use multiple cameras, professional microphones and sophisticated editing techniques, interspersing the unfolding events with footage of leaders such as David Cameron and Barack Obama. The captives are all dressed in the orange jumpsuits identified with Guantanamo Bay.

The earlier hostage videos were so gruesome that sharing was limited and were narrated in Arabic rather than English. But the most recent films appear to be designed to have wider coverage in the West. And if that is the intention, Islamic State have succeeded, with front pages dominated (at the time of writing) every time a video is released.

After the announcement of Sotloff's death, Al Jazeera PR put out the following tweet:
We respect Steven Sotloff and won't air images of his death, or him in a jumpsuit. We suggest all media do the same. #ISISmediaBlackout Al Jazeera PR (@AlJazeera) September 2, 2014

The same calls were heard after the death of Haines. And while some newspapers did focus on the kind of images that the Sotloff and Haines family would prefer, most of the mainstream media found the imagery too compelling—and indeed often compared them with Foley’s appearance, handing IS the result that they wanted.

This becomes, as Cottle puts it in chapter 1, “image wars”: when the use of such media techniques becomes implicated in the acts of violence. The fears that non-reporting of conflict in the past allowed inhumane acts to occur has now become disturbingly twisted as the presence of media—social media, then re-mediated by mainstream media—fuels such barbarous acts.

Conclusion

In September 1943, famine engulfed Calcutta in what Ian Stephens, then editor of the Indian publication the Statesman described as “slow dispirited noiseless apathy” (1966, p. 184). When he started to comprehend the suffering that was happening, he found official denials and cover-ups all around him. Cables leaving Bengal were watched carefully, and all "such meaningful words as famine, corpse, starvation were methodically struck out” by (India’s) central government (p. 187) and the Bengal government stopped putting out mortality statistics. For two months the Statesman waged a campaign to allow the truth about the famine to get out. Yet even so, estimates are that between 7 and 10 million people died of starvation, malnutrition, and disease out of a population of 60 million, during 1943–1944.

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale hit Haiti at 16.53 local time. At 17.00 Haitian Fredo Dupoux posted one of the first recorded tweets: “Oh shiet [sic] heavy earthquake right now! In Haiti”, along
with tweeter @FutureHaiti who said “Earthquake 7 Richter scale just happening #Haiti” (Macleod, 2010).

On the surface the difference between the cover-up of the Bengal Famine nearly seventy years earlier and the extensive coverage of the Haiti earthquake could not appear more stark: one characterised by no information or disinformation; the other by “ordinary” people getting volumes of material out about the trauma.

The communication of humanitarian issues has undergone profound changes in recent years, and the introduction of new technologies has aided this. But it would be naïve not to realise that, alongside the opportunities, there are grave problems exposed.

For journalists, many working in increasing squeezed financially situations, the temptation in crisis stories to rely increasingly on social media accounts and film/photos provided by either onlookers or humanitarians—at least initially—is huge. But there are dangers here. While much of social media rumour is quickly self-corrected, alongside the deluge of genuine pictures of 2012’s Hurricane Sandy, an analysis of the top 100 most-tweeted picture stories for the Guardian datablog showed that 15% were fakes (Burgess, Vis, & Bruns, 2012). And following the Boston Marathon bombings, social media tried to crowdsourse the identifying of the perpetrators with a terrifying lack of success (Shih, 2013.) While the growth of agencies like Storyful and the aftermath of stories such as Boston have meant that journalists are increasingly cautious about the use of such material, there is still much unverified material used. Journalists need to continue to be transparent about the material they use and give the credit to citizen journalists if they reproduce such material.

For humanitarians, the attraction of the idea that Big Data could rapidly transform the dispersal of aid is huge; but while there are many exciting steps forward in this area, the best use of such computer models will only come about with clear leadership and protocols to ensure it is deployed most successfully. Technology alone is no substitute for experience.

To make sure that the connection between donor and agency and beneficiary remains strong, aid agencies need to challenge themselves about the fundraising images they use. While most would agree past tasteless and patriarchal imagery, promulgating the idea of a dependent majority world ‘saved’ by rich white Westerners, is recognised as unacceptable, many of those involved in this book warned that agencies were still using imagery and text that portrayed a majority world in an infantilised and simplistic way—combined with an approach which consumerises the very act of giving.

Finally, journalists and aid agencies have worked together for years to try to bring to public attention those stories that the public should hear: often those in the most obscure part of the world. While criticisms have been made of the
symbiotic relationship these two groups have had, at its most positive it is clear that by working together, journalists and NGOs have brought some of the most important humanitarian stories to the public domain.

What is worrying is that in the determination to share these stories, journalists and aid workers have themselves become not just storytellers but an integral image of the story. The increased targeting of both by groups such as Islamic State raises questions of the safety of both aid workers and journalists and the ability for both to do their jobs. But most of all it shows the sad fact that one of the key changes in humanitarian communication is the fact that they are now seen as valid targets.

Bibliography


Cooper, G. (2007). *Anyone here survived a wave, speak English and got a mobile? Aid agencies, the media and reporting disasters since the tsunami*. Oxford: Nuffield College.


