GORILLAS IN THE HOUSE OF LIGHT

London Zoo and the Modernist Project

Five shuffle past a plate-glass door. Two men in coats. A family of three: a small girl topped with a knitted hat pulled along by her father and mother. They pass through a dark space of curving metal out into the light. A guard stoops to unlatch and seal the doors shut. In the next shot, a sheer glass-front onto something that might be a laboratory, or an observatory: a ceiling in motion, rapidly sweeping about to flood the white space and reflective surface of the glass-screen with sun. The eye can make nothing of this. Nothing is substantial, nothing is still. Some futurist fantasy of a vast and abstract mechanism for the movement of shadow and light. Both building and a machine. But what? – the roof and wall fully retract to reveal a colossal cage. Mok and Moina are kept here: the baby gorillas at London Zoo. Face pressed to the bars and chicken-wire, one of the infants looks up to the right, the concrete-wall curling about to enclose him. In winter the House is shut – public in one half, apes in the other. In summer the cage is revolved and the glass-screen pulled back – the infant gorillas occupying the complete circle, while the public watches from without.

In this motion picture by Lazlo Moholy-Nagy, The New Architecture and the London Zoo (1936), the Gorilla House at London Zoo, by Berthold Lubetkin’s firm Tecton, is hailed as the beginning of a new era, ushered in by the use of reinforced concrete. And zoo-enclosures were a significant milestone for the modernist movement. For most of those working-class Londoners who flocked to see the gorilla-children in their new home, this was their first encounter with the
new architecture. Built at a time when the works of the modernist mainstream, centred in Paris, remained for the most part on the drawing board, the Gorilla House, with subsequent enclosures by Tecton in London, Dudley and Whipsnade, was perceived to be providing a sane blueprint for the future development of the human metropolis. In fact, the project can be interpreted as a form of animal-testing. As science-historian Peder Anker has noted, Peter Chalmers-Mitchell, secretary of the Zoological Society, believed that if gorillas and penguins could be shown to thrive in ‘the most unnatural conditions’ the same would hold for the poor, who were in desperate need of being liberated from their “natural” conditions of criminal and filthy slums. ‘It was thus of revolutionary importance to display thriving animals in an unnatural setting as if to prove that humans too could prosper in a new environment’. Following wide-spread ruin in the course of the Blitz, this ambition would at last be realised, as the architect Lubetkin began to apply the modernist architecture he had pioneered at London Zoo to the problem of mass-housing. The kernel of that future city we now inhabit is this Le Corbusian *machine for habitation* in London Zoo. This first House of Light.

The fate of the infant gorillas therefore holds peculiar horror. After six months in their new home Mok and Moina were dead; their bodies subjected to a Persian funeral, put in a cage on a roof in the sun, to be picked clean by carrion-crow. The tussle over where to assign blame – to poor maintenance or to poor design – to owner or to architect – must now seem an ironic foreshadowing of the argument that would rage, in subsequent decades, over modernist mass-housing in the UK. I wish to explore the possibility that the gorillas in their House of Light were not the victims of an oversight, as the architect maintained, but of a terrible mistake in the Cartesian philosophy underpinning modernist thought. I suggest that in addition to representing a turning-point for modernism, the Gorilla House occupies an important place in the crisis in humanism identified by Jacques Derrida. The gorilla can be seen to have possessed extraordinary resonance in the early twentieth century; a symbol for a crisis of faith in the Cartesian definition of the human being.
I.
THE ANIMAL-MACHINE

In *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (2007) Derrida set out to track the systematic relegation of the Animal in western philosophy back to the theoretical break initiated by Descartes; the stark binary that defines the human by corralling every other species on the planet into a single concept, under a single name, “The Animal”.\(^4\) This consistent characterisation of the Animal as that which is deprived of the Logos, the right and power to respond, is the root of the misery inflicted on other animal species by humans, or on other humans unfortunate enough to have themselves been marked out as “Animal”. The Gorillas in the House of Light represent the culmination of this Enlightenment reduction of the Animal: the subject is held in a fearsome geometry, a lyrical celebration of human reason. But this extremity is also a symptom of societal unease – an anthropocentric reinstitution of the superiority of the Human over the Animal that testifies to the panic generated by ‘humanity’s second trauma’: evolution – the knowledge that mankind is intimately involved in everything that he had for so long tried to disavow as other, as Animal.

But what did Rene Descartes actually say, and in what way does his theoretical formulation of the human-animal binary differ from the earlier idea stretching right back to Aristotle that man is an animal distinguished from the rest by his capacity for rational thought: the Rational Animal? As Derrida points out, Descartes is a man in a hurry, compelled to eliminate everything that is not certain and indubitable. Here is the passage in the *Meditations* in which Descartes called time on the earlier definition:

What, then, did I formerly think I was? I thought I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say rational animal? No indeed: for it would be necessary next to inquire what is meant by animal, and what by rational, and, in this way, from one single question, we would fall unwittingly into an infinite number of others, more difficult and awkward than the first, and I would not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me by using it to unravel subtleties of this kind.\(^5\)
To arrive at what “I am” it is necessary to begin by dismissing the concept of the rational animal. This frees Descartes to reach a new formulation in *Discourse on Method* – “I think therefore I am”\(^6\). On first impression, this might seem to be merely reasserting the idea that man’s defining characteristic is reason: I think – I have the capacity for rational thought. But what must follow? I am a Man? No. I think therefore I AM. Something truly radical has taken place here in relation to that earlier tradition; a moment of rupture that has had profound implications for humanity’s relationship to the Animal. In a startling move the capacity for rational thought has been equated with Being itself, with the very Name of God.

Previous philosophers had insisted that the animal lacked reason, though Aristotle, for instance, clearly believed that humans and animals shared much else. Certain animals possessed qualities nearly akin to those common to mankind in greater or less measure: “For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness and fierceness, mildness or cross-temper; courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirits or low cunning, and with regard to intelligence, something akin to sagacity.”\(^7\) In contrast, the new means for defining the essence of what it is to be human cut us off from animals in the world, and from everything that is animal in our own selves. “But I, who am certain that I am, do not yet know clearly enough what I am; so that henceforth I must take great care not imprudently to take some other object for myself, and thus avoid going astray in this knowledge which I maintain to be more certain and evident than all I have had hitherto.”\(^8\) To this end Descartes abstracted from the “I am” his own living body, which is presented objectively as a machine or corpse: “I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body.”\(^9\) In short, he is a “thing that thinks”.\(^10\) And anything lacking the capacity for rational thought is nothing more than a machine, is empty of the living Name of God. The Animal is therefore, in a sense, unreal: no longer capable of a meaningful response – of saying “I am”.

In order to illustrate this point, Descartes presents us with a famous allegory that
curiously anticipates the science-fiction of Philip K. Dick. Imagine a future in which man has never seen an animal. Imagine man has created a machine that precisely simulated the appearance, movement and sound of an irrational animal. According to Descartes, one could not distinguish between real and simulated animal, because there would be no fundamental difference. But no one could make such a mistake if confronted with a clockwork man, and this is because the human being is capable of responding in intelligent fashion to any questions put to him.

And this shows not only that animals have less reason than men, but that they have none at all; for we see that very little of it is required in order to be able to speak; and since one notices inequality among animals of the same species as well as among men, and that some are easier to train than others, it is unbelievable that the most perfect monkey or parrot of its species should not equal in this the most stupid, or at least a child with a disturbed brain, unless their souls were not of an altogether different nature from our own.

II. THE HORROR OF THE APE

The discovery of the Gorilla in the nineteenth century posed a challenge to this classic thought-experiment, presenting new possibilities that were to prove profoundly unsettling to the hard-and-fast categories of humanist thought. The earliest specimens (a skull and other bones) were obtained by the American physician and missionary Thomas Staughton Savage in Liberia, and presented to the scientific community as Troglodytes Gorilla in Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural History in 1847. The first part of the name simply means cave-dweller but the second part is derived from a mysterious word that occurs in the Periplus of Hanno the Navigator; – a Greek translation of a Punic account of a voyage along the coast of West Africa in the fifth century BCE. After cataloguing the fauna and prominent landmarks encountered (a mountain of the gods, a river of fire pouring into the sea), Hanno speaks of a skirmish between the Carthageni and a tribe of hairy folk:
By flame for three days to South Horn, the bayou, the island of folk hairy and savage
whom our Lixtae said were Gorillas.
We cd. not take any man, but three of their women.
Their men clomb up the crags,
Rained stone, but we took three women
who bit, scratched, wd. not follow their takers.
Killed, flayed, brought back their pelts into Carthage.
Went no further that voyage,
as were at end of provisions.¹⁵

Neither Greek nor Punic, the word gorilla might be related to gorku, the Fulani
word for man, the diminutive form of which is gorel.¹⁶ But it is impossible to be
sure if the gorilla should be identified as a forgotten breed of hominid or with the
species later designated as such. In any event, this name proved an inspired
choice; with its echo of a remote, mythical past, gorilla fired the imagination,
initiating a rush for specimens, on the part of museums across the world.

The first stuffed gorillas were displayed in Paris in 1852. The explorer Paul du
Chaillu became the first western-man to see a living gorilla on his expedition of
1856-59, and brought the first dead specimen to England in 1861.¹⁷ But in spite
of the mounting interest provoked by these scientific discoveries, which only
intensified following publication of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution in 1859,
no systematic field-study took place before the second quarter of the twentieth
century, when the American Museum of Natural History sent Carl Akeley to
secure specimens for the collection.¹⁸ For over seventy years the term gorilla
would mark, no less than it had in the time of Hanno, the point at which
knowledge failed, the edge of uncharted territory – a space for speculation and
for doubt.

First, and perhaps most unsettling, of the new monsters to emerge from this
vanishing point, is the sculpture Gorilla Dragging Away a Dead Negress (1859) by
Emmanuel Fremiert. In this colossal image there is none of the twisted eroticism
that hindsight might lead us to expect in this the first representation of that now
familiar trope of the gorilla and the girl. Crushed tight by a huge stubby hand, the
woman’s face and body are pressed into the flabby bulk of a female gorilla; a big
hoop swings from the ear beneath an elaborate head dress; the robes are heavy, funereal; the arm let swing is not that of some sylph from the Salon but muscular; the fingers a taut claw; no poetry, no glamour; a real corpse. The gorilla's face is a blank – fixed snarl – but the eyes are sad. Surging forward, the gorilla is an unstoppable force bearing the away the dead. But it is impossible to read reasons or circumstances into this sombre tableau. The piece possesses a mystery that is profoundly troubling; something terrible has taken place, something on a mythical order, not spelt out. Exhibited in the same year that saw the publication of the Origin of Species, it is little wonder that the Paris Salon refused to exhibit the piece, only consenting to do so on the condition that the gorilla was screened by a curtain; or that they should have hastened to have had the sculpture destroyed after the exhibition. The gorilla entered the art of the west freighted with humanity's second trauma, hauling off the shell of what was once thought to be the image of God.

Fremiet's next treatment of the motif greatly refined the gorilla's symbolic potential. His Gorilla Carrying Off a Woman of 1887 won the Paris Salon Medal of Honour; and the Republic approved a bronze reproduction edition that proved highly popular.19 This is rather a curious reversal, since this image is more sensational than the first. Once again a gorilla is pulling away a woman, tucked tight under biceps – but the woman is beating and pushing the monster; her breasts crushed big against the ape, her thighs behind soft and full; embodying a sensuality in shocking juxtaposition with an immense knot of bone and muscle and hair; no uncertainty, no ambiguity as to intent; an alpha-male gorilla in heat; hefting a sharp-edged rock, screaming through a mouthful of fang. But in some respects this image is safer, though more explicit, rather more conventional, than the group of 1859. The original was shocking because Fremiet had chosen to adopt a style that drew upon his training as an illustrator at the Parisian Museum of Natural History. Stiffly respectable, rigorously researched and anatomically correct, best remembered for the Terrible Lizards that roam through Crystal Palace Park – that stocky mid-Victorian Naturalism which had become inextricably identified with scientific veracity. In contrast, the later Gorilla is in a style more in keeping with the aesthetic of the Paris Salon. The woman is now
Caucasian, the scene is of no particular time or place but is set in some mythical past. The sculpture could be taken as a modern recapitulation of the Centauromachy – an allegory in classical art, expressing humanity's struggle to overcome the irrational or animal. The motif had been reconfigured as a conflict – the outcome of which was far from as clear cut as might initially appear.

Fremiet’s iconic revision of the Gorilla and the Girl is recapitulated with remarkably little elaboration in the scores of gorilla-related horrormovies that were produced in the early twentieth century. One recent survey indicates that one hundred films with gorillas were made between 1908 and 1948 and of these the vast majority were horrors. Most of the gorillas in the genre were played by men in gorilla-costumes – a dedicated band of professional ape-impersonators, often taking their passion for realism to alarming lengths. If no one has heard of Charlie Gemora, the Master of the Art, in part this is because this remarkable actor would insist on having his name removed from the credits in order to maintain the realism of the production. The maker of his own gorilla-suit, and the sculptor of the gigantic hand that reaches into a hotel-room to snatch Fay Wray in King Kong (1933), Charlie Gemora was the leading figure in a genre that testifies to the tremendous unease that surrounded these recently discovered creatures in the public mind, rehearsing the psychopathologies the collapsing Cartesian paradigm had generated beneath the veneer of twentieth-century culture; often with surprising sensitivity and sophistication.

The motif of the gorilla and the girl, repeated ad infinitum in these films, owed its popularity to the fact that it successfully channelled as yet vague new fears into a familiar and therefore reassuring template: the conflict between Man and his Inner Animal. This fact is nowhere clearer than in Edward D. Wood Jnr’s sole contribution to the genre – his brilliantly twisted script for Bride and the Beast (1958), in which a couple have their wedding-night disturbed by the violent bull-gorilla that the husband, Dan, keeps locked up in a dungeon (complete with flaming torches) underneath the house. The gorilla is called Spanky, and Dan is not a little disturbed to discover that his new wife (played by Charlotte Austin), who insists on sleeping in a separate bed to her husband, smoulders with a
sexual intensity rarely caught on celluloid whenever in the presence of the gorilla. A jealous Dan shoots Spanky dead, and Charlotte Austin is subjected to hypnotherapy and regressed to a past life, in which she was an albino gorilla. Readers who have seen Tim Burton’s wonderful biopic *Ed Wood* (1994), will have no difficulty in recognising the confession that emerges in the course of the hypnosis as an expression of the director’s own unconventional sexual drives: “Soft like kitten’s fur”, says Charlotte Austin, recalling her former pelt. “Felt so good on me.” Though rather more candid in this respect than most, the process of projection crystallised in this particular gorilla-movie is a characteristic feature of a genre that could have been invented for the sole purpose of illustrating the psychoanalytical interpretation of animal-phobia developed earlier in the century by Sigmund Freud. In short, this is the theory that sexual desires deemed abhorrent by the father, together with hatred of the father provoked by that repression, are displaced onto an Animal. “By wild-beasts the dream-work usually symbolises passionate impulses,” Freud explains; “those of the dreamer, and also those of other persons of whom the dreamer is afraid; or thus, by means of a very slight displacement, the persons who experience those passions”. In fact, Freud’s thoughts on this topic seem eerily prescient, when one remembers that so many gorillas in these movies are treated precisely as a totem-animal: “From [the dream] it is not very far to the totemistic representation of the dreaded father by means of vicious animals, dogs, wild horses, etc. One might say that wild-beasts serve to represent the libido, feared by the ego, and combated by repression.”

‘The conflict between Man and his Inner Animal’: this is clearly how many engaging with the trope of the gorilla at the time explained the motif themselves. Consider Aldous Huxley’s satirical representation of the American film-industry in *Ape and Essence* (1948). Huxley picks up on the recurring imagery of the ape in films produced in this era, and incorporates this into a meta-fictional film-script discovered by an exploratory expedition sent to a Hollywood destroyed by nuclear war. In the following passage the Freudian-Darwinian understanding of the horror of the ape outlined above is presented as self-evident:

"
But there is a problem with this psychoanalytical approach. The Animal itself is entirely eliminated from the equation. The specific horror of the ape is neutralised in the moment of its expression. In becoming a sign for the “bestial” – the term which most accurately describes the horror of what you see in these movies – the gorilla has become a symbol of something from which beasts are exempt by definition. As Derrida has observed, “One cannot speak ... of the bêtise or bestiality of an animal. It would be an anthropomorphic projection of something that remains the preserve of man”. In presenting the gorilla as a symbol of the Inner Animal, movie-makers and writers were re-enacting the disavowal of something intrinsically human. The gorilla is reduced to an empty sign, interchangeable with any other animal species in a structure of meaning that is the product of that sign-making power thought proper to man. These motion pictures ultimately reassert the problematic Cartesian formulation of the Human subject and the Animal object.

But is the gorilla interchangeable with any other species? It is true every creature imaginable has at some point or another been rendered an object of horror by the film-industry; there have been birds, there have been sharks, there have even been killer shrews. In any number of gorilla horrormovies, from Bela Lugosi’s Murders in the Rue Morgue (1932) to Acquanetta’s Captive Wild Women (1943) the horror of the ape can be seen to derive not merely from its role as a symbol, one among many, for the depredations of the sub-conscious mind, but from the fact that the gorilla was perceived to be the embodiment of the challenge that the great apes posed to the thought-experiment set out in the Discourse on Method. Descartes asserted that the machine or animal would always be recognised as such by us because the animal-machine could not respond, and because an intelligent response could not be simulated. But could the Logos be Aped?
In *The Descent of Man* (1871), Charles Darwin had remarked that: “It is not the mere power of articulation that distinguishes man from other animals, for as everyone knows, parrots can talk; but it is his large power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas”.26 But having clearly signalled his engagement in this way with Cartesian Thought, Darwin then observed that this is an Art and therefore achieved through imitation: “As bearing on the subject of imitation, the strong tendency in our nearest allies, the monkeys, in microcephalous idiots, and in the barbarous races of mankind, to imitate whatever they hear deserves notice”.27 If those dull, stupid men mentioned by Descartes could be conflated in this way with mere monkeys and said to be entirely capable of the mimicry that permitted language, what might happen when explorers eventually discovered the “perfect ape”?28 Could we count on our ability to tell the simulation or aping of a response by this sophisticated animal-machine from the real thing?

One should bear in mind just how little was known concerning gorillas in this period. No one yet knew what feats these beasts were capable of – and for the vast majority of people in the thirties and forties the *Gorilla* was, of course, a man in a costume called Charlie Gemora! – It is possible that the gorilla horror-movies of the period played no small part in exacerbating anxieties that sustained them, presenting their uninformed audiences with preternaturally intelligent gorilla-men.

The nature of this anxiety emerges particularly clearly in what must be the original ape-related horror story, and primary prototype for the genre considered above, *The Murders in the Rue Morgue* (1841) by Edgar Allan Poe. The unsettling effect of the story stems in large part from the fact that the sleuth Dupin refers to the deaths in the Rue Morgue as “murders” after he has utterly eliminated the possibility that the perpetrator could be human: “In the manner of thrusting the corpse up the chimney, you will admit that there was something excessively outre – something altogether irreconcilable with our common notions of human action, even when we suppose the actors the most depraved of men”.29 The narrator confesses to feeling “a creeping of the flesh” on hearing Dupin’s summary of the case; and one can understand why, when one
appreciates that a murder that represents a "horror absolutely alien from humanity" necessarily involves a paradox. For as Will Smith observes in *I, Robot* (2004), only a human can be guilty of homicide – a restatement of the familiar Cartesian conflation of the human being with the capacity for rational judgement. It is significant that when the narrator speculates "A madman ... has done this deed – some raving maniac, escaped from a neighbouring *Maison de Sant*, Dupin concedes that the "idea is not irrelevant". Presumably the idea is not irrelevant because a madman would not have been tried for a murder in any court. In solving the “murders” in the Rue Morgue, Dupin discovers that no murder took place – and so no one is charged for this offence at the end. Because the perpetrator is an ape. Not a gorilla – the mystery was published six years before the scientific discovery of that species – but a “large fulvous *Ourang-Outang* of the East Indian Islands”. The violent deaths were not murder, but the result of the mechanical imitation believed to be proper to an ape – aping a man shaving – followed by violent reaction to a sudden fright. Poe has presented the reader with the perfect *simulation* of a crime by an animal lacking capacity for rational thought: the most intelligent men on the Parisian police-force have been shown to have failed that test upon which Descartes had grounded his case for setting human beings apart from animal-machines; they have been shown to be incapable of distinguishing the illusion of the Logos from the real thing. Nor, one should point out, is the effect of Dupin’s intervention exactly to restore these imperilled boundaries. In his famous preface, Poe explains that the purpose of the narrative is to provide a commentary on his proposition there is a hitherto unrecognised distinction between ingenuity and analysis. “The consecutive or combining power, by which ingenuity is usually manifested, and to which the phrenologists (I believe erroneously) have assigned a separate organ, supposing it a primitive faculty, has been so frequently seen in those whose intellect bordered otherwise upon idiocy, as to have attracted general observations among writers on morals.” Against the ingenuity of a retentive memory and of playing by the book, Poe sets up the analysis that he characterises as the very soul and essence of method; “it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is evinced”. The narrative presents a very clear difference between the acumen of Dupin and the mere cunning of the Prefect of Police. But
it is hard to say how one can distinguish the cunning exhibited by the Parisian Police from the cunning exhibited – to rather more effect! – by the Ourang-Outang. In each case, cunning is based on a retentive memory and the capacity for repeating certain procedures in a mechanical, unreflective way. Perhaps the most terrifying element in this landmark horror story is a variation on the familiar Cartesian distinction between response and reaction that puts most of humanity beyond the pale, with little or nothing to distinguish the “ingenuity” of which they boast from the “cunning” of the merely animal.

The full implications of this impending ontological crisis are set out in Pierre Boulle’s novel La Planète des Singes (1963). The film-adaptation, Planet of the Apes (1968) significantly revised the plot of Boulle’s novel in order to present a timely satire on the “bestiality” of mankind, merely reconfirming the Cartesian Human-Animal binary in the act of inverting it. The book is very different. Everything horrific in the novel stems from the fact that for the most part everyday life is pure “reaction” rather than “response” – and can therefore be aped. It is in this traditional belief that it is the capacity for imitation that is characteristic of the ape that the specific anxieties that became attached to the new anthropoid apes, and the unfortunate gorilla in particular, are to be found. In these passages from La Planète des Singes you have fully realised the horror of the ape.

What is it that characterizes a civilisation? Is it the exceptional genius? No, it is everyday life. ... Is it possible that creatures devoid of intelligence could have perpetuated it by a simple process of imitation? ... This should be able to be achieved by monkeys, who are essentially imitators, provided of course they are able to make use of language. ... At the level of administration, the quality of aping seemed even easier to admit. To continue our system, the gorillas would merely have to imitate certain attitudes and deliver a few harangues, all based on the same model.35
Charlie Gemora would have instantly recognised the compositional elements in the Gorilla House at London Zoo. The ‘intrinsic human ceremony’ enacted by a porch ushering the public into a dark theatre. And that sliding panel – like the false-walls that conceal Spanky’s dungeon, or that of Bela Lugosi in The Ape-Man (1943), or like the curtains that screen King Kong, or Fremiet’s first Gorilla. Everything in the approach to the building worked toward a particular theatrical effect. The big reveal of a horror intended to figure the spectator’s own primitive drives – suddenly there and held in a spotlight. If the Gorilla House presents certain strong similarities to the Cabinet of Dr Caligari, the laboratory of the Mad Scientist, this is perhaps no coincidence. For there is evidence to suggest that Lubetkin may have been inspired in his design by the same sources. “There are two possible methods of approach to the problem of zoo design”, explained Lubetkin; “the first, which we may call the ‘naturalistic’ method, is typified in the Hamburg and Paris zoos, where an attempt is made, as far as possible, to reproduce the natural habitat of each animal; the second approach, which, for want of a better word, we may call the ‘geometric’, consists of designing architectural settings for the animals in such a way as to present them dramatically to the public, in an atmosphere comparable to that of a circus.” Lubetkin was committed to ensuring his enclosures drew upon traditional spaces of popular entertainment. His elephant-paddock at Whipsnade Zoo emulates a Big Top, for instance. The famous Penguin Pool at London Zoo resembles a Lido. And, perhaps most troubling, his pit for the Polar Bears at Dudley Zoo can only have been modelled on the Elizabethan Bear-Pit – a vertical tube in which bears were set upon by dogs for the amusement of the public. In the light of this commitment it seems at least highly probable that Lubetkin’s first structure for London Zoo should be based upon the platform for the popular exhibition of the gorilla referenced by so much cinema of the period. That is to say, the freak-show at a circus or fairground.

This was not lost on contemporary critics. An American critic for instance argued
that the modernist projects at London Zoo had the “flavor of a circus or a country

carnival” for the “pure pleasure and amusement of their owner” with the result
being that “the educational or scientific value of an English zoo is nearly zero”.38

In a recent article surveying the legacy of Bauhaus ideas in the UK, science-
historian Peder Anker cites this passage, and explains that this interpretation of
the project (that is to say, the architect's own understanding of his zoo buildings)
can only obscure the very real scientific objectives that the management at
London Zoo hoped to achieve through commissioning these new buildings.
“Though they welcomed entertainment that could generate general interest in
biology (and money from entrance fees), they were not willing to pursue
amusement at the expense of their scientific integrity”, insists Anker. “It was the
promotion of public health and not amusement which prompted the Zoo keepers
to build modernist architecture.” His subsequent emphasis on the discourse of
the “healthy environment”, shared by Zoo keepers, newspapers and architects
alike, is entirely correct, and the article as a whole, extremely illuminating. But I
would like to suggest that Lubetkin's conception of nature as a circus for human
entertainment was not incompatible with at least one key scientific and
educational objective of the London Zoological Society's research anatomist,
Solly Zuckerman, who played a major role in securing the commission for Tecton.

For much of his life, Zuckerman saw himself as engaged in unrelenting struggle
against the cardinal error of inferring that “comparison of animal and human
social life will enable us to discover some of the basic instincts and impulses
upon which the whole edifice of human society is reared”39. It is true that
Zuckerman believed the life of primates to be a crude picture of a social level
from which our earliest human ancestors emerged: “But”, Zuckerman
immediately goes on to say, “only that”.40 Contrary to Anker's assertion, his
landmark thesis on primate behaviour, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*
(1932), does not present this material as a model for explaining deeper sexual
and social instincts in humans. “Indeed much could be said for divorcing the
study of man's behaviour from that of other animals in relation to the subject
matter of sociological discussion”.41 It is explained that “[w]hen the impetus
given to biological inquiry by Darwin's exposition of the evolutionary hypothesis
made them prominent subjects for discussion, both these aspects of mammalian behaviour were at first considered together, and there accumulated a wealth of literature to fill the Cartesian gulf separating man from the beasts, and proving the continuity of mind and society through the world of living organisms”. Thus Kropotkin’s *Mutual Aid* (1919) examined organised social groups in the animal kingdom to prove that progress is best fostered by the practice of mutual cooperation and support. E. Westermarck’s *The History of Human Marriage* (1921) provided an anecdotal account of the “family group” of the gorilla, in order to establish a natural basis for the human institution of marriage. And Yerkes and Yerkes had taken certain facts about a New World monkey to indicate “a species of communism” as being “of the utmost importance to mankind”. Zuckerman casts a caustic eye on that “somewhat surprising discovery of politico-economic systems at a biological level in which work and production, in the economic sense, can hardly be thought of as existing”. He proceeds to point out that the mating habits of even closely aligned species like spotted deer and red deer can differ enormously: “it is even more misleading to attempt to infer the mating habits of the first men from those of the gorilla or any other sub-human primate”. The book that follows is very much in keeping with these “Cartesian principles”, providing an epoch-making account of the atrocities that took place on Monkey Hill between 1925 and 1930. “It is in their demonstration of the ways in which human social behaviour has renounced its biological background that studies of Old World apes and monkeys have greatest significance”, Zuckerman later explained, in his article on “The Biological Background of Human Social Behaviour” (1937); “Such studies do not indicate fundamental limiting factors in primate social expressions, but they show the full extent to which human behaviour has altered in the course of human evolution”. The sexual violence inflicted on the living and the dead on Monkey Hill should most certainly not be read, it is implied, in order to gain an insight
into what we are as a species – and one suspects that the often gruesome details in Zuckerman’s account were intended precisely to forestall any such effort. “Those who study the social behaviour of apes”, he continued in his characteristically dry fashion, “in the belief that they are significantly helping in the provision of data that will allow of the better ordering of human society would appear to be somewhat mistaken”.50 If his study of the sexual power-struggles among baboons at London Zoo was intended to serve this end, there is a terrible irony in the fact that Zuckerman’s account was so often received in the opposite spirit by his readers. This is registered in the postscript to the belated second edition of The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes (1981), in which Zuckerman attacked the ongoing misuse of information about the social lives of primates to provide a natural foundation for theories about mankind’s political problems: “The proposition that the aggressive “instincts” we have inherited from our primitive forebears have something to do with the control of overpopulation or possible nuclear war, is no more sophisticated or useful a message than was the view of Sir Arthur Keith, that renowned British physical anthropologist of the early half of our century, that “war is Nature’s pruning fork” – a conclusion which he was able to reach without the benefit of the writings of latter-day primatologists”.51

This is not to say that Zuckerman denied the ferocious sexual drives displayed on Monkey Hill held some place in the unconscious of the human psyche. In fact, in his article on “The Biological Background to Human Social Behaviour”, he readily identifies with the theory, developed by Freud in Totem and Taboo, that “The price of our emergence as man would seem to have been the overt renunciation of a dominant primate impulse in the field of sex”.52 There can be no doubt that Anker is correct to suggest that Zuckerman believed, “Visitors at the Zoo observing the gorillas would thus also observe and reflect upon their own primitive desires”.53 But it should be recognised that this belief must have been enormously complicated by that scientist’s life-long battle against those who made easy analogical comparisons with the ways of monkeys and apes in order to shore up their own theories on human society. Instead of ignoring the elements in the Gorilla House that reference the circus freak-show, on the basis
that this format is incompatible with serious scientific objectives, we should recognise this aspect of the design as the fulfilment of a specific educational requirement. The structure would permit the public to witness “a crude picture of that social level from which emerged our earliest human ancestors” but, since “we have little or nothing to gain from watching the behaviour of animals” in seeking “a solution to our own social and political problems”, this engagement with the ape could only be presented as catharsis. A recognition of our functional affinities with the animal-machine in order to induce a yet more rigorous repression of that shared past. A repression that would re-enforce, since in Zuckerman’s philosophy it originally constituted, the essence of our human identity. “[It is] idle to suppose that because man is a primate, and sub-human primates lead their lives blindly according to scales of dominance and submission, human beings must therefore resign themselves to an eternity of conflict over material things”, he insisted, on reviewing his horrific survey of sub-human social behaviour. “The price of our continued existence may well be further repressions of dominant impulses, and further developments of the operative behaviour whose beginnings can be vaguely seen in our transition from a simian to a human level of existence”.

The estrangement that “pulp” elements in the design of the Gorilla House effected therefore served an important purpose. Like much of the cinema of the period, Lubetkin’s theatre offered scope for a popular ritual of regression: the primitive drives that threatened civilised society were not permitted to fester in darkness, but were rendered safe by being brought to light. Lubetkin's Gorilla House rigorously asserted throughout the viewing experience the traditional Cartesian gulf between Human subject and the Animal object, preventing that process of “anthropomorphising” that Solly Zuckerman feared and wished to guard against.

In Bertold Lubetkin the London Zoological Society had found exactly the right architect to respond to Zuckerman’s concerns over how the lives of the great apes might be interpreted by an uninformed public. As architectural historian John Allan has observed, the theatrical approach is “readily traced back to
Lubetkin’s philosophic commitment to the rationalist ideal.” Allan notes that the architect chose to place a Corinthian capital (unearthed in the course of excavation; part of the Nashe project in this district during the Regency) next to the entrance like a talisman, or an embryonic caryatid. “For Lubetkin, even a gorilla house was not merely a machine for gorillas to live in: it was a declaration of human values.” The architect’s own daughter describes this commitment rather more bluntly: “He believed that human reason was an irresistible force; that science would unlock every secret, cure every ill, and that human beings, by virtue of their rationality, were superior to all other forms of life”. Her father is said to have clung to these credenda “fiercely and proclaimed them with a passion which was anything but rational”. In her account of a childhood on the Gloucestershire farm that Lubetkin took over after retiring from the capital, Louise Kehoe relates how these beliefs propelled the builder of zoos into pioneering new industrial methods of farming, including one contraption that he called a “cattle crush” – which apparently did just what the name implied. “Factory farming had not then been invented, but he discovered it for himself, turning his architectural skills to the task of designing slat-floored prisons in which pigs and cows could be immobilized and forcibly, repeatedly mated to ensure the best yield of offspring with the least fallow time”. Kehoe is quick to add that Lubetkin was not unsympathetic to his animals; he could be kind and took great pleasure in watching their antics. But his philosophy bound him to the idea that the Animal is a machine, while only the Human can be said to have mind. His zoo buildings aggressively insist upon this fact in an era when this tenet central to the Cartesian tradition seemed to have been threatened by Darwinism and the discovery of the Anthropoid. As Kehoe obverses, “by juxtaposing the cool, mathematical precision of pure geometric shapes – cylinders, spirals, ellipses, cast in thin sections of white reinforced concrete – with the lumbering gait and awkward, unrefined behaviour of the captive tenants, he made clowns and performers of them in spite of themselves”. The animal is held in patterns from Euclidean geometry, mapped on a Cartesian grid, that testify to the all-encompassing power of the rational mind. “The animals became living monuments to rationalism, imprisoned not so much by bars or cages, but by their intellectual inferiority to humankind, whose will had wrought
the seamless, soaring concrete canopies that sheltered them".\textsuperscript{61}

In many of the zoo buildings this tendency is not nearly as pronounced as Kehoe suggests and Lubetkin has been justly hailed for developing a new form of civic architecture that permitted unprecedented interactions between man and beast. But as Louis MacNeice recognised, on viewing the structure shortly after its completion, there was something excessive in the Gorilla House's formal emphasis on circulation and control.

Beyond the Elephant House is one of the very newest and grandest of the Zoo buildings, the circular gorilla House of white concrete [...] by Messers. Tecton. This is all gadgets, central heating, coddling and slickness, and, like all this firm's designs, is, aesthetically, a trifle frigid. We must of course always plump for the animal's health and comfort rather than for our own, probably sentimental, certainly irrelevant, delight in a more homely and cowshed atmosphere, but all the same we may remember that Alfred, the Bristol gorilla [...] has lived in perfect health for years in much more primitive quarters without any of this air-conditioning or up-to-the-minute setting. And we may remember that Americans, with all their science-in-the-home and centrally heated houses, beat the world when it comes to catching colds.\textsuperscript{62}

Ostensibly there to protect the gorillas from air-borne infection and a northern climate to which they were not adapted, the obtrusive nature of the systems for air-conditioning, running water, sliding dust-screen, revolving sun-room, are said to represent an unwarranted thoroughness of treatment. In point of fact, these elements seem to have been lifted from the design for a Tuberculosis Clinic that was never eventually built.\textsuperscript{63} When the care taken over the formal integration of measures for the flow of human traffic through the building is also taken into account it becomes evident these systems were not in place merely for the sake of the gorillas, but were part of a wider preoccupation on the part of the architect with the aesthetics of circulation and control. "In the new house the audience is encouraged to keep moving: porches, entrances and public spaces are designed to give directions to the visitor and to propel him forward", runs a contemporary report in the journal for \textit{Architectural Designs and Construction}, June 1933. "The old game of discovering family likenesses at the Zoo is, therefore, discouraged".\textsuperscript{64} This attention to the structure's formal emphasis upon movement is also evident
in the film on the modernist architecture at London and Whipsnade by Lazlo Maholy-Nagy, referred to in earlier in this article, in which a series of simple animations highlight the kinetic properties of the Gorilla House and Penguin Pool. Significantly, the treatment of the two gorillas in this motion picture differs considerably from that accorded the other zoo animals; while giraffes and penguins are captured rushing through their new enclosures, in shots that convey an exhilarating sensation of freedom and speed, the gorillas alone do not move, but cling and stare as the building itself moves about them. The freedom of movement celebrated in this section of the film is not proper to the gorillas, but a property of the machine they inhabit; while the other structures suggest movement, only the Gorilla House is a moving object; while the rest seem to inspire a delight in movement on the part of the animals, the Gorilla House reduces the apes it contains to passive spectators.

The architect’s preoccupation with a systematic regulation of circulation is a striking manifestation of a concept that has been a characteristic element in European thought since the Enlightenment: the metaphor of circulation. As David Trotter has shown in his book on this subject, over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth century this concept, initially derived from medicine, became an all-encompassing metaphor that politicians, economists, urban planners, philosophers and philanthropists applied to an extraordinary range of different problems, enabling them to formulate and install those systems that our technological, highly-populated and urbanised civilisation now depends upon.65

‘The formula is as simple as can be’, remarks Wolfgang Schivelbusch: ‘whatever was part of circulation was regarded as healthy, progressive, constructive; all that was detached from circulation, on the other hand, appeared diseased, medieval, subversive, threatening’.66 It should come as no surprise that we should find Zuckerman struggling for this word in the thirties when he came to define the essence of culture, that which sets us apart from the rest of the animal world: “By virtue of the tools we construct, we organize our lives to a large extent according to means of production and exchange”, he claimed.67 And Zuckerman expressed this idea more stridently in later years, having talked with Lévi-Strauss: “I believe Lévi-Strauss to be right when he makes the point that “humanization” implies a
synthesis of a number of cultural elements (among which exchange is critical) which, as it were, became combined in a flash” (my italics). No less than the Corinthian capital set up at the entrance, Lubtkin’s formal emphasis on circulation is an emphatic expression, not merely of western civilisation, but of “human” values, as formulated in the Enlightenment. The animal that might have successfully aped our human capacity to respond is held immobile in the midst of systems for the circulation of light, water, air, heat and the crowd, powerless within a cultural paradigm that had become the entelechy of that Logos proper to man. No longer free to say “I am”, but bound within a fearsome structure of thought, the inmates are given space to play only at being what we think of as gorilla: in this instance, as has been suggested, the embodiment of a peculiarly human quality, a culturally specific notion of the bestiality of the Id. Mok and Moina were in one sense dead on the moment of arrival; they could only ever have been experienced as human artefacts, in the House of Light.

In closing this section I would like to indicate that the formal procedures employed in the Tecton Gorilla House are by no means unique, but might well reflect a more general tendency in that phase of theory and practice to which the term Modernist is applied. To demonstrate this effectively would require more space than is here available. But an examination of an extract from a monumental work of literary modernism may serve to show that the aggressive procedures set out in this essay can cast light on analogous structures in material by modernist writers and artists, thereby contributing to the ground-breaking work currently being conducted on the Modernist Animal by Carrie Rohman and Carey Wolfe. Published a year after the completion of the Gorilla House at London Zoo, the passage of poetry at the start of this essay, the translation of the Punic Periplus of Hanno the Navigator; is in fact a component in The Cantos of Ezra Pound, one of the largest fragments in that monster mosaic inspired by the glittering canopy of the Galla Placidia, Ravenna: the circle of gold in the gloom that gathers the light against it. Hanno’s gorillas are one luminous detail in Pound’s epic poem. They too have been enclosed in a house of light. Having studied the role that these apes were compelled to perform in a contemporaneous modernist structure, we are now in a position to contend that,
though overlooked by previous commentators on Canto XL, the gorillas represent a discourse central to a full understanding of the themes developed in that text.

Critics have noted that the financial conspiracies, war-profiteering and institutionalized swindling that occupy the poet's attention in the first part of the canto are counterpointed by Hanno's periplus; that is to say, “a journey not by fixed charts or stars, but by intuition and reason; not by plotting a course ahead on paper; but by looking directly at what is in front of you and acting accordingly”. Or as Pound himself puts it in Canto LIX: “periplum, not as land looks on a map / but as sea bord seen by men sailing.” Or as Pound himself puts it in Canto LIX: “periplum, not as land looks on a map / but as sea bord seen by men sailing.”70 In contrast to the destructive activities of the war-profiteers we are presented with the exemplary account of a ancient voyage of discovery that represents a valuable contribution to human knowledge. An equivalent to Pound's project in fact, the periplus is a recurring motif in The Cantos.71

But there is mystery and speculation surrounding Hanno's account, of which Ezra Pound cannot have been unaware. As B.H. Warmington noted in 1964, a whole literature of scholarship had grown up round the report: he explains that “From everything we know about Carthaginian practice, the resolute determination to keep all knowledge of and access to the western markets from the Greeks, it is incredible that they would have allowed the publication of an accurate description of the voyage for all to read”.72 The interest of Hanno's Periplus resides not so much in what has been recorded as in what has been omitted – that which the Cartheginians were looking for in Senegal (Sene Khole: river of gold). “The very purpose of the voyage, the consolidation of the route to the gold market, is not even mentioned”.73 The significance of this omission is signalled in Pound's translation by a capital mid-sentence, at the point the Cartharginian ships mysteriously turn back on themselves, presumably to deposit their newly-acquired cargo, before proceeding into the unknown: "Next is a river wide, full of water / crocodiles, river horses, Thence we turned back to Cyrne / for 12 days coasted the shore / Aethiops fled at our coming / Our Lixtae cd. not understand them.” The possibility so unlikely in the first half of the canto has been realised in the second. “If a nation will master its money”, the poet sighed, and in this
object-lesson from the past, Pound has shown how this was once achieved. The periplus is an emblem of a Latin motto cited at the start of Eleven New Cantos (1934) – “Tempus loquendi / Tempus tacendi.” The report is a public secret that enables the State to maintain an absolute control over the medium of exchange and the circulation of wealth.

Privateers have been forestalled by a political expedient on the part of the Prince. Given the extent to which the gorilla in this period represented precisely that blurring of ontological categories that Pound execrated elsewhere in The Cantos, their violent treatment must represent a triumph over that error. Throughout that poem “obstructors of knowledge, / obstructors of distribution” are associated with types of animal, and the evil of usura, “corrupter of all things”, cutting loose the signifier from the signified, is represented as Satan-Geryon, or Neschek — that is, as irredeemably hybrid. In Pound’s vision the achievement of earthly harmony is inextricably bound up with the extirpation of the bestial: “The fourth; the dimension of stillness” requires one to exercise “the power over wild beasts”. The first recorded encounter with the gorilla is therefore re-enacted to serve a definite purpose. The species that was the embodiment of that lack of “clear demarcation”, hated by Pound, is emptied of being. “Killed, flayed, brought back their pelts to Carthage”. According to Roman historian Pliny, the Prince “placed the skins of two of these females in the temple of Juno, which were to be seen until the capture of Carthage”. Like Mok and Moina, the gorillas in Pound’s Canto are put on public display, a necessary sacrifice to that regulation of circulation that constitutes the basis for the culture celebrated and signified by the House of Light. An image of this radiant temple, to which these artefacts are dedicated, concludes Canto XL.

To the high air, to the stratosphere, to the imperial calm, to the empyrean, to the baily of the four towers
the NOUS, the ineffable crystal:
Karxedonion Basileos
hung this with his map in their temple.

98
IV.

THE RATIONAL ANIMAL

The formal procedures employed in the Tecton Gorilla House may reflect a more general tendency in that phase of theory and practice to which the term Modernist is applied, though to demonstrate this effectively would require more space than is here available. I want to suggest that the subsequent application of Lubetkin’s Cartesian architecture to the human environment ultimately constituted a form of subtle violence inflicted upon the concept of the Human Being – by that concept and in the name of that concept – in the act of naming that concept. In a final twist, the working-class visitors who flocked to see the gorillas in the house of light had encountered a foreshadowing of their own alienation. As John Berger pointed out in 1977, in the post-war era people would perceive in captive animals (in spite of Zuckerman’s efforts) a template that might “help us to understand, accept and overcome the stresses involved in living in consumer societies.”

Though many post-war modernist housing-projects were lovingly created they are undeniably totalitarian environments. Everything is worked out, either for good or ill, by the architect. Like the animals in London Zoo, the inhabitants occupy a space that leaves nothing open to chance or change, but which have built specifically in order to foster what the architect perceived to be the essential characteristic of human being: a capacity for rational thought. In at last realising on that basis the complete separation of our species from every other animal on the planet, many inhabitants of the post-war New Reality soon found themselves physically trapped in a habit of thought, one that has often produced remarkable results, but which is still very much a habit, merely one way of thinking, crippling our personal capacity for re-creation. An architect might create spaces for play in the most successful complexes, as in Le Corbusier’s *Unite de Habitation* in Marseilles, but even a playful totalitarian space leaves no space for that re-creation, the reinvention of the self, that is be all and end all of recreation. The architect may have been in a playful mood, but the occupant is not free to say “I am” or “I will be”.

99
In such total environments, with no outlet for creative participation, residents are deprived of a capacity which has been thought of as proper to mankind – but which can be shown to belong in some measure to every living thing. As Charles Darwin pointed out birds, for instance, in choosing a mate, will select that bird with the plumage they find most appealing; over time such choices will transform the secondary sexual characteristics of any given species. This observation is vertiginous because in a mere paragraph Darwin has shown how other species can be said to respond – to say what they are or what they will be – to modify and enrich their world.

In short, the modernist urban-planning initiated in the United Kingdom by Lubetkin’s Gorilla House propelled us into a new phase in our thinking regarding “the Animal”. We had imposed on our own species that passivity which has throughout recorded history been entailed upon “the Animal”, and had done so in the very act of rendering that difference absolute. In moving beyond that shared tragedy, the recognition of this capacity for self-creation is providing the basis for the participatory practices currently being introduced in both zoos and the human environment. Far from eliminating the differences between humans and animals (as in well intentioned, but flawed, attempts to extend Human Rights to other species, this post-modernist approach provides scope for the multiplication of difference.


3 Berthold Lubetkin, Notes for ‘Samizdat’, p.40. RIBA, Lubetkin’s Papers, Box 1, LuB/25/4.


6 Ibid., p.53.


8 Descartes, p.103.

9 Ibid., p.104.

10 Ibid., p.106.

11 Ibid., pp.73-75.

12 Ibid., p.75.


16 This interesting idea is put forward in the papers of the late Livio Catullo Stecchini, collected at www.metrum.org.

17 Paul du Chaillu, Explorations and Adventures in equatorial Africa: with accounts of the manners and customs of the people, and of the chase of the gorilla, the crocodile, leopard, elephant, hippopotamus, and other animals (London: J.Murray, 1861).


20 See the filmography at www.gorillamen.com.


25 Derrida, p.41


27 Ibid., p.109.

28 Descartes, p.75.


31 Ibid., p.436.

32 Ibid., p.437.

33 Ibid., p.

34 Ibid., p.


41 Ibid., p.172.

42 Ibid., p.9.

43 Ibid., p.10.

44 Ibid., p.13.


47 Ibid., p.25.

48 Ibid., p.1.


50 Ibid., pp.433-434.


53 Anker, p.239.


57 Ibid., p.208.


59 Ibid., p.42.

60 Ibid., p.41.

61 Ibid., p.41.


63 Allan, p.208.


69 For some of the best work that currently being undertaken on this topic see Carrie Rohman, Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), and Carey Wolfe, ed., Zoontologies (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).


71 The book opens with this motif: see Canto I, “And then went down to the ship . . .”


73 Ibid., p.79.

74 Pound, p.200.


76 Ibid., p.425, p.812.

77 Ibid., p.245.

78 Ibid., p.229.

79 Ibid., p.201


81 Pound, p.201.


83 Darwin, p.687.