The transformation of citizenship in complex societies

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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. To this end, the paper is divided into six sections. The first section elucidates the main reasons for the renaissance of the concept of citizenship in the contemporary social sciences. The second section argues that a comprehensive sociological theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions: the content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. The third section suggests that in order to understand the sociological significance of T.H. Marshall’s account of legal, political, and social rights we need to explore the particular historical contexts in which citizenship rights became ideologically and institutionally relevant. The fourth section offers some critical reflections on the main shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship. The fifth section draws an analogy between the transformation of social movements and the transformation of citizenship. The sixth section sheds light on the fact that contemporary citizenship studies are confronted with a curious paradox: the differentiation of citizenship has led to both the relativistic impoverishment and the pluralistic enrichment of contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the political’. The paper concludes by arguing that, under conditions of late modernity, the state’s capacity to gain political legitimacy increasingly depends on its ability to confront the normative challenges posed by the ubiquity of societal complexity.

Keywords
citizenship, complexity, differentiation, Marshall, modernity, rights, social movements, transformation, universalism

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. Traditional notions of citizenship emerged with the rise of modern society. Hence, the rise of late modern or – as some would argue – postmodern society poses new challenges to contemporary discourses of citizenship. In the light of these challenges, a common assumption in the social sciences
is that complex forms of society require complex forms of citizenship. With the aim of assessing the validity of this assumption, the paper is structured as follows.

The first section is concerned with the reconceptualization of citizenship in recent sociological debates. As is widely acknowledged, the concept of citizenship has been enjoying a revival of paradigmatic significance in the social sciences. What are the socio-historical reasons for the thematic renaissance of the concept of citizenship?

The second section seeks to show that valuable insights can be gained from the theorization of citizenship. To this end, a brief definition of citizenship, which captures some of its key features, is offered, and it is argued that a comprehensive sociological theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions: the content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. Why can these dimensions be regarded as constitutive components of a critical sociology of citizenship?

The third section centres on what may be described as the historicization of citizenship. Different traditions of social and political thought emphasize different dimensions of citizenship. One of the most influential approaches in modern sociological theory is T.H. Marshall’s three-dimensional account of citizenship. What is the historical significance of legal, political, and social rights, and when did they become ideologically and institutionally relevant?

The fourth section offers some critical reflections on what may be conceived of as the recontextualization of citizenship, which is based on a critical examination of the explanatory value of Marshall’s account in the context of contemporary society. What are the theoretical and practical shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship, and what are the sociological implications of these shortcomings?

The fifth section sheds light on more recent ideas about the autonomization of citizenship. In order to illustrate the sociological relevance of these ideas, an analogy can be drawn between citizenship and social movements. If there is sufficient empirical evidence to demonstrate that it makes sense to distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ social movements, it may also be appropriate to distinguish ‘old’ from ‘new’ forms of citizenship. Is it plausible to suggest that there is a normative tension between the institutionalism of modern forms of political participation and the autonomism of late modern forms of political participation?

The sixth section analyses the complexification of society in terms of the differentiation of citizenship, focusing on the increasing influence of what is generally referred to as the ‘politics of difference’. On what grounds do most versions of the politics of difference advocate a radical reconceptualization of the idea of citizenship? Has the differentiation of citizenship led to the relativistic impoverishment or to the pluralistic enrichment of contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the political’? And, finally, to what extent do increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship?

The reconceptualization of citizenship – Citizenship in a new era: Neoliberalism, postcommunism, multiculturalism, and globalization

Both in theoretically orientated academic discourses and in practically orientated political discourses, the concept of citizenship is highly contentious. This paper examines the concept of citizenship by drawing upon both classical and contemporary sociological
approaches to the nature of social and political participation in the modern era. In recent years, the concept of citizenship has been enjoying a revival of considerable discursive relevance and intellectual scope in the social sciences. In order to make sense of this thematic renaissance, we need to understand the historical conditions under which citizenship has become an increasingly important concept in contemporary social and political thought. At least three significant historical dimensions have contributed to the rising interest in the concept of citizenship.

The first factor is the consolidation of neoliberalism as the hegemonic ideology in contemporary society. The triumph of the neoliberal model is strongly associated with the crisis of the welfare state. There is a complex set of social and political tendencies directly related to the dissolution of the post-war social-democratic consensus: privatization, de-nationalization, de-regulation, de-centralization, de-bureaucratization, and flexibilization – to mention only a few of the tendencies which lie at the heart of the neoliberal project. Under the neoliberal model, the ‘internal or domestic protection of citizenship rights for poor and disadvantaged citizens’ (Janoski, 1998: 4) competes with the external and global protection of capital rights for investment and trade. Thus, in the context of neoliberalism, citizenship appears to have been converted into an increasingly privatized affair of capitalist society.

The second aspect is the emergence of what is commonly referred to as postsocialism or postcommunism: there is a widespread belief that, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, we have come to live in a world in which there is no viable alternative to the ideological and material predominance of capitalism. The collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe epitomizes the triumph of capitalism in a postcommunist world. The legitimacy of the neoliberal project seems to be confirmed by the quasi-ubiquity of capitalism on a global level. The ‘re-creation of citizenship and civil society in the transition to democracy and capitalism’ (Janoski, 1998: 4) forms an essential part of the construction of an increasingly globalized world in which capitalism has succeeded in affirming its social legitimacy by virtue of its ideological and material hegemony. In other words, in the context of postcommunism, citizenship appears to have established itself as a universalized affair of a global capitalist society.

The third element is the rise of multiculturalism, which is now widely recognized as a constitutive feature of a substantial number of advanced societies. Intensified flows of migration have led to complex processes of cultural hybridization which transcend traditional, and hence national, frameworks of citizenship. In advanced societies, processes of systemic differentiation go hand in hand with processes of cultural fragmentation. The ‘increasing international claims on citizenship by immigrants and refugees’ (Janoski, 1998: 4) tend to undermine the political legitimacy of the nation-state, which is largely based on the belief in cultural homogeneity expressed in the ideological construction of an imagined community. The assumption that ‘a nation needs a state just as a state needs a nation’ may be considered complementary to the idea that ‘there is no nation without citizenship just as there is no citizenship without a nation’. Nevertheless, in the context of multiculturalism, citizenship appears to have become a hybridized affair of a global capitalist and multiplex society.

In short, the renewed interest in the concept of citizenship is due to three main factors: the consolidation of the neoliberal project, the emergence of a postcommunist world, and the rise of multicultural politics. Under the neoliberal model, citizenship has been transformed
into a privatized affair of an ever more *commodified* society; in the postcommunist context, citizenship has been turned into a universalized affair of an increasingly *globalized* society; and, following the multicultural agenda, citizenship has been converted into a hybridized affair of a culturally *fragmented* society.

These three dimensions can be regarded as the most crucial, but by no means the only, historical conditions which have led to a renewed interest in citizenship over the past decades. It is worth noting that the aforementioned factors – that is, neoliberalism, post-communism, and multiculturalism – are constitutive components of the *globalization* of society. The omnipresence of globalization poses the question of whether or not globalized societies require globalized forms of citizenship. In this sense, the renewed interest in citizenship is, at least partly, due to the restructuration processes of an increasingly interconnected world. Regardless of whether or not we consider globalization to be a constitutive process of the present age, we cannot dissociate the discursive re-signification of citizenship from the structural transformation of society.

### The theorization of citizenship – The reality of citizenship: Content, type, conditions, and arrangements

‘Citizenship can be described as *both* a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual’s membership in a polity’ (Isin and Wood, 1999: 4). In the light of this definition, it would be erroneous to reduce the notion of citizenship either to a merely sociological or to a purely legal category, for what is crucial to membership in a polity is the way in which the sociological and the legal aspects of citizenship are interrelated (see Isin and Wood, 1999: 4). The socio-relational and politico-legal dimensions of citizenship are mutually inclusive and interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive and competing, aspects of the modern world: just as social practices are regulated by the legal institutions of modern societies, judicial frameworks are shaped by the social practices of modern subjects. Recognizing the complexity of processes of structural differentiation in the modern world, a comprehensive theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four key dimensions: the *content*, the *type*, the *conditions*, and the *arrangements* of citizenship (see Turner, 1993: 3).

First, the *content* of citizenship concerns both the entitlements and the obligations which arise from an individual’s membership in a polity. Thus, the content of somebody’s formal participation in a politically defined community refers to ‘the exact nature of the rights and duties which define citizenship’ (Turner, 1993: 3). If we accept that citizenship can be regarded ‘as a status which is enjoyed by a person who is a full member of a community’ (Marshall, 1994: 54), then it becomes clear that the individual’s position in the modern world depends on the possibility of access to the rights conferred, and the duties imposed, by a particular polity in relation to a given society. The content of citizenship, however, can never be taken for granted as it is spatiotemporally contingent. The historical specificity of every polity sets the parameters for the dynamic relationship between the state’s political legitimacy and the subjects’ political identity. Despite the fact that there are significant differences between historically specific forms of citizenship, one common feature of most modern forms of citizenship is that – following Marshall⁸ – they
stipulate the legal, political, and social characteristics of rights and duties. These characteristics may be considered as the triadic nucleus of modern citizenship, but this is not to suggest that they therefore constitute a complete institutional framework of society. Citizenship is always a contentious, rather than a completed, project aimed at defining the relationship between the state and its subjects. Indeed, the possibility of the historical development of citizenship is indicative of the impossibility of its total completion. What manifests itself in the social and political struggles over the content of citizenship is the normativity which is inherent in all forms of social and political participation.

Second, the type of citizenship refers to the specific form in which social and political participation is organized (cf. Marshall, 1964 [1963]). The content of every set of rights and obligations needs to be institutionalized in concrete social and political arrangements if it is aimed at allowing individuals to develop a sense of civic belonging to a given society. Empowering forms of citizenship must seek to make the creation of social and political participation possible in order to be more than a mere façade of decorative democracy. To be sure, abstract ideals – such as freedom and equality – can be pursued and defended by different political systems; the translation of these ideals into material reality, however, can differ substantially between political – for example, liberal-democratic and state-socialist – systems, demonstrating that the political legitimacy of powerful regimes is contingent upon the discursive elasticity of powerful ideas. Different forms of political organization favour different types of citizenship. In fact, social and political struggles over different types of citizenship are symptomatic of the contentiousness which surrounds all practical attempts to translate abstract ideals into material reality.

Third, the conditions of citizenship can be identified ‘with the social forces that produce … practices’ (Turner, 1993: 3) of civic participation by virtue of state power. The historical conditionality of citizenship is due to the social agency of the subject; there is no citizenship without citizens. To comprehend the conditions under which citizenship inscribes itself into the contingency of history requires accounting for the social conditionality of every polity: different contents and different types of citizenship emerge out of spatiotemporally specific conditions. The consolidation of citizenship is not a historical accident, but the result of social struggles over the establishment of the necessary conditions which allow for the right to political participation. Thus, citizenship does not exist simply in and for itself; rather, it exists through society, that is, it exists insofar as it is embedded in society. In this sense, it is not the nature of citizenship that explains the nature of social struggles, but, on the contrary, it is the nature of social struggles that explains the nature of citizenship. The historical indeterminacy of citizenship derives from the collective agency generated through social struggles over established forms of normativity. Every struggle for or against the legitimacy of a given polity corroborates the fact that no form of citizenship can possibly escape the malleability of the structural conditions which allow for the construction of society.

Fourth, the arrangements of citizenship constitute the institutionalized ways in which ‘benefits are distributed to different sectors of society’ (Turner, 1993: 3). In modern society, resources are distributed via administrative arrangements whose existence is guaranteed by the institutionalization of citizenship. Hence, the recognition not only of legal and political rights but also of social rights is fundamental to the functioning of modern
democracies. In fact, it is the cross-fertilizing function of legal, political, and social rights which converts citizenship into an effective political tool capable of guaranteeing people’s status as recognized members of a given society. The integrative power of citizenship hinges on the state’s capacity to unite and control a territorially defined and ideologically imagined community. The relative stability of citizenship rests on people’s identification with and commitment to the polity which represents their respective society. In the modern era, large-scale demographic integration is inconceivable without a minimal degree of state legitimation derived from social and political identification. The struggles over institutionalized ways of allocating resources are a sign of the systemic need for legitimacy which is built into the integrationist nature of every modern polity.

In short, a comprehensive theory of citizenship needs to account for the social complexity of four dimensions: the normativity of different contents of citizenship, the contentiousness of different types of citizenship, the malleability of the conditions of citizenship, and the legitimacy of the arrangements of citizenship.

The historicization of citizenship – The Marshallian paradigm of citizenship: Civil, political, and social rights

If we acknowledge that different sociological traditions emphasize different dimensions of citizenship, it comes as no surprise that diverging approaches to citizenship put forward diverging conceptions of citizenship. Indeed, the multiplicity of sociological approaches to particular aspects of human reality is indicative of the complexity underlying the multilayered construction of society. Theories of citizenship are no exception: what manifests itself in the plurality of different approaches to citizenship is the complexity of the constitutive elements of citizenship. By definition, all sociological concepts are subject to the multidimensional scrutiny of perspectival pluralism. Concepts do not enjoy the transcendental freedom of existing – as free-floating categories – beyond the specific cognitive interests by which all knowledge-producing entities, including social scientists, are unavoidably driven; on the contrary, explanatory bias has to be understood as an integral part of social theorizing. Applying this epistemological insight to the debate on the concept of citizenship, it is crucial to recognize that the way in which citizenship is theorized depends largely on the explanatory presuppositions implicitly operative in a given social analysis. Thus, in one way or another, every theory of citizenship – whether it considers itself to be ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’, ‘left’ or ‘right’, ‘progressive’ or ‘conservative’ – is impregnated with the ideological parameters of its own explanatory framework.

The complexity of social analysis, which is partly due to the diversity of available explanatory tools, is reflected in the fact that all attempts to categorize different theoretical approaches to citizenship are necessarily undertaken under specific typological criteria. Within the field of citizenship studies, three prominent theoretical traditions – with diverging sociological emphases and explanatory presuppositions – can be distinguished: the Marshallian theory of citizenship, the Tocquevillian/Durkheimian account of civic culture, and the Gramscian/Marxist model of civil society (cf. Janoski, 1998: 6). Rather than examining the respective strengths and weaknesses of these theoretical traditions, this section aims to stress the sociological significance and continuing relevance of Marshall’s theory of citizenship (see Marshall, 1964 [1963]; see also Marshall, 1981).
Marshall’s theory of citizenship is based on a – by now well-known – typology of *citizenship rights*. According to this typology, the historical development of civic forms of belonging and participation manifests itself in the evolutionary development of citizenship rights. Given its evolutionist underpinnings, Marshall’s theory can be regarded as a ‘stage theory’, that is, as a sociological theory which identifies three decisive historical stages that are particularly relevant to understanding ‘the struggle for, and attainment of, citizenship’ (Mann, 1994 [1987]: 63) in the modern era. In the light of Marshall’s tripartite conception of citizenship, the following three dimensions are crucial to the historical development of modern citizenship: civil, political, and social rights. From Marshall’s perspective, citizenship can be considered as a mediator between the principle of economic liberty and the principle of social equality: the conflict between the individualistic pursuit of economic liberty and the collectivistic quest for social equality lies at the heart of every regulated capitalist society.

Civil citizenship constitutes a predominant paradigm of the eighteenth century, guaranteeing the individual’s legal and judicial rights and thereby challenging the arbitrary power of the absolutist regimes of the premodern era. Political citizenship represents a predominant paradigm of the nineteenth century, consolidating the individual’s participatory and electoral rights, which are central to the project of modern democracy. Social citizenship embodies a predominant paradigm of the twentieth century, particularly of the post-war period from 1945 onwards, ensuring the individual’s social rights to economic welfare and material security. The historical relevance of civil, political, and social rights is illustrated in the existence of three central institutions of modern society: the law courts, the parliament, and the welfare system (see Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202; see also Turner, 2009: 68).

There are at least three reasons why Marshall’s account of the historical development of civil, political, and social rights is central to a critical sociology of citizenship: first, owing to its theoretical relevance to the debates on citizenship in the contemporary social sciences; second, because of its empirical relevance to the study of citizenship rights and citizenship-based institutions in contemporary societies; and, third, in consideration of its normative relevance to the question of whether – and, if so, to what extent – Marshall’s triadic account of citizenship does justice to the structural complexity of advanced societies. In the face of this complexity, we need to examine the main pitfalls of Marshall’s account of citizenship. It is the purpose of the following section to provide a critical analysis of the Marshallian perspective.

**The recontextualization of citizenship – The complexity of citizenship: Against conceptual reductionism**

It is because of, not despite, the fact that Marshall’s theory of citizenship has been highly influential that it has been criticized on several counts. Therefore, the numerous criticisms levelled against the Marshallian account of modern citizenship should be regarded as symptomatic not only of its substantial weaknesses but also of its overall explanatory strength. Notwithstanding Marshall’s significant contribution to the sociological study of citizenship, it is important to be aware of the fundamental pitfalls and shortcomings of the Marshallian perspective. Indeed, Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be questioned on at least six grounds.
Marshall’s theory of citizenship is problematic in that it is based on *evolutionist* assumptions. Thus, it can be criticized ‘for developing an evolutionary perspective on the historical emergence of citizenship’ (Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202). According to such an evolutionary view, the historical development of citizenship is shaped by the underlying driving forces which determine both the constitution and the evolution of modern society. To be more precise, Marshall’s evolutionist framework is founded on three assumptions: first, the assumption that the historical development of society in general and of citizenship in particular is inevitable (*determinism*); second, the assumption that this inevitable historical development is linear and progressive (*teleologism*); and, third, the assumption that citizenship rights can be regarded as ideological expressions and institutionalized effects of the historical development of modern society, guaranteeing the systemic stability and political legitimacy of capitalism (*functionalism*). In other words, Marshall’s evolutionist account of citizenship remains trapped in a deterministic, teleological, and functionalist understanding of social development.

Marshall’s historical evolutionism can be characterized as *idealistic* ‘for failing to consider the wider social context’ (Turner, 1994b [1990]: 202) within which social rights were translated into welfare policy, namely in the Second World War period and in the post-war era. ‘Sociologists are prone to forget that “evolution” is usually geo-politically assisted’ (Mann, 1994 [1987]: 76). Marshall, in this regard, is no exception, for his account of citizenship fails to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the emergence of social rights is inextricably linked to the Second World War and the subsequent reconstruction period in Europe. In times of international war and national reconstruction, the systematic use of all-inclusive incorporation programmes constitutes an indispensable strategic imperative of nation-states, which – in the face of the difficult challenges posed by profound social and political crises – are forced to make extensive use of their material and ideological resources to unite and mobilize their respective populations. Given the historical determinacy of their emergence, it would be hard to deny that social rights are strategically allocated, rather than altruistically donated, by the nation-state. The legitimacy of social rights does not rise above but is contingent upon the interest-laden historicity of social development.

Marshall’s account of citizenship suffers from an unhealthy degree of *formalism* in that it seems to suggest that the attainment of citizenship rights in the twentieth century is a social process which is both complete and irreversible. According to this perspective, citizenship rights – once they are both recognized and institutionalized – represent irretrievable features of modern democracies. Nevertheless, the assumption that the consolidation of citizenship rights is both complete and irreversible is deeply flawed for at least two reasons. First, we need to acknowledge that complex societies require complex forms of citizenship. Complex forms of citizenship have to prove that they can transcend the limitations of Marshall’s tripartite framework of legal, political, and social rights and thereby do justice to the normative significance of other – for example, cultural, sexual, and human – rights. Second, we need to acknowledge that both the recognition and the realization of citizenship rights are far from irretrievable, as is unequivocally illustrated by the continuing presence and frequent resurgence of dictatorial regimes in numerous parts of the world, which are powerful enough to ‘turn the clock back’. The consolidation of citizenship rights can always potentially be undermined by
their violation, just as the restoration of citizenship rights can always potentially be jeopardized by their abolition. To borrow two terms from the German language, the attainment of citizenship rights is never definitely abgeschlossen (completed), but always potentially ausgeschlossen (precluded). In the modern world, citizenship rights are both a central target and an effective vehicle of social struggles. With the rise of neoliberal policies, for instance, social rights have been relegated further down the agenda, for an essential component of the neoliberal project is to roll back the state by rolling forward the market. The systematic deconstruction of the welfare state implies the gradual dissolution of social citizenship rights. If citizenship rights have one irreversible feature it is their reversibility.

(iv) Given its emphasis on the development of citizenship rights in Britain, the Marshallian account remains largely ethnocentric. Marshall’s theoretical model constitutes an explanatory framework that may well provide an accurate account of the constitution and evolution of citizenship in Britain, but this does by no means guarantee that it can be equally applied to other countries. ‘Marshall’s logic of social progress has been found wanting when applied to other national experiences. In Germany, for instance, social policy innovation came first, in order to compensate for deficient political rights’ (Hemerijck, 2001: 138). The British – or, to be more precise, the English – experience does not necessarily coincide with the experience of other countries. Of course, it would be erroneous to assume – in accordance with an orthodox Marxist conception of social change – that there is a straightforward correlation between an ‘economic base’ and an ‘ideological superstructure’. Yet, even if we reject an economistic conception of social change, we are compelled to acknowledge that different types of capitalism have created, and will always continue to create, different types of citizenship.

(v) Marshall’s take on citizenship may be criticized for being insufficiently radical and overly reformist in that it is based on the naïve assumption ‘that citizenship has rendered class struggle innocuous’ (Mann, 1994 [1987]: 63). Notwithstanding the question of whether or not capitalism and democracy can be reconciled, it is hard to refute that modern citizenship – in particular with regard to its provision of welfare rights – serves as a legitimizing vehicle for class compromise, rather than as a delegitimizing vehicle for class struggle. The integrative function of social citizenship manifests itself in its systemic power not to undermine but to stabilize capitalism, thereby reaffirming its position as the hegemonic form of social reproduction in the modern era. The concession policies epitomized in the introduction of social citizenship rights seek to overcome radicalism through reformism, revolutionism through revisionism, class struggle through class compromise, rebellion through restoration, and state communism through regulated capitalism. The institutionalization of class conflict through the consolidation of citizenship contributes to the reproduction, rather than the transformation, of class domination, in that it is aimed at mitigating, rather than instigating, the struggle between capital and labour.

(vi) Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be, and has been, attacked for providing a reductionist account of the development of citizens’ rights in modern society. The notion of reductionism, however, is a somewhat ambiguous one, not only because it seems to be fashionable in the social sciences to discredit particular approaches using this label, but also because the term ‘reductionist’ can be conceptually stretched in a number of ways. With regard to the question of whether Marshall’s account of citizenship can be applied
to advanced – that is, increasingly complex – societies, there are at least three types of criticism on the basis of which the Marshallian approach may be accused of putting forward a reductionist conception of citizenship.

First, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards étatisme, which reduces citizenship to an ideological affair of the state apparatus and tends to underestimate the democratic potentials of what, in contemporary discourses, is commonly referred to as ‘civil society’, which can be legitimately regarded as the stronghold of active citizenship.

Second, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards universalism, which reduces citizenship to a quasi-transcendental political programme whose ideological strength lies in its a priori commitment to liberty and equality, but whose real political weakness manifests itself in its de facto blindness to identity and difference.

Third, inherent in Marshall’s account is a modernist tendency towards teleologism, which reduces citizenship to a tripartite framework of legal, political, and social rights and which, as a result, portrays citizenship as a quasi-completed project, that is, as a normative framework which does not allow for the inclusion of other – for example, cultural, sexual, and human – rights and thus fails to do justice to the increasing complexity of advanced societies.

Taken together, these three elements – that is, étatisme, universalism, and teleologism – are a significant source of theoretical reductionism in Marshall’s account of citizenship. If we accept that citizenship does not represent an autonomous, let alone autopoietic, reality, then we also need to acknowledge that the nature and development of citizenship cannot be divorced from the constitution and evolution of society as a whole. In other words, the potential transformation of citizenship is intimately interrelated with the potential transformation of society.

One of the most debated questions in contemporary social and political theory is whether or not, in the late twentieth century, modern forms of society have been replaced by ‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ forms of society. In the light of this dispute, one of the main issues to be examined in contemporary social and political analysis is the question of whether increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship. It shall be the task of the remainder of this paper to respond, however tentatively, to this question.

The autonomization of citizenship – New challenges to citizenship: Between old and new social movements

From a sociological perspective, it seems sensible to draw an analogy between citizenship and social movements because, over the past decades, both the alleged transformation of the former and the alleged transformation of the latter have been extensively discussed in relation to the contention that we have entered a ‘late modern’, or possibly even ‘postmodern’, age. Owing to the profound structural transformations experienced by advanced societies, contemporary sociological accounts of citizenship and social movements tend to be based on the descriptive assumption that the nature and role of both the former and the latter have changed, as well as on the normative assumption that the nature and role of both the former and the latter ought to have changed. It is not
purpose of this section to offer a detailed analysis of the emergence and characteristics of ‘new social movements’ (see Susen, 2010). Rather, this section focuses on some key aspects which illustrate the sociological usefulness of providing a comparative analysis of citizenship and social movements.

To assume that it ‘is important to put a particular emphasis on the notion of social struggles as the central motor of the drive for citizenship’ (Turner, 1994 [1990]: 203, italics added) means to suggest that citizenship is always in the process of being constructed and reconstructed, negotiated and renegotiated, shaped and reshaped. In a similar vein, to recognize that it is imperative to put a particular emphasis on the notion of social movements as the central motor of the drive for civil society means to acknowledge that civil society is always in the process of being built and rebuilt, structured and restructured, and formed and re-formed. Thus, it is essential to abandon a static and top-down conception of passive citizenship in favour of a dynamic and bottom-up conception of active citizenship. For such a view permits us to shed light on the sociological implications of the fact that citizenship is both the outcome and the vehicle of social struggles: the very existence of citizenship should not be taken for granted but regarded as a historical achievement of painstaking negotiation over legitimate forms of social integration and political participation in the face of permanent modernization.

Both contemporary forms of citizenship and contemporary social movements play a pivotal role in defining the political landscape of advanced societies. Yet, whereas the former tend to contribute to processes of social institutionalization, the latter are oriented towards processes of social autonomization. A prominent view in the current literature on collective action suggests that ‘new’ social movements, as opposed to ‘old’ social movements, have become increasingly influential collective actors capable of setting the political agenda in late modern societies. Hence, the obvious question to be asked is what makes ‘new’ social movements different from ‘old’ social movements. It is generally assumed that ‘new’ social movements share the following features.

First, they are supposed to be primarily social and cultural. In contrast to classical forms of collective mobilization, they are – if at all – only secondarily political, since their target is the ‘mobilization of civil society, not the seizure of power’ (Feher and Heller, 1984: 37).

Second, bypassing the state and established institutions, they are ‘located within civil society’ (Taylor, 1989: 17, italics added). Therefore, they seek to realize their political aims not ‘from above’ through parliamentary decision-making processes using the state apparatus of pluralist societies, but ‘from below’ through grassroots decision-making processes bypassing the hegemonic forces of the political establishment.

Third, they aim to bring about social change by focusing on the creation and spread of alternative values, life-styles, and identities. In this sense, they seek to develop idiosyncratic patterns of target articulation and reject mainstream patterns of social and political participation.

Fourth, they stress the normative centrality of the quest for personal and collective autonomy in the day-to-day construction of an alternative society. This search for autonomy, however, must not be misunderstood as a complete retreat from the political sphere or as a kind of escapism; rather, it should be seen as an ‘extension of politics to cover a wider range of concerns and social relations’ (Taylor, 1989: 17). Indeed, what manifests
itself in the defence of both personal and collective autonomy is a sustained attempt to redefine citizenship in terms of a move away from ‘representative democracy’ embodied in the state towards ‘direct democracy’ based on civil society.

As recent debates illustrate, ‘civil society’ is a controversial and historically variable concept in social and political theory. Yet, despite the fact that there are substantial points of divergence between different theoretical approaches to the concept of civil society, the predominant view in the literature is that the concept of civil society refers to a ‘third sector, situated between the state and the market’ (Serrano, 1999: 56). ‘Civil society is a combination of social movements, civil associations, informal groups and influent individuals of public opinion, whose action preserves and enlarges the horizons of social autonomy’ (Olvera Rivera, 1999: 343). Thus, civil society can be conceived of as ‘a sphere of freedom against a potentially despotic state’ (Friedmann, 1998: 21) and the commodifying market. New social movements are a stronghold of the third sector, firmly situated between the state and the market, for their target is not the seizure of institutional power but the mobilization of civil society.

In the light of the above reflections, it would be fair to suggest that classical notions of citizenship are – or at least appear to be – diametrically opposed to contemporary notions of collective action, for the nature of new forms of social mobilization appears to differ significantly from the nature of old forms of citizenship. In contrast to new social movements, citizenship – at least in the classical sense – contains the following characteristics: (i) it is primarily legal, political, and social; (ii) it is located within the state; (iii) it is based on traditional patterns of participation; and (iv) it is embedded in conventional models of representative democracy.

Hence, the main insight gained from drawing an analogy between citizenship and social movements can be described as follows: the normative tension between the institutionalism of modern citizenship and the autonomism of new social movements indicates that there is a profound discrepancy between ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ conceptions of participation, predominant in industrial societies, and ‘late modern’ and ‘postmodern’ conceptions of participation, prevalent in postindustrial societies. In essence, there has been a paradigmatic shift from the ‘premodern’ preoccupation with the seizure of power and the ‘modern’ concern with the participation in power towards the ‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ search for the autonomy from power.

If citizenship is to be located within the state, through which political participation and representation are made possible, then the legitimacy of classical forms of citizenship is substantially undermined by the posttraditional agendas of new social movements. The contemporary idea that civil society serves as a realm of collective empowerment ‘from below’ challenges the traditional idea that citizenship serves as a realm of collective empowerment ‘from above’. The former perspective is particularly common amongst defenders of deliberative forms of democracy, whereas the latter view tends to be embraced by advocates of representative forms of democracy. A reappropriation of citizenship must not simply be tied to an abstract set of rights guaranteed by the “rule of law”, but address the deeper bases of social power (Taylor, 1989: 20). Just as ‘new’ social movements seek to overcome the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collective mobilization, ‘new’ forms of citizenship need to go beyond the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of collective representation. In order to allow for the possibility of democracy in the context of
increasing societal complexity, the gradual autonomization of social mobilization needs to go hand in hand with the gradual autonomization of citizenship. The normative grounds on which a convincing plea for the autonomization of citizenship can be made shall be examined in the following section.

The differentiation of citizenship – The generality of citizenship: The particular problem of universalism

Just as the emergence of ‘new social movements’ appears to undermine the legitimacy of classical forms of citizenship, the rise of the ‘politics of difference’ (Young, 1990) is an indication of the fact that traditional notions of social belonging and political participation have lost a great deal of credibility. Nevertheless, this does not mean that citizenship has been transformed into an anachronistic appendage of the state whose integrative function ceases to have relevance in advanced societies. In the face of the increasing complexity of the late modern world, it is the legitimacy not of citizenship in general but of modern citizenship in particular which has come under attack.

The complexification of the contemporary world manifests itself in the differentiation of society into increasingly specialized and fragmented functional realms (see Susen, 2007: 67–71, 92–93, 171–180, 185, and 192). The question that arises in the light of the fact that the contemporary world is shaped by profound cultural and systemic differentiation processes is to what extent increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship. The sociological significance of this question is reflected in the transformation of contemporary forms of social mobilization and political organization: just as traditional notions of citizenship have been challenged by post-traditional notions of citizenship, the agendas of old social movements have been contested by the agendas of new social movements.

There is little doubt that the multiplicity of contemporary social movements enriches the discursive pluralism of civil society. Yet, in order for the emancipatory potentials of a diverse and polycentric civil society to have a tangible impact on the course of history, the discursive pluralism of new forms of collective mobilization needs to be translated into the institutional pluralism of new forms of political organization. Public spheres in advanced pluralistic societies tend to be characterized by the presence of an eclectic variety of social movements: proletarian movements; ethnic movements; religious movements; feminist movements; environmentalist movements; anti-racist movements; anti-fascist movements; peace movements; squatter movements; student movements; youth movements; gay, lesbian, and bisexual movements; civil rights movements; and animal rights movements – to mention only a few. The diversification of small-scale collective mobilization is intimately intertwined with the complexification of large-scale social organization.

When comparing modern forms of citizenship and late modern forms of collective mobilization, we are confronted with various normative tensions, such as institutionalism versus autonomism, universalism versus particularism, and equality versus difference. What becomes obvious when reflecting on these tensions is that there is a stark contrast between ‘early modern’ and ‘late modern’ political agendas: a main strength of new social movements is their capacity to recognize and promote difference and
particularity; a key weakness of classical forms of citizenship is their incapacity to incorporate and institutionalize the widespread demand for the recognition and promotion of difference and particularity.

Given the sociological importance of group-specific differences and particularities, the viability of differentialist models of citizenship depends on their ability to overcome at least three crucial shortcomings inherent in universalistic models of citizenship:

(i) Universalistic models of citizenship tend to treat equality as sameness (totalization).
(ii) Universalistic models of citizenship tend to homogenize the heterogeneous (hegemonization).
(iii) Universalistic models of citizenship, by seeking to transcend group-specific differences, in practice tend to exclude and disempower particular social groups (marginalization).

Far from being neutral or disinterested, this threefold universalization process reinforces the privileged status of the most powerful social groups and the unprivileged status of the least powerful social groups. To totalize sameness means to suppress the other, not to recognize it. To hegemonize the heterogeneous means to colonize difference, not to respect it. And to marginalize the disempowered means to further exclude them, not to integrate them.

In view of the above reservations, the ideal of universal citizenship turns out to be a somewhat ambiguous affair: its philosophical strength lies in its categorical commitment to equality; its practical weakness, however, emanates from its inherent tendency to reinforce social processes of totalization, hegemonization, and marginalization by ignoring and transcending, rather than recognizing and promoting, group-specific differences and particularities:

In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege; for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.

(Young, 1994 [1989]: 391)\(^{30}\)

Thus, an emancipatory notion of citizenship which aims to acknowledge and promote, rather than ignore and suppress, group-specific differences would have to prove that it is able to translate the multiplicity of social and cultural particularities into a plurality of social and cultural citizenships: Marshall’s three-dimensional conception of citizenship – founded on civil, political, and social rights – would have to be extended to a multidimensional conception of citizenship – based on a large variety of socio-specific rights – in order to do justice to the material and ideological complexities to be faced in highly differentiated societies.

What emerges when confronting the polycentric structurality which underlies every highly differentiated society is the possibility of creating an eclectic variety of different forms of citizenship: ‘civil citizenship’, ‘political citizenship’, ‘social citizenship’, ‘economic
citizenship’, ‘cultural citizenship’, ‘reproductive citizenship’, ‘sexual citizenship’, ‘national citizenship’, ‘transnational citizenship’, and ‘global citizenship’— to mention only a few possibilities. The slogan of differentialist models of citizenship is not ‘through sameness and equality against difference’ but ‘through difference against sameness and inequality’. Nonetheless, we need to be aware of the fact that the late modern plea for differentialist models of citizenship is not necessarily less problematic than the modern plea for universalistic models of citizenship. To be exact, a critical theory of citizenship needs to account for the fact that differentialist models of citizenship are problematic in at least three respects.

First, there is a philosophical problem. This philosophical problem concerns the normative tension between deontological universalism and utilitarian differentialism. According to the former perspective, everybody should be treated equally, and citizenship is to be understood as an institutional means for the pursuit of the common good. According to the latter perspective, social differences have to be recognized and protected by the state, and socially heterogeneous forms of large-scale communities have to be able to incorporate socially diversified realms of small-scale collectivities. The main philosophical problem with the idea of a differentiated citizenship, however, derives from the tacit essentialism upon which the politics of difference are potentially based. If the plea for a differentiated citizenship is motivated by the assumption that the meaning of difference should be converted into a political battlefield, then it runs the risk of contributing to the essentialist absolutization of identity and difference:

> The irony of the logic of identity is that by seeking to reduce the differently similar to the same, it turns the merely different into the absolutely other. … Difference now comes to mean not otherness, exclusive opposition, but specificity, variation, heterogeneity.

(Young, 1990: 99 and 171)

If differentiated citizenship is based on the absolutization of ‘the other’ as ‘the Other’, it will turn out to be more totalizing, hegemonizing, and marginalizing than its universalistic predecessor. If, by contrast, differentiated citizenship is guided by the insight that difference must not be essentialized, it will have the potential of deconstructing, detotalizing, and transcending the tacit essentialism of its universalistic predecessor.

Second, there is a political problem. The extension of civil, political, and social citizenship to a potentially infinite number of different forms of citizenship leads to the relativistic impoverishment, rather than to the pluralistic enrichment, of contemporary accounts of ‘the political’. To differentiate citizenship in such a way that literally any kind of social group can claim to institutionalize their collective necessities would mean to convert citizenship into a mere identity game on a higher level. To be sure, what distinguishes emancipatory from reactionary political projects is their capacity to prove that they have both a pluralistic commitment to difference and a universalistic commitment to equality. Yet, if this pluralistic commitment to difference is impregnated with the aim of turning every single individual or collective need into an issue of citizenship, then the emancipatory potentials of political pluralism are in danger of being undermined by the inflationary potentials of political relativism.
Finally, there is a sociological problem. The practical viability of the theoretical discussions concerning the extension of citizenship is highly questionable. In social and political thought, the normative implications of the counterproductive gap between theory and practice are well known, even more so since the publication of Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Amongst both sociologists and philosophers, there should be at least an implicit commitment to the critical study of social reality and to the pursuit of the question of how this reality can, or should, be changed. Merely theoretical debates on the institutionalization of social and cultural differences tend to produce rather sterile and somewhat detached accounts of the – in many ways unpredictable – complexities of human reality. One central empirical problem in modern society, however, is its inherent tendency towards generating processes of large-scale bureaucratization, whose sociological complexity tends to be underestimated by idealistic conceptions of differentiated citizenship. Most new social movements are reluctant to engage in the formulation of strategic programmes aimed at the institutionalization of political demands, precisely because they are deeply suspicious of being involved in processes of large-scale bureaucratization. Nevertheless, if the institutionalization of differentiated citizenship leads to an over-bureaucratization of society, then both the practical viability and the normative validity of polycentrically anchored and pluralistically oriented forms of citizenship have to be called into question.

In short, as long as the philosophical problem of essentialism, the political problem of relativism, and the sociological problem of idealism are not resolved, it may well remain necessary to identify and criticize the significant shortcomings of Marshall’s tripartite conception of citizenship, but it will also remain difficult to propose and implement a viable alternative.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has by no means sought to do justice to the entire complexity of the concept of citizenship. Rather, it has deliberately focused on some key dimensions which are essential to providing a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. The main insights gained from the previous study can be summarized as follows.

(I) In order to understand why the concept of citizenship is enjoying a discursive revival, the recent debates on the nature and function of citizenship need to be put into historical context. As elucidated above, at least three historical tendencies have contributed to the thematic renaissance of the concept of citizenship: the consolidation of neoliberalism, the emergence of postcommunism, and the rise of multiculturalism. Under the neoliberal model, citizenship has been transformed into a privatized affair of increasing commodification; in the postcommunist era, citizenship has been turned into a universalized affair of accelerated globalization; and, in the wake of multiculturalism, citizenship has been converted into a hybridized affair of cultural fragmentation.

(II) Citizenship is neither a merely sociological nor a purely legal category; on the contrary, the socio-relational and politico-legal dimensions of citizenship are mutually inclusive and interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive and competing, facets of the
modern world. A comprehensive theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four key dimensions: the *content*, the *type*, the *conditions*, and the *arrangements* of citizenship. Such a four-dimensional analysis permits us to shed light on the normativity of different contents of citizenship, the contentiousness of different types of citizenship, the malleability of the conditions of citizenship, and the legitimacy of the arrangements of citizenship.

(III) Different sociological traditions emphasize different dimensions of citizenship. According to Marshall’s tripartite account, the historical development of modern citizenship is reflected in the gradual emergence of civil, political, and social rights. *Civil citizenship*, as a predominant paradigm of the eighteenth century, is aimed at conferring individuals with legal and judicial rights; *political citizenship*, as a predominant paradigm of the nineteenth century, is aimed at endowing individuals with participatory and electoral rights; and *social citizenship*, as a predominant paradigm of the twentieth century, is aimed at providing individuals with welfare rights. The historical significance of civil, political, and social rights manifests itself in the existence of three central institutions of modern society: the law courts, the parliament, and the welfare system.

(IV) As argued above, Marshall’s theory of citizenship can be criticized on at least six grounds:

(i) Contrary to an *evolutionist* view, the development of citizenship is not predetermined, linear, or necessarily progressive.

(ii) Contrary to an *idealistic* view, the allocation of rights takes place mainly in moments of crisis in which the pursuit of integrationist strategies is imperative to securing the legitimacy of a given polity.

(iii) Contrary to a *formalistic* view, citizenship is never totally completed but always potentially precluded.

(iv) Contrary to an *ethnocentric* view, we need to account for the fact that different countries develop different – i.e. legally, politically, and socially specific – traditions of citizenship.

(v) Contrary to a *reformist* view, although class struggle may have been ideologically domesticated, it has not been structurally eliminated by modern forms of citizenship.

(vi) Contrary to a *reductionist* view, the democratic potentials inherent in civil society cannot be replaced by the steering capacity of modern étatisme, the normative challenges arising from the negotiation of identity and difference cannot be met by the all-embracing capacity of modern universalism, and the various contingencies emerging from the open-ended search for diversified forms of institutional recognition cannot be controlled by the assembling capacity of modern teleologism.

(V) The comparative analysis of social movements and citizenship is useful in that it indicates that increasingly complex forms of large-scale social organization require increasingly complex forms of participation and representation. Abandoning a state-centred view of citizenship is the first step towards confronting the normative challenges that arise from the possibility of cross-fertilizing the numerous political agendas produced.
by the simultaneous rivalry and complementarity of intersecting social struggles. In order to account for the multilayered complexity of coexisting social conflicts, we need to put forward a bottom-up, rather than a top-down, approach to collective mobilization processes.

There are substantial differences between early modern forms of political organization and late modern forms of social mobilization. Whereas the former are oriented towards the effective institutionalization of social struggles, the latter are aimed at the constant autonomization of social struggles. The former are primarily legal, political, and social; by contrast, the latter are primarily cultural. The former are embedded within the institutional structures of the state; the latter are located outside, and in fact seek to bypass, the institutional structures of the state. While the former are founded on systemic processes of indirect participation through representative forms of democracy, the latter are based on lifeworldly processes of direct participation through deliberative forms of democracy.

To the extent that new social movements are made up of politically and discursively interconnected actors, purposive processes of collective mobilization are inconceivable without communicative processes of social coordination. What appears to manifest itself in the quest for individual and collective autonomy is a significant historical tendency: a paradigmatic shift from the ‘premodern’ preoccupation with the seizure of power and the ‘modern’ concern with the participation in power towards the ‘late modern’ or ‘postmodern’ search for the autonomy from power. At the same time as ‘new’ social movements aim to overcome the étatisme of ‘old’ social movements, ‘new’ forms of citizenship seek to transcend the étatisme of ‘old’ forms of citizenship.

(VI) While new social movements can be considered as collective actors capable of challenging the legitimacy of classical forms of citizenship, the politics of difference can be seen as a key ideological ingredient of contemporary normative agendas which problematize the modern quest for universality by facing up to the challenges arising from increasing societal complexity. Nevertheless, as argued above, it is not citizenship in general but modern citizenship in particular which has come under attack. In essence, the politics of difference are aimed at pluralizing citizenship by recognizing that increasingly complex forms of society require ever more complex forms of citizenship. Thus, the rainbow coalition of civil society ought to be translated into a rainbow agenda of citizenship.

A significant strength of new forms of collective mobilization is their ability to convert the politics of difference into a constitutive component of the discursive landscapes of complex societies; a major weakness of classical forms of citizenship is their inability to confront and accept the normative challenges posed by the politics of difference in relation to the emergence of societies of difference.

The fundamental problem with the commitment to formal equality is that, in practice, it can lead to the production of substantial inequality. Ironically, then, the emancipatory commitment to equality can be perverted into a reactionary weapon of privileged groups capable of strengthening their position in society in the name of the ‘general will’. In reality, the pursuit of universal citizenship creates social processes of totalization, hegememonization, and marginalization. By conceiving of equality as sameness, undifferentiated forms of citizenship tend to homogenize the heterogeneous and therefore contribute to the disempowerment of social groups whose particularities and differences are – openly or tacitly – suppressed by the politics of the universal.
An alternative conception of citizenship, expressed in the idea of a *differentiated citizenship*, must seek to overcome the disempowering implications of classical conceptions of citizenship, articulated in the idea of a *universal citizenship*. Having said that, it is important to bear in mind that an emancipatory notion of a differentiated citizenship can only be regarded as philosophically defensible, politically useful, and sociologically feasible if it is able to transcend three potential pitfalls of identity politics: philosophical essentialism, political relativism, and sociological idealism. While it continues to be crucial to problematize and criticize both the theoretical and the empirical limitations of Marshall’s tripartite model of citizenship, it remains to be seen to what extent it is possible to construct a viable alternative.

**Notes**

1. See, for example: Alibhai-Brown (2000); Bickford (1997); Boucher Castel (2008); Bovens (1998); Chesters and Welsh (2005); Clark et al. (1993); Dunne and Bonazzi (1995); Gleizer Salzman (1997); Horváth (2008); Kofman (1995, 2002); Kymlicka and Norman (2000); Mavroudi (2008); Melucci (1989); Rogers and Tillie (2001); Vorhaus (2005).

2. The view that there has been a renewed interest in citizenship in the social sciences over the past few decades is taken by a number of scholars in the field. See, for example: Clarke (2008: 26–27); Janoski (1998: 4); Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 5); Marston (1995: 194–195); Mouffe (1992: 3–4); Staeheli (2008: 7–8); Taylor (1989: 19); Turner (1993: 1; 1994b [1990]: 200).

3. See, for example: Chomsky (1999); DeMartino (2000); Gamble (1994); Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004); Harvey (2005); Haug (1996); McCarthy and Prudham (2004); Roy et al. (2007); Saad-Filho and Johnston (2004); Sadler and Lloyd (2009); Smith et al. (2008); Somers (2001); Touraine (1998, 2001 [1999]).

4. See, for example: Anderson et al. (2001); Hann (2002); Holmes (1997); Mandel and Humphrey (2002); Mandelbaum (1996); Outhwaite and Ray (2005); Prozorov (2009); Sakwa (1999); Taras (1992); White and Nelson (2000).

5. See, for example: Alibhai-Brown (2000); Clark et al. (1993); Delgado-Moreira (2000); Dunne and Bonazzi (1995); Fullinwider (2001); Gidoomal (2003); Izadi (1996); Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997); Kukathas (2001); Levey and Modood (2008); Liu (2007); Rogers and Tillie (2001); Young (1990, 1994 [1989]).


7. See also Turner (1993: 2): ‘Citizenship may be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups.’

8. See, for example, Marshall (1964 [1963]). Marshall’s account of citizenship shall be examined further below.


traditions which have shaped, and continue to shape, the debates in the field of citizenship studies (as stated above); the Marshallian theory of ‘citizenship’, the Tocqueville/Durkheimian account of ‘civil culture’, and the Gramsci/Marxist model of ‘civil society’ (1998: 6).

In this paper, I prioritize (iii) because it represents one of the most influential – and probably most convincing – theoretical distinctions in citizenship studies. On (i), see also, for example, Hemerijck (2001: 139-140) and Mouffe (1992: 226–227).

11. See also Turner (2009: 69): ‘[Marshall’s] theory failed to provide a coherent and consistent analysis of the causal mechanisms that produced an expansion of citizenship’ (italics added).


13. Another counterexample can be found in the Soviet Union, where ‘social rights’ used to enjoy priority over both ‘legal rights’ and ‘political rights’ (or where – as radical critics might argue – genuine ‘legal rights’ and ‘political rights’ did not exist in the first place). On this point, see also Turner (2009: 69): ‘Marshall … treated citizenship as a uniform and coherent concept and failed to show any real interest in the comparative study of different forms of citizenship in terms of distinct historical trajectories’ (italics added).

14. Cf. Weber (1995). This article provides an insightful analysis of the various ways in which Marx’s model of base and superstructure has been misinterpreted in terms of a deterministic reading.


16. See also Turner (2009: 68): ‘Citizenship has not significantly damaged property rights and hence citizenship is at best reformist and at worst a strategy for incorporating the working class …’

17. Note that this criticism is diametrically opposed to the common view that ‘welfare rights are, at least in principle, a potential challenge to the very functioning of capitalism as an economic system’ (see Turner (1994 [1990]: 202). From a reformist perspective, then, welfare rights can be conceived of as a potential challenge to the legitimacy and functionality of capitalism; from a Marxist point of view, by contrast, welfare rights constitute an affirmative component of the absorbability and elasticity of capitalism.


20. See, for example: Bauman and Tester (2007); Lash (1990); Smart (1990).

21. See, for example: Bauman and Tester (2007); Beck (1992); Beck et al. (1994); Clark et al. (1993); Giddens (1990); Lash (1990); Serrano (1999); Smart (1990); Turner (1994a); von Beyme (1991).


23. See, for example: Cohen (1999); Cohen and Arato (1992); Janoski (1998); Seligman (1995); Somers (2001). It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the recent debates on the concept of civil society in the humanities and social sciences. For a useful introduction, see Cohen (1998). According to Cohen, there are three approaches which are particularly important to the twentieth-century European debates on the concept of civil society. (i) The Gramscian approach stresses the ‘cultural and symbolic dimensions of civil society’ (1998: 6). Here, the reproduction of the existing social order is seen as result of the interplay between two dimensions: on the one hand, hegemony and consent through civil society, and, on the other hand, domination and coercion through the state. (ii) The Touraine approach and the Meluccian approach seek to shed light on ‘the dynamic, creative and contestatory side of civil society’ (1998: 7). Here, civil society is conceived of as a dynamic, forward-looking, and innovative sphere of human emancipation. (iii) The Habermasian approach regards ‘public...
opinion’ as ‘the normative core of the idea of civil society’ (1998: 8). Here, civil society is considered to be the normative basis of modern democracy.

24. My translation; original text in Spanish: ‘un tercer sector, situado entre el Estado y el mercado’.

25. My translation; original text in Spanish: ‘... la sociedad civil es un conjunto de movimientos sociales, asociaciones civiles, grupos informales e individuos influyentes en la opinión pública cuya acción mantiene y amplía los horizontes de la autonomía social.’


27. On the concept of empowerment, see, for example. Susen (2009a).


   In citizenship, it may be possible to reconcile the claims for pluralism, the need for solidarity and the contingent vagaries of historical change. If citizenship can develop in a context with differences ..., then citizenship need not assume a repressive character as a political instrument of the state. Thus, in a world which is increasingly more global, citizenship will have to develop to embrace both the globalization of social relations and the increasing social differentiation of social systems. The future of citizenship must therefore be extracted from its location in the nation-state.

30. See also Janoski (1998: 25): ‘... while most theories of citizenship require the universality of rights and obligations, each universalistic right benefits certain groups more than others ...’. See also Isin and Wood (1999: 4):

   We approach the relationship between citizenship and identity from a perspective that sees modern citizenship ... also as an articulating principle for the recognition of group rights. We conceive of citizenship ... also as the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights ..., we recognize the rise of new identities and claims for group rights as a challenge to the modern interpretation of universal citizenship, which is itself a form of group identity.

Crouch et al. also refer to ‘issues of self-determination and group rights for minorities’(2001: 7).

31. Or, alternatively, as the Zapatistas in Mexico put it: ‘¡Queremos un mundo en el que quepan muchos mundos!’ (cf. Holloway and Peláez, 1998).


33. See Marx (2000/1977 [1845]: 173): ‘The Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.’ In this context, two observations are worth mentioning: (i) Engels replaced the comma after ‘interpretiert’ with a semicolon, and (ii) Engels added the word ‘aber’ (‘but’ or ‘however’) to Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Thus, Engels’s revised version reads as follows: ‘Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern’ (see Marx, 1971 [1845]: 372). This formulation suggests not only that the relation between theory and practice is to be conceived of in terms of an opposition, but also that practice is more important than theory. Yet, as Ernst Bloch pertinently remarks, what is essential to Marxian thought is the unity of, rather than the opposition between, theory and practice. See Bloch (1971 [1968]: 93): ‘There is no opposition, and, indeed, in the original, the word “but” (“aber” – which here suggests amplification, not opposition) is lacking.’ For an excellent analysis of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, see Haug (1999).
References


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