Delaney, L. (2013). Valuing Voluntary Disclosure with Competitive Interactions using a Real Options Approach. London: Financial Economics Research Group, City, University of London.
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This paper examines the impact of competition, in a duopoly framework, on the voluntary disclosure policy of firms. Each firm is assumed to have invested in a specific product and the manager of each firm must then decide when to optimally disclose its involvement in the product to the market, while taking into consideration the disclosure strategy of the other firm. A preemption, attrition, or synergy equilibrium is found, depending on the trade-off between first and second mover advantages and, also on the advantage from simultaneous disclosure.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2013 The Author.|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||Voluntary disclosure, Real options, Preemption game, War of attrition, Synergy equilibrium|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics|
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