Bourdiesian Reflections on Language: Unavoidable Conditions of the Real Speech Situation

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The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of language. Although he has dedicated a significant part of his work to the study of language and even though his analysis of language has been extensively discussed in the literature, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that Bourdieu’s account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering a detailed overview of 10 key features which, from a Bourdiesian point of view, can be regarded as inherent in language. On the basis of this enquiry, the study seeks to demonstrate that—contrary to common belief—there is not only a Bourdiesian sociology of language but also a Bourdiesian philosophy of language, which provides a useful theoretical framework for examining the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation. The paper draws to a close by reflecting on the flaws and limitations of Bourdieu’s approach to language.
Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of language. On various occasions, Bourdieu distances himself from what he considers to be “transcendental”, “idealistic” and “scholastic” accounts of language. In opposition to Habermas’s communication-theoretic approach, for example, Bourdieu claims that language almost never functions as a mere instrument of communication (Bourdieu 1982f, 60). On the contrary, given that the production of communicative relations is inconceivable without the reproduction of power relations, the meaning-bearing construction of linguisticality cannot be dissociated from the interest-laden constitution of society. In other words, our communicative orientation towards mutual comprehension is impregnated with our purposive immersion in mutual competition. If linguistic power is a matter of social power, every rationally raised “validity claim” can be regarded as a relationally determined “legitimacy claim”. Examining both the philosophical and the sociological implications of this perspective, this paper makes a case for the view that we need to identify the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, rather than the avoidable conditions of the ideal speech situation, in order to understand that the legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social legitimacy.

The question remains, however, what the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation are and to what extent a Bourdieusian framework permits us to identify, and make sense of, the various—relationally defined—conditions of linguistical communication. Before embarking upon a detailed examination of the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, it is worth pointing out the following: although he has dedicated a significant part of his work to the study of language and even though his analysis of language has been extensively discussed in the literature, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that Bourdieu’s account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language. One can speculate about the reasons for this omission in the literature, but, whatever conclusion one may reach, three reasons appear to be particularly important in this regard:

(a) Given that Bourdieu is explicitly opposed to what he considers to be merely theoretical—that is, “transcendental”, “idealistic” and “scholastic”—accounts of language, it seems that, whilst it is right to point out that there is a Bourdieusian study of language, it would be a contradiction in terms to affirm that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian theory of language.

(b) Since Bourdieu—as a philosophe by training and a sociologue by choice—is primarily concerned with the empirical, rather than the transcendental, conditions of linguistic communication, it seems that, whilst it is appropriate to assume that there is a Bourdieusian sociology of language, it would be mistaken to suggest that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian philosophy of language.
(c) In light of the fact that, according to Bourdieu, language constitutes only one amongst other social dimensions and the linguistic field only one amongst other social fields, it seems that, whilst it is sensible to acknowledge that there is a Bourdieusian social-theoretic approach to language, it would be unjustified to characterize Bourdieusian sociology as a language-theoretic approach to the social.

Nevertheless, as shall be demonstrated in the following sections, Bourdieu does identify a number of transcendental features of language, he does provide us with philosophical tools to understand the nature of language, and he does conceive of language as a fundamental, albeit not necessarily foundational, element of social life. If this holds true, then a strong case can be made that—contrary to common belief—there is not only a Bourdieusian theory of language, but also a Bourdieusian philosophy of language. Yet, taking into consideration Bourdieu’s field-pluralistic conception of society and his emphatic rejection of communication-theoretic approaches to the social, there is little doubt that it would be erroneous to assert that Bourdieu puts forward a language-theoretic approach to the social. With the aim of illustrating that Bourdieu’s account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, the following analysis shall examine 10 key features that can—and, from a Bourdieusian perspective, indeed should—be regarded as inherent in language.

1. The Sociality of Language

The most fundamental feature of language is that it is social. To be more precise, language is both a socially constructed and a socially embedded force of human action: as a socially constructed force, its existence is contingent upon the collective production of linguistic utterances; as a socially embedded force, its existence is dependent upon the collective framing of linguistic utterances. Insofar as language is collectively produced, it is socially constructed through processes of human interaction; insofar as language is collectively framed, it is socially embedded in contexts of human interaction.

If we regard language as a constitutive component of both the processual and the contextual nature of social reality, then we are obliged to recognize the explanatory limitations of “pure” linguistics (Bourdieu 1982f, 72; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992c, 141), that is, of transcendentalist approaches to language which fail to account for the intrinsic sociality of human linguistic activity. Just as we need to give up “the ambition of absolute knowledge” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23, italics added) based on “the illusion of a detached and rootless intelligentsia” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23, italics added), we need to renounce the belief in the possibility of absolute linguisticality derived from the transcendental power of a removed and footless intelligibility, since our “linguistic capacity” is a “social capacity”, that is, a competence that is acquired and developed in relation to a social environment. If we examine both the “social factors” producing a seemingly universal linguistic ontology and the
“social value” generating a relatively arbitrary linguistic hierarchy, then we are able to decipher the underlying sociality of human linguisticality.

To be sure, there is no linguistic ontology without a “linguistic community” and there is no linguistic hierarchy without a stratified society. For the expressive power of linguistic representations cannot be separated from the coercive power of social relations. Every linguistic ontology is constructed through the social relations established between members of a linguistic community. Inasmuch as “language is an integral part of” (Thompson 1992, 1) and “plays a basic role in much of social life” (Hanks 1993, 139), social life is an integral part of and plays a basic role in much of language. In short, both the *linguisticality of sociality* and the *sociality of linguisticality* lie at the heart of the meaning-bearing construction of humanity.

2. The Dialecticality of Language

Another essential feature of language is that it is *dialectically* produced and reproduced. From a Bourdieusian perspective, the dialectical nature of language operates on three main levels: first, on the level of *competence* and *performance*; second, on the level of *grammar* and *pragmatics*; and, third, on the level of *commonality* and *singularity*.

First, on the level of *competence* and *performance*, language owes its existence to subjects who are both in *principle* and in *practice* capable of speech and action. To be in *principle* capable of speech and action means to be equipped with the “competence” of engaging in linguistically mediated forms of interaction (see Thompson 1992, 4–5). To be in *practice* capable of speech and action means to be prone to the “performance” of engaging in linguistically mediated forms of interaction (see Thompson 1992, 4–5). Although the methodological distinction between “competence” and “performance” convincingly captures the ontological difference between the background potentiality of language and the foreground performativity of speech, it is crucial to recognize the intrinsic interdependence of linguistic competence and linguistic performance: a speaker needs to be able to generate speech acts to become a member of a speech community. Linguistic competence, however, is reflected not only in “the capacity to generate an unlimited sequence of grammatically well-formed sentences” (Ledeneva 1994, 8), but also in “a capacity to produce expressions which are appropriate for particular situations” (Ledeneva 1994, 8). Thus, our *sens linguistique* is a *sens pratique* which enables us to produce situated language games in relation to situating life forms. The reflexive power of speech cannot be divorced from the immersive power of context.

Second, on the level of *grammar* and *pragmatics*, language owes its existence to both symbolic *structures* and symbolic *processes*. As emphasized in Saussurian thought, language emanates from the continuous interplay between *langue* and *parole*. Indeed, the dialectics of grammaticality and praxeology can be regarded as the backbone of linguisticality: linguistic practices are embedded in grammatical frameworks. Our linguistic involvement in communicative processes is conceivable only as the combination of language-based speech and speech-based language: our
speech is \textit{language}-based in that it takes place within \textit{grammatically} defined frameworks of rules and conventions, and our language is \textit{speech}-based in that it is employed within \textit{pragmatically} established situations of encounters and interactions. To the extent that \textit{langue} forms the legislative framework that makes communication possible by establishing a set of formal rules inherent in a particular language, \textit{parole} constitutes the executive process that makes communication possible by applying the immanent rules of a particular language. Hence, language can be conceived of as both an \textit{opus operatum} and a \textit{modus operandi} (Bourdieu 1982c, 8). As an \textit{opus operatum}, the grammaticality of linguisticality imposes itself upon the situated trajectory of human determinacy; as a \textit{modus operandi}, the praxeology of linguisticality is impregnated with the assembled teleology of human agency. Put differently, language is a set of “structuring structures” and “structured structures” [Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 165; see also Grenfell and James 1998, 74]. As a set of—grammatically organized—structuring structures, it \textit{shapes} our symbolic interactions; as a set of—pragmatically mobilized—structured structures, it \textit{is shaped} by our symbolic interactions.

Third, on the level of \textit{commonality} and \textit{singularity}, language owes its existence to both \textit{shared} points of cultural reference and \textit{unique} sources of lived experience. In fact, the very possibility of linguisticality rests on a curious paradox: “[t]he paradox of communication is that it presupposes a \textit{common} medium, but one which works—as is clearly seen in the limiting case in which, as often in poetry, the aim is to transmit emotions—only by eliciting and reviving \textit{singular}, and therefore socially marked, experiences” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16, italics added). In other words, language is infused with the paradoxical relationship between commonality and singularity, ordinariness and uniqueness, sociality and individuality. As an \textit{intersubjectively externalized} generator of symbolically mediated interaction, language is both a source and a medium of \textit{collective} identity; as a \textit{subjectively internalized} generator of symbolically mediated interaction, language is both a source and a medium of \textit{individual} identity. The \textit{commonality} of human language, which allows for the \textit{intersubjectively} negotiated signification of the world, is intimately intertwined with the \textit{singularity} of human experience, which is due to the \textit{subjectively} filtered absorption of the world.

3. \textbf{The Signifiability of Language}

A further remarkable feature of language is that it is a—if not, \textit{the} most—crucial source of human \textit{signification}, that is, of our ability to attach meaning to the world by which we find ourselves surrounded. The meaning-laden nature of language contains six key dimensions. First, as \textit{meaning-creating} entities, we produce meaning “about” the world: the creation of meaning is a constitutive component of the \textit{symbolic production} of society. Second, as \textit{meaning-projecting} entities, we attribute meaning “to” the world: the projection of meaning is pivotal to the \textit{symbolic organization} of society. Third, as \textit{meaning-perceiving} entities, we absorb meaning “from” the world: the perception of meaning is a \textit{sine qua non} of the \textit{symbolic}
internalization of society. Fourth, as meaning-interpreting entities, we process meaning “beyond” the world: the interpretation of meaning is vital to the symbolic subjectivization of society. Fifth, as meaning-reciprocating entities, we exchange meaning “with” the world: the reciprocation of meaning is the driving force of the symbolic ritualization of society. Finally, as meaning-fusing entities, we merge meaning “through” the world: the fusion of meaning lies at the heart of the symbolic unification of society.15

A language, then, is inevitably a view of the world, a vision du monde, a Weltanschauung (see Bourdieu and Delsaut 1981, 3), for it makes us see certain things and not see other things, and——more importantly——it permits us to see some things and precludes us from seeing other things in a particular way. Indeed, our view of the world is inextricably linked to our language about the world: linguistically mediated “schemes of perception and appreciation” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16)16 are socially powerful frameworks of reflection and action. Language constitutes a “house of meaning” situated within, rather than detached from, the “house of being”: our search for intelligibility is symptomatic of our existential dependence on society. We see what language lets us see, and language sees what society lets it see. Linguistic conceptions of reality can never escape the societal determinacy of symbolically mediated interactionality. Despite the undeniable weight of the societal determinacy which permeates the most abstract forms of human linguisticity, it is essential not to underestimate the relative autonomy of linguistic signifiability: language is an irreducible component of the social world, just as the social world is an irreducible component of language. “[A]gents endowed with schemes of perception and appreciation” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16)17 are subjects equipped with collectively constructed and individually internalized frameworks of reflection and action. “To speak is inevitably to situate oneself in the world” (Hanks 1993, 139) and to situate oneself in the social world means to immerse oneself in a cultural realm imbued with the signifying power of linguistic meaning. Just as “[p]eople construct the social world using language” (Hanks 1993, 139), language constructs the social world using people. The meaning-giving production of linguisticity is the precondition for the meaning-bearing reproduction of society.

4. The Doxicality of Language

Another noteworthy feature of language is that it is doxic: to establish a linguistic relation to reality requires imposing symbolically mediated background assumptions upon the world.18 As linguistic beings, we are, by definition, prejudgmental entities, for we cannot escape the presuppositional power of the interpretive backgrounds which lurk behind our performative foregrounds. Even if we bring the interpretive background of a doxic relation to the world to the performative foreground of a discursive reflection upon the world, we cannot escape the ubiquity of doxicality which permeates the universe of linguisticity. To be submerged in language means to be immersed in prejudice, because all our foreground utterances are embedded in background traditions. The use of language presupposes “an
immediate pre-reflexive consensus on the meaning of the world” (Bourdieu 1997b, 206)\(^{19}\), since linguistic communication is inconceivable without a background horizon of shared presuppositions.

If doxa embodies the taken-for-grantedness of the world based on common sense, language reflects the meaning-ladenness of human existence derived from our communicative competence. Doxa and language are intimately intertwined, because there is no reflexive interpretation of reality without a pre-reflexive immersion in society. Just as language enables us to convert the seemingly objective world into a genuinely normative world, doxa allows for “the transformation of history into nature, of the culturally arbitrary into nature” (Bourdieu 1998a, 8)\(^{20}\). Language seems so natural to us that the surreptitious substance of its socio-historical evolution gets overshadowed by the misleading appearance of its socio-ontological constitution. The doxic nature of language contributes both to the socialization of the natural, in that it permeates the objectivity of the physical world with the normativity of the social world, and to the naturalization of the social, in that it impregnates the normativity of the social world with the objectivity of the physical world.\(^{21}\) In other words, our access to language permits us to be both socialized and naturalized members of the human world: as socialized members, we are situated in the human world; as naturalized members, the human world is located in us.

5. The Discursivity of Language


First, a distinction should be drawn between ordinary and scientific discourses.\(^{22}\) A reflexive sociology that is unambiguously committed to the principle of “epistemological vigilance” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)\(^{23}\) recognizes that “the separation between common belief and scientific discourse” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)\(^{24}\) is “particularly important in the case of the human sciences” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)\(^{25}\). The distinction between pre-reflexive and reflexive, implicit and explicit, practical and
theoretical, and intuitive and critical knowledge is crucial to understanding the difference between the reality of the social world and the study of the social world. To be more precise, ordinary and scientific discourses can be separated in terms of differentiality, hierarchy, priority, functionality and asymmetry.

(a) Ordinary and scientific discourses are qualitatively different in that they constitute two diametrically opposed forms of knowledge: the former are governed by "practical reason" based on the reproduction of common sense, whereas the latter are generated by "theoretical reason" committed to meticulous and systematic enquiry.

(b) Ordinary and scientific discourses stand in a hierarchical relation to each other: the naïve spontaneity of the former is epistemologically inferior to the critical reflexivity of the latter.

(c) Ordinary and scientific discourses cannot be given the same priority: the social complicity of the former may be questioned by virtue of the investigative audacity of the latter.

(d) Ordinary and scientific discourses serve fundamentally different functions: the former allow for the largely unconscious reproduction of society, whilst the latter can contribute to the epistemically informed transformation of an established reality.

(e) Ordinary and scientific discourses are separated by a socio-structural asymmetry: the epistemological discrepancy between common sense and expert knowledge is rooted in the positional gap between laypersons and social researchers.

In short, the intuitive "pre-constructions inherent in the routine of everyday discourse" (Bourdieu 1982b, 34, italics added)\(^{26}\), which emanate from "the presuppositions inscribed in the language" (Bourdieu 1982b, 34)\(^{27}\) of ordinary socialization, need to be sharply distinguished from the critical reconstructions inherent in the spirit of scientific discourse, which stem from the presuppositions intrinsic to the language of methodical explanation.

Second, a distinction should be drawn between disinterested and interested discourses, or, to be exact, between allegedly disinterested and openly interested discourses. Bourdieu insists that "[i]f the sociologist manages to produce any truth, he does so not despite the interest he has in producing that truth but because he has an interest in doing so—which is the exact opposite of the usual somewhat fatuous discourse about ‘neutrality’" (Bourdieu [1984]–a 1993, 11, italics in original). In other words, there is no such thing as an "immaculate conception" (Bourdieu [1984]–a 1993, 11) of anything in the world because the construction of truth is always—at least implicitly—interest-bearing. If we recognize that nothing is less socially neutral than the relationship between subject and object (Bourdieu [1984]–b 1993, 53), then we have to acknowledge that our immersion in society is inescapably impregnated with the presence of normativity. One of the central concerns of a truly reflexive sociology, therefore, "is to be able to objectify one’s relation to the object so that discourse on the object is not the simple projection of an unconscious relation to the object" (Bourdieu [1984]–b 1993, 53, italics
added), but, on the contrary, the complex reflection upon a conscious relation between subject and object. There is no such thing as a genuinely disinterested discourse because subject and object are intimately intertwined. The subject is in the object, and the object is in the subject; for “[t]he body is in the social world,” and “the social world is in the body” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000, 152). If we account for “the contextuality of discourse” (Bourdieu 2001a, 49)28, we need to discard “the illusion of the transcendence of a transhistorical and transpersonal reason” (Bourdieu 1997b, 143)29. Put differently, if we accept that every discourse is shaped by the spatiotemporal determinacy of its own historicity, we have to reject the fictitious assumption that the neutral and disinterested appearance of rational discursivity can escape the partial and interested nature underlying all forms of linguistic intelligibility.

Third, a distinction should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate discourses. Legitimate discourses possess, whereas illegitimate discourses lack, normative authority in relation to a field-divided reality (see Bourdieu 1982b, 7). Hence, discursive legitimacy is always a matter of field-specific determinacy. Economic discourses may be deemed irrelevant in the artistic field, and judicial discourses may be considered worthless in the cultural field, just as political discourses may be seen as out-of-place in the field of sports, and religious discourses may be regarded inappropriate in the scientific field. Be it in the economic field (“business for the sake of business”), the artistic field (“art for the sake of art”), the judicial field (“justice for the sake of justice”), the cultural field (“belonging for the sake of belonging”), the political field (“power for the sake of power”), the field of sports (“competition for the sake of competition”), the religious field (“faith for the sake of faith”) or the scientific field (“truth for the sake of truth”) (see Bourdieu 1997b, 116–7) —— the relative autonomy of fields is rooted in their capacity to function in accordance with their own laws and to create their own discourses of legitimacy in relation to their idiosyncratic functionality.30 The immanent laws of a legitimate field manifest themselves in “the immanent laws of a legitimate discourse” (Bourdieu 1982e, 25)31, and the legitimacy of a particular discourse is reflected in the presence of normative authority over a field-specific domain of social reality.

Fourth, a distinction should be drawn between instituted and ephemeral discourses. Whereas “instituted discourses” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) are relatively stable sets of “collective belief” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167, italics removed) which have acquired sufficient symbolic “authority and necessity” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167, italics removed) to impose the legitimacy of their self-determinacy on particular realms of society, “ephemeral discourses” (see Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) are fairly volatile sets of “collective thought” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977) whose symbolic determinacy is confined to the short-lived presence of contextual contingency. The problematic nature of instituted discourses is due to the fact that they tend to impose themselves as “prestigious and sterile meta-discourses” (Bourdieu 1999, 334), which are driven by the illusory “anxiety over the ultimate foundation” (Bourdieu 1999, 334) of their own possibility and by “the mystical ambition to reach in the essence in a single leap” (Bourdieu 1999, 334–5) out of epistemologi-
cal necessity. Instead of undergoing “the historical critique of unconscious presuppositions” (Bourdieu 1999, 334) and engaging in “the patient reconstruction of genesis” (Bourdieu 1999, 335), established discourses tend to be reproduced as universally recognized and symbolically powerful institutions, rather than criticized as socially imagined and relatively arbitrary constructions. Thus, social struggles in “the universe of discourse” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), that is, in “the universe of the thinkable” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), are symbolic struggles over the institutionalization of the ephemeral, that is, over the delimitation of the signifiable.

Fifth, a distinction should be drawn between orthodoxy and heterodoxy discourses. Whereas orthodoxy discourses usually contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of symbolically and institutionally consolidated arrangements, heterodoxy discourses tend to be oriented towards undermining the authority of ideally and materially established conditions. The “confrontation of competing discourses” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 169) is symptomatic of the clash between conflicting interests. The orthodox, and largely conservative, discourses (orthodoxy or doxa) of the dominant groups serve the reproduction of social authority; by contrast, the heterodox, and often subversive, discourses (heterodoxy or heresy) of the dominated groups advocate the transformation of social reality (see Bourdieu [1984]-d 1993, 73). Not only is there a competition between orthodox and heterodox discourses, but there is also a “boundary between the universe of (orthodox or heterodox) discourse and the universe of doxa” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), that is, there is a qualitative difference between discursive and doxic forms of relating to the world. To be sure, orthodox and heterodox conceptions of the world can be both discursively and doxically grounded: discursively motivated imaginaries, regardless of whether they are conservative or subversive, allow for the conscious construction of themes and conceptions; doxically inspired imaginaries, on the other hand, rely on the unconscious reproduction of traditions and preconceptions. To the extent that “the production of a critical discourse” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 169) undermines the reproduction of uncritical doxa, the structural differentiation between dominant and dominated groups is expressed in the symbolic separation between orthodox and heterodox discourses. In short, doxa can be described as a set of “unexamined and unspoken presuppositions about the world” (Holton 2000, 91), orthodoxy “is conservative and looks backward to the reestablishment of previous doxa” (Holton 2000, 91), and heterodoxy aims at “contesting […] the conservatism of orthodoxy” (Holton 2000, 91), thereby reminding us of the fact that all social arrangements are provisional and malleable.

6. The Legitimacy of Language

Another central aspect of language is its capacity either to sustain or to undermine the power of social legitimacy. Yet, the attainment of social legitimacy through the employment, exchange and exposure of linguistically articulated claims to validity is by no means a straightforward matter. In the most general sense, legitimacy can
be defined as symbolic authority derived from an individual or collective actor’s ability to be socially recognized. Given the constraining power of relationally constituted and positionally differentiated realms of interaction, the legitimacy of linguistic validity is contingent upon the validity of social legitimacy. From a Bourdieusian perspective, the legitimacy of language contains at least five key dimensions.

First, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of representationality. A legitimate language is essentially a “legitimate representation of the social world” (Bourdieu 1982b, 14)32. In other words, a legitimate Sprachanschauung is a legitimate Weltanschauung. Our cognitive absorption of the world is mediated by our linguistic interpretation of the world. As communicative entities, endowed with the capacity to represent reality by virtue of language, we are capable not only of perception and appreciation but also of linguistic interpretation: what the world means to us depends on the interpretive parameters of our language. Legitimate forms of language are legitimate forms of representing the world.

Second, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of contextuality. A language is legitimate only insofar as it is embedded in a legitimate context. “[T]he ubiquity of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu 1982d, 17)33 is worth nothing without the situational contingency of the legitimate context. Just as different contexts produce different languages, different languages produce different contexts. To the extent that life forms generate language games, language games generate life forms. Whilst every social field creates its own doxa, every doxa creates its own social field. The context-dependent legitimacy of rational claims to validity is symptomatic of the historical determinacy of linguistically mediated forms of sociality. Linguistically raised validity claims are worthless if they fail to obtain legitimacy in relation to a field-specific domain of social reality. Legitimate forms of language are situated in legitimate contexts of the world.

Third, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of capacity. The acquisition of a legitimate language depends on “the acquisition of a legitimate competence” (Bourdieu 1982e, 25)34, just as “the imposition of a legitimate language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)35 rests on the consolidation of a legitimate linguistic capacity. Competent speakers are capable of communication and interaction in concreto, rather than in abstracto: we develop our capacity to communicate and interact with each other not in a free-floating realm of discursive imagination, but in a relationally structured realm of asymmetrical socialization. The binary “definition of legitimate and illegitimate” (Bourdieu 1982e, 25)36 modes of linguistic mastery is inconceivable without the symbolic division between legitimate and illegitimate forms of communicative capacity. If, as Bourdieu asserts, “the imposition of the recognition of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 33)37 can be achieved only through the “devaluation of dialects and the instauration of a new hierarchy of linguistic usages” (Bourdieu 1982e, 33–4)38, then the most “legitimate” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)39 communicative capacity is the allegedly most “expurgated and purified” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)40 expression of “hypercorrect”41 linguistic mastery. The development of a “legitimate linguistic competence”42 is
subject to the attainment of “legitimate linguistic capital”\(^{43}\), which is embedded in a “legitimate linguistic habitus”\(^{44}\) and cultivated through continuous exposure to a “legitimate linguistic field”\(^{45}\). Processes of social legitimation based on linguistic habitualization are mechanisms of symbolic distinction reproduced through the hierarchical stratification of access to linguistic capital for the possibility of self-realization. *Legitimate forms of language are generated through the production, imposition and recognition of legitimate linguistic capacities.*

Fourth, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of authority. Put differently, there is no linguistic legitimacy without symbolic authority. Indeed, linguistic legitimacy without symbolic authority would be worthless, for only insofar as the former is capable of exercising its power by virtue of the latter can language succeed in having a substantive impact on the way in which social actors make sense of both themselves and the world by which they find themselves surrounded. In essence, symbolic authority is “the power to make see and to make believe” (Bourdieu 1982b, 19)\(^{46}\). An *authorized* speech act can transform itself into an *authorizing* speech act to the extent that the symbolic authority granted to a speaker converts itself into the symbolic authority granted by a speaker. “[T]he power to make see and to make believe” (Bourdieu 1982b, 19) cannot prescind from the power to be seen and to be believed. Paradoxically, the projective power to impose “schemes of perception, appreciation and action”\(^{47}\) *upon* society hinges on the receptive power to be perceived, appreciated and acted upon by society. To find oneself in a “position of authority to say with authority what saying with authority involves” (Bourdieu 1982b, 56)\(^{48}\) presupposes that one is given the authority to give authority to particular schemes of linguistically raised validity. *Legitimate forms of language are sustained through the exercise of legitimate authority.*

Fifth, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of normativity. The main function of normativity is to regulate relationally established forms of reality. In other words, normativity is habitualized objectivity. Society is impregnated with normativity, since the very possibility of its existence depends on its capacity to create mechanisms of collectively internalized habituality. Language is imbued with normativity because it is embedded in the established habituality of a given society. What is “socially recognized” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8)\(^{49}\) is “recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8)\(^{50}\) insofar as it is regarded and treated as normatively binding. The normalization of language is generally achieved on the basis of three social processes: standardization, officialization and institutionalization. (a) Normalization through linguistic *standardization* requires the binary differentiation between “correct” and “incorrect” forms of language use.\(^{51}\) (b) Normalization through linguistic *officialization* involves the binary separation between “national” and “regional” forms of language use.\(^{52}\) (c) Normalization through linguistic *institutionalization* manifests itself in the binary division between “paradigmatic” and “peripheral” forms of language use.\(^{53}\) In short, the normalization of language is founded on the legitimation and delegitimation of linguistic practices. Given the interest-ladenness permeating the taken-for-grantedness of the regulating lawfulness of “the normalized language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 32)\(^{54}\), it must be the task of a critical
sociology of communication to uncover the relative arbitrariness underlying social processes of linguistic normalization. The symbolic power derived from “the fetishization of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8) is nothing but the social power exercised through the fetishization of the legitimate culture. *Legitimate forms of language are produced and reproduced through the creation of legitimate modes of normativity.*

7. The Ideology of Language

Another significant feature of language is that it is *ideological.* In fact, just as there is no ideology without linguisticity, there is no linguisticity without ideology. Language is unavoidably ideological because it is a vehicle for the production and articulation of ideas. Ideas are based on interrelated and interdependent, rather than free-floating and self-contained, concepts, however, disorganized and haphazard they may be. Language permits, and indeed compels, us to express ideas through sets of interconnected concepts. Every ensemble of concepts is a symbolic conglomerate of more or less logically related ideas. Linguistic beings are condemned to be ideological entities, because every language of the world *(Sprachwelt)* creates its own view of the world *(Betrachtungswelt).*

If ideology, in the Marxian sense, can be conceived as “necessarily false consciousness” *(Sprachanschauung)* without ideology, then language, in the Bourdieusian sense, can be regarded as “necessarily ideological consciousness” *(Sprachwelt).* Insofar as the creation of linguisticity ineluctably involves “the imposition of the ‘true representation’ of reality” (Bourdieu 1982b, 16), ideology is a constitutive component of our daily search for intelligibility. A *Weltanschauung* of a particular social group is always also a *Feldanschauung* from a given social place mediated by a *Sprachanschauung* with a specific social meaning. The “power to make see and to make believe” (Bourdieu 1982b, 19) is the power “to make recognize” (Bourdieu 1979b, 5) what would otherwise not be recognized. Ideology is a self-perpetuating form of “collective misrecognition” (Bourdieu and Delsaut 1975, 23) of arbitrariness owing to the normalizing exercise of “social recognition” of taken-for-grantedness.

The “imposition of the dominant position” (Bourdieu 1980b, 69) is inconceivable without the diffusion of the dominant ideology through the dissemination of the dominant language. At the end of the day, every ideology strives to be a “legitimate mode of perception” (Bourdieu 1984, 7) solidified by legitimate modes of action and reflected in legitimate modes of linguistic conception. The “symbolic power to cause one to see and to believe *(faire voir et faire croire)* in order to impose visions of the world and, in particular, visions of the divisions of the world” (Bourdieu 1999, 337) is tantamount to the capacity to normalize “principles of classification” (Bourdieu 1999, 337) through the discursive power of linguistic ideologization. In brief, legitimate ideologies are legitimate languages, just as legitimate languages are legitimate ideologies.
8. The Contestability of Language

A further central feature of language is that it is contestable. In fact, the contestable nature of linguistic relations emanates from the transformative potential of social relations. Just as social relations—and, more importantly, both the symbolic and the material arrangements by which they are sustained—are never simply “a given” (see Camic [1986] 2000, 328) whose pervasiveness is reflected in habitualized mechanisms of repetitive reproduction, linguistic relations are always open to transformative reconstruction. If “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1985, 79), the history of all hitherto existing language is “the history of symbolic struggles” (Bourdieu 1982b, 17).65 Symbolic struggles, in the Bourdieusian sense, are ideological conflicts over “the imposition of the ‘true representation’ of reality” (Bourdieu 1982b, 16).66 To be sure, what is considered to be a “true representation’ of reality” (Bourdieu 1982b, 16) is spatiotemporally contingent: different social spaces generate different social discourses in different historical contexts, and—more importantly—different social groups, situated within spatiotemporally specific settings, struggle to impose their view of the world upon the rest of the world with the aim of converting their “representation of reality” into the “reality of representation.”67

Peripheral ideologies succeed in carving a niche for themselves to pervade the margins of society; paradigmatic ideologies, by contrast, succeed in widely imposing themselves in order to hegemonize the centre of society. The secret of successful ideologies is the consolidation of tacit hegemonies: “what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying: the tradition is silent, not least about itself as a tradition” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167).68 The taken-for-grantedness of ideology is hidden behind the outspokenness of linguistically evoked claims to validity. What is ideologically true is what is practically considered to be true. As long as the contestability of ideological claims to validity remains trapped in the linguistic background horizon of implicit legitimacy, the truth of social struggles will continue to be contested in social struggles over truth. For “if there is one truth it is the fact that truth is a stake of struggles” (Bourdieu 1982b, 25).69 The struggle over language is a struggle over truth, and the struggle over truth is a struggle over symbolic power. The existence of different life forms is reflected in the existence of different language games, just as the existence of different social struggles manifests itself in the existence of different “symbolic struggles” (Bourdieu 1986, 2).70 Every symbolic struggle is essentially a “struggle over the legitimate vision of the world” (Bourdieu 2001a, 170),71 that is, a struggle “over the monopoly of the legitimate representation” (Bourdieu 2001a, 150) of reality. The production of language, then, can be regarded as an “inseparably symbolic and political” (Bourdieu 2001a, 47) feature of the social world, for relations of communication are always “interested”74 and “value-laden”75, rather than “disinterested”76 and “value-free,”77 relations of socialization. Linguistic patterns of signification and interpretation are contestable because they are embedded in social
patterns of stratification and hierarchization. The relative taken-for-grantedness of the former cannot escape the relative arbitrariness of the latter.

9. The Commodifiability of Language

Another—somewhat problematic—feature of language is that it is commodifiable. In essence, Bourdieu conceives of the “linguistic market”\(^78\) as a “market of symbolic goods”\(^79\). Advanced societies are characterized by the proliferation of a multiplicity of markets. Yet, the production of all markets—regardless of their relative autonomy, idiosyncrasy and irreducibility\(^80\)—depends on the reproduction of the linguistic market. Language is an omnipresent feature of society, and not even spheres that are dictated by the laws of profitability can escape the ubiquity of linguistic signifiability. The sociological significance of the linguistic market is reflected in its capacity to affirm its functional omnipresence in other markets: the labour market, the market of goods and services, the market of knowledge and skills, the market of training and education, the market of science and technology, the market of arts and humanities, the market of culture and communication—all markets are mediated by and managed through the linguistic market.

The sociological importance of the linguistic market is due not only to its ubiquity in commodified realms of society, but also to the commodifiability of its own reality. The linguistic realm is a market itself. Linguistic relations may have a communicative foreground, but they also have a purposive background. It would be naïve to reduce linguistic encounters to purely understanding-oriented interactions, as they are—in most cases—also largely, if not primarily, utility-driven transactions. The dream of the subject’s communicative engagement in disinterestedness is shattered when facing the reality of the actor’s purposive investment in interestedness. Habermas’s paradisal view of the “ideal speech situation”\(^81\) needs to be replaced by Bourdieu’s relational account of the “real speech situation”\(^82\), since “it is rare that, in ordinary existence, language functions as a pure instrument of communication” (Bourdieu 1982f, 60)\(^83\). The use of language as a mere vehicle of communication is the exception; the use of language as an instrument of symbolic power is the norm.

The task of a “materialist analysis of the economy of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu 1998a, 9)\(^84\) is to uncover the stratifying logic which underlies differentiated fields of cultural production. To recognize that the “communicative relation between a transmitter (coding) and a receiver (decoding)” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)\(^85\) is never simply a “linguistic exchange” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)\(^86\) but always also a “symbolic exchange” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) requires acknowledging that every linguistically raised “validity claim” (Bourdieu 2002b, 351) is a symbolically laden “value claim” (Bourdieu 1982d, 15; Bourdieu 1982e, 43, 45 and 46): validity claims are value claims because they are legitimacy claims, recognition claims, in short, they are social claims.\(^87\) The ultimate currency in every society is legitimacy. Whereas access to legitimacy allows for the possibility of socially

recognition
agency, absence of legitimacy creates the need to fill a vacuum of social indeterminacy through the unrecognized affirmation of symbolic authority.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, the critical “analysis of the economy of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu 1998a, 98) in general and of “the economy of linguistic exchanges” (Bourdieu 1982d) in particular needs to account for the structural interplay between three key sociological dimensions: (a) linguistic fields, (b) linguistic habitus and (c) linguistic capital.

(a) Every linguistic field is produced and reproduced by a particular “linguistic community” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\), which can be defined as “a group of people who use the same system of speech-signals” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\). A minimum of semantically, syntactically and phonetically defined rules and conventions is “the precondition” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\) both “for economic production” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\) and “for symbolic domination” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\). Even societies with a high degree of systemic differentiability and cultural heterogeneity cannot exist without a minimum of collective identity and demographic homogeneity. Just as “space […] defines its language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\), “language […] defines its space” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)\(^9\). To the extent that every field generates its own language, every language generates its own field. Given that every “field of linguistic production” (Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 163) constitutes a “horizon of reference” (Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 163), “the unification of the linguistic field” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 4)\(^9\) is made possible not only by the imposition of intelligibility—that is, of what can and what cannot be said—but also by “the imposition of legitimacy” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 4, italics added)\(^9\)——that is, of what should and what should not be said. Hence, linguistic fields define the symbolic boundaries of intelligibility and legitimacy.

(b) Every linguistic habitus is produced and reproduced by an individual member of a particular linguistic community. A really existing language cannot survive without really existing speakers. The habitual production of linguistic conventions is practically worthless without the habitual construction of linguistic entities. Actors capable of linguistically filtered perception and appreciation are subjects capable of habitually structured reflection and interpretation. For linguistic entities, language is the ultimate source of meaning: even if we were convinced of the meaninglessness of life, we could not escape the meaning-ladenness of language. “In its structure and use language is one of the central vehicles of habitus” (Hanks 1993, 139). At the same time, in its structure and use habitus is one of the central vehicles of language. The interdependence of habituality and linguisticality resides in the communicative infrastructure of every society.

(c) Linguistic capital is unequally distributed in every linguistic community. Having access to linguistic capital is contingent not only upon the capacity to immerse oneself in a particular language but also, more importantly, upon the ability to develop a sense of belonging to a particular speech community. The
acquisition of linguistic capital manifests itself in the cultivation of a linguistic habitus developed in relation to a linguistic field. Indeed, both our acquisition of linguistic capital and our cultivation of a linguistic habitus depend upon our regular exposure to and continuous enclosure in a linguistic field. In this sense, the seemingly most disinterested “everyday linguistic exchanges” (Thompson 1992, 2) can be regarded as “situated encounters between agents endowed with socially structured resources and competences, in such a way that every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce” (Thompson 1992, 2, italics added). In other words, the development of our linguistic competence is never a neutral or transcendental matter, but always an environmentally determined and socially embedded affair. The “social value of linguistic competence” (Bourdieu 1982e, 46) is conditional upon the symbolic worth of “linguistic capital”: speaking a language in a legitimate way requires mastering the semantic, syntactic and phonetic codes of the legitimate linguistic field through the development of a legitimate linguistic habitus derived from the acquisition of legitimate linguistic capital. Symbolic profits gained from linguistic distinction can be translated into social power gained from symbolic power. To be sure, given the “interconvertibility” of different types of capital, the attainment of linguistic resources depends on access to various forms of capital, notably on access to social capital, cultural capital, educational capital and economic capital. Irrespective of the question of how different forms of capital are obtained, our participation in a linguistic field and our cultivation of a linguistic habitus are inconceivable without the acquisition of linguistic capital.

10. The Symbolic Power of Language

Another crucial feature of language is that it is both a source and a medium of symbolic power. Just as “language is an integral part of social life” (Thompson 1992, 1), social life is an integral part of language. To the extent that social life is permeated by power relations, language is permeated by these power relations. And, if symbolic relations are power relations, language is a form of symbolic power. The critical analysis of symbolic power is essential to a comprehensive examination of the social, since it unveils the subtlety and efficiency with which power relations operate beyond subjective consciousness. In order to demonstrate this, it makes sense to reflect upon the nature of symbolic power on five levels: (a) symbolic power and society, (b) symbolic power and instrumentality, (c) symbolic power and universality, (d) symbolic power and validity and (e) symbolic power and legitimacy (see Susen 2007, 142–7).

(a) Symbolic power is embedded in society. The societal nature of symbolic power may seem rather obvious. It is difficult, however, to overemphasize the sociological significance of the fact that symbolic power is always situated in, and
exercised in relation to, society. In order to understand the various—often subtle and hidden—ways in which symbolic power operates, it is imperative to comprehend how it is used in society. Thus, the “relation of communication between a transmitter and a receiver” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59) needs to be studied as an embodied “linguistic exchange” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59) that is embedded within, rather than as a disembodied linguistic encounter that is detached from, social reality. If we account for the fact that, as speakers, we are members of a “linguistic community” (Bourdieu 1982d, 18), then we are obliged to accept that symbolic exchanges are located within the relationally constituted realm of society. Symbolic power is a form of social power.

(b) Symbolic power is impregnated with instrumentality. As such, it can be, and is, used as an instrument of social power. The secret of the efficacy of symbolic power is that it escapes the empirical eye that looks out for evidence-based provability. “For symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 164, italics added). Our daily complicity with symbolic power makes its instrumental nature not less but more subtle. If it “is rare that, in ordinary existence, language functions as a pure instrument of communication” (Bourdieu 1982f, 60), it is common that, in everyday life, language serves as a mere vehicle of social domination. In fact, to the extent that all social relations are power relations, the real possibility of communicative empowerment is always already inhabited by the possible reality of symbolic disempowerment. “Symbolic power is effectively this form of domination which—overcoming the common opposition between relations of meaning and relations of force, between communication and domination—is realized through acts of communication under which it is concealed” (Bourdieu 1976, 127). The most pervasive instruments of social power are invasive forms of symbolic power. Symbolic power is a form of instrumentalized and instrumentalizing power.

(c) Symbolic power creates the illusion of universality. Not only are “linguistic relations [...] always relations of symbolic power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992d, 142), but they are also relations oriented towards creating a false currency of transcendental universality founded on the genuine determinacy of societal particularity. Symbolic power succeeds in making the particular look universal when making the social appear natural. Indeed, “to impose the partial truth of a group as the truth of the objective relations between the groups” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23) means to install a social hegemony that represents the interests of a minority in the name of the majority. National programmes of standardized linguistification are large-scale endeavours of social regulation. The “consecration-universalization process” (Bourdieu 2001a, 58) allowing for the normalization of a particular language seems to convert the spatiotemporal contingency of linguistic conventionality into the transcendent determinacy of linguistic universality. Symbolic power makes
the recognizably particular look unrecognizably universal. For symbolic power can conceal the predominance of particular interests behind the appearance of universal interests. Symbolic power is a form of universalized and universalizing power.

(d) Symbolic power needs to claim validity in order to impose itself upon society. In fact, symbolic power can permeate reality only insofar as it succeeds in constantly reaffirming its tangible impact on the stratified construction of society by claiming validity for the sake of its own, tacitly reproduced, legitimacy. Yet, rather than portraying validity as a cognitive source of removed transcendentality, here it is considered as a recognitive force of lived sociality: validity needs to be validated in order to be valid; that is, validity needs to be recognized by society, or at least by particular members of society, in order to play a role in the symbolic construction of reality. To suggest that validity is “recognized value” means to accept that meaning acquires normative significance through processes of social recognition. Far from representing an endogenously determined presupposition of rationality, validity constitutes an exogenously constrained construction of society. In this sense, Habermas’s paradiatic view of the “ideal speech situation” is diametrically opposed to Bourdieu’s relational account of the “real speech situation”. The idea of pure linguistic Gesellschaftlichkeit can hardly be sustained when confronting the reality of social Kräfteverhältnismäßigkeit. The validity of utterances is determined not by the force de la rationalité derived from linguistic modes of interactionality, but by the rapports de force created by stratified forms of society. Linguistic validity is practically worthless if it fails to obtain normative legitimacy through its recognition by a given social community. Thus, cognitive claims for validity are recognitive claims for social legitimacy oriented towards the attainment of symbolic authority. Symbolic power is a form of validated and validating power.

(e) Symbolic power needs to claim legitimacy in order to affirm its presence in society. Indeed, the raison d’être of symbolic power is the acquisition of legitimacy. To compete for symbolic power through language means to struggle over the legitimacy of the world through the “legitimacy of the word” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992d, 148). Just as efficient modes of linguistic communication always have a power dimension, resourceful forms of social “domination always [have] a symbolic dimension” (Bourdieu 1997b, 206). The effectiveness of symbolic power rests on its capacity to provide systems of domination with social legitimacy by normalizing the silent exercise of quotidian complicity. Owing to its subtle nature, symbolic violence can be characterized as a form of “sweet violence, insensitive, invisible to its own victims that is exercised essentially by the purely symbolic paths of communication and knowledge, or—to be more precise—of ignorance, of recognition or, at the limit, of feeling” (Bourdieu 1998a, 7). Paradoxically, then, the legitimacy of domination cannot dispense with the complicity of the dominated: symbolic power operates by making “the dominated contribute to their own
domination” (Bourdieu 2001b, 9)\textsuperscript{116}. Since stable forms of legitimacy need to create reliable modes of complicity, “[t]here is no symbolic power without a symbolism of power” (Bourdieu 1982f, 73)\textsuperscript{117}. We are most blind to symbolic power when we are most immersed in it, for complicity is the most forceful guarantee of legitimacy. Symbolic power is a form of legitimized and legitimizing power.

Critical Reflections

This paper has sought to shed light on Bourdieu’s conception of language. As demonstrated above, the concept of language is a central category in his oeuvre. Perhaps the most fundamental assumption in Bourdieu’s writings on language is the idea that the production of communicative relations is inconceivable without the reproduction of power relations, for the meaning-bearing construction of linguisticality cannot be dissociated from the interest-laden constitution of society. In this light, rationally ascertained “validity claims” are relationally determined “legitimacy claims”, since linguistic power is unavoidably a matter of social power. Examining both the philosophical and the sociological implications of this view, the previous analysis has suggested that we need to identify the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, rather than the avoidable conditions of the ideal speech situation, in order to understand that the legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social legitimacy.

More controversially, the foregoing study has sought to illustrate that Bourdieu’s account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language. To this end, the paper has focused on 10 features that, in accordance with Bourdieu’s writings, can be regarded as inherent in language: (1) the sociality of language, (2) the dialecticality of language, (3) the signifiability of language, (4) the doxicality of language, (5) the discursivity of language, (6) the legitimacy of language, (7) the ideology of language, (8) the contestability of language, (9) the commodifiability of language and (10) the symbolic power of language. The insights of the preceding enquiry, which support the view that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian philosophy of language, can be synthesized as follows:

(1) Language is both a socially constructed and a socially embedded force of human action. As a socially constructed force, its existence derives from the collective production of linguistic utterances; as a socially embedded force, its existence is subject to the collective framing of linguistic utterances. Linguisticality is an integral element of human sociality.

(2) Language is dialectically produced and reproduced. Its dialectical nature operates on three main levels. On the level of competence and performance, language owes its existence to subjects who are both in principle and in practice capable of speech and action. On the level of grammar and
pragmatics, language owes its existence to both symbolic structures and symbolic processes. On the level of commonality and singularity, language owes its existence to both shared and unique forms of human experience.

(3) Language is both a vehicle and an outcome of our need to attribute meaning to the world. Linguistically mediated schemes of perception and appreciation are relationally constructed frameworks of reflection and action.

(4) Language is a doxic affair in the sense that the establishment of a linguistic relation to reality is possible only through the symbolically mediated taken-for-grantedness of society. The doxic nature of language contributes to both the socialization of the natural and the naturalization of the social.

(5) Language permits us to develop a discursive relation to the world. The tensions between ordinary and scientific, disinterested and interested, legitimate and illegitimate, instituted and ephemeral, as well as orthodox and heterodox discourses are indicative of the functional elasticity underlying human linguisticality.

(6) Language can be used as a symbolic resource either to sustain or to undermine the power of social legitimacy. Legitimate languages are reflected in legitimate representations, situated in legitimate contexts, embodied in legitimate linguistic capacities, materialized in legitimate authorities and imbued with legitimate normativities.

(7) Language is unavoidably ideological, because it is by definition a conceptually mediated representation of the world. To recognize that every language creates its own view of the world means to acknowledge that every Sprachanschauung is a form of Weltanschauung.

(8) Language is always contestable, since the validity of linguistically raised knowledge claims is socio-historically contingent. Every struggle over language is a struggle over the legitimate representation of the world.

(9) Language is commodifiable in that it constitutes an essential component of the market of symbolic goods. The economy of linguistic exchanges is driven by the dynamic interplay between linguistic fields, linguistic habitus and linguistic capital. In fact, the participation in a linguistic field, the cultivation of a linguistic habitus and the acquisition of linguistic capital are preconditions for the construction of a linguistic world.

(10) Language is both a source and a medium of symbolic power. If all linguistic relations are social relations and if all social relations are power relations, then our daily immersion in language involves our implicit participation in the exercise of symbolic power.

Contrary to common belief, Bourdieu identifies a number of transcendental features of language, he provides us with philosophical tools to understand the nature of language, and he conceives of language as a fundamental, albeit not necessarily foundational, element of social life. In light of the above analysis, a fine-grained picture emerges that illustrates that Bourdieu’s account of language is
based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal assumptions about the nature and functioning of language. Nonetheless, whilst acknowledging that Bourdieu’s approach to language is far more complex and insightful than commonly recognized, we need to shed light on its shortcomings and limitations. Following the structure of the previous enquiry, this paper shall conclude by arguing that, despite the fact that Bourdieu offers useful conceptual and methodological tools for the study of symbolic relations, his account of language suffers from a number of serious flaws. It is the purpose of this final section to examine these flaws in some detail.

(1) Of course, Bourdieu is right to emphasize the social nature of language. The question is not, however, whether language, through processes of human interaction, is collectively produced and, within contexts of human interaction, collectively framed. Rather, the question is the extent to which language endows human actors with the capacity to transcend the spatiotemporal determinacy underlying their relationally constituted immersion in society. Even if we share Bourdieu’s view that there are no historically removed and socially disembedded forms of linguisticity, we need to account for the cognitive autonomy enjoyed by all modes of intelligibility. To recognize that language games are intersubjectively constructed and spatiotemporally situated does not mean that linguistic ways of engaging with the world are reducible to the collective consciousness of human actors and the relative arbitrariness of social contexts.

Regardless of whether we consider political, judicial, scientific, religious or artistic forms of linguistic expression, in principle all language games have the empowering capacity to subvert the spatiotemporal determinacy of a given social reality by virtue of the cognitive autonomy inherent in discursive claims to epistemic validity. If, as political entities, we were mere products of our time, we would not be able to transform the givenness of social arrangements through the transcendent potential of normative considerations. If all judges were dogmatic followers of legal rules and regulations, they would not be able to contest each other’s verdicts on the basis of logical arguments and rational discourse. If scientists were sheer paradigm-surfers of their academic disciplines, they would be incapable of generating innovative research agendas with ground-breaking ways of looking at things. If all believers were condemned to be eternal prisoners of their faith, there would be no such thing as religious transformation, let alone religious conversion. If there were no room for aesthetic creativity, artists would not be endowed with the playful ability to escape the detrimental preponderance of instrumental rationality in totally administered and commodified societies. In short, no matter how powerful the constraining conditions of production in a given social field may be, we must not underestimate people’s capacity to challenge the relationally constituted determinacy of the position they occupy in society by dint of the relative autonomy that inhabits symbolically mediated forms of agency.

(2) In accordance with influential linguistic theorists such as Saussure, Austin, Chomsky and Habermas, Bourdieu stresses the fact that language is dialectically
produced. This is essentially due to the intrinsic relationship between (a) competence and performance, (b) grammar and pragmatics and (c) commonality and singularity. From a sympathetic angle, one may regard Bourdieu’s critical engagement with these conceptual pairs as indicative of his firm commitment to overcoming counterproductive antinomies in the social sciences. It must be highlighted, however, that his analysis of each of these dimensions is problematic for a number of reasons.

(a) The main problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship between competence and performance is that it conceives of both dimensions primarily in terms of their social determinacy, rather than in terms of their anthropological specificity. Consequently, Bourdieu fails to explore the species-constitutive implications of the fact that linguistically equipped entities are not only performative beings capable of action and communication, but also discursive subjects capable of reasoning and reflection. Put differently, our sens linguistique is not only a sens pratique, which allows us to engage in successful communication, but also a sens théorique, which enables us to mobilize our discursive resources of reflection.

(b) The most significant problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship between grammar and pragmatics is that it does not shed any light on the extent to which the rational logic of particular language games is impregnated with the interactional infrastructure of specific life forms. Put in Bourdieusian terms, the question is to what degree the norms and conventions of a given field are reflected in the rules and principles of a given doxa, and vice versa. Different modes of production are sustained by different ideologies (Marx); different life forms generate different language games (Wittgenstein); different regimes of power manifest themselves in different discourses of power (Foucault); different lifeworlds are suffused with different sociocultural horizons (Habermas); different regimes of action are negotiated through different regimes of justification (Boltanski); and different social fields create different forms of doxa (Bourdieu). Whatever theoretical model one seeks to defend in order to make sense of the multifaceted ways in which specific sets of social arrangements create particular forms of symbolic relations, it would be reductive to consider the grammatical rules of linguistic frameworks as mere homological epiphenomena of interactional conventions.

(c) The key problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship between commonality and singularity is that, with regard to linguistic relations in particular and human relations in general, it tends to prioritize social over individual dimensions of people’s existence. Bourdieu’s one-sided emphasis on the structuring power deriving from the social conditions of production, whose preponderance shapes, and often determines, different modes of human action, leads him to disregard the individualizing function of language in processes of personality and identity formation. The commonality of language cannot do away with the singularity of individual experience. Undeniably, all languages share a set of essential functions: the constative, normative, expressive and communicative functions of language emanate from the teleological, social, dramaturgical and intelligible dimensions of human action. Yet, even if we recognize that language is a common medium in
terms of both its *transcendent* functions, which rise above the spatiotemporal specificity of a given linguistic community, and its *immanent* functions, which allow for the construction of a sense of cultural identity, we must account for the irreplaceable role that linguisticality plays in the meaning-laden construction of individuality. In other words, language is a vehicle of both socialization and individualization. As a speaking species, we develop not only a sense of cultural identity, which we share with members of the same linguistic community, but also a sense of personal identity, through which we assert our ontological singularity. Language is a common house of being constructed by unique carriers of meaning.

(3) Given that his work is generally associated with the sociology of domination, rather than with the sociology of communication, it may be tempting to overlook the fact that Bourdieu is willing to acknowledge that language plays a pivotal role not only in the daily reproduction of power mechanisms but also, in a more fundamental sense, in the *symbolic* construction of social relations. As demonstrated above, Bourdieu considers language to be a symbolic tool without whose interpretive resources the production of meaning in field-specific contexts would be inconceivable. Fields are universal because our place in society depends on the positional structuration of reality; habitus is universal because our interaction with society is unthinkable without the dispositional naturalization of reality; and capital is universal because, in order to perpetuate or undermine the legitimacy of a given society, we need to mobilize the material and symbolic resources that permit us to act upon reality. Since language allows for the symbolic mediation of reality, we need to account for the socio-ontological centrality of everyday hermeneutics: “[h]ermeneutics is universal because understanding is the fundamental way in which human beings participate in the world” (Outhwaite 1987, 62; cf. Susen 2007, 41). In other words, linguistic beings are meaning-producing entities.

Bourdieu does not explore, however, the extent to which the meaning-bearing constitution of linguistic forms of intelligibility escapes the power-laden nature permeating stratified forms of society. As critical sociologists, we need to do justice to the socio-ontological significance of the *empowering* potentials built into language, in particular the rational resources that allow not only for mutual understanding and agreement, but also for the consolidation of social relations based on trust and empathy. To be sure, Bourdieu’s critical analysis of the economy of linguistic exchanges is methodologically useful and sociologically insightful in permitting us to examine the degree to which the universality of claims to epistemic validity is contingent upon the symbolic authority derived from social legitimacy. Nevertheless, even if we accept that there are no linguistic discourses without social resources and no explicit claims to epistemic validity without an implicit assertion of social legitimacy, we need to account for our species-constitutive capacity to draw on the communicative power of linguistic intelligibility, in order to overcome the material and symbolic distance generated by social asymmetries.

(4) Bourdieu attributes great importance to the *doxic* nature of language. In this regard, his account of language resides in the tradition of hermeneutic
philosophy. Linguistic beings are prejudgmental entities, since foreground utterances are unavoidably embedded in background traditions. Put differently, every discursive reflection upon reality presupposes the doxic taken-for-grantedness of society. Yet, even if we sympathize with Bourdieu’s engagement with the sociological significance of symbolically mediated background traditions, we must face up to the fact that language is both a structuring and a structured structure. Insofar as Bourdieu focuses almost exclusively on the reproductive mechanisms, rather than the transformative elements, underlying communicative processes, he overestimates the extent to which linguistic resources structure and determine largely complicit and unreflective agents and underestimates the extent to which language is structured and determined by potentially creative and reflective subjects. Language evolves because of, rather than despite, the fact that it is constantly reinvented and resignified by those who use it. The hidden conservatism that pervades philosophical hermeneutics is epitomized in Gadamer’s systematic insistence upon the sociohistorical influence of linguistically constituted prejudices. In light of Bourdieu’s emphasis on the doxic nature of language, his account of symbolic exchanges turns out to be just as problematic as the approaches he accuses of remaining trapped in “hermeneutic idealism” and “pure linguistics” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992d, 141). If doxa were an unchallengeable source of ideological disempowerment, rather than an interpretive resource of practical empowerment, the usage and meanings of words would never change. Words speak for themselves, but so do the speakers who utter them.

(5) Similar to other influential twentieth-century social theorists, Bourdieu is concerned with the discursive nature of language. Different social realms produce different social discourses, and language is the symbolic vehicle of these discourses. Although, as illustrated above, Bourdieu’s account of language provides useful insights into the differences between ordinary and scientific, disinterested and interested, legitimate and illegitimate, institutional and ephemeral, and orthodox and heterodox discourses, it is also problematic in these respects.

(a) When drawing a distinction between ordinary and scientific discourses, we are confronted with three epistemological options. The first—arguably positivist—option is to assume that, in principle, scientific knowledge is superior to ordinary knowledge, because the former permits us to uncover the causal mechanisms underlying the natural and the social worlds, whereas the latter is largely based on misconceptions and misrepresentations derived from common sense. The second—arguably interpretivist—option is to suggest that, ultimately, ordinary knowledge is more valuable than scientific knowledge. The former allows for an authentic understanding of the world, obtained through immediate experience, whilst the latter tends to produce abstract concepts, sterile data and self-referential research agendas, which fail to grasp the meaning-bearing constitution of everyday existence. The third—arguably contextualist—option is to accept that the point is not to establish an artificial hierarchy between scientific and ordinary knowledge, but to concede that one is not necessarily more insightful than the other. In fact, it
depends on the kind of insights one seeks to gain whether scientific or ordinary knowledge proves to be the more appropriate tool for comprehending particular aspects of social reality. The aim of providing a scientific—that is, analytical, methodical and explanatory—account of an objectively existing reality is one thing; the idea of giving an ordinary—that is, spontaneous, intuitive and interpretive—account of a subjectively grasped reality is quite another. Since Bourdieu unambiguously favours scientific over ordinary forms of knowledge, he tends to disregard the epistemic capacities of social actors: (i) as representational beings, we are able to produce descriptive knowledge; (ii) as analytical beings, we construct systematic knowledge; (iii) as reflexive beings, we are capable of developing explanatory knowledge; (iv) as critical beings, we generate normative knowledge; (v) as rational beings, we participate in the exchange of discursive knowledge; (vi) as learning beings, we build on cumulative knowledge; (vii) as projective beings, we can even make assumptions about the future on the basis of predictive knowledge. Rather than regarding these cognitive capacities as an epistemic privilege of scientists and experts, we need to recognize that they are built into the human condition.

(b) With regard to the epistemological distinction between disinterested and interested discourses, Bourdieu’s position can be summarized as follows: truth claims are inescapably interest-bearing, because the social conditions underlying different modes of knowledge production are ineluctably power-laden. More specifically, we can identify five reasons why there is no such thing as disinterested knowledge. First, since knowledge is always constructed within a given social context, it is necessarily normative (Erkenntnisnormativität). Second, given that knowledge is produced from a specific standpoint in the social space, it is unavoidably perspectival (Erkenntnisstandpunkt). Third, insofar as knowledge plays a particular—for example, complicit or critical, conservative or subversive, reproductive or transformative—role in society, it is inevitably functional (Erkenntnisfunktion). Fourth, to the extent that knowledge can be used for different—notably political, ideological, scientific and economic—purposes, it is instrumentalizable (Erkenntnisnutzung). Fifth, considering that knowledge is generated by socially competing subjects with diverging views of the world, it is in principle always contestable (Erkenntniskonkurrenz). In short, epistemic acts (Erkenntnisvollzüge) are incomparable without underlying cognitive interests (Erkenntnisinteressen). Yet, even if we share Bourdieu’s contention that there are no disinterested epistemic discourses, we need to admit the fact that his insistence upon the scientificity and objectivity of reflexive sociology is not easily reconcilable with his emphasis upon the intrinsic partiality and normativity of all linguistic claims to epistemic validity. In other words, whilst Bourdieu’s conception of knowledge is based on both objectivist realism and normativist constructivism, it is far from obvious to what extent the presuppositional tensions between these diametrically opposed epistemological frameworks can be resolved.

(c) The Bourdieusian distinction between legitimate and illegitimate discourses is based on the Wittgensteinian insight that different life forms produce different language games. From this perspective, legitimate discourses possess, whereas
illegitimate discourses lack, normative authority in relation to field-specific aspects of reality. Whilst Bourdieu’s relational analysis of language is useful in that it allows us to account for the fact that all claims to epistemic validity are, directly or indirectly, shaped by struggles over social legitimacy, it does not permit us to understand why, and to what degree, rational discourses can challenge the spatio-temporal determinacy of their own reality. To the extent that linguistic discourses are relatively autonomous, they cannot be reduced to epiphenomenal reflections of structurally differentiated realities. The rational resources of linguistic communication can rise above the social determinants of spatiotemporal framing. To the extent that linguistic discourses are interpenetrable, they cannot be reduced to self-contained sets of doxic presuppositions. Every discourse is an epistemic conglomerate derived from the interaction between numerous social fields. To the extent that linguistic discourses are multifunctional, they cannot be reduced to monolithic ideologies mobilized in pursuit of one overriding interest. Just as actors pursue a variety of interests, discourses serve a multiplicity of functions. In brief, the symbolic playfulness of language games is irreducible to the historical arbitrariness of life forms.

(d) With regard to the distinction between instituted and ephemeral discourses, Bourdieu has a tendency to emphasize the relationally determined nature and reproductive function of the former and disregard the relatively unpredictable emergence and potentially transformative impact of the latter. If, following Bourdieu, we assume that dominant social groups have an interest in consolidating orthodox discourses, oriented towards the preservation of their status, and dominated social groups have an interest in generating heterodox discourses, oriented towards the transformation of their position, then it seems logical to conclude that field-specific discourses are largely determined by the underlying social interests that shape the actions and reflections of those who produce them. Such a mechanistic conception of social reality, however, tends to underestimate the extent to which social fields can create an infinite number of language games, whose ideological complexity escapes the binary logic of an ideological antagonism between orthodox and heterodox discourses.

(e) In order to assess the epistemic validity of the distinction between orthodox and heterodox discourses, we need to reflect upon the complexity of symbolic relations. Every social field can, at least in principle, be shaped by a whole plurality of social discourses, whose multifaceted constitution transcends the binary logic of a struggle between orthodox and heterodox patterns of action and reflection. Dominant groups can have heterodox discourses, just as dominated groups can have orthodox discourses; relatively powerful actors may endorse patterns of action and reflection that challenge the legitimacy of their status quo, whilst relatively disempowered actors may embrace ideological positions that contribute to the reproduction of established power relations. In short, polycentric societies produce an unlimited amount of competing orthodoxies and heterodoxies that cannot be reduced to epiphenomenal reflections of infrastructural antagonisms.
Bourdieu is correct to insist that there is no comprehensive philosophy of language without a critical sociology of symbolic power. The theoretical presuppositions that undergird his analysis of the role of legitimacy in the linguistic construction of validity are nevertheless problematic in at least five respects.

First, let us reconsider the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of representationality. Even if we accept that every Sprachanschauung is a Weltanschauung, we need to identify epistemic criteria that allow us to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate, truthful and misleading, perceptive and deceptive representations of the world. Bourdieu appears to take a convenient middle position between epistemological realism and epistemological constructivism. On the one hand, language equips us with the epistemic capacity to represent reality more or less adequately, for without the possibility of descriptive and explanatory accuracy there would be no point in making a case for the scientificity of reflexive sociology. On the other hand, language makes us represent reality in accordance with the socio-historically specific resources borrowed from a particular linguistic community, implying that every rational claim to validity is impregnated with the spatiotemporal contingency of social legitimacy. Paradoxically, then, language is both a vehicle for the representation of reality and a tool for the construction of a reality of representation.

Second, let us return to the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of contextuality. Even if we acknowledge that language games are unavoidably embedded in coexistential contexts, it is not always obvious which particular set of social relations determines the legitimacy of a speech act in a given situation. Due to the simultaneous presence of competing fields in polycentrically organized societies, it is not necessarily evident which particular field has the “upper hand” and can impose its idiosyncratic codes of legitimacy on a spatiotemporally defined dimension of reality. Just as human actors are simultaneously determined by several social determinants (such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability), simultaneously influenced by an ensemble of coexistential conditions (in particular, sociological, historical, anthropological, psychological and biological factors), and simultaneously immersed in different levels of existence (micro and macro, ephemeral and institutional, communal and societal), they are simultaneously situated in various social fields. In short, contextual legitimacy is a matter of multidimensional determinacy.

Third, let us revise the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of capacity. Even if we share the view that the acquirement of language depends on the acquisition of the ability to communicate with other members of a culturally constituted community, it is far from clear to what extent it makes sense to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate a linguistic competences. Bourdieu is right to assert that the development of linguistic capacity is subject to the attainment of linguistic capital, to the formation of a linguistic habitus and to immersion in a linguistic field. In addition, he justifiably points out that, in most linguistic communities, a distinction is drawn between legitimate and illegitimate—that is, “correct” and “incorrect”, “pure” and “hybrid”, “original” and
“derivative”, “standard” and “peripheral”—forms of language use. Nonetheless, Bourdieu’s notion of linguistic capacity is problematic in that it fails to take seriously the fact that the social meanings attributed to different forms of language use are often blurred and largely subjective. Bourdieu’s field theory allows us to account for the contextual contingency of social legitimacy, but it does not permit us to grasp the relative arbitrariness underlying both the recognition and the misrecognition of linguistic hierarchies.

Fourth, let us reassess the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of authority. Even if we concede that communicative processes oriented towards mutual understanding are often motivated by purposive considerations aimed at the attainment of social recognition, we cannot conclude that the search for epistemic validity is always and exclusively driven by a struggle for social legitimacy. Insofar as the validity of a particular knowledge claim transcends the relationally defined doxa of a given social field, epistemic authority is a matter not of social legitimacy but of rational acceptability. Whilst Bourdieu is eager to remind us of the sociological fact that the symbolic authority attributed to different claims to validity is largely contingent upon asymmetrically distributed resources of social legitimacy, he tends to disregard the epistemological fact that the cognitive authority inherent in universally defensible claims to validity derives from their rational acceptability.

Fifth, let us revisit the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of normativity. Even if we presuppose that the power-laden structuration of society is inconceivable without the interest-bearing regulation of language, we must not reduce the normalization of linguistic relations to a mere vehicle for the exercise of symbolic power. There is no doubt that it makes sense to reveal the social constructedness of language and thereby expose the validity of binary forms of linguistic legitimacy to historical scrutiny. We need to admit, however, that the establishment of linguistic norms and conventions may contribute not only to the forceful reproduction of power relations but also to the successful coordination of social relations. Of course, state-engineered processes of linguistic normalization may be considered largely artificial, essentially arbitrary and profoundly asymmetrical. Yet, they constitute an insufficient but necessary condition for the efficient organization of large-scale societies. The standardization of language makes both linguistic communication and action coordination across local, regional and often national boundaries possible, thereby contributing to the empowering, rather than disempowering, fusion of potentially distant socio-historical horizons. The point is not to ignore, let alone deny, the fact that the standardization, officialization and institutionalization of “national” tongues lead to the problematic division between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” forms of language use. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that the normalization of language can have both disempowering and empowering consequences for both empowered and disempowered groups in society.
(7) One of the most significant features of language is that it is unavoidably ideological. Linguistic entities are ideological beings because every language of the world (Sprachwelt) creates a particular view of the world (Betrachtungswelt). Paradoxically, the Bourdieusian account of the doxic constitution of language is situated both within and outside the Marxist project of ideology critique. In accordance with Marx’s conception of ideology, Bourdieu conceives of doxa as a form of everyday false consciousness, which, in its hegemonic variations, tends to serve the material reproduction and symbolic legitimation of socially dominant groups. In contrast to Marx’s conception of ideology, Bourdieu regards doxa as a relationally contingent vehicle of symbolic representation, whose claims to ideological universality are raised within spatiotemporally confined spaces of legitimacy. From a Bourdieusian perspective, then, a Sprachanschauung is not only a Weltanschauung but also a Feldanschauung. For Marx, the ruling ideas of a given society are those of the ruling class. For Bourdieu, the ruling ideas of a given society are those of the dominant group of the ruling field. Thus, whilst Bourdieu’s polycentric account of social relations succeeds in avoiding the pitfalls of economic reductionism, it remains trapped in the explanatory limitations inherent in functionalist approaches to symbolic representations. Yet, far from being reducible to a Feldanschauung that is completely determined by the underlying logic of a space of possibilities, a Sprachanschauung is a relationally constituted Weltanschauung that can create its own realities.

(8) Another key feature of language is that it is contestable. Surely, Bourdieu is right to insist that linguistic struggles represent an integral component of social life. The symbolic and material organization of society is inconceivable without the emergence of both open and hidden conflicts over the signification and normalization of reality. For this reason, Bourdieu tends to conceive of symbolic relations primarily in terms of power relations. The fact that symbolic relations are unavoidably power-laden, however, does not mean that they are necessarily power-driven. In other words, to the extent that symbolic realms are ineluctably impregnated with, but not inevitably determined by, power relations, the micro-interactional creativity of language games cannot be reduced to the macro-structural functionality of social struggles. We must not forget that homo sapiens is a homo ludens. The playfulness that inhabits various forms of social interaction—such as joking, singing, teasing, flirting, dancing and performing—escapes Bourdieu’s agenda of permanent struggle over social positioning and access to resources. A proclivity for strategic calculation driven by competition for resources and recognition does not linger behind every symbolic interaction. Just as it “is rare that, in ordinary existence, language functions as a pure instrument of communication” (Bourdieu 1982f, 60), it is unusual that, in everyday encounters, language serves as a mere vehicle of competition. The point is not to deny the forcefulness of symbolic power, but to recognize that linguistic beings are equipped with the capacity to bypass and, if necessary, challenge the interest-bearing determinacy of society by exploiting the potential playfulness of symbolically mediated forms of agency.
(9) Another key feature of language is that it is commodifiable. From a Bourdieusian perspective, it is the task of a critical sociology of “the economy of symbolic goods” (Bourdieu 1998a, 9) to shed light on “the economy of linguistic exchanges” (Bourdieu 1982d). Yet, Bourdieu’s account of linguistic relations is paradoxical in that it is both critical of and caught up in the logic of economic determinism. On the one hand, Bourdieu is wary of the economic reductionism inherent in rational choice theories, which fail to account for the social conditions of production, and he condemns the detrimental consequences of market-driven societies, which manifest themselves in processes of stigmatization and marginalization (see Bourdieu 1993a and Bourdieu 1998b). On the other hand, Bourdieu paints an economicistic picture of reality, suggesting that social life is driven by a permanent struggle over material and symbolic resources, which are acquired through the attainment of legitimate forms of capital within competitively structured fields. Hence, Bourdieu conceives of linguistic encounters as symbolic exchanges, linguistic fields as symbolic economies, linguistic competences as stocks of symbolic capital and linguistic habitus as the practical ability to struggle over symbolic resources. Such an economicistic perspective, however, disregards the fact that language constitutes a species-constitutive capacity that allows human beings to raise themselves out of nature by developing a sense of autonomy and responsibility through their meaning-laden structuration of reality and communicative organization of society. If our hermeneutic capacity to develop a meaningful relation to the world by virtue of language were reducible to the practical ability to compete for resources in an economy of symbolic goods, our species-constitutive need to attribute existential significance to reality would be reduced to an accidental commodity of a market-driven society.

(10) According to Bourdieu, language is both a source and a medium of symbolic power. As argued above, however, the assumption that linguistic realms are not only impregnated with but also largely determined by power relations is based on a form of socio-ontological fatalism that leaves little, if any, room for exploring the civilizational functions inherent in the universally empowering potentials of language. In fact, conceiving of rapports sociaux primarily as rapports de force, rather than as rapports normatifs, prevents us from grasping the emancipatory role of species-constitutive resources, notably the civilizational accomplishments of our critical, judgmental and moral capacities. Social relations would be unsustainable if they were based exclusively on power relations, and social actions would undermine the very possibility of human coexistence if they were not only permeated but also driven, primarily, by struggles over the acquisition of material and symbolic resources. To be sure, the point is not to replace Bourdieu’s relational account of the “real speech situation” with Habermas’s paradisal view of the “ideal speech situation”. Rather, the point is to recognize that just as we need to reject Habermas’s socio-ontological romanticism, which portrays the lifeworld as a power-free realm of pristine intersubjectivity, we need to discard Bourdieu’s socio-ontological fatalism, which suggests that human actions are ultimately driven
by competitive struggles over power and legitimacy. By contrast, embracing a position of socio-ontological realism permits us to face up to the simultaneous existence of the power-laden and the power-critical elements of social life. Most real speech situations are constituted by competent speakers who, whilst having an interest in gaining access to material and symbolic resources, are able to mobilize the empowering potential of their communicative capacity and thereby contribute to the construction of a better society.

Notes

[1] See, for example: Bourdieu (1977); Bourdieu ([1977] 1992); Bourdieu (1982c); Bourdieu (1982d); Bourdieu (1982e); Bourdieu (1982f); Bourdieu (1982g); Bourdieu (1982h); Bourdieu ([1984]-e 1993); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975); Bourdieu and Delsaut (1975, 23); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c).

[2] See, for example: Boschetti (2004); Calvet (2002); Collins (1998); Encrevé (2004); Gebauer (2005); Grenfell (2010); Grenfell and James (1998); Grenfell and Kelly (1999); Hanks (1993); Jenkins (1994); Kögler (2011); Ledeneva (1994); Loos (2000); Myles (2010); Olivesi (2005); Searle (2004); Snook (1990); Susen (2011a); Susen (2011d, 397–400); Susen and Turner (2011a, esp. 34, 37, 55, 108, 200, 219 and 298); Susen and Turner (2011b, xix–xxvii); Thompson (1992).


[5] On Bourdieu’s analysis of the “linguistic field”, see, for example, Bourdieu (1982a, esp. 11–21, 47–51 and 53–7). See also Ledeneva (1994, esp. 13–6).


[8] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982f, 67): “une compétence linguistique”.

[9] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982d, 20): “une compétence sociale”.

[10] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982f, 68): “les facteurs sociaux de la compétence linguistique”.

[11] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982e, 46): “la valeur sociale de la compétence linguistique”.

[12] Bourdieu emphasizes the community-based nature of language on various occasions. See, for example, Bourdieu (1982d, 18): “les membres de la même communauté linguistique”. See also Bourdieu (1982e, 26): “la communauté linguistique [...] comme un groupe de gens qui utilisent le même système de signes linguistiques”. In addition, see, for instance: Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 2–3): “communauté linguistique” : un groupe de gens qui utilisent le même système de signes linguistiques”; Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 6–7) : “communauté de conscience” : à travers le langage”; Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 10–11) : “les membres d’une communauté linguistique”; Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 28) : “La langue existe dans la conscience de tous les membres de la communauté linguistique en cause.”

My translation; original text in French: “Le paradoxe de la communication est qu’elle suppose un médium commun mais qui ne réussit—on le voit bien dans le cas limite où il s’agit de transmettre, comme souvent la poésie, des émotions—qu’en suscitant et en ressuscitant des expériences singuliers, c’est-à-dire socialement marqués.”

On Bourdieu’s—hermeneutically inspired—account of the nature of meaning, see, for example: Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 171–2 and 177–97); Bourdieu (1980a, 53–5, 62–6, 103, 113, 135, 161, 178–9, 186–8, 191–207, 211–9, 226–7 and 244); Bourdieu (1982b, 10 and 34); Bourdieu (1982c, 8–9); Bourdieu (1982d, 15); Bourdieu (1982f, 79 n. 17); Bourdieu (1982h, 171–86); Bourdieu (1984, 6); Bourdieu (1994, 190); Bourdieu (1997b, 21–6, 44–5, 64, 67, 118, 120–3, 181, 184 and 206); Bourdieu (1999, 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 30, 38, 56, 70 and 100–5); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d, 143–4).

My translation; original text in French: “des schèmes de perception et d’appréciation”.

My translation; original text in French: “des agents dotés des schèmes de perception et d’appréciation”.


My translation; original text in French: “consensus pré-réflexif, immédiat sur le sens du monde”.

My translation; original text in French: “la transformation de l’histoire en nature, de l’arbitraire culturel en nature”.

On Bourdieu’s analysis of “the socialization of the natural” and “the naturalization of the social”, see, for example: Bourdieu (1980a, 236 and 243); Bourdieu (1980b, 66); Bourdieu (1982c, 8); Bourdieu (1997b, 87 and 113); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 34–5); Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992, 113). See also, for example: Accardo (1997, 12–9, 33–7, 121–2, 156 and 192); Andréani (1996, 61); Bonnewitz (1998, 39); Butler (1999, 114 and 120); Camic ([1986] 2000, 329 and 341); Caro (1980, 1188); Chauvière and Fontaine (2003, 35–6 and 40); Holton (2000, 91); Hong (1999, 245); Kögl (1992) 1996, 237; Robbins (2000, 138); Smith (2001, 156 and 160); Susen (2007, 182).

On the Bourdiesian distinction between ordinary discourses and scientific discourses, see, for example: Bourdieu (1980a, 24, 43–5, 48–50 and 61); Bourdieu (1982b, 10, 15 and 32); Bourdieu (1982d, 18–9); Bourdieu (1995a, esp. 3–5 and 10); Bourdieu (1997b, 119, 163, 217–8 and 225–6); Bourdieu (1999, 334–5); Bourdieu (2001b, 15); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 27–49 and 100–2); Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992, esp. 117); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c, 150); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992f, 213). For critical commentaries on the Bourdiesian distinction between ordinary discourses and scientific discourses, see, for example: Acciaioli ([1981] 2000, 94–5); Bohman (1997, 177); Bohman (1999, 135); Boltanski (1990a, 37–40); Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1998, 248–51); Boltanski (1999–2000, esp. 303–6); Boltanski (2009, 19–22, 39–41, 100–1 and 215); Bonnewitz (1998, 27–8 and 34–9); Brubaker (1985, 754); Brubaker (1993, 216–7); Caro

[23] My translation; original text in French: “vigilance e´ piste´ mologique”.
[24] My translation; original text in French: “la sé´paration entre l’opinion commune et le discours scientifique”.
[25] My translation; original text in French: “[... s’impose particulièrement dans le cas des sciences de l’homme [...]]”.
[26] My translation; original text in French: “pré´ constructions inhé´ rentes a` la routine du discours quotidien”.
[27] My translation; original text in French: “pré´ suppose´ s inscrits dans le langage”.
[28] My translation; original text in French: “la contextualité du discours”.
[29] My translation; original text in French: “[...] l’illusion de la transcendance d’une raison transthorique et transpersonnelle [...]”.—In the published English translation the word “et”, between the words “transhistorique” and “transpersonnelle”, was replaced by a comma. See Bourdieu (1997) 2000, 120).
[31] My translation; original text in French: “les lois immanentes du discours le´gitime”.
[32] My translation; original text in French: “représentation le´gitime du monde social”.
[33] My translation; original text in French: “l’ubiquité sociale de la langue le´gitime”.
[34] My translation; original text in French: “l’acquisition de la compétence le´gitime”.
[35] My translation; original text in French: “imposition de la langue le´gitime”.
[36] My translation; original text in French: “dé´ finition du le´gitime et de l’ille´gitime”.
[37] My translation; original text in French: “l’imposition de la reconnaissance de la langue le´gitime”.
[38] My translation; original text in French: “la dévaluation des dialectes et l’instauration de la nouvelle hiérarchie des usages linguistiques”.
[39] My translation; original text in French: “le` gîte”.
[40] My translation; original text in French: “e´ pure` e et purifie` e”.
[41] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982e, 54, 55 and 85): “les strate` gies linguistiques de la petite-bourgeoise et en particulier sa tendance à l’hypercorrection”; “l’hypercorrection contrôlée”; “les incorrrections par hypercorrection”.
[42] See, for example: Bourdieu (1982e, 25, 43, 44, 46 and 53); Bourdieu (1982f, 64, 67, 68, 74 and 85); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d, 147). See also, for example: Bohman (1999, 132); Bronckart and Schurmanns (1999, 164); Grenfell and James (1998, 73); Jenkins (1994, 96–7); Thompson (1992, 6); Wagner (2003, 216).


[46] My translation; original text in French: “le pouvoir de faire voir et de faire croire”. See also Bourdieu (1979b, 5).

[47] See, for example: Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 83); Bourdieu (1980a, 28, 90 and 122); Bourdieu (1982d, 16); Bourdieu (1982f, 84); Bourdieu (1997b, 44, 166, 205 and 222); Bourdieu (1998a, 102); Bourdieu (2001a, 129); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 46).

[48] My translation; original text in French: “position d’autorité pour dire avec autorité ce que c’est peut dire avec autorité”.

[49] My translation; original text in French: “socialement reconnu”.

[50] My translation; original text in French: “reconnu comme é’gitime”.

[51] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982e, 54, 55 and 85): “les strate’ gies linguistiques de la petite-bourgeoise et en particulier sa tendance à l’hypercroURATION; “l’hypercroURATION contrôle’; “les ‘incorrections’ par hypercroURATION” (already referred to above).

[52] See, for example, Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 2 and 5): “la langue officielle d’une unité’ politique”, and “[...] les langues régionales et les usages populaires de la langue officielle subissent un déclassement systématique [...]”.


[54] Italics removed from “normalized”; my translation; original text in French: “la langue normalisè”.

[55] My translation; original text in French: “la fe’ tichisation de la langue le’ gitime”.

[56] Excellent discussions can be found in Haug (1999), Rehmann (2004) and Reit (2004).

[57] On Bourdieu’s use of the term “ideology”, see, for example: Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 188): “The system of symbolic goods production and the system producing the producers fulfil [...] ideological functions [...]” (italics added).——Bourdieu (1980a, 78): “l’ide’ologie de «l’acteur rationnel»”.——Bourdieu (1982b, 19): “le pouvoir de faire voir et de faire croire” (already referred to above).——Bourdieu (1982c, 8): “[...] la linguistique structurale ne pouvait devenir la science dominante dans les sciences sociales sans exercer un effet ide’ologique, en donnant les dehors dela’ scientifique’a la naturalisation de ces produits de l’histoire que sont les objets symboliques [...]” (italics added).——Bourdieu ([1984]:b 1993, 50): “[...] the unconscious is the forgetting of history. The product, separated from its social conditions of production, changes its meaning and exerts an ideological effect [...]” (italics added).——Bourdieu (2001b, 28): “[...] l’ide’ologie intellectuelle par excellence, c’est l’ide’ologie de Mannheim, «l’intellectuel sans attaches ni racines», nous sommes sans feu ni lieu, sans foi ni loi, nous sommes libre, [...] c’est l’ide’ologie par excellence des intellectuels actuels parce qu’ils se croient libres [...]” (italics added).——Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c, 115): “the dominant vision of the intellectual universe, [...] the ideology of the freischwebende Intelligenz” (italics in original).——See also, for

[58] My translation; original text in French: “imposition de la «repre’sentation vraie» de la réalité”.

[59] My translation; original text in French: “le pouvoir de faire voir et de faire croire”. See also Bourdieu (1979b, 5) (already referred to above).

[60] My translation; original text in French: “de faire reconnaître”.


[62] Bourdieu (1997b, 39); my translation; original text in French: “reconnaissance sociale”.

[63] My translation; original text in French: “imposition de la définition dominante”.

[64] My translation; original text in French: “mode de perception légitime”.

[65] My translation; original text in French: “L’histoire des luttes symboliques”.

[66] My translation; original text in French: “imposition de la «repre’sentation vraie» de la réalité” (already referred to above).

[67] See Bourdieu (1998a, 9): “[...] faire apparaître une construction sociale naturalisée [...] comme le fondement en nature de la division arbitraire qui est au principe et de la réalité et de la représentation de la réalité et qui s'impose parfois à la recherche elle-même” (italics added). See also Bourdieu (1980a, 67): “[...] de glisser du mode de la réalité à la réalité du mode le”.

[68] Italics removed from “goes without saying because it comes without saying”. See also Bourdieu ([1997] 2000, 9): “It is because we are implicated in the world that there is implicit content in what we think and say about it”. (Italics added.)

[69] My translation; original text in French: “s’il y a une vérité, c’est que la vérité est un enjeu de luttes”.

[70] My translation; original text in French: “luttes symboliques”.

[71] My translation; original text in French: “lutte à propos de la vision légitime du monde social”.

[72] My translation; original text in French: “à propos du monopole de la représ éntation scientifiquement légitime” (“scientifiquement légitime” left out in the above translation).

[73] My translation; original text in French: “inseparablement symbolique et politique”.

[74] See, for example: Bourdieu (1980a, 61 and 186); Bourdieu (2001a, 104 and 105); Accardo (1997, 106 and 112); Quiniou (1996, 121).

[75] See, for example: Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 70); Bourdieu (1982e, 57); Bourdieu ([1984]-c 1993, 58); Karakayali (2004, 356); Pels (1995, 88).

[76] See, for example: Bourdieu (1980a, 186 and 209); Bourdieu ([1984]-a 1993, 9); Bourdieu ([1984]-b 1993, 49); Bourdieu (2001a, 104 and 105); Bourdieu (1997b, 91); Quiniou (1996, 121); Singer (1999, 283).

[77] See, for example: Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968, 61); Bourdieu (2001a, 104 and 183); Lahire (1999a, 15).

[78] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982e, 27 and 43); my translation; original text in French: “marche linguistique”.

[79] See, for example, Bourdieu (1982e, 35); my translation; original text in French: “marche des biens symboliques”.

[80] On various occasions, Bourdieu stresses the autonomous, idiosyncratic and irreducible nature of markets in particular and of social fields in general. See previous note on “the autonomy of the field”.


See, for example, Habermas ([1984]-a 2001, 85–6, 93, 97–9 and 102–3). See also Susen (2009, 81–2 and 93–9) and Susen (2010a, esp. 107–11).

Numerous critical comments on Habermas’s arguably idealistic account of language in particular and his communication-theoretic conception of society in general can be found in Bourdieu’s writings. See, for example: Bourdieu (1979a, 581 n. 34); Bourdieu (1982e, 25 n. 4); Bourdieu (1982f, 60); Bourdieu (1982g, 105); Bourdieu (1982h, 192–4); Bourdieu (1988, 40 n. 55, 101 n. 1 and 110 n. 18); Bourdieu ([1992/1993] 2002, 271–2); Bourdieu (1993b, 210); Bourdieu (1994, 165, 170–1 and 235–6); Bourdieu (1995a, 10); Bourdieu (1995b, 114); Bourdieu (1997b, 32, 80, 81, 95, 99, 128, 131, 143, 145, 292 n. 13, 296 n. 8, 296–7 n. 9 and 297 n. 10); Bourdieu (1997a, 60); Bourdieu (1999, 338); Bourdieu (2001a, 10, 48, 161–2, 167 and 200); Bourdieu (2002a, 4 and 7); Bourdieu (2004b, 13); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c, 139); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c, 147, 154 n. 109 and 156); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992e, 188–9).

My translation; original text in French: “[...] il est rare que, dans l’existence ordinaire, la langue fonctionne comme pur instrument de communication [...]”.

My translation; original text in French: “[a]nalysse matérialiste de l’économie des biens symboliques”.

My translation; original text in French: “relation de communication entre un émetteur (chiffrement) et un récepteur (déchiffrement)”.

My translation; original text in French: “é´ change linguistique”.


My translation; original text in French: “[a]nalys[e] […] de l’´economie des biens symboliques” (already referred to above).

My translation; original text in French: “communaute´ linguistique”.

My translation; original text in French: “un groupe de gens qui utilisent le même système de signes linguistiques”.

My translation; original text in French: “la condition”.

My translation; original text in French: “de la production économique”.

My translation; original text in French: “de la domination symbolique”.

My translation (text slightly modified in the English translation); original text in French: “l’espace […] définit la langue”.

My translation; original text in French: “la langue […] définit son espace”.

My translation; original text in French: “[l’]unification du champ linguistique”.

My translation; original text in French: “l’imposition de légitimité”.

My translation; original text in French: “la valeur sociale de la compétence linguistique”.

On Bourdieu’s notion of “interconvertibility” see, for example, Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 178).

On Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977); Bourdieu ([1977] 1992); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d). See also, for example: Addi (2001); Cicourel (2004); Hallett (2003); Honneth (1984); Jurt (2004); Kraemer (2002); Leneveu (2002); Loos (2000); Mauger (2005); Peter (2004); Schubert (2002); Terray (2003); Wacquant ([1993] 2002).

My translation; original text in French: “Relation entre un émetteur et un récepteur […]”.

My translation; original text in French: “l’´e change linguistique”.

My translation; original text in French: “communaute´ linguistique”.

My translation (already referred to above).

My translation; original text in French: “La violence symbolique est en effet cette forme de domination qui, dé´ passant l’opposition que l’on fait commune´ ment entre les rapports de sens et les rapports de force, entre la communication et la domination, ne s’accomplit qu’au travers de la communication sous laquelle elle se dissimule”.
106] My translation; original text in French: “[…] a imposer la vérité partielle d’un groupe comme la vérité des relations objectives entre les groupes”.

107] My translation; original text in French: “le processus de connaissance-universalisation”.


109] Literal translation from German into English: “sociability”.

110] Literal translation from German into English: “balance of power” or “strength-relativity”.

111] Literal translation from French into English: “relations of power” or “relations of force”.


113] My translation; original text in French: “la domination […] toujours une dimension symbolique”.

114] On Bourdieu’s notion of complicity, see, for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d, 167).

115] My translation; original text in French: “[…] violence douce, insensible, invisible pour ses victimes mêmes, qui s’exerce pour l’essentiel par les voies purement symboliques de la communication et de la connaissance ou, plus précisément, de la reconnaissance, de la connaissance ou, à la limite, du sentiment”.

116] My translation; original text in French: “les domine’s contribuent à leur propre domination”.

117] My translation; original text in French: “Il n’y a pas de pouvoir symbolique sans une symbolique du pouvoir”.


121] In order to illustrate this point, it may be useful to introduce a typology that distinguishes between “foundational fields”, “contingent fields” and “ephemeral fields”. (i) A foundational field constitutes a civilization ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which is necessary for the emergence of social order. (ii) A contingent field represents a societal ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which is possible within the emergence of social order. (iii) An ephemeral field stands for an interactional ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which is largely irrelevant to the emergence of social order. (i) The most obvious examples of foundational fields are economic, political, cultural, artistic, linguistic and sexual fields, because no society can possibly exist without some degree of division of labour, small-scale and large-scale modes of action coordination, various forms of habitualization, diversified realms of aesthetic expression, everyday spaces of communicative interaction, and overt or subtle ways of regulating sexual reproduction. (ii) Contemporary examples of contingent fields are judicial, military, religious, scientific, academic and journalistic fields, because society may be organized more or less efficiently with, but can—at least in principle—exist without, legal arrangements, martial resources, sacred institutions, systematic forms of knowledge production, disciplinary divisions of cognition and media industries. (iii) Obvious examples of ephemeral fields are short-lived gatherings, political demonstrations, concerts, stage performances, parties, sport events, football matches, train journeys, lectures, seminars and classes; in short, an infinite list of collectively constructed situations and shared experiences.

122] My translation (already referred to above).

123] My translation; original text in French: “l’économie des biens symboliques”. 

References


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