THE SOCIOLOGICAL CHALLENGE OF REFLEXIVITY IN BOURDIEUSIAN THOUGHT

Simon Susen

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity. The concept of reflexivity plays a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s attempt to develop a ‘critical sociology’ (sociologie critique), often referred to as ‘reflexive sociology’ in the Anglophone literature. Based on a thorough textual analysis of his key works, the chapter aims to demonstrate that the following twelve elements are particularly important to Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity: (1) ‘science’, (2) ‘vigilance’, (3) ‘consciousness’, (4) ‘self-awareness’, (5) ‘critique’, (6) ‘self-objectification’, (7) ‘distance-taking’ (8) ‘rupture’, (9) ‘epistemology’, (10) ‘historicization’, (11) ‘understanding’ and (12) ‘emancipation’. Although the concept of reflexivity constitutes a useful methodological tool for the construction of critical epistemologies and for the pursuit of social research, it raises a number of significant questions. It is the task of the final section of this chapter to address several controversial issues that arise when one is faced with the challenge of evaluating the merits of Bourdieu’s account of reflexivity. In accordance with the structure of the foregoing inquiry, these issues will be synthesized on the basis of ‘twelve theses on Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity’.

‘Reflexivity’

Bourdieu makes extensive use of the concept of reflexivity throughout his writings. Indeed, the vital role that this concept plays in the development of his sociology is illustrated in the fact that it appears in the titles of several studies published by Bourdieu himself as well as in the titles of numerous
commentaries concerned with central aspects of his oeuvre.² It is worth taking note of the etymological observation that the term ‘reflexivity’ is derived from the Latin word re-flexere, meaning ‘to bend back’,³ that is, to recline with the intention of considering or reconsidering something in a paused, contemplative and – if necessary – critical fashion. Before launching into a detailed examination of his writings, let us draw our attention to three distinctive ambitions that characterize ‘Bourdieu’s brand of reflexivity’:⁴

(a) the ambition to shed light on ‘the social and intellectual unconscious embedded in analytic tools and operations’,⁵ rather than on the individual or psychological unconscious of the seemingly isolated or atomized researcher;
(b) the ambition to provide a critical understanding of social practices by conceiving of social inquiry as ‘a collective enterprise’,⁶ rather than by reducing investigative activity to ‘the burden of the lone academic’;⁷ and
(c) the ambition to identify and explore the constitutive components that undergird ‘the epistemological security of sociology’,⁸ thereby challenging the view that radical uncertainty permeates all claims to objective, normative or subjective validity.

In the Bourdieusian universe, then, the project of developing ‘a critical theory of society’⁹ cannot be dissociated from the task of mobilizing the purposive, collective and assertive resources inherent in the exercise of reflexivity. Far from representing a merely playful or self-sufficient endeavour based on arbitrary and disembedded language games, however, the whole point of the Bourdieusian plea for reflexivity is founded on a strong belief in both the possibility and the epistemic authority of ‘scientific objectivity’¹⁰ and, hence, in the aspiration to contribute to ‘increasing the scope and solidity’¹¹ of conceptually informed, methodologically controlled and empirically substantiated inquiries.

In this context, it may be useful to differentiate the following levels of analysis when grappling with the concept of reflexivity:¹²

(a) The level of ‘ordinary reflexivity’: Insofar as they are ‘concept-bearing’¹³ entities capable of attributing meaning to, giving justifications for and coordinating their actions, human subjects are reflexive.
(b) The level of ‘scientific reflexivity’: Insofar as they are equipped with the theoretical power to generate authoritative and evidence-based knowledge, as well as with the practical power to ‘inject’¹⁴ their epistemic resources into the reality that they aim to study, both the natural sciences and the social sciences are reflexive.
(c) The level of ‘societal reflexivity’: Insofar as – by virtue of both their theoretical and their practical tools – they possess the capacity to shape and to control their own civilizational development, human societies are reflexive.15

What is missing from these interconnected levels of critical engagement with reality, however, is ‘the idea of reflexivity as a requirement and form of sociological work, that is, as an epistemological program in action for social science, and as a corollary a theory of intellectuals as the wielders of a dominated form of domination’.16 In other words, it is crucial that researchers and academics learn to face up to their own complicity in the construction of value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden realities. The main implications of the previous considerations for Bourdieu’s conception of ‘reflexive sociology’ can be synthesized as follows:

Reflexive Sociology starts with the ‘very primitive assumption that theory is made by the praxis of men in all their wholeness and is shaped by the lives they lead’.17

On this view, theory and praxis are inextricably linked: the pursuit of sociological reflexivity would be pointless without recognition of the fact that the objective, normative and subjective representations generated by human subjects emerge within spatiotemporally contingent horizons of action and interaction. ‘Reflexivity’, understood in this sense, cannot be reduced to the Hegelian notion of Selbstbewusstsein, that is, to an anthropologically constitutive ‘reflection of the subject on the subject’,18 bestowed with the species-distinctive capacity to seek worth of existential significance by immersing itself in processes of mutual recognition. Rather, the purpose of a genuinely sociological reflexivity is to account for the fact that any interpretation of reality is, by definition, pervaded by different forms of bias. To be exact, from a Bourdieusian standpoint, there are at least three types of bias that ‘blur the sociological gaze’:19

(a) The social origin: Fundamental sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability – shape the multiple ways in which members of differentiated human life forms perceive, interpret, relate to, act upon and interact with reality. Specialized social scientists are no less influenced by sociological factors than ordinary social actors. For the former are a subcategory of, rather than an aberration from, the latter.20

(b) The academic field: The sociologist – like any other researcher in the social sciences – occupies a position not only in the macrocosm of society, and thus ‘in the broader social structure’21 of the human universe, but also, more specifically, ‘in the microcosm of the academic field’.22 Similar to other social fields, the academic field constitutes a realm composed
of multiple material and symbolic positions occupied by purposive subjects, who, within their relationally structured spaces of action and interaction, compete over access to resources, influence, status and – ultimately – power.

(c) The intellectualist predisposition: Owing to their tendency to remain caught up in self-referential language games, tension-laden dynamics of ideological positioning and struggles over symbolic power, their ‘intellectualist bias […] entices [them] to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically’.23 Such a scholastic – that is, essentially theoreticist – take on reality is deeply problematic in that it can lead social researchers ‘to miss entirely the differentia specifica of the logic of practice’24 – that is, of the codified, and largely implicit, patterns that govern empirically unfolding actions and interactions, whose ineluctable preponderance is inscribed into the daily construction of social reality.

To be clear, following the inquisitive spirit of Bourdieusian sociology, the categorical commitment to the critical exercise of reflexivity is ‘neither egocentric nor logocentric but quintessentially embedded in, and turned toward, scientific practice’.25 If taken seriously, the challenge of ‘epistemic reflexivity invites intellectuals to recognize and to work to neutralize the specific determinisms to which their innermost thoughts are subjected, and it informs a conception of the craft of research designed to strengthen its epistemological moorings’.26 Such a ‘reflexive turn’,27 therefore, is concerned with facing up to the sociohistorical determinacy of the seemingly most autonomous articulations of symbolically mediated claims to objective, normative or subjective validity. The different facets of Bourdieu’s multi-layered conception of reflexivity can be traced in his key writings.28 As shall be demonstrated in subsequent sections, twelve dimensions are particularly important when seeking to shed light on the principal meanings underpinning Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity.

1. Reflexivity and science

The first – perhaps, most obvious – element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is science. Irrespective of which particular discipline one may have in mind, social science constitutes a ‘reflexive science’.29 Regardless of whether one moves within the epistemic horizon of anthropology, economics, political studies, psychology or sociology, genuinely ‘scientific work’30 within these disciplines is inconceivable without their researchers’ willingness to commit themselves – albeit, admittedly, to varying degrees – to embarking upon the exercise of reflexivity.
Tautologically speaking, ‘scientific sociology’ \(^3\) is a ‘sociological science’. \(^3\) Aware of ‘the social history of social science’ , \(^3\) scholars concerned with ‘the sociology of science’ \(^3\) are confronted with the challenge of ‘increasing the knowledge of the social determinants of sociological thought and, thus, the effectiveness of critique’. \(^3\) In this sense, reflexivity permits researchers to become aware of the social embeddedness not only of the knowledge they produce but also, more significantly, of the epistemic parameters on the basis of which their claims to validity are judged and, potentially, applied. Science, in the Bourdieusian sense, involves the methodical study of the social conditions of production that make systematic forms of knowledge generation possible in the first place.

Scientific endeavours permit those involved in them to explore realities whose constitution, functioning and development escape the epistemically limited grasp of everyday experience and common sense. Hence, science ‘reveals things that are hidden and sometimes repressed’, \(^3\) including the fact that the systematic exchange of knowledge claims is itself a ‘site of a competition’, \(^7\) in which ‘the pursuit of specific profits […] , specific interests\(^8\) and specific paths – potentially, leading to the obtainment of status and recognition – constitutes the precondition for, at worst, survival and, at best, success within the academic field. Rather than succumbing to the quasi-mythological force of ‘a scientific hagiography’, \(^9\) sociological reflexivity obliges us to question the validity of the self-fulfilling prophecies that dominate the habitualized interactions taking place within the academic field. Just as symbolic power can be reinforced by institutional mechanisms of consecration, ritualization and legitimization, it can be called into question by critical processes of reflection, investigation and justification. Sociological reflexivity allows for the exposure of the arbitrary nature permeating the criteria employed to raise allegedly disinterested claims to validity.

In fact – and this is what makes the particular difficulty of sociology – these ‘interests’ and ‘passions’, noble or ignoble, lead to scientific truth only in so far as they are accompanied by a scientific knowledge of what determines them and of the limits that they set on knowledge. […] the more advanced a science is, the greater is the capital of knowledge accumulated within it, and the greater the quantity of knowledge that subversive and critical strategies, whatever their ‘motivations’, need to mobilize in order to be effective. \(^4\)

Critical social scientists need to mobilize their reflexive resources in order to unearth the relationally contingent constraints that define the epistemic scope of the conceptual, methodological and empirical tools employed in their inquiries. Sociological reflexivity permits critical researchers to comprehend
the extent to which their production of knowledge is never a disinterested, unbiased or neutral affair. To be precise, it enables them to recognize that their investigative activity constitutes a social practice whose spatiotemporally variable direction can be shaped by conservative or subversive, orthodox or heterodox, complicit or rebellious, conformist or dissident strategies. Furthermore, it requires them to concede that these strategies are far from straightforward insofar as they can be employed consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, theoretically or practically, deliberately or unwittingly.

As a ‘truly reflexive social science’, sociology – understood as a self-critical endeavour – must include ‘the sociology of sociology’, prepared to ‘guard itself against this epistemocentrism, or this “ethnocentrism of the scientist”, which consists in ignoring everything that the analyst injects into his [or her] perception of the object by virtue of the fact that he [or she] is placed outside of the object, that he [or she] observes it from afar and from above’. Guided by a ‘genuine sociological reflexivity’, a ‘genuinely reflexive sociology’ must avoid falling into the trap of scholastic transcendentalism, which gives researchers the misleading impression that they act as disembodied, disconnected and disembedded subjects, whose free-floating minds have the epistemic capacity to generate disinterested, unbiased and neutral knowledge. Social science – conceived of as a reflexive endeavour – ‘is necessarily a “knowledge of a knowledge” and must make room for a sociologically grounded phenomenology of the primary experience of the field’, that is, for the systematic study of the social conditions of production that make the emergence of science possible in the first place. Such a ‘sociology of sociology’ is a reflexive project that ‘continually turns back onto itself the scientific weapons it produces’. As such, it draws attention to the fact that sociological reflexivity obliges those who endorse it to confront the spatiotemporal variability permeating their own claims to scientificity. By means of multiple conceptual, methodological and empirical tools, social researchers are in a position to scrutinize the relational determinacy of human reality, including the contingency that pervades both ordinary and scientific affirmations of validity.

To be sure, for Bourdieu, ‘[t]o adopt the point of view of reflexivity is not to renounce objectivity’, let alone the claim to scientificity, but, on the contrary, ‘to give it its full generality by questioning the privilege of the knowing subject, arbitrarily freed, as purely noetic, from the work of objectivation’. Reflexive sociology, in other words, is the radical transcendence of atomistic versions of the philosophy of the subject and the philosophy of consciousness: it reminds us that all forms of subjectivity and consciousness are socially situated, socially generated, socially reproduced and socially transformed. Hence, ‘the sociology of the social determinants of sociological practice’ teaches us that the first step towards emancipating ourselves from the constraining power of social
structures is to recognize and to problematize – rather than to ignore, let alone to deny – their existence. The seemingly most self-determined entity capable of action, reflection and justification cannot escape the existential weight of the multiple structural forces exercising the power of social determination. Sociological reflexivity is about the assertion, rather than the rejection, of scientificity to the extent that it succeeds in exposing the relational constitution of all material and symbolic dimensions permeating the daily construction of human reality.\textsuperscript{52}

2. Reflexivity and vigilance

The second noteworthy element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is vigilance. It is vital to ‘subject the operations of sociological practice to the polemics of epistemological reason’,\textsuperscript{53} thereby cultivating ‘an attitude of vigilance’\textsuperscript{54} that permits researchers to develop an ‘adequate knowledge of error’,\textsuperscript{55} bias and preconception. Genuinely vigilant investigators are aware of the distortive force of misperception, misconception and misrepresentation. The gaze of scientifically motivated minds – although it may be able to challenge the doxic illusions of common sense and everyday experience – is limited in terms of its epistemological capacity to grapple with the intricacies of reality.

The intention of giving the researcher the means of taking on the oversight of his [or her] own scientific work is quite different from the calls to order by censors whose peremptory negativism can only inspire the mortal fear of error and a resigned recourse to a technology invested with the function of exorcism.\textsuperscript{56}

To be clear, self-surveillance – in the Bourdieusian sense – is not equivalent to supervising one’s own epistemic activities and embodied practices to such an extent that scientific work becomes a stifling exercise of self-paralysis. In fact, if the sociologically motivated ‘philosophy of critical vigilance’\textsuperscript{57} is converted into a default position of self-destructive cynicism, then it is difficult to see how it is possible to make any individually or collectively empowering contributions to society by virtue of conceptually sophisticated and empirically substantiated inquiries into the constitution, functioning and development of reality. Sociological vigilance requires ‘the “psychoanalysis of the scientific mind”’:\textsuperscript{58}

the ‘psychoanalysis of the scientific mind’ is taken further by an analysis of the social conditions in which sociological works are produced: the sociologist may find an exceptionally valuable instrument of epistemological vigilance in the sociology of knowledge, a means of enhancing and clarifying knowledge of error and the conditions that make it possible and sometimes inevitable.\textsuperscript{59}
Reflexive sociology, then, is the attempt to problematize the social conditions of production shaping both the daily construction and the systematic study of human reality. Put differently, professional researchers are no less embedded in and influenced by relationally constituted – and, thus, historically contingent – circumstances than ordinary people.

Sociological investigators have access to conceptual and methodological tools, by means of which they are able to examine the constitution, functioning and development of reality. Unlike ordinary actors, who are primarily motivated by common sense and who make judgments on the basis of their everyday experiences, social researchers are equipped with the epistemic capacity to distance themselves not only from their object of study but also from themselves. Reflexivity, conceived of in terms of vigilance, permits sociological researchers to scrutinize their own position, as well as their own positioning, in the social universe.

Far from constituting a pristine realm of neutral and unbiased interactions, the scientific field is no less value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden than other social fields. Notwithstanding the functional specificity of the social field in which they find themselves immersed in a particular – that is, spatiotemporally contingent – context, both individual and collective actors are divided by the unequal distribution of, as well as by the asymmetrically structured access to, material and symbolic resources.

The act of ‘epistemological reflection’ stands for an exercise of constant vigilance, enabling the sociologist to analyse the ‘social conditions of his [or her] sociological practice and his [or her] relation to sociology’ with the aim of grasping his or her own relational determinacy, which stems from his or her immersion in a relationally constructed – and, therefore, ceaselessly changing – reality. Understood in these terms, reflexivity is ‘the precondition for his [or her] making his [or her] unconscious presuppositions explicit and for a more complete internalization of a more adequate epistemology’. To recognize the link between sociological reflexivity and epistemological vigilance means to face up to the fact that the sociologist operates within and through – rather than outside, let alone above – society. In other words, we need to consider the far-reaching implications of the sociologist’s social embeddedness.

Perhaps the most fundamental presupposition that the sociologist owes to the fact that he [or she] is a social subject is the presupposition of the absence of presuppositions which defines ethnocentrism; the sociologist (more than the ethnologist) is vulnerable to the illusion of immediate self-evidence or the temptation to unconsciously universalize particular experience when he [or she] forgets that he [or she] is the cultivated subject of a particular culture and fails to subordinate his practice to a continuous questioning of this relationship.
Critiques of and attacks on ethnocentrism need to be ‘constantly revived and reinterpreted by epistemological vigilance’, in order to ensure that ritualized dogmatism, canonized ideologism and codified close-mindedness are challenged by openness to argument, enthusiasm for debate and acceptance of contradiction. A sociology without vigilance and reflexivity would be tantamount to a social science incapable of acknowledging its relationally constituted determinacy.

3. Reflexivity and consciousness

The third striking element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is *consciousness*. This facet is expressed in the view that the exercise of sociological reflexivity requires an approach comparable to that of psychoanalysis: ‘the “psychoanalysis of the scientific mind”’, including ‘the sociological mind’, is crucial to exploring the researcher’s *unconscious*, comprising his or her ‘unconscious presuppositions’ – regardless of whether they are shaped predominantly by social, cultural, economic, political or ideological factors. On this account, social science is ‘a science of the unconscious’, that is, ‘an objective archaeology of our unconscious’, which serves the function of ‘the instrument of a genuine socioanalysis’. Social science can be conceived of as ‘a social critique’ capable of uncovering the hidden causal forces that govern the development of behavioural and ideological patterns and, consequently, people’s everyday immersion in, and construction of, reality.

If effective, psychoanalysis may enable individuals to overcome obstacles generated by mental pathologies that put a strain on their quotidian existence, as reflected in different forms of depression or paralysis. In a similar vein, to the degree that it is anchored in day-to-day practices, social critique may permit both small-scale and large-scale communities to cope with dysfunctionalities produced by interactional pathologies that limit the possibilities of human empowerment, owing to the detrimental effects of outcome-oriented and systemically steered rationalization. What is needed is ‘a reflexive return to its own practice’ and, paradoxically, to ‘a social unconscious within the analysis’ of the social. To be *sociologically conscious*, in the Bourdieusian sense, means to be prepared to accept that, in order for a critical social science to come into existence, its defenders need to admit that ‘an *epistemological reflection* upon its practices is inseparable from a *political reflection* upon both its effects and its function’. To the extent that science – because it is a value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden endeavour – is far from neutral or disinterested, it requires that its participants and defenders be conscious not only of the unconscious of the actors they examine but also of their own unconscious.
What has to be constantly scrutinized and neutralized, in the very act of construction of the object, is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgment […]. It follows that the subject of reflexivity must ultimately be the social scientific field in toto.77

Sociologically informed reflexivity is inconceivable with the consciousness of one’s own unconscious, the awareness of one’s own unawareness, the (re-)conceptualization of one’s own preconceptions and the attempt to make judgments about one’s own prejudgments. In short, ‘the historical critique of unconscious presuppositions’78 is vital if one is willing to recognize that ‘the mystical ambition to reach the essence in a single leap’79 needs to be abandoned in favour of ‘the patient reconstruction of genesis’,80 thereby exposing the potential for the constant transformation of the social world, including the continuous refinement of the conceptual and methodological tools employed to study, and to make sense of, it.81

4. Reflexivity and self-awareness

The fourth significant element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is self-awareness. The centrality of this dimension is synthesized in the Bourdieusian emphasis on ‘self-reflexivity’,82 which may be regarded as an indispensable component of critical sociology. A truly critical sociologist needs to ‘subject his [or her] own questioning to sociological questioning’,83 thereby demonstrating a capacity to convert his or her inquiry into a source of self-reflexivity. Thus, ‘the reflexive return to the subjective experience of the social world’84 lies at the core of ‘the objectification of the objective conditions of that experience’.85 Sociohistorically contingent arrangements shape the manifold ways in which subjects perceive, appreciate and act upon the world. All researchers, irrespective of the degree of their conceptual and methodological sophistication, are ordinary actors. As such, they need to grapple with the relationally assembled determinacy not only of their object of inquiry but also of their own analytical gaze, which is located within an embodied – and, hence, dispositionally structured – cognitive entity, concerned with the systematic exploration of reality.

In light of this commitment to conceiving of reflexivity in terms of self-awareness, ‘the game of the inaugural lecture on the inaugural lecture’,86 understood as the critic’s willingness to criticize himself or herself, is crucial to the very possibility of developing a sociology whose examination of reality involves the study of its own constitution as a discipline and, thus, of its own claims to validity. A self-reflexive discourse is ‘a discourse that conceives of itself as an object’,87 that is, as an object of contemplation whose significance
comes to the fore through sociology’s ‘reflexive return’ in relation to itself. Such a discourse obliges us to call the allegedly privileged position of the ‘knowing subject’ into question: sociologically reflexive subjects are aware of the objective, normative and subjective aspects that shape – if not, determine – their multifactorially structured – and, hence, constantly shifting – place in the world. A ‘sociology of sociology’, in the genuinely reflexive sense, is a sociology of the determinants of sociological practice. Reflexive sociology converts ‘its own functioning’ into an object of inquiry, thereby making a case for a form of scientficity based on the critical awareness of the limitations permeating its own epistemic activities. In a Bourdieusian sense, there is no sociological reflexivity without the self-awareness of those who embrace the challenge of scrutinizing the relational constitution of human realities. The capacity to develop ‘a point of view on a point of view’ is vital to the construction of a critical attitude motivated by self-awareness and reflexivity.

5. Reflexivity and critique

The fifth significant element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is critique. The critique of critique is an indispensable component of sociological reflexivity insofar as it permits – and, indeed, compels – the critic to criticize the existence of behavioural, ideological or institutional patterns whose legitimacy is objectively, normatively or subjectively questionable. Yet, reflexivity – in the Bourdieusian sense – requires not only the critique of different facets of social reality but also the critique of the criticizing gaze itself. In short, social critique is inconceivable without self-critique. The schizophrenic nature of sociological critique consists in the fact that it needs to include itself in the realm of the criticized in order to be genuinely critical. Otherwise, it would lead to the pretentious assumption that the critic stands over and above society, rather than being immersed within and dependent upon it. Critical sociology cannot do without the sociology of critique, because there is no radical way of uncovering, let alone problematizing, the contradictions of social life without recognizing that sociological analysis – since it is undertaken by spatiotemporally embedded, positionally divided and dispositionally equipped actors – forms part of these contradictions, rather than being able to rise above them.

It is possible to conceive of ‘the sociologist [as] a social worker’ in the sense that, if he or she is motivated by a normative mission, his or her work can contribute not only to the empowerment of other individual or collective actors, but also to his or her own empowerment. The ability to step back from both one’s external world and one’s internal world is vital to the very possibility of sociological reflexivity, giving sociologically inspired actors the
opportunity to criticize – and, thus, to challenge – mechanisms of disempowerment and domination, whilst exploring resources that can be mobilized in the pursuit of human empowerment and emancipation. ⁹⁸

6. Reflexivity and self-objectification

The sixth major element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is self-objectification. From a Bourdieusian perspective, it is essential for the researcher to ‘objectify the objectifying distance and the social conditions that make it possible, such as the externality of the observer’. ⁹⁹ Every observer – no matter how removed, isolated or free-floating his or her perceptions, appreciations and actions may appear – is a socihistorically situated entity, occupying multiple positions in different realms of interaction and developing multiple dispositions in relation to relationally constructed environments. To be sure, whilst a sociological inquiry may be conducted from ‘a viewpoint away from the stage on which the action is played out’, ¹⁰⁰ researchers are always already immersed within particular scenes of individual and collective performances encountered in their own everyday lives. Indeed, critical investigators are shaped by key sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and ability – to no lesser extent than the actors whose material and symbolic practices they scrutinize within their studies.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, ‘every genuine sociological undertaking’ ¹⁰¹ is inextricably linked to the exercise of ‘a socioanalysis’, ¹⁰² that is, to the possibility of objectifying the objectifying gaze itself. Indeed, ‘the objectification of objectivity’ ¹⁰³ – including the objectification of those who seek to objectify particular aspects of objectivity – allows for ‘a genuine self-reappropriation’ ¹⁰⁴ to the degree that it enables researchers to regard themselves – both consciously and critically – as spatiotemporally situated and embodied actors, who are no less influenced by the power of social structures than those whose lives they examine.

It is vital ‘to objectify objectification’ ¹⁰⁵ in order to generate truly reflexive forms of sociological investigation: for without ‘a critical objectification’ ¹⁰⁶ of ‘the epistemological and social conditions’ ¹⁰⁷ that undergird specific human – including academic and scientific – performances, it is impossible to grasp the extent to which theoretical, explicit and conscious forms of engagement with reality are preceded by actors’ practical, implicit and unconscious immersion within it. Put differently, ‘to objectivize the objectivizing point of view of the sociologist’ ¹⁰⁸ means ‘to objectivize his [or her] position in the universe of cultural production’ ¹⁰⁹ and, thus, in the entire sphere of human constructions. In other words, ‘reflexivity conceived of as the task of the scientific objectification of the objectifying subject’ ¹¹⁰ constitutes an integral component of a
sociology that is critical not only of others but also of itself, that is, not only of the researched but also of the researchers themselves.\footnote{111}

7. Reflexivity and distance-taking

The seventh core element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is distance-taking. One of the principal challenges for the reflexive sociologist is ‘to reconcile attachment to the mysteries of internality with the imperatives of distanciation’.\footnote{112} This task has two – seemingly opposed – dimensions.

- On the one hand, reflexive sociologists’ motivation, imagination and inspiration are inconceivable without their capacity to wonder about the infinite intricacies of the social world, their willingness to continue to be surprised by the hidden forces shaping the daily construction of human reality and – if necessary – their readiness to express a sense of incredulity when trying to make sense of social constellations, especially of those constellations whose constitution, development and functioning are not immediately obvious.

- On the other hand, reflexive sociologists’ perceptiveness, thoughtfulness and insightfulness rest upon their ability to describe, to analyse, to interpret, to explain and to assess the unlimited complexities of the social world, their attempt to uncover the underlying determinants of human reality and – if required – their preparedness to take a step back when examining particular sets of cultural arrangements, particularly if they happen to possess a sense of native familiarity with a given sphere or aspect of a relationally constructed entity.

In short, we are confronted with the dialectics of interiority and exteriority, immanence and transcendence, enchantment and disenchantment, attachment and detachment, participation and observation, closeness and remoteness, proximity and distance.

Reflexivity represents an exercise of distance-taking whilst recognizing every human actor’s ineluctable situatedness in reality, it permits the sociologist to embark upon the journey of critical inquiry by employing conceptual and methodological tools designed to scrutinize and to objectify different fields of sociality. Hence, ‘the controlled and conscious construction of his [or her] distance from the real and his [or her] action to the real’\footnote{113} is a prerequisite for the pursuit and defence of a ‘reflexive science’.\footnote{114} For without the awareness of the epistemic gap between ordinary belief, common sense and everyday experience, on the one hand, and scholarly knowledge, conceptually and methodologically sophisticated investigation and empirically substantiated theorization, on the other, there is no point in insisting on the scientificity of sociology.\footnote{115} Role-specific distance-taking\footnote{116} forms an enriching ingredient of
everyday life, expressing actors’ ability to step back – if only temporarily – from their immediate immersion in particular domains of society. At the same time, it constitutes an indispensable element of reflexive scientific analysis, conveying a researcher’s capacity to take – if only transitonally – an objectifying perspective aimed at the examination of relationally constructed realities.117

8. Reflexivity and rupture

The eighth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is *rupture*. Reflexive sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, requires the researcher to undertake a double-epistemological rupture: first, the break with the *ordinary* vision of the world; and, second, the break with the *scholastic* vision of the world.118 “The former reaffirms the scientific nature of reflexive sociology, the latter emphasises the social embeddedness of reflexive sociology.”119 This double-epistemological rupture is paradoxical in the sense that it obliges us to call ‘the two very conditions of reflexive thought”120 into question: namely, ‘the being-in-the-world and the being-beyond-the-world”121 of reflexive researchers, that is, their simultaneous immanence and transcendence. Insofar as they are immersed in reality, they are constrained by the limitations imposed upon them by objective, normative and subjective patterns of material and symbolic forms of structurality. Insofar as they can step back from reality, they are in a position to identify, to problematize and – if necessary – to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of the givenness that permeates an actor’s participation in the performative – and, to a large extent, routinized – construction of everydayness.

The double-epistemological rupture endorsed by reflexive sociology serves two – aforementioned – basic functions: the break with *ordinary* conceptions of the world and the break with *scholastic* conceptions of the world. The former constitutes a radical epistemological rupture with cognitive dispositions and predispositions based on conventional belief, common sense and everyday experience. The latter stands for a radical epistemological rupture with cognitive dispositions and predispositions founded on the *skholè*,122 that is, on ‘the privileged scholastic situation of freedom from necessity, which allows scholastic thinkers to produce scholastic thought’.123

In relation to the first epistemological break, it is essential to examine the *relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge*.124 The distinction between these two types of knowledge rests on five central epistemological presuppositions:125

(a) A *distinction* can be drawn between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: they represent two fundamentally different epistemic levels of engaging with and making sense of reality.
(b) A hierarchy can be established between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: the latter is epistemically superior to the former insofar as its conceptually sophisticated, methodologically regulated, empirically substantiated and intellectually mediated reflexivity rises above the doxically distorted horizon of conventional belief, common sense and everyday experience.

(c) A fundamental difference in terms of priority can be discerned with regard to the relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: by virtue of both theoretically and practically empowering investigative tools, the latter has the enlightening mission to uncover, to demystify and to challenge the misconceptions, misrepresentations and misinterpretations generated within the epistemically limited realm of the former.

(d) A key dissimilarity with respect to their social functionality characterizes the relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: one of the primary functions of the former is to make social order possible by equipping human entities with the ability to draw upon taken-for-granted assumptions when interacting with their natural and cultural environments; by contrast, one of the principal functions of the latter is to scrutinize – that is, (i) to describe, (ii) to analyse, (iii) to interpret, (iv) to explain and (v) to assess – the consolidation, reproduction and transformation of social order by unearthing the praxeological power of symbolically codified and materially anchored interactions.

(e) A structural asymmetry lies at the core of the relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: the epistemological discrepancy between these two forms of knowledge is due to the profound positional gap between ordinary subjects, whose actions are, to a large extent, guided by doxic preconceptions derived from everyday experiences and reflexive social scientists, whose task is to shed light on the extent to which quotidian practices are regulated by common sense and, therefore, by effective – but, ultimately, misleading – modes of meaning construction. On this account, the positional gap between epistemically unprivileged laypersons and epistemically privileged experts permeates the entire universe of structurally differentiated knowledge production.

In relation to the second epistemological break, it is crucial to consider the nature of scholastic thought. Ten fallacies can be identified to demonstrate that scholastic thought represents a profoundly problematic mode of attributing meaning to reality:126

(a) Scholastic theoreticism. Scholastic thought is theoreticist in that it is based on ‘theoretical reason’, rather than ‘practical reason’.127 As such, it remains
caught up in the self-sufficient intellectual exercise of producing theory for the sake of, and only in relation to, theory, instead of recognizing – let alone engaging with – the socio-ontological preponderance of everyday practices.\textsuperscript{128}

(b) \textit{Scholastic intellectualism}: Scholastic thought is intellectualist in that it is based on ‘intellectual reason’, rather than ‘socially committed reason’. As such, it permits intellectuals to create a ‘theodicy of their own privilege’,\textsuperscript{129} removed from the real-world urgencies of both the under- and the non-privileged.\textsuperscript{130}

(c) \textit{Scholastic universalism}: Scholastic thought is universalist in that it is based on the idea of ‘universal reason’, rather than ‘particular reason’. As such, it makes claims to ‘universal validity’, ‘universal legitimacy’ and ‘universal authority’,\textsuperscript{131} which – by definition – rise above the spatiotemporal specificity of relationally constructed realities.\textsuperscript{132}

(d) \textit{Scholastic rationalism}: Scholastic thought is rationalist in that it is based on the idea of ‘reasoning reason’, rather than ‘reasonable reason’. As such, it hinges on the assumption that reason, rather than bodily experience, determines how humans engage with and attach meaning to the world, thereby succumbing to the ‘illusion of (intellectual) mastery of oneself that is so deeply ingrained in intellectuals’,\textsuperscript{133} whilst failing to face up to the sociohistorical contingency of all forms of human rationality.\textsuperscript{134}

(e) \textit{Scholastic transcendentalism}: Scholastic thought is transcendentalist in that it is based on the idea of ‘transcendental reason’, rather than ‘immanent reason’. As such, it is driven by ‘the illusion of the transcendence of transhistorical and transpersonal reason’,\textsuperscript{135} capable of escaping the historical and personal constraints to which those who invented, and keep inventing, it are exposed as spatiotemporally situated, physically constituted, as well as both dispositionally and positionally divided actors.\textsuperscript{136}

(f) \textit{Scholastic purism}: Scholastic thought is purist in that it is based on the idea of ‘pure reason’, rather than ‘possible reason’. As such, it is motivated by the myth of the existence of a ‘pure subject’ equipped with the capacity to generate ‘pure knowledge’\textsuperscript{137} about itself and the world by which it is surrounded, instead of conceding that ‘[t]he possibility of purity is built upon the impurity of possibility’.\textsuperscript{138} Put differently, it falls short of admitting that claims to epistemic purity constitute futile attempts to cover up every human subject’s conscious or unconscious complicity in the construction of value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden realities.\textsuperscript{139}

(g) \textit{Scholastic foundationalism}: Scholastic thought is foundationalist in that it is based on the idea of ‘foundational reason’, rather than ‘historical reason’. As such, it rests on the self-referential assumption that the foundations of reason are to be found in and through, rather than outside of, reason.
Paradoxically, however, it is perhaps on condition that reason is subjected to the test of the most radical historicization, in particular by destroying the illusion of foundation by recalling the arbitrariness of beginnings and by historical and sociological critique of the instruments of historical and sociological science itself, that one can hope to save it from arbitrariness and historical relativization.\(^\text{140}\)

[We need] to sacrifice the anxiety over the ultimate foundation to the historical critique of unconscious presuppositions, to repudiate the mystical ambition to reach the essence in a single leap in favor of the patient reconstruction of genesis.\(^\text{141}\)

To the degree that reason is unavoidably embedded in the ‘social foundations’\(^\text{142}\) of human existence, the philosophical project of ‘foundationalist rationalism’ or ‘rationalist foundationalism’ needs to be replaced by the sociological project of ‘historical rationalism’ or ‘rationalist historicism’.\(^\text{143}\)

(h) **Scholastic neutralism**: Scholastic thought is neutralist in that it is based on the idea of ‘neutral reason’, rather than ‘interested reason’. As such, it aims to portray interestedness as disinterestedness. Yet, to the extent that all forms of knowledge are – unavoidably – value-laden (Erkenntnisnormativität), perspective-laden (Erkenntnisstandpunkt), interest-laden (Erkenntnisfunktion), power-laden (Erkenntniskampf) and purpose-laden (Erkenntnissnutzung), the illusion of neutrality evaporates in the face of the social contingency permeating all claims to epistemic validity. The most abstract form of rationality cannot bypass the social power of normativity, positionality, functionality, conflictuality and instrumentality. Insofar as every theory of cognition (Erkenntnistheorie) is derived from a practice of cognition (Erkenntnispraxis), there is no such thing as a disinterested form of reasoning.\(^\text{144}\)

(i) **Scholastic autonomism**: Scholastic thought is autonomist in that it is based on the idea of ‘autonomous reason’, rather than ‘dependent reason’. As such, it reinforces the autonomization of reason on two levels: on the symbolic level, scholastic thought asserts its independence from ostensibly inferior facets of meaning production, notably those that are situated outside the realm of philosophy, that is, outside the empire of the queen of knowledge; on the material/level, scholastic thought declares its independence from the mundane – notably, physical – dimensions of reality, which it seeks to transcend by virtue of its claims to rationally grounded autonomy.

Those who are immersed, in some cases from birth, in scholastic universes resulting from a long process of autonomization are led to forget the exceptional historical and social conditions that make possible a view of the world and of cultural products that is characterized by self-evidence and naturalness.\(^\text{145}\)
Whilst concealing its material dependence upon necessity through relative symbolic independence, scholastic thought hides its symbolic dependence upon necessity through relative material independence.  

(j) **Scholastic hegemonism**: Scholastic thought is hegemonist in that it is based on the idea of ‘philosophical reason’, rather than ‘sociological reason’. As such, it is aimed at occupying a position of ultimate hegemony in the sphere of knowledge. This objective manifests itself in ‘the age-old battle of philosophy against sociology’. Sociology means to philosophy what science means to religion: ‘a threat to the self-declared ultimate authority of an arbitrary historical authority’. Whereas philosophy has always been substantially shaped by attempts to make claims to universally defensible validity (Gültigkeit), the whole point of doing sociology is to insist on the contextually contingent preponderance of sociality (Gesellschaftlichkeit) pervading all human engagements with reality (Wirklichkeit).

In short, ‘the hegemonic ambition’ of scholastic thought can be conceived of as an expression of the philosophically inspired quest for theory, intellectuality, universality, rationality, transcendentality, purity, foundationality, neutrality and autonomy. It is the task of sociological reflexivity to unmask the illusory nature of the scholastic desire to step outside the horizon of relationally constructed realities.

The break with **ordinary** conceptions of the world and the break with **scholastic** conceptions of the world constitute two irreducible components of the social-scientific attempt to engage critically with reality: reflexive social researchers need to aim for both sufficient theoretical distance to question people’s common-sense representations of reality and sufficient practical proximity to account for the empirical weight of people’s immersion in society.

9. **Reflexivity and epistemology**

The ninth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is epistemology. To be exact, reflexivity – in the Bourdieusian sense – forms part of a social epistemology. As such, it pursues the project of a ‘sociology of knowledge’, which – by definition – consists in relativizing the validity of knowledge and, hence, in shattering any illusions about the possibility of developing an epistemology capable of demonstrating the existence of free-floating symbolic forms. To recognize that ‘the sociology of sociology’ is inconceivable without ‘the sociology of sociological knowledge’
requires accepting that every claim to epistemic validity takes place within a spatiotemporally contingent realm of sociality. From a Bourdieusian perspective, there is no epistemology without reflexivity, just as there is no reflexivity without epistemology.

Challenging ‘the theological or terrorist use of the canonical writings’, a truly reflexive epistemology permits the researcher to draw upon ‘the effectiveness of critique’ with the aim of exposing not only the social determinants of human action but also the ‘social determinants of sociological thought’. Considering the ‘social history of the sociology of science’, it is vital not to fall into the trap of ‘providing cognitive tools that can be turned back on the subject of the cognition’. If epistemological devices turn out to be anti-epistemological, this implies that they defeat the whole point of sociological inquiry, which is to generate knowledge with, within and for – rather than without, outside and against – society. To the degree that we are willing to unearth the ‘social grounds’ of knowledge – that is, of both ordinary and scientific ways of grasping particular aspects of reality –, we need to be prepared ‘to historicize the subject of historicization [and] objectify the subject of objectification’.

Epistemology, understood in sociological terms, involves the effort to gain ‘knowledge of its historical presuppositions’, that is, of the social conditions of production in whose context subjects capable of cognition and action operate. Thus, the reason ‘[w]hy the social sciences must take themselves as their object’ is that the defence of a self-critical epistemology is a precondition for the possibility of pursuing a reflexive sociology. Hence, ‘sociologists have to convert reflexivity into a disposition constitutive of their scientific habitus, that is, into a reflexive reflexivity, capable of acting not ex post, on the opus operatum, but a priori, on the modus operandi’. By so doing, they can contribute to creating a sociology whose epistemology is as reflexive as its reflexivity is epistemological. Within the epistemological horizon of reflexive sociology, there is no place for narcissism or self-complacency, because it is motivated by the ambition to shed light on the intimate link between the production of knowledge and the construction of society.

10. Reflexivity and historicization

The tenth chief element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is historicization. One of the main tasks faced by reflexive research is to explore the ‘historical and social conditions under which sociological practice is accomplished’, including the practices of ordinary actors in their everyday lives. Every social performance is historically situated. It is possible to make sense of
the historicity that permeates worldly realities by focusing on different levels of analysis, notably the following:

- on the *objective* level, history can be conceived of as a *naturally* constituted process, founded on *physically* organized occurrences;
- on the *normative* level, history can be interpreted as a *culturally* constituted process, shaped by *socially* constructed occurrences;
- on the *subjective* level, history can be considered a *psychologically* constituted process, derived from *mentally* projected occurrences.

However one wishes to conceptualize historicity, one cannot deny the *temporal* – and, hence, *transient* – composition pervading all – including the seemingly most consolidated – forms of sociality. Thus, ‘to historicize the subject of historicization’\(^{168}\) means to reconstruct ‘the genealogy’\(^{169}\) of socially assembled realities, comprising both ordinary and scientific attempts to make sense of their temporal contingency. A ‘reflexive *historico-sociological* analysis of science’\(^{170}\) is the epistemological precondition for acquiring ‘knowledge of its *historical* presuppositions’,\(^{171}\) that is, of the sets of principles, criteria and assumptions on the basis of which researchers establish an investigative relation to the aspects of reality that they aim to study. Put differently, ‘all social scientists should *contextualize* themselves by going through a process of *sociological self-analysis* or rigorous *epistemological vigilance’\(^{172}\). For without the ‘historical critique of unconscious presuppositions’\(^{173}\) it is impossible to account for the pivotal role that hermeneutically constituted – and, hence, constantly shifting – background horizons play in the construction of meaning. There is no comprehensive form of sociological reflexivity without the researcher’s awareness of his or her situatedness in history:

Through the sociologist, a historically situated historical agent and socially determined social subject, history – that is, the society in which the existing remains of history are present – turns for a moment back on itself, and reflects on itself; and, through the sociologist, all social agents are able to know a little more clearly what they are and what they are doing.\(^{174}\)

Given the temporality that permeates all forms of worldly reality, including epistemic attempts to capture particular aspects shaping the constitution of society, it is one of the key functions of sociological reflexivity to draw attention to the fact that there is no such thing as a transcendental mode of human agency capable of escaping its embeddedness in the horizon of historicity.\(^{175}\)


11. Reflexivity and understanding

The eleventh fundamental element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is understanding. In this context, it is both possible and useful to distinguish three principal levels of understanding (comprendre or Verstehen), all of which are vital to the possibility of sociological reflexivity:

- understanding in the cognitive sense of comprehending something (Verstehen eines Tatbestandes);
- understanding in the intersubjective sense of comprehending someone else’s assertions (Verstehen einer Aussage); and
- understanding in the empathetic sense of comprehending someone else’s motives, feelings or situation (Verstehen eines Mitmenschen).  

Put differently, sociological reflexivity – in the Bourdieusian sense – comprises a tripartite challenge: the ability to grapple with (a) objective, (b) intersubjective and (c) subjective dimensions of reality. In effect, the conceptual differentiation between these three spheres of existence is somewhat arbitrary: ‘objectivity is intersubjectivity’ to the extent that, in order to acquire social recognition, it requires ‘intersubjective validation’; objectivity is subjectivity to the extent that, in order to obtain personal legitimacy, it needs to receive subjective validation. Such a constructivist conception of the world ‘is opposed to any form of realism seeking to ground truth in “the match between the thing and the spirit” ’, that is, in a correspondence between reality and representation and, thus, in a homology between ‘the way things are’ and ‘the way things are thought to be’. The Bourdieusian challenge, then, consists in exposing the social constructedness of human reality in general and of symbolic representations in particular. In order to comprehend the sociological role of human modes of understanding, we need to examine the social factors shaping our symbolically mediated engagement with the physical, cultural and personal realms of our existence.

Far from being reducible to a monolithic affair, the intimate link between reflexivity and understanding needs to be studied in terms of the multiple dimensions permeating both ordinary people’s and social researcher’s attempts to attribute meaning to reality. Yet, it is the intersubjectivist constitution of human understanding that deserves particular attention:

*to situate oneself* at the point where the author was situated, at the point that he [or she] occupied within the social world and from which he [or she] viewed the world;
*to place oneself* at that point means *to adopt the point of view* on the world that is his [or hers],
*to understand* it as he [or she] understood it, and so, in a sense, *to justify* it.
On this account, *reflexivity* that is oriented towards understanding is tantamount to a *perspective-taking exercise*: our capacity to look at the world from the viewpoint of others forms an indispensable component of our ability to develop a sense of empathy as well as, at a more fundamental level, a sense of morality. There is no comprehensive understanding of human reality without recognition of the fact that we, as moral entities, are equipped with the capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of others. Put differently, sociological reflexivity is inconceivable without the ability to see things through the eyes of our fellow human beings by virtue of empathy. It is by learning to communicate with others that we learn to attribute meaning both to our external world and to our internal world. Given the tripartite constitution of our simultaneous immersion in the physical, cultural and personal realms of our lives, the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of our existence are inextricably intertwined. Reflexive sociology, then, constitutes ‘a resource to understand the world’ that surrounds us and, indeed, a resource through which we can seek to understand the nature of understanding itself.184

12. *Reflexivity and emancipation*

The twelfth central element underlying Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is *emancipation*. Returning to people the meaning of their actions, thereby ‘learning to know oneself, to situate oneself, to reflect upon one’s position’ and, thus, to become aware of both the resources of empowerment and the sources of disempowerment – all of these aspirations were amongst ‘Bourdieu’s strong demands’, inspired by his ambition to develop a sociology guided by the constant exercise of reflexivity. To be sure, ‘[t]he knowledge of determinisms – irrespective of whether they are, primarily, of material or symbolic, behavioural or ideological, empirical or representational nature – can contribute ‘to liberty and to action’, both of which constitute indispensable ingredients of emancipatory forms of transformation. In this way, sociology can be converted into an ‘instrument of liberation’, but without thereby ascribing ‘the role of the liberating hero’ to the sociologist, as if he or she were the enlightener of the to-be-enlightened. Rather, it is the task of sociology to provide conceptual and methodological tools by means of which it becomes possible not only to uncover and to challenge mechanisms of domination but also to allude to the possibility of creating social conditions allowing for processes of both individual and collective emancipation.

I too sometimes wonder if the completely transparent and disenchanted social universe that would be produced by a social science that was fully developed (and widely diffused, if that could ever be the case) would not be impossible to
live in. I think, all the same, that social relations would be much less unhappy if people at least understood the mechanisms that lead them to contribute to their own deprivation. 193

In light of the previous reflection, we are confronted with a curious paradox. On the one hand, a human universe that is utterly shaped – if not, controlled – by social-scientific knowledge is not necessarily a viable, let alone a desirable, option for the construction of a society capable of escaping the constraining force of systemically driven determinacy. On the other hand, a world whose development is dictated by mechanisms of domination, rather than by processes of emancipation, can be challenged by exploring the civilizational role of our species-distinctive potential. In other words, reflexive sociologists need to be both realistic and optimistic: they need to be sufficiently realistic to recognize that the construction of an entirely emancipated world is not only unviable but also undesirable. At the same time, they need to be sufficiently optimistic to insist that the construction of a world shaped in accordance with universal human needs, as well as on the basis of a fairly distributed access to material and symbolic resources for action, is an ideal for which it is worth struggling.

The particularity of sociology is that it takes as its objects fields of struggle – not only the field of class struggle but the field of scientific struggles itself. And the sociologist occupies a position in these struggles. 194

the more advanced a science is, the greater is the capital of knowledge accumulated within it and the greater the quality of knowledge that subversive and critical strategies, whatever their ‘motivations’, need to mobilize in order to be effective.195

On this view, reflexivity is an empowering resource on several counts:

(a) It permits us to conceive of society as an ensemble of fields and, hence, as a set of multiple struggles between asymmetrically positioned individual and collective actors. 196
(b) It enables us to conceive of sociology as a discipline located within the scientific field and, thus, as an undertaking shaped by both structural and ideological modes of position-taking – not only in relation to its own area of research but also, more generally, in relation to society as a whole. 197
(c) It allows us to use science as a tool, not in order to authorize or to legitimize research for the sake of research, but, rather, in order to empower the disempowered, give a voice to the voiceless and make visible the invisible. 198

From a Bourdieusian perspective, then, ‘the weapons of criticism have to be scientific in order to be effective’.199 That is, reflexivity that shies away from
making claims to scientific validity fails to overcome the limited status of rhetorically motivated speculation based on common sense and on personal experiences of everyday reality. A socially committed sociology is a critical undertaking that faces up to the fact that ‘scientific work [has] political implications’, even – or, perhaps, especially – if and when these are unintended and not immediately obvious. Sociology cannot escape the horizons of normativity emerging from the construction of value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden and tension-laden realities. Aware of both the negative and the positive contributions that science can make to the development of society, sociology has a major task on its hands when drawing on the power of reflexivity in order to contribute to the construction of realities in which – at least in principle – all humans can flourish and which, therefore, deserve to be characterized as ‘really or potentially emancipatory’.

**Conclusion**

As shown in the preceding analysis, Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity is complex and multifaceted. By means of an in-depth examination of his key works, this chapter has aimed to demonstrate that twelve elements are particularly important to Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity: (1) ‘science’, (2) ‘vigilance’, (3) ‘consciousness’, (4) ‘self-awareness’, (5) ‘critique’, (6) ‘self-objectification’, (7) ‘distance-taking’, (8) ‘rupture’, (9) ‘epistemology’, (10) ‘historicization’, (11) ‘understanding’ and (12) ‘emancipation’. From a Bourdieusian point of view, the concept of ‘reflexivity’ plays a pivotal role in the pursuit of sociology. Yet, the previous inquiry raises a number of significant questions about controversial issues that need to be addressed when evaluating the merits of Bourdieu’s account of reflexivity. It is the task of this concluding section to consider some of these issues, which – following the structure of the foregoing study – can be synthesized on the basis of ‘twelve theses on Bourdieu’s conception of reflexivity’:

1. Reflexivity needs science, and science needs reflexivity. The danger of falling into the trap of scientism arises, however, to the extent that science is hypostatized and, hence, treated as a catch-all endeavour, capable of producing pristine, infallible and omnipotent forms of knowledge.
2. Reflexivity needs vigilance, and vigilance needs reflexivity. The risk of succumbing to academic narcissism emerges, however, to the extent that vigilance is fetishized and – unwittingly – converted into a source of intellectual paralysis, which may lead researchers to be concerned more with themselves and their objectifying gaze than with their object of investigation.
3. Reflexivity needs consciousness, and consciousness needs reflexivity. We face the possibility of getting caught up in cognitivism, however, to the extent that we overestimate the civilizational significance of actors’ consciousness and underestimate the sociological role of their unconscious. Even the most mindful ways of performing social actions, including those aimed at conducting social-scientific research, cannot do away with the formative influence of constantly shifting – and largely implicit – background horizons.

4. Reflexivity needs self-awareness, and self-awareness needs reflexivity. We are confronted with the issue of subjectivism, however, to the extent that we commit the error of attaching more importance to researchers’ attentiveness to their inner world than to their sustained engagement with the external world of those whose lives they set out to examine.

5. Reflexivity needs critique, and critique needs reflexivity. We run the risk of confining ourselves to a stifling position of normativism, however, to the extent that we attribute more weight to the critique of the criticizing gaze than to the critique of the social arrangements put in place to sustain mechanisms of social domination and thereby to undermine processes of human emancipation. Sociologists have described, analysed, interpreted, explained and assessed the world in different ways; the point is to change it.

6. Reflexivity needs self-objectification, and self-objectification needs reflexivity. It is difficult to bypass the problem of objectivism, however, to the extent that reality is conceived of as a conglomerate of merely factual properties, rather than in terms of a combination of objectively established, normatively constructed and subjectively projected assemblies of actuality, which constitute relationally constituted frameworks for human agency.

7. Reflexivity needs distance-taking, and distance-taking needs reflexivity. The epistemological stance of externalism becomes a methodological challenge, however, to the extent that one treats the perspective of the sociological observer as superior to that of the social actor. Immersion can be as much an obstacle to understanding as it can be a key to insight.

8. Reflexivity needs rupture, and rupture needs reflexivity. Instead of submitting to the seductive force of epistemological reductionism, however, to the extent that one considers one mode of knowledge production categorically more valuable than another, it is sensible to recognize the cognitive complexity permeating all symbolically mediated representations of reality.

(a) Scientific knowledge can be superior to ordinary knowledge to the degree that it permits us to uncover underlying causalities that escape our common-sense grasp of reality.

(b) Ordinary knowledge can be superior to scientific knowledge to the degree that it captures the socio-ontological immediacy of people’s
everyday epistemologies: the authenticity of subjectively experienced and intersubjectively shaped processes of perception, appreciation and action escapes the reifying lenses of conceptual sophistication and methodological objectification.

(c) Both ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge can be insightful to the degree that they can express epistemically forceful modes of attributing meaning to objectively, normatively or subjectively constituted actualities. One of the greatest epistemological challenges for sociology consists in cross-fertilizing – rather than strictly separating – ordinary and scientific ways of relating to, engaging with and acting upon reality.

9. Reflexivity needs epistemology, and epistemology needs reflexivity. The problem of rationalism poses itself, however, to the extent that social-scientific researchers privilege rational over non-rational ways of relating to the world. Seemingly non-rational – notably, artistic – modes of grappling with reality deserve a place in sociology insofar as they contribute to a critical understanding of the world capable of drawing on the purposive, cooperative and creative resources of humanity.

10. Reflexivity needs historicization, and historicization needs reflexivity. The overt or tacit advocacy of relativism becomes apparent, however, to the extent that sociologists – if they choose to do so – follow the constructivist dogma that every worldly phenomenon can be studied in terms of social malleability, cultural contingency and historical indeterminacy. The fact that everything is context-laden does not mean that ‘anything goes’.

11. Reflexivity needs understanding, and understanding needs reflexivity. The endorsement of interpretivism is problematic, however, to the extent that ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ are conceived of as two mutually exclusive, rather than complementary, paradigms. Just as we need to understand the power of explanation, we need to explain the power of understanding. Instead of attaching the sphere of objectivity exclusively to the paradigm of explanation and, correspondingly, the spheres of normativity and subjectivity solely to the paradigm of understanding, we should explore the degree to which the constitutive elements of human reality can be explicating and interpreting in terms of a combination of physical, cultural and personal properties.

12. Reflexivity needs emancipation, and emancipation needs reflexivity. An idealist position that is inspired by the promises of positivist utopianism is misleading, however, to the extent that it portrays sociology as a scientific tool capable of providing a theoretically coherent and practically viable blueprint for the construction of an emancipatory society. It is crucial to reject all forms of socio-ontological romanticism, according to which human lifeworlds constitute power-free realms of pristine intersubjectivity. It is no
less important, however, to discard all forms of socio-ontological fatalism, according to which all human actions are driven by competitive struggles over power and legitimacy. In contrast to these reductive perspectives, the position of socio-ontological realism does justice to the fact that human life forms are characterized by the tension-laden coexistence of power-laden and power-critical, competitive and cooperative, egoistic and altruistic dimensions, which have always shaped – and which will always continue to shape – the course of history, irrespective of its protagonists’ degree of reflexivity.

Notes

1 See, for instance: Bourdieu 1990, 2001a; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992a, b.
3 Wacquant 1992a, 36.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. (italics in original).
6 Ibid. (italics in original).
7 Ibid. 36.
8 Ibid. (italics in original).
9 Ibid.
10 On this point, see Wacquant 1992a, 36–7.
11 Wacquant 1992a, 37.
13 Wacquant 1992a, 37.
14 See Ibid.
15 On this point, see Susen 2015a, esp. Chapter 1, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
16 Wacquant 1992a, 38 (italics in original).
17 Ibid. (italics added); the quoted passage (within this quotation) is taken from Gouldner 1971, 483.
18 Wacquant 1992a, 40 (italics in original).
19 Wacquant 1992a, 39.
20 On this point, see ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. (italics in original).
23 Ibid. (italics in original).
25 Wacquant 1992a, 46 (italics added).
26 Ibid. (the comma after the word 'subjected' does not appear in the original version).
27 Wacquant 1992a, 42.

29 Bourdieu, Chambredon and Passeron 1968, 31 (my translation); original text: ‘science réfléxive’.
30 Bourdieu, Chambredon and Passeron 1968, 14 (my translation); original text: ‘travail scientifique’.
31 Bourdieu 1982a, 9 (my translation); original text: ‘sociologie scientifique’.
32 Bourdieu 1982a, 23 (my translation); original text: ‘la science sociologique’.
33 Bourdieu 1982a, 9 (my translation); original text: ‘l’histoire sociale de la science sociale’.
34 Bourdieu 1982a, 23 (my translation); original text: ‘la sociologie de la science’.
35 Bourdieu 1982a, 23–4 (my translation); original text: ‘en accroissant la connaissance des déterminants sociaux de la pensée sociologique, donc l’efficacité de la critique’.
36 Bourdieu 1984a, 9 (1993) (italics added to the words ‘reveals’ and ‘hidden’; the word ‘repressed’ is italicized in the original version).
37 Ibid. (italics added).
38 Ibid. (italics added to ‘profits’; the word ‘interests’ is italicized in the original version).
39 Ibid.
40 Bourdieu 1984a, 11 (1993) (italics added; the word ‘limits’ is italicized in the original version).
41 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992c, 72.
42 Ibid.

s’ignore comme sujet cultivé d’une culture particulière et qu’il ne subordonne pas toute sa pratique à une mise en question continue de cet enracinement, que le sociologue (plus que l’ethnologue) est vulnérable à l’illusion de l’évidence immédiate ou à la tentative d’universaliser inconsciemment une expérience singulière.’

65 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘ravivées et réinterprétées par la vigilance épistémologique’.


67 Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 14 (my translation); original text: ‘la “psychanalyse de l’esprit scientifique”’.

68 Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 39 (my translation); original text: ‘une psychanalyse de l’esprit sociologique’.

69 Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 100 and 105 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘les présupposés inconscients’.

70 Bourdieu 1982a, 10 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une science de l’inconscient’.

71 Bourdieu 1998, 9 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une archéologie objective de notre inconscient’.

72 Ibid. (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘l’instrument d’une véritable socioanalyse’.

73 Bourdieu 2001b, 7 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une critique sociale’.

74 Mounier 2001, 161 (my translation); original text: ‘un retour réflexif sur sa propre pratique’.

75 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘un inconscient social dans l’analyse’.

76 Mounier 2001, 176 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une réflexion épistémologique sur ses pratiques est inséparable d’une réflexion politique sur ses effets et sa fonction’.

77 Wacquant 1992a, 40 (italics in original). On this point, see also Bourdieu 2002.

78 Bourdieu 1999, 334.
On Bourdieu’s conception of the relationship between ‘reflexivity’ and ‘consciousness’, see, for instance: Bourdieu 1982a, 10; 1998, 9; 1999, 334–5; 2001b, 7, 20, 30 and 57; Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 14, 39 and 100. In the secondary literature, see, for example: Celikates 2009; Mounier 2001, 161 and 176; Wacquant 1992a, 36 and 40.


On this point, see, for instance, Bourdieu 1997b, 12–13. 95
On this point, see, for instance, Susen 2014a and Susen [2015], 2014. See also, for instance, Bénatouïl 1999a and 1999b.


Bourdieu 1980, 29–30 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘objectiver cette distance objectivante et les conditions sociales qui la rendent possible, comme l’extériorité de l’observateur’.

On this point, see, for instance, Susen 2014a and Susen [2015], 2014. See also, for instance, Bénatouïl 1999a and 1999b.


Bourdieu 1980, 29–30 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘objectiver cette distance objectivante et les conditions sociales qui la rendent possible, comme l’extériorité de l’observateur’.

On this point, see, for instance, Susen 2014a and Susen [2015], 2014. See also, for instance, Bénatouïl 1999a and 1999b.

Bourdieu 1980, 40 (my translation); original text: ‘toute entreprise sociologique véritable’.


Bourdieu 1980, 40 (my translation); original text: ‘l’objectivation de l’objectivité’.

Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘une véritable réappropriation de soi’.

Bourdieu 1980, 51 (my translation); original text: ‘objectiver l’objectivation’.

Bourdieu 1980, 43 (my translation); original text: ‘une objectivation critique’.

Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘les conditions épistémologiques et sociales’.

Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992c, 69.

Ibid.

Bourdieu 1995b, 116 (my translation); original text: ‘La reflexivité conçue comme travail d’objectivation scientifique du sujet objectivant’.


Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 31 (my translation); original text: ‘réconcilier l’attachement aux mystères de l’intérriorité avec les impératifs de la distanciation’.

Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 57 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la construction contrôlée et consciente de sa distance au réel et de son action sur le réel’.

Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 31 (my translation); original text: ‘science reflexive’.

On this point, see, for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992c, 70.

On this point, see, for instance, Bourdieu 1997b, 29.


On this point, see, for example:

- Bourdieu 1980, 61: ‘C’est seulement par une rupture avec la vision savante, qui se vit elle-même comme une rupture avec la vision ordinaire, que l’observateur pourrait prendre en compte dans sa description de la pratique rituelle le fait de la participation (et du même coup le fait de sa propre rupture): [...] une conscience critique des limites inscrites dans les conditions de production de la théorie’. (Italics in original)


Susen 2007, 135 (italics in original).

Ibid.

Ibid.

On the notion of the skholè, see, for example: Bourdieu 1980, 47; 1994, 234 and 265; 1995b, 115; 1997b, 9, 15, 22, 24, 131 and 143; 2001b, 15. See also, for

123 Susen 2007, 158.


127 See Bourdieu 1980, 43–244: ‘Livre 1 – Critique de la Raison Théorique’.

128 On ‘scholastic theoreticism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1997b, 64, 66, 68, 75–6, 80, 97–8, 115 and 164–5; 2001a, 78.


131 See Bourdieu 1997b, 37.

132 On ‘scholastic universalism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1997b, 90, 93, 96, 99–100, 113, 143 and 265.


134 On ‘scholastic rationalism’, see, for example: Ambroise 2004, 262; Bourdieu 1997b, 64, 75, 97, 130 and 265.

135 Bourdieu 1997b, 143 (my translation); original text in French: ‘l’illusion de la transcendance d’une raison transhistorique et transpersonnelle’. In the published English
translation the word *et*, between the words *transhistorique* and *transpersonnelle*, has been replaced by a comma. See Bourdieu [1997], 2000, 120.

136 On ‘scholastic transcendentalism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1980, 48–9; 1997b, 56, 137 and 141.


138 Susen 2007, 163.

139 On ‘scholastic purism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1997b, 31, 88 and 97; 1997a, 15; 2001a, 78 and 91; Dortier 2002, esp. 4.


141 Bourdieu 1999, 334–335 (italics added).

142 Bourdieu 2001a, 16 (my translation); original text: ‘fondements sociaux’.

143 On ‘scholastic foundationalism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1997b, 136–7, 139, 144–5 and 149; 1997 (2000), 93; 2001a, 8, 108 and 160; Wacquant 1992b, 47.

144 On ‘scholastic neutralism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1975, 4; 1997b, 10, 36, 39 and 125; Hacking 2004, esp. 147–148; Wacquant 1999, 275; 2003, esp. 61–2 and 65.


146 On ‘scholastic autonomism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1997b, 30, 36, 39, 64 and 116; Pels 1995, esp. 81–3.

147 Bourdieu 1999, 335.

148 Susen 2007, 166.

149 On ‘scholastic hegemonism’, see, for example: Bourdieu 1975, 4; 1997b, 10, 36, 39 and 125; Hacking 2004, esp. 147–148; Wacquant 1999, 275; 2003, esp. 61–2 and 65.

150 Bourdieu 1997b, 42 (my translation); original text: ‘l’ambition hégémonique’.


153 Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 102 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘relativiser la validité du savoir’.

154 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘la sociologie de la sociologie’.

155 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘la sociologie de la connaissance sociologique’.

156 Bourdieu 1982a, 11 (my translation); original text: ‘l’utilisation théologique ou terroriste des écrits canoniques’.

157 Bourdieu 1982a, 24 (my translation); original text: ‘l’efficacité de la critique’.
158 Bourdieu 1982a, 23–4 (my translation); original text: ‘des déterminants sociaux de la pensée sociologique’.
159 Bourdieu 2001a, 19 (my translation); original text: ‘histoire sociale de la sociologie de la science’.
160 Bourdieu 2001a, 15 (my translation); original text: ‘fournir des instruments de connaissance qui peuvent se retourner contre le sujet de la connaissance’.
161 Bourdieu 2001a, 16 (my translation); original text: ‘fondements sociaux’.
162 Bourdieu 2001a, 168 (my translation); original text: ‘historiciser le sujet de l’historicisation, objectiver le sujet de l’objectivation’.
163 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘la connaissance de ses présupposés historiques’.
164 Bourdieu 2001a, 167 (my translation); original text: ‘Pourquoi les sciences sociales doivent se prendre pour objet’.
165 See Bourdieu 2001a, 174 (italics in original; except for ‘a priori’, which is not italicized in the French version) (my translation); original text: ‘les sociologues doivent convertir la réflexivité en une disposition constitutive de leur habitus scientifique, c’est-à-dire une réflexivité réflexive, capable d’agir non ex post, sur l’opus operatum, mais a priori, sur le modus operandi’.
167 Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 96 (my translation); original text: ‘conditions historiques et sociales dans lesquelles s’accomplit la pratique sociologique’.
168 Bourdieu 2001a, 168 (my translation); original text: ‘historiciser le sujet de l’historicisation’.
169 Bourdieu 1995b, 116 (my translation); original text: ‘la généalogie’.
170 Bourdieu 1997b, 140 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘analyse réflexive historico-sociologique de la science’.
171 Bourdieu 2001a, 168 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la connaissance de ses présupposés historiques’.
172 Robbins 1999, 310 (italics added).
174 Bourdieu 1982a, 29 (my translation); original text: ‘A travers le sociologue, agent historique historiquement situé, sujet social socialement déterminé, l’histoire, c’est-à-dire la société dans laquelle elle se survit, se retourne un moment sur soi, se réfléchit; et, pat lui, tous les agents sociaux peuvent savoir un peu mieux ce qu’ils sont, et ce qu’ils font’.
176 Susen 2013b, 326.
177 Bourdieu 2001a, 154 (my translation); original text: ‘L’objectivité est intersubjectivité’.
178 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘validation intersubjective’.
179 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘s’oppose donc à toute forme de réalisme visant à fonder la vérité sur l’ “adéquation de la chose et de l’esprit”’.
180 On this point, see ibid.
181 On this point, see Susen 2016a.
182 Bourdieu 2001a, 184 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘se situer au point où se situait l’auteur, au point qu’il occupait dans le monde social et à partir duquel il voyait le monde; se situer en ce point, c’est prendre sur le monde le point de vue qui est le sien, le comprendre comme il le comprenait, donc, en un sens, le justifier.’
183 Boltanski 2003, 153 (my translation); original text: ‘une ressource pour comprendre le monde’.
185 On the concept of ‘emancipation’, see, for example, Susen 2015b. See also, for instance: Browne and Susen 2014; Holloway and Susen 2013; Susen 2008a; 2008b; 2009; 2010c; 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014c; [2012], 2014; [2015], 2014; 2016b.
186 De Saint Martin 2003, 331 (my translation); original text: ‘Restituer aux hommes le sens de leurs actes’.
187 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘apprendre à se connaître, à se situer, réfléchir sur sa position’.
188 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘des exigences fortes de Bourdieu’.
189 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘La connaissance des déterminismes’.
190 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘à la liberté et à l’action’.
191 Ibid. (my translation); original text: ‘instrument de libération’.
194 Bourdieu [1984a], 1993, 10 (italics added).
196 See Susen 2010a, esp. 151–82 and 198–208, as well as Susen 2010b, 268–74.
197 See Susen 2011d, esp. 58–60, 64–8 and 77–82, Susen 2013a, 205–13 and 223–8, as well as Susen 2014c, esp. 91–6 and 98–9.
199 Bourdieu [1984a], 1993, 11.
200 On this point, see Pinto 1998, 197.
201 Pinto 1998, 190 (my translation); original text: ‘le travail scientifique avait des implications politiques’.

References


Anthem Press, Simon Susen and Bryan Verlag, soziale Praxis. Gesellschaftliche Se

Global Ethics

Sociology

226.

problemáticas

Teresita Philosophy

Empowerment and Disempowerment of the Human Subject’, Anthem Press, Spirit

Reflections on Luc Boltanski’s Thesis Eleven

Anthem Press, S.
in Bruno

Pour un dialogue entre la sociologie critique et la sociologie pragmatique         de la critique’, Social Epistemology

Speech

728.

ré

How

Theory of Science

173

S.

Society:

2: 133

–

2012b. ‘Poder y anti-poder (IV-V)’, Erasmus: Revista para el diálogo intercultural 10, no.

2: 133–80.


