The commitment problem of secured lending

Fabbri, D. & Menichini, A.M.C. (2016). The commitment problem of secured lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(3), pp. 561-584. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.02.009

Text - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (509kB) | Preview


The paper presents a new theory of trade credit in which firms buy inputs on credit from suppliers to restore the benefits of secured bank financing impaired by contract incompleteness. In a setting where investment is endogenous and unobservable to financiers, we show that a bank-secured credit contract is time-inconsistent. Upon being granted credit, the entrepreneur has an incentive to alter the original input combination, jeopardizing the bank’s revenues. Anticipating the entrepreneur’s opportunism, the bank offers an unsecured credit contract, reducing the surplus from the venture. One way for the entrepreneur to commit to the contract terms is to purchase inputs on credit from the supplier. The supplier observes the input investment and acts as a guarantor that inputs will be purchased as contracted, thus facilitating access to secured bank financing. The commitment role of trade credit still holds in a multi-period extension that investigates the impact of bank relationship lending on secured debt and trade credit. Our model provides novel testable predictions on optimal financial contracts in both one-period and repeated lending relationships.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Collateral; Commitment; Trade credit; Bank financing
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Cass Business School > Faculty of Finance

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics