REPRESENTATION OF TURKEY IN THE BRITISH PRINT MEDIA: TO BE OR NOT TO BE EUROPEAN

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT:

This research analyses the representation of Turkey in four British broadsheets (the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, the Independent and the Times) as well as their Sunday sister papers between 2007-2013. Using the concepts of self and other as a theoretical basis, this research seeks to determine whether Turkey, a predominantly Muslim, secular and partially Westernised EU candidate, was represented as a part of the European Self or as an Oriental Other in British broadsheets during the time period specified. As well as defining modern Turkey’s unique position on the Self-other axis of Europe in the context of British quality media, the research examines how applicable Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism is to the Turkish example. Taking Turkey’s multifaceted national identity and Britain’s exceptionalist attitude towards Europe (as well as the British media’s prejudices about Islam) into consideration, the research goes on to demonstrate that the straight-forward, binary understanding of Self-Other relationships in Said’s Orientalism is not applicable to the Turkish example. Instead, the research utilises the concept of Nesting Orientalisms (created by Bakić-Hayden to explain the self-other relationships within Europe) in the analysis and concludes that Turkey was perceived and represented as an agreeable, useful yet still inferior Model Other in British media texts during the time period analysed in this study. The research, which consists of a quantitative content analysis conducted on 731 news items and a qualitative textual analysis conducted on 150 representative news articles, 60 editorials and 10 front-page stories, creates the most detailed map of Turkey’s coverage in the British print media to date as well as providing continuity to the existing relevant literature.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1:1 Introduction

Turkey is a country that is in the headlines all around the world nearly everyday; not only because it is strategically located between Europe and the Middle East, but also because it is the only secular democracy with a majority Muslim population that has been trying to become a member of the European Union since 1963 and is a member of Nato since 1952.

Turkey has a special relationship with Britain, the only country in the European Union that openly supports Turkey’s accession and does not fear (at least officially) a Muslim presence in Europe (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012 p: 3). In 2010, only three months after taking office, Prime Minister David Cameron underlined this special relationship and said “Turkey is vital for our economy, vital for our security and vital for our politics and our diplomacy (Cameron, 2010)”. British media is also aware of this strategic partnership and hence is highly interested in Turkey and its role in international politics.

And, Turkey is highly interested in what Western, and especially British, media has to say about it\(^1\). Commentaries, news articles and features about Turkey published in the British broadsheets are often translated and republished in Turkish newspapers and

\(^1\) It can be argued that Turkish media and consequently Turkish public and politicians are more interested in British and American news outlets’ Turkey coverage compared to French, German, Spanish or Italian news reports because they are more familiar with the English language and English language news coverage is dominant around the world.
websites with headlines that read something like “Look at what Britons have to say about us!”

As it can be seen in the comments sections of Turkish newspapers’ websites and speeches of government officials, Turkish public and politicians are immensely sensitive to the foreign coverage about any issue regarding Turkey (Paksoy, 2012, p: 292).

Turkish politicians frequently comment on the foreign coverage on Turkey and even directly respond to commentaries, editorials and news stories published in British broadsheets.

And, as a result, there is an on-going debate in Turkey about exactly how the country is being represented by the British media. Is it, in the eyes of British journalists, part of Europe, the Middle East, Eurasia or the Mediterranean? Is it a leading actor in the

---

2 I have been working as the London correspondent of the flagship Turkish daily Hurriyet for nearly three years. And one of my main duties as a correspondent, other than following Kate Middleton’s latest fashion statements, is to scan every single British broadsheet on a daily basis to see what British journalists have been saying about Turkey.

3 See: Hurriyet, 19/05/2015; Hurriyet, 10/06/2015; Hurriyet, 07/08/2015; Hurriyet, 11/06/2015; Hurriyet, 30/09/2014; Sozcu, 23/02/ 2015; Radikal, 16/05/2015; Hurriyet, 30/06/2014; Hurriyet, 12/06/2014

4 For example, in June 2015, several pro-government Turkish newspapers inaccurately translated a Guardian editorial about Turkey and claimed that the broadsheet said, “Poor Muslims who are not entirely Westernized cannot be allowed to rule their countries on their own (YeniSafak, 05/06/2015)”. Even though other Turkish news outlets rapidly pointed out the inaccuracy of the translation, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was quick to respond. Only a week after the publication of the editorial, at a rally in the eastern Turkish province of Ardahan, Turkish leader said: “Do you know what an English newspaper is saying? It says ‘poor Muslims who are not entirely Westernized cannot be allowed to rule their countries on their own.’ Who are you to say this? Who are you, you shameless [one]? Know your place, since when have you been given such an authority? Turkey is no longer a country of mandates. That is history now. This country is now governed by its true sons” (Erdogan, 2015). The Guardian editorial titled “The Guardian view on Turkey: growing autocracy threatens a crucial country”, did not include that particular quote or any expression that may be interpreted in the same way. (Guardian, 31/05/2015 The Guardian view on Turkey: growing autocracy threatens a crucial country, URL: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/31/guardian-view-turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan accessed: 10/08/2015)
Muslim world or a ‘torn’ country desperately trying to fit in to the Western civilisation? Is it Europe’s strong and loyal ally or an enemy at the gates? And most importantly, is it being represented as an “equal” to Britain or is it being orientalised as an inferior other?

These questions are unique to Turkey, since there is not another country in the world that has such a multifaceted and complicated identity.

While this issue is being discussed in Turkey on a daily basis, there has not been a comprehensive, empirical study on the representation of Turkey in the British print media in the last decade. Even when Turkish government accused Western media of ‘attacking’ Turkey as a result of their ‘orientalist mind-set’ after the Gezi Park protests in 2013 (Al Jazeera, 11/12/2013), responses to these accusations were limited to opinion and not fact.

All previous studies on the subject, which will be examined in detail in the following chapters, either only focus on a singular aspect of the media representation (like the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid) or focus on a singular event (like the coverage of Turkish general elections in 2002).

This research, titled “Representation of Turkey in the British print media: To be or not to be European” will look into the way four British broadsheets and their Sunday sister papers (the Times, the Guardian, the Independent and the Daily Telegraph) covered Turkey between 2007-2013.
The chosen time period of this study is significant for multiple reasons. In 2007, the AKP established its success in Turkish political life by winning the majority of the general vote for a second time. The support coming from nearly half of the Turkish public encouraged the political party to start a process of transformation in Turkey. And as the AKP government changed Turkey, Turkey’s image in the foreign media also changed accordingly. But this new period, in which the AKP’s ‘new’ Turkey occupied newspaper headlines around the world as a ‘Model Muslim democracy’, came to an end in 2013.

The Gezi Park protest in Summer 2013, which carried Turkey to international headlines and altered the image of the country and its government in the foreign media drastically, marked the beginning of a new period for Turkey and its identity. This event also coincided with the escalation of the conflict in Syria and the emergence of ISIS as a serious threat in the Middle East. These developments and Turkey’s active and at times problematic involvement in regional politics caused Turkish government’s foreign policy, alongside with its democratic credentials, to be questioned. As a result, the 7 years between 2007 and 2013 can be seen as a unique time period for the analysis of Turkish representation in the British press.

Using both quantitative and qualitative research methods, the study will try to determine if Turkey, a predominantly Muslim, secular and partially Westernised EU candidate, was being represented as an extension of the European self or an oriental other in British broadsheets during this unexampled time period. To do this, the research will seek to find an answer to the main research question of “Does British
print media perceive and present Turkey as an extension of the European self or as an Oriental other?"

As well as attempting to define modern Turkey’s unique position on the self-other axis of Europe in the context of British quality media, by looking at not a singular aspect but the totality of the coverage, the research will examine the applicability of Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism to the Turkish example.

Taking Turkey’s multifaceted national identity and Britain’s exceptionalist attitude towards Europe (as well as its prejudices about Islam) in to consideration, the research will apply the concept of Nesting Orientalisms (created by Bakić-Hayden to explain the self-other relationships within Europe) to the Turkish example and hypothesise that Turkey was perceived and represented as an agreeable and useful, ‘Model Other’ for Europe in British media texts during the time scale of this study.

The research will consist of a quantitative content analysis conducted on 731 news items and a qualitative textual analysis conducted on 150 representative news articles, 60 editorials and 10 front-page stories published in 4 selected British broadsheets and their Sunday sister papers.

In-depth interviews with 5 journalists who regularly cover Turkey for British broadsheets and 5 journalists who follow the coverage of Turkey in the British media for Turkish media outlets will also be conducted and integrated in to the research in
order to obtain some insight on the production and reception of the media content that will be analysed.

1:2 Structure of the thesis

The study will consist of 8 main chapters. **Chapter 1** introduces the research question, the hypothesis and the methodology and lays out the general research framework.

**Chapter 2** will present the analytical framework of the research by looking into concepts like self, other, Orientalism, Nesting Orientalisms and the Model Other. In its first section, the chapter will explore the existing literature on representation of Turkey in Western media and explain how Turkey is a rather complicated other to Europe as a result of its strong historical and cultural bonds with the continent and the Muslim world. In its second part, the chapter will explore British media’s relationship with Islam and Europe.

**Chapter 3** will provide a brief summary of the development of the Turkish national identity and the way it has been perceived by the Western world through out the last century. The first section of the chapter will examine Turkey’s Westernisation process and how this Westernisation project affected the way it is perceived in Europe and Britain. The second section of the chapter will look into the development of the country’s ‘Islamic’ identity.

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5 It needs to be noted that this is not a reception or a production study. Interviews will only be used as a secondary research method.
Chapter 4 will explore Turkey’s long and challenging relationship with the European Union and its half a century long EU candidature journey. After presenting a brief history of relations between the Turkish state and the EU, the chapter will conclude by presenting the major issues that are being discussed in regards to Turkey’s membership bid.

Chapter 5 will demonstrate the methodological structure of the research. It will explain the quantitative and qualitative methods used in the analysis. The chapter will also elaborate on the sampling process and how each selected research method is applied to the research sample. Additional research questions that will be answered through qualitative and quantitative methods will also be presented in this chapter.

Chapter 6 will present the numerical and statistical data obtained through the quantitative content analysis of the news items in the research sample, using graphs and tables. After presenting the data in detail, the chapter will provide an analysis of the quantitative outcomes in the context of analytical concepts presented in Chapter 2. In depth interviews will also be integrated in to this chapter when necessary.

Chapter 7 will present the results of the qualitative textual analysis of the research sample. The first section will explore the ways British media othered Turkey in their narratives and the second section will look in to the representation of the Turkish government and the prime minister in British media texts. In depth interviews will also be integrated in to this chapter when necessary.
Finally, Chapter 8 will present a general summary of the findings by giving short and to the point answers to additional research questions that were presented in the Methodology. The study will conclude with presenting its contributions to the existing literature, explaining its limitations and giving some suggestions for future studies.

1:3 Conclusion

All in all, this study on the representation of Turkey in the British print media will serve several purposes.

Firstly, by quantitatively analysing a large and representative research sample, the study will provide a map for the coverage of Turkey in the British broadsheets between 2007 and 2013. The data obtained through this effort will fill a significant gap in the literature and show how the British media was handling Turkey and its identity during this period.

Secondly, by qualitatively analysing the coverage of Turkey in British broadsheets, the study will provide a profound assessment on the applicability of Said’s theory of Orientalism to the Turkish example and will introduce Bakić-Hayden’s Nesting Orientlisms and the concept of ‘Model Other’ to the media representation studies on Turkey.

Finally, the study will conduct a thorough analysis of the representation of the Turkish government in the British broadsheets and provide a conclusive answer to Turkish government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at Western journalists.
CHAPTER 2: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

East is East, and West is West
And never the twain shall meet

Rudyard Kipling

2:1 Introduction

In a study exploring the way modern Turkey is represented in the British media; examining historical, cultural and sociological relations between Turkish, European and British identities is essential.

While explaining British representation of Turkey through the concept of othering, this chapter will deal with the theoretical background material on which this study will be built on and will examine previous academic works exploring similar research questions and subjects.

2:2 Concept of othering and its relevance to press coverage

Light cannot be defined without dark and good cannot be defined without the existence of evil. Similarly, identities also need an opposite to define and make themselves stronger (Paksoy, 2012, p: 67). In other words, as Conolly puts it, “An Identity requires

6 Kipling, Rudyard (1889) The Ballad of East and West in A Victorian Anthology: 1837-1895
difference in order to exist, and it converts difference into otherness to secure its own self certainty (Conolly, 1991, p: 64)

The idea of ‘self’s need for the other to exist’ was first introduced by Claude Levi Strauss in his book Structural Anthropology (Strauss, 1976) and was developed by many others including Hegel, Fichte, Sartre, Levinas and Beauvoir through history. The concept was studied in disciplines such as cultural studies, media studies, international relations, sociology, philosophy and history (Criss, 2008, p: 67).

But it was Edward Said who made the process of othering a major topic of discussion in European identity formation and representation of Oriental cultures in the West; by claiming that the traditional idea of a European identity that drives from the idea of a common history, culture and morality was in need of an opposite to define itself (Kosebalaban, 2007) and it used (and is still using) the Orient as this opposite, or the other 7.

European nations defined the similarities that make them ‘one’ by defining their differences with nations of the East (and their most obvious common Islam). So, the civilized, moral and superior European came in to existence by defining the underdeveloped, passive and immature Orient 8.

Said formulated this idea by redefining the word Orientalism as the acceptance in the

West of ‘the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate

theories, epics, novels, social descriptions and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny and so on’ (Said, 2003, p: 4).

According to Said there are three separate designs of ‘Orientalism’, or in other words ‘ways of dealing with the Orient’ (Said, 2003, p: 3): Academic, imaginative and historic. While academic orientalism to him is what “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient either in its specific or its general aspects’” does, he defines imaginative Orientalism as the works of novelists, philosophers, poets, theorists, painters and musicians (Said, 2003, p: 3).

The third meaning is defined as historical material. This is Orientalism as "something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point, he discusses and analyses Orientalism as ‘he corporate institution for dealing with the Orient - dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it’ (ibid.).

These three different designs of Orientalism are all interdependent and European or Western journalism is under the influence of all different types of orientalist thinking since it is a product frequently dealing with the Orient, which is created by Europeans, for Europeans. So Orientalism has a “central importance for an investigation of representations of the Islamic world (specifically the Near and Middle East) as the cultural contestant against which 'the West' first had to define itself (Bryce, 2009, p: 67; Kösebalaban, 2007, p: 97; Paksoy, 2012, p: 67)”. 
2:2:1 Representation of the Turk in the British media: A complicated other

Said’s Orientalism is also an important tool in the studies on the European media’s representation of the Turk.\(^9\)

It is unanimously accepted that the Turk was one of the most dominant others in the history of European identity creation\(^10\), (Delaty, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Kylstad, 2010) since there were several reasons for Europe to see the Turk, or the Ottoman, as an important other.

The Ottoman had the military might, physical proximity, and a strong religious tradition that made it a particularly relevant other in the evolution of the fledgling international society that evolved from the ashes of Western Christendom and that took up a pivotal position in the forging of European identities. From fourteenth century to nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire occupied and controlled a quarter of the European continent, comprising some of the Europe’s most coveted territory (Neumann, 1999, p: 40).

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\(^9\) The studies that are looking into the media representation of the Turk and Turkey using the concept of Othering or Orientalism are: Dogan, 2000; Paksoy, 2012, 2013; Oktem, 2005; Devran, 2007; Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006; Kejanlioğlu and Taş, 2009; Bryce, 2007; Aksoy, 2009; Negrine, 2008; Wimmel 2009; Turksoy, 2011; Marcellini and Şenyuva, 2011. These studies will be examined in detail in Chapter 5.

\(^10\) Yet, it needs to be noted that, compared to the Arab world, Orientalism as a concept has never been as popular in Turkey. Westernised Turks see themselves as Europeans (or at least lesser Orientals) and as a result consider Orientalism to be a problem of the “real” Orientals, mainly Arabs. Or, they argue that Orientalism is the definition of the relationship between the colonial West and the people of previously colonised territories. At this point it also needs to be mentioned that Turks are guilty of Orientalism towards non-Westernised elements within the Turkish society (See: Chapter 2) and their Arab neighbours. Turkish academics’ works on Orientalism are consequently quite limited. The prominent works can be listed as: Parla, 1985; Akyay and Topçuoglu, 1996; Keyman, 1999; Ozturk, 2000; Süphandağı, 2002; Bulut, 2002; Yavuz, 2003; Yeğenoglu, 2003; Arli, 2004; Yıldız 2007.
Yet it is not possible to say Turkey was ever a straightforward other to the West (Çirakman, 2005; Findlay, 2005; İnalçık, 1994).

The West’s historical relationship with Turkey has been characterized by an inability to appropriate it materially or indeed discursively with any degree of assurance. Western travelers in the Ottoman Empire over several centuries referred to its Islamic and Oriental ‘otherness’ while also admiring aspects of its political and social organization and were obliged to deal with it, functionally, as one of the great states of Europe (Bryce, 2007: 181).  

This two-sidedness to Turk’s identity in the eyes of Europeans, became even more apparent in the 19th century (Neumann, 1999, p: 40). For the first time in 1856 with the treaty of Paris, Ottoman Empire was recognized as a permanent part of the European power balance. And the treaty, which gave the Ottoman Empire a right to benefit from the international law and the Concert of Europe, somehow included the other in to the self (ibid). In the same time period the Ottoman effort to become European also escalated. And with the creation of the secular, Western minded Turkish republic in 1923 and the Turkish application to join the European Union, this complex relationship between identities made the Turk’s status as the European ‘other’ somewhat questionable.

12 Also see: Montagu, 1994; De Busbecq, 2001; De Amicis, 2005
13 The Concert of Europe (also Vienna system of international relations), also known as the Congress System after the Congress of Vienna, represented the balance of power that existed in Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) to the outbreak of World War I (1914).
14 Two sides of the Turkish identity will be examined in detail in Chapter 3.
This caused several pertinent criticisms against the use of Said’s Orientalism as a theoretical base for a study on Turkish representation in the European media (See: Paksoy, 2012; Bryce, 2009).

As well as criticisms pointing towards the core of the Orientalist theory, the fact that Said mostly ignored Turkey in his work, strengthen these claims.

Critics of application of Said’s theories to the case of Turkish media representation in the West argue that discussions in Said’s work about Turkey or the Ottoman Empire are limited and “it is even possible to say that he purposefully ignored Turkey’s case because it may have weakened his claims about Western othering towards the Orient (Bryce, 2009, p: 112)”.

The reason for the insufficient focus on Turkey in his (Said’s) work Orientalism can be the fact that Turkey is not the most appropriate example to explain the differences between the East and the West. More analysis on Turkey could have even impoverished Said’s several arguments in Orientalism (Paksoy, 2012, p: 80).

Said is not to only one to struggle placing Turkey in the self-other or East-West axis. This can also be seen in Huntington’s contradictive theory ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which predicts that “The new world order will be based on patterns of conflict and cooperation founded on cultural distinctions and identifications (Huntington, 1996, p: 264)”. In his thesis, while dividing the world in 6 major and conflicting civilizations (Western, Latin American, Eastern, Sub-Saharan African and Muslim) Huntington,

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like Said, struggles to place Turkey in a single civilization, or a single side of the self–other conflict between West and the Orient (Huntington, 1996).

Huntington tries to fit Turkey in his theory by creating the concept of “torn” countries meaning “countries that are seeking to affiliate with a civilization other than their own” (ibid). He explains by saying:

The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Ataturk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey and such (Huntington, 1993, p: 42).

So in the end, relevant literature (supportive or critical of the Said’s Orientalism alike) agrees that Turkey is not a straightforward representative of Western or Oriental civilizations and the country does not completely fit in to the conventional explanations of the self vs. other relationships.

Turkey’s status as a ‘torn’ country\(^\text{16}\), as Huntington puts it, between Orient and Occident affects the way it is perceived and represented in any given European media

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\(^{16}\) According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements to redefine its civilizational identity. First, its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country. According to the criteria set by Huntington, Turkey has not managed to redefine its civilizational identity (just like any other Torn country he talks about, such as Japan). According to him, in Turkey’s case, this redefinition did not occur partially as a result of public’s resistance to Westernisation but also because of the West’s (or more specifically Europe’s) refusal to accept Turkey fully in to their identity.
outlet. Yet, the situation is even more complicated for British press partly as a result of Britain’s positive attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership bid.

According to Wimmel, debates in the British quality media shows that “commentators strongly and almost unanimously support Ankara’s request for EU membership” and he argues that they categorically reject the importance of cultural and religious differences between Turkey and Europe regarding Turkey’s place in the union (Wimmel, 2009, p: 223). And Turksoy says, “Recent literature acknowledges that the representation of Turkey tends to be different in British press than any EU member state […] It will not be wrong to say that on the whole the British press holds more supportive or neutral position on Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU (Turksoy, 2011, p: 147)”.

Yet, the positive coverage and support for Turkey’s EU application in the British media, does not indicate that it accepts Turkey to be a part of the British or European “self” or eliminate Turkey’s role as the Oriental other completely. As Wimmel points out in the above quote, British media rejects the importance of the differences between Europe and Turkey regarding the EU membership bid, but there is no indication that they ignore these differences while forming their general perception of the country.

Britain’s exceptionalism towards the EU and the European identity, which will be further explained in the following sections, is the main cause of the supportive coverage Turkey received about its EU bid (Oktem, 2005) and this exceptionalism does not in anyway indicate that it accepts Turkey to be a part of the British or European “self” or eliminate Turkey’s role as an other to Europe.
Another particularity of the British media’s coverage of Turkey between 2007-2013, which makes Turkey’s status as an Oriental other questionable, is their supportive and welcoming attitude towards the country’s government, which has roots in Turkish political Islam.

Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2001 and won three consecutive landslide general election victories in Turkey. The party, which was born from the Islamist ideology, had long been accused of trying to “Islamise” Turkey by Turkish ‘seculars’.

The literature shows that Islam has long been and still is one of main others of Britain and the British media. Yet, for a long time, AKP received a significantly positive and supportive coverage in British media outlets (Gürsel, 2011).

These positive and celebratory portrayals of the Turkish brand of political Islam or the support for Turkey’s EU membership bid still did not cause the British media to abstain from using orientalist narratives while covering Turkey. And certainly did not include Turkey in to the European self.

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17 Throughout this dissertation, sections of the Turkish society, which support Kemalist secularism, will be referred to as ‘seculars’ or ‘Turkish seculars’. Kemalist secularism, as opposed to the secularism defined by Enlightenment thinkers like Locke, Diderot and Voltaire and practiced in Western countries, does not limit itself with merely separating religion from political affairs. Instead, it requires all religious affairs to be strictly controlled by the state (Daver, 2013), and restricts religious observance to the private sphere completely. Kemalist secularism and its influence on the Turkish identity will be further discussed in the second section of Chapter 3. The history of AKP and political Islam in Turkey will also be further explained in the same chapter.

19 See: Said 1997, 2003; Daniel, 1960; Sardar, 1999; Ahmad, 1994; Bungawala, 2002; Poole, 2001 and 2006; Richardson, 2004; Harb and Bessaiso, 2006 and Runnymede Trust, 1997 also British media attitudes towards Islam will be examined in detail in the second section of this chapter.
The most important indication of British media’s reluctance to accept Turkey in to the European self is the emphasis on the country’s religious identity and general “otherness” in their coverage. Current literature shows that traces of Oriental discourse and othering are present in the British media’s coverage of Turkey, its government and its EU membership bid (Paksoy, 2012; Oktem, 2005; Devran: 2007; Neumann, 1998, p: 41).

Devran says “Whoever reads the British newspapers will face various descriptions of Turkey as a poor, predominantly Muslim, culturally alien, over-crowded country with a population of 72 million; a country with a shaky democracy and economy that lies geographically outside the boundaries of Europe (Devran, 2007, p: 103)”.

Paksoy also draws to this conclusion and says even though there is a supportive tone in the news coverage in Britain regarding Turkey’s EU bid, Turkey’s character as the Islamic other was preserved in the content (Paksoy, 2012, p: 282-283).

In other words the Turk’s “Muslimness”, alongside the Oriental cultural heritage and historical baggage that comes with it, gets in the way of its adopted “Europeanness” and leaves the country in a grey area between the European self and the Oriental other in the eyes of British media outlets.

As explained above, on one hand Turkey is a Middle Eastern Muslim society and a significant part of the Islamic other, on the other hand as a result of the Westernisation
process it went through\textsuperscript{20}; it is also somewhat European\textsuperscript{21}. Subsequently, it is hard to fit the Turkish example in any given theoretical framework when it comes to media representation. Current literature shows that Britain’s and British media’s perception and representation of Turkey is more positive compared to their perception and representation of Islam and Islamic countries in general, but it is not completely deprived from othering and as a result Said’s Orientalism.

While trying to answer the main research question “does British print media perceive and present Turkey as an extension of the European Self or as an Oriental Other” and looking in to different aspects of Turkish representation in the selected time period, Said’s theory of Orientalism will be the main theoretical base for this research. Yet, accepting that theory of Orientalism on its own is not sufficient to explain Turkey’s unique situation as a complicated other, this research will also take the concepts of Nesting Orientalisms and Positive Othering in to consideration and finally will propose utilization of a new concept for the description of Turkish representation in Britain and the British media: the “Model Other”.

\textsuperscript{20} The reasons for Turkey’s claim to Europeanness will be explained in full in the following chapter.
\textsuperscript{21} See: Keyman, 2003; Huntington 1996; Inalcik, 1994; Çirakman, 2005
In their 1992 article titled “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics”, Robert and Milica Bakić-Hayden argued that each region within Europe has a tendency to view the cultures and religions to its South and East as more conservative and primitive (Bakić-Hayden, 1992) and they named this concept as “Nesting Orientalisms”. In the article, they argued that “The main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism is whether the continua of human reality can be divided into clearly differentiated cultures, histories, traditions, societies without implying insurmountable hostilities by the absoluteness of the distinction [between self and other] (ibid)” and through the example of Yugoslavia concluded that these distinctions are, in fact, neither dichotomous nor absolute (ibid).

Milica Bakić-Hayden further clarified this concept in her 1995 article titled “Nesting Orientalisms: The case of former Yugoslavia” by stating:

The gradation of ‘Orients’ that I call ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ is a pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised. In this pattern, Asia is more ‘East’ or "other" than Eastern Europe; within Eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced with the Balkans perceived as most ‘eastern’; within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies (Bakić-Hayden, 1995, p: 918).

They explained how this gradation of others is present all through the European continent by pointing out the fact that “industrious and rational” Northern Europeans
see peoples of Southern European countries as ‘undisciplined and passionate others’, while ‘civilized’ Western Europeans perceive their Eastern European neighbours as ‘violent’, ‘uncivil’ or even ‘barbaric’ (ibid).

After making a distinction between “proper” European states placed in the North-West of the continent and “internal others” in the South-East, Bakić-Hayden claims that the Turk is more of an “other” to Europe compared to the “internal others” in the Balkans.

If we extend this gradation of Orients to Europe’s External others in the Middle East and beyond, we can claim that modern Turkey, as a result of its history, westernization efforts, secular nature and geographical proximity, is also a ‘lesser’ other to Europe than its Middle Eastern neighbours.

As oppose to Said’s rigid understanding of self- other relationship between the Occident and Orient, the idea of Nesting Orientalisms gives an explanation for Turkey’s “unique” position in the self- other axis of Europe.

But this understanding still does not explain the precise nature of Turkish representation in Europe and eventually Britain. To be able to determine if Turkey is an extension of the European self, (like Eastern European nations that are being Orientalized by “proper Europe” even though they are also perceived as European in many contexts) or a more straightforward Oriental other that can have no claim to Europeanness, we need to utilize a different concept.
2:2:1:2 Positive Other

In his dissertation on the representation of Turkey’s EU bid in the British Media between 1999 and 2008, Paksoy agrees with Bakić-Hayden on the gradual nature of Orients and says “Turkey’s position in its relation to the European Self should be evaluated within their particular relatedness rather than a nebulous and broad binary of Self/Other (Paksoy 2012, p: 74)”. 

And to explain Turkey’s position in relation to the European self, and media representations of the country’s EU membership bid, he utilizes the concept of ‘Positive Other’.

The Positive Other, a term coined by Neumann and Welsh in early nineties, is used to define an other, which has a ‘mutual, fruitful interaction’ with the self (Neumann and Welsh, 1991, p: 331).

Paksoy argues that while there are numerous studies underlining the differences and clashes between the European self and its others; “the concept of ‘Positive Other’ […] has not reached the place it deserves in theoretical discussions concerning the Self/Other nexus (Paksoy, 2012 p: 69)”.

He carries this international relations concept in media representation studies and uses it to explain the reasons behind Britain’s strong support for Turkey’s accession to the union.
Analysing British broadsheets’ Turkish coverage solely through the EU membership discussions, he claims that British media perceives and represents Turkey as a ‘Positive Other’ to Britain/Europe, meaning an other which “is not a part of Europe” but has a “positive and mutually advantageous” relationship with it, which may lead to it being categorized as an “extension of the European self”. He says, the concept of Positive Other, “gives a multidimensional and constructive image to Turkey as the other while keeping the self and other nexus intact” and makes it possible for it to be viewed as a positive element of the European self.

Paksoy also utilizes Tekin, Petersoo and Hobson’s views on self’s ability to “transform its others from negative to positive with time” (Tekin, 2010; Petersoo 2007; Hobson 2006 in Paksoy, 2012, p: 71)” and claims, “Turkey is an outstanding example of this transformation (ibid).

It needs to be noted that in his research he equates the European Union’s identity to the historical and cultural European identity23 and only looks at the Turkish representations in the British media through the EU membership discussions.

While it is acceptable to see Turkey as a ‘Positive Other’ to Britain and the British media to some extent in the context of EU membership negotiations (especially during a time period Paksoy studied in which negotiation process was at its peak), in a wider context it is impossible to view othering of Turkey by Britain/ British media as a mutually beneficial interaction.

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23 Differences between the EU identity and the historical and cultural European identity will be further explained in the last section of this chapter.
This study argues that Britain’s and British media’s support for Turkey’s EU membership bid is simply pragmatic and not an indication of the Turk’s loss of its status as the Oriental other to Europe and Britain and proposes a new concept to define Turkey’s unique position as a complicated other to Britain in British media texts: The Model Other.

2:2:1:3 Model Other

As explained above, this research differs from Paksoy’s thesis in two main aspects; first it is looking in to a different time period in which British attitudes towards Turkey changed and EU negotiations slowed down significantly. Secondly, and most importantly, this research is not restricted to the analysis of Turkey’s EU membership bid.

This research will argue that looking to the media representation of Turkey in Britain between 2007 and 2013 from a broader perspective, orientalist approach is still dominant and while Turkey is not a straight forward other to Britain, orientalist attitudes of British media outlets are still causing Turkey to be presented as an Oriental other.

And to be able to explain relatively “positive” and inclusive representations of Turkey, the gradation of others defined in the theory of Nesting Orientalisms and the concept of “Model Other” will be utilized.
In the 21st century, Turkey under AKP rule is frequently defined as a “Muslim model for the Middle East” in Western narratives. For years, at least until Gezi Park protests in mid 2013, this narrative was commonplace in Western political discussions, academic articles and media texts. The West has described Turkey as a “model” since the end of the Cold war for a variety of pragmatic reasons. As Benli Altunisik explained:

First, it was the Clinton administration right after the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union that talked about the “Turkish model” in the context of the Central Asian and Caucasus states. Then the issue for the U.S. was to encourage these newly independent countries to choose the secular Turkish model as opposed to Iranian theocracy. After that, came the Bush administration. This time the context was post-9/11 era and the “war on terrorism”. In that context, Turkey was made the model for reconciliation between Islam and democracy, an example of “moderate Islam,” much to the dismay of seculars in Turkey (Benli Altunisik, 2011).

While discussions about the legitimacy of the Turkish model are on going in the West, Turkey and the Middle East, this study will focus on the affects of this narrative on the media representations of Turkey in Britain and discuss how the model status of Turkey helped it to be represented as a unique and rather complicated other in British media texts.

This study will argue that the status of Turkey as a “model” for Muslim Middle East, causes the country to take on the role of a “Model Other” for Europe in British media texts: An Other that is more friendly and even represents the Western perception of an

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24 For a detailed explanation of the Turkish model and discussions surrounding the concept see: Chapter 3
25 See: Kaddorh, 2010; Gökssel, 2012; BenliAltunisik, 2005; Dede, 2011; Perekli, 2012; Younis, 2012
“ideal” Islamic society, but still perceived and represented as inferior and less civilized compared to the (European) self.

While the concept of “Model Other” is new to the literature on Turkey’s representation in the Western media, it is built on an idea that has been discussed frequently by Turkish academics and journalists in the recent years: Turkey being seen a bonne pour l’orient model for the Middle East.

**A Model “Bon pour l’Orient”**

“Bon pour l’Orient” (Good enough for Orient) is a French term referring to the stamps affixed to diplomas of colonial students (and also some coming from the Ottoman territories) subjected to a less intensive level of education in French educational institutions. These diplomas, which were useless in Europe, were “good enough” to get employment in colonial territories. And until 2013, this term was being used frequently to describe the perception of Turkey and also the Turkish democracy in the West as a model that is only “Good enough for the Orient”.

Many Turkish journalists and academics including Karli, Mert and Gürsel emphasized in various articles that Turkey’s role as the “Muslim model for the Middle East” directly influenced the perception of Turkey in the Western media and created a new, seemingly “politically correct” brand of Orientalism (Mert, 2015) in which Muslim Turks were subjected to a less intense scrutiny regarding their democratic credentials and approach to human rights compared to European nations.
They argued that this narrative caused some Western media outlets and commentators, including British ones (as a result of their commitment to Turkey’s role as a “Model Other” against more Islamic, more threatening and more problematic others to its East) to condone some developments in the country that would be seen as unacceptable in a proper, European, liberal democracy (Karli, 2007; Mert, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015; Gürsel, 2008, 2011, Bekdil, 2011).

Mert and Gürsel argued that in late 2000’s, Western media embraced an unreasonably supportive, at least on the surface, narrative towards AKP (Gürsel, 2011; Mert 2011, 2015b) even though they perceived the party as the representative of political Islam, an ideology that they normally present as an aggressive element of the Islamic other (el Aswad, 2013). They argued that Western commentators, while still othering and orientalizing Islam, chose to defend AKP as a shining example of “tame” and “benign” model political Islam and classify any criticism regarding their commitment to democracy, human rights and secularism as “exaggerations” because of their belief in Middle East’s inferior capability for democracy.

In other words, according to them, West’s positive attitude for Turkey was actually rooted in a patronizing approach in which they classified Turkey under AKP rule to be the best in a bad bunch.

For example in an article examining ‘the model Muslim democracy’ or ‘Democracy alla Turca [sic]’ created by AKP in Turkey, Economist said “Life has been made easier for pious Muslims in ways that secular Turks dislike; but so far, at least, Turkey
is a long way from any Iranian-style enforcement of female dress, let alone a clerical
class that has the final say in all big decisions (Economist, 04/08/2011)."

In this article, instead of discussing the situation of rights and freedoms in Turkey
through the criteria they subject Britain or any other Western democracy to, Economist
preferred to dismiss criticisms and warnings about AKP’s conservative policies on the
grounds that the situation in Turkey is ‘not as bad as Iran’ or ‘good enough’ compared
to some other countries in the region. Mert responded to this article and similar
narratives used by other Western media outlets in late 2000’s by saying:

There is a disturbing connection between the idea of “democracy a la
Turca” and “democracy bon pour l’Orient.” It sounds as if Westerners
preach us to stop complaining and stop asking for more, but to confine
ourselves to the limits of the Turkish model. Moreover it implies that,
although it is no proper definition of democracy, this is more than
enough for the Turks, Muslims or Orientals! In this respect, it is a new
version of Orientalism that reinvented itself in multiculturalist lines
(Mert, 2011).

To respond to Western media’s wide spread condonation of AKP’s social
conservatism, human rights violations and Islamic interpretation of democracy,
Turkish opposition MP Safak Pavey also penned a commentary in the Guardian and
underlined her concerns about the affects of the “model” narrative on the Western
perceptions of the country.

Pavey asked the British journalists to “[not to act] as if a lower level of rights is
somehow ‘good enough’ for our region, when you would never accept such restrictions
in yours – just as France used to stamp the university diplomas earned by its Arab
colonial subjects "Bon pour l'Orient" (good enough for the Orient) (Pavey, 2013)."
This study will use the idea that Western media is subjecting Turkey to a different, lower set of standards compared to European nations and presenting it as a ‘Bonne pour l’Orient model’ as a result of their belief that ‘Oriental nations can not achieve the level of democracy that is present in the West’; this study will argue that in some contexts Turkey is being represented as a ‘Model Other’ in the British media texts.

2:2:2 Conclusion

This study, which attempts to answer the question ‘does British print media perceive and present Turkey as a part/extension of the European Self or as an Oriental Other’, will use Said’s theory of Orientalism as a starting point and argue that Turkey is, in fact, an other to Britain and the British media.

But to be able to make sense of British media’s unique, relatively positive and accepting attitudes towards the country, its people and its government, the study will utilise the concept of Nesting Orientalisms and argue that as a result of its geographical proximity to Europe and the Westernisation process it went through over the last two centuries Turkey is a lesser other to Britain compared to rest of the Muslim world.

Finally the study will suggest utilisation of the concept of “Model Other” to describe Turkey’s unique place between the European self and the straight-forward Oriental other that Said described.
2:3 British media attitudes towards Europe and Islam

2:3:1 Introduction

To be able to understand British media outlets’ perception of Turkey’s unique position on the self-other axis of Europe, it is necessary to examine their relations with both the European self and its main other; Islam.

This section will first look into British media’s relations with and representations of Islam and review the literature on British media’s Orientalist attitudes towards this religion and Muslim peoples of the world. Secondly, the chapter will look into British media’s relations with Europe and the European Union.

2:3:2 British Journalism and Islam: Orientalist misrepresentation

British media’s coverage of Turkey, a country in which nearly all members of the public are Muslim,26 is inevitably affected by its attitude against Islam and Muslims. Current literature shows that, news items published in the British media that are about Turkey nearly always emphasise the country’s Islamic identity (Devran, 2007; Paksoy, 2012). Previous studies also show that in terms of the adjectives, words, and phrases that were used the most to describe Turkey in the British media, the country was usually associated with the label ‘Muslim’ (Paksoy, 2012, p:49; Devran, 2007, p:103).

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26 According to the “Turkish Religious Life” report published by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs in 2014, 99.2% of the Turkish public defines themselves as “Muslim” (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, 2014)
To clearly understand what it means for Turkey to be seen and presented as a part of the Islamic civilization by the British press, it is essential to understand how British media represent Islam in general.

2:3:2:1 Islam in British Print Media

There is a very extended and detailed literature looking into the representation of Islam in the British media and the conclusion in all research is that Oriental othering is still dominant in the tone of reporting.27

Othering of Islam is not a new phenomenon for British media outlets. Research shows that Islam and Muslims were already presented to the British public as the ‘enemy’ during the first Gulf war and Iranian revolution and many other conflicts British audiences were informed through the media (Poole, 2001; Said, 1996). Yet, when American President George W. Bush made his famous speech after 9/11 and stated that “You are either with us (democratic world) or with them (terrorists) (Guardian, 2001)”, he led to a menichean view of good West versus bad Muslim world to become dominant. After this, the concept of Islamic other became even more important and apparent in the British media than it was before (Poole, 2002).

This can be seen in the fact that in the British media, orientalist attitudes against Muslims were not exclusive to foreigners in the last decade (Poole, 2002; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008).

Even though British Muslims who have arrived and settled in Britain for over a thousand years, entering the economy and society as traders, bankers, spice merchants, medical students, sailors and servants (Abbas, 2011 p: 48); identify themselves more strongly as ‘British’ compared to the white majority (Nandi and Platt, 2012), they can’t escape from being a part of the central radicalized Other in Britain next to foreign Muslims (Harb and Bessaiso, 2006, p: 1063-1076).

This attitude points out that in the last decade Islam is the main source of othering in the British media (ibid). So Muslims, whether they are British or foreign, are being represented by their religious identity in the British media in spite of their many other, possibly positive identities.

On top of reducing multi dimensional identities of communities and nations to simply being ‘Muslim’, British media had also been simplifying different and complex Muslim identities (See: Hall, 1993; Ahmed, 1992 and Whitaker, 2002; Sian, 2012; Elgamri, 2008).

In general, it can be argued that the British media “uses stereotypes to simplify and unify diverse Muslim identities around the world and also in Britain. These common images and stereotypes of Muslims that tend to dominate the British media, creates a limited caricature of the faith and its followers and the ‘preferred reading’ or meaning of these discourses convey to the reader the otherness of Muslims” (Hall, 1993, p: 33; Ahmed. 1992, p: 9).
As cited in Islamic Human Rights Commission’s report on Muslim representation in the British media, Whitaker claims, “There are four very persistent stereotypes that crop up time and again in different articles. These tell us that Muslims are intolerant, misogynistic, violent or cruel, and finally, strange or different” (Whitaker, 2002; Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2007).

Another important aspect of British coverage of Islam is the focus on the ‘negative’ (Ahmed, 1992 p: 9). Allen and Nielsen state “A research published by INSTED in 2007 showed that, in a randomly chosen normal week of the 19 national newspapers analysed on a daily basis, 91% of all coverage (of Islam) was deemed to be negative (Allen and Nielsen, 2002, p: 8)”.

The same study also underlines the fact that Muslims are almost always represented as a threat or a group to be feared. Allen and Nielsen say almost 50% of all of the coverage referred to Muslims and/or Islam as posing a ‘threat’ whilst a further 34% related to crises. A significant majority (84%) represented Islam and Muslims as ‘likely to cause damage or danger (ibid)’.

Another study by the Cardiff School of Journalism, published in 2008, reached the same conclusion and stated that, “the bulk of coverage of British Muslims focuses on Muslims as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim extremism in general) (Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008, p: 21)”.

The reasons for the “negativity bias” in the media will be further discussed in the following section.
While representing Muslims as a threat or a group to be feared, choice of words in news articles was an important tool. The most common nouns used in relation to British Muslims were terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant, with very few positive nouns (such as ‘scholar’) used. The most common adjectives used were “radical, fanatical, fundamentalist, extremist and militant (ibid)”.

The language used by media outlets, such as ‘Islamic and Muslim terrorists’, ‘Islamic extremists’, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, and articles questioning why Islam breeds so many violent strains (Poole, 2002, p: 4)’ clearly contributed to the rise of Islamophobia and othering of Muslims in the eyes of the British public (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2007).

The language used by media outlets also points out over representation of ‘radical Muslims’ in the British media. Indeed, according to the research done by Cardiff School of Journalism, references to radical Muslims outnumber references to moderate Muslims by 17 to one (Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008, p: 21).

The research done on the media representation of Muslims in 2012 by Bail clearly showed this imbalance of representation between Muslim groups. After analysing more than a thousand press releases sent to media outlets by Muslim organizations and comparing these with 50 thousand news articles, Bail reached to the conclusion that since 9/11, negative messages about Muslims have received more media attention than positive ones in the Western world (Bail, 2015).
The research showed that the groups that were getting the majority of the attention, especially after 9/11, were some of the least representative groups and while Muslim organizations which put out messages condemning terrorism received little media coverage, angry and emotional messages published by Muslim groups in response to cases of discrimination against Muslims got a lot of media attention (ibid).

The stories chosen to be covered by journalists created a false impression of Muslims in the eyes of the newspaper-reading and TV-watching public. The impression created was that Muslims care little about condemning terrorism and are over-sensitive to Islamophobia (Bail, interview for Livescience, 2012).

But there is also an effort in the British media to avoid the Orientalist and Islamophobic discourse, especially when it comes to terrorism acts.

2:3:2:2 Efforts to curb Orientalist Othering of Islam

After 9/11 when othering of Islam peeked in the Western media (Poole, 2002), both George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair made it clear they are not declaring a war against Islam. According to Poole, they had two main reasons behind their enthusiasm to point this out: not losing international support on their US led coalition’s actions against terrorism, and not distressing Muslim communities in their countries (ibid). And this agenda affected the way British newspapers reported on Islam and Muslims.
Research conducted on the coverage of Islam after 9/11 showed that, British media joined in to this effort on surface. Most studies found that many newspapers referred to terrorists as Islamists, instead of Muslims in an attempt to make a distinction between the ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ Muslims, and after 7/7 attacks many newspapers emphasised the fact that there were Muslims amongst the victims too (Poole, 2002).

Several newspapers even focused their reports on these Muslim victims to make sure public does not turn on the Muslim communities and published articles about the ‘real Islam’ to inform their readership about the main practices and beliefs of Muslims (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2007).

A report published by the European Monitoring Service on Racism and Xenophobia titled “The Impact of 7 July 2005 Bomb Attacks on Muslim Communities in European Union” pointed out this effort by the media by stating, “in general, the media went to great lengths to make the point that Muslims were killed in the bombings and that the perpetrators were not acting on behalf of Islam. On 7 July, the media carried articles warning against a potential anti-Muslim backlash (European Monitoring Service, 2006)”.

These efforts by the British media can also be seen in the coverage of murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich (BBC, 25/05/2013). In the aftermath of the incident, British media emphasized the risk of a backlash against Muslims and published several articles and television reports on the subject29.

29 See: (Guardian, 28/05/2013)
Yet, looking at the wider picture, these efforts by the media stayed insufficient to curb the orientalist misrepresentation of Muslims in general (Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008).

To explain why misrepresentation of Islam is present in the British media against all efforts, it is important to examine reasons behind this kind of coverage.

2:3:2:3 Practical and pragmatic reasons of Othering Islam

British media’s fundamentally negative approach to Islam can be explained with the orientalist mind-set of the West as Said argued (Said, 1997), yet there are also some practical and pragmatic reasons behind the othering of Muslims.

It has been mentioned previously that British media is inclined to cover negative news about Muslims instead of positive ones. While this tendency inevitably leads to the Muslim world being represented as an aggressive other in British media texts, there is strong evidence that the media outlets all around the world cover bad news far more than good, in general30. So ‘negativity bias’ is not a habit exclusive to the British media or to the news about Islam, but it rather is a common media practice (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; O’Neill and Harcup, 2009; Golding and Elliott, 1979).

As Meter and Minnaugh explains “whether it’s about the various diseases children can contract at preschool, the possibility of a nuclear missile attack, or how poorly our nation’s leaders are doing their jobs, the news never fails to make the situation as

30 The negativity bias in the media and its influence on the Turkish/Muslim representation will be further discussed in the Qualitative Analysis Chapter.
dismal as possible. Every day, millions of people tune in to the media outlet of their choice and get pummelled with these stories” (Meter and Minnaugh, 2010).

According to Galtung and Ruge, negative news are more attractive for the media because they generally happen in a shorter time span, they are easier to interpret and they are more unexpected31 (Galtung and Ruge, 1965 p: 69-70).

So, the othering of Islam in the British or Western media is the result of natural editorial choices regarding newsworthiness as well as it is a product of the Orientalist mind-sets of journalists and media organisations.

And there are many other practical and pragmatic reasons for the othering of Islam in the media.

For example, while othering of Islam is present in both broadcast and print media in Britain, orientalist attitudes are more clear and strong in newspapers (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p: 2). According to Poole, this mainly is a result of the lack of regulation on the print media compared to the broadcast media. Also, the print media is able to publish any story while the broadcast media is dependent on ‘interesting pictures’ (ibid).

Amongst newspapers the leaders of the orientalist wave is, as expected, the publications on the centre-right of the political spectrum32. Yet, literature shows that

31 Also, modern media is highly web-oriented and it is a known fact that negative news events attract more online traffic. The influence of economics on the representation of Islam in media texts will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
the media outlets placed in the centre-left also contributed to the raise of Orientalism (Klein, 2009). While centre-right media outlets were portraying the whole Islamic civilization as evil extremists and a less developed violent crowd, the centre-left media was unwillingly dehumanizing them by portraying groups of people simply as oppressed oriental masses in need of Western guidance and help (ibid).

In the British print media one of the reasons behind the othering of Muslims and Islam in general is the economics of journalism.

In the era of advertisement, the audience is not the consumer of newspapers; they are the product newspapers are supplying for advertisers. And for advertisers Muslims who generally are in the lowest income groups in Western countries are not quality products. So the reporting in the British news outlets is targeting the white middle class, the group advertisers are interested in (Curran and Seaton, 1997, p: 37).

This reality can be seen in the advertisement rates of the Sun and the Times (as of 2012). The Sun, a tabloid that reaches 1.5 million readers daily, charges just under 51,000 pounds for a full page display while the quality broadsheet The Times who reaches an audience of just under 400,000 people (Mostly from upper middle class), charges 27 thousand 195 pounds. This makes a Times reader significantly more valuable compared to a Sun reader for the advertiser.33.

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32 A detailed explanation of the publications' political inclination will be provided in the Methodology chapter.
33 Rate card for the Sun, URL: http://newscommercial.co.uk/assets/pdfs/NGN%20Display%20Rate%20Card%20Oct-2010.pdf, accessed: 08/10/13
Rate card for the Times, URL: http://newscommercial.co.uk/assets/pdfs/timesdisplayratecard.pdf, 08/10/13
A detailed breakdown of pricing and audience worth can be found at: Jackson (2012), How much do newspapers think their audiences are worth?, the Media briefing, URL: http://www.themediabriefing.com/article/how-much-do-newspapers-think-their-audiences-are-worth, accessed: 08/10/13
The fact that some readers are simply more valuable for advertisers than others confirms the suggestion of an advertisement hand book from 1851 that suggests “character is more important than number when it comes to audiences. A journal that circulates a thousand among the upper or middle classes is a better medium than one circulating a hundred thousand among the lower classes (Curran and Seaton, 1997 p: 35)”.

So as a result, newspapers, which are already struggling to survive in the highly competitive market, are forced to target the rich, which mostly consist of the white middle class who has no apparent connection with Muslims.

John E. Richardson, in his book titled “(Mis) Representing Islam: The Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspapers”, points out the same fact by saying “the audiences of British broadsheet newspapers are predominantly educated, professional, economically and politically powerful individuals and groups’” and he says (because of this) “the content and agenda of broadsheets reflect preferences and politics of predominantly upper and middle class audience (Richardson, 2004, p: 36)”.

He continues to say, the corollary of this audience segmentation, of course, is that within a predominantly white society, where 93% of the audience is white, this playing to “the middle ground of white opinion and interests’” can result in minority ethnic (mainly Muslim) voices, opinions and interests becoming marginalized (Cottle, 2000, p: 20; ibid).
In Britain, Muslim communities are over represented in the lower classes of society. They are mainly amongst the poorer and less educated masses (Abbas, 2011); “As a result British elite broadsheets do not waste their reporting resources by attempting to appeal to such an audience (Richardson, 2004, p: 36)”.

Another important reason behind the othering of Islam is the backgrounds of UK journalists. As well as the target audience they are reporting for, according to most current studies, British journalists themselves are predominantly coming from a white middle class background that does not have a significant connection with Muslim communities (Sutton Trust, 2006).

A report published by The National Council for the Training of Journalists (NCTJ) in 2013 showed that UK journalism industry workforce is lacking in ethnic diversity and continues to be heavily influenced by social classes (NCTJ, 2013). The Journalists at Work report showed that 94% of journalists in the country are of a white ethnic background (ibid).

A study done about the backgrounds of top journalists of Britain by the Sutton Trust in 2006 showed over half (54%) of the country’s leading news journalists were educated in private schools and 45% of them attended Oxbridge, hence coming from a privileged background. The survey also suggests that the latest new recruits to the national news media are even more likely to come from privileged backgrounds than those from previous generations (Sutton Trust, 2006).
The research showed that reasons for domination of white middle class in the British media range from: low pay and insecurity at junior levels; the high costs of living in London; the increasing costs of postgraduate courses; a bias towards those with family or personal connections within the industry amid a largely informal but highly competitive recruitment process; and finally, the stronger skills and attributes exhibited at an earlier age by those from private schools (ibid).

Ian Hargreaves, professor of digital economy at Cardiff University and former editor of the *Independent* and the *New Statesman* who chaired the report said: "Ethnic diversity remain troublingly low, especially for an industry where more than half of those employed work in London and the south-east. The parents of journalists tend themselves to work in higher status jobs (Hargreaves, 2013)".

So in the end Journalism is an occupation for the rich and white middle class youth (Sutton Trust, 2006).

In conclusion it is possible to say that in the British media Muslims are presented as aggressive, threatening and radical individuals, who are a threat to the British life style and identity (see above). Reasons for this misrepresentation are the general orientalist attitude against Islam, economics of journalism, natural editorial choices and the average British newspaper readers’ lack of interest in the realities of Muslim communities as well as the lack of connection between British journalists and the Muslims. And as a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey is not being excluded from this kind of oriental misrepresentation even though it is mostly seen as the representative of ‘Good and tame’ Islam or, as this study argues, a *Model Other*. 
"We know what it's like to be shut out of the club. But we also know that these things can change. It makes me angry that your progress towards EU membership can be frustrated in the way it has been. My view is clear. I believe it is just wrong to say that Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit in the tent. So I will remain your strongest possible advocate for EU membership and greater influence at the top table of European diplomacy."

David Cameron (Cameron, 2010)

Literature shows that even though British media presents Turkey as a part of the Islamic other (Paksoy, 2012; Devran 2007), it also shows unanimous support to Turkey’s EU membership bid (Oktem, 2005; Turksoy, 2011 and Paksoy, 2012).

British media’s seemingly contradictory attitude towards Turkey can be explained by Britain’s “awkward” relationship with the European Union and the distinction it makes between “EU” and the “European” identity (See: George, 1990; Wilks, 1996 and Schneeberger, 2011, p:68).

As explained previously, the “European identity” or the concept of Europeanness started to materialize when “European” nations formed their “civilized and superior” collective identity against the “Barbaric” Oriental other; centuries prior to the formation of a politically or economically united Europe under the EU banner (Kosebalaban, 2007; Said, 2003).
This collective identity was based on the qualities that made “European” nations different to their Oriental other such as “A shared culture, history, values and most importantly a shared religion (Ibid)”.

As Kylstad explains, the foundation of this European identity was a pan-European heritage stretching from Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire through Christianity up to the Enlightenment (Kylstad, 2010; Federici, 1995; Mazower, 1998; Scruton, 2002), which induced an attitude of domination and supremacy in the European man (Kylstad, 2010; Flis, 1997).

But this common identity, this perceived ‘sameness’ and ‘superiority’, was not strong or binding enough to eliminate conflict between ‘European’ nations (Neumann and Welsh, 1991). Hence, in the latter half of the 20th century, after two devastating Euro-centric world wars, a concrete pact of alliance was made between the nations that supposedly share this superordinate identity, in order to ensure stability, security and economic cooperation in the region.

This ‘pact’, which first came into existence as European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and transformed into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, took its final form in 1993 and became the European Union (EU).

Formation of the European Union enhanced the importance and relevance of the historic and cultural “European identity” but also gave birth to a new “political” EU identity.
If we look at the texts that are at the foundation of the European Union as well as the Copenhagen criteria, we see that founding members imagined a union based on Kantian principles that aims to provide a peaceful environment and has an inclusive, political identity that is not based on territory, culture or history (Kylstad, 2010, p:12).

For example, Treaty on European Union (TEU), originally signed in Maastricht in 1992, states that, “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” and continues to say “These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (TEU, art.2)”. And, the 49th article of the same treaty states that “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union (TEU, art.49)”.

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34 According to the Copenhagen criteria, which were established in order to lay out the necessary requirements for EU membership: Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. Relevant criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995.

To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:
1-political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2-economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
3-acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

35 In a short text entitled Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, Kant has laid the foundations of a cosmopolitan approach meant to secure a perpetual peace among persons and nations and the three main principles listed in this text was followed in the foundation of European Union. Kant’s first definitive in Perpetual Peace article states that ’The Civil Constitution of Every State Shall be Republican’ (Kant, 1991, p.99). Kant’s second definitive article stipulates that ‘the Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States’ (Kant, 1991,p.102). Kant’s third and final definitive article states that ’Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality’ (Kant, 1991, p.105). For more information on the place of Kantian principles in the EU see: Düzgit, 2006; Kylstad, 2010).
The fact that there is no specific definition of what makes a state “European” in either TEU or the accompanying Copenhagen Criteria, or any reference to Europe’s shared history, religion or culture; it can be assumed that unlike the European identity that we defined above, EU identity is solely based on inclusive values like democracy, equality and respect to human rights as opposed to restrictive historical, cultural or religious criteria (Kylstad, 2010 p: 6).

But while the European Union treaties differentiate the ‘political’ EU identity from the historical and cultural European identity on paper, it cannot be denied that for the majority of member states these two concepts are still interchangeable (ibid).

For example, in an article published in the German newspaper Die Welt, German chancellor Angela Merkel said: “The EU is more than an economic association. It is a political and economic union of the states and peoples of Europe that is based on a value-system that has historical roots’ (Merkel, 2004) and declared that she, as the leader of Germany, believes that the European Union is simply the political embodiment of the cultural and historical European identity.

But Britain’s attitude towards the EU and the European identity differ drastically from Germany and other member states. Britain fully embraces the Kantian understanding of the EU identity and differentiates it from the historico-cultural and religious European identity completely.
Since the Second World War, Britain had always been sceptical about European integration, and as a former imperial power found it particularly difficult to adjust and narrow its political interest only to Europe (Perisic, 2010 p:3). Social, physical, cultural and political concerns and the strong English national identity, which formed centuries prior to any other continental European identity, contributed to the country’s Euroscepticism. As Perisic explains in *Britain and Europe: a History of Difficult Relations*:

> When entering the EU, people of most member states saw it as a positive step towards reaching out to the world and as a way to improve communication with other countries. Smaller states saw it as an advantage, such as Slovenia, while others wanted to improve their unfavourable image from the past, such as Germany. For the former British Empire, on the other hand, belonging to and being constrained by European institutions meant a loss of their world-wide influence, and the focus only on Europe consequently narrowed its opportunities. (Perisic 2010, p:3).

And this continuous scepticism caused Britain to support a Kantian understanding of European Union, which is not based on an over-powering European identity (which

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36 Euro-scepticism (Sometimes Anti-EU'ism) is a relatively new concept, coined in 1998 by Paul Taggart which can be defined as scepticism towards European Union and strong European integration (Taggard, 1998; Kaniok and Arato 2009 p:159).

Literature devides Euro-skepticism in two distinct categories: Hard and Soft. In 2003, Taggard and Szerbiak defined hard Euro-skepticism as “Opposition in principle to EU and European integration” (Taggard and Szerbiak, 2003 p:6) and the soft Euro-Skepticism was defined by Kopecky and Muddde as “opposition to further expansion of EU sovereignty (as the current trajectory of European Integration)” (Kopecky and Muddde, 2002 p:300-304; Kaniak and Arato, 2009 p:161).

37 Britain joined EEC in 1973 but Eurosceptic voices were never silenced. In merely 2 years after membership Harold Wilson's Labour government began a renegotiation of the terms of British membership, followed by a national referendum on whether the UK should stay in the European Community. More than 67 per cent of those who took part voted in favour of continued membership. Even though the result of the referendum kept Britain in the Union, just the fact that Britain made the referendum showed that she will never be an engine for the United States of Europe, like France or Germany (Channel 4 News, Europe and Britain: A specially complex relationship). Until Margaret Thatcher (1925-2013), Labour left-wingers, were the most forceful advocates of a Eurosceptic position. By 1983 Labour's election manifesto - dubbed "the longest suicide note in history" by MP Gerald Kaufman - included a pledge that the party, if elected, would take Britain out of the European community, and without a referendum (ibid). But when Thatcher became the British prime minister in 1979, eurosceptism gained a powerful, Tory voice. For Britain, the united Europe project is seen merely as something made out for economic reasons, a
may eventually lead to the union becoming a more controlling and powerful federal Europe) but instead a union founded on an inclusive, functional and political “EU identity”.

Britain’s understanding of the EU’s identity and this identity’s difference from the historico-cultural European self can be clearly seen in the words of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, uttered nearly 5 years before the Union took its present form.

In a speech to the College of Europe in Bruges in 1988, which later became the go-to text of Euro-sceptics, Mrs Thatcher rejected the idea of an "identikit European personality" and a "European super-state" and called for a Europe where countries relished their separate national identities and looked outwards to preserve its links with the United States.

In her speech, while still insisting on Britain’s Europeanness (*As in belongingness to the historical and cultural European Self*), she dismissed the idea of a strong, overpowering, controlling European identity being at the core of the European integration. She said:

> Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality (Thatcher, 1988)

union supposed to create a common European market. Euroscepticism is still strong in modern Britain. According to a Euro barometer survey in autumn 2009, only 30% of people in the UK thought EU membership was a good thing (Euro-barometer, 2009).
And, Britain, under both Labour and Conservative governments\textsuperscript{38}, did not drift far away from Thatcher’s understanding of the EU and kept rooting for a loose Union that is not based on a strong European identity.

For example in 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron explained how he sees EU as a formation based on values and not religion. He said:

\begin{quote}
I will always argue that the values of real Islam are not incompatible with the values of Europe, that Europe is defined not by religion, but by values. The EU is a secular organisation. And Europe welcomes people of all faiths, or none. Likewise, Turkey is a secular and democratic state. This is all the more reason to make Turkey feel welcome in Europe (Cameron, 2010).
\end{quote}

This attitude also caused Britain to embrace a functionalist (utilitarian) approach in European expansion, which makes it easier for it to keep the political EU identity separate from the cultural and historical European identity and eliminate the risk of European Union becoming an over-powering, supra-national super state rather than a strong economic and political partnership.

And Turkey was and still is essential for this functionalist expansion plan.

Acceptance of every new member to the European Union, causes the European identity to evolve. Yet, amongst all the candidates and recent members, only Turkey has the potential to change the essence of the union and once and for all make a clear

\textsuperscript{38} Euroscepticism is a phenomenon affecting both the left and the right in the British politics. However, with the birth of the New Labour left decided not to use the anti-European discourse and it became almost entirely an issue for the right (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999 p:60).
distinction between the historical and cultural European identity and the political EU identity.

As Baban and Keyman, argue, “… the debate about Turkey is a debate about the future of Europe in terms of its identity, its geography, its political and institutional structure, and its role in our globalizing world” (Baban and Keyman, 2008, p: 109). And Oktem explains Britain’s support for the Turkish candidature by saying:

The UK’s foreign policy objectives are decidedly trans-Atlanticist, and its economic interests are global rather than European. The case for Turkey’s membership bid then appears as the perfect template on which UK visions of Europe, clearly shaped by British Euroscepticism and, indeed, visions for global governance can be expressed. From this perspective, the accession of Turkey would make possible the transformation of the EU into a free-trade zone of democratic states and subvert Franco-German hegemony and perceived plans for a supranational European state (Oktem, 2005, p: 15-16).

In other words, Britain only wants Turkey to join the union, to make sure the union stays as a political, strategic and economic partnership and does not transform in to an entity that is threatening Britain’s sovereignty and national sense of Self.

As a result, it can be argued that Britain does not perceive Turkey as a part of the European Self but rather it perceives Turkey as an actor, which, by entering the union, will separate the union from the historical and cultural European identity.

And the literature shows that British broadsheets, conservative and liberal alike, are on the same page with the British state regarding this subject.
While looking at the coverage of “Europe” in the British print media, it is necessary to make a differentiation between the media outlets’ attitudes towards the European identity that we defined as the “self” to the Oriental other and the identity of European Union.

There is no indication that British media views Britain and British people (their audience) as ‘not European’ but the coverage of European Union in the British print media is dominated by Euro-scepticism.

As explained previously, Euro-scepticism is a phenomenon affecting both the left and the right in the British politics. However, with the birth of the New Labour, the British left decided not to use the anti-European discourse and it became almost entirely an issue for the right (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999 p: 60). As a result of this, in the British media clearest articulation of Eurosceptic sentiment is to be found in the centre-right print media, yet in the centre-left media’s coverage of the EU affairs the heavy effect of Euro-scepticism, although in a different form, can still be observed (ibid).

In the Guardian, Observer and the Mirror there is evidence of a counter-discourse which challenges the assumptions on which it is the Eurosceptic discourse is based. The EU is given credit for the unprecedented period of peace, stability and democracy experienced in Europe over the last half-century. [...] However, many themes from the Eurosceptic discourse are also present. Space is also afforded in these pro-European titles to overtly Eurosceptic voices (Hawkins, 2012).
British journalists from centre-right and centre-left media alike contributed to the Eurosceptic discourse in politics, economics, and also in culture (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, p: 63; Paksoy, 2012, p: 82).

Paksoy gives the strong opposition to the monetary union as an example to the Eurosceptic coverage of economic issues in the British media and says “when the discussions about the EMU were on the agenda, it was emphasized that […] EU would weaken British control on the national economy” (ibid).

Other common economic arguments against Europe in the British press are “The possible consequences of signing the Social Chapter, the evidence of faltering economies of other member nations caused by the EMU and Maastricht criteria and the evidence of increases of socio – political unrest in member states because of issues relating to Eurozone and the Union in general (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, p: 63)”.

Most recently there are two more arguments that were added to the economic arguments against Europe in the British press: Costs of bailing out bankrupt Eurozone nations and immigration to Britain from Eastern European countries (Migration Watch UK, media reports archive, 2013).

When it comes to the Eurosceptic coverage regarding politics, it is possible to say that the EU is defined in terms of the nation-state and presented as a threat to Britain’s

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39 The Maastricht criteria are the criteria which European Union member states are required to meet to enter the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro as their currency. The four main criteria, which actually comprise five criteria as the “fiscal criterion” consists of both a “debt criterion” and a “deficit criterion”, are based on Article 140 (ex article 121.1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
national sovereignty (Hawkins, 2012). For example, it was argued that “Britain has a sound parliamentary democracy and if the authority of the British Parliament is partly or fully transferred to the hands of Brussels’ non-elected bureaucrats, the power of the national parliament may diminish (Paksoy, 2012 p:82)”. Giddins and Drewery agree by saying:

Many citizens and parliamentarians complain about the remoteness of the EU and its ‘democratic deficit’. And those of a ‘Eurosceptic’ persuasion add that the whole enterprise of European integration is a fundamental threat to national sovereignty and to healthy and effective parliamentary government (Giddins and Drewery, 2004, p: 2).

Another important topic in the Eurosceptic discourse in the British media is, of course, historico-cultural issues. These include the consequences of the activities of other EU member states and of the perceived expansionist ambitions of Germany as well as the effects of the intervention of the EU upon the traditional freedom of Britain to act independently on a range of issues now and at critical moments in the future (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999 p: 63).

Even though many of these arguments clearly derive from legitimate and realistic concerns of the British public and the political elite, British media sometimes adopt scandalous and fictional narratives when it comes to news concerning the European Union (Palmer, 2013).

Former European editor of the Guardian, (a newspaper that can be considered Europhile by British standards) John Palmer says, “British media reflected popular
attitudes through the distorting prism of a massive magnifying glass, adopting an aggressive tone against unifying European identity (Palmer, 2013).".

They presented the EU as not as an international organization of which the UK is a member-state, but as a state-like entity from which the UK is excluded from and with which it engages in a bilateral relationship. Within this frame, the EU is seen as a hostile, quasi-imperial power, which poses an existential threat to the UK (Hawkins, 2012).

Palmer claims that, especially in the last decade, quality of coverage concerning European Affairs deteriorated mainly because many outlets don’t even have the budgets to have permanent correspondents in many EU countries. Claiming British public “knows more about what is going on in Washington compared to Brussels”, he says: “Think only of such fictions as alleged EU policy directives enforcing the wearing of ‘hairnets by fishermen’ or regulating the permitted shape of bananas. As serious reporting has declined, what appears in some newspapers appears more driven by the values of the entertainment industry rather than professional journalism (Palmer, 2013).”.

Daddow argues that the lack of quality in the coverage of the European Union in Britain is also a result of foreign owned media outlets. He claims that especially Rupert Murdoch, who sees the British media as a business, accelerates the Eurosceptic attitudes just because it is profitable for his other businesses (Daddow, 2012).
He says “The rise of the Murdoch empire […] is an essential—perhaps the essential—
exploration for the broader media drift from permissive consensus to destructive
dissent on the question of British relations with Europe (Daddow, 2012, p: 1235)”.

But the Eurosceptic attitude in the British press cannot and should not be reduced to
populism or bad journalism.

These distortions and non-constructive criticism towards the EU aside, broadsheets in
the UK also offer a more serious and understandable response to the nation’s Euro-
scepticism: Transformation and redefinition of the European identity in the context of
European Union (Oktem, 2005). And to do that, just like the British government, they
sometimes use Turkey.

Current literature shows that, British media organizations, centre-left and centre-right
alike, support Turkey’s accession to the European Union just like Britain itself does40
(Paksoy, 2012; Oktem, 2005), but studies about this subject also point out that each
publication has a slightly different motivation behind its support for Turkey.

For example according to Oktem, in the centre-right intellectual magazine Spectator
“support for Turkey is often presented together with a categorical rejection of the
European Union”, while many comments in the Independent “see Turkey as a chance
to transform the EU into an inclusive and multi-cultural polity that does not threaten
the British self (Oktem, 2005 p:8)”

40 A detailed list of studies dealing with the representation of Turkey’s EU membership bid can be seen in Chapter 5.
According to Paksoy, another reason for British media’s support for Turkey’s accession to the European Union is the fact that they see Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and its main other Islam (Paksoy, 2012). He says, the most dominant reason for British media’s support for Turkish accession is the country’s possible contribution to ending the alleged ‘clash of civilizations’ and the Turkish help to provide better relations between the Western world and the Muslim world (Paksoy, 2012 p: 146).

The positive attitude of the British print media about the Turkish EU bid can be read as an attempt to reduce the union in to an economic and strategic partnership by changing the core of its identity.

So in the end, it can be argued that British media clearly differentiates historical and cultural Europeanness from belongingness in to the EU and presents the European Union as an other to the British public (Paksoy, 2012, p: 81). And by othering the Union, they somehow get closer to the Europe’s “Model” other: Turkey (Ibid; Anderson and Weymouth, 1999 p: 5-6)\(^1\).

**2:4 Conclusion**

Literature shows that Islam has long been, and still is the primary Oriental other for the British self, and Orientalism is a dominant factor in representations of Muslim individuals, communities, peoples and countries in the British media. To this day,

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\(^1\) In this research the term “European identity” will be used to define the historico-cultural identity that is dominant in the European continent. When referring to the newly constructed identity of the European Union, the term EU identity will be utilised. Also the term “Europe” will be used to define the sovereign entities placed on the continent that is to the east of the Atlantic Ocean, to the north of the Mediterranean, and to the west of Asia. When referring to the political entity that is European Union, the term EU will be utilised.
Muslims are being represented as aggressive, radical, threatening, misogynistic and culturally inferior actors in British media narratives.

As a result, words like “Muslim” or “Islam” carry negative meanings in British media texts and imply, or even accentuate, the “other” status of actors that are associated with them. In spite of its secular nature, Turkey is also commonly presented as a “Muslim” actor in the British broadsheets and hence, it is influenced from these prejudices about Islam and the Islamic civilization.

Yet, even though Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, it has also been through a long and painful Westernisation process and it is actively seeking European Union membership. This unique aspect of Turkish identity also affects the country’s representation in the British media and raises questions about Turkey’s role as an Oriental other.

This chapter first laid out how this research will approach the Turkish representation in the British media and determine whether the country is being represented as a part of the European self or the Oriental other. The chapter also showed British media’s attitudes towards two faces of the Turkish identity: Europe and Islam.

The following chapter will look into the historical formation of Turkey’s multifaceted identity, which shapes its representation in the British media texts.
CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH IDENTITY

3:1 Introduction

It is not possible to understand or assess the representation of Turkey in the British print media and decide if British broadsheets perceive the country as a part of the European self or as an Oriental other, without understanding the multi layered, multifaceted Turkish identity and its historical evolution.

As explained in detail in Chapter 2, Turkey is a country, which is claiming to be European and Middle Eastern, Muslim and secular, Western and Oriental at the same time.

This chapter will present a rather brief summary of the development of the Turkish national identity and the way it is perceived by the Western world throughout the last century. The first section of the chapter will start with explaining the formation of the Turkish identity in Ottoman times. Then, the Westernisation of the Turkish nation starting from the last years of the Ottoman Empire to the first years of the new Turkish republic will be examined. The second section of the chapter will look in to development of the country’s ‘Islamic’ identity. Starting with the birth of the modern Turkish political Islam, the chapter will go on to explain AKP’s ‘post-Islamism’, the perception of Turkey as a ‘Model’ country in the West and the section will conclude with the explanation of the affects of the 2013 Gezi Park protests on the ever-evolving Turkish national identity.
3:2 Westernisation of the Turk

In 1958 American scholar Daniel Lerner published a study, titled the Passing of Traditional Society, which was a sociological inquiry into modernisation and shifting attitudes in the countries of the Middle East (Lerner, 1958). In his book, Lerner explained how nations became “modern,” a term that for Lerner and other modernization theorists meant ‘Western.’ (Shah, 2011)

Lerner’s modernization theory was clear in its position that any nation could be modern. No nation was destined to be traditional and backward. To be modern, *a nation’s citizens had only to emulate the actions and ideas of people in the Western nations* that had earlier moved away from tradition bound backwardness and into the modern world (Shah, 2011, p: 4 – Emphasis added-)

Lerner was praised for writing a book that “expertly combined a general theory of change with empirical specificity (ibid)” but his work was also widely criticised regarding the patriarchal, xenophobic, and simplistic character of the model of social change it proposes (Wilkins, 2010).

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42 As a part of this study he conducted interviews with citizens of the young Turkish republic alongside with citizens of other Middle Eastern nations such as Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran
One of the criticisms directed at Lerner’s work came from Mahar, who stated that Lerner’s modernization theory best fit the Turkish example and it was less prominent in countries like Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran (Mahar, 1959). 43

The suitability of Lerner’s Orientalist and Eurocentric model of modernisation to the Turkish example can be explained by the dominant understanding of modernisation within Turkey in the late 19th and early 20th century, a time period in which the Turkish political elite equated modernisation to westernisation, just like Lerner. In a way, Turkish example was suitable for Lerner’s Orientalist understanding of modernisation because it had Orientalist elements at its core. This section will explore the effects of modernisation and/or westernisation on the Turkish national identity as well as the West’s perception of Turkey during this time period.

43 Several explanations can be given regarding for the suitability of Lerner's theory to the Turkish example. Mahar argues that the theory is more in line with the situation in countries like Turkey and Lebanon because of their relative modernity and stability compared to their more unstable neighbours such as Egypt and more backward neighbours such as Iran (Mahar, 1959).
3:2:1 Turkish identity from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish republic

Turkish national identity has been defined by different parameters throughout history. Until nationalism was born in Western Europe with the French Revolution, identity was determined primarily by religion and locality in the Ottoman Empire, (Grigoriadis, 2009, p: 124) so the modern concept of Turkish national identity, even though symbols, traditions, values and myths that form the Turkish ethnic long existed, did not emerge until mid-nineteenth century.

Until then, all of the empire’s ethnically diverse inhabitants described themselves simply as Ottoman (Baran, 2010, p: 10). Ethnic sub identities were ignored (Davison, 1954) and the Turkish identity was mainly used to designate the Turkish nomads or ignorant and uncouth Turkish-speaking peasants in Anatolia, mainly in an insulting manner (Lewis, 2002, p: 1).

“The Ottomans, although originally members of Turkic tribes, did not capitalise on Turkish ethnicity. On the contrary, from language and culture to legal practice, in a whole array of areas, they aspired to Persian, Arab Muslim, Byzantine traditions of rule and conduct during their long imperial reign (Canefe, 2002).”

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44 Ethnies are defined as "named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites (Smith, 1995, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era Cambridge, UK, p. 57)". Ethnie is a concept coined by Anthony D. Smith. He used this concept to propose a middle ground between modernist and primordial theories of nationalism and argued that in early civilisations such as medieval Christendom and Islam, 'ethnic belonging' had very strong roots and contributed to nation-formation.
Yet, even though Ottoman people refused to call themselves Turkish, merchants from Italian city states as well as the English and the French, referred to Ottomans as Turks or Turque; The Greek Orthodox Church called the rule of the Ottomans as “Tuorkokratia and in general the term ‘Turk’ was synonymous with Muslim for many Christians (Ahmad 2003, p: ix).

In a general sense, for Western Europeans, Turkishness symbolised barbarism. The main source of this Western image of the Turk was fear, imprinted on the Western mind during the long period when the Turks were attacking Europe constantly and seemed to threaten the core of their civilisation (Lewis, 2002). According to Bernard Lewis, a prominent Orientalist, this sense of fear was augmented by the religious hostility between Christendom and Islam, dating back to the first Arab-Muslim conquests (ibid).

So, long before Turks give any thought about their national identity and how they are willing to present themselves as a nation, in the eyes of the West, the Turkish identity was already formed.

Centuries later, when Turks\textsuperscript{45} decided that they are willing to be considered as a part of the Western civilization, they had to work really hard and forcefully reshape their identity, to be able to erase this ‘barbarian’ image from the collective memory of their western neighbours. And in a sense, at least some of them are still struggling to do the same thing today.

\textsuperscript{45} In this instance “Turk” refers to the “Turkish state” which was formed after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Westernisation can be considered as a fundamental part of the 20th century Turkish identity. Just like many other developing nations, Turks used the European civilisation as a model in modernization (Oran, 2001, p: 51). Yet, Turkey’s relationship with West cannot be simplified in to imitation and admiration.

Turkish nation building process, especially in the early years of the Republic, had three main goals 46: 1-Achieving total independence, 2-Modernisation (or more accurately Westernisation) and 3- Creation of a positive nation brand. As Baskin Oran stated in his book Turkish Foreign Policy first two goals are contradictory by nature (ibid.) This made Turks’ relations with Europe complicated, especially in the early years of the republic. The young Turkish Republic wanted to be like the West, to become a part of the modern world, yet it also wanted to be different to remain independent. This paradox at the core of the Turkish nationalism and nation branding is still effective on Turkey’s relations with Europe.

46 It needs to be noted here that the state construction of a nation, as described in the works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, is contested. (Cole and Kandiyoti, 2002). While it is true that Turkish national identity was largely shaped by the Kemalist elite in the early 20th century, this identity cannot be solely described as a construct of the state elite since the Turkish “ethnie” was already formed all around Anatolia as well as in other regions of the Empire where ethnically Turkish populations were residing. In other words, Turkish ethnie was used to create a Turkish national identity and in this process, it was re invented multiple times. As White and Jondergen explain “The history of modern Turkey has been dominated by attempts of political and military elite to create social cohesion by the spread and establishment of a Turkish cultural sense of nationhood. In this process political and military elite has at least twice reinvented the Turkish ethnie. The first reinvention of the Turkish ethnie […]occurred at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, when its reference in Ottoman times, to a socio-economic and linguistic category of peasants assumed a national character. The second reinvention took place in the 1970’s and 80’s when the theory of Turk-Islam synthesis came in to the agenda (White and Jondergen, 2003 Turkey’s Alevi Enigma, Brill, Boston, p: 71).
The concept of national identity in the Ottoman Empire before 19th century

For individuals living in the Ottoman territories, ethnic identities were trivial before 19th century given that the state grouped them based on their religion.

In the Ottoman Empire the society was divided in to “millet”s (Ortaylı, 2006). A millet was an autonomous community, each organized under its own laws and headed by a religious leader, who was responsible to the central government, particularly for paying taxes and maintaining internal security (ibid).

Kurds, Turks and Arabs were considered to be members of the same “millet” and they were governed under sharia law as one. Christians and Jews were also identified by their religions in the eyes of the state (ibid).

But when ethnies such as Bulgars, Greeks and Arabs which have been living under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, started to embrace their ethnical and cultural, and in certain cases religious, heritage and fight for national independence with the influence of the French revolution (Shaw, 1977), the Turkish majority of the Empire also embraced their own brand of nationalism (Canefe, 2002)47.

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47 This chapter will briefly look in to the Turkish nation-building process together with the Turkish state-building process in relation to the Turkish Westernisation and Turkey’s relations with the Western civilization. A more detailed theoretical exploration of the Turkish national identity and its formation can be found in Canefe, 2002.
First attempts of Europeanization and emergence of the Turkish identity

During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, which was then being described as a ‘sick man’ by Europe48 (Temperly, 1936, p: 272), creation of a national identity and Europeanization of the nation were prime objectives of the governing elite (Zurcher, 1993). This objective was then transferred to the Turkish republic by the Young Turk movement (Hanioglu, 1995; Hanioglu, 2002). But emergence of these Europhile elites was not sudden.

Ottoman Empire had always been in close relations with Europe, as a rival, as the enemy and mainly as the other but also from time to time, as an ally. There was a constant flow of information between the Ottoman Empire and its Western neighbours (Bryce, 2007).

Yet, Selim the third, who ruled between 1789-1807, was the first Ottoman Sultan to attempt to Europeanize the Empire, thus letting European ideas of nationalism to reach the Turks (Zurcher, 1993, p: 21). As Zurcher pointed out, he was interesting as a revolutionary figure in the history of the Empire mainly because he was prepared to take on European practices and European advisors to achieve his goals (ibid)

Sultan Selim’s main reform was to create a new army, which turned out to be a major failure and cost him his throne and his life (Shaw, 1977, p: 68).

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48 For a detailed analysis of the meanings behind the description of the late Ottoman Empire as the “Sick man of Europe”, see: Chapter 7: “Othering Turkey by underlining its Ottoman past.”
But the new army he formed managed to start a movement of change in its short life span. The new army with its European (mainly French) instructors produced a channel of communication between the young Ottoman elite and Europe (Zurcher, 1993, p:23).

The failed military reform was an important step in the Europeanization of the empire because at that point the traditional Ottoman military, especially the Janissaries, were the main protectors of the traditional Ottoman government, lifestyle and identity (Ahmad, 2003, p: 26).

Janissaries formed an alliance with the Ulema, the religious elite, and together they become the opposition against any kind of reform that would threaten their place in the Ottoman social structure (ibid). So for any reform attempt to go forward, dismantlement of the Janissaries was essential.

As well as trying to create a new military based on the French model, Selim the third established the first permanent Ottoman Embassy in London (1793), thus accelerating the relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire (Yalcinkaya, 2010, p: 184). The establishment of the embassy in London laid the foundations for modern Ottoman diplomacy and signalled the Ottomans' recognition of the principle of reciprocal diplomatic relations found in the European system (ibid).

The first Ottoman ambassadors in Europe were less than successful, given that they had no prior experience in the European diplomacy and they were mainly traditional old men who could not speak Western languages and have a prejudice against the European culture. But they were not travelling alone (ibid).
Ambassadors brought young secretaries with them whose main role was to learn Western languages and “investigate” European culture (Lewis, 2002). Later these young scholars and diplomats had the important role of being ambassadors of the European lifestyle in the Ottoman Empire (ibid).

Selim’s efforts to Europeanize the Ottoman state and military were not appreciated by the conservative governing elite of the era (Shaw, 1965). Also the masses, who had to pay for the reforms in the form of high taxes, were not happy with the Sultan (ibid).

In spring 1807, members of the janissary garrison of Istanbul rioted and demanded the abolition of the new army and the sacking of important reformists who were backing the Sultan in his attempts of Europeanization (ibid).

Sultan gave up easily and dismantled the new army he formed but he did not manage to save his position. He was deposed immediately after the highest religious authority of the Empire, Seyhulislam, stated that Sultan’s reforms were against the religious law (Zurcher, 1993, p: 25). In his fetwa Seyhulislam claimed that Selim "introduce[ed] among the Muslims the manners of infidels and show[ed] an intention to suppress the Janissaries" (Kinross, 1977, p: 433).

In that environment Selim’s reforms did not live long, but his attempt of modernisation (or Westernisation) opened up a new door for the Ottoman Empire.
Selim’s short-lived vision planted the seeds of Westernisation in the Ottoman Empire and as a result following generations familiarized themselves with the West.

**Reforms of the 19th century and creation of the “European Turk”**

In the summer of 1807, after the deposition of Selim, the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire seemed to be extinguished (Lewis, 2002).

The new Sultan, Mustafa, who was crowned as a result of a conservative coup, was willing to do whatever traditionalist powers in the empire wanted from him. Yet, it only took a year for the reformist powers to reorganize and give the throne to Mustafa’s brother Mahmud (ibid).

Mahmud, sometimes described as the Peter the Great of the Ottoman Empire, (Lewis, 2002) was mostly notable for the extensive administrative, military and fiscal reforms he instituted, which culminated into the Decree of Tanzimat (Reorganisation) that was carried out by his sons Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz (ibid).

At the beginning of his reign, the Deed of Agreement (Sened-I İttifak) was signed by the Sultan and the notables of the Empire (Inalcik, 1964). With this agreement, sometimes described as the Ottoman Magna Carta, both notables and the Sultan promised to rule justly and notables also promised to support reforms and creation of a new army (Ozoglu, 2002).
Mahmud had the opportunity to conclude the military reform Selim started after Janissaries couldn’t prevent Greece, Serbia and Romania to gain autonomy. They lost the support of the Ottoman Muslims who blamed the disorderly army for the loss of power Empire was experiencing (Ahmad, 2003, p: 28).

This caused the Ulema, religious elite, to break bonds with the Janissaries (ibid). With the support of the Ulema and the public, it was relatively easy for Mahmud to form a new army. When Janissaries rebelled once again in 1826, Mahmud eliminated them for good and created a new, relatively modern military (Ahmad, 2003, p: 28).

**Tanzimat: The era of reconstruction**

Mahmud’s westernisation efforts played an important role in the formation of the contemporary Turkish national identity. When Mahmud passed away in 1839, his young son Abdulmecid, who became the Sultan, decided to continue his father’s legacy of reform mainly because he was convinced that only way to keep the empire together was to gain Europe’s, and especially Great Britain’s support(Ahmad, 2003, p: 33). He wanted Ottoman Empire to become a part of the new global market Britain was creating (ibid).

With that goal in mind, Abdulmecid launched a series of reforms and started the reconstruction period of the Ottoman Empire dubbed Tanzimat, which will last until 1876 (ibid).
Tanzimat, which officially began with the Tanzimat Edict (Tanzimat Fermani) announced on 3 November 1839, is a key period to understand and analyse contemporary Turkish national identity in the social, political, cultural, and economic fields (Okumus, 2005, p: 9). The Tanzimat Period of the Ottoman State is considered to be the real foundation of modernization and laicization in Turkey (ibid).

The first proclamation of the Tanzimat period, called the Charter of the Rose Chamber, aimed to convert Ottoman Empire into a modern state of law by promising equality for all Ottoman’s, whatever their religion may be (Shaw, 1977). This eliminated the millet system and guaranteed all citizens right to live, own property and lead an honourable life (ibid).

The real reason behind these changes was to make sure minorities in the empire do not feel the need to fight for their independence (Mango, 1985). The proclamation also made it possible for government officials and bureaucrats to oppose Sultan’s decisions without being afraid for their lives (ibid).

But, Great Powers of the era, including Britain, did not believe Ottoman Empire was ready to implement these new equality rules, so the Sultan who was eager to please the West invited them to supervise the transition process (Ahmad, 2003, p.33). At this point, as Ahmad explained, West was personally taking charge for the Westernization of the Ottoman Empire (ibid).

Russia who witnessed Britain and France gaining an important amount of control above the Ottomans wanted to become the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the
Empire. Ottoman’s refused Russia’s proposal and Britain, who did not want Russia to have any power over the Ottoman Empire, backed the decision. This led to the Crimean war (Schroeder, 1972). The Crimean war had several major effects on the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

First of all as a direct result of this victory against Russia, Ottoman Empire was included in the European Concert System\(^\text{49}\) and European powers guaranteed its independence and territorial integrity (Ahmad, 2003, p: 35).

At this point Ottomans proposed Britain and France to give up their capitulation rights in the Empire.\(^\text{50}\) Europeans declined this demand claiming that Ottoman society and laws were “too different and unacceptable” for Europeans to live under (Ahmad, 2003, p:35).

This attitude clearly showed that even in an era Ottoman’s were making visible changes in their government model and lifestyle, Europeans still continued to view them as an inferior Oriental other.

The Sultan, who was eager to convince Europe that the Empire was really evolving, issued a new charter called the Islahat in 1856 that reaffirmed the changes made with the Tanzimat Edict (Davison, 1954, p:850).

\(^{49}\) The Concert of Europe (also Vienna system of international relations), also known as the Congress System after the Congress of Vienna, represented the balance of power that existed in Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) to the outbreak of World War I (1914).

\(^{50}\) The Turkish Capitulations were grants made by successive Sultans to Christian nations, conferring rights and privileges in favour of their subjects resident or trading in the Ottoman dominions, following the policy towards European states of the Byzantine Empire.
While working on the Westernisation efforts, Ottoman elites were also trying to promote Ottomanism (ibid, p: 852), an ideology that promotes the loyalty to the Empire in order to tackle the raise of nationalism amongst the minorities.

After the charter of 1856, Christian communities in the Empire who had the support of Europe started to embrace their culture and ethnicity (Davison, 1954, p:853). Armenians and Bulgarians acquired the characteristics of individual nations with the support of their churches. Bulgarians even started to use Bulgarian in the education of their children (Ahmad, 2003, p: 36).

In the same period Turkish national identity did not form as quickly because the Ottoman notables were busy promoting Ottomanism, an ideology that was doomed to fail in the era of nationalism (Davison, 1954).

**Young Ottomans**

In 1865 some of the Ottoman Intellectuals and bureaucrats were not satisfied with the reform movements (Mardin, 2000). They believed Sultan’s reforms put Christians and Europeans living in the Empire in a privileged position while making the Muslim majority second-class citizens (Ahmad, 2003).

They claimed that Sultan’s economic reforms caused European powers to control the Empire’s economy instead of making Ottoman’s an equal partner in the global market (Akgunduz, 2011, p: 317). They wanted a different, more Ottoman way of
modernisation, which can reform the country without turning in to a hollow clone of Europe (ibid).

Those intellectuals were the first organized opposition group from the Ottoman intelligentsia to use the ideas of the Enlightenment and attempt to modernization with Islam. They were also the first Ottoman group to use the media as a means of spreading their ideology (Poulton, 1997, p: 55).

Young Ottomans was the name given to those Ottoman intellectuals by Europeans. Charles McFarlane first used the name around 1828 to refer to the new, westernised Ottoman youth (Hanioglu, 2001, p: 584). But later it became the official name of the pro-reform, patriotic movement shaped during the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz. Later their legacy influenced another group named Young Turks, the group who formed the Turkish Republic and its national identity in the 20th century.51

In the beginning, Young Ottomans did not have a strict ideology but it is possible to say that they were influenced highly by the newly formed French bourgeois. All participants of the movement were coming from rich, influential and intellectual families in the empire (Akgunduz, 2011, p: 318; Mardin, 2000). They were products of the reformation era.

Their intellectual background differentiated them from the rest of the Ottoman society and as a result, according to Zurcher, kept their attempts of change out of touch with

\[51\] For a detailed narrative on the Young Ottoman’s and their legacy see: Mardin. S. 2002 The Genesis of the Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernisation of Turkish Political Ideas, Syracuse University Press, New York.
the common people (Zurcher, 1993, p: 67). They wanted the empire to become more European but they were also nationalists who did not want western powers to take control of the state. In a way they were under the influence of the liberalist and nationalist ideas emerged after the 1848 revolution (ibid).

Young Ottomans wanted reform movements to be carried further and declaration of a constitutional monarchy but they never wanted a further regime change. They also wanted reforms to be more beneficial for the Muslim society of the empire and they worked towards a more secular society for Muslims (Ibid).

They believed, because of the nature of the reforms done by the Sultan, the Ottoman Empire was to becoming a market for the Europe instead of becoming a partner (Ahmad, 2003, p: 39).

But their ambitions were not welcomed by the state and they were forced to flee to Europe. When they formed their base in Europe, they started to attack the Ottoman government more openly and they were accepted by Europe as the legitimate reformers of the Ottoman Empire (Akgunduz, 2011, p: 318).

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52 They believed that Islamic modernism is the only way the Empire can take a stand against the European expansionism. They thought Islam and traditionalism were not the main reasons of the demise of the Empire. They wanted to modernize the country and take Western technology and political systems but they also wanted to protect the culture, religion and integrity of the Ottoman Empire (Zurcher, 1993, p: 67).
Tanzimat and the Young Ottomans’ effect on the Turkish national identity and culture

Tanzimat, meaning reformation, was the period of modernisation in the Ottoman military, bureaucracy and diplomacy but these changes also deeply affected the Turkish cultural life and national identity. Feroz Ahmad defines these changes as a “Cultural Revolution” led by the new, europeanised generation (Ahmad, 2003).

The majority of the public remained mostly unaffected from the changes and kept their traditional life style but a new, European middle class emerged as a result of the reforms (ibid). This new elite who is familiar with the Western literature, life style and culture lead to the formation of a new Turkish identity (Mardin, 2000).

But except a few real intellectuals like Namik Kemal, many members of this new middle class or bourgeois only had a superficial understanding of the European culture and an ungrounded disdain against anything traditional and Ottoman (Zurcher, 1993, p: 66). They were dressing in a Western manner, wearing frocks and dresses sewed according to the latest French fashion trends and enjoying the company of Europeans. They were even using French words commonly in their daily conversations (ibid). But their fake Europeanization, at least according to writers like Zurcher, did not make them popular amongst the society. Muslims resented them for their snobbery against their own culture, while genuinely Westernized Christian Ottomans ridiculed them for being oriental men posing as Europeans (Zurcher, 1993, p: 66).
Europeans were not too eager to accept these new, European Turks as one of them either. The real intellectuals of the era and the leading figures of the Young Ottomans movement were accepted as Europeans but according to Zurcher and Ahmad, the newly formed Turkish bourgeois was still seen as Orientals impersonating a civilization they did not understand (Zurcher, 1993; Ahmad, 2003).

Other than starting a cultural change and contributing to the Europeanization/Westernization process of the Turkish people, Young Ottomans also helped the formation of the Turkish national identity by introducing the concept of homeland to Turks (Gol, 2003, p: 18).

**First attempt to constitution and the reign of Abdulhamid**

In 1876, efforts of the Young Ottomans finally blossomed and the first Ottoman constitution was accepted and a national assembly was formed. The constitution came after the bankruptcy of the state and it was seen as a last resort to save the empire in a changing world and guarantee its territorial integrity (Masters and Agoston, 2009, p: 144).

The constitutional monarchy was achieved relatively quickly in the Ottoman Empire; compared to Europe, where constitutionalism emerged slowly through centuries (Ahmad 2003, p: 42). But this rapidness caused Ottoman constitutionalism to be rather
weak and unfounded (ibid). The constitution was affective for only two years before it fell in to abeyance\textsuperscript{53}.

When Russia declared war to the Empire in 1978, Sultan Abdulhamid suspended the constitution. After that, the constitution and the assembly were not active until 1908, the year in which, the successors of the Young Ottomans called the Young Turks, returned to the Ottoman parliament (Ahmad, 2003, p: 42).

**Young Turks and the second constitutional era**

To understand the Turkish modernisation process, it is essential to understand the Young Turks movement who controlled the country during the second constitutional era and later took part in the foundation of the current Turkish republic.

The Young Turk movement was the successor of the movement Young Ottomans started. Most members of the Young Turk movement were European educated or they were graduates of the new higher education establishments, which function according to Western principles (Demonian, 1996, p: 11). Their first goal was to bring back the constitution and end the dictatorship of the Sultan.

Ideologically the Young Turks were not any different than the Young Ottomans. They did not even dream of a republic, they only wanted to limit the authority of the Sultan.

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\textsuperscript{53} Yet, the constitution of 1876 was important in many ways. The constitution, which was based on the French and Belgian constitutions, stated Turkish as the Empire's official language (Kanun-I Esasi, Article 57). With that statement, the constitution helped the nation building process of the Turkish Republic by underlining the Turkish identity of the Empire.
and Europeanise the Ottoman Empire to be able to protect it from imperialist aims of its Western neighbours (Hanioğlu, 2001).

They believed in the fact that Islam is a definitive part of the Ottoman identity and their ideas, as European as they may be, were partially shaped by the principles of their religion. But their understanding of Islam was not in anyway fundamentalist. Many Young Turks said that positivism shaped their way of thinking majorly (Hanioğlu, 2001, p: 200).

Even though there were plenty of different organizations formed by the Young Turks, their most known and most accomplished formation was ‘the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)”, this organization was in control of the Parliament after the start of the second constitutional era and also they were the ones who formed the leading elite during the Turkish revolution after the First World War.

The Young Turks were also important for the Turkish- British relations. In 1899 after the Sultan decided to let Germans build the Baghdad railway, one of the most lucrative projects of the time; Brits decided to support the opposing Young Turk movement and they kept giving their support to the movement until declaration of war between two countries (Aksin, 1987 p: 34).

**The second constitutional era: 1908 – 1918**

In 1908, masses were protesting against the rule of the Sultan all around Anatolia. Many saw sultan Abdülhamit as a dictator who restricted all freedoms and rights, but
the modernisation of the Empire was still in progress. He was simply focusing on the ‘institutional modernization’ instead of a ‘social modernisation’ (Tanor, 1992, p: 167).

According to Tanor, Sultan’s unwilling support for institutional modernisation caused the demise of his authoritarian rule (ibid). The new military education facilities and the new medical schools he established caused positivism to gain supporters amongst the younger generations (Lewis, 2002 p: 214).

Young Turks were influential in İstanbul and their newspapers were circulating in high quantities and they had the European, especially British support behind their backs.

Finally on July 23 1908, as a result of the immense pressure coming from Western powers as well as the elite circles within the empire, Sultan, decided to reinstate the constitution once again, to be able to save his reign (Burak, 2004, p: 301).

It is possible to say that the main ideology behind this second constitutional era was not any different from the first one. The Young Turks were trying to promote ideas of Ottomanism in order to keep the Empire intact. They were fighting against the idea of “Brotherhood of the nations of the Ottoman Empire” while trying to create a unified “Ottoman Nation” (Tanör, 1992, p: 169) 54.

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54 In the last years of the Ottoman Empire, defined as the second constitutional era, there were three main ideologies that competed against each other to be the basis of the new national identity of the empire: Islamism, Turkism and Westernism. Prominent Turkish historian Sina Aksin, simplified these three ideologies in his book “A short history of Turkey” (Aksin, 2007). According to Aksin, Islamism replaced Ottomanism after the Balkan war of 1913 when the elite accepted that they won’t be able to assimilate the non-Muslim minorities of the empire. Islamists believe that a religion-based identity was the only way the Empire can stand strong against the Western imperialism (Aksin, 2007, p: 83-88). On the other hand, Westernism was the ideology that claimed Ottoman Empire should imitate Western civilisations to be able to survive in the new world. And finally Turkism, the ideology that was popular amongst the members of the resistance after the
As a result of the first parliamentary elections of the era, different identities of the empire got the opportunity to be represented. But, the Young Turks’ CUP Party managed to get a total of 160 chairs in the parliament and they became the majority (Burak, 2004, p: 301).

But, even though they had the support of an important percentage of the population the CUP failed to sustain its support within and outside the Parliament due to the waning of its revolutionary appeal and its failure to take charge of the government despite its strength in the Parliament (Kayali, 1995) Several fractions of the Young Turk movement became dissidents in time and also radical Islamists who see the efforts of Westernisation as an attack against their lifestyles were opposing the Young Turks. Minorities of the Empire like Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Arabs were also opposing the Young Turk movement.

Murder of an opposition journalist\(^{55}\) on April 6, 1909 triggered these feelings of resentment against the Young Turks and in a couple of days Islamists rebelled against the government demanding “Sharia law” (Tanör, 1992, p: 188). This countercoup attempt known as 31 March Incident\(^{56}\) had attempted to put an end to the Second Constitutional Era in the Ottoman Empire and to the newly established influence of the

\(^{55}\) Hasan Fehmi Bey (born 1874 - died April 6, 1909) was the editor-in-chief of Serbesti, an Ottoman newspaper, in which he wrote articles against the Committee of Union and Progress. He was murdered on the evening of April 6, 1909, as he was crossing the Galata Bridge in Istanbul, by unidentified assailants.

\(^{56}\) 31 March 1325 on the Rumi calendar in use at the time in Turkey for official timekeeping is equalivent of 13 April 1909)
Committee of Union and Progress, in order to re-affirm the position of the Sultan Abdulhamit as an absolute monarch (ibid).

The Young Turks at the time were not strong enough to react to the counter coup immediately but the Turkish army came to their rescue and reacted to the rebellion immediately (Tanör, 1992, p: 191)...

This attempt of counter-revolution against the CUP was especially important for Turkey’s national identity because for the very first time in the Turkish history the military directly intervened in the administration of the country to protect the constitutional system (Bardakç, Sabah, 2007).

The revolt led to a series of changes including dethroning of Abdulhamit. With a new Sultan at the throne, the Young Turks who wanted to prevent a similar incident in the future decided to make some changes in the constitution to make it more effective and permanent (Tanör, 1992, p: 192). They made reforms on the legal system, structure of the state and further restrictions of the authority of the Sultan. These new changes that made the legislation more powerful against the Monarch can be considered as additional steps towards a more European government style.

But even though the leading elite, the Young Turks, were working on transforming the Ottoman Empire in to a Western-style state that can survive in the new world order, which is being shaped by Western actors, their efforts were not effective enough to save the empire against the raising Imperialism and Western powers desire to divide
and control the Ottoman territory. This reality became apparent with the First World War.

**First world war: Germany, massacres and a new beginning**

The First World War was immensely influential on the Turkish identity. First of all, France and the United Kingdom, once the representatives of what’s modern and influential in the eyes of Ottoman intellectuals, officially became the enemies who want control over the Empire’s territory.

During the war, the Ottoman Empire had form an alliance with Germany to be able to keep the empire’s territories intact (Ahmad, 2003, p: 63). There were historical reasons behind their decision to side with the German.

Since the first German military mission to the Ottoman Army after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8, German officers had often been attached to the army in an advisory or training role and some of the best Ottoman officers had attended staff colleges in Germany. Ottoman officers admired the German Army’s professionalism and traditions, and, like many foreign observers at the time, were convinced that it was the best in the world (New Zeland Ministry of Culture and Heritage, 2014)

During the war, the Young Ottomans were convinced that Greeks and Armenians in the Empire were helping enemy forces and this led to major massacres or even “genocides” (Bloxham, 2005)\(^57\). This had a grand effect on the national identity of the empire because it clearly showed that the Ottoman government was abandoning the Ottomanism ideology. During the war Ottoman officials and the Sultan believed that

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\(^57\) The massacres committed during the WW1, especially the attacks against the Armenian population, will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
an ideology of Ottomanism that included non-Muslims has failed and their only option was to keep the Muslim majority of the population that includes Arabs, Kurds and mainly Turks intact. Turkish nationalism rose while the conflicts between different identities present in the Empire escalated. During the First World War, CUP government forcefully homogenized the Anatolian demography by getting rid of minorities (ibid).

According to Ahmad, this second constitutional period made Turks of the Ottoman Empire embrace their national identity for the first time:

In short, the constitutional period had transformed the mentality of the Ottoman peoples, especially those who now began to see themselves as Turks rather than Ottomans. Writing on the 46th anniversary of the revolution, the author, Vala Nureddin observed: ‘if the Turks had had no experience of the second constitutional period, the ideas of country and nation would not have become widespread. The country and the people would have remained the sovereign’s domain. People would have continued to think in terms of ‘‘His royal Highness does what he knows to be best, it is not for us to question his wisdom.’’ Under such conditions a national struggle would have been impossible. It is quite possible that there would have been no republic of Turkey today and Turkey may have been a monarchy in the Middle East (Ahmad, 2003, p: 73).

In conclusion, it is possible to say that Turkey’s current identity was mainly based on the ideals of the Europeanized Ottoman elite created in the 19th century: Muslim, Turkish, anti-imperialist but also European and West oriented.
3:2:2 Turkish identity under Mustafa Kemal

After the defeat of Germany and its allies in the First World War, Ottoman Empire signed the Moudros Armistice with the Entente in 31 October 1918 (Zurcher, 1993, p: 133). The conditions of the Armistice were generally acceptable for the Ottoman palace, given the state of their military and economy. Yet article 24 of the agreement that let the Entente countries to partially occupy Ottoman territory, if they feel their security was threatened, was used by Britain and France to simply grab any piece of territory they fancied and this caused emergence of a resistance movement amongst Turks (ibid).

Later Greece also joined in the occupation and took over the most of the western Anatolia including İzmir, the third biggest city of modern Turkey, which they believed to be historically Greek. Greek invasion that was supported and funded by the British fired up the resistance movement (Helmreich, 1974, p: 40) and people in Anatolia started to form an alliance against the occupants.

58 The Armistice of Moudros, concluded on 30 October 1918, ended the hostilities in the Middle Eastern theatre between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies of World War I. It was signed by the Ottoman Minister of Marine Affairs Rauf Bey and the British Admiral Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, on board HMS Agamennon in Moudros harbor on the Greek island of Lemnos. As part of several conditions to the armistice, the Ottomans granted the Allies the right to occupy forts controlling the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus; and the right to occupy "any Ottoman territory in case of a threat to security. The Ottoman army was demobilized, and all ports, railways, and other strategic points were made available for use by the Allies. In the Caucasus, the Ottomans had to retreat to within the pre-war borders between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires. The armistice was followed with occupation of Constantinople and subsequent partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) followed the armistice, but this treaty was not enacted due to the outbreak of the Turkish War of Independence. The Sèvres Treaty, even though it was not implemented, triggered what is known as the Sèvres Syndrome in the Turkish society: a fear that any kind of Western intervention, suggestion or at times alliance was aiming to attack the territorial unity of the country. This sentiment was influential in Turkish society’s reaction to EU, regarding their suggestions concerning minorities (especially Kurds) residing in Turkey.
The new resistance movement followed the footsteps of Young Turks, as the leaders of the resistance movement were Young Turks themselves, and promoted the idea of Islamism that exclude Christian minorities of the Empire as they were now considered to be allies of the enemy (Ahmad, 2003, p: 80).

Also at this point in history, ignoring the existence of non-Muslim Ottomans was easier than ever. Before the First World War, 10% of the population living in Anatolia was non-Muslim but their percentage decreased to 2.5% after the end of the war\(^{59}\) (Grigoriadis, 2009, p: 126).

In the end, the resistance was forced to exclude Arabs from their movement too. Even though Arabs were Muslim, resistance leaders were aware that it would be nearly impossible to convince these people, who live in their own territories in the Middle Eastern region and speak their own language, to become a part of a Turkish ruled state once again (Ahmad, 2003).

So the resistance movement tried to create an umbrella identity that embraced Turks, Kurds, Laz’ and Çerkez’ and make them unite against the Western enemy (Ahmad, 2003, p: 80). This idea of an umbrella Turkish identity that covers all the sub-identities was the basis of the new, Kemalist Turkish identity that was formed after the end of the Independence war.

\(^{59}\) They were forced to move to different areas and most of them died in the process, also many non-Muslims of Anatolia immigrated to neighboring countries to avoid being targeted. These massacres and forced deportations will be explained in detail under section 4:3:3:2 Armenian genocide in chapter 4.
Mustafa Kemal and his nationalism

After the Turkish independence war against the British, the French and the Italian armies as well as the Greek army and several internal dissident groups that support the Western mandate; Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the resistance, needed to form an ideology to keep the Anatolian people together and he chose to use territorial nationalism to unify the peoples of Anatolia (Grigoriadis, 2009).

The application of the territorial nationalism model in Turkey was inextricably linked with the program of radical Westernisation that Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal) put forward in his effort to overcome Turkish political, economic, and cultural underdevelopment. To move Turkey toward convergence with contemporary civilization lessons were drawn from the decline and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Both pan Islamist and pan Turkist ideologies had to be abandoned, and a territory based model of national identity developed (Grigoriadis, 2009, p: 126).

The new national identity Mustafa Kemal was trying to form was based on the idea that every community in Anatolia is a part of a bigger body that share history, culture, ancestry and same aspirations for the future (Zurcher, 1995, p: 187-193). The ethically Turkish population accepted this concept, while other ethnic groups saw this approach, rightfully so, as a way to assimilate them.

During the era of resistance these groups’ concerns were easily ignored based on the fact that everybody was focused on getting rid of the ‘enemy’ occupying their homeland. But after the formation of the republic these concerns formed an identity crisis in the republic and led to Kurdish problem as well as the rise of Islamism60.

60 For more info on the Kurdish problem see: Chapter 4 section 4:3:3:1 Kurdish issue
As the new Turkish Republic, which was officially founded on 29 October 1923, grew stronger, Mustafa Kemal and his followers started an aggressive process of modernisation.

In the first years of the new state, people of Anatolia were forced to change the way they dress, the way they read and write and the way they communicate with the governing body. Religion was reduced to a private affair. The citizens of the new Turkish state started to wear hats and dresses like Europeans and they started to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic one. The country also converted to the European calendar (Kongar, 1986, p: 19-68).

The legal system changed completely too. The family law was secularised and religious marriages were declared null. Polygamy was banned. Swiss civil law was modified to fit Turkey’s needs and adopted as civil law and Italy’s penal law was also adopted (Zurcher, 1993, p: 253; Karpat 2010, p: 189).

After defeating the Western ‘enemy’ now the new Turkish republic was trying to be a part of the West. The new republic’s elite, who was basically the same group as the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire, was working towards the complete modernisation and Europeanisation of the country.

As Kadioglu explained, the Turkish modernisation project involved two uneasy aims: to create a distinct Turkish identity and culture, yet to aspire to be part of the “civilized” Western world (Kadioğlu, 2005). To make this possible, the new Turkish
government rewrote education books, made it compulsory for every citizen, including the Kurds, who mostly does not speak or understand a word of Turkish, to talk only in Turkish (ibid).

The new bureaucrats and statesmen were attending official balls where everybody consumed alcohol, waltzed and dined on European cuisine. Women were encouraged to take part in the society and now that Turkish women were not hidden at home in accordance with the fundamentalist understanding of Islam, they started to become teachers, nurses, doctors and pilots (Arat, 1999, p: 57).

The secularisation process was another important part of the reformation of the Turkish society.

In September 1925 the religious shrines and fez, the red felt cap that had been the Ottoman Gentlemen’s traditional headgear since the days of Sultan Mahmut, were prohibited and replaced by the Western style hat or cap. These measures met with stubborn resistance from the population. Religious shrines (Tekkes and Türbes) played an important role in everyday Muslim life and hat was considered a symbol of Christian Europe. The Independence Tribunals played their part in suppressing this resistance. Under the law of Maintenance and Order nearly 7500 people were arrested and 660 were executed. (Zurcher, 1993, p: 173)

On 10th April 1928, the Turkish Parliament deleted the clause that said "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam" from the 1924 constitution and secular Turkey was officially born (Lewis, 2002, p: 276).
The elite managed to embrace this new, modern and secular Turkishness yet the masses were still defining themselves as Muslims as much as Turks (Grigoriadis, 2009, p: 131).

The Menemen incident in 1930 was the first example of the “shallow rootlessness” of these secular reforms (Ahmad, 2003, p: 89). A religious leader in the area called for sharia law and gained support of the community (ibid).

The disturbance began when a reserve officer in the local gendarmerie was sent to Menemen to quell a disturbance caused by Dervis Mehmed of the Naksibendi mystical order who claimed that he was the Mahdi, who had come to save the world. The reserve officer was seized by the raging crowd, beheaded, and his head was stuck on a flag pole and paraded around the town. The Menemen incident is critical in channelling the subsequent route of the Republican regime since it made it quite clear to the Republican elites that the reforms that were undertaken in the 1920s had not taken root (Kadioglu, 2005, p:187).

In the aftermath of the Menemen incident, Kemalist leaders, who realised that secularist reforms were taking hold neither as quickly nor as deeply as they wanted, started a significantly more aggressive secularisation process. They also started to give great importance to education and through the new education system created the cult of Mustafa Kemal, in order to avoid similar uprisings in the future (ibid).

Mustafa Kemal statues were erected all around the country. His image and legacy became the symbol of positivism and Europeanisation/ Westernisation in Turkey for years to come (Ahmad, 2003).

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61 This was significant in an Islamic society, which considers statues and any representation of human form as idol worship (Ibid)
But, a significant part of the newly formed Turkish Republic’s population was still resisting to the Kemalist reformation.

In 1937, a year before Mustafa Kemal’s death, Kurds in the Eastern province of Dersim started a revolt (ÇağlayanGil, 2007, p.65). The people of Dersim who were Kurds and Alevi had problematic relations with the state since the Ottoman times. They always wanted autonomy and had clashes with the Ottoman state (ibid).

When the revolt started, the leaders of the new republic decided to solve the Dersim problem once and for all. After the military operation in the area, 13 thousand people were killed by the army (Kieser, 2011).

That massacre was a good example of the Turkish State’s attempt to suppress different ethnic and religious sub-identities amongst the nation and that attitude created the root of several conflicts Turkey is still facing today. In conclusion, this severe and nearly forced transition to a European lifestyle created modern Turkey.

3:2:3 Turkish identity after Mustafa Kemal

After the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on 10 November 1938, Turkish identity kept evolving as the young republic continued its journey towards democracy, westernisation and Europeanisation.

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62 In 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan officially apologized for what happened in Dersim in 1937.
Mustafa Kemal’s successor Ismet Inonu continued the quest of ‘nation building’. He focused on creating a homogenized Turkish nation within the new borders (Ahmad, 2003, p: 95).

Inonu used the economic hardship the country is in as well as the rise of fascism in Europe to further homogenize the Turkish nation. He introduced a wealth tax that demanded different amounts of money from different religious and ethnic groups. Those who suffered most severely were non-Muslims like the Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Levantines, who controlled a large portion of the economy. Though Armenians, who were the primary subject of the forced migration efforts and massacres during the First World War at the hands of Young Turks, were most heavily taxed (Smith, 2001, p:4). Up to 87% of the total tax collected was from non-Muslim minorities of Anatolia (Oktem, 1951, p:47). This unjust distribution of the burden caused many middle class Armenians and Jews to be forced to sell their properties in Istanbul and declare bankruptcy63. Muslim’s bought 67% of the property bartered away by the non-Muslims and another 30% was bought by the state organisations (Akar, 2006). This new distribution of the wealth resulted in the creation of a new, ethnically Turkish and Muslim bourgeois in Turkey (Oran, 2001, p: 392).

This newly formed Turkish bourgeois was in need of a more liberal, investment friendly government (Zurcher, 1995, p: 298) so when the war was over İnönü decided that its time to transform the new Turkish Republic in to an actual democracy. With the

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63Minorities in Turkey form a substantial part of the country's population, with an estimated 25-30% of the populace belonging to an ethnic minority according to the CIA World Factbook. While the Republic of Turkey, following the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, recognizes Armenians, Greeks and Jews as ethnic minorities, this legal status is not granted the Kurds, which constitute the largest minority by a wide margin (18%), nor any of the other minorities in the country.
blessing of the ruling CHP (The successors of CUP, the Young Turks); the first, real functioning opposition party of the republic was created: Democrat Party.

In the elections of 1950 Democrat Party who also supported the Kemalist ideals and reforms but was more liberal, religion friendly and less statist than the governing CHP, won 53% of the general vote (Aksin, 1995, p: 178). Their success was based on their seemingly liberal ideals and promise of democracy as well as publics frustration with İnönü.

In this era the western powers were also demanding Turkey to become more democratic. For Britain, France and USA the Second World War was a victory for democracy. So they expected their newfound and highly strategic ally, Turkey, to accept their ideals (Zurcher, 1995, p: 302). So, İnönü’s decision to transfer the country in to a multi party democracy was a result of Western pressures as well as the internal demand coming from the newly fabricated Turkish middle class.

The 1950’s were important for being the era Turkey actually became a functioning democracy but also the era was important because of the effect the Cold War between the Soviets and USA had over Turkey’s identity.

Soviet Russia, a country that funded and supported the Kemalist independence War against the Western powers was definitely not an enemy of the Turkish Republic. (Oran, 2001, p: 314-322).
Because of the geopolitical importance of the Turkish territory, both world powers were interested in making Turkey their ally. Turkey tried to stay out of the conflict first. But Stalin’s aggressive politics and the USA’s proposals of economic help made Turkey to side with the United States (ibid).

Later Turkey became an important ally to the United States of America and gained another Western example to look up to in its search for a new identity. With joining NATO, Turkey officially declared the side its taking in the polarized world of the Cold war and just like United States, Turkey created a new other to define itself against: Communism.

In late 50’s Turkey was officially a member of the Western block as a member of NATO, but Turks who were still aspiring to be more occidental were planning to become not only an ally to Europe but an official part of it. To do that they believed they should become a member of the newly established EEC. Turkey’s application to join the EEC on 1st August 1959 started a candidature process that will last more than 50 years. But Turkey’s dreams of Westernisation took a hit in 1960 when Turkish military staged a coup and executed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

3:2:4 Turkish identity and the multiparty democracy

In 1960, military staged a coup against the Democrat Party (DP) government claiming the new Turkish state and its Kemalist ideals were under attack. Karpat says this intervention was formed because of military’s “paranoid, class based” hatred against

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64 This long journey will be examined in a detailed way in the following chapter.
the new, liberal government (Karpat, 2010, p: 243). As a result of the coup, the DP Prime Minister Menderes was executed for treason and a new constitution was formed (ibid). The 1960 constitution, drafted under the direction of the military, was a mixture of several European constitutions and for many, yet again; it was an unfounded imitation of the West (Giritli, 1962).

Even though the new constitution was promising an exemplary European democracy, the reality was that elites of the country were still “forcing” their point of view over the public. This fact was clearly seen in the general elections following the military coup. Public voted for the successors of the Democrat Party and showed that they weren’t sharing the concerns of the military and the Kemalist establishment (Karpat, 2010, p: 243).

In the years following the military junta Turkish left embraced the view that Turkey was being used as a pawn in the imperialist West’s fight against the Soviet Union (Ahmad, 1993). So, some fractions of the Left re-defined the Kemalist nationalism creating an ideology that is nationalistic and anti-Western or particularly anti-American. Yet, they did not renounce their commitment to core concepts of Kemalism that were borrowed from the West. During this time, centre-right nationalists also transformed their ideology, embracing a more “religion” based nationalism. And also the Islamists, who had been suppressed for decades started to make their voices heard in the political arena (Ahmad, 1993, p: 142).\(^{65}\)

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\(^{65}\) The second part of this chapter will look in to these developments in detail.
And in the end, the military coup of 1960 did not bring stability to the young republic in anyway. In the following years Turkey’s identity and class based problems intensified and the governments failed to create order in a highly divided society (Ahmad, 1993).

By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities has ceased to function. Students emulating Latin American urban guerrillas robbed banks and kidnapped US servicemen, and attacked American targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike and more workdays were lost between 1 January and 12 March 1971 than during any prior year. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Atatürk and Kemalism, infuriating the armed forces (Ahmad, 1993, p:147).

As a result, in September 1971 Turkish military intervened in democracy once again and published a memorandum demanding the formation of a strong government that will end the chaos and re-establish public order (ibid).

The government immediately resigned to give way to the formation of a new government, which would please the military, but once again, military’s intervention did not create any long-term solution. After a decade of coalition governments, political violence and chaos, in 1980 Turkish military staged its second coup and took over the control of the Turkish republic. This time around, the generals stayed in power for a 3-year period and re-shaped the Turkish political life to their liking. They changed the constitution once again and most of their constitutional reforms were essentially taking back the rights and liberties provided to the public by the constitution drafted by the previous military junta.
While talking about the differences between the two military interventions, it needs to be noted that military’s politics changed significantly over time. Even though they were officially the “Kemalists” representing the core values of the republic and especially secularism all along, they adopted a significantly more centre-right attitude after 1960, promoting centre-right views, religiosity\textsuperscript{66} and nationalism against centre-left movements or “communism”, as it was the norm in the cold war era.

It is widely alleged that clandestine nationalist organizations dubbed “deep state” (Derin devlet) that have strong connections with the military were formed in the 1970’s as a part of a CIA-backed effort to combat communism in Turkey (Licursi, Freedomhouse, 2012)\textsuperscript{67}.

Even though generals left the government in 1983, military’s influence on Turkish politics was strong even in the 90’s, when the Kurdish conflict was the main concern of the public as well as the government.

But even though military juntas are being remembered as dark periods in Turkish democracy, military always had genuine public support in Turkey, at least up to late 2000’s (Jenkins, 2001).

The military has always lain at the heart of how Turks define themselves; and most still regard the institution of military as the embodiment of the highest values of the nation. The resultant high public esteem in the military is held has been enhanced rather than eroded, by the Turkish experience of multi party democracy. Even its detractors admit that the Turkish military is not only the most efficient institution in Turkey but has remained relatively free of corruption that

\textsuperscript{66} This will be explained in detail in the second part of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{67} Ergenekon is characterized as a successor of these elusive networks.
has become endemic in both the government and the civil service […]. On several occasions in recent Turkish history, political infighting has brought the machinery of government close to collapse. In such situations it has been to the military that the Turkish public tended to turn, either to intervene directly or to provide leadership in applying pressure to the government (Jenkins, 2001, p: 6).

The military’s unofficial role as ‘the guardian of Kemalist principles’ came to an end as a result of the EU harmonization process and the AKP government’s efforts to take military out of politics.

Elimination of the military from the Turkish political life says a lot about identity politics in Turkey and can be seen as a final confrontation between two sides of the Turkish identity. But to be able to understand the influence and the role of the Turkish military in the nation’s identity formation and how this influence came to an end, it is necessary to take a close look at the ideology that they worked hard to keep at bay: political Islam. The second part of this chapter will be looking in to the Turkish political Islam and its influence on the Turkish identity.

3:2:5 Conclusion

As explained above, Westernisation of the Turk started in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and continued to be forced upon the public for nearly a century. This Westernisation and modernisation process which grew hand in hand with Turkish nationalism; eventually led to the emergence of a dualistic national and civilizational identity in the country (Kosebalan, 2008, p: 5; Zeydanlioglu, 2008).
In the early days of the republic the sole aim of the young Turkish state was to “reach the contemporary level of civilisation” and to form an ethnically, culturally, and linguistically homogenous, strictly secular and ‘Westernised’ nation state.

To be able to achieve this, the state introduced the Latin alphabet, banned traditional headwear like the fez and the Islamic veil, dismantled religious organisation and reformed the education system. These changes managed to westernise a small section of the society.

The ‘westernised’ Turkish public never managed to be accepted by the ‘West’ itself as a fundamental part of the Western civilisation and also this harmonisation and westernisation project had grave impacts within the Turkish society.

The pursuit of this goal alienated (and at times eliminated) minorities\(^68\) in Turkey and also created a duality in the Turkish population. While a considerable section of the urban population embraced the new ‘westernised’ (but equally nationalistic) Turkish identity, masses in central, southern and eastern Anatolia stayed loyal to their traditional identity defined by their religion and their ethnicity.

The Muslim identity, which most of the society still primarily identified themselves with, was presented as an indication of underdevelopment and backwardness by the state; in a similar way that Europe’s Orientalists saw it.

\(^{68}\) The influence of the Westernisation process on Armenian genocide discussions and the Kurdish problem is further explained in Chapter 3.
As James Carrier has explained “Orientalism serves not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line within” and “this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in societies that self-consciously stand on the border between the occident and the orient (Carrier, 1995, p: 22-23)” and hence it is possible to explain Kemalist Turkish state’s attitude towards Islam and the Muslim identity with the concept of ‘Internalized Orientalism’ (Zeydanlioglu, 2008). As Zeydanlioglu explains:

Kemalists took on what I call the “White Turkish Man’s Burden” in order to carry out a civilising mission on a supposedly backward and traditional Anatolian society enslaved by the retrograde influence of Islam. By assuming the Orientalist narrative and re-enacting it in the form of a Turkish Orientalism “indigenous” to Turkey, the Turkish ruling elite negated the Ottoman past for its “backwardness” and “religiosity”. The Kemalists rejected the Orient and assigned to Islam the definition of Orientalness, thus equating Westernisation with de-Islamisation (Zeydanlioglu, 2008, p: 5).

In other words, the Turkish state, in their efforts to “reach the contemporary level of civilisation” and westernise the country (in a way that provides a perfect example for the west-centred understanding modernisation of Lerner) , orientalised the majority of its own population. The appropriation of the Muslim masses’ inferiority cemented the differentiation between Turkey’s two distinct identities (Muslim and westernized) and led to suppression of Islam and Islamists in Turkish social, cultural and political life at the hands of the Turkish military, state and elite.

This suppression and orientalisation resulted in a strong resentment towards the westernised Turkish identity and created a suitable environment for the materialisation of Turkish brand of political Islam.
3:3 Rise of political Islam in Turkey


For a long time, Islam was the embodiment of Orientalness, backwardness, ignorance and rurality in the minds of the Turkish elite and hence, political Islam (and with it the Islamic identity) was forced in to hiding.

In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a new political Islam challenged the Kemalist principles of the Republic more than ever before. In 1996 the Islamist veteran, Erbakan, became for one year the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey, and in 2000 the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, won a landslide victory in the elections (ibid, p: 265).

Today, after three consecutive AKP governments, Islam is more visible in Turkish public space then ever before and the Turkish military lost its grip on the executive power in the country. This also led to a transformation in the already segmented Turkish identity. A new bourgeois, who prefer to define its identity through Islam rather than secular Western values, gained power and the country begin to associate itself a lot more with the Muslim Middle East.

AKP’s political Islam is different than any Islamist movement seen in Turkey. They never (up to now) attempted to undermine the parliamentary system and democracy. At least during the first years of their time in government, they embraced values like democracy, human rights, open-market economics and hence was promoted by the West as a ‘Model’ for the Muslim World (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010, p: 6).
This section will look in to the history and transformation of the Islamist movement in Turkey, their struggles against the secular establishment and military and their influence on the formation of the modern Turkish identity.

3:3:1 Political Islam in the young republic

Establishment of the new Turkish republic from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in 1923 changed the role of Islam in Turkish political, cultural and social life significantly. The new republic immediately banned any type of Islamic activity from the public sphere and hence forced it underground (Yavuz, 2003, p: 113). As opposed to the Ottoman Empire, this new nation state was defining its identity through nationalism and secularism rather than religion.

As explained previously, Mustafa Kemal and his party aimed to “catapult Turkey in to modernity (Hermann, 2003)”. They introduced among other things the Latin script and the Gregorian calendar, the hat and ‘Republic’ balls. In other words, they pushed Islam out of the public space by eliminating religious objects, symbols and traditions and brought a modern and secular and ‘western’ life-style to the country (ibid)\(^69\).

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\(^{69}\) As a result of the states’ policies regarding religion, three distinct types of political Islam blossomed in Turkey. As Hermann explains, the first type is the product of the Kemalist State’s efforts to tailor Islam in a way that it will ‘fit’ with secularism. This is an Islam that is compatible with the Kemalist modernization project, and provide an answer for those Turks who define themselves as secular citizens as well as good Muslims (Hermann, 2010). The second type of Political Islam constitutes violent and extremist elements and is aiming to dismantle the secular state completely to form a Sharia state in Turkish territory (ibid). The last is a more forceful Islamic presence in politics, and, since the majority of Turks are conservative and religious, society is pressing for this. However, the movement for political Islam has split into two: one wing is rather strictly traditional as regards the traditional Islamic political agenda, and this has lost ground. The other wants Islam to constitute a system of values that can be referred to, just as Christian Democratic parties in Europe have Christian values as their reference point; this wing took power in Turkey after the election of 2002 (ibid). This chapter will focus on the third type of political Islam which is the most prominent and influential type today.
The newly formed establishment’s strict secularism made institutionalisation of Islamism impossible during the first years of the republic and the Islamist ideology and the religious identity lived in the shadows for nearly three decades (Bulac, 2005, p: 48).

During this period, Islamist ideology was kept outside the political realm and Islamic practices were preserved strictly within the household (Yavuz, 2003, p: 113) and any accepted religious activity was controlled and designed by the state.

Indeed, a kind of religious “counterculture” existed outside the cities. In response to their forced exclusion from the political sphere, many Muslims established their own informal networks and educational systems. The religious networks and brotherhoods such as the Nakşibendi and the Nurculuk movement became a kind of ‘for the marginalized majority excluded from the top-down transformation. Counter-public sphere’ and the incubator of a more popular Islamic identity. Islam, as Hakan Yavuz has noted, remained the ‘hidden identity of the Kemalist state’ and provided the vernacular (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 34).

But, with the formation of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) after the Second World War, an alternative, more overtly religious (but not Islamist) discourse found its way to Turkish political realm. And this party, as the first alternative to the Kemalist establishment in the newly found Turkish republic, quickly rose to power and formed a government.

Under the DP rule, Islam in Turkish public life became a lot more prominent and strict secularism of the Kemalist establishment was partially abandoned. The DP formed alliances with illegal religious brotherhoods (tarikat) to augment the number of their
supporters. They also did a series of reforms to include religion in to the Turkish public life and please their conservative electorate (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010).

[During the DP’s time in government], religious instruction in public schools was made virtually compulsory. It was made obligatory to furnish a letter for parents, who did not wish their children to receive such an instruction. Article 526 of the penal code, which forbade the call for prayer being made in any language other than Turkish, was amended. Arabic replaced Turkish in five daily calls for prayer and in sermons in mosques, and broadcasts of the Quran over state-owned radio started. The DP also turned a blind eye toward the Quran courses of the Islamic brotherhoods. For example, Süleymançis [a religious brotherhood] facing legal measures were released by orders of some DP parliamentarians and of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (Eligur, 2010, p: 57).

But the DP’s government came to harsh end after a decade in power when Turkish military, as the protector of the secular state, intervened and executed the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1960, on the grounds that the party and its leader were violating the constitution.\textsuperscript{70}

The military junta that came to power after the coup penned a new constitution that they believe would protect the essence of the Turkish republic.

The 1961 constitution, outlined by the military, was libertarian in many ways but it was also designed to protect the Turkish state from a variety of ideologies including Islamism. For example it had a clause, Article 19, that criminalised the use of religion for political purposes stating that “no individual can exploit religion in order to change the social, economic, political, or legal structure of the state according to religious.

\textsuperscript{70} It needs to be noted that DP came in to power promising “Liberalisation and democracy” to the masses fed up with the strict one party rule of the Kemalist elite; yet (In a similar manner to AKP) after having a series of land slide election victories became a source of authoritarianism jailing journalists, using state radio for propaganda, banning political meetings and peaceful demonstrations (Eligur, 2010 p: 58).
principles, neither can he use religion to further his personal or political interests (Turkish constitution, 1961).

After the military coup, Islamists in Turkey kept a low profile and instead of forming a party to further their cause, inserted themselves in a variety of parties and acted as individual agents (Eligur, 2010). But during this era the cold war environment and the belief that ‘communism is a bigger threat to Turkey compared to Islam’ played in to the hands of Islamists and allowed the Islamist ideology to sneak in to the mainstream political discussions in the country. Successive governments kept implementing the DP’s religion-friendly policies in order to use the public’s religious sentiments to form a type of Islamism that is state-friendly and that could be used to combat the Soviet influence in the country (ibid).

3:3:2 Political Islam before AKP

In 1970, Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamist supported by the Naksibendi Order, after entering the Turkish parliament as an independent MP, formed the first traditionally Islamist party in Turkish politics: Milli Nizam Party (National Order Party, MNP) (Cakir, 2005, p: 545). The MNP was the country’s first openly Islamist party and was supported by religious, conservative and traditional Turk’s who lived in rural areas of Anatolia (ibid). However, after only 16 months in parliament, the party became aggressive in their Islamist agenda and denounced Kemalism and its secular principles openly (Ahmed, 1993, p: 147). As a result, Turkish military intervened once again, this time more subtly with a “coup by memorandum”, and banned the party on the grounds that it was participating in anti-secular activities (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p: 3).
After the MNP’s time in the parliament, Erbakan formed another Islamist political party, Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, MSP). Even though the MSP managed to survive long enough to participate in 1973 and 1977 elections and take part in a series of coalition governments, it was also banned after the military coup of 1981, again on the grounds that it had an anti-secular agenda\textsuperscript{71} (ibid, p:4; Hermann, 1996, p: 44–5; Seufert, 1997, p: 82–90).

But even though the military coup of 1980 led to the end of the MSP, it paved the way for political Islam to become a defining actor in Turkish politics in the following decades. As Eligur explained:

The late 1970s was a period of “short-lived and ideologically incompatible coalition governments, which were unable to curb the political violence of the radical leftist and the ultranationalist groups. By late 1979 the growing political violence, [...] and] an economic crisis led to the third military intervention on September 12, 1980\textsuperscript{72}. 1980 to November 1983, the military regime that governed Turkey outlawed all existing political parties. The military, having realized that the increased ideological polarization of the 1970s had led to the political instability and terrorism, manipulated the electoral laws in order to eliminate ideological minor parties and transform the party system into a manageable two- or three party system. A new electoral law passed in 1983, while maintaining proportional representation, introduced a 10 percent national threshold (Eligur, 2010 p: 76)

This new system gave political Islam the opportunity to become a strong force in Turkish politics. After 1980, Turkish state (under the influence of the Turkish military)

\textsuperscript{71} The results of both the 1973 and 1977 general elections suggest that the NSP’s electoral support base was in rural areas. In the 1973 elections, the party received 67.2 percent of its votes from rural areas. In the 1977 elections, 63.2 percent of its votes were from rural areas. And the party was mainly being supported by religious orders (Eligur, 2010 p: 71; Hermann, 2010)
adopted and promoted the Turkish- Islam Synthesis (Türk-Islam Sentezi) as the most suitable ideology for the welfare of the Turkish nation.

**Turkish Islamic Synthesis**

The principal concern of the military junta, who took over the government after the military coup, was the political and institutional restructuring of the country and as Ahmad explained, they set about the task with great abandon (Ahmad, 1993, p: 184).

Generals wanted to de-politicise the urban youth and extinguish the rise of leftist and ultra-nationalist ideologies in the Turkish society and to do that they decided to allow a relatively tame version of Islamism, that they call the Turkish Islamic Synthesis back in to the Turkish public life (Ahmad, 1993; Eligur, 2010). At this time, in direct defiance to the Kemalist principles of previous decades (ibid, p: 95) the military regarded Sunni Islam as a useful tool for creating citizens who would be respectful and loyal to the state (Eligur, 2010, p: 93). Anat Lepidot explained this contradictory strategy by saying:

> After the military coup of September 1980, the generals’ attitude towards Islam was ambiguous, on the one hand opposing Islamic radicalism and on the other promoting Islamic activities. Even though the fear of Islamic irtica (reaction) was one of the reasons for the military takeover, ironically it was the generals who introduced Islam and adopted it as part of the state ideology (Lapidot, 1997, p: 68).

The Turkish – Islamic Synthesis ideology, concocted by a group called ‘Intellectuals’ Hearth’ during the 70’s (Ahmad, 1993, p: 184), was aiming to reinterpret the Turkish-Islamic history by incorporating Islam into the nationalist credo, with the goal of
creating an Islamic sense of national community and preventing a recurrence of ideological clashes and the political violence of the 1970s (Toprak, 1990, p: 10).

In other words, this ideology was aiming to use religion as the essence of culture and social control (Tapper, 1991).

Adaptation of this ideology and military Junta’s close relations with religious groups and organisations gave way to the rise of political Islam in the following decades (Eligur, 2010). As Rabasa and Larabee explains:

The architects of this ideological program hoped to create a new form of depoliticized Turkish-Islamic culture that would reunify society and provide the basis for a unified, strong, and stable state. The synthesis, however, sent an ambiguous message. On one hand, under the 1982 constitution, Turkey was defined as a secular state. On the other hand, the role of religion was strengthened in schools and education as a means of reinforcing Turkish nationalism, which tended to weaken the emphasis on secularism. At the same time, it provided opportunities for the Islamists to expand and reinforce their own message (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 38).

**Welfare Party**

The next party formed by Necmettin Erbakan and his supporters in the wake of the military coup of 1980, was Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP). The RP succeeded in expanding electoral support for political Islam and making political Islam a significant actor in Turkish politics (Hermann, 2003).
As oppose to the MSP and the MNP, the electoral support for the RP was coming from urban areas instead of rurally based citizens and religious orders (ibid; Benli Altunisik, 2005, p: 47).

As explained previously, the RP was formed in a time period that allowed the Turkish Islamic identity to blossom. During this period, following the military coup that disintegrated the Turkish left and introduced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as a state ideology; Turkey also embraced the new market economy under Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and as a result a new religious bourgeois started to form in Anatolia (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008). For the first time in this period Turkey had Islamist businessmen and companies (Seufert, 1997, 117–27), Islamist intellectuals and even an Islamist media (Hermann, 2010).

This new ‘Green’ bourgeois was an alternative to the westernised elite created by the Kemalist revolution in the first quarter of the 20th century. They were representing the ‘Islamist’ Turkish national identity that had been oppressed and ignored for a long time.

They started to form their own symbols (segregation of genders, an alcohol free life style and most importantly the Islamic veil) and step-by-step claimed their place in Turkish public life (White, 2002, p: 206).

The RP managed to reflect this social change in to the election results by two methods. First, they presented themselves as the representatives of this new religious elite and contested the idea that religiosity is equal to ignorance, backwardness and rurality.
Second, they took the place of the Turkish left (which was brutally crushed during the military coup) and emphasized issues such as social justice and unemployment, poverty and social security in their election manifestos (Harmann, 2010).

These two approaches brought wide spread success to the RP in the communal election of 1994 and the parliamentary election of 1995. As a result, on 28 June, 1996, Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey (ibid, p: 271).

Erbakan’s success was a major shock for the country’s secular establishment, who were sceptical and angry about the prospect of an Islamist leading the country in to the new century and during his short time in power Erbakan failed to impress both Seculars\(^{73}\) and Islamists:

He angered hard-core Islamist supporters by accepting a customs union with the EU and continuing to honor treaties with Israel that he had promised to annul. At the same time, he inflamed the secular establish- ment by saying that rectors of universities would have to kiss the hands of female students wearing headscarves (the wearing of headscarves was forbidden in universities) and threatening to build a mosque in Taksim Square, a major public transportation hub in the heart of Istanbul Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 43).

And, as a result, political Islam’s time in power did not last long. On 30 June 1997, the military once again acted as the guardian of secularity and Kemalist principles and pressured Erbakan to step down as Prime Minister (ibid; Hale and Ozbudun, 2010

\(^{73}\) As mentioned previously in the second chapter, the term ‘seculars’ will be used to define people who support the Kemalist understanding of secularism (which promotes total state control over religious affairs) in this research.
During this time, the RP’s electorate was angry at the military for their intervention but yet was equally frustrated with Erbakan and his MPs for failing to hold on to power and incorporating political Islam in to the mainstream Turkish politics.

At that time the Welfare Party was already split into two camps: the traditionalists led by Erbakan, and the modernists led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been elected mayor of Istanbul on 30 March, 1994. The traditionalists recruited their support from tarikats, mainly the Nakshibendis, while the modernists saw themselves as urban pragmatists (Hermann, 2010, p: 272).

While the traditionalist arm of the RP continued their political journey under the name Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, FP) and changed very little in their combative anti-West discourse; ‘modernists’ formed the party that will change the Turkish political scene and identity in the 21st century: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP).

To be able to understand what the AKP stands for and how they differ from the traditional political Islam, in and outside Turkey, we need to take a closer look at Erbakan and his Islamist movement’s ideology: “Milli Görüş” (National Outlook).

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74 This was the result of the 28 February process. 27 February process was named in reference to the decisions issued by the Turkish military leadership on a National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997 regarding alleged Islamisation of the country under RP government. The Council decided to reform education and abolish all religious orders and forced Erbakan to sign their decisions.

75 FP was once again closed down by the constitutional court as a result of its alleged “Anti-secular” agenda- particularly its agitation over the repeal of the headscarf ban in universities, and was reformed under the name of Saadet Partisi (SP).
Erbakan’s Ideology: National Outlook

When he entered the political scene in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan founded a movement, which became widespread in Turkey (and through Turkish immigrants, in Europe), called “Milli Görüş” (National Outlook).

Erbakan and his followers were not allowed to be overtly Islamist or use Islamic symbols in their propaganda under the secular Turkish constitution so even though they used the name ‘National Outlook’ as the name of their ideology, what they actually meant by it was ‘Islamist Outlook’ (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010, p: 5).

The core of the National Outlook’s ideology was othering, more specifically othering the West and the westernised Turk. In other words, the National Outlook grew on the promise that they would revitalise the Islamic identity of the Turk, which in their minds was oppressed and othered by the Kemalist establishment who defined modernity in Western terms. They aspired to end the Westernisation of the country for good. As Hale and Ozbudun explain:

The National Outlook ideology posits a fundamental conflict between Western (Judeo-Christian) and Islamic civilisation. [For the followers of this ideology] the former is false, in the sense of resting upon force, while the latter is based on righteousness. Western civilization is described as materialist, oppressive and colonialist and doomed to extinction. This fundamental opposition to Western civilization has led the national outlook parties to take an extremely negative view of Turkey’s Westernisation process. In their view, once glorious Ottoman Empire began to decline and disintegrate when it started to imitate the West. By the same token they are extremely critical of the secularizing republican reforms (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010, p: 6).
The National Outlook’s foreign policy was also founded on the alleged clash between the East and the West. Erbakan, through out his time in Turkish politics, was aggressively anti-EU, US and Israel (ibid). Erbakan always claimed that Turkey’s application for EU membership was “a treason against our history, concept of civilisation and most important of all our independence (Erbakan, 2011)”.

The National Outlook favoured “the creation of a Muslim Common Market, with the Islamic dinar as its common currency, and the development of a Muslim Defense Alliance. In other words, they wanted to form a ‘new civilisation’ based on traditional Islamic values (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008)”.

And this was exactly where the AKP and its leaders Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül differed from Erbakan and his National Outlook.

3:3:3 AKP’s Post Islamism

Modernist founders of the AKP; Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Bülent Arınç; in contrast to the traditionalists in the National Outlook movement, were open to cooperation with the Western establishment.

Even though most of their members were coming from the Islamist movement shaped by the National Outlook (Ismael and Perry, 2014 p: 202), AKP was now classifying itself as a ‘conservative democratic’ party instead of an ‘Islamist’ one. They were comparing themselves to Germany’s Christian Democrats and arguing that they are on board with Turkey’s Western outlook and EU membership bid. In their discourse, they emphasized the importance of global values such as human rights, democracy, rule of
law and equality (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p: 20; Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 47). They defined themselves as socially conservative neo-liberals who were aiming to bring ‘real’ democracy, equality and justice to Turkey.

But Kemalist seculars in Turkey, who formed the establishment at the time, were not keen to believe that Erdoğan and his supporters changed overnight. They were reluctant to believe them because anti-secularist quotes from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other founders of the party, uttered during their National Outlook days, were still fresh in Turkish memories.

Erdoğan previously made antisecular statements; in 1996, in a newspaper interview, he ‘admitted that democracy is not the goal but is an instrument for the WP[RP, Refah Parisi].’ [...] In another interview, in 1994, Erdoğan affirmed, “Elhamdulillah [thank God] we are for the Sharia (Eligur, 2010, p: 243).

And in April 1998, after reciting a poem by Turkish Islamist-Nationalist poet Ziya Gokalp, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was sentenced to prison for inciting religious hatred under Article 312 of the Turkish penal code. The poem in question included the lines “The mosques are our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the believers our soldiers (Jenkins, 2003, p: 53).”

But after his conviction, Erdoğan announced that he had changed his views. He contacted western diplomats and journalists, and started to praise parliamentary democracy and Turkey’s endeavors to enter the EU. This can be considered as the starting point of the post-Islamist movement and AKP (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008).

While this change of heart was not enough to convince the secularist military,
Kemalist opposition or secularist sections of the public mainly residing on the coastline of the country, analysts in the EU and liberals in Turkey were willing to give this new ‘Modern’ Islamists a chance to prove their commitment to democracy.

By adapting a more moderate and pragmatic political discourse instead of an ideological one, the AKP gained unprecedented electoral support. They won the 2002 general elections with 34% of the vote, well ahead of the secularist and Kemalist CHP, which placed second with 19% of the vote (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 48).

Their supporters were the newly formed conservative elite of Anatolia as well as the millions of people who are residing in the poor favella like neighbourhoods (gecekondumahallesi/varos) in big cities. They also had the backing of Turkish liberals who were frustrated with the secular establishment’s authoritarian attitude towards Muslim masses as well as their conservative economic outlook.

After he won a landslide victory in 2002 general elections, Erdoğan hold his promise and declared that his government’s first priorities as membership to the EU and reconstruction of the Turkish economy.

This led to an unprecedented reconstruction of the Turkish political environment. The AKP’s commitment to include Turkey in to the European Union and its eagerness to make the reforms necessary for Europeanisation and democratization of the country resulted in the West giving its full support to the party.

76 For a detailed explanation of West’s perception of AKP, see the section on “Turkish model” in this chapter.
But, as the West became a tacit ally of the AKP, formerly pro-Western secularists surfaced as opponents of EU accession. The CHP, once the champion of a Western orientation for Turkey, has increasingly moved in a more nationalistic direction and has adopted a more ambiguous attitude toward the West, seeing some aspects of the West’s influence as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish state and Kemalism (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 51).

Seculars were unsure about the motivation behind the AKP’s efforts to meet the EU accession criteria mainly because they believed that the party was exploiting the reforms to advance their Islamist secret agenda. The AKP had a common goal with the EU: Diminishing the power of the military in Turkey and CHP believed that (even though they were not supportive of military coups) army’s presence was a necessary deterrent against Islamism in Turkish politics (Eligur, 2010, p: 248).

Also the AKP had introduced several conservative policies during this era, which angered secularists and raised questions about their newly found commitment to secularism.

In November 2003, the party tried to open up boarding Quran courses that would provide year-round religious education. In February 2004 they proposed a new law in the Turkish penal code, which would make it a crime, punishable by two to five years’ imprisonment, to inhibit the right to educate and teach, the right to benefit from public services, and the right to organize massive religious prayers and rituals77 (Eligur, 2010 p: 251). These attempts were seen as proof that the AKP, like previous Islamist parties from the National Outlook movement, was trying to undermine

77 This was aiming to block secularist attempts to limit religious education outside schools that is not controlled by the state.
secularity and start the Islamification of the country from the education system.

And in 2004, the AKP tried to criminalize adultery with an amendment to the Turkish penal code. This attempt received strong criticisms from Turkey as well as Europe. Erdoğan, understanding that this may be the end of the party's new image as 'conservative democrats', withdraw the proposal. Yet, many Turkish seculars argued that this was a clear indication of Erdogan’s “hidden Islamist agenda” and his desire to transform Turkey into a religious republic (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008).

The AKP's attempts to reconstruct Turkey and make it a more Islamic and socially conservative country, or in their words "Normalizing a Muslim country which suffered under oppressive secularism” deepened the divide between the two distinct sides of the Turkish identity.

While these attempts caused a lot of controversy in Turkey, the outside world, which was already disillusioned by Turkey’s militant brand of secularism, did not interpret these developments as a proof of the AKP’s alleged “Islamist hidden agenda”.

In May 2006, tensions between the AKP and the seculars raised once again as a result of a terrorist attack targeting Council of State judges. The attacker, who was later named as Alparslan Aslan, opened fire in the courthouse killing Second Criminal Bureau Judge Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin and wounding many others. He claimed that the motivation behind the attack was the “on going ban on the use of religious headscarves
in public institutions in Turkey” (BBC, 2006).78

After this attack and new military cadres taking place, including the new commander in chief Yasar Buyukanit, military’s friction with the government became more and more intense and declarations by military officials regarding the importance of secularism and the threat the AKP posed to the secular, Kemalist Turkish republic became common ground (Eligur, 2010, p: 254).

During this time, while the public support for the government remained strong, secular circles started to argue that the AKP was only doing ‘Takkiye’ and the party is not committed to secularity and democracy.

The conflict between the secularists and the AKP supporters, or the ‘new’ conservatives and the ‘old’ Kemalist establishment reached its peak in 2007, when the parliament failed to elect a new president which will replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer.

In early 2007, the AKP government tried to elect Abdullah Gul, who is one of the founders of the party and its first leader, as the new president. Gül’s wife, Hayrunisa was wearing the religious headscarf and many ‘secular’ Turks believed that a woman wearing the headscarf should not enter the Presidential Palace in Ankara and represent Turkey internationally. Gül’s nomination provoked mass secularist demonstrations all around the country and finally led to a warning by the military.

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78 It was later claimed, during the Ergenekon trial, that this was an attack orchestrated by the Secularist military to increase tensions between the seculars and Islamist’s in the country.
79 Takkiye is a behavior of disguise for the sake of promoting the cause of Islam and is permitted in Sharia.
In a statement posted on the Turkey General Staff web site, (called the ‘midnight memorandum’ or the ‘e-coup’), the Turkish army said the military is ‘the definite defender of secularity’ and ‘will manifest its attitude and behaviour in an explicit and clear fashion when necessary,’ which was perceived by many Turks as a veiled threat of a possible military coup (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008, p: 72).

After the so called e-coup, the AKP government decided to draw forward the general elections, which were set to be held in November, to 22nd of May. The party scored another landslide victory (gaining 46.58% of votes) and re-established its place in Turkish politics.

After the election, the AKP went forward with electing Abdullah Gul as Turkey’s new president. Gul’s entry in to the presidential palace with his head-scarved wife on his side was a turning point in Turkish politics.

It was the first time that an overtly religious politician was entering the presidential palace and becoming the head of the Turkish state and it was an obvious indication that military’s control over politics was loosening up (Rabasa and Larabee, 2008).

Instead of resolving the conflict, Gul’s presidency further fueled secularist concerns and reactions towards the AKP government. In March 2008, Public prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya presented documents to the Turkish constitutional court, requesting the closure of the AKP on the grounds that the party was undermining the

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80 Turkish General Staff Press Release, published on April 27, 2007
secular principles of the Turkish state. Yalcınkaya’s indictment also demanded 71 AKP politicians, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül to be banned from politics for five years.

The court decided not to close the party with only 6 of the 11 judges voting in favour of the closure. Yet 10 out of 11 judges agreed that the AKP had become ‘a centre for anti-secular activities’ and decided to cut down the party’s state funding as a warning (CNN Turk, 2009).

The failure of the closure attempt showed that nothing was the same in Turkey after the AKP’s time in power. By surviving this trial, Erdogan and his supporters showed that they were not going to share the same destiny with their predecessors (National outlook movement) and be defeated by the secularist establishment.

But the AKP’s main struggle at this point was not against the secular establishment, but it was against the military. And, after two controversial trials, they managed to win that struggle.

3:3:4 AKP vs. Turkish military

In June 2007, Turkish police confiscated 27 hand bombs and several other explosives in an address in Istanbul. This discovery, which looked relatively minor at the time, led to the largest and most elaborate investigation in the history of Turkish republic. After 13 months of investigations, public prosecutors submitted the first indictment of what will later be known as the Ergenekon trial. Prosecutors alleged that senior names from the Turkish military and establishment formed a terror organization named Ergenekon
in order to end the constitutional order and overthrow the AKP government. Under the first indictment, 86 people including the chancellor of İstanbul University Kemal Alemdaroğlu, Cumhuriyet’s editor in chief İlhan Selçuk, retired brigadier general Veli Küçük, and the leader of the Turkish Labour Party Doğu Perinçek were prosecuted.

In March 2009, the court accepted the second indictment of the Ergenekon trial. Under this indictment, a total of 56 suspects were added to the trial. And finally in August 2009, 52 more suspects were added to the trial (Al Jazeera, 2013).

While Turkish liberals and Western observers first applauded the trials as “Turkey’s first serious attempt to end military’s influence over politics”, in time serious concerns were raised about the way the prosecution was conducted. In 2010, courts started to use Ergenekon trial as a way to silence journalists, academics or anyone else that was critical of the government. By the end of that year, there were thousands of open investigations against journalists who covered the case in a critical manner, and 43 were in pre-trial detention (Licursi, 2012). Arrests of two renowned investigative journalists in March 2011, Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık, refuelled these fears at home and abroad (ibid). Financial Times explained the contradicting opinions regarding the case to its readers by saying:

To proponents, the case is the most serious attempt yet to liberate the country from the deep state – a nexus of military officials and ultranationalists who have allegedly exercised the real power over Turkey for much of the republic’s 90-year history, committing atrocities against Kurds and other minorities, and plotting against the current

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\(^{81}\) At the time of their arrest Şener was writing a book about the possible complicity of government forces in the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and Şık was writing a book about the Gülen movement’s infiltration, since the AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002, of the bureaucracy and police force. They both categorically denied that they were ever involved with any terror organisation, including Ergenekon.
government. To its detractors, Ergenekon is little more than a witch-hunt against the enemies of the AK party and, in particular, the foes of the Gulenists, an Islamist movement whose members have often championed the trials as a key stage in Turkey’s move towards greater democracy (Financial Times, 05/08/2013).

In 2010, another high profile case carried the confrontation between the AKP government and the military to the courtrooms once again.

Turkish liberal daily Taraf published a series of documents, which alleged that in 2003 ‘secular’ generals in the Turkish military were making plans to overthrow the Islamist government. After the publication of these documents, Turkish police immediately started an investigation. As a result of the investigation, dubbed ‘Sledgehammer’ by the Turkish press, nearly 330 people, many of them high ranking military officials, were arrested and put to trial.

As a reaction to the Sledgehammer arrests Turkish generals resigned en masse. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accepted the resignations immediately and assigned someone he chose, Gen. Necdet Ozel, as the new senior commander of the military.

International media claimed that this development “stamped Mr. Erdoğan’s civilian authority on the country’s military, which has long regarded itself as a protector of Turkey’s secular traditions” (New York Times, 29/07/2011).

In September 2012 the court declared its verdict about the Sledgehammer case and sentenced three former army generals to 20 years in jail each for plotting a coup.

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82 Also, in 2011 general elections, AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved a landslide victory, by getting 49.8% of the vote and 327 seats in the parliament. This was read as the public’s stamp of approval for not only AKP’s war against the “deep state” and military but also its increasingly conservative and authoritarian policies.
alongside with hundreds of military officials. Sentenced generals Cetin Dogan, Ozden Ornek and Ibrahim Firtina maintained their innocence and said the trial was “unfair and unlawful” (BBC, 21/09/2012). Many members of the Turkish judiciary and media, as well as several European experts, agreed with the defendants claims and branded the trial a politically motivated with hunt.

While discussions regarding the Sledgehammer trial were still on-going, in 2013, Turkish courts declared their verdict on the Ergenekon trial and handed down harsh sentences for nearly 300 defendants. As Zaman reported:

The court sentenced former military chief Gen. İlker Başbuğ, journalist Tuncay Özkan, retired Col. Dursun Çiçek, lawyer Kemal Kerinçszíz, Workers' Party (İP) leader Doğu Perinçek, retired Col. Fuat Selvi, Hasan Ataman Yıldırım, retired generals Hurşit Tolon, Nusret Taşdeler, Hasan Iğsız and Şener Eruygur to aggravated life imprisonment. Retired Brig. Gen. Veli Küçük, Capt. Muzaffer Tekin and Council of State shooter Alparslan Arslan got consecutive life sentences in the trial. The court acquitted a total of 21 of the 275 defendants. Force commanders were given lengthy or life sentences on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, but there were also civilians, such as journalists Tuncay Özkan and Mustafa Balbay, who were given lengthy prison terms. Özkan was given 22 years and six months in jail while Balbay, who is also a Republican People's Party (CHP) deputy, was given 34 years and eight months. (Today's Zaman, 05/08/2013).

Once again, while many people were happy to see what they perceived to be the end of the ‘deep state’ and military interventions, others were sceptical of the legitimacy of the trial and the verdict.

During this time, in which AKP’s authoritarian tendencies became more and more apparent as a result of the Gezi Park protests, more and more people were perceiving

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83 For example, it has been established by experts (and later accepted by the court) that some of the evidence that was used against the defendants were fabricated. The documents, which detailed the coup plot and used as evidence in the trial were allegedly created in 2003. But it was later understood that all these documents were written in Microsoft Word font that was not invented until 2007. Hurriyet, 16/02/2015 “Balyoz davasında çarpıcı bilirkişi raporu” URL: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/28218495.asp, accessed: 08/08/2015
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials not only as the end of the military rule in Turkey but also as the start of the AKP’s (or more accurately, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s) authoritarianism. The legitimacy of the trials was being questioned widely.

And in a year’s time, the critics of the trials were proved right.

In 2014, nearly all defendants from both Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials were released. While the Sledgehammer trial completely collapsed (BBC, 31/03/2015); Ergenekon trial fell in to a limbo when the court failed to publish its verdict in time (Hurriyet Daily News, 10/03/2014).

Outcomes of these cases proved that a legitimate attempt to oust military from power was transformed in to a sham prosecution reminiscent of the show-trials of Soviet Russia during the cold war. But, this worrisome result does not alter the fact that through these trials the AKP (for better or for worse) ended the days of military control in Turkey.

The end of military’s authority over civilian executive powers was also highly significant for the on-going identity crisis in Turkey. As a result of the Sledgehammer and the Ergenekon trials the Westernised and strictly secular Turkish identity lost power alongside the military.

3:3:5 : The ‘Turkish Model’

Since the formation of the Turkish republic in 1923, Turkey and its secularist, state-imposed, west-oriented modernisation experience has been presented as a positive example or a ‘Model’ for democratisation of the Middle Eastern region ( Benli Altunisik, 2005; Goksel, 2012). Especially after the end of the Cold War, a large
number of Western (especially American) scholars, politicians and journalists argued that Turkey’s success in forming a secular, democratic and westernised republic should provide a template for Muslim nations of the Middle East in their democratization efforts.

The notion of Turkey being a model for Islamic countries re-emerged more forcefully after 9/11 (Benli Altunisik, 2005, p: 46). But, at this time, the reasons for presenting Turkey as a ‘Model’ have also changed significantly. In the post-2001 era, when the AKP was in power, ‘Turkish model’ started to be defined as a ‘liberal and Islamic’ model instead of a strictly secular and westernised one. As Benli Altunisik explains:

First, it was the Clinton administration right after the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union that talked about the “Turkish model” in the context of the Central Asian and Caucasus states. Then the issue for the U.S. was to encourage these newly independent countries to choose the secular Turkish model as opposed to Iranian theocracy. After that, came the Bush administration. This time the context was post-9/11 era and the “war on terrorism”. In that context, Turkey was made the model for reconciliation between Islam and democracy, an example of “moderate Islam,” much to the dismay of seculars in Turkey (Benli Altunisik, 2011).

President George W. Bush clearly showed the US’ eagerness to present Turkey as an ‘Islamic’ model in his speech to the Istanbul NATO Summit in 2004 by saying “I appreciate very much the example that your country [Turkey] has set on how to be a Muslim country which embraces democracy, rule of law and freedom (Hurriyet Daily News, 28/06/ 2004)”. The same year, US secretary of state Colin Powell referred to Turkey as an exemplary ‘Islamic republic’ and said "There will be an Islamic Republic in Iraq just like other
Islamic Republics such as Turkey and Pakistan... There is no reason why Islam cannot be together with democracy. Turkey is an Islamic country, why would there not be a democracy just like there is in Turkey at the same time” (*NTV, 02/04/ 2004*). Many perceived Powell’s comments as an indication of the new, ‘Islamic’ role the US has tailored for the country, which has been praised for its ‘secular’ quality in the past (Benli Altunisik, 2005).

There were several reasons for this fundamental change in the perceptions of the Turkish model.

First of all, the influence of ‘Islam’ on the Turkish national identity increased significantly as a result of the AKP’s time in government (Which started in 2002, shortly after 9/11). Secondly, after 9/11, the West’s eagerness to present and promote an acceptable and applicable democratisation model for the Middle East increased. And, since the radically secularist discourse of the Turkish state in the past was difficult for conservative Muslim nations to emulate, It was more fruitful to present the new, more overtly Islamic Turkey as a model (Goksel, 2012 p:101, Gürsel, 2011).

First, Turkey's experience in reform is unique and cannot be repeated elsewhere. The uniqueness of the Turkish case was largely explained by

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84 In 2010, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)’s annual survey on “Perception’s of Turkey in the Middle East” showed that 66% of the respondents (coming from Egypt, Iran, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Iraq) see Turkey as a “Model” for the region. The most preferred reason for appreciating Turkey as a model was its “Muslim identity” (15%), then its economy (12%) which was followed by its democracy (11%) and its “advocating the rights of Palestinians and Muslims” (10%) (TESEV, 2010). The reasons listed for not seeing Turkey as a model were also focused on the country’s “Islamic” identity. 12% of respondents said, “Turkey can not be a model because of its secular system” while 11% said “Turkey is not Muslim enough to be perceived as a model”. And for 10% of the respondents Turkey’s good relations with the West was an obstacle for its role as a Model (ibid). The percentage of respondents from the region who thought that Turkey can be a model for the region decreased to 53% in 2013 , but their main objection to the idea of a “Turkish model” was once again their belief that “Turkey was not Muslim enough” (17%) (TESEV, 2013).
Turkey's secularism. [...] Second, problems in Turkey's democratization were cited in explaining why Turkey could not be a model. The difficulties Turkey has been facing in consolidating its democracy as well as the lack of domestic legitimacy, reflected in challenges in the 1990s by political Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. Third, Turkey's traditional problems with the Middle East, particularly the Arab world, were perceived as an obstacle for Turkey's role as a model. It is claimed that the largely negative legacy of Ottoman rule, Turkey's secularism, its alliance with the West and relations with Israel have largely been criticized in the Middle East and thus vastly limit the acceptance of Turkey as a model. Fourth, Turkey's historical ties with the West, particularly its institutional links were thought to make Turkey a unique case. In short, critics of Turkey as-a-model claim that the Turkish experience is sui generis and cannot be transplanted (Benli Altunisik, 2005 p: 46).

As well as Turkey’s suitability for being a ‘Model’ for the Middle East, this notion’s affect on the Turkish identity is also a subject of discussion.

Some scholars perceive the newly tailored notion of the ‘Islamic Turkish model’ as a threat towards the westernized identity Turkey had been struggling to form for nearly a century.

Goksel says: “The more Turkey is defined as a model or mentor of the Middle East, the less Turkey appears to the EU as a European country facing European concerns” (Goksel, 2004).

And Turkish seculars are claiming that with the ‘Model’ discourse, especially by redefining secular Turkey as a model ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ democracy (just like Powell did in 2003) the West is pushing Turkey in to the depths of Islamism and jeopardizing Turkey’s hard earned secularity to achieve an alleged ‘greater good’ and inspire the Muslim World. For example in an article for journal Turkish Policy Gürsel said:
Presenting Turkey to the Middle East as a “Muslim democracy” is also a way for the West to provide a clear moral and political boost to the policies of the AKP government in the direction of making Turkey more religiously conservative, which at the end of the day will create an electorate less keen to safeguard secularism [...] The moral and political support provided by the Western circles may also end up with the Turkish democracy deficit to grow further. Presenting a regime as a model, by definition, means justifying and favoring it, thus stifling the healthy criticism needed to keep Turkey on the right track of reform. Turkey cannot and will not be a model to the Middle East by being Middle-Easternized. On the contrary, a Turkey which protects its democratic and secular identity will be a better inspiring example for the region (Gursel, 2011, p: 97).

The Western world’s perception of Turkey as a ‘model’ continued for a long time, even though Turkish secularists were strongly opposing this narrative. Yet, in time, the AKP started to become a ‘less agreeable’ ally for the West as it raised its level of authoritarianism after its second general election victory.

This gradual change in the AKP and the West’s perception of it reached its climax during the summer of 2013 with the Gezi Park protests.

3:3:6 Questioning the ‘model’: Gezi Park protests

As explained in detail above, when the AKP came to power in 2002, it started a process of transformation in Turkey. Its goal, as senior members of the party stated frequently, was to create a ‘new Turkey’ in which the nation as a whole was in control, instead of a minority. To achieve this goal they focused on integrating the religious masses, which they perceived as being marginalised by the Kemalist establishment, to the political and economic centre (Moudouros, 2014 p: 183). In their first term in power, they achieved this goal by focusing on the democratisation process fuelled by
the EU membership negotiations and in time they created their own, more overtly religious bureaucracy, judiciary and bourgeoisie.

While this transformation caused a severe reaction in the secular masses who are devoted to the Kemalist ideals and a Jacobin understanding of secularity\textsuperscript{85}, Turkish liberals and the western world gave their full support to the so called ‘Model’ Muslims in Turkey.

While Turkish seculars were complaining about how Turkey was becoming more and more socially conservative under the AKP, supporters of the government were glossing over these developments and secular reactions by branding them as tremors of democratisation.

The Kurdish Peace Process and attempts to anti-militarise the democracy through trials like Ergenekon were widely applauded during this time. Yet, after their second election victory, the AKP started to become a lot more oppressive and hence groups other than old school seculars also started to voice their concerns about the government.

Public’s discontent with AKP grew gradually in the party’s last two terms in power for a variety of reasons. Government’s attempt to partially ban alcohol (\textit{Guardian}, 31/05/2013), their reluctance to let people celebrate 1\textsuperscript{st} of May in Taksim (\textit{Reuters}, 01/05/2013), the way they tried to control the media and journalists (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2013; Pierini, 2013)\textsuperscript{86}, their plans to adapt a US style presidential system (\textit{Al

\textsuperscript{85} This reaction manifested itself in major protests dubbed “Cumhuriyet yürürüyüşleri” (Republic protests) in 2007, in which millions of secular Turks accused the AKP of “trying to transform Turkey in to an Iran like Islamist state” and demanded the government’s resignation (\textit{Reuters}, 29/04/2007).

\textsuperscript{86} In their report about the situation of press freedom in Turkey, Carnigie House researchers concluded that:

• According to independent estimates, Turkey currently has the highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world, but the government and civil society organizations strongly disagree about the exact number. This creates an antagonistic atmosphere that hinders constructive reform.
Jazeera, 27/08/2013), their tendency to condone moral policing (Hurriyet, 25/05/2013), their plans to ban abortion (BBC, 01/06/2012), their decision to encourage every Turkish woman to have at least three children (Milliyet, 02/01/2013) and their plans to name the third Bosporus bridge after a Sultan that the Alevi minority regard as a mass murderer (Hurriyet Daily News, 03/06/2013) can be shown as examples of their authoritarianism and lack of respect for certain members of the Turkish society.

These developments caused nearly half of the Turkish public to feel like their life style, freedoms and future is being threatened. Yet, during this time, Turkish economy was still on the rise and the AKP’s conservative electorate was content with the government’s authoritarian policies, since none of these policies were directly affecting them, or their life style.

But, the discontent of the certain sections of the Turkish public, and especially the educated Turkish youth, exploded in to an unprecedented public protest on May 28th 2013.

Everything started with nearly 50 environmentalists staging a protest in Taksim Gezi Park, one of İstanbul’s last remaining public parks, to oppose the reconstruction of the historic Taksim Military Barracks as a part of a project that would also house a

• The judicial system tends to equate criticizing government policies and sympathizing with radical ideology. Journalists who report and comment on sensitive investigations or court proceedings as part of their job can face judicial prosecution.
• Many imprisoned journalists are detained on charges relating to terrorist activities linked to Kurdish separatism.
• The government filters content online and blocks websites, seemingly targeting content that it deems unwanted or illegal.
• Large conglomerates control major media outlets, so economic interests cloud media decisions and undermine editors’ and journalists’ ability to provide truly independent, critical reporting.
• The government directly interferes at times in media affairs by lashing out at journalists or outlets in response to personal and policy criticism.

87 Original barracks were demolished in 1940.
shopping mall. Yet, when Turkish police attacked the peaceful protesters with water cannons and tear gas, this small environmental protest that aimed to save a couple of trees, quickly spiralled into Turkey’s largest urban uprising.

On May 30th, as the police violence against the protesters continued, a diverse array of people disenchanted by the government's Muslim conservatism or its free-market policies poured into the park to show their discontent and desire for change.

The demographic of the protesters was highly interesting. The quantitative research KONDA conducted on the Gezi Park protesters showed that:

- 50.8% of the protesters were female and 49.2% were male. Therefore, the gender distribution of the protesters in Gezi Park was more or less in parallel to the population of Turkey on average.
- The average age of protesters was 28.
- Amongst the protesters 34.5% were high school graduates, 42.5% were college graduates and 12.9% had masters of PhD level qualifications. (Hence, the protesters were significantly more educated compared to the general Turkish public).
- 78.9% of protesters said they were not affiliated with any political party or organisation and 93.6% said that they came to the park at their sole discretion in general (in other words they were not attending the protest to show support for a party or organisation in particular).
- 34.4% of the protesters said that they attended the Gezi Park uprising because they want ‘Freedom’, while 18.4% said they came to demand their rights. 9.7% said they were there to stand against dictatorship and oppression and 9.5% said they attended to demand the government to
resign. Only 4.6% said they came to stand against the removal of trees and the replica barrack (KONDA, 2014)\textsuperscript{88}.

In short, KONDA’s quantitative findings showed that Gezi Park protesters were young people who spent most of their adult lives under the AKP rule and who were not politically active previously. They were educated, urban and frustrated with the government.

In a really short amount of time, protests sprat all around Anatolia\textsuperscript{89}, (and even to Europe and America\textsuperscript{90}) and fractions of the Turkish society who normally do not see eye to eye such as Kemalists, liberals, LGBT activists, Kurdish nationalists, anarchists and socialists came together to stand against what they perceive as the conservative government’s oppression.

As Amnesty International later explained in their detailed report on the subject, the Turkish authorities’ reaction to the protest was brutal and unequivocal. “Over the next few months, police repeatedly used unnecessary and abusive force, including tear gas, water cannons and beatings, to prevent and disperse peaceful demonstrations” (Amnesty International, 2014). When the protests ended at the end of the summer, the human toll was heavy. Eight people died, at least four as a result of police violence. About 8,000 were injured, 104 sustained serious head injuries and 11 people lost an eye, most as a result of plastic bullets fired by the police (Guardian, 29/05/2014).


\textsuperscript{89} On the fifth day of protests, Turkish interior minister Muammer Guler said “More than 90 demonstration in 48 provinces, including Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Antalya, Konya, Eskişehir and many others have been organized (Hurriyetdailynews, 31/05/ 2013, Police withdraw from Taksim after violent crackdown as protesters remain defiant on 5th day, URL: \url{http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-withdraw-from-taksim-after-violent-crackdown-as-protesters-remain-defiant-on-5th-day.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48009&NewsCatID=341} accessed: 08/08/15)."

\textsuperscript{90} All Gezi-solidarity demonstratrations are listed in the blog titled “Gezi around the World” : URL: \url{http://geziaroundtheworld.tumblr.com/}
Gezi Park protests did not have an immediate affect on the AKP and Erdoğan’s popularity in Turkey\textsuperscript{91}, yet, it was an important turning point, even end of an era, for the Turkish national identity and the way it is perceived abroad.

First of all the narrative that defines Turkey as a ‘model’ took a hit and the AKP’s ability to provide a positive example for the region started to be questioned. The criticism for the Turkish government peaked in the international media\textsuperscript{92} and, as a result, Prime Minister Erdoğan started to be more and more aggressive against foreign criticisms.

For many, the Gezi Park protest proved that the AKP failed to end the century old dichotomy in the Turkish society. Protests proved that the AKP’s post-Islamism could not end the polarisation between the Muslims and seculars, Kemalists and Islamists or in a more general sense, the ‘westernised and the ‘Oriental’ in Turkey.

This social movement showed that, the AKP and Erdoğan managed to end the hegemony of westernised and strictly secular Kemalist establishment but failed to transform Turkey in to a nation that can accommodate both sides of its own identity.

But, these protests also marked the birth of a new group in Turkey, who embraced a new version of the complex Turkish identity. As Göle explained:

\begin{quote}
The Gezi movement is reuniting people across ancient divides by rejecting the politics of polarization and stigmatization. While it is predominantly a secular movement, it is not a movement in favour of authoritarian state secularism and the exclusion of Muslims from sharing the same public spaces. […] The soul of this libertarian and unifying movement is best
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{91} KONDA research showed that half of the population, especially less educated, religious AKP voters, perceived the protests as a conspiracy against Turkey and its successful government. Also, AKP had a considerable success in the local elections following the uprising.

\textsuperscript{92} This phenomenon is going to be examined in detail in chapter 7.
3:4 Conclusion

This chapter tried to present a brief history of the evolution of different sides of the Turkish national identity that also shapes the representation of Turkey and the Turkish people in British media texts. Starting from the formation of the concept of ‘Turkishness’ in the Ottoman times, the chapter explained how westernisation affected the evolution of Turkish identity and its perception in the West. The chapter also looked into Turkey’s, and especially Turkish state’s problematic relationship with Islam. By explaining the way political Islam evolved and became a prominent (or even leading) actor in Turkish politics, the chapter outlined the reasons why in the 21st century Turkish national identity is Islamic and European simultaneously.

This chapter also showed that in the time period that this study is interested in, (between 2007-2013) the West perceived Turkey and the Turkish version of political Islam as an ‘Islamic’ model for the Middle East.

The next chapter will look into an important part of Turkey’s Westernisation process: (which is also an important factor in the evolution of the country’s identity) Turkey’s EU membership bid.
“Europe is our common home that we have united around common norms, principles and values. As a part and parcel of the European family, Turkey not only had an influence on the political, economic and socio-cultural developments in the Continent but has also been influenced by them. An overall evaluation of the history of Europe cannot be made without analysing the role that Turkey played in the Continent. As in the past, the destinies of Turkey and other European countries are intertwined. We face the future together. Therefore, relations with the EU are a fundamental aspect of the Turkish foreign policy. In this context, our goal to become an EU member is a strategic choice”.

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

4:1 Introduction

Since the creation of the Republic in 1923, there had only been one foreign policy goal that all Turkish governments from all political spectrums agreed on: Entering European Union (Ortaylı, 2007, p: 9).

But today, Turkish government claims that Turkey has a stronger economy than many members of the union and hence is not ‘desperate’ for membership as it was before. And, while all prominent Turkish political parties are pro-European Union, they do not see membership negotiations as a priority in their agenda.

Yet, European Union membership bid is still an influential and important subject in Turkey. For Turkey’s old establishment, the European Union represents a lot more than economic and political power (Ortaylı, 2007, p: 9) and they are enthusiastic about the prospect of a European Turkey, even thought they don’t believe accession is a

possibility in the near future. And for the AKP, or the ‘new’ establishment, their commitment to the EU membership negotiations represents their commitment to a democratic and liberal Turkey.

Today, even though negotiations are on going, nearly all members of the EU, excluding Britain, are sceptical or even completely against the Turkish accession. While some objections against the Turkish membership are based on Turkey’s core identity and religion, there are also several other issues that affect the membership negotiations like Turkey’s human rights record or attitude towards the Kurdish problem.

To be able to understand Europe’s, Britain’s and finally the British media’s perception of Turkey and its national identity, it is necessary to understand Turkey’s decades long journey towards the European Union.

First section of this chapter will look in to Turkey’s EU accession journey, from 1950’s to the current day. The second section will be laying out the major arguments that are being used for and against Turkey in the accession negotiations.
4:2 Turkey and the EU: A brief history of relations

Turkey and Europe had always been in close contact. Through history, they formed their respective identities using each other as a base point (See: Chapter 2, 3). So when European nations were forming the idea of a politically and economically unified Europe, Turkey was always a part of the discussion (Ortaylı, 2007, p: 2). But, Turkish-European discussions on identity only became politically relevant in 1957, when some states that have territories in the European continent formed the European Economic Community (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Turkey, as a country that has established its place in the western bloc after joining the European Council in 1949 and NATO in 1952, applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 (ibid).

Turks main motivation in their application was, as always, to become more European and westernized, but they also had several pragmatic reasons to seek membership. They wanted to feel safe in a polarized world and they did not want Greece, their regional ‘nemesis’, to have an alliance they lack (Erdoğan, 2002, p: 2).

With those strong motivations Turkey rushed in to the application thinking they have to apply before the admission of Greece and in the end was unlucky in timing. Turkish application came at a time when the EEC had become, under Gaullist pressure, much more inward looking (Redmond, 1993 p: 26). Right after the application, France showed reservations about Turkey’s European identity citing “cultural” issues. These reservations were backed by several members of the newly formed Union but the environment of the Cold War period, and the special importance of the country’s geo-
political condition at the time, helped Turkey to approach an association agreement with the EEC (Muftuler-Bac, 2000, p: 29). The Ankara Association Agreement was finally signed on September 12, 1963 and became effective on December 1.

This agreement, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the European Economic Community through the establishment of a customs union, which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

The agreement prescribed a gradual integration, which referred to preparatory and transitional stages, a customs union and full membership. At this stage, the EEC was clear that progression was completely bound to the realization of some concrete objectives by the Turks, but Turkey viewed the agreement as a promise of full membership (Erdoğan, 2002, p: 3).

In 1970, Turkey completed the first stage of the integration process and signed the additional protocol to the Association Agreement.

The Additional Protocol of 13 November 1970 set out in a detailed fashion how the Customs Union would be established. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years, and called for the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation of natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 to 22 years (Ministry of EU affairs, 2007).
Turkey and ‘Europe’ seemed to be strengthening economic and political relations between them after the association agreement yet Turkey’s internal turmoil got in the way. 1970’s were an era of social unrest, political unbalance and economic fluctuation for Turkey (See: Chapter 3).

Country’s internal problems blocked the integration process. Also, Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974\(^4\) and the consequent formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus damaged relations between Europe and Turkey beyond repair (Barkey and Gordon, 2001).

In 1978, Turkey was forced to demand a five-year freeze in its commitments under the association agreement (Erdoğan, 2002, p: 3). And following that, the military coup of 1980 blocked the negotiations between the new political formation in Europe and Turkey completely (Dismorr, 2008, p: 39).

Still, the new military government was eager to keep relations with European states on track, mainly because they felt that they need their western neighbours approval in order to be accepted in the international arena as a legitimate government (Oran 2001, p: 83). But European countries froze the integration process as a result of the efforts of France, Denmark and Holland. In this period Turkey’s sole supporters in European continent were Germany and Britain who argued the military intervention was necessary and essential for the future democratic progress of the country (ibid).

\(^4\) The situation in Cyprus is still a big obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership bid. First of all Turkey is refusing to recognise Cyprus, a member of EU, as a reaction to the international isolation Republic of Northern Cyprus is facing. As a result Cyprus, which does not recognise the republic of Northern Cyprus alongside with the majority of the world, is blocking Turkey’s membership negotiations.
In this period Turkey lost nearly all the earnings of the Association agreement including Turkish citizens’ right to travel to most European countries without a visa.\(^95\)

Many countries in Europe started to complain about the number of political asylum requests coming from Turkey and human rights violations by the state started to raise flags in the international arena (Özkan, 2007, p: 412).

Turkey’s journey towards West faced another important obstacle in 1981, when Greece finally became a member of the EEC. Many Turks felt that they lost a race against their primary regional rival and the public started to believe that Turkey will never be able to join a union that includes Greece.

But after the 1983 elections, under Prime minister Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), Turkey returned to democracy and started to reform the state to reach Europe’s expectations. They were hoping that in spite of the Greek opposition, they still hold a change to fulfill the dream of officially becoming European (Oran, 2001 p: 93).

In October 1985, European Parliament, which observed Turkey’s stability and readiness to make internal reforms, finally agreed to continue relations on the grounds that Turkey will meet several conditions regarding human rights (Faucompret and Konings, 2008, p: 30).

\(^95\)France, Germany, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg started to require Turkish citizens to apply for a visa to visit, Ankara contested this decision claiming that it is against the Association Agreement, but Turkish objections were ignored. Britain started to require Visa’s from Turkish citizens, 9 years later on 22 June 1989.
Two years later, in 1987, Turkey applied for full membership. This application was mostly just a statement showing Europe the country is still willing to become European, and even Turkish officials weren’t too optimistic about the answer.

In general Turkish application was not received well in Europe. The Turkish request was described, rather diplomatically, as “bold” and perceived as a tactical move to overcome the deadlock in EEC-Turkey relations. Especially Greece and Luxemburg said they would oppose Turkey’s candidature completely. Germany, which already had a considerable number of Turks living inside its territory, said they would only support the formation of a customs union with Turkey. Only support for Turkey came from Britain and Belgium. Britain, as expected, declared that Turkey’s application should be considered as any other candidate (Tekeli-İlkin, 2000, p: 91). But, after considering it for nearly two years EEC finally decided to temporarily suspend Turkey's application (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 31).

European Commission said the suspension was due to their decision to not to expand until 1993 but they also stated that for negotiations to begin Turkey should do major improvements in its political and economic circumstances (Oran, 2001, p: 100).

It is important to state that the European Commission did not mention any concern on cultural differences at this point (Erdoğan 2002, p: 4).

During this period, fall of the Berlin wall also was a hidden reason behind Europe’s decision to deny Turkey the membership (Oran, 2001, p:101). Concentrating on the post-cold war world, Europeans wanted to focus their energy and resources on
integrating ex-soviet nations to their system, instead of taking on the burden of a country which does not hold a lot of strategic importance without the threat of communism (ibid).

After the official fall of the Soviet Union, Europe started to focus on European values instead of economy. Turkish government failed to see the obvious change in Europe and they kept believing that economic reforms they had been implementing since 1980 would satisfy the conditions for accession (Kahraman, 2000, p: 5).

While suspending the option of a full membership, Europe offered Turkey to join the customs union by 1995. According to Erdoğan, this was seen as a necessary price and tool to keep Turkey pro-European while denying their membership (Erdoğan 2002, p: 4).

In 1992, Members of the EEC signed the Maastricht Agreement and formed the economically, politically and legally unified European Union. Following the formation of the modern EU, the European Council decided on the Copenhagen Criteria \(^{96}\) in June 1993 (Faucompret and Konings, 2008, p: 33), which officially determined criteria’s for EU membership.

Copenhagen Criteria clearly showed Turkey that full membership was still years ahead so Turkey focused on the first and most achievable step of its path to Europe: Customs Union.
But even forming a customs union with the EU was not easy. First, the EU was demanding Turkey to change 14 clauses in its military-made constitution and Greece was constantly opposing any kind of Turkish integration (Faucompret and Konings, 2008, p: 36).

Yet, against all odds, on 31 December 1995 a customs union between Turkey and the European Union came into effect and Turkey became the only state that is in a customs union with the EU, which is not a member.

With the customs union agreement, Turkey economically became a part of Europe but the EU kept the supply of services, the movement of capital, and the movement of labour out of the deal keeping Turkish integration minimal (Erdoğan, 2002, p: 5).

For Turks, the customs union was another step towards becoming a full member of the European Union. The headline of a Turkish national daily on the following day was ‘Finally Europe!’ but on the contrary, Europe believed that this compromise would calm Turkish pressure about membership (Bryce, 2009, p: 174).

Even though the EU was being clear that the customs union does not mean immediate full membership, Turkish public was hopeful and expectant.

Yet, support for Turkey’s admittance in Europe start to decrease rapidly after the customs union. First, Turkey’s human rights violations caused the European Parliament to freeze EU assistance to Turkey in October 1996. Mainly Greece was behind this decision yet Europe’s general opinion on Turkish integration was shifting.
In 1995 a survey constructed by EUROPINION showed that only 43% of the European public was supportive of Turkey’s EU candidature. This percentage decreased even further in 1997 to 32% (Eurobarometer, 1995, 1997).

The lack of support for Turkey’s candidature became official in European Council’s Luxembourg summit in 1997. Council declared that the membership negotiations were going to start with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. European Council also declared that another group of countries would be able to start negotiations as soon as they fulfil their commitments to the European Union. (Hülsse, 1999, p: 15).

In Luxembourg, European Council singled out Turkey from all other eligible candidates and offered a special path and special set of requirements to be followed to be able to become a full member in the future (Erdoğdu, 2002, p: 8). In response, Turkey, finding this approach discriminatory and even offensive, decided to freeze all political dialogue with the European Union.

Turkey’s plan at this point was to prove a point to Europe and act with dignity without losing any privileges gained from the EU membership negotiations in the past, especially the customs union. So Turks started to wait for the EU’s next move (Oran, 2001, p: 348).

On 4 March 1998, European Commission published its communications on ‘The European strategy for Turkey’ and as a peace offering advised Council of European Union to start long promised financial aid to Turkey. The Commission said:
The Commission wishes to draw attention to the urgent need for the Council to adopt the financial regulation for the special financial cooperation arrangements for Turkey as fast as possible, as this will enable a comprehensive and consistent strategy for Turkey to be implemented (European Commission, 1998, p: 10).

In the next European Summit in Helsinki, the Union presented another olive branch and declared Turkey an official candidate for EU membership (Oran, 2001, p: 351). While Austria and Germany initially wanted to leave the possibility that negotiations with Turkey would lead to a privileged partnership (something significantly less than full membership) on the table, accession negotiations were ultimately launched with the objective of full membership (ibid).

Turkey’s recognition as an official candidate opened a new chapter in relations between EU and Turkey. But most importantly, it started a period of change within Turkey.

4:2:1 Turkish EU relations in the AKP era

After being accepted as an official candidate, Turkey started to make the necessary changes to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Turkish government amended thirty-four articles of the Turkish Constitution (Tanlak, 2002, p: 3) and signed almost all European and international human rights agreements (Arikan, 2008, p: 232).

The reforms grant Kurds the right to broadcast and teach the Kurdish language. Another major change allows television and radio broadcasts in Kurdish on the condition they follow constitutional principles and do not incite violence. The rights reforms include ending punishments for criticism of the armed forces and other pillars of the Turkish establishment and outlawing organ and people smuggling. The package also lifts certain restrictions on people’s right to associate and form
civic organizations, and imposes stricter penalties for human trafficking. It allows non-Muslim minority communities such as Greeks, Armenians and Jews greater rights over religious property such as churches. The reforms also tighten regulations governing the police, who are frequently accused of human rights abuse and also introduced tough penalties for people and organ smugglers (Tanlak, 2002, p: 3).

Yet, all these changes Turkey made to become “more European”, were not enough.

During the Laeken Summit in 2001, members of the European Union crafted a road map for the European Union’s candidate countries. They separated candidates in to two groups: Candidates who will become official members by 2002 and candidates who will start negotiations by 2002 (European Commission, 2002).

Turkey, once again, was not in either group. EU talked about the prospect of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey but the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’ were again left unanswered (Erdoğan, 2002, p: 9).

And this time it was becoming obvious that, the lack of support for Turkey’s candidature in Europe had more complicated reasons than simply fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria.

Many members of the European Union believed that Turkey was capable of becoming ‘European’ economically and even politically (in a distant future), but they were not convinced about the Turkey’s capacity to become European ‘culturally’.

For example, just one month before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, former French President Giscard d’Estaing made his famous comment on Turkey’s EU
bid. In his statement to the French daily Le Monde, he said: “Turkey is not a European country and its membership would be the end of Europe” (Guardian, 09/11/2002).

Turks slowly started to believe that the promise of the full European membership is nothing more than an unreachable target, used by European countries to force Turks to cooperate with them.

In 2001, the Economist finally said out loud what had been on everybody’s minds for quite some time: In reality, Turkey does not have a chance to become a part of the European Union because as a Muslim country, it is not European (Economist, 17/05/2001).

The magazine said, “The EU is meant to be a liberal organization, based on rational, non-discriminatory principles. It cannot say [to Turkey]: “We won’t let you in because you are mainly Muslims” (ibid).

In 2002’s Copenhagen Summit, attitude of many European countries towards Turkey was rather cold. European Council announced that 8 new countries joined the EU and Cyprus and Malta will become members in two years time. They also announced Bulgaria and Romania will be joining the Union in 2007. Regarding Turkey, Council only said that it would reveal its decision in 2004 (Roy, 2005: 23).

In 2004, European Council accepted that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, so Turkey finally started the membership negotiation process on 3 October 200597.

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97 The start of negotiations is usually referred to as “the October 3rd process”.
Even though it looked like a rather huge improvement in Turkey’s EU bid, considering any other country that managed to proceed to the negotiation process successfully became a member; it did not offer Turkey any concrete plan.

EU was once again clear that the negotiation process was open ended and they were not promising Turkey official membership. Also the accession process gave veto rights to each Member State. It also commanded that in order to open or close any chapter in negotiations, all EU members must agree unanimously on the case (Paksoy, 2012, p: 26).

In the presence of members like Greece and Cyprus, unanimity clause regarding the negotiations made it nearly impossible for Turkey to make any considerable progress.

In 2006, the Cyprus problem got in the way of successful negotiations. As a result of the Customs Union, Europe was expecting Turkey to open its ports to Republic of Cyprus. But Turkey, reluctant to start normal relations with Cyprus before ending the international isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, refused to open its ports. This soared Turkish European relations, to the point that eight of 35 chapters of membership negotiations were frozen at the end of 2006 (Turkish Ministry of EU, 2007).

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98 Northern Cyprus, officially the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a self-declared state. Recognised only by Turkey, Northern Cyprus is considered by the international community as occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus. (Emerson, 2004). All other countries recognize the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state, as the only legitimate government for the whole island. However the Republic of Cyprus de facto only controls the south of the island while the Northern government, controls the north. (Case Cyprus Vs Turkey European Court of Human Rights)
Turkish-European relations entered a silent period after 2006. New governments in many European countries started to argue against the Turkish accession on a more fundamental basis. Especially German chancellor Angela Merkel, who was elected in 2005, openly stated that she is not willing to negotiate full membership with Turkey, given that the EU is based on European political and cultural values that Turkey does not share (Kylstad, 2010 p:18).

France and Austria were equally against the Turkish accession in this period and they both declared that they would hold a referendum to decide on Turkey’s membership if the Union decides to conclude negotiations. Looking at the poll results coming from these countries, it was obvious that the referendum results would never be in favour of Turkey.

The two major actors of the EU (France and Germany) clearly taking side against the Turkish accession, the priorities of the union as a whole also changed rapidly in this era.

While Europe was discussing the European Constitution, the enlargement in the Western Balkans, the global financial crisis, the Eurozone, huge economic problems of Greece, and the Arab Spring, the Turkish issue became remarkably unpopular on the EU’s political and media agenda (Paksoy, 2012, p: 29).

But, in the second half of 2000’s Turkey’s approach to the European Union was also changed. The AKP government started to work on its relations with the Middle Eastern

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99In June 2008, France changed its constitution to make it possible for a country to join the EU without getting the approval of the French public with a referendum. President Sarkozy clearly stated that the change was to help ‘country’s other then Turkey to easily join the Union.’ (see: Euroactive, “France scraps referendum on Turkey's EU bid, URL: http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/france-scrapsturkeys-news-220068, accessed: 08/08/2015)
countries, and being a party with Islamist roots, they emphasized Turkey’s Muslim identity instead of its European one.

Turkey was improving its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and dealing with its domestic problems such as the problematic election of the President in 2007, the cooled relations with Israel, the military operations towards the PKK, the clashes between the Army forces and the Government, the Ergenekon case, and the Arab Spring. All these reasons made Turkey-EU relations a less popular subject in the EU (ibid).

But in 2013, Turkish-European relations started to move forward once again. First, two countries in Europe that oppose the Turkish membership the most, France and Germany, declared that they are once again willing to continue with the negotiations.

During her visit to Turkey in February 2013, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said they are looking forward to open new chapters of negotiation with Turkey (\textit{DW}, 24/02/2013) while German Foreign Affairs Committee head Ruprecht Polenz has called for opening new chapters despite the country's blockade of Cyprus, in order to "allow both sides to have a systematic discussion" (\textit{DW}, 23/02/2013).

But despite all the efforts of European leaders to assure Turkey that their candidature for EU is still valid, Turkey started to show its frustration with seemingly never-ending negotiations. Prime minister Erdoğan, who always insisted that he is pro-European, suddenly declared that they are considering joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation instead of EU\textsuperscript{100}. In a TV interview Prime Minister said:

\textsuperscript{100} The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or SCO (is an intergovernmental mutual-security organisation, which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the members renamed the organisation.
The EU wants to forget about us, but hesitates, and cannot really forget. But if it said what it truly feels, we would be only relieved. Instead of wasting our time, it should be open and explain, so that we can go about our business. You sit and talk with them, but they can't really speak convincingly. When things go so poorly, you inevitably, as the Prime Minister of 75 million people, seek other paths. That's why I recently said to Mr. [Vladimir] Putin: 'Take us into the Shanghai Five; do it, and we will say farewell to the EU, leave it altogether. Why all this stalling? (Today’s Zaman, 27/01/2013).

Turkish Prime Minister’s comments on Europe were mirroring Turkish public’s views about the EU candidature. A poll conducted by Turkey-Europe Education and Scientific Studies Foundation in 2012 showed that only 17% of the Turkish population believed in the possibility of full EU membership. This percentage was 78% in 2004 (TAVAK, 2012).

But, during his visit to London in February 2013, Turkey’s EU Minister Egemen Bağış denied that the Turkish government is shifting its foreign policy towards East and giving up on the European dream. Bağış said:

Turkish Prime Minister is not bluffing when he says he is willing to form an alliance with the East. Yet, this does not mean we are changing our foreign policy or giving up our dream to join European Union. Turkish foreign policy is not one sided. We are talking about a government who formed a special ministry just for EU relations (Bagis, 2012).

Bağış stated that in the 21st century, neither Europe nor Turkey has the luxury to give up on each other. Minister said:

Turkey is the only predominantly Muslim country in the world that has a functioning secular democracy. In today's world
Europe needs us. And for us, Europe is like our dietician. Everybody knows that they need to exercise and eat healthy. But they never do it on their own. Once they hire a dietician to tell them what to do, they start to do it. This is a lot like our relationship with Europe. Their membership criteria’s makes us improve faster (ibid).

In 2013, Gezi Park protests caused another confrontation between the EU and Turkey. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele, while insisting that ‘They are not giving up on Turkey’s membership bid’ criticized Turkish government’s harsh reaction to the protests and insisted that Turkey had to maintain values of freedom and fundamental rights in order to become an official member of the European community (BBC, 08/06/2013).

Prime Minister Erdoğan reacted to these comments and warnings by accusing the EU of ‘double standards’ and said “Similar protests have taken place in Britain, France, Germany and bigger ones in Greece”. During this time Turkish leader also criticized the EU’s attitude towards Turkish accession and said Turkey is facing “Unjust obstructions” (ibid).

During the protests the strongest critic of the Turkish government was Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel. The chancellor criticized the crackdown by security forces as "much too strong". German leader, who had long been sceptical of Turkey’s EU ambitions, also blocked a decision to move forward the negotiations during this time (Huffington Post, 21/06/2013)\(^{101}\).

\(^{101}\) This led to harsh comments being exchanged between Turkish and German state officials and ambassadors from both sides to be called to Turkish and German parliaments.
But after the end of the protests, (and German general elections in September 2013), talks between Turkey and the EU on regional policy was launched once again.

The debate moved on to Chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and security), which are considered more political. Belgium, Italy, and Sweden argued that the chapters should be opened and Germany was a cautious supporter. Cyprus, on the other hand, blocked the decision by linking it to a deal on the town of Famagusta. On the question of visa liberalisation, another crucial issue, relations suffered a setback after the European Court of Justice ruled that the Association Agreement did not entitle Turkish citizens to visa-free access to the EU. Effectively, the judgment brought the two parties back to the political track. In December, Turkey signed a long-delayed readmission agreement with the EU in exchange for a visa liberalisation roadmap. It reserved its right to cancel the deal should the EU decline to lift visas after technical conditions were met (European Policy Score Card, 2014).

According to many Turkish experts the re-launch of the EU membership negotiations was in fact a direct result of the Gezi protests. Gursel said “The Gezi Park agenda is simply the EU agenda; liberties, rights, civil society, having a say in the future of the country. It was a European type of protest, and this encouraged the EU to keep the accession process alive (VoA news, 24/10/ 2013)."

Prime Minister Erdoğan even declared 2014 to be the ‘Year of the European Union’. During that year, he visited Brussels and met with the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament and adopted a ‘European Union Strategy’ intended to re-invigorate its accession process (EU Enlargement Strategy Paper, 2014). But the reactivation of the negotiations does not mean Turkey’s EU membership is a likely possibility in the near future.
Some experts believe that Turkish government’s current interest in the EU accession is mostly caused by the collapse of its foreign policy in the Middle East.

Aktar says “The government’s foreign policy has no correspondent anymore in the world and I think at the end of the day what remains in terms of foreign policy bonds is the EU relationship and the NATO relationship, full stop (VoA, 24/10/2013)”

Turkey’s journey to become officially European is still on-going after 54 years. Since Turkey’s initial membership application to the EEC, a lot has changed in Turkey and also in Europe. A partnership that started simply as an economic collaboration evolved in to a political, cultural and financial Union, which is sceptical about Turkey’s European identity. Today, in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis and the Ukrainian crisis nearly nobody in Europe sees full membership of Turkey as a realistic possibility in the near future.

Out of 35 membership chapters Ankara has to complete to join the EU, after eight years, just 14 have been opened and only one has been completed (ibid).

In Turkey, elite is still eager to become European, at least on paper, yet the public is not as enthusiastic as it once was. Also, none of the prominent Turkish political parties, including the governing AKP, seems to be viewing the EU membership negotiations as a priority at the moment, mainly as a result of shifting public interest.
The AKP government is constantly underlining the fact that Turkey is willing but not desperate to join the EU and trying to create a foreign policy that is not entirely reliant on West.

Yet, it is possible to say that European Union still has an important role in shaping the Turkish political agenda and the Turkish image in the West. Also, the arguments that are being put forward by European nations to stop the Turkish accession to the EU say a lot about Europe’s view of the Turkish identity.

The next section will be looking into the major issues and arguments that are affecting Turkey’s membership process. These issues are also influential in shaping British media’s views on Turkey’s “Europeanness”.

4:3 Prominent Issues about Turkey’s EU membership bid

In this section the issues and arguments that are affecting Turkey’s EU membership negotiations will be presented in three categories.

There are three distinct understandings of the EU and its future evolution: Utility based, rights based and value based (Sjursen, 2007, p: 2-11). And each one of these viewpoints provides a distinct set of arguments for and against Turkish membership.

People (or nations) who view the European Union as a ‘value based’ formation claim that the Union is based on a common set of ‘European’ values such as culture, history,
geography and religion. They believe any country that does not belong to the ‘European Self’ should not be allowed in to the European Union.

On the other hand, people (or nations) who have a utility-based view of the European Union, “conceive the union pragmatically, as a problem-solving entity to which they lend their support depending on a cost-benefit analysis: the more they benefit or expect to benefit from EU policies in economic, political or security terms, the more they support it and vice versa (Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2007 p:2)”. In other words, they make their decisions about the EU expansion regarding their personal (or national) interests.

And finally, people (or nations) who view the European Union as a ‘rights based’ formation believe that the EU is founded on a set of universal principles and values such as democracy, rule of law, equality and human rights. They believe the Union should be welcoming to any country that meets these standards (Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2007 p: 3).

The following sections will layout the prominent issues and arguments regarding Turkey’s EU accession according to each viewpoint presented above.

4:3:1 Value based issues

As explained previously in the first chapter, the ‘European identity’ or the concept of Europeanness started to materialize when “European” nations formed their “civilized and superior” collective identity against the ‘Barbaric’ Oriental Other; centuries prior
to the formation of a politically or economically united Europe under the EU banner (Kosebalaban, 2007; Said, 2003).

This collective identity was based on the qualities that made ‘European’ nations different to their Oriental Other such as “A shared culture, history, values and most importantly a shared religion (Ibid)”.

Today most members of the European Union, especially countries like Germany and France, believe that the European Union is also based on this collective identity.

And hence, they argue that Turkey, as a Muslim country that has most of its territory in Asia Minor, does not belong in to this formation.

The European Foundation of Freedom, a centre-right pan-European political party, explains these arguments by saying:

Only 3% of Turkey’s landmass is calculated to be in Europe. The other 97% is geographically, historically and culturally outside the European continent. The identity of Europe, which has evolved over thousands of years, is based on the heritage of antiquity, Christian and Jewish traditions, humanism and the Enlightenment. On the other hand, Turkey has historically been dominated by the old Turkish nomadic culture of Central Asia, the Ottoman Empire and Islam. Turkey’s EU membership would change the character of Europe and thus destroy the ideological basis for political dialogue. The Islamic collectivism is incompatible with the liberal societies of European countries that provide the individual with his freedom (EFF, 2013).

People and entities supporting Turkey’s accession to the union, especially Britain, oppose these arguments on many levels. British governments (conservative and Labour alike) do not agree that the EU should be based on ‘Europeanness’. They adopt a view
of the EU based on rights and utility and argue any country that meets certain standards regarding democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights should be allowed to accede as long as this accession is also “useful and beneficial” for Britain (See: Chapter 2).

Also Britain does not sign up to the idea of a close knit ‘federal Europe’ that comes hand in hand with a value-based, essentialist understanding of the union. So they support the Turkish accession on the basis that it will end the dream of a federal Europe.

On the other hand, Turkish governments confront value-based arguments against Turkey’s EU membership by saying that Turkey is ‘fundamentally European’. Turkish foreign ministry explains this by saying:

Europe is our common home that we have united around common norms, principles and values. As a part and parcel of the European family, Turkey not only had an influence on the political, economic and socio-cultural developments in the Continent but has also been influenced by them. An overall evaluation of the history of Europe cannot be made without analysing the role that Turkey played in the Continent. As in the past, the destinies of Turkey and other European countries are intertwined. We face the future together (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).
4:3:2 Utility based issues

As oppose to the value based understanding of the EU, some nations (including, Britain) see the union as a “Utility”. And their concerns regarding Turkish accession are different. It needs to be noted that these concerns/ issues are not in anyway related to Turkey’s perceived ‘Europeanness’102.

4:3:2:1 Immigration

Opinion polls show that many (western) Europeans fear their countries’ may be overwhelmed by a wave of immigrants should Turkey join the EU, even though the bloc could maintain indefinite restrictions on labour migration (Ruiz Jimenez and Jose Torreblanca, 2007; Reuters, 2006). But, the other side of this argument is that Turkey has a young population, which can provide a necessary work force for aging European nations.

4:3:2:2 Size/ Power

According to latest figures, Turkey’s population is 81 million and this number is rising rapidly (CIA Factbook/Turkey). With such a large population, Turkey’s accession to the European Union would have major consequences on the decision making process in Brussels. It would have at least as many votes in the EU council and seats in the European Parliament as Germany, the largest member, and more than any other (Reuters, 2006). This can shift the power balance in the union significantly and many member states are leery of this prospect.

102 Since similar arguments have been used against candidate countries that are accepted as being European without much discussion.
**4:3:2:3 Economy**

Today, Turkey has the world’s 17th largest GDP and it is the fastest growing economy in the European Union. Also, it has been in a customs union with the EU since 1995. Many argue that accession of an important trade partner in to the EU would vitalize economic relations further and benefit the EU and Turkey equally. But there are also worries about the costs of the Turkish accession for the European Union.

Britain has long been claiming that Turkey’s EU accession would only aid the union’s economy. Prime Minister David Cameron once explained this by saying:

I ask myself this: which European country grew at 11% at the start of this year? Which European country will be the second fastest growing economy in the world by 2017? Which country in Europe has more young people than any of the 27 countries of the European Union? Which country in Europe is our number one manufacturer of televisions and second only to China in the world in construction and in contracting? Tabii ki Turkiye [Tr: Of course Turkey] (Cameron, 2010).

**4:3:2:4 Security**

Many argue that Turkey is the only country that has the capability to act as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and the Muslim world and create an environment of stability, security and mutual understanding. Hence they believe that Turkish accession would provide the union with a member that can initiate dialog and act as a mediator in issues like Israeli-Palestinian conflict (The Week, 18/06/2015).

Also, Turkey has a large, strong army, which fought alongside European troops in Korea and Afghanistan, and it is a NATO member since 1952. People who support
Turkish accession for utilitarian reasons argue that the country should be rewarded for its military commitment to Europe. British politicians have been using this argument on a regular basis in support of the Turkish membership bid.

In 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron summarized security related utilitarian arguments for supporting Turkish accession in a speech delivered in Ankara. He said:

> Turkey is a great NATO ally and Turkey shares our determination to fight terrorism in all its forms, whether from al-Qaeda or from the PKK [...] You [Turkish people] are not just a great ally; the fact is that Turkey’s unique position at the meeting point of East and West gives you an unrivalled influence in helping us to get to grips with some of the greatest threats to our collective security [...] When I think about what Turkey has done to defend Europe as a NATO ally and what Turkey is doing today in Afghanistan alongside our European allies, it makes me angry that your progress towards EU membership can be frustrated in the way that it has been. My view is clear: I believe it is just wrong to say that Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit in the tent (Cameron, 2010)

4:3:3 Rights based issues

The last set of issues that are being discussed regarding Turkey’s EU accession is ‘rights-based’. These issues are coming up in relation to the view of the EU as a formation that is based on universal principles such as human rights, equality, rule of law and democracy.

Some people, who are against Turkey’s accession, view Turkey’s shortcomings regarding these issues as a proof that it is not a part of the civilized (Western) world and hence the European Union. Yet, supporters of the accession including Britain
emphasise that Turkey came a long way regarding human rights, democratisation and equality in the last couple of decades and it has the potential to reach EU standards in the near future.

The rights-based issues are also prominent in British media’s coverage of Turkey and these issues play an important role in shaping their perception of Turkey’s Europeannesss.

As explained in the second chapter, Turkish democracy had been chaperoned by the Turkish military for nearly a century, mostly against the threat of Islamisation. But, after numerous coups and soft interventions, (and controversial court cases like Ergenekon) today Turkish military is no longer an active actor in the Turkish political life.

While European circles applauded the end of military control in Turkey, this also led to a dilemma regarding Turkey’s European identity and its place in the European community. Even though Turkish military was being seen as an obstacle in front of Turkey’s democratisation process, it was also the self-assigned guardian of the western values (especially secularity) implemented by the Kemalist establishment (which were the core of Turkey’s westernisation process and claim to Europeanness). Once the army was out of the way, Islam became a more visible part of the Turkish identity (Kylstad, 2010).

The European Union embraced this development and even supported Turkey’s transformation, saying the new Turkey would be a democratic model for the Muslim
World. But this transformation also caused Turkey to start losing the basis of its claim to Europeanness.

As Kylstad explained, the more politically ‘European’ Turkey became, through the democratisation efforts supported by the EU, the more visible religion become in the country (Casanova, 2006, Kylstad, 2010). In other words, when Turkey came one-step closer to fulfil the “rights-based” criteria for its EU accession, it drifted further away from the value-based criteria.

Yet, the disappearance of the military from the Turkish political scene also did not result in a pluralist, liberal and fully functioning democracy.

Since 2002, the AKP has steadily increased its electoral support and become the dominant party in Turkish politics. While multiple political and legal reforms were adopted under its rule, and accession negotiations with the European Union commenced in 2005, the systemic deficiencies in Turkish politics have nonetheless slowly crept up. Since 2013, the political developments in Turkey point to a nexus between democratic consolidation and Turkey’s systemic deficiencies [...] Turkish democratic consolidation process is impacted by the systemic tendencies of “dominant party” politics, a democratic disconnect within Turkish society, a weak system of checks and balances, and, most importantly, an inherent intolerance for diversity and plurality. It is in light of these systemic deficiencies that the process of Turkish democratic consolidation has unexpectedly turned into majoritarian authoritarianism (Muftuler Bac and Keyman, 2015).

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103 “On September 30, the government announced what it called a “democratization package” of reforms that demonstrated that the government is more focused on addressing the undemocratic legacy it inherited than abuses that have proliferated under its watch. Positive steps included ending the headscarf ban for women in the civil service; signaling that the 10 percent election threshold that has kept minority parties out of parliament will be lowered; and easing the restriction on mother-tongue education by permitting it in private schools. Cross-party efforts to reach a consensus on a new constitution stalled over contested elements such as the definition of citizenship and minority rights provisions (HRW, 2014)”.
Today, AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian attitudes are a cause for concern for Turkish seculars as well as Europeans. While there was a consensus in the West on Turkey’s democratic progress in 2000’s, now Turkish democracy’s strength, alongside with the country’s claim to Europeanness is being questioned once again.

One of the biggest obstacles in front of Turkey’s EU membership (and its goal to becoming a fully functioning liberal democracy) is its problematic human rights record.

Respect for human rights is one of the main pillars of European Union’s expansion policy and it is largely being implemented through the Copenhagen criteria.\(^{104}\)

In early 2000’s Turkey made several reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In 2001 - 2002 Turkish parliament passed a series of EU harmonization packages affecting freedoms of expression, organization and assembly, the use of minority languages, abolition of the death penalty, the role of the military in politics, freedom of press, the activities of associations, the closure of political parties and the prevention of torture (Hale, 2003 p: 109). As a result of these reforms, in 2004, European Union accepted that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria and started membership negotiations with the country in the following year. Yet today, even though reformation efforts are on going, human rights violations are still a common occurrence in Turkey (HRW,

\(^{104}\)At its meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, the European Council laid down the economic and political criteria to be fulfilled by the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe seeking to become Members of the European Union. Among the binding political criteria it laid down the achievement of institutional stability as a guarantee of democratic order and the rule of law and for ensuring respect for human rights, as well as respect for and the protection of minorities (EU Parliament, 1998) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/20a2_en.htm
and hence EU is still not content with the situation of human rights in the country. As stated in the European Commission’s yearly progress reports on Turkey, the country still needs to implement a series of reforms to make sure its approach to human rights is up to EU standards.

Turkish legislation concerning the right to assembly focusing more on the legality rather than on the peaceful character of the demonstration, and its implementation by law enforcement officers, have to be brought in line with European standards. Legislation on the establishment of a law enforcement monitoring commission as an independent oversight body for police offences needs to be adopted. The unclear definition in criminal legislation of membership of an armed organisation continues to be the source of a large number of arrests and prosecutions. An ECHR compatible legal framework has to be established on matters of faith and conscientious objection. Substantial efforts are needed to effectively guarantee the rights of women, children, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals. Domestic violence, occasional ‘honour’ killings and the issue of early and forced marriages remain a serious concern. Turkey needs to ensure full respect for all property rights, including those of non-Muslim religious communities (European Commission Turkey Progress Report, 2014).

The Gezi Park protests in 2013 underlined the gravity of human rights deficiencies in Turkey. As the Human Rights Watch stated in its 2014 Turkey report, the government’s response to the Gezi Park protests demonstrated its intolerance of the right to peaceful assembly and free expression. The authorities charged hundreds of individuals involved in the protests with a variety of crimes including terror related

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For example, Turkish penal code that was passed as a part of the EU harmonization package in 2005 caused controversy because of its oppressive attitude towards the media and the freedom of expression in general. Especially article 301 of the aforementioned penal code made insulting “Turkishness” a crime punishable by a 3-year prison sentence. While this clause was amended several times up to now, a series of high profile cases filed by ultra nationalists using this law carried the situation of freedom of expression in Turkey to international headlines. As of 2014, EU is still pressuring Turkey to further amend this article. Implementation of two ECHR judgments on Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code, which, after a series of amendments, now criminalises insulting the Turkish nation instead of a more general “Turkishness”, is still pending (European Commission, Turkey Progress report 2013 and 2014).
offences. During the protests police dispersed protesters using water cannons, rubber bullets, and teargas. They resorted to excessive use of force and beatings of detainees. Police also unlawfully shot teargas canisters directly at protesters, leading to scores of protesters receiving serious head injuries as a direct result (Human Rights Watch, 2014)\textsuperscript{106}.

These protests also showed the deficiencies of media freedom in the country. Turkish media’s coverage of the protests was muted or biased at best, mostly as a result of governmental pressures and self-censorship. Also hundreds of journalists who showed support for the demonstrators lost their jobs (ibid)\textsuperscript{107}.

But, the human rights abuses in Turkey are not in anyway limited to Gezi Park protesters. Minorities living in Turkey\textsuperscript{108}, especially Kurds who constitute the largest ethnic minority in the country are facing graver violations of their basic human rights on a daily basis.

For decades, Kurds were not allowed to speak their mother tongue in their homeland, they were prosecuted for attempting to give their children Kurdish names, their

\textsuperscript{106}“The Turkish Medical Association reported that 11 people lost an eye in this way. Fourteen-year-old Berkin Elvan was hit by a teargas canister in June and remained in a critical condition in a coma at time of writing. Six demonstrators and one police officer died in the course of demonstrations between May and September. Ali Ismail Korkmaz, a protester in Eskişehir, died of his head injuries in July after being beaten during a June 2 demonstration. The trial of four police and four civilians for his murder was scheduled to begin in February 2014. A police officer stood trial in September for the fatal shooting of Ethem Sarılıık, a protester in Ankara (Human Rights Watch, 2014)”.


\textsuperscript{108}For example, Alevi community’s places of worship (Cemevleri) are still not officially considered as places of worship and as a result they do not receive government funding like sinagogs, churches or mosques. Roma community in Turkey is also facing habitual discrimination (European Commission, 2014).
political parties were banned and journalists (Kurdish or not) who attempted to cover Kurdish issues in a way that contradict Turkish state’s interests were prosecuted and sometimes jailed.\footnote{For more info on jailed Kurdish journalists: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/10/turkey-journalists-trial-terrorism-kurd}

Today, Kurdish issue is one of the most significant ‘rights-based’ problems facing Turkey on its journey to EU membership. The next section will look into the evolution of the Kurdish problem and European Union’s approach to this situation in detail.

4:3:3:1 Kurdish issue

Today, Kurdish issue is the fundamental source for human rights violations in Turkey and it also serves as a major irritant in the country’s relations with the European Union (Barkey and Fuller, 1998).

According to CIA’s latest estimates, there are more than 14 million Kurds living in Turkey, constituting approximately 18% of the total population (CIA, 2015).

Kurds, a people originally from the Middle Eastern region known as Kurdistan, have been an integral part of the Ottoman society for centuries, but after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the formation of a brand new national identity that was based on ethnicity and territory (See: Chapter 3), the Turkish state started a...
program of assimilation for the Kurds. For most of the 20th century Turkish
governments denied the existence of Kurds as a separate ethnic group and as a result
refused to give them any minority rights. As Zeydanlioglu explains:

Following the establishment of the Republic, the Kurdish language, identity and the geographical area of Kurdistan were gradually denied and the official argument developed that there were no Kurds in Turkey, only those who had forgotten their "Turkishness". The denial of the existence of Kurds and simultaneously clamping down on the Kurdish language and culture shaped the core of the Turkish state's Kurdish policy, which continued unabated throughout the 20th century (Zeydanlioglu, 2012 p:101).

Aiming to create a unified and homogenous nation, the leaders of the Turkish Republic gradually banned the use of the Kurdish language in education as well as public life. The Kurdish political activity was either harassed or outright banned. The state also Turkified Kurdish city, town and village names (ibid).

During this time, as Grigoriadis points out, “highest ranks of Turkish politics, bureaucracy and military were open to Turkish citizens of Kurdish decent, but only under the condition that they jettisoned their Kurdish identity (Grigoriadis, 2009 p:133)”. In other words, the problem was not that Turkey refused to accept Kurds as Turkish citizens. The problem was its attempt to force Kurds to see themselves as Turks (Kymlicka, 1999, p: 134).

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112 The treaty of Sevres, signed between the allied forces and the Ottoman Empire was promising Kurd’s an autonomous states. This treaty was rejected by the new Turkish leadership and after the Independence war was replaced with the treaty of Lausanne.
113 Lausanne Peace treaty only gave “minority rights” to religious minorities (Christians and jews) and denied this opportunity to any ethnic minority that is Muslim, like Kurds. This caused Kurds not to have the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue like Armenians etc (Gunes and Zeydanlioglu, 2014 p: 211).
This program of assimilation, or in other words the program of ‘Turkification’, caused a lot of resentment and resulted in many Kurdish uprisings throughout the first three quarters of the 20th century (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997 p:100). In 1970’s, Abdullah Ocalan114 formed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and this organization initiated an armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984.

After nearly a decade of intense conflict, the PKK declared unilateral ceasefire in 1993. Turkish president Turgut Ozal (who is half Kurdish himself) was planning to accept a pro-Kurdish reform package during this period, yet he died in office before his plans materialized.

This led to continuation of the conflict and further stigmatization of the Kurdish people in Turkey115. As a result of the armed conflict, it became impossible for the Turkish state as well as ethnic Turks living in Turkey, to deny the existence of the Kurdish identity; but instead of solving the problem this led Turks to otherise the Kurdish minority (Grigoriadis, 2009, p: 133).

After another decade of intense clashes and thousands of deaths, in 15 February 1999 PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured in Nairobi, Kenya and consequently sentenced to life in prison. This caused another ceasefire declaration by the PKK in the following months116.

114 The leader of the Kurdish movement in Turkey is currently serving a life sentence in Imrali, an island located in the Marmara sea.
115 During this era, Turkish military destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages, which were supposedly providing logistical assistance to Kurdish rebels residing in mountainous regions as well as in Iraq. People from these villages were forced to immigrate. (Some of these immigrants moved to Western cities in Turkey while some made their way to Western Europe). Also the “village guard” system was initiated in which some farmers were paid and armed to protect the villages from the PKK and also stop villagers from collaborating with the insurgents (BBC, 04/08/2006).
116 To this day, riots and uprisings are still common on the anniversary of Ocalan’s capture.
After the ceasefire, PKK fighters retrieved to the Qandil Mountains in Iraq. They declared the end of the war, officially changed their name to KADEK (and in 2003 to KONGRA GEL) and said that they will be continuing their efforts to provide equality for the Kurdish people through peaceful methods (BBC, 11/11/2003).

While clashes between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdish fighters continued to a certain extend, this era was a turning point for the Kurdish issue. With the prospect of EU membership, Turkish governments accepted a series of reforms regarding Kurdish people’s basic human rights and for the first time attempted to solve the Kurdish problem by democratic means.

After the Helsinki summit, Turkey passed a series of reform packages, which increased the rights of ethnically Kurdish citizens of Turkey. The reforms finally granted Kurds the right to teach/ speak the Kurdish language and allowed them to have television and radio broadcasts in their mother tongue (Tanlak, 2002, p: 3) but fell short of allowing Kurdish language to be thought in state schools\textsuperscript{117}.

Yet, in June 2004, the PKK announced that they would be ending the 5-year ceasefire stating "The ceasefire's political and military meaning has been lost with the Turkish state's destructive operations over the last three months" (Hurriyet Daily News, 31/05/2004).

\textsuperscript{117} But the amendment did not change the language policy of Turkey, as defined by Article 42 and Article 3 of the Constitution. According to these provisions, the language of the state is still Turkish, and no language other than Turkish can be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens. The teaching of Kurdish as a mother tongue at any public institution is implausible in the near future without constitutional changes. The relevant Articles (Articles 3 and 42) of the Turkish Constitution still form the basis for prohibiting education in any language other than Turkish (Cengiz and Zeydanlioglu, 2014 p: 214)
After the end of the ceasefire, clashes between the Turkish security forces and the PKK fighters continued and Kurdish insurgents also attacked many civilian targets in Turkey. Consequently in 2007 and 2008 Turkish military conducted a series of military operations in Iraq, attacking the PKK bases in the country.

Yet in 2009, Turkey’s AKP government escalated their efforts of reform and reconciliation. On January 1, Turkey’s first Kurdish language state channel TRT 6 (TRT Kurdi) started its broadcast (Hurriyet, 01/01/2009) and in July, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched the Kurdish initiative. In the meantime, the PKK declared another ceasefire.

The Kurdish initiative, which was a part of the larger democratisation project named ‘Democratic initiative’, was directly linked to Turkey’s European aspirations and it included plans to rename the Kurdish villages that had been given Turkish names, restore Turkish citizenship to Kurdish refugees, strengthen local governments, and extend a partial amnesty for PKK fighters (ibid).

The EU immediately gave backing to the Kurdish initiative and said “The Commission welcomes any non-violent, democratic move that is likely to facilitate a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue”. The spokesman for the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, also demanded concrete action to make sure that the initiative will produce real changes (Today’s Zaman, 23/10/2009).
But, merely months after the start of the initiative\textsuperscript{118}, Turkish constitutional court banned the Kurdish political party DTP and this caused the PKK to end the ceasefire. As a result, Kurdish Initiative was shelved before it had any kind of concrete impact\textsuperscript{119} (Al Jazeera, 13/12/2009).

Heavy clashes between the Turkish security forces and the PKK fighters continued until the end of 2012, but simultaneously 36 Kurdish MPs from the newly found Kurdish political party BDP entered the parliament in the 2011 general elections and kept the hopes for a peaceful solution alive\textsuperscript{120}.

On 31\textsuperscript{st} of December 2012, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan revealed that Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) have been negotiating with the jailed PKK leader Ocalan to end the decades long conflict (Guardian, 31/12/2012).

This admission was the start of the ‘Peace process’ (or the solution process) between the Turkish state and the PKK and it was strongly supported by the European Union.

\textsuperscript{118} The Kurdish initiative suffered the first setback when 34 members of the PKK returned to Turkey to take advantage of the proposed amnesty. They entered the country from the Turkish-Iraqi border gate of Habur on 24 October 2009. This was a symbolic movement supported by the Turkish government that should have helped to integrate returnees into Turkish politics and to lay the first stone in the peace-building process. Yet, the 34 Kurds were welcomed by thousands of supporters of the Kurdish nationalist movement, and the Turkish media presented the refugee's return as a PKK victory. This triggered a nationalist reaction in Turkey and jeopardized the success of the process (Jerez Rios, 2012)

\textsuperscript{119} Also, while the Kurdish initiative was continuing on the surface, 20,720 proven cases of Human Rights violations were carried out in south-eastern Anatolia in 2009, 1,917 people were investigated, prosecuted or punished because of their use of language, 4,475 persons were detained, and 931 proven human rights violations were carried out in prisons against Kurdish detainees in the same year (Erbey, 2009)

\textsuperscript{120} In 2011, Turkish air force bombed a group of suspected PKK militants crossing the Turkish-Iraqi border near Uludere (Kurdish name Roboski) village. Later it was understood that 35 people immediately killed as a result of the attack were Kurdish civilians smuggling cigarettes from Iraq to Turkey (BBC, 2011). While Turkish military and government apologized for the “mistake”, Kurds and a large section of the Turkish public branded the incident a “massacre”. Tensions between the government and Kurds raised once again and PKK called for an uprising. Even though there were relevantly violent protests all over the country, further incidents were avoided when Kurdish MP’s from BDP called for calm.
The process is still on-going, even though spill over from the Syrian civil war and Turkey’s reluctance to help Kurdish cities under ISIS attack have caused tension and even rioting all around Turkey (BBC, 08/10/2014).

The conflict between the Turkish military and the PKK, which is still not completely resolved, claimed lives of more than 30 000 people including soldiers, insurgents and civilians. This situation, which was not short of a war, further polarized and divided the Turkish society (Grigoriadis, 2009 p: 133).

Kurdish problem had always been and still is a priority for the European Union. And the union is one of the most important actors in the attempts for resolution (Çelik and Rumelili, 2006 p: 209).

Until 2004, the EU tried to force Turkish state to improve the human rights situation of its Kurdish minority by emphasizing the necessity of reform regarding human rights, rule of law and minority rights in the country, without directly mentioning the problem. But for the first time in its 2004 recommendation report, the European Commission clearly discussed the situation of the Kurdish minority rather than implicitly referring to the cultural rights of the minorities (ibid, p: 211).

We can say that the EU's enabling and constructive impacts have been the strongest on Turkey's Kurdish question. Through Turkey's involvement in the European integration process, the Turkish state started treating its Kurdish question as a democratization issue if not an unpronounced minority representation issue […] The NGOs representing such stakes in the Turkish public all refer to the EU as the most important actor in bringing the conflict to this stage. […] Although it cannot be argued that the two sides came to a complete understanding and respect for each other's needs, it seems that, with the
involvement of the EU, at least the parties have started to change positions (Çelik and Rumelili, 2006 p: 211-212).

Today, mostly as a result of the EU’s membership conditionality, both Turkish state and the Kurdish nationalist movement changed their positions about the issue. The Turkish state finally accepted the existence of Kurds as a different ethnic group while Kurdish movement gave up their goal of independence.

While efforts to find a stable solution to the Kurdish problem is on-going, it is reasonable to say Turkey’s attitude towards its Kurdish minority is an area in which the country’s suitability to the European Union and belongingness in the European community in general is being judged.

As a persistent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership bid, Britain is the country that is most optimistic about the future of the Kurdish issue. In a speech delivered in 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron applauded the progress Turkey made regarding this issue. He said:

I know Turkey has already made significant reforms in just the last few years. The bans on teaching and broadcasting of Kurdish - scrapped. A new state Kurdish television station - now up and running. The death penalty - scrapped. The penal code - reformed. Democratic institutions - strengthened. These are significant changes. And they should be recognized (Cameron, 2010).
4:3:3:2 Armenian genocide

The Christian and Jewish communities in Turkey have their rights guaranteed by international law under Articles 38-44 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and, unlike Kurds, have been officially recognized as minorities. This gives them several rights including the right to education in their mother tongue. Also their worship places are officially recognized and funded by the Turkish government.

But there is one issue regarding a non-Muslim minority in Turkey that is causing serious problems for Turkey’s EU membership bid: Armenian genocide.

Turkey’s refusal to classify the massacre and forced deportations of more than a million Armenians in the latter years of the Ottoman empire as genocide has been the subject of heated debates in national parliaments, academia and international media in the second half of 20th century. This issue is also affecting Europe’s perception of Turkey’s national identity.

In 1915-16, Ottoman Turks under the command of the CUP (Young Turks) government deported Armenians en masse from eastern Anatolia to the Syrian Desert and elsewhere. According to a number of credible accounts from survivors and witnesses, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were killed, tortured or died from starvation and disease during this process\textsuperscript{121}.

\textsuperscript{121} For more details on the happenings of 1915 see: Akçam, 2012; Suny, 2011; Hovannissian, 2003; Gellately and Kiernan, 2003
The total number of Armenian death is still disputed. Armenians, along side with prominent academics and researchers from the West, say 1.5 million died. The Republic of Turkey estimates the total to be 300,000 and also claims that nearly as many ethnic Turks and Kurds had been killed in the ‘conflict’. According to the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), the death toll was more than a million (BBC, 13/04/2015).122

Today it is not disputed that Ottoman Turks and Kurds massacred a significant number of Armenians in the first two decades of the 20th century, yet there is no consensus on whether these massacres can officially be classified as genocide.

The UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) defines genocide as “Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent

122 To understand the discussions surrounding the issue as well as the importance of these claims regarding Turkey’s place in the European community, it is necessary to look at the reasons behind the happenings as well as their importance for the Turkish national identity that was formed after the First World War. For centuries Muslims living under the rule of the Ottoman Empire believed themselves to be superior to Western nations as well as Christian minorities residing in the Ottoman territory. But, in the 19th century, as the empire started to crumble, this balance shifted in favour of Western powers. Suddenly, the now “superior” West came in to the picture as the protectors of the Christian minorities in the Empire. During this time Christian minorities, who were not welcomed in the military or the bureaucracy (and were forced to go in to trade), started to flourish while Muslim populations of the Empire were suffering in wars and poverty. This change in social structure caused resentment in the Turkish society towards Christian minorities. This resentment (and sadly the events that followed) was reminiscent to the hostile feelings towards the Jewish population in Europe (Akçam, 2004). When it was obvious to the new Ottoman leaders that the dream of Ottomanism which would embrace the Empire’s Christian and Muslim subjects alike, a “program” of homogenisation was started, which lead to the forced deportations and eventual massacres of Christian minorities. It needs to be noted that these massacres were not caused by “religious hatred” per say, but rather a nationalistic desire to avenge the demise of the superiority of Muslims (or more specifically Turks and the Kurds) in the region.
births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (CPPCG, 1948, article 2)".

The dispute about whether the events can be considered as genocide or not centres on the question of premeditation - the degree to which the killings were orchestrated. Many historians, politicians, governments, international organisations and the Armenian people agree that the massacres were a premeditated attempt to end the existence of Armenian people, at least in Anatolia. Yet a small number of scholars alongside successive Turkish governments question this.

As of 2015, 25 countries officially recognise the Armenian genocide around the world; including some EU member states like Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and Poland (Armenian National Institute, 2015).

The European Parliament, the Catholic Pope and the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have also classified the events of 1915 as “genocide” in the past.

While 43 states within the USA officially declared the events of 1915 “a genocide”, none of the US presidents ever uttered the word “genocide” during their declarations about the subject, mostly as a result of their reluctance to strain relations with the Turkish republic.

Members of the European Union also do not have a unified opinion on whether these massacres should be classified as genocide or not.
On the centenary of the events, the European Parliament published a non-legislative resolution in which they urged Turkey to recognise the genocide (Uras, 2015). But Britain is still reluctant to accept that the deportations and massacres amount to genocide.

The current British line about the issue is that ‘it is for courts, not governments, to decide what constitutes genocide (FCO, 2013)\(^{123}\). Therefore the British government only recognises the events that have been found so by international courts as genocide (eg, Holocaust, Srebrenica, Rwanda) (ibid)\(^{124}\).

It is possible to argue that Britain’s motivation to not to recognize the events of 1915-16 officially as genocide is pragmatic, just like the US. As the FCO documents show, even though they accept that there is an overwhelming consensus on the interpretation of the events as genocide, they do not want to risk their strategic relationship with Turkey, which is an important economic, political and military ally (FCO, 2013).

In the past, Turkish government’s reactions to the genocide claims have been harsh. Generally, Turkish public perceive this issue not as a historical discussion but rather an attack on their national pride. Turkish mainstream media fuels this attitude by largely

\(^{123}\)In 2009, the Armenian Centre in London instructed Geoffrey Robertson QC to review all legal and factual issues surrounding the events of 1915-16 to assess whether the evidence met the definition of genocide as set out by the UN convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 (1948 Convention). He concluded that it did, and that if the same events happened today, “there can be no doubt that the Genocide convention would be engaged and would require prosecutions for that crime as well as for crimes against humanity”. Further, following disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of advice given by FCO officials to ministers on those events, he states “[FCO] advice reflects neither the law on genocide nor the demonstrable facts of the massacres in 1915-16, and has been calculated to mislead parliament into believing that there has been an assessment of evidence and an exercise of judgement on that evidence (FCO, 2013 p: 2)”

\(^{124}\)It needs to be noted that in contrast to the UK; Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales unanimously recognise the massacres as genocide.
reporting on the ‘Armenian claims’ as an attack to Turkey’s allegedly ‘clean’ formation period.

Also attempts by several states to make it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide is also fuelling public fury and anger in Turkey. For example, when the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a resolution recognising the Armenian Genocide, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested Turkey could expel up to 100,000 illegal Armenian migrants if genocide recognition efforts continued, causing outrage in Armenia, the US and the European Union. Also, Turkey occasionally called its ambassadors back from countries that attempted to recognise the genocide or make genocide denial illegal. Yet, there is also a growing community of Turkish intellectuals who consider the events of 1915 as ‘genocide’ and the AKP tried (unsuccessfully) to soften the Turkish attitude towards the issue several times\textsuperscript{125}.

The European Union has previously said Turkish acceptance of the Armenian genocide is not a condition for Turkey's entry into the bloc; but Turkey’s stance on this subject is still being seen as a major obstacle for its future in Europe.

For example in 2004, government of France, while stating that they won’t demand Turkey to recognize the genocide to start membership negotiations, stated that they

\textsuperscript{125} Two protocols were signed between Turkey and Armenia on 10 October 2009 setting out the basis for establishing diplomatic relations and developing their bilateral relationship. The signing followed, after some delay, the April 2009 announcement of a road map to normalising relations. This rapprochement was initiated by President Sargsyan of Armenia, who invited Turkish President Gül to visit Armenia in September 2008 to watch the first leg of Turkey and Armenia’s 2010 World Cup Qualifying match, the first visit by a Turkish Head of State to Armenia. President Sargsyan made the return journey in October 2008 to watch the second leg of the football match in Turkey (FCO, 2010). These attempts were not fruitful to normalise relations between to nations in the long term.
would expect Turkey to “acknowledge the mass killing of Armenians from 1915 as a ‘tragedy’ when it begins EU accession talks (BBC, 13/12/2004)”.

Hence, it can be argued that the recognition of the Armenian genocide is not an official condition for Turkey’s EU membership but it is a condition for the country to be accepted in the ‘European self’.

4:4 Conclusion

Turkey’s journey towards European Union membership started in the early 50’s and it is still on-going to this day. The goal of EU membership inspired Turkey to change for the better and undoubtedly made the country more democratic, egalitarian and as a result ‘European’. Yet, most of the EU member states are still sceptical about allowing Turkey to become an official member of the European community.

The arguments used against Turkey’s accession to the union are varied. While some argue that Turkey is ‘simply not European’, others are opposing Turkish membership on the grounds that Turkey’s accession will not be economically or politically beneficial for the union. Yet, the most prominent argument against Turkey’s EU membership bid is the unacceptable state of the country’s democracy and human rights record.

While this study does not solely focus on membership negotiations, Turkey’s journey towards European Union is a significant factor that shapes the country’s identity (and the British perception of this identity) and hence is an important part of this study.
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

5:1 Introduction

Literature shows that good research benefits from the use of a combination of methods. So, while trying to choose a research method, “researchers should not only consider which is the most appropriate method for the study of their chosen topic or problem but also what combination of research methods will produce a better and deeper understanding of it” (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, 1998, p: 1).

Taking that idea on board, this study on the representation of Turkey in the British print media between 2007-2013, will use a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis methods.

Specifically, quantitative content analysis, qualitative textual analysis and in-depth interviews will be used to map the Turkish coverage in the British press and answer the main research question of ‘Is Turkey being represented as a part of the European self or as an Oriental Other in the British media?’
5:2 Analysis methods

Research methods in media (and other social sciences) are often divided into two main types: quantitative and qualitative.

According to Strauss, the fundamental difference between the quantitative and qualitative methods is that the first one studies the association or relationship between quantified variables and the other do it in structural contexts (Strauss, 1987).

In other words, while quantitative methods provide objective, measurable, repeatable and generalizable results, qualitative methods provide subjective, observational, prolific and authentic results (Gonzalez, 2011).

The differences between these two methods of analysis can be seen in table 1, developed by Pita and Pértigas based on different authors proposals (Pita and Pertigas, 2002, p:76-78):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative research</th>
<th>Quantitative research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focused on the phenomenology and understanding.</td>
<td>Based on probabilistic induction of logical positivism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective.</td>
<td>Objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inference of your data.</td>
<td>Inferences beyond the data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploratory, inductive and descriptive.</td>
<td>Confirmatory inferential, deductive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data &quot;rich and deep&quot;.</td>
<td>Solid and repeatable data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not generalizable.</td>
<td>Generalizable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic.</td>
<td>Particularist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic reality.</td>
<td>Static reality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Pita and Pertigas’ comparison chart for Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis Methods
Even though this table was specifically created to explain the use of the quantitative and qualitative analysis methods in health research, same principals apply to media analysis. A media content, whether it is a movie, a magazine, a commercial or a newspaper article, can be analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. And both methods provide different benefits.

The following section of this chapter will explain those benefits and why both methods were chosen to be used in this particular study.

5:2:1 Quantitative content analysis

Today ‘the primary message centred methodology’ for empirical research questions is quantitative content analysis (Jensen 2012, p: 153; Neuendorf, 2002, p:9).

Quantitative content analysis is a popular method in media studies; especially ones dealing with representation such as this one; because it is systematic, less prone to subjective selectiveness and it describes and analyses media content in a more comprehensive way compared to rival methods (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, 1998, p: 91).

In other words, quantitative content analysis can be defined briefly as “The systematic assignment of communication content to categories according to rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those categories using statistical methods (Riffe, Lacy and Fico, 1998, p: 2)” As a result, for an analysis to be fully quantitative, it needs to have certain qualities.
As Nauendorf explains, content analysis has to be conducted within the scientific method but with certain additional characteristics that place it in a unique position as the primary message-centred methodology. As well as relying on the scientific method by being objective, reliable, valid and replicable; it has to take the message as the unit of analysis, it has to create mathematical results and it has to be summarizing (Neuendorf, 2002).

By conducting a quantitative content analysis, it is possible to determine ‘Who says what through which channel to whom and with what effect’ in the media content objectively and scientifically (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p: 12).

Even though it is the singular method of choice for majority of research papers dealing with media representation; and it can cover the totality of media representation in theory, there are several criticisms directed at the use of quantitative analysis in media research, especially when it is the sole method of analysis.

The main criticism directed at the use of quantitative content analysis on it’s own is its positivist notion of objectivity and lack of a theory of meaning (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, 1998, p: 123; Kracauer, 1952; Burgelin, 1972; Sumner, 1979).

Yet, the methodological rigour and objectivity of quantitative analysis is useful, even essential, while charting long-term changes and trends in media coverage. And combined with a complementary qualitative approach, it gives solid and reliable results.

Also, although quantitative content analysis initially simply fragments texts down into building blocks to be counted, it can be argued that, it re-assembles these blocks at the analysis stage to examine ‘which ones co-occur in which contexts, for what purposes and with what implications (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold, 1998, p: 123)’ and in the end it conducts a deeper analysis.

In a study looking into a 7-year time frame (2007-2013) and a variety of resources (see below), quantitative content analysis will be the method of choice for mapping and the initial analysis, in other words creating ‘the big picture’.

Yet, accepting the criticisms mentioned above, an additional qualitative textual analysis will also be applied to the selected article sample to be able to perform a deeper analysis and discern latent meaning, [...] implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a text (Fürsich, 2009, p: 241)."
5:2:2 Qualitative analysis

Qualitative analysis, which is the second method of analysis used in this research, had been defined as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p: 1278)”. “Any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings (Patton, 2002, p: 453)” can be classified as qualitative analysis and in the end qualitative analysis can simply be defined as any type of research which does not extract quantitative results (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p: 17).

While there are several methods of doing qualitative analysis, this research will conduct qualitative textual analysis and in-depth interviews.

5:2:2:1 Qualitative textual analysis

Qualitative textual analysis is defined as “a method of data analysis that closely examines either the content and meaning of texts or their structure and discourse (Lockyer, 2008, p: 865)”. It is “an approach of empirical, methodological, controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification (Mayring, 2000, p: 2).”

While applying qualitative textual analysis method to the selected data in this research, the researcher will try to ‘go beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or
latent in a particular text and understand the social reality in a subjective but scientific manner (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p: 1).

According to McKee, “Textual analysis is a methodology for gathering information about sense-making practices, that is, how members of various cultures interpret the world around them”. He states, “We analyse texts using a form of ‘forensic’ analysis - treating them like clues (or ‘traces’) of how people have made sense of the world” (McKee, 2003).

In other words while quantitative content analysis focuses on the numbers and statistics, qualitative textual analysis focuses on ‘the meaning’. And by using this method, this study will aim at identifying patterns, themes and meanings in the British media texts that portray how the British media perceive and represent Turkey and its identity.

Effective as it is, there are criticisms against the use of this method on its own for analysis in media research. It has been claimed that solely using qualitative textual analysis to interpret media representation makes it too easy for the researcher to select and report only the examples that fit the preconceptions in the hypothesis (Priest, 1996, p: 191).

To avoid this, this study will relay on the objective data provided from the quantitative content analysis while doing the qualitative textual analysis.
But for some scholars, even using a combination of quantitative content analysis and a qualitative textual analysis in a study is not enough. For example, Philo argues that both methods simply focus on the ‘content’ and not integrate the context of production or audience reactions (Philo, 2007 p:194; Paksoy, 2012, p:89).

While this is a valid criticism, integration of production process and the audience reception in to a media representation study causes several practical and scholarly problems.

The best way to accurately analyse the production process of media content is real-time observation (Paksoy, 2012). Yet, in a study like this, which looks at content produced over a long period of time and by a high number of individuals (located in different cities and even countries), this is practically impossible for the researcher.

When it comes to including the ‘reception’ to the analysis, there are further obstacles. The ideal way to include the public reception of the news items will be to conduct surveys on the British public (including the Turkish community living and consuming media in Britain), on the Turkish public or forming focus groups. But conducting a reception research of this scale as a part of this dissertation is not possible as a result of time and space restrictions as well as financial limitations.

Also, including the production process and audience reactions to a media representation study may overextend the scope of the research and result in an *unfocused* analysis of all three aspects of the communicative event.
The primary aim of this study is to map and analyse the Turkish representation in the British media, or, in other words, analyse the ‘content’ itself rather than looking in to the whole of the communicative event (ibid).

Yet, it is still necessary to obtain a certain insight about the production process as well as the audience reception to be able to conduct a meaningful analysis of the content.

To achieve this, this research will use in-depth interviews. A selection of 5 journalists who report on Turkey for British broadsheets and 5 Turkish journalists who closely follow the Turkish representation in the British media for Turkish language media outlets will be interviewed. These in-depth interviews will be used as a complementary research method in this study.

5:2:2:2 In-depth interviews

Today, in-depth interviewing is one of the main data collection methods in qualitative research (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p: 138) mainly because it gives the researcher the opportunity to benefit from the personal accounts and experiences of interviewees.

As defined by Boyce and Neyale, in-depth or unstructured interviewing is “a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation (Boyce and Neyale, 2006)”.

In-depth interviews differ from structured, conventional interviews and surveys because they “encourage the participant to talk in depth about the topic under
investigation without the researcher's use of predetermined, focused, short-answer questions (Cook, 2008).”

In an in-depth interview the researcher is not required to prepare an extensive list of questions, rather “(She/he) is required to be aware of the major domains of experience likely to be discussed by the participant and be able to probe how these relate to the topic under investigation (Ibid)”.

As a result of this, in-depth interviews are often described as ‘Conversations with a purpose (Burges, 1982, 84; Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Webb and Webb, 1932 p: 130)’ in literature. But there are still some obvious differences between unstructured interviews and everyday conversations. First of all, their objectives are quite different. While appearing to be a ‘natural conversation’, in-depth interview aims to uncover the reality of a process or a situation.

Also as oppose to the egalitarian structure of the everyday conversation; in an in-depth interview the researcher is covertly dominant and is responsible for leading, directing and manipulating the conversation towards the topic under investigation (See: Kvale 1996, Rubin and Rubin 1995, Ritchie and Lewis, 2003)

In conclusion, it is possible to say that in-depth interview is a qualitative analysis method that combines structure with flexibility and uses the researcher as a tool to obtain, form and make sense of the data (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).

But there also are criticisms against the method.
The main criticism against the method is that “It provides limited opportunity for interpretation by the researcher because recalling an experience in an interview does not replicate actual observation of the experience or provide insight into the intentions or motivations of the various actors involved (Cook, 2008 p: 424)”.

Even though the criticism is not unfounded, when experiencing the real production process for a long period of time in different news outlets or collecting representative data from audience members is practically impossible for the researcher, in-depth interview is still the most rewarding method of production/reception analysis (Paksoy, 2012).

As a result, in depth interviews with the journalists who wrote news articles about Turkey for British broadsheets during the timescale of this study will be useful for the purposes of this thesis and will give an insight to the news production process as well as journalists’ personal perceptions of the Turkish identity.

In order to gain an insight about the ‘reception’ of the content, this research will also include in depth interviews with London correspondents of major Turkish news organisations who constantly report and comment on the coverage of Turkey in the British media and the reception of this coverage by the Turkish and British readers.
5:3 Application of each method

5:3:1 Quantitative content analysis

5:3:1:1 Research sample

It is rarely either possible or desirable to analyse absolutely all media coverage of a subject when doing quantitative content analysis. (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold 1998 p: 100). So for conceptual and for practical reasons, this research will analyse a certain selection of news content to try and answer the research questions.

This research focuses on the Turkish representation in the British media between 2007 and 2013, or more specifically the period between the start of the second term of the AKP in government, to the end of the Gezi Park protests that carried questions about Turkish identity to international headlines.

While choosing a starting point for the time period that is going to be analysed, several points were taken in to consideration.

The literature review showed that there are several extended quantitative and qualitative content analysis’ already done on the representation of Turkey in British as well as French and German press between 1997 and 2007 (See: Paksoy 2012; Christensen 2002; Turksoy 2011; Devran 2007 and Oktem 2005).
Christensen, in his 2002 study titled *Pocketbooks or Prayer Beads?* analysed US/UK newspaper coverage of the 2002 Turkish Elections. Looking into the news items published in the British and American newspapers in the week following the elections, he concluded that the AKP and Turkey’s religious identity was emphasised unnecessarily in these news reports.

Doğan, in her research titled *Turkey, as 'Other' and being 'Othered The 'Images' and 'representations' of Turkey in Western Europe and the role they play in the 'othering' of Turkey*, looked into the representations of Turkey in the *Guardian*, the *Times* and the *Daily Mail* in 1999 (Dogan, 2000).

In his research titled *Representation of Turkey’s EU Bid in the British Media* Paksoy analysed 143 news items published in the British broadsheets between 1999 and 2006 using the concepts of ‘positive other’ and ‘Orientalism’. All news items in his research sample were selected from time periods in which Turkey’s bid for European Union membership was in the agenda of the British press (Paksoy, 2012).


Devran, in his 2007 article titled *The Portrayal of Turkey in the British media: Orientalism resurfaced* focused on the influence of Orientalism on the way British media reports on Turkey’s bid to become a European state. He analysed the coverage
of Turkey in the *Guardian* and *Telegraph* between September 2004 and December 2005 (Devran, 2007).

Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, in their 2006 article *Turkish image in the EU media: Turkey’s representation in EU media through the 3rd October Process* analysed Turkey’s image in the European press during this period using the photographs that accompanied the news reports (Baştürk-Akca and Yılmaztürk, 2006).

Bryce in his study titled *The generous exclusion of Ottoman-Islamic Europe: British press advocacy of Turkish EU membership* also analysed the representation of Turkey in British broadsheets during the 3rd October Process. He concluded that commentary in the UK newspapers which, while sympathetic to the notion of the Turkish EU membership, still deploys a discourse that remains exclusionary where assumptions of Turkey’s intrinsic cultural and civilisational ‘Europeanness’ are concerned (Bryce, 2009a).

Aksoy also focused on the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British press and analysed related articles that were published in the *Times* and the *Guardian* between 2002 and 2005 in his dissertation titled *The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership as representation in the British newspapers Times and Guardian* (Aksoy, 2009).

While working on the subject of the media representation of Turkey’s EU bid Turksoy, Negrine and Wimmel extended their analysis’ to German and French press coverages (Negrine, 2008; Wimmel 2009; Turksoy, 2011).
Marcellini and Şenyuva analysed Turkey’s representation in the Italian press in their study titled *Turkey in Italian Media: Between Islam and Europe* and looked into if the representation of Turkey in Italian newspapers is stereotyped and ill-informed; if there is a convergence among the political elites and the media on Turkey; and whether Islam is being inserted into the construction of the perception about Turkey by the Italian media (Marcellini and Şenyuva, 2011).

The main difference between the studies mentioned above and this one is that they mostly focus on the coverage of Turkey’s EU bid in the British media and ignore how Turkey and its national identity is represented outside the discussions regarding the enlargement process of the European Union. This study is looking into the totality of the Turkish representation in the British media.

But even though these studies only focus on Turkey’s EU bid, they still provide an insight on the general representation of Turkey and its identity in the British press.

So, to create a continuation in the literature, this study will start in 2007, where other studies left off.

Also, the period starting with the 2007 general elections marks an important turning point for Turkey and the Turkish identity. By winning the majority of the general vote, the AKP established the success of political Islam and a transformation started in the country. And this research argues that this transformation affected the way Turkish identity is being portrayed in the European press.
The end of the Gezi Park protests (Summer 2013), which carried Turkey to international headlines and altered the image of the country and its government in the foreign media drastically, was chosen as the end point of this research.

5:3:1:1:2 Selection of media outlets

When it comes to the type of content that is going to be analysed, this research will use four major British broadsheets’ and their Sunday editions.

Following the example of Oktem, who conducted a representation study on Turkey’s EU bid in the British print media between 1997-2004 (Oktem, 2005), and many others, British tabloids were excluded from the research.

The reason for excluding tabloids from the research, even though they have larger circulations compared to broadsheets, is their relative lack of interest in international news stories (Harcup and O’Neill, 2010).

For example, during the climax of Gezi Protests in June - July 2013, compared to more than a hundred Turkey related articles published in British quality broadsheets, Britain’s highest circulation tabloid The Sun only published 21 articles longer than 100 words in which Turkey was the main subject and 13 of them were about British expats and holiday makers (Lexis Nexis Data Base: Search word “Turkey” and/ or Turkish”, in all English language publications between 31st of May – 1st of August).
This effect can also be seen in the coverage of the Turkish Presidential Election (August 10, 2014). A research conducted in Lexis Nexis Data base using the key words ‘Erdogan’, ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’ shows that while British broadsheets published 10 articles on average covering the Turkish election during a one week period before the election (including the election day), the only tabloid that covered the event, the Sun, published 1 single article (Lexis Nexis Data Base: Search word ‘Turkey’ and/ or ‘Turkish’ and/or ‘Erdogan’, in all English language publications between 2nd of August 2014- 11th of August 2014).

Also while the coverage by British broadsheets happen to have an immediate affect on Turkey, (their coverage is being translated to Turkish daily by Turkish media outlets) tabloids do not have such an impact\textsuperscript{126}.

This affect can once again be explained by looking at the coverage of Presidential Elections that took place on 10\textsuperscript{th} of August 2014. Hurriyet, the leading national daily of Turkey, as well as Radikal and Cumhuriyet published news reports on “The world’s reaction to the Presidential elections” immediately after the declaration of results. In these articles news items on the subject published by the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, the Financial Times, the Times and the Independent as well as the BBC were covered while the limited reactions coming from the tabloids and midmarket newspapers like the Daily Mail were completely ignored.

While selecting the news outlets that will be analysed their attitudes towards the European Union and the European identity were also taken in to consideration.

\textsuperscript{126} For a detailed exploration of this issue see: Chapter 2
Literature shows that the *Times* and the *Telegraph* has a Eurosceptic attitude while the *Guardian* and the *Independent* are Europhiles (Paksoy, 2012 p: 110; Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, p: 111). The difference of attitude between these newspapers concerning European integration and Britain’s relationship with the European identity makes it possible for the researcher to see the different approaches to Turkey’s European identity.

This study also decided to take broadsheets political inclination in to consideration while determining which media outlets will be selected to be analysed. As Bryce explained, while fluid ideological points of demarcation within the UK news sector have been observed in recent decades by McNair (2003, p:175), each UK title still has a obvious political leaning (Bryce, 2009a). While the *Independent* and the *Guardian* are on the left of the political spectrum, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Times* are on the right (Bryce, 2009a; Reid 2001; Higgins 2006; Negrine et al. 2008).

In the end while trying to get the broadest selection that represents the centre right and centre left press, as well as Europhiles and Euroseptics; four major British broadsheets, the *Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Telegraph* and the *Independent* (and their Sunday editions) were selected for analysis.

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127 As explained by Anderson and Weymouth, Euroscepticism is prominent in nearly every British newspaper in the 21st century yet the Independent, the Guardian, the Financial Times and the Mirror are considerably more pro-European in their narratives compared to The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Daily Mail, The Sun and of course The Daily Express (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, p: 111).

128 Hence, this study will classify the Independent and the Guardian as centre-left broadsheets and the Times and the Telegraph as centre-right.

129 The Financial Times was excluded from the sample because none af the avaliable newspaper data bases included articles by this broadsheet.
5:3:1:1:3 Selection of articles

British broadsheets mention Turkey, Turkish public and Turkish individuals in news items nearly every day. While some of these items are primarily about Turkey, Turkish identity and Turkish politics; in a considerable section of them Turkey is just a secondary actor.

Since time and space restrictions on the study makes it impossible for the researcher to analyse every single article that mentions Turkey between 2007 and 2013, this research will analyse articles that are primarily about Turkey and were published during representative time periods when certain major events happened.

While selecting these major events concerning Turkey, BBC’s country timeline, which was the only timeline about modern Turkey created by a major British media outlet, was used as a starting point.

The BBC’s country timeline for Turkey had a total of 32 events in the selected time period\textsuperscript{130}. Since the BBC did not provide exact dates for these happenings; exact dates of these events were found by crosschecking British, American and Turkish media reports\textsuperscript{131}. After determining that 2 events in the list took place in a close proximity of each other these events were collapsed together and listed under a singular event.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{130} A copy of this timeline is provided in Annex 5: Coding Manual for Quantitative Analysis. The web address is : BBC, “Turkey Timeline”, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17994865, accessed: 02/02/2013

\textsuperscript{131} In the presence of more than one event in a given article of the BBC timeline, the event that is more prominent or mostly covered was chosen to be the “median” event. (Ex: Event 30: Tension rises with Damascus. After Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish border town kills five civilians, parliament authorises
To make sure that the BBC timeline was not lacking any major events concerning Turkey, which may attract the attention of British broadsheets, a search was conducted in the websites of the Times, the Guardian, the Daily Telegraph, the Independent and the Financial Times using the search words ‘Turkey’ and ‘Turkish’ to see if there were any dates not stated in the BBC timeline in which number of Turkey related news items peaked and it was decided that the BBC timeline was indeed inclusive of all the major points of the coverage.\(^{133}\)

The selected events were:

**2007:**

A total of four events were chosen to be analysed from the year of 2007. These events were the general elections which resulted in a resounding victory for the incumbent Justice and Development Party, election of Abdullah Gül as the 11\(^{th}\) president of Turkey, Turkey's decision to launch airstrikes against PKK militants in Iraq and the USA congress’ acceptance of a bill that officially recognises the massacres of military action inside Syria, and the armed forces respond with artillery fire into Syria. An EU Commission report on Ankara's progress towards EU membership highlights numerous concerns about democracy and human rights. – The date of the actual attack (03 October) was taken as the median date, since the parliaments authorisation of military action is not an event in its self but a reaction, also the second event still falls in the timeframe of the first one)\(^{132}\)

\(^{132}\) The events on the BBC timeline were: 08 July 2009 - President Abdullah Gul approves legislation proposed by the ruling, AK Party giving civilian courts the power to try military personnel for threatening national security or involvement in organised crime and 20 July 2009 - The Istanbul Criminal Court began trying 56 suspects under the second indictment of the Ergenekon probe. The 1,909-page indictment consisted of accusations against 56 suspects including retired generals.

\(^{133}\) It needs to be noted that a newspapers online coverage is not exactly the same as the coverage in its print additions as a result of space restrictions of the printed copy. Also there is a tendency to use different headlines or a tendency to give more prominence to controversial news items in the online coverage to get more clicks.
Armenians that took place in the last years of the Ottoman Empire as genocide (See: Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Events chosen from 2007**

- **22.07.2007**
  - AKP wins parliamentary elections

- **11.10.2007**
  - US congress accepts Armenian genocide bill

- **22.08.2007**
  - Gül is elected president

- **06.12.2007**
  - Turkey launches airstrikes on PKK in Iraq

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**2008:**

From the year 2008 a total of 3 events were chosen to be analysed. These events were the start of the Ergenekon trial, failure of a petition to ban the AKP from parliament, Turkey’s governing party on the grounds that they were threatening the secular basis of the country and the decision of the Turkish parliament to approve constitutional amendments to allow women wear Islamic headscarves in universities (See: Figure 2).
Figure 2: Events chosen from 2008

2009:
A total of 5 events were chosen from the year 2009. These events were 10th anniversary of the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan which led to clashes and protests in the eastern regions of the country, the decision to give civil courts the authority to try military personnel, start of the trial of 56 people including serving and former generals under the second indictment of the Ergenekon probe, Turkey’s decision to normalise relations with Armenia and Turkish parliament’s decision to introduce measures that would increase Kurdish language rights (See: figure 3).
From the year 2010, a total of 7 events were chosen to be analysed: A national newspaper (Taraf) publishing the Sledgehammer report on the alleged coup plans against the Islamist government, arrest of 70 high ranking military officials as a result of that report, US house of representatives accepting another bill about the Armenian genocide and causing Turkey to pull its ambassador to Washington for a short period of time, start of the debates on constitutional changes in the Turkish parliament, the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident with Israel, indictment of a further 196 people as a result of the Sledgehammer report and finally the constitutional referendum that resulted in increasing the parliamentary control over the judiciary (See figure 4).
Figure 4: Events Chosen from 2010

2011:

A total of 4 events were chosen from the year 2011. These events were: 2011 general election that resulted in another resounding victory by AKP, President Abdullah Gül assigning top military leaders for the first time in Turkey’s history, a PKK attack that killed 24 Turkish soldiers and France making the denial of Armenian genocide a criminal offence (See figure 5).

Figure 5: Events chosen from 2011
From the year 2012, a total of 6 events were chosen. These events were: Former armed forces chief Gen İlker Basbug going on trial on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, three people being jailed for the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, Iranian nuclear summit being held in Istanbul, Turkish parliament finally permitting schools to offer Kurdish language as an optional course, Turkey’s decision to change its rules of engagement with Syria and Turkish parliament’s decision to authorise military operations in the same country (See figure 6)

Figure 6: Events chosen from 2012

Only two events were chosen from the year 2013, following the decision to end the study with the analysis of the coverage of the Gezi Park protests, which ended at the end of June. The two events chosen to be analysed from this year were: the military
leader of the Kurdish rebel group PKK, Murat Karayılan saying the fighters will start to withdraw from Turkey and the Gezi Park protests which sparked by plans to develop one of Istanbul’s few green spaces and resulted in the death of several protesters as well as police officers (See figure 7).

Figure 7: Events chosen from 2013

5:3:1:2 Collecting research materials

The Lexis Nexis database was used to collect selected articles. As a control mechanism, the broadsheets’ own websites were also scanned for Turkey related articles published in the selected time periods.

Articles on Turkey published two weeks before and two weeks after the events (median dates) were also included to give context to the event. In the special case of the Gezi protests, the period between 31 of May and 31 of July was fully covered.

134 When time period assigned to an event clashed with the previous event, the news items published in the intersection period were only added to the sample once, under the preceding event.
To make sure none of the Turkey related articles were missed, every search in the Lexis Nexis database was repeated with the search word ‘Turk’ after an initial search was done with search words ‘Turkey’ and/or ‘Turkish’.

Every article, (excluding articles from travel, sports and finance sections) over a 100 words that mentions Turkey more than three times in total, and has at least a single mention of Turkey in the first two paragraphs was included in the research sample (See Figure 8; for the search criteria used for collecting data for Event 19).

![Lexis Nexis Search Window](image)

**Figure 8: Lexis Nexis Search Window**

### 5:3:1:2:1 Obstacles

During the data gathering process several problems were faced. These obstacles were:

1. Lexis Nexis could not eliminate news items that were published in the online editions of the *Guardian* and the *Telegraph*, so these articles were taken out of the data set manually.
2. Also, several literary reviews, finance and travel articles as well as obituaries concerning Turkish art works, Turkish personalities and Turkey came up with the search results. These were eliminated manually as well.

3. Sometimes the Lexis Nexis search engine brought several editions of the same news story in its search results. (First and Second editions as well as National, Irish and Scottish editions) The latest (final) National edition was always selected for analysis when there is more than one version of a given article.

4. There was an unexplained raise in the number of articles about Turkey during the last two months of every year. After the examination of the search results, it was understood that Lexis Nexis was also selecting news items about the bird ‘turkey’ as well as the Turkish republic; hence the raise in Turkey related stories near Christmas. These stories (mostly consisting of turkey recipes by famous chefs) were also manually eliminated from the data set.

As a result 731 articles were selected to be used in the Quantitative Content Analysis.

5:3:1:2:2 Preparing a coding schedule

After the selection of the data set, a coding schedule was created to be able to extract the necessary data from the articles to answer research questions.

Preparation of a coding scheme was essential to transform the text-based content into numbers because as Krippendorff states “[c]oding is the transcribing, recording,
categorizing, or interpreting of given units of analysis into the terms of a data language so that they can be compared and analyzed (Krippendorff, 2004, p: 220)”.

While trying to create categories and questions that is going to be in the coding schedule, the researcher tried to make sure they answer these research questions:

1. Was there a direct causality between the political inclination of a news outlet and the number of news items it published on Turkey?
2. Which region Turkey is being associated with the most in British broadsheets?
3. What are the most common adjectives or labels that were used to define Turkey and its government? What kind of an image these adjectives created for Turkey?
4. What are the most prominent issues in the coverage of Turkey?
5. What kinds of news stories regarding Turkey get the most coverage?
6. Who wrote the news items in the research sample and where?
7. Who are the main actors in the coverage?

The coding manual that was created to further explain the process of content analysis can be seen in the annexes.

After creating a coding schedule, an inter-reliability test was conducted to test its efficiency.
Reliability is the extent to which a measuring procedure gives the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 1979) When human coders are used in content analysis, this translates to inter coder reliability, or level of agreement among two or more coders (Nouendorf, 2002, p: 12) According to Macnamara, in order to make sure quantitative content analysis is up to scientific standards, it is a necessity to use two or more coders, and to conduct an inter coder reliability test on their results (Macnamara, 2005).

There are many accepted ways to conduct inter reliability tests, yet at a minimum the researcher has to create a representative set of units for testing reliability (Lombart, 2002).

The main methods to calculate inter-reliability in quantitative media analysis can be listed as:

- Percent agreement (basic assessment);
- Scott’s pi (p);
- Cohen’s kappa (k);
- Spearman’s rho;
- Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r);
- Krippendorf’s alpha; and
- Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient (rc). (Nouendorf, 2002)
This research has used percent agreement; which is the percentage of all coding decisions made by a couple of coders on which the coders agree (Lombart, 2002, p: 590). The method can be viewed in the exemplary chart below that was created by Lombart:

![Chart](image)

**Percent agreement:**

\[
PA_0 = \frac{\text{Total } A'}{n} = \frac{127 + 1}{128} = \frac{128}{129} = .99224 = .99
\]

**Figure 9: Lombart’s exemplary chart demonstrating the per cent agreement method for interrealibility testing**

Even though basic per cent agreement is criticised for its failure to account for agreement that would occur simply by chance (ibid), it is simple, straightforward, can easily be calculated without computers and it accommodates any number of coders. So it is a commonly used method of reliability testing, especially in media studies.

This research took one representative event, Israel’s attack on Mavi Marmara Flotilla on 31 May 2010, as the inter-coder reliability sub-sample and asked 5 coders to apply the coding scheme to each one of the 48 items in the data set independently.
Blind coding was conducted by coders of the inter-coder reliability sub-sample (i.e. coders were not allowed to see coding of the others prior to completion of the assessment) to minimize what researchers term ‘demand characteristic’ – a tendency of participants in a study to try to provide what the primary researcher wants or to skew results to meet a desired goal (Macnamara, 2005 p: 11).

Each coder created their own Microsoft excel chart from their results, and 2 random coders’ results were paired up to conduct a per cent agreement calculation.

While the first 5 questions on the coding schedule as well as questions 7,8 and 9 showed nearly 100 % reliability between Coder E and Coder D\textsuperscript{135} several problems were observed in other categories.

- In question 6, which asked the coder to decide on the type of article, agreement between Coder E and D was 83.3%.

Discussions after the completion of the task showed that one of the coders (Coder E) was having problems in differentiating between features from columns or editorials even though he was given definitions before hand. Yet, the percent agreement was still relatively high because most of the articles in the sub-sample were simple news stories.

\textsuperscript{135} Only disagreements observed between coders D and E on these categories were mistakes made as a result of carelessness and lack of attention. (For example in several cases journalists middle names were skipped or dates were wrongly noted) It should be considered that all 48 articles were coded in a 24 hour period.
• In question 10, which asked the coder to state the general category of the item, inter coder reliability between coder D and E was 77%. Disagreements were mainly caused by coder D’s belief that he was only allowed to choose one category. This was later fixed by giving more specific directions in the introduction of the coding schedule.

• In question 11, which asked the coder to state the main issues covered in the item, the inter coder reliability between coder D and E was 87.5 %. (All five coders pointed out at the end of the task that one of the main themes of many news items they coded was ‘Islamisation fears and secularity debates’. This was later added as option 13)

• Questions 12 and 13, which asked the coder to list definitions and adjectives used to define Turkey and the AKP proved to be overly problematic. Inter reliability was well below 50 %. It is observed that the ‘adjectives’ coders listed in this section were identical. The low reliability was mainly caused by coders’ disagreement on ‘definitions’. To solve this problem the word ‘definition’ was taken out of the question.

• Questions 14 and 15, asking about differences and similarities between the EU, Britain and Turkey were mainly left unanswered by both coders. They stated that there were no data in the articles related to these questions. Both questions were omitted.
• The inter reliability in questions 16 and 17 that asked the coders to name the Turkish and foreign actors in the news items were 92 and 89 % respectively. During the discussions after the completion of the task it was established that disagreements in these questions were caused simply by lack of attention most of the time. Yet, several coders stated that they were not sure whether to consider countries, or entities like ‘White House’ as ‘characters’. This was later explained in the coding scheme for further clarity.

• Question 18, asking about the sources journalists showed in the news items, showed the lowest reliability of all questions and nearly every answer given by each coder was different. This question was omitted from the coding scheme.

There is no consensus in the literature about the lowest acceptable inter coder reliability (Macnamara, 2005). However, Neuendorf cites Ellis (1994) as offering a ‘widely accepted rule of thumb’.

Ellis states that correlation coefficients exceeding 0.75 to 0.80 indicate high reliability (p. 91). In relation to specific statistics, Frey, Botan and Kreps (2000) declare 70% agreement (0.70) is considered reliable. Popping (1988) suggests 0.80 or greater is required for Cohen’s kappa which he cites as the optimal (ie. strictest) measure, while Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney and Sinha (1999) propose that a 0.75 score for Cohen’s kappa indicates excellent agreement beyond chance. Riffe, Lacy and Fico (1998), without specifying the type of reliability coefficient, recommend high standards and report that content analysis studies typically report reliability in the 0.80 to 0.90 range (Macnamara, 2005, p: 12).

So in this research, keeping in consideration that percent agreement calculation produces higher reliability rates compared to all other methods; the highest standards
in literature were followed. Every article of the coding scheme that gave out an inter
coder reliability that was lower than 75% was completely omitted or fundamentally
changed and articles that gave out inter coder reliabilities that were lower than 80 %
were changed for improvement as explained above.

After reshaping the coding schedule according to the results of the first reliability test,
a secondary test was conducted, with the same group of 5 coders, on a new, smaller
sample event.

At this new reliability test, conducted on the 12 news items in Event 9 the per cent
agreements were significantly higher:

- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on questions 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 = 100%
- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on question 6 = 92%
- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on question 10 = 83%
- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on question 11 = 83%
- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on question 12 = 83%
- Per cent agreement between coder D and E on question 13 = 92%

The final coding scheme can be seen in the annexes.
5:3:2 Qualitative textual analysis

5:3:2:1 Selection of articles

150 representative articles, 60 editorials and 10 front-page stories were selected from the original research sample for the Qualitative analysis (%30 of the initial research sample). Each article was selected on the basis that it contains major points, ideas and assumptions that were recurring in the coverage. The decision to include all editorials and front-page stories was made on the basis that front-page stories were read by larger audiences and editorials represent the broadsheets’ official point of view on Turkey and its identity.

Initially three articles (excluding editorials and front page stories) were chosen from each one of the 31 events. But since the number of articles in each event is not homogenous, the number of selected articles was altered in order to make sure the final research sample was representative. For example, while only 1 article was selected from Event 6 that has a total of 6 articles in it, 4 articles were selected from Event 17 that has a total of 37 articles.

5:3:2:1 Conducting analysis

As well as trying to find an answer for the main research question of ‘Is Turkey being represented as a part of the European self or as an Oriental Other in the British media?’ the qualitative textual analysis was aiming to answer a series of secondary research questions, such as:
1. Was there a qualitative difference between the representations of Turkey in the centre-left and centre-right British broadsheets?

2. Which aspects of the Turkish identity were dominant in the coverage?

3. Were British broadsheets supportive of Turkey’s EU membership bid? (If so) What were the reasons behind their support?

4. In which ways British media presented Turkey as an Other in their coverage between 2007-2013?

5. What were the implications of the narrative that classify Turkey as a “Model” for the country’s representation in the British media?

6. Did British media’s perception of AKP change in the time scale of the study?

7. Were the government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at Western journalists during this period substantial?

To be able to find definitive answers for these questions, each article in the qualitative research sample was coded using the QDA software called Nvivo.

In Nvivo, 4 main ‘nodes’ or coding groups were created to be able answer research questions mentioned above:

- Representation of Turkey as the Oriental other
- Representation of Turkey as a part of the European self
- Representation of Turkey as the ‘model’ other
- Attitudes towards the AKP
Under the node titled ‘Representation of Turkey as the Oriental other’, news items in which Turkey was othered through its history, geography, culture, economy, population size, politics and religion were coded separately. Also, unnecessary mentions of Turkey’s religious identity and articles that exclude Turkey from the first person plural were coded under this category.

Under the node titled ‘Representation of Turkey as a part of the European self’, all news items that present Turkey as a European country or news items that claim Turkey should be a part of the European community / identity were coded. Articles that include Turkey in to the first person plural were also coded under this category.

Under the third main node, titled Representation of Turkey as the ‘model’ other; news items that present Turkey or its government as ‘a model Muslim country’, ‘a test for Islam’s compatibility with democracy’ or as ‘good or benign Muslims’ were coded.

And any example that shows British media’s attitude towards the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan (whether positive, natural or negative) was coded under the final main node.

After determining the main coding groups, several sub-nodes were created in order to analyse specific aspects of the coverage.

These nodes were:

- Mentions of human rights abuses
- Mentions of press freedom
- Kurdish issue (Negative towards Turkey)
- Kurdish issue (Negative towards Kurdish insurgents)
- Discussions about Armenian genocide
- Mentions of Turkey’s Ottoman heritage
- Opinions about “Turkish seculars”
- Opinions about Turkish military
- Mentions of Ergenekon/ Sledehammer trials

Later, data obtained from in-depth interviews were also integrated into the relevant nodes.

5:3:3 In-depth interviews

5:3:3:1 Selection of interviewees

Once it is decided that in-depth interviews are going to be used to obtain data in a research, the first issue that needs to be resolved was the sample size.

The sample size used in qualitative research methods is often smaller than the ones that are used in quantitative research methods (Dworkin, 2012).

But, literature does not provide an upper (or lower) limit to the number of in-depth interviews that should be used in a study to make it relevant and representative (Charmaz, 1990, p: 1162). Most scholars argue that the concept of saturation is “the
most important factor to think about while trying to make sample size decisions in qualitative research” (Mason, 2010).

Charmaz says that conceptual categories in a research project can be considered saturated “when gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of your core theoretical categories” (Charmaz, 2006, p: 113).

Only the researcher can decide when the research sample is saturated, but sometimes, complete saturation can be unattainable. Level of heterogeneity of the research sample, concerns about time and finance, unwillingness of selected interviewees to participate and geographical limitations can cause a qualitative analysis that uses in-depth interviews as the base method to not to reach saturation (Dworkin, 2012). And a study that is not completely saturated can still be accepted and useful.

As a result, many experts claim the size of the research sample in qualitative research that uses in-depth interviews depend on the individual research project. Dworkin says:

There is indeed variability in what is suggested as a minimum. An extremely large number of articles, book chapters, and books recommend guidance and suggest anywhere from 5 to 50 participants as adequate. All of these pieces of work engage in nuanced debates when responding to the question of ‘how many’ and frequently respond with a vague (and, actually, reasonable) ‘it depends (Dworkin, 2012).

In this study on the representation of Turkey in the British print media, the size of the research sample for in-depth interviews, which were used as a complementary research method alongside quantitative content analysis and qualitative textual analysis, was also determined using the concept of ‘saturation’ and it was decided that 10 interviews
(5 with journalists from British broadsheets and 5 with journalists from Turkish media outlets) would be sufficient.

This research aimed to get interviews from correspondents of analysed British broadsheets who produce the news items that had been analysed quantitatively, as well as London correspondents / foreign news desk editors for Turkish media outlets that regularly report on the British coverage.

Since the aim was to conduct in-depth interviews with two distinct sets of interviewees (journalists from Turkish and British media outlets), a two-step approach was used while deciding on the research sample.

The selection of the British journalists for the interviews was made using the data gathered from the quantitative content analysis.

First the list of 196 journalists who wrote the 731 articles in the initial research sample for the Quantitative Analysis were scanned and the journalists who reported from countries other than Turkey were eliminated\(^{136}\).

This elimination was made on the basis that the journalists who are based in countries such as USA, Lebanon, Israel, Greece and Syria do not report mainly on Turkey. Than, out of the 97 journalists remaining in the list, names that come up more than 10 times were contacted for interviews.

\(^{136}\) List of journalists can be seen in Annex 6
5 journalists accepted to be interviewed, but some stated that they could only give an interview under the condition that they remain anonymous. Their main concern was that they might appear to be critical of their employer in the interview. Also, these journalists stated that they do not want to be named since they may not agree with the conclusions of the research regarding the British coverage of Turkey or the Turkish government. 2 of the journalists also wanted their job titles to be omitted from the dissertation, since the titles were specific enough for them to be identified. These requests were accepted and it was decided that all journalists’ identity and job titles would be kept anonymous.

In the second step of choosing interviewees, London correspondents for two prominent media outlets which broadcast/publish in Turkish were contacted as well as 3 journalists who follow the British coverage from media offices in İstanbul, Turkey. While they all accepted to be interviewed, two asked to stay anonymous stating that they do not want to be named in a research on Orientalism during a period in which the subject is highly topical in Turkey. Before performing the interviews an application to the Ethics Committee was submitted stating that all journalists’ identity and job titles will be kept anonymous. The application was accepted without any amendments.

137 After Gezi Park uprising representatives of the Turkish government as well as media outlets close to the government frequently claimed that Western media’s criticism of AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was rooted in Orientalism.

138 This concern was mainly stated by a particular Turkish broadsheet’s London representative in June 2014. The broadsheet was experiencing a fall out with the Turkish government at the time.
5:3:3:2 Performing the analysis

Even though two lists of questions were prepared according to the concepts presented in the literature review and the findings in the quantitative content analysis as well as the qualitative textual analysis in this study prior to the interviews (One for British journalists reporting on Turkey and one for Turkish journalists based in London) each interview was unique and flexible.

During each hour long interview, additional questions were added when the researcher felt the need to follow up on a point the interviewee has made and also specific questions were asked to specific interviewee’s based on their published work.

The main aim of the interviews with journalists who report for British broadsheets was to see how they personally view Turkey (as a European country, as a Middle Eastern country or something in between) and how they report on this country. While the interviews with Turkish journalists that work and live in London were trying to uncover how they perceive and analyse this coverage.

The interviews with the journalists who are based in London were conducted in their offices or a location of their choice, while the interviews with the journalists based in İstanbul were conducted over Skype.

All interviews with the journalists who report for British broadsheets were conducted in English while interviews with Turkish journalists were in Turkish.
5:3:3:3 The data transcription and coding

The analysis on in depth interviews in this thesis was done in three steps: transcription, coding, and integrating.

As a first step, the researcher transcribed all the digitally recorded data. Then, all Turkish data was translated to English.

Finally the raw data was transferred in to NVIVO and coded under the nodes used in the qualitative textual analysis.

For in-depth interviews two extra nodes were created in which British journalists’ comments about their perception of Turkish identity and Turkish journalists’ comments on their perception of British broadsheets were coded.

The data gathered from the interviews was integrated to the qualitative textual analysis and also was used to interpret the outcomes of the quantitative analysis. Also data gathered through these interviews will be presented in the first annex of this study.

5:4 Pre-conceived ideas of the researcher

Next two chapters of this study will present the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted on selected news items. But, before presenting the findings of this research, it is necessary to disclose the pre-conceived ideas the researcher may have on the issue.

I was born in the Turkish capital Ankara to secular, Turkish parents and I was raised in Turkey’s largest city, Istanbul. I completed my high school education in Istanbul’s American Robert College, an English language high school that was founded as a
missionary school in the 19th century. I went on to study international relations in
Galatasaray University, a French language university in Istanbul, which is partially
funded by the French government.

It is possible to say that I spent most of my childhood and adolescence in an
environment in which I only interacted with a homogenous group of strictly secular,
completely westernised Turkish people coming from similar ethnic and socio-
economic backgrounds. In other words, I was mostly isolated from Turkey’s reality.

In that environment, I did not feel the need to question my own identity for a long time.
I was Turkish and I was sure that I was as ‘European’ as any Greek, French or British
young adult. Islam had no influence on how I perceived my national identity.

When I was in school, girls and women who wore Islamic headscarves were not
allowed to enter schools and universities in Turkey. They were also not ‘welcomed’ in
neighbourhoods in which young people (at least young people like me) socialised.
And, religious men and boys, even if they were in school with us, kept their distance
and did not ‘out’ themselves. So, religion and religious people were simply not a part
of my life in Turkey.

The idea that Turkey’s ‘Muslim’ identity was conflicting with its ‘European’ identity
was simply incomprehensible to me in my early years. We would listen to constant
television reports on the threat of political Islam and religious fundamentalism that the
secular republic is facing and how this threat is going to affect Turkey’s possible
membership to the EU, but at least for me, it was more of an abstract discussion than a reality.

I only started to question the meaning of being ‘Turkish’ and ‘European’ at the same time when I started university and read Edward Said’s Orientalism for the first time. During a time in which the AKP was changing Turkey and making Islam and religious Turkish citizens a lot more visible in our daily lives, Said’s theory, in a way, opened my eyes to the reality around me and made me think about the internalised Orientalism that I was a part of within the Turkish society. I started to see that the Turk’s Europeanness was not as clear-cut as I believed.

When I moved to London in 2011 to do a masters degree in International Journalism and started to work as the London correspondent of a Turkish national daily, a faced a completely different understanding of the Turkish identity. In London, as a Turkish citizen, I was Middle Eastern, Muslim and definitely not European.

As a result, when I started this research project, I had several pre-perceptions about the British media’s representation of Turkey. I still believe that I am Turkish and European at the same time but I also see that for many Turkish citizens, Turkey’s Europeanness is just an illusion. And, as my understanding of the different layers of the Turkish identity evolved over time, I started to believe that the British broadsheets were reporting on a stereotypical, Orientalist representation of the Turkish identity instead of the complex, multidimensional reality of the country. The findings of this study were in line with my pre-perceptions on this issue.
CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

6:1 Introduction

This chapter presents a quantitative content analysis based on a research sample of 731 news articles about Turkey published in four British broadsheets over a period of seven years. In the chapter, numerical data obtained through quantitative analysis is put forward in the form of frequencies and percentages.

The chapter firstly looks at the distribution and frequency of news items about Turkey amongst news organisations and time periods. This is followed by data related to the format of news items such as length, type, page number and page label. Next, a detailed portrayal of subjects and issues covered in the research sample is presented. Following this data on the labels, descriptions and adjectives that are used to define Turkey, its people and its government in the research sample is laid out. Finally data gathered on the actors who shape the news items is presented. All data is explained in reference to the theoretical framework of the study.

In the second part of the chapter, these numerical findings are analysed in the context of the main research question “Is the British media representing Turkey as an Oriental Other, or as an extension of the European self?” Once again, concepts introduced in the second chapter such as othering, Orientalism and ‘the Model other’ constituted the theoretical basis of the analysis. In-depth interviews were also used in this chapter to be able to add some insight on the production process of the analysed news articles.
6:2 Presentation of the Data

6:2:1 Distribution of news items according to media outlets

As Table 1 shows, distribution of the 731 news items in the research sample was not equal between four British broadsheets. The *Guardian* published the highest number of articles that are directly about Turkey (209 articles in total), and the *Times* was a close second (183 articles in total). The *Independent* and the *Daily Telegraph* published fewer articles about Turkey compared to their two rivals. The *Independent* published 152 news items that are primarily about Turkey, while the *Daily Telegraph* published only 125 (See: Table 1, Graph 1).
A similar trend was found in the Sunday papers. While the Sunday Times and the Observer published 26 and 24 articles on Turkey respectively, the Sunday Telegraph published only 9. The Independent on Sunday published only two articles on Turkey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Distribution of news items according to media outlets. N: 731

As explained in the Methodology chapter, the news outlets analysed in this study were grouped according to their political affiliation as ‘centre-left’ and ‘centre-right’ (See: Chapter: 5 Section: 5:3:1:1:2 Selection of media outlets). The quantitative analysis did not show a direct causality between the political inclination of a news outlet and the number of news items it published on Turkey (See: Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Political affiliation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>Centre-right</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent on Sunday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distribution of news items according to media outlets’ political affiliation. N:731
The total number of articles published by ‘centre-left’ broadsheets was higher than their ‘centre-right’ rivals (387 vs. 344), but the *Times* (centre-right) was the newspaper that published the second highest number of articles on Turkey in the timescale of this study.

The results of the quantitative analysis showed that the *Guardian*, a centre-left broadsheet (Kaposi, 2014), provided the broadest coverage on Turkey between 2007 and 2013. The 209 news items published by it constituted 28.59% of the total research sample and half of these news items were longer than 600 words. Furthermore while no other broadsheet allocated space to Turkey on their front page more than two times in the time scale of this study, the *Guardian* placed 5 news items about Turkey on its front page.

But the *Independent*, a newspaper that is also in the centre-left of the political spectrum like the *Guardian*, published a considerably fewer number of news items about the country (21% of the research sample) and only published two Turkey related news items on its front page.

There was also a major difference between the amounts of coverage Turkey received from the two centre-right broadsheets analysed for this study. While The *Times* published the second highest number of articles on Turkey in the time scale of this study (183 articles - 25% of the research sample); the *Daily Telegraph*, also in the centre-right of the political spectrum, published only 126 news items and 87 of these were shorter than 600 words.
After looking at the results of the quantitative analysis, it can be argued that the number of articles a broadsheet publishes about Turkey is determined by its journalistic style and editorial policy towards international news instead of its general political inclination.

Journalists interviewed for this study claimed that centre-left British broadsheets, like the Guardian, are more interested in international subjects that does not have a strong British angle compared to their centre-right rivals and argued that this attitude also directly affects their coverage of Turkey.

For example Journalist M said, “The Guardian’s core audience is more interested in human rights abuses, foreign insurgencies and day to day politics of foreign countries. So… some stories about Turkey, like detailed accounts of the Kurdish conflict, find their way to the Guardian’s pages on a daily basis while other broadsheets may not bother to report on them (Journalist M, interview with author, 2014)”.

The quantitative findings of this study regarding the Guardian were in line with these claims, yet, the analysis showed that the Independent, another centre-left broadsheet analysed for this study, did not publish a considerably high number of news articles on Turkey compared to its rivals.

This difference between the Independent and the Guardian can be explained by the journalistic style of each media outlet. The Independent is a ‘comment heavy’
newspaper, while the *Guardian* is more focused on news reports. It can be argued that broadsheets that accommodate a high percentage of news reports in their daily coverage like the *Guardian* and the *Times*, produce a higher number of items about any given international subject compared to broadsheets that are opinion focused like the *Independent* (Kaposi, 2014).

This effect was clearly observed in the data provided by this study. In the time scale of this study commentaries and columns constituted 20% of the *Independent*’s coverage of Turkey, while for the *Guardian* and the *Times* this percentage was only 13% and 10% respectively (See: Graph 2,3,4 and 5). But overall, both the *Guardian* and the *Times* published a higher number of Turkey related news items than the *Independent*.

So, it can be argued that the relatively low number of Turkey related articles published by the *Independent* is not a indication of the level of interest it shows towards Turkey, but it is a result of the broadsheet’s general journalistic style.

The same pattern was also seen in the findings of David Kaposi, who analysed the coverage of the 2008-09 Gaza war in the British media (Kaposi, 2014). He found out that the coverage of the Gaza war was much more extensive in the *Guardian* than in any other British newspaper and most of the material appeared in the form of news articles rather than commentaries. He also demonstrated that the *Independent* was the

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139 While Independent never officially claimed the role of being an “opinion based newspaper”, it is described as such frequently in British media commentaries. For example, in an interview with Piers Morgan in 2007, Guardian’s editor in chief Alan Rusbriger explained this by saying “[In the Independent] the emphasis on views, not news, means that the reporting is rather thin, and it loses impact on the front page the more you do that (Rusbriger, Medialens, 2007)”. Also, in a 2007 media commentary for Reuters Tony Blair defined Independent as a “Viewspaper not a newspaper (Blair, 2007)”
broadsheet that published the highest number of commentaries on the subject even though it did not publish a particularly high number of news items.

The fact that results of this quantitative analysis is perfectly in line with Kaposi’s findings on an unrelated international news subject, further proves that the differences of density in British broadsheets’ Turkey coverage is determined by their journalistic style and general attitude towards international news and not particularly related to their political standing or attitude towards Turkey.

But the level of interest a broadsheet, or the print media in general, has in a subject cannot be determined by solely looking at the number of news items published. The content of the coverage, (meaning the type, length and subject of news items as well as their tone) is much more important than its numerical density while trying to understand the way Turkey was represented by the British broadsheets. So, the content of the British broadsheet’s coverage of Turkey will be examined in detail in the following sections of this chapter and in the Qualitative Analysis Chapter.
72% of the news items in the research sample of this study were news articles while 13% were commentaries. The *Guardian* was the newspaper that published the highest number of news articles on Turkey (152), followed closely by the *Times* (130). As mentioned in the previous section, the *Independent* was the newspaper that published the highest number of commentaries (31) (See: Table 3, Graph 2,3,4,5).

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**The Times**

![Pie Chart: Distribution of news items published by the Times according to their types. N: 183](image)

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140 The methods of classification can be seen in Annex 5: Coding Manual for Quantitative Analysis
**Graph 3:** Distribution of news items published by the *Daily Telegraph* according to their types. N: 126

**Graph 4:** Distribution of news items published by the *Independent* according to their types. N: 152
In the timescale of this study a total of 60 editorials about Turkey (8% of the research sample) were published in the British broadsheets. Since editorials directly indicate the level of importance a media outlet gives to a subject (Oktem, 2005) and demonstrates its official point of view on the matter, this study will provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the editorials in the research sample.

Broadsheets that published the highest number of articles on Turkey; the Guardian and the Times; also published the highest number of editorials (18 each) while the Independent and the Daily Telegraph only published 10 and 8 editorials on Turkey respectively (See: Table 3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights issues</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious freedoms</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority issues</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarization of democracy</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish issue</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian genocide</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU candidature process</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conflicts(^1)</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey’s foreign policy and relations</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamisation fears and secularity debates</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Issues discussed in editorials about Turkey. N: 60

35% of these editorials were focusing on the foreign policy and relations of Turkey and 20% on the country’s role in the Middle Eastern conflicts; indicating British broadsheets view Turkey as an important international actor, especially in the Middle East.

Turkey’s EU membership bid was only mentioned in 9 editorials (15% of the sample) but the issues that dominate the arguments regarding Turkey’s European identity was widely covered in the editorials.

28% of the editorials in this research sample examined the Islamisation fears in Turkey\(^2\) while 23% discussed the attempts to de-militarise the Turkish democracy. The Kurdish conflict was another issue that had a significant coverage in the British broadsheet’s editorials on Turkey (See: Table 4).

\(^1\) All editorials that mention Turkey’s role in the international conflicts were focusing on conflicts that are taking place in the Middle East region, most significantly Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war.

\(^2\) For a detailed explanation of what “Islamisation fears” stand for, see Chapter 2 and the Quantitative Analysis Coding Manual.
The event that led to the British press to write the highest number of Turkey related editorials was the Gezi Park protests that took place in June- July 2013 (See: Chapter 3). A quarter of the 60 editorials analysed as a part of this research sample were published during the Gezi Park protests (15 editorials in total) and discussed the reasons behind the protests as well as the Turkish government’s reaction to them.

6:2:3 Length of news items

Nearly 83% of articles in the research sample were longer than 300 words while 41% were longer than 600 words (See: Table 5). Since longer articles often include more detail and background information on the subject in focus, it can be assumed that the media outlets that cover news about Turkey in relatively longer articles have more interest in the country (Paksoy, 2012 p: 124).

The Guardian, which was the newspaper that published the highest number of articles concerning Turkey, was also the newspaper that published the longest articles (33% of the long articles in the research sample were published by the Guardian). And the broadsheet that published the lowest number of news items about Turkey, Daily Telegraph, was also the media outlet that published the highest number of ‘short’ articles on this subject (30% of the short articles in the research sample were published by the Daily Telegraph.)
The quantitative analysis showed that 123 (41%) of the 300 long news items in this research sample were focusing on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, indicating that the analysed British broadsheets gave more detailed accounts when they were reporting on Turkey’s relations with that region compared to Turkish-European or Turkish-British relations (See: Table 6).

### Table 5: Length of articles according to media outlets. N:731.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Short Articles 100-300</th>
<th>Medium Articles 300-600</th>
<th>Long Articles 600- over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative analysis showed that 123 (41%) of the 300 long news items in this research sample were focusing on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, indicating that the analysed British broadsheets gave more detailed accounts when they were reporting on Turkey’s relations with that region compared to Turkish-European or Turkish-British relations (See: Table 6).

### Table 6: Length of news items according to their subject N:731

*Total percentages are higher than 100% in each row because articles were coded under multiple subjects.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Length</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Internal Affairs</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6:2:4 Placement of news items

Newspapers are not often read like books, and readers may skip their international news pages (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, p: 168). Thus, page numbers could influence the chance of a news item being read. And news items that are placed in the cover page reach to a wider audience (Paksoy, 2012, p: 125).

As it can be observed in Graph 6, most of the articles in the research sample were placed between pages 15 and 34, where international and world news pages are mostly placed. (See: Table 7 for page label distribution) and only 102 articles were placed between pages 1 and 10 (where home and European news pages are mostly placed) (See: Graph 6). In the time scale of this research only 10 articles about Turkey made it to the front page of a British broadsheet.\textsuperscript{143}

Amongst the 10 articles that made it to the front page of a British broadsheet, 4 were covering subjects related to internal affairs of Turkey, 5 were covering Turkish Middle Eastern relations, and one was covering Turkey’s relations with Britain. In two of the articles, Turkish- American relations were also mentioned. 10 articles that were published on the front page of a British broadsheet and the subject of the article are shown in Table 8.

\textsuperscript{143} More than 35% of the articles in the research sample were published on pages simply labelled as "News". 21% were published on pages titled "International News" and a further 16% on pages titled overseas, foreign or world news. Only 13 articles (2%) were published on a page labelled "European News" and 37 (5%) on a page labelled "Home/ National news". 29 (78.7%) of the articles published in the Home News section were by the Guardian, the broadsheet that showed the highest interest in Turkey over all. Independent only published 4 articles about Turkey in their Home News pages but Independent was the broadsheet that published the highest number of Turkey related articles in their European News section (12 articles in total).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features/Letters/Other</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Overseas/Foreign World</th>
<th>Editorial/Leader</th>
<th>Financial/Econ.</th>
<th>Comment/Debate</th>
<th>Int. News</th>
<th>Home News</th>
<th>European News</th>
<th>News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.
As it can be seen in Table 8, most of the Turkey related news items published on the front page of a British daily were negative. For example three news articles about the clashes with the PKK, one item about Turkey’s role in the Syrian civil war and a story.
about an earthquake that killed hundreds of people in Turkey made it to the front page.

While these negative news stories about Turkey which were published on the front pages of the British broadsheets may played a role in the representation of Turkey as an inferior, problematic and conflict ridden “other” to the British public, they most certainly are amongst the biggest news stories about the country at the time and they have a higher news value compared to positive news stories coming from Turkey. So, even though they portray Turkey as a country covered in conflicts, riots and poverty; it will not be justifiable to argue that they were published on the front page as a result of the Orientalist tendencies of British journalists\textsuperscript{144}.

The effect of these front-page stories on the image of Turkey in Britain is further discussed in the Qualitative Analysis chapter.

6:2:5 By-lines

Amongst the 731 news items analysed as a part of this study, only 83 were published without a by-line. 20 of these 83 articles were published by the *Times* (18 of them editorials), 16 by the *Telegraph* (10 of them editorials), 20 by the *Independent* (12 of them editorials) and 20 by the *Guardian* (18 editorials). The *Sunday Times* and the *Observer* published the remaining 7 news items that does not have a by-line.

\textsuperscript{144} The factors that British journalists use while determining the news value of an event will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
In the research sample of this study, a total of 196 journalists and analysts were credited for writing news items on Turkey. 121 of those names published only one news item about Turkey while a further 70 published less than 15 news items per person. The large number of journalists writing about Turkey in the selected British broadsheets can be explained by the extensive use of freelancers and stringers by these publications, especially regarding news stories that are coming from border towns of Turkey.

Also, news reports about Turkey coming from different countries such as the USA, Israel, Iraq, Belgium and Germany elevated the number of journalists that were credited for reporting on Turkey because British broadsheets used their correspondents/ stringers that were based in these regions to cover these stories.

None of the analysed broadsheets had a Turkey correspondent with a staff position or a Turkey office during the time period analysed in this study but they all had at least one freelance Turkey ‘correspondent’ based in the country or a ‘Middle East correspondent’ who published reports on Turkey on a regular basis (See: Table 9)\textsuperscript{145}.

\textsuperscript{145} The journalists that published the highest number of news items on Turkey; Alex Christie Miller, Constanze Letzch, Suna Erdem and Ruth Scherlock were all working as freelancers even though they wrote for specific British broadsheets for a long period of time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>News Outlet</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number of news items published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alex Christie Miller</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>Turkey Correspondent</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constanze Letzch</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Turkey Correspondent</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suna Erdem</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>Turkey Correspondent</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth Sherlock</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Middle East Correspondent</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Tait</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Turkey Correspondent</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Vela</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph / The Independent / Sunday Telegraph</td>
<td>Middle East Correspondent</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Birch</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>Turkey Correspondent</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrian Blomfield</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Jerusalem/ Middle East Correspondent</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damien McElroy</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Foreign News Editor</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9\(^{146}\): Most common by-lines in the research sample

These journalists were mostly of Western European origin, with the exception of Suna Erdem, who is of Turkish origin and Justin Vela who is originally from the United States.

Also amongst 196 journalists who produced the news items in the research sample; only 14 were of Turkish origin and Turkish journalists or analysts produced only 52 of the 731 news items in this research sample\(^{147}\). The low number of Turkish

\(^{146}\) Journalists’ positions are true for the time period they produced the news items analysed for this study.

\(^{147}\) 7% of the research sample was produced by local Turkish reporters/analysts but if we exclude Suna Erdem who had the position of Turkey correspondent for Timed before Alex Miller, this ratio goes down to 2.3%.
reporters/ analysts/ experts in the research sample shows that the selected British broadsheets opted to using foreign correspondents in their Turkey coverage instead of local reporters (See: Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>News Outlet</th>
<th>Number of news items published</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suna Erdem</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selcuk Gokoluk</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Report on army chief’s first visit to president Gül</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Karlı</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reaction to a Guardian editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Tikr</td>
<td>Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Turkish plane high jacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bülent Keneş</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Terror attacks in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amberin Zaman</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bülent Arıç</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commentary on 2011 General elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeynep Erşahin</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Freedom of expression in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yavuz Baydar</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Press Freedom in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elif Shafak</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph / The Guardian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commentary on Gezi Park Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet Davutoğlu</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commentary on Gezi Park Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ediz Tiyansan</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Government’s reaction to Gezi Park protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şafak Pavey</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commentary on Gezi Park Uprising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binnaz Saktanber</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Commentary on Gezi Park Uprising</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Journalists of Turkish origin that contributed news stories to the research sample

A media organisation’s choice between local journalists and foreign correspondents is part of a wider discussion. There is an on going debate about whether local journalists
are better at covering their own countries for international audiences than foreign correspondents; and literature does not have a definitive answer to that question yet (Bunce, 2011; Burden, 2009; Burton, 2011; Davies, 2014)\textsuperscript{148}.

But, in a study dealing with the representation of Turkey in the British print media and looking for effects of Orientalism on the coverage, cultural composition of journalists that produce the news items in the research sample is particularly important and cannot be ignored as a natural occurrence. The apparent hegemony of foreign reporters in this list has several effects on the representation of the country.

This research focuses on the content itself instead of the production process of the said content. Yet, as it was explained in the Methodology Chapter, in order to provide some insight into the production process, a small number of in-depth interviews were conducted with journalists who produced news reports on Turkey for British broadsheets. A report on these interviews can be seen in Annex 1.

\textsuperscript{148} Here it needs to be noted that Said himself does not claim that native voices should be privileged in discussions about culture (or journalism). He doesn't think it holds any water at all to use only "insider" knowledge, that only Muslims (Turks) can speak about Islam (Turkey). In discussing the problem of Orientalism, he encourages scholarship to focus on the gap between local or native discourse and foreign discourse. That gap, he says (and maybe only that gap), can become the unit of analysis. In other words, discussing Orientalism does not mean that foreign opinions and reports on Turkey do not hold any value.
6:2:6 Locations

The location of the reporter was specified only for a total of 243 news items in the research sample (33.1% of the total sample). In-depth interviews showed that news items that were published with a by-line but without a location as well as the articles published without any by-line were generally written in the relevant media outlet’s London offices.149

Amongst the 243 news items in which the reporter’s location was specified, 155 were written in Turkey (21% of the total sample). Israel was the second most popular location for Turkey related stories (21 news items from the research sample were written there) followed by EU (17 news items in total) (See: Table 11, Chart 3)

149 The only exception to this was the Times, which chose not to mention it’s correspondent’s location in many instances even though he/she was reporting from Istanbul. So it can be argued that the majority of the news items in the research sample were written in London.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of news items</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of news items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>Washing.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guvecci</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kandil</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antakya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kortek</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guvecci</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bagdad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dohuk</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Saladin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anishky</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Idlib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akmaray</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akcakale</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashdod</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Cities in which the news items were produced

6:2:7 Events

As explained in the Methodology Chapter, news items in the research sample of this study were selected according to 31 major events that took place between 2007 and 2013.

Each one of these 31 events was an important occurrence in Turkey’s recent history and received considerable media attention in the Turkish national press. Yet, British broadsheets showed different levels of interest to each event. While some events like

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150 See: Chapter 5: Methodology, Section:5:3:1:1:3 Selection of articles
the Gezi Park protests (Event no: 31) and the Israeli flotilla crisis (Event no: 16) had a considerable coverage in the British broadsheets (126 and 42 news items respectively), many others were mostly (and in some cases completely\textsuperscript{151}) ignored (See: Table 12).

\textsuperscript{151} For example there were no articles in Event 19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event No</th>
<th>Event description</th>
<th>Fre.</th>
<th>Percentage in the research sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AKP wins general election</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gul elected president</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Referendum on presidential election methods</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Air strikes against PKK in Iraq</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Headscarf bill</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Petition to ban AKP</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ergenekon Tri. starts</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anniversary of Ocalan’s arrest</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Civilian courts to try military personnel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Armenia-Turkey normalisation agreement</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kurdish language rights accepted in parliament</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Alleged Sledgehammer plot revealed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sledgehammer plot arrests</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>US Armenian Genocide bill</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Debates on constitutional changes start</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Israel flotilla crisis</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Ergenekon trial: Indictment of 196 people</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Referendum on constitutional reform</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Wikileaks documents released</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>AKP wins general election</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>President assigns military leaders for the first time</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>PKK kills 24 Turkish soldiers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>France Armenian genocide bill &amp; Roboski massacre</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Hrant Dink murderers jailed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Army chief on trial</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Istanbul Summit for Iranian Nuclear Programme</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kurdish language in lessons in schools</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Syria downs a Turkish plane</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Military action in Syria- 3 generals jailed</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>PKK decides to withdraw from Turkey</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Gezi Park protests</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 12:** News items according to events N: 731

But solely looking at the percentage of news items published in the timescale of an event is not enough to establish the relative importance given to that particular event or subject by the British media.
In this study, every article about Turkey published in the time scale of each selected event which is over a 100 words, mentions Turkey more than three times in total, and has at least a single mention of Turkey in the first two paragraphs, was included in the research sample (See: Methodology).

Consequently, some articles were included in the research sample as a part of a certain event even though they were focusing on a subject other than the one stated in the event description.

To provide clarity on the subject composition on the research sample, subject/article distribution for each event is analysed independently in the following section.
EVENT 1

Median Date: 22 July 2007

Period Analysed: 7 July 2007 – 6 August 2007

Event description:

AK Party wins parliamentary elections.

The first event that was analysed as a part of the quantitative analysis was the Turkish parliamentary elections that took place on 22 July 2007. 32 news items that were published before and after this event met the criteria stated in the Methodology. Amongst these 32 news items, 28 were strictly about the election while 4 were not about the election. Three of the off topic items were about the on-going Kurdish conflict and one was about the creationist movement in Turkey\textsuperscript{152}.

Amongst the broadsheets analysed, The Independent published the highest number of articles about this event (9 articles in total – 28% of the total sample). The Guardian also published 7 articles about Turkey in the timescale of this event, but 3 of the news items published by them was on the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK militants instead of the general elections (See: Table 13).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
EVENT NO & FRE & Tm. & Tele. & Inde. & Gua. & Sun Inde. & Sun Tm. & Obs. & Sun Tele. & On topic articles & Off topic articles \\
\hline
1 & 32 & 8 & 4 & 9 & 7 & 0 & 2 & 2 & 0 & 28 & 4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 13\textsuperscript{153}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{152} Since early 90's the Islamic creationist movement have been on the rise in Turkey under the leadership of Adnan Oktar aka Harun Yahya. The AKP government supported the movement and argued it should be a part of the national curriculum. This led to over 700 Turkish scientists suing the Ministry of Education. (Birch, Nicholas The Independent, 14/07/2007)

\textsuperscript{153} Abbreviations for event tables:

FRE: Frequency
Tm: The Times
Tele: The Daily Telegraph
Inde: The Independent
Gua: The Guardian
Sun Inde: Sunday Independent
Sun Tm: Sunday Times
Obs: Observer
EVENT 2

Median Date: 28 August 2007


Event description:

Abdullah Gül is elected president

The second event analysed for this study was the assignment of Abdullah Gül as the President of Turkey.

A total of 30 news items published in the time scale of this event met the criteria stated in the methodology and were added to the research sample. Of these items, 8 were not about the presidential election. 6 of these off topic articles were focusing on British foreign minister David Miliband’s first official visit to Turkey\textsuperscript{154} and 2 articles focused on the high jacking of a passenger plane in Turkey\textsuperscript{155}

The broadsheet that showed the highest interest in Turkey during the time scale of this event was The \textit{Times} (8 articles in total – 27\%) (See: Table 14).

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Table 14:

Sun Tele: \textit{Sunday Telegraph}

\textsuperscript{154} British foreign minister David Miliband made an official visit to Turkey in September 2007. During his visit he also penned an article for the Daily Telegraph on the importance of Turkey for European Union’s future (Miliband, David \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 05/09/2007 p:20).

\textsuperscript{155} A Turkish Atlas-Jet passenger plane heading to Istanbul from northern Cyprus was hijacked on 18 August 2007, but the hijackers gave themselves up and released all hostages five hours after the craft landed in Turkey.
EVENT 3

Median Date: 11 October 2007

Event description:
US congressional committee’s Armenian genocide bill / Referendum on Electoral reform / Turkish parliaments decision to let the army conduct military operations in Iraq.

The third event was the diplomatic row between Turkey and the United States as a result of the US congressional committee recognising the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide (10 October 2007). However during this time scale the Turkish parliament also gave its go-ahead to the Turkish army to conduct military operations in Iraq and it also decided to hold a referendum on electoral reform on 21 October 2007. The impact of this was that it led to future Turkish presidents being elected by the people instead of parliament.

During the time scale of this event a total of 58 articles, which met the criteria were published in the selected British broadsheets. Of these articles, 39 were about the clashes between the Turkish army and the Kurdish militants in Iraq, 12 were about the US genocide bill and the remaining 7 were off topic.

156 On 10 October 2007, The United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved HR 106, a bill that categorized and condemned the Ottoman Empire for the Genocide, on October 10, 2007, by a 27–21 vote. However, some of the support for the bill from both Democrats and Republicans eroded after the White House warned against the possibility of Turkey restricting airspace as well as ground-route access for U.S. military and humanitarian efforts in Iraq in response to the bill (Congressional Panel OKs Armenian Measure, Washington Post, 10/10/ 2007, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/10/AR2007101000203_pf.html , Accessed: 24/01/2015)
In this time scale, not a single article was published about the presidential referendum\textsuperscript{157} (See: Table 15)

Two of the “off topic” articles were about the Western fears that Turkey could be changing its alliances in international politics. One article was about Turkey’s EU membership bid and the other was an analysis on the UK supermarket Tesco’s economic operations in Turkey and one was about a father’s who had successfully prevented his daughter from attending obligatory religion courses in her school in Turkey.

Whilst every single broadsheet showed a substantial amount of interest in Turkey during the time scale of this event, The Independent was the newspaper that published the highest number of articles (18 articles about 31% of the total coverage)

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|c|cccccccccc|}
\hline
EVENT NO & FRI & Tm. & Tele. & Inde. & Gua. & Sun Inde. & Sun Tm. & Obs. & Sun Tele. & On topic articles & Off topic articles \\
\hline
3 & 58 & 15 & 9 & 18 & 14 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 39/12 & 7 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 15:}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{157} The referendum, held on Oct. 21, 2007, primarily addressed whether the president should be elected by the people or the Parliament. The voters said “yes” to the people selecting the president, lowering the threshold for deputies in a parliamentary meeting to 184 and changing the legislative year to four years instead of five. The “yes” side received 68.95 % of the votes while the “no” side drew 31.05 %.
EVENT 4

Median Date: 06 December 2007


Event description:

Turkey launch military an airstrike against the PKK in Iraq

The fourth event analysed for this study was the airstrike that was launched by the Turkish army against the PKK in Iraq. A total of 13 articles were published in the timescale of this event with only 4 were about something else. these covered the capsizing of a boat carrying illegal immigrants from Turkey to Greece in the Aegean Sea\textsuperscript{158}, the Turkish secular elite’s fears about the government’s plan to lift the headscarf ban in universities, a major plane crash in Eastern Anatolia\textsuperscript{159} and a Turkish publisher’s fears about publishing a book by a British author on the Armenian genocide in Turkey\textsuperscript{160}.

During this period The Guardian was the broadsheet that published the highest number of articles on Turkey (See: Table 16).

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\textsuperscript{158} On December 10, 2007 50 people lost their lives when a vessel carrying more than a hundred illegal immigrants from Turkey to Greece capsized in the Aegean Sea (Smith, Helena \textit{The Guardian}, 11/12/2007 p:16)

\textsuperscript{159} An Atlas-jet plane crashed on a mountain shortly before it was due to land in south-west Turkey on November 30, 2007, killing all 57 people on board, including a six-week-old girl (Hacaoglu, Selcan \textit{The Independent}, 01/12/2007 p:34)

\textsuperscript{160} Ragip Zarakolu, a Turkish publisher, is facing up to three years in prison for publishing a book - promoting reconciliation between Turks and Armenians - by George Jerjian, a writer living in London (Smith, Helena \textit{The Guardian}, 05/12/2007 p:25).
EVENT 5

Median Date: 09 February 2008


Total Time Period: 31 days

Event description:

Approval of the headscarf bill and subsequent protests

The fifth event analysed for this study was the Turkish parliament’s approval of the bill that allowed Turkish women to wear Islamic headscarves in university buildings\textsuperscript{161}. During this event a total of 11 news items about Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets and only 3 of these items were actually on this subject\textsuperscript{162}.

While 7 of the 8 off topic articles were reporting on the on-going clashes between Kurdish militants and the Turkish army (a continuation of Event 3); one article was about an arson attack in Germany that killed 9 Turkish citizens\textsuperscript{163} (See: Table 17)

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Table 17:

\textsuperscript{161} This approval was taken to the constitutional court by the opposition party and was annulled in 2008.

\textsuperscript{162} For a detailed explanation of the headscarf debates in Turkey, see: Chapter 1 p: xx

\textsuperscript{163} 9 people of Turkish origin were killed in the German port city Ludwigshafen as a result of a racially motivated arson attack on 03/02/2008.
EVENT 6

**Median Date: 28 July 2008**

**Period Analysed: 13 July 2008 – 12 August 2008**

**Event description:**

Petition to ban AKP fails

The sixth event analysed for this study was the failure of a petition to the constitutional court to have the governing AKP banned for allegedly undermining the secular constitution\(^{164}\).

In the time scale of this event; a total of 37 news items about Turkey that fit the criteria were published in the British broadsheets. Of these 37 articles, 14 were off topic. 5 of the off topic articles were covering the terror attack in İstanbul that killed 17 people\(^{165}\). The rest of the off topic articles covered the on-going clashes between the Turkish army and Kurdish militants, Iranian leader Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey, appointment of a new Turkish army chief, a forest fire in southern Turkey, AKP’s

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\(^{164}\) In March 2008, Abdurrahman Yalçinkaya, then chief public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals, submitted an indictment to the Constitutional Court demanding that the AKP to be closed down on the grounds that it had become a focal point for anti-secular activities. The indictment also sought a political ban of five years for 71 party members, including Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül, who was also an AK Party member at the time. The Constitutional Court ruled against the closure of the ruling party, although six judges out of a total of 11 voted in favour of the closure. According to the law regulating the Constitutional Court at the time of the ruling, at least seven members were required to vote in favor for a political party to be closed down. But as 10 of the judges also agreed that the AK Party had become a center for anti-secular activities, the court ruled that the AK Party should be deprived of funds from the state treasury, which all political parties that are represented in Parliament officially receive in accordance with their number of deputies (AK Party to ask for retrial by Constitutional Court, *Today’s Zaman*, URL: [http://www.todayszaman.com/news-323934-ak-party-to-ask-for-retrial-by-constitutional-court.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/news-323934-ak-party-to-ask-for-retrial-by-constitutional-court.html), accessed: 07/01/2015)

\(^{165}\) On July 27, 2008 when two explosions hit a busy shopping street in the Güngören district of Istanbul, killing seventeen people. Nobody has claimed responsibility for the bombing as yet, although Kurdish separatist militants are suspected. The İstanbul Police indicate that the incident bears the hallmarks of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), possibly in revenge for a series of major operations by the Turkish military on its bases days prior to the incident.
“anti-porn” bill\textsuperscript{166}, Turkish seculars being charged for plotting a military coup as a part of the Ergenekon case and Turkey’s EU membership bid.

The \textit{Guardian} was the broadsheet that published the highest number of articles about Turkey (See: Table 18)

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Table 18:

\textbf{EVENT 7:}

\textit{Median Date: 30 October 2008}

\textit{Period Analysed: 15 October 2008 – 15 November 2008}

\textbf{Event description:}

Start of the Ergenekon trial

The seventh event that was analysed for this study was the start of the Ergenekon trial on 30 October 2008\textsuperscript{167}. During this period a total of 14 articles about Turkey were published in the British broadsheets, but only 3 of them were on topic (See: Table 19).

5 of the off topic articles were focusing on the accusations directed to the Duchess of York, for secretly filming in a Turkish orphanage\textsuperscript{168}. 2 of the remaining off topic

\textsuperscript{166} The AKP’s deputy chairwoman Edibe Sözen published a plan to force buyers of pornography to give their details to shopkeepers, who would have been obliged pass them to the authorities. The bill also included provisions requiring prayer facilities in all state schools, despite constitutional laws demanding the separation of religion and state. AKP later distanced itself from the bill (Tait, Robert 14/08/2008, \textit{The Guardian}, p:26).

\textsuperscript{167} For a detailed explanation of the case See: Chapter 3 – section 3:3:4 AKP vs. Turkish military

\textsuperscript{168} In 2008, the Duchess and her younger daughter Princess Eugenie, 21, accompanied an undercover reporting team probing living conditions in institutions for abandoned children. Disguised with a black wig and headscarf, the Duchess gained access to the Saray orphanage and obtained footage broadcast on ITV1\textquotesingle s Tonight programme. The Turkish government accused the Duchess of trying to smear the
articles were focusing on a new Turkish film titled “Mustafa”, while another one focussed on the ban placed on a Turkish newspaper’s website as a result of an Islamic creationist’s complaints about the content.

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Table 19:

**EVENT 8:**

Median Date: 25 February 2009

Period Analysed: 10 February 2009 – 12 March 2009

Event description:

10th Anniversary of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s arrest

The eighth event analysed for this study was the 10th anniversary of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest. The anniversary lead to clashes between Kurdish protesters and Turkish security forces. Also, the prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk, defied Turkish law by delivering a speech in Kurdish to the parliament.

Only 6 articles were published in the British broadsheets during the timescale of this event and all articles were off topic (See: Table 20).


169 Mustafa is a 2008 Turkish biographical documentary about Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, which was written and directed by Can Dündar. The film, which controversially WHY?? concentrates on Atatürk's personal life, is the first documentary covering Atatürk's life from his early years to his death.

170 These articles were not excluded from the research sample because they are focusing on the political and cultural effects of the film on the Turkish society, instead of the film itself.
In the timescale of this event a Turkish Airlines plane crashed on landing in Amsterdam’s Schipol airport, killing 9 people overshadowed the news on the Kurdish conflict\(^{171}\), which reduced usual continuous coverage of the Kurdish conflict by British broadsheets

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Table 20:

**EVENT 9:**

*Median Date: 08 July 2009*

*Period Analysed: 25 June 2009 – 23 July 2009*

**Event description:**
Turkish president approves the legislation that permits civilian courts to try military personnel / Second indictment of Ergenekon trial takes place

The ninth event analysed for this study was the Turkish president’s approval of the legislation that permits civilian courts to try military personnel and the second indictment of Ergenekon Trial. British broadsheets published a total of 6 articles on Turkey during the timescale of this event. While 4 of these articles were on this topic, 2 were not. These include coverage of the sacking of Turkish football referee for being gay and the re-start of a controversial dam project in Turkey (See: Table 21)\(^{172}\).

\(^{171}\) Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 from İstanbul, crashed during landing at the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Netherlands, on 25 February 2009, resulting in the death of nine passengers and crew including all three pilots. The aircraft broke into three pieces on impact. The wreckage did not catch fire (Davies, Lizzy 26/02/2009, *The Guardian*, p:2).

\(^{172}\) Turkish Environment Secretary Veysel Eroglu declared that the work on controversial Ilisu Hydroelectric dam on the Tigris river in South-east Turkey would re-start despite environmental concerns (Tait, Robert 02/07/2009 *The Guardian*, p:18).
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
9 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2

Table 21:

EVENT 10:

Median Date: 10 October 2009

Event description:
Agreement of normalisation between Armenia and Turkey

The tenth event analysed for this study was the normalisation agreement between the Armenian and Turkish governments signed in Switzerland. 173 12 articles met the criteria stated in the Methodology chapter were included to the research sample. Of these 12 articles, 8 of them were off topic (See: Table 22).

Three were on crimes committed by Turkish citizens in Britain, 174 3 focused on the controversy caused by the “racist” plotline of a Turkish soap opera. 175 One was on Turkey’s decision to ban Israeli aircraft from its air space and final one was an analysis on the current Middle Eastern politics. 176

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173 On October 10th 2009 Turkey and Armenia have signed a historic accord normalising relations after a century of hostility. Under the agreement, Turkey and Armenia are to establish diplomatic ties and reopen their shared border.
174 15 years old Tulay Gülen, a second generation Turkish immigrant living in Britain, was killed by her father Mehmet in London. The murder was declared to be an honour killing and it started a debate on the culturally motivated crime commited in Britain (Brown, David 22/10/2009, The Times, p:5)
175 Turkish state television TRT started airing a drama series called Ayrilik, which shows Israeli soldiers brutalising Palestinian soldiers. Israel called the series “racist and barbaric” (Mcantyre, Donald 16/10/2009, The Independent, p: 28)
176 On October 12, 2012 USA was forced to cancel its biggest air-defence exercise with Israel after Turkey refused to allow Israeli aircraft to participate in the war games do to take place in Turkish airspace. Turkey's stance over the 11-day manoeuvres, codenamed Operation Anatolian Eagle, was the result of lingering anger at Israel's devastating onslaught on the Gaza Strip (Hider, James 12/10/2009, The Times, p:32)
EVENT 11:

Median Date: 01 December 2009

Period Analysed: 15 November 2009 – 15 December 2009

Event description:

Kurdish language rights accepted in the Turkish parliament

The eleventh event analysed for this study was the introduction of increased Kurdish language rights in the Turkish parliament. At the same time, the Turkish parliament decided to reduce the military presence in the mainly-Kurdish southeast as part of the "Kurdish initiative\(^ {177}\)". But following these developments the Turkish constitutional court decided to ban the Democratic Society Party (DTP) over its alleged links to the PKK.

A total of 6 news items about Turkey were published in the British broadsheets but none of these news items mentioned the decisions to increase Kurdish language rights or reduce the military presence in Eastern Anatolia. Only one of the 6, published by the Guardian, reported the decision to ban DTP. Three of the remaining articles focused on the convergence between Iran and Turkey, while one was discussed new developments in Turkey’s EU membership bid. One final article reported a row between Cyprus and Turkey about the ownership of a feline breed (See: Table 23).

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\(^{177}\) The Kurdish initiative is the most discussed initiative of the government. The main goal of the Kurdish initiative is to improve the human rights of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin and to end a 25-year conflict between Turkey and the PKK. For details see: Chapter 4, Section 4:3:3:1 Kurdish issue
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EVENT 12:

*Median Date: 20 January 2010*

*Period Analysed: 5 January 2010 – 4 February 2010*

**Event description:**

Alleged Sledgehammer plot revealed

The twelfth event analysed for this study is the report that the Turkish national daily *Taraf* published on the alleged 2003 "Sledgehammer" plot, the aim of which was to destabilise the country and legitimise a future military coup\(^{178}\).

17 news items were published on Turkey in the British broadsheets and 16 of those articles were off topic. 4 of the 16 were on the on-going negotiations between Cyprus and Turkey to reunify the island, 3 covered the claims of the Turkish gunman who shot the Pope in the 1990’s and 4 were on Turkish-Israeli relations\(^{179}\).

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\(^{178}\) Forty-nine senior military figures, some retired and some still on active duty, have been brought before special prosecutors in Turkey to answer charges of involvement in an alleged plot to pave the way for a military coup. The figures are on trial in relation to the so-called "sledgehammer plot", which emerged when *Taraf*, an independent Turkish newspaper, published leaked documents on the affair. The Turkish army says the documents were discussed in a seminar on war-time contingency plans and denies that they represented a coup plot (Turkey’s sledgehammer plot, *Aljazeera* URL: [http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/02/201022516176575355.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/02/201022516176575355.html), accessed: 06/01/2015).

\(^{179}\) During the time scale of this event Turkish-Israeli relations were strained as a result of the Israeli deputy foreign minister publicly humiliating the Turkish ambassador (by making him sit on a low chair during a press conference) over a tv series that was deemed offensive by Israelis (McCarthy, Rory, *The Guardian*, 13/01/2010, p:18)
In the time scale of this event articles on the genetic links between the Turkish and the Irish people, the Armenian genocide, the headscarf ban in Turkey and the Turkish human rights record were also published\(^\text{180}\) (See: Table 24).

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Table 24:

EVENT 13:

\textit{Median Date: 21 February 2010}

\textit{Analysed interval: 06 February 2010 – 04 March 2010}

\textit{Event description:}

Sledgehammer plot arrests

The thirteenth event analysed for this study was the arrests made as a result of the alleged ‘Sledgehammer’ plot revelations. A total of 18 articles that met the criteria were published. Amongst these articles 11 were off topic. 8 of these reported the negotiations in the American House of Representatives about a bill that accepts the killing of Armenians by Turkish forces during the WW1 as genocide\(^\text{181}\).

The remaining 3 articles covered Turkey’s role in the Palestinian conflict, Turkish Radio Television Authority’s (RTÜK) and new laws being introduced about showing tobacco products in TV and press freedom in Turkey (See: Table 25).

\(^{180}\) Lack of interest in the British broadsheets about the revelations on the alleged Sledgehammer plot will be further analysed while answering the supplementary research question “What are the reasons behind the fluctuation in British media’s level of interest towards Turkey?” in the second section of this chapter.

\(^{181}\) Acceptance of this bill is the main subject of the next event (Event 14).
EVENT 14:

Median Date: 05 March 2010

Period Analysed: 05 March 2010 – 20 March 2010

Event description:

USA approves Armenian genocide bill

The fourteenth event analysed for this study was the approval of a bill in the American House of Representatives that accepts the killing of Armenians by Turkish forces during the WWI as genocide\textsuperscript{182}.

A total of 14 articles that met the criteria were published during the timescale of this event and only 2 of them were off topic. These 2 articles reported on the aftermath of the arrests that were made as a result of the “Sledgehammer” plot\textsuperscript{183} (See table 26).

\textsuperscript{182} U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee on Thursday approved a resolution to label the killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turks during World War I as "genocide. "The resolution was passed by a 23-22 margin, even though the White House had urged the House panel not to adopt it. In response to the move by U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Turkey temporarily recalled its ambassador to the United States just minutes after the resolution was approved.

\textsuperscript{183} These arrests were the primary subject of the previous event (Event 13)
EVENT 15:

Median Date: 30 April 2010


Event description:

Start of the constitutional change debates

The fifteenth event analysed for this study was the start of a debate in the Turkish parliament regarding constitutional changes, that result in the government having more control over the judiciary.

The government defined these proposed changes as “Steps that should be taken to create a more democratic nation”. The opposition politicians, including senior judges described the proposals as an attack on the secular judiciary.

In the timescale of this event a total of 8 news articles on Turkey were published in the British broadsheets and only 2 of them were on topic.

2 of the articles reported on Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Greece while 2 covered the unity negotiations in Cyprus. The remaining 2 were on the singing lessons Turkish preachers were getting and the resignation of the Turkish opposition leader Deniz Baykal over a sex tape\(^\text{184}\) (See: Table 27).

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\(^{184}\) The leader of Turkey’s main opposition party has resigned after the release of grainy video footage purporting to show him having an affair with one of his MPs. The recording appeared on the website of the pro-government Habervaktim newspaper ahead of a crucial parliamentary vote on changing the constitution, provoking accusations that its release was the work of the ruling AK Party. The nine minutes and 23 seconds of silent footage, seemingly shot with a hidden camera allegedly shows Deniz Baykal, 71, veteran leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nesrin Baytok, 50, his former private secretary and now a CHP deputy, speaking in the presence of another man in one clip, and getting dressed alone in a bedroom in another. The website claimed that the man accompanying the two in the first clip is Mrs Baytok’s husband. The film, which appeared with the title...
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EVENT 16:

Median Date: 31 May 2010

Analysed interval: 16 May 2010 – 15 June 2010

Event description:

Israel flotilla crisis

The sixteenth event analysed for this study was the flotilla crisis between Israel and Turkey\textsuperscript{185}. Turkey’s mediation efforts between Iran and US, regarding Iran’s nuclear program was also an important topic during the time scale of this event\textsuperscript{186}. A total of 42 articles on Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets during the timescale of this event. Amongst these articles 31 were focusing on the flotilla crisis while 10 were reporting on the role Turkey played in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

\textquotedblleft Sex Adventures with the CHP\textquotedblright, initially emerged on Thursday evening, and although it was removed after half an hour, it had circulated on video sharing websites for weeks. It ends with the caption "To be continued". Announcing his resignation at a televised press conference, Mr Baykal claimed he was the victim of a government conspiracy.

\textsuperscript{185} The Gaza flotilla raid was a military operation by Israel against six civilian ships of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” on 31 May 2010 in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea. Nine activists were killed in the raid. The flotilla, organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH), was carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials, with the intention of breaking the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip (Q&A: Israeli deadly raid on aid flotilla, BBC News, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10203726, accessed: 12/01/2015)

\textsuperscript{186} On 17 May 2010, Iran signed an agreement to send uranium abroad for enrichment after mediation talks in Tehran with Turkish and Brazilian leaders. With this deal Iran was trying to convince the World that they are not aiming to build nuclear weapons. Israeli officials claimed that Iran was manipulating Turkey and Brazil in order to avoid facing further sanctions from Western nations. Under the deal, Iran’s foreign ministry said it was ready to ship 1,200kg (2,645lb) of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, in return for fuel for a research reactor. This deal and the role Turkey played in it was analysed in depth by both Turkish and European press (Iran signs nuclear fuel-swap deal with Turkey, BBC News, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8685846.stm, accessed: 12/01/2015)
Only one other article was off topic and was focusing on Turkey’s European Union membership bid (See table 28).

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Table 28:

EVENT 17:

Median Date: 20 July 2010

Analysed interval: 05 July 2010 – 04 August 2010

Event description:

Ergenekon indictment

The seventeenth event analysed for this study was the indictment of 192 people, including serving and former senior military officers, accused of plotting to overthrow the government as part of the alleged anti-Islamist Ergenekon organisation. A total of 22 articles about Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets during the timescale of this event but none of these articles were on topic.

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187 Ergenekon is the name given to an alleged clandestine, secularist ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with alleged ties to members of the country’s military and security forces. Since the police confiscated several documents allegedly belonging to the organisation in 2001, 275 people including military officers, journalists and opposition lawmakers, were tried in court for being members of this organisation and plotting against the Turkish government. The court delivered 17 life sentences in 2013, but these sentences were carried to the appeals court. Many analysts claimed that this case has ended almost half a century of military domination in the country while many others emphasised that it created conditions for an increased monopolisation of power by the civilian government and raised concerns about freedom of speech and the media, the independence of the judiciary, and the government's utilisation of its parliamentary majority to pass laws without engaging in public debate (Ergenekon: The court case that changed Turkey, BBC News, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23581891, accessed: 12/01/2015)
10 of these articles were focusing on British Prime Minister David Cameron’s official visit to Turkey\textsuperscript{188}, while 4 were analysing Turkey’s on-going European Union membership bid. 2 of the news items were covering the latest developments on the on-going Flotilla crisis between Israel and Turkey while another 2 were reporting on the state of Turkish tourism industry. There were two reports on the on-going Kurdish conflict. One article was published on the new Turkish Internet censorship bill\textsuperscript{189} and the last article was covering the so-called ‘Yogurt wars’ between Turkey and Greece\textsuperscript{190} (See: Table 29).

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**Table 29**

**EVENT 18:**

*Median Date: 12 September 2010*

*Analysed interval: 29 August 2010 – 27 September 2010*

*Event description:*

Referendum on constitutional reform

\textsuperscript{188} Prime Minister David Cameron made his first official visit to Turkey in May 2010. During his visit he gave a speech in Ankara highlighting the importance of Turkey for Europe and accusing Germany and France of having double standards about EU membership (Watt, Nicholas, 2010, David Cameron warns EU not to shut Turkey out, *The Guardian*, URL: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/27/david-cameron-turkey-european-union, accessed 12/01/2015).

\textsuperscript{189} Ankara imposed a ban on Youtube on 5 May 2008, after a series of 17 temporary bans the preceding year. In 2010 the ban was extended to a large group of websites hosted by Google. This caused a severe public reaction and in July 2010 the Alternative Informatics Association organized one of the first and largest street protests against Internet censorship in Istanbul. And in the same month Internet Technologies Association has launched a legal challenge arguing the restrictions illegally discriminate against millions of users (Sobecki, Nichole, *The Guardian*, 05/July/2010, p:20).

\textsuperscript{190} A Greek pensioner named Minas Karatsoglu sued a Swedish dairy company for using his photos to promote its Turkish yoghurt range. He won a 160 000 Euro compensation but the case caused further friction between Turkey and Greece regarding their national products (Smith, Helena, *The Guardian*, 16 July 2010, p: 19)
The eighteenth event analysed for this study was the referendum that backed the amendments to the constitution that aimed to increase parliamentary control over the army and judiciary. A total of 12 articles were published in the timescale of this event and 3 of these articles were off topic. Amongst these 3 articles, one was covering a survey conducted in Turkey about the population’s views on European Union, while another was reporting on the scale of honour killings in the country.

The last off topic article was published by the *Daily Telegraph* and was claiming that Turkey’s governing party, AKP, received a 16 million pound donation from the Iranian government (See: Table 30).

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Table 30:

191 A constitutional referendum on a number of changes to the constitution was held in Turkey on 12 September 2010. The results showed the majority supported the constitutional amendments, with 58% in favour and 42% against. The government said with the proposed changes they are hoping to bring the Turkish constitution more in line with the EU standards. But the opposition argued that the governing party is seeking dangerous levels of control over the judiciary. (Turkey backs constitutional changes, BBC News, 12/09/2010. Accessed 12/01/2015)

192 The annual Transatlantic Trends survey that was conducted in 11 EU countries, the US and Turkey found that 20% of Turks believed their primary partners should be Middle East countries, while only 13% favoured the EU. Compared with the previous year, the results showed that Turkish public’s support for EU membership was halved while their will for engagement with the Middle East was doubled (Traynor, Ian, *The Guardian*, 16/09/2010, p:24)

193 In September 2010, The Daily Telegraph accused AKP of receiving a 25 million dollar donation package from the Iranian government (Coughlin, Con, *The Daily Telegraph*, 15/09/2010, p:18). In the article by Con Coughlin, it was argued that the donation “increased fears that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister, is preparing to abandon the country's secular constitution”. The Turkish authorities categorically denied the claims and the newspaper was forced to publish an apology after accepting that their reporter was ‘misinformed’. In 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also took substantial undisclosed libel damages from the Daily Telegraph after winning the libel case he filed in a London court (Turkish PM accepts substantial Telegraph libel damages, Press Gazette, URL: http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/node/46762, accessed: 12/01/2015)
EVENT 19:

Median Date: 28 November 2010

Analysed interval: 13 November 2010 – 13 December 2010

Event description:

Publication of Wikileaks cables about Turkey

The nineteenth event analysed for this study was the confidential cables published by the whistle blowing website Wikileaks that indicated Austria and France have been deliberately blocking Turkey’s EU membership negotiations. No articles about Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets in the timescale of this event\(^4\) (See: Table 31).

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Table 31:

EVENT 20:

Median Date: 12 June 2011


Event description:

AKP wins general election

The twentieth event analysed for this study was the election victory of AKP on 12 June 2011. A total of 33 news items on Turkey were published in the timescale of this event and 21 of these articles were off topic.

\(^4\) Lack of interest in the British broadsheets about these Wikileaks cables will be further discussed while answering the supplementary research question “What are the reasons behind the fluctuation in British media’s level of interest towards Turkey?” in the second section of this chapter.
Amongst the off topic articles 17 were on the on-going Syrian civil war and Turkey’s role in this conflict; while the remaining 4 were focusing on the Kurdish conflict (See: Table 32).

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Table 32:

EVENT 21:

*Median Date: 23 August 2011*

*Analysed interval: 08 August 2011 – 07 September 2011*

*Event description:*

President assigns military leaders for the first time

The twenty-first event analysed for this study was the appointment of military leaders by the Turkish president for the first time in country’s history\(^{195}\). A total of 37 news items on Turkey were published in British broadsheets in the timescale of this event and all of these items were off topic. 16 of these news items were covering the affects Flotilla crisis had on the Israeli- Turkish relations while 4 were on the Syrian civil war. 5 news items were focusing on Turkey’s relations with the Muslim Middle

\(^{195}\) In August 2011, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has approved the appointment of the country’s four top military leaders, after the resignation of their predecessors over the arrest of officers accused of plotting to undermine the government. As expected, army chief Gen Necdet Ozel was promoted to chief of general staff. This was the first time a civilian government has been able to decide who commands the powerful armed forces in Turkey. (Turkey appoints military heads after shock resignations, BBC News, URL: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14401661](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14401661), accessed: 13/01/2015)
Eastern countries and 5 were covering the murder of a British citizen in Turkey.\textsuperscript{196} The remaining 7 news items were covering a wide range of subjects including the Kurdish conflict and Turkey’s demand to get a certain artefact back from the British museum\textsuperscript{197} (See: Table 33)

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Table 33:

**EVENT 22:**

*Median Date: 18 October 2011*

*Analysed interval: 03 October 2011 – 02 November 2011*

**Event description:**

24 Turkish soldiers were killed by PKK militants

The twenty-second event analysed for this study was the death of 24 Turkish soldiers near the Iraqi border in the hands of Kurdish militants. In the time scale of this event a total of 20 articles about Turkey were published in the British broadsheets and 16 of these news items were off topic.

\textsuperscript{196} Marion Graham was stabbed to death by her 15 year-old daughter’s Turkish boyfriend on 20 August 2011, Graham’s friend Kathy Dinsmore was also killed during the ordeal that took place in a Turkish holiday resort. Turkish police jailed 17 year-old Recep Cetin for the crime (Turkey murders: father flies out to comfort daughter in wake of killings, The Guardian, URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/21/turkey-murders-father-daughter-northern-ireland, accessed: 13/01/2015)
15 of the off topic articles were covering the earthquake that hit eastern Turkey\(^{198}\), while 1 was reporting on the fake fashion products being sold in Turkey (See: Table 34).

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Table 34:

**EVENT 23:**

*Median Date: 22 December 2011*

*Analysed interval: 07 December 2011 – 06 January 2012*

**Event description:**

French parliament passed a bill that makes it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide

The twenty-third event analysed for this study was the bill French parliament passed that makes denial of the Armenian genocide a criminal offence.\(^ {199}\) In the time scale of this event, Turkish army bombed and killed 32 smugglers in the Eastern town of Roboski, thinking they were PKK militants.\(^ {200}\)

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\(^{198}\) A destructive magnitude 7.1 Mw earthquake struck eastern Turkey near the city of Van on Sunday, 23 October 2011 at 13:41 local time. It occurred at a shallow depth of 20 kilometres causing heavy shaking across much of eastern Turkey and lighter tremors across neighbouring parts of the South Caucasus and Levant. According to Disasters and Emergency Situations Directorate of Turkey (AFAD), the earthquake killed 604 and injured 4,152. At least 11,232 buildings sustained damage in the region, 6,017 of which were found to be uninhabitable.

\(^{199}\) On 22/12/2011 French National Assembly passed a bill criminalising the denial of genocides acknowledged by the Republic of France, which includes both the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide. However, the bill was considered unconstitutional on February 28, 2012 by the French Constitutional Court on the grounds that it contradicts with freedom of expression (French National Assembly passes Armenian genocide bill, CNN Online, URL: [http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/22/world/europe/france-armenia-genocide/](http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/22/world/europe/france-armenia-genocide/). accessed: 14/01/2015)

\(^{200}\) Roboski massacre, took place on December 28, 2011, at 9:37 pm local time near the Turkish–Iraqi border. Two Turkish F16 jets fired at a group of villagers, acting on an information that PKK militants were crossing the border. According to Turkish government sources, 35 cigarette and drug-smuggling civilians of Kurdish origin were killed in the incident. Major protests followed in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish cities, most notably Diyarbakir where protests turned violent and police used
A total of 26 articles on Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets in the timescale of this event. While 13 of these articles were on the French genocide bill, 8 were covering the Roboski massacre. 4 of the remaining off topic articles were covering the arrest warrant issued by Turkey for Duchess of York, and one was reporting on how Turkish goats may be responsible from the anthrax outbreak in Scotland (See: Table 35).

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Table 35:

**EVENT 24:**

*Median Date: 16 January 2012*

*Analysed interval: 07 January 2012 – 30 January 2012*

*Event description:*

Hrant Dink murderers jailed

The twenty-fourth event analysed for this study was a Turkish court’s decision to jail 3 people for the murder of prominent Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. A total of 16 batons and tear gas against protesters and protesters threw stones and Molotov cocktails at police. Protests were also held in Ankara and Istanbul, where over 1,000 protesters gathered in Taksim Square and threw stones at police and smashed vehicles before police dispersed the crowds with tear gas and water cannons (Turkey admits 35 civilian deaths near Kurdish village, BBC Online, URL: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16352388](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16352388), accessed: 14/01/2015)

201 The prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was assassinated in Istanbul on January 19, 2007. Dink was a newspaper editor who had written and spoken about the Armenian Genocide, well known for his efforts for reconciliation between Turks and Armenians and his advocacy of human and minority rights in Turkey. He had been under prosecution for violating Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and “denigrating Turkishness”. His murder sparked both massive national protests in Turkey itself as well as widespread international outrage. One day after the assassination Oğün Samast and Yasin Hayal were arrested for murdering Dink alongside with four other people. Samast was sentenced to 22 years in prison in July 2011 and rest of his accomplices including Hayal were sentenced and imprisoned on 15 January 2012, ending a case that dominated the Turkish news agenda for
articles about Turkey were published in the British broadsheets in the time scale of this event and all of these articles were off topic.

Amongst these 16 articles 7 were covering the arrest warrant issued by Turkey for Duchess of York, 3 were covering the French genocide bill that was the subject of the previous event (Event 23) and 2 were focusing on the Polly Peck case. Remaining news articles included an analysis of the Turkey’s economy and women’s rights problems in the country (See: Table 26).

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Table 36:

EVENT 25:

*Median Date: 26 March 2012*

*Analysed interval: 11 March 2012 – 10 April 2012*

*Event description:*

Army chief on trial

The twenty-fifth event analysed for this study was the start of the trial of Former Turkish Armed Forces Chief Basbuğ, on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. A total of 11 news items on Turkey were published in the time period analysed for this event and only one of these articles was off topic (See: Table 37).

over 5 years (Hrant Dink murder: Turkish court jails man for life, BBC Online, URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16600746, accessed: 14/01/2015)
The off topic article was covering Turkey’s demand to take an artefact back from the British museum.

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Table 37:

**EVENT 26:**

**Median Date: 14 April 2012**

**Analysed interval: 11 April 2012 – 29 April 2012**

**Event description:**

Istanbul Summit for Iranian Nuclear Program

The twenty-sixth event analysed for this study was the summit held in İstanbul to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis. 16 news items on Turkey were published in selected British broadsheets during the time scale of this event and all of these articles were off topic.

10 of these articles were on the affects of the on-going Syrian civil war on Turkey, while 2 were on the developments concerning the trial of the Turkish man who killed a British citizen. The remaining articles were reporting on the Armenian Genocide Bill in France, trials of army officials in Turkey and return of an Ottoman princess to Turkey after many years (See: Table 38).

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EVENT 27:

*Median Date: 12 June 2012*

*Analysed interval: 29 May 2012 – 20 June 2012*

**Event description:**

Kurdish language lessons allowed in Turkish schools

The twenty-seventh event analysed for this study was Turkish parliament’s decision to let Kurdish language to be offered as an optional course in Turkish state schools. In the timescale of this event, Turkish armed forces hit Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq after PKK militants killed 8 Turkish soldiers.

A total of 25 articles on Turkey were published in the selected British broadsheets in the timescale of this event and all of these articles were off topic, focusing on Turkey’s role on the Syrian crisis instead (See: Table 39)

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</table>

Table 39:

EVENT 28:

*Median Date: 26 June 2012*

*Analysed interval: 21 June 2012 – 11 July 2012*

**Event description:**

Turkey changes its rules of engagement with Syria
The twenty-eighth event analysed for this study was Turkey’s decision to change its rules of engagement about Syria after Syrian forces shot down a Turkish plane\textsuperscript{203}.

8 news items about Turkey were published in the time scale of this study and all of these articles were on topic (See: Table 40)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 40:

EVENT 29:

\textit{Median Date: 03 October 2012}

\textit{Analysed interval: 18 September - 18 October 2012}

\textbf{Event description:}

Turkish parliament authorised military operations in Syria / Three Turkish generals jailed as a result of Ergenekon trials.

The twenty-ninth event analysed for this study actually includes two separate events that happened in close proximity to each other. The main event is the Turkish Parliament’s decision to authorise military operations in Syria after the murder of 5 Turkish civilians by Syrian security forces and the secondary event is a Turkish courts

\textsuperscript{203} On 22 June 2012, Syrian armed forces shot down a Turkish F-4 reconnaissance jet. Two pilots in the jet were killed and the incident escalated the tensions between two countries. As a response to this attack Turkey changed it’s rules of engagement with Syria on 26\textsuperscript{th} of June and declared that they will treat any kind of military approach from Syria as a threat. This was a major turning point for Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war (Turkey changing rules of engagement after Syria incident, CNN, URL: \url{http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/26/turkey-changing-rules-of-engagement-after-syria-incident/}, accessed: 19/01/2015).
decision to jail three military commanders for more than 20 years as a result of the Ergenekon trial\textsuperscript{204}.

Selected British broadsheets published a total of 38 news items about Turkey during the time scale of these events and only 5 of these articles were off topic.

27 articles were focusing on Turkish-Syrian relations in the light of latest developments\textsuperscript{205} while 5 articles were focusing on the results of the Ergenekon trial.

One of the off topic articles was reporting on the arrests Turkey made regarding the murder of the US ambassador in Libya while another was analysing Turkey’s on-going European Union bid, in relation to an EU Commission report on Ankara's progress towards EU membership highlighted numerous concerns about democracy and human rights\textsuperscript{206}.

The remaining three were on PM Erdoğan’s plans to build a new Mega-mosque in İstanbul, a new helpline that aims to protect Turkish citizens from police brutality and a ‘lucky’ lottery booth in İstanbul (See: Table 41).

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
EVENT NO & FRE & Tm. & Tele. & Inde. & Gua. & Sun Inde. & Sun Tm. & Obs. & Sun Tele. & On topic articles & Off topic articles \\
\hline
29 & 38 & 11 & 10 & 9 & 8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 27/5 & 5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textbf{Table 41:}

\textsuperscript{204} On 21 September 2012 a Turkish court jalled 3 generals for 20 year for allegedly plotting a coup against the government in 2003. 330 army officers received lesser sentences. They all maintained their innocence Turkey trial: Three army generals jailed for 'coup plot', BBC Online, URL: \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19681883}, accessed: 19/01/2015).

\textsuperscript{205} 3 of these 27 articles were also reporting on the claims about Russian Federation transporting weapons to the Syrian regime, using passenger flights to Syria.

\textsuperscript{206} See: Chapter 4
EVENT 30:

**Median Date:** 15 April 2013

**Analysed interval:** 01 April 2013 – 30 April 2013

**Event description:**

PKK’s decision to withdraw from Turkey

The thirtieth event analysed for this study was the PKK’s decision to withdraw from Turkey in early May. In the timescale of this event, famous pianist Fazil Say received a suspended 10-month jail sentence for "insulting Muslim values" on Twitter and this case raised concerns about the government's erosion of secular rights. Say’s jail sentence was mentioned in BBC’s timeline for Turkey, but no articles on this subject were published in British broadsheets.

Selected British broadsheets published a total of 15 news items in the timescale of this event. 4 of these articles were focusing on PKK’s withdrawal from Turkey while 7 were reporting on the latest developments on Turkish-Syrian relations.

Another article, published by the Independent’s Robert Fisk, was focusing on the Armenian genocide. The remaining off topic articles were reporting on a variety of subjects such as Turkish Israeli relations, Turkey’s new ‘Islamist’ middle class and a lookalike of Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (See: Table 42).

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 42:
EVENT 31:

Median Date: -

Analysed interval: 01 June 2013- 01 August 2013

Event description:
Gezi Park Protests

The last event analysed for this study was the Gezi Park protest that was sparked by plans to develop one of Istanbul's few green spaces. During the time scale of this event a total of 126 articles about Turkey were published in the selected broadsheets. Only 6 of these articles were off topic.

The off topic articles were covering a wide range of subjects, including the Kurdish conflict, the UK intelligence agency GCHQ's attempt to illegally tap Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek's phone\textsuperscript{207}, the court case that was filed in Britain against the founder of Turkish mobile communication company Turkcell\textsuperscript{208} and a British teenager getting stabbed in a Turkish resort for kissing a local girl (See: Table 43).

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 43:

As it can be seen in the previous section; news items in the research sample of this study cover a large variety of subjects, issues and events about Turkey. But different

\textsuperscript{207} It was revealed that BBC intelligence agency GCHQ tapped Turkish finance secretary Mehmet Şimşek’s phone in London. GCHQ Surveilance: Why was Turkey targeted?, The Guardian, URL: \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/16/g20-surveillance-turkey-targeted-gchq}, accessed: 19/01/2015

\textsuperscript{208} On July 09 2009, A British court has set the terms for Turkish conglomerate Cukurova Group to buy back a stake in telecoms group Turkcell (TCELL.IS), opening the way to ending an eight-year dispute which has paralyzed decision-making at the company (UK court tells Cukurova to pay $1.6 billion for Turkcell shares, Reuters, URL: \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-turkcell-cukurova-idUSBRE9680K320130709}, accessed: 19/01/2015).
subjects and issues received different levels of coverage from British broadsheets. While the British Broadsheets covered 25 of the 31 major events analysed for this study, 6 events were completely ignored (See table 44 for the amount of coverage each primary event got in the analysed broadsheets in percentage form).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT NO</th>
<th>Percentage of news items covering the primary news event</th>
<th>Percentage of off topic articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>91%</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>84%</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 44: Percentage of off/on topic articles for each event
6:2:8 Subjects

Some events and issues about Turkey, like the Gezi Park Uprising, the Flotilla Crisis, Kurdish conflict and Islamisation fears in Turkey got an extensive coverage while democratisation and Europeanization efforts by the Turkish government and positive news events regarding the Kurdish conflict received less attention, at least numerically.

If we look at the totality of the research sample, we can see which subjects and issues about Turkey received the highest interest from the British media.

Graph 8: Subject distribution in the research sample, according to regional relations. N:731

Almost half of the news items in the research sample (52% - 381 articles) refer to internal affairs of Turkey. While 99 articles deal with Turkish-European relations, 256 articles reports on Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Turkish-British relations constitute a relatively small part of the coverage, (considering all analysed media outlets are British) with only 86 articles (See: Table 45, Chart 8).
The high percentage of news items that mention Turkey’s ‘internal affairs’ can partially be explained by journalists’ need to provide context and background information on Turkey even when they are writing a story mainly about international relations. But the majority of these news items, 281 of them to be exact, only covered Turkey’s internal issues indicating that British media is indeed interested in what’s going on in Turkey. 96 of these news items were published during the Gezi Park protests, when the whole world was focused on Turkey and rest of these news items (as it can be seen in the previous section), were always reporting on a subject that has a British connection or has a relevance to the international news agenda of the day.

When it comes to Turkey’s international relations, the quantitative analysis showed that the most of the British media’s coverage of Turkey was focused on its relations with the Middle East. While only 13% and 11% of the research sample referred to Turkey’s relations with the European Union and Britain respectively, a staggering 35% referred to its relations with Middle Eastern countries.

This can be explained by the dominance of the Middle Eastern conflicts in the international news agenda during the time scale of this study, but it still gives a clear indication of which region Turkey is primarily associated with in the British newspapers.

---

209 100 of the 381 news items were coded as reporting on “Turkey’s internal affairs” were also coded under other categories, indicating that these news items were covering a larger subject matter that is not restricted to internal affairs.

210 In-depth interviews showed that British broadsheets were interested in some occurrences in Turkey only because they were seen as a larger on-going news story. For example news items about the creationist movement in Turkey found their way to the British broadsheets as a result of similar occurrences happening in USA and carrying the subject in to the news agenda.
Turkey is a candidate for European Union membership and an important trade partner to Britain, yet, the results of the quantitative analysis distinctly shows that it is not seen as a primary part of the European discussions and debates.

Out of the 99 articles that focused on the Turkish-European relations, only a total of 8 articles were directly reporting on Turkey’s EU membership bid\(^\text{211}\) and more than half of these were published as a result of British politicians visits to Turkey or were penned by politicians themselves\(^\text{212}\). The fact that nearly all news items about Turkey’s EU membership bid was published as a result of British politicians efforts (and the remaining two were talking about the bleak future of the membership bid) further emphasises the lack of interest and belief in Turkey’s European future in the British media. Especially during a period in which Eurozone crisis and debates on the future of the union carried the EU to the headlines of the British newspapers on a daily basis, the lack of articles on Turkey’s relations with Europe reveal that Turkey is not in fact seen as a European country or credible candidate for EU membership by the British media.

\(^{211}\) Amongst the 99 news items that were focusing on Turkey’s relations with Europe, 21 were actually discussing the Turkish-European collaboration about Middle Eastern conflicts and another set of 23 news items were reporting on the recognition of Armenian genocide in France as well as Europe’s position on the subject. In 70 of the 99 news items Turkey’s EU membership bid was mentioned or referred to. While in 19 this fact did not come up at all. 8 articles directly discussed Turkey’s EU membership bid.

\(^{212}\) 4 of these news items were published during the timescale of Event 17, in reference to the British PM David Cameron’s visit to Turkey and his comments about “Turkey’s importance for EU”, while 1 was penned by the British Foreign secretary David Miliband himself, to once again emphasize British governments support for the Turkish EU membership bid during his official visit to the country. Another article was published in the timescale of Event 16, during the days Israeli flotilla crisis and Turkey’s efforts to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis was in international headlines. The article, published in the Guardian, was arguing that Turkey should be reengaged in Europe. Ant the last article in the research sample about Turkey’s EU membership bid was published in the timescale of Event 18 and was reporting on the results of the annual Transatlantic Trends survey that was conducted in 11 EU countries, the US and Turkey. The survey showed that only 13% of Turks favoured the EU. (Traynor, Ian, The Guardian, 16/09/2010, p: 24)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Turkish – Middle Eastern Relations</th>
<th>Turkish – European Relations</th>
<th>Turkish–British Relations</th>
<th>Turkish–American Relations</th>
<th>Internal Affairs of Turkey</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
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<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>The Observer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 45: Subject distribution in the research sample, according to regional relations and news outlets. N:731

It is also possible to analyse the Turkish coverage in the British media through ‘issues’ that were covered in the news items.

**Graph 9: Issues in the research sample. N:731**
6:2:9: Issues

The issues that were prominent in the discussions about Turkey’s European identity, as they discussed in Chapter 4, were coded under 13 different categories in this Quantitative analysis. The issue that was covered the most by British Broadsheets was Turkey’s foreign policy (31%), while the Kurdish Issue (19%), Turkey’s role in the international conflicts (26%) and secularity debates in the country (16%) also constituted a significant part in the coverage. (See: Table 46, Chart 5)

Human rights issues including issues about religious freedoms and minority rights in Turkey were covered in a total of 85 news items in this research sample, constituting 12% of the coverage. Discussions about Turkey’s denial of the Armenian genocide was mentioned in 66 news items (9% of the coverage). The Kurdish issue also got high coverage in the British press. Nearly one fifth of the research sample was referring to this issue.

Also Kurdish problem was the only issue where the political inclination of media outlets played a role in the coverage. It was observed that left leaning liberal broadsheets, the Guardian and the Independent published articles on this subject more frequently than their right-wing rivals. While the Guardian and the Independent talked about the Kurdish problem in 22% and 22% of their total coverage respectively, this ratio was only 15% and 18% for the Times and the Daily Telegraph.

213 For detailed explanations of these issues see the Coding Manual and Chapter 4, section 4:3
214 Frequency of these issues in the coverage will be further discussed in the second section of this chapter.
The amount of coverage these issues receive in the British press is particularly important when trying to determine if Turkey is being presented to the audiences as a European country or not; since these issues are shaping the arguments against accepting Turkey into Europe (both as a member of the EU and as a cultural component of the region).

The fact that 113 news items in the research sample were referring to the discussions about the alleged Islamisation of the country under the AKP government is also significant; since Turkey’s ‘Muslim’ identity is one of the most common arguments against it being ‘European’.

The results of this quantitative analysis showed that while all of these issues were widely covered in the British press, there were obvious fluctuations in the British media’s interest in them. While some occurrences about these issues were widely covered, some (mostly positive) events were completely ignored.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Telegraph</th>
<th>The Observer</th>
<th>The Independent Times</th>
<th>The Sunday Times</th>
<th>The Guardian</th>
<th>The Independent</th>
<th>The Daily Telegraph</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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Table 46.
These fluctuations in the British media’s interest about major events, subjects and issues related to Turkey can be seen as a result of a collaboration between natural editorial choices and Orientalist attitudes of British editors and journalists towards Turkey.

The media is not neutral transmitter of information (Altheide and Snow 1979, Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, Cook 2005, Parkinson 2006). The process of news making depends to a great extent on the news value that journalists ascribe to an event or viewpoint, and organizational pressures on journalists such as deadlines and economic goals (Korthagen, 2013, p: 3-4).

There are several factors that editors and journalists all around the world consider while they are determining how “newsworthily” an international event or a topical issue is and how much prominence should be given to a news story215.

215 According to Galtung and Ruge these factors are:

- The time span of the event: The event that has a shorter time span (like a murder or an earthquake) is more likely to be considered “newsworthy” compared to an event that take time to conclude (like the development process of a country)
- The “amplitude” of the event: An event has to be “big” to be newsworthy. For example the newsworthiness of a protest will increase in line with the number of protesters attending.
- “Clarity” of the event: An event that has a single and clear interpretation will be considered more newsworthy.
- Cultural relevance and meaning: An event that is interpretable within the cultural framework of the audience will be considered more newsworthy. In other words an editor will pay more attention to an event that takes place in a country that has a similar culture with the audience. (For example, in the British press, events that occur in countries such as France, Germany, USA and Australia, have more news value compared to events that take place in countries that have considerably fewer connections to their main audience)
But an event may happen in a culturally distant place but still be loaded with meaning in terms of what it may imply for the audience. Thus the culturally remote country may be brought in via a pattern of conflict with one’s own group.
- Audience’s expectancy about the event: An event that the audience actively “wants” to see happening will be considered newsworthy by the editors.
- “Shock value" of the event: An event that is unexpected or rare (within the meaningful and consonant), or preferably both, is more newsworthy.
And these factors, which contribute to the way foreign countries are represented in national and international media, also play a prominent role in shaping the coverage of Turkey in Britain.

According to Galtung and Ruge, who listed these factors in 1965, a news outlet will pay more attention to an event that takes place in a country that has a similar culture with its target audience (Galtung and Ruge, 1965).

Even though most British broadsheets have a substantial influence outside Britain, their primary audience is a specific sub-section of the British public. This means they form their news agenda to accommodate the needs and interests of this audience.

While Turkey is a highly important country for Britain and the British public, (not only because of its geopolitical position but also culturally and economically) its status as a ‘European’ or ‘Western’ country is open to discussion and it is widely considered as an other to Britain as well as Europe (See: Chapter 2). Thus, in the eyes of British editors and journalists some events that are important for Turkey are not relevant or culturally interpretable for the British public.

- Continuity factor: If an event was considered “news” in the past, chances of it becoming news in the future will increase.
- Composition of current news agenda: If there are many events on the news agenda about a certain subject or a country, the threshold value for a similar event to be considered news worthy will increase.
- “Elite Nations”: An event that takes place in a country that is powerful and prominent in eyes of the international community will have a better chance of being considered newsworthy.
- “Elite people”: An event that includes “elite” or prominent individuals will have a better chance of being considered newsworthy.
- Personification: An event that can be personified by the audience of the news outlet will have a better chance of being considered newsworthy.
- Negativity: The more negative an event and its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item (Galtung and Ruge, 1965 p: 65-72).

216 For further information on the target audiences of selected broadsheets: See Chapter 2
So, many events regarding Turkey that does not have a direct effect on the British public, or events that they cannot clearly relate to, were overlooked in the coverage of British broadsheets.

The quantitative analysis showed that the composition of Britain’s news agenda at the time of an event also affects its coverage. Whenever there is a major domestic event in Britain, or a major international event that is not mainly about Turkey, the number of Turkey related articles in British broadsheets decrease and their placement in the newspapers became less prominent. And consequently British broadsheets overlook some important events in Turkey.

Also when there are multiple important items about Turkey on the news agenda, British newspapers are forced to only report on the events that are most relevant to Britain to keep their international coverage balanced between countries (Ibid).

Lack of coverage in the British broadsheets about the unexpected resignation of the Turkish opposition leader Deniz Baykal on 10 May 2010 can be seen as a perfect example of these factors in action.

217 The leader of Turkey’s main opposition party has resigned after the release of grainy video footage purporting to show him having an affair with one of his MPs. The recording appeared on the website of the pro-government Habervaktim newspaper last week ahead of a crucial parliamentary vote on changing the constitution, provoking accusations that its release was the work of the ruling AK Party. The nine minutes and 23 seconds of silent footage, seemingly shot with a hidden camera allegedly shows Deniz Baykal, 71, veteran leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nesrin Baytok, 50, his former private secretary and now a CHP deputy, speaking in the presence of another man in one clip, and getting dressed alone in a bedroom in another. The website claimed that the man accompanying the two in the first clip is Mrs Baytok's husband. The film, which appeared with the title "Sex Adventures with the CHP", initially emerged last Thursday evening, and although it was removed after half an hour, it has since been circulating on video sharing websites. It ends with the caption "To be continued". Announcing his resignation at a televised press conference, Mr Baykal claimed he was the victim of a government conspiracy.
This event, which was in the headlines of every Turkish national daily for over a month, and was considered to be a turning point in Turkish politics by many, was not even listed as a major event in the BBC’s Turkey timeline. And amongst the broadsheets analysed for this study, only *Times* published a single news article on the subject (*Times*, 11/05/2010).

The factors that were explained above can be hold responsible for the lack of interest in the British media regarding this event. First of all, as important as he may be in the eyes of the Turkish public, Deniz Baykal is not a known figure in Britain and hence the British public was not interested in his resignation.

Secondly, his resignation came merely days after the beginning of the debates on constitutional change in the Turkish parliament (See: Table 5, Event 15). So the coverage of Turkey in the British press was focused on a different, more relevant subject.

And lastly, this event coincided with the formation of the new British government after the general elections that were held on 6 May 2010. During this period British broadsheets were focused on the new government and resignation of Gordon Brown from the leadership of the Labour Party and they allocated large places in their international pages to the worlds reaction to these events.

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218 Deniz Baykal was only mentioned 6 times in the research sample of this study.
United States diplomatic cables leak or the ‘cablegate’\textsuperscript{219} may be another good example to show these factors that cause a decrease in the coverage of Turkey in the British press in action.

On 28 November 2010, the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks published several highly confidential diplomatic cables, including documents indicating that France and Austria have been deliberately blocking Turkey's EU membership negotiations.

Even though this was a major set back in Turkish-European relations (at least from the Turkish point of view) and a primary news story in the Turkish media, none of the 4 British broadsheets analysed in this study published a single article on this subject.

British media chose to completely focus on other leaked documents, which directly affected Britain, Europe and the US and their relations with each other\textsuperscript{220}.

Another factor that affected British broadsheets coverage of Turkey was editors’ inclination to focus on “negative” events.

There is strong evidence that the media outlets all around the world cover bad news far more than good, so ‘negativity bias’ is not a habit exclusive to the British media or to the news about Turkey, but it rather is a common media practice (Galtung and

\textsuperscript{219} The BBC archive on leaked cables (Does not include leaks about Turkey): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11914040, accessed 08 November 2014

\textsuperscript{220} A Lexis-Nexis search conducted on the articles published in the British broadsheets between 28 November 2010 and 28 December 2010 shows that a total of 597 news items on these leaks were published in that period. While all of these articles were focusing on leaks about the relations between USA, Britain and other European countries, only a couple of them vaguely mentioned anything about the documents on Turkey’s relations with France and Austria.
As Meter and Minnaugh explains “As Whether it’s about the various diseases children can contract at preschool, the possibility of a nuclear missile attack, or how poorly our nation’s leaders are doing their jobs, the news never fails to make the situation as dismal as possible. Every day, millions of people tune in to the media outlet of their choice and get pummelled with these stories” (Meter and Minnaugh, 2010).

According to Galtung and Ruge, negative news are more attractive for the media because they generally happen in a shorter time span, they are easier to interpret and they are more unexpected (Galtung and Ruge, 1965 p: 69-70)

Journalist B, who was interviewed as a part of this study agreed that British media’s coverage of Turkey is also affected by this so called negativity bias. He/She said: “Bad news is always better than good news. Editors are not interested in stories about how everything is great in Turkey” (Journalist B, Interview with author, 2014)

Inclination of the British media towards negativity can also be seen in the results of this quantitative analysis. For instance in late 2007, all British broadsheets covered clashes between Turkish army and PKK extensively. But the “Headscarf bill” that was approved by the Turkish parliament in February 2008 had relatively less coverage in Britain (See: Event 5). Even though this was considered to be

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221 This bill lifted the constitutional ban on wearing headscarves at public universities.
significantly ‘positive’ development in the West, only 3 articles were published on this subject in the British broadsheets\textsuperscript{222}.

Several other achievements of the Turkish state towards Europeanization and democratisation that took place in the time scale of this study, also had relatively small coverage in the British broadsheets.

Abdullah Gul’s approval of the legislation that allowed Turkish civilian courts to try military personnel for the first time hardly got any coverage in the British press. Even though this approval was one of the two main occurrences in Event 9 (other being the start of the Ergenekon trial), it was only mentioned in articles about the Ergenekon trial and no articles exclusively about this approval or its significance for demilitarisation of Turkish democracy were published in British broadsheets.

Turkish parliament’s decision to increase Kurdish language rights (See: Event 11) and permit state schools to offer Kurdish language lessons (See: Event 27) were other ‘positive’ events that were completely ignored by the British press.

While articles about the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK made it to the British broadsheets on a regular basis, PKK’s decision to finally withdraw from Turkey as a part of Turkish government’s ‘Kurdish peace initiative’ was also mostly ignored by the British media (a total of 15 articles on Turkey were published in the British broadsheets in that month – only 3 of them were on this subject)

\textsuperscript{222} A total of 11 articles regarding Turkey were published in the timescale of Event 3. But only 6 of those articles were directly about the “Headscarf bill”. The remaining 5 articles were focusing on the on-going clashes between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrillas.
Armenian genocide bills passed by US and French parliaments as well as the Roboski massacre committed by the Turkish military (See: Table 5 – Event: 3, 23) also received a considerable attention from British broadsheets as expected. But when the murderers of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink were finally jailed, British media once again stayed silent.

In the time period analysed for this study, the event that had the largest coverage in the British media was the Gezi Park protests that started in İstanbul on May 31st 2013. In the two-month period that the protests continued, a total of 126 articles about Turkey were published in four British broadsheets (See: Table 5).

This sudden peak in the coverage can also be explained by factors naturally affecting editorial choices.

First of all, an unprecedented number of people attended the protests, making the event highly attractive for international media (KONDA, 2013). And Turkish security forces’ brutal response to the peaceful protest, which resulted in several deaths and hundreds of injuries, as well as their attacks to the local and international media representatives added to the ‘shock value’ of the event (Ibid). Also, the social composition of the protesters (educated, middle class) made the event ‘relevant’ and culturally familiar to the target audience of British broadsheets.\(^{223}\)

\(^{223}\) See chapter 3 for the detailed explanation of the social composition of the Gezi Park protesters.
But even though every single factor that affects the ‘newsworthiness’ of an event listed by Galtung and Ruge applied to the Gezi Park protests, Turkish government and several Turkish academics interpreted the increase of ‘negative’ coverage as a sign of Orientalism in the Western media.

Dr Ertan Aydin, a senior advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, penned an article for Al Jazeera Online titled “Talking Turkey: Orientalism strikes back” (Al Jazeera, 11/12/2013). In his article he claimed that Western media ignored the positive transformations Turkey went through under the AKP government and exaggerated and sensationalised the ‘negative’ events like the Gezi Park protests as a result of their Orientalist attitudes. He said:

We should first remember some facts that are rarely mentioned in recent Western news on Turkey. It was under AK Party's government in the last 10 years that the Turkish legal system and political culture became more democratic … Various social, religious and cultural rights struggles of the 1990s - such as the right to use the Kurdish language, or the right to wear headscarves in public - have been achieved in the last several years … Why is it, then, that Western media discourses come close to declaring Turkey as an Oriental despotism ? (ibid)

Aydin’s claim that some positive developments in Turkey were not covered extensively in the Western media was also verified in the results of this quantitative analysis.

But, since the Gezi Park protests and other ‘negative’ events regarding Turkey were highly newsworthy according to the criteria set by Galtung and Ruge, high number of articles published on these subjects by the British media (as well as the limited
coverage of positive issues deemed less newsworthy), does not prove the existence of an Orientalist mind-set on its own.

To be able to determine if Orientalism is a dominant factor in the coverage of British broadsheets (during the Gezi Park protests, as well as the remaining parts of the research sample), examining adjectives that were used to define Turkey and its government and the ‘actors’ that took part in these news items can also be useful.

6:2:10 Adjectives

![Bar Graph: Adjectives that were used to define Turkey and Turkish people](image)

**Graph 10:** Adjective distribution in the research sample (Turkey) N: 226

While covering Turkey, journalists seldom used specific adjectives to define the country, its people and its government. In a significant percentage of the research sample, Turkey and its characteristics were explained to the reader by definitions. But
reliability tests conducted on segments of the research sample showed that coders could not reach a consensus on which segments should be coded as ‘definitions’ and as a result, quantitative questionnaire was changed to only include adjectives that directly define Turkey, Turkish people and the Turkish government (‘including adjectives that were used to define PM Erdogan).

Consequently, this section will only present ‘direct adjectives’ in the sample and general definitions will be analysed in the Qualitative analysis chapter.

Quantitative analysis determined that direct adjectives that define Turkey were used in a total of 226 news items (31 % of the total sample). To obtain clear and more interpretable results, adjectives that were slightly different but carry the same meaning were grouped together under 5 categories during the analysis.

While ‘Muslim’, ‘Islamic’, ‘Predominantly Muslim’, ‘Overwhelmingly Muslim’ and ‘Muslim nation’ were coded under the category ‘Religion-based’; ‘Nato Ally’, ‘Regional ally of the West’, ‘Nato member’ and ‘Europe and US ally in the region’ were coded under the category ‘Alliance-based’. Adjectives that underline Turkey’s secular nature (‘Secular’, ‘Secular nation’, ‘Secular state’) were coded under the category ‘Secular’ and adjectives that define Turkey through its culture and geography such as ‘Bridge between Middle east and Europe’, ‘Strategically placed between the West and the Muslim world’ and ‘Crossroads between Europe and Asia’ were coded under ‘Culture and Geography based adjectives’. Finally, remaining adjectives that cannot be placed in the first 4 categories were coded under ‘Other’.

224 For a detailed explanation of the coding process See: Annex 5 (Coding manual)
The quantitative analysis showed that 39 % of these adjectives were based on Turkey’s alliances while 27 % were based on Turkey’s religious identity and only 12 % of them underlined that Turkey is a secular republic (See: Table 47, Graph 10). It was also determined that there was a peak in the number of religion-based adjectives in 2010, in the backdrop of the Israeli flotilla crisis (See: Table 48)
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<th>The Guardian</th>
<th>The Independent</th>
<th>The Observer</th>
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<th>Sunday Times</th>
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Table 47:
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<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 48: Distribution of religion based adjectives according to years. N: 76

British journalists refrained from using definitive adjectives when it comes to the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan too. Only 26% (188) of the articles in this research sample contained adjectives that were used to define the AKP government or Recep Tayyip Erdogan directly (a total of 304 adjectives were used in 188 news items). These adjectives were collapsed under 12 categories.

![Graph 11: Adjective distribution in the research sample (AKP and Erdoğan)](image)

The most commonly used adjective in the sample was ‘Moderate/Mildly Islamist’ (Used in 61 news items) followed by ‘Islamic rooted’ (Used in 52 news items) (See: Graph 11).
And even though adjectives directly defining the AKP were only used in 310 news items, in 208 (67.09%) of these articles the existing adjectives were based on religion. The AKP or Recep Tayyip Erdogan were never defined as being secular throughout the research sample.

In 21 news items Erdogan was defined as a leader with autocratic tendencies and 10 of these items were published during the Gezi Park protests in 2013. While in 16 news items Erdogan and his political party were described as ‘reformists’, in 10 news items their ‘pro- EU’ politics were emphasised (See: Table 49).

Religion based adjectives that were used to define the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan peaked in 2007, directly after the general elections. Another peak in the number of the religion-based articles was in 2010, in the backdrop of the Israeli flotilla crisis (See: Table 50).
<p>|                | Democratic | Popular | Islamic | Neo-Islamis | Reject Islam | No advertisers | Other | Deen | Muslim | Religious minded | Islamism past | Former Islamism | Islamism | Alawite | Sultan | Pro EU | Reformism | Israel / Political Islam | Israel / Political Islam | Israelism / Hamas | Islamism | Moderate / Midey | Category |
|----------------|------------|---------|---------|-------------|--------------|----------------|-------|------|--------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|---------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|--------------|----------|-------|
|                |            |         |         |             |              |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 0            | 0              | 0      | 0    | 0      | 0               | 0             | 0              | 0         | 0       | 0     | 0     | 0       |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 1       | 0           | 1             | 2              | 1      | 2    | 1      | 1               |              |                |           | 7       |       | 2     | 2       |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 1          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 0             | 0              | 1      | 1    | 0      | 1               |              |                |           | 1       |       | 1     | 1       |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 1       | 0       | 0           | 8             | 0              | 0      | 0    | 1      | 0               |              |                |           | 10      |       | 1     | 1       |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 8          | 15      | 17      | 197         | 159           | 97             | 1       | 1    | 2      | 96              |              |                |           | 543     |       | 126   | 11     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 1       | 0           | 7             | 6              | 8      | 11   | 8      | 6               |              |                |           | 36      |       | 11    | 11     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 6             | 5              | 2      | 1    | 1      | 1               |              |                |           | 17      |       | 17    | 17     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 2             | 7              | 0      | 8    | 8      | 17              |              |                |           | 17      |       | 17    | 17     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 6             | 6              | 6      | 6    | 6      | 6               |              |                |           | 48      |       | 48    | 48     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 4             | 4              | 4      | 4    | 4      | 4               |              |                |           | 12      |       | 12    | 12     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 1       | 0       | 0           | 1             | 0              | 3      | 5    | 5      | 5               |              |                |           | 10      |       | 10    | 10     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 0       | 0       | 0           | 7             | 2              | 1      | 6    | 6      | 6               |              |                |           | 16      |       | 16    | 16     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
|                | 0          | 3       | 5       | 0           | 16            | 10             | 6      | 9    | 9      | 9               |              |                |           | 22      |       | 22    | 22     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| Telegraph /   | 0          | 6       | 2       | 0           | 14            | 11             | 10     | 18   | 18     | 18              |              |                |           | 61      |       | 61    | 61     |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| Sunday Times   |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Observer   |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Independent |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Guardian   |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Telegraph  |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Daily      |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |
| The Free Times |            |         |         |             |               |                |       |      |        |                 |               |                |           |         |       |       |         |                   |                   |                |           |             |          |       |</p>
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</table>

Table 50: Distribution of religion based adjectives according to years (for AKP or Erdoğan). N: 199

While trying to determine whether the coverage of Turkey in the British media is influenced by Orientalism or not, the nature of the adjectives that were used to define the country, its people and its government is highly significant.

Emphasising the status of a nation as the ‘other’ by unnecessarily underlining its religious identity (Especially when that identity is Islam, the main other to the Western civilisation) is one of the common signs of Orientalism in the media.

As Edward Said explained in his book *Covering Islam*, the use of the word ‘Islam’ (or any other direct adjective indicating that a group, a country or a nation is Islamic) “Produce at least two meanings each time they are used. First they perform a simple identifying function, as when we say Khomeini is a Muslim, or Pope John Paul II is a Christian. Such statements tell us as a bare minimum what something is, as opposed to all other things. (…) The second function of these several labels is to produce a much more complex meaning. To speak of ‘Islam’ in the West today is to mean a lot of unpleasant things (Said, 1997, p: 118)”.

\[225\] For a detailed explanation of how Islam and Muslims are represented in the British media see: Chapter 2, Section 2:3:2: British Journalism and Islam: Orientalist misrepresentation
The results of this quantitative analysis clearly showed that while British journalists and editors chose not to use direct adjectives to define Turkey, the AKP and Erdoğan most of the time; the adjectives they used were highly based on religion.

The common use of adjectives that indicate the AKP and Turkey are indeed ‘Muslim’ can be read in two different ways as Said suggested. First of all, these adjectives simply declare a reality (Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a practicing Muslim) and in journalistic texts, these simple facts are often used to add variety and depth to the report. Journalists feel the need to use a different word or adjective instead of ‘Turkey’ after mentioning Turkey more than once (Paksoy, 2012, p: 242).

But the fact that Turkey’s secular identity was only underlined in 34 news articles show that the common use of religion based adjectives while defining Turkey or Turkish public indeed has a deeper meaning.

Also British journalists do not use as many religion-based adjectives when they write about predominantly Christian countries like Germany, Bulgaria or Poland and they do not mention that the German chancellor Angela Merkel is ‘Christian’ (Even though she is the leader of the Christian Democrat Party) in news items that are not specifically dealing with her views on religious affairs. So it can be argued that the British media’s inclination to define Turkey, the AKP or Erdoğan as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamist’ in every third article about the country does indeed carry a deeper meaning.
than simply stating a fact and can indicate that the coverage of Turkey is influenced by Orientalism\textsuperscript{226}.

Another common type of adjective that was used to define Turkey in this research sample was ‘alliance-based’. In 110 news items Turkey was defined as an ‘Ally’ and the fact that it is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) was reminded to the reader.

The widespread use of these two groups of adjectives (religion-alliance based) can be seen as contradictory since one is emphasizing the fact that Turkey is different from Europe while the other is reminding that Turkey is ‘on the same side’ with Europe.

But in the research sample the fact that Turkey is a ‘Nato ally’ was stated most commonly in articles covering Turkey’s foreign policy and it’s role in the conflicts taking place in the Middle East while religion based articles were commonly used in news items about Turkey’s internal affairs.

So the use of these adjectives sets perfectly with the idea that Turkey is a ‘Model Other’ to Britain. It shows that the British media (just like British politicians) see Turkey as an ally in international politics and want to present it as such. But on the other hand, does not necessarily view the country as completely European or a part of the self.

\textsuperscript{226}Quantitative results can not definitively show whether the over-use of religion-based adjectives are a sign of straight-forward Orientalism or not since they do not provide any data on the actual context Turkey's Islamic identity was emphasised. The influence of the emphasis on Turkey's religious identity in British broadsheets will be further analysed in the Qualitative Analysis chapter.
The common use of religion and alliance-based adjectives regarding Turkey in the British media and their affect on the perception of the Turkish identity in Britain will be further analysed in the Qualitative analysis chapter.

6:2:11 Actors

![Graph 12: Foreign actors that were mentioned or quoted in the research sample](image)

Actors in news items, whether they are institutions, politicians, state officials, experts, activists or members of public, play an important role in shaping the tone and point of view of the coverage. For a small number of events, the actors that are going to be mentioned or quoted in news reports are pre-determined, since the news story is singlehandedly revolving around a certain person, group or institution. But for many other events and issues, journalists have the opportunity to choose which actors they are going to quote or mention in their reports.
There are several factors that affect journalists’ decisions about actors that they are going to use in their reports such as organisational pressures, deadlines, economic restrictions and their own viewpoints. Official actors (government and state representatives) receive somewhat more media attention than unofficial actors (activists, citizens) in the news reports; and governing officials more than non-governing officials (Korthagen, 2013, p:26). In other words, journalists are more inclined to use actors with authority in a news story (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; Shehata and Hopmann, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2011).

Journalists prefer to mention or quote official actors with authority because the information provided by these actors is seen as factual, authoritative and legitimate. Also statements and commentaries of these actors are more accessible to journalists as a result of the work of professional public relations practitioners employed by their offices (Cook, 2005; Eshuis and Klijn, 2012 in Korthagen, 2013 p: 26).

Deadlines and economic pressures also affect the process of choosing actors, since some actors are harder to reach. And in some cases journalists’ personal viewpoint on a subject affects which actors they quote or mention in their news report.

All these factors are influential in the news making process but since this study is aiming to determine the way Turkey is being represented in the British print media, it will be focusing particularly on the factors that affect journalists’ actor choices in international news reporting.
Just like in domestic news events, when an international or foreign news event is in question journalists are more inclined to use actors with authority in their news reports. But while covering foreign news events, the nationalities of the actors that are going to be quoted or mentioned are also open to choice.

As explained previously, editors and journalists want to make any given international news story more relevant to their audience (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and to be able to achieve this they sometimes use domestic actors in their foreign news reports as opposed to solely using locals. They include opinions of domestic experts, get statements from their own politicians or use statements and testimonies from actors who are more culturally relevant to their audience compared to the actors from the country that the news event is taking place.
| Actors | 171 | 12 | 44 | 22 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 14 | 69 | 82 | 31 | 34 | 44 | 37 | 31 | 27 | 33 | 38 | 42 | 34 | 46 | 46 | 46 | 46 |
|--------|-----|----|----|----|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 0      | 1   | 4  | 0  | 0  | 59| 31| 31| 31| 10 | 69 | 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31| 31|
| 1      | 0   | 1  | 0  | 7  | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7  | 7  | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| 1      | 2   | 2  | 0  | 25 | 25| 18 | 23 | 101| 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| 0      | 1   | 2  | 0  | 27 | 19 | 21 | 20 | 90 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| 2      | 8   | 10 | 0  | 82 | 69 | 31 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 |
| 2      | 9   | 9  | 0  | 36 | 42 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 |
| 1      | 4   | 4  | 1  | 31 | 23 | 27 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| 3      | 5   | 7  | 0  | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 37 |

Table: 31
The Quantitative analysis determined that 35% of the news items in the research sample of this study were reporting on Turkish Middle-Eastern relations, making Middle East the most popular region in the coverage of Turkey. The actors that had been quoted or mentioned in these news items also reflected this reality. In 198 of the 731 news items (27%), Middle Eastern actors were either quoted or mentioned by journalists. But, while Turkish-American relations were the subject of only 76 news items in the research sample, (10% of the total coverage), a total of 156 American actors were quoted or mentioned in the research sample (Meaning American actors were used in 21% of the research sample).

The overrepresentation of American actors in the research sample, shows that in some news items journalists quoted and mentioned American actors even though the US was not a main actor of the news event. This can be explained by the USA’s role as a global power, long term presence as an actor in the Middle East as well as its cultural proximity to Britain. British actors were also slightly over represented in the coverage (News items focusing on the Turkish-British relations constituted 12% of the research sample but British actors were quoted or mentioned in 17% of the sample) but this can be seen as a natural occurrence while analysing British media outlets.

227 To view the full list of actors that were included in the “Middle Eastern actors” category, see: Annex 5 Coding Manual.
According to Said, the West’s tendency to speak for the Orient on matters concerning the Orient is a sign of Orientalism (Said, 2003) and over representation of ‘western’ actors in the research sample can be seen as the proof of the West’s tendency to speak for the Orient; but to be able to reach to this conclusion in regards to the use of actors in the British broadsheets, it is necessary to see how many Turkish actors were quoted or mentioned in the research sample.

In the research sample of this study Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was mentioned or directly quoted in a total of 426 news items (58 %), Turkish president at the time, Abdullah Gul, was quoted or mentioned in 95 (13 %) and other government and state officials from Turkey as well as representatives of Turkish ministries were quoted or mentioned in a total of 324 news items (44 %). These results contradict with Said’s claims, since Turkish voices were obviously more dominant in the coverage compared to ‘western’ voices. Foreign experts were quoted or mentioned in 101 news items while the opinions of Turkish experts were reported in 173 news items further indicating Turkish voices were more dominant in the
coverage (See: Table 52). Also while a total of 171 news items did not include any foreign actors, only 42 news items reported on Turkey without mentioning or quoting a single Turkish actor\textsuperscript{228}.

Looking at the rest of the Turkish actors in the research sample we can see that factors that were explained in the beginning of this section were influential in journalists’ decision about who to quote or mention in their news reports. While Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the official with highest authority in the country, was the most popular actor, he was followed by Abdullah Gul and other state officials. The representatives of the Turkish opposition were not quoted or mentioned as frequently since they do not hold the same level of authority as the officials in the government. Turkish army was also a dominant voice in the coverage of Turkey in the British media (They were quoted or mentioned in a total of 60 news items, 8% of the coverage). This is the consequence of the army’s influential role in the Turkish political life as well as the Ergenekon trial, which put the demilitarisation process in Turkey under the spotlight. Clashes with the Kurdish militants also raised the importance of the Turkish army as an actor in the British coverage. In this study Kurdish actors, who were quoted or mentioned in 107 news items (15% of the coverage) were another significant part of the coverage. The quantitative analysis showed that in the research sample 139 news items, constituting the 19% of the total research sample, were dealing directly with the Kurdish issue. The fact that the number of news items that include Kurdish actors is close to the number of news items directly dealing with the Kurdish issue, shows

\textsuperscript{228} It need to be noted that most of the journalists producing these news items do not speak or understand Turkish hence, their reports on Turkish actors are dependent on translations. For a detailed look in to this language deficiency see: Annex 1.
that the British broadsheets did not narrate the conflict story in a one sided way and included Kurdish voices to the news reports as well.
<table>
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<th>Newspapers</th>
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<th>The Independent</th>
<th>The Observer</th>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 52.

331
In depth interviews conducted for this research also showed that all in all Turkish voices, opinions and analysis was actually quite dominant in the British coverage of Turkey. For example, when asked about this interaction between Turkish and foreign journalists, Journalist M, who currently works as the London correspondent of a Turkish news channel said,

I consider most of the British correspondents working in London friends. Especially when I was working in İstanbul, they used to call me whenever they were writing an important story and I would give them my opinion. For example, back in 1994, during the local elections in İstanbul, a British journalist called me to ask about my predictions about it. I told him that Livaneli (the candidate for SHP-Social Democratic Populist Party) had no chance of winning against Recep Tayyip Erdogan and I gave him the reasons behind my predictions. The next day, I saw that he used quotes from me in his piece, referring to me as a ‘Turkish expert’. He also made the same predictions I made, using the same reasoning. That day, we translated his piece to Turkish and published it, saying ‘This is what Britain thinks about the elections’. It was quite amusing to report on my own words as if they were coming from ‘Britain’. This happens quite regularly in the Turkish press. When an opinion comes from the UK or the US it immediately becomes newsworthy for the Turkish press, even though Turkish people, Turkish journalists have been saying the same thing for ages. This still happens to this day. It is sort of a news cycle (Journalist M, interview with author, 2014).\

\[229\] For an extended section on in-depth interviews see: Annex 1
6:3 Analysis

In the last section of this chapter, quantitative findings are summarised and analysed in the context of the main research question ‘Is the British media representing Turkey as an Oriental Other, or as an extension of the European self?’ Concepts introduced in the Literature review such as othering, Orientalism and ‘the Model Other’ constitutes the theoretical basis of the analysis.

The quantitative analysis conducted on 731 news items that were published in four British broadsheets and their sister Sunday papers provided a significant amount of data regarding the way Turkish identity is being perceived and represented in the British media.

In the time period analysed for this study, British broadsheets produced an average of 23 news items about Turkey per month in total\textsuperscript{230}, indicating that Turkey is a significant and permanent actor in their international coverage. Additionally, they published 60 editorials and 10 front-page stories about the country.

While quantitative results showed that the density of the Turkish coverage was varied between British broadsheets, a direct causality between the political inclination of a news outlet and the number of news items it published on Turkey was not found. It was determined that the centre-left daily the *Guardian* provided the widest coverage of Turkey while the *Times*, a centre-right conservative daily, came second.

\textsuperscript{230} Average per month (During the 32 month period covered by this study): The Times: 6, The Daily Telegraph: 4, The Independent: 5, The Guardian: 7
*Independent*, another centre-left daily, published a relatively low number of news items regarding Turkey, yet it was the news outlet that published the highest number of commentaries about the country. This was in line with the newspaper’s general propensity to cover news events with a limited number of commentaries instead of a large number of news reports. The case of the *Independent* was seen as a demonstration of how different media outlets choose to cover world events in different manners and as a result it was decided that the density of a media outlet’s Turkey coverage was determined by its journalistic style and editorial policy towards international news, instead of its political viewpoint.

Nearly 200 journalists, based in 15 different countries produced the news items in the research sample of this study, according to the quantitative analysis. Many journalists produced less than 5 news items about Turkey and the number of journalists who regularly produced news reports and commentaries on Turkey were extremely limited.

The extensive range of by-lines in the research sample showed that the coverage of Turkey in the British media is not dominated by a limited number of viewpoints. Yet, there were merely 14 Turks amongst the journalists credited for writing the news items in the research sample and only one of the journalists who published regularly about Turkey was of Turkish origin. The lack of Turkish names amongst by-lines is worth mentioning because it shows that foreigners produced the narrative about Turkey in the British broadsheets almost singlehandedly.
The subjects and issues covered in the news items were also varied and different events and issues got different levels of coverage. This study quantitatively analysed the coverage of 31 major events about Turkey and determined that 6 of these events had no coverage whatsoever in the British broadsheets while other events like the Gezi Park protests or the Israeli Flotilla crisis received significant amounts of coverage.

This fluctuation in the British print media’s interest in Turkey was explained by natural editorial choices regarding newsworthiness. Yet, it was also determined that there was a noticeable negative bias in the coverage of Turkey. Several ‘positive’ news events like the approval of the headscarf bill that allowed women to enter university buildings while wearing their religious headscarves, the Kurdish peace process that was a major step towards ending the conflict or the Turkish parliament’s decision to increase Kurdish language rights received little or no attention from the British broadsheets.

While the dominance of negative events in the coverage of Turkey can be explained by the general negativity bias in the media, it can’t be denied that this negative representation is playing in to the hands of the Orientalist discourse. Omission of the ‘positive’ from the general narrative is emphasising Turkey’s image as an inferior, Oriental other to Britain.

The quantitative analysis also showed that the coverage of Turkey in the British media was mainly focused on the Middle East, with every third story reporting on Turkey’s relations with its neighbours in the region. In the recent years, conflicts in
the Middle East had been dominating international politics and as a result international media was also focused on the region. So, it is only natural that the British media followed Turkey’s relations with this region closely.

But quantitative results also showed that Turkish-European relations constituted less than 15% of the total coverage and news items that are directly dealing with Turkey’s prospects of joining the EU constituted a mere 1%. Especially during a period in which the discussion about the future of Europe was in the headlines of the British newspapers on a daily basis as a result of the Eurozone crisis, the lack of articles on Turkey’s relations with the region reveal that Turkey was not, in fact, seen as a European country that is a part of the debates and discussions about Europe and its future.

It was observed that the research sample covered a large variety of issues that are prominent in the debates about Turkey’s European identity. Issues that are causing Turkey’s place in the European community to be questioned, like the Armenian genocide or the human rights violations in the country, received a considerable amount of coverage.

The Kurdish conflict also received a significant amount of attention from the British media (Every fifth news item in the research sample was either reporting on the Kurdish conflict or referring to it while reporting on another issue). Kurds are an indicative part of the Turkish identity and the Kurdish problem (as well as the Turkish government’s attitude towards it) is highly influential on the EU’s perceptions of
Turkey. Results of this quantitative analysis showed that British media also presented the Kurdish conflict as an important part of the Turkish narrative\textsuperscript{231}.

Another issue regarding Turkey that had a significant amount of coverage in the British broadsheets was ‘Islamisation’. The accusations towards the government about undermining the secular principals of the country were mentioned in a total of 113 news items and the religious identity of the country was put under the spotlight.

The emphasis on Turkey’s religious identity in the coverage was also seen in the adjectives that were used to define the country and the Turkish government.

While not many direct adjectives were used in the research sample to define Turkey, a considerable percentage of the adjectives that were used were based on religion. The common use of adjectives that indicate Turkey is indeed ‘Muslim’ can be read in two different ways.

On one hand, since Islam is undoubtedly an important part of the Turkish identity, it can be argued that these adjectives were simply declaring facts and they were used to add depth and variety to news reports. But on the other hand, especially in the post-9/11 era, words like ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ are loaded with deeper meanings and frequent utilisation of these adjectives in the media can be seen as a sign of othering.

\textsuperscript{231} To be able to analyse the way this coverage affected the general representation of Turkey, it is necessary to look at “how” this issue was covered as well as “how often” it was covered. The detailed analysis of the way Kurdish issue was covered in the British broadsheets can be found in Annex 2.
And the fact that adjectives that emphasise the ‘secular’ identity of Turkey were not used as commonly (the ratio is 2 to 1) also supports this argument.

But even though the usage of religion-based adjectives was common in the research sample, actually, alliance-based adjectives dominated the coverage, putting forward the idea that Turkey was not a straight-forward Islamic other in the British media but rather it was (as it was explained in Bakić-Hayden’s Nesting Orientalisms), was presented as a lesser, more positive and acceptable other.

Also, the quantitative analysis showed that negative adjectives that were commonly used to define Muslims in the British media, such as ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, ‘terrorist’ etc. were not used to define the Turkish government or Turkey in the British media texts in the time period analysed for this study. The fact that these adjectives were not associated with the Turkish representation once again shows that Turkey, unlike a significant part of the world’s Muslim population, was not presented as a hostile Islamic other. Instead, it is possible to say that the country was presented as the representative of ‘good Islam’.

In 110 news items (compared to 76 news items for religion-based adjectives) Turkey was defined as a political or military ‘ally’ of Europe and in some cases the ‘West’. This shows that, even if Turkey was being orientalised by the frequent use of religion-

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232 For a detailed examination of what Islam and Muslims are generally associated with in the British media see: Chapter 2.
based adjectives, it was also being presented as a positive actor with the emphasis on its ally status\textsuperscript{233}.

The analysis of the foreign and local ‘actors’ in the research sample also showed that Turkey was not presented as a straightforward Oriental other in the British media. Said claims that the West’s tendency to speak for the Orient on matters concerning the Orient is a sign of Orientalism (Said, 2003) but the results of this quantitative analysis showed that in the British coverage of Turkey, Turkish actors were clearly more dominant compared Western or European actors.

In conclusion, it can be argued that there were two sides to the coverage of Turkey in the British media.

From one viewpoint, the quantitative analysis showed that British media emphasised the “Otherness” of Turkey by frequently underlining it’s Muslim identity and focusing on the country’s affairs in the Middle East while paying nearly no attention to its relations with Europe in their coverage. They also gave weight to the coverage of “negative” events while ignoring positive occurrences in the country and in their narratives clearly differentiated Turkey from its Western counterparts.

But, on the other hand, they emphasised Turkey’s role as an ‘ally to the West’ on a regular basis and gave weight to Turkish actors in their reports about the country rather than telling the Turkish story through Western actors.

\textsuperscript{233} It needs to be noted that while definitions that categorise Turkey as a an ally of the West are positive, they also categorically differentiate Turkey from the Western/ European self.
These findings were in line with the initial hypothesis of this study, which argued that Turkey is not presented as a hostile, straightforward Oriental other in the British media but instead was presented as a ‘lesser’, somewhat more positive other.

The numerical data gathered as a result of the content analysis clearly shows that Turkey was not subjected to the same level of othering and vilification that Muslims in general face on a daily basis. Turkey and its government were not defined by overtly negative adjectives like ‘terrorist’, ‘attacker’, ‘aggressor’, ‘extremist’, ‘militant’ or ‘suicide bomber’. Yet, as mentioned before, it also was not included in to the European discussions and was generally presented as a strictly Middle Eastern actor.

In the end, the quantitative analysis helped establishing two important aspects of the representation of Turkey in the British print media.

First of all the results showed that, Said’s theory of Orientalism, which is based on strictly dichotomous differentiations between the West and the Orient, can not be used to explain and understand the Turkish representation in the British media on its own.

Yet, secondly the results also portrayed that claiming that Orientalism is not influential on Turkey’s representation in British media texts is also not possible.

Hence, these results, while providing a detailed map for the coverage of Turkey between 2007-2013 also showed that Bakić-Hayden’s Nesting Orientalisms can be a
useful tool to explain Turkey’s status as a complicated, lesser other in the British media.

However, numerical data collected through quantitative analysis on its own is not sufficient to make a final judgement on the representation of Turkey and the Turkish identity in the British media, since numbers and statistics do not provide an insight on the ‘meaning’ of the analysed texts. So, in the next chapter a qualitative analysis will be conducted on selected news items from the initial research sample in an attempt to paint a more detailed picture of the Turkish coverage in the British broadsheets.
CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

7:1 Introduction

As explained previously in the Methodology chapter, by conducting a quantitative content analysis, it is possible to determine “Who says what through which channel to whom and with what effect” in the media content in an objective and scientific way (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p: 12). Yet this method fails to explain latent meaning, implicit patterns, assumptions and omissions of a text.

In a study trying to determine how Turkey and its government are being represented in the British print media through texts; it is essential to understand and explain the meaning and context of these texts as well as ‘what was said’ and/or ‘how many times it was said’ in them.

For example, determining how many times Turkey was referred to as a ‘predominantly Muslim country’ or ‘a NATO ally’ in the research sample is not enough to paint an accurate picture of how Turkey is being represented in the British press. To be able to produce a complete analysis, it is necessary to understand in which instances these factual definitions were used and what kind of an image was actually created by using them.

So, to be able to paint an accurate picture of the representation of Turkey in the British press between 2007 and 2013, a qualitative textual analysis is conducted on
150 selected articles, 60 editorials and 10 front-page articles about Turkey. Interviews conducted with British and Turkish journalists who produced or analysed these texts are also used in the analysis.

As explained in detail in the Methodology Chapter, the analysis is conducted using the Qualitative Analysis computer software named Nvivo.

Using the complementary research questions listed in the Methodology Chapter, 4 main “nodes” or coding groups (Representation of Turkey as the Oriental Other, Representation of Turkey as a part of the European Self, Representation of Turkey as the ‘model’ Other and Attitudes towards AKP) are created to conduct a structural analysis of the selected news items.

After determining the main coding groups, several sub-nodes relevant to the research questions such as ‘Mentions of human rights abuses’, ‘Kurdish issue’, ‘Armenian genocide’, ‘Turkish military’ and ‘Turkish seculars’ were created in order to analyse specific aspects of the coverage. Then, each selected article was scanned and coded using these sub-nodes.

The complementary research questions for Qualitative Textual Analysis were:
1. Was there a qualitative difference between the representations of Turkey in the centre-left and centre-right British broadsheets?
2. Which aspects of the Turkish identity were dominant in the coverage?
3. Were British broadsheets supportive of Turkey’s EU membership bid? (If so) What were the reasons behind their support?
4. In which ways British media presented Turkey as an Other in their coverage between 2007-2013?
5. What were the implications of the narrative that classify Turkey as a “Model” for the country's representation in the British media?
6. Did British media’s perception of AKP change in the time scale of the study?
7. Were the government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at Western journalists during this period substantial?
In this chapter, the data gathered through this coding process will be used to qualitatively analyse the representation of Turkey in the British media texts in two main sections: ‘Turkey in British Media Texts’ and ‘The AKP and Erdogan in British Media Texts”.

Both sections will analyse Turkish representation in the British media using the concepts of othering and Orientalism and will try to determine whether westernised, secular and allegedly European Turkey is being included in to the European self, or whether it is still being othered and orientalised as a result of its religion, cultural heritage and history.

While arguing that Turkey is situated somewhere between the European self and the Oriental other, this chapter will seek to explain how this unique position is affecting the way news about Turkey are being covered by the British media.
7:2 Turkey in the British media

This section will look into different ways Turkey has been othered in the British print media between 2007-13. Starting with a detailed analysis of the 10 front page articles about Turkey, the section will continue with an analysis of the ways British media used the first person plural in their narratives and argue that the exclusion of Turkey from the ‘we’ in media texts is a proof that the country in not being perceived as a part of the European self. After that, the coverage of Turkey’s EU membership bid will be analysed as one of the British media’s means of othering. Finally the section will focus on how Turkey’s religious and historical identities have been used as a method of othering in the British media.

7:2:1 Turkey on the front pages:

The most visible and as a result most influential part of a newspaper is its front page. Every day millions of people glance through front pages of newspapers in supermarkets, off licences and newsagents even if they do not buy or carefully read them.

Also multiple news organisations, including the BBC, publish photographs of the front pages of British newspapers on their websites or read them during their morning broadcasts, causing the news items on these pages to reach a wider audience than the rest of the newspaper.
In this section, news items about Turkey that were published on the front page of a British broadsheet will be analysed in order to determine which issues and news events about Turkey were highlighted in the British media and to see if Turkey was presented as a European country on this most visible part of newspapers.

In the seven-year time period analysed for this study, only 10 news items about Turkey were published on the front pages of the selected British broadsheets. As detailed in the Quantitative Analysis Chapter, three news items about the Kurdish conflict (Guardian 25/10/2007; Guardian 23/10/2007; Independent 23/02/2008), one item about Turkey’s role in the Syrian civil war (Telegraph, 10/04/2012), a story about an earthquake that killed hundreds of people in Eastern Turkey (Telegraph, 26/10/2011) and the Gezi Park protests (Guardian, 04/06/2013) made it to the front pages of selected British broadsheets.

The AKP’s general election victory in 2007 (Guardian, 23/07/2007), the Israeli Flotilla crisis (Guardian, 01/06/2010), murder of two Northern Irish women in a Turkish holiday resort (Sunday Times, 21/08/2011) and Turkey’s mediation efforts during the Iranian nuclear crisis (Times, 18/05/2010) were the remaining subjects that carried Turkey to the front pages of British newspapers.

Nearly all of the front-page news items analysed for this study were covering negative news events about Turkey, with only the oldest of the ten articles reporting on a rather natural event; the Turkish general elections.
The short news article titled ‘Turkey’s AKP scores landslide victory’ was published by the *Guardian* and defined the election results as a “Triumph for AKP”. The article claimed that the Turkish political party obtained this victory after facing “veiled threats of a military overthrow (*Guardian, 23/07/2007*)” and stated that this election was seen as “the most crucial Turkish election in the last generation (ibid)”. While hinting that the newspaper was supportive of AKP’s second term in power, the news article had an objective and informative tone.

Immediately after the elections, three news items about Turkey were published on the front pages of British broadsheets and all of these articles were focusing on the Kurdish conflict. The *Guardian* published two of these articles while the *Independent* published the remaining one.

All three articles on the Kurdish conflict presented Turkey under a negative light and used a narrative that is complimentary of the Kurdish fighters.

After the escalation of the Kurdish conflict, Turkey was not mentioned on front-pages of analysed British broadsheets for over a year.

On 18 May 2010, *Times* published a front-page article about the deal Brazilian President Lula de Silva reached with Iran regarding its controversial nuclear program. In the article, newspaper mentioned that “Iran accepted to ship 1 200 kg’s of low-enriched Uranium to Turkey in return for 120 kg of fuel rods for a Tehran research

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235 For a detailed analysis of British media’s attitude towards the AKP and Turkey in 2007, see: Chapter 6 section: 6:3:1 2007- 2010: A period of unconditional support

236 Front-page news items about the Kurdish conflict will be analysed in detail in the following sections of this chapter.
reactor (*Times*, 18/05/2010)” but did not elaborate on Turkey’s role in the deal. The article also did not use any quotes from any Turkish actors and only focused on the US’s reaction to the subject.

The next Turkey related news event that carried the country to a British broadsheet’s front page was the Israeli flotilla crisis. In an article titled ‘Gaza flotilla assault: Israel accused of state terrorism after deadly assault on flotilla: At least nine Gaza bound activists killed: Dozens were wounded by commandos: Turkey leads international condemnation (*Guardian*, 01/06/2010)’ *the Guardian* reported on Israel’s attack on the Turkish Mavi Marmara Flotilla, which was aiming to reach Gaza to deliver humanitarian aid.

The article used a quote by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the second paragraph and used a narrative that supported Turkey’s interpretation of the event. It was also highly critical of Israel and its government.

Barely a week after the flotilla incident Turkey was on the front-page of *Times*’ sister paper the *Sunday Times*. The Sunday newspaper published an article about the murder trial of Recep Celik (17) who confessed to killing two British women from Northern Ireland in the Turkish holiday resort Kusadasi (*Sunday Times*, 21/08/2011).

The article about the trial, titled ‘Turkish murder suspect 'confessed for lenient sentence’, was written by *Sunday Times* reporter John Rooney.
A British citizen getting murdered in a foreign country is almost always newsworthy for British media outlets yet the significant thing about this article is the emphasis on the suspect’s nationality and profession. The article underlined the fact that the murder suspect is a ‘Turkish waiter’ on a regular basis.

British women’s holiday romances with Turkish men and the disastrous results of these relationships are a news subject that is incredibly popular with British and Turkish tabloids alike. British tabloids generally use these stories as an opportunity to present Turkish men as ‘oppressive, controlling and opportunistic’ predators from an alien and ‘Oriental’ culture, while Turkish media uses the same stories to present British women as ‘sex crazed, easy and promiscuous’ individuals (Turksoy, Zoonen and Kuipers, 2004, 2014a).

This front-page article by the *Sunday Times* does not contain these obvious stereotypes; but it still shows even a broadsheet, which normally uses a less sensationalised narrative while reporting on crime, cannot resist the allure of this narrative and over-emphasise the suspects’ nationality and occupation.

The next news event that carried Turkey to a British broadsheet’s front-page was the earthquake that killed 604 people in Eastern Turkey on 23 October 2011. *The Daily Telegraph* published a news item about baby Azra Karaduman who was rescued after spending 48 hours under the rubble of her collapsed home with her mother (*Telegraph*, 26/10/2011).
While focusing on a miraculous recovery, the article emphasised the lack of organisation in Turkish government’s rescue and aid distribution efforts and represented Turkey under a negative light.

6 months after the earthquake Turkey was on the front-page of the *Daily Telegraph*, but this time as a result of Syrian army’s attack on a Turkish border town.

In an article titled ‘Syrian violence spills across the borders (*Telegraph*, 10/04/2012)’, the newspaper explained how the Syrian conflict was affecting Turkey and Lebanon while giving a brief overview of the latest situation in the region. The tone of the article is highly supportive of Turkey and clearly identifies Turkey as ‘an ally’ of the West and a victim of Syrian President Assad’s aggression.

The last front-page article about Turkey that was published in the period analysed for this study was covering the Gezi Park protests.

In the article titled ‘Unrest grows in Turkey as US wades in’, the *Guardian* chose to lead with the US’s reaction to the protests instead of the latest developments in Turkey, indicating that the Turkish protests gained more importance in the eyes of the media outlet when politicians from the US reacted to it (*Guardian*, 04/06/2013).

The article, which defined the protest movement as a “Nationwide protest against the rule of Prime Minister Erdogan”, was highly critical of the Turkish government. It focused on the police brutality and gave a detailed record of the protesters’ injuries.
After taking a close look at the front-page news items in the research sample of this study, we can say that the British broadsheets were more inclined to carry negative developments about Turkey to their front pages.

While these negative news stories about Turkey that made it to the front pages of British broadsheets may have played a role in the representation of Turkey as an inferior, problematic and conflict ridden other to the British public, they most certainly are amongst the biggest news stories about the country at the time and they have a higher news value compared to positive news stories coming from Turkey. So, even though they portray Turkey as a country covered in conflicts, riots and poverty; it will not be justifiable to argue that they were published on the front page as a result of the Orientalist tendencies of British journalists.

But, front-page news items still give an indication of the way a media outlet views and presents Turkey. For example after looking at these ten articles we can confidently say that Turkey was not presented as a European country on the British broadsheets’ front-pages.

None of the front-page items were focusing on Turkey’s relations with Europe or indicating in anyway that Turkey is more than an occasional ally to Britain.
Othering Turkey through excluding it from the first person plural

As Coleman and Ross pointed out in their book ‘The media and the public: Them and us in media discourse’, media narratives are based on an ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy (Coleman and Ross, 1957) that reflects the concepts of self and other (ibid, p: 135).

In media narratives, the first-person plural pronoun is used to refer to the ‘self’ but this ‘self’ can represent different identities in different contexts.

While reporting on domestic affairs, media outlets generally only refer to a small section of the public (that they identify as their target audience) as ‘us’ and hence present it as the ‘self’\(^\text{237}\). For British broadsheets that group is the educated, tax paying, predominantly white and Christian middle-class. For example; they rarely refer to British Muslims, immigrants or people living in municipal housing (public housing) as ‘us’ even though these groups constitute a large percentage of the British population (Coleman and Ross, 1957 p: 135-136)\(^\text{238}\).

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\(^{237}\) For a detailed discussion on the use of first person plural in media narratives and conversations in general see: Scheibman, 2004 and Duszak, 2002.

\(^{238}\) The problem with the way journalists use the first person plural in their narratives has been brought to Guardian’s attention by a reader, In an open letter Guardian leader Fred Dee said he is not happy with headlines declaring “We are drinking more real ale” or “Now we understand the universe better” because, according to him, the use of first person plural in these contexts exclude large sections of the society. Guardian readers’ editor Chris Elliott penned an article about this issue which can be read at: Elliott, 2012, The readers’ editor on ... inappropriate use of the first person plural, the Guardian, URL: [http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/12/inappropriate-use-first-person-plural](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/12/inappropriate-use-first-person-plural), accessed: 06/08/2015.
Yet, in news items about Britain’s foreign affairs, British media stretches the first person plural to embrace whole of the British public, European community and in some cases the entire ‘Western civilisation’.

In news items about Britain’s relations with the European Union, media outlets use the first-person plural pronoun to refer to the ‘British public’ and ‘Britain’ in general but in news items about the country’s relations with, for example, Syria, ‘us’ can refer to a large range of allies and ‘friends’.

As a result, in many narratives dealing with international affairs, ‘us’ becomes an entity that is based on a certain set of values and alliances. And since the use of the

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239 Luu Thi Kim Nhung touched upon this issue in his dissertation titled “A critical discourse of a UK broadsheet paper on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005” and he argued that the analysed broadsheet (Independent) was vague about what first person plural stands for in their coverage of the issue. He says,

Except for the use of our to refer to the world in line 3 of the text, almost all of the other uses of the first person plural pronoun seem to denote the U.K. as a united people - a collective actor, comprising everyone living in, constituting the U.K. with a common interest in and an aggregated effort in support of the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, as a means to eliminating the hurdles of adverse impacts of climate change. The United Kingdom of Britain, with ‘our Kyoto obligation,’ ‘our own national target,’ ‘our climate change programme,’ ‘our own action at home’ ‘have set our own targets,’ ‘must remain committed to this target,’ and ‘should give a single cheer for Kyoto’ so that ‘we can find a way forward which puts the long term interests of us all first.’ This prevalence of the first person plurals seem to foreground a nationalistic or patriotic ideology. However, in line 46, it is unclear who the pronoun us (in the long term interests of us all first) refer to: does us here refer to the U.K. or the E.U., or both? With such vagueness in reference, there is one question left unresolved as to whether who will find a way forward for the long term interests of us all (Nhung, 2005, A critical discourse of a UK broadsheet paper on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, URL: http://foe.hnue.edu.vn/Portals/1/Luu%20Kim%20Nhung.pdf, accessed: 04/08/2015).

240 A recent example to this can be seen in the Telegraph article in which the writer uses the first person plural to define the entirety of Britain against the EU. (Scott, 2015 Daily Telegraph, Even if we scrap the Human Rights Act, we'll still be beholden to EU laws, URL: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11768166/Even-if-we-scrap-the-Human-Rights-Act-well-still-be-beholden-to-EU-laws.html, accessed: 06/08/2015)

241 For example, in an article for the Independent Paddy Ashdown uses “We” and “West” interchangeably while talking about defeating ISIS. (Ashdown, 2015 Diplomacy not bombs will defeat Isis – the West is being sucked into sectarian conflict, the Independent, URL: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/diplomacy-not-bombs-will-defeat-isis-the-west-is-being-sucked-into-sectarian-conflict-10405995.html, accessed: 06/08/2015)
first-person plural is a clear indication of who and what is included in to the ‘self’ in that given context; one wonders if Turkey, an important ally, economic partner and a prospective member of the European Union, ever gets to be included in it.

As seen in the editorials they published about Turkey in the last seven years, British broadsheets constantly claim Turkey should be seen as a European country. They emphasize Turkey’s importance for the region, underline the fact that Turkey and rest of the European Union are bound together by shared interests (Daily Telegraph, 05/09/2007)” and criticize France and Germany for alienating the Turks by blocking their EU membership bid (Times, 14/06/2011; Daily Telegraph, 28/06/2010). Also, the most common adjective they use in their coverage to directly define Turkey is ‘ally’.

Yet, if we look at the general narrative closely, we see that Turkey is never included in to the first person plural and as a result the European or the Western ‘self’.

Just to give some examples; the Daily Telegraph once said “Turkey’s role in the flotilla affair should worry us all in the west (Daily Telegraph, 04/06/2010)” while the Guardian, commenting on the Syrian civil war, stated that “There is a moral case for intervention, but with the west reluctant, Turkey and other powers will be the ones to decide (Guardian, 12/04/2012).”

These narratives, like many others, plainly draw a line between “the West” which is the ‘self (us) and Turkey, the ‘other’ (them). They make it clear that, according to
British broadsheets Turkey is an ally but it is not a part of the European first person plural.

And even when Turkey’s president at the time, Abdullah Gul, said “There is no reason to have doubts about Turkey, we are European (The Times, 02/07/2010)”, The Times went with the subhead “President Gul assures Martin Fletcher and Suna Erdem that the West can trust its powerful Islamic ally (emphasis added, ibid)”.

This attitude shows that even when the highest-ranking representative of the Turkish republic openly declares the country to be European, or acts as an ally, it is not included in to the European or the Western ‘self’ in British media narratives.

Western civilization’s reluctance to include Turkey in to the ‘civilized’ self was most obvious in 2007, when Turkey decided to launch a cross-border attack in to Iraq under the banner of so-called ‘war on terror’.

The British broadsheets, who generally supported Turkey’s EU membership bid and classified the country as a strategic and important ally, started to question the legitimacy of Turkey’s involvement in the ‘civilized’ self and desire to rage its own ‘war against terrorism’.

Famous Slovanian Philosopher Slavoj Zizek, explained this in a commentary for the Guardian:

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242 British broadsheets attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession will be analysed in detail in the following sections of this chapter.
With the likelihood of Turkey launching a cross-border attack under the banner of the war on terror growing by the minute, it is as if an intruder has gatecrashed the closed circle of "we", the domain of those who hold the de facto monopoly on military humanitarianism. What makes the situation unpleasant is not Turkey's "otherness", but its claim to sameness. What such a situation reveals is the set of unwritten rules and silent prohibitions that qualifies the "we" of the enlightened humanity (Guardian, 23/10/2007).

In other words, Turkey was an ally, a partner and even a possible future EU member, but at its core it was not a part of the European or Western self that can participate in ‘military humanitarianism’. That kind of action was reserved for the real, ‘superior’ and ‘civilized’ European/Western Self.

This attitude is in line with Bakić-Hayden’s theory of Nesting Orientalisms (Bakić-Hayden, 1992), which points out the gradation of Orients and provides an explanation for Turkey’s place in the periphery of the first person plural.

Differentiating Turkey from the European self by excluding it from the first person plural in the coverage is a powerful proof for Turkey’s status as the other in the British media coverage. The roots of this attitude, which excludes Turkey from the first person plural and hence the European self, can be found in correspondents’ personal views about Turkey. In-depth interviews conducted for this study showed that journalists who report on Turkey for British broadsheets do not perceive the country as a part of the European/Western identity. Yet, they also emphasised that they do not see Turkey as a fully Middle Eastern (Islamic) country either. When asked, if they consider Turkey to be a European country or a Middle Eastern one, all journalists seemed to be hesitant to give a definitive answer. For example, Journalist

243 For details of the interviews see: Annex 1
C said, “In my opinion [Turkey is] both, I find that difficult to answer with one or the other (Journalist C, interview with author, 2015)”. It is possible to argue that this attitude shows that Turkey, while being a ‘lesser’ other, which is in the periphery of the self, is still not being seen as an acceptable member of the ‘civilized world’ by the British media.

This attitude was also prominent in the coverage of Turkey’s EU membership bid in the last decade.

French and German media outlets oppose Turkey’s membership bid claiming that Turkey is not European (or in other words ‘part of the European self’) and hence should not be in the European Union. On the other hand British media, following British foreign policy, gave their full support to Turkey’s membership bid.

But just like they do in their coverage of many other subjects, while covering Turkey’s EU membership bid British media once again refrained from including Turkey in to the European first person plural.

In other words, their support for Turkish accession was not an indication of their belief in Turkey’s belongingness to the European self. Rather, it was just another indication of how they see Turkey as an other.
Othering Turkey in the coverage of EU membership negotiations

If Turkey can play a role as a member of the European Union, engaged in shared projects, promoting shared values, the prize for Turkey, for Britain and for Europe as a whole is immense: to witness an age where the world is not only more connected and more interdependent, but also more at ease with the different identities that Turkey bridges, and as a result, more secure.

David Milliband (The Daily Telegraph, 05/09/2007)

The following section will analyse British broadsheet’s coverage of an issue that incorporates all the discussions and view points regarding Turkey’s place in the European community: Turkey’s European Union membership bid.

The analysis will also try to determine the British broadsheets’ attitudes towards controversial issues relevant to Turkey’s accession to the EU, such as the Kurdish conflict, Armenian genocide and the country’s human rights record.

7:2:3:1 Coverage of Turkey’s EU bid:

In 2010, within three months of becoming the Prime Minister of Britain, David Cameron visited the Turkish capital, Ankara. When asked ‘Why Turkey?’ and, ‘Why so soon?’ he said: “Because Turkey is vital for our economy, vital for our security and vital for our politics and our diplomacy (Cameron, 2010)”.

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After acknowledging Turkey’s importance for Britain with this grand gesture, the prime minister continued to show his support to the country by promising to ‘fight’ for its membership to the European Union. He even claimed that a European Union without Turkey at its heart was "not stronger but weaker... not more secure but less... not richer but poorer (ibid)".

Cameron’s support for Turkey’s European aspirations was simply a continuation of a longstanding British foreign policy. Britain has been a strong supporter of Turkey’s European Union membership bid since it applied to accede to the European Economic Community, the predecessor of European Union, on 14 April 1987244.

While Britain stood firmly with Turkey for nearly three decades, other member states like Germany, France and Netherlands openly objected to the country’s European aspirations. Most recently in June 2013, in the wake of Ankara's fierce crackdown on the Gezi Park protests, Germany blocked the new EU accession talks with Turkey (Guardian, 21/06/2013).

But David Cameron recently repeated his strong support for Turkey’s membership bid during another visit to the Turkish capital in 2014. He said, “In terms of Turkish membership of the EU, I very much support that. That’s a longstanding position of British foreign policy which I support (Daily Telegraph, 09/12/2014)”.

Looking at the news items about Turkey’s membership bid published between 2007 and 2013 we can see that British broadsheets, liberal and conservative alike, followed

244 For a detailed look in to British attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union see chapter 2 section 2:3:3 and chapter 4.
the Prime Minister’s lead in showing support for Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

For example, the Guardian, in a leader titled ‘Turkey: a vital player’, said “Mr Cameron is fundamentally right to keep hammering away at what much of the Europe now considers a lost cause: Turkey’s membership of the EU (Guardian, 28/July/2010)”. Similarly the Times stated, “The EU carrot doesn’t look that tasty, but it’s in everyone’s interest for Ankara to take it (Times, 29/07/2010)” and in an editorial titled ‘Stabilising Turkey’ the Daily Telegraph, rather directly, said “This newspaper has long supported Turkey’s European ambitions (Daily Telegraph, 24/02/2010).

Yet, while their unanimous support to the membership bid shows that British broadsheets ‘want to see Turkey in the European Union’ it does not necessarily mean that they perceive Turkey as a ‘European country’.

Britain’s support for the Turkish accession is based on the country’s ‘functionalist’ or ‘utility-based’ understanding of the union and does not necessarily mean that it perceives Turkey as an integral part of the European identity. And, British broadsheets seem to be on the same page with their government on this issue.

British media outlets used several arguments in their narratives to support Turkey’s accession to the union but none of these arguments actually portrayed Turkey as a part of the European self.
In their coverage, British broadsheets mainly argued that they are supporting Turkish accession because it may change the identity of the European Union itself, to the benefit of Britain\textsuperscript{245}.

British governments have long been opposing the idea of a federal Europe (an attitude which goes hand in hand with the essentialist or value-based approach to European integration), in which Brussels will have more power than national governments\textsuperscript{246}.

British broadsheets (especially the centre-right ones which are more Eurosceptic in nature) also supported this line of thought in their narratives and their fierce opposition to a ‘federal Europe’ played a significant role in their undisputable support for Turkey’s EU membership bid.

They claimed, Turkey’s accession to the Union would not validate its identity as a European nation but instead would make the European Union a weaker and looser free trade area. In a editorial published in 2008, \textit{Daily Telegraph} explained this by saying:

\begin{quote}
[Turkey’s accession to the European Union] would also help Europe move towards a broader and looser free trade area and away from the top down, over regulated super state dreamed of by the Brussels establishment (\textit{Daily Telegraph}, 29/07/2008).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{245} For detailed explanations of these arguments, see chapters 2 and 4.
\textsuperscript{246} Prime Minister David Cameron emphasised that his government is still holding this position during a speech in 2014, in which he opposed the candidature of federalist Jean Claude Juncker for European Commission Presidency. He said: “Jean Claude Juncker has been at the heart of the project to increase the power of Brussels and reduce the power of nation states for his entire working life. He is not the right person to take this organisation forward (\textit{Guardian}, 27/06/2014, “Juncker is wrong person for European commission job, says David Cameron”, URL: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/27/juncker-wrong-person-european-commission-leadership-david-cameron, accessed: 06/08/2015)
Also, again in line with the utility-based approach to the European integration, British broadsheets based most of their arguments on Turkey’s value as a political, economic and military ally and underlined the role of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and the Middle East.

In their coverage, British broadsheets also claimed that the alleged shift in Turkey’s foreign policy was a result of the European Union’s reluctance to allow the country in. They argued that Brussels should welcome Turkey in to the union if they do not want Europe to lose a crucial ally.

Yet, while making these points, none of the British broadsheets ever claimed that Turkey is a part of the shared history, culture or values that shape the modern European identity and they never openly declared Turkey ‘a European country’. For example, while commenting on Turkey’s possible EU membership Daily Telegraph said:

The country [Turkey] is demonstrating its usefulness to the West in myriad ways – providing a link to less sympathetic nations in the Middle East, such as Iran; remaining a faithful member of NATO and supplier of troops in Afghanistan and playing a crucial role in the development of secure energy routes [...] the West should do its utmost to ensure our friend and ally remains a stable, democratic and prosperous nation. The best way to do that is to push forward the accession talks (Daily Telegraph, 24/02/2010).

In this editorial, Daily Telegraph clearly showed that they are strongly backing Turkey’s EU membership bid, just like the British government. But, their argument to

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247 It has been argued that Turkey’s foreign policy, which was facing Westwards for nearly a century faced a paradigm shift, under AKP government. (Sözen, 2010; Murinson, 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz; 2009; Oğuzlu, 2008; Kutlay, 2011)
do so was based on Turkey’s *usefulness for the EU* rather than its belongingness to it. In other words, they were welcoming a treasured ally in to a political and economic union, but not in to the European identity.

In a 2010 editorial, the *Guardian* also used a similar approach. They explained that Turkey is a useful and necessary ally that would be even more useful as a EU member. But, they also underlined Turkey’s differences from Europe by saying “This [their support for the Turkish accession] is not to paper over the gaps that open up between Turkey and European norms (*Guardian, 28/07/2010)*”.

And the *Times*, in an editorial published in the same year, declared that “Turkey is turning East, encouraged by the neglectful foreign policy of Western nations” and continued to say “The most conspicuous example of [this] neglect is the reluctant attitude of the European Union (*Times, 05/07/2010)*”. The media outlet suggested that since Turkey’s cooperation is vital for Europe’s security, Britain should make up for this neglect by supporting Turkey’s European ambitions (ibid).

As it can be observed in these examples, British broadsheets were not focusing on Turkey’s ‘European identity’ or claiming that ‘Turkey is a part of the European self’ while they were rooting for the country’s accession to the union. Instead, they were only suggesting that Turkey’s membership would be advantageous for Britain and the European Union.
In their coverage they were also pointing out that ‘Muslim’ Turkey’s accession to the European Union would be highly beneficial to ensure peace and stability of the European community.248

Broadsheets used narratives that indicate that they see Turkey as a ‘model’ Muslim nation, which does not participate in Islamic extremism and is eager to adjust itself to the Western values. They argued that Turkey could be a useful ‘bridge’ between two conflicting civilisations (Times, 05/07/2010; Independent 24/07/2007; Daily Telegraph 09/06/2013; Times, 01/06/2010; Observer 06/06/2010).

A columnist for the Times, Antonia Senior, explained this in a 2010 commentary titled ‘Frenemy or enemy Turkey should be in Europe (Times, 29/07/2010)’.

You can see it [Turkish accession] as a way for moderate, secular but nominally Christian states to extend a hand of friendship to a moderate, Islamic but nominally secular, state. Alternatively, you can take the view that Islam is an implacable enemy of Western values. [...] But even if you take this line, Turkish membership of the EU is still the answer. [...] It can only aid European relations with the rest of the Islamic world if we build a close fraternal bond with Turkey (ibid).

In her article, Senior strongly supported Turkey’s accession to the EU, on the basis that Turkey is ‘the Model Muslim country’ or ‘the best in a bad bunch’. Yet, she did

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248 It needs to be noted that all journalists interviewed for this study (who report on Turkey from Turkey for British broadsheets) unanimously said that, just like the publications they work for, they want to see Turkey in the European Union. But the reasons for their support were significantly different compared to the broadsheets that they work for. As mentioned above, British broadsheets support Turkey’s accession to the European Union because they think it will be beneficial for Britain. Yet, journalists interviewed for this study emphasized the fact that accession will be beneficial for Turkey and the Turkish public. For example, Journalist D said “Obviously I really hope it one day does [join the European Union]. I think regardless of whether or not it ends up joining it’s a massively positive thing for Turkey to be in the accession process (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).” For details see: Annex 1.
not even hint at Turkey’s Europeanness. As the use of the words ‘Frenemy or Enemy’ in the title indicates, she was still presenting Turkey as an other.

In her conclusion she even stated that Turkey’s accession to the European Union could be seen as “[either] binding the bastards closer, or embracing your Muslim brothers (ibid)” further illustrating the fact that Turkey is either a ‘Muslim’ ally or a straight forward enemy, but never a ‘European brother’ or a part of the European self in the eyes of the British media.

All in all, British broadsheets’ positive attitude towards Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU cannot be interpreted as a sign of their acceptance of Turkey in to the European Self since none of their supportive arguments is based on Turkey’s “Western/European” identity, created as a result of a long and painful Westernisation process.\(^\text{249}\) Instead, these arguments focus on Turkey’s Muslim identity, or perceived “Otherness”.

In other words, narratives used in the coverage regarding Turkey’s European Union bid indicate that British media perceive and present Turkey as a useful and necessary Other but not as a part Europe. These narratives show that Turkey, with its multifaceted identity, is neither presented as a straightforward Oriental Other nor a part of the European Self in British broadsheets, even when it is being encouraged to join in to the European Union. And the main reason for Turkey’s exclusion from the European Self is the prominence of Islam in its identity.\(^\text{250}\).

\(^{249}\) See: Chapter 3, section 3:2 Westernisation of the Turk
\(^{250}\) This conclusion is in line with Bryce’s findings, who after analysing the coverage of the October 3rd process in British broadsheets concluded that “Commentary in UK newspapers which, while sympathetic to the notion of Turkish EU membership, still deploys a discourse that remains
Islam is still the quality that unifies several Oriental others in the eyes of the Western civilisation (Just like Judeo-Christian heritage is still a unifying factor for the European self) and Turkey’s Muslim identity affects the way its represented and othered in British media texts.

This chapter will provide an extensive analysis on the affects of Turkey’s Muslim identity on the British media coverage. But first, the following sections will look in to the British broadsheets’ attitudes towards controversial issues relevant to Turkey’s accession to the EU such as the Kurdish conflict, the Armenian genocide and the country’s human rights record.

7:2:3:2 Coverage of human rights issues:

The issue of human rights is of high importance for Turkey’s claim to ‘Europeanness’, since the country’s poor human rights record is often listed as a reason for blockage in its EU membership bid.

Countries which oppose Turkey’s accession to the union, such as Germany and France, see the high number of human rights violations in the country as an exclusionary where assumptions of Turkey’s intrinsic cultural and civilisational ‘Europeanness’ are concerned. Turkish membership is advocated as a sort of strategic supplement to a historical ontology of ‘Europe’ proceeding from a grand narrative of Latin Christendom – Reformation – Enlightenment – Modernity (adorned with the selective appropriation of Classical antiquity), superimposed upon a wider historicocultural and religious milieu. Membership is supported on the basis that Turkey is an exceptional case, considered on the instrumental grounds of guaranteeing Turkish secular democracy within the context of EU institutions while presenting an ‘example’ to the wider Islamic ‘world (Bryce, 2009a)”.

251 For a detailed explanation of human rights violations in Turkey and the effect of this issue over Turkey's EU membership bid see: Chapter 3
indication of Turkey’s incompatibility with the European community and its values. And even Britain, a country that is openly supportive of Turkey’s accession, agree that Turkey needs to improve on this aspect to further its membership process.

The quantitative analysis showed that human rights violations constituted a significant part of British broadsheets’ coverage of Turkey (this issue was mentioned in 7.93% of the research sample).

In their coverage of human rights violations in Turkey, British broadsheets unanimously agreed that Turkey is a ‘European’ country. They compared Turkey’s human rights record with its European neighbours and analysed the issue in a European context. The narrative that they used did not focus on Turkey’s ‘European aspirations’ but rather accepted Turkey’s place in the European community, or the European self, as a given fact.

For example, in an article about the 8-year jail sentence given to a 15 year-old girl in Eastern Anatolia for allegedly attending a pro-PKK protest, the Guardian used the headline; ‘Turkey is the worst violator of human rights in Europe (Guardian, 2010 F-2)’. The broadsheet did not make a comparison between Turkey and countries in the Middle East, or the Muslim world in general, (as it is the norm in the coverage of other issues) but chose to treat (and criticise) Turkey as a European country.

This was a rather surprising finding, since the same media outlets refrained from accepting Turkey’s Europeanness even in news items that discuss the country’s EU membership bid.
Journalist A, Istanbul correspondent of a British broadsheet who was interviewed for this study, claimed that this phenomenon was a direct result of British editors’ eagerness to make news stories about human rights abuses in Turkey more newsworthy.

She/he said “[…] stories about human rights demographics, standards or authoritarianism (in Turkey) wouldn’t attract attention if Turkey was presented as a Middle Eastern country. Because, on the scale of kinds of abuses happening elsewhere in the Middle East, it’s pretty low scale (interview with Author, A)”.

A headline that says ‘Turkey is the worst violator of human rights in Europe’ is indeed more sensational and eye catching than a head-line that reads ‘Turkey has one of the best human rights records in the Middle East’, so it is understandable that editors and journalists prefer to present this issue in a European context.

But, if we look at the bigger picture it is easy to see that representation of Turkey as a part of European community is mostly limited to the coverage of human rights abuses in the country and it is not an indication of British media’s acceptance of Turkey in to the European identity.

7:2:3:3 Coverage of the Kurdish conflict

Today Kurdish conflict is at the heart of Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU. For some, who view Kurdish aggression as a natural result of Turkey’s unjust treatment of its largest minority, the conflict proves that the country does not share the
same values with its Western neighbours and thus does not belong in the European community.

But for others, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is not that different from the troubles in Britain or violent separatist movements in other European countries. They believe this bloody conflict should not be used against Turkey in its bid to join the European Union.

Kurdish conflict is one of the most talked about and reported on subjects regarding Turkey in the British media. The quantitative analysis showed that selected British Broadsheets published a total of 139 news items about the conflict in the timescale of this study (19% of the research sample). 11 of these news items were editorials and 3 of them were front-page stories further indicating the high level of exposure and importance the British broadsheets gave to this issue.

The way Kurdish conflict has been covered by the international (and British) media has long been a topic of discussion in Turkey and this topic also came up during the in-depth interviews with London based Turkish journalists conducted for this study. Journalist K, who is the London bureau chief of a Turkish national daily, said,

If I have to define the way British media covers Turkey, I would say… they have a significant Kurdish bias. When I read British media reports on Turkey, I feel like I am reading a Kurdish newspaper. Most of the British correspondents in Turkey, especially the Guardian’s Constanze Letzch, see Turkey from a strictly Kurdish point of view. I think this sometimes leads to a biased, judgemental coverage (Journalist K, interview with author, 2014)
Journalist M, who is the London correspondent for a leading Turkish news channel also agreed with his colleague and said “I think it is indisputable that British media is siding with the Kurds about this conflict (Journalist M, interview with author, 2014)”.

But, journalists who frequently report on the Kurdish conflict for British broadsheets categorically denied these accusations and even argued that actually, Turkish journalists were the ones who are ‘biased’ when it comes to the coverage of the Kurdish issue.

For example Journalist C said, “I think the bias is on the other [Turkish] side there. Turkish newspapers often feel ‘bias’ when the Turkish state is being criticised, and in the case of the Kurdish issue, the criticism has been severe, I suppose. [But] there are many topics - the Kurdish issue included - which are written about much more openly today, there is more of a discussion (Journalist C, interview with author, 2015)”.

And the qualitative analysis showed that, Turkish journalists’ claims about British media’s so called “Kurdish bias” were only partially true. 42 of the 150 news items selected for qualitative analysis were mentioning the Kurdish conflict and close analysis of these items showed that the centre-left and the centre-right broadsheets have significantly different views about the subject.

The centre-left broadsheets, (Guardian, Independent and their Sunday sister papers), were a lot more supportive of the Kurdish movement in Turkey compared to their centre-right rivals (Daily Telegraph, Times and their Sunday sister papers).
In their coverage, broadsheets from the left of the political spectrum focused on the oppression Kurdish people have been subjected to in the hands of the Turkish state and they emphasised the fact that Turkey is radicalising the Kurds by unlawful arrests and widespread discrimination (Guardian, 29/12/2011). They based their reports on testimonies of PKK representatives, Kurdish civilians and Kurdish leaders.

For example while covering the Turkish army’s bombardment of the PKK bases in Iraq in 2007, the Guardian used the title ‘Turkey launches biggest bombing raid on Kurdish rebels in Iraq: Woman killed as 50 planes target PKK guerrilla bases: Prime minister warns of further military action (Guardian, 17/12/2007)’ and focused on the effect the raid had on the Kurdish communities.

The Independent used a similar narrative in their reports on the issue (Independent 23/02/2008). For a front-page news story about Turkey’s intention to attack PKK troops in Iraq in 2008, the newspaper used the headline “THE NEW INVASION OF IRAQ: Up to 10 000 troops launch an incursion which threatens to destabilise the country’s only peaceful region (Independent, 23/02/2008).” The article, penned by Patrick Cockburn, compared Turkey’s military operation in Iraq to US and Britain’s previous invasion of the country.

The article did not mention recent terror attacks by the PKK in Turkey that elevated tensions and caused Turkey to start considering an incursion. The news article only mentioned recent Turkish casualties in a quote by Ahmet Danees, head of foreign relations of the PKK. While defining Iraqi Kurdistan as the only peaceful region in Iraq and claiming that Turkish incursion was ‘destabilising the region’ Cockburn
implied that Turkish army’s attacks were one sided and unjustifiable. While quoting multipl Kurdish actors, Cockburn only used one quote by a Turkish military official that confirmed the number of Turkish soldiers that had been sent to Iraq.

As a result, the news item showed Turkey under a negative light and used a narrative that presents the country as an aggressor in the region.

The Guardian and the Independent also refrained from defining the PKK as a ‘terror organisation’ and PKK fighters as ‘terrorists’ in their coverage.


The Independent and The Guardian also provided an extended coverage of human rights violations Turkey committed in Anatolia’s Kurdish regions (For example: Guardian, 30/12/2011).

On the other hand, conservative broadsheets like the Times and the Daily Telegraph viewed the Kurdish conflict mainly as a ‘terrorism problem’ Turkey, an ally, is

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252 Britain, European Union and US consider PKK as a terrorist organisation (Home office, 2015) Proscribed Terrorist Organisation list, published by the Home Office says “Proscribed: March 2001 PKK/KADEK/KG is primarily a separatist movement that seeks an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. The PKK changed its name to KADEK and then to Kongra Gele Kurdistan, although the PKK acronym is still used by parts of the movement”.
facing. They focused their reports on Turkish army’s efforts to abolish the PKK. Compared to their liberal rivals, they paid little attention to the suffering of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and generally based their coverage of the conflict on the testimonies of Turkish officials instead of the PKK representatives or Kurdish leaders.

For example in an editorial published in the wake of Turkey’s decision to bomb PKK bases in Northern Iraq in 2007, the Daily Telegraph said “While Turkey's Kurds have legitimate grievances, the PKK is a brutal terrorist organisation. […] Mr. Erdoğan's first obligation is to the security of Turkey's people and, if he decides that cross-border strikes are the best way to eliminate the PKK, he deserves the world's support. […] While the risks are considerable, this may prove to be Turkey's only viable response to outrageous provocation (Daily Telegraph, 18/10/2007)”.

During this period the Times also showed support for the Turkish government. While telling Turkey to ‘hold back if possible’, the newspaper told its readers that “[Turkey’s willingness to conduct a cross border operation] has ample justification in the form of a 30-year running battle with separatist fighters of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has cost 30,000 lives, including those of 13 Turkish soldiers gunned down on their own soil on Sunday (The Times, 11/10/2007)”. In the same editorial the broadsheet also said “[…] the Kurdish separatists' arcane brand of Marxism-Leninism is an ideology almost as extreme, in its way, as that of the al-Qaeda groups that the secular West is battling against worldwide. The PKK is also listed as a terrorist organisation by both the US and the EU (ibid)”.

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Also, unlike their liberal rivals, conservative broadsheets did not retain from defining the PKK as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in their coverage (*Daily Telegraph*, 18/10/2007; *The Times*, 11/10/2007; *Daily Telegraph* 04/06/2010).

In conclusion it is possible to say that conservative broadsheets presented Turkey and its government under a more positive light regarding the Kurdish conflict compared to their liberal rivals. Liberal and conservative broadsheets’ significantly different approach to the Kurdish conflict can be seen as a result of these newspapers different attitude towards separatist movements around the world.

**7:2:3:4 Coverage of the Armenian Genocide:**

Turkey’s refusal to classify the massacre and forced deportations of more than a million Armenians in the latter years of the Ottoman empire as genocide has been the subject of heated debates in national parliaments, academia and international media in the second half of 20th century.

The European Union has previously said Turkish acceptance of the Armenian genocide is not a condition for Turkey’s entry into the bloc but Turkey’s stance on this subject is still being seen as a major obstacle for its future in Europe.

To date, majority of EU member states including France, Belgium and Italy have formally recognised the Armenian genocide. These member states argue that it is

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253 The total number of Armenian dead is disputed. Armenians say 1.5 million died. The Republic of Turkey estimates the total to be 300,000. According to the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), the death toll was "more than a million".

254 For a detailed explanation of these discussions see: Chapter 4.
essential for Turkey to recognise the genocide in order to become truly European. In March 2015, the European Parliament published a report in which they called on all the EU Member States and the EU institutions to legally acknowledge the Armenian genocide and refuelled these arguments.\textsuperscript{255} Yet Britain, (just like the USA and Israel) still uses different terminology to describe these mass killings, in a bid not to upset an important ally, Turkey.

The EU’s active involvement in the ‘genocide’ debate brings events of 1915 to the core of discussions regarding Turkey’s place in the European community.

In the past decade, discussions about the mass killing of Armenian’s in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey’s stance in these discussions have also been a reoccurring subject in the European and British media.

The position of the European media outlets on the events of 1915 varies significantly from country to country. Following their government’s footsteps most of the French and German news outlets consider the Armenian genocide to be a historical fact, while most British news outlets, in the time period analysed for this study, shy away from using the word genocide and talk about it as a dispute between the Turks and the Armenians.

\textsuperscript{255} In 2015, the European Parliament published a report in which they called on all the EU Member States and EU institutions to legally acknowledge the Armenian genocide. The report caused uproar in Turkey and was slammed by the Turkish foreign ministry. (European Parliament, 2015 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2013, March 2015, URL: \url{http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-slams-european-parliament-call-for-recognition-of-armenian-genocide_375245.html}, accessed: 23/08/15)
The quantitative analysis showed that the Armenian genocide was mentioned in a total of 66 news items in the research sample and unlike the Kurdish conflict there was a consensus amongst media outlets on this subject.

All analysed media outlets, conservative and liberal alike, showed unreserved support for Armenians’ interpretation of events and suggested that Turkey should come in to terms with its Ottoman past and recognise the genocide, especially if it wants to become a ‘European country’.

Keeping in line with the British government policy, the British broadsheets never declared that they officially recognise the genocide in their editorials, but always used narratives that indicate that they classify the events of 1915 as genocide.

For example, in an editorial published in 2007 the Guardian said “Outside Turkey there is a broad consensus that the massacre and forced deportations of more than a million Armenians in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire were nothing less than genocide (Guardian 12/10/2007)” and argued that the future of Turkey’s EU bid is dependent on this subject by saying “The issue [Armenian genocide] is not just a lightning rod for nationalists, but a litmus test for the human-rights agenda on which EU entry talks depend (ibid)”.

The Independent was also presenting the Armenians’ interpretation of the events as a historical fact. In a 2007 editorial the broadsheet said, “In the long term, Turkey needs to accept the terrible stain that the Armenian slaughter has left on its national history (Independent, 12/10/2007)”.

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The *Daily Telegraph* was more restrained in its coverage of the issue but still supported claims of genocide. For example, in a news article published in 2011 the media outlet presented the massacre of up to 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 as a fact, but chose to use the word genocide in quotation marks (*Daily Telegraph*, 22/12/2011).

Even though none of the British broadsheets ever referred to the massacre directly as genocide in their editorials, a significant number of British columnists used this word to describe the events of 1915 in their columns and commentaries.

For example, the *Independent*’s prominent Middle East correspondent and columnist Robert Fisk never shied away from using the term ‘genocide’ to describe these events.

He was the most vocal journalist in the British media regarding the subject and he frequently penned commentaries and features about the hardships the Armenian nation faced in early 20th century and often used highly sentimental and sensational narratives.

In a commentary, entitled ‘Genocide forgotten: Armenians horrified by treaty with Turkey: A new trade deal is set to gloss over the murder of 1.5 million people’, he said:

The 40,000 or so women were all Armenians, separated from their men - most of whom had already had their throats cut by Turkish gendarmerie - and deported on a genocidal death march during which up to 1.5 million Armenians died. Subjected to constant rape and beatings, some had already swallowed poison on their way from their homes in Erzerum, Serena, Sivas, Bitlis and other cities in Turkish
western Armenia. "Some of them," Bishop Grigoris Balakian, one of Litzmayer's contemporaries, recorded, "had been driven to such a state that they were mere skeletons enveloped in rags, with skin that had turned leathery, burned from the sun, cold, and wind. Many pregnant women, having become numb, had left their newborns on the side of the road as a protest against mankind and God." Every year, new evidence emerges about this mass ethnic cleansing, the first holocaust of the last century (Independent, 08/10/2009).

In general, British broadsheets presented Turkey’s interpretation of these events as false and baseless claims. They also frequently criticised British government’s attitude towards the issue in their coverage of the Armenian genocide discussions. For example, while accusing the UK government of acting ‘pragmatically’ regarding the Armenian problem, the Times said “The British Government has been similarly spineless on the Armenian question, despite ample contemporary evidence […] It refuses even to allow the Armenian genocide to be mentioned on National Holocaust Memorial Day for fear of upsetting Turkey (Times, 05/03/2010)”.

To sum up, it can be argued that while they are hesitant to openly treat genocide allegations as ‘facts’,

British broadsheets are not sympathetic to Turkey’s interpretation of this subject. Also there is a consensus amongst broadsheets that it is necessary for Turkey to face the allegations of genocide to further its chances to become a member of the European community.256

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256 Some news items covering the genocide discussions contained narratives, that contributed to Turkey’s portrayal as an Other. These narratives will be discussed further in the chapter.
7:2:4 Othering Turkey by emphasising its religious identity

Being a predominantly Muslim country and the successor of Europe’s one time ‘arch enemy’, the Ottoman Empire, Turkey had inevitably been a victim of Orientalism in the European media for a long time, just like any other Muslim country or community (See: Neumann, 1999; Paksoy, 2012; Turksoy, 2011; Devran, 2007 and Oktem, 2005). But since ‘Europe’ is an entity that includes several different national identities within itself, it is impossible to say that different European media outlets has a singular Orientalist attitude towards Turkey.

Literature shows that the German and the French media’s approach to Turkey is prominently more Orientalist compared to the British media (Turksoy, 2011). Yet, this does not in any way indicate that the British media, which regularly presents Muslims and Islam through an Orientalist lens (Poole, 2001; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008), is not guilty of Orientalist othering when it comes to covering Turkey.

According to the ‘Turkish Religious Life’ report published by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs in 2014, 99.2% of the Turkish public defines themselves as ‘Muslim’ (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, 2014). So it is a fact that Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population. Yet, since the annulment of the constitutional clause that states, ‘The religion of the state is Islam’ in 1928, and addition of the adjective ‘secular’ to the definition of the Turkish state in the constitution in 1937, Turkey officially is a secular country (Tanör, 2014).
Since the British media nearly never refers to Greece (98% Christian), Italy (80% Christian) or Poland (89.3% Christian) as ‘Christian nations’ when covering news events related to them, it is intriguing to see 26.76 % of the adjectives directly defining the republic of Turkey were based on religion. And looking at the 150 selected news items from the sample as well as 60 editorials and 10 front-page stories it is easy to see that the emphasis on Turkey’s religion is even higher in the general narrative of the coverage.

In their coverage of Turkey, even when they were presenting the country as an important ally or welcomed edition to the European Union, British journalists kept reminding their audiences that Turkey is an ‘Islamic nation’.

Adjectives like ‘overwhelmingly Muslim’, ‘predominantly Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ were scattered in the narrative and labels and definitions like ‘Muslim democracy’ (Times, 05/03/2010), ‘Muslim inspired democracy (Times, 13/05/2010)’, ‘Tame Islamists (Guardian, 20/04/2010)’, ‘Chief Muslim Democracy (Daily Telegraph, 04/06/2010)’, ‘Moderate Islamic State (Independent, 22/01/2012)’ and ‘Nato’s Muslim Ally’ (Times, 13/06/ 2013) were commonly used throughout the coverage.

It can be argued that by stating Turkey is not simply a ‘democracy’ or an ‘ally’ but a ‘Muslim or Islamic’ one, British journalists implied that even though Turkey is on ‘their’ side, it is still fundamentally different to Europe and as a result they underlined Turkey’s ‘otherness’ against the British and the European self (Devran, 2007, p: 13).

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258 See: the Quantitative Analysis Chapter
Of course, this study does not claim that the labels and definitions about Turkey’s religious identity should have been completely omitted from the coverage, since the emphasis on Turkey’s religion in certain stories, which are directly dealing with issues related to Islam, is by any means understandable and even necessary. For example it would be unreasonable to expect the British media (or any media), to cover news items about the secular-Islamist divide in Turkish politics or the developments on the headscarf ban in Turkish universities without pointing out the dominant religion in the country.

Also, it cannot be denied that under the government of AKP, religion became a more substantial part of the daily political discussions in Turkey.

Yet, these religion-based adjectives, labels and definitions also pop up in the coverage of subjects that have no relevance to the dominant religion in the country.

For example, in an article published in the Daily Telegraph about US president Barack Obama’s planned visit to Turkey in 2009, the title ‘Obama reaches out to Muslims with Turkey visit’ was used. The introduction of the article said “President Barack Obama will seek to extend America’s key alliances beyond Europe by using a visit next month to Turkey, which is ruled by a moderate Islamic party, to court the Muslim world” (Daily Telegraph, 10/03/2009).

The rest of the article clearly states that Obama never talked about ‘courting the Muslim world via Turkey’ and White House clearly denied any suggestion that he
may give a speech to ‘Muslim crowds’ in İstanbul\textsuperscript{259}. Yet, Instead of presenting the story as what it is: ‘American president Barack Obama is going to make a planned visit to Turkey, a long term American ally’, the \textit{Daily Telegraph} chose to use the words ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ 5 times throughout the first paragraphs of the article.

While the unnecessary emphasis on Turkey’s religious identity in the article can be seen as a sign of Oriental othering on its own, there are several other complementary examples of Orientalism in the ‘religion-based’ narrative of this news item.

First of all, the article claims that ‘President Barack Obama will seek to extend America’s key alliances beyond Europe’, and places Turkey outside of the European region. This particular news item was published in the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, a news outlet that clearly stated that it supports Turkey’s European ambitions and wants to see the country in the EU (\textit{Daily Telegraph}, 24/02/2010). But the narrative used in the article shows that even though the media outlet supports Turkey’s EU bid and claims to see it as an essential part of Europe, it does not in any way perceive ‘Muslim’ Turkey as a part of the European self or as a country that is in fact ‘in Europe’. In a way, the reporter uses Turkey’s religious identity to differentiate it from the ‘genuinely’ European countries.

Furthermore the article assumes that a speech directed to the Turkish public (which, in the end was never delivered) will be the equivalent of ‘courting the Muslim world’. According to the numbers provided by the Pew Research centre, as of 2010, there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, constituting 23.4 \% of the planet’s total population.

\textsuperscript{259} In the end, Obama only delivered a speech in the Turkish parliament.
(Pew Research Centre, 2011). The Muslim world includes a variety of people from Indonesia to Iran, Saudi Arabia to Lebanon who have significantly different cultures, worldviews, political interests and views about the United States and its president. Turkey is home to more than 80 million Muslims but it is not in any way the representative of the ‘Muslim World’ on its own. Claiming that the American president will be courting a quarter of the world’s population by giving a speech in Turkey is a clear example of how the media ignores the particularities of different Muslim nations and perceives them as a singular homogenous entity."\(^{260}\)

In his book ‘Covering Islam’ Said also touched upon this particularity of the Western media by stating “[In the Western media] ‘Islam’ seems to engulf all aspects of the diverse Muslim world, reducing them all to a special malevolent and unthinking essence. Instead of analysis and understanding, as a result, there can be for the most part only the crudest form of us-versus-them (Said, 1997 p: 117)”. In other words, labels like ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ carry deeper meanings than ‘just a religious identity’ for the Western media (ibid) and in fact they show a country, a nation or an individual’s place in the self-other axis. By unnecessarily underlining Turkey’s religious identity in news items that has no relevance to religion, British media is including Turkey in to an Orientalist discourse that uses labels about Islam to bind the highly diverse Muslim nations and communities together and consequently present them as a singular Oriental other.

\(^{260}\) The article ends with the remark “White House officials indicated that he would not [deliver a speech to a majority Muslim crowd] but the symbolism of a backdrop of the Bosporus, which divides Europe from Asia, could prove difficult to resist.” It needs to be noted that the coverage of Obama’s visit to Turkey had a similar tone in the American press. So, the emphasis on Turkey’s religion was not exclusive to British media outlets.
This can be seen clearly in the coverage of negative news events regarding the Muslim world in the Western media. As Said discussed in *Covering Islam*, atrocities committed in any given country with a Muslim population or a government is being reported in the Western media with an emphasis on religion; while similar acts in the Western world is never being connected to Christianity (Said, 1997 p: 117). Said says,

> Of course no one has equated the Jonestown massacre or the destructive horror of the Oklahoma bombing or the devastation of Indochina with Christianity, or with Western cultures at large; that sort of equation has been reserved for Islam (ibid).

This can also be observed in the British media’s coverage of Turkey. For example in an article about the Armenian genocide published by the *Times*, the atrocities committed by the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the 20th century was explained with the phrase “Christian Armenians living in what was eastern Anatolia died in blood-letting by Muslim Ottoman troops (*Times*, 05/03/2010)”.

By emphasising the fact that Armenians are Christian while Ottomans are Muslims, this atrocity was presented as an example of Islamic violence towards Christians.

Since this massacre was not committed in the name of religion\(^\text{261}\) and was actually ordered by nationalist leaders from the Young Turk movement, the emphasis on the religious identity of the Ottoman Empire in the coverage of the Armenian genocide is unjustifiable. It is not common ground in the Western media (and rightfully so) to claim the Holocaust is a ‘Christian crime’. They don’t refer to Nazi’s as ‘Christians’

\(^{261}\) For a detailed explanation of the reasons behind the Armenian Genocide and circumstances of the era see: Chapter 4, section 4:3:3:2 Armenian genocide
in media narratives, even though the Nazi party was endorsing ‘positive Christianity’ to combat so-called ‘Jewish materialist spirit’ (Noakes and Pridham, 1974).

Thus, it can be argued that the emphasis on the Ottoman Empire or Turkey’s religious identity in the coverage of the Armenian genocide is another sign of media’s tendency to present the Muslim world as a singular, interconnected and homogenous Oriental other, especially when it comes to negative occurrences. Also, this type of coverage shows that Turkey, as a result of its Islamic identity, is seen and presented as a part of the Oriental other and not the European self in the British media.

In-depth interviews conducted for this study were also inline with these findings. Commenting on the utilization of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory in the news coverage, Journalist B said that editors in London are pressuring him/her to unnecessarily emphasise Turkey’s religious identity in news reports for a variety of reasons. He/She said:

I think there is definitely a pressure coming from editors of some newspapers about this [Framing news stories from Turkey as confrontations between Western and Islamic civilisations] including mine. They like stories, which play up the fear of Islam. That is something I always push against because I don’t like writing in that way. It is sort of an obsession for a lot of British news editors. I certainly wouldn’t want that to be put under my name. But I think some newspapers like the Guardian and the Independent are quite good at this and Financial Times is good at it. I think the Times and Telegraph are very bad for it (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

She/he also drew attention to the prejudices some broadsheets’ audiences have against Islam and Muslim nations and suggested that British editors may be using these prejudices to please their readers. She/he said “They [Editors in London] know that
most of their readers, it is enough to look at the comments on the website, are basically Islamophobic. And editors play to that (ibid)\textsuperscript{262}.

So, it can be argued that the content published in the selected British broadsheets about Turkey between 2007-2013 was also affected by the general Orientalist attitudes that influence the representation of Muslims in these media outlets.

Yet, it needs to be underlined here that British media’s attitude towards Turkish Islam or Turkey’s unique Muslim identity is different to their attitude towards Islam in general. As explained in the second chapter, British media organisations (just like publications from the US or continental Europe) have been inclined to make direct connections between Islam and violence, terror or radicalism, especially after 9/11. But qualitative analysis showed that Turkey, mainly as a result of its multifaceted and partially Westernised identity (see: Chapter 3: Historical development of the Turkish identity), was often portrayed as the ‘good’ or ‘model’ Muslim nation.

So, even though it is true that the emphasis on Turkey’s ‘Muslimness’ in the British media texts presents the country as an other to Europe, the positive attitudes towards this emphasised identity shows that Turkey is still a ‘lesser’, more acceptable other in this context.

\textsuperscript{262} For a detailed account of journalists’ views on Orientalist attitudes in the coverage of Turkey see: Annex 1
References to Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and history also played a significant role in representation of Turkey as an Oriental other in the British coverage.

From fourteenth century to nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire occupied and controlled a quarter of the European continent, comprising some of the Europe’s most coveted territory (Neumann, 1999, p: 40) and thus was a particularly important and influential other to Europe. And even though the Ottoman Empire seized to exist with the proclamation of the Turkish republic in 1923, the memory of this pivotal other continued to live in European minds and as a result was influential over the way British media perceived and presented modern Turkey in their coverage. As Neumann says “Present-day representations of Turkey [...] carry with them the memory of earlier representations” (Neumann, 1999, p: 62).

The qualitative analysis showed that Orientalist metaphors using Ottoman imagery like janissaries, carpets, bazaars and sultans were also commonly used in the coverage and as a result Turkey’s historical and cultural ‘otherness’ was reminded to the reader.

For example in and editorial published in 2010, the Times used the headline “A welcome carpet for Turkey (Times, 05/07/2010) ”. The article argued “Britain should give reasons to Turkish ministers to look West rather than East (ibid)” but at the same time underlined Turkey’s cultural otherness by using the Orientalist imagery of a
The same media outlet, in another commentary supporting Turkey’s accession to the European Union, said, “Put the hijabs down, shave the facial hair and come closer (Times, 29/07/2010)” and used Turkey’s Islamic and cultural heritage to present it as an Oriental other.

Also, autocratic tendencies of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were frequently communicated to the reader by referring to him as ‘a Sultan’ in the coverage.

For instance, in an article published during the Gezi Park protests the Sunday Times argued that “Already he [Recep Tayyip Erdogan] is displaying sultan-like behaviour with whimsical decrees about what bread people should eat (wholemeal) and how many children they should have (three) (Sunday Times, 09/06/2013)”. While another article published by the Times during the same time period argued “Now the Turks are taking to the streets again […] frustrated by the modern sultan, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Times, 04/06/2013).”

British media also used the term ‘Neo-Ottoman’ to emphasise modern Turkey’s similarities with its predecessor.

When the AKP won the general election in Turkey for the second time in 2007, it was claimed that they started to change the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy (Cornell, 2011, p: 3). Under the rule of AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country, which exclusively faced westwards for nearly a century, has cultivated close ties with Iran, Syria, Gulf countries and Palestine while severing its ties with its long term ally

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263 Carpet is one of the staples of “Orientalist imagery” alongside harem, concubine, fez etc (Dogan, 2000).
Israel\textsuperscript{264}. The AKP determinedly pursued European Union (EU) accession for a couple of years, but since membership talks actually began in 2005, the party's energy for the EU has also fizzled away (Cağantay, 2009).

In Europe and the USA alike, this alleged reorientation in the Turkish foreign policy or the ‘axis-shift’ had been interpreted as an attempt by Turkey to re-assert itself in the Ottoman realm and it was labelled as ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ by many European and American media outlets (Çandar, 2009).

But Western media’s use of this label, which was first coined by the Greek media after the invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974 (Karpat, 2002), was immediately refuted by the Turkish government on the grounds that the words ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ can be seen as a throw-back to Turkish sentiments of grandeur and can equally be perceived as expansionism by the regional counterparts of that foreign policy (Çandar, 2009, p: 5). Many scholars also pointed out that the new Turkish foreign policy should not be simplified with labels like ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ since “the AKP does not assert Turkey's weight equally in the areas that were under Ottoman rule (Cağantay, 2009)”.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister at the time Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is presented as the head-architect of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ in the British coverage, personally denied that the country’s new foreign policy could be defined as such. In a speech in 2013, he said:

\textsuperscript{264} For a detailed exploration of the alleged axis shift in Turkey’s foreign policy after 2007 see: Onis, 2011 Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique, Insight Turkey Vol. 13, No. 1, p: 47-65
Why is it that when the whole of Europe is casting off its borders and unifying, they don't become the Neo-Romans or the New Holy Roman Empire, but when we call for the peoples who lived together just a century ago to come together once again, we are accused of being Neo-Ottomans? (Kiper, 2013).

But, against the Turkish governments objection and denials, throughout the 7-year timescale of this study labels like ‘Neo-Ottomans’ and other narratives that equate Turkey to the Ottoman Empire were commonly used in the British coverage.

For example, in an article commenting on the Syrian civil war and Turkey’s role in the conflict, the Guardian went with the title “Europe has left Syria to a distinctly Ottoman fate” (Guardian, 12/04/2012). The article, which defined Turkey as ‘Neo-Ottoman’, continued to say “[the AKP’s] doctrine of strategic depth sees Turkey as a regional power, straddling Europe, Middle East and Central Asia, like… guess who (ibid)”. Another article by the same media outlet argued “join the dots of [Turkey’s] contacts at all points of the compass around Ankara and there is some geographical truth in the jibe that Mr Erdogan is trying to re-establish the Ottoman Empire” (Guardian, 28/07/2010).

British media’s tendency to label Turks as ‘Neo-Ottomans’ in their coverage is highly significant for the purposes of this study because this narrative implies that Turkey is the direct continuation of Europe’s most pivotal historical other and thus can not be seen as a part of the European self.

The label ‘The sick man of Europe’, a term coined by Europeans to define the later stages of the Ottoman Empire, was also frequently used in the British coverage of modern Turkey as a way to connect the country’s present to it’s past.
For example, in an article published by the *Daily Telegraph* in 2010 titled “*Turkey’s role in the flotilla affair should worry us all in the West*”, it was stated, “A country that was once called the sick man of Europe, has become the Angry man of the East” (*Daily Telegraph*, 04/06/2010). With this single statement, Turkey’s status as an historical other was reminded to the reader and it’s current inclination to become a more ‘aggressive’ Oriental other was also established.

It needs to be noted that this famous analogy, supposedly coined by Tsar Nicholas I in 1835 (Bellaugie, 2001), categorises Turkey as the “Sick man of Europe” and not as the sick man of the East.

Nicholas I originally have referred to the Ottoman Empire not as “the sick man of Europe,” but as a “man,” who “has fallen into a state of decrepitude (ibid)”. So, when he uttered these words the Russian leader never really intended to include the Ottoman Empire in to the list of European nations. But it is still important that the words that were used to explain the demise of a terrorising ‘other’, quickly evolved in to a commonly used phrase that, even though in a negative manner, confirms the European identity of the Ottoman Empire.

As Aysha explains, when the Ottoman Empire was a strong threat, a ‘Scourge of Christendom’, it was most definitely not seen as a part of Europe, but when it became ‘weak and vulnerable’ it suddenly evolved in to the sick man of Europe (Aysha, 2007, p: 36).
It can be argued that Europeans only choose to refer to the Ottoman Empire as a part of Europe when, as Said puts it, “it was being surveyed by Britain and France for its dismemberment (Said, 2003, p: 223)”.

While Ottoman Empire’s efforts of westernisation were also influential in it’s partial acceptance in Europe in the late nineteenth century\textsuperscript{265}, the *Daily Telegraph*’s claim that “the sick man of Europe, has become the Angry man of the East” clearly shows that Turks were being considered ‘Europeans’ when they are ‘weak, benign and useful’ but go back to being the Oriental other when their actions become in any way ‘threatening’.

Up to this point, this chapter pointed out the different ways that Turkey was othered and even Orientalised in the British print media. The chapter also showed that while being presented as an other, Turkey was not vilified or Orientalised to the same extent as Muslims in general. These qualitative findings were in line with the hypothesis of this study, which argued that in line with Bakić-Hayden’s gradual understanding of Orientalism, Turkey was being portrayed as a lesser, useful ‘Model’ other to Europe in British media texts. Yet before reaching a final judgement on the way Turkey was represented in British media texts between 2007-13, it is necessary to take a closer look at the representations of the most prominent actors in the coverage: the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan

\textsuperscript{265} The partial acceptance of Turkey in to the European identity in late 19th and 20th century was discussed in detail in the 3rd chapter of this study.
7:3 The AKP and Erdogan in the British media

To be able to determine how Turkey was perceived and represented in the British media between 2007 and 2013, it is essential to look at the representation of the country’s government and leader at the time.

The quantitative analysis conducted on 731 news items showed that of all the adjectives that were used to define the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdogan directly, 67% were based on religion (See: Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis, Section 5:2:10: Adjectives). This hyperbolic emphasis on AKP and Erdogan’s religious identity was also seen in the qualitative analysis of more than 150 news reports, editorials and commentaries.

British broadsheets repeatedly underlined that Erdoğan is a ‘Practicing and devout Muslim’, an ‘Islamist’ or a ‘Former Islamist’ in their news reports. They also emphasized the fact that the AKP is a ‘Religiously minded party’ throughout their coverage. Similar narratives were used to describe president Abdullah Gül.

In general, centre-right newspapers (the Daily Telegraph and the Times as well as their sister Sunday papers) made more of an emphasis on the religious identity of the AKP and its leaders. Yet, narratives that emphasize the Turkish government’s Islamist nature were also present in centre-left daily newspapers like the Independent and the Guardian.

Previous studies already established that there is a difference between left wind and centre-right British outlets’ attitudes towards Islam and their representations of Muslim actors. For details see: Chapter: 2 Analytical Framework Section 2:3:2:1 Islam in British Print Media.
For example when Abdullah Gul, one of the founding members of the AKP, was elected president in August 2007, Guardian used the subhead “Prayer mats to enter residence for first time (Guardian, 29/08/2007)” emphasising the fact that Gul is a devout Muslim.

This strong, (and at times unnecessary) emphasis on the prime minister, president and the governing party’s religious identity, along side with narratives that portray AKP as ‘new Ottomans’ and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the new ‘Sultan’, can be interpreted as indications of Orientalism in the coverage of the AKP.

Yet, even though an orientalist narrative, which classified them as ‘Muslims’ above anything else and differentiated them from European politicians and leaders, was present throughout the coverage; it is not a sufficient proof for concluding that the Turkish government was a victim of orientalist othering in the British media coverage.

The way British media represented Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government between 2007 and 2013 will be qualitatively analysed in this section to determine whether their image in the British media have been affected by Orientalism or not.
7:3:1 2007- 2010: A period of unconditional support

The AKP government and Prime Minister Erdogan were generally presented as positive figures in the British media, (especially in editorials that put the official view of the news outlet forward) until the Gezi protests in 2013. British broadsheets analysed for this study showed unanimous and invariable support for the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2007- 2010.

For example, right after AKP’s landslide election victory in 2007, the Guardian listed the party’s previous political, social and economic achievements and declared “It will not be easy to reform a country as large and varied as Turkey, but Mr Erdogan is the right man for the job (Guardian, 22/08/2007)” while the Independent said “The AKP has its roots in political Islam, but it has not been a backward force since winning power in 2002. On the contrary, the party's economic reforms have delivered impressive growth, and Turkey attracted record foreign investment last year (Independent, 24/06/2007)”.

The Daily Telegraph also showed support for the AKP government after the elections and said: “Erdogan promises a statesmanlike potential which could make him, along with Ataturk and Özal, one of the outstanding leaders of modern Turkey (Daily Telegraph, 27/07/2007)”.

When Abdullah Gul was elected president (against strong protestations from Turkish seculars), British broadsheets, once again, showed their support to the government.
The *Independent* said “The election of Abdullah Gul as President of Turkey closes a stormy chapter in Turkish politics in the most satisfactory possible way. An accomplished diplomat who as foreign minister negotiated the terms of Turkey's accession into the European Union, Mr Gul was by far the strongest candidate (*Independent*, 29/08/2007).” and the *Times* said “The success of Abdullah Gül in becoming Turkey's new President is a victory for democracy (*Times*, 29/07/2007).

During this period, Turkey’s western oriented, secular establishment was accusing the AKP government of ‘trying to transform Turkey in to an Islamist state and undermining the republic’s secular foundations’ (See: Chapter 2, section 2), but British broadsheets analysed in this study dismissed these accusations by categorising AKP’s critics as ‘Militant secularists’ who are ‘paranoid’ about the government’s alleged Islamist agenda (*Times*, 28/01/2010; *Guardian*, 22/08/2007).

For example, while commenting on Erdogan’s election victory in 2007, the *Independent* said, “[…] There is no reason to believe AKP is going to swerve in to hard-line Islamism. And it is worth noting that the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used his post-election speech yesterday to reaffirm his pledge to respect Turkey’s secular principles (*Independent*, 24/06/2007) while the *Guardian* argued, “The result [of the general election] meant a resounding popular rejection of Turkey's traditional masters, its conservative, secular elite (*Guardian*, 24/07/2007).”

The *Times* also dismissed these accusations by saying “If Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister, is a stealth Islamist, he hides it well. Most available evidence suggests he is, in fact, a hard-nosed politician, committed to Europe, who believes in
democracy because it has brought him power and who is devoutly Muslim (Times, 18/07/2008)”

Similarly, in a commentary published after Gül’s assignment as the president, the Guardian said “The distracted detractors of Turkey's new president continue to remind us that he is a devout Muslim, he worked in the Saudi banking sector for a few years, belongs to a party that once described democracy as a train leading to an Islamist state, and has a wife who wears a headscarf. But as foreign minister he won the trust and respect of Europe's diplomatic community” and suggested critics should stop worrying about AKP’s alleged Islamist agendas and focus on the governments democratisation efforts (emphasis added, Guardian, 31/08/2007). And in another editorial same media outlet said “Turkish brand of secularism has its unattractive side too, associated as it is with the wealthy elite and politics that at times can be far from progressive (Guardian, 22/08/2007).

British media’s support and praise for the Turkish government as well as their dismissal of any criticism towards them as ‘secular paranoia’ continued in the following year. In February 2008, the AKP and the newly elected president Gul attempted to lift the ban on Islamic headscarves at universities.267 This development triggered major secularist protests all around Turkey and occupied Turkish headlines for weeks. While covering these developments, British broadsheets chose to downplay the significance of the bill as well as the secularist criticisms and only published a handful of neutral news reports about the subject (Independent, 28/01/2008; Observer, 10/02/ 2008; Times, 07/02/2008).

267 A bill that will overturn the ban was passed through the parliament and was approved by President Gül. But, the Turkish constitutional court later overturned the bill.
And when chief public prosecutor of the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals Abdurrahman Cetinkaya submitted an indictment to the Constitutional Court demanding “the AKP to be closed down on the grounds that it had become a focal point for anti-secular activities” in July 2008, British broadsheets were quick to defend the government.

In an editorial titled “Democracy Trumps fears of Islamism” the Observer argued AKP government should stay in power and said “secularists should be making arguments for why they [AKP government] should be trusted again instead of requisitioning the constitution to crush an elected government (Observer, 27/07/2008)”.

In their coverage of the petition, the Guardian and the Independent also chose to condemn the move as ‘anti-democratic’ rather than focusing on the accusations directed to the government (Guardian, 28/07/2008; Independent, 29/07/2008).

After the dismissal of the petition by Turkish courts, the Times published a leader titled “By a whisker” and claimed this decision was a step forward for Turkish democracy (Times, 31/07/2008).

When high ranking members of the Turkish armed forces, (an institution that has long been seen as ‘the Guardian of secularism’ in the country) were arrested and brought to trial for the first time for allegedly trying to stage a ‘secularist’ coup against the AKP government in 2008, British media once again gave their support to the
government\(^{268}\). Turkish secularists claimed that this was a witch-hunt conducted by the AKP in a bid to police the judiciary, undermine the military and weaken the secular system but these accusations were promptly dismissed in the British media.

For example while reporting on the start of the trial, dubbed Ergenekon after a Turkish legend, the *Independent* went with the headline “*Democracy on trial in Turkey as 86 face coup attempt charge; A shadowy secularist gang stands accused of plotting murders to turn people against the Islamic government* (Independent, 20/10/2008)” and said as a result of this trial “the country [Turkey] may finally be able to crush the shadowy criminal groups that, for decades, have hobbled its democratic development (ibid)”.

In a leader published about this confrontation between the Turkish military and the AKP government, the *Times* also supported the government and said, “This is a confrontation that Mr Erdogan must win. It is unacceptable in a would be EU member for the army to be immune of the civilian courts, have veto over policy, block a settlement in Cyprus or intimidate the government (*Times*, 01/03/2010). While commenting on the same subject, the *Independent* also applauded the AKP and said “Turkey has suffered too long from military intervention in its political affairs. If it is to be truly modern, it has to make the division clear and absolute (*Independent*, 21/07/2009)”.

The use of loaded words like ‘shadowy’ and ‘gang’ to describe the suspects in the coverage, gives a clear indication of how British media outlets viewed the trial at the

\(^{268}\) For a detailed explanation of the Balyoz coup plot and trials see: Chapter 3
time and how they collectively agreed, at least for a while, that this confrontation between the military and the government was a step towards democratisation that should be applauded.

As shown in the examples above, British media’s representation of the AKP on nearly every subject matter was highly positive in the first couple of years of their second term in power. Along side with Prime Minister Erdogan, the AKP was presented as a ‘beacon of hope’ for Turkey’s developing but problematic democracy. The government’s economic success, enthusiasm for democratisation and rebellion against the secular but also allegedly ‘conservative and oppressive’ establishment was underlined and applauded in editorials and news reports.

And in a significant part of the coverage AKP’s government was presented as a ‘positive model’ or a ‘test case’ for the Islamic world.

The *Times* argued that the AKP government was being perceived as a ‘test case’ for political Islam’s compatibility with democracy (*Times*, 23/07/2007); while the *Independent* said AKP’s failure or success will “have implications on democracy, secularism and Islam all around the world (*Independent*, 21/07/2007).” (Also see: *Independent*, 29/07/2008; *Guardian*, 22/08/2007; *Times*, 06/09/2007; *Daily Telegraph*, 29/07/2008).

But, in the latter half of 2010, serious criticisms about the AKP government and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan started to surface in the pages of British broadsheets.
7:3:2 2010-2013: Suspicions arise

After the Palestinian Flotilla crisis ended Turkey’s decades long alliance with Israel and the country’s relations with Iran grew stronger, British broadsheets started to argue that the AKP was ‘turning Turkey eastwards and abandoning its European dreams’. While defining AKP’s foreign policy as ‘Neo- Ottomanism’, they focused on the Prime Minister’s highly controversial comments on subjects like abortion, women’s rights, freedom of expression and social equality and claimed that the AKP and Erdogan were on a path that will lead to a more Islamic and threatening Turkey (See: Times, 04/06/2010; Times, 01/06/2010; Guardian 16/09/2010).

The alleged change in Turkey’s foreign policy, combined with the AKP’s conservative social policies269 led to old, secular establishment’s criticisms about the AKP and Erdogan to be taken more seriously by British journalists. In this period the emphasis on the government’s religious identity in the general coverage grew stronger and the AKP started to lose British media’s backing gradually. One of the British correspondents in Turkey explained this gradual change in British media’s attitude towards the Turkish government by saying:

In 2010, people were still broadly supportive of the AKP. There was generally an optimism about the direction Turkey is heading in. […]

269 Government’s attempt to partially ban alcohol (Guardian, 28/06/2013), their reluctance to let people celebrate 1st of May in Taksim (Reuters, 01/05/2013), the way they tried to control the media and journalists (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2013; Pierini, 2013), their plans to adapt a US style presidential system (Al Jazeera, 27/08/2013), their tendency to condone moral policing (Hurriyet, 25/05/2013), their plans to ban abortion (BBC, 01/06/2012), their decision to encourage every Turkish woman to have at least three children (Milliyet, 02/01/2013) and their plans to name the third Bosphorus bridge after a Sultan that the Alevi minority regard as a mass murderer (Hurriyet Daily News, 03/06/2013) can be shown as examples of their authoritarianism and conservatism.
Back then the journalists and analysts who had anti-AKP lines, who were warning about Islamism and authoritarianism were very much fringe voices and seen as a bit wacky and a bit out there and maybe ideologically driven by mainstream foreign journalists. But this changed over time. Now [2014] anyone who doesn’t think like that is seen that way (Journalist B, Interview with author, 2014).

Another journalist based in İstanbul, who had been reporting for a British national daily since 2005 also agreed. He/she said:

British media's perception of the [AKP] government changed around 2010. I think during the e-coup in 2007 there was still a lot of sympathy for the AKP (Journalist D, interview with author, 2015).

Turkish journalists also picked up on this change, but they placed the turning point in the coverage of the AKP in 2011. The London bureau chief of a Turkish national daily, who was interviewed for this study, said “There was a fundamental difference in the way AKP was represented in the British media before and after 2011 (Journalist K, interview with author 2014)”. He/she said that in 2002, when the AKP came to power for the first time, British journalists were rather ‘sceptical’ of their democratic credentials. Yet, he claimed that this changed around 2007, when foreign journalists decided to perceive and present the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as beacons of democratisation He/she said,

In 2007-08, the Guardian, the Independent and Financial Times… and, to some extent, the Times and the Telegraph demonstrated strong support for the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. During that period, British media was backing the AKP because of their belief in democratic principles […] they looked at AKP’s reforms and Erdogan’s speeches and thought the AKP was genuinely trying to make Turkey a more democratic country. Especially, they viewed AKP’s confrontation with the military as a positive thing. But this changed around early 2011. I think the breaking point was the referendum270. After the referendum victory the party changed and, as

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270 A constitutional referendum on a number of changes to the constitution was held in Turkey on 12 September 2010. The results showed the majority supported the constitutional amendments, with 58%
a result, the British media’s perception of the party has changed. The government and Erdogan became more and more authoritarian each day, and the British media picked up on that. And, of course, the Gezi Park uprising and government’s harsh reaction to it, turned British media against the government completely. Now [2014], the representation is worse than ever. They are solely presented as authoritarian Islamists (ibid).

This attitude change in the British broadsheets that happened in late 2010 and early 2011 can also be observed by looking at the news items in the research sample of this qualitative analysis.

For example, while all British broadsheets condemned Israel for attacking the flotilla that was aiming to deliver humanitarian aid to Palestine in the immediate aftermath of the incident; they also focused their coverage on Turkish government’s ties with the ‘Islamist’ activists on board the flotilla (Times, 01/06/2010) and in time they even claimed western nations should be worried about Turkey’s role in the flotilla affair (Daily Telegraph, 04/06/2010).

During this period centre-right broadsheets took on a more critical narrative about Turkish government compared to their liberal rivals, yet it was evident that British media’s perception of the AKP in general was changing.

in favour and 42% against. The government said with the proposed changes they are hoping to bring the Turkish constitution more in line with the EU standards. But the opposition argued that the governing party is seeking dangerous levels of control over the judiciary. (Turkey backs constitutional changes, BBC News, 12/09/2010. Accessed 12/01/2015). The British media showed a considerable interest in this event as it can be seen in Event 18 in Quantitative Content Analysis.
Between 2010 and 2013, articles on the AKP government’s poor record on human rights, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarian attitudes and his tendency to oppress any form of opposition surfaced in the British media frequently.

Islamisation fears in Turkey and Turkish secularists’ claims about the AKP’s ‘secret Islamist agenda’ also got a lot of coverage and started to be taken more seriously by the British broadsheets during this time period. The opponents of the AKP and Erdogan started to be presented as credible sources instead of ‘paranoid and militant secularists’ in the coverage.

British media’s attitude towards the Ergenekon trial also shifted in 2010 and articles seriously questioning the motives behind these trials started to be seen in the pages of British broadsheets. Even centre-left broadsheets like the Independent and the Guardian, which were highly vocal about their support for the trials previously, started to voice their concerns (Independent, 22/09/2012).

At the time of the Turkish general elections in June 2011, in which Erdogan’s party won another landslide victory, British media’s support for the party and its leader was also a lot more muted compared to the previous election.

For example, the Times used the headline “Arrests fuel fears over Turkish democracy on eve of elections; The Islamist government is popular but there are fears that its Prime Minister is moving towards the Russian model (Times, 11/06/2011)” while explaining the political background of the elections. The article, penned by James Bone, underlined the AKP’s economic success but also gave a lot of weight to human
rights abuses and restrictions on the freedom of press that took place during the party’s previous term in power (ibid).

And in an editorial titled “Admiration and Apprehension”, published in the aftermath of the general elections, the Guardian praised the AKP’s economic and electoral success but at the same time harshly criticized Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s accelerating authoritarianism. The media outlet said, “There is much to admire, internally and internationally, about the new Turkey. But peaceful revolutions can overreach themselves too, and it is vital that Turkish society is able to place some limits around Mr. Erdoğan's formidable ambitions (Guardian, 14/06/2011).”

During this period, British broadsheets also started to argue that the AKP government could no longer be seen as a ‘positive model’ for political Islam in the Middle East.

For example in her expose on the Kurdish conflict published in 2011, Guardian’s Turkey correspondent Constanze Letzch said, “Turkey has been held up as a blueprint for the emerging Middle Eastern democracies to copy. But many observers question whether its treatment of its Kurdish minority gives it the right to be treated as a role model (Guardian, 29/12/2011). And in a commentary for the same newspaper Mehdi Hasan argued:

There is a new climate of fear in Istanbul, as hopes that Erdoğan would provide a model for others evaporate. [...]The truth is that Turkey cannot be the model, the template, for post-revolutionary, Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia and Egypt until it first gets its own house in order. To inspire freedom abroad, the Turkish government must first guarantee freedom at home (Guardian, 11/06/2012)
But, despite reporting frequently on the growing criticisms directed towards Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government, British media also kept reminding the government’s positive qualities to their audiences during this period.

For example, in an editorial published in 2011 the *Times* declared, “[Under the AKP government] Turkey is a more modern, confident and prosperous place than it was a decade ago (*Times*, 25/10/2011). And the same media outlet praised the AKP once again the following year by saying “Turkey's moderate Islamist leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has turned his country - once controlled by a Western-backed secular army - into a regional powerhouse, both politically and economically (*Times*, 06/04/2012).

Yet, in mid 2013, with the start of the Gezi Park protests, British media’s perception of the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a turn for the worse and British media’s support for the Turkish government came to a stern end.

7:3:3 Gezi Park protests in the British media

During the Gezi Park protests, which lasted for over a month and resulted in 11 deaths and more than 8000 injuries, four British broadsheets and their Sunday sister papers produced a total of 129 news items about Turkey and a significant proportion of these articles were highly critical of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP government.

In these articles, there were several reoccurring themes such as restrictions on the press freedom and freedom of expression in Turkey (*Guardian*, 04/06/2013),
destruction of green spaces in Istanbul and general police brutality in the country (Independent, 15/06/2013). Turkish government’s Islamist background was frequently underlined in the coverage and Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government were portrayed as negative figures.

In their definitions of these protests, British broadsheets were collectively antithetic of the Turkish government. Media outlets, which supported an AKP friendly discourse for a long time in late 2000’s, in direct defiance of the Turkish government, chose to describe the protest movement in a strictly positive manner.

While government officials and the Prime Minister insistently defined the protests as ‘acts of terrorism and vandalism’; British broadsheets used positive descriptions such as ‘a new people-power movement’, ‘a wide grass-roots movement’ or ’a student driven anti-Erdogan movement’ (Guardian, 17/07/2013; Guardian 09/06/2013; Guardian 04/06/2013; Independent 09/06/2013; Sunday Times 09/06/2013; Daily Telegraph, 08/06/2013 and Daily Telegraph, 04/06/2013).

Adjectives and labels that were used to describe Gezi protesters were also positive and it can even be argued that the AKP government and its opponents switched positions in the eyes of the British media during this period.

Turkey’s Kemalist seculars who had been accused of being conservative, delusional and paranoid by the British media reports for a long time, started to be presented as the ‘sensible side’ during this period, while the AKP and Erdogan took over their previous role.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who defined Gezi demonstrators as ‘terrorists’, ‘looters’, and ‘marginal’, and claimed that the unrest was part of an international conspiracy to destroy Turkey (*Times*, 18/06/2013), was presented as a delusional, vain, paranoid and aggressive leader in British media reports. On the other hand, Gezi Park protesters (and Erdogan’s critics in general) were regularly defined with positive or neutral adjectives and labels such as ‘Western minded’, ‘culturally closer to Europe’, ‘secular’, ‘young’, ‘educated’, ‘middle class’, ‘peaceful’, ‘urban’, ‘fashionable’, ‘successful’ and ‘innocent’ (*Guardian*, 09/06/2013; *Guardian*, 04/06/2013; *Sunday Times*, 09/06/2013; *Times*, 06/06/2013; *Daily Telegraph*, 08/06/2013).

While trying to explain the reasons behind the protests, British broadsheets focused on the AKP government’s repressive attitude and Islamist mind-set. They highlighted Erdogan’s restrictive alcohol laws, the unofficial ban on public displays of affection in the Turkish capital and the steady rise in press censorship in the country as the main reasons behind the protesters discontent with the government and the Prime Minister (*Times*, 03/06/2013; *Sunday Times*, 02/06/2013)”. These were all subjects that they were not eager to emphasise in the past.

During this period, British media’s criticisms were focused on Prime Minister Erdogan’s person rather than his government. His personal ‘hubris’ was presented as one of the primary reasons behind the protests. British media argued that the protests were a result of Prime Minister Erdogan’s belief that he can do as he pleases just because he has the support of the majority.
For instance, in an article titled “Protesters burst Erdoğan’s bubble of fear” Guardian asked, “Could the PM's [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s] hubris be tempered at last by the anger shown on the streets? (Guardian, 04/06/2013) and said “Hubris on the part of the prime minister - an insistence that his majority entitles him to do as he pleases - appears to be his biggest problem, the main issue that put hundreds of thousands of people on the streets at the weekend, not only in Istanbul, but across the country (ibid).

The Daily Telegraph also blamed Prime Minister Erdoğan’s ‘vanity’ for the chaotic situation in Turkey. In a commentary titled “Hubris and nemesis with a Turkish accent” the conservative broadsheet claimed, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s style of politics lies at the heart of his problems at home and abroad (Daily Telegraph, 04/06/2013)”. In a news story published in the Sunday Telegraph, Ruth Sherlock also said the main problem in Turkey at the time was ‘Erdogan’s personal style of leadership’ and claimed “ [Erdogan is] confident to the point of cocky, and clear in his view that three landslide election victories, most recently in 2011, gave him a mandate to push through his vision" (Sunday Telegraph, 09/06/2013)”.

Finally in an editorial titled “Erdogan and democracy” the Times agreed with its rivals’ criticisms about the Prime Minister’s leadership style and said “The new danger for Turkey, […], is the hubris of its Prime Minister (Times, 13/06/2013)”.

British broadsheets also questioned Erdogan’s belief in democracy during the protests. They frequently reminded their readers that Erdogan once said, “Democracy is a means to an end, not an end itself” and speculated on whether Recep Tayyip
Erdogan genuinely changed and devoted himself to democracy and pluralism after becoming Prime Minister (Sunday Times, 09/06/2013; Daily Telegraph, 10/06/2013).

For example, in an editorial published in June 2013 the Daily Telegraph said, “Mr Erdogan’s increasingly belligerent and autocratic style is […] resurrecting old fears that he believes in democracy only as a means to an end (Daily Telegraph, 10/06/2013)”.

Erdogan’s highly controversial words, from 1990’s, were already known to the British press before the Gezi Park protests, yet until 2013 these comments were always glossed over.

For example, in a leader published in 2010 Guardian have said, “The Turkish leader [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] has changed his views on the EU and Nato, both of which he opposed in speeches in the 1990s, and he thinks democracy is a means to an end, not an end in itself. But rather than seeing dark designs in a leader who is both pro-European and a moderniser, it would be fairer to judge him on what he has achieved so far (Guardian 14/09/2010)”; and encouraged its readers to not focus on quotations from the past while judging a politician. But after the Gezi Park protests the media outlet started to openly question Prime Minister’s perception of democracy.

While broadsheets from all political inclinations agreed that Erdogan was the one in fault regarding the protests, centre-right broadsheets were more eager to put the blame on Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party’s Islamist tendencies compared to their liberal rivals.
For example in an editorial titled “Creeping Islamism”, the Times said, “Turkey’s latest law on alcohol is an ominous portent of the nation’s direction (Times, 28/05/2013)” and accused the government of following an Islamist agenda; while the Daily Telegraph pointed out that “Mr Erdogan leads the Justice and Development party (AK), whose Islamist leanings appear increasingly at odds with the secular republic forged by Ataturk 90 years ago. When the prime minister urges Turks to have ‘more than three children’, tells people who drink that they are ‘alcoholics’ - and then restricts the sale of alcohol - many naturally question his intentions (Daily Telegraph, 03/06/2013)”.

Centre-left dailies, the Guardian and the Independent, also increased the emphasis on the fact that Erdogan is an ‘Islamist’ in their coverage of Turkey during the Gezi Park protests, but they underlined that ‘Turkish Prime Minister’s real problem is not Islamism but rather authoritarianism’.

The Guardian explained this by saying “Erdogan's party has Islamist roots and he is often accused of seeking to 'Islamise' Turkey by stealth. But the arbitrariness smacks more of hubris after 10 years in power; less about religion than about power and control (Guardian, 04/06/2013)”.

Yet, British broadsheets, centre-left and centre-right a like, agreed that the Gezi protests cannot be compared to the Arab Spring. They unanimously reached to the conclusion that the Gezi protest was a collective movement against an unsatisfactory yet democratically elected government, similar to the ones in Europe.
The Independent’s Patrick Cockburn explained this in a commentary published in June 2013. He compared the widespread protests against Erdogan to the protests against Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair that took place in Britain in the past and said:

The parallel should be between Turkey and Western Europe, not between Turkey and Middle East states. One of the many reasons why foreigners find Turkey so difficult to understand is that they imagine that its politics have similarities with other Muslim states in the region, which are not there. […] Turkey never ceased to have elections that, unlike in Latin American and Middle Eastern police states, mattered in the distribution of power. Even at the height of military rule, Turkey never wholly ceased to be a democratic state in which powerful parties stood for election and the outcome was not fixed from above as in Mubarak's Egypt or Saddam Hussein's Iraq (Independent, 09/06/2013).

And the Daily Telegraph agreed by saying, “Turkey is not Syria, and this is not a Turkish Spring (Daily Telegraph, 09/06/2013)”.

Also, it is important to underline that while changing their attitudes towards the Turkish leader drastically during the Gezi protests; British broadsheets did not try to ignore his previous achievements or the public support he continued to hold on to during the protests. They also did not hide the fact that they fully supported him in the past.

In their coverage, they frequently reminded their readers that in the first decade of his government Erdogan ‘Tripled the size of the Turkish economy’, ‘forced the Turkish military back in to their barracks’, ‘re-opened EU negotiations’, ‘tried to end the Kurdish conflict’ and ‘proved to be one of the most accomplished politicians of his
time’ (Sunday Telegraph, 09/06/2013; Guardian, 04/06/2013; Guardian, 12/06/2013; Times, 28/05/2013; Sunday Times, 02/06/2013; Sunday Times, 09/06/2013).

They also underlined the fact that Erdogan is a democratically elected leader who still enjoys widespread public support” (Times, 13/06/2013; Daily Telegraph 10/06/2013; Independent, 08/06/2013).

For example, in an editorial highly critical of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, titled “Creeping Islamism” the Times noted, “He [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] has thrived precisely as a democrat, winning three consecutive parliamentary majorities, each more decisive than the last” (Times, 28/05/2013).
7:3:4 Differentiating political criticism from Oriental othering

“There is a psychological war against Turkey in the Western media, based on complete lies. Each day, some international newspapers conduct a perception operation”

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Hurriyet Daily News, 03/11/2014)

Since the start of the Gezi Park protests in 2013, AKP officials and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan insistently claim that the Western media outlets follow an orientalist agenda while reporting on their government.

During the Gezi protests, they argued that the high number of negative news reports published in the Western media about the AKP government was a result of Western journalists’ ‘ulterior motives’ and orientalist prejudices (Al Jazeera, 11/12/2013; Guardian, 28/06/2013). They even accused BBC and CNN’s Turkey correspondents of being ‘western spies’ for covering the protests in a way that makes the Turkish government look bad (Guardian, 28/06/2013).

For example, when Selin Girit from the BBC Turkish Service tweeted several direct quotes from Gezi protesters in Istanbul, she became the focal point of Turkish government’s accusations towards the western media.

271 BBC’s Turkish service’s London based presenter Selin Girit was accused of treachery for tweeting direct quotes from Gezi Protesters by the Mayor of Ankara and Prime Minister Erdoğan. CNN’s Istanbul correspondent Ivan Watson has also faced criticism for his coverage of Gezi Park protests and he was even briefly detained while reporting live from Taksim square. On June 3, 2013 Prime Minister Erdoğan said, “That CNN International lackey is trying to do something there. He made an eight-hour broadcast during last year’s Gezi events. Why? To stir up trouble in my country. This year, they have been caught red-handed” and labeled the veteran correspondent an American “agent” (Hurriyet Daily News, 28/06/2014).
Ibrahim Melih Gokcek, the longstanding mayor of the Turkish capital Ankara and a senior member of the AKP, accused Girit of ‘treachery’ and acting as a foreign agent in a series of tweets. In a tweet from July 2013, he asked:

Who is @selingirit? She is BBC's reporter in Turkey. Led by England, they are trying to collapse our economy via agents hired, both nationally and internationally. They are dreaming for Turkey to be the 'Sick man of Europe' once again. Here is a concrete proof (Gokcek, Twitter, 23/06/2013).

And later, Prime Minister Erdogan also supported Gokcek’s accusations towards the journalist, who is of Turkish origin, by saying “Turkey correspondent of an international media outlet [Selin Girit] said ‘Let’s stop the economy, lets stop consuming. Then they will listen to us.’ How can a person be a part of a conspiracy against her own country? (Yeni Şafak, 25/06/ 2013)”.

Some academics and pro-government media outlets in Turkey also backed these arguments and alleged that, as well as ‘participating in a conspiracy against Turkey’, the western media was collaborating with Erdogan’s Turkish opponents to unjustly portray him as an ‘Oriental despot’. For example, Turkish national daily Aksam’s Fahrettin Altun said:

[During the Gezi Park protests] We started to see negative representations of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in visuals, headlines and commentaries published in the mainstream Western newspapers. In their caricatures they depicted Erdoğan as an Islamist dictator. In these caricatures, Erdoğan was drawn next to minarets, wearing İmam or Sultan outfits. He was depicted as an “Oriental dictator” corrupted by power (Altun, Aksam, 22/04/ 2014).
In the same commentary titled “Tayyip Erdogan and the western media” Altun also claimed that the narratives about Erdogan in the Western media started to become more and more negative and ‘Orientalist’ after the Davos economic forum in 2009, in which Erdogan had a heated argument with Israeli leader Shimon Perez during a televised debate. Altun argued that the ‘Israeli lobby’, who wants to see a more Israel friendly government in Turkey, collaborated with Erdogan’s opponents in Turkey to make sure Turkish prime minister was represented as a negative figure in the mainstream western media. He claimed that these representations became especially common during the Gezi Park protests (ibid).²⁷²

These arguments, which at times merged Orientalism with conspiracy theories, were widely represented in the pro-government Turkish media during the Gezi Park protests. One of Erdogan’s most senior consultants, Ertan Aydin, summed up these

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²⁷² On January 29, 2009 Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan walked off the stage after an angry exchange with the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, during a panel discussion on Gaza at the World Economic Forum and vowed never to return to the annual gathering. Erdoğan became incensed after the moderator (Washington Post columnist David Ignatius) curtailed his response to remarks by Israeli leader Peres on the recent Israeli military campaign. The panel was running late, and Peres was to have had the last word. As a result of his actions in Davos, Erdoğan received a “heroes welcome” in Turkey and was praised for “standing up to Israel” (New York Times, 30/01/2009) In the following years, especially during Gezi Park uprising, many pro-government analysts in Turkey, just like Altun, claimed that Western media’s attitude towards Erdoğan started to change as a result of this exchange in Davos. They claimed Turkey’s deteriorating relations caused pro-Israeli media organisations operating in the West to start attacking Erdoğan.

The incident at the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum was not listed as a main event in BBC’s timeline for Turkey, which was used as a basis while determining the research sample of this study. Yet, since many Turkish analysts insisted that Davos 2009 really was a “turning point” for Erdoğan and AKP’s representation in the Western media, a search was conducted in the Lexis- Nexis database to determine how this incident was covered in the British broadsheets. The research showed that analysed British broadsheets mentioned this event in a total of 5 news items (Daily Telegraph, 31/01/2009; Guardian, 31/01/2009; Times, 31/01/2009; Independent, 31/01/2009; Times 30/01/2009). Only two of the news items, published by the Guardian, and the Telegraph were focusing on Erdoğan’s argument with the Israeli leader, while the rest were simply mentioning the incident while reporting on the World Economic Forum in general. None of the news items were criticising Erdoğan for his actions. Also, the Qualitative analysis showed that this incident did not affect British media’s representation of AKP or Erdoğan in a negative way. Analysed British broadsheets continued to use a highly optimistic and positive discourse while reporting on Erdoğan for at least another year after Davos 2009.
arguments in an article for Al Jazeera online 5 months after the end of the protests. In the article, titled “Talking Turkey: Orientalism strikes back”, Aydin said:

Why is it, then, that Western media discourses come close to declaring Turkey as an Oriental despot? The answer to this question lies in the assumption that Muslims, as pious believers, can never reconcile their values with the standards of liberal multi-party democracy. Hence, the incomprehension and denial of the last 10 years of Turkish political experience, where a conservative party achieved more democratising reforms than any other political party in modern Turkish history (Al Jazeera, 11/12/ 2013).

Aydin, just like Altun and many other pro-government analysts in Turkey, also accused journalists from the US and Europe of collaborating with Erdogan’s opponents in Turkey to create a distorted and negative image of the Turkish government. He said:

Turkish intellectuals and journalists from the opposition parties manipulated and aided Western media's Orientalism for their own purposes. Most Turkish intellectuals could easily detect Western stereotypes about Turkey, and they have little patience for images of flying carpets, belly dancing and oriental baths associated with their society, and know the fallacies of Oriental despotism narratives of horrible prisons as shown in movies such as Midnight Express. Yet, after losing seven consecutive elections at national and municipal levels, and with little hope of winning any of the upcoming national elections, segments of the Turkish opposition tried to make an alliance with media Orientalism in demonising and delegitimising the Turkish government as a "civil dictatorship" with a hidden Islamist agenda (ibid).

These accusations were directed at the ‘western media’ in general but since ‘the West’ is not a homogenous and singular entity; this study will only try to determine if they are accurate for the British broadsheets in particular.
In order to provide an objective analysis of the representation of the Turkish government in the British broadsheets, and to be able to determine whether Turkish government’s accusations of Orientalism towards the western and British media are accurate or not, it is essential to look at the representation as a whole (before and during the Gezi Park protests) and differentiate political criticism from Orientalist othering.

After qualitatively analysing over 150 news items in the research sample of this study, we can confidently say that British broadsheets did not have an idée fixe about the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2007 and 2013 based on the party’s religious identity or political standing.

As explained in detail in the previous section, British broadsheets drastically changed their views about the party and its leader from positive to negative in the seven-year time period analysed for this study. While they were highly supportive of the government between 2007-2010, this attitude changed gradually in the following years and strong support turned in to strong criticism in 2013.

So it is hard to argue that British media criticised, or ‘plotted against’ the Turkish government as a result of an undergoing Orientalist mind-set.

Ertan Aydin’s claim about ‘achievements of the AKP government not being sufficiently covered in the Western media’ was previously verified in the results of the quantitative analysis conducted as a part of this study. The quantitative analysis of 731 news items showed that several achievements of the AKP government such as
allowing the civilian courts to try military personnel, passing several democratic
reforms, achieving an unprecedented economic success or increasing Kurdish
language rights did not receive a high coverage in the British broadsheets (See:
Quantitative analysis).

Yet, even though news items focusing solely on the achievements of the AKP were
not published in British broadsheets frequently, these topics were regularly mentioned
in news items focusing on other subjects about the country.

For example, while none of the news items in the research sample were specifically
focusing on the AKP’s economic success or the party’s democratisation efforts; these
subjects were frequently mentioned in news items about Turkish general elections, the
Ergenekon case and even the Gezi Park protests. Also, British broadsheets dutifully
underlined the achievements of the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdogan in
their editorials about Turkey.

As Galtung and Ruge explained, negative developments in any given foreign
country are more attractive for the international media because they happen in a
shorter time span, they are easier to interpret and they are more unexpected. On the
other hand positive developments such as ‘economic success’ or ‘gradual
democratisation’ happen in a longer time span and they are harder to report on in the
The British journalists who report on Turkey on a regular basis also agreed with this point and claimed that their editors are not interested in positive stories about Turkey, because they do not consider these stories to be ‘newsworthy enough’.

Journalist B, a British correspondent based in Istanbul who was interviewed for this study, said, “Bad news is always better than good news. Editors are not interested in stories about how ‘everything is great in Turkey (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014)”.

So, it can be argued that the reason behind the notable dominance of negative news items in the coverage of Turkey in the British media is not based on media outlets’ orientalist attitudes towards the country or its government, but it’s rather based on the media’s natural tendency to see negative events as more newsworthy.

Aydın, alongside with the Turkish government and pro-government media organisations in Turkey, also accused the western media of collaborating with Erdogan’s opponents in Turkey in order to create a distorted and negative image of the Turkish government.

Determining if the so called ‘Jewish lobby’ or the ‘Interest lobby’ had been collaborating with Turkish seculars to influence the way western media presented Turkey and its government is beyond the means of this study273. But, it is possible to

273“Interest lobby” is an alleged entity Prime Minister Erdoğan has been accusing to “conspire against Turkey” since 2012. As Wall Street Journal explained “The Turkish leader hasn't publicly outlined who he believes constitutes this lobby. But he is commonly understood to be referring to foreign parties—including investors, economists and journalists—who have called for an increase in Turkey's benchmark policy rate in order to tame inflation and cool an overheating economy (Wall Street Journal, 12/01/ 2012)”. In many contexts Turkish government hints that the so called interest lobby is
see if the government’s critics have been over-represented or unjustifiably favoured in the British coverage or not.

As explained in the previous section, the qualitative analysis showed that the critics of the Turkish government were presented as ‘paranoid’, ‘ideologically motivated’ and ‘oppressive’ in the British coverage between 2007 and 2010. After 2010, these negative descriptions gradually softened and with the Gezi Park protests, Erdogan’s opponents started to take the centre stage in the British coverage. As a result, British broadsheets’ coverage of the Gezi Park protests was highly favourable of the protesters in the streets and other critics of the government who chose not to participate in the protests.

But in contrary to Aydin and the government officials’ claims, all of AKP and Erdogan’s critics did not receive the same amount of support from the British media because the Turkish opposition is not homogenous and they are not being seen as such by the British journalists.

Even during the Gezi Park protests, British broadsheets acknowledged that some opponents of the government were unjustly critical of Erdogan and his party as a result of their fear and distrust for political Islam and they differentiated these critics from the masses protesting against the government.

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the equivalent of an alleged “jewish lobby” which also conspires against Turkey. Anti-semitism has been a ongoing narrative used by the AKP government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan through out their time in power. For a detailed look in to Erdogan and AKP officials discourse on jews and Israel can be found in Kadri Gursel’s article for Al-monitor tittled “Turkey’s Israel problem” (Gursel, (09/06/2013) “Turkey’s Israel Problem”, Al Monitor, URL: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/turkey-israel-normalization-threat-gezi.html, accessed: 13/08/2015)
For example, in a commentary for the *Times*, Alex Christie Miller underlined this fact by saying, “[Gezi Park protesters] feel little connection to Turkey’s nationalist, xenophobic, old school secularists. But they have been pushed over the brink by an ever more overtly Islamist government (*Times*, 10/06/2013).

Turkish government and pro government academics and journalists in Turkey also argued that during the Gezi Park protests the coverage of Turkey in the western media was dominated by interviews with protesters themselves as well as journalists and academics that are critical of the government. They claimed that the masses who are supportive of Erdogan and his party were being silenced and ignored in western media reports and interpreted this as a proof of western media’s prejudice towards the government or the protesters’ collaboration with ‘orientalist western powers’.

But, when we look at the Turkish actors that were mentioned or quoted in the time period analysed for this study, we clearly see that British journalists used the Turkish government and Recep Tayyip Erdogan as primary sources of information (See: Chapter 5: section 5:2:11 Actors).

As a result, while it is true that AKP and Erdogan’s critics were presented under a positive light during the Gezi Park protests by the British broadsheets, after looking at the way they were presented over the 7-year time period analysed in this study, it is not justifiable to say that the British media ‘collaborated with Turkish seculars’ to take down the Turkish government.
Turkish government and its supporters also accused the Western media of being unjustly critical of the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdogan as a result of their prejudices against Islam in general and political Islam in particular (Al Jazeera, 11/12/2013).

The literature shows that, in the 21st century Islam is the main source of othering in the British and western media (Poole, 2001; Klein, 2009; Harb and Bassaiso, 2006; Moore, Mason and Lewis, 2008). And, the quantitative analysis conducted as a part of this study showed that narratives that emphasise Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party’s roots in political Islam were used execratively throughout the coverage.

The frequent use of adjectives, labels and definitions that indicate Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a ‘Muslim democrat’, ‘Former Islamist’ or a ‘Religiously minded politician’ created a discourse that differentiate Erdogan and the AKP from their counterparts in Britain, the European Union or the United States of America and presented the Turkish government as a part of the Islamic other.

Since Islam is the main subject of European Orientalism in modern times, it can’t be denied that the unnecessary and strong emphasis on Turkish government’s religious identity in the coverage resulted in them being perceived as a representative of the ‘other’ rather than a part of the European or western ‘self’.

Yet, the qualitative analysis showed that the emphasis on AKP and Erdogan’s Islamic identity was not used to present the party and its leader under a negative light. On the contrary, until late 2010, Erdogan and his party were perceived and presented as ‘the
proof that Political Islam can and should be a part of the democratic world’ by the British broadsheets. In other words, they were presented as a positive, Model Other and a template for Muslim nations in the Middle East to use while adapting to democracy.

The AKP government and Turkey’s status as the Model Other started to be questioned by the British media in late 2010 and these narratives came to an end during the Gezi Park protests. And it is true that during this period British broadsheets, especially conservative ones, started to present AKP’s ‘Islamist identity’ as being negative and even threatening.

Yet, after looking closely at more than 150 news items that were published in the 7-year time period analysed for this study, it is clear that the AKP and its leader Erdogan were not targeted or victimised by the British press as a result of its affiliation with political Islam. Instead, they were supported and applauded for being ‘democratic and Islamic’, until their ‘autocratic’ tendencies started to dominate the press coverage.

In the end, the qualitative analysis of 150 representative news items published in British broadsheets during the Gezi Park protests showed that the British media’s critical approach towards the AKP government and Prime Minister Erdogan during this period was ‘political criticism’ rather than oriental othering.

The narratives that were used in British broadsheets in which the AKP and Erdogan were harshly criticised for their treatment of the protesters, also reminded the Turkish
government’s previous achievements to their audiences. In a way, the coverage was the portrayal of a certain level of ‘disappointment’ rather than the reflection of an orientalist mind set.

British journalists who reported on the Gezi Park protests from Turkey also strongly contested the government’s accusations of Orientalism about their coverage of the events in Turkey. They reminded that they praised and defended Erdogan for years and the critical tone they used during the protests was ‘just and objective’. For example Journalist B, Istanbul correspondent for a British broadsheet, who was interviewed for this study, said:

In the context of Turkey, word Orientalism is used in a ridiculous way. It’s basically any narrative. The functional meaning of Orientalism in the Turkish discourse is ‘A narrative being put forward by foreigners which a political fraction, who ever they may be, do not like. And so they say ‘you are imposing this view from outside, this is not based on desire to understand Turkey, but instead it is based on a desire to control and manipulate Turkey’. You know, it is just a rhetorical tactic. And I think it is pretty empty as a real charge (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

And İstanbul correspondent for another British daily, Journalist C, who agreed that Orientalism was not a factor in the critical coverage of the Gezi Park protests, said:

I would think that the reporting on the Gezi uprising was the least orientalist. Especially since it was portrayed as an uprising of the middle class, the ‘white Turks’, in the press (Journalist C, interview with author, 2014).

The findings of this study are inline with the arguments of interviewed journalists. But does this mean that the coverage of the AKP or Erdogan (or even Turkey) is never affected or influenced by Orientalism?
7:4 Othering Turkey by presenting it as a model ‘Bonne Pour Orient’

The project to create a country that is Muslim, democratic, secular, financially stable and connects the European Union with the Middle East makes Turkey possibly the most important political experiment in the world today.

Daniel Howden (Independent, 29/07/2008)

The qualitative analysis showed that British broadsheets were supportive and even celebratory of the AKP during most of its last two terms in power and their criticisms for the party and its leader, which started to dominate the coverage during the Gezi Park protests, were not Orientalist defamations as the Turkish government suggested.

But this does not prove that the party, and as a result Turkey, was not subjected to orientalist othering by the British media. As explained in the first chapter of this study, Orientalism is not a static, meaningless hatred or a baseless criticism but rather a general patronizing western attitude towards oriental societies which can also manifest itself in seemingly positive representations. And this patronising attitude was very much present in the British media’s representation of the AKP and Turkey between 2007-13.

It is possible to say that British media never insulted or criticised the AKP because of western orientalist attitudes towards political Islam and the Muslim world. Instead, on the contrary, their contemptuous attitudes towards a country that is not strictly a member of the ‘western’ civilisation caused them to overpass and condone wrongdoings of the party and its leader in their coverage.
As mentioned above, until the Gezi Park protests in 2013, British broadsheets repeatedly defined Turkey and its governing party AKP as a ‘model for the Middle East’ (*Times*, 23/07/2007; *Guardian*, 29/12/2011; *Times*, 06/04/2012; *Guardian*, 11/06/2012; *Daily Telegraph* 12/06/2013; *Independent*, 22/01/2012).

And this supposedly positive narrative was actually the most solid representation of British media’s orientalist attitude towards Turkey.

In their coverage of Turkey, British broadsheets declared Turkey’s, by their definition, ‘Islamist’ government to be a *test case* for political Islam’s compatibility with democracy (*Times*, 23/07/2007) and argued that the AKP (and its leader Erdogan) is setting a positive example for the Middle Eastern countries. Their narratives showed that, to them, Turkey under AKP rule represented the ideal Muslim county: It was Islamic enough to be seen acceptable by its more conservative Eastern neighbours but at the same time democratic and agreeable enough to be a trusted western ally.

British media’s belief in Turkey and the AKP’s ‘model’ status gradually disappeared with the escalation of AKP’s authoritarian attitudes; yet it served as a source of Orientalism while it lasted.

Leaving aside how this attitude once again grouped a large variety of nations together under a simplistic banner and assumed that the AKP can be a realistic model for them
all, it also caused British media to judge Turkish politicians and political parties by a different, lower set of standards than their European counterparts.

When they were presenting Turkey under the AKP’s government as a ‘model’ to their readers, British broadsheets did not argue that the AKP is a fully democratic and liberal government but instead claimed that the party and its leader were ‘good enough for Turkey and the Middle East’ or in other words ‘good enough for a Muslim democracy’.

This attitude was especially apparent in the Guardian’s 2007 editorial titled “Islam and Democracy (Guardian, 22/08/2007)” which was discussing the concerns the Turkish army and secular Turks\textsuperscript{274} have about Abdullah Gul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and AKP’s alleged “Islamist agenda”.

After listing these concerns and criticisms; the broadsheet said, “From a European liberal perspective, some of this is worrying, but in parts of the Middle East - among reformers in Egypt, for example - it is often seen as a model” (Ibid)” and they concluded the article by indicating that the illiberal actions of the AKP government should not be condemned.

\textsuperscript{274} Throughout this dissertation, sections of the Turkish society, which support Kemalist secularism, will be referred to as ‘seculars’ or ‘Turkish seculars’. Kemalist secularism, as opposed to the secularism defined by Enlightenment thinkers like Locke, Diderot and Voltaire and practiced in Western countries, does not limit itself with merely separating religion from political affairs. Instead, it requires all religious affairs to be strictly controlled by the state (Daver, 2013), and restricts religious observance to the private sphere completely.
In other words, the news outlet openly argued that some allegedly illiberal actions of the AKP and its leaders, which were unacceptable for a western liberal democracy, were ‘good enough’ for a Muslim democracy like Turkey.

In a way, in this editorial Guardian editors admitted that they were not judging the AKP by the same standards they apply to proper European countries and their governments. They were openly condoning anti-democratic developments in Turkey, so that the country can keep its role as a ‘model’.

And this behaviour was not exclusive to the Guardian. Until Gezi Park protests, which made AKP’s status as the ‘model’ unattainable in the eyes of the western world, British broadsheets chose to ignore or at least trivialise questions about the AKP’s commitment to democracy and their socially conservative and controversial policies in their coverage.

They ignored AKP’s actions that are not in line with the European liberal standards as long as these actions were in line with the role of the Model Muslim democracy. In their reports about these deficiencies they frequently underlined that the situation in Turkey is not as bad as it is elsewhere in the Middle East.

In other words, they turned a blind eye to the wrongdoings of the AKP government to be able to create and sustain an agreeable model for Europe’s more threatening and problematic others.
This entails a deep Orientalist mind-set, which implies that a Muslim society can not be (or should not aspire to be) as liberal as a European one. These narratives show that Turkey, even though it is a ‘lesser’ and ‘more acceptable’ other in the eyes of the British press compared to rest of the Muslim world, is still not being treated as an equal. Instead, it is just being presented as the best in a bad bunch.

This attitude can also be seen in news stories about Turkey that has nothing to do with the AKP or Erdogan.

The qualitative analysis showed that Turkey and its government have multiple and seemingly contradictory representations in the British print media. British broadsheets, conservative and liberal alike, unanimously supported Turkey’s European Union bid but refrained from referring to the country as a part of the European community.

They frequently suggested that the country is an important, loyal and essential ally but also insistently refused to include it in to the ‘first person plural’ that represents the wider self in their narratives.

And finally, they over-emphasised Turkey and its government’s ‘Islamic’ identity and orientalised the country with references to its Ottoman past in their narratives; but also, for years, defended the actions of its ‘Islamist’ government against vocal secular criticisms.
In other words, British broadsheets never gave any indication that Turkey is an equal part of the European self, but also they never quite treated it as a straightforward Oriental other.

In their eyes Turkey, being predominantly Muslim, was not one of them. But, as a result of the westernisation process it went through and its eagerness to be accepted by Europe, it was the ‘ideal’ Muslim country. It was what the West wanted all Muslim countries to be, it was a model other.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8:1 Introduction

This study was set out to explore and analyse the representation of Turkey in British broadsheets between 2007 and 2013. Using Edward Said’s Orientalism and concepts of self and other as a theoretical basis, the study aims to answer the main research question of ‘Is Turkey being represented as a part/extension of the European self or as an Oriental Other in the British media?’

Taking Turkey’s multifaceted national identity and Britain’s exceptionalist attitude towards Europe in to consideration, this study applied the concept of Nesting Orientalisms, created by Bakić-Hayden to explain the self-other relationships within Europe, to the Turkish example and hypothesised that Turkey was perceived and represented as an agreeable and useful, lesser other to Europe in British media texts.

Postulating that Turkey was placed somewhere between the European self and Said’s categorically negative oriental other, the study also claimed that Turkey was being put forward as a model for the Middle Eastern region in British media texts during this period and consequently proposed to define the country’s unique position on the self-other axis of Europe with the concept of ‘Model Other’.

The Model Other was defined as an other that is the representative of the western perception of an ‘ideal’ oriental (Islamic) society but still perceived and represented as an inferior and less civilized entity compared to the (European) self.
This chapter seeks to present a detailed picture of the Turkish representation in the selected time period as well as giving a definitive answer to the main research question.

To achieve this goal, the chapter will start with summarising the key quantitative and qualitative findings of this study by answering complementary research questions that were presented in the Methodology Chapter. These findings will be conceptualised in accordance to the theoretical framework and the over all judgement on the hypothesis will be presented. The chapter will conclude by listing the study’s contributions to the relevant literature, revealing its limitations and setting forth suggestions for future research.

8:2 Quantitative findings

A quantitative content analysis was conducted as a part of this study in order to map the coverage and determine the building blocks of the Turkish representation in the British media. In this section, findings obtained through this analysis will be summarised by providing short and to the point answers to the complementary research questions that was listed in the relevant section of the methodology chapter.

1. Was there a direct causality between the political inclination of a news outlet and the number of news items it published on Turkey?
Centre-left news outlets (the *Guardian*, the *Independent* and their Sunday sister papers) published a slightly higher number of news items about Turkey compared to their centre-right rivals over all. But the quantitative analysis did not show a direct causality between the political inclination of a news outlet and the number of news items it published on Turkey. After looking at the results of the quantitative analysis, it was determined that the number of articles each broadsheet published about Turkey was determined by its individual journalistic style and editorial policy towards international news instead of its general political inclination (for example the *Times*, a centre-right daily published a significantly higher number of news items on Turkey compared to the *Independent*, a centre-left, liberal publication).

2. **Which region Turkey is being associated with the most in British broadsheets?**

   In the time scale of this study, Middle East was the region Turkey was being associated with the most. While less than 15% of the research sample referred to Turkey’s relations with Europe, 35% of the news items were focusing on Turkey’s relations with the Middle East indicating that Turkey was mostly represented by its actions in or interactions with this region in British media texts.

3. **What are the most common adjectives or labels that were used to define Turkey and its government? What kind of an image these adjectives created for Turkey?**
In the research sample of this study, the most common adjective that was used to define Turkey was ‘ally’. The country was frequently described as a ‘regional ally of the West’, a ‘Nato ally’ or “Europe and the US’ ally in the region’. The second set of adjectives that were frequently used to define the country were based on its religious identity, such as ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’, Turkey was also, very occasionally, defined as a ‘secular’ country. Yet, the ratio between the adjectives that emphasise Turkey’s religion and its secular nature was approximately 2 to 1, indicating that Turkey was mostly categorised as a Muslim nation.

The fact that Turkey was referred to as an ally above anything else shows that the country was represented as a positive actor in British media texts. Yet, the strong emphasis on Turkey’s religion (and the relatively low interest in the country’s secular nature) indicated that Turkey’s status as an ‘Islamic other’ was also prominent in the coverage.

Quantitative analysis showed that the emphasis on religion was even higher in adjectives/ labels that were used to define the AKP and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Overall, 67% of adjectives that were used to define the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in British media texts were based on religion. This finding demonstrated that Turkish government and the Prime Minister were presented as ‘Muslims’ above anything else even though they were identifying themselves as conservative democrats.
Over all, solely looking at the adjectives/labels that were used to define Turkey and its government in British media texts, it can be argued that the country was presented as an ally, a positive actor but it was not perceived as a part or even an extension of the European self.

4. What are the most prominent issues in the coverage of Turkey?

Issues that were reported on most frequently in the Turkish coverage were international conflicts (mostly rooted in the Middle East) and Turkey’s foreign policy (Again, relevant to Middle East). The percentage of the news items that focus on Turkey’s European membership bid was relatively low during the timescale of this study, yet, issues that directly affect Turkey’s claim to Europeanness such as the Kurdish conflict, human rights violations, denial of the Armenian genocide and demilitarisation of democracy were also widely covered.

Another prominent issue in the coverage (which popped up in more than 15% of the news items) was Turkey’s perceived Islamisation under the AKP government.

The prominence of the discussions about alleged Islamisation of the country in the coverage is significant since Turkey’s “Muslim” identity is one of the most common arguments against its Europeanness.”
All in all, it can be argued that the issues about Turkey that were covered in the British media between 2007 and 2013 were nearly identical to the issues that are being raised in Turkey’s EU membership negotiations.

5. What kinds of news stories regarding Turkey get the most coverage?

The Quantitative analysis showed that British media’s interest in Turkey fluctuated a lot during the time period analysed in this study. Some events and on-going occurrences about Turkey, like the Gezi Park Protests, the Israeli Flotilla Crisis, and the Kurdish conflict got an extensive coverage while democratisation and Europeanization efforts by the Turkish government and positive news events regarding the Kurdish conflict received relatively less attention. The event that received the broadest coverage in the British newspapers was the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and the Israeli flotilla crisis in 2010. The quantitative findings showed that British media published a higher number of articles on ‘negative’ occurrences in Turkey overall.

6. Who wrote the news items in the research sample and where?

The quantitative analysis determined that 731 news items analysed for this study were written by a total of 196 journalists and analysts in 16 different countries. Only 14 of the journalists/analysts who wrote about Turkey in the British broadsheets were of Turkish origin. More than half of the news items were written in the UK while 155 of them were written in Turkey.
The high number of journalists who wrote about Turkey during the time scale of this study shows that the British broadsheets did not rely on a single voice in their coverage of Turkey. Yet, the low number of Turkish reporters/analysts/experts in the research sample shows that British broadsheets opted to using foreign correspondents in their Turkey coverage instead of local reporters.

7. **Who are the main actors in the coverage?**

The quantitative analysis showed that the main actor in the coverage was, by far, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who was either quoted or mentioned in more than half of the news items in the research sample. Turkish government officials, state representatives, military officials and members of the Turkish opposition were also prominent actors in the coverage.

The most commonly quoted or mentioned foreign actor in the coverage was the United States of America. Since the percentage of news items directly dealing with the Turkish-American relations were low, this indicates that American point of view was presented in news items that are actually dealing with Turkey’s internal affairs or relations with the Middle East and Europe.

Experts who were mentioned or quoted in the research sample were also predominantly Turkish, indicating that even though news reports were produced by foreign journalists, Turkish stories were told by Turkish voices in the British media.
Another prominent actor in the coverage were the Kurds in Turkey. This was the reflection of the importance British media gave to the Kurdish conflict.

The primary aim of the quantitative analysis was to present an objective, empirical and comprehensive map of the coverage of Turkey in the British media. The data that was collected as a result of this effort provided a foundation for this study, which is aiming to understand how Turkey and its government was perceived and represented in the British media between 2007-2013.

The hypothesis of this study is that Turkey and its government were presented as a lesser, ‘Model Other’ in the analysed British broadsheets between 2007 and 2013, meaning that it was placed somewhere between the European self and the oriental other as an agreeable and useful other, which can be put forward as a model for the rest of the Muslim world.

The quantitative findings were supportive of this hypothesis.

First of all quantitative analysis determined that an overwhelming majority of the news items in the research sample were produced by western (European/British) journalists instead of local reporters, as expected. This finding made it possible for the study to move forward with the claim that concepts of self and other as well as Orientalism were inevitably influential in the coverage.
After determining that the coverage of Turkey in the British media was indeed a western interpretation of the Turkish reality, the quantitative findings were used to understand exactly how Turkey was represented in this context.

It was observed that, even though Turkey is a prospective member of the European Union and is an active and influential trade/military partner to the nations that form the core of the European self including Britain, the country was primarily being associated with the Middle Eastern region in the coverage. Furthermore, the number of reports on Turkey’s relations with the European Union / individual members of the European community were relatively low, indicating that the country was not being seen as a part of the European news agenda.

Also, Turkey’s religious identity was a prominent part of the coverage while the country’s secular identity was largely overlooked, demonstrating that Turkey was presented as an Islamic other and not as a part of the European self.

Additionally, quantitative findings showed that a certain negativity bias was present in the British coverage of Turkey. Analysed British publications gave weight to negative news events and developments about Turkey in their coverage while glossing over several indications of progress. As a result, they involuntarily encouraged the country’s image as an inferior other.

Over all, the coverage was shaped by a variety of issues that are being used against Turkey in its ongoing quest of becoming a member of the European community.
Yet, Turkey was not a straightforward other in the eyes of the British media. Quantitative findings indicate that Turkey was not being subjected to the same level of alienation; demonization, othering and Orientalism Muslims are being subjected to on a daily basis in British media texts. For example it was not being associated with terror, violence or threat. Instead, Turkey was frequently described as a British or western ‘ally’ or in other words, presented as the ‘good Muslim nation’.

Also, quantitative results reaffirmed some of the criticisms directed at Said’s theory of Orientalism regarding the Turkish example. Said claimed that the West’s tendency to speak for the Orient on matters concerning the Orient is a fundamental sign of Orientalism. Yet, after taking a close look at the actors quoted or mentioned in the coverage, it was determined that this was not true regarding Turkish representation in British broadsheets. Turkish voices were dominant in British media’s narratives about Turkey.

In short, the quantitative findings were in line with the hypothesis of this study and they confirmed that Turkey was not presented as a straightforward Oriental other in British media texts but it also was not presented as a member of the ‘civilised’ European self.

Yet, numerical findings of the Quantitative content analysis was not sufficient to determine exactly how Turkey was represented in the British media so a qualitative analysis was also conducted on the research sample. Key findings obtained as a result of this effort will be presented in the following section.
8.3 Qualitative findings

A Qualitative textual analysis was conducted as a part of this study in order to examine meanings, themes and patterns that may be manifest or latent in the coverage of Turkey in British media texts. Interviews conducted with journalists who report for British broadsheets and Turkish media outlets were also used to achieve this goal. In this section, findings obtained through qualitative research methods will be summarised by providing short and to the point answers to a set of complementary research questions that was listed in the relevant section of the Methodology Chapter.

1. **Was there a qualitative difference between the representations of Turkey in the centre-left and centre-right British broadsheets?**

The qualitative analysis showed that centre-right and centre-left British newspapers did not have a significantly different attitude towards Turkey in the time scale of this study. Centre-right broadsheets (especially *Daily Telegraph*) were more inclined to emphasise Turkey’s religious identity in their narratives, but this emphasis was also seen in the *Guardian* and the *Independent* from time to time.

All newspapers were on the same page regarding their views of the Turkish government, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the country’s general foreign policy. The broadsheets were also unanimously supportive of Turkey’s accession to the European Union.
Yet, there was one particular issue regarding Turkey centre-left and centre-right newspapers handled very differently: the Kurdish conflict. While the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Times* used a narrative that is sympathetic to the Turkish state, the *Guardian* and the *Independent* were highly critical.

In their coverage, centre-right broadsheets focused on the oppression Kurdish people have been subjected to in the hands of the Turkish state and they emphasised the fact that Turkey is radicalising Kurds by unlawful arrests and widespread discrimination. They based their reports on testimonies of PKK representatives, Kurdish civilians and Kurdish leaders.

On the other hand, centre-right broadsheets like the *Times* and the *Daily Telegraph* viewed the Kurdish conflict mainly as a ‘terrorism problem’ Turkey, an ally, is facing. They focused their reports on Turkish army’s efforts to abolish the PKK. Compared to their centre-left rivals, they paid little attention to the suffering of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and generally based their coverage of the conflict on the testimonies of Turkish officials instead of PKK representatives or Kurdish leaders.

2. **Which aspects of the Turkish identity were dominant in the coverage?**

As explained in detail in the second chapter of this study, Turkey is a secular country with a Muslim population that claims to be an integral part of the European community.
The westernisation process it went through in late 19th and early 20th century, its geographical proximity to Europe and its military and economic alliances with the western world caused Muslim Turkey to assume a multifaceted identity.

Particularities of this multifaceted identity were present in the British coverage to some extent. Yet, the dominant characteristic of Turkey in the British coverage was its religion. In a significant number of news items British journalists emphasised the fact that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country and ignored the fact that it is aspiring or even claiming to be a European one.

In negative as well as positive news items focusing on Turkey, the country was defined as a part of the Muslim world above anything else. Even in the coverage of Turkey’s European Union bid, which all of the British newspapers support, Turkey’s Islamic identity was underlined.

On the contrary, Turkey’s secular identity was trivialised throughout the coverage. Turkish brand of secularism was described as a conservative or even obscurantist force in the country and secular Turkish republic was frequently defined as a ‘Muslim democracy’.

3. Were British broadsheets supportive of Turkey’s EU membership bid? (If so) What were the reasons behind their support?
In the time scale of this study British broadsheets were unanimously supportive of Turkey’s European Union membership bid.

They based their arguments on Turkey’s value as a political, economic and military ally and underlined the role of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and the Middle East. Yet, while making these points, none of the British broadsheets ever claimed that Turkey is a part of the shared history, culture or values that shape the modern European identity and they never openly declared Turkey ‘a European country’. They claimed, Turkey’s accession to the union would not validate its identity as a European nation but instead would make the European Union a weaker and looser free trade area. In their coverage they were also pointing out that ‘Muslim’ Turkey’s accession to the European Union would be highly beneficial to ensure peace and stability of the European community. Broadsheets claimed that as a model Muslim nation, Turkey could be a useful member of the European Union and form a bridge between two conflicting civilisations.

4. In which ways British media presented Turkey as an Other in their coverage between 2007-2013?

As mentioned many times throughout this thesis, in the period analysed for this study Turkey was not presented as a stereotypical Oriental other in British media texts. Yet, there were several aspects of the coverage in which Turkey was othered and even orientalised.
First of all, Turkey was never included in to the first person plural in British media narratives. This indicates that even though Turkey was described as an ally and a welcomed addition to the European Union it was not perceived as a part or even an extension to the European self. Instead, it was always perceived as an other.

Secondly, Turkey’s religious identity was emphasised unnecessarily at times and the country was included in to the Orientalist generalisations about the Muslim world.

Thirdly, imagery and metaphors about Turkey’s Ottoman past as well as comparisons between the modern Turkish government and the Ottoman Empire/ Sultans that associate Turkish republic with Europe’s historical other were used in narratives.

Fourthly, Turkey and its government were presented to the readers as the ‘good Muslims’ or a ‘model Muslim democracy’ causing the country to be classified as a ‘Model Other’.

5. **What were the implications of the narrative that classify Turkey as a ‘Model’ for the country’s representation in the British media?**

While narratives that classify Turkey or the AKP as a ‘model’ for the Muslim world seem to be positive or even complimentary for the country on surface, they were a significant source of Orientalism.
These narratives reduced Turkey into a Muslim democracy (as if there are different subsets and levels of democracy for different civilisations) and implied that it is subject to lower standards compared to its western counterparts.

These narratives precipitated the British media to turn a blind eye to several illiberal practices of the Turkish government. While negative developments in Turkey were reported in detail and brought to public’s attention (which reinforced Turkey’s image as an inferior and less developed other), the narratives that present Turkey as a Model Muslim Democracy created an environment in which these deficiencies in the country, especially in the country’s democracy, were trivialised on the grounds that they were acceptable in a predominantly Muslim country.

Narratives that service Turkey and its government as a Muslim democratic model for the Middle Eastern region also contributed to the othering and orientalisation of the Muslim world as a whole. These narratives lumped all predominantly Muslim countries into one pot and reduced the complex problems in the region to religion.

6. Did British media’s perception of the AKP change in the time scale of the study?
British broadsheets’ perception of the AKP changed drastically in the time scale of this study. After the Turkish general election in 2007, in which the AKP won a landslide victory; support and encouragement for the AKP peeked in British media texts.

In this period, British broadsheets applauded Turkish government’s efforts for democratic reform and ignored Turkish seculars’ concerns about the AKP government’s autocratic tendencies and socially conservative policies. During this time narratives that classify Turkey as a ‘Model Muslim democracy’ were common ground.

Yet, this seemingly positive perception started to change around 2010. As the AKP started to pursue an aggressive social and political reconstruction project and turned Turkey’s direction eastwards, critical reports on the party started to find their way in to British broadsheets.

And finally in 2013 with the Gezi Park protests the AKP lost all of the support it acquired from British broadsheets over the years. The AKP’s fall from grace also affected British media’s perception and representation of Turkey and caused the country to lose its model status.

7. **Were the government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at western journalists during this period substantial?**
The qualitative analysis showed that the British media’s critical attitude towards the AKP government during the Gezi Park protests was not the product of an Orientalist mind-set as the Turkish government suggested. As explained in the previous question, until the Gezi Park protests, British broadsheets embraced a generally supportive narrative towards the AKP, even though they perceived the party as the representative of political Islam, an ideology that they normally present as an other. They chose to defend the AKP as a shining example of tame and benign ‘model’ political Islam and classify any criticism regarding their commitment to democracy and secularism as ‘exaggerations’.

So, their critical attitude towards the government regarding the Gezi Park protests was political criticism rather than an act of orientalist defamation. In a way, during this period British media was reflecting their ‘disappointment’ about the collapse of the Turkish ‘model’.

The primary aim of the qualitative analysis conducted as a part of this study was to go beyond the revelations of the numerical data obtained through quantitative analysis and unearth the ‘meaning’ in the content.

The analysis confirmed that Turkey was not represented as a straightforward oriental other in British media texts. Through this analysis, it was determined that Turkey was frequently presented under a positive light as an irreplaceable regional ally or a prospective member of the European Union during this period. Yet, qualitative analysis also showed that Turkey was not immune to orientalist generalisations or
othering and hence was not represented as a part or even an extension of the European self in British media texts.

Even though it was seen as a positive actor over all, the country was not included in to the first person plural (that coincides with the concept of the self) in any context. It was principally represented by its religious identity and its positive qualities were mostly used to portray it as the good one in a bad (Muslim) bunch.

Representations of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan were also qualitatively examined as a part of this study. It was determined that the party and its leader were presented as predominantly positive actors in British media texts until the Gezi Park protests of 2013.

Yet, these positive representations were partly a consequence of the British media’s eagerness to put Turkey forward as a Muslim model. While representing the AKP and Erdogan as a ‘model’ British journalists were glossing over their deficiencies regarding democracy and secularity and hence, they were orientalising the country alongside with rest of the Muslim world.

Conclusively, both quantitative and qualitative findings obtained as a part of this study showed that Turkey was not presented as a part of the European self or a straightforward Oriental other in British media texts between 2007-13. Instead, it was portrayed as a lesser, ‘Model Other’, and was placed somewhere between the self and Said’s categorically negative oriental other.
The next section will look into theoretical implications of this conclusion as well as this study’s contributions to the relevant literature.

**8:4 Theoretical Implications/ Contributions to the literature**

The ideas Said presented in his 1978 book Orientalism undoubtedly revolutionised the discussions about the Occident’s relations with and understanding of the Orient. His theories sparked new discussions in feminism, cultural studies, political science, international relations, anthropology, literature and even art history.

But, legitimacy of the theory of Orientalism is still being questioned. It is being criticized for a variety of reasons including the vagueness of the terminology it utilises, the contradictions in its theoretical system and its alleged reinforcement of the binary opposition between the Occident and the Orient. And, one of the most prominent criticisms about Said’s work is revolving around Ottoman Empire and Turkey.

As mentioned in the second chapter of this study, Said nearly never talked about Ottoman Empire, one of Europe’s most prominent others, in his work. Many of his critics including Lewis, Ahmad and Gellner, justifiably argued that his reluctance to give examples from Ottoman Empire’s relations and interactions with the Occident was based on the fact that these examples would have impoverished his theory. Similarly, Turkey, the Ottoman Empire’s main successor, did not play a prominent role in his writings about Orientalism.
Turkish academics were also not that interested in Orientalism and Orientalism’s possible influence on Turkey, until recently. While there were some prominent studies about Turkey’s place on the self-other axis of the West and possible implications of the theory of Orientalism for Turkey, for a long time Orientalism was generally seen as something that mostly affects Europe’s old colonies and Arabs (Yildiz, 2007 p:13).

But in the 21st century, especially after the Gezi Park protests in 2013, Orientalism became a popular topic of discussion in Turkey. The Turkish government claimed that the West, and especially the western media, is being critical of them as a result of an orientalist mind-set and hence, sparked new discussions about Turkey’s place in Said’s theories. As a result, Orientalism became an important tool to analyse the West’s perception of Turkey’s multifaceted identity, which is European and oriental at the same time.

This study, analysing the representation of Turkey in the British media, aimed at establishing Turkey’s place in Europe’s self-other axis in the British context and proposed an explanation for Turkey’s unique and problematic role in the Orientalist theory.

Admitting that Turkey, with its strong alliances with the western civilisation, geographic proximity to Europe and eagerness for westernisation, was not fitting in

Bakić-Hayden's Nesting Orientalisms can be used to explain this tendency. Westernised Turks see themselves as Europeans (or at least lesser Orientals) and as a result consider Orientalism to be a problem of the “real” Orientals, mainly Arabs. At this point it also needs to be mentioned that Turks are guilty of Orientalism towards non-westernised elements with in Turkish society (See: Chapter 2) and their Arab neighbours.
Said’s binary understanding of Occident-Orient relationships, this study carried Bakić-Hayden’s concept of Nesting Orientalisms (originally created to explain Balkan countries relations with Western Europe) to the Turkish example and through quantitative and qualitative research methods showed that Turkey was a lesser, more positive other to Europe compared to its neighbours in the Middle East. As a result, by assessing self–other relationships as gradual and not static, this study presented the reasons behind Turkish example’s unsuitability to Said’s binary understanding of Occident and Orient.

After determining that Turkey was a lesser other to the European self, the study also proposed utilising a new concept to define Turkey’s unique status on the self-other axis in British media texts between 2007-13: the Model Other.

The study established that during this time period, in British media texts, Turkey was presented as a benign and useful Muslim actor, which can be used to bridge the alleged gap between western and oriental civilisations. While this attitude was prominent in the whole coverage (from discussions on Turkey’s accession to the European Union to the analysis of Turkey’s role in international conflicts) it was most obvious in narratives in which Turkey was openly defined as a ‘Muslim model’ or a ‘model Muslim democracy’.

This study argued that these narratives actually classified Turkey as a ‘Bonne pour l’Orient’ model and orientalised it in the process by condoning its democratic deficiencies and subjecting it to a lower set of standards compared to liberal European democracies and encouraging to fulfil a role tailored solely by the West (a role which
may not be positive for Turkey). In other words, this study pointed out that Turkey, actually, was orientalised through seemingly positive narratives during this period.

By analysing Turkish representation in the British media between 2007-13, this study filled an important gap in the relevant literature in journalism studies. As explained in the Methodology Chapter, most research dealing with Turkish representation in the western media was focusing on a particular aspect of the coverage (most frequently Turkey’s EU membership bid). In contrast, this study looked in a large variety of events (and analysed a larger sample than any other existing study) and assessed the coverage in its entirety. This study also provided a chronological continuation to previous research on the subject.

For example, Christensen (2002) who focused on Turkish general elections in 2002 and qualitatively analysed representation of the AKP in the British and American press during the weeklong period after the elections, using the concept of media framing as a basis, concluded that AKP’s election victory was framed as “(1) a victory for an “Islamic” party, (2) an issue for concern vis-à-vis relations with “the West,” and (3) a victory serving as both an experiment in the mixing of Islam and democracy as well as a possible example to other Muslim nations (Christensen, 2002 p: 121)”. This study followed up on his effort and showed how AKP’s victories in 2007 and 2011 general elections were covered in British broadsheets.

On the other hand Paksoy (2012) analysed the representation of Turkey’s EU membership bid in selected British broadsheets and the BBC between 1999 and 2008 and concluded that Turkey was represented as a ‘Positive Other’ in this context.
Building up on to his findings, this study analysed the representation of Turkey’s EU membership bid up to 2013 and determined that British broadsheets continued to provide a supportive coverage of the issue. Yet, looking into the entirety of the coverage between 2007-2013, this study concluded that Turkish representation can be better defined by the concept of a ‘Model Other’, instead of the ‘Positive Other’, since the British broadsheets did not represent Turkey as an equal to the British and European self and the relationship between two entities, as it is represented in the media coverage, was not mutually beneficial.

This study also provided a counter argument to Devran’s (2007) article titled “The portrayal of Turkey in the British Media: Orientalism Resurfaced” in which he argued that Turkey was represented as a straightforward oriental other to the European self by the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph.

Another important contribution of this study to the literature was providing a methodological answer to Turkish government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at the Western media.

After Prime Minister Erdogan’s senior advisor Ertan Aydin summarised these accusations in his article for Al Jazeera titled “Talking Turkey: Orientalism strikes back” (Al Jazeera, 11/12/2013), several journalists and academics including Bloomberg’s Marc Champion who was personally named by Ertan in the article and Christian Christensen who published an analysis on representation of the AKP in the British and American media back in 2002 (Bloomberg, 11/12/2013; Aljazeera, 20/01/2014) responded and unanimously refuted these accusations.
Yet, by analysing British media’s representation of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2007-13 in detail, this study provided the first methodical response to Aydin and through him the Turkish government and stated that even though Orientalism was a prominent factor in the formation of British broadsheets’ coverage of Turkey; their criticisms of the Turkish government during the Gezi Park protests were not orientalist defamations.

8:5 Limitations of the study/ Recommendations for future research

Just like any other study, this one had several limitations. First of all, the research sample did not include every news item about Turkey published by British broadsheets in the seven-year time scale of this study. As a result, there is a small possibility that a number of relevant news items may have been involuntarily excluded from the sample. Yet, a larger research sample than any other previous study (a total of 731 news items, from four British broadsheets and their sister Sunday papers were analysed) was analysed for this one, so this possibility does not pose a serious risk for the representative quality of the results.

Secondly, as explained in detail in the Methodology Chapter, this study examined the news product (content) without also examining modes of production and/or consumption (audience reception) in detail. A snapshot of the production and the reception processes was provided using in depth interviews (see: Annex 1), and these interviews were also used throughout the qualitative and quantitative analysis
chapters when necessary. Yet, this effort cannot be seen as a conclusive explanation of the production or the reception of the coverage of Turkey in the British media.

This brings us to the recommendations for future research. This study provided a conclusive analysis of the British media texts about Turkey. Yet, further research on production as well as reception of these news items can be enlightening.

For example, documenting the production of Turkey related news items in real time (from journalists gathering information in the field to the editors in London finalising the copy) can provide an invaluable addition to the findings of this study by demonstrating which factors affect the formation of the final product. Also, focus groups can be formed in Britain in order to understand how does the coverage of Turkey in British broadsheets influences British public’s perception of the country. Finally similar focus groups can be formed in Turkey to observe how this coverage affects the Turkish public. Additionally, prospective studies looking in to the representation of Turkey in the German, French, Italian and American news outlets during the second and third terms of the AKP government can provide a possibility for observing if media attitudes about Turkey were similar to Britain in these countries during this time period.

Also, the Gezi Park protests in 2013 (where this study ends) marked a turning point for Turkey and its national identity. A follow up study looking in to the representation of Turkey in the British media in the post-Gezi period (In which the Turkish government faced a corruption scandal as well as a general election defeat) can
demonstrate how British media attitudes towards Turkey and the AKP government evolved in time and be a valuable asset for literature.

Lastly, an analysis of Turkish media’s attitudes towards Turkey’s internal others as well as the rest of the Muslim world can be useful for furthering the understanding of the concepts of Nesting Orientalisms and the Model Other.

8:6 Concluding remarks

As explained above in detail, British media’s perception and representation of Turkey, due to its unique position between the European self and the oriental other, is more positive compared to their perception and representation of Islam and Islamic countries in general. Yet, it is not completely free of othering and Orientalism.

Today, Orientalism is being seen (and is actively being used) by the Turkish government as a way to brush off any Western criticism towards Turkey. While arguing that any negative comment about Turkey coming from the West is a baseless orientalist defamation is unacceptable, this does not mean Orientalism does not affect the coverage of Turkey in the Western media.

Orientalism is not a static, meaningless hatred or a baseless criticism but rather a general, patronizing Western attitude towards Oriental societies. And this patronising attitude is very much present in British media’s representation of Turkey.
This thesis showed that between 2007 and 2013, Turkey was presented as a ‘lesser’ or a ‘model’ other in British media texts. It wasn’t seen ‘civilized’ enough to be accepted in to the first person plural, but it was presented as a ‘good enough’ model for the rest of the Middle East.

This narrative, which was rooted in the idea that Muslim nations should be evaluated by lower standards than their Western counterparts, reduced the diverse Muslim world in to a singular and homogenous mass that should be content with a lower grade of democracy represented by Turkey. Also, it caused the British media to gloss over the illiberal and anti-democratic attitudes of the Turkish government and dismiss criticisms coming from Turkish seculars as exaggerations.

Today, in the post-Gezi Park era, it is commonly accepted that the idea of a ‘Turkish model’ is losing ground, as the Turkish government is becoming more and more authoritarian and less accommodating to Western interests and ideals.

This gives an opportunity to Western journalists to evaluate their perception of Turkey and to create a new, more accurate and just representation of the country. A representation that won’t orientalise it by assuming it should be subjected to lower standards regarding its democracy.
To be able to provide an accurate coverage of the Middle East, journalists need to be willing to step out of the us vs. them dichotomy when reporting on the region and refrain from seeing and presenting Turkey as a model ‘Bonne pour l’orient’.
ANNEX 1 - IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

The quantitative analysis showed that 731 news items in the research sample of this study were produced by a total of 196 journalists, analysts and experts based in 16 different countries around the world.

As mentioned in the Quantitative Analysis Chapter, the large number of journalists writing about Turkey in the 4 British broadsheets analysed for this study can be explained by the extensive use of freelancers and stringers. The large number of news reports about Turkey coming from different countries such as the USA, Israel, Iraq, Belgium and Germany also contributed to this number.

In the time scale of this study none of the analysed broadsheets had Turkey correspondents with staff positions but this shouldn’t be seen as an indication of the British media’s lack of interest in Turkey, since these days more and more Western news organizations are relying on freelance journalists to cover foreign countries where economic realities have forced the closure of fully staffed bureaus (Guthrie, 2009).

But one thing quantitative analysis determined that is significant for the purposes of this study is the fact that only 14 of the 196 journalists / analysts who wrote about Turkey in the British broadsheets were of Turkish origin and the majority of the coverage was provided by Britons or other Europeans.

A media organisation’s choice between local journalists and foreign correspondents is part of a wider discussion. There is an on going debate about weather local journalists
are better at covering their own countries for international audiences than foreign correspondents; and literature does not have a definitive answer to that question yet (Bunce, 2011; Burden, 2009; Burton, 2011; Davies, 2014). Both European and Turkish journalists interviewed for this study said they view the dominance of British reporters in the British coverage as a natural reality or even a necessity and argued that British broadsheets choose to employ British or European reporters to cover Turkey because they want their news reports about the country to have a European angle that makes the stories relevant and relatable for their audiences back home.

Yet, in a study dealing with the representation of Turkey in the British print media and looking for the effects of Orientalism on the coverage, cultural composition of journalists that produce the news items in the research sample is particularly important and cannot be ignored as a natural occurrence. The apparent hegemony of foreign reporters in the list has several effects on the representation of the country.

This section will try to provide a snapshot of the production as well as reception of the coverage of Turkey in selected British broadsheets by presenting the outcomes of in-depth interviews conducted as a part of this study.

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276 Here it needs to be noted that Said himself does not claim that native voices should be privileged in discussions about culture (or journalism). He doesn't think it holds any water at all to use only "insider" knowledge, that only Muslims (Turks) can speak about Islam (Turkey). In discussing the problem of Orientalism, he encourages scholarship to focus on the gap between local or native discourse and foreign discourse. That gap, he says (and maybe only that gap), can become the unit of analysis. In other words, discussing Orientalism does not mean that foreign opinions and reports on Turkey do not hold any value.
A: 2 Reasons for moving to Turkey

Journalists that were interviewed for this study gave a large variety of reasons for moving to Turkey. One journalist, who is of German origin, said “It was both the interest in the country and the desire to learn more about it because I had many friends in university who were from Turkey. And I'm German, so there has always been a strong connection (Journalist C, interview with author, 2015)”.

While another journalist claimed that he/she made the decision to move to Turkey as a result of a combination of professional and lifestyle reasons. He/she said:

I moved to Turkey in 2010. And at that time it wasn’t quite the magnet for foreign journalists that it’s become since then. [...] That was one factor. There was a scope for freelancing. Not that many publications actually had salaried correspondents there. So that was an attraction. The other factor was really just that I’d always heard that Istanbul was an amazing place to live. And another factor again would be that it’s within the European cheap flights network so it wasn’t difficult to go home and see family when I need to. So it was a mixture of professional and lifestyle reasons (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

So each journalist had her/his own (personal) reasons to make the decision to move to Turkey and, they all had an idea, an image of Turkey in their minds before they made the move. This carries us to the question of pre-perceptions about Turkey that journalists had.

A: 3 Pre-perceptions of Turkey

All journalists who were interviewed for this study denied that they carried any pre-perceptions about the country before they actually moved there and experienced it
first hand. They also unanimously declared, ‘They did not (and still do not) hold views about Turkey that may be categorised as Orientalism’. Yet, their answers told a significantly different story.

For example Journalist C said “I would not say that I had a certain perception [of Turkey] before I moved here”; but continued by saying that his/her view of Turkey ‘changed’ after he/she moved to the country because “[He/She] learned more about it (Journalist C, interview with author, 2015)”. This indicates that even though he/she believed that he/she did not have an image of Turkey in his/her mind that was formed in his/her home country before actually experiencing Turkey, this was not true.

Also, later in the interview he/she said, “[When I moved to Turkey] I started to understand the Kurdish issue, which until then I had only heard about from Kurdish activists in Lyon, much better (ibid).” This shows that he/she came to Turkey with a certain point of view on one of Turkey’s most significant problems, a point of view that was formed in Europe.

And Journalist B, when asked about his/her views about Turkey prior to making the decision to move there said:

To be honest I didn’t know [much about the country]. I’ve read some books about Turkey before I moved here but I had no connection with the country before coming here. I didn’t have a clear picture of what it was like in my mind. In terms of… my political perspective of Turkey changed. The way in which I view the country has changed. But I wouldn’t say my cultural perception of it has changed particularly (Journalist B, 2014).
The journalists’ accounts on their views about Turkey prior to their decision to move to the country and their admission that these views changed after spending time there provides an important insight for this study.

First of all it needs to be clarified that orientalist pre-perceptions are not limited to rather comical examples like Westerners thinking, ‘Camels are being used for transportation in Turkey’ or believing ‘all Turkish woman know how to belly dance or all Turkish men have mustaches’. Instead, these pre-perceptions are subtler.

As Said puts it, the role of the foreign correspondent is to “translate what happens there (the country they are reporting on) into language that his compatriots at home can understand (Said, 1997 p: 180)”. And while playing the role of the ‘cultural translator’ it is inevitable for an individual to “thrust back on what he or she knows”(ibid).

While Said made this point to explain the behaviour of American journalists working in the Middle East, it is also applicable to the British/ European journalists reporting on Turkey.

Journalists’ accounts on their pre-perceptions about Turkey show that even though they were certain that they did not have Orientalist prejudices about the country, they involuntarily (and inevitably) had a certain point of view about Turkey prior to their life in the country. This was a point of view that they utilised while ‘translating’ the occurrences in Turkey in a language that is understandable for their target audience, the British public.
But, they also claimed that their views changed as a result of their experiences in Turkey. This carries us to the question of how they currently perceive Turkey.

A: 4 Current perceptions of Turkey

British/European journalists interviewed for this study said they have a significantly positive perception of Turkey after spending some time in the country. Some journalists also claimed that their experiences in other Middle Eastern countries made them appreciate their life in Turkey even more.

Journalist A said that he/she thinks living in Turkey made him/her form an emotional attachment to the country and its people and he/she even claimed that “Turks are more honest and hospitable in their day to day interactions compared to Britons (Journalist A, interview with author, 2014)” and he/she claimed that he/she prefers to live in Turkey.

Over all, talking about their experiences in Turkey, from going on vacation to South Western Anatolia to partying in Istanbul or reporting on the refugee crisis on the Eastern border, journalists were positive, even complimentary about the country. They all indicated that they love their lives in Turkey and they enjoy their interactions with the Turkish public. They said that they never faced any hostility or discrimination and never felt that ‘they are not welcomed’.
Journalist M, a Turkish journalist who currently works as the main correspondent of a national Turkish news channel in London, provided an interesting insight regarding foreign journalists’ perceptions of Turkey.

During his interview he said that, he worked closely with several foreign journalists who regularly write for British and American news publications throughout his career and observed that they all had similarly positive perceptions of Turkey.

Foreign journalists who choose to reside in Turkey for longer than a couple of months and who exclusively report on Turkey, do so because they genuinely love the country. Turkey is not a war zone so we do not get the adventurous types who are after the adrenalin. These days those types go to Iraq and Syria. I’ve always observed that correspondents of Western publications in Turkey are less critical of the country in general compared to my Turkish colleagues and me. I sometimes think this is because they expect less from Turkey. They see it as a Middle Eastern country (Journalist M, interview with author, 2014).

While all interviewed Turkish journalists, just like Journalist M, were adamant that foreign correspondents view Turkey as a Middle Eastern country and that this perception affects the way they report on the country, correspondents themselves were undecided about this categorization.

When asked, ‘if they consider Turkey to be a European country or a Middle Eastern one’, all journalists seemed to be hesitant to give a definitive answer. For example Journalist B claimed that he/she believes Turkey ‘falls between the two stools’:

It’s funny when I’m down on the Syrian border I very much feel like Turkey is part of Europe. And then when I’m in İstanbul I feel more like its part of Middle East sometimes. Which is kind of counter
intuitive. But the reason is when you go down and see what’s happening in Syria and Iraq; you see how Turkey is light-years away from those countries in standards of governance. Actually its not true that I think ‘Turkey is Middle Eastern’ when I’m in İstanbul, but when I’m down on the Syrian border I definitely feel very aware of how different Turkey is from Middle Eastern countries. But culturally speaking it’s hard to say (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

Journalist C also agreed with his/her colleague and said, “In my opinion [Turkey is] both, I find that difficult to answer with one or the other (Journalist C, interview with author, 2015)”.

Also, while they were reluctant to place Turkey under any geographical or cultural category (Middle Eastern- European) interviewed journalists unanimously said that, just like the publications they work for, they want to see Turkey in the European Union.

But the reasons for their support were significantly different compared to the broadsheets that they work for. This study established that British broadsheets supported Turkey’s accession to the European Union because they think it will be beneficial for Britain. Yet, journalists interviewed for this study emphasized the fact that accession will be beneficial for Turkey and the Turkish public. For example, Journalist D said “Obviously I really hope it one day does [join the European Union]. I think regardless of whether or not it ends up joining it’s a massively positive thing for Turkey to be in the accession process (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).”

All in all in depth interviews showed that British broadsheets’ Turkey correspondents all viewed Turkey under a positive light and some even declared that they see the country as a ‘second home’.
This carries us to the question ‘Is it possible for people who genuinely love a country to provide an Orientalist coverage of it?’

**A: 5 Orientalism**

Edward Said never tried to paint an *absolute* picture of reality in his works. Certainly he was well aware that many Orientalists (like Bernard Lewis who received Ataturk International Peace Award in 1998 for his work on Turkey and the Turkish history) liked the Middle East, spent time there, and were sympathetic to Arabs, Muslims, Turks etc, at least to a certain extent.

As explained throughout this study, Orientalism is not a static, meaningless hatred or a baseless criticism but rather a general patronizing Western attitude towards Oriental societies which can also manifest itself in seemingly positive representations.

So, British journalists’ love for and interest in Turkey should not be seen as proof that they cannot, even involuntarily, orientalise the country in their reports. Yet, when questioned directly about Orientalism, most of these journalists said that they find accusations of Orientalism baseless and even offensive.

The strongest objection to accusations of Orientalism came from Journalist B. He/She said:

> In the context of Turkey word Orientalism is used in a ridiculous way. It’s basically any narrative. The functional meaning of Orientalism in
the Turkish discourse is ‘A narrative being put forward by foreigners which a political fraction, who ever they may be, do not like’. And so they say ‘you are imposing this view from outside, this is not based on desire to understand Turkey, but instead it is based on a desire to control and manipulate Turkey’. You know, it is just a rhetorical tactic. And I think it is pretty empty as a real charge (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

Yet, the same journalist gave a considerably different opinion when the word Orientalism was omitted from the question and replaced by ‘Cultural misrepresentations of Turkey in the Western media’.

In that context he/she said there is an ‘absolute’ difference between the real Turkey and Turkey that is being presented to the British public by the media (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014).

Commenting on the utilization of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory in the news coverage, he/she said that even though he/she personally does not want to misrepresent Turkey in his/her reports, or unnecessarily emphasise the country’s Muslim identity (and consequently present it as an other) editors in London are pressuring him/her to do so.

I think there is definitely a pressure coming from editors of some newspapers about this [Framing news stories from Turkey as confrontations between Western and Islamic civilisations] including mine. They like stories, which play up the fear of Islam. That is something I always push against because I don’t like writing in that way. It is sort of an obsession for a lot of British news editors. I certainly wouldn’t want that to be put under my name. But I think some newspapers like the Guardian and the Independent are quite good at this and Financial Times is good at it. I think the Times and Telegraph are very bad for it (ibid).
Journalist E, who also strongly refuted the suggestion that his/her reports may have contributed to the Orientalist narratives about Turkey or Muslims, also claimed that his/her editors in London altered his/her reports in a way that caused Turkey to be ‘misrepresented’. He/She said,

“Editors in London are keen to frame Turkey as an Islamic country. They will rewrite introductions to stories to make them more sensational. Or they will find a headline that will sensationalize the story. They will add words like Islam, Islamic or mention that the AKP comes from ‘Islamic roots (Journalist E, interview with author, 2014).”

While blaming their editors for altering their copy, journalists emphasized that news staff in London are also not doing this as a result of their own Orientalist mind set but rather, they do it to meet their readers’ expectations.

For example Journalist B said “They [Editors in London] know that most of their readers, it is enough to look at the comments on the website, are basically Islamofobic. And editors play to that (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014)”.

Journalist M also agreed and said,

As I said before, British journalists in Turkey are inclined to protect, defend Turkey; even more so than Turks themselves. It’s the editors in London who alter their reports to make it sound like each story is about a confrontation between the West and Islam. They do it to please their readers and sell papers. In my experience this attitude is especially visible in conservative broadsheets. The Guardian and the Independent’s core readers would not be happy with a presentation like that (Journalist M, 2014).

All in all, after looking at most journalists’ accounts regarding Orientalism and misrepresentation, it is possible to say that they are all willing to accept that there is a
tendency to misrepresent Turkey in the British media, especially by unnecessarily emphasizing its religious identity, but they refuse to categorize this tendency as Orientalism.

Journalists’ strong opposition to the utilization of the word Orientalism in relevance to the British coverage can be explained by their anger over the Turkish government’s accusations of Orientalism directed at Western journalists after the Gezi Park protests.

Since they find these accusations (which were analysed in chapter 6) ‘baseless’, they tend to discard the entirety of the theory of Orientalism as a ‘baseless political accusation’ in the Turkish context. In other words, they reduce Orientalism to a rhetoric used by the Turkish government to dismiss any criticism coming from outside of Turkey.

The fact that they equate Orientalism with the AKP’s accusations can also be seen in the way they explained how ‘Orientalism is not relevant in the Turkish coverage (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).’

For example, one of the journalists said,

Today, they [Turkish government] claim any critical report about them is just Orientalism. But British journalists were, like 5-6 years ago, really supportive of them. Back then they [Turkish government] never said anything about foreigners being prejudiced. On the contrary, they were using positive news stories in the West to prove they are doing a good job. So, no, I do not think Orientalism is a fair accusation (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).
The only journalist who said that there is a certain degree of Orientalism in the British coverage of Turkey was Journalist C. But, he/she also refuted the claim that British media’s criticism of the AKP government during the Gezi Park protests was an example of this Orientalist discourse. He/She said,

> Sometimes clichés are easier than the layers. So, I believe there is a certain degree of Orientalism in the coverage. But I find Turkish government’s accusations about Orientalism that came after the Gezi Park uprising a bit surprising. I would think that the reporting on the Gezi uprising was the least orientalist. Especially since it was portrayed as an uprising of the middle class, the ‘white Turks’, in the press (Journalist C, 2015).

He/she continued by agreeing with the findings of this research and said, “I find narratives that classify Turkey as a ‘Model for the Muslim world’ more orientalist than the reporting on Gezi. It disregards many factors and regional differences and lumps them all into one pot under ‘majority Muslim country’. So I don't agree with this narrative (ibid).”

In conclusion, in depth interviews showed that, journalists who produced news items about Turkey for British publications are aware that the coverage incorporates misrepresentations of Turkey. Even though most of them refuse to link these misrepresentations to Orientalism, their accounts show that this is not the case.

But, in depth interviews also unearthed other, more practical, reasons that resulted in Turkey being misrepresented in the British media. Following sections will look in to these reasons.
A: 6 Language abilities

In depth interviews showed that majority of the British journalists who report on Turkey on a regular basis do not consider themselves to be fluent in Turkish and they admit that they rely on translators, fixers and trusted Turkish ‘experts’ while collecting information and conducting interviews.

Only one of the journalists working for a British broadsheet interviewed for this study indicated that he/she is fluent in Turkish and is even studying Kurdish to further his/her understanding of the country and its people.

One journalist who admitted his/her lack of language skills said,

My Turkish isn’t very good. I’d say I’m beginner to intermediate level. Yea, its really really bad. It’s a big embarrassment of mine. I can do like, random interviews on the street. I can sort of muddle through the press, with the help of, like, Tureng. But I can’t do an interview in Turkish properly. And, I couldn’t read a Turkish novel. And if I’m with Turkish friends and they are all chatting away in Turkish, I will maybe be able to pick out half of it (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).

While it is possible to cover a news story without speaking the local language, journalists’ lack of Turkish language skills can limit their over all experience of the country. Since they wont be able to hear the first hand accounts of Turkish people on any given subject, important details and nuances may get lost in translation.

277 Tureng is a popular online dictionary that provides Turkish/English translations for everyday words, idioms, technical words and mainstream slang. www.tureng.com
A: 7 Space limitations

Journalists interviewed for this study also claimed that space limitations sometimes cause them to over simplify their reports on Turkey and they alleged that this over simplification results in Turkey being misrepresented in British media texts.

For example Journalist B said, “If you are writing a 500 word story as opposed to a 1000 word story you will inevitably tend to simplify and you know its much harder to accurately present what’s going on (Journalist B, interview with author, 2014)”. And Journalist D agreed by saying “It is not easy to present every layer or angle of a story in 300, 500 words. We do our best but sometimes simplification is inevitable and this, I guess, may result in misrepresentation (Journalist D, interview with author, 2014).

A: 8 Cycle of news

Discussions about reasons behind the possible misrepresentations of Turkey also led to a rather unexpected finding about the production and reception processes of British broadsheets’ coverage of Turkey. Journalists explaining how they obtain in-depth knowledge about certain aspects of the country without speaking the native language revealed that they utilise the views of a set of Turkish experts/journalists that they respect to form their opinions.

When asked about this interaction between Turkish and foreign journalists, Journalist M, who currently works as the London correspondent of a Turkish news channel said,
I consider most of the British correspondents working in London friends. Especially when I was working in İstanbul, they used to call me whenever they were writing an important story and I would give them my opinion. For example, back in 1994, during the local elections in İstanbul, a British journalist called me to ask about my predictions about it. I told him that Livaneli (the candidate for SHP-Social Democratic Populist Party) had no chance of winning against Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and I gave him the reasons behind my predictions. The next day, I saw that he used quotes from me in his piece, referring to me as a ‘Turkish expert’. He also made the same predictions I made, using the same reasoning. That day, we translated his piece to Turkish and published it, saying ‘This is what Britain thinks about the elections’. It was quite amusing to report on my own words as if they were coming from ‘Britain’. This happens quite regularly in the Turkish press. When an opinion comes from UK or US it immediately becomes newsworthy for the Turkish press, even though Turkish people, journalists have been saying the same thing for ages. This still happens to this day. It is sort of a news cycle (Journalist M, 2014).

British journalists interviewed for this study did not elaborate on to what extend they rely on Turkish journalists/experts while analysing occurrences in Turkey, yet they said they are aware of the impact their reports have in Turkey and on Turkish media.

One journalist said, “I know that British and American news stories, especially the ones on controversial subjects like the Kurdish conflict or the Armenian genocide have a huge impact in Turkey. But I cannot say I think about this when I’m writing because whichever way I may frame a story, or editors frame a story, it will upset some people in Turkey. The most important thing, of course, is to give an accurate account (Journalist E, interview with author, 2014)”
ANNEX 2: Quantitative Content Analysis Coding Schedule

Instructions:

- Please write the answers (value number) next to the question mark of each question.
- If you cannot find the answer, you should code ‘N.A.’

1- Date of issue?

2-The name of news organisation?

(1) The Times
(2) The Daily Telegraph
(3) The Independent
(4) The Guardian
(5) Independent on Sunday
(6) Sunday Times
(7) Observer
(8) Sunday Telegraph

3- Period of the sample (Event)

Code event number: 1 to 31

4- Item number?

5- Length of item?

(1) 100-300 words
(2) 301-600 words
(3) 601 & over words

6- Type of article?

(1) News Report
(2) Leader / Editorial
(3) Commentary / Column
(4) Feature
(5) Economic Analysis

7- Page number?

8- Page Label?
(1) News
(2) Home news
(3) European News
(4) International News
(5) Analysis
(6) Comment
(7) Finance/economics
(8) Editorial
(9) Overseas/Foreign/ World news
(10) Middle East
(11) Other

9- Name of journalist (byline)?
(1) Reporter/ Correspondent (Give full name)
(2) Unspecified
(3) Agency

10- Category of the news item?
(1) Turkish – Middle Eastern relations
(2) Turkish - European Relations
(3) Turkish –British Relations
(4) Turkish – American Relations
(5) Internal affairs of Turkey
(6) Other

11- Which issues does the news item cover?
(1) Human rights issues
(2) Issues about religious freedoms
(3) Minority issues
(4) De-militarisation of democracy
(5) Kurdish issue
(6) Disputes on Armenian genocide
(7) EU candidature process
(8) International conflict
(9) Culture
(10) Turkey’s Foreign Policy - Relations
(11) Policy Making
(12) Other
(13) Islamisation fears, secularity debates

12- Which adjectives were used to define Turkey and Turks in the news item?

13- Which adjectives were used to define AKP government or PM Erdoğan?

14- Who are the actors (excluding Turkish actors) who are quoted or mentioned in the news item?

15- Who are the Turkish actors in the news item
ANNEX 3: CODING MANUAL

THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

While analysing the media representation of Turkey in British print media between 2007 and 2013, this thesis uses samples from 31 representative events taken from the BBC timeline for Turkey.

These are the events as they were listed on BBC timeline:

**2007**
- July - AK Party wins parliamentary elections.
- August - Abdullah Gul is elected president.
- October - Diplomatic row with United States after a US congressional committee recognises the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide. Parliament gives go-ahead for military operations in Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels. Voters in a referendum back plans to have future presidents elected by the people instead of by parliament.
- December - Turkey launches a series of air strikes on fighters from the Kurdish PKK movement inside Iraq.

**2008**
- February - Thousands protest at plans to allow women to wear the Islamic headscarf to university. Parliament approves constitutional amendments which will pave the way for women to be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities.
- July - Petition to the constitutional court to have the governing AK Party banned for allegedly undermining the secular constitution fails by a narrow margin.
- October - Trial starts of 86 suspected members of shadowy ultra-nationalist Ergenekon group, which is accused of plotting a series of attacks and provoking a military coup against the government.

**2009**
- February - Protesters marking the 10th anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the banned Kurdish PKK movement, clash with police in southeast Turkey. Prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk defies Turkish law by giving speech to parliament in his native Kurdish. State TV cuts live broadcast, as the language is banned in parliament.
- June - Trial starts of a further 56 people in connection with the alleged ultra-nationalist Ergenekon plot to bring down the government.
- July - President Abdullah Gul approves legislation proposed by the ruling AK Party giving civilian courts the power to try military personnel for threatening national security or involvement in organised crime. PM Tayyip Erdoğan holds a rare meeting with the leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party, Ahmet Turk, as part of efforts to solve the Kurdish problem politically.
- October - The governments of Turkey and Armenia agree to normalise relations at a meeting in Switzerland. Both parliaments will need to ratify the accord. Turkey says opening the border will depend on progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- December - The government introduces measures in parliament to increase Kurdish language rights and reduce the military presence in the mainly-Kurdish southeast as part of its "Kurdish initiative". The Constitutional Court considers
whether to ban the Democratic Society Party over alleged links to the PKK, in a move that could derail the initiative.

2010 January - Newspaper carries report on alleged 2003 "Sledgehammer" plot to destabilise country and justify military coup. Armed forces head Gen Ilker Basbug insists that coups are a thing of the past.

2010 February - Nearly 70 members of the military are arrested over alleged "Sledgehammer" plot. Thirty-three officers are charged with conspiring to overthrow government.

2010 March - US House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee passes resolution describing killing of Armenians by Turkish forces in World War I as genocide, prompting Ankara to recall its ambassador briefly.

2010 April - Parliament begins debating constitutional changes proposed by the government with the stated aim of making Turkey more democratic. The opposition Republican People's Party says the Islamist-leaning ruling AK Party is seeking more control over the secular judiciary.

2010 May - Relations with Israel come under severe strain after nine Turkish activists are killed in an Israeli commando raid on an aid flotilla attempting to reach blockaded Gaza.

2010 July - Istanbul court indicts 196 people, including serving and former senior military officers, accused of plotting to overthrow the government as part of the alleged anti-Islamist Ergenekon organisation. PKK leader Murat Karayilan says it is willing to disarm in return for greater political and cultural rights for Turkey's Kurds. Turkey refuses to comment.

2010 September - Referendum on constitutional reform backs amendments to increase parliamentary control over the army and judiciary.

2010 November - The whistle-blowing website Wikileaks publishes confidential cables revealing that France and Austria have been deliberately blocking Turkey's EU membership negotiations.


2011 August - President Gül appoints top military leaders after their predecessors resign en masse. This is the first time a civilian government has decided who commands the powerful armed forces.

2011 October - PKK rebels kill 24 Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, the deadliest attack against the military since the 1990s.

2011 December - Relations with Paris are soured after French MPs pass bill making it a criminal offence to deny that the mass killings of Armenians during the Ottoman Empire amounted to genocide. The bill is struck down by France's Constitutional Court.

2012 January - A court jails three people for incitement over the 2007 killing of prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, one of them for life.

2012 March - Former armed forces chief Gen Ilker Basbug goes on trial on charges of attempting to overthrow the government, which he denies as "tragicomic".

2012 April - Iranian nuclear summit is hosted in İstanbul

2012 June - Turkey permits schools to offer the Kurdish language as an optional course.

2012 July - Turkey changes its rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish plane, saying Syrian troops will be seen as a military threat if they approach Turkey's borders.
2012 September - A court jails three generals for 20 years for plotting the alleged Operation Sledgehammer (Ergenekon) coup against the Islamist government in 2003. Another 330 officers receive lesser sentences. All maintain their innocence.

2012 October - Tension rises with Damascus. After Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish border town kills five civilians, parliament authorises military action inside Syria, and the armed forces respond with artillery fire into Syria. An EU Commission report on Ankara's progress towards EU membership highlights numerous concerns about democracy and human rights.

2013 April - The military leader of the Kurdish rebel PKK group, Murat Karayilan, says fighters will begin to withdraw from Turkey in early May, responding to a call by jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for a ceasefire in March as part of peace negotiations with the government.

2013 May-June - Mass anti-government protests spread to several cities, sparked by plans to develop one of Istanbul's few green spaces. The police respond with violence, and two protestors die. Prime Minister Erdoğan responds with defiance.

To obtain the stories that will be used in the analysis a keyword search should be conducted in the Lexis Nexis media database. Articles published two weeks before and after each event’s exact date should also be included in the search to create some context for each event.

For example the keyword search for the first event dated 22 July 2007 will be conducted between the dates 08 July 2007 – 05 August 2007. In the special case of Gezi Uprising, the period between 31 of May and 31 of July will be fully covered.

In the case of an overlap between events (For example event 28 and 29: 7 Sept 2012 – 4 Oct 2012 and 17 Sept 2012 - 17 Oct 2012), articles published in the period of intersection should be coded only once.

The key words that should be used to identify stories that are going to be coded are Turkey AND/OR Turkish. (To make sure none of the Turkey related articles were missed, every search in the Lexis Nexis database was repeated with the search word “Turk”.)

Every article, (excluding articles from Travel, sports and finance sections) over a 100 words that mentions Turkey more than three times in total, and has at least a single mention of Turkey in the first two paragraphs should be included in the research sample. (See Figure 1; for the search criteria used for collecting data for Event 19)
The results Lexis Nexis provides, as detailed as they may be, require a certain level of manual weeding.

Such as:

5. Most of the time Lexis Nexis can not eliminate news items that were published in the online editions of the *Guardian* and the *Telegraph*, so these articles need to be taken out of the data set manually.

6. Also, several literary reviews, finance and travel articles as well as obituaries concerning Turkish art works, Turkish personalities and Turkey come up with the search results. These need to be eliminated manually as well.

7. Sometimes the Lexis Nexis search engine brings several editions of the same news story in it’s results. (First and Second editions as well as National, Irish and Scottish editions) The latest (final) National edition needs to be selected every time.

8. Stories and articles about the bird “turkey” are also included in the keyword search results of Lexis Nexis. These items (especially common in November and December each year) should be eliminated manually.
HOW TO CODE: DETAILLED INFO ON THE CODING SHEET

SECTION 1 (QUESTIONS 1 to 8): FORMAT

The first 8 questions of the coding sheet will be focusing on the Format. The category of “format” will allow us to examine the views of each news outlet on Turkey.

Seeing how many long, medium and short articles a broadsheet published on Turkey, as well as examining how many of these were features, columns or news reports will give us an important insight about the importance the newspaper gives to this subject.

Also, looking at the labels of the pages these articles were placed on can be extremely useful for our analysis. For example a news story about a new policy in Turkey can be in the “Home news” or “European News” section in one given newspaper while another can place it in another page under the label “Middle Eastern News”. This will tell us a lot about how the newspaper views Turkey.

The information we gather in this section may help us answer questions such as:

- Is there a difference in the amount of coverage Turkey gets from each broadsheet?
- Under which section each broadsheet prefers to publish articles about Turkey?
- Which events got the most and least coverage in the British press?
- How many articles about Turkey were published on the front page?
- How many columns, features, editorials, news reports and economical analysis about Turkey were published in each newspaper?

1- Date of the issue: When was this news item published? Put in as DD.MM.YY

2- Name of the news organisation: Please code the number associated with the right publication name for each article

(1) The Times
(2) The Daily Telegraph
(3) The Independent
(4) The Guardian
(5) Independent on Sunday
(6) Sunday Times
(7) Observer
(8) Sunday Telegraph

3- Code which specific event this sample belongs to (Simply site the event number)

4- Item number:

5- Length of item: (If an article has an additional info section the total length of all parts of the item should be coded)

   (1) 100–300 words
   (2) 301–600 words
   (3) 601–over words

6- Type of article:

   (1) News article: An article reporting events, press releases, news of the moment (Should be shorter than 600 words, does not openly include opinions of the writer. Reporting of facts, numbers, declarations, happenings, events etc.) – When in doubt news article should be used as default category.

   (2) Leader/ Editorial: An article in a publication expressing the opinion of its editors or publishers. (Does not include a byline. Sometimes starts by saying “Guardian thinks” or “According to the Telegraph” etc.)

   (3) Commentary/ Column: An article giving opinions and/or perspectives of the writer on a given subject. (Articles written by Turkish or foreign officials, public figures, opinion leaders, academics and artists should be coded as a Commentary/ Column)

   (4) Feature: A prominent or special article in a newspaper or periodical. A broader discussion, can be written at any time.(Should include at least 3 interviews, should be longer than 600 words)

   (5) Economic Analysis: An analysis on Turkish economy. Should include the word “economy” and focus on the economics of a given subject283.

7- Page number: What is the number of the page the article was printed on? If the article spreads on more than one page, specify.

283 The type of article is often stated in the Lexis/ Nexis search results, yet the labels on the data base can be misleading and the coder should rely on his/her own judgement.
8- Page label: What is the label of the page the article was printed on? If the article was printed on a page labelled anything other than the first 10 options, code under “other” and specify.

(1) News
(2) Home news
(3) European News
(4) International News
(5) Analysis
(6) Comment/ Debate/ Comment and Debate
(7) Finance/economics
(8) Editorial/ Leader pages
(9) Overseas/Foreign/ World news
(10) Middle East
(11) Other

SECTION 2 (Question 9): SOURCE

The information gathered through this question will make us understand the source of the reporting. We will be able to answer questions such as:

- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was actually written in Turkey by a special correspondent?
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was written by a reporter in London?
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was written in a place outside Turkey, other then London?
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey were written by a Turkish journalist/ expert/ artist/ politician?

9- Name of the journalist (byline)

(1) Reporter / Correspondent / Columnist (Give full name and location)
(2) No information given
(3) Agency copy
(4) Expert/ Artist / Guest Writer (Give full name and indicate if Turkish)

SECTION 3 (Questions 10 – 11) : ISSUES

Information gathered in this category will help us understand which subjects and issues dominated the coverage of Turkey by British broadsheets. By deciding on the general category of each article as well as the specific issues covered in it we will be able to tell what kind of news stories regarding Turkey get the most coverage in the British media.

We will be able to answer questions such as:
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was about Turkish – Middle Eastern Relations?
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was about Turkish European or British relations?
- What percentage of the articles about Turkey was about Turkish – American relations?
- Does stories on internal affairs of Turkey get coverage in Turkey, if they do which issues get the most coverage?
- What is the issue regarding Turkey that gets the most coverage? (Human rights issues, Kurdish problem, religious freedoms, Islamisation fears etc)
- How often Turkey’s role in international conflicts get reported on in Britain?
- Does the British media give more importance to Turkey’s relations with the West compared to its relations with the Orient?

10- Category of the news item: Can code more than one option

(1) **Turkish – Middle Eastern Relations:** If the story is mainly about the relations of Turkey with another Middle Eastern nation it should be coded under this category. For an article to be coded under this category the word “Middle East” should be used more than once and also one or several of the following country names should be mentioned more than 3 times: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

(2) **Turkish – European Relations:** If the story is mainly about the relations of Turkey with either European Union or an European country other than Britain, it should be coded under this category. For an article to be in this category the words European Union or Europe should be mentioned more than three times and/or one of the following country names should be mentioned more than 3 times: Albania, Andorra, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey and Alderney, Iceland, Jersey, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Man, Island of, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican City State (Holy See), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

(3) **Turkish–British Relations:** Articles should be coded under this category if they are specifically refer to an issue concerning Britain and Turkey alone. For an article to be coded under this category the article needs to mention Britain, United Kingdom, England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland or a British company or a organisation more than 3 times.

(4) **Turkish – American Relations:** Articles should be coded under this category if they are specifically referred to an issue concerning USA and Turkey alone. For an article to be coded under this category USA,
America, White House or an American company or an organisation should be mentioned more than 3 times.

(5) **Internal Affairs of Turkey:** Articles talking specifically about internal affairs of Turkey such as referendums, elections, policy decisions, internal debates also natural disasters/ large scale catastrophes happening in Turkey (For ex: internet freedoms, legal age of consent, abortion debates, construction of a third airport in İstanbul, construction permissions on forests etc) should be coded under this category.

(6) **OTHER**

11- Which issues does the news item cover? Can code more than one option.

(1) **Human rights issues:** Articles talking about human rights issues such as freedom of expression, gender equality, internet censorship should be coded under this category.

(2) **Issues about religious freedoms:** Issues concerning religious freedoms such as the highly discussed freedom to wear the Islamic headscarf in university’s and public offices should be coded under this category as well as problems Aloits, Christians and Jews face in Turkey concerning their religion.

(3) **Minority issues:** Articles concerning problems of Greeks, Bulgarians, Assyrians, Arabs, Jews, Kurds etc living in Turkey should be coded under this category as well as articles concerning problems Aloits face that are not about religious practices.

(4) **De militarisation of democracy:** Articles concerning the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials as well as the reactions, protests and discussions to these trials should be coded under this category.

(5) **Kurdish Issue:** Articles concerning any attacks on the military by the Kurdish rebels, any military operation against the rebel organisation PKK inside or outside Turkish borders, any declaration by jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, reforms on the use of Kurdish language in public televisions and offices, peace negotiations between the government and Kurds political representative BDP should be coded under this category.

(6) **Disputes on Armenian genocide:** Any article concerning Armenian genocide, (that has the words Armenian Genocide, Armenian Massacre or Armenian Holocaust more than three times) as well as new American and French law proposals to make denying Armenian genocide a crime punishable by law.

(7) **EU Candidature process:** Articles that deal with Turkey’s EU candidature process. For an article to be coded under this category it needs to be talking about candidature negotiation process between Turkey and EU, any reforms done in Turkey to meet the EU criteria etc.

(8) **International conflict:** Articles concerning Turkey’s role in international conflicts such as the Syrian civil war and Ukrainian civil war as well Iranian nuclear crisis.

(9) **Culture:** Any article specifically talking about an aspect of Turkish culture should be coded under this category. Articles mentioning
Turkish cuisine, music, arts in general as well as traditions should be coded as “culture”.

(10) **Turkey’s foreign policy –relations:** Articles about Turkey’s foreign policy, such as articles on Turkey’s falling out with Israel while forming new close relations with Iran, China etc.

(11) **Policy making:** Articles about the new policy’s of AKP government. Such as new laws concerning judiciary, government powers etc.

(12) **OTHER:** Articles that talk about a subject that does not fall under any of the other categories, such as crime stories concerning British expats.

(13) **Islamisation fears/ Secularity debates:** Articles on Islamisation fears concerning Turkey as well as Turkish secularity debates.

**SECTION 4 (QUESTIONS 12-13) : ADJECTIVES**

Adjectives that are used in a news article can tell us a lot about the objectivity and the point of view of the writer as well as the news outlet. While lack of adjectives can be a sign of objectivity, repeating of adjectives such as “Muslim, Muslim democracy and Muslim ally” can be a sign of Orientalism in the reporting. So with the data gathered in this section, we will be able to answer questions such as:

- What is the most common adjective that is used to define Turkey?
- What is the most common adjective that is used to define AKP?
- What is the most common adjective that is used to define PM Erdoğan?
- Do journalists use different adjectives to define Turkey and AKP?
- Do journalists use different adjectives to define Turkey when they are writing about international conflicts and Turkey’s internal affairs?
- Do journalists change the adjectives they use for Turkey/ Erdoğan and AKP in time?

12- What kinds of adjectives are used to define Turkey and Turkish people in the articles? Can code more than one adjective/ category. (Please note the actual adjective as well as its category)

(1) **Adjectives based on religion:** Any adjective that defines Turkey/ Turkish people from a religion-based viewpoint such as Muslim or secular (Ex: Muslim, Muslim democracy, Islamic, Predominantly Muslim, Secular, Secular with predominantly Muslim population etc.)

(2) **Adjectives based on alliance:** Any adjective that defines Turkey/ Turkish people by defining its alliance to a group. (Ex: NATO ally, long time ally of US, ally of Israel in the Middle East, NATO member, ally of West in the Middle East)

(3) **Adjectives based on culture:** Any adjective that defines Turkey/ Turkish people from a culture-based viewpoint. (Ex: Bridge between East and West, Middle Eastern, European, Western etc)
(4) **Other adjectives:** Any Other adjective used to define Turkey or Turkish people that does not fall in to any of the first three categories should be coded here. (Historically autocratic, modern, economically strong etc)

(5) **NO ADJECTIVES**

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13- What kinds of adjectives are used to define AKP government and PM Erdoğan in the articles? Can code more than one adjective/ category. (Please note the actual adjective as well as its category)

(1) **Adjectives based on religion:** Any adjective that defines Erdoğan/AKP people from a religion-based viewpoint (Ex: Muslim, mildly Islamic, Islamic, representative of political Islam etc)

(2) **Adjectives based on governing style:** Any adjective that defines Erdoğan/AKP people from a governing style based viewpoint. (Ex: Authoritarian, controlling, oppressive, democratic, reformist, modernist, pro-business, conservative, religious minded, pro European etc)

(3) **Other adjectives:** Any Other adjective used to define Erdoğan/AKP that does not fall in to any of the first three categories should be coded here. (Ex: Charismatic)

(4) **NO ADJECTIVES**

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**SECTION 5 (QUESTIONS 14-15): ACTORS**

Using the information gathered from these last two questions we will be able to see who are the most prominent actors in articles about Turkey in the British press.

We will be able to answer questions such as:

- Who is the most quoted Turkish actor in these articles?
- Who is the most quoted foreign actor in these articles?
- Does the amount of quotes from the Turkish opposition change in time?

14- **Who are the actors (Excluding Turkish actors) quoted or mentioned in the article?** (Code (a) if the actor is quoted, and code (b) if the actor is only mentioned)

(1) **USA:** This category includes American Presidents, state secretaries, government officials, politicians, American companies etc. Please
specify each actor. (“White House” or “Washington” when representing the USA government will also be coded under this category)

(2) **Britain:** This category includes British prime minister, state secretaries, government officials, politicians, royal family, British companies etc. Please specify each actor. (“Downing Street number 10”, “London” or “Buckingham Palace” when representing the British government will also be coded under this category)

(3) **EU:** This category includes prime ministers of any EU country, state secretaries, government officials, politicians, royal families, European companies etc. as well as EU parliament, EU organisations and EU officials. Please specify each actor. (“Brussels”, “Paris” or “Europe” when representing a European government or EU itself will also be coded under this category)

(4) **Middle Eastern Countries:** This category includes leaders, prime ministers, presidents, government officials etc of Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Religious authorities that has political power as well as Royal’s from these countries will be coded under this category.

(5) **UN/ International Organisations:** This category includes UN officials as well as representatives of any other recognised International organisations.

(6) **Experts:** Experts and academics from any nationality other than Turkish.

(7) **Witnesses/ general public:** People who witnessed the event being reported or interviewees from general public.

(8) **Other:** Any other actor that does not belong to previous categories should be coded here

(9) **NO ACTORS**

15- Who are the Turkish actors quoted or mentioned in the article?

(1) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
(2) President Abdullah Gül
(3) Government and State officials, state organisations
(4) Representatives of the opposition: MHP, CHP leaders, officials, MP’s and representatives
(5) Representatives of the Army/ Generals
(6) Kurds: Representatives of PKK, BDP, as a group
(7) Experts: Experts and academics from Turkey (Artists, writers, novelists and journalists who give their opinions on Turkey related subjects will be coded under this category)

(8) Witnesses / general public
(9) Other: Any other actor that does not belong to previous categories should be coded here (Specify )

(10) **NO ACTORS**
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