Untangling a Web of Lies: 
Exploring Automated Detection of Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication

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Biographical Statements

**Stephan Ludwig** is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Marketing & Business Strategy Westminster Business School. He has a Ph.D. in Marketing and eight years of consulting experience in marketing research for financial services, FMCGs and communication services. His research interests focus on communication design, e-commerce and marketing strategy and is published in leading international journals including the *Journal of Marketing, MIS Quarterly, IJEC*, and other outlets.

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Abstract

Safeguarding organizations against opportunism and severe deception in computer-mediated communication (CMC) presents a major challenge to CIOs and IT managers. New insights into linguistic cues of deception derive from the speech acts innate to CMC. Applying automated text analysis to archival email exchanges in a CMC system as part of a reward program, we assess the ability of word use (micro-level), message development (macro-level), and intertextual exchange cues (meta-level) to detect severe deception by business partners. We empirically assess the predictive ability of our framework using an ordinal multilevel regression model. Results indicate that deceivers minimize the use of referencing and self-deprecation but include more superfluous descriptions and flattery. Deceitful channel partners also over structure their arguments and rapidly mimic the linguistic style of the account manager across dyadic e-mail exchanges. Thanks to its diagnostic value, the proposed framework can support firms’ decision-making and guide compliance monitoring system development.

Keywords and Phrases: CMC between business partners, deception severity, speech act theory, automated text analysis
Deceitful practices in business, ranging from white lies, flattery, and evasions to bald-faced falsification, appear to be endemic to all sorts of day-to-day business interactions [17, 65]. Recent research shows that deception is particularly common in business communications, with the more severe ones drastically interfering with the flow of information across organizations [1]. Deception in business can result in serious delicts, leading to lawsuits and in extreme cases, is costly to society at large. Estimations of the costs of deception in business-to-business (B2B) communication in the US range up to $200 billion annually [1]. Given information technology (IT)’s pervasiveness in facilitating most business communications it is little surprising that computer-mediated communication (CMC) is also frequently used to transmit deceitful information in business [2-4]. Intentionally designed “to foster a false belief or conclusion by the receiver” [5, p.205], deception is particularly a common problem in computer-mediated business requests and negotiations because a successful lie can earn one side tremendous advantages [1]. Furthermore, the isolation and relative anonymity of the communicators reduces interpersonal awareness and increases the truth bias. Moreover, unstructured CMC is mostly text based (e.g., e-mail), as opposed to the combination of spoken words, tone, and facial expressions used in face-to-face talks. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the other person’s goals, mood, and motives [6]. Given the insufficient resources and the poor ability of humans to detect deception in communication in general [7] and in CMC in particular [8, 9], safeguarding organizations against opportunism and severe deception detection thus presents a major challenge to CIOs and IT managers [6].

Although much research into deception in general communication has been conducted in the past several years [7], little support is provided for the detection of deception severity in the CMC field. An emerging body of research considers the viability of simple text features (i.e., single word cues) as predictors of deception [10]. Yet, such information system
research essentially enters linguistic terrain, which requires richer text interpretations to develop a more subtle profile of deception severity [2, 11]. Such interpretations appear innate to speech act theory [12, 13]. This theory proposes that any form of expression, whether vocal or textual, represents the performance of an act, intended at invoking some behavior in the receiver. Where a truthful act is directly related to the intent, the purpose of insincere acts is to keep the illegitimacy of the speaker’s claim hidden [14]. In the absence of an unambiguous cue, higher level linguistic context may matter greatly when investigating deception [7]. Accordingly, beyond single (or combinations of) words used in current CMC analysis systems, message development and exchanges may serve as further cues to detect deception [6]. Using conceptualizations of speech acts [12, 13, 15] this paper proposes and empirically validates a design framework for text analysis of deception detection in CMC.

First, we clarify the notion of insincere speech act and its implication in terms of deception, which constitutes the relevance of our model. We illustrate the various ways linguistic indicators relate to deception severity along its established dimensions of falsification, concealment, and equivocation [16]. Previous experimental, information systems research pertaining to instant messaging and chat room conversations suggests mixed insights about linguistic cues of deception [9, 17], but a rigorous field test of a theory-driven, comprehensive framework is lacking [11]. We systematically review the IS and communication literature to develop such a multilevel framework, accounting for the subtleties and complexities of deceitful communication in CMC.

Second, we focus on within-message argument development. Previous information systems research has treated text as a unitary variable [18] or considered single (or combinations of) words [19]. However, in reality, severe deception often is developed sequentially across a series of sentences, where relative coherence or discord may also indicate deception [20]. To uncover how business partners purposefully develop deception
across a sequence of sentences, we therefore consider messages’ macro structures in CMC. Thus, we extend speech act theory to include the macro-level structural features evincing deceitful CMC.

Third, we focus on the between-message interactional exchanges and assess the implications of linguistic style matching (LSM) for deception. Deceivers have an interest to make themselves appear more accommodating and likeable [21], which may manifest itself in close and rapid alignment of their communication style with that of their conversant across interactional exchanges. Following recent information systems research, such style alignment in CMC is symbolically reflected and may be measured considering the linguistic style matching (LSM) between conversant [22]. Extending speech act theory to the meta-level of conversation, we explore whether rapid LSM indicates deception in CMC.

In the next section, we review the insights from research on deception in the CMC field in particular, highlighting the relevance of a multilevel framework and providing conceptual clarification of the terminology adopted in deception research. We formulate hypotheses aimed at assessing the relative predictions of deception severity in CMC between businesses and test these hypotheses with a large set of requests discussed as part of a reward program run by a global Fortune 100 company. We conclude by outlining the theoretical and practical implications of our findings with regard to the design and management of enhanced information systems to detect deception severity.

**Speech Act Theory on Deception**

Austin [12] coins the notion of speech acts. Using acting as a metaphor for speaking, he conceptualizes speech, whether vocal or textual, as the performance of “acts” that are aimed at invoking certain behavior, such as commanding, confirming, or questioning. He distinguishes analytically between locutionary speech acts, the acts of saying something;
Illocutionary speech acts, what individuals intend to achieve in saying something; and lastly perlocutionary speech acts, the actual effects of utterances on their audience. Searle[23] anticipates the linguistic discipline’s focus on illocutionary acts by arguing that linguistic cues at a higher level than “mere” words convey the intention of a speaker to tell the truth (or not) and, as a result, make a speech into an (in)sincere act. He also introduces the notion of insincere speech acts in which the connection between the truth and the utterance is not clear but troubled. Habermas[24, 25] later describes the speaker’s intention to tell the truth (or not) as a condition that validates a speech act. Notably, this intention of the speaker makes the legitimacy or the truth of a communication (in)accessible to a receiver, thus marking a clear separation in terms of speaker/receiver and insincere/sincere, or deceitful/truthful.

Since speech act’s conceptualization, research has demonstrated that a speaker can install false beliefs in a receiver[23]. Subsequent studies have confirmed that an insincere speech act can succeed in persuading its receiver that the claim is legitimate and true[7]. If undetected, the effects can be strong and long-lasting. The effect that insincere speech acts achieve is deception of the claim receiver. However, the performance of insincere speech acts is markedly different from that of sincere speech acts, making it possible to detect liars. CMC is especially vulnerable to deception, as unstructured data is exchanged through emails[6, 26]. The cue availability heuristics[27], information asymmetries, informational richness, and processing complexities[2] associated with these exchanges provide fertile ground for deception. Three established dimensions of deception severity—falsification, concealment, and equivocation[28] drive these insincere speech acts.

First, insincere speech acts may require that liars communicate claims that they consider false—the deceitful illocution. Second and third, liars may deceive through two main components: concealment and equivocation. In avoiding detection, liars may provide incomplete information or they may opt to be intentionally evasive, indirect, or vague.
Together, falsification, concealment, and equivocation offer an explanation for an insincere speech act to appear legitimate and true. In accordance with these features, we define (in) sincerity of a speech act as the extent to which a liar aims to persuade a receiver by (1) falsification to make a claim appear legitimate and a liar avoids detection by (2) concealment and (3) equivocation, which leads him or her to leak insincerity in linguistic features during communicative acts.

**Towards a Multilevel Framework of Deception in CMC**

Insincere speech acts are an unethical form of communication and as such have attracted much scholarly attention [7]. Several theories, such as the leakage [29] and four factor theory [30], explain deception at the single-word level. Leakage refers to involuntary physiological processes that “leak” unbidden in the form of tell-tale cues to deception; the physiological processes are the four factors of arousal, negative affect, cognitive load, and attempted control. Table 1 contains an overview of studies focused on uses of (combinations of) words as indicators of deception. Although various peculiar uses of specific ranges or combinations of words appear distinctly manifest or absent, the empirical evidence from these studies is mixed and inconclusive, which hampers the diagnosticity and predictive ability of linguistic cues of deception.

[Please insert Table 1 about here]

Matsumoto and Hwang [10] highlight that these mixed findings primarily stem from an exclusive focus on monologues or comparative writing, rather than conversations as they occur in real, interactive exchanges. Extending prior classifications of deception, Xiao and Benbasat [31] also query the lack of insight into deception in inter-organizational CMC and DePaulo et al. [7] observe that deception studies have been conducted almost exclusively in university laboratories. As Miller and Stiff [32] caution, experiment participants have little
motivation to get away with their lie, minimal actual interaction with other participants, and an artificially high degree of self-consciousness.

The equivocality of existing findings might further stem from the inability of such micro-level cues to do justice to nuanced, carefully crafted, deceitful communication [10]. Following this line of reasoning, Carlson et al. [11] indicate that no single behavior or specific cue sufficiently determines deception; nor the severity thereof. Accordingly, the feeling/thinking cues theory [29, 33] conceptualizes “leaks” at the macro level (e.g., an inconsistent or over-rehearsed claim). Buller and Burgoon [21] further conceptualize deception as interpersonal: Liars rely on adapting the style of their claim’s presentation to (their perception of) the receivers’ preferences. Similarly, self-presentational theory [7] demonstrates that liars are more concerned with their impression on others, which is less present in truth speakers. This multilevel approach to deception fully aligns with Abbasi and Chen [2] calling for externally valid, text mining research that considers the information embedded in the structure and exchange of textual CMC.

In sum, even though speech act theory has laid the groundwork for understanding deception as actions situated at multiple levels, empirical evidence for this has essentially remained at the micro level of (combinations of) words [34]. Thus, a comprehensive model is overdue not only to advance knowledge on deception (severity) detection per se but also to complement speech act theory. Accordingly, we extend deception research to the macro-level of deceitful claims as bodies of texts patterned by structural features and explicitly consider conversation as a crucial resource for interpreting deception as an interactive and socially located phenomenon. Hence, we use a comprehensive approach, spanning all three levels of communication, to develop a multilevel framework for deception severity in CMC that forms the basis for our hypotheses. Consider for instance two different request formulations by business partners in our study’s data set:
Business partner A: Good day! We have received an enquiry for the [...] reward we requested. Could you please kindly help to check whether the [...] has successfully registered the [...]? If not then there seems to be an error in your system with processing the reward points [...]. Thanks very much for your help!

Business partner B: Is this a joke? I sent in an email asking about an offering of yours on Sept 5. I got an email acknowledging my request, but I received nothing else for over a month. About a week later, [...] went ahead and ordered some items with our reward points, including the item I asked about [...]. Once again, I got an acknowledgement that you received my email, but absolutely nothing else [...].

Thanks

Notice that both partners essentially request the same thing, a redemption of rewards as part of the partner program. Yet, already at the micro level, their word use differs. For example, partner A, whom the account manager identified to have made a severely deceitful request here, makes much less effort to expound the situation. He also uses fewer reference words (e.g., personal pronouns like I, them, and her), avoids contextually embedding the situation (e.g., providing times and places), and avoids providing other clarifying descriptions (e.g., adjectives). Partner B, whom the account managers identified to be rightfully frustrated and her request fully legitimate, uses more reference words (e.g., I, my) and makes an effort to contextualize her request (e.g., on Sept 5, over a month).

Although the macro-level cues are not easy to detect, consider the partner A’s request full of causality and cognitive process words in every sentence (e.g., although, if, whether). Partner B instead tends to use these words more sporadically, leaving her argument development partially unstructured. At the meta level (interactional-level), Buller and Burgoon [21] propose that deceivers, in an attempt to invoke liking and empathy, mimic (their perceptions of) receivers’ behavior. Thus, we would expect partner A to rapidly adapt
to the writing behavior or linguistic style of his conversation partner during the e-mail exchange process [35].

**Micro-Level Deception Cues**

First, corroborating mixed findings at the micro level, we discern five word and word-combination cues of deception severity and develop hypotheses about their predictive value.

**Referencing.** Severe deceivers tend to withdraw and communicate less. Ekman [33] as well as Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal [30] show that deceivers experience feelings of guilt or apprehension about deceiving, so they are less forthcoming and appear distant. Such acts appear as a lack of “categorical references” [23, p.74]. The speech act of referencing pinpoints and identifies the people involved [7], whereas fewer references to the self or others (e.g., I, them, her) constitute linguistic constructions that distance the speaker from his or her message [36]. For example, “One could believe this” is more impersonal than “I could believe this.” As such we hypothesize that, in B2B communication, fewer personal pronouns reflect partners’ intentions to distance themselves from their message as well as a linguistic cue of more severe deception:

\[ H_{1a}: \text{Referencing relates negatively to deception severity in CMC.} \]

**Contextual embedding.** Deceivers avoid describing the context [37]. Contextual embedding connects a message to actual events [12]. Linguistically, the extent to which speakers substantiate the circumstances of an account is manifest in their use of spatial and temporal context words (e.g., down, in, end, until) [38]. Deceivers either choose not to [21] or are unable to [37] describe situational circumstances in their account. In CMC, the reluctance or inability to embed messages, marked by the use of fewer context words, may indicate the severity of a business partner’s deception. Thus:
$H_{1b}$: Contextual embedding relates negatively to deception severity in CMC.

**Detailing.** Severe deceivers use relatively fewer descriptions in their accounts [7]. From a speech act perspective, descriptive adjectives explicate an account [23]. Although Zaparniuk, Yuille, and Taylor [38] find that deceivers strategically bury the deception in “vivid and concrete descriptions of superfluous details” that make a message seem rich in—albeit unnecessary—specifics, most research suggests that deceivers tend to avoid detailed descriptions [e.g., 7]. We hypothesize that in CMC less descriptive adjectives indicate more severe deception, as the partners aim to avoid being caught on details.

$H_{1e}$: Detailing relates negatively to deception severity in CMC.

**Self-deprecating.** Knowing their intent is insincere, deceivers work to rule out uncertainty about their own actions [39]. For example, deceivers consciously exclude “unfavorable, self-incriminating details” [38, p. 344]. Linguistically, self-deprecation becomes evident through references to the self (first-person pronouns) in combination with discrepancy words (e.g., “I could,” “I should,” “it might be just me”; [40]). We propose that in CMC severely deceitful partners are apprehensive of questions about the legitimacy or appropriateness of their own conduct and thus less likely to disparage it. Therefore, we hypothesize:

$H_{1d}$: Self-deprecating relates negatively to deception severity in CMC.

**Flattering.** Deceivers are motivated to appear increasingly pleasant and thus use compliments and flattery [21]. Flattery seeks to increase or consolidate rapport with the conversant [41, p.442] and is common in CMC [42, 43]. Linguistically, flattery results from the use of achievement words (e.g., “the best,” “hero,” “great”) in combination with a
reference to the conversant (second-person pronouns) [41]. Though flattery in itself is acceptable in CMC, more flattery may reflect an ulterior, more harmful motive through faked solidarity by business partners [21, 41]. Therefore, we hypothesize:

\[ H_{1e}: \text{Flattering relates positively to deception severity in CMC.} \]

**Macro-Level Deception Cues**

Macro-level speech acts reflect how a speaker develops and structures her rationale (e.g., coherence, flow) [15]. Ekman [33] and DePaulo et al. [44] emphasize the need to attend to such macro aspects in communication when assessing deception. For example, Ekman [33] notes that deceivers’ fears of being caught, while aiming to be as convincing as possible, likely are manifest in the form of over-rehearsed arguments. Particularly if there is time to prepare (e.g., in e-mail exchanges), “too smooth a line may be the sign of a well-rehearsed con man” [45, p.185].

Linguistically, a cohesive level of argumentation across the series of sentences in a message, rather than varying between more and less reasoning, signals such consistent structuring (e.g., using words such as “because,” “although,” and “if” consistently in every sentence of a message). Even if messages contain arguments in several sentences, people naturally vary the reasoning intensity across those sentences [46]. Goldkuhl [20] identifies that deceivers’ tendency to over-structure their message development gets exacerbated in highly motivating contexts, such as B2B communication. Accounting for within-message argument structuring in CMC should improve assessments of deception in B2B communication. Specifically, we posit that partners’ cohesive argument structuring signals deception severity at the macro level.

\[ H_{2}: \text{Cohesive argument structuring relates positively to deception severity in CMC.} \]
**Meta-Level Deception Cues**

Mimicking increases deceivers’ likelihood of success, as Campbell et al. [47] explain: Recipients of messages from speakers who have assimilated their communication style, exhibit high levels of trust and tend to comply with requests. Such common ground perceptions in written communication may occur through the largely unconscious process of linguistic style matching (LSM) [35]. The convergent use of similar linguistic styles enhances understanding and perceptions of a common social identity while decreasing perceptions of social distance [22]. In online text-based negotiations, closer matches in function word usage (e.g., uses of pronouns, articles, conjunctions, prepositions, auxiliary verbs, high-frequency adverbs, negations, and quantifiers) as part of the interactional exchange increase interpersonal rapport and agreement among potential partners [48]. Although in B2B communication, partners may naturally accommodate each other’s communication style due to genuine liking, their tendency to do so immediately and rapidly ought to be weaker. If during the interactional exchanges, partners rapidly alter their linguistic style to create a closer match with their conversant’s linguistic style, this may indicate deception. In effect, we hypothesize:

**H₃:** Rapid LSM during interactional exchanges relates positively to deception severity in CMC.

**Empirical Study**

**Setting: The CMC Field**

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a field study, in cooperation with a global Fortune 100 technology vendor. The data for our study comprises of archival, unstructured CMC (e-mails) between the company’s account managers and its channel partners. All partners participate in the company’s reward program, which includes approximately 120,000
partners worldwide. This research setting is relevant for testing our hypotheses for several reasons. First, emails serve as the sole means that partners use to request their rewards and on which the vendor’s account managers rely to assess the legitimacy of those requests. The absence of vocal (e.g., tone of voice) and physical cues (e.g., gaze, posture) makes a focus on linguistic markers imperative in such a CMC system. Second, in this reward program, significant monetary and non-monetary rewards (ranging from US$100 to US$100,000) are requested and issued. Third, the communication procedures and duration for each request within- and between-partners are very similar, increasing the comparability of the requests.

Sample

The sample consisted of 16,768 e-mails about reward requests, requested and processed between 1 June 2013 and 4 February 2014. The reward program is set up to award monetary incentives for partners’ sales and training performance. All CMC with partners therefore included monetary reward pay-outs due to their actual (or fabricated) performances. The program incorporates 11 different languages, but for feasibility and to ensure robust insights, we only included messages written in English in our sample. In addition, for the text analysis part of our measurement development we used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text mining software which is primarily validated in the English language context [49]. We manually corrected all spelling mistakes and removed automated e-mails (e.g., out-of-office replies), resulting in a final sample of 8,886 e-mails (4,496 from partners and 4,390 from account managers), concerning 2,420 requests made by 1,320 partners. On average, each partner wrote 3 e-mails per request, which contained an average of 5 sentences and 20 words per sentence.

Measurement Development

Although the request was generally presented in the first e-mail a partner sent, the discussion about its legitimacy could take place over several, sequential interactive exchanges.
and thus span several e-mails. We first derived our cues, using the LIWC software, at the e-mail level, using words, word combinations, and the overall structure of the email. Meta-level cues (i.e., LSM) were measured at the interactional exchange level of emails. We then aggregated all scores to the request level. Our dependent measure—deception severity—the vendor’s account managers determined externally for each request, investigating first whether a request was legitimate and then how severe the deception was, using the dimensions which Buller et al. [16] established. We outline our measure development below.

Dependent variable. In accordance with recent conceptualizations of deception in information systems research [31] and drawing on Buller and Burgoon [21], we asked the account managers to investigate and evaluate all reward requests in the sample. Prior to the observation period, during which five managers investigated all reward requests, they were briefed that the study was intended to uncover linguistic elements which would relate to deceitful reward requests. Similar to Burgoon et al.’s [50] approach, we instructed the managers to attribute a score of 1 if (following their investigation) a request was completely legitimate and truthful. If this was not the case we asked them to rate the overall deception severity (scored 2-5) based on the extent to which statements were untrue (falsification), seemed to omit or withhold relevant information (concealment), and/or requests seemed evasive, indirect, or vague (equivocation). Thereby all requests were judged on a single-item, 5-point Likert-type scale where the most severely deceitful requests scored 5.

Independent variables. We considered three levels of speech acts: micro- (i.e., word use and combination of word uses), macro- (i.e., within-message development), and meta-level (i.e., between-message interactional exchanges). We provide illustrative examples in Table 2. To ensure an overall deductive approach which future scholars and IS practitioners find generalizable and easily replicable, we followed Tausczik and Pennebaker’s [49]
approach and text mined all partner emails, using LIWC dictionaries and the LIWC program, rather than building dictionaries based on specific text samples in our dataset.

Accordingly, we determined referencing to self and others as the ratio of personal pronouns to the total amount of words in an e-mail. We operationalized contextual embedding as the proportion of relativity words. For detailing, we measured the proportion of adjectives. Because no LIWC text mining dictionary exists for adjectives, we compiled a dictionary with 1,656 unique adjectives for this study, using online dictionary sources (i.e., enchantedlearning.com, the Oxford dictionary, thesaurus.com, and yourdictionary.com). For each of the text-mined, micro-level, speech act cues (Speech act cue\textsubscript{c}), we constructed a request-level measure by dividing the number of cue words (CueWords\textsubscript{e}) in a particular speech act category (j) within the e-mail (e) by the total amount of words (Words\textsubscript{e}) in that e-mail (e). We then calculated the average ratio across all e-mails (E) for the same request (r). Our formula for calculating these speech act cues is thus:

\[ \text{Speech act cue}_{rj} = \frac{\sum_{e \in r} \text{CueWords}_{ej}}{E \cdot \text{Words}_{e}}, \]

where \text{speech act cue}_{rj} represents either referencing, contextual embedding, or detailing, respectively.

To construct the combinations of word use measures of self-deprecating and flattering, we next text mined the proportion of co-occurrences within each individual sentence of first-person pronouns and discrepancy words, and then second-person pronouns and achievement words. Conservatively, we measured only co-occurrences for which a pronoun was the only one in that sentence. Thus, we were certain that either the partner or the account manager was the sole subject of the sentence. We created these composite speech act cues (Composite speech act cue\textsubscript{c}) by summing the amount of co-occurrences in an e-mail (e) first, then aggregating these use intensities across all e-mails (E) for a particular request (r). Our formula for calculating these composite speech act cues is thus
Composite speech act cue\textsubscript{ej} = \sum_{e \in E} \frac{(\text{Co-occurrence of CueWords}_e)}{e}, \quad (2)

where composite speech act cue\textsubscript{ej} represents either self-deprecating or flattering.

Next, to construct the measure of structuring across the sentences of an e-mail, we computed variation in the cognitive process words. Most research that has examined writing behavior (dis)similarities uses direct consensus models (i.e., taking the average as the preferred level of aggregation). Yet recent research highlights that within-message variability or dispersion composition models might assess writing behavior and its implications more appropriately [51]. We therefore created an argument structuring measure in which we (1) summed the use of cognitive process words in each sentence in each e-mail, (2) calculated the structuring at the e-mail level as 1 divided by the within-e-mail variability in cognitive process word uses across all sentences, and (3) aggregated e-mail level coherences across all e-mails in a particular request (r).

For LSM, we followed recent research on interactional exchanges in CMC [22] and calculated it as the degree to which a partner produces usage intensities of function words that are similar to those the account manager used in the previous e-mail. First, we text mined the proportion of function word (CueWords) uses for each of the nine function word categories [35]. These categories comprise all 464 function words in the English language: articles, auxiliary verbs, common adverbs, conjunctions, impersonal pronouns, personal pronouns, prepositions, negations, and quantifiers. We measured the proportion of function words (Wordcue) for each e-mail (e) and for each function word category (j) by dividing the number of words belonging to the particular function word category by the number of words in the same e-mail (e):

\[
\text{Speech act cue}_{ej} = \left( \frac{\text{CueWords}_e}{\text{Words}_e} \right), \quad (3)
\]
Second, we derived the degree of a partner’s LSM in each individual request (c) for each function word category (j) separately. The differential use of each function word category (j), between the account manager’s (m) previous e-mail (T1) and the partner’s (p) response e-mail (T2), came from the formula:

\[
\text{LSM}_{rj} = 1 - \frac{|\text{CueWords}_{mej}^{T1} - \text{CueWords}_{pej}^{T2}|}{|\text{CueWords}_{mej}^{T1} + \text{CueWords}_{pej}^{T2} + 0.0001|},
\]  

(4)

where \( \text{LSM}_{cij} \) is the degree of overlap between the usage intensity of a function word category (j) by the partner (p) and the usage intensity of the same function word category (j) by the account manager (m). We added .0001 to the denominator to prevent empty sets. We calculated the partner’s overall LSM at the e-mail level by averaging the nine separate degrees of LSM for each function word category. Finally, we calculated median partner LSM across all e-mails for a particular request.

[Please insert Table 2 about here]

Control variables. In addition to the speech act cues at the request level, we controlled for demographics, which may affect people’s writing styles, at the partner level. Specifically, following previous research [e.g., 52, 53], we controlled for years of work experience in the field (experience\(_p\)) of 1073 partners, and their gender (sex\(_p\)), coded as 1 = female and 0 = male, for 1223 partners. We also coded whether they included an e-mail signature (signature\(_r\)) (coded 1) or not (coded 0). Research suggests the relative motivation to deceive may alleviate the leakage effects. To rule out such an effect as an alternative explanation for our deception severity measure, we included scaled variables for the factored monetary amount for 940 request cases and account size of 168 partners. We assigned all missing observations (where we did not have the background information on experience, gender, monetary amount of the request and account size) a score of zero, for each variable after standardization (i.e., assigned missing observations the mean value), then included the
dummies in our multilevel regression analyses to control for missing observations (for a discussion of this standard imputation technique, see [45]). Therefore, we were able to use the full set of e-mails and requests collected to analyze speech act cues that were not missing due to a lower level of abstraction, such as simple word use or were lacking partner-level observations. Furthermore, deception severity may also relate to the writers’ ability to converse in the English language. While English is the common global business language, we included a dummy variable coded 1 if a partner request was send from a native English-speaking country (e.g., Australia, India, the UK, the US, etc.) or 0 if not (e.g., Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, etc.) to account for English language ability. Importantly, incidences where partners stopped responding to questions were likely to be cases where they gave up trying to deceive in a CMC sequence and hence may further predict deception severity. Accordingly, we text mined the account managers’ replies for question marks (“?”), indicating a request for more information in a communicative sequence. We dummy coded all request communication streams and denoted a 1 if the very last email in the email exchange included a request (question) by the manager and there was no later response by the partner. All other requests were coded 0. Finally to control for potentially systematic disagreement between individual managers from one-another, we include 4 dummy variables (D_{M1}-D_{M4}) in all our models which control for the 5 managers who rated a particular request scenario.

[Please insert Table 3 about here]

**Results**

To capture the estimates of the explanatory variables at the request and partner levels and thereby predict deception severity in individual requests, we specified a series of multilevel regression models, often referred to as hierarchical linear models (HLMs). This
approach is appropriate for the current data structure, because it accounts for
interdependencies among requests (e.g., multiple requests by the same partner), whereas
standard regression techniques do not and instead assume that each observation is
independent of the others [54]. Our data contained multiple requests nested within any given
partner, and the HLM modeling approach appropriately controlled for the possibility that
communication behavior in e-mails from the same partner would be more similar to one
another than to e-mails from another partner. It also supported the simultaneous testing of the
explanatory variables at the request and partner levels [55].

Before estimating the hypothesized relationships, we sought to determine whether
there was any significant between-group variation in our dependent variable, a prerequisite
for conducting multilevel analysis [56]. We first estimated a baseline ordinal regression
model (intercept only) that included only the dependent variable (deception severity), then
conducted a baseline multilevel ordinal regression (intercept only) that included deception
severity as the dependent variable and a random effect for the partner as a grouping variable.
A likelihood ratio test indicated that the multilevel ordinal regression model provided
significantly better fit than the non-nested ordinal regression model ($\chi^2(1) = 643.93, p < .001$),
indicating the appropriateness of multilevel modeling for testing our hypotheses.

To determine the extent to which the variation in deception severity was due to the
grouping variable (partners), we calculated the intra-class correlation (ICC) statistic for
multilevel ordinal regression models [56], which reveals a ratio of between-group variance to
total variance. The ICC value of .72 indicated that differences between partners, in terms of
the severity of their deception, accounted for a large percentage of the total variance in
deception severity. Certain partners were consistently less (or more) severe. We thus found
convincing evidence that partner characteristics can exert direct influences on the severity of
their deception.
We next specified a series of multilevel ordinal regression models to estimate the effect of the antecedent request- and partner-level variables on deception severity. We specified this model because of the skewed distribution of our deception severity measure, with 59.5% of requests identified as truthful (i.e., coded 1), 33.8% deceitful requests (coded 2 or 3), and 6.7% severely deceitful requests (coded as 4 or 5). We relied on the R “ordinal” package [57] to estimate the models, beginning with the intercept only Model 0. We introduced the individual-level variables related to micro-level speech act cues in Model 1, then included individual-level variables related to macro-level speech act cues in Model 2. We accounted for the individual-level variables related to the meta-level speech act cues in Model 3. The group-level covariates remained for all consecutive models (1–3) to ensure comparability (see table 4). We assume an independent correlation matrix. The correlation matrix in Table 3 and the maximum variance inflation factor score (1.77) indicated no potential threat of multicollinearity. For interpretability, we standardized all predictor variables at the request level before conducting the analyses, turning each variable into a z-value. Using $\chi^2$ difference tests, we confirmed that the request- and channel partner-level explanatory variables added explanatory power to the final model (see Table 4, Models 0–3). Model 1 provided a better fit ($\chi^2(10) = 219.14, p < .001$) than Model 0. Model 2 yielded a significantly better fit than Model 1 ($\chi^2(2) = 8.73, p < .01$), and Model 3 had substantially more explanatory power than Model 2 ($\chi^2(2) = 11.73, p < .001$). We took all the standardized estimates from our final Model 3; the estimates provided support for most of the hypotheses.

For each explanatory variable in our models, we calculated the odds ratio (OR) as a measure of the effect size, such that it provides the odds of a one-unit increase in deception severity, given a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, *ceteris paribus*. An OR greater than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of deception severity with increases in the
explanatory variable, whereas an OR less than 1 indicates a decrease in those odds when the explanatory variable increases. Because we standardized the continuous explanatory variables in our models prior to analysis, the OR indicates the odds of increasing one unit in deception severity, given a one standard deviation increase in the variables. For example, in the final model, the OR for structuring, was 1.5, so when structuring increased by one standard deviation in a request, the odds of deception severity increasing by one unit should be multiplied by 1.5. This intuitive ratio provides a means to explain the effect size of each individual explanatory variable, as well as compare the effect sizes across different explanatory variables.

We report the effects of the micro-, macro-, and meta-level speech act cues in Table 4. First, we considered each micro-level cue separately. The results support our overall prediction that deception severity co-varies with different (combinations of) word uses; this co-variation was statistically significant and negative for referencing ($\beta_1 = -.31, p < .01$), positive for detailing ($\beta_3 = .13, p < .05$), negative for self-deprecating ($\beta_4 = -.17, p < .05$), and positive for flattering ($\beta_5 = .17, p < .01$), in support of $H_{1a}, H_{1c}, H_{1d},$ and $H_{1e}$. However, no statistically significant effect emerged for contextual embedding ($\beta_2 = -.09, p = .18$), so we cannot confirm $H_{1b}$. Second, we examined the effect of macro-level speech act cues and found that, consistent with $H_2$, cohesive structuring related significantly and positively to deception severity ($\beta_6 = .35, p < .01$). Third, regarding the effect of meta-level speech act cues, LSM was statistically significant ($\beta_7 = .26, p < .01$), in support of $H_3$, such that rapid LSM during interactional exchanges indicated more severe deception. For robustness purposes and to derive the linguistic effects in isolation, we re-analyzed model 3 excluding all control variables. These results remain similar, with no difference in significance for any of the effects reported above. Fourth, the findings pertaining to the control variables indicated that deception severity did not differ with channel partners’ use of an e-mail signature. We
also did not find a significant relationship between the monetary amount of the request ($\beta_{10} = - .28, p = .12$) and the account size of the partner ($\beta_{14} = - .30, p = .26$) on the one hand and deception severity on the other. In line with Anders et al. [53] we found that working experience and deception severity relate negatively, such that channel partners with more working experience appeared less deceitful ($\beta_{11} = - .55, p < .05$). Furthermore, in line with Hitsch et al. [52], women were significantly less deceitful than men ($\beta_{12} = - .76, p < .05$). Requests originating from English-speaking countries were positively and significantly related to deception severity ($\beta_{13} = .90, p < .01$). The failure to respond to a request by the managers further significantly related to partners’ deception severity ($\beta_{9} = .26, p < .01$). None of the dummy variables for the account managers were significantly related to deception severity, ruling out potential bias due to systematic differences in deception severity ratings. Using a classification table, we found that our model accurately classifies 70.13% of requests into legitimate and truthful (score 1) or illegitimate and deceitful (score 2-5). Excluding the partner-level control variables and including only the linguistic cues achieved an accuracy of 60.02%.

Notably, for all models we used all communication incidences (e.g., several emails per request). More interactions may however have meant a greater opportunity for the company to scrutinize the partner. Thus, in the later email exchanges, the deceiver may have had less degrees of freedom to, for example, withhold details. This may have lead to the nonsignificant relationship between an increased use of adjectives and deception severity. Therefore, as a further post-hoc examination, we re-conducted our final model including only the first, incoming emails per request (excluding LSM since this is an exchange-based, meta-level cue). We find that, when considering first emails only, the effects remain the similar, with the exception of flattery ($\beta_{5_{new}} = .04, p = .53$) and cohesive structuring ($\beta_{6_{new}} = .17, p = .08$). Offering an explanation for some of the discrepancies between previous experimental
research that focused on deceptive monologues and research that focused on communicative cues in dialogues, this result shows that flattering and structuring, in addition to being micro- and macro-level cues, may well be partly meta-level communicative acts too.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

With CMC as a primary means to support coordination and decision-making in business-to-business (B2B) relationships, it is important to explore how to counter the vulnerabilities to deception that may result from its use. While extensive literature addresses the benefits of information-sharing between businesses, such as the potential generation of additional relational rents [58], limited research is devoted to uncovering means to safeguard against falsification, concealment, and equivocation in these systems [31]. Some deception is tolerated in business interaction, yet severe deception negatively affects performance and increases management costs [59]. The complexities and subtleties of deception, along with a barrage of CMC employees face every day, however, makes detecting deception a formidable challenge for CIOs and IT managers [6]. In this paper, we develop a framework for deception detection that may aid the design and management of enhanced information systems. While there is voluminous research on deception and on CMC, there is a relative scarcity of theoretical and empirical work at their intersection, especially for B2B communication. In line with recent conceptualizations of information systems as symbolic action systems [60], our study is firmly grounded in speech act theory and advocates a multilevel framework, incorporating single words (i.e., micro-level), structural (i.e., macro-level) and interactional (i.e., meta-level) speech acts. This study contributes to the extant information systems research on CMC-based deception in three ways.

Corroborating experimental research in CMC, we found that four micro-level speech acts relate to deception severity in such B2B communication. Severely deceitful CMC lacked
self- and other-referencing (e.g., fewer personal pronouns), likely because partners sought to draw less attention to and avoid mentions of the people involved in the message [10, 36]. Business partners seemed to dismiss ownership of and put psychological distance between themselves and the deceitful message. Contrary to the relationship we predicted, detailing (e.g., the use of adjectives such as “sublime,” “brilliant”) appeared positively related to deception severity. DePaulo [24] suggests that descriptions of imagined events should contain fewer perceptual details, but a more recent meta-analysis revealed that the negative association between details and deception may be limited to handwritten accounts [61]. As people gain experience with constructing an extended, digital self or selves [62], they might also become more adept at burying their deception in rich, superfluous detail. With these insights, we reconcile some equivocal prior findings and assumptions about the use of detailed descriptions in CMC.

Furthermore, less self-deprecating and more flattering appear linguistic markers of business partners’ deception severity. Compared with low levels, severely deceitful partners less frequently combined discrepancy words, such as “should” and “could,” with first-person pronouns, and they more frequently combined achievement words, such as “earn” or “hero,” with second-person pronouns. Regarding self-deprecating, DePaulo et al. [39] similarly suggest that deceivers refrain from it to avoid any implications of blame. Regarding flattering, our field study confirms Gordon’s [63] laboratory experiments, in which he finds that linguistic elements of flattery and praise indicate severe deception. However, contrary to Fuller et al. (2009) as well as Schelleman-Offermans and Merckelbach [64], we did not find a negative relation between contextual embedding and deception in CMC by business partners. This speech act describes the spatial location and timely occurrence of an event; apparently, given the expectations in business communication, even severe deceivers cannot avoid contextualizing the place and time of the event that “entitled” them to request benefits. Even
if partners aimed to deceive by imagining an event or borrowing from actual experience, it seems the time and place or the context in which the fabricated event occurred still needed to appear in their CMC to avoid negative expectancy violations [65, 66].

Beyond micro-level cues, we draw on conceptualizations of macro-level speech acts [34] to identify cohesiveness in message development as a first, higher-order linguistic predictor of deception severity in CMC. In our study, severely deceiving business partners structured their argumentation excessively, arguably to remove doubt and avoid detection. This finding is in line with DePaulo et al.’s [7] assertion that deceivers appear overly rehearsed, an impairment that seems exacerbated in highly motivated liars [44]. Our examination also highlights the importance of text structure as a macro-level speech act that allows for a more comprehensive understanding of cues of deception in CMC and supplements information system design for deception detection.

At the meta level, we profile deception in CMC by analyzing between-message interactional exchanges between business partners in a reward program. The degree of partners’ linguistic style matching with the account manager’s style was found to be a second higher-order, linguistic indicator of deception severity in CMC. DePaulo [67] demonstrates that deceivers are more concerned with their impression on others, a concern that is less present in truth tellers. Buller and Burgoon [21] propose that deceivers tend to mimic (what they perceive to be) receivers’ behavior. Our approach, consistent with a speech act perspective, empirically validates that deceivers actively adapt their communication behavior through LSM to maximize their chances of success.

**Limitations and Directions for Research**

The limitations of our research reveal some avenues for further research. First, our examination of speech act cues of deception sought to aid a more holistic understanding of deception in CMC and provide a complementary, additive examination, at the expense of
focusing on predictive accuracy. Although this type of model maximizes interpretation and meaning and yields direct estimates of predictor–outcome relationships, additional studies should seek to enhance predictive accuracy too. Further research might investigate theoretically unfounded linguistic cues of deception (see Table 1), transfer findings about other nonverbal cues to CMC [cf., 7], or include multiple tests to measure deception severity to increase predictive accuracy. Such studies may also further test the relation between the linguistic cues and the three deception dimensions, namely falsification, concealment, and equivocation [50].

Second, we derive linguistic markers to approximate speech acts, yet the scope of our study was limited to relatively anonymized CMC data. The significant overall explanatory power of the observed (e.g., work experience, gender, revenue, native language) and unobserved partner-level characteristics collectively explain 72% of variation in partners’ inclination to write deceitful messages. They demonstrate the importance of accounting for partner-specific characteristics as relevant cues of deception in CMC. What remains to be investigated is what forces certain partners to deceive more. It appeals to intuition that partners should deceive more when they stand a chance of gaining more. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely [68] however find that deception does not increase with the amount of money involved. Relatedly, neither in our research nor in others [69] is there a relationship between the size of an account and deception. In other words, deception detection seems to go beyond the standard economic considerations of value of external payoff. Viable future research should aim to investigate such relationships. Although we control for English language ability, cross language difference and/or cultural differences and their relationship to deception severity or the perception thereof would complement such research designs [70], also given the global nature of business operations today. More understanding is also needed on the personal factors that make receivers more susceptibility to deceitful CMC [71].
Third, the study setting may have limited the generalizability of our findings. That is, we examined deception in a CMC-based system for managing a reward program. Other settings might not share the same specificities. For example, Anderson and Simester [72] suggest that fake reviews are widespread in consumer-to-consumer communication on online retail sites. The distinctive effects of communication in this, or other context, could offer interesting research opportunities related to integrity and deception detection.

**Practical Implications**

CMC systems have become the pervasive channel for most types of inter-organizational communication. Given the scope and scale of unstructured CMC and the natural human deficiency that limits their successful investigation, CIOs and IT managers need to mitigate the risks of severe deception in everyday business communications. Our proposed framework has important implications, which we outline below.

First, firms communicating and exchanging information and requests via CMC systems can use the linguistic cues for deception identified in this study and train managers to improve their intuitive skills for judging incoming e-mails. Such cue-based training has recently been shown to be very effective [6] and should better safeguard users by knowing how to detect the cues that leak from deceivers.

Second, managers should proactively implement systems to prevent deception in CMC. For example, the introduction of closed question forms (vs. open e-mail formats) give business partners basic decision rules to follow (e.g., identifying the actors involved), thus reducing their freedom to use deceitful formulations. Such system and interface changes promoting higher involvement and mutuality between managers and partners is likely to improve decision making and reduce deception due to increased rapport [73].

Third, we advocate a multilevel framework for designing systems to support deception detection through text analysis. While our study delineates and validates general
linguistic cues at each of the three levels, the inclusion of partner level characteristics boosts the overall classification accuracy to 70% highlighting the importance of personal and context-specific cues. While this research does not offer insight into how to deal with deceivers, noting the time and resources necessary to manually investigate CMC in detail, our text analysis approach can help companies streamline their investigations and tailor their audits to messages which have been automatically pre-classified as potentially severely deceitful. Such information systems support rather than supplant managerial decision-making and would have to be carefully integrated to not threaten the human experts judging deception [74]

In conclusion, this study provides a better understanding of the linguistic markers of deception severity, spanning all three levels of CMC. This understanding may enable management to design information systems and provide employee training to safeguard against losses and risks in CMC. As a result, they can detect, deter, and prevent severe deception in business-to-business communication, and untangle any web of lies.
References


Table 1. Relevant Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Micro-Level Cues</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Incentive</th>
<th>Medium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali and Levine [75]</td>
<td>Fewer negative emotions, less discrepancy, fewer modal verbs,</td>
<td>Confessions or lies about trivia game cheating</td>
<td>US$20</td>
<td>Video</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more modifiers, longer speech</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anderson and Simester [72]</td>
<td>More words, word length, family references, repeated exclamation</td>
<td>Reviewers writing product reviews that are confirmed and not confirmed</td>
<td>No reward</td>
<td>CMC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>points</td>
<td>to have purchased the product.</td>
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<td>Bond and Lee [76]</td>
<td>More third-person pronouns, more motion words, more spatial</td>
<td>Eyewitness recollections or lies about crime-related video segments</td>
<td>Group Pizza</td>
<td>Audio</td>
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<td></td>
<td>words, fewer first-person pronouns, more negative emotion</td>
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<td>Party</td>
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<td>words, more motion verbs, fewer exclusive words</td>
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<td>Brunet [77]</td>
<td>Fewer words, more motion terms, more self-references, fewer</td>
<td>True or fabricated stories about sporting or bullying events</td>
<td>US$10</td>
<td>Video</td>
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<td>spatial terms, fewer sensory and perceptual process words, fewer</td>
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<td>tentative words</td>
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<td>Fuller, Biros, and Wilson [78]</td>
<td>More words, fewer sensory words, less lexical diversity, more</td>
<td>Real-life true or false military misconduct witness statements</td>
<td>(non-)</td>
<td>Written</td>
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<td>references, more group pronouns, fewer spatial terms, more affect</td>
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<td>punishment</td>
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<td>Hancock et al. [9]</td>
<td>More words, more questions, more third-person pronouns, fewer</td>
<td>Truths or lies about various conversation topics, such as “Discuss</td>
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<td>causation terms, more sense terms, fewer first-person pronouns,</td>
<td>the most significant person in your life”</td>
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<td>more second-person pronouns, more negative affect terms, fewer</td>
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<td>exclusive words and negation terms</td>
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<td>Humpherys et al. [79]</td>
<td>More affect, greater complexity, less diversity, more non-</td>
<td>Real-life non-fraudulent or fraudulent financial statements</td>
<td>Report (10-k)</td>
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<td>less self-referent and other referents</td>
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<td>Newman et al. [36]</td>
<td>Fewer first-person pronouns, fewer third-person pronouns, more</td>
<td>Truthful and deceitful essays about views on abortion</td>
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<td>negative emotion words, more motion verbs, fewer exclusive words</td>
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<td>Porter and Yuille [80]</td>
<td>Less details, less coherence, less admitting lack of memory</td>
<td>Truthful or false alibis about a mock theft</td>
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<td>Audio</td>
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<td>True and fabricated stories about an aversive situation in which the</td>
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<td>Written</td>
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<td>Zhou et al. [19]</td>
<td>More sentences and words, less lexical and content diversity, more modifiers, more positive affect, more negative affect, more group references, less plausibility, less self-referencing, fewer redundancies, fewer spatial words, and fewer perceptual references.</td>
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<td>Fewer words, more edits, less lexical diversity</td>
<td>Truthful or deceitful communication about descriptions, affect, narratives, personality, moral dilemmas, comparisons, attitudes, and future actions</td>
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<td>More references, more substitutions, more ellipses, more conjunctions, more lexical cohesion</td>
<td>Deception to win the mafia game</td>
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Notes: Variables that produced significant results in the respective study appear in bold. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies were conducted in a laboratory-based, experimental, comparison setting.
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<th>Speech Act Cue</th>
<th>LIWC Categories</th>
<th>Representative Words</th>
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<td>Relativity words</td>
<td>area, down, until</td>
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<td>you, your, thou; earn, hero, win</td>
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<td><strong>Meta-level</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>LSM</td>
<td>Function words</td>
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Notes: The word categories were all adopted from the LIWC text-mining dictionaries, with the exception of the adjectives. The research team compiled the list of 1,656 adjectives, using the following online sites: enchantedlearning.com, the Oxford dictionary, thesaurus.com, and yourdictionary.com. Text mining was conducted using the 2007 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program and the tm Package in R.
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Notes: * p < .05. ** p < .01.
Table 4. Multilevel Regression Analysis

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Log likelihood       2406.29 | 2296.78 | 2292.36 | 2286.49 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 |
AIC                  4822.58 | 4643.41 | 4638.71 | 4630.98 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 |
N (requests)         2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 | 2420 |
N (channel partners) 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 | 1320 |

Notes: All coefficients are standardized. Odds ratio (OR) = the odds of a one-unit increase in deception severity, given a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. For Models 0–3, the LR test is significant (\(p < .01\)), indicating a relative increase in model fit. The estimates for \(D_{M1}-D_{M4}, D_c\) and \(D_p\) are not reported, because they do not offer any interpretative relevance. Importantly none of the account managers’ dummy variables \((D_{M1}-D_{M4})\) were significant, so there was no systematic difference in their rating of deception severity. * \(p < .05\), ** \(p < .01\).