A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries

Schlegel, J. C. (2017). A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries (Report No. 17/06). London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University of London.

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We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Additional Information: Copyright 2017, the authors.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Matching; School Choice; Lotteries; Ex-Ante Stability
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18703

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