Employment Protection and Takeovers

Dessaint, O., Golubov, A. & Volpin, P. (2017). Employment Protection and Takeovers. Journal of Financial Economics, 125(2), pp. 369-388.

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Abstract

Labor restructuring is a key driver of takeovers and the associated synergy gains worldwide. In a difference-in-differences research design, we show that major increases in employment protection reduce takeover activity by 14-27% and the combined firm gains (synergies) by over half. Consistent with the labor channel behind these effects, deals with greater potential for workforce restructuring show a greater reduction in volume, number, and synergies. The reforms do impede layoffs, and the associated wage costs match the magnitude of synergy losses. Offer prices are not fully adjusted, with both bidders and targets exhibiting lower returns following the reforms.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Uncontrolled Keywords: Employment Protection, Takeovers, Mergers and Acquisitions, SynergyGains, Premiums, Efficiency
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Cass Business School > Faculty of Finance
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/16503

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