Geopolitics and Global Democracy in Owen Lattimore’s political thought

Asia will be the litmus paper that reveals the nature of the world order brought about by a victory of the United Nations. For the very reason that the United Nations represent on the whole the democratic world cause, and yet themselves are not equally democratic in all respects, victory will face them with the responsibility of determining the degree of democracy that is to prevail over the world as a whole.

- Owen Lattimore

In 1942 Owen Lattimore, a well-known American sinologist, published an enthusiastic article in Foreign Affairs entitled 'The fight for Democracy in Asia'. He underlined the need of the United Nations, and the United States in particular, to commit to a post-imperial democratic regional order in Asia. In this paper I argue that in the 1940s Lattimore articulated a pluralistic and flexible idea of a democratic world order centered on Asia and based on participation and political agency. While Lattimore’s contribution to Asian studies, Frontier theory and Mongol scholarship has often been acknowledged, his legacy as political thinker has fallen into oblivion. In this paper I examine Lattimore’s international political thought as a unique and interesting contribution to the debate on world order on the eve of the Cold War. Lattimore’s understanding of international affairs emerged from his interpretation of geopolitics, and from his direct knowledge of local politics and culture in Asia. Geopolitical concepts like tripolarity and the Frontier theory were key features in his international democratic thought: the frontier was an area of exchange and interaction which could become the foundation of an Asian version of democracy as part of a Soviet-American-Asian tripolar order. He was concerned not only with Asia's domestic
transformation, but also with its potential impact on world politics, and suggested that Asia, and China in particular, could set a model for a new globally-applicable democratic vision. His criticism of American foreign policy towards Asia and Russia, and his opposition to state-centered geopolitical strategy made him a target for nationalist and anti-communist activists, culminating with Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s attack which shattered Lattimore’s public reputation.

The intention of this article is to explore the relationship between geopolitics and global democracy, and to reclaim the complexities of geopolitical thought in the 1940s by discussing an important yet nowadays largely forgotten intellectual figure. My argument is that geopolitical perceptions offer useful insights on the development of 1940s theories of global democracy. The article includes five parts. I begin with an overview of Lattimore’s biography, focusing on his activities in the 1940s and discussing his definitions of key terms like ‘democracy’ and ‘geopolitics’. In the following section I assess Lattimore’s geopolitical theory as the background for his global democratic vision. I subsequently turn to his theory of global democracy as a critique of essentialism and Orientalism emerging from his subtle understanding of the cultural and political complexities of Asia.² The fourth section deals with the impact of Lattimore’s vision of democracy on international relations, and the fifth looks at the role of race and nationalism in his international thought. In conclusion I argue that despite today’s scholarship little credit to Lattimore as an international thinker, his idea of a pluralistic democratic world order sheds new light on mid-century geopolitical scholarship, and makes an interesting contribution to thinking about global democracy and its limits.

1. Introduction
Owen Lattimore (1900-1989) was born in Washington DC, but grew up in China where his parents taught history and classics. He was schooled in Switzerland and England, then returned to China and worked for a Tientsin-based British firm, obtaining first-hand knowledge of China by extensive travels to the interior provinces, including Mongolia, which became his subject of expertise. In 1928 he received a Social Science Research Council (SSRC) grant to spend a year as a graduate student at Harvard College in preparation for a research trip to Mongolia, which was the foundation for his celebrated research on frontiers. The geographer Isaiah Bowman, director of the American Geographical Society and an influential member of the SSRC, supported Lattimore’s grant application and became his academic patron. Lattimore was involved with two institutions which contributed to forming American International Relations: the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR) and the School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. The IPR was a well-known independent international study group on Pacific interests, with a network of national research committees including Chatham House. In 1934-1941 he was the editor of Pacific Affairs, the IPR journal, and promoted a pluralist and politically inclusive editorial line. In 1937, Bowman, then President of John Hopkins University, appointed Lattimore director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations. During his ten-year tenure he began theorizing international relations beyond the Asian sphere, attempting to shift the academic focus in international affairs from Europe to Asia.

Lattimore’s educational vision at Johns Hopkins reveals his contribution to the development of the discipline of International Relations in 1940s America. He insisted on the relevance of geopolitics, history, anthropology and sociology to the study of international relations. Geopolitics in particular was for him the key to understanding world affairs, and to promoting a new kind of pluralistic democracy. His institutional vision, partially realized in
Johns Hopkins and later in Leeds, emphasized the importance of inter-disciplinarity. He sought to convey that the political attributes of a system could only be measured against its own past – rather than by comparison to other societies - underlining an important message about the great diversity of human political organization, and the difficulty of thinking about democracy outside the familiar Western geopolitical context.

Bowman, whose opinion was appreciated in the White House, introduced Lattimore to the State Department and in 1940, at Roosevelt’s request, he returned to China as advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. By that time he was widely acknowledged by the American press as the leading authority on Far East affairs. In China Lattimore hoped Chiang’s leadership capabilities would help uniting the fragmented local political map, and was a great supporter of the United Front of Communists and Nationalists against the common enemy, Japan. When the US joined the war Lattimore relocated to San Francisco as the director of Pacific Operations for the Office of War Information and participated as an expert on territorial settlement in the secret ‘Project M’ (for Migration) and in the War and Peace Studies program. Later, he was a Special Advisor to the State Department’s reparation mission in Japan, and served on the United Nations Preparatory Mission to Afghanistan.

In 1944 he accompanied US Vice-President Henry Wallace on an airplane trip to Russia, China and Mongolia, in order to have first-hand idea of life in the Soviet world. Upon their return, Wallace was discarded by Roosevelt, who picked a more palatable candidate as his election running-mate: Harry Truman. As Wallace attracted increasing criticism for his pro-Soviet views, Lattimore’s prestige was undermined by association. Lattimore’s own political opinions in the 1940s may have diverged from the American consensus, but there is little evidence of any unqualified sympathy with Soviet Russia or its interests. Despite his knowledge of Russian and Asian languages and cultures, Lattimore
underestimated the scope of Soviet destructive policies against local populations. But this was probably due to political naivety rather than intentional pro-communist approach.

In the early 1950s the IPR was targeted by Senators Joseph R. McCarthy and Pat McCarran as a hub for anti-American views, and Lattimore’s association with the institute provided the grounds for his prosecution as a ‘top Soviet spy’. This attack was synchronized with public campaign blaming Lattimore, along with President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson, for the ‘loss of China’ to the communists. Yet accusations of pro-communist tendencies were directed at Lattimore as early as 1945, by various members of the so-called ‘China lobby’, a powerful right-wing pressure group of wealthy and prominent businessmen and public figures (including Alfred Kohlberg, Henry R. Luce and his wife Claire Booth-Luce) who sought to convince American politicians to support and finance Chiang Kai-shek’s regime as a bulwark against communism. Lattimore’s call for united China may have encouraged members of the China Lobby to pin him down as a pro-Communist. Kohlberg, a New York businessman in China, published a series of articles accusing the Institute for Pacific Relations and Lattimore of pro-Soviet activities. Kohlberg’s accusations were not based on any substantial evidence other than his misguided interpretation of Lattimore’s writings. But Kohlberg’s connections in the American political establishment helped convincing more and more people of Lattimore’s and the IPR’s subversion.

In the second half of the 1940s, the relationship between the two world-powers, the United States and the USSR, became increasingly tenuous. In the eyes of some contemporaneous commentators, Asia became the focal point of political and strategic competition between the two victors. Lattimore insisted that the United States should support the nationalist government only if it instituted wide-ranging reforms, including
offering the Communist party a share in political power. This view was not popular in postwar America, as financial and military support for Chiang’s regime continued at a growing rate. Lattimore’s writings reveal an energetic, perhaps naïve, critique of American institutions and foreign policy. His biographer, Robert P. Newman, implies in his analysis of the events that led to the McCarthy campaign, that Lattimore simply failed to read the map of American public opinion: he expressed unpopular views and naively associated himself with individuals and institutions that later came under attack, including for instance John Service, *Amerasia*, and the IPR.\(^\text{11}\) Five long years of investigation and trial led to Lattimore’s complete acquittal, but many of his readers, admirers and colleagues dissociated themselves from his legacy and consigned him to oblivion.

Today it is difficult to evaluate Lattimore’s impact on international theory and practice in the first half of the twentieth century. After McCarthy’s attack, few people wanted to be associated with him or his writings. Yet in the 1930s and 1940s a variety of articles, reviews and radio broadcasts dedicated to his work recognized Lattimore as ‘one of America’s foremost authorities on the Far East’. His scholarly work was acknowledged by a variety of intellectuals and public figures including Franklin D. Roosevelt and his economic advisor Lauchlin Currie, Chiang Kai-Shek, John Fairbank, John Foster Dulles, Arnold J. Toynbee, Isaiah Bowman, Joseph Needham and German geopoliticians Karl Haushofer.

In 1963 he relocated to the University of Leeds, UK, where he founded the Mongolian Studies program at the Department of Chinese Studies.\(^\text{12}\) He established an interdisciplinary department focused on China and Mongolia in a wider Asian perspective. This project was the continuation of his 1940s experience at Johns Hopkins, where he sought to form a sophisticated and diversified intellectual environment where international relations would be studied by examining the geographical, cultural, linguistic and social traits
of political communities. As director of Page School of International Relations, he introduced an interdisciplinary approach to International Relations, emphasizing the importance of Asia to understanding world politics. Later in Leeds, languages, culture and politics of central Asia were studied in a non-essentialist approach, taking into account the complex reality of these areas and exploring world affairs from local – Mongolian and Chinese – viewpoints.

Before turning to a detailed analysis of Lattimore’s international thought, it is necessary to assess his definitions of “geopolitics” and “democracy”. For Lattimore geopolitics indicated an approach to analyzing political relations: ‘it is a “realist” understanding of a territory and the political powers that control it. It is a unique perspective, a way of studying a political unit, a region or a state, and its position in the world’.13 “Realist” in this context seems to be an approach departing from an empiricist analysis of “real” geographical, physiological, cultural and historical conditions. As I’ll show in the following section, this experience-based attitude to geopolitics as a spatial and not ideological category expressed Lattimore’s intention to distance his geopolitical writings from the ideologically-oriented German school of geopolitik, as well as from the security-focused American geopoliticalists like Nicholas Spykman. Lattimore’s idea of ‘democracy’ also aimed at separating this political idea from dominant ideological interpretations. In essence, Lattimore opposed “democracy” to “imperialism” as two contrasting modes of politics. Arguing that a democratic political system was necessarily based on political freedom and popular participation, Lattimore did not provide a more detailed institutional and conceptual account of democracy, or a specific analysis of “freedom” and “participation”. By adopting a republican version of “democracy” in opposition to imperial domination as the foundation of a post-colonial world order, Lattimore hoped to
accommodate a variety of local interpretations of democracy sharing a fundamental vision of a free and self-governing political community. The focus of his democratic vision was therefore communitarian and collective, rather than individual. By this token, the main feature of a global democracy was “global conversation” between various communities, states and regions conducted in a definitely post-colonial environment, rather than a specific set of institutions and values that could be traced back to western liberal democratic modes of politics.

2. Geopolitics and democracy

Lattimore, like Bowman, argued that the relations between geography and politics should be taken seriously by scholars of international affairs. He was part of a group of scholars who shared a keen interest in geopolitics, including Bowman, Halford Mackinder, Robert Strausz-Hupe and Hans Weigert. They sought to create an American version of German Geopolitik, in sharp contrast to Hitler’s expansionist projects. The exchange of ideas between the German and American geopolitical schools flourished in the interwar years and culminated in the 1940s when American political geographers and international thinkers used geopolitical concepts like the Land/Sea dichotomy and the Frontier to envisage a new global order, often unfolded in anti-imperial terms, in which the United States would have an active leading part. The basic assumption of Lattimore’s geopolitics, as well of his international theory in general, is based on Mackinder’s Heartland theory, arguing that land powers – rather than naval empires – would have greater political influence on world affairs after the Second World War. For him, Geopolitics was important to theorizing politics because it created the conditions in which a new concept of democracy could emerge. His geopolitical theory acquired many followers, among whom Karl Haushofer who considered him one of
the greatest geopoliticians in America. Yet Lattimore thought his own vision differed from German *geopolitik* in endorsing democracy: political and social interaction around the Asian ‘longest frontier’ area could generate practices of political participation and free exchange of ideas, which were for him the foundations of a sound democratic system.

Lattimore’s interpretation of geopolitics was centered on an innovative conception of the frontier as a zone of interaction and exchange, which became his most recognized contribution to anthropological and historical scholarship. For him the frontier population was not a pawn in a global balance of power but a proactive community which could influence the entire political unit. This geographic area was for Lattimore a space of cultural interaction and a hub of national movements. It was not, however, a unified political space. James Scott’s reading of Lattimore emphasizes the contention between the agricultural plane and the pastoral hills populations, and the fundamental importance of the relations between the human and the natural in creating the political sphere. Lattimore saw the nomadic social order, which escaped the control of the territorial state, as a complex developed social system, unlike most interpreters who conceived the transition from agriculture to nomadism as social deterioration. The populations inhabiting the frontier zone, like the Mongols, Uzbeks and – in Scott’s research – the Zumia, created a pluralistic, unstable and amorphous political space that was characterized by ‘low-stateness’. Lattimore and Scott alike saw this unique political reality as a counterbalance to the western conception of the state as a territorially-fixed entity. It allowed a more flexible and versatile interpretation of the territorial space of political action and democratic participation. Lattimore rejected natural determinism and envisaged a complex system in which human and geographical elements are intertwined in a mutually influential relation. Famously, he gave the ‘longest frontier’ which stretched from Korea to Turkey as an example for a politically active frontier zone.
Another central aspect of Lattimore’s geopolitics is the Land/Sea dichotomy, which he borrowed from Mackinder and Mahan and turned into a critique of Western imperialism. Lattimore took as his starting point the assumption that the European and American imperial powers came across the sea to Asia and looked at the vast territory from boats and ports in the littoral zone: ‘our thinking about Asia stemmed from the great age of navigation at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the old caravan routes were surpassed by new sea routes’.22 By contrast, local Asian powers established their political centre in the land masses, looking outwards from the continental core towards the coasts. For Lattimore, the former form was repressive and exploitative; the latter was constructive and collaborative.23 The oceanic gaze, typical of the European empires, does not penetrate the local territory, and has no grasp of its unique cultural and political characteristics. According to Lattimore’s conception of knowledge, a superficial outlook cannot offer detailed information of Asia and its people. A political system based on ignorance cannot, therefore, be anything other than repressive. On the other hand, a territorial gaze allows a better understanding of local habits and structures, and, following Lattimore’s notion of the frontier, encourages interaction. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a territorially based system of control was not, in itself, a guarantee against imperial repression and domination. The advantage it offered was merely a potential political interaction, which could lead to the creation of political space which measured itself with the local populations’ recognized political agency.

Along with geopolitics, political agency and knowledge are two themes woven into Lattimore’s vision of world order. They can help us understand how he envisaged the transformation from imperial to democratic global order, and what might be the specific qualities of postwar international politics. His underlying assumption in analyzing
international relations was that the current world order was based on the notion of ‘Empire’: it divided the world into political spaces of ‘colonizers’ and ‘colonized’, denied the latter populations political autonomy and excluded, in both theory and practice, the possibility of local political agency. His post-imperial world order required a revision of the geographic limits of political agency, which should be extended to the colonies. Lattimore suggested this new geopolitical vision could only be realized through the joint action of the leading political powers. Here it is important to remember Lattimore’s interpretation of “democracy” as an anti-imperial political concept based on free participation in political and social life. A geopolitical revision of political agency on a world scale would result in a pluralistic democratic Asian region as an independent democratic power of global importance.

In order to foster political agency worldwide, the international thinker would need theoretical as well as empirical knowledge of local societies. Lattimore argued that a new world order could not be grasped by abstract theorizing, and insisted that knowledge of international affairs had to be based on lived experience of other cultures, places and organizations around the world. ‘Travel is an excellent corrective of book-bred ideas’, he wrote, and underlined his interest in ‘facts, not theories’. As we shall see, Lattimore argued that detailed, non-instrumental knowledge of Asia could help thinking about an Asiatic democracy without reducing local cultures to a traditional a-historical monolith. He thought that Asia could follow its own trajectory to modern democracy without erasing completely its historical and cultural heritage.

The tension between the Western viewpoint on Asia and the way the Asians perceived themselves featured as a main theme in Lattimore’s writings. He struggled to find a way to study and know Asia without falling into the trap of cultural essentialism. Curiously, besides the notion of knowledge, Lattimore listed ‘commonsense’ as a corrective of
prejudices and reductionism. For him knowledge as the basis of scholarship equaled a ‘common sense kind of reasoning’ which combined textual and non-textual information. Yet what is exactly ‘commonsense’? It may be defined as making observations on the basis of non-specialized knowledge, some kind of ordinary good judgment that anyone can make. One may use the notion of popular, democratic and easily accessible ‘commonsense’ as expression of diffidence against the abstruseness and inaccessibility of abstract political philosophy. Based on his own life experience, Lattimore considered abstract thought to be futile if not based on facts and empirical experience. Thus, ‘commonsense’ possibly meant a pre-theoretical idea based on direct lived experience and on a simple perception of the world. Some theorists, like the Italian Antonio Gramsci, argued that the commonsensical approach may lead to conservatism, because it prioritizes what seems to fit the society’s cultural experiences or the political status quo. However, Lattimore’s ‘commonsense’ avoided this conceptual trap by juxtaposing it with the notion of ‘knowledge’. In the 1940s this view was emphasized by Lattimore’s endeavor to share his knowledge of China with the American public by writing a series of non-specialized books on international relations which he thought would have given anyone the necessary tools to think independently about the new world order. Moreover, by becoming a ‘public intellectual’ and authority on Asian affairs, Lattimore hoped to block other aspiring policy advisors, in particular the China Lobby who obtained growing influence on the Truman administration after the war.

3. Global or Local Democracy?

In April 1940, Lattimore argued that America was already implicated in the Asian conflict between Japan and Asia, which broke out with the Marco Polo incident in 1937, and could make a decisive contribution to its solution. In the following year he described the war as
global rather than regional, and suggested it was closely related to the problem of imperialism. Lattimore’s opposition to imperialism sheds light on his international thought, which sought to transform the imperial order into a global democratic system. The United States had a special role in this transformation, although it would not necessarily be the world’s new hegemonic leader. How could a democratic world order be created? Was it sufficient to export democratic principles and institutions from the West to the colonies? Was democracy, in both its conceptual and practical aspects, limited geographically or culturally, or could it be internationalized? Lattimore’s answer was a vision of a pluralistic, post-colonial global democracy in which different democratic systems could coexist.

Lattimore’s democracy was associated with a locally-specific concept of ‘freedom’, not with a universal concept of ‘justice’. Thus, political organization became the first and foremost step towards a just society, in which justice is administered by a legitimate democratic government. Lattimore was wary of making national self-determination the main criterion for statehood. Nationalism was too divisive and particular a concept for a democratic state, not to speak of a democratic world. The core of his regional democracy was a minimal notion of freedom which could be modified and extended to suit any political condition, and had two contingent meanings: a collective freedom from external imperial domination and a set of individual freedoms including freedom of political participation, freedom of speech, free press, and cultural freedom. In addition, political participation and social mobility were integral parts of the democratic project.

From the individual’s viewpoint, Lattimore’s approach ‘liberated’ certain aspects of human activity from political interference. The state could no longer coerce some activities which were beyond its sphere of action. This idea fits in Lattimore’s liberal project, which also emphasizes the importance of economic freedom from foreign domination. Industry
and trade could be part of imperial domination, or contribute towards a global economic
democratic order. Simultaneously, Lattimore readily accepted that democracy could be
paired not only with a capitalist economy but also with a collectivist-socialist system. He
argued that both systems provided potential for growth, and the choice should remain in the
hands of the local populations.

Lattimore argued that Chinese version of democracy would appeal to traditional
Asian communities where values like individual liberty, justice and equality often did not
have the same meaning as in the European or American democracies. In 1945 he opposed
the claims of Wendell Willkie’s bestseller One World that the American concept of political
freedom should be applied universally. In 1943 Willkie, an ex-presidential candidate,
published the story of his 49-day airplane tour around the world. For Lattimore, Willkie’s
own cultural and political views prevented him from understanding the local populations and
their unique political values. Unlike Willkie, Lattimore argued that in Asia social mobility and
political participation could be considered as attributes of democracy, even if political
freedom, as understood in America, was not fully guaranteed. Freedom was not an absolute
or universal value, but could be measured by the society's own standards, and should be
negotiated locally or regionally. External political influence was not completely excluded, but
rather articulated as a process of interaction and exchange, in which each self-governing
polity might look to its neighbors or to other states for political inspiration without losing its
sovereign power.

Lattimore thought the postwar world order would be based on a structural view of
politics in which ‘sovereignty’ would remain a supreme value. Could this vision
accommodate a concept of global justice without compromising state sovereignty? In his
writings Lattimore did not refer specifically to the term ‘justice’, unlike ‘democracy’ and
‘freedom’ which he discussed regularly. Since Lattimore did not accept a common, universal human good which goes beyond the principle of no-domination and self rule, any idea of global democratic justice cannot be realized without imposing a particular moral criterion on the entire world. Thus ‘Justice’ could only mean abolishing the discriminatory bias between internal and external freedom: the democracies that foster freedom at home should not deny democratic self-determination to other peoples.\(^{33}\) ‘Justice’ was a moral concept only to the extent that it followed the maxim ‘\textit{do as you would be done by}', which fits into Lattimore’s anti-imperial project.

Democracy as a world-ordering principle emerged, according to Lattimore’s historical analysis, from Western modernity. Contemporaneously, the global principle of imperialism became dominant. This dualism was the source of political and economic tensions, and thus had to be abolished. The geopolitical divide between the democratic imperial world and the non-free colonial world undermined the entire human project of modernity. It is evident from Lattimore’s loose conception of “democracy” that his humanistic vision was not prescriptive or conclusive, and focused on a republican version of “democracy” as freedom from domination, and free political participation. The main feature of humanity was the capacity to interpret “democracy” to match local social and political conditions, maintaining a shared core of individual freedom in a free community. Lattimore’s concept of freedom was essentially collectivist and communitarian, discussing the political space of the individual in terms of social mobility, political participation and economic entrepreneurship.

Interestingly, Lattimore made no reference to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, proclaimed at the State of the Union Address in 1941. These four aspects of liberty (freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear)
were set by Roosevelt as the goals of a new world order promoted by the United States which was celebrated by the United Nations Declaration of 1947. Possibly, Lattimore was more influenced by Chinese democratic thinkers than by American ones. Without subscribing to a ‘rights’ discourse, Lattimore did explore, although not in a consistent manner, free press, cultural freedom and freedom from imperial domination. It is significant that for Lattimore these were the foundations of a sound and democratic polity, not the entitlements of any human being regardless of political affiliation.

The fact that Lattimore did not share the individualistic approach to freedom fits into the Arendtian vision of human rights. Moyn, building on Arendt’s idea of ‘the right to have rights’, argued recently that global freedom in the 1940s was mainly perceived by Western thinkers as national self-determination, while individual rights, or ‘human rights’ were not part of the global political discourse of the time. Similarly, the main units of Lattimore’s global visions were not individuals but social groups, nations, states and regions. The term ‘human rights’ appeared sparsely in Lattimore’s writings and was not as central to his democratic vision as were political participation, inclusiveness and pluralism. The role of the international community was not to guarantee the freedom of each individual everywhere in the world, but to promote the development of local democratic and participatory mechanisms of self rule, which at their turn would defend the individual liberties of their citizens.

Emphasizing the importance of imperialism to shaping political traditions in Asia, Lattimore thought democracy in Asia meant ‘Asia for Asians’, instead of a government motivated by foreign powers and interests. But would this maxim mean that any government led by ‘local interests’ would be legitimate, regardless of popular consent and participation? Discussing minority problems in China, Lattimore recommended that each social faction be
democratically represented in the Parliament. However, for Lattimore participation at the national level was not a necessary condition for democracy. He distinguished between government and sovereignty in order to consider separately the origins and the practices of political rule. As a consequence, even a government that was not elected democratically could govern according to democratic principles of equality, freedom and legality. Thus he was able to affirm that the Chinese one-party system was democratic if it governed democratically and allowed a greater level of local participation than was allowed under the previous regime. The same was valid for the Soviet regime: its ‘harsh and cruel’ aspects were not inherent but a result of foreign influence. Lattimore admitted these self-proclaimed democracies to his global democratic system but failed to appreciate that a government for the people might in fact be empty propaganda, and thus undermined his own idea of popular participation in a government by the people. This view is doubtlessly problematic because it undermines the important deficiencies of the Chinese system in regard to individual liberties, popular participation and political rights. One way to understand Lattimore’s permissibility is suggesting that for him “democracy” meant an invitation card to political modernity. It was the minimal formal requirement to become a member in the international community of advanced nations. Since Lattimore expected the Asian states to become equal members in the international community, both symbolically and institutionally, he underlined democratic political organization as the basis for their political participation. As we shall see below, the content of each particular local version of ‘democracy’ could be transformed at a second stage, through democratic international relations with the established western democracies.

Democracy thus became an attribute of political progress, which had to be measured temporally rather than spatially, in comparison with the past condition of the same society rather than with other societies’ present situation. Lattimore struggled with the need to
accommodate different histories within the institutional and conceptual framework of democracy, and his solution was to maintain the flexibility and inclusiveness of the democratic system, instead of selecting one historical version of democracy as a normative model. In other words, he described democracy as a scalar not binary concept, which had to be re-measured and readjusted continuously. Yet the basic values that he considered as contributing to progress (like freedom, self rule, welfare) already indicate his own alignment with a particular concept of human modernity.

In 1945 Lattimore gave a series of lectures at Claremont College, California on American-Asian relations. In his lectures he outlined the nature of future political interaction between the United States and China and affirmed that unlike the Americans, the Chinese grasped one basic political principle: democracy was ever-changing, a way of ‘doing things’ rather than a fixed political system. Here the notions of ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization’ collide. Since there were for Lattimore many different civilizations, among which China was the ‘oldest living civilization’, it was only to be expected that each produced a different standard of democratic values and institutions. Lattimore might have been inspired by the works of his friend and colleague Arnold J. Toynbee, who developed a well-known theory of ‘world civilizations’ as historical and political components of the world’s system. Rather than states or the ‘international system’, Toynbee referred to ‘civilizations’ as the building-blocks of world politics. While for Toynbee the historical encounter between civilizations was characterized by conflict, Lattimore hoped for a more pacific interaction in which each civilization would put its cultural and political experience to the service of world democracy. This idea shifts the discussion from the merely political or legalistic plane to a social and cultural one. Here we return to the importance of knowledge, primarily anthropological and linguistic, in political decision making. A democratic world order could emerge from the
collective participation of different civilizations, nations, societies and peoples, rather than from the formation of legal and political world institutions.

The obvious and necessary question arising from this pluralistic global vision is how can different civilizations develop their different democratic systems? Lattimore argued that democracy was not only a system of political government, but also a method for decision-making based on popular participation and public discussion. Therefore, it had to emerge locally. ‘One of our habitual assumptions is that as backward peoples develop, even though they may demand political independence from Western countries, they must model their thought on the Western countries, hoping eventually to model their institutions on these same countries. This was true. It no longer is true.’ Lattimore accepted that foreign ideas could stimulate local democratic thinking in Asia. Yet following his geopolitical concept of the frontier, Lattimore suggested that the meaning of political concepts like democracy should emerge from active exchange of opinions and practices between different populations in a specific area. While exchange of ideas might not be a unique attribute of democracy, it was, for Lattimore, a necessary condition for its development. Geopolitical conditions also mattered because they allowed unmediated educating and inspiring encounters, as Lattimore never stopped emphasizing in his frontier theory. In lack of direct knowledge of far-away countries, when Asian populations acquired political agency they used ideas and models they discovered in encounters with local neighbors. The close relationship between politics and geography could contribute to formulating local pluralistic versions of democracy through the fruitful exchange of bordering societies.

However, Lattimore’s democratic theory was pluralistic and permissive only up to a point. The demand for secular politics articulated his idea of democracy in modern terms, but also set a limit to its inclusiveness. Although his ethnographic research presented religion
as an integral part of Asian cultures, he saw it as a source of conflict that should be expunged from the public sphere. Lattimore was particularly enthusiastic about India’s independence, and on several occasions met with Nehru to discuss their visions of Asia. However, in 1949, he expressed the hope that the newly founded state would turn away from the ‘archaic politics of religion’ towards ‘modern secular politics’. Secularism, and not only democracy, becomes the standard for participation in modern politics, and thus in the international sphere. Trying to limit the source of international and domestic conflict, Lattimore circumscribed the action of cultural attributes like religion to the private sphere, insisting that the public sphere would be guided by secular democracy alone. It is not clear how this view can be reconciled with his pluralistic democratic order founded on local interpretations of freedom. If we previously saw an attempt to integrate different cultural traditions into the modern idea of democracy, now it seems that this pluralistic approach is limited by a western concept of modernity as disenchanted secularism.

Lattimore’s account of the international role of democracy may seem slightly confusing. On the one hand, democracy was a local and contingent political structure based on political freedom and popular participation, but on the other hand democracy was the foundation of a global order. This tangle can be undone by viewing the flexible and mutating quality of democracy as a universal value in an increasingly interconnected world:

democracy by definition is a process of adjusting the demands and interests of all peoples by giving decision to the majority and at the same time protecting the basic rights of the minority. Democracy therefore has an inherent tendency to become a world order. [...] Today we live in a world which, for reasons of communications alone, let alone many other things, is a world in which isolation is physically impossible. The consequences of things done in any part of the world spread to all
other parts of the world. The fact that we are a democracy has a tremendous impact on hundreds of millions of people who do not have democracy.\textsuperscript{47}

In the 1940s many, like Willkie or Claire Booth Luce, the aviation pioneer, Republican politician and wife of publisher Henry Luce, argued that the world’s interconnectedness was not only a technological condition but also a political one.\textsuperscript{48} Yet for Lattimore this implied that the space of political action had to be extended from the West to the whole world, endowing all peoples with political agency. The assumption that political activity in one region had global effect directed him to envisage a world order which would be universal in taking the interests of ‘all peoples’ into account, and legitimate because the majority of these peoples would back it up, and could potentially withdraw their support. This was not a cosmopolitan democracy in which the individual was the centre of politics: Lattimore made explicit reference to ‘peoples’ as the basic political units.

Yet, if admittedly the variety of ‘peoples’ and ‘civilizations’ produced different - often contrasting - conceptions of democracy, such as the Chinese, the Soviet and the American variants, is it possible to reconcile them in one world order? Lattimore argued that political participation was the most important element of democratic rule. By taking an active stance in politics, any group of people could demand and guarantee their rights and freedom. However, even following Lattimore’s loose notion of ‘democracy’ it is certain that Soviet Russia or Chiang’s China did not guarantee the same degree of freedom of press and political participation as Roosevelt’s America, and could hardly be described as democratic. If we take Lattimore’s ideas as an outline of the future world order, rather than a descriptive account of his times, we still risk assuming that all polities should share a similar democratic prospect in varying degrees, even if their history shows no such inclination. As we shall see in more detail in the next section, Lattimore was not so naïve as to assert that communist
China and Russia could be considered as democratic as the United States, but he certainly came very close. He argued the Asian states had some democratic attributes that could be reinforced by free exchange of ideas with the democratic United States, but underlined that necessary differences between various democratic systems would be maintained in the future as well. It was the lack of explicit criticism of the totalitarian and repressive aspects of Soviet Russia and Republican China, and his hopes for democratic reforms, that rendered his writings vulnerable to attacks by McCarthy and his supporters.

4. 'Power of Attraction' and International Organizations

In 1946 Lattimore did not foresee a postwar world ‘divided into two sharply differentiated halves’, and objected to the tendency to define ‘who are for us and who are against us’. \(^49\) Instead, he saw a great potential for new political ideas, combining elements from the existing political, economic and social systems to create a pluralistic world order. ‘Among the most backward peoples the tendency will be toward an eclectic choosing of some things from our way of life and a somewhat lesser number of things from the Russian way of life. A part of this process will go the development of important new schools of thought.’ He suggested turning to Poland, Outer Mongolia and India for new political ideas to prevent the nascent United Nations Organization (UNO) from becoming a tool in the battle of the two great powers, the US and Russia. Thus, these smaller states would have direct political agency, rather than becoming “satellites” orbiting around the Great Powers. \(^50\) Lattimore envisaged a world order based on the geopolitical principle of tripolarity. The world would be divided into three dynamic democratic regions, America, Russia and an Asian ‘Freedom Bloc’ of small states led by China. Each region would be governed, possibly as a federation, according to its own political and economic philosophy. The interactions
between the three regions would have to be “democratic”, which for him meant based on popular participation and open discussion.

The two main means of international and interregional relations would be ‘power of attraction’ and ‘international organizations’. ‘Power of attraction’ is repeatedly though vaguely discussed in his writings: like ‘prestige’ it is the criterion by which local powers may be chosen as models by other peoples in their region, according to their dedication to freedom and ability to spread their political vision and cultural heritage beyond its borders. Power of attraction could be compared with ‘soft power’: the idea that states can have international impact without employing military means.\(^5^1\) This conceptualization of foreign policy aimed at convincing the American political leadership that direct military and financial intervention in favor of the Kuomintang government was not the best way to increase American influence in the region. It was both probable and desirable that societies formed their political structure according to models they find in their vicinity, and not in a distance military power. Lattimore suggested a more nuanced American foreign policy in China, in favor of local political agency, democratization and cross-party participation.

One way to measure ‘prestige’, or ‘power of attraction’, was ‘to compare what [a power] does with what it says’. By this logic, Lattimore judged Russia to be a major potentially democratic power that could have regional ‘power of attraction’ by acting more democratically.\(^5^2\) But unlike imperial power-politics, in the politics of prestige the smaller nations ‘will have some degree of option in deciding in which direction they prefer to gravitate’.\(^5^3\) By becoming more democratic, China could increase its prestige and attract more local nations under its political umbrella. Economic aid was a prominent feature of postwar ‘power of attraction’. After the Bretton Woods conference, he envisaged an international organization focused on social and economic development. In a conference on
war aims in Nebraska in March 1944, Lattimore described the UNO as a means to promote economic prosperity by a combined collective-capitalistic approach. Instead of insisting on European recovery through the Marshall Plan, he emphasized the need to involve Asia actively in formulating economic policies in the highly inter-connected world of the postwar era.

The question of political agency was central to Lattimore’s understanding of the role of international organizations in the era of decolonization. Lattimore was an enthusiastic supporter of decolonization movements worldwide and hoped the war would speed this process up. He saw the 1942 bilateral Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China, signed by the British and Chinese governments, as the dawn of a new geopolitical era in Asia. The new order would no longer be characterized by unequal or exploitative political and economic relationship, but by local governments for the benefit of local populations. Yet he warned that the legal change did not eradicate the Western mindset which considered Asia as an area that has ‘things done to it’ by the West. ‘It is often assumed that Asia is not a part of the world which can be expected to do things that alter the destiny or destroy the power of decision of the Western peoples.’ Accordingly, Asian states were not considered an ‘original political force’. It is unclear whether there is a contradiction between Lattimore’s focus on freedom in China and his theory of politics of ‘prestige’ which in practice would have allowed local powers to influence and perhaps curtail the freedom and sovereignty of smaller powers. While he was sensitive to the pernicious influence of the West on Asia, he was less concerned with the possible limitations of freedom resulting from the interaction between different states within the region.

Eric Wolf, who developed the idea of ‘people without history’, was greatly influenced by Lattimore’s work *The Inner Asian Frontier*. Lattimore originally argued that the imperial
worldview made the West see the Chinese, and the Asian populations more generally, as peoples without politics. Subsequently Wolf’s thesis challenged Western historical triumphalism by arguing that interconnectedness and interdependency characterize human societies all over the world. For Lattimore, as there were no peoples without history, there could not be peoples without political agency. The UNO could serve as a bulwark against Western imperialism by recognizing the political agency of non-Western peoples. The new trusteeship system should not be based on imported values and institutions, but on the development of local political systems according to international standards of good government, which for Lattimore spelled ‘democracy’. It is not clear, however, if for Lattimore all the peoples always had political agency, or just the capacity for political agency that needs certain conditions to be expressed. Possibly, his interpretation of imperialism as a repressive power suggests the latter.

Lattimore argued that although the UNO was often referred to as a ‘mechanism’, it operated by human will and intentions and not by unbiased technology or by a legalistic structure of interstate cooperation. Rather, the UNO was an open arena for political struggle which manifested the same controversies and power relations as the diplomatic world. Yet, Lattimore’s opinions of this organization changed according to his political priorities. In 1946, he thought the UNO should assist the colonial areas in their transition to democracy through the trusteeship system: ‘we should envisage the development of the trustee mechanism of the United Nations to the point where it can cover the whole range of territories, peoples, and problems represented by a number of countries now independent but so backward technically, socially, and politically that they really rank with the colonial countries.’ His position differed from most commentators on two points: he welcomed Russia’s participation as a trustee, and considered the trusted areas, especially in Asia, as
politically proactive. He thought the mandates should be limited in time in order to prevent the stabilization of political colonial rule. If the principle of prioritizing local interests was respected, Lattimore considered this system as an acceptable transition from imperial rule to freedom, giving Burma and the Philippines as examples.

I will now return to the question of Lattimore’s interpretation of democracy in Soviet Russia. For the bulk of his career, Lattimore presented Russia as a legitimate participant in world politics. In 1945 he wrote that the competition for ‘prestige’ and ‘power of attraction’ in Asia would make Russia adopt more democratic policies towards its citizens in general and minority groups in particular, increasing personal liberty and economic prosperity. Later, referring to Winston Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in Missouri, and to the Truman Doctrine which stemmed from it, he affirmed that ‘if we want to keep Russia behind “an iron curtain” we can do so, but to bring Russia out from behind the curtain, involves giving Russia equal status in the community of the world.’ Lattimore argued that the postwar UNO trusteeship system, could end the imperial world order only if it included Russia accommodated its collectivist economy side by side with the capitalist economy. Lattimore’s misguided faith in Soviet democracy was not shaken by his visit there with US vice-President, Henry Wallace in 1944. Despite traveling in the immediate vicinity of the Siberian gulags, and knowing the local languages, Lattimore didn’t uncover the antidemocratic essence of local political relations.

By 1949 there was a clear shift in Lattimore’s position. Despite Russian communism’s role in encouraging anti-imperial movements, particularly in its Leninist version, Lattimore recognized that this revolutionary prestige was dimmed and became a threat to American interests. What transformed Russia from a partner to a rival, or even an enemy? One possible reason could be rooted in American postwar political culture.
Lattimore’s legitimizing view of Russia as the editor of *Pacific Affairs* had already fueled the increasing suspicions of the American establishment against him as early as 1945. Perhaps the growing American Red-Scare hostility prompted Lattimore’s more patriotic approach. Yet another reading may underline the aggressive turn in Russian policy, exemplified in Czechoslovakia, as the motivation for Lattimore’s change of heart. During his visit to Prague in 1947, to commemorate the 1942 massacre of Lidice by German Nazis, Lattimore praised Czechoslovakia as an example of his idea of a political and economic ‘Third World’ between the US and Russia. In Prague he found that the capitalist and collectivist systems were reconciled peacefully and democratically in a polity based on free press and free elections, not on massacre and coercion. Less than a year afterwards the Soviets staged a communist coup which put an end to the democratic regime. This development must have induced Lattimore to accept that his ‘third quotient’ of democratic power would not be born with Soviet blessings. Although no supporter of communism as a political doctrine, it is easy to interpret Lattimore’s inclusiveness towards Soviet Russia as a support of the regime. While this interpretation might be wrong, it had a significant political purchase in postwar America and led eventually to Lattimore’s fall from academic and public grace.

5. Politics of race and nation in the global democracy

I will now discuss in further detail two notions which set the terms for political discussion in the 1940s: race and nationalism. As Gerry Kearns notes, after the First World War the discourses of race and nationalism provided two alternative geopolitical visions. At the Paris conference in 1919, the Wilsonian notion of a ‘nation’ had set the direction for a new geopolitical world order. At the outset of the Second World War these discourses were still in vogue: the geopolitical discourse of the 1940s was imbibed with notions of race and
nationalism, this time on a global and not only European scale. However, as we shall see in this section, Lattimore’s conception of democratic world order sought to limit significantly the influence of both race and nationalism on world politics.

Lattimore’s formative years were the ‘golden era’ of racial theories. From the late nineteenth century racial terminology permeated most areas of the social sciences. The idea of ‘race’ was widely employed to explain, describe, analyze and classify social phenomena, often encouraging racial essentialism both in academia and in the general public. These ideas also permeated the Chinese intellectual sphere, and were developed by local elites into theories of racial classification focused on the ‘biologically pure’ Han race. Later, Sun Yatsen’s vision of racial nationalism was the key political idea in Republican China. Although Lattimore was inspired by Sun, Mackinder and Bowman, he did not share their views on nationalism and race. For Mackinder, race was the fundamental quality of a nation. The characteristics of race, tied in a causal relation to the natural geographical environment, conditioned the political importance of a nation in the world. The ‘Anglo-Saxon race’, which developed a ‘benign government’, was distinguished and elevated above other nations and could therefore justify its imperial projects. For Mackinder and Bowman, who saw the imperial space as unstable and mutable, the notion of race could explain how certain peoples could control the environment better than others. Race remained a constant in the social-Darwinist struggle which constituted world politics.

By contrast, Lattimore tried to empty the concept of ‘race’ of political significance, and excluded it as a criterion for human classification or for political domination. At an earlier stage of his career, he used racial terms to describe the unique traits of the Chinese society, yet race was rarely the primary explanation of human action. By the 1940s he refuted the racial prejudices that prevailed in Chinese, American and British political
discourse. Lattimore sought to purge the debate on world politics of its racial obsessions, and disapproved of any use of the idea of race as a principle for political classification:

Several of the countries which are democratically organized at home are the owners of imperial possessions in Asia and Africa which not only are not democratically ruled, but are in fact organized on precisely the principle of "master race" and "subject" (less-human) race which is a fascist dogma. With the outbreak of war between the established master-races and the claimant master-races all this was changed. There are two important aspects of this change. In the first place, geographically localized demands for an extension of the principle of empire-modifications of the "old order"-were superseded by an all-inclusive struggle for the "new order"-the redivision of empire everywhere in the world. In the second place, all the subject-races have acquired a new importance. It is partly for the profit of ruling them that the great nations are fighting. Are they simply to acquiesce, paying taxes and in some cases providing troops?71

Significantly, Lattimore rejected the idea of distribution of political power by racial criteria as ‘a fascist dogma’. Did he reject the notion of ‘race’ as a whole, or only its imperialistic, ‘fascist’ version? Could some interpretation of ‘race’ be the foundation of social order? The concept of ‘race’ became for Lattimore a social construct, which might develop into an authoritative ‘dogma’ based on groundless beliefs. It was not the foundation of imperial relations and the historical experience of conquest, but the result. Similarly, in the 1940s nascent regimes with expansionist aspirations adopted racial discrimination as part of their imperial discourse: this was typical not only in Fascist Europe but also in rising empires like Japan, who wished to become the ‘new master race’.72 Thus, Lattimore did not share the view that Japanese imperialism announced a true new era of race relations which saw the
White race losing its superiority. Rather, he argued that a real new era would emerge only when the politically defined ‘subject races’ would throw off the imperial yoke and become free citizens in a democratic state. The 'subject races' existed only in the eyes of the imperialists, who used these categories to justify their conquests. When imperialism was obsolete the category of 'race' would disappear from political language.

Lattimore ‘race’ was no more than a rhetorical tool in political discourse. As a ‘fascist dogma’ it was an anti-liberal metaphor which pretends stability and rigidity where there are none. Wartime changes in the political geography of the world and the acquisition of political agency by previously marginalized groups revealed the manipulative political use of the racial discourse in the hands of the imperial powers. The war destabilized the relationships between White and non-White populations, who could also be categorized as colonizers and colonized. The hegemony of the White populations gave way not to an ascendant new race but to a universal, individualistic regime of human rights. Similarly, Lattimore excluded any race discourse that sought to establish a new exclusive political hegemony. His rejection of the politics of race fits into his vision of a new world order. The vertical categorization of human societies along racial lines had to be expunged from his global vision which entailed a ‘flat’, non-hierarchical but diversified space. Lattimore promoted a horizontal vision of mankind which accepted the shared traits of humanity as the foundation of the political system, thus rhetorically underlining the humanity of those previously described as less human subject races. To the extent that the notion of ‘equality’ appears in Lattimore’s writings, and it was not often discussed, it was conceptualized from a collectivist viewpoint which saw all communities as equally legitimate because they all showed different aspects of a pluralistic humanity, and were therefore entitled to have cultural and political voice. Yet, the equal standing of all human communities did not
guarantee a Wilsonian entitlement to self determination and political independence, but only to free participation in the democratic government of a racially and nationally pluralistic polity.

Unlike race, nationalism had a place in Lattimore’s theory as a guarantee for global pluralism and diversity. Lattimore argued that nationalistic movements promoted the development of each territory to its residents’ benefit. He considered nationalism as the only force in Asia that could guarantee local independence from the two rising powers, America and Russia. However, nationalism had to be curtailed; post-imperial politics would significantly differ from previous political patterns only if the ends of national politics were ‘national interests’ and the well-being of the whole world alike. Nationalism could be an anti-imperial ideology because historically, but not normatively, it was instrumental in transforming the obsolescent imperial order into a modern democratic system. But nationalism did not imply political self-determination: many nations could exist within a large state, and express their uniqueness through their particular culture and language. Lattimore construed a ‘nation’ as a social group, larger than a family or a village, which shared historical, ethnic and cultural traits. He saw nationalism as an anthropological-historical notion, not an ideological-political one, and ignored its possible manipulative or artificial aspects. Nationalism was one expression of the multiple political and social energies sparkling in Asia, awaiting the end of imperial rule to find new expressions within the new, large-scale, multinational Asian states. Lattimore's point was that national uniformity should not be the criterion for political legitimacy. On the contrary, he argued that different and diverse communities that wished to be joined in a common political project could establish a dynamic and long-lasting democracy based on free discussion and exchange of opinions.
Nationalism in Asia was thriving because it filled a social and political gap left after the postwar dissolution of empires. This political energy was ‘the “third quotient” which unlike the weak European ‘third force’ is not motivated by class but by nationalism.’ By 1949, Lattimore envisaged a concrete geopolitical location for the Asian “third quotient”, which he earlier called a “Third World”: between the Russian-Chinese land frontier and the American and European imperial ports and island holds. In this area Lattimore found various small ‘nations’ or societies, which have not yet obtained any political recognition, like the Mongols, Uzbeks, Menchu, Turkish Asians, Burmese, Koreans, and the Philippines. This ‘Third World’ could become a ‘Freedom block’ with a triple goal: to guarantee political liberty to local peoples, to become a ‘buffer zone’ between the two powers of Russia and America, and to generate new political activism to develop Asia as a region.

Looking at the world that emerged from Lattimore’s vision of a regional democracy, focused on the Asian land mass, it is clear that national self-determination could not be a globally-applied criterion. The geopolitical concept of ‘large spaces’ as ‘blocs’ of freedom and democracy, containing various ‘nations’ or peoples, was very important for Lattimore. He argued that political freedom was viable only in larger, pluralistic polities. What he defined as the Asian ‘Freedom bloc’, or the ‘third world’, would be an independent and democratic political region with important geopolitical stabilizing function in maintaining a global balance of powers. The idea that not all ‘nations’ should have political expression echoes that of earlier British internationalists, like A. E. Zimmern, who sought to revive the British Empire by encouraging the colonial peoples to embrace non-political nationalism. National qualities, such as culture, language, education, can flourish without a political system based on self-determination. Rather, a larger polity committed to freedom and democracy may be a better guarantee of minority rights than smaller national-states. While Lattimore rejected
any continuation of European imperialism in Asia, his vision of unifying various national minorities in a larger polity committed to freedom and democracy followed similar lines to the plan suggested by a British imperial apologist. Yet unlike Zimmern Lattimore did not promote large polities in order to guarantee that political power remained in the hands of those 'fit to govern'. Lattimore envisaged the origins of democracy in the political and social exchange in the frontier area. This practice could not continue in a state based on national homogeneity. Therefore, pluralism and diversity became the protectors of democracy, and rendered the Asian version of democratic politics globally extendable.

6. Conclusion: The Prospects of Democratic World Order

This article traced Owen Lattimore’s attempts at discussing global democracy through the demarcation and distinction of new political spaces. Lattimore used geopolitics to describe the two-way relationship between political power and geography, which was fundamentally - but not deterministically - important for the development of a new democratic world order. The story told in this paper shows that for Lattimore geopolitics was key for global change, rather than the foundation of state-centered security policy.\(^8\) Lattimore’s reconstruction of the global political space aimed to show that technology rendered the world unified, and to suggest that America’s foreign affairs should be managed according to a global and inclusive perception of politics. Yet, and no less important was his emphasis on democratic pluralism as a key factor in a new post-colonial world order. His global geopolitics encouraged American interventionism but underlined the need to collaborate on equal terms with the new rising democratic powers, especially in post-colonial Asia.

Lattimore’s hopes for a new democratic Asia were not fulfilled, and his geopolitical vision remained unrealized. By the early 1950s American policy-makers and public found his
views unsuitable for the fast-changing international situation. The United States struggled to come to terms with their role in the Korea War, and with the ‘loss of China’ to ‘atheist communism’. Even Lattimore agreed that Chiang and the Kuomintang failed to democratize China, but blamed the indifferent West for their defeat. He saw Chinese communism as anti-democratic because unrepresentative of the people’s will, and turned pragmatically to discuss India as the new democratic leader of the Asian ‘Freedom Bloc’. Contemporaneously, McCarthy’s attack banished Lattimore from the public sphere, and he abandoned his studies of international politics.

Nonetheless, today Lattimore’s international thought still offers a unique geopolitical and pluralistic vision of global democracy. Set against the state-centric realism that would become dominant in the American postwar discipline of International Relations, Lattimore used geopolitical ideas to promote a political strategy for an inclusive, regional and communitarian world order. This geopolitical perception of the world focused on politically-proactive communities – and not on individuals – as the basic units of a democratic, dynamic and intentionally unstable world order. Importantly, this structure would be based on interaction, voluntary exchange of opinion and popular participation, which for Lattimore were the antithesis to imperialism. Thus, unlike other contemporary geopolitical visions, his was a strategy for global post-colonial democracy, not for American supremacy.

Finally, Owen Lattimore’s invitation to think geopolitically about global democracy underlines the importance of local political agency in building a new world order. His political optimism led him to believe that the right to participate in political government, even to a limited extent, would be strong enough a guarantee of a democratic regime, which in turn would foster individual liberty. While facts did not back up this belief, Lattimore’s
emphasis of pluralism, diversity and localism as the conditions of a definitely post-colonial world democracy remains a worthy conclusion of his intellectual work.


William Holland and Robert Newman argued that the accusations were groundless and motivated simply by personal enmities and the collective hysteria which followed the rise of Chinese Communism and the Korean War. Newman, Lattimore, 180–193.


Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (London: Cresset Press, 1945), 58.

Bowman’s most celebrated work was an inspiration for German geopoliticians like Karl Haushofer. Isaiah Bowman, The New World; Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Company, 1928).


Lattimore’s frontier theory was applied by historians and anthropologists to various geopolitical realities. For example: M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, The Kirghiz and Wakhi of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers and War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); C.R. Whittaker, Rome and Its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire (London: Routledge,


22 Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 12.

23 Ibid., 10–15.


30 Owen Lattimore, 'After Four Years,' *Pacific Affairs* xiv (1941), 141–153; Lattimore, 'America Has No Time to Lose'; Lattimore, 'American Responsibilities'; Owen Lattimore, 'How to Win the War,' *American Legion Magazine* cxxxi (1942), 14–15, 111–3.

31 Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 104.


33 Owen Lattimore, ‘The Issue in Asia’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1946), 51. Similar ideas were voiced a few years earlier by the federalist Clarence Streit.


35 Moyn does not discuss non-Western thinkers. However, the affinity between his claims and Lattimore's Chinese inspired thought possibly shows the shared preference for community-rather than individual-based rights. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2010); Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken Books, 2004 [1951]).


38 Sandro Chignola explores the idea of democracy as the material and formal horizon of political modernity. See Chignola, ‘Democrazia’ in Roberto Esposito and Carlo Galli, eds., *Enciclopedia Del Pensiero Politico. Autori, Concetti, Dottrine* (Laterza, 2005), 208.


Lattimore, ‘The Issue in Asia’, 52.

The most salient example of this is Sun Yat-sen who read and translated many western political thinkers, including Rousseau, before developing his own ideas.

Lattimore, *Situation in Asia*, 185.

Lattimore, *America and Asia*, 22.


Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia*, 229.


Lattimore, *Solution in Asia*, 85.

Ibid., 87.

Lattimore edited into his book *Solution in Asia* the two lectures, ‘Japan and the Causes of War in Asia’ and ‘Japan and the Future of America’ delivered at Omaha, Nebraska, in March 1944, constituting the Fourth Annual Baxter Memorial Lectures.


Owen Lattimore, ‘Yunnan, Pivot of Southeast Asia’, *Foreign Affairs* xxi (1943), 476–93.


60 Lattimore, Solution in Asia, 99.


63 Newman, Lattimore, 56.


68 Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (London: Hurst, 1994), 97–107, 123.

Rowe, 'Owen Lattimore', 768.

Lattimore, 'After Four Years', 142.


Ibid., 3, 345–355.

Lattimore, Solution in Asia, 215.

Lattimore, Situation in Asia.

Lattimore was among the first to use the term ‘third world’. In 1948 he wrote of Asia as the ‘third world’, an alternative to both Soviet Russia and capitalist America. Owen Lattimore, ‘The Chessboard of Power and Politics’, The Virginia Quarterly Review xxiv (1948), 185.

Lattimore, Situation in Asia, 36–51.

Alfred E. Zimmern, Nationality and Government, with Other Wartime Essays (London: Chatto and Windus, 1918).


Newman, Lattimore, ix–xi.

Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (London, 1940); Lattimore, The Situation in Asia.