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Citation: Lanoszka, A. & Hunzeker, M. A. (2016). Confronting the anti-access/area denial and precision strike challenge in the Baltic region. *RUSI Journal*, 161(5), pp. 12-18. doi: 10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367

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Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/16233/>

Link to published version: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367>

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Confronting the Anti-Access/Area-Denial and Precision Strike Challenge in the Baltic Region

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Forthcoming in the *RUSI Journal*

ABSTRACT

The Baltic States are once again worried that their security is under threat. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have responded with air patrols, joint exercises, and battalion-sized ground force deployments. As important as these efforts have been, they do not fully address Russia's anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) and precision strike capabilities, both of which undermine NATO's stratagem for deterring aggression in the first place. This article assesses the current military imbalance and describes two conflict scenarios in order to show how A2AD and precision weapons threaten extended deterrence. It concludes with a discussion of the policy implications.

The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are once again worried that their security is under grave threat. They fear that Russia could undertake subversive and hostile action against them under the pretext of safeguarding the interests of local Russian-speaking populations.¹ They also worry that Russia could use the same 'hybrid' approach (orchestrated by Moscow and supported by the Russian military, but executed by pro-Russian partisans, militias and intelligence operatives) as it did in Crimea in early 2014 to achieve its aims.² To address such concerns, the US and fellow members of NATO have taken steps to bolster defence of the Baltic States and to improve deterrence.

These steps include increased air patrols, joint military exercises, prepositioning heavy military equipment, and the indefinite placement of four battalions and other small rotational forces in the region.³

Important as these efforts have been, they do not address the most significant strategic problem confronting the Baltic members of NATO, which is the anti-access/area denial (A2AD) and precision strike challenge that Russia could impose on NATO, thanks to its existing force posture in the region. A2AD and precision weapons undermine efforts to extend deterrence in the Baltic States, over which Russia enjoys a military advantage. Russian forces are already capable of seizing Baltic territory quickly in a conventional or hybrid offensive. Long-range precision weapons enable Russian forces to disrupt, neutralise and destroy (or simply threaten) NATO's small forward-deployed presence and its prepositioned military equipment.⁴ Meanwhile, Russia could use its A2AD capabilities to make it prohibitively difficult for NATO to enter the theatre of operations forcibly both to support and reinforce front line troops.

Of course, the fact that Russia has a robust precision strike and A2AD capability does not automatically imply that it will use them in a war. Nor is war inevitable. Deterrence depends on credibility and credibility turns on how each side perceives the other's willingness and ability to prevail on the battlefield. To deter Russian aggression in the Baltics, NATO must convince Russia that any attempt to conquer Baltic territory will be costly and perilous. Perceptions to the contrary are detrimental to NATO's credibility, risking heightened regional insecurity, more divisive nationalism in East Central Europe, and nuclear proliferation incentives for neighbouring front line states.⁵

The precision strike and A2AD challenge in Eastern Europe has already been identified, but existing work largely focuses on the air and naval threat.⁶ Although Russia's counter-air and counter-naval capabilities are important, insufficient attention has been paid to how precision and A2AD weapons might impact operations on the ground.⁷ The threat of invasion is only credible when the invader has the ability to take and hold territory, and Russia will have to use ground forces to pursue such an objective in the Baltics. Ground troops will also be needed to defend Baltic territory, but they in turn will need to be resupplied and reinforced in any prolonged ground campaign. More importantly, because forward-deployed ground troops are a tangible signal of NATO's commitment to the Baltics, such forces can reduce the risk of conflict in the first place. This article therefore argues that any meaningful plan to counter the Russian precision strike and A2AD threat must involve a fundamental shift in NATO's forward-deployed force posture. Specifically, there needs to be less reliance on small rotational forces and prepositioned equipment, a much larger deployment of NATO ground troops in the Baltics than the four multinational battalion-sized battlegroups approved at the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit for the Baltic States and Poland, and a reorientation of Baltic ground forces to consider insurgency a core mission.⁸ The goal of this article is not to encourage NATO or the United States to adopt these measures, several of which are provocative. Instead, the objective is to identify clearly what steps are necessary if they want to deter Russian aggression against the Baltic States meaningfully.

This article first outlines the reasons for why A2AD and precision weapons threaten the military foundations of extended deterrence. A description follows of the military balance of power in the Baltic region and an outline of war scenarios showing

how NATO's efforts to defend its northeastern flank would face major difficulties. This article concludes with an analysis of policy implications for tackling the A2AD and precision strike challenge in the Baltic region. Consistent with A2AD literature, the analysis here assumes that any militarised conflict would be non nuclear, despite Russia's use of nuclear threats in recent crises.⁹

How A2AD and Precision Warfare Complicate Extended Deterrence

Extended deterrence describes the action of a country pledging to defend an ally from attack by an adversary. In making this pledge, the defending country seeks to raise the costs of attack high enough that they become unacceptable to the adversary. Deterrence can take two forms: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment means that the defender threatens to inflict an intolerable amount of harm on the adversary if it decides to attack. US nuclear strategy had this essence in the first twenty years of the Cold War. Under the doctrine of 'Massive Retaliation', the US threatened to unleash its nuclear forces on Soviet military and political assets in response to Soviet aggression against West Germany and other NATO allies. It was an all-or-nothing strategy designed to turn the Soviet Union into a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours. By doctrinally shifting to 'flexible response' in the late 1960s, NATO began to emphasise deterrence by denial, by which it planned to prevent Soviet forces from succeeding on the battlefield in the first place rather than waiting until after the fact to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons.¹⁰

Both forms of deterrence require a strong and effective military foundation that the ally and adversary believe the defender can and will use. In other words, the deterrent

must be credible. In the presence of nuclear weapons, meeting this requirement has been problematic because a defender such as the US might be tempted to sacrifice its ally in order to avoid suffering from harm itself. To demonstrate its commitment accordingly, the US positioned its own soldiers in the territory of its allies. Doing so tied the fate of US troops to the security of those beneficiary allies, thereby creating a ‘tripwire’ effect (the phrase refers to a small military force whose involvement in hostilities will trigger the use of a larger force).¹¹ At least during the latter parts of the Cold War, those troops were armed with sophisticated weaponry so as to raise the likelihood that they could hold off the adversary long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Moreover, throughout the Cold War, the US maintained a more credible forcible entry capability than it possesses today.¹² As such, troop deployments were more than just tripwires. They were also a fighting force capable perhaps of persevering against the adversary. Such has been the utility of land power for deterrence.¹³

Yet recent technological developments threaten to deprive US land power of the ability to present itself as a credible fighting force and thus to bolster extended deterrence. Specifically, A2AD and precision weapons challenge how the US deploys and employs its ground forces. To begin with, A2AD and precision weapons might undermine the longstanding stratagem of the US for defending its vast alliance network. Geographically distant but globally committed, the US necessarily spreads its military assets around the world.¹⁴ Thus, when hostilities break out, forward-based forces must hold out long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

Adversaries can use long-range precision and A2AD weapons to counter this stratagem by making it difficult for the US to defend and reinforce its deployments.¹⁵ At

the start of a conflict, an adversary can hit forward-deployed units with long-range precision weapons. Command-and-control assets, troop staging areas, supply dumps, maintenance depots and ports are the targets in the greatest danger during this early stage. Although forward-based units will likely withstand these initial strikes, they will need to be quickly reinforced and resupplied, and an adversary can then use A2AD weapons to impede this. Long-range anti-access weapons can damage ports and airfields, precluding easy access into the theatre of operations, while shorter-range anti-access weapons (including sea mines, diesel submarines, patrol boats and anti-ship missiles) can also complicate forcible entry by making it risky for naval ships to operate close to shore, limiting their ability to launch airstrikes, seize beachheads or offload equipment. Even if US forces successfully penetrate anti-access defences, they must still contend with area-denial weapons, which can harass staging areas, supply dumps and resupply convoys.¹⁶

Worse still, precision technologies are becoming less expensive as they continue to mature and the effect this has on extended deterrence is subtle but important. Facing rising personnel costs, shrinking defence budgets and new technological innovations, US defence planners are eager to substitute manpower with technology.¹⁷ Ironically, although precision weapons make the US military more capable, they make the country appear less reliable as a security guarantor, especially when they replace forward-based ground troops. Allies and adversaries know it is far easier for US leaders to write off jets, ships, drones and robots than it is for them to resist calls for revenge over the loss of American lives. Shared risk, not materiel, binds allies in a crisis.

[H1]A2AD and Precision Strike in the Baltic Region

In light of these issues, it is important to examine both the balance of forces in the Baltic region and the likely ways Russia might use its precision strike and A2AD capabilities.

Individually and collectively, the contrast between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Russia in terms of military power is stark. Estonia has a conscript-based army of 5,300 personnel and one patrol vessel.¹⁸ The Latvian navy has several more patrol and mine-countermeasures vessels, but total active personnel numbers about 5,300.¹⁹ Both of these countries, as well as Lithuania, have only a handful of utility aircraft and depend on the NATO air-policing mission for defence of their airspace. Lithuania, the biggest of the three Baltic States, has the largest military, with an active duty army of approximately 12,000, and a navy of four mine warfare vessels and four patrol vessels.²⁰ Nuclear forces aside, the Russian military has about 845,000 active duty personnel, of which 250,000 are in the army. The Western Military District is one of four operational strategic commands of the Russia's army. Headquartered in St Petersburg, it comprises one tank division, one tank brigade, one mechanised division and five mechanised brigades, in addition to several other brigades that serve combat support roles.²¹ The capabilities of these forces have increased as a result of modernisation efforts that began after the 2008 Russo–Georgian War. Since then, Russian ground forces have improved both their professionalism and readiness. They are organised in mobile brigade formations suitable for low- and medium-intensity conflict.²² The Russian navy has four major naval fleets, one of which is the Baltic Fleet, based in Kaliningrad, with several submarines and more than 50 surface ships, including destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships and minesweepers.²³ The Russian air force is similarly capable: it has 36 fighter squadrons and about 30 ground attack squadrons, to say nothing of its attack helicopter and nuclear-

capable bomber fleets.²⁴ Despite assertions that the Russian military is bedevilled by structural weaknesses and financial constraints, it has been able to simultaneously mount military operations in Ukraine, an intervention in Syria, and a major military manoeuvre known as Center-2015, in which tens of thousands of troops and law enforcement personnel rehearsed rapid mobilization and deployment.

Given this massive imbalance, the Baltic States rely on the promise of NATO intervention for their security.²⁵ While NATO enjoys military superiority over Russia, its presence in the Baltics is limited. Consider the NATO air-policing mission. Before 2014, it constituted the ‘only NATO military presence in the Baltic States’.²⁶ Nevertheless, although NATO conducts constant surveillance of its airspace in the region, the deployments provided by the air forces of fellow NATO allies are small, now usually numbering about four aircraft. As such, their military effectiveness is hard to overstate: in any war scenario, Baltic airbases are vulnerable to Russian artillery and precision-guided weapons, and thereafter Russia’s air force would find it relatively easy to gain air superiority in the region.

NATO’s land power presence in the Baltic States is even weaker. Because the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act stipulated against ‘additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces’, the Baltic States and other former Soviet-bloc alliance members have not hosted the same military commitments from the US as their Western European counterparts.²⁷ The result has been an imbalance in the distribution of NATO forces across Europe. One analysis indicates that 80 per cent of NATO’s total European troop strength is in Western Europe, whereas only five of 28 NATO installations are located on East Central European territory. As of early 2014, the total number of US

troops in East Central Europe was just short of 150.²⁸ This imbalance was moot when the political environment in Eastern Europe was peaceful, but NATO's eastern members have developed acute anxieties about this imbalance amid recent Russian aggression and have asked for major troop deployments from the US and other allies. In July 2016, NATO members agreed to position four battalion-sized battlegroups in the Baltic States and Poland on a rotational basis. The US also plans to have three brigades based in Europe on a continual basis by 2017 and will also preposition heavy military hardware in the Baltic region.²⁹

Multiple options are available to Russia to exploit this military imbalance in an attack on the Baltic States, but its recent conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine indicate two scenarios: a pre-emptive conventional invasion ordered by Moscow and carried out by Russian military units; and a subconventional (or hybrid) incursion orchestrated by Moscow and supported by Russian military units, but executed by pro-Russian partisans, militias, intelligence operatives and volunteer forces. Both scenarios involve precision and A2AD weapons challenging NATO's forward-based and follow-on ground forces, and none of the force posture proposals considered by NATO at the 2016 Warsaw Summit are likely to meet the challenge. In this event, the credibility of NATO's deterrent will suffer accordingly. Each scenario is briefly discussed below.

[H2]A Pre-emptive Conventional Invasion

If Russia were to launch a conventional attack against the Baltic States, such an invasion would likely come without warning. After all, Russia has local (but not regional) military dominance over Baltic and NATO forces. If the decision to seize territory had already

been made, Russian leaders would not want to give NATO time to begin mobilising its forces. And Russian forces can mount just such a no-notice operation, having increased its readiness through ‘snap’ exercises, which allow regular and reserve units to rehearse mobilization and deployment plans. Some analysts speculate that Russia could transport up to 60,000 troops within 72 hours by air alone.³⁰ It is possible that Baltic and NATO ground troops could wake up one morning with Russian units already operating in their rear. In such a scenario, Russian forces would probably use precision weapons to hit NATO’s air and missile defences, prepositioned equipment and forward-deployed ground forces in a sudden pre-emptive strike. Such an attack might occur in conjunction with Russian special operations units manoeuvring behind NATO lines to harass command-and-control assets. Meanwhile, Russia’s land-, sea- and air-delivered A2AD weapons could hinder reinforcements, making it difficult and costly for follow-on forces to link up with the prepositioned hardware and forward-deployed garrisons that survived the initial long-range strikes. Although a conventional invasion is perhaps less likely than a hybrid incursion, in part due to the risk of escalation, it is also the most dangerous scenario for NATO given the existing military imbalance and lack of geographic depth, which means Russian weapons can easily range targets across the entirety of their territory.

[H2]A Hybrid Incursion

Due to the risks inherent in a pre-emptive conventional invasion, Russia might prefer a subconventional approach if it were to attack. As this approach would exploit Russia’s local military power and ethno-political ties in the region, a hybrid operation would have at least three advantages. First, it might be harder to detect and diagnose in its earliest stages, generating a protracted debate within NATO instead of a decisive and immediate

response. Second, to the degree that a hybrid incursion relies upon pro-Russian groups already living within the Baltics, it might undermine the legitimacy of any military response by NATO troops. After all, pro-Russian agitators (in the Estonian city of Narva, for example, that is home to a large Russian-speaking population) could articulate legitimate grievances against their governments and may cite other nationalist and ethnic movements in Europe as justification. Furthermore, neutralising such groups might require NATO troops to undertake such provocative actions as arresting and even harming NATO citizens. Third, by depending on militias as well as other irregular (and ostensibly unmarked forces), a hybrid incursion would make it very difficult for NATO to use long-range, stand-off weapons of its own (including drones) without undue risk to civilians. Distinguishing friend from foe in a hybrid scenario could require heavy reliance on ground troops and counterinsurgency-style tactics.

If recent Russian operations in Ukraine offer any guidance, then a subconventional assault would begin with Russian-directed espionage, propaganda and agitation.³¹ These early operations will attempt to organise anti-government forces and foment popular discontent with the government, thereby providing a pretext for Russian interference. Such efforts will be hard to detect and unlikely to justify a sizeable increase in NATO ground troops. Eventually, pro-Russian agitators within the country can call for support and protection from Moscow, either because they have themselves destabilised the domestic political situation or because they have provoked violent repression by the state security apparatus. Whichever is the case, Russia might intervene by providing material support, specialised training, and an influx of ‘volunteers’ who just so happen to be well-trained Russian troops. In this scenario, Russia would use its conventional

military power to deter and delay a meaningful military response by NATO, and threaten the use of precision strikes and A2AD weapons.

[H1]Policy Implications

Although it is unlikely that Russia will resort to armed force in the Baltic region, these scenarios are useful, not because they are probable, but because they suggest how Russia might choose to use violent means if deterrence were to fail. To the degree that NATO can anticipate how Russia might use military force in the Baltics, the alliance can calibrate its deterrence threats so as to make war less likely in the first place. The problem is that NATO is contemplating solutions that are unlikely to resolve the underlying problem. Russia's precision strike and A2AD capabilities render existing forward-deployed ground troops vulnerable, making it easier for Russia to present NATO with a *fait accompli*. NATO's current solutions largely involve prepositioned heavy military hardware, four battalion-sized battlegroups, and modest deployments of rotational forces.

If this analysis is correct, it suggests a different approach to deterrence in the Baltics. The first policy implication is to recognise that technology is a necessary, but insufficient, part of the solution to precision strike and A2AD. The US Department of Defense's 'Third Offset Strategy' is an important initiative given its emphasis on investing in new technologies, including drones, artificial intelligence and three-dimensional printing, to counter a wide range of adversary capabilities, including A2AD. Nevertheless, even advanced technology is limited in what it can achieve for the US in terms of deterring Russia and reassuring NATO's Baltic allies. The precision strike and

A2AD challenge is severe *because* it threatens the US's longstanding stratagem of using forward-deployed ground forces to signal credibility. However, if forward-deployed ground forces cannot fend off invading forces, their value to allies is at risk of primarily being symbolic. As noted, their mission should not be to perish in the hope that their loss will trigger a wider US intervention, but to meaningfully bolster NATO's ability to obstruct Russian forces on the battlefield. The Third Offset – in its emphasis on robotics and unmanned autonomous strike aircraft – overlooks this valuable mission that ground forces can perform.

The second policy implication is that no easy or cheap solutions are available for answering the A2AD and precision strike threat. We believe that only two options in East Central Europe exist, both of which entail considerable cost and risk. The first is to repudiate the NATO–Russia Founding Act and base permanently large numbers of NATO troops on territories located in the alliance's northeastern flank. The second is to deploy large numbers of rotational forces – far more than are currently being considered – in the region.³² Either step is bound to be provocative to Russia, although an explicit renunciation of the Founding Act would be particularly inflammatory. Such a move would require the political willingness that NATO might be incapable of mustering at present. Short of such measures, however, the A2AD and precision strike problem will remain acute and the credibility of NATO's deterrent will suffer.

These last two points culminate to the third: that insurgency should no longer be considered a collateral mission for Baltic ground forces. In the improbable event that Russia does attack the Baltics, the invasion would be swift and difficult for local NATO forces to defeat. Indeed, the Baltic States would likely lose their already small ground

forces in such an engagement. Even a robust forward-deployed presence will still be subject to punishing long-range strikes. It makes more sense to have Baltic ground forces trained and prepared for insurgency as their primary mission to make Russian targeting difficult and to improve deterrence by denial. Although transitioning Baltic ground forces to this insurgency-exclusive focus might come at a cost in terms of alliance interoperability, they are so small that their contribution to conventional operations will still be marginal at best. This is not to say that Russia would find it impossible to deal with an insurgency. As an autocracy, it would face few political constraints in launching a 'nasty' campaign. Nevertheless, the goal for the Baltic States is to increase the woes it can inflict on Russian military forces to the greatest extent possible. Guerrilla operations (rather than engaging in set-piece battles or being easily discoverable) will improve such efforts and also hamper any Russian operation, conventional or hybrid, thus buying time for NATO forces to respond.

An irony exists here. When the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments released a report outlining what would eventually develop into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), its authors asserted that US defence planners were unduly preoccupied with 'the demands of modern irregular warfare' and were 'continuing to field forces more designed for waging the kinds of security threats that are fading into history'.³³ This view was reasonable because of the growing conventional threat from China's rise. Yet it is overstated if we take seriously the overwhelming military balance that favours Russia over its small three Baltic neighbours. To prepare for the absolute worst-case scenario, NATO would do well to place 'the demands of modern irregular warfare' onto Russia in order to deter and

defend against an attack on its northeastern flank. This need is all the more urgent should its stronger members be unwilling to provide meaningful conventional force deployments in that region.

Finally, for NATO forces, these implications yield a conclusion that many policymakers and practitioners would find unpalatable: it makes little military sense to place prepositioned heavy military hardware and small rotational forces in the region. For one, these military assets simply provide instant targets that would be the first to suffer from long-range Russian strikes. For another, they do not address the fundamental problem of reassurance and deterrence. Small rotational forces will suffer heavily against a Russian onslaught without appreciably slowing it. Even if such forces serve as a ‘tripwire,’ larger follow-on forces will experience extreme difficulties forcibly entering the theatre of operations, are likely to find their prepositioned equipment heavily damaged or inaccessible, and may well arrive to discover that the issue has already been settled.

[H1]Conclusion

The war scenarios that could take place in the Baltic States are unsavoury. Deterrence is clearly preferable. However, to make deterrence credible, NATO must deal with Russia’s precision strike and A2AD capabilities. The challenge is tractable, but the solutions are neither easy nor cost-free. Existing efforts, especially those focusing on small rotational forces, four battalion-sized battlegroups and prepositioned gear, are unlikely to reassure nor deter in light of the precision strike and A2AD threat. If NATO and the US want to

enhance deterrence by denial meaningfully, then bolder steps will be necessary.

Technology will be part of the solution, but it is no panacea. Effective deterrence will require a robust ground-troop presence, aided by a creative reimagining of the role to be played by Baltic troops. These steps will make it more difficult for Russia to present NATO with the hard fact of an annexation and occupation of the Baltic States, thereby enhancing deterrence and regional stability.

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Notes

¹ For a plausible conflict scenario involving the Baltic States, see Richard D Hooker, Jr, 'Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016: NATO Defends the Baltic States', *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 160, No. 3, 2015), pp. 26–36.

² Dan Altman, 'By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries', (working paper, last modified 11 April 2016), <http://www.danielwaltman.com/uploads/3/2/3/1/32312379/altman_by_fait_accompl.pdf>, accessed 13 September 2016. On the need to improve local military capabilities in East Central Europe, see Jakub Grygiel and A Mitchell Wess, 'Limited War is Back', *National Interest* (No. 135, August 2014), pp. 37–44; Matthew Kroenig, 'Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (Vol. 57, No. 1, 2015), pp. 49–70; Edward Lucas and A Wess Mitchell, 'Central European Security After Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO's Eastern Defenses', Report No. 35, Center for European Analysis, 25 March 2014.

³ The US announced the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in June 2014 to fund rotational deployments, combined training, prepositioned equipment and partner capacity. In February 2016, President Barack Obama's administration proposed quadrupling its ERI budget to \$3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017. See Mark F Cancian and Lisa Sawyer Samp, 'Critical Questions: The European Reassurance Initiative', Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 February 2016. On the internal challenges facing NATO as of 2016, see Alexander Mattelaer, 'The NATO Warsaw Summit: How to Strengthen Alliance Cohesion', *Strategic Forum* (No. 296, June 2016).

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- ¹⁷ Charles Hagel, ‘The Defense Innovation Initiative’, Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 15 November 2014, <<http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf>>, accessed 13 September 2016. See also Simón, ‘Balancing Priorities in America’s European Strategy’; Daniel Fiott, ‘Europe and the Pentagon’s Third Offset Strategy’, *RUSI Journal* (Vol. 161, No. 1, 2016), pp. 26–31; and Luis Simón, ‘The “Third” US Offset Strategy and Europe’s “Anti-access Challenge”’, *Journal of Strategic Studies* (Vol. 39, No. 3, 2016), pp. 417–45.
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- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 185–86.
- ²⁵ Lucas and Mitchell, ‘Central European Security After Crimea’.
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³¹ According to Alexander Lanoszka, 'Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe', *International Affairs* (Vol. 96, No. 1, 2016), pp. 178–79, Russia would still encounter difficulties mounting 'hybrid' operations in the Baltic States. Local conditions in the Baltics are much less favourable to Russia than in parts of Ukraine. For an analysis of Russian strategy, see Dmitry Adamsky, *Cross-Domain Coercion: The Russian Art of Strategy [Proliferation Papers 54]* (Paris, France: IFRI, November 2015).

³² Shlapak and Johnson suggest that a minimum deterrent capability would require seven brigades reinforced by airpower at an annual cost of approximately \$3.7 billion per year, see Shlapak and Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics*, pg. 1.

³³ Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, 'AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept', Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, p. xv.