Luc Boltanski and His Critics:

An Afterword

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This Afterword provides a summary of the key themes, issues, and controversies covered in each of the preceding chapters.

Luc Boltanski and (Post-) Classical Sociology

Bridget Fowler

Readers who are not, or barely, conversant with Luc Boltanski’s key contributions to the contemporary social sciences will appreciate the clarity with which Bridget Fowler provides a valuable, wide-ranging, and critical introduction to his work in the opening chapter of this volume. As indicated in the title of her piece, ‘Figures of Descent from Classical Sociological Theory: Luc Boltanski’, Fowler examines Boltanski’s writings in relation to classical sociological thought. In so doing, she suggests that his critical engagement with mechanisms of ‘domination’ is firmly situated ‘in the Marxist and Weberian traditions’, whilst his interest in ‘moral and symbolic representations’ is indicative of the profound influence of ‘the Durkheimian tradition’ on his intellectual development. Full of admiration, Fowler insists that Boltanski ‘has made an enduring contribution to sociology’. More specifically, she claims that ‘perhaps the main virtue of Boltanski’s sociology has been to enrich our understanding of subjective meanings at moments of indeterminacy’, notably by exploring ordinary actors’ capacity to cope with the ontological uncertainty that appears to be built into the construction of social reality.

Seeking to make sense of Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory, Fowler proposes to distinguish three phases that are particularly relevant to the development of ever-more fine-grained conceptual tools in his writings:

I. The initial period refers to Boltanski’s outputs published in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. During this stage, he occasionally co-authored articles
with his ‘intellectual father’, Pierre Bourdieu. According to Fowler, the writings that Boltanski produced during this phase bear the hallmarks of ‘a critical advocate of Bourdieusian theory’—that is, of someone sharing the basic presuppositions that undergird Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist realism’.  

II. The **middle period** is based on the influential studies that Boltanski published in the 1990s. In these works, he focused on the sociological significance of the emergence of multiple social universes (*cités*), conceived of as different regimes of action and justification. If Fowler is right, this post-Bourdieusian phase in Boltanski’s intellectual biography is founded on a socio-contextualist version of ‘relativist perspectivism’, according to which human beings are always embedded in spatio-temporally contingent settings and can justify their practices only by undertaking ‘tests’ (*épreuves*) in relation to the normative parameters underlying idiosyncratic regimes of action.

III. The **most recent period** designates the phase between 1999 and the present—that is, the stage of his intellectual career in which, in Fowler’s view, ‘Boltanski has written his three greatest works’ and in which he has sought to develop an outline of ‘an original critical theory’, not only by eschewing any kind of epistemic or normative relativism, but also, more importantly, by ‘combining sociological enquiry with political or ethical reflections’. In other words, this intellectual period is marked by Boltanski’s utmost scholarly maturity, permitting him not only to avoid some of the key limitations and shortcomings of his earlier works but also to make his hitherto most substantial contribution to the humanities and social sciences.

I.

With regard to the **initial period**, two studies—both of which Boltanski co-authored with Bourdieu—stand out: ‘Le fétichisme de la langue’ (1975) and ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ (1976).  

In the first of these two works, Bourdieu and Boltanski ‘extended Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism to linguistic fetishism’, demonstrating that—at least since the fourteenth century, in France in particular and in the Francophone world in general—the phonetic mastery of the Parisian accent has been associated with the ability to benefit from ‘profits of distinction’ and obtain privileged symbolic legitimacy. To be sure, the surplus-value of ‘legitimate’ accents goes hand in hand with the devaluation of ‘illegitimate’ forms of language use. Thus, ‘the dialects of the devalued strata’—such as the working classes, peasants, and those people speaking with regionally specific accents—are degraded to ‘vulgar’ forms of linguistic expression, used by those who are deprived of the social privilege of being able to master the semantic,
syntactical, grammatical, phonetic, and pragmatic rules of the ‘legitimate language’. The differentiation between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ – regardless of whether it is socially, economically, culturally, or geographically defined – is essential to the reproduction of a ‘social system [that] inflicts from generation to generation on the underprivileged’ the burden of discrimination and marginalization.

In the second of the aforementioned two works, Bourdieu and Boltanski provide ‘a brilliant content analysis of key texts of social policy (“new vulgate”) and a sociological scrutiny of its sources’. In this study, as Fowler explains, the emergence of an ‘enlightened conservatism’ is scrutinized, notably in terms of its capacity to replace the obsolete agendas underlying the dominant ideologies of both the war and the post-war governments in twentieth-century France. On this account, the elites’ ‘radical plans for “unblocking” French society’ was motivated not only by the aim to retain Keynesian and progressive policies but also, paradoxically, by the market-oriented ambition to undermine the “dinosaurs” of French bureaucracy and trade unionism. This ‘modernizing agenda’, then, anticipated contemporary notions of the ‘Middle Way’ or the ‘Third Way’, inspired by the conviction that it is possible to find a compromise between state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism.

II.

During the middle period, Boltanski gradually moved away from the Bourdieusian framework, which he began to reject for its tendency ‘to focus too much on symbolic violence at the cost of a detailed phenomenology of actors’ subjective experience’ One of the main limitations of Bourdieu’s approach was that ‘it was premised on a gulf between the everyday world of agents and the objectified scientific understanding of the sociologist’ – that is, on an epistemic divide between people’s situated experiences and context-laden interpretations, on the one hand, and experts’ situating reflections and context-transcending explanations, on the other.

The shift of emphasis from ‘the domination of “agents”’ to the self-emancipation of ‘critically resourceful “actors”’ is reflected in the paradigmatic move from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. A pivotal assumption underpinning the former programme can be described as follows: since field-embedded agents are largely incapable of ‘seeing through’ the veil of doxa and common sense, it is the mission of sociologists to uncover the underlying mechanisms of domination by which social relations are shaped or, to some extent, even determined. A crucial conviction at the heart of the latter approach can be synthesized as follows: since ordinary actors are equipped with reflexive resources enabling them to problematize the legitimacy of normative arrangements and attribute
meaning to the power-laden constitution of the social world, it is the task of sociologists to demonstrate that people need to be conceived of as ‘possessing and implementing their own critiques’ when engaged in the construction of their everyday lives.

Several of Boltanski’s key works are associated with this post-Bourdieuian period, but Fowler considers two of them especially important: *L’amour et la justice comme compétences* (1990) and *De la justification : Les économies de la grandeur* (1991, with Laurent Thévenot). In this middle phase, Boltanski focused on exploring and ‘addressing the multiple worlds contemporary actors inhabit’, each of which possesses an idiosyncratic mode of functioning and specific normative parameters. As Fowler points out, this emphasis on the polycentric constitution of differentiated societies constitutes ‘less a break with than an elaboration of Bourdieu’s long-held concern with the divergent fields of modernity’. When examining ‘these clashing worlds (cités)’, Boltanski forcefully illustrates that ‘normative questions’ can be regarded as ‘the benchmarks of a truly social existence’. All forms of sociality are impregnated with spatio-temporally contingent codes of normativity. In Fowler’s view, however, since the publication of *La souffrance à distance* in 1993, ‘an important shift has occurred, a move away from cognitive relativism’, expressed in a rigorous rejection of ‘the anti-realist scepticism of certain post-1968 philosophers, notably Baudrillard’. This epistemological turn paved the way for Boltanski’s most recent phase, in which ‘kaleidoscopic perspectivism’ and socio-contextualist relativism have little, if any, place.

### III.

What is remarkable about the French scholar’s most recent – but not necessarily final – period is that, according to Fowler, this is the phase in which Boltanski ‘has written his three greatest works’. The three major studies that Fowler has in mind are the following: *Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme* (1999, with Ève Chiapello), *La condition fatale : Une sociologie de l’engendrement et de l’avortement* (2004), and *Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes* (2012).

Fowler begins by reflecting on the third of these important books. As she states, it is in *Énigmes et complots* that Boltanski ‘adds to his oeuvre a comparative assessment of different national trajectories, focusing closely on Britain and France’. Comparing and contrasting detective fiction (by Conan Doyle and Georges Simenon) and spy novels (by John Buchan, Eric Ambler, and John Le Carré), Boltanski aims to shed light on both the cultural and the structural determinants that have shaped the development not only of *detective and spy genres*, but also, more generally, of the social constitution of *France and Britain* in the second half of the nineteenth century. What is particularly
noteworthy, in this respect, is Boltanski’s claim that ‘the rise of positivist sociology in the 1850s inaugurates a mode of investigation of […] social forces underlying and structuring perceived regularities of social action’.49 This scientifically justified belief in the possibility of discovering hidden laws and causal mechanisms in both the natural world and the social world – which was epitomized in the uncovering mission of methodical enquiry and pursued in ‘such disparate disciplinary fields as sociology and psychiatry’50 – was reflected in the radical reconceptualization of the human subject: once portrayed as ‘sovereign arbiters of their own fates’,51 notably in liberal and socialist versions of Enlightenment thought, social actors now appeared constrained by both internal and external forces, whose existence largely escaped not only their consciousness but also their control. The rise of the nation-state and ever-more sophisticated instruments of ‘bio-power’52 were integral components of this paradigmatic shift from ‘autonomy’ to ‘heteronomy’. More significantly, however, Fowler maintains that, ‘for Boltanski, the spy novel revolves around the epistemological problem of determining the real springs of action within modern capitalism’.53 In Boltanski’s own words, ‘the spy novel exploits systematically what we have called the “hermeneutic contradiction”’;54 that is, it illustrates the ontological uncertainty that is built into the seemingly most consolidated forms of sociality.

Fowler goes on to draw attention to the main contributions made in Boltanski’s *La condition fémale* (2004). As she explains, not only is this study based on the Durkheimian proposition to conceive of social order as a moral order; but, in addition, it offers a ‘radical neo-Durkheimian analysis’55 that ‘enhances our empirical understanding of this moral order’.56 According to Fowler, Boltanski accomplishes this by making a case for ‘a progressive position from the point of view of feminist theory’57 – namely, in relation to the normative defence of ‘women’s freedom to have an abortion’.58 Indeed, one of the significant limitations of Durkheim’s analysis is that, although it endorses ‘the meritocratic right of actors’,59 it does so – essentially – in relation to men and, thus, without including women.

As Fowler stresses in her appreciative remarks, Boltanski succeeds in making ‘a powerful case for the moral nature of abortion itself’,60 rather than simply examining the presuppositional underpinnings of the arguments made in opposition to it. Fowler praises Boltanski for providing an empirically informed and ‘invaluable phenomenology of abortion’,61 in which he illustrates how women who decide to have an abortion justify their choice. Indeed, it appears that, for many of them, it represents the ‘least bad choice’62 and – in the light of ‘work, kinship, and personality constraints’63 – ‘an unfortunate necessity’.64 Similar to key themes running through recently developed conceptions of ‘reflexive modernity’,65 according to which actors living in highly differentiated societies are not only allowed but also expected to make both short-term and long-term decisions for themselves, Boltanski places considerable emphasis
on the sociological significance of ‘choice’. According to Fowler, ‘Boltanski’s basic argument is that once a woman becomes pregnant she has a choice of whether or not to keep the “tumoral foetus”’. From this perspective, pregnancy confronts the woman carrying the foetus no less with the option of aborting it than with the option of keeping it. If, for instance, it fits into her ‘parental project’, she will metaphorically ‘adopt’ it and, hence, project herself into the future with and through it, rather than without and against it.

Although she agrees with substantial parts of the argument made in this study, Fowler posits that La condition fœtale suffers from significant shortcomings for the following reasons:

(a) for failing to take into account ‘the specific patriarchal bargain that women make in current capitalist societies, particularly in relation to their occupational fields’;
(b) for painting a reductive picture of the situation, insofar as ‘the place where the sample was selected – the abortion clinic – means that it throws light on women who choose abortions’, thereby systematically excluding the views and practices of those categorically opposed to them;
(c) for understating the sociological consequences arising from ‘the construction of “abortion” as a criminalized act in the nineteenth century’;
(d) for downplaying the sociological significance of structural differences – notably those based on class, ethnicity, and age – in shaping women’s relation to, attitude towards, and perception of abortion.

Drawing on Kristin Luker’s Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (1984), Fowler insists that women who enjoy the benefit of being equipped with high cultural and economic capital tend to conceive of motherhood as a ‘private discretionary choice’, rather than as ‘a natural role for all women’, whereas ‘[w]omen who have few of these resources and limited opportunities in the job market want to see motherhood recognized as the most important thing a woman can do’. In short, sociological determinants – such as class, ethnicity, and age – are enormously powerful in influencing attitudes towards, as well as embodied practices in relation to, the contentious subject of abortion.

Finally, Fowler comments on what is arguably ‘the crowning achievement of Boltanski’s career’: Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, co-authored with Ève Chiapello (1999). In Fowler’s opinion, this study not only provides a ‘compelling critique of neo-liberal individualism’, but, furthermore, transcends the relativism underpinning some of Boltanski’s previous works. Yet, far from naively portraying the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism as an exclusively progressive – let alone universally empowering – historical achievement, Boltanski and Chiapello stress its ‘obscenely inegalitarian’ character. Indeed, its ‘expectations of mobility and constant tests for
selection (épreuves) create a precarious existence for ordinary people”\textsuperscript{81} to the extent that they cannot cope with the new systemic imperatives thrown at them and are, in many cases, relegated to the fringes of society. In Fowler’s eyes, the brilliance of Boltanski and Chiapello’s account ‘lies in its grasp of the complexity of the social world’\textsuperscript{82}. Rejecting the socio-ontological optimism of communication-focused – notably Habermasian – approaches and the socio-ontological pessimism of power-focused – especially Nietzschean – approaches, Boltanski and Chiapello endorse a position of socio-ontological realism capable of doing justice to the fact that all societies – including advanced capitalist ones – are permeated by the paradoxical interplay between altruistic and egoistic, solidary and strategic, as well as cooperative and competitive forces.

What is crucial from a historical perspective, however, is to distinguish between three ‘spirits of capitalism’:

- The ‘first spirit of capitalism’ is intimately interrelated with the ‘productive ethos’\textsuperscript{83} of Weber’s famous Protestant Ethic.\textsuperscript{84} Yet, instead of endorsing an idealist reading of this ‘spirit’, Fowler – drawing upon Christopher Hill’s Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England\textsuperscript{85} (1991 [1974]) – insists that ‘it was only the conjunction between the already developing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century urban capitalists and the new spirit\textsuperscript{86} that was capable of doing away with ‘the ancient mould’\textsuperscript{87} of feudal-absolutist societies. Doing away with the rigid social, political, and economic structures of premodern formations, the constitutive component of the ‘first spirit of capitalism’ was productivism.

- The ‘second spirit of capitalism’ emerged in ‘response to the crisis of 1929–30’\textsuperscript{88}. In essence, it was composed of a combination of Keynesianism and Fordism – that is, of ‘Keynesian economics and the Fordist factory division of labour’\textsuperscript{89} –, which can be conceived of as ‘a trade-off between the civic cité of Rousseau and the industrial cité of Saint-Simon’.\textsuperscript{90} The societal constellation generated by this historic settlement – which may be described in terms of a search for a ‘class compromise’ aimed at maintaining and legitimizing, rather than undermining or jeopardizing, capitalism – had two major consequences: (a) it contributed to enhancing the acquisitive power of the working classes as well as people’s chances to benefit from upward social mobility; and (b) it contributed to the rise, and increasing influence, of a ‘more autonomous salaried professional work, especially in the liberal professions, arts and sciences, and public sector’\textsuperscript{91}.

- The ‘third spirit of capitalism’, also described as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, is founded on ‘the restoration of full-blown market discipline together with a shift to financialization’.\textsuperscript{92} This development appears to indicate ‘the re-emergence of the power of capital’\textsuperscript{93} at the expense of previously
established processes and structures of social integration based on cross-class solidarity. Similar to Bourdieu, Boltanski and Chiapello interpret ‘the new ideologies of the 1970s as a turn to neo-liberalism’. As Fowler highlights, however, it appears that ‘the architects of the neo-liberal spirit developed an innovative form of individualism, paradoxically gaining new force from its adversaries’. More specifically, ‘the unexpected recuperation of a number of the critical themes of the student and artists’ revolt of May 1968 and of the nineteenth-century modernist critique of the philistinism of the bourgeoisie’ implies that the ‘third and new spirit of capitalism’ has succeeded in appropriating the subversive forces that sought to undermine its very legitimacy for its own purposes. In other words, the elastic and flexible nature of this ‘new spirit’ builds on capitalism’s capacity to promote and integrate, rather than to tolerate or marginalize, discursive processes of debate and critique, thereby transforming itself into a politico-economic system that is structurally and ideologically highly adaptable. In brief, the idea of ‘dominating by change’ represents the Zeitgeist that lies at the heart of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’.

As Fowler explains in the penultimate section of her chapter, Boltanski and Chiapello’s analytical approach is similar to Bourdieu’s method, in the sense that both not only draw upon but also seek to cross-fertilize ‘classical’ – that is, Marxian, Weberian, Durkheimian, and Simmelian – traditions of sociological thought. The most general consensus, in this respect, is the insight that ‘markets are embedded in social relations’ and that, to use Bourdieusian terminology, they cannot be dissociated from the social – and, hence, historically contingent – conditions of production under whose influence they emerge. Thus, even if we come to the conclusion that, in principle, ‘the desire for ever-increasing money has no limits’, it is the task of sociologists to examine this seemingly ‘natural drive’ against the background of idiosyncratic – and constantly shifting – socio-historical backgrounds.

In her Conclusion, Fowler turns her attention to De la critique (2009), one of Boltanski’s latest books. In various – recently published – review articles, this study has been criticized on several counts, perhaps most importantly (a) for making numerous rather straightforward points in an unnecessarily complicated language, (b) for failing to make an original contribution to critical theory, and (c) for not succeeding in providing a systematic account of what is to be gained – both theoretically and practically – from reconciling Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ with Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’.

According to Fowler, one of the most central aspects of De la critique, however, is Boltanski’s attempt ‘to combine critical realism with social
constructivism” by drawing a conceptual distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité). The former is composed of ‘everything that is the case’, whereas the latter encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’. Put differently, the world is ‘everything that happens to people’, whilst reality is ‘everything that is constructed by people’. As Fowler eloquently states, the sociological significance of this distinction is due to the fact that the world ‘of which we have experience’ is ‘often out of kilter with ideological expectations and constructions’ emerging within and through social reality. From a Boltanskian perspective, therefore, it is the task of social institutions – that is, of perhaps the most powerful ‘bodiless beings’ regulating the performative constitution of the modern world – to enable human actors to cope with the ontological insecurity that is built into their lives, by constructing a sense of existential certainty and praxeological predictability in their symbolically mediated encounter with reality. Boltanski’s belief in the necessity and viability of an ‘emancipatory politics’ is motivated by the conviction that ordinary people’s critical capacity permits them not only to problematize the countless ‘hermeneutic contradictions’ that shape the tension-laden developments of their communities and societies, but also to contribute to ‘a better distribution of capacities for action’ in the attempt to construct more egalitarian – and, thus, more universally empowering – coexistential realities.

Luc Boltanski and Pragmatism

Louis Quéré and Cédric Terzi

In their methodical and in-depth contribution to this volume, Louis Quéré and Cédric Terzi take on a paradoxical task: they examine, assess, and criticize Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic’ sociology from a ‘pragmatist’ perspective. The thought-provoking spirit underlying this endeavour is reflected in the provocative title of their chapter: ‘Did You Say “Pragmatic”? Luc Boltanski’s Sociology from a Pragmatist Perspective’. As they state in the opening section of their analysis, ‘Luc Boltanski’s sociology has been labelled “pragmatic”, and the author now uses this label to characterize his research endeavour’. Yet, the two authors seek to challenge the validity of this description; indeed, they go as far as to assert that they ‘do not see what is truly “pragmatic” in Boltanski’s sociology’, which they perceive as ‘a continuation of the classical dualisms of European thought’. In particular, they maintain that the explanatory framework proposed by Boltanski ‘seems to make the same mistakes as the wholesale generalizations of social theory’. Their chapter is divided into four principal sections.
I.

In the first section, entitled ‘What Is “Pragmatic” about Boltanski’s Sociology?’, the authors explore the distinctive presuppositional nature of the explanatory framework developed by Bourdieu’s arguably most influential disciple. According to their account, Boltanski, when choosing the term ‘pragmatic’ to characterize his sociology, draws mainly upon linguistic pragmatics. The distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ is essential to understanding the extent to which the social construction of meaning is not only symbolically mediated (‘semantics’) but also contingent upon context-specific practices (‘pragmatics’). In a somewhat critical manner, Quéré and Terzi insist, however, that such a meaning-focused approach – which aims to study social orders ‘from the perspective of action and actors’ – is not unique to Boltanski’s pragmatism. What is more original about his framework, they claim, is his attempt to construct a ‘wide grammar of action oriented towards morals’, which is based on the following four operations:

(a) the attempt to conceive of critical capacity as a moral capacity, thereby accounting for the fact that ordinary criticisms are, to a large extent, founded on ethical reasoning and a sense of justice;
(b) the attempt to examine social actions in terms of both normative requirements and structural constraints, both of which play a pivotal role in shaping people’s everyday practices;
(c) the attempt ‘to “model” both actors’ competences and the devices in which their actions take place’, notably with regard to the evaluative capacities and regulative supports that are necessary for the construction of culturally codified practices;
(d) the attempt to provide a conceptual framework capable of ‘connecting the analysis of action to an analysis of situations’.

As Quéré and Terzi point out, the key assumption underlying most so-called ‘pragmatic’ frameworks in sociology is that action can be conceived of ‘as a purposive process – that is, as an ordered and self-organizing series of acts carried out in order to achieve a particular result’. On this view, social actions should be studied not only in terms of their context-specific ‘temporality, sequentiality, and seriality’ but also in terms of people’s capacity to convert their ‘reflexivity’ into one of the core elements of their performative engagement with reality. What is perhaps even more significant about most ‘pragmatic’ conceptions of human actions, however, is that they strongly ‘reject the idea that qualities, ends, or values can be determined without practical experience’. On this account, people’s purposive, normative, and expressive ways of relating to reality are
embedded in the everyday practices in which they find themselves immersed, and of which they have direct experiences, as members of a given society.

In his ‘sociology of critique’, however, Boltanski seeks to ‘reconstruct a “grammar” of action’ by insisting on the socio-ontological significance of both normative requirements and structural constraints, owing to the central role that they play in shaping the course of human practices. Drawing on French structural semantics, the following three – interrelated – operations appear to be chiefly important in Boltanski’s sociology:

(a) the attempt to identify specific interactional patterns by virtue of a grammatical analysis of social practices;
(b) the attempt to confirm the existence of these patterns on the basis of the empirical study of the ways in which ordinary actors experience reality;
(c) the attempt to examine historical variations of these patterns and of the ways in which they impact upon the constitution and the development of individual and collective actions.

Quéré and Terzi interpret the elaboration of this sociological framework as a product of Boltanski’s serious engagement with processes of qualification and categorization in general as well as with public denunciations of different forms of injustice in particular. This focus on normative issues led him to distance himself from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and, subsequently, develop his own approach, widely known under the name ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. As they explain, Boltanski – in his later work, notably in his On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation (2011 [2009]) – has made a substantial effort to cross-fertilize the two frameworks. Such an endeavour is aimed at formulating a ‘metacritique’ by virtue of which social orders can be studied as ‘totalities’, whilst acknowledging that ordinary people have the capacity to engage in disputes over the tension-laden constitution of multiple regimes of action. More specifically, Boltanski’s interest in different forms of criticism is inextricably linked to his insistence on the ‘role of contradictions at the core of social life’, expressed in the ‘vulnerability of institutions’ and, more generally, in what he describes as the ‘fragility of reality’.

II.

In the second section, entitled ‘A Depreciation of the Domain of Practice’, the authors scrutinize Boltanski’s interpretation of ‘the limitations of capacities of practice’. To be exact, they affirm that Boltanski seeks to justify his view of these limitations by reference to three key concerns: (a) ‘linguistic pragmatics’, (b) ‘reflexivity’, and (c) ‘qualification’.
(a) Linguistic Pragmatics

In relation to the concept of ‘linguistic pragmatics’, the distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ is central. The former conceives of meaning ‘as a linguistic relation between signs’ and focuses on the relations between ‘signifiés’ within a given language. The latter examines meaning in terms of its ‘contextual production’ and the way it is constructed through the use of symbolic forms in spatio-temporally specific settings. As Quéré and Terzi remark, Boltanski ‘takes up this distinction in a somewhat idiosyncratic fashion’. For him, they contend, semantics concerns essentially ‘the “construction of reality” in the domain of discourse’ and, hence, the ‘relation between a symbol and an object, or between a symbol and a state of affairs in the world’. Given his critical engagement with processes of classification, he is particularly interested in ‘the establishment of qualifications’—that is, in ‘the operations which indivisibly fix the properties of beings and determine their worth’. According to Quéré and Terzi, pragmatics is interpreted as ‘the reverse of semantics’ in Boltanskian thought. As such, it is intimately interrelated with ‘the uncertainty and contingency of situated action’. In short, ‘[w]hereas semantics is integrative and totalizing, pragmatics is about the display of the many interpretive operations required by action and, consequently, about a field in which meanings are infinitely divided’.

For Quéré and Terzi, the principal problem with Boltanski’s assertion that his approach deserves to be described as ‘pragmatic’ is that ‘he borrows many of his concerns and presuppositions from semantics, especially from Greimas’s structural semantics and from Chomsky’s generative semantics’. Consequently, he runs the risk of failing to do justice to the importance of ‘pragmatics’ for a genuinely ‘pragmatic’ sociology of action. Moreover, it appears that his ‘account of objects remains partial’; it overemphasizes the role of ‘actors’ competences’ and of ‘their cognitive and deontic endowments’; at the same time, it underemphasizes the centrality of actors’ practices and of their experiences. In particular, Quéré and Terzi are critical of Boltanski’s portrayal of ‘the social world as the scene of a trial, in the course of which actors in a situation of uncertainty proceed to investigations, record their interpretations of what happens in reports, establish qualifications and submit to tests’. The main reason why the two authors reject Boltanski’s framework is that, as they see it, it suggests that actors’ critical competences are substantially restricted in two respects:

(i) the preponderance of grammatical constraints in realms of social interaction ‘is unfavourable to the development of critique’; and
(ii) in the Boltanskian universe of normative tests, one gets the impression that actors can ‘hardly grasp the devices and test the formats through which the worth and value of persons and things are defined’.
In brief, for Quéré and Terzi, there is little doubt that, in essence, ‘this approach is more structuralist than pragmatist’ and that it fails to take seriously the accomplishments of both classical and contemporary forms of pragmatism, which not only ‘attribute critical competences to people’ but, furthermore, avoid falling into the pitfalls of ‘grammaticalist’ forms of social determinism. Put differently, according to Quéré and Terzi, there is too much structuralism and too little pragmatism in Boltanski’s sociology.

(b) Reflexivity

In relation to the concept of ‘reflexivity’, Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski of endorsing an intellectualist position. As they state, Boltanski differentiates between two registers of analysis: ‘the practical’ and ‘the metapragmatic’. In the first register, ‘reflexivity is low and tolerance prevails’. At this level, there is not much room for critique, as it is characterized by general acceptance, tacit agreement, and de facto taken-for-grantedness, implying that contradictions remain largely unnoticed. In the second register, ‘reflexivity is high’, meaning that, in principle, everything is open to questioning and scrutiny. At this level, critique is vital, as ‘the attention of participants shifts from the task to be performed to the question of how it is appropriate to characterize what is happening’.

Boltanski, then, ‘links the increase of reflexivity in action to dispute or controversy’. On this view, reflexive processes are based on ‘a transition from an implicit qualification of events, situations, objects, and persons to an explicit one through an open confrontation’. As far as Quéré and Terzi are concerned, this account is problematic in that it gives the misleading impression that an intensification of reflexivity is possible only in terms of a ‘disconnection’ between the framing of a judgement of a situation and the situation itself. Yet, as the two commentators insist, from a genuinely pragmatist perspective, ‘there can be no switch of such kind: we cannot stop acting, but there are many ways of acting’. In opposition to Boltanski’s account, they posit that ‘passing from the “practical register” to the “metapragmatic register” looks more like a change in attitude in a continuous course of action, in which a normative practice takes over from an ordinary one’. Indeed, it seems that, in everyday life, these attitude-specific transitions are common, rather than exceptional, forming an integral part of ‘situated practical activities’. If this is true, then ‘Boltanski’s distinction between “pragmatic registers” and “metapragmatic registers” is unsatisfactory’. For what he presents – or, to be precise, misrepresents – ‘as an increase in the level of reflexivity is, rather, a change in attitude’ – that is, a transformation in an actor’s way of relating to reality whilst immersed in an incessant stream of actions. Quéré and Terzi put this as follows:

One evidence for the reflexive character of mundane action is the fact that every practical activity directs and corrects itself from within its accomplishment –
through adjusting itself to transformations of its object or to the changes occurring both in agent and in circumstances, through evaluating *a priori* and *a posteriori* the results and consequences of movements and gestures, through measuring what has been done in the light of what should have been done, or what is being done in the light of what is aimed for, and so on and so forth.\textsuperscript{175}

Far from being reducible to a mechanical switching-back-and-forth between ‘the practical register’ and ‘the metapragmatic register’, social life constitutes a continuous flow of interconnected actions, which are shaped and modified from within, rather than from without, their spatio-temporally situated sphere of performative unfolding.

(c) Qualification

In relation to the concept of ‘qualification’, Quéré and Terzi remark not only that it lies at the heart of Boltanski’s sociology of everyday tests (épreuves), but also that, within his framework, it is to be understood ‘in reference to juridical procedures’.\textsuperscript{176} In essence, the process of qualification represents ‘an authorizing act’,\textsuperscript{177} which fulfils three key functions:

(i) it establishes typological *definitions* of objects and of its predicates;
(ii) it determines their *value* in relation to other objects;
(iii) it provides implicit or explicit codes of *normativity*, stipulating what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.\textsuperscript{178}

According to Quéré and Terzi’s perspective,

Boltanski’s modelling is problematic because he takes into consideration only the *semantic* function of legal qualifications – that is, without mentioning their *pragmatic* dimension.\textsuperscript{179}

More specifically, they maintain that ‘qualifications imply less ontological import than Boltanski appears to suggest’.\textsuperscript{180} In their eyes, he ‘confines the “qualification of beings” in the merely metapragmatic register, as he downgrades the reflexive component of practices’.\textsuperscript{181} As illustrated by John Dewey, however, qualification processes form an integral component of all practical judgements, including those resting on ‘an intuitive or emotional grasp both of the unique quality of a situation and of the qualities of things in that situation’.\textsuperscript{182} Quéré and Terzi go as far as to affirm that ‘Boltanski’s action-based approach appears as a regression with reference to Bourdieu’s analysis of practice’.\textsuperscript{183} In their view, the latter provides an astute account of the logic of bodily knowledge – including ‘practical reflection’ and
‘practical reasoning’ – in terms of a person’s ‘habitus’, whereas the former offers little more than an intellectualist explanation of corporeal practices.

In the end, even if Boltanski had good reasons to distance himself from Bourdieu, he left aside Bourdieu’s ‘logic of practice’ approach; consequently, he was led to adopt the intellectualist depreciation of the domain of practice.\(^{184}\)

As Quéré and Terzi see it, however, actors are always already required to cope with the practical imperatives to which they are exposed when finding themselves immersed in particular social situations. Consequently, they are – although, admittedly, to varying degrees – used to facing ‘uncertainty, contingency, and unpredictability of circumstances and consequences, of acts and events, and the risks they imply’.\(^{185}\) Given this inseparable relationship between the experiential and the epistemic dimensions of social practices, pragmatism has always sought to challenge the scholastic ‘depreciation of practice’,\(^{186}\) which fails to account for the fact that, as Charles Taylor puts it, ‘[r]ather than representations being the primary locus of understanding, they are only islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world’.\(^{187}\)

In their analysis, Quéré and Terzi draw on a central conviction articulated by the later Wittgenstein: insofar as language games are played within spatio-temporally specific life forms, the emergence of grammatical rules cannot be dissociated from the unfolding of social practices. With this contextualist persuasion in mind, Quéré and Terzi insist that, from a pragmatist perspective, ‘one cannot agree with an approach asserting that the normative frameworks required for ordering social life cannot be produced and maintained through practices’.\(^{188}\) What is, for them, utterly unsatisfying about Boltanski’s allegedly ‘pragmatic’ account is that, upon reflection, it turns out to be ‘a very “classical”’ – or, if one prefers, “mainstream” – theory of action’,\(^{189}\) culpable of ‘belittling the domain of practice’.\(^{190}\) On this interpretation, it seems that, not dissimilar to methodological-individualist models, it ‘remains focused on the actors’,\(^{191}\) instead of engaging with the realm of performances in a far broader sense. Owing to this significant shortcoming, ‘it is not interested in how processes of action are organized and directed from within their accomplishment’;\(^{192}\) rather, it is limited to the unsatisfactorily abstract – that is, ‘metapragmatic’ – analysis of performative processes, without doing justice to the fact that these are always already inhabited by the practical power of reflexivity.

III.

In the third section, entitled ‘A Hobbesian Anthropology as a Background for “Pragmatic Sociology”?’,\(^{193}\) Quéré and Terzi – in line with arguments put forward by Joan Stavo-Debauge\(^{194}\) as well as by Laurence Kaufmann\(^{195}\) – defend
the claim that Boltanski’s theory of critique is founded on an atomistic conception of the human condition. To be exact, Boltanski’s sociology is based on a Hobbesian anthropology, since it aims – in the author’s own words – ‘to pose the question of the consistency of the social world from an original position where a radical uncertainty prevails’. Inevitably, as Quéré and Terzi remark, ‘[h]is conception of such an original position gives primacy to individuals needing to be acculturated and socialized’. According to this Hobbesian account, we need to recognize not only that individuals are driven by ‘differing impulses, desires, and interests’ and that, as a consequence, they develop particular worldviews representing their position in relation to others, but, in addition, that – owing to the ontological ‘primacy of individuals’ – ‘the social world is derived and constructed’. Thus, instead of making a case for methodological holism, inspired by the belief in the existential preponderance of ‘the social’, Boltanski appears to embrace a position of methodological individualism, expressed in the insistence on the ontological prevalence of the – relatively independent and seemingly self-sufficient – ‘human actor’. Grappling with the problems arising from this Hobbesian presupposition, Quéré and Terzi reflect on the following sociological issues.

(a) The Semantic Nature of Institutions

One of the most fundamental Hobbesian – and, arguably, Boltanskian – questions can be formulated as follows: If the existence of individuals enjoys ontological primacy over the existence of society and if – owing to their multitude of impulses, desires, and interests, as well as to their plurality of interpretations, opinions, and worldviews – there is no consensus inherent in, or quasi-naturally emerging from, the construction of social life, how is it possible to avoid an outbreak of violence and, indeed, of ‘the war of all against all’? As Quéré and Terzi point out, ‘Boltanski’s response is a variation of Hobbes’s: only submission to institutional authority can reduce radical uncertainty, because institutions are in charge of ordering what reality is, decreeing what has worth, and prescribing what must be done’. For Boltanski, ‘[i]nstitutional authority is a “bodiless” one’. Yet, although ‘institutions provide for a semantic and deontic vouchsafing’, they are always in danger of being undermined. To the extent that ‘an institutionally constructed, stabilized, and totalized reality remains irretrievably fragile’, the most consolidated social constellations are subject to the possibility of their deconstruction and transformation.

Thus, similar to John Searle’s conception of social constructionism, Boltanski insists that ‘[r]eality is radically uncertain’. Whilst ‘institutional devices take on the semantic function of reducing the gaps between “world” and “reality”’, the attempt to take control of the ‘world’ in its entirety can never be fully accomplished, since ‘“reality” remains irremediably fragile and exposed to the risk of division’. Given his ‘nominalist bias derived from
linguistic semantics, Boltanski is eager to stress that one of the key functions of institutions is to guarantee the symbolically mediated ‘maintenance of reality’. As Quéré and Terzi contend, however, ‘Boltanski’s Hobbesian anthropology rules out the existence of primordial agreement between members of a society’. In their eyes, this atomistic anthropology is deeply problematic for the following reason:

The agreement Boltanski rules out is a semantic, not a pragmatic, one. He objects—and rightly so—to the existence of an agreement of beliefs, of a convergence of opinions and representations, or of a harmony of interpretations. Yet, he ignores a possible agreement in activities that would differ from the agreement of opinions or points of view.

In other words, Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski not only of effectively endorsing a Hobbesian anthropology but also of advocating a semanticist, rather than pragmatist, conception of agreement. According to this allegation, his approach fails to account for actors’ capacity to establish pre-cultural and pre-semantic – that is, pre-institutional – forms of coexistent arrangements, allowing for the relative predictability of their peaceful practices. What is even more significant, however, is the following irony: owing to the emphasis it places on the empowering – notably, critical and moral – capacities of ordinary actors, Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ tends to be conceived of as a form of socio-ontological optimism; by contrast, due to its insistence on the potentially disempowering – notably structural – effects of social domination, Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ tends to be interpreted as a form of socio-ontological pessimism. As elucidated above, Quéré and Terzi challenge this assessment by claiming that the Hobbesian spirit underlying Boltanski’s understanding of ‘the social’ – especially in his later work – leaves little, if any, room for an idealist conception of the human condition in general and of human lifeworlds in particular.

(b) Do Desires and Points of View Precede Society?

In opposition to Boltanski’s – arguably Hobbesian – conception of pre-institutional life, which is characterized by radical uncertainty and constant fear sparked by the potential outbreak of violence, Quéré and Terzi defend the notion that, ‘[f]rom a pragmatist point of view, desires and interests, opinions and points of view are always already socially saturated’ for the following reasons:

(i) they cannot be abstracted from the spatio-temporally specific contexts in which they emerge, and they cannot be reduced to ahistorical forces driving quasi-disembodied entities;
(ii) given that they are shaped by the concrete conditions of particular environments, they cannot be dissociated from the norms, conventions, and customs established in a given socio-historical setting;

(iii) they are influenced, if not determined, by situations, which can be perceived as positive or negative, appropriate or inappropriate, appealing or repellent, illustrating the interpretive contingency permeating people’s interactions with reality.\(^{215}\)

Quoting Vincent Descombes, Quéré and Terzi argue that ‘the social is present in the mind of everybody’,\(^{216}\) reflecting a relationalist conception of human cognition, to which Boltanski’s ‘intellectual father’, Bourdieu, would have happily subscribed. As Quéré and Terzi affirm, however, his disciple’s approach is flawed due to the Hobbesian presuppositions on which it is based.

A Hobbesian anthropology cannot conceive of the antecedence of ‘objective mind’ over the ‘subjective’ one. At most, it can consider a weak form of mediation by others in the vouchsafing of reality.\(^{217}\)

From a genuinely pragmatist angle, on the other hand, all aspects of the human condition – including desires and points of view – are profoundly social.

(c) Radical Uncertainty

As the two commentators explain, Boltanski borrows not only the concept of ‘radical uncertainty’ but also the distinction between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ from Frank H. Knight.\(^{218}\) Whereas ‘uncertainty’ cannot be calculated, ‘risk’ can be measured insofar as it constitutes a probabilistic category.\(^{219}\) More importantly, for Boltanski’s concerns, the uncertainty that is built into social life ‘is expressed in disputes and conflicts of interpretation as a constant worry about “what is” and “what matters”’.\(^{220}\) By no means do Quéré and Terzi deny the socio-ontological centrality of the uncertainty that appears to be inherent in all human life forms. They do argue, however, that Boltanski’s conception of ‘radical uncertainty’ is misleading:

Uncertainty is never utter, because we are accustomed and adjusted to behavioural regularities of things, of people, and of ‘social settings’, even though we know we cannot accurately anticipate their conduct in such and such a situation. If uncertainty were radical, then indeterminacy would prevail and action would be impossible. We could not act or think if we were deprived of certainties and doubted everything. And one must consider many things to be certain in order to doubt.\(^{221}\)
From this perspective, people’s fundamental existential certainties possess an objective, rather than a merely subjective, character. For, as Quéré and Terzi emphasize, they ‘do not belong to the realm of thought or representation, but they are ways of acting’; that is, they are deeply ingrained in people’s everyday performances. On this account, ‘[o]bjective certainty is a kind of Ur-Trust, a know-how, the lack of which would prevent us from behaving in a meaningful way’. Owing to its largely implicit, intuitive, and unreflexive constitution, objective certainty can be described as ‘a practical attitude that appears as complete trust in the accomplishment of actions’ and, hence, in the possibility of realizing purposive, normative, and expressive performances with the aim of contributing to the meaningful construction of social life.

(d) The Lack of Common Sense

Quéré and Terzi have similar reservations about Boltanski’s understanding of common sense. Drawing on the work of the later Wittgenstein, the two commentators suggest that we cannot overemphasize the fact that ‘agreement between humans is an agreement embedded in a form of life’. If we take this socio-existentialist insight seriously, then we need to recognize that agreement, far from being reducible to a mere ‘convergence of beliefs or opinions’ held by independent or even free-floating individuals, is ‘situated at a much deeper level’ than at the symbolic level of discursive encounters between semantically equipped entities. From this perspective, ‘[c]ommon sense is an agreement in action’ – that is, a form of tacit consensus operating at the socio-existential level of everyday performances. To the extent that ‘[a]greement in action consists of reacting in the same way, doing the same things’, it presupposes the possibility of creating culture, shared by interconnected and interdependent subjects capable of relating to the world in normatively codified modes of mental and physical functioning. In this sense, both the possibility of reaching agreements and the possibility of generating culture are fundamental to the unfolding of social practices based on mutual recognition and embedded in collectively sustained, albeit potentially shifting, horizons of meaning:

*Agreement in a form of life underpins even the expression of the most subjective opinions and points of view, for a speech act can be regarded as the expression of an opinion only if it takes place in a form of common life in which one can (or is expected to) express something recognized as one’s opinion.*

In short, agreements – especially those attained by virtue of common sense – are symptomatic of the ineluctable preponderance of ‘the social’ permeating human life forms. Yet, contrary to Boltanski’s claim that common sense can be regarded as
Quéré and Terzi maintain that the former constitutes a precondition for the emergence of the latter. On this account, common sense is a requirement for, rather than an impediment to, critical operations, irrespective of whether they are undertaken by sociologists or by ordinary actors. Put differently, subjects capable of action, reflection, and justification can criticize only by drawing on socio-historically contingent background assumptions.

(e) Is Reality a Construction?

Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski of embracing ‘too easily fashionable discourses about the “social construction of reality”’. In their mind, he is guilty of endorsing

the well-known ‘myth of the given’, considering the world as a senseless fact, on which meanings are imposed through the semantic work of symbolization, mainly by selecting, defining, conceptualizing, categorizing, or setting the reference of words.

On this view, we are confronted with the binary separation between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité): the former constitutes a meaningless conglomerate of physically structured existence; the latter represents a meaningful domain of symbolically organized systems of action, perception, and interpretation, which are projected upon the world in order to work upon, relate to, and make sense of it.

According to Quéré and Terzi, however, ‘Boltanski’s nominalist and semanticist approach excludes practical experiences and activities from our understanding of relationships, interactions, and properties of things (except in the form of “reality testing”)’. Put differently, they accuse him of putting forward a misleadingly abstract notion of social practices performed by quasi-disembodied actors. ‘To escape such a restrictive approach’, they go on to argue,

one should consider ‘reality’ not as a matter of statements or discourses, but as primarily related to our practical participation in the world – that is, to the explorations and investigations in which we engage in order to deal with it.

From this perspective, what is fundamental to the construction of reality is the constant unfolding of human practices. In Quéré and Terzi’s eyes, there is no doubt that

it is a mistake both to consider that we grasp the world, first and foremost, by relying on our description and categorization of things and to assert that we totally rely on institutional definitions of the ‘whatness of what is’.
For the constitutive element permeating the construction of reality are not names (*nominalism*), symbols (*semanticism*), or institutions (*institutionalism*), but human practices (*pragmatism*).

(f) *Social Order, Inherent Contradictions, and Institutions*

Quéré and Terzi are aware of the centrality of Boltanski’s twofold assertion that ‘institutions [are] both necessary for and fragile within social life’. 237 They are necessary because they allow for the establishment of ‘a minimum semantic agreement’, 238 without which the consolidation of social order would be impossible. At the same time, they are fragile because they are ‘mere fictions’ 239 and, as such, they can be as easily constructed as they can be deconstructed and reconstructed, thereby confirming the radical contingency of social life. Chiefly important for Boltanski’s analysis, in this regard, is his claim that ‘any social order contains contradictions – that is, “inherent contradictions”’. 240 To be exact, from a Boltanskian standpoint, we are confronted with two main ‘hermeneutic contradictions’: the first one stems from a tension internal to institutions, and the second one emanates from a tension between semantics and pragmatics.

The first ‘hermeneutic contradiction’ is due to the tension between two praxeological options: institutions can either ‘resign their semantic function’ 241 of defining the parameters and boundaries of a particular ensemble of social arrangements, thereby contributing to the symbolic and material destabilization of reality, or ‘rely fully on spokespersons’, 242 thereby fulfilling their regulative role of delineating a specific set of principles allowing for normatively codified interactions, but also – given their prescriptive character – raise doubts about their trustworthiness.

The second ‘hermeneutic contradiction’ is due to the tension between semantics and pragmatics – that is, between the semantic function of bodiless institutions and the practices of actors. 243 The former is crucial to the task of establishing ‘the whatness of what is’ and, hence, to the definition of reality; the latter is vital to actors’ symbolically mediated performances and, thus, to their interaction with reality. In fact, ‘institutions irremediably face the problem of being unable to cope with “the contingency and uncertainty inherent in situations”’. 244 For Boltanski, this is – if one can put it in these terms – critique’s chance; that is, it is an opportunity for the emergence of emancipatory processes. For ‘[t]his tension between semantics and pragmatics opens a space for critique as “a relativization of institutional qualifications”’. 245 Although Quéré and Terzi are willing to recognize that ‘Boltanski rightly insists on the semantic function of institutions’, 246 they argue that ‘his nominalist conception of this function is not satisfactory’. 247 The main reason for this critical assessment is that, according to the two commentators, ‘critique is an
Inherent aspect of institutions when they are – implicitly or explicitly – created. More specifically, they express their reservations, concerning this issue, as follows:

[Institutions] are able to be challenged by any alternative that can prove more accurate, more efficient, or more legitimate. Institutions are especially open to critique when their effective functioning deviates from their constitutive normative ideals.

In other words, instead of demonizing institutions as sources of arbitrary symbolic and material power, we should recognize their – at least potential – openness to both internal and external forms of criticism and, hence, their ability to adjust in accordance with discursively channelled normative demands if and where their transformation is deemed necessary by those who construct them or by those who are directly or indirectly affected by their existence.

IV.

In the fourth section, entitled ‘From “Sociology of Critique” Back to “Critical Sociology”’, Quéré and Terzi reflect on the controversial relationship between Boltanski’s and Bourdieu’s respective contributions to the contemporary humanities and social sciences. As Quéré and Terzi stress, Boltanski – that is, the ‘later’ Boltanski – and Bourdieu share one key assumption: ‘domination systems are socially accepted because they mask the power and constraints they entail and because dominated actors misunderstand domination’s actual operating modes’. At the same time, they point out that Boltanski rejects various aspects of Bourdieu’s approach, notably the following:

his overarching perspective; the way he excessively extends the notions of domination and violence; his appeal to ‘the unconscious’ to explain social actors’ blindness to domination; his systematic underestimation of actors’ critical abilities; his endorsement of the long-standing scheme of the incorporation of dominant norms; his focus on dispositions and structures disregarding actual situations; his ignorance of social activities through which social structures are achieved (Boltanski specifically mentions state activities, including categorization, classification, measurements, etc.); his conception of sociologists as omniscient beings […]; his correlative strong distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’; and, finally, his incapacity to ‘fully account for action’ and, especially, for disputes and blurred situations […].
Summarizing these misgivings in a systematic fashion, we can distinguish the following levels of criticism levelled against Bourdieu’s approach:

(1) sociological holism  
(overarching perspective)

(2) sociological fatalism  
(domination and violence)

(3) sociological determinism  
(‘the unconscious’) 

(4) sociological paternalism  
(underestimation of actors’ critical abilities) 

(5) sociological reproductionism  
(longstanding scheme of the incorporation of dominant norms) 

(6) sociological (dis-) positionalism  
(focus on dispositions and structures) 

(7) sociological scientism  
(sociologists as omniscient beings) 

(8) sociological functionalism  
(‘ordinary knowledge’ vs. ‘scientific knowledge’) 

(9) sociological structuralism  
(incapacity to account for action) 

(10) sociological reductionism  
(incapacity to account for disputes and blurred situations) 

Quéré and Terzi do not deny that the above-mentioned issues are problematic aspects of Bourdieu’s approach. They insist, however, that Boltanski’s conception of ‘metacritique’ is essentially useless.254 In his attempt to make a case for the formulation of a ‘metacritique’, Boltanski draws not only upon Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ but also upon the tradition of ‘critical theory’ associated with the works of the Frankfurt School. According to both intellectual currents, the ‘unveiling’ or ‘uncovering’ of underlying mechanisms of power and domination by critical social scientists is necessary, because ordinary actors lack the
conceptual and methodological tools to identify, let alone understand, the structural forces by which fundamental aspects of their lives are shaped or, to some extent, even determined. Yet, Quéré and Terzi warn of the danger involved in proclaiming ‘glittering generalities’\textsuperscript{255} based on sweeping statements about the nature of ‘general forces’\textsuperscript{256} governing the development of the social world. Referring to Dewey,\textsuperscript{257} they go as far as to assert that – far from being restricted to experts in the social sciences – ‘different actors can lead social inquiries’\textsuperscript{258} and thereby contribute to an insightful understanding of reality.\textsuperscript{259}

Suspicious of elitist and scholastic ways of engaging – or, rather, not engaging – with key elements of human existence, Quéré and Terzi emphasize that, from their perspective, it is as ‘unrealistic to relate social mobilizations to mere intellectual convictions about reality gained by the study of real situations’\textsuperscript{260} as it is erroneous to underestimate the socio-ontological value of emotions, imagination, creativity, subjectivity, and experience in and for people’s everyday lives. On this account, then, it is the task of both critical sociologists and critical social actors – that is, of both experts and laypersons – to contribute to ‘the day-to-day analysis and treatment of problems’\textsuperscript{261} as well as to discursive processes ‘determining purposes to be pursued and values to be preserved in a given society’.\textsuperscript{262} Thus, rather than subscribing to ‘overall generalizations’\textsuperscript{263} and announcing holistic truisms about the functioning of society, we should concede that – as Dewey once eloquently stated – ‘the dependence of ends upon means is such that the only ultimate result is the result that is attained today, tomorrow, the next day, and day after day, in the succession of years and generations’.\textsuperscript{264} In brief, spatio-temporal specificity is irreducible to socio-structural generality, just as the in-depth and empirical engagement with local particularities undermines the validity of the quest for epistemic universality.

More significantly, however, Quéré and Terzi contend that a genuinely pragmatist conception of inquiry makes pointless the foundation of critique on the mere “hermeneutic contradiction”.\textsuperscript{265} In fact, in their eyes, such a foundation ‘proves to be nothing but the Achilles’ heel of the authoritarian method, to which Boltanski attaches great importance and which is actually privileged by most institutions’.\textsuperscript{266} For the two commentators, then, there is no substantial reason why both individual and collective actors – including those functioning within ‘bodiless entities’ such as institutions – should not have the capacity to reject ‘the authoritarian method’\textsuperscript{267} and endorse an emancipatory ‘method of inquiry’.\textsuperscript{268} They insist that such a pragmatist understanding of reflection and investigation contributes to ‘revealing the relativity and the contingency of reality “constructed” by institutions and opening a space for critique’\textsuperscript{269} – that is, a space for critique both within and beyond, rather than outside and against, institutions. Arguably, such an approach obliges us to discard any attempt to demonize institutions by
reducing them to mere vehicles of social domination. As George Herbert Mead – one of the founding fathers of American pragmatism – provocatively declared,

[t]here is no necessary or inevitable reason why social institutions should be oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not rather be, as many are, flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discouraging it.²⁷⁰

Summary

The principal objective of Quéré and Terzi’s chapter has been to demonstrate that, ironically, Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic’ approach is incompatible with key aspects of pragmatist thought, mainly due to his failure to overcome the pitfalls arising from his ‘intellectualist and asocial anthropology’²⁷¹ as well as from his ‘authoritarian methodology’.²⁷² Whatever one makes of Quéré and Terzi’s substantial accusations, there is little doubt that their analysis illustrates that, for numerous commentators, Boltanski’s proposal for a ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ raises more questions than it offers assurances. As his advocates will indicate in response to this critical observation, however, the whole point of an emancipatory sociology is to raise open questions, rather than to provide ultimate answers. Instead of aiming to build stifling systems of epistemic recipes and definitive solutions, we should recognize that critical capacity constitutes, above all, a normative competence permitting us to call different aspects of reality into question, thereby creating a discursively assembled space of open reflection.

Tanja Bogusz

The title of Tanja Bogusz’s chapter – ‘Why (Not) Pragmatism?’²⁷³ – sums up the purpose of her discussion, which consists in responding to the following question: To what extent is it justified to characterize Boltanski’s research programme as a ‘pragmatist’ endeavour? Put differently: ‘Is Luc Boltanski a pragmatist thinker?’²⁷⁴ At first glance, it appears that the label ‘pragmatic’ plays a pivotal role in permitting Boltanski to distinguish his approach, the ‘sociology of critique’, from that developed by Bourdieu, generally known as ‘critical sociology’ or, in Anglophone circles, as ‘reflective sociology’.²⁷⁵ Interestingly, Boltanski and his followers at the Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale (GSPM) have always tended to avoid any allusions, let alone explicit references, to the works of classical American pragmatists – notably, to the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Whilst the significance of this omission has been acknowledged by some members of the GSPM,²⁷⁶ it does not appear to represent a major problem for Boltanski. Yet, given that he is now widely
regarded ‘as one of the founders of French neo-pragmatism’, the fact that Boltanski’s ‘references to this philosophy of knowledge and action are scattered and appear anything but systematic’278 is somewhat surprising. This should be reason enough to consider Bogusz’s analysis a long-needed contribution to our understanding of Boltanski’s relation to pragmatism in general and to neo-pragmatism in particular.

Bogusz observes that, similar to Bourdieu, Boltanski has sought to overcome the counterproductive divisions between rival intellectual traditions by combining their respective insights in his own work. Constitutive elements of this undertaking are ‘structurational hermeneutics, symmetrical analysis, Deleuzean thought, practical phenomenology, anthropological empiricism, and, finally, critical theory’.279 Even though, according to Bogusz, various ‘postmodern’280 traces can be found in Boltanski’s oeuvre, he is not interested in endorsing an ‘abyssal regression into pure relativism’.281 Rather, in his attempt to provide a systematic account not only of the profound structural transformations of capitalism in recent decades282 but also of the role of ‘critical capacity’ in the development of human societies,283 he ‘has opened up new avenues of enquiry and challenged the historical legacy of critical theory’284 as well as of ‘critical sociology’. On this view, ‘Boltanski’s merit […] lies exactly in the fact that his sociology has enlarged critical theory by making actors part of it’.285 In other words, he has succeeded in demonstrating that critical capacity – far from being reducible to a professional privilege of intellectuals, experts, and scientists – constitutes an empowering competence with which, in principle, every ordinary subject capable of action, reflection, and justification is equipped.

Throughout her chapter, Bogusz stresses that ‘[t]he critique of the fixing of concepts, rich in nouns but poor in data’,286 is central not only to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ and to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, both of which are committed to the empirical study of social reality, but also to Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Actor–Network Theory (ANT), both of which have made major contributions to the socio-historical understanding of ‘knowledge production practices’.287 What all of these approaches share with classical pragmatism, notably with the work of John Dewey,288 is the assumption that ‘knowledge [is] a matter of practice, a matter of “doing”’.289 Exploring the significance of this pragmatist presupposition for assessing the contributions of Boltanski’s sociology, Bogusz focuses on three key dimensions: (I) the conceptual dealing with uncertainty, (II) the constitutive character of critique in society, and (III) the relationship between description and normativity.290

I.

In relation to the first dimension, the conceptual dealing with uncertainty, Bogusz makes a number of important observations. As she points out, ‘[t]he concern
with uncertainty is a main feature of both classical pragmatism and the sociology of Luc Boltanski'.\textsuperscript{291} In opposition to ‘mainstream philosophy’\textsuperscript{292} and ‘abstract academicism’,\textsuperscript{293} the pragmatist insistence upon the fact that there is ‘a close relation between knowledge and reality’\textsuperscript{294} is vital to recognizing that the artificial ‘separation between theory and practice’\textsuperscript{295} is counterproductive, preventing us from facing up to the intimate link between cognition and action. Therefore, ‘the isolation and marginalization of practice’\textsuperscript{296} – arguably, ‘the fatal error of rationalism’\textsuperscript{297} in its traditional forms – has no place in pragmatist thought.

One of the principal pragmatist challenges, then, consists in developing ways of ‘coping with uncertainty’.\textsuperscript{298} Boltanski and Thévenot’s concern with the role of ‘trials’ or ‘tests’ (épreuves) – not only in scientific enquiries but also in everyday life – is essential to the capacity of developing an existential, rather than simply a professional, ‘ethos of contingency’.\textsuperscript{299} As Bogusz remarks, this open attitude towards the experience of uncertainty is no less important to STS and ANT than it is to the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. To be sure, this is not to deny the structuring influence of underlying social ‘grammars’,\textsuperscript{300} notably those shaped by ‘the power of institutions’.\textsuperscript{301} This is to accept, however, that Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘detailed analysis of the varieties of practices and test formats’\textsuperscript{302} demonstrates that, even in the seemingly most consolidated realms of interaction, human subjects cannot escape ‘the radical uncertainty of social arrangements’.\textsuperscript{303} Indeed, to the extent that ‘critique functions as a driving motor for social transformation’,\textsuperscript{304} people’s reflexive capacity – that is, their ability to call the legitimacy of different aspects of their existence into question – constitutes an individually and collectively empowering resource that can be mobilized in order to contribute to subverting mechanisms of domination and, at the same time, creating processes of emancipation.

II.

In relation to the second dimension, the constitutive character of critique in society, Bogusz draws an analytical comparison between classical American and contemporary French pragmatism: ‘[w]hat for Dewey is the experimental character of democracy as a practice is the constitutive character of critique in capitalism for Boltanski’.\textsuperscript{305} Put differently, democratic and critical practices are inextricably linked. In Boltanski’s writings, the concept of ‘critique’ is used as a multidimensional category, examined within a ‘genealogical’,\textsuperscript{306} ‘symmetrical’,\textsuperscript{307} ‘political’,\textsuperscript{308} and ‘moral’\textsuperscript{309} framework of analysis with the aim of illustrating the socio-ontological power of agreements that are discursively established between different actors. The decision to abandon Bourdieu’s ‘structuralist habitus’\textsuperscript{310} and instead consider ‘critical capacity’
as ‘an anthropological constant’\textsuperscript{311} is central to Boltanski’s – arguably pragmatist – ambition to shed light on ‘the human potential for intelligent action’,\textsuperscript{312} especially in terms of the anthropological centrality of problem-solving practices.

In Boltanski’s ‘engaged sociology’,\textsuperscript{313} problem-solving practices – far from representing merely purposive, instrumental, or teleological performances oriented towards the utility-driven realization of a particular goal – constitute normative modes of interacting with reality, whose presuppositional underpinnings are, in principle, exposed to critical testing and open to revision. In this respect, Boltanski’s attempt to combine ‘structuralist and pragmatist analysis’\textsuperscript{314} by illustrating that grammatical constructions and interactional performances presuppose, rather than exclude, one another is a way of demonstrating that ‘society is not a form of order, but an ordering’\textsuperscript{315} – that is, a set of spatio-temporally contingent constellations and, thus, a relatively arbitrary assemblage of symbolic and material arrangements that are in a constant state of flux. From a Boltanskian perspective, then, ‘critique is a methodological tool to understand actors’ capacity to seek for equivalences in a non-coherent world’.\textsuperscript{316} It is one of the key tasks of his ‘engaged sociology’\textsuperscript{317} to question any ordinary or scholastic projection of total consistency upon a reality that is, by definition, fundamentally marked by both the existence and the experience of uncertainty.

\textbf{III.}

In relation to the third dimension, the relationship between description and normativity, Bogusz insists, in line with Boltanski, that ‘[e]ndless disputes’\textsuperscript{318} are as much part of scientific developments as they are ‘part of our everyday life’.\textsuperscript{319} In this light, pragmatic sociology is confronted with a twofold task: the task of describing normative practices, as well as the task of assessing them in terms of the extent to which they contribute either to sustaining mechanisms of domination or to generating processes of emancipation.

In essence, ‘principles of equivalence’\textsuperscript{320} constitute – sometimes explicitly defined, but, for the most part, implicitly established – ‘normative criteria to orient actor’s negotiation practices’.\textsuperscript{321} What is remarkably important in this journey through the jungle of ‘principles of equivalence’, however, is the pragmatist commitment to ‘putting actors’ descriptions and sociological descriptions on the same analytic level’,\textsuperscript{322} rather than contending that scientific modes of studying the world in the search for objective epistemic validity are necessarily superior to ordinary ways of engaging with oneself and one’s environment through everyday constructions of reality.

Wary of ‘the implicit normativism critical sociologists conceal by pretending positivist neutrality’,\textsuperscript{323} pragmatic sociologists of critique à la Boltanski urge us
to face up to the contestability pervading all forms of sociality. Just as *social values have a factual dimension* in the sense that they have a tangible impact upon people’s practices, *social facts have a value-laden dimension* in the sense that they are culturally codified. Put differently, the legitimacy of normativity is impregnated with the power of performative objectivity, whilst the validity of objectivity is permeated by the force of social normativity. To the extent that ‘the social sciences grapple with moral beings interacting with other moral beings’, social actors can problematize their own normative standards when exposed to values and principles that differ from those they tend to take for granted. In a more general sense, the recognition of the ineluctable normativity shaping all forms of sociality has two major implications:

(a) We need to draw an *ontological* distinction between ‘the natural world’ and ‘the social world’: the latter, unlike the former, is composed not only of physical but also of self-conscious, reflexive, critical, and moral entities.

(b) We need to draw a *methodological* distinction between ‘the natural sciences’ and ‘the social sciences’: the latter, unlike the former, need to provide operational and conceptual tools able to account for the fact that the human universe constitutes a realm of interpreting beings, who are equipped with the species-distinctive capacity to attribute meaning to their existence by virtue of symbolically mediated practices and imaginaries.

**Critical Pragmatism?**

As forcefully stated in Bogusz’s Conclusion, pragmatic sociologists are confronted with the challenge of grasping people’s ‘capacities to criticize one another or given sets of social arrangements in particular situations’. Given his emphasis on the sociological significance of the empowering – notably, critical and moral – resources mobilized by ordinary actors, Bogusz rightly suggests that one of Boltanski’s key contributions to the contemporary social sciences can be summarized as follows:

The sociology of critique has become one of the most advanced attempts to reinforce – with a certain optimism – ordinary people’s capacities to design their environment and to move methodologically closer to their own ways of modelling, judging, classifying, protesting, enquiring, or even resigning given frameworks of action and thought.

If we take seriously the fact that subjects capable of action, reflection, and justification are able to empower themselves by engaging in processes
of normative construction and perspective-taking discussion, then we need to pay no less attention to the ‘experimental character and unpredictability’ 328 pervading the ostensibly most consolidated forms of social reality.

Pragmatism has taught us that the experimental attitude must be judged not only by what is being said, but also by what is being done. 329

One may add to this that Boltanski has taught us that an ‘engaged sociology’ 330 – irrespective of whether it is conceived of in terms of a ‘critical sociology’ or a ‘sociology of critique’ – must be judged not only by its theoretical capacity to explain or interpret reality, but also, more importantly, by its practical capacity to change it.

**Cyril Lemieux**

The title of Cyril Lemieux’s chapter gives a concise summary of its thematic focus: ‘The Moral Idealism of Ordinary People as a Sociological Challenge: Reflections on the French Reception of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s *On Justification*’ 331 (2006 [1991]). As Lemieux accurately states, the main purpose of this influential book is to demonstrate that ‘we need to take seriously the fact that ordinary actors are equipped with critical, moral, and judgemental capacities’. 332

In contrast to one-sided approaches in the social sciences, notably rational choice theories and structuralist explanatory frameworks, here it is assumed that ‘normative claims are irreducible to simple calculations of self-interest and cannot be directly deduced from relationships of force’. 333 With the aim of examining the intellectual significance of *On Justification*, Lemieux’s chapter is divided into seven sections.

I.

In the first section, Lemieux argues that *On Justification* offers ‘a new approach to the relation of sociology with common sense’. 334 Whilst acknowledging that Boltanski and Thévenot’s research programme can be regarded as a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between action and justification, Lemieux insists that we are confronted with the following question:

If the sociologist makes it a rule not to reduce actors’ normative claims to power relations, to relations based on individual or social interests, to the local values of a social group, or to the product of private arrangements, does this not undermine the very purpose of sociology? 335
If we abandon the project of ‘uncovering’ underlying structures that are supposed to govern both the constitution and the evolution of the social world, does it still make sense to draw a distinction between ‘social-scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’? To be clear, the point is not to deny that there are several significant qualitative differences between scientific analysis and common sense. Rather, the point is to recognize that these two levels of epistemic engagement with reality are not as far apart as they may appear at first sight.  

Undoubtedly, sociologists of critique à la Boltanski and Thévenot will find it difficult to express much sympathy for Bourdieu’s proposed ‘epistemological break’ with the ‘doxic illusions of common sense’. As astutely noted by Lemieux, ‘for a whole generation of young researchers, On Justification has become a sort of manifesto in favour of a completely renewed vision (in the French context) of the craft of sociology’ — that is, of a paradigmatic approach determined to ‘locate “reflexivity” in “common sense”’, instead of opposing the latter to the former. Similar to micro-sociological and ethno-methodological research programmes in the social sciences, and comparable to Bruno Latour and Michel Callon’s anthropology of science and technology, Boltanski and Thévenot are interested in ‘examining discursive processes of critique and justification carried out by social actors’ Indeed, in terms of their methodological mission, the two French neo-pragmatists are willing to go one step further: ‘we need to study how they themselves are capable of undertaking acts of unveiling and of adopting perspectives’. On this view, people’s quotidian search for intelligibility is not an obstacle to but, rather, a precondition for the possibility of reflection and justification.

II.

In the second section, Lemieux is concerned with the nature of Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘grammatical’ approach to ordinary actors’ ‘common sense of justice’. According to Lemieux, the study of its sociological significance contains two principal levels:

(a) The empirical level, implying that ‘one needs to collect data on situations in which people make normative claims’;  

(b) The conceptual level, suggesting that ‘one needs to formalize the implicit rules that people adopt or fail to respect when they find themselves immersed in social situations and when they have to remind each other of the obligation to respect them’.  

In other words, similar to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ constitutes — literally — a socio-logical
approach that is committed to combining empirical and conceptual, practical and theoretical, substantive and interpretive analysis. Hence, inspired by the thorough empirical engagement with processes of reflection, argumentation, and discussion in ordinary social life, the introduction of an innovative conceptual framework into the sociological canon can be regarded as one of the main intellectual achievements of *On Justification*: ‘grandeur’ (worth), *personne* (person), *monde* (world), *bien commun* (common good), *cité* (polity), or *épreuve* (test)\(^{349}\) – to mention only a few. In essence, these terminological tools are aimed at shedding light on ‘people’s capacity to mobilize their reflexive, discursive, and moral resources in everyday life’.\(^{350}\)

### III.

In the third section, Lemieux examines the extent to which Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach may be conceived of as a ‘relativist theory of justice’.\(^{351}\) As is well known, in their ‘formal-grammatical’\(^{352}\) examination of normative orders, the two French neo-pragmatists – if we can characterize them as such – ‘identify six ideal *cités* (polities)’:\(^{353}\) ‘market’, ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘of fame’, ‘civic’, and ‘industrial’.\(^{354}\) According to this ‘axiomatic model’,\(^{355}\) in modern societies actors are confronted with multiple ‘orders of worth’,\(^{356}\) in relation to which they are required to mobilize ‘multiple normative resources’.\(^{357}\)

As elucidated by Lemieux, it is because of the preponderance of this axiomatic framework in their co-authored writings that Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic account of regimes of interaction and justification avoids falling in the trap of ‘complete epistemic or moral relativism’.\(^{358}\) Far from declaring that, in the normative construction of social life, ‘anything goes’ and that claims to cognitive or moral validity are entirely arbitrary, Boltanski and Thévenot’s axiomatic model draws attention to both the plurality and the grammaticality of interactional regimes. On this account,

> everyone involved in the normative construction of interactional situations has to obey largely implicit grammatical rules according to which some arguments count as legitimate and others as illegitimate.\(^{359}\)

Of course, one may contend that, owing to its emphasis on the contextual contingency of claims to theoretical or practical validity, Boltanski and Thévenot’s conception of human interactionality leaves considerable room for the situational relativity of all individual and collective constructions of normativity. Nonetheless, as Lemieux is eager to stress, the most context-specific expressions of sociality cannot transcend the constraints imposed upon actors by the structural force of grammatical determinacy.
IV.

In the fourth section, Lemieux grapples with the question of the extent to which Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic approach may be interpreted as ‘a new version of historical materialism’. One of the key insights gained from their framework is that disputes, even apparently minor ones, are decisive moments that determine the material and symbolic nature underlying both the reproduction and the transformation of social life.

Hence, far from being reducible to symbolically mediated encounters or merely self-referential language games, controversies between cognitively and normatively motivated actors have an impact on both the ideological representation and the empirical structuration of reality. Put differently, disputes result not only in the symbolic reallocation of different kinds of worth attributed to each participant, but also in the material reorganization of social relations.

In this light, Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology may be characterized as ‘historical-materialist’ to the degree that it is aimed at studying the dialectical – that is, the symbolic and the material, the conceptual and the empirical, the theoretical and the practical, the invisible and the visible – dimensions shaping processes of interaction and justification.

V.

In the fifth section, Lemieux illustrates that the concept of épreuve (test) forms an integral component of ‘a denaturalizing analysis of socialization’. Perhaps, one of the central elements of sociological enlightenment obtained from the pragmatic exploration of everyday discursive encounters is that ‘most actors possess a degree of realism when engaging in disputes’. Practically speaking, this implies that ‘people regularly assess the value of the things and ideals at stake in the situations in which they find themselves immersed’. Their willingness to undertake ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’ on a daily basis presupposes the capacity to put things in perspective and thereby recognize that different social contexts generate different normative arrangements with different expectations. At the same time, however, we need to recognize the historical significance of ‘the substantial socio-economic differences and structural asymmetries generated by the division of labour in modern societies’. Indeed, in stratified societies, the unequal allocation of people’s
capacities for action manifests itself in an ‘asymmetrical distribution of access to cités’. Insofar as the ability to participate in the normative construction of social life is contingent upon an actor’s access to material and symbolic resources, processes of reflection and justification cannot be dissociated from asymmetrically constituted realms of socialization.

VI.
In the sixth section, Lemieux asks to what extent Boltanski and Thévenot put forward ‘an irenic view of social relations’. Commenting on the validity of this charge, he spells out that, from his perspective,

\[t\]he accusation that Boltanski and Thévenot are trapped in an irenic, and hence idealistic, conception of social relations is based on a profound misinterpretation of their work. Indeed, according to Lemieux, it would be utterly mistaken to assume that these two influential French scholars ‘suggest that ordinary actors are equipped with only one competence: their moral competence’. For they are interested in the pivotal role that several fundamental human capacities – notably, people’s critical and reflexive faculties – play in the construction of social life. This, however, does not mean that they embrace some kind of socio-ontological idealism or lifeworld-romanticism. On the contrary, they are well aware of the fact that, ‘in real life, conflicts are full of insincerity, violence, cynicism, intimidation, insinuation, personal attraction, local bargaining, etc.’. Hence, just as ‘people have to make compromises’, they have to learn to live with the fact that both open and hidden conflicts are constitutive ingredients of social life. Put differently, in the construction of intersubjective relations, instrumental and strategic forms of action are no less significant than communicative and discursive practices oriented towards mutual understanding.

VII.
In the seventh section, Lemieux seeks to show that Boltanski and Thévenot have developed ‘a new approach to personal identity’. ‘Touching upon crucial themes explored in Bernard Lahire’s theory of the ‘plural actor’, it is vital to take into account that

Boltanski and Thévenot insist upon the idea that one and the same person has access to a plurality of cités and worlds, as well as to a multiplicity of regimes of action.
Similar to Bourdieu’s field-theoretic framework and Lahire’s action-theoretic account, Boltanski and Thévenot’s *cité*-theoretic approach posits that highly differentiated societies are polycentrically organized. Given the multiplicity of regimes of action in decentred societal formations, human actors are expected to take on a variety of roles and to be able to cope with the diversified normative imperatives with which they find themselves confronted in different relationally constituted contexts. In such a pluralized world, ‘a multiple personality is in a certain sense normal’, that is, those actors who are exposed to diverse social settings with specific – grammatically codified – modes of functioning tend to develop increasingly fragmented subjectivities that lack a context-transcending epicentre for the formation of individual or collective identities.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of ‘On Justification’**

In his Conclusion, Lemieux provides a sympathetic but critical assessment of the impact of *On Justification*. In his opinion, numerous criticisms commonly levelled against this study are both unfounded and misleading. In particular, Boltanski and Thévenot have never sought to argue that the distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’ is based on an entirely artificial conceptual antinomy and that, therefore, these two epistemic spheres can be collapsed into one another. Furthermore, they have not intended to make a case for a philosophical idealism according to which, in the last instance, communicatively constituted processes of justification and action-coordination are preponderant over strategically driven dynamics of domination and competition. Finally, it would be no less naïve to assert that normatively established regimes of action and justification can escape the constraining influence of social stratification.

Nonetheless, Lemieux is willing to concede that at least two key forms of criticism launched against Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology are legitimate. The *first* accusation, brought forward primarily by social historians, is that their pragmatic approach is considerably weakened by the fact that it fails ‘to account for the historical nature of cités’. The *second* charge, articulated especially by macro-sociologists,

takes issue with the authors’ tendency to focus on the micro-level of social interactions at the risk of underestimating the sociological significance of systemic regularities that have to be, and can only be, observed at a larger level.

As Lemieux remarks, however, Boltanski’s later works do contain pertinent reflections on both the spatio-temporally contingent and the institutionally consolidated constitution of different regimes of action. Arguably, this also applies – to a
significant extent – to Thévenot’s later writings. Whatever one makes of the respective strengths and weaknesses of *On Justification*, there is no doubt that this study deserves to be regarded as one of the most original, and also most significant, contributions to French sociology in the late twentieth century.

**Luc Boltanski and Critique**

**Simon Susen**

In his chapter, Simon Susen poses the following question: ‘Is There Such a Thing as a “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”? As indicated in the second part of the title of his contribution, his essay aims to respond to this question by articulating several ‘[r]eflections on Luc Boltanski’s *On Critique*’ (2011 [2009]). As is widely acknowledged in the literature, Boltanski’s oeuvre has had, and continues to have, a substantial impact upon paradigmatic developments in the contemporary social sciences. The label ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ provides a succinct description of the key characteristics of Boltanski’s approach.

(a) The term ‘sociology’ indicates that Boltanski is concerned with the empirical enquiry into ‘the nature of the social’ in general and into ‘both the social nature and the social functions of critique’ in particular.

(b) The term ‘pragmatic’ expresses Boltanski’s conviction that ‘an essential task of sociology consists in studying human practices’, thereby demonstrating that, in order to do justice to the socio-ontological significance of fundamental ‘anthropological competences’, ordinary ‘people need to be taken seriously’.

(c) The term ‘critique’ is central in that – as illustrated in great detail and with considerable skill in Boltanski’s writings – it is due to ‘people’s critical capacities’ that they are able to relate – both reflexively and discursively – to the three constitutive worlds of human experience: that is, to “the” external world (objective realm), “our” external world (normative realm), and “their” internal world (subjective realm).

In short, from a Boltanskian perspective, ‘society is the ensemble of practical and criticizable relations established between human actors’. It appears that in *On Critique* Boltanski succeeds in conveying the paradigmatic weight of this pivotal assumption with more analytical conviction, philosophical inspiration, and conceptual precision than in any of his other studies. This should be reason enough to take this book seriously and scrutinize its key thematic foci and intellectual contributions. As demonstrated in Susen’s chapter, five dimensions are especially important in this respect.
Boltanski reflects upon the task of critical theories. All critical theories ‘share a fundamental concern regarding the concept of social domination’. Guided by this diagnostic orientation, they seek to identify ‘the causes, symptoms, and consequences of power relations within concrete historical contexts’, notably in societies whose development is significantly governed by systems of domination. What is problematic from a ‘socio-critical’ standpoint is not power, in the sense of ‘the capacity to do something’, but domination, in the sense of ‘the capacity to impose oneself upon another entity’ with the aim of exercising a relatively arbitrary degree of control over it. From a Boltanskian perspective, ‘[t]he fact of exercising power or of being subjected to power does not escape the consciousness of actors’. On this account, ordinary people are not only aware of power relations but also able to problematize the tangible implications of their existence. From a Bourdieusian standpoint, by contrast, ‘actors establish a largely unconscious relation with power in general and with domination in particular’. On this view, critical sociologists are confronted with the task of uncovering the underlying structures that shape field-specific interactions and go beyond people’s everyday grasp of reality.

Unlike Bourdieu, Boltanski insists that we need to understand ‘the intrinsic relation between morality, critique, and reflexivity’. To be exact, the notion that moral, critical, and reflexive resources are built into the human condition has four major philosophical implications.

(a) We need to draw an ontological distinction between the natural world and the social world: whereas the former constitutes a physical and objective space composed of an ensemble of things and non-reflexive creatures, the latter represents a cultural and normative space constructed by reflexive entities equipped with moral and critical capacities.

(b) We need to draw a methodological distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences: the former are concerned with the study of ‘the natural world, which is composed of non-conscious entities’; the latter explore ‘the cultural world, which is constructed by creatures that are conscious not only of their environment but also of their existence’.

(c) We need to question the empirico-conceptual distinction between facts and values: the former are pervaded by the latter, since ‘everything that “is” within the world of collective construction needs to be consolidated through processes of normalization’; the latter are permeated by the former, since ‘everything that “should be” within the world of normative actualization needs to be confirmed by processes of objective realization’.

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We need to question the epistemological distinction between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge: both the former and the latter can be informed by critical reflection and perceptive insights; both the former and the latter are context-laden, perspective-laden, value-laden, interest-laden, and power-laden.

II.

Boltanski grapples with the key functions of social institutions. The principal task of social institutions is to produce solidified – or, at least, seemingly solidified – realms of social interaction and thereby enable actors to cope with the uncertainty that is built into human life forms. In relation to the sociological study of institutions, three analytical distinctions appear to be crucial: (a) the epistemological distinction between ‘exteriority’ and ‘interiority’, (b) the methodological distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘justification’, and (c) the socio-ontological distinction between ‘distancing’ and ‘immersion’. Arguably, Bourdieusian sociology tends to focus on the analytical levels of exteriority, explanation, and distancing. Boltanskian sociology, on the other hand, tends to place the emphasis on the analytical levels of interiority, justification, and immersion. Rather than seeking to scrutinize the functional logic of institutions ‘from without’ – that is, from the perspective of the objective and objectifying scientist – the whole point of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to examine institutional realities ‘from within’ – that is, from the perspective of bodily equipped and spatio-temporally situated actors.

From a Boltanskian angle, then, ‘the institutional’ and ‘the social’ can be conceived of as two interdependent – if not, equivalent – aspects of reality:

[I]t is because societies are institutionally consolidated and because institutions are socially naturalized that the reality of the world is structured and the world of reality remains unnoticed. What distinguishes ‘social facts’ from ‘natural facts’ is that they are not only ‘given’ but also ‘instituted’. Social reality is inconceivable without the ensemble of instituted facts.

In this context, Boltanski’s conceptual distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité) is central. The former is ‘everything that is the case’, whereas the latter encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’. In other words, whereas the world is ‘everything that happens to people’, reality is ‘everything that is constructed by people’. Institutions play a pivotal role in the material and symbolic construction of reality, for they convert our encounter with the world into an experience based on the illusion of relative certainty. To the extent that ‘[a]n institution is a bodiless being to which is delegated the task
of stating the whatness of what is’, it is imperative to recognize that it is ‘first of all in its semantic functions that the institution must be considered’. Owing to their symbolic power, institutions can determine the vocabulary mobilized by members of society when attributing meaning to reality. Owing to their material power, institutions possess the normative capacity to set the parameters for performative operations embedded in specific grammars of interaction. This double-function appears to make institutions indispensable to the construction of social life.

III.

Boltanski explores the role of critique. In the most general sense, critique constitutes a driving force of historical change, for it permits both individual and collective actors to shape the development of society in accordance with their discursively articulated search for principles that are defensible in terms of their practical worth and normative validity. For Boltanski, two registers of action are vital to comprehending the possibility of social development: a ‘practical register’, on the one hand, and a ‘metapragmatic register’, on the other. The former is characterized by rather weak and rudimentary levels of reflexivity, involving ‘a certain tolerance for differences’ and thereby maintaining a set of codified arrangements that guarantee the reproduction of society. The latter is marked by relatively elevated and differentiated levels of reflexivity, entailing an implicit or explicit reference to the necessity of critique and allowing for the articulation of two metapragmatic forces: confirmation and justification. On this view, ‘the normative rivalry between the immanent force of confirmation and the transcendent force of justification’ is central to every person’s ability to participate in processes of interaction and socialization. Rather than taking their social conditions of existence for granted, human actors have the ability to draw on their critical capacity in order to reflect on and, if necessary, transform the symbolic and material arrangements prevalent in their communities or societies. Confronted with ‘hermeneutic contradictions’ emerging in relationally constituted life forms, human actors are able to call the apparent givenness of reality into question by reminding themselves of the constructedness of all products of social action.

The power of critique can be confirmed only by criticizing the power of confirmation, just as the power of confirmation can be criticized only by confirming the power of critique.

To be sure, different types of test (épreuve) can be undertaken in order to reinforce or undermine the legitimacy of a specific ensemble of social constellations:
Truth tests (épreuves de vérité) are ‘symbolic’ in the sense that, on the basis of interpretations, they aim to understand ‘a universe of signs’\textsuperscript{422} shared by a community. Reality tests (épreuves de réalité) are ‘material’ in the sense that, by means of actions, they seek to uncover ‘the powers concealed’\textsuperscript{423} within society. Existential tests (épreuves existentielles) are ‘experienced’ in the sense that they face up to ‘the incompleteness of reality and even its contingency, by drawing examples from the flux of life’\textsuperscript{424} and by exposing manifestations of the fundamental ambiguity pervading all social constructions which, in their totality, form the ensemble of reality.\textsuperscript{425}

Irrespective of whether – within a spatio-temporally unique context – truth tests, reality tests, or existential tests decide over the worth and validity of an idiosyncratic set of principles and actions, there is no emancipatory transformation of society without a critical engagement with the ubiquity of normativity.

IV.

Boltanski discusses the nature of domination. In so doing, he proposes to draw a distinction between two fundamental types of domination: ‘simple domination’\textsuperscript{426} and ‘complex domination’,\textsuperscript{427} or – if one prefers – ‘primitive domination’\textsuperscript{428} and ‘managerial domination’.\textsuperscript{429}

The former represents a monolithic form of domination, in the sense that the control over a particular population is monopolized by a state or an overarching institution. Here, people are deprived of fundamental liberties (such as freedom of speech, expression, and communication) – as well as of basic rights (such as civil, political, social, economic, and human rights). Under regimes of ‘simple domination’, the exercise of power is relatively arbitrary and unambiguously asymmetrical. Obvious historical examples of this type of domination include absolutism, fascism, and any kind of dictatorial government whose exercise of power is motivated by normative principles based on political authoritarianism.

The latter, by contrast, constitutes a polycentric – or, in a more radical sense, even centreless – form of domination, in the sense that power structures are circular, amorphous, volatile, and in a constant state of flux, lacking an institutional or ideological epicentre. Here, people’s essential liberties and rights are not only largely respected, or even defended, but also instrumentalized in order to foster the legitimacy of the hegemonic political and economic system in place. Under regimes of ‘complex domination’, the exercise of power is seemingly democratic and even, to some extent and in some areas, relatively horizontal. The easily discernible historical scenario that Boltanski has in
mind can be found in the emergence of ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist societies’, in which it is ‘the establishment of a new kind of relationship between institutions and critique and, in a sense, the incorporation of critique into the routines of social life which characterize these systems’. In societies in which – within the limits of the parameters prescribed by liberal-democratic systems – the cultivation of critical processes is not only accepted but also encouraged, domination can obtain unprecedented degrees of legitimacy. The idea of ‘dominating by change’ and by openness to criticism is a constitutive ingredient of the new spirit of capitalism.

The more a social system succeeds in giving a voice to critique without running the risk of being undermined, the more critique becomes an affirmative force contributing to, rather than a negative counterforce moving away from, the reproduction of social domination.

The elasticity, adaptability, and long-term viability of domination under the new spirit of capitalism depends on its capacity to respond to both the systemic and the normative, the institutional and the experiential, the structural and the ephemeral, as well as the material and the ideological pressures building up in highly differentiated societies.

V.

Boltanski proposes to consider the conditions underlying the possibility of emancipation. Surely, in the history of social and political thought, one finds multiple conceptual tools to identify the species-constitutive competences that have permitted human actors not only to raise themselves out of nature but also to attribute meaning to the idea of individual and collective liberation from relatively arbitrary – and, hence, unnecessary – sources of alienation, repression, exploitation, subjugation, and domination. Kantians insist on the civilizational accomplishments derived from the use of pure reason, practical reason, and aesthetic judgement. Marxists point at the empowering potential of purposive, cooperative, and creative activity built into work-based processes of self-realization and fulfilment. Habermasians draw attention to the socio-ontological significance attached to the affirmative, normative, and expressive functions of language, stemming from communicative reason and intersubjective processes oriented towards mutual understanding. And Boltanskians seek to bring to light the anthropological centrality of critical capacity, by means of which discursively versatile actors engage in disputes and various kinds of test, enabling them to establish orders of worth and validity.
For Boltanski, a fundamental feature of emancipatory processes is that they are motivated – consciously or unconsciously – by the attempt to promote the ‘critical project of a reduction in the privileges’435 of dominant social groups and thereby contribute to ‘a better distribution of capacities for action’.436 In this sense, emancipation designates any kind of purposive process oriented towards, or contributing to, individual or collective empowerment in terms of one’s belonging to a common humanity, rather than in terms of one’s tribalist identification with a particular social group. Whilst it is ‘the closure of reality on itself that discourages critique’,437 it is the opening of society in relation to itself, and to other societies, that stimulates critique. Criticism, in this radical sense, needs to encourage experimentation with life forms in which the risk of disempowerment – based on implicit or explicit mechanisms of segregation, exclusion, and discrimination – is minimized and the possibility of empowerment – emanating from individual and collective processes of integration, inclusion, and self-realization – is maximized. In this light, the point is not to aim for the construction of a perfect society. Rather, the point is to contribute to the creation of human life forms in which people’s self-empowering potential, projects, and imagination play a greater role than privilege, status, and access to material and symbolic resources in shaping the development of their lives.

Critical Remarks

Susen’s chapter draws to a close by examining the weaknesses and limitations of Boltanski’s On Critique. Following the thematic structure of his previous analysis, he points at five significant problematic aspects of this book.

I. Critical Theory: Given that ‘Boltanski fails to provide solid normative foundations for his conception of sociology in general and for his conception of critique in particular’,438 it is far from clear on what grounds it is possible to distinguish between emancipatory and repressive, desirable and undesirable, empowering and disempowering sets of beliefs and practices.

II. Institutions: Owing to its terminological vagueness, its weak discursive justification, and its lack of evidence-based sociological analysis, his account of institutions suffers from definitional ambiguity, from absence of clarity as to what ‘the indispensable and irreplaceable functions of institutions’439 are, as well as from the failure to identify criteria by means of which the boundaries of institutional settings can be defined.

III. Critique: Due to Boltanski’s unsystematic approach to the multilayered relationship between ordinary and scientific forms of critique, it is far from evident on what grounds it is possible to defend the contention that ‘[b]oth scientific critique and ordinary critique are legitimate and potentially insightful’.440
Indeed, in order to avoid fabricating an ineluctable epistemic hierarchy between ‘scientific’ and ‘ordinary’ modes of engaging with and attributing meaning to reality, it is imperative to demonstrate that a comprehensive ‘sociology of critique’ is inconceivable without an analytical ‘philosophy of epistemic capacities’.441

IV. Domination: Boltanski’s lack of attention to the polycentric constitution of power relations in highly differentiated societies implies that his conception of domination suffers from residual economic reductionism442 and, thus, falls short of accounting for the complex interplay between multiple ‘sources of both structural and ideological domination, such as ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, ageism, and ableism’,443 let alone for the convertibility of different forms of capital, such as social, cultural, symbolic, and linguistic capital, in addition to economic capital in the strict sense.

V. Emancipation: Boltanski’s understanding of human emancipation is so elastic and nebulous that it ‘fails to capture the qualitative specificity of universally empowering social practices’;444 that is, it does not succeed in offering a normative framework that is, at the same time, sufficiently wide-ranging to be applicable to any kind of society, regardless of its spatio-temporal idiosyncrasy, and sufficiently narrow to distinguish empowering from disempowering sets of beliefs and practices, in the face of radical historical contingency.

Finally, it is striking that, despite its author’s explicit ambition to reconcile his ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ with Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, On Critique contains little in the way of a systematic overview of the key points of convergence, divergence, and possible integration between the two approaches’.445 It is the task of Susen’s second chapter in this volume – entitled ‘Towards a Dialogue between Pierre Bourdieu’s “Critical Sociology” and Luc Boltanski’s “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”’446 – to provide such an outline and thereby demonstrate that useful insights can be gained not only from comparing and contrasting, but also from combining and integrating, these two paradigmatic frameworks.

Rob Stones

As indicated in the title of his chapter, Rob Stones proposes to unearth the ‘Strengths and Limitations of Luc Boltanski’s On Critique’447 in his contribution to this volume. He stresses from the outset that, in his opinion, ‘On Critique is an important book that deserves to be influential’.448 In addition, he points out that its author explicitly states that On Critique (2011 [2009]) ‘is to be seen as sketchy and provisional’,449 as it is based on ‘a series of remarks, presented in synthetic form, which accompanied his thinking in the three years before publication’.450 The core contents of this
study were delivered in the form of three lectures – that is, in this case, the prestigious Adorno Lectures – at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in November 2008. Despite its author’s modest contextualizing comments, aimed at reminding the reader that his treatise is, at best, ‘a sort of précis of critique’, Stones rightly insists that it represents one of Boltanski’s most significant – and, as one may add, most philosophical – contributions to contemporary debates on the nature of critique, notably in relation to its place in the social sciences in particular and in society in general. Hence, ‘[w]hatever its imperfections, it is much better that On Critique has been written than not written’, mainly, perhaps, because it obliges us to rethink the role of critique in ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist societies’, especially in terms of its capacity to call established modes of complex domination into question and thereby challenge the hegemonic power of ‘neo-managerialism’ in the current era.

I.

In the first section of his chapter, Rob Stones reflects on “‘Neo-managerialism” and the Proliferation of Tests, Audits, and Benchmarks’. In accordance with Boltanski, he states that the concept of ‘neo-managerialism’ refers to ‘an instrumental mode of governance whose arch value is efficiency’. In essence, this implies that, in advanced capitalist societies, systemic forms of rationality are converted into hegemonic modes of functioning, imposing their impersonal and outcome-oriented logic upon almost every sphere of society. Undoubtedly, Boltanski’s concern with the domineering power of systemic forces echoes Jürgen Habermas’s misgivings regarding the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’: in the modern era, systemic forces – notably the state and the economy – have the capacity to undermine communicative rationality, which is built into everyday life, by virtue of instrumental rationality, which constitutes the underlying driving force of the increasing bureaucratization and commodification of society.

It seems that, in such an instrumentally driven world, ‘[t]he space for meaningful conversation and debate about the role of normative values in guiding policy has become severely constricted’, for almost every aspect of social life appears to be dominated by success-oriented considerations, rather than shaped by the critical engagement with the search for and defence of ethical standards and principles. From a Boltanskian perspective, this tension-laden reality – which is created by the lack of concern with substantive rationality and, correspondingly, by the preponderance of instrumental rationality – manifests itself in a ‘hermeneutic contradiction’ between the ‘voice of experts’ and ‘the voice of the people’ – that is, between the self-legitimizing influence of specialists, elites, and managers, on the one hand, and laypersons and ordinary actors, on the other.
The systemically mediated compulsion to exercise hegemonic control over society ‘from the top down’ is reflected in ‘an intensification of rules, categories, decrees, and technical directives’.\textsuperscript{463} This applies, above all, to neo-managerially organized institutions, which promote modes of ‘monitoring according to tests, audits, and benchmarking of countless kinds’.\textsuperscript{464} What may be – somewhat euphemistically – referred to as ‘the accountability of practices’\textsuperscript{465} represents a strategic imperative permeating an increasing number of relatively solidified spheres of interaction. The illusion of creating a social order that is not only largely ‘coherent and progressive’\textsuperscript{466} but also seemingly immune to crises and contradictions exposing its inherent fragility is central to ‘[t]he semantic functions of legitimation performed by institutions’.\textsuperscript{467}

As Stones astutely suggests, however, we must not underestimate Boltanski’s insistence upon the fact that ‘the incessant character of change in test formats undermines the possibility of radical critique, as no sooner have the dominated grasped the putative values of legitimation embedded within the relevant tests than the tests are altered once again’.\textsuperscript{468} In other words, owing to the dynamic, malleable, and adaptable nature of the test formats emerging within power-laden spheres of interaction, critique – to use Boltanski’s words – ‘finds itself disarmed’\textsuperscript{469} when confronted with the rearming capacity of the systemic structures whose legitimacy it is supposed to call into question. Normative parameters constantly shift, redefining the rules of the game – and so do the test formats designed to reaffirm their legitimacy. Critique, then, becomes a paradoxical affair, since it is never quite clear to what degree it succeeds in reaching beyond the immanence permeating its own quest for transcendence.

In practice, this dismantling of critique – or, at least, of its radical forms – may ‘entail the incremental redundancy of debates and disputes concerning the criteria of normative justification appropriate to the activities that go on in a particular sphere’.\textsuperscript{470} To be exact, systemic processes oriented towards reinforcing ‘the authority that institutions claim for themselves’\textsuperscript{471} involve – in the best-case scenario – the marginalization of radical critique and the relative weakening of reformist critique or – in the worst-case scenario – the de facto elimination of radical critique and the decorative instrumentalization of reformist critique. Suspicious of the misleading test-format-driven ‘window dressing’\textsuperscript{472} of neo-managerial institutionalism, Boltanski conceives of critical capacity as the ultimate resource permitting actors ‘to rebalance their relationship with institutions [and] to make their voice heard within them’.\textsuperscript{473} In this sense, it is the task of a comprehensive ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ to expose the ‘provisional and revisable character of modes of qualification, test formats and definitions of reality’\textsuperscript{474} and thereby remind us of the fragility inherent in the most consolidated forms of sociality.
II.

In the second section of his chapter, Stones grapples with the idea of ‘A Synthesis of Two Forms of Critique: “Structural” and “Pragmatic”’. According to Stones’s characterization, Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ tends to focus on the former, whereas Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ tends to be concerned with the latter. On this account, Bourdieu stresses the importance of the structural components of social life, whereas Boltanski insists upon the significance of its pragmatic dimensions.

To be precise, ‘critical sociologists à la Bourdieu maintain that their explanatory mission consists in shedding light ‘on structures of domination and, hence, on deep and enduring asymmetries within the social world’, as these are ‘necessarily inaccessible’ to ordinary people, whose quotidian engagement with reality is based on common-sense preconceptions. In order to accomplish this, however, social researchers have to embrace ‘the point of view of the totality from which to develop modes of classification’. This ‘overarching’ perspective emanates from an ambitious ‘cartography, metrology, and social morphology’, according to which the key task of the critical sociologist is to uncover the underlying structures that shape – or, in some cases, even determine – the development of human reality.

By contrast, ‘pragmatic sociologists of critique’ à la Boltanski propose that ‘[h]uman persons [be] envisaged as active agents involved in unfolding practices’ and able not only to attribute meaning to their lives but also to recognize and problematize the power relations permeating their everyday existence. In Boltanskian studies, then, particular emphasis is placed on the sociological significance of exploring the ‘series of fragmented and singular, individual, experiences’. Rather than implying that ‘structures of domination escape the consciousness of lay actors’, here it is assumed that both scientists and ordinary people are, at least in principle, equipped with ‘the tools required to grasp their character and effects’. To be sure, this is not to posit that structural inequalities between social actors do not exist. Rather, this is to insist that every subject capable of action, reflection, and justification has the ability not only to become aware of asymmetrically arranged social relations but also to problematize and, if necessary, criticize their detrimental and potentially disempowering consequences.

It is only when one begins to ask what Boltanski calls ‘deliberately naïve’ questions – such as, why is it always the same people who pass all or most of the tests? – that the structured patterning of asymmetries are revealed.

It is this ‘deliberate naïvety’ that permits social scientists to draw on the potential perceptiveness of people’s understandings of the world when examining ‘patterns
of opportunity and exclusion that transcend individuals’. Ordinary actors may not be able to offer methodologically rigorous explanations of the structural determinants shaping their existence. To the extent that they are equipped with critical, reflexive, and moral capacities, however, they are in a position to provide insightful accounts of the tangible challenges arising from their exposure to and immersion in vertically structured regimes of social interaction. As Stones explains, such a methodologically open perspective attributes ‘a sense of active agency’ to all sources of meaningful – that is, semantically mediated and ‘testable’ – practices. Whilst, according to Stones, Boltanski appears to be willing to concede that ‘the standpoint of the totality adopted by “critical sociology” permits the detached researcher to “generate a greater critical power than the pragmatist approach”, he considers that the real challenge consists in cross-fertilizing the former and the latter with the aim of taking advantage of their respective conceptual and methodological strengths, in the attempt to contribute to an insightful understanding of the social world. Undoubtedly, for Boltanski, this entails the following conviction: just as we need to take seriously ‘pragmatists’ appreciation of the active skills and capabilities of persons within situations’ and, hence, avoid falling into the trap of overstating ‘their passivity and their subjugation by structural factors’, we need to be careful not to ignore the substantive influence of both micro- and macro-sociological determinants capable of shaping human interactions in powerful ways.

The methodological ambition ‘to compare social orders with other possible social orders’ obliges the critical researcher ‘to relativize the current reality as merely one possible way of doing things’. Indeed, this contextualist insight lies at the heart of Boltanski’s commitment to exploring the functioning of different ‘regimes of normativity’. One of his most influential studies, On Justification (2006 [1991]), co-authored with Laurent Thévenot, is founded on one of the most ambitious intellectual undertakings of modern social and political thought – namely, the attempt to demonstrate that ‘the principles and justifications at work’ in classical texts of political philosophy are also at work in ordinary regimes of interaction and justification, to which the authors refer as ‘orders of worth’, ‘the inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the world of fame’, ‘the civic world’, ‘the market world’, and ‘the industrial world’. Whilst ‘each of these worlds can coexist with the others within any particular site’, each of them has its own operational logic, comprising idiosyncratic codes of normativity that undergird the processes of interaction and justification taking place within pragmatically established and semantically sustained boundaries. The ‘metacritical labour’ performed by ordinary people when confronted with the task of establishing and negotiating ‘moral criteria appropriate to enlist in support of arguments and justifications within a given world’ is central to the normative construction of the regimes of action in which they find themselves situated.
Somewhat emphatically, Stones applauds Boltanski for following the Foucauldian tradition of social analysis when insisting upon ‘the disseminated nature of power […] and the pluralistic character of the modes of assessment and attachments operative in social life’. Just as Foucauldian scholars highlight the plurality of regimes of power and the multiplicity of épistèmes generated in order to sustain or undermine them, Boltansian researchers stress the diversity of regimes of action and the variety of épreuves undertaken in order to preserve or subvert them. In such polycentric accounts of society, there is no place for the temptation to reduce the daily unfolding of micro- and macro-spheres of human interactionality to a monolithically constituted process steered by an overarching logic permeating the entirety of relationally constructed realities.

In emphasizing the plurality of the sites and situations of power and also the plurality of principles and concerns at work in society, Boltanski aims to criticize and counter another of the deficiencies of overarching theories of domination – one it shares with absolutisms of various colours – which is its tendency to reduce all struggles, conflicts, and dimensions of social life to one or other preferential dimension, whether this be religious, ethnic, sexual, or social class […]

In brief, Boltanski is committed to both methodological and ontological pluralism. His pluralism is methodological in the sense that he is committed to developing practical tools and theoretical frameworks permitting us to study, and account for, the polycentric physical and symbolic organization of the social world. His pluralism is ontological in the sense that he is committed to exploring the degree to which the behavioural and justificatory codes structuring people’s engagement with and interpretation of the world are themselves polycentrically constituted, lacking a centre of praxeological or ideological gravity. Since ‘complex societies are necessarily multi-sited and multi-dimensional in their “orders of worth” and “principles of justification”’, their members are effectively obliged to develop ‘the ability to live with compromise’ and accept that different criteria and principles are applied in different social contexts. As Stones – drawing on Boltanski’s pragmatist account – accurately states, ‘critique always involves an in situ hermeneutic moment in relation to the inner worlds of implicated actors’. Put differently, critique is necessarily ‘immanent’ insofar as it is formulated by spatio-temporally situated entities equipped with reflexive resources, which they need to mobilize in order to be able to cope with the normative imperatives thrown at them in socio-historically specific contexts.

[…] ‘immanent standards’ are produced through an examination of the norms and values of the community of participants from which these judgements have emerged, but only once these norms and values have been considered in a more systematic and reflective
manner than is typically possible for ordinary people responding to *contingencies* within the flow of events.\(^{508}\)

One of the key problems arising from the holistic explanatory framework of Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ consists in the fact that it has little, if anything, to say about the role of people’s critical capacity in grassroots processes of normativization. It is, therefore, one of the principal aims of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ to bring to light the sociological — and, arguably, civilizational — functions of ordinary people’s ability to mobilize their reflexive resources when confronted with the daily challenge of negotiating and renegotiating normative standards, permitting them to create relatively solidified domains of action and, thus, to cope with both the fragility and the contingency built into the constitution of reality.\(^{509}\)

### III.

The aforementioned issue leads us to the third, and penultimate, section of Stones’s chapter: ‘Three Kinds of Test: Truth, Reality, and Existential’. By ‘looking closely at how actors actively engage in disputes over regulatory regimes’,\(^ {510}\) whose purposive and potentially transformative force gives them the opportunity to ‘express resistance to forms of regulation’\(^ {511}\) and normalization, Boltanski proposes to distinguish three types of test: ‘*truth tests*’, ‘*reality tests*’, and ‘*existential tests*’.\(^ {512}\) As Stones highlights in his scholarly explanation of this conceptual differentiation, ‘[a]ll of these can figure in each of the plural worlds outlined by Boltanski and Thévenot in *On Justification*’;\(^ {513}\) that is, each of them plays a pivotal role in the normative construction of ‘orders of worth’. This section shall elucidate the extent to which these three types of test need to be distinguished from one another.

(a) ‘*Truth Tests*’

‘Truth tests’ function, first and foremost, as *symbolic* checks, especially as ‘instances of confirmation’\(^ {514}\) or as ‘instances of transformation’\(^ {515}\) in contexts in which habitualized practices and canonized declarations ‘*make visible the fact that there is a norm*’.\(^ {516}\) Their principal role is to confirm or undermine, stabilize or disrupt, legitimate or challenge established orders of interaction and justification. By and large, ‘truth tests’ — by means of ‘rituals and formulaic pronouncements’\(^ {517}\) — are ‘*designed to reduce uncertainty and to confirm the current order of things*’.\(^ {518}\) No society can exist without a minimal degree of interactional predictability and certainty, which its members need to project upon reality in
order to convert their encounter with the world into a symbolically mediated and culturally codified immersion in reality.

The ‘need for institutions’,519 then, derives from the necessity ‘to create a secure and authoritative environment’520 and thereby permit actors to cope with the experiential gap between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité). The fact that the former and the latter tend to be out of kilter corroborates people’s need to construct empirical or conceptual domains of normativity by transforming their immersion in the world into an engagement with socially constructed realities. ‘Norms are celebrated and ceremonialized in order to emphasize both the desirability of the current state of affairs and its identity with [the] symbolic forms’521 upon which actors rely when attributing meaning to their quotidian practices. It is ‘[f]ormulas and codifications […]’, rather than arguments’,522 which allow patterns of ‘familiarity, repetition, and identification’523 to emerge in social life. Crucially, however, all ritualized confirmations of existing states of affairs ‘are tests in the sense that it is possible for them to fail’.524 Hence, ‘[t]ruth is revealed as fallible, uncertain, and fragile’,525 it is no less imperfect, indeterminate, and frail than social life itself.

(b) ‘Reality Tests’

‘Reality tests’ function, above all, as material checks, notably in terms of the empirical manifestation of contextually specific established norms and values. Affirmative ‘truth tests’ ‘invoke, hold up, and symbolically reinforce what is valued in a social world’.526 Negative ‘truth tests’ question, challenge, and symbolically emasculate what is taken for granted in a given ‘order of worth’. By contrast, ‘reality tests’ – regardless of whether they are affirmative or negative – pose the question of whether specific sets of established ‘values are translated into the routine, everyday practices, and processes that take place within that world’.527 In this sense, their sociological role is to ‘test the symbolic truths against the reality of particular mundane processes’.528 Consequently, they confront actors with two épreuve-specific options: ‘they can end up either confirming the existing order or criticizing it for not living up to its own ideals’.529 The socio-ontological significance of ‘reality tests’ stems from their capacity to test the validity of symbolically mediated and normatively established relations against the practical imperatives imposed upon actors when exposed to the tangible constraints of empirical realities.

(c) ‘Existential Tests’

‘Existential tests’ function, above all, as experiential checks, mainly in the sense that they concern the ways in which actors experience the normative
parameters that implicitly or explicitly underlie the construction of social realities. ‘Truth tests’ relate to the symbolic or epistemic level, and ‘reality tests’ to the material or substantive level, at which codes of action and justification can be confirmed, rejected, or transformed. ‘Existential tests’, on the other hand, refer to the experiential or immersive level at which social practices situated in particular settings are experienced, and potentially acted upon, by people in their everyday lives. As such, they can involve ‘human responses to injustice or domination’, often articulated by those who live on the fringes of society. The normative implications of Boltanski’s conceptualization of these ‘tests’ are not trivial: whereas ‘truth tests’ and ‘reality tests’ tend to be reformist, ‘existential tests’ are more likely to have the potential of being radical.

Thus, it is through ‘existential tests’ emanating from direct experience that the arbitrary world of reality can be challenged by the – non-mediated and non-distorted – reality of the world. This is crucially important with regard to the sociological understanding of actors suffering from mechanisms of discrimination, marginalization, and domination on a daily basis. For their direct experience of individual or social forms of disempowerment implies that nobody is in a better position to speak about access to power, freedom, and autonomy than those who are deprived of this entitlement. To the extent that actors are driven by ‘[t]he desire […] to speak with authority for the whole institution and, in so doing, to solidify reality’, the emancipatory potential embedded in their ability not only to face up to ‘radical uncertainty’ but also to encourage subversion motivated by argument and dialogue around alternative perspectives is degraded to a decorative appendage of a sterile reality drowning in the preponderance of its self-inflicted immanence.

Weaknesses and Limitations

One may sympathize with Boltanski’s conceptual framework and with the normative presuppositions underpinning his attempt to confront the challenge of reflecting on the meaning of both domination and emancipation in the contemporary era. As Stones forcefully demonstrates, however, it would be erroneous to ignore the significant limitations of Boltanski’s analysis. It is the task of the final section of his chapter – entitled ‘Addressing On Critique’
Limitations: *In Situ* Critique and the Strategic Terrain’ – to draw attention to some of the most important shortcomings of Boltanski’s account. Let us, for the sake of brevity, mention only the key issues raised and discussed by Stones in his chapter.

1. Generality and Abstraction

Stones suggests that Boltanski’s approach is weakened insofar as he ‘self-consciously pitches his argument at a relatively high level of generality, in order to optimize the intellectual impact of his message’. The problem with the universalizing tendencies underpinning Boltanski’s analysis, Stones claims, is that it pays insufficient attention to ‘the contextual, the specific, and the particular’ – that is, to the irreducible composition of social settings as they are constructed and experienced by human actors. Undoubtedly, this limitation is ironic, given that the whole point of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to take ordinary actors seriously and to shed light on the ways in which justificatory processes operate in everyday life. Indeed, as Stones admits, large parts of Boltanski’s writings are ‘marked by unusual sensitivity to the contextual and the situational’. On Critique, however, appears to suffer from an unnecessarily ‘high level of abstraction’ and a lack of ‘substantive illustrations’. In short, the exceedingly general and abstract level of the analysis developed in On Critique may not be perceived as particularly helpful by those who, like Stones, are used to Boltanski’s strong commitment to the sociological engagement with the idiosyncrasies of empirical realities, whose irreducibility cannot be captured by relying on essentially philosophical and universalizing statements.

2. Power and Domination

Stones considers it important to point out that, owing to the previous limitation, Boltanski’s treatise is

overlaid both with a lack of detailed attention to the meaning of the ‘totality’ in any given case study and with a one-sided account of structures that […] is overly focused on normative issues. According to Stones, what is needed is a critical examination of the ‘structural positioning’ of both dominated and dominant actors, in order to do justice to the complexity of advanced societies and avoid falling into the trap of producing one-dimensional misinterpretations of symbolically and materially highly differentiated realities. Stones is unsatisfied with Boltanski’s lack of attention to ‘the structural positioning of the dominant actors’ Crucial, in this regard,
is the sociological challenge of examining ‘the extent to which dominant actors feel they have autonomy from external pressures and forces’ – that is, the degree to which individual or collective subjects occupying positions of power and privilege conceive of their own situation as a condition based on sovereignty, freedom to make choices, and the capacity to exercise a certain amount of control over others. For Stones, then,

[c]ritique needs to understand not only the ideal moral orientations of dominant actors, but also the constraints they feel confront any attempt to put these into ‘action’.

On this view, critical reflection is no less important to ‘dominant’ actors than it is to ‘dominated’ ones. Yet, as Stones remarks,

[Boltanski’s] lack of attention dedicated to the conceptualization of power and its distribution within the structural context of a dispute prevents [him] from thinking through the practical implications of critique in situ.

Surely, as Stones is willing to concede, ‘[t]o charge Boltanski with neglecting the role of power within the field of domination may well seem counter-intuitive’, since there are numerous passages in On Critique in which the concept of power is examined in detail. Whilst Boltanski’s emphasis on the ‘semantic’, rather than merely ‘economic’, dimensions of power in general and of domination in particular may be perceived as useful by those committed to rejecting the explanatory reductionism inherent in monolithic accounts of human coexistence, his failure to conceptualize vertical social relations from the standpoint of those who have the ‘upper hand’ appears to represent a major shortcoming of On Critique.

3. Perception and Reality

As Stones notes,

[for Boltanski, ‘the semantic’ – borrowing terms from Wittgenstein – refers to the field in which the relationship between symbolic forms and states of affairs is established.

In every regime of action, we are confronted with a ‘hierarchy of normative values implicitly or explicitly vaunted within those symbolic forms’ These values are either reproduced or transformed by means of ‘normative tests’, which – according to Stones – ‘represent the core of Boltanski’s argument’. Despite their centrality,
it seems that in On Critique there is ‘too little elaboration of how these normative tests are to be thought of in situ’\(^\text{553}\) – that is, of how they are embedded in and impregnated with power relations. This is ironic, given that every regime of action is marked by the aforementioned ‘hierarchy of normative values’,\(^\text{554}\) which can hardly be explained by reference to merely epistemic or moral criteria detached from the unequal distribution of social forces and resources.

Stones accepts that the whole point of cross-fertilizing Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to contribute to ‘a greater grasp of the broader structural terrain’,\(^\text{555}\) whilst connecting this big-picture approach ‘with a respectful, engaged understanding of the everyday perceptions of situated actors, their shared normative worlds and related justifications, and their existential motivations to rebel and transgress’.\(^\text{556}\)

Surely, Boltanski seeks to take ordinary actors’ experiences of processes of segregation, exclusion, and discrimination seriously. As Stones contends, too frequently, however, he ‘writes as if this powerlessness were a matter of perception’.\(^\text{557}\) As a result, one gets the impression that, in the Boltanskian universe of social relations, the aforementioned ‘hierarchy of normative values’\(^\text{558}\) is reducible to an imaginary of semantically constituted projections, rather than a reality of structurally established and vertically organized intersections.

4. Variability and Heterogeneity

The previous point ties in with another issue: the problem of the empirical variability of test formats. As Stones forcefully states,

> the capacity of any one group of social actors caught up in this web to affect a specific test format or set of codified regulatory processes will be extremely variable.\(^\text{559}\)

This, of course, applies not only to the praxeological differences between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ actors but also, more significantly, to those between ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ actors. Indeed, Stones challenges Boltanski’s account of test formats by insisting that ‘[c]ollectives of dominant actors will have variable capacities’\(^\text{560}\) and that, moreover, ‘they will often find themselves caught up in networks of social relations that allow them little autonomy’.\(^\text{561}\) Instead of presupposing, then, that dominant actors can be conceived of as a homogenous group of interrelated subjects with homological interests, we need to study the structural and ideological divisions between them. To put it bluntly, it would be sociologically reductive to assume that test formats are negotiated between ‘dominant’ and ‘hegemonic’ groups, on the one hand, and ‘dominated’ and ‘counter-hegemonic’ groups, on the other. This is not to suggest that this is
not a valid distinction; rather, this is to insist that dichotomous conceptions of the distribution of resources for action – and, hence, of the capacity of individual and collective subjects to shape test formats – fail to do justice to the polycentric complexity of heterogeneous realities.\textsuperscript{562}

5. ‘Context’ and ‘Situation’

It is far from obvious what is to be gained – theoretically or practically – from the \textit{distinction between ‘context’ and ‘situation’}.\textsuperscript{563} For Boltanski, the latter ‘is more exclusively phenomenological\textsuperscript{564} than the former. In other words, ‘situation’ is a phenomenological sub-realm of the empirical domain called ‘context’. Within a ‘situation’, ‘meaning and significance can change from moment to moment as the texture of attention is altered’.\textsuperscript{565} Within a ‘context’, by contrast, actors find themselves immersed in a ‘structural terrain’.\textsuperscript{566} This ‘theorized contextual field\textsuperscript{567} is much closer to Bourdieu’s conception of ‘field’,\textsuperscript{568} which is largely shaped by underlying structural constellations that form the spatio-temporal basis of interest-laden interactions between objectively positioned agents. Thus, the Boltanskian distinction between ‘context’ and ‘situation’ reflects the attempt to overcome the divide between \textit{structuralist objectivism} and \textit{phenomenological subjectivism}. Yet, as Stones appears to imply in his critical reflections, it is not immediately evident what insights can be obtained from drawing this conceptual distinction. Indeed, the ambition to overcome the counterproductive antinomy between structuralist and phenomenological thought lies at the heart of the Bourdieusian project.\textsuperscript{569} The question of whether or not one comes to the conclusion that Boltanski is more successful than Bourdieu in transcending this paradigmatic divide is a different matter.

6. Reflexivity and Irreducibility

Boltanski’s account of \textit{social domination} is illuminating in many ways. Examining the transformation of power relations in the contemporary world, he is deeply critical of the ‘managerial mode of domination’,\textsuperscript{570} notably of the ‘hegemonic managerial and expert-centric discourses of the age’,\textsuperscript{571} which prioritize \textit{neo-liberal} and \textit{market-oriented} principles (such as efficiency, productivity, mobility, flexibility, and risk-taking) over \textit{social-democratic} or \textit{socialist} values (such as solidarity, cooperation, cohesion, stability, and predictability). In the connectivist world of constant movement and change, ‘you have to be always one step ahead of the game, exhibiting flexibility and creativity in order to seek new differentials’.\textsuperscript{572} Building on the first of his aforementioned criticisms, however, the problem for Stones is that ‘[t]he force of Boltanski’s argument […] is weakened by its generality’\textsuperscript{573} and that, more specifically, ‘[he]
can argue as he does only because he treats the dominated as a homogenous group and, consequently, as abstracted from particular contexts’. 574

Yet, as far as Stones is concerned, those who are in a position of social, political, cultural, or economic power belong to a highly heterogeneous assemblage of relatively loosely interconnected actors. On this view, ‘there are many dominant groups, differently situated, and the power of any particular group-in-focus will be more or less constrained, hedged-in, and limited’. 575 Thus, we need to acknowledge that ‘[t]he ability of particular dominant groups to ignore the rules, for example, will in fact be highly variable’; 576 no less inconstant is their capacity to impose or transform specific test formats. What is needed, then, is a case-sensitive analysis of social groups, based on sociological ‘reflexivity in situating the relevant “leaders”, carefully and responsibly, within the networks and relations of their fields of action’. 577 Ironically, one of Boltanski’s main criticisms of Bourdieu appears to apply to the rebellious disciple himself: the reflexivity of ordinary actors in vertically organized societies is irreducible to a strategic mechanism of position-taking oriented towards the homological reproduction of group-specific interests and the quest for power, privilege, and authority.

**Peter Wagner**

The purpose of Peter Wagner’s contribution to this volume is captured in the thought-provoking title of his chapter: ‘A Renewal of Social Theory That Remains Necessary: The Sociology of Critical Capacity Twenty Years After’. 578 As he aims to demonstrate in his essay, Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘sociology of critical capacity’ represents a major contribution to the contemporary social sciences. Inspired by this conviction, Wagner’s chapter has three main objectives:

*first*, to define the project of the renewal of social theory that is at stake; *second*, to demonstrate why the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ has had the potential to make such a renewal possible; and, *third*, to provide some reasons why, today, this renewal remains necessary, despite the work that has already been accomplished. 579

As Wagner points out, the appearance of *De la justification* (1991) triggered a lively controversy regarding the question of whether or not a radically new form of social science had been born in France, particularly in terms of its impact on contemporary conceptions of both social theory and social research. 581 Indeed, more recently, debates about the value and significance of pragmatic sociology have begun to play a pivotal role in other — notably Anglophone and Germanophone — traditions of sociology. From Wagner’s perspective, the
discussions on this ‘pragmatic turn’ in European – especially Francophone – sociology have been accompanied by an ‘uneven history of reception’. More importantly, perhaps, Wagner expresses his reservations about the ways in which Boltanski and Thévenot’s studies have been interpreted and applied, asserting that many scholars ‘fail to recognize the issues at stake and, thus, the fruitful potential of [their] approach’.

As has been widely acknowledged, the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ emerged in opposition to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. The latter, which is also characterized as ‘genetic structuralism’, stresses the influence of structural constraints on the unfolding of social life. The former, on the other hand, insists on the ‘significance of human agency for societal developments and transformations’.

Granted, ‘the emphasis on human agency makes it more difficult to analyse large-scale social phenomena and their transformations’. In fact, this is one of the main reasons why many Bourdieusian scholars are suspicious of Boltanskian approaches. Rather than establishing a counterproductive division between ‘social holism’ and ‘methodological individualism’, however, the point is to understand the extent to which ‘conceptual reconstructions’ that have been taking place in social theory over the past decades reflect the willingness of most contemporary sociologists to combine and cross-fertilize micro- and macro-oriented approaches in their research.

As Wagner has demonstrated both in this chapter and in various other studies, Boltanski and Thévenot – in their proposal for a ‘sociology of critique’ – insist on taking various ‘radical steps’, which shall be considered in the following sections.

I. Action and Justification

In opposition to both ‘atomism and holism, as forms of social metaphysics’, Boltanski and Thévenot seek to shed light on ‘the need for human beings to justify their actions and the consequences of those actions’. On this account, the relationship between action and justification is vital not only to the construction of social life but also, in a more fundamental sense, to what it means to be human. As morally responsible beings, ‘we have to be able to give good reasons for our actions when interrogated about them’. In other words, the ‘sociology of critique’ is based on the assumption that human entities are capable of purposive action and reason-guided justification.

II. Normativity and Plurality

In opposition to ‘the philosophical ambition to determine a single order of justification’, Boltanski and Thévenot stress the sociological significance of the multiplicity of normative regimes of action. Insisting that both within and across
societies we are confronted with ‘a plurality of criteria of justification’, they go one step further by affirming that each set of criteria is ‘irreducible’ and that, in terms of their regulative function, they are ‘devoid of hierarchy’. It is not the case, however, that ‘a dominant order of justification’ is straightforwardly and unambiguously – homological to ‘a dominant order of action’, irrespective of whether these orders are constituted ephemerally or institutionally. Rather, as Wagner points out, ‘[i]t is the task of the actors themselves to determine which order of justification is the appropriate one in the situation in which they find themselves immersed’. To be sure, whilst ‘[t]he degree to which a given situation is open to interpretation is empirically highly variable’, it is true that different interactional orders impose context-specific normative parameters upon those immersed in them. To the extent, however, that ‘Boltanski and Thévenot give […] methodological priority to ambivalence and openness to interpretation’, they emphasize both the radical plurality and the relative uncertainty of normative criteria underlying the construction of social life.

III. The Spirits of Capitalism

As Wagner critically remarks, the problem with this French neo-pragmatist approach is that, insofar as it ‘runs the risk of concentrating on situations of interaction’, it fails to account for the complexity of ‘the entire social configuration’. In this sense, although Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘sociology of critical capacity’ – or, if one prefers, of their ‘sociology of disputes’ – can be regarded as an important contribution to the contemporary social sciences, it is limited in terms of its investigative and explanatory scope. Yet, as Wagner convincingly illustrates, Boltanski has made a significant attempt in his later works to address ‘the question of the long-term development of entire social configurations’, notably in The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005 [1999]), co-authored with Ève Chiapello. In this influential study, the two French analysts distinguish three ‘spirits of capitalism’:

(a) The ‘first spirit of capitalism’ was intimately interrelated with ‘the promise of domestic peace’ as well as with the increasing ‘wealth of nations’, both of which were reflected in the rise of industrial society, driven by ‘entrepreneurial creativity’, and characterized by the ‘the paternalistic care of the factory owner for his workers’.
(b) The ‘second spirit of capitalism’ was ideologically sustained by developing patterns of ‘justification through the industrial efficiency of standardized mass-production and through the social achievements that would be secured by trade-union participation in the rationalized capitalism of the twentieth century’. What is important from a sociological point of view, in this
respect, is that the paradigmatic shift from the first ‘spirit’ to the second ‘spirit’ can be conceived of as a large-scale response to the social criticisms that gained considerable influence throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

(c) Similarly, the intellectual and artistic forms of radical criticisms that led to the events of 1968 played a pivotal role in bringing about the ‘third spirit of capitalism’, under whose umbrella the preponderance of commodification processes and market-driven practices is justified by reference to people’s ‘potential self-realization at work’,

and, thus, to their seemingly unprecedented capacity to contribute – purposively and creatively – to the development of society.

IV. Critique and Change

Wagner draws attention to the fact that the ‘connection of action, institution, and critique’

represents a central concern in Boltanski’s On Critique (2011 [2009]). Indeed, as a sympathetic commentator, he goes as far as to suggest that it is the fine-grained exploration of this nexus

that turns the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ into the most significant, and also the most promising, attempt at renewing social theory and historical-comparative sociology which has emerged over the past twenty years.

In this context, critical capacity can be conceived of as a socio-historical driving force capable of shaping the relationship between actions and institutions in potentially emancipatory – that is, both individually and collectively empowering – ways. Undoubtedly, the credibility of critical theory will always depend on its ‘time-diagnostic capacities’.

Whilst expressing strong reservations about the – largely disempowering – effects of capitalist forms of social organization, Boltanski is willing to recognize that ‘incessant change’ constitutes a central ‘feature of our time’.

In other words, as sociologists concerned with contemporary – and, arguably, complex – forms of domination, we need to face up to ‘the elastic, adaptable, and integrative power’ of capitalism – especially of its most recent variant, driven by its ‘third spirit’. The question of whether or not this means that capitalism can go on forever by constantly inventing new successive ‘spirits’ is an entirely different issue.

Laurent Thévenot

As indicated in the title of his chapter, Laurent Thévenot grapples with ‘Enlarging Conceptions of Testing Moments and Critical Theory’.

He proposes to do so by reflecting on key themes covered in Boltanski’s and
his *On Justification: Economies of Worth* (2006 [1991]), Boltanski’s *On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation* (2011 [2009]), and his own single-authored writings on the ‘sociology of engagements’. In the opening section of his chapter, Thévenot draws his readers’ attention to the fact that, although his own writings and those of his colleague and former collaborator Luc Boltanski diverge in many respects, ‘the long, friendly, and ongoing conversation between [them], renewed this past year’, illustrates that they tend to agree on the crucial issues at stake in their respective research projects.

As spelled out in the opening sections of his chapter, Thévenot aims to shed light on what occurs ‘before and after the “critical reality test”’. As he explains, Boltanski – notably in *On Critique* – distinguishes three types of test: ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’. All of them play a vital role in the normative construction of social life. Similar to Boltanski, Thévenot has sought to make sense of two essential dimensions of everyday life: namely, ‘endorsement’ and ‘critique’.

Put differently, the interplay between confirmation and critique, taken-for-grantedness and questioning, intuitive immersion and reflexive distance-taking is central to the unfolding of social existence.

### I. Between ‘Endorsement’ and ‘Critique’

As Thévenot explains, since the publication of his paper ‘L’action qui convient’ (The appropriate action), the concern with the concept of ‘engagement’ has become more and more central to his work, notably with respect to his attempt to make sense of the two aforementioned ‘moments’ – that is, ‘endorsement’ and ‘critique’. Rather than interpreting them as separate aspects, however, here the idea is to consider the possibility of ‘integrating the two moments as two sides of one and the same “mode of engagement of persons and things” or “engagement in appropriate action”’. In addition, Thévenot takes on the challenge of exploring ‘the issue of uncertain “coordination” of actions’. *Action coordination* cannot take place without some form of engagement with the external world. Yet, as Thévenot stresses, the daily quest for contextual or existential ‘assurance is highly dependent on the arrangement of the material environment with which one engages while grasping it by means of a certain format’. On this view,
the construction of ‘personal identity’ is always a matter of ‘mobile, fragile consistency’ contingent upon processes of recognition and, hence, upon the constant – both subjectively and intersubjectively exercised – going-back-and-forth between certainty and uncertainty.

II. Between ‘Truth Tests’ and ‘Reality Tests’

Thévenot goes on to offer a detailed account of the main commonalities and differences between Boltanski’s and his own conceptual architecture. According to the theoretical framework defended in Boltanski’s On Critique, we need to draw a distinction between ‘metapragmatic registers’ of explicit confirmation or questioning, on the one hand, and ‘practical moments’ of implicit agreement, on the other. The ‘metapragmatic register’ is characterized by a tension between ‘truth tests’ and ‘reality tests’: the former tend to be founded on ‘systems of confirmation’ sustaining ‘official assumptions’ and leading, practically, to the ‘absolutization’ of a given set of social arrangements; the latter, by contrast, can trigger a form of criticism that can ‘create unease, by challenging the reality of what presents itself as being, either in official expressions or in manifestations of common sense’. Boltanski has famously characterized this tension in terms of a ‘hermeneutic contradiction’, emanating from ‘the relationship between language and the situations of enunciation wherein it is realized’ – that is, from ‘the tension between “the letter” and “the spirit” of the law’ or – if one prefers – between its representational and its empirical reality.

III. Between ‘Closed Eyes’ and ‘Open Eyes’

In this regard, Thévenot’s conceptual framework, which is concerned primarily with the socio-ontological role of ‘regimes of engagement’, differs substantially from Boltanski’s universe of ‘hermeneutic contradictions’. Indeed, he claims to advocate ‘a broader understanding of this tension’, which it locates in ‘all attempts to find guarantees or assurances’, thereby proposing to move beyond the merely institutional or linguistic level of action coordination and conflict resolution. Similar to Boltanski’s account, however, Thévenot’s approach is based on a fundamental dichotomous distinction: namely, the one between ‘closed eyes’ and ‘open eyes’. He explains the significance of this conceptual separation as follows:

In each regime, one can rely blindly (‘with one’s eyes closed’) on marks that one views as the most significant reference points for coordination. Yet, symmetrically to marking, engaging also involves the phase of doubting (‘having one’s eyes
opened’) – that is, remarking and, thus, noticing with renewed attention what one sacrifices, or fails to see, by ‘blindly’ trusting in the given mark.\textsuperscript{650}

In other words, it appears that we are confronted with a well-known dialectics underlying the everyday construction of social life: when interacting with the world, we draw on both implicit and explicit, intuitive and reflexive, unconscious and conscious, as well as practical and theoretical forms of knowledge. Ultimately, people’s ‘quest for assurance’\textsuperscript{651} reflects their need for a minimum of ontological security in their daily interaction with reality. This search for certainty manifests itself in the establishment of different regimes of action: irrespective of whether one focuses on the ‘regime of individual engagement in a plan’\textsuperscript{652} – central to ‘the capacity to project oneself into the future’\textsuperscript{653} and thereby express a sense of purpose – or on the ‘regime of familiar engagement’\textsuperscript{654} – crucial to an individual’s experience of ‘feeling at ease’\textsuperscript{655} in a given social setting – the capacity to switch back and forth between intuitive and reflexive forms of relating to reality lies at the heart of both reproductive and transformative, conformative and deviant, complicit and subversive forms of agency.

IV. Between ‘Critique from Above’ and ‘Critique from Below’

The question remains ‘what the sociology of engagement contributes to critical theory’\textsuperscript{656} and vice versa. Not only in Bourdieu’s critical sociology, but also in the critical theory associated with the writings of members of the Frankfurt School, it appears to be the case that ‘normative forms get imposed on dominated agents by means of unconscious internalization’.\textsuperscript{657} Thévenot contends that Boltanski, especially in his later works, has a tendency to (over-) ‘dramatize’\textsuperscript{658} his previously undertaken ‘break from the sociology of critique’.\textsuperscript{659} Moreover, the former does not subscribe to the latter’s thesis that

\begin{quote}
pragmatic sociology, because it is rooted in the ‘taken for granted’ aspect of pragmatic moments and is ‘set on starting out from reality as it presents itself both to the actors and the observer, tends to produce an effect of closure of reality on itself’.\textsuperscript{660}
\end{quote}

In fact, for Thévenot, quite the opposite is the case if we take the methodological strategy of his ‘sociology of engagement’ seriously:

The plurality of formats for ‘marking’ engaged reality at levels that are below institutional and symbolic forms enables us to enlarge and deepen critical sociology of domination.\textsuperscript{661}
For him, then, the whole point of his approach is to shed light on multiple ‘dominating forms’ without necessarily privileging one over any other because of its alleged – institutionally or symbolically constituted – preponderance. More specifically, Thévenot is convinced that his ‘sociology of engagement’ has enriched Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ in three respects:

(a) The concept of ‘engagement’ permits us to make sense of ‘people’s relationship to sources of trust’ without explaining it in terms of unconscious internalization. For, in each regime of engagement, actors are given the opportunity not only to develop ‘trust in an objective marker’ but also to undertake a conscious process oriented towards their ‘self-distancing from it’.

(b) Far from limiting its analytical framework to a critical concern with the sociological function of symbolic forms, his approach aims to examine the existence of ‘a wider range of formats’. Thus, it is ‘attentive to bodies, objects, and instruments’.

(c) Within the parameters of this new methodical strategy, one is ‘no longer confined to exposing domination in publicly instituted forms and formats’. Consequently, the distinction between ‘the official and the unofficial’ loses its previously defended socio-ontological primacy.

To put it tautologically, the sociology of engagement engages with the multiple ways in which human actors engage in different forms of engagement. To be clear, this is not to suggest that it is blind to, or indifferent towards, processes of ‘reification, objectification, and alienation’. On the contrary, the critical study of mechanisms of ‘structural oppression’, of ‘domination by symbolic forms’ or by material arrangements, and also of ‘micro-power dispositifs’ is central to its attempt to unearth the underlying factors shaping people’s everyday interactions. Yet, far from advocating some kind of socio-ontological pessimism, let alone fatalism, there is considerable room for socio-ontological optimism, or even a healthy degree of idealism, in the sociology of engagement, to the extent that it seeks to account for the drive towards looking-forwardness that appears to be built into the human condition. In particular, its interest in the pivotal role of ‘explorative engagement’ in the construction of future-oriented forms of coexistence is fundamental to its commitment to taking seriously people’s ‘excitement of discovering the strangeness of something new’.

Certainly, one may defend a rather cynical view of this socio-ontological dimension when acknowledging that ‘[p]resent-day economies play on people’s engagements by exploiting the fact that they can get (superficially or profoundly) excited by the stimuli thrown at them by the consumerist imperatives of advanced forms of capitalism. Indeed, ‘the presence of
stimulating cues that trigger one’s eagerness⁶⁷⁸ – channelled by digital ‘[t]echnologies of communication and web navigation’⁶⁷⁹ – is vital to complex regimes of governance capable of ‘dominating by change’.⁶⁸⁰ For Thévenot, however, it is equally important to recognize that ‘explorative engagements’⁶⁸¹ are part and parcel of what it means to be ‘human’, regardless of the extent to which this anthropological need can be instrumentalized by external systemic forces and constellations of power.

V. Between ‘Sociological Art Forms’ and ‘Literary Art Forms’

In the final section of his chapter,⁶⁸² Thévenot provides an astute and imaginative analysis of the relationship between ‘sociological art forms’ and ‘literary art forms’. Indeed, he demonstrates the relevance of the examination of human modes of engagement to our understanding of culture in general and of aesthetic appreciation in particular. This interest is shared by Boltanski, who has produced not only influential sociological studies but also respectable artistic – notably, theatrical and poetic – works.⁶⁸³ The insightful analogy that Thévenot draws in this context is that writers – similar to social actors – deal with tensions of different kinds by taking a ‘critical’, ‘ironic’, or ‘lyrical’ stance.⁶⁸⁴ Indeed, one may go a step further by declaring that what is needed is not only a ‘sociology of critical capacity’, but also a ‘sociology of ironic capacity’ as well as a ‘sociology of lyrical capacity’. As Thévenot forcefully reminds us in the Conclusion of his chapter, we must not forget that what is often one-sidedly characterized as ‘Boltanskian thought’ is, in reality, based on what may be described – more accurately – as a ‘Boltanski–Thévenot paradigm’⁶⁸⁵ or as a ‘Boltanski–Thévenot matrix’.⁶⁸⁶ This is due to the fact that some of Boltanski’s major intellectual achievements are inextricably linked to the ‘foundational’ work that he co-produced with Thévenot during the 1980s and 1990s.

Luc Boltanski and Critical Sociology

Derek Robbins

The key explorative concern of Derek Robbins’s contribution is pertinently synthesized in the title of his chapter: ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Early Luc Boltanski (1960–1975): Collective Ethos and Individual Difference’.⁶⁸⁷ As indicated in this title, Robbins aims to scrutinize key aspects underlying the personal and intellectual relationship between ‘the master’ (Bourdieu) and ‘his disciple’ (Boltanski), both of whom are now widely regarded as belonging to the selective group of the most influential French sociologists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
A fundamental conviction that Bourdieu shared with his collaborators – including not only Boltanski, but also Yvette Delsaut and Jean-Claude Passeron – was the firm belief in ‘the continuous interplay between theory and research’ and, thus, in the importance of the attempt to contribute to ‘the overcoming of the division between “thinkers” and “researchers”’. Robbins follows Tom Bottomore in suggesting that an important characteristic of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne (CSE) was – especially in its early years – the ‘elective affinity between the members of the group’. As pointed out by Yvette Delsaut, one of Bourdieu’s former collaborators, ‘there were real bonds and common goals between people’ at the CSE; and Bourdieu, in his response to her comment, confirmed that, for him, it represented ‘a collective’. One may infer from Robbins’s detailed description of the early days of the CSE that its members shared a particular ‘habitus’ – that is, ‘an acquired disposition as well as an incorporated disposition’ that permitted them to relate to and identify with one another.

At the same time, there is little doubt that ‘Bourdieu was the dominant point of reference, always the primus inter pares’. In other words, he appeared to have the upper hand, both interpersonally and intellectually. Hence, there was the constant danger of him antagonizing members of the group who were not willing to accept the power dynamics in which they found themselves immersed. Delsaut made this clear when voicing her misgivings about the deep ambivalence permeating her experience of this ensemble of collaborators: on the one hand, the group membership gave her a sense of belonging, purpose, confidence, and solidarity; on the other hand, its apparent ‘ethos of mutual support’, in practice, translated into the reproduction of hegemonic power mechanisms, reflected in ‘a form of “censure” preventing members from breaking rank and fully expressing their individualities’. It remains open to debate whether this was mainly due to ‘Bourdieu’s style of management’, often perceived as ultimately self-referential and authoritarian, or whether this was mostly down to other – internal or external – factors, or indeed whether this was a result of a combination of these elements.

The principal purpose of Robbins’s chapter, however, ‘is to seek to place Boltanski and his early work within this framework’. Indeed, as Robbins – one of the most knowledgeable experts concerned with the in-depth study of the history of European social theory – spells out, such an endeavour involves at least three ‘necessary methodological caveats’.

(a) Owing to the inaccessibility of specific textual sources, in addition to the limited space available in the context of his chapter, Robbins’s analysis is ‘selective rather than comprehensive’.

(b) His report, rather than being informed by anecdotal or first-hand – for instance, interview-based – evidence, is based exclusively on his ‘reading of texts’.
Robbins does not aim to provide an ‘ex post facto interpretation’ of the contradictory mechanisms of cooperation and competition that affected the tension-laden relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski during—and, to some degree, even after—their years of intense collaboration. Furthermore, in his examination, he does not rely on the explicit (both unsympathetic and sympathetic) criticisms that Boltanski formulated—especially in his later works—when reflecting upon the respective weaknesses and strengths of Bourdieusian sociology. Rather, Robbins is concerned—primarily—with ‘seeking to understand the mutual influence’ between the two French sociologists and the ways in which this reciprocal impact shaped their respective oeuvres.

Robbins’s entire account is founded on one central assumption, which—he claims—is largely accepted by Bourdieusian scholars: namely, the supposition that there was a crucial change in Bourdieu’s thinking at about 1972, as he allowed himself to explore fully the implications of the ‘post-structuralist’ position, which had been dormant throughout the 1960s.

More specifically, Robbins contends that Bourdieu’s attempt to achieve some kind of balance between structuralism and ethnomethodology ‘can be better understood in comparison with Boltanski’s—arguably distinctive—attempt to resolve the problems associated with the analysis of everyday experience’. The detailed enquiry that follows is chronologically structured: (I) 1960–1965, (II) 1965–70, (III) 1970–1972/73, and (IV) beyond 1972/73.

I.

With regard to the first period, 1960–1965, Robbins remarks that ‘Luc Boltanski’s introduction to Bourdieu was initially social—that is, the consequence of a social network’. In fact, as the British commentator remarks, Boltanski explains in a footnote in his recently published Rendre la réalité inacceptable (2008) that he met Bourdieu ‘through the medium of [his] elder brother, Jean-Élie’. The latter got to know the former whilst completing his military service in Algiers. During his studies in Sociologie at the Sorbonne, Boltanski had the chance to establish an unusually close and friendly link with Bourdieu, after this new ‘assistant’ had returned from Algeria. What is more significant from an intellectual perspective, however, is his sustained interest in epistemological questions regarding the difference between ‘common sense’ and ‘science’ as well as in methodological issues concerning the sociological study of
human practices. Of noteworthy importance, in this respect, is the book *Un art moyen : Essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie*\(^\text{712}\) (1965), which he co-authored with Luc Boltanski, Robert Castel, and Jean-Claude Chamboredon.

As Robbins explains, in relation to the *epistemological* level,

> Bourdieu was anxious to explore the nature of the relationship between *ordinary experiences* (in particular, the accounts of their experiences given by people in everyday life) and *scientific analysis* (notably, the accounts given by sociologists of those experiences).\(^{713}\)

As Robbins states, referring to the *methodological* level, Bourdieu sought to analyse sociologically the practice of photography, because sociological discourse tended to operate with an *imposed stratification of research objects*.\(^{714}\)

To the extent that, in every hitherto existing society, objects of study have been classified in terms of different – relatively arbitrary – hierarchies of legitimacy, we are confronted with socio-historically contingent mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion justified ‘under the guise of objectivity’.\(^{715}\) For Bourdieu, then, the sociological examination of photographic practices was ‘an attempt to advance the study of hitherto unconsecrated objects’\(^{716}\) and thereby ‘retrieve everyday practice’.\(^{717}\) The sociological engagement with ‘the immanent effects of indigenous objectivity’,\(^{718}\) expressed in the quotidian mastery of photography, seemed to enable Bourdieu to transcend the artificial and counterproductive antinomy between the positivist belief in scientific purity and the interpretivist celebration of subjective grasps of reality. In Robbins’s words,

> Bourdieu was seeking to oppose – simultaneously – *intuitive and narrative spontaneity*, on the one hand, and *abstracted and detached objectivism*, on the other.\(^{719}\)

Given its ‘grassroots’ usage, photographic activities – unlike other socio-creative practices, especially those associated with ‘high-brow culture’ – seemed to be largely ‘uncontaminated by the legacy of consecrated rules of art’\(^{720}\) and, therefore, appeared to possess some sort of empowering ‘anti-establishment’ potential. To the degree that photographic technologies could be seen as an instrument not only for the production but also for the recognition of ‘naïve experience’,\(^{721}\) their sociological study could help understand ‘the primary attitudes of ordinary people’\(^{722}\) without ignoring, let alone refuting, the social and aesthetic value of their own small-scale cultural practices.

In this context, Boltanski’s single-authored contribution to *Un art moyen*, entitled ‘La rhétorique de la figure : Image de presse et photographie’,\(^{723}\)
is exceptionally interesting, since, according to Robbins’s account, it illustrates – amongst many other things – the extent to which its author’s conception of language differed from that of his intellectual patron, Bourdieu. Within Bourdieu’s framework, producers of symbolic forms tend to be analysed ‘in direct correlation with their social conditions or social position-taking’ that is, human practices are examined in terms of their homological determination contingent upon sets of social structures. Within Boltanski’s framework, by contrast, producers of symbolic forms are scrutinized ‘in relation to the socially constructed codes of their specific professional contexts’, in which strategic forms of action play a much less significant role than in the Bourdieusian universe of constant struggle for symbolic and material resources. Insofar as ‘Boltanski seems to have been inclined to regard language as the medium which pragmatically constitutes and consolidates social structures’, he has been willing to attribute a far greater degree of autonomy to human agency than Bourdieu within the rather constraining parameters of his ‘socio-genetic structuralism’.

In brief, according to Robbins, the main difference between the two sociologists in Un art moyen can be described as follows: Bourdieu sought to demonstrate that

the social position-taking of photographic professionals inhibited the possibility that the democratization of image making secured by a new technological apparatus might actualize a greater degree of egalitarian social solidarity.

Boltanski, on the other hand, sought to shed light on processes of ‘normative structuration’ emerging through people’s capacity to construct ‘networks of semiotic signification’ based on ‘individual and collective representations’.

II.

With regard to the second period, 1965–70, Robbins makes a number of interesting remarks. Let us, for the sake of brevity, focus on a few key issues raised in relation to this phase. One of the striking features of the second edition of Un art moyen in 1970 was that it no longer included ‘the single-authored contributions to Part 2 of Lagneau and Boltanski’, in addition to having excluded Castel’s previously published Conclusion. Reflecting on the implications of this omission, Robbins makes an important point:

This exclusion may simply have been to render the argument of the book more coherent and consistent, but the effect was to suppress the element of dissent from the dominant – that is, largely Bourdieusian – interpretation.
Thus, the second edition of *Un art moyen* may be interpreted as a manifestation of the unquestionable hegemony of the Bourdieusian doxa within the CSE. *Le métier de sociologue : Préalables épistémologiques* – which Bourdieu had co-written with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron and which was published in 1968 – was an ambitious project in that it ‘sought to offer a blueprint for a reflexive methodology capable of securing scientific validity for sociological explanation by deploying procedures outlined by Gaston Bachelard’.

Broadly speaking, this book makes a case for a *realist-objectivist* – and, arguably, Durkheimian – conception of sociology, arguing that ‘[t]he construction of a science of social behaviour involves the deliberate detachment of “facts” from their everyday contexts’. At the same time, this study endorses a *constructivist-contextualist* – and, arguably, Kuhnian – conception of sociology, contending that these ‘facts’ need to be discussed, just as their existence needs to be corroborated, ‘within a self-referencing epistemic community’. To the extent that the conception of sociology defended in this epistemological treatise has both realist-objectivist and constructivist-contextualist underpinnings, it anticipates Bourdieu’s attempt to overcome counterproductive antinomies in the social sciences.

Whilst recognizing the valuable insights gained from constructivist-contextualist accounts of knowledge, in particular the fact that ‘the academic gaze has to be situated’, Bourdieu was eager to insist that social scientists should not underestimate ‘the benefits of structuralism’ for the pursuit of critical research aimed at exposing seemingly subterranean mechanisms and forces whose existence largely escapes a quotidian grasp of reality based on common sense. In this respect, his article ‘Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge’ (1968) conveys an unambiguous message – namely, that it would be utterly inappropriate to dismiss the epistemic challenges arising from scientific projects motivated by an ‘uncovering mission’.

Certainly, it is possible to trace various Bourdieusian themes in the writings Boltanski produced between 1965 and 1970, notably in the following works: *Le bonheur suisse* (1966), *La découverte de la maladie* (1969), *Prime éducation et morale de classe* (1969), and *Taxinomies populaires, taxinomies savantes: Les objets de consommation et leur classement* (1970). Although Bourdieu and Boltanski appeared to start following different intellectual paths, ‘there was no public indication of disagreement in the second half of the decade’. There is, however, ample evidence supporting the view that Boltanski’s paradigmatic outlook had begun to shift. Without wishing ‘to celebrate “popular thought” or “popular knowledge”’ in his writings, and whilst sharing Bourdieu’s persuasion that, in hierarchically structured societies, ‘the models of thought, and, *a fortiori* knowledge, always circulate from top to bottom but never, inversely, from bottom to top’, Boltanski sought to move away from his mentor’s explanatory framework by stressing the *socio-ontological significance*
of human agency – including the critical, moral, and reflexive resources from which it is derived. In Robbins’s words, ‘Boltanski was articulating – against structuralism – his conviction that social science has to study the conscious relations of human actors, especially as they are rendered conscious linguistically in relation to dominant discourses imposed by dominant institutions’. 748

III.

With regard to the third period, 1970–1972/73, Robbins points out that the differences between Bourdieu and Boltanski became more and more pronounced.

Bourdieu contended that not only do observed persons act strategically, rather than in accordance with ‘rules’ separately constructed by scientific observers, but that, in addition, scientific observers are themselves strategic agents. 749

In other words, ‘strategic action’ can be regarded as a power-laden, an interest-driven, and an outcome-oriented mode of behaviour that, in principle, exists in all social fields, including the scientific field. On this account, it is not only the ‘observed’ but also the ‘observers’ who are strategically motivated agents. According to Robbins, this sociological presupposition is central to Bourdieu’s Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique: Précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie Kabyle750 (1972) and, arguably, applies to an even larger extent to the English version of this study, published under the title Outline of a Theory of Practice751 (1977 [1972]). During the aforementioned transition process – which Robbins characterizes as a shift from a ‘structuralist’ to a ‘post-structuralist’752 conception of social research – the concept of ‘reflexivity’753 acquired increasing importance and, indeed, ‘became a cornerstone of his methodology’. 754 For Robbins, Bourdieu’s concern with the methodological commitment to sociological reflexivity reflects a ‘kind of epistemological Angst’755 triggered by a ‘sense of guilt’756 for running the risk of becoming ‘a transfuge, a betrayer of his class origins’.757

Faced with Bourdieu’s paradigmatic shift towards a methodological emphasis on radical sociological (self-) awareness and (self-) questioning, Boltanski began to carve a niche for himself.

Boltanski continued to work within the collective framework that Bourdieu had established, continuing to acknowledge the direction of his patron, but he did so with his own particular orientation.758

In this reorientation process, the epistemological question regarding the status of everyday knowledge as well as the sociological question concerning the status
of ordinary people became central to Boltanski’s research programme. In the paper ‘Carrière scientifique, morale scientifique et vulgarisation’ (1969), co-written with Pascale Maldidier, the ‘differentiation between professional and everyday knowledge’ is a crucial concern in the effort to understand, from a sociological perspective, ‘the attempts of scientists to popularize their knowledge’. What is perhaps even more significant, however, is that Boltanski—in his aforementioned ‘Taxonomies populaires, taxonomies savantes: Les objets de consommation et leur classement’ (1970), which articulated a strong critique of recent studies of food consumption—proposed to examine ‘the effects of “systems of naming and classification” on the perceptions of ordinary people’. In the context of this enquiry, Boltanski’s plea for a sociology inspired by the ‘vigilance of its practitioners’ is, as remarked by Robbins, ‘reminiscent of the epistemological vigilance recommended in Le métier de sociologue’ and, indeed, comparable to Bourdieu’s Durkheim-inspired insistence upon ‘the need for an “epistemological break”’. Yet, as became clear in his subsequent writings, for Boltanski, such an epistemic distance-taking from everyday experiences and common-sense understandings of reality can be justified only to the extent that ordinary actors are conceived of as critical entities capable of reflection and justification.

IV.

With regard to the fourth period, beyond 1972/73, Robbins draws his readers’ attention to the fact that the works published in 1973 ‘intimated new research directions within the CSE’, most notably the definite ‘end of the collaboration between Bourdieu and Passeron’. To be sure, Boltanski’s ‘L’espace positionnel : Multiplicité des positions institutionnelles et habitus de classe’ (1973) contained unambiguous traces of Bourdieu’s continuing influence on his disciple’s work. This may not have been particularly surprising, given that this research project—which was concerned with position-taking dynamics at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris—‘was explicitly located in the context of a collection of projects, directed by Bourdieu, to examine the production and reproduction of “dominant ideologies” in society’. The publication of Bourdieu’s La noblesse d’État : Grandes écoles et esprit de corps (1989) may be interpreted as the culmination of a long-term research project, designed to explain the reproductive logic governing both materially and symbolically constituted power structures in stratified societies, such as late twentieth-century France. Several influential studies preceding this book—especially ‘Les stratégies de reconversion : Les classes sociales et le système d’enseignement’ by Bourdieu, Boltanski, and Saint Martin (1973), but also ‘Le titre et le poste : Rapports entre le
système de production et le système de reproduction' by Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975) – were aimed at uncovering the logic underlying the production and reproduction of power mechanisms in class-divided and field-differentiated societies.

It may be tempting to draw parallels between Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’, which he developed from the mid-1980s onwards, and Erving Goffman’s ‘ethnomethodology’, on whose respective merits and limitations he reflected, in some detail, in a piece published in 1973 and entitled ‘Erving Goffman et le temps du soupçon’. If the commentator Yves Winkin is right to suggest that this text had been intended to serve as the Introduction to the French translations of Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1971 [1959]) and Relations in Public (1971) for the one-volume edition La mise en scène de la vie quotidienne in 1973, then anyone who has read the article will not be astounded to learn that it was ‘ultimately considered too critical for inclusion’ in the French version. In particular, Boltanski was suspicious of Goffman’s attempt to borrow, from the indigenous language of the groups and classes that he is analysing, their categories of thought and words and, by systematic and controlled redeployment, makes quasi-conceptual use of them [...].

Boltanski’s scepticism vis-à-vis the seemingly unproblematic ‘appropriation of indigenous terminologies’, combined with his misgivings about the ethno-methodological ambition to reconstruct people’s experiences as ‘quasi-natural’ processes by virtue of ‘quasi-conceptual’ frameworks developed by social scientists, can be regarded as an expression of his critical attitude towards the methodological failure to distinguish between ‘immersion’ and ‘distance-taking’. His sustained effort ‘to expose the tensions between everyday experience and scientific observation’ was – perhaps, even more forcefully – articulated in a core article he co-wrote with Bourdieu: ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ (1976), republished – six years after the master’s death – in 2008. The centrality of this piece is reflected in the fact that this new edition was accompanied by an extensive commentary by Boltanski, Rendre la réalité inacceptable : À propos de ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’ (2008), containing a number of instructive remarks on the context in which the original piece had been written.

Most studies concerned with the difficult – personal and intellectual – relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski may come to the conclusion that ‘[t]he intellectual tension that had been so creatively fruitful clearly could not be sustained’ from the mid-1980s onwards. One may follow Robbins, however, in recognizing that the ‘valedictory flavour’ permeating Boltanski’s acknowledgment in the final section of his Foreword to Les cadres: La formation
d’un groupe social (1982) illustrates that – despite all his subsequently articulated reservations and disagreements with his patron – he will always be grateful for the immensely formative impact that his père intellectuel had on him: after ‘so many years of collaboration with him having left their mark on this work’, Boltanski’s ‘homage in action’ is a genuine ‘homage as practice’ in recognition of the profound influence that Bourdieu has had, and will always continue to have, on his oeuvre.

Mohamed Nachi

As anticipated in the title of his chapter, ‘Beyond Pragmatic Sociology: A Theoretical Compromise between “Critical Sociology” and the “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”’, Mohamed Nachi proposes to examine Bourdieu’s and Boltanski’s respective approaches with the prospect of reconciling them. Arguably, the French sociological discourses produced between the 1960s and the 1980s were dominated by the influence of four prominent scholars: Raymond Boudon (1934–2013), Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), Michel Crozier (1922–2013), and Alain Touraine (1925–). These high-flying intellectuals shaped, respectively, ‘four major currents’ of sociological analysis: ‘methodological individualism’ (Boudon), ‘genetic structuralism’ or ‘critical sociology’ (Bourdieu), the ‘sociology of organizations’ (Crozier), and the ‘sociology of action’ (Touraine). Their hegemonic position in French academia ‘prevented the development of other sociological perspectives’, or at least it appeared to have a constraining impact upon the development of French sociological thought, notably in terms of its potential diversity and its capacity to generate a multiplicity of paradigms with a corresponding plurality of fruitful theoretical controversies. Considered in this light, Thévenot and Boltanski’s success in having created an alternative paradigmatic approach – known as the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – will go down as a remarkable achievement in the history of French intellectual life.

Crucial to their project is the sociological ambition to grasp the ‘plurality of action’ by examining – to use Thévenot’s terminology – ‘diverse modes of engagement in the world’. More specifically, they are concerned with shedding light on the ‘grammatical construction of regimes of action and justice’ – that is, on the rule-governed constitution permeating socio-historically situated performances and normativities. Given their determination to develop ‘a model of analysis capable of taking seriously the justifications provided by ordinary people in their performative actions’, it comes as no surprise that they reject any attempt to generate a ‘totalizing account of society’.
In opposition to the macro-sociologically oriented and scientifically motivated aspiration to provide some sort of ‘catch-all framework’ capable of uncovering underlying causal mechanisms, which reflect the lawfulness of the social universe but which, by and large, escape people’s everyday perceptions of reality, Boltanski and Thévenot’s project possesses a more contextualist outlook. In particular, the two researchers aim to explore

the modes of equivalence – as well as the operations of judgement, qualification, adjustment, and justification – by way of which agreements and compromises are made and unmade in the course of action coordination processes.799

In other words, the paradigm shift from ‘critical sociology’ to the ‘sociology of critique’ reflects the need to account for people’s capacity to coordinate their actions in accordance with discursively negotiated values and principles.

I.


With regard to the first book, it is important to take notice of the fact that its authors, Boltanski and Thévenot, take issue with both the critical theory developed, in different variants, by members of the Frankfurt School and the critical sociology proposed by Bourdieu for their tendency ‘to conceive of society exclusively in terms of domination, power relations, exploitation, and conflicts of interests’.803 At the same time, Boltanski and Thévenot do not have much sympathy for Kantian and contractual approaches, notably those associated with the works of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, due to their alleged failure to do justice to the sociological role of contradictions and conflicts within people’s lifeworlds.804 Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘overture towards a new social critique’805 – namely, the critique derived from the reflexive resources of ordinary actors – rejects the macro-theoretical ambition to develop an ‘overarching’806 conceptual architecture of society.

With regard to the second book, it is vital to acknowledge that its authors, Boltanski and Chiapello, are determined to ‘take into account relations of power and, above all, relations and actions of a non-institutional nature’,807 which – in the ‘connectionist world’808 of the ‘global village’ – play no less important a role than the ideological endorsement of ‘networks, flexibility, autonomy’809 in the construction of post-Fordist societies. Yet, far from conceiving of processes of critique and justification as obstacles to the emergence of a ‘new spirit of capitalism’, Boltanski and Chiapello interpret them as driving forces of
large-scale social transformations, especially with regard to capitalism’s ability to adapt to the demands of rapidly changing interactional environments by converting the ‘projects-oriented polity’ (cité par projets) into the future-oriented powerhouse of an ever-more pioneering stage of modernity.

II.

In the second section of his chapter, entitled ‘Hybridization’, Nachi grapples with the eclectic thematic underpinnings of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. In his opinion, two intellectual sources of influence are chiefly important in this regard: structuralism and phenomenology.

Central to structuralist analysis is the concept of ‘grammaticality’. In structuralist studies, this term is employed to account for the fact that human actions are shaped – or, in some cases, even determined – by different sets of underlying structures. There is a large variety of grammars impacting upon the constitution of social life: human actors are simultaneously immersed in numerous – notably cultural, political, economic, demographic, linguistic, and ideological – grammars.

Crucial to phenomenological analysis is the concept of ‘experience’. In phenomenological studies, this term is used to account for the fact that human actions acquire meaning only insofar as they possess direct or indirect implications for people’s experiential exposure to and absorption of reality. Surely, there is a wide range of experiences allowing for the meaning-laden participation in social life: human actors can have countless – for instance, individual or collective, rational or emotional, mediated or unmediated, soothing or unsettling, ordinary or extraordinary, formative or insignificant, reassuring or traumatic, positive or negative – experiences.

There is, however, a third dimension to which Nachi draws his readers’ attention: ‘historicity’. This category mediates between grammatically organized structures and phenomenologically constituted experiences in that both levels of existence are spatio-temporally connected and obtain meaning in relation to the socio-historically constituted background horizons in which human actors find themselves situated. Put differently, the ‘dialectic established between the structural and the phenomenal’ is embedded in the constantly changing horizon of the historical.

III.

The third section of Nachi’s chapter takes on the task of reflecting on the possibility of a significant intellectual challenge: finding a ‘compromise between “critical sociology” and the “sociology of critique”’. In particular,
Boltanski’s later writings – notably, *On Critique* (2011 [2009]) and *Rendre la réalité inacceptable* (2008) – play a pivotal role in his attempt to reconcile his own approach with that of his ‘intellectual father’, or at least in his ambition to accomplish this vis-à-vis key aspects of their respective conceptual and methodological frameworks.

However one seeks to settle previous disputes between the two currents of thought, and regardless of whether or not one comes to the conclusion that it is not only possible but also desirable to cross-fertilize their respective insights, a compromise between Bourdieu’s and Boltanski’s thought can be found only to the degree that the advocates of both approaches are willing, at the same time, to accept and to reject the *distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’*.822

- The distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’ needs to be *accepted* to the extent that the validity claims raised by experts and researchers are meant to transcend the constraining and misleading boundaries of common sense and everyday misconceptions.
- The distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’ needs to be *rejected* to the extent that laypersons are capable of engaging in processes of communication, reflection, and justification, by means of which they – similar to trained investigators – are able not only to question taken-for-granted assumptions about specific aspects of reality, but also to shape the development of different domains in society in accordance with discursively established principles of normativity.

Hence, the attempt to ‘establish a relationship between sociology and critique, metacritique and ordinary critique’,823 reflects the ambition to locate the cognitive, normative, and judgemental resources of actors not in the privileged sphere of scientific enquiry but in both the material and the symbolic construction of everyday reality.

**Simon Susen**

In his second chapter, entitled ‘Towards a Dialogue between Pierre Bourdieu’s “Critical Sociology” and Luc Boltanski’s “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”’,824 Simon Susen reflects on ‘the relationship between two prominent paradigmatic programmes, which are often regarded as diametrically opposed’.825 Bourdieu’s *critical sociology* and Boltanski’s *pragmatic sociology of critique* have not only attained considerable recognition and praise, but also provoked a substantial amount of criticism and scepticism in the contemporary literature. Furthermore, the intellectual connections between these two approaches have been explored, in some detail, by numerous
sympathetic and unsympathetic commentators. What is striking, however, is that ‘the key points of convergence and divergence between Bourdieu and Boltanski have hardly been examined in a systematic fashion’. This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by reflecting on (I) points of convergence, (II) points of divergence, and (III) points of integration between Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. As demonstrated in this enquiry, ‘paradoxically, the key points of convergence between Bourdieu and Boltanski are, at the same time, the most significant points of divergence between these two thinkers’, in addition to representing the central issues in relation to which their respective insights can be cross-fertilized. The following levels of analysis are particularly important.

(1) The concept of ‘the social’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski scrutinize social reality from a sociological point of view – that is, by insisting on its relational constitution. Bourdieu stresses the determinate, power-laden, unreflexive, complicit, and reproductive mechanisms permeating social structures. Boltanski, by contrast, emphasizes the indeterminate, value-laden, reflexive, discursive, and transformative dimensions pervading social processes.

(2) The concept of ‘practice’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski shed light on the practical constitution of social reality, which is reflected in the methodological privilege they ascribe to the systematic study of human actions. Bourdieu portrays social practices as the product of the homological correspondence between objectively determined positions, which are situated within specific social fields, and subjectively naturalized dispositions, which are located within particular forms of habitus. Boltanski, on the other hand, interprets social practices in terms of an open flow of normative performances structured in relation to context-dependent orders of worth, which are embedded within specific regimes of action, and shaped by context-sensitive critical and moral capacities, whose empirical significance manifests itself in processes of discussion and justification.

(3) The concept of ‘critique’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski conceive of their projects as profoundly normative, rather than merely descriptive, endeavours. Bourdieu tends to regard critique as a professional privilege of researchers, who are not only able to undertake an epistemological break with common sense but also equipped with the terminological and methodological tools necessary to uncover the underlying power mechanisms that govern the constitution of field-specific realities. Conversely, Boltanski considers critique as a universal resource of ordinary people, who are not only able to engage in processes of reflection and justification but also bestowed with the capacity to assess the validity of social actions by mobilizing their discursive resources on the basis of ‘tests’ – notably ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’ – in order to shape the development of everyday life.
The concept of ‘interest’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski recognize that all human practices are – directly or indirectly – influenced by social interests. According to Bourdieu, social interests emerge within social fields: (a) as ‘spaces of possibles’, they are structuring horizons, which set the limits for what agents can and cannot do; (b) as ‘spaces of divisions’, they are stratifying horizons, which divide agents between those who are dominant and those who are dominated; (c) as ‘spaces of struggles’, they are tension-laden horizons, in which agents compete for access to dominant positions and resources. According to Boltanski, social interests arise within social ‘cities’: (a) as ‘spaces of engagement’, they are interactional horizons, which form the background against which actors are invested in the world; (b) as ‘spaces of worth’, they are the interpretive horizons through which actors attribute meaning to their practices in accordance with specific principles; (c) as ‘spaces of disputes’, they are the normative horizons, which oblige actors to participate in processes of discussion oriented towards the justification of different modes of performance.

The concept of ‘aporia’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski aim to overcome different sources of explanatory reductionism in the social sciences. One of Bourdieu’s main objectives is to transcend the allegedly artificial and counterproductive division between ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ approaches in social and political thought. One of Boltanski’s principal intentions is to challenge the fatalistic implications of ‘determinist’ accounts, as well as the positivist presuppositions underlying ‘scientistic’ research programmes, in social and political analysis.

The concept of ‘background’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski insist upon the sociological centrality of social grammars, providing indispensable background horizons within and against which human actions take place. For Bourdieu, the foundational space of human life is the social field, whose underlying logic of functioning tends to be unconsciously reproduced and taken for granted by those immersed in it. For Boltanski, the foundational space of human life is the cité, whose order of worth can be consciously problematized and, if necessary, called into question by those situated in it.

The concept of ‘power’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski seek to contribute to a better understanding of social power by exploring the origins, functioning, and consequences of its existence. The former appears to endorse a form of socio-ontological pessimism, according to which the unequal distribution of social power is – largely and unconsciously – accepted and reproduced by human actors, even by those who are negatively affected by it. The latter seems to advocate a form of socio-ontological optimism, according to which the unequal distribution of social power can be, and often is, challenged and transformed by human actors, both by those who benefit from and by those who suffer from it.
The concept of ‘emancipation’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski are committed not only to criticizing the existence and effects of social domination but also to envisaging the construction of historical conditions allowing for processes of social emancipation. For Bourdieu, processes of social emancipation can be brought about by making use of the critical spirit inherent in scientific rationality, capable of seeing through the false consciousness permeating everyday preconceptions, thereby contesting the epistemic validity of doxic misrepresentations prevalent in particular interactional realms of society. For Boltanski, processes of social emancipation are inconceivable without the critical spirit derived from ordinary people’s moral and reflexive capacities, enabling them to question the apparent givenness of reality and thereby dare to imagine the possibility of alternative, and universally empowering, modes of sociality.

By way of conclusion, Susen’s chapter formulates eight hypotheses concerning the possibility of cross-fertilizing Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. These hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

(1) The production of scientific knowledge is inconceivable without the construction of everyday knowledge, since the reflexive discourses of specialist researchers emanate from the critical capacities of ordinary people.

(2) Homologically structured realities cannot escape the unforced force of critique, which has the normative power to convert relationally assembled regimes of action into discursively constituted spaces of justification.

(3) Every social field forms a relationally constructed space of action that depends on processes of justification, just as every cité represents a communicatively constituted regime of validation that is internally divided by mechanisms of social stratification.

(4) People are agents who are bodily situated in social relations shaped by dynamics of competition and confrontation. People are also actors, however, able to build communal bonds based on normative processes of justification and cooperation. The outcome-driven attitude underlying strategic action cannot be divorced from the understanding-oriented spirit motivating communicative action.

(5) Critical competence, whilst permitting subjects capable of action and justification to convert their engagement with reality into an object of reflection, is socio-historically situated in a doxic horizon, composed of culturally specific values and preconceptions.

(6) The normativity of every cité is not only sustained by orders of worth, which set the parameters for actions and justifications, but also impregnated with the structuring power of social fields, which impose a stratifying logic of
positioning upon the seemingly most disinterested encounters between its competing participants.

(7) The normative configurations created within cités are shot through with relations of power and structures of inequality generated within fields. Yet, in any social setting, the material and symbolic divisions between dominant actors and dominated actors can be called into question by those who produce and reproduce them when converting the real or imagined existence of legitimacy into an object of test-based scrutiny.

(8) Critical sociology needs to draw on the sociology of critique, since the critique of society acquires its normative resources from the society of critique. At the same time, the sociology of critique needs to build on critical sociology, since the society of critique dissipates its emancipatory resources without the critique of society.

Luc Boltanski and Political Sociology

Kate Nash

In her chapter, entitled ‘The Promise of Pragmatic Sociology, Human Rights, and the State’, Kate Nash steps into what many Boltanskian sociologists may perceive as unfamiliar territory. Indeed, it is far from clear to what extent the sociology of human rights and the sociology of the state have an explicit, or at least implicit, role to play in Boltanski’s scholarly writings. As Nash forcefully states, ‘[p]ragmatic sociology, with its emphasis on the importance of principles of justice as intrinsic to social life, is an attractive starting point for exploring […] questions’ vis-à-vis the status of human rights in the contemporary social sciences in particular and in present-day society in general.

Far from reducing social life to a power-laden conglomerate that is dominated by ‘violence, self-interest, or habit’, and instead of downgrading the value of human rights by asserting that they represent little more than decorative ingredients of ‘neo-liberal imperialist ideology’, Nash welcomes ‘the study of disputes, uncertainty, and socially embedded moral argument’, which – in her eyes – is central to Boltanski’s sociological project. She critically remarks, however, that ‘it is striking that Boltanski has written nothing explicitly on human rights, despite the concerns of pragmatic sociology with contemporary questions of justice’. Hence, given the lack of attention to the sociological role of human rights both in Boltanski’s own studies and in the numerous commentaries grappling with the significant – empirically informed and conceptually sophisticated – insights provided in his works, Nash has a major challenge on her hands when trying to fill this gap by attending to the task of assessing the potential usefulness of pragmatic sociology for examining citizens’ entitlements and obligations in relation to the state. Her analysis is divided into three main sections.
I.

In the first section of her chapter, Nash explains why, from her point of view, pragmatic sociology represents a promising and fruitful paradigmatic approach. At the same time, she questions ‘the lack of attention that has been given to human rights in refining it theoretically and empirically’ within the Boltanskian framework. Reflecting on the intellectual merits of Boltanski’s writings, Nash is convinced that ‘the most significant contribution of his work to sociology’ is his empirically grounded and conceptually innovative capacity to demonstrate, in impressive detail and with palpable passion, that ‘[e]veryday life is normative’. The centrality of this ambition is eloquently summarized in the following assertion:

Pragmatic sociology involves understanding everyday life as involving disputes over the appropriateness of principles of justice in particular situations.

Unlike various power-focused analytical frameworks (notably those inspired by Nietzschean, Marxist, Bourdieusian, Foucauldian, and Deleuzean thought), in Boltanski’s universe of normative encounters, social action is not portrayed as ‘invariably motivated by hidden interests, habit, or the “will to power”’. Rather, in his studies, it is conceived of as a form of value-laden performance, which is – to a significant extent – shaped by people’s ability to mobilize their critical and moral resources when coordinating their practices and when establishing meaningful relations with one another and, more generally, with the world by which they find themselves surrounded. According to Nash, two levels of analysis are chiefly important in Boltanski’s sociology:

(a) the level of reflexive individuals, and
(b) the level of polities or cités.

‘Individuals are situated in “worlds” in which they are required to confront “assemblages of ways of categorizing” by means of which they mediate their encounter with different dimensions of existence through the normative construction of symbolically organized realities. Yet, there is no such thing as an ultimate and unshakable consensus about anything concerning people’s existence. On the contrary, human actors need to face up to both the fragility and the multiplicity of agreements, implying that social arrangements – irrespective of whether they are of material or symbolic nature – are never forever and, furthermore, that there is ‘a pluralism of equally valid principles’ from which actors have to choose in particular situations. Drawing on insights provided by Latour, both Boltanski and his collaborator Thévenot are eager to emphasize that
‘arrangements of things’\textsuperscript{845} are, by definition, relatively \textit{arbitrary} and, hence, \textit{malleable}, as illustrated in the sociological function of ‘tests’ (épreuves), by means of which the validity of a given set of agreements and constellations can be either confirmed or questioned.

Tests provide ‘proof’ that social reality is organized correctly to ensure that principles of justice are being properly applied, whilst at the same time they organize reality as such.\textsuperscript{846}

One of the most original, but also most controversial, aspects of Boltanski and Thévenot’s framework\textsuperscript{847} is ‘the relation they posit between “ordinary” judgements and “philosophical” traditions’.\textsuperscript{848} In essence, they claim that the \textit{normative principles} at work in the six polities (cités) they identify – namely, ‘the inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the civic world’, ‘the world of opinion and fame’, ‘the world of the market’, and ‘the industrial world’\textsuperscript{849} – have both a ‘\textit{quotidian}’ and a ‘\textit{metaphysical}’ dimension.

* Their ‘\textit{quotidian}’ – or, if one prefers, ‘\textit{ordinary}’ – dimension is reflected in the fact that these principles are relevant to people’s everyday practices, as they find themselves immersed in different \textit{regimes of action and justification}, when navigating their way through the social universe: the experiences of passion (‘inspired’), trust (‘domestic’), solidarity (‘civic’), recognition (‘fame’), exchange value (‘market’), and productivity (‘industry’) are built into ‘orders of worth’, providing the normative parameters for the construction of social life in the context of modernity.

* Their ‘\textit{metaphysical}’ – or, simply, ‘\textit{philosophical}’ – dimension is expressed in the fact that these principles can be traced back to the writings of \textit{classical political philosophers}: St. Augustine (‘the inspired world’), Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (‘the domestic world’), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (‘the civic world’), Thomas Hobbes (‘the world of fame’), Adam Smith (‘the world of the market’), and Henri de Saint-Simon (‘the industrial world’).

Whilst both the validity and the usefulness of this two-level framework may be called into question,\textsuperscript{850} Nash is willing to concede that ‘their methodology seems reasonable, not to say highly inventive, for their purposes’.\textsuperscript{851} It is important to acknowledge, however, that, ‘\textit{when social actors justify moral principles, they generally do not articulate them fully}’.\textsuperscript{852} Unlike political philosophers, ordinary people – placed in the immediate circumstances of their lifeworlds – tend to apply normative codes implicitly and intuitively, rather than explicitly and consciously. As stressed in all forms of sociological pragmatism, in real life, we are confronted with the tangible preponderance of praxis,
rather than with the imagined preponderance of theory. In their everyday interactions, people’s ‘pronouncements are often incomplete, fragmentary, even incoherent, but this does not mean that they are unintelligible or self-regarding’. 853

Whilst expressing her support for a pragmatist approach that is designed to draw attention not only to the normative constitution of social life, but also to both the fragility and the plurality of contemporary regimes of action, she critically remarks that ‘[t]he most obvious principles of justice that are neglected in On Justification are those of human rights’. 854 This explorative limitation reflects a serious shortcoming whose significance has been acknowledged by Thévenot in a recent interview conducted by Paul Blokker and Andrea Brighenti. 855 In fact, Thévenot, unlike Boltanski, has a tendency to consider ‘expressions of rights only as strategic, intended to further an individual’s advantage, rather than as fragmentary and incomplete manifestations of a model of justice’. 856

If there is such a thing as a ‘polity of human rights’, it must not be interpreted as tantamount to the ‘civic polity’ in the Rousseauian sense. 857 Given the context-transcending nature of their normative validity and owing to their global relevance, ‘[h]uman rights go beyond a social contract with a particular state’ 858 governing within a specific territory. The theoretical framework defended in Boltanski’s Love and Justice as Competences 859 (2012 [1990]), which is central to his conception of normativity, makes a case for a model of justice that is founded on two key ideas:

(a) the idea of a ‘common humanity’, which presupposes ‘the equivalence of identity amongst individuals, with no human being left out’; 860
(b) the idea of ‘orders of worth’, on the basis of which ‘equivalences are drawn between individuals’, 861 allowing for the pursuit of the ‘common good’, notwithstanding the various differences that exist between people.

Even though ‘Boltanski is committed to a version of sociology that is both empirical and conceptual’, 862 and despite his in-depth engagement with the normative issues arising from both ordinary and scholarly debates on the nature of justice, there is little in the way of systematic enquiry into

the importance of migration and multiculturalism, the building of transnational connections and networks concerned with justice, and ‘arrangements of things’ and tests now developing across borders. 863

What, according to Nash, is even more serious a shortcoming in Boltanski’s work, however, is that his silence on the ‘polity of human rights’ is intimately
related to a highly questionable ‘conceptualization of institutions and, most significantly, of the state’. This leads us to the next stage of Nash’s analysis.

II.

In the second section of her chapter, Nash examines the relationship between ‘states, justice, and critique’ in Boltanski’s writings. In essence, she argues that, despite its considerable strengths, ‘the model he has developed since On Justification remains unsatisfactory’. In particular, she makes the following assertion: if he and Thévenot had paid more attention to the sociological significance of human rights, they would have been able to produce a much more fine-grained, and more timely, account of the ways in which the development of the state and the development of claims for justice are closely interrelated.

As famously noted by Paul Ricœur, one of the major limitations of On Justification consists in the fact that its authors fail to ‘specify the kind of political society to which their model is applicable’. Indeed, one may suggest that ‘pragmatic sociology can be valid only in a constitutional democracy, in which, by definition, there is respect for pluralism’. What their conceptual framework falls short of providing, then, is ‘any insight into how different models of justice are actually realized, denied, or avoided’. In other words, rather than taking the existence of basic rights and political pluralism for granted, it is of paramount importance to reflect on the possibility of their absence and, indeed, of systematic attempts – notably, by dictatorial states – to delegitimize or even suppress them.

More specifically, Nash insists that, in light of the above, we need to distinguish between two levels of politico-discursive articulation: on the one hand, there are ‘localized disputes’, permitting embodied actors to engage in dialogue and, if necessary, reach agreements within their respective lifeworlds; on the other hand, there is the ‘wider, national, or even transnational’ arena, in which normative concerns about justice can be applied and ‘administered’ on the basis of ‘legal and bureaucratic procedures’ that ‘conform to rational-legal principles’, whose validity goes beyond the spatio-temporally limited horizons of people’s lifeworlds.

As Nash – drawing upon Boltanski – points out, ‘the critiques of everyday injustices that give rise to disputes and justifications are almost invariably reformist’, mainly because people have to be – or, at least, appear to be – ‘realistic’. If, by contrast, they engage in radical forms of critique, they run the risk of ‘being perceived as abnormal by their fellows’ and, consequently, of being marginalized by those who endorse seemingly moderate and measured normative positions.
‘Reformist’ criticisms remain within the limits of the regulative parameters dictated by integrationism, gradualism, pragmatism, opportunism, and realism. ‘Radical’ criticisms, on the other hand, tend to be oriented towards inventing new normative agendas capable of transcending the constraining logic of instrumentally driven mechanisms of systemic immanence. 

Although Nash welcomes Boltanski’s concern with ‘political strategy’, she remains unconvinced by his conceptualization of the state. She complains that, when Boltanski, in On Critique, finally theorizes the state, he does not engage with the polities outlined in On Justification and elaborated elsewhere in his work at all. In her view, Boltanski’s failure to apply his – rather sophisticated – theory of polities to the state means that he ends up offering little more than a highly obscure account of institutionalized ‘power from above’. Put differently, ‘he outlines a highly speculative metacritique of the state as securing domination’. Indeed, unsympathetic critics may be suspicious of the vagueness underlying the following Boltanskian claim: in order to avoid remaining trapped in the oppressive steering power of the state, ‘there doubtless exists no other road than the eternal road of revolt’. Not only does such a broad assertion omit to provide any details about what needs to be done in concreto in order to challenge the ubiquitous power of the state; but, in addition, it fails to specify on what normative grounds mechanisms of domination can, and should, be undermined and – correspondingly – processes of emancipation can, and should, be reinforced.

In Nash’s opinion, Boltanski’s highlighting of the ‘semantic functions’ of institutions in general and of the state in particular illustrates that his theory stresses the symbolic – notably, linguistic – mediation of actors’ involvement in their everyday existence. Put differently, we relate to the world by constructing meaningfully organized realities. It is evident, then, that Boltanski ‘gives a good deal of emphasis to language as the paradigmatic institution through which social reality is constructed’. To the extent that ‘institutions construct social reality’, and to the extent that they do so by codifying and regulating people’s engagement with their environment, they define – in Boltanski’s terms – ‘the whatness of what is’. In this light, as Nash points out, Boltanski’s approach can be regarded as a contemporary version of social constructivism, not dissimilar to the epistemological perspective advocated by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann.

An institutional manifestation that epitomizes the constructed – and, hence, contingent – constitution of social reality is ‘the enterprise-state’, which is central to both the implementation and the justification of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. Whilst such an ‘enterprise-state’ is no less ‘totalizing and dominating’ than previous forms of capitalist statehood, one of its
distinctive features is that it prioritizes transformation and dynamism more than any hitherto existing polity. Certainly, ‘domination through change (rather than through repression)” can be considered a constitutive element of neo-liberal and neo-managerial regimes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. What is more worrying when reflecting upon the development of Boltanski’s theoretical framework, however, is that his ‘metacritique of the enterprise-state is disengaged from “ordinary” critiques’. Thus, Nash expresses a significant degree of scepticism about Boltanski’s conception of ‘metacritique’:

It does not relate to, or engage with, any of the criticisms that arise from the polities identified in On Justification, and it is not rooted in a new or emerging polity. It is, in this sense, a classic example of critical sociology to which pragmatic sociology was a (critical) response. […] It is unclear, then, why Boltanski goes against all the basic precepts of pragmatic sociology in order to elaborate a revolutionary metacritique that is not grounded in daily disputes over justice.

On this account, we are confronted with the following problem: just as Boltanski’s late ‘sociology of critique’ remains caught up in the disempowering implications of ‘metacritical sociologies’, his ‘sociology of domination’ does not succeed in liberating itself from the ‘domination of sociology’ by the elitist mission to transcend the illusory immanence of ordinary epistemic comfort zones by virtue of rigorous scientific enquiry.

III.

In the third section of her chapter, Nash defends a conception of the state ‘that is closer to the pluralist model of On Justification’ than to the metacritical model advocated in On Critique. Indeed, Nash explicitly states that, in her eyes,

>[t]he pragmatic theory of plural ‘worlds’ and ‘polities’, supplemented with a theory of the state, still seems […] to be a very important contribution to establishing the sociology of human rights.

Yet, she is also convinced that such a pragmatic approach – ‘if it is to realize its potential as a paradigm that can re-establish and reconnect sociology with popular disputes and everyday normative reasoning’ – is in need of both further conceptual refinement and further empirical substantiation. There is not much point in insisting upon the pivotal importance of human rights unless it can be demonstrated that the defence of their validity and centrality is anchored in quotidian forms of sociality.
Of course, we may follow Ricœur in arguing that the civic sphere is not ‘simply one polity amongst others’.

Rather, it may be regarded as the polity par excellence, owing to its power to shape and revise the normative parameters underlying the construction of any democratically organized society. At the same time, one may share Ricœur’s sympathetic assessment that, due to the increasing interconnectedness of different polities or cités in highly differentiated social settings, the ‘civic polity’ has lost its foundational status, given that it has not only to compete but also to engage with other polities. In practice, this means that, in the present age, the civic polity is obliged to provide justifications, not only in terms of the parameters it sets for itself, but also in terms of the parameters set by other ‘worlds’ – that is, by ‘the inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the world of opinion and fame’, ‘the world of the market’, ‘the industrial world’, and ‘the connectivist world’. Applied to real-world politics in general and to people’s normative validity claims in particular, it is difficult to deny that, although ‘the state remains the pre-eminent institution towards which demands for justice are oriented’, its capacities to govern – that is, to ‘make law and regulations on behalf of its citizens’ – have been substantially weakened in the context of an increasingly globalized world.

One may be inclined to share Nash’s conclusion that ‘it would not be difficult to add the polity of human rights to those listed by Boltanski and Thévenot in On Justification’. Challenging the relativist underpinnings of radically constructivist or pragmatist approaches in sociology, we need to recognize that the defence of human rights requires endorsing universalist normative parameters in the search for interculturally defensible principles, which, in terms of their validity and applicability, transcend the spatio-temporal specificities of both small-scale and large-scale forms of sociality. What is no less important, however, is to acknowledge, as Nash does, that ‘states are never unified’, but ‘always complex assemblages of official positions, rules, categorizations, and instruments’. Such a ‘poly-constructivist’ conception of ‘the social’ leaves little, if any, room for clear-cut separations between the state and other spheres of action, let alone between the state and civil society. What we need to understand, then, is that – far from constituting ‘unified, totalizing institutions’ – states in advanced capitalist societies are ‘pluralist, fragmented, complex, even incoherent’.

As Nash forcefully argues, it would have been much more difficult for Boltanski and Thévenot to ignore the pivotal role that states play in the regulation of norms and values, if they had paid more attention to the increasing importance of political discourses concerned with human rights in the current era. Irrespective of whether or not one wishes to conceive of the state as a ‘composite set-up’, there is little doubt that a truly pragmatist spirit is committed to the idea of bringing ‘sociologists and citizens together, rather than
splitting us into “experts” and “objects of study”’. Tautologically speaking, the challenge consists in developing a ‘critical sociology of social critique’ with the aim of denouncing mechanisms of domination and promoting processes of emancipation, whilst anchoring the reflexive resources of methodical enquiry in quotidian forms of sociality.

Paul Blokker

Paul Blokker’s chapter – entitled “The Political” in the Pragmatic Sociology of Critique: Reading Boltanski with Lefort and Castoriadis – is not only a persuasive reminder of the normative dimensions underpinning Boltanski’s work but also an illustration of the insights that can be gained from comparing and contrasting his main contributions with those made by other major social and political thinkers. Yet, the purpose of Blokker’s chapter is not merely comparative. Rather, its ambition is to shed light on a key dimension that remains largely implicit in most of Boltanski’s writings: ‘the political’. Undoubtedly, as Blokker points out, there is ‘a normative dimension in pragmatic sociology that links it with (radical) democratic theory’. This aspect, however, remains under-conceptualized, not only in Boltanski’s own works and in those he co-authored with his collaborators, but also in the numerous commentaries in which both his sympathetic and his unsympathetic critics seek to engage with the various contributions he has made to sociology in particular and to the social sciences in general. One of the remarkable achievements of Blokker’s chapter, then, is to have provided a fine-grained understanding of the role of ‘the political’ in Boltanski’s work, not only by examining some of his key writings, but also by drawing useful comparisons between central insights provided by Boltanski himself and those one may find in the seminal studies of Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis.

I.

In the first section of his analysis, Blokker invites his readers to reflect upon the concept of ‘the political’. To the extent that Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘sociology of critical capacity’ conceives of social realities as ‘grounded in a plurality of possible ways of engaging with the world and of justifying individual actions’, it is opposed to both monolithic and dualistic accounts of human existence. Indeed, as observed by Blokker, their pluralist approach to the normative aspects underpinning the construction of social realities builds upon the variegated framework developed by Michael Walzer, especially in his influential book Spheres of Justice (1983). Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘explicit sensitivity to a plurality of justifications’ is expressed in their commitment
to exploring different ‘worlds’ or, as they also call them, different ‘cités’, each of which develops its own ‘mode of justification’ – that is, its own normative patterns of interaction and validation. As Blokker – quoting Ricœur – critically remarks, however, one of the most problematic, and paradoxical, aspects of the theoretical framework developed in On Justification is that ‘politics seems both to constitute one sphere of justice among others and to envelop all the other spheres’. Indeed, the tautological concept of the ‘civic city’ suggests that we are confronted with a paradox: on the one hand, it appears to be only one amongst many other cities; on the other hand, its pleonastic description indicates that, in a fundamental sense, it represents ‘the city’ par excellence – that is, it comprises all other ‘cities’. In short, Boltanski and Thévenot’s cité-based perspective implicitly presupposes that the most differentiated human life forms are permeated by the preponderance of ‘the political’. It is in light of this insight that, for Blokker, Lefort’s work comes into play. In this respect, the French philosopher’s conceptual ‘distinction between “politics” (la politique) and “the political” (le politique)’ is crucial. The former designates ‘explicit political activity’, notably ‘the struggle for public power in society’. The latter denotes a much broader conception of political practice – that is, of any kind of human performance oriented towards the construction of normativity. The ‘confinement of “the political” to “politics”’, commonly expressed in ‘reductive and “scientific” views of politics’, is problematic in that it tends to generate narrow – that is, institutionalist, professionalist, managerialist, or elitist – conceptions of discursively shaped, and ideologically driven, coordinating practices. Lefort, then, is eager to endorse a broad definition of ‘the political’, which Blokker eloquently describes as follows:

‘[T]he political’ refers not to an a priori defined, objectified understanding of ‘the political’, a sphere of overt political action or conflict, but instead to a symbolic or representational dimension of power: the principle, or set of principles, that institutes a particular kind of society.

II.

According to Blokker, the Lefortian distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ occupies a firm place in pragmatic sociology, notably in Lamont and Thévenot’s edited collection Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology (2000), but also in Boltanski and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005 [1999]) and – perhaps, most importantly – in Boltanski’s On Critique (2011 [2009]). Indeed, in the second section of his chapter, Blokker examines the role of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ in the writings of
Bourdieu’s probably most influential disciple. Chiefly important in this regard is Boltanski’s conception of politics as an ensemble of ‘historical constructs’, and, more specifically, his claim that

\[\text{the normative supports that critiques and justifications are based on are associated with systems rooted in social reality, which are considered to be the product of the political history of a society.}\]

On this view, human practices of critique and justification cannot be divorced from socio-historically specific horizons shaped by political rules and expectations.

Boltanski’s distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité) is not insignificant in this respect, as it illustrates that one of the key socio-ontological functions of ‘the political’ is to enable individuals to confront ‘the fundamental uncertainty and indeterminacy that plague human society’ by constructing normatively codified domains of interactionality. If the ‘world’ – in the Wittgensteinian sense – is ‘everything that is the case’, then ‘reality’ – in the Boltanskian sense – is ‘everything that is habitually allowed to be the case’, and ‘politics’ is ‘everything that is discursively agreed, or authoritatively imposed, to be the case’. In other words, just as the construction of ‘reality’ is oriented towards the ‘preservation of order’, enabling individuals to cope with their exposure to the uncertainty inflicted upon them by the ‘world’, the pursuit of ‘the political’ permits them to define the parameters on which to coordinate their actions. Regardless of whether the construction of reality and the coordination of social activities are mediated by ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, or ‘existential tests’, the very fact that normative processes can be called into question – not only by those who study them ‘from outside’, but also by those who are directly involved in them ‘from inside’ – indicates that there is at least the potential of transformative and subversive ‘beyondness’ within the most conservative and complicit forms of ‘withinness’. In fact, as Blokker notes, ‘the reference to radical possibilities for challenging instituted reality is vital to recognizing the emancipatory role of ‘radical understandings of democracy’.

III.

It is in the third section of his chapter that Blokker proposes to reflect upon the meaning of ‘radical democracy’. Although this may not be obvious, in Boltanski’s later writings, especially in *On Critique*, there is a substantial point of convergence between his own understanding of social reality and that of political theorists endorsing the idea of radical democracy: namely, their
insistence upon ‘the impossibility of full semantic closure’\textsuperscript{939} and, correspondingly, their defence of the right to ‘the public disclosure of societal fragility’\textsuperscript{940} Such an anti-reductionist – and, arguably, anti-totalitarian – conception of social reality goes hand in hand with ‘an open, post-foundationalist view of democracy\textsuperscript{7941} and an anti-universalist interpretation of normativity. Faced with the ubiquity of ‘contingency, uncertainty, conflict’,\textsuperscript{942} heterogeneity, and indeterminacy, it is imperative to abandon the ambition to aim for ‘the full closure and completion of the democratic project’,\textsuperscript{943} representing a scenario that is neither possible nor desirable.

If anything prevails in highly differentiated social settings, which are characterized by elevated degrees of complexity, it is ‘an irreducible plurality of understandings of the common good’\textsuperscript{944} whose amorphous composition constitutes one of the most challenging aspects permeating collective processes oriented towards the construction of democracies based on ‘openness and transparency’.\textsuperscript{945} To be sure, this is not to deny the fact that both systematic and systemic ‘attempts to create coherence and semantic closure in order to diminish uncertainty and inquietude’\textsuperscript{946} are vital not only to modes of domination but also, in a more general sense, to all small-scale and large-scale endeavours to generate codified – and, hence, relatively predictable – frameworks of both concrete and abstract socialization. Every society is permeated by both the uncertainty of certainty and the certainty of uncertainty. It is the task of radical democracy to permit, and indeed encourage, its participants to face up to the material and symbolic consequences of this existential ambiguity.

Blokker goes on to scrutinize three key elements underlying his argument: (a) ‘uncertainty’,\textsuperscript{947} (b) the relation between ‘world’ and ‘reality’,\textsuperscript{948} and (c) ‘the political form of society’.\textsuperscript{949}

(a) Blokker draws attention to the fact that a striking similarity between Boltanski, Lefort, and Castoriadis can be found in their emphasis on the radical uncertainty permeating human existence. The ‘world’, far from presenting itself as ‘some kind of total preordained order’,\textsuperscript{950} constitutes a ‘void’ or form of ‘nothingness’, upon which socialized and socializing actors project the structuring power of institutions and ‘social imaginary significations’.\textsuperscript{951} Instead of searching for an ‘Archimedean point’\textsuperscript{952} from which to grasp the entire complexity of the social universe, we need to face up to the ineluctable indeterminacy of both the world itself and the discursive tools mobilized to attribute meaning to it.

(b) The distinction between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ is useful in that it permits us to shed light not only on the social constructedness of the variegated relations that humans establish with their environment, and indeed with themselves, but also on the empowering role of critique in enabling them to question the taken-for-grantedness of instituted realities.\textsuperscript{953}
The potential *beyondness* derived from people’s critical capacity indicates the fragility pervading the *withinness* of reality.

(c) The ‘lack of explicit engagement with “the political” in pragmatic sociology’, which manifests itself in Boltanski and Thévenot’s tendency to confine normative affairs concerning the pursuit of the ‘common good’ to the realm of the ‘civic world’ may be regarded as a serious paradigmatic limitation. Yet, their emphasis on the ‘irreducible plurality of understandings of the common good’ as well as their critical engagement with the ineluctable presence of existential uncertainty are indicative of their commitment to conceiving of *democracy as an open-ended process*, whose participants are not only ‘sensitive to the threat of closure’ but also conscious of the need to defend individual and collective expressions of autonomy against the disempowering causes and consequences of social mechanisms driven by the logic of heteronomy.

IV.

In the final section of his chapter, Blokker explores the extent to which, in ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist societies’, we have been witnessing ‘the decline of politics’. Undoubtedly, the seriousness of this concern is intimately interrelated with Boltanski’s thesis that the rise of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ is reflected in the emergence of a ‘complex’ system of domination, in which the paradoxical mixture of technocratic rationality and neo-managerialist creativity appears to have transcended the dividing lines of traditional political ideologies. This is not to contend that we have entered a ‘post-political age’ characterized by ‘the end of ideology’. Rather, this is to acknowledge that the principle ‘*dominating by change*’ is central to a dynamic *Zeitgeist* that has converted the belief in the civilizational power of late modern imperatives – such as ‘flexibility’, ‘elasticity’, ‘adaptability’, ‘accountability’, ‘creativity’, ‘vitality’, and ‘velocity’ – into virtues of, rather than obstacles to, the success of an economic system capable of colonizing the entire planet and defending its legitimacy, even in the face of profound social and political crisis and instability.

Yet, in addition to accusing Boltanski of failing to provide a satisfactory account of the role of ‘the political’ in the multilayered construction of society, Blokker puts his finger on a major problem arising from the overly pessimistic interpretation of the present with which one appears to be confronted in *On Critique*:

It seems to be an overstatement to argue that ordinary actors do not have any recourse to a radical critique of reality in current times, not least because the instituted imaginary still refers to democratic markers.
If Blokker’s criticism is justified, then we are confronted with a curious paradox. On the one hand, one of the main reasons for the paradigmatic attempt to replace Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ with Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ was to avoid falling into the trap of socio-ontological fatalism, by doing justice to the central role of ordinary people’s moral and critical capacities in shaping the development of society. On the other hand, motivated by the ambition to reconcile his own approach with that of his ‘intellectual father’, Boltanski – in his later works, notably in On Critique – appears to overestimate the pivotal role of reflexive sociologists’ metatheoretical and metacritical capacities in uncovering the underlying mechanisms that presumably determine the constitution of reality. Put differently, one gets the impression that Boltanski runs the risk of confining critical capacity to a professional privilege of reflexive sociologists, rather than pursuing his previous project of demonstrating that it constitutes a universal privilege of human actors. As Blokker perceptively observes, such a pessimistic conception of ‘the social’ needs to be challenged by reminding ourselves, and others, of the emancipatory potential of ‘the political’: ‘the possibility of speaking out’ is not only inconceivable without ‘the existence of a public space that allows one to make one’s views public’ but, more fundamentally, constitutes a sine qua non for constructing a society based on the normative foundations of a genuinely consolidated – that is, open-ended and, hence, never fully consolidated – democracy. Blokker has done contemporary social theory a great favour by making Boltanski’s largely implicit engagement with politics explicit and by illustrating that there is no comprehensive conceptualization of ‘the social’ without the critical consideration of ‘the political’.

Mauro Basaure

In his chapter, entitled ‘Axel Honneth and Luc Boltanski at the Epicentre of Politics’, Mauro Basaure examines a controversial issue: namely, the tension-laden relationship between Honneth’s ‘theory of recognition’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatist sociology’. As he explains in the opening paragraphs of his chapter, the systematic reconstruction of Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition permits us to identify three central analytical axes, which are closely interrelated:

(a) The moral-sociological-explicative axis: This axis concerns the moral motives underlying human actions in general and social struggles in particular. Important in this regard is Honneth’s explicit attempt to develop a non-utilitarian approach to social conflicts, which is capable of shedding light on the morally constituted reasons and impulses behind human practices.
Indeed, moral principles and ‘values anchored in the intersubjective structures of mutual recognition’ are chiefly important in shaping people’s everyday performances, including the specific grammars underpinning social conflicts, in normatively codified ways. To the extent that the collective experience, or perception, of ‘moral damage’ can ‘form the motivational basis for social struggles’, there appears to be an intimate ‘link between conflict and normativity’ in every society.

(b) The historic-philosophical-reconstructive axis: This axis relates to the ‘historical interpretation of processes of moral construction’ emerging within spatio-temporally situated social struggles. This level of analysis illustrates that, by definition, every social conflict is embedded in a given context and, hence, in a set of historically specific circumstances. Irrespective of whether one chooses to focus on individual, communal, or societal practices, all three levels of social-scientific exploration – that is, ‘the micro’, ‘the meso’, and ‘the macro’ – permeate ‘processes oriented towards moral learning’ and have to be historicized in terms of their context-dependent capacity to set the normative agendas structuring the moral grammars of social conflicts.

(c) The political-sociological axis: This axis obliges us to reflect upon ‘the concept of struggle in a strict sense’. As such, it is concerned, first and foremost, with ‘the modes of construction of collectives in antagonistic positions’ as well as with ‘the opportunities they have to access the public political space, intervene in it, and transform social categories, value orientations, and practices that regulate social recognition and individual rights’. Thus, this axis focuses on the performative capacity of individual and collective actors to mobilize their symbolic and material resources, with the aim of coordinating their practices and shaping their environment in accordance with their normative principles and moral values as well as with their personal or social interests.

In brief, the first axis is concerned with the morally constituted ‘why’, the second axis with the historically structured ‘when and where’, and the third axis with the politically motivated ‘how’ of social struggles. Similar to Boltanski, Honneth assumes that ‘a moral – and, hence, normative – logic is at the basis of political action’. It comes as no surprise, then, that – again, in line with Boltanski – he is strongly opposed to ‘utilitarian-strategic explanations of political motivations’, which arguably play a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s writings. In this respect, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – developed by Boltanski, in collaboration with his colleague Thévenot – appears to be a more promising starting point than Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. Whereas the former places the sociological significance of morally motivated actions at the centre of its analysis, the latter tends to reduce them to praxeological manifestations of the field-specific – and, thus, interest-driven – logic permeating the entire social universe.
Basaure goes on to unearth the central presuppositions underlying Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘moral and political sociology’; he does so by comparing and contrasting their approach to the intellectual tradition associated with the works of members of the Frankfurt School, notably Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth. Unlike most critical theorists, especially those who explicitly draw on Kantian and neo-Kantian as well as Hegelian and neo-Hegelian frameworks,

Boltanski and Thévenot’s moral and political sociology not only lacks but also rejects the idea of developing a normative framework based on the development of reason in history.984

In Basaure’s own terminology, their investigative model does not possess a ‘historic-philosophical-reconstructive axis’.985 Given Boltanski and Thévenot’s concern with both moral and political matters, however, they engage – extensively – with the key issues arising from the ineluctable presence of the aforementioned ‘moral-sociological-explicative axis’986 and ‘political-sociological axis’. 987

Perhaps, one of Boltanski and Thévenot’s most significant contributions to contemporary sociology is reflected in the ample evidence they have provided to illustrate not only the existence but also the central normative role of people’s ‘ordinary sense of justice’988 in the construction of social life. The multiplicity of ‘regimes of justification’989 manifests itself in the ‘plurality of orders of value’,990 to which social participants implicitly or explicitly refer when coordinating, or justifying, their actions. Owing to their shared emphasis on the plurality of action, an analogy can be drawn between Walzer’s theory of different ‘spheres of justice’,991 Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘regimes of action’,992 and Honneth’s ‘spheres of recognition’.993 Indeed, what all of these ‘spheres’, ‘domains’, ‘realms’, or ‘regimes’ of action have in common is that they possess specific grammars that structure the normative practices taking place within the boundaries of people’s context-dependent existence. Indeed, both Honneth’s three ‘spheres of recognition’ – love, legal rights, and social esteem994 – and Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘regimes of action’ with their corresponding ‘orders of worth’ – ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘reputational’, ‘civic’, ‘market-based’, and ‘industrial’ – indicate that, as sociologists, we need to account for the fact that codified and codifying sets of relationally established arrangements both mediate and regulate people’s engagement with reality.

This insight leads Basaure to examine what he characterizes as the ‘immanent normativity of political and moral judgement’.995 More specifically, we are confronted with the task of scrutinizing ‘the “grammaticalization” of the normative bases of ordinary judgement’.996 To put it simply, every judgement is made
on the basis of a set of assumptions. The semantic resources through which these assumptions are expressed can be mobilized implicitly or explicitly, unconsciously or consciously, intuitively or reflexively, unwittingly or deliberately. The ‘acceptability’ of an action depends on its capacity to obtain approval by those assessing its validity in terms of the parameters underlying a particular regime of action generating normatively codified forms of sociality. Crucial in this regard is the pragmatist conviction that

*morality does not refer to more or less formal criteria that are exterior to social practices* on the basis of which the universal justifiability of pretensions of discursive validity is evaluated.\(^{998}\)

Rather, *morality*, in the pragmatist sense, constitutes an assemblage of ‘pre-theoretical’ and *context-dependent* principles, which are applied in specific situations and shaped by ‘evaluations and judgements made by actors’\(^{1000}\) when navigating their way through the multiple situations they experience as participants in social life.

Basaure summarizes the principal objective that undergirds the Boltanskian project as follows:

The main purpose of Boltanski’s sociological research is to *reconstruct immanent or implicit forms of normativity* – that is, *the ordinary sense that governs the evaluative judgement of expressive practices […]*.\(^{1001}\)

He is aware of the fact, however, that grammars create normative oppositions: ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’, ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’, ‘appropriate’ versus ‘inappropriate’, ‘legitimate’ versus ‘illegitimate’. Hence, the parameters defining the boundaries of acceptability are socially contingent:

This clearly implies the opposite possibility – that is, that such practices do not satisfy the pragmatic conditions of acceptability immanent in evaluative judgement of an ordinary subject and, as a result, are considered *illegitimate, illusory, unbalanced*, etc.\(^{1002}\)

Put in more radical terms, we may suggest that the creation of every *grammar* potentially involves the emergence of an *anti-grammar* – that is, of a way of doing things that diverges from the rules imposed by a particular normative framework and, hence, has the transformative, or even subversive, potential of creating a new one. In relation to the dynamic constitution of normative grammars, Basaure proposes to distinguish ‘three separate aspects of the justification of critique’:\(^{1003}\) namely, ‘legitimacy, facticity, and admissibility’\(^{1004}\)
According to Basaure, these dimensions lie at the heart of Luc Boltanski, Yann Darré, and Marie-Ange Schiltz’s influential study entitled ‘La dénonciation’\textsuperscript{1005} (1984). This enquiry may be conceived of as ‘the basis of the architecture of the model of cities developed by Boltanski and Thévenot’\textsuperscript{1006} in\textit{De la justification}.\textsuperscript{1007} Many political sociologists will sympathize with the emphasis placed on the role of normativity in the construction of ‘regimes of action’, especially with regard to the fundamental Rousseauian idea that the worth that people in the civic city (\textit{cité civique}) can access is directly related to the capacity that they demonstrate for de-singularizing or de-privatizing their relationships and, with that, for embodying and representing the general interest.\textsuperscript{1008}

As Basaure notes, however, we must not forget that, often, those who present themselves ‘as procurers of the common good’\textsuperscript{1009} seek to pursue their individual, personal, or private interests.\textsuperscript{1010}

This sensibility towards the relationship between ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests is central to Boltanski and Thévenot’s model of \textit{economies of worth},\textsuperscript{1011} illustrating that their conceptual framework is informed by the critical engagement with \textit{empirical} dimensions of human existence – that is, by an explanatory approach that ‘presupposes a strong anchoring in reality and objects’,\textsuperscript{1012} rather than a soft reliance on symbolic representations and language. Far from following the post-structuralist rhetoric about the social construction of reality by virtue of symbolically mediated and discursively constituted realms of interpretive projection, Boltanski and Thévenot endorse a form of ‘\textit{sociological realism}’, capable of avoiding the danger of falling into the traps of hermeneutic idealism, linguistic determinism, and postmodern textualism. In fact, their ‘opposition to the discourse-theoretic accounts associated with the “linguistic turn”’\textsuperscript{1013} is expressed in their conviction that not only \textit{sociologists}, when examining and reflecting upon social life, but also \textit{ordinary actors}, when experiencing and participating in the construction of everyday existence, have to be ‘\textit{realistic}’.\textsuperscript{1014} The role of different ‘tests’ (épreuves) – notably of ‘\textit{truth tests}’, ‘\textit{reality tests}’, and ‘\textit{existential tests}’\textsuperscript{1015} – is significant due to their capacity to contribute either to \textit{confirming} or to \textit{challenging} the validity attributed to particular aspects of reality. From a pragmatist point of view, then, human experiences of suffering – irrespective of whether they occur on an individual or on a collective basis – cannot be dissociated from the socio-historical contexts in which they take place, let alone from the concrete practices of those who undergo these experiences. As Basaure reminds us, the \textit{interconnectedness of the moral, historical, and political dimensions permeating social struggles} oblige us to take seriously the significance of the aforementioned axes of analysis: both as critical theorists and as pragmatic sociologists, we need to explore the
morally constituted ‘why’, the historically structured ‘when and where’, and the politically motivated ‘how’ of people’s practices if we seek to understand the normatively specific (i.e. value-laden), spatio-temporally contingent (i.e. context-laden), and ideologically driven (i.e. interest-laden) constitution of social struggles.

Irène Eulriet

As anticipated in the title of her chapter, Irène Eulriet compares and contrasts two of the most influential books in contemporary sociology: Jeffrey Alexander’s The Civil Sphere (2006) and Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification (2006 [1991]), which she characterizes as ‘two models of public culture’. With this ambitious task in mind, Eulriet is interested, above all, in their respective ‘understanding of public culture in liberal democracies’, especially with regard to the sociological tools they offer for its critical study.

I.

Eulriet makes it clear from the outset that their approaches have a number of significant features in common. Both are inspired by Durkheimian intuitions, notably in terms of the distinction between ‘the sacred’ and ‘the profane’. Both aim to combine philosophical and sociological issues, as reflected in their shared terminology – such as ‘justice’, ‘pragmatics’, and ‘compromise’. Both have been given promising paradigmatic labels: in the case of Alexander, ‘cultural sociology’ or – with more precision – ‘new American cultural sociology’; in the case of Boltanski and Thévenot, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, the ‘sociology of justification’, or – in a more wide-ranging sense – ‘new French social sciences’. Both endeavour to examine the extent to which specific normative aspirations – particularly in relation to justice, solidarity, and universalism – trigger idiosyncratic socio-political dynamics, which are vital to the construction of liberal democracies.

These are the most obvious reasons why The Civil Sphere and On Justification are comparable. As Eulriet convincingly illustrates, however, there are several further points of convergence. The two frameworks of analysis coalesce in their effort ‘to isolate culture from other conceivable social dimensions’ – an ambition that involves the methodological challenge of having to specify how culture can and should be studied in sociology. Consequently, both are opposed to ‘the common-sense notion of culture as a homogeneous symbolic whole presiding over the social practices of those who happen to be socialized in it’. Irrespective of whether one has a preference for Boltanski and Thévenot’s six-dimensional differentiation of ‘regimes of justification’ or for Alexander’s model of a ‘binary code’,
both approaches are designed to identify not only the core elements of culture, but also the multiple ways in which its constitutive components impact upon people’s capacity to mobilize their symbolic resources. In both accounts, then, the critical engagement with ‘justice’ and ‘processes of justification’ plays a pivotal role.

II.

In Alexander’s case, the ambition to shed light on ‘the structure and dynamics of the civil sphere’, reflected in ‘a definite form of discourse and a range of institutions’, is central. In this regard, his distinction between ‘civility’ and ‘anti-civility’ needs to be taken into consideration.

• The former designates an attitude based on ‘rationality, autonomy, and self-control’. It can be conceived of as both a producer and a product of ‘open, trusting, critical, honourable, altruistic, truthful, straightforward, deliberative, and friendly social relations’ – that is, of social ties and connections shaped by communicative processes oriented towards mutual engagement, understanding, and consensus-building.

• The latter refers to an attitude motivated by the search for power, control, and self-interested success. It can be interpreted as both a producer and a product of ‘secrecy, suspicion, deference, self-interest, greed, deceit, calculation, conspiracy, and antagonism’ – that is, of social links and networks sustained by instrumental actions impregnated with dynamics of competition, conflict, and deception.

The above-mentioned opposing attitudes and values manifest themselves in the emergence of ‘civil and anti-civil institutions’. The dialectic of ‘civility’ and ‘anti-civility’ permeates not only the symbolic, discursive, and ideological domains of society but also the institutional structures that allow for a minimal degree of solidified interactionality. In this context, what is significant from a normative standpoint is Alexander’s assertion that, inevitably, processes of inclusion generate mechanisms of exclusion. On this account, ‘[t]he evils of modernity are not anomalies’ but, rather, ‘systemic products of the search for civil justice and the good life’. In other words, there is no search for justice and the good life without the creation of injustice and the bad life.

III.

In Boltanski and Thévenot’s case, processes of ‘critique, debate, and deliberation’ are considered to play a pivotal role in the construction of normative orders.
Yet, instead of developing a narrative based on binary categories such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, they make a case for a multidimensional framework founded on several ‘orders of worth’ or ‘cité’, in which people employ their ‘day-to-day sense of justice’ and in which they not only coordinate their actions, but also assess the validity of the principles by which they are guided when performing them. On this view, there is no overarching normative principle; rather, each ‘cité’ – ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘civic’, ‘market’, ‘industrial’, or ‘fame-based’ – is shaped by its own parameters of justification, which human subjects cannot possibly bypass when defending the moral value of an action within the normative boundaries of a particular social realm. In a general sense, then, the normative pluralism that underpins Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociology of justification goes hand in hand with the emphasis placed on the fruitful role of the diversity of opinions, belief systems, and life styles in democratically organized societies.

IV.

It appears that, both in *The Civil Sphere* and in *On Justification*,

the primary battle to be fought is not one over allocation of resources or access to power structures, but one that situates itself on the terrain of influence, persuasion, and hence discourse.¹⁰³⁶

Unlike Bourdiesian approaches, which tend to focus on field-specific struggles over access to material and symbolic resources and, correspondingly, on the homological interplay between position-taking and disposition-acquisition, here social actors are portrayed as capable of engaging in critical dialogue and discursive processes of justification.

Of course, one may level various criticisms against Alexander’s as well as against Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual frameworks, notably – as pointed out by Eulriet – with regard to the ethnocentric spirit underlying their understanding of normatively differentiated societies. Notwithstanding the epistemic limitations attached to their respective sociological projects, the insights provided in *The Civil Sphere* and *On Justification* are far from insignificant: just as Alexander’s fine-grained socio-historical analysis of the civil sphere permits us to shed light on ‘the vital, maybe primary, role of cultural processes in shaping social life in liberal democracies’,¹⁰³⁷ Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociopragmatist account of processes of justification opens ‘conceptual avenues […] for the study of public culture as an autonomous sphere of social life within changing institutional environments’.¹⁰³⁸ The creation of open, democratic, and empowering civil spheres depends on dialogical processes of justification. At the same time, the possibility of dynamic, inclusive, and emancipatory
processes of justification is inextricably linked to the normative challenge of contributing to the communicatively constituted construction of civil spheres.

William Outhwaite and David Spence

In their chapter, William Outhwaite and David Spence take on the – perhaps, slightly unexpected – task of placing ‘Luc Boltanski in Euroland’. More specifically, they seek to demonstrate that some of Boltanski’s key theoretical contributions are useful to contemporary studies of European politics in general and of the European Union in particular. Notoriously controversial issues, in this respect, are the following: the conditions of European integration, the possibility of the emergence of a European state, the creation of European citizenship, the construction of a European identity, and – more generally – both the idea and the reality of a European society.

I.

In the first section of their chapter, Outhwaite and Spence propose to distinguish ‘four broad families of critical social theory’, all of which are relevant to contemporary studies of Europe and ‘Europeanization’.

First, ‘Frankfurt’ critical theory – rooted in Germany, but increasingly present on a European and, indeed, transatlantic scale – is now represented by various German scholars (notably, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Claus Offe, Hauke Brunkhorst, Ulrich Beck, and Edgar Grande), but also by prominent Anglo-American intellectuals (such as Andrew Arato, Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Jean Cohen, Nancy Fraser, William Rehg, and others). In recent decades, their numerous works have gained considerable influence in and on the field of European studies.

Second, Foucauldian theories of governmentality – rooted in France, but widely discussed, developed, and applied across and beyond Europe – are defended by a variety of social and political scientists. They are commonly applied by researchers focusing on two related areas in European studies: (a) ‘the territorial polity of the EU – borders, regional policy etc.’; and (b) the ‘mode of surveillance’ of the EU, especially with regard to the emergence of ‘a regulatory state’. The ‘regulated freedom’ that characterizes demographic forms of control and movement in contemporary Europe lends itself to being studied in Foucauldian terms, for it obliges social and political scientists to revise traditional conceptions of power, advocated in modern – notably, Marxist and Weberian – theories of domination.

Third, Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ – widely recognized as one of the most influential approaches in the social sciences of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries – has had a substantial impact not only on his
disciples – such as Luc Boltanski, Jean-Louis Fabiani, and Loïc Wacquant – but
also, more widely, on social scientists across the world. Multiple scholars
have illustrated the usefulness of Bourdieu’s work to the field of European
studies.\textsuperscript{1049} Crucial in this context is Bourdieu’s \textit{La misère du monde}\textsuperscript{1050} (1993), a
large-scale study of ‘the reproduction of class inequalities in the spheres of
culture and ideology’\textsuperscript{1051} in late twentieth-century France. Bourdieu’s attack
on neo-liberalism is comparable to Honneth’s criticisms of social mechanisms
based on disrespect,\textsuperscript{1052} Beck’s enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism,\textsuperscript{1053} and
Habermas’s reflections on the emergence of a ‘post-national constellation’.\textsuperscript{1054}
For all of these European thinkers share a firm belief in the possibility of an
emancipatory society contributing to the self-realization and self-
empowerment of humanity.

Fourth, Luc Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – more and more influential
since the mid-1980s, not only in Francophone circles but also internationally,
notably in Anglophone and Germanophone social science – features centrally
in Outhwaite and Spence’s chapter. Two of Boltanski’s most well-known co-
authored books are particularly relevant to European studies:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{On \textit{Justification: Economies of Worth}}\textsuperscript{1055} (2006 [1991]), co-written with Laurent
    Thévenot, offers an insightful analysis of practices of justification and
    of decision-making processes in everyday life. The book’s explanatory
    framework can be applied to the study of formal and institutional settings,
    including those existing in the EU.
  \item \textit{The New Spirit of Capitalism}\textsuperscript{1056} (2005 [1999]), co-written with Ève Chiapello,
    provides an original examination and assessment of the transformation of
capitalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, epitomized
in the emergence of a new ‘spirit’ of capitalism, allowing for social domination
based on constant change and for processes of innovation in which people’s
critical capacity plays a pivotal, rather than marginal, role.
\end{itemize}

Boltanski’s emphasis on ‘the contingency of social order’\textsuperscript{1057} and on what
he refers to as ‘the fragility of reality’\textsuperscript{1058} is reflected in the fact that, as he
himself points out, he has always been interested in ‘the practical and flexible
application of […] theoretical categories’,\textsuperscript{1059} rather than in ‘their more
formal aspects’.\textsuperscript{1060} This has permitted Boltanski and his followers – similar
to symbolic interactionists and ethno-methodologists – to develop a special
sensitivity to the normative significance of micro-social dynamics and, hence,
of ‘the production of social order in everyday interaction’.\textsuperscript{1061} To be concerned
with ‘how people engage in critique’\textsuperscript{1062} requires taking ordinary actors seriously
and recognizing that they are equipped with both individually and collectively
empowering moral, reflexive, and discursive capacities. One of the principal ambitions of Boltanski’s pragmatic approach, then, is to propose a conceptual and methodological framework designed to shed light on the grammatical underpinnings of ‘the activity of critical justification’\textsuperscript{1063} and on the practical role of ‘tests’ (épreuves)\textsuperscript{1064} in shaping the normative development of social life in general and of different ‘worlds’ – representing distinct ‘orders of worth’ – in particular.\textsuperscript{1065}

II.

In the second section of their chapter, Outhwaite and Spence go on to discuss the relevance of Boltanski’s pragmatic approach to the study of the European Union. As they state at the outset, given that the EU

is substantially a discursive forum based on argument and justification […]\textsuperscript{1066} it is perhaps surprising that Boltanski’s approach has not been more widely invoked in the extensive volume of literature devoted to it.\textsuperscript{1066}

In this respect, one may compare Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ with Habermas’s ‘theory of communicative action’. Indeed, it is striking that, despite the somewhat abstract and largely conceptual nature of Habermas’s work, there are several empirical investigations that draw upon his writings.\textsuperscript{1067} With regard to Boltanski’s oeuvre, a literature attempting to combine substantive data with a Boltanskian framework is starting to emerge,\textsuperscript{1068} but in relation to the EU this is not – or, perhaps, not yet – the case.

As Outhwaite and Spence explain, one of the most central – and, possibly, most controversial – aspects of the Lisbon Treaty concerns the fact that it stipulates the ‘primacy of EU law, noting that EU law takes precedence over the national laws of EU member states’.\textsuperscript{1069} Consequently, one easily gets the impression that ‘[n]ational borders disappear’\textsuperscript{1070} and that ‘the territorial imperative manifests itself at a geographically higher level’,\textsuperscript{1071} reflecting a process that may be described as an integral part of the transnationalization – and, indeed, the globalization – of contemporary societies, which are increasingly interconnected and interdependent. To the extent that this ‘process is essentially contested by both analysts and the general public’,\textsuperscript{1072} it is ‘in need of “justification”’\textsuperscript{1073} by those who endorse it – either as social-scientific researchers or as laypersons experiencing its tangible consequences. This new ‘post-Westphalian world’\textsuperscript{1074} however, ‘is only in part recognized by Europeans’\textsuperscript{1075} most of whom continue to consider the nation-state to which they belong – in terms of their citizenship – as the main reference point for large-scale decision-making processes and for the definition of their cultural identity.
Nevertheless, in such a post-Westphalian context, it appears ‘unacceptable for a minister to say in the European Council that he or she is concerned only with the national interest’, although Eurosceptic politicians – such as Margaret Thatcher and David Cameron – have often come close to articulating such an openly nationalist position.

The key contention that Outhwaite and Spence seek to defend, then, can be summarized – in their own words – as follows:

*Tension between national (member state) and Union interest is fundamental to the nature of the EU; in fact, it constitutes a frequent theme of its self-justification.*

They go on to comment that

we must regret that Boltanski has so far not developed for the EU as a subject of sociological inquiry the ideas contained in *On Justification*, in particular his discussion of the tensions between the *cité civique* and *cité industrielle*.

In other words, justificatory processes are no less relevant – empirically – to the everyday functioning of the EU than they are – theoretically – to Boltanski’s architecture of ‘the social’. Notwithstanding the question of whether or not it is possible, in a given case, ‘to reclassify a national interest as a European interest and thereby bolster political support’ for the EU, Outhwaite and Spence regret that Boltanski did not develop his views on the resolution of such tensions between servants and politicians at the level of the nation-state and of the supranational state.

Granted, in one of his latest works, *Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes* (2012), Boltanski provides a critical study of ‘the relations between the state, its employees, and citizens’ in relation to the development of police fiction and spy novels. In this context, his enquiry into ‘the relation between official and unofficial power resources’ is remarkably insightful. One of his most fundamental questions concerning the nature of power – ‘Where is power really located, and who really holds it?’ – is central not only to social and political theorists, but also to the empirical study of both national and supranational decision-making processes within the EU.

In seeking to scrutinize the relationship between different levels of deliberative and institutional power, ‘[w]hat an approach drawing on Boltanski may contribute is a sharper focus on modes of justification’, not only in relation to ‘the legitimate use of rhetoric’ but also – à la Habermas – in relation
to the legitimate use of arguments. Unlike Bourdieu’s framework, which appears to reduce discursive practices to their exogenous determinacy in terms of ‘static elements of position in a field and possession of capital’, Boltanski’s pragmatist model – reminiscent of Habermas’s discourse ethics – ‘can be invoked to reinforce the case for attending to the more dynamic aspects of Eurocracy’. The ‘fragility of reality’ is reflected in the instability of European democracy, including the lack of legitimacy from which it may suffer within different – nationally defined – societies, especially when political decisions are justified by reference to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’.

As Outhwaite and Spence emphasize, Euro-governance relies – substantially – on the knowledge of ‘independent experts’ and their capacity to form ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘policy networks’ forming an integral component of ‘Eurocracy’, which has been extensively discussed in the literature. When using Boltanskian parameters to make sense of ‘forms of argumentation’ underlying decision-making processes in the EU, it becomes clear that different – but interrelated and overlapping – logics of discursive engagement are at work: the ‘inspired’ world, shot through with creativity; the ‘civic’ world, motivated by the defence of public interests; the world of ‘opinion’, shaped by both private and public interpretations and attitudes; the ‘domestic’ world, ruled by – often nepotistic – networks and hierarchies of personal and collective dependence; the ‘mercantile’ world, based on market principles, notably competition and profit; and, last but not least, the ‘industrial’ world, in which productivity and efficiency are considered indispensable. One may, of course, add the ‘connectivist’ world, which represents the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ and which, nourished by the idea of ‘flexicurity’, is driven by the ambition to construct a transnational ‘network society’. Whichever of these ‘worlds’ one may consider objectively preponderant or normatively most significant, a ‘commitment to the idea of supranationality’ – and, hence, ‘to “integration” at the highest level’ – appears to be unavoidable when steering the development of increasingly globalized societies. A ‘Boltanskian approach may illuminate the discursive micro-dynamics of [...] negotiations making the emergence of communicatively organized realms of supranationality possible in the first place. In a world of globalization, processes of justification are no less trans- and supranational than the realities with which they are concerned. Indeed, borderless processes of justification have themselves become a constitutive reality of the global network society.

Boltanski’s reflections on ‘a “transport of values”’ – that is, a situation in which one kind of “value” is judged with the tools of another – may remind us of Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘convertibility of capital’ – that is, a situation in which one kind of ‘capital’ can be transformed into, and be valorized with the tools of, another. A given world may be characterized as ‘inspired’, ‘civic’, ‘opinion-
based’, ‘domestic’, ‘mercantile’, ‘industrial’, or ‘connectivist’. In a similar vein, a specific type of capital embodies primarily ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, ‘intellectual’, ‘educational’, ‘linguistic’, ‘political’, ‘symbolic’, or ‘erotic’ resources. In both the Boltanskian and the Bourdieusian universe, however, every ‘world’ and every form of ‘capital’ can be attributed meaning and value through the lenses of another ‘world’ and form of ‘capital’, at the same time as people navigate their way through reality by going back and forth between different domains of action and by mobilizing different resources for action.

Considering the impact of bottom-up constructions of normativities upon the development of democratically organized societies, ‘Boltanski’s stress on the critical activity developed by ordinary actors’¹¹⁰⁶ may seem plausible. Yet, when reflecting on the implications of the fact that – as Outhwaite and Spence argue – ‘Europe’s diplomats[…] currently live divided lives and loyalties’,¹¹⁰⁷ the challenge consists in examining the extent to which their official justifications (justifications officielles) differ from their unofficial justification (justifications officieuses) and, correspondingly, the extent to which their public reasoning (raisonnement publique) diverges from their private reasoning (raisonnement privé). Inevitably, the ‘new global order’¹¹⁰⁸ is permeated by various material and symbolic, real and imagined, formal and informal, public and private conflicts. The tension-laden construction process of the EU is only one example of the multiple conflicting forces shaping social developments on a supranational scale. One of the key strengths of the Boltanskian analytical framework resides in its ability to do justice to the civilizational role of critical capacity, without reducing it to an outcome of a monolithic power that is self-sufficient enough to escape the normative parameters underpinning particular domains of social reality.

**Bryan S. Turner**

In his chapter, Bryan S. Turner provides a number of insightful and critical ‘Reflections on the Indignation of the Disprivileged and the Underprivileged’,¹¹⁰⁹ arguing that Boltanski’s approach offers a useful sociological framework for the analysis of the causes and consequences of the recent and ongoing social and economic crisis.

I.

According to Turner, one of the most significant limitations of orthodox versions of Marxism has been their inability ‘to explain the failures of working-class opposition to capitalist exploitation’.¹¹¹⁰ Indeed, the emergence of what Lenin provocatively called ‘the working-class aristocracy’ – that is, the rise of a relatively affluent working class in most economically developed
countries – poses a serious challenge to classical variants of Marxism, since it illustrates the adaptable, elastic, and integrationist potential of advanced forms of capitalism.

One can find several examples in modern history demonstrating capitalism’s capacity to obtain considerable degrees of legitimacy in different national societies: the consolidation of Otto von Bismarck’s ‘minimal social security system’ in late nineteenth-century Germany; H. H. Asquith’s attempt to build a ‘welfare safety net’ in the early twentieth-century United Kingdom; or the Beveridge Report of 1943, which – as is widely acknowledged – ‘laid the foundation of the British welfare state and the social rights of citizenship’. What these substantial socio-political developments have in common is that they are indicative of capitalism’s capacity to strengthen its own systemic stability and ideological legitimacy by virtue of institutional adjustments, implemented and administered by the state, in order to guarantee its own long-term viability as the predominant mode of organizing the economy.

Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects Gramscian explanations concerning ‘the creation of a moral and ideological hegemony through the church and educational institutions over the working class’, and irrespective of whether one advocates or discards classical and contemporary versions of the ‘dominant ideology thesis’, there is little doubt that capitalism has turned out to constitute a far more flexible and adjustable economic system than assumed in orthodox Marxist circles. Modern analysts grappling with the numerous theoretical challenges arising from this socio-historical constellation have developed diverging understandings of what is commonly referred to as the ‘structure/agency debate’. In Marxist and Durkheimian approaches, the emphasis tends to be placed on structural constraints shaping, or even determining, social actions. In Weberian thought, the consideration of interpretive and reflexive resources mobilized for the realization of human actions tends to be given particular attention. In the writings of most influential modern sociologists – such as Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu – the critical engagement with the tension between structure-focused and action-focused explanatory frameworks plays a pivotal role. Luc Boltanski’s oeuvre is, in this respect, no exception.

One may choose to follow Giddens by recognizing that ‘social structures are both the product and the medium of human actions’ in addition to accounting for ‘the “knowledgeability” of the social actor and the “contingency” of social action’. In a similar vein, Boltanski’s writings on people’s ‘moral and critical capacities’ as well as his insistence on what he describes as the ‘the fragility of reality’ are aimed at taking ordinary actors seriously, whilst drawing attention to the fact that social arrangements, given that they are constructed, can be both deconstructed and reconstructed. When examining ‘the relationship between
action and structure, subjectivity and objectivity, and common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge’, one may come to the conclusion that ‘big-picture’ thinkers – such as Marx, Durkheim, and Bourdieu – tend to overemphasize the constraining impact of social structures, whereas ‘context-sensitive’ scholars – such as Weber, Simmel, and Boltanski – tend to overestimate the degree of freedom enjoyed by subjects performing social actions.

For a long time, Marxist thought has been motivated by the following – perhaps, hopelessly optimistic – conviction: ‘Once their alienation was turned into anger and their anger into organization, the collective action of the workers would become a potent historical force.’ In opposition to this view, Karl Mannheim, in his seminal study *Ideology and Utopia* (1936 [1929]), maintained that ‘declining classes or class fractions would adhere to conservatism’. Yet, in his book *Conservatism* (1986 [1925]), he acknowledged that, far from converting into some kind of new ‘bourgeoisie’ or secure class of mere affluence, the “middle stratum” (Mittelstand) in Germany was not fully developed and had a long way to go.

In this chapter, Turner reflects on the social and political consequences of the financial crisis of 2008. In the context of this crisis, he interprets both ‘the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement and the Tea Party as empirical examples of indignation and rage’. Throughout his discussion, he draws, above all, upon three major modern sociological works, namely *On Justification* (2006 [1991]), *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2005 [1999]), and *Distant Suffering* (1999 [1993]). In Turner’s opinion, Boltanski’s ‘work has a strong ethical quality, because he seeks to understand how human beings respond to injustice’. More specifically, his scholarly writings permit us to understand that ‘social actors are not passive and supine in the face of tangible evidence of inequality and injustice’, but, on the contrary, responsive, reflexive, and engaged when being confronted with circumstances whose normative constitution they perceive as problematic or even unacceptable.

II.

As convincingly explained by Turner, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* can be regarded as an important study for several reasons:

(a) It provides one of the most powerful accounts of the transformation of capitalist forms of organization in Western Europe, notably in France, since the 1960s – in particular vis-à-vis ‘class formation, the role of the state, the character of industrial relations, and the rise and fall of ideologies’.

(b) It offers a convincing proposal to revise Weber’s conception of ‘the spirit of capitalism’, based on substantial evidence suggesting that ‘the discourses by which the social order is legitimated and individuals are motivated to
engage in tasks and enter into occupations have fundamentally changed since the late twentieth century.

(c) It illustrates the qualities and merits of Boltanski’s sociological framework in terms of its capacity to shed light on the role of critical capacity in bringing about, and influencing the direction of, ‘historical change’. 1134

(d) It forms part of the more ambitious attempt to develop ‘a critical and moral sociology’ 1135 aimed at taking ordinary actors seriously, especially by exploring the ways in which they deal with ‘issues relating to justice and inequality’ 1136 in their everyday lives. For Boltanski and Chiapello, processes of justification are not ‘merely an ideological smokescreen’. 1137 On the contrary, they have a direct impact, and exert constraints, upon ‘the power elite and on the functioning of capitalism’, 1138 thereby potentially limiting the detrimental effects of alienation, exploitation, and domination. On this view, the public sphere can be conceived of as a discursive realm shaped by an ‘endless debates between different orders of value’ 1139 and by a ceaseless undertaking of ‘tests’ (épreuves) either confirming or undermining the legitimacy of a given set of normative arrangements and practices.

According to Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, we can distinguish three ‘spirits’ of capitalism:

- The first ‘spirit’ can be characterized as ‘family capitalism’ 1141, which prioritizes ‘the individual figure of the bourgeois capitalist proprietor’ 1142 and finds its ideological justification, above all, in the ‘domestic city’.
- The second ‘spirit’ can be conceived of as ‘industrial or organizational capitalism’, 1143 epitomized in the protagonist role of ‘the manager’, 1144 whose societal function is ‘associated with “organization man”’. 1145
- The third ‘spirit’ manifests itself, most clearly, in the ‘city of projects’, 1146 in which neo-liberal principles – such as ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’, ‘creativity’, and ‘mobility’ – play a pivotal role in developing an ever-more elastic and seemingly forward-looking capitalist system.

As Turner eloquently puts it, we are confronted with ‘a profound irony of modern capitalism’. 1147

The social and artistic critiques that flowered in May 1968 have been incorporated into the management ideology of modern capitalism, just as the soixante-huitards have themselves been incorporated into the French social establishment. 1148

Capitalism has not only been able to tolerate criticism; but, in a more fundamental sense, it has succeeded in incorporating evaluative processes based on critical discourse into its
very mode of functioning, thereby converting openness to debate, controversy, and constant assessment into one of its normative cornerstones.

Given the ‘emphasis on flexible global networks’ with people working cooperatively on multiple projects’,[1160] the ‘sustained attack on hierarchical, bureaucratic, top-down organizations’[1150] has reflected a significant shift in capitalist culture from the 1960s onwards. The rise of the ‘network man’,[1151] however, stands not simply for the emergence of an unprecedented systemic and ideological *modus operandi* of capitalism, but also for its unparalleled capacity to take seriously ‘four sources of indignation’: inauthenticity, oppression, misery and inequality, and egoism.[1153] The former two were central objects of different versions of *artistic critique*; the latter two were principal matters of concern under the umbrella of *social critique*.

If Boltanski and Chiapello are right to assert that ‘[t]here is no ideology, however radical its principles and formulations, that has not eventually proved open to assimilation’,[1154] then capitalism is equipped with the capacity to incorporate, and thereby neutralize, the apparently most subversive forms of criticism and alternative social realities. As Turner remarks, profound changes have taken place, reshaping the structural constitution of capitalism since the 1960s:

the *decline of large trade unions* in the manufacturing sectors of the economy; the transformation of the *career structure of employment*, where employees now have short-term projects, rather than long-term jobs; the *casualization and outsourcing of employment* that is associated with project-driven employment; and, above all, the *decline of solidaristic and politically active social classes* as the basis of social identity and classification.[1155]

Arguably, one of the key features characterizing the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ is that ‘*social exclusion has replaced social class as the principle of social differentiation and division*’,[1156] that is, patterns of social stratification are increasingly complex. In the contemporary literature, this differentiation process is often described in terms of the sociological challenge of ‘*intersectionality*’.[1157] Social structures and processes of inclusion and exclusion are shaped by key – intersecting – sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability. In the ‘connexionist world’,[1158] being ‘successful’ is associated with being ‘incessantly on the move’, whilst those who are considered ‘unsuccessful’ are portrayed as having ‘squandered their talents’[1160] and as being trapped in a state of ‘fixity’.[1161] The ‘endless freedom of movement’[1162] enjoyed by the super-rich is expressed in their privileged capacity to obtain ‘visas, passports, and citizenship’[1163] when and if they need them – unlike poor migrants, for whom these matters are hardly ever a matter of choice.[1164]

Turner draws attention to the fact that, owing to the emphasis that most modern sociologists place on the social constructedness of reality, which – in
many cases – leads to cognitive and normative ‘relativism’, \textsuperscript{1165} the term “justice” rarely enters the sociological lexicon, \textsuperscript{1166} and the term ‘injustice’ may even have less of a solid place in the discursive space of social-scientific analysis. It comes hardly as a surprise, then, that Boltanski and his collaborators are criticized for failing to identify ‘context-transcendent principles of justice common to different ways of life’\textsuperscript{1167} and, in addition, for giving the impression that ‘their “cities” are historically somewhat arbitrary and underdeveloped’. \textsuperscript{1168} Turner’s main criticism levelled against Boltanski and his collaborators, however, is their ‘lack of attention to gender and religion’\textsuperscript{1169} as well as to culture and ethnicity. Elaborating on the implications of this significant limitation, Turner makes the following remarks:

For a study of indignation, protest, and justification, they have remarkably little to say about the women’s movement or feminist criticisms of inequality and exploitation.\textsuperscript{1170} […] Public contestations over ethnicity and citizenship, race and religion, Islamism and laïcité spilt onto the streets of Paris suburbs in a spectacular fashion in 2006; and yet, there are no references to ethnicity or religion in their study of French society.\textsuperscript{1171}

Whilst rejecting orthodox versions of Marxist materialism, Boltanski and Chiapello draw on Weber’s concern with the constantly changing ‘spirit’ of capitalism. Unlike Weber, however, they fail to take religion seriously. Habermas is amongst the most prolific and prominent contemporary social and political analysts eager to reflect on the normative challenges arising from the tension-laden relationship between ‘secular and religious citizens’.\textsuperscript{1172} In whatever way one wishes to make sense of this relationship, Habermas rightly insists that, in democratically organized and pluralistically constituted societies, ‘both secular and religious citizens have an obligation to defend their views in public by offering cogent reasons for their beliefs’.\textsuperscript{1173} The notion that we have entered a ‘post-secular’ era has been examined from different angles; undoubtedly, Habermas’s conception of ‘post-secularity’ is highly influential.\textsuperscript{1174} Insisting on the sociological complexity of post-secular realities in the contemporary context, Turner goes on to argue that the recent and current crisis – which may be described as ‘the worst recession since the Great Depression’\textsuperscript{1175} – appears to have overshadowed tensions not only between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ actors but also between religious movements themselves. As he contends, however, these tensions have far from disappeared.

III.

According to Turner, ‘[t]he origins of the current economic crisis can be traced back to the 1970s’\textsuperscript{1176} One only needs to remember the oil crisis of 1973, combined
with rising inflation rates and the end of the Bretton Woods system designed to guarantee monetary stability, in order to become aware of the fact that, in the late twentieth century, capitalism has been far from entirely stable, let alone completely predictable. Reaganomics in the United States, Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, and Helmut Kohl’s neo-conservatism in Germany can be regarded as symptoms of the emergence of a worldwide hegemony of the neoliberal project, notably in the economically advanced countries of ‘the West’. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in other financially strong countries, ‘bank deregulation and cuts in personal taxation produced a number of economic bubbles, especially around the Internet and the rapid rise in house prices’. The most devastating consequences of the crisis were certainly experienced in the weaker European countries, also described as the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), which were substantially exposed to economic upheavals not only due to internal mismanagement but also ‘as a result of the credit collapse and the rapid decline in property markets and tourism’. One option is to interpret the 2008 crisis as the result of avaricious bankers, financiers, and investors who took advantage of ‘the deregulation of the banking sector to satisfy their own narrow interests’. Another option is to conceive of the 2008 crisis as a manifestation of the structural contradictions built into capitalism, which – because of their far-reaching detrimental effects – suggests that, ‘without deficit financing and quantitative easing, there is insufficient consumer demand to sustain full employment and full production’. Irrespective of whether one favours a ‘voluntaristic’ or a ‘structuralist’ account of economic crises, there is little doubt that ‘the financialization of capitalism constitutes a key feature of the emerging global network society in which we live.

The austerity packages imposed not only upon the PIGS but also upon the United Kingdom and other ‘big players’, however, illustrate that we are not confronted with a merely economic or systemic problem; any major crisis on a large scale has significant socio-political implications. Confronted with the consequences of financial crisis, the tendency to blame either external or internal forces, or a combination of these two levels, is reflected in the rise of far-right movements, which hold particular – ethnically or culturally defined – groups wholly or at least partly responsible for economic disasters and societal instability.

IV.

It is in this context that Turner proposes to reflect on the role of progressive protest movements aimed at giving a voice to the seemingly voiceless and at expressing ‘indignation against the current state of society’. Turner offers an unorthodox interpretation of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement.
when drawing attention to the fact that, upon close examination, ‘one finds an interesting, if unexpected, dimension: namely, faith leaders’. Shortly after the OWS mobilizations began to take shape on 17 September 2011 in New York’s Zuccotti Park, it became clear that it was more than a local, ephemeral, and amorphous group of protesters; it quickly spread across the country and, eventually, around the entire globe. As Turner observes, ‘[p]rotest chaplains from Union Theological Seminary in New York were in Zuccotti Park on a regular basis, joining in the protest actions, while also offering spiritual support to the protesters’, showing that OWS – far from being reducible to an entirely secular movement – had numerous religiously motivated participants, whose activities were, in some cases, based on ‘interfaith collaboration’ grappling with issues concerning social and economic justice. Their presence and active participation in OWS are yet another empirical example of the fact that classical versions of the ‘secularization thesis’ need to be seriously revised in the face of the continuing influence of religiously based practices and belief systems on the development of contemporary societies.

Over the last two decades, sociologists of religion have turned against the secularization thesis to argue that religion is more – rather than less – important and visible in modern public domains. The notions of ‘de-secularization’, ‘public religions’, and ‘post-secular society’ have been developed to understand the role of religion in the public sphere. Such public debates are especially important in response to economic and political crises.

Unsurprisingly, the Marxist and anarchist elements of the OWS movement were not easily reconcilable with traditional Christian values, notably the Christian striving towards and ‘respect for social order’. Moreover, OWS’s critical attitude towards mainstream and ‘organized politics’, especially in terms of their hierarchical and institutional dimensions, is indicative of their commitment to grassroots processes of inclusion and decision-making processes in the spirit of radical democracy. To be sure, individual or collective actors associated with left-wing – that is, ‘progressive’, ‘forward-looking’, and ‘inclusivist’ – discourses and practices do not possess a monopoly on grassroots politics. Indeed, as Turner points out, there are various right-wing – that is, ‘conservative’, ‘backward-looking’, and ‘exclusivist’ – movements that also defend a particular notion of grassroots politics.

V.

One contemporary example of these right-wing movements is the Tea Party, which was formed in 2009, largely as a response to the social and economic
crisis of 2008 in general and to the Obama administration’s policies designed to deal with it in particular. As a value-conservative and, to a large extent, reactionary movement, the supporters of the Tea Party are deeply sceptical of rapid social change and critical of the forces that are allegedly behind destabilizing structural and ideological transformations in the contemporary era.\textsuperscript{1193}

Their anger is directed at what they see to be the undeserving poor, the freeloaders, and generally people who do not share their strong sense of the Protestant Ethic. There was also a clear element of racism in their vocabulary against President Obama, who was seen to be an outsider, if not a Muslim. They were especially fearful of what they saw as the unstoppable spread of the shari’a, which was evidence of Muslims taking over the country. Whereas OWS had only weak linkages with organized religion, over 40% of Tea Party supporters describe themselves as evangelical Christians. The social conservatism of their rank and file is also illustrated by their standpoint on a range of social issues. Illegal immigrants were seen to be ‘freeloaders’, who were accessing benefits to which they had no entitlement […].\textsuperscript{1194}

It is difficult to demonstrate with more clarity that – despite the arrival of secularization processes – religion and politics remain intimately interrelated. Given their significant mutual influence, it is surprising that, although ‘Boltanski has developed a powerful and general analysis of responses to injustice through his study of resentment and indignation’,\textsuperscript{1195} in his numerous writings one finds little in the way of a fine-grained analysis of the pivotal role religion continues to play in contemporary societies. When scrutinizing economic, cultural, political, and ideological divisions in highly differentiated societies, such as the United States, it becomes evident that there are multiple ‘types of indignation’.\textsuperscript{1196} These are triggered by individual and collective experiences of injustice, shaped by sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability. On this account, then, it is difficult to ignore ‘that “the city” is deeply fragmented and indignation as such provides no collective basis for uniting “the city”’.\textsuperscript{1197}

Some may perceive their participation in a given ‘city’ as empowering and others as disempowering, depending not only on the relationally defined positions they occupy in the social space, but also on the ideologically constituted and behaviourally habitualized dispositions they develop within it. One need not be a Bourdieusian to recognize the constraining power of mechanisms of social structuration, just as one need not be a Boltanskian to acknowledge the potentially liberating force of processes of discursive justification. One of the key tasks for both ‘critical sociologists’ à la Bourdie and ‘sociologists of critique’ à la Boltanski, however, consists in elucidating the extent to which structural
determinacy and critical reflexivity depend on one another when shaping the development of society. Whatever the real or imagined sources of anger and resentment in a particular context affecting a specific group of actors may be, both mechanisms of social structuration and processes of discursive justification permeate people’s meaning-laden exposure to the experience of indignation.

**Luc Boltanski and Contemporary Issues**

**Bruno Karsenti**


Put differently, Boltanski has sought to restore ‘a broken link: that between abortion and what it has just denied’ – that is, the relationship between the possibility of terminating a pregnancy and the possibility of continuing with it. More specifically, Karsenti maintains that Boltanski’s analysis permits us to understand that abortion is a twofold process: as a process regarding our ‘natural’ condition, it raises various questions vis-à-vis ‘production of the living by the living, reproduction in the biological sense’; as a process concerning our ‘social’ condition, it poses multiple challenges arising from the ‘reproduction of society itself by the continuous flow that is required of new beings called up to incorporate themselves within it’.

I.

For Karsenti, there is little doubt that *La condition fœtale* is as much a book about the woman as it is a book on the foetus, and all its difficulty lies precisely in its effort not to separate them, and especially not to put them in opposition, aiming at placing itself exactly at the point at which they belong together.

On this reading, it appears that the whole point of a sociological understanding of the foetus and its mother is not to dissociate them from another, but, on the contrary, to shed light on their – presumably ontological – *interconnectedness.* In terms of its methodological outlook, Boltanski’s study combines two
epistemologically distinct forms of social analysis. On the one hand, his account is 'resolutely constructivist',\textsuperscript{1206} in the sense that it examines abortion in terms of its ‘logical or grammatical’\textsuperscript{1207} constitution and, hence, conceives of it as a social practice that cannot be divorced from the act of procreation. On the other hand, his account is determinedly perspectivist, in the sense that it takes seriously ‘the perspective of the actor […]’, engaged in a very particular problematic situation, whose most salient feature, regardless of the chosen outcome, is irreversibility’.\textsuperscript{1208}

In brief, abortion is both a grammatically constructed and a personally experienced process, one of whose constitutive characteristics is its protagonist’s exposure to irrevocability.

It is this ‘horizon of the irreversible’\textsuperscript{1209} which Karsenti considers to be about ‘much more than life or death’\textsuperscript{1210} and which, according to him, features centrally in Boltanski’s enquiry into abortion. Given the simultaneously grammatical and phenomenological aspects underpinning the process of abortion, ‘[l]ogical dilemma and tragedy experienced are […] inseparable’.\textsuperscript{1211} What is more significant from a sociological standpoint, however, is that ‘they can be explained only by each other’.\textsuperscript{1212} Yet, ‘explaining’ and ‘justifying’ are two separate, albeit interrelated, tasks. Indeed, as Karsenti spells out, ‘the justification for what cannot be’,\textsuperscript{1213} or for what can be, is a major challenge to be confronted when reflecting upon the moral dimensions attached not only to decision-making processes concerning abortion but also to ‘the biological and social question of procreation’.\textsuperscript{1214} What is at stake, then, is not only the purposive and cognitive constitution of an individual actor, let alone simply the behavioural and ideological patterns prevailing in a given realm of society, but also – in a broad sense – ‘the relationship between nature and culture’,\textsuperscript{1215} as well as – in a narrow sense – ‘the relationship between nature and culture’\textsuperscript{1216} in terms of the impact it has on her – that is, on ‘the actor’,\textsuperscript{1217} who, in this case, ‘is a woman’.\textsuperscript{1218}

II.

Karsenti draws attention to the fact that, even if one is sympathetic towards Boltanski’s emphasis on the grammatical constitution of the motivational and circumstantial background conditions that undergird abortion, the ‘structuralist lineage is somewhat surprising in the case of a sociology that explicitly calls for a pragmatics of action’.\textsuperscript{1219} Whatever one makes of such a grammatical approach, the message is clear: for sociologists, the challenge consists in making sense of the social constitution of both abortion and procreation:

Procreation, understood as the production of new human beings, is an activity in which society reveals itself in its conditions of life, but only to the extent that the life processes themselves are always already socially apprehended.\textsuperscript{1220}
In a similar vein, one may infer from the above statement that, for Karsenti, abortion – conceived of as an intervention aimed at obstructing the production of one new human being or, possibly, multiple new human beings – is also an activity impregnated with the conditions of life created within a given society and, hence, comprehensible only in terms of the relationally organized constellations of the socially apprehensible context in which it takes place. Even if we agree, however, that both procreation and abortion constitute social practices and social experiences, we are confronted with several complicated – and rather contentious – questions, such as the following:

How do humans relate to what happens [...]? How does society deal with its relationship with its own nature, knowing that it is never ‘nature’ in the separate and indeterminate sense of the term? Of course, one of the most debated and recurring issues in this context is the question of the point at which ‘the foetus should be considered a living being with a personality’. Conservatively inclined sociologists may draw upon Durkheim’s *Suicide* (1966/1951 [1897]) in order to explain the ways in which societies aim to regulate individual behaviour, thereby making it relatively predictable and allowing for the possibility of consolidating a real or imagined sense of social order. Far from constituting an unambiguous ‘social fact’, however, the foetus cannot be described as an external being [...]—it is, instead, a boundary social condition, whose outline is a continual question for subjects who come up against its ambiguous mode of existence.

In a more radical sense, then, Boltanski’s book demonstrates that ‘it is artificial and mistaken to separate a natural from a social moment’ when studying procreation and abortion. Indeed, his enquiry illustrates that these two moments are inextricably linked. In order to do justice to the fact that the boundaries between ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ are increasingly blurred, we need to recognize the performative constitution of all human actions. Hence, as Karsenti argues, procreation is ‘an activity’:

this is not something that happens passively to human beings; rather, it is something that women do, and something through which they make social beings.

Owing to its performative constitution, we, as sociologists, need to examine the ‘socio-historical variations’ not only of procreative practices themselves,
but also of the meanings attributed to them by individual and collective actors. Societies put in place what Boltanski calls – cultural, ideological, institutional, or legal – mechanisms of ‘confirmation’,\textsuperscript{1229} in order to generate relatively solidified realms of interaction. ‘For the already-born, there is an extreme tension: to procreate is to elect this one and no one else.’\textsuperscript{1230} On this account, abortion can be conceived of as ‘an emergent possibility in the very course of procreation’\textsuperscript{1231} – that is, as a potential scenario inherent in a horizon of practical options.

Within the new context that it is given here, abortion no longer seems to be at all the external and contradictory opposite of procreation, but it is rather the negation that procreation \textit{modally} incorporates (as possibility) \textit{to be able to carry out what it carries out}, to be able to occur as action – that is to say as an entire process organized towards confirmation.\textsuperscript{1232}

Hence, we are confronted with a new picture, according to which \textit{procreation and abortion} are to be regarded not as antithetical but as two mutually inclusive possibilities. To the extent that abortion ‘is something practiced in all known societies’,\textsuperscript{1233} it is sociologically perplexing to realize that – even in contexts in which it is both institutionally and culturally accepted, if not protected, as an inalienable right of women – it tends to be ‘relegated to the sphere of the secret and unofficial’.\textsuperscript{1234} The sociological distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ – epitomized in antinomies such as ‘society’ versus ‘individual’ (‘collective’ versus ‘personal’), ‘visibility’ versus ‘concealment’ (‘transparent’ versus ‘opaque’), and ‘openness’ versus ‘closure’ (‘accessible’ versus ‘sealed’)\textsuperscript{1235} – can hardly be more relevant to abortive practices, including in the most liberal societies. As Karsenti perceptively remarks, however, ‘the unofficial is no longer the same thing when it is snared by the official, when it is managed by it, when it finds its place not outside of it, but within it’.\textsuperscript{1236} Put differently, ‘the unofficial’ can be regulated and colonized by ‘the official’ to such an extent that it is almost completely controlled by it, in which case the very distinction between these two levels of sociality appears to become meaningless.

\textbf{III.}

For Karsenti, there is no doubt that, ‘by admitting publically and legally that there really is a leftover, that any being procreated is not \textit{ipso facto} destined to be born’,\textsuperscript{1237} we are obliged to reject absolutist conceptions of life and death. In an existentialist fashion, Karsenti suggests that abortion is misrepresented if understood as the opposite of procreation and that, in a fundamental sense,
uncertainty is built into the very condition of humanity, including the reproductive practices aimed at securing its survival as a species. If, however, there is one certainty that is inherent in all human societies, it is the fact that its members cannot escape from their exposure to the experience of irreversibility when participating in reproductive practices, whose spatio-temporal contingency cannot do away with the ‘unrewritability’ of history.

In Karsenti’s eyes, ‘both procreation and abortion alongside it come under the order of the irreversible’.1238 Put in negative terms, the condition of human life is permeated by the presence of irreversibility at the heart of its evolutionary determinacy. Put in positive terms, the construction of human life is driven by the presence of choice at the centre of its developmental indeterminacy. By studying the conditions of our existence, then, we come to realize that to decide means to renounce, implying that we need to accept that the experience of irreversibility forms an integral part of our participation in the construction of human reality. At the same time,

by scrutinizing life, it is society that one examines, with all of the scandal that it involves, not only of unequally redistributing beings, but also, in the very first place, of choosing them.1239

As a species, we cannot choose not to choose, but, in principle, we can choose what to choose when having to choose between abortion and procreation.

Ilana F. Silber

In her chapter, entitled ‘Luc Boltanski and the Gift: Beyond Love, beyond Suspicion…?’,1240 Ilana F. Silber takes on a difficult task: she examines Boltanski’s writings in terms of their relevance to contemporary studies of the gift. As she explains, his ‘pragmatic sociology’ has ‘remained largely untapped in that regard’.1241 Hence, Silber seeks to fill this gap in the literature by illustrating not only the insightfulness of Boltanski’s contributions but also their usefulness to the sociological engagement with the nature of the gift.

I.

In the first section of her essay, Silber is concerned with Boltanski’s understanding of the gift in his seminal study Love and Justice as Competences1242 (2012 [1990]), notably in terms of its relationship to what he calls philia and agapè. Whilst the concept of ‘the gift’ remains a relatively marginal category in Boltanski’s analysis, this book includes a subsection entitled ‘The Paradoxes of the Gift and the Counter-Gift’,1243 in which some sociological issues
arising from social processes based on intersubjective reciprocity are given special attention. Boltanski is suspicious of structuralist approaches to the gift, particularly of its Lévi-Straussian and Bourdieusian variants, since, in his opinion, they tend to disregard the sociological importance of people’s ‘experiences and interpretations of the gift’. Drawing on the works of Marc Anspach and Claude Lefort, he argues that there is a ‘paradoxical quality built into gift exchanges’: namely, ‘the tension between the freedom entailed in the gift […] and the demands of exchange’. Rather than privileging the importance of one of these two dimensions at the expense of the other, it is crucial to comprehend their interrelatedness.

The principal problem with structuralist approaches to gift exchanges lies in the fact that they tend to underestimate the power of agency (‘freedom’) and overestimate the power of necessity (‘demands’), thereby endorsing the ‘fatalistic view that social actors are merely deluded and that their behaviour is essentially the result of structural forces, of which they are unconscious’. Boltanski, however, ‘refuses to conceptualize it in terms of a form of collective lie or distortion of reality’, let alone in terms of an expression of ‘bad faith’ or ‘false consciousness’. Instead, he is eager to face up to ‘the profoundly complex and paradoxical character of gift exchanges.

For Boltanski, it is not primarily the concept of agapè, understood as ‘a distinct “regime of peace” and type of “love”’, but, rather, the concept of philia, broadly conceived of as ‘friendship’, which permits us to understand that gift exchanges – far from being reducible to social mechanisms driven by interestedness, strategy, and utility – also constitute social processes motivated by the need for intersubjectivity, solidarity, and reciprocity, thereby anticipating the possibility of ‘a political-contractual alternative to violence’. In order to comprehend the contradictory nature of gift exchanges, it is imperative to study how they ‘are perceived and experienced, as well as often discussed and reflected upon, by social actors’. In other words, ordinary people have to be taken seriously in order to understand why they engage in the construction of social relations based on exchange and mutuality.

Yet, the concept of agapè – defined as ‘a state of peace that is basically indifferent to all matters of reciprocity and equivalence’ – is also central to the sociological study of the gift. Unlike philia, which is based on dynamics of reciprocity and mutuality, agapè is an attitude that ‘expects nothing in return, either in the material form of objects or in the immaterial form of requited love’. Of course, one may speculate about the sociological viability of agapè, especially with regard to the question of the ‘sociological “possibility” or “impossibility” of the pure, non-reciprocal gift as an enduring form of social action’. Rather than succumbing to the illusion of disinterestedness and
rather than making transcendental claims about unconditional forms of love that can dispense with reciprocity-based forms of social relationships, we need to face up to ‘the sociological impossibility of pure agapè’.\textsuperscript{1258} Instead of hypostatizing the value of an allegedly ‘agapic state’,\textsuperscript{1259} understood as an ‘ideal love situation’, which is not far removed from Habermas’s paradisal ‘ideal speech situation’,\textsuperscript{1260} it seems fruitful to grapple with ‘less utopian situations’,\textsuperscript{1261} especially with those ‘in which not all actors share the same regime’,\textsuperscript{1262} contributing to the grammatical and praxeological complexity of their interrelated performances. Irrespective of whether or not different actors are – often simultaneously – immersed in different regimes, however, the point is to recognize that the antinomy that is built into gift exchanges is not only one between agency (‘freedom’) and necessity (‘demands’), but also – in Boltanskian terms – one between philia (‘reciprocity’ and ‘equivalence’) and agapè (absence of ‘calculative reciprocity’ and ‘strategic equivalence’).\textsuperscript{1263} In short, gift exchanges are a tension-laden affair.

II.

In the second section of her chapter, Silber reflects on the place of the gift in Boltanski and Thévenot’s \textit{On Justification}\textsuperscript{1264} (2006 [1991]). She laments that ‘[l]ittle has been done […] to approach the gift with the help of his ideas on economies of worth and justification’.\textsuperscript{1265} Given that this book ‘hardly relates to the gift or gift exchange at all (tellingly, the word “gift” is not even mentioned in the volume’s thematic index)’,\textsuperscript{1266} this may be hardly surprising. Amongst the six different ‘worlds of worth’ identified by Boltanski and Thévenot in \textit{On Justification}, the ‘world of inspiration’ may be the most appropriate one to make sense of gift-exchange dynamics. In this world, ‘greatness’ is conceived of as the privilege of experiencing ‘an interior state of intense emotions, passions, and creativity’,\textsuperscript{1267} triggered by a seemingly unidentifiable force, intuition, afflatus, or inspiration. As such, it surges ‘in an unexpected, involuntary, and spontaneous fashion’,\textsuperscript{1268} manifesting itself in ‘a powerful desire to create’.\textsuperscript{1269} The ‘world of inspiration’ is shaped by the ‘experience of receiving a gift’\textsuperscript{1270} – that is, the gift of being driven by the relentless motivation to imagine, envisage, and invent something. Arguably, this potentially resourceful looking-forwardness lies at the heart of artistic creation. It is not far removed from theological conceptions of ‘grace’, which is represented by St. Augustine and founded on the notion of ‘(God’s) “free giving”’ – “gratuité du don”.\textsuperscript{1271}

Another option, however, would be to conceptualize the gift as ‘an additional “regime of justification” in its own right, with its own battery of parameters of worth and tests’.\textsuperscript{1272} On this account, gift exchanges are based
on an idiosyncratic and irreducible praxeological grammar that makes them possible in the first place. In a similar vein, various studies\textsuperscript{1273} have argued that it is necessary to identify and scrutinize ‘additional regimes of action and/or justification’\textsuperscript{1274} permitting us to shed light on the emergence and functioning of “‘worlds of worth” centring on benevolent emotions and non-reciprocal orientations’.\textsuperscript{1275} Whichever option one may prefer, these alternative approaches indicate that ‘the gift – in diverse modalities and configurations – may constitute a potent source of critique and justification on its own’\textsuperscript{1276} rather than being reducible to other regimes of action, such as the regimes of peace and love. It is one of the key contributions of Silber’s chapter to have demonstrated precisely this.

It is no less significant to recognize, however, that the gift constitutes not only a pivotal source of critique and justification but, in addition, ‘a dynamic feature of social life which is itself in constant, and perhaps increasing, need of justification’.\textsuperscript{1277} In practice, this means that, as sociologists concerned with dynamics of giving and taking, we need to explore ‘what kind of regimes of worth and justification […] actors deploy when engaged (as donors, recipients, mediators, or spectators) in specific gift situations’,\textsuperscript{1278} not to mention the difficult task of investigating, in some detail, ‘what tensions and dilemmas are entailed in these situations’.\textsuperscript{1279}

If we follow Silber in assuming that ‘a plurality of coexisting and competing regimes of justification’\textsuperscript{1280} undergirds gift-exchange scenarios, then it makes sense to suggest that ‘Boltanski’s conception of the gift’\textsuperscript{1281} can be enriched by conceding that ‘the very same pluralism that characterizes his approach to social life’\textsuperscript{1282} in general can, and should, be applied to the study of the gift in particular. Hence, rather than reducing the nature of gift-exchange processes to conceptual antinomies – such as ‘reciprocity’ versus ‘non-reciprocity’, ‘obligation’ versus ‘spontaneity’, and ‘interestedness’ versus ‘disinterestedness’ – we need to take seriously the imperatives of ontological and methodological pluralism. At the ontological level, gift-exchange processes are impregnated with multiple normative realities – that is, with several interconnected and partly overlapping ‘worlds of worth’ and ‘worlds of justification’.\textsuperscript{1283} At the methodological level, sociology needs to develop appropriate investigative tools to examine these processes in terms of their variegated constitution.

As Silber forcefully states in her Conclusion, one of the main challenges faced by contemporary sociologists, especially by those drawing on the significant intellectual insights provided by Marcel Mauss,\textsuperscript{1284} consists in developing ‘increasingly complex and multidimensional typologies of gift giving and gift relations’,\textsuperscript{1285} of which there are numerous examples in the literature.\textsuperscript{1286} In essence, neither an idealistic ‘hermeneutics of love and recognition’
nor a fatalistic ‘hermeneutics of power and suspicion’ will enable us to unearth the underlying secrets of gift exchanges. Rather, it is a realistic ‘hermeneutics of contradictions’ – capable of accounting for multiple coexistential dimensions ‘ranging from trust, authenticity, and truthfulness to suspicion, manipulation, and falsification’¹²⁸⁷ – that permits us to explore the infinite ways in which human actors navigate their way through society by accepting their constant exposure to different degrees of existential uncertainty. If there is a gift with which we have all been bestowed, it is the experience of having been thrown into a reality characterized by uncertainty, even if and where we believe we have overcome it by constructing social domains marked by a sense of interactional predictability.

**Steve Fuller**

In his chapter, entitled ‘The World of Worth in the Transhuman Condition: Prolegomena to a Proactionary Sociology’,¹²⁸⁸ Steve Fuller confronts his readers with a number of thought-provoking reflections.

I.

He starts by affirming that, probably against Boltanski and Thévenot’s will and intentions, their book ‘On Justification (2006 [1991]) marks a triumph for economic reasoning within sociology’.¹²⁸⁹ Whilst the six ‘polities’ or ‘worlds of worth’ that they distinguish in their study obtain meaning and derive value from different sources, what they have in common is that they are contingent upon ‘the same general accounting principles’,¹²⁹⁰ in such a way that it is possible to identify commensurable criteria on the basis of which they ‘allocate costs and benefits to sustain their respective conceptions of value’.¹²⁹¹ At the same time, it appears that ‘each world presupposes a sense of “common humanity”’,¹²⁹² which serves as a universal normative reference point for the construction of context-specific values and ideologies. According to one of Fuller’s principal assertions, however, Boltanski’s conception of ‘the human’ is embedded in a Lockean notion of the individual. It is this presupposition, allegedly inherent in Boltanski’s understanding of ‘the social’, with which Fuller takes issue in the first section of his chapter. In the second section, he proposes to interpret and conceptualize the ‘world of worth’ in terms of what he characterizes as ‘the transhuman condition’.¹²⁹³ Let us consider the key elements underpinning Fuller’s critical assessment of Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘pragmatic sociology’.

What lies at the heart of Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘common ontology of value’¹²⁹⁴ is their concept of ‘investment formula’,¹²⁹⁵ which permits them to examine, and explain, how each particular ‘world’ or ‘regime of action’
establishes outcome-oriented criteria for ‘the business of justice’. Influenced by John Rawls’s ‘difference principle’, they grapple with the idea that structural inequalities can be justified only to the extent that ‘they serve to benefit disadvantaged members of the polity’. ‘This does not mean, however, that such a – normatively regulated – trickle-down mechanism converts some, let alone all, deprived members of society into privileged ones. Since every ‘world’ has its own currency, different forms of resources – which may be material or symbolic – can be redistributed in each of them. Far from seeking to provide an ‘abstract normative yardstick’ for the measurement of value, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ aims to shed light on what Fuller describes as ‘the boundary conditions of concrete sociality’ and, hence, on the practically established parameters underpinning the construction of context-laden realities.

According to Fuller, to the degree that the ‘principle of common humanity’ is tantamount to a normative cornerstone of ‘gravitational attraction’, the Boltanskian ensemble of social polities is comparable to a Newtonian universe of laws and ‘inertial tendencies’. People’s everyday engagement with questions concerning justice demonstrates that, despite the presence of ‘earthly imperfection’, the critical capacity with which ordinary actors are equipped enables them to choose, or at least to attempt to construct, ‘the best of all possible worlds’ available within a specific set of circumstances. In line with Thomas Hobbes, we may assume that, although individuals are fallible and driven by desires, they are ‘mutually adaptive’ and, hence, capable of committing to respecting the rules of a ‘social contract’, which allows for the consolidation of relatively predictable and stable forms of coexistential orders, perhaps even a ‘world order’, based on a set of shared assumptions about the nature of justice. As Fuller eloquently spells out,

> [h]ere, ‘justice’ refers to a state of equilibrium between a population and its environment, which amounts to a balance of power among individuals whose behaviour is minimally prescribed, independently of their interactions.

Fuller posits that it is necessary to advocate a ‘bottom-up approach to value creation and maintenance’, in order to contribute to ‘de-refying Boltanski’s six worlds of worth’. Perhaps, the most contentious claim that Fuller makes in this regard is the assertion that ‘differences in kind may be rendered as differences of degree’, indicating that ‘one world can be exchanged for another through a common ontological currency’. There is a healthy degree of commensurability, translatability, and interconvertibility due to the existence of a shared underlying ontology built into distinctive – grammatically structured – spheres of social reality.
II.

Fuller goes on to propose an idiosyncratic interpretation of Boltanski and Thévenot’s account of ‘worlds of worth’, which distinguishes three levels of analysis in terms of the ‘physical origin of value’.1314

- The first level designates the realm of the ‘individual self’ – that is, the micro-sphere of human existence, sometimes characterized as ‘people’s subjective or inner world’.
- The second level refers to the realm of the ‘local environment’ – that is, the meso-sphere of human existence, sometimes described as ‘people’s normative world or lifeworld’.
- The third level refers to the realm of the ‘entire world’ – that is, the macro-sphere of human existence, sometimes defined as ‘people’s societal world’.

The ‘inspired’ and ‘industrial’ worlds are particularly important to the first level; the ‘domestic’ and ‘market’ worlds are located at the second level; and, finally, the ‘civic’ and ‘fame-oriented’ worlds permeate the complexity of the third level.1315

This multilevel model is useful in that it draws attention to the environment-specific constitution underlying different scopes of value. As Fuller explains, ‘Boltanski’s worlds of worth escape the neat opposition of top-down and bottom-up approaches to social order’,1316 in the sense that – unlike systems theorists à la Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, or Humberto Maturana – he is ‘not interested merely in functional differentiation within a larger social system or in the self-differentiation of some proto-social state’.1317 Rather, he insists on the importance of recognizing and ‘respecting the dignity of the individual human being’,1318 including ‘the body’s territorial integrity and self-ownership’.1319 Hence, he subscribes to an anthropocentric conception of reality, in line with the type of humanist thought defended by Enlightenment scholars – a position to which Fuller refers as ‘Humanity 1.0’1320 and which is, arguably, enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

III.

In light of the above, it comes as no surprise that Boltanski is unlikely to endorse what Fuller describes as the ‘proactionary principle’.1321 This normative opposition is reflected in Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘strident comments against eugenics, which they denounce as a “degenerate industrial order” […] for its portrayal of human reproduction as akin to the manufacture of goods’.1322 Their main objection to eugenics, however, is its reduction of an individual’s life to an instrumental component of
a genetically constituted societal whole, in which every single aspect of existence appears to be dictated by the evolutionary principle of ‘the survival of the fittest’, regardless of the presuppositional grounds on which such a seemingly determinist conception of being is justified. To be sure, these ‘grounds’ can be of social, political, cultural, ethnic, ‘racial’, or physiological nature – to mention only a few possibilities. In any case, from Boltanski and Thévenot’s perspective, eugenics is culpable of ‘endogenizing sacrifice to the polity; which is to say, each person’s life is not valuable in its own right but only as a means to a political end’. Arguably, humanistically inclined thinkers – such as Boltanski and Thévenot, but also Rawls and Habermas – presuppose the existence of a Homo sapiens in terms of a ‘Lockean individual’ – that is, of an entity ‘whose life ends with the death of the body of one’s birth’.

In contrast to this anthropocentric account of the world, Fuller advocates what he describes as ‘an extended “proactionary” conception of the human condition’, in which a ‘post-Lockean individual would find a natural home’. In this context, as he explains, the term ‘proactionary’ refers to the foundational normative principle of transhumanism, an emerging ideology that defines humanity’s uniqueness in terms of our capacities for self-transcendence, typically through various biomedical enhancements (for instance, brain-boosting drugs, gene therapy, etc.), though increasingly the prospect of our minds migrating from a carbon to a silicon platform is countenanced.

Such a ‘proactionary’ or ‘transhumanist’ understanding of existence conceives of the human entity as an actor who

has acquired sufficient morphological freedom to regard his or her identity as a portfolio of investments in diverse asset groups, which may include avatars in cyberspace, specific genomic sequences, as well as membership rights in more conventional social formations.

IV.

The challenge to be confronted, then, consists in exploring ‘the scope for self-transcendence’ within the ‘transhumanist world of worth’, particularly in relation to the role that critique plays in both the material and the symbolic – that is, both the substantive and the formal construction of social existence. As Fuller observes, the concept of ‘humanity’ designates ‘the quality of being human’, irrespective of which of the different elements underpinning this quality may be considered to be of fundamental importance. Far from
constituting a merely secular point of view, however, humanistic conceptions of worldly existence cannot be dissociated from religious thought:

That all members of *Homo sapiens* are eligible to be treated as humans is essentially an Abrahamic theological aspiration that, over the past five centuries, has been sharpened by science.\textsuperscript{1334}

The ‘world-historic significance’\textsuperscript{1335} of the notion that, as a teleologically motivated individual, one may have ‘*a desire to overcome the body of one’s birth*’\textsuperscript{1336} – epitomized in the Christian ‘idea of a humanity created “in the image and likeness” of God’\textsuperscript{1337} – can hardly be overestimated. Such a goal-oriented and purpose-driven attitude is not incompatible with the ‘proactionary’ perspective endorsed by Fuller:

To be proactionary is, in the first instance, to identify with this *progressive historical narrative*, which, in the secular West, has been known mainly as ‘*Enlightenment*’ but in our own day is expressed as the drive to ‘*human enhancement*’.\textsuperscript{1338}

The idea of ‘enhancement’, understood in the above terms, is embedded in a ‘vision of *human upgrading*’.\textsuperscript{1339} Undeniably, extreme versions of eugenics, as experienced in the twentieth century, ‘involved sterilization, forced migration, warfare, and even genocide’.\textsuperscript{1340} As Foucauldian researchers are eager to point out, eugenicist policies have become more sophisticated, subtle, and widespread in the second half of the twentieth century – a development that Fuller provocatively describes as ‘a courtesy of the welfare state’.\textsuperscript{1341} By and large, ‘proactionaries welcome *this domestication of control* over the most fundamental features of human existence’.\textsuperscript{1342} What they are even more in favour of, however, is ‘the *democratization* of access to eugenic information and technologies’,\textsuperscript{1343} which – as they see it – ‘marks a major advance over the more authoritarian versions of eugenics that were on offer for most of the twentieth century’.\textsuperscript{1344} In short, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, eugenics has been gradually domesticated and democratized. An example of this development is reflected in the proposal of ‘*hedogenetics*’\textsuperscript{1345} – that is, a genetics defined and ‘treated as a source of hedge fund investment’,\textsuperscript{1346} enabling human actors to bestow those who have ‘inherited certain common genes’\textsuperscript{1347} with intellectual property rights and, thus, effectively leading to a *redefinition of self-ownership*, which Fuller characterizes as ‘*Humanity 2.0*’.\textsuperscript{1348}

In a more general sense, such a post-humanist development entails ‘a *radicalization of attitude towards the “human”*’.\textsuperscript{1349} Traditional humanist ideals about the construction of the ‘just society’ à la Rawls are ‘self-evidently precautionary’.\textsuperscript{1350} Contemporary post-humanist pleas for the construction of
a ‘risk-taking society’,\textsuperscript{1351} by contrast, encourage the ‘entrepreneurship of the self’\textsuperscript{1352} with the aim of generating ever-more experiment-friendly – and, hence, potentially innovative and progressive – coexistential settings. Yet, as Fuller states, members of highly differentiated societies ‘are no longer compelled by a sense of common ancestry and are inclined to veer into increasingly divergent futures’.\textsuperscript{1353} This post-humanist recognition of social – that is, political, cultural, economic, and demographic – complexity poses a serious ‘proactionary challenge to classical liberalism’,\textsuperscript{1354} especially with regard to the question of how it remains possible to promote – arguably cosmopolitan – attitudes based on tolerance, mutual respect, and the willingness to engage in perspective-taking exercises on a daily basis.

Furthermore, such a proactionary vision encourages us to face up to the ambivalence of the human condition by accepting the validity of two fundamental premises: on the one hand, ‘the naturalist premise that we are products of evolutionary forces’\textsuperscript{1355} and, hence, governed by underlying socio-biological mechanisms, whose determining power lies partly within and partly outside our control; on the other hand, ‘the super-naturalist premise that we are destined for a life that radically breaks with that of our ancestors’\textsuperscript{1356} and, thus, capable of constantly reshaping the parameters underpinning the spatio-temporal conditions of our existence.

V.

To the degree that \textit{Homo sapiens} has transformed itself into a ‘Techno sapiens’,\textsuperscript{1357} it appears that ‘biological evolution is the prehistory of technological evolution’.\textsuperscript{1358} To put it in Marxist terms, the development of productive forces has permitted the human species to raise itself above nature by converting technology into the motor of its own destiny, thereby challenging the ontological limitations imposed upon the condition of its existence by the lawful functioning of its own biology. Irrespective of the question of whether or not human bodies can be reduced to ‘vehicles for the propagation of genes’\textsuperscript{1359} and, consequently, human beings to ‘evolutionary dupes’,\textsuperscript{1360} proactionaries do not have a principled objection to seeing one’s body as a means for realizing a larger end, especially if it enables what one regards as an improved expression of our humanity.\textsuperscript{1361}

On this account, the exchange of ‘biocapital’\textsuperscript{1362} – in addition, rather than in opposition, to other forms of capital – turns out to be a fundamental element of proactionary societies.
Given their constructivist outlook, it is no accident that the conceptual, let alone empirical, analysis of ‘biocapital’ has no space in Bourdieusian approaches, which tend to focus on other – notably, social, cultural, linguistic, educational, political, and symbolic – forms of capital. Constructivist sociologists will have little, if any, sympathy with Fuller’s assertions about the alleged emergence of a ‘proactionary world’. Whatever one makes of his framework, however, the burden on proactionaries will be not only ‘to design welfare states that tolerate […] a diversity of human conditions’,1363 but also to demonstrate that they do not, in practice, end up endorsing – in the best-case scenario – mechanisms of exclusion reflected in different forms of ‘ableism’ or – in the worst-case scenario – an open or concealed system of ‘Apartheid 2.0’.1364 If Fuller’s plea for ‘a fundamental reorientation in our epistemic horizons’1365 in the name of the ‘enhancement of the human species’1366 turns out to be an unintended re-legitimization of processes of domination and discrimination, then its most sympathetic critics will have to search for ways of reconceptualizing the conditions of our existence by resorting to alternative – that is, if necessary, ‘post-post-humanist’ – intellectual sources.

Lisa Adkins

The thematic focus of Lisa Adkins’s contribution to this volume is succinctly summarized in the title of her chapter: ‘Luc Boltanski and the Problem of Time: Notes towards a Pragmatic Sociology of the Future’.1367 In her fine-grained analysis, she reflects on key ‘issues of temporality’1368 in terms of their relevance to Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology.

I.

In the first section of her chapter, Adkins draws attention to the theoretical challenges arising from what she describes as ‘the renewal of the social sciences’.1369 As she explains, one of the key issues that have been reconceptualized in recent decades – not only by Boltanski in his pragmatic ‘sociology of critical capacity’,1370 but also by other scholars within diverging explanatory frameworks – is ‘the relationship between agents and the world’.1371 According to Bourdieu’s ‘dispositionalist sociology’,1372 socially acquired dispositions can be conceived of as ‘durably inscribed in agents’1373 whose behaviour is largely shaped, if not governed, by ‘structuring structures (or a field of positions)’1374. According to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology’, by contrast, the explorative emphasis should be placed on how human actors ‘make use of objects to establish orders and, conversely, how they consolidate objects by attaching
them to orders constructed’. Both approaches highlight the relational nature of social existence. Yet, whereas the former seeks to identify structural 

homologies established between habitus-specific dispositions and field-specific positions, the latter aims to examine situation-laden normativities emerging from the interplay between ‘critical capacity’ and ‘orders of worth’.

What is particularly important to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic programme’, then, is the negotiation and consolidation, but also the subversion and transformation, of ‘standards, regulations, assurances, conventions, principles, and guarantees’. For Adkins, however, one of the most significant paradigmatic developments in contemporary intellectual thought is the elaboration of a ‘post-representational social science’, which is characterized by the ambition ‘to go beyond constructionism and constructivism by exploring non-hermeneutic activities, including those of sensation and affect’. Far from representing a uniquely Boltanskian undertaking, the project of proposing a ‘non-dispositionalist social science’ is a collective endeavour in which multiple researchers in different disciplines have been involved in recent decades. In Adkins’s eyes, especially promising in this regard are socio-philosophical approaches committed to taking seriously the concept of ‘time’ in general and the concept of ‘future’ in particular.

Irrespective of whether one advocates a ‘post-Bourdieuian’ sociology, based on a radical ‘critique of dispositionalism and of the critical sociology of domination’, or a ‘turn to the surface’, inspired by a ‘descriptive or (post-) empirical turn’, in light of the profound social and political transformations that have reshaped the entire globe over the past few decades, it appears imperative ‘to rethink the axes of sociological enquire in and for the contemporary age’. For Adkins, a decisive shift from ‘a form of sociology which focuses on an already-inscribed-world (and cartographic descriptions of that world) to a sociology of a world-in-the-making’ reflects a paradigmatic transition process aimed at converting the description and interpretation of the temporal dimensions permeating society into an integral – if not, the most significant – concern in present-day critical social enquiry. Such an ‘emphasis on an in-process-world of as-yet-unrealized potentialities’ encourages social and political researchers to treat the power of transformative transcendence as both a motivational cornerstone of sociology and a constitutive component of human society, thereby challenging material and symbolic mechanisms that remain trapped in the logic of reproductive immanence.

II.

In the second section of her chapter, Adkins goes on to expose some of the key challenges resulting from ‘the rise of a pragmatic world’, which requires a
sociological sensitivity for the study of what Adkins calls ‘post-representational action’. One of the most obvious examples of this kind of social performance, escaping conventional standards of modern action theory, is – according to Adkins – ‘the practice of value creation, or more precisely, valuation’. Yet, rather than reducing ‘value’ to ‘a social or cultural construction’, to a relationally constituted condition, or to a property inherent in particular objects, here it is conceived of as ‘an activity or a practical action’. Put differently, value constitutes an activity that ‘considers a reality while provoking it’.

On this account, the emergence of ‘value’ is not simply a factual, let alone a static, affair. Rather, it designates both a regulative and an active – that is, both a codified and a performative – process, which those participating in, as well as those observing, its construction may seek to measure in objective, normative, or subjective terms. Far from having access to universally valid parameters permitting the context-transcending measurement of value, however, it is crucial to face up to ‘the historical specificity of these activities’ – that is, to the spatio-temporal contingency permeating all processual constructions of reality.

According to Adkins, ‘reality […] is increasingly pragmatic in character; that is, it is invoked and constituted via a range of post-representational actions’. From this perspective, if we aim to examine financial realities, we can understand ‘the various techniques and devices associated with economic science – including hypotheses, formulas, and algorithms’ – only to the extent that we scrutinize them, above all, not in terms what they represent, but, rather, in terms of ‘what they do in the making of economic reality’. Hence, for Adkins, ‘the contemporary world […] is increasingly one of (post-representational) actions; that is, it is increasingly pragmatic’. It is for this reason that, as she spells out, ‘the programme of pragmatic sociology is much more than a simple corrective to a faulty or deficient social science’. Indeed, the fact that it not only recognizes the practico-processual constitution of social reality but also considers it as its constitutive feature illustrates that it is ‘thoroughly entangled in changes to and in the world’, rather than being detached from, let alone indifferent towards, them.

III.

In the third section of her chapter, Adkins offers a number of insightful reflections on what she characterizes as ‘the time of situations’. If it is true that ‘the world is increasingly pragmatic’ and that, correspondingly, ‘post-representational actions’ are more and more important in shaping social reality, then sociologists, faced with this unprecedented scenario, need to grapple with ‘issues of time and temporality’, even – and, perhaps, especially – if
this involves ‘the shattering of temporal continuity’. Similar to Bourdieu, Boltanski intends to transcend the programmatic opposition between structuralist approaches, focusing on macro-sociological matters, and interactionist approaches, concerned with micro-sociological issues. Whilst seeking to overcome this counterproductive paradigmatic antinomy, Boltanski’s sociology dares to envisage ‘a possible and different future’. On this view, it is the task of sociologists to engage with the normative – and, conceivably, emancipatory – nature of social relations ‘not simply to analyse situations, but also, potentially, to present something new – “a possible and different future”’. Ernst Bloch’s *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* [The principle of hope] (1959) springs to mind, inviting us to take seriously the looking-forwardness that appears to be built into the human condition.

Human hereness is always already inhabited by human beyondness: we have a desire to envisage the world, to imagine it, to long for it, to look forward to it; in short, we have a desire to desire the world.

Sociology is never simply about producing descriptive, interpretive, explanatory, analytical, or critical forms of knowledge but always also about generating normative, creative, imaginative, and innovative – and, hence, future-oriented – cognitive maps, permitting human actors to convert their day-to-day immersion in existential immanence into an invaluable source of self-empowering transcendence. Indeed, sociology is ‘thoroughly entangled with change and the creation of the new’; hence, ‘questions of the new’ are an integral element of its paradigmatic make-up.

It is in this context that Adkins insists that ‘[t]he recent history of capitalist innovation’ is profoundly shaped by the fact that ‘commodities take on properties of openness or indeterminacy’. Indicative of the hegemonic parameters of late capitalism, the consumer of a commodity is not only allowed but also expected to engage with and attribute meaning to it – that is, to ‘put it to work in various ways’. When reflecting upon the assumptions about temporality underpinning Boltanski’s writings, one presuppositional difference appears striking: the grammar-focused analysis developed in *On Justification* operates mostly with a synchronic model of time; the action-oriented enquiry undertaken in *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, by contrast, is based on ‘a diachronic approach’. Thus, instead of building on ‘relatively static models of situated orders of worth’, capturing the essence of the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism requires a dynamic understanding of its rapidly changing, constantly adapting, and highly elastic constitution, allowing for ‘both the displacement and the emergence of distinct orders through and in time’.
IV.

In the fourth section of her chapter, Adkins articulates a number of critical thoughts on the bleak prospect of having to confront a ‘no future’ scenario. In the ‘post–financial crisis period’, which is dominated by ‘neo-liberal rationalities’ and, thus, by ‘market-disciplinary modes of governance’, more and more people – especially those of the most vulnerable and disempowered sectors of society – perceive their lives as both impoverished and impoverishing – that is, as a state of affairs characterized by ‘futurelessness’ and ‘perspectivelessness’. Symptomatic of this development towards ‘late-modern disenchantment’ is the emergence of the Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without a future) movement in contemporary Spain, where – in light of the recent and ongoing economic crisis – the situation could hardly be more precarious.

Skyrocketing youth unemployment rates (which, as I write, stand at 54.2%); ongoing government spending cuts; the privatization of education; labour market and labour law reforms; the prospect of a whole lifetime of unemployment and/or precarious employment; insecure housing; and, last but not least, no guaranteed retirement income.

In brief, more and more people, especially those in their youth, are confronted with ‘the disappearance of the future as a horizon of possibility and hope’. The struggle against such a horizonless horizon – that is, resistance against the possibility of becoming ‘a lost generation’ – has become an everyday reality at the grassroots level of many societies – notably, of economically fragile European countries, such as the aforementioned PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) – in the collective refusal to accept that a futureless present is all there is left for large parts of the population. Large-scale protests against ‘hollowed-out, precarious, and compromised futures’ illustrate that individual lives, rather than ideological language games, are at stake.

As Adkins eloquently remarks, the sheer possibility of such a futureless reality obliges us to take the potential transformation of temporality in contemporary society seriously:

[C]ritiques of capitalism now demand not different kinds of time – for instance, the time of the singular, the authentic, or of difference – but a right to time itself. And, while contemporary critique demands access to time itself, futures – including alternative futures – are not to be found in conditions ‘freed from the constraints of situations’, but are not to be found at all. In short, the cries of ‘no future’ in post-financial crisis recessionary post-Fordism demand that pragmatic sociology – and the discipline of sociology more generally – revisit and revise its views on time, change, and the new.
It is difficult to think of a more poignant way of synthesizing the fact that, both for ordinary actors and for social scientists, it is time to develop conceptual and methodological tools capable of accounting for the transformation of time in the face of what large parts of the world population perceive as a seemingly futureless present.

V.

In the fifth section of her chapter, Adkins elucidates the discouraging implications of the emergence of an ‘eternal present’. Drawing on informative and perceptive statements made by people who have experienced the consequences of social insecurity, Adkins urges us to grapple with the question of ‘how exactly the present may be dispossessed of time – that is, dispossessed of time-in-motion’. Sympathetic to a Bourdieusian understanding of the link between temporality and sociality, she argues that ‘for a practical disposition towards the forthcoming to be constituted – that is, for a future to be sensed and lived – a certain threshold of objective chances is required’. Put differently, there is no future-orientedness without an actor’s presence-bound immersion in the horizon of a field structured by interactions and struggles situated in the past.

In practical terms, the experience of unemployment has serious implications for social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and disempowerment, purposefulness and meaninglessness, recognition and misrecognition:

[T]he unemployed, and especially the chronically unemployed, are deprived of such chances or more precisely of an objective universe (deadlines, dates, timetables to be observed, buses to take, rates to maintain, targets and indicators to meet, and so on) which orientates and stimulates protensive practical action – that is, action which is future-orientated. This deprivation [...] is evidenced in the chronically unemployed typically experiencing time as purposeless and meaningless – as dead time – and in their often incoherent visions of the future. The chronically unemployed, therefore, have ‘no future’ because they are precisely excluded from those objective conditions – or the pull of the field – which would allow the practical making of time.

To the extent that experiences of futurelessness are reflected in experiences of meaninglessness and purposelessness, a person’s immersion in temporality is a socio-ontological precondition for their self-realizing capacity. To be excluded – provisionally or permanently – from participating in the production of the objective conditions, normative situations, and subjective projections emerging in a given social field means to be deprived of the right to protensive – that
is, purposive, cooperative, and creative—action. The disenchanted adventure of living in an ‘eternal present’ is tantamount to the experience of realizing that one’s life cannot be realized in self-realizing terms.

[A] present dispossessed of the future — or an eternal present — is a present in which practical action is deprived or is adrift from the pull of fields, a present in which protensive practical action cannot be actualized. To put this slightly differently, this kind of elaboration adds fuel to the argument that a present dispossessed of a future is one in which habits and dispositions are adrift from social fields, or — better said — one in which habits and fields lack synchronicity.

Actors may be bestowed with a multifaceted set of resources. Yet, unless they are granted the opportunity to realize their potential in relation to an ensemble of conditions permitting them to do so, their empowering — notably purposive, cooperative, and creative — capacities will fail to be the basis of their ‘pro-tensive’, rather than ‘contra-tensive’, performances. To be sure, the ‘lack of synchronicity between habits and fields’ can have profoundly disempowering and disconcerting consequences, in the sense that it can deprive people of the opportunity to use and develop their subjective dispositions by occupying, relating to, and identifying with objective positions. At the same time, however, it can have intensely empowering and stimulating effects, in the sense that it can trigger, or at least contribute to, people’s reflexivity and versatility, when exposed to unexpected circumstances that lie outside their comfort zones and horizons of interactional familiarity.

In the face of despair, one may get the impression that, ‘in the contemporary present, the future is over’. Although it may appear overly schematic, and somewhat reductive, to suggest that the twentieth century was the ‘century that trusted in the future’, whereas the twenty-first century is the century that falls short of substantial faith in the yet-to-come, it is true that the naïvely optimistic belief in ‘limitless growth’ and prosperity has been shattered by the individual and collective experiences of the bleak historical constellations generated by large-scale crisis and austerity. Given current and recent reality checks imposed by the systemic imperatives of inherently unstable social and economic formations, what has emerged in capitalist countries affected by politics of austerity is a climate shaped by a ‘post-futurist mood […] based on the consciousness that the future is not going to be bright’. A ‘post-futurist sensibility’, then, ‘concerns a shift in time itself’, implying that the parameters of temporality have shifted, irrespective of whether they are defined in objective, normative, or subjective terms.

The ‘colonization of the domain of time’ by systemic imperatives involves not only ‘colonization of the mind and perception’ but also, more generally, a
Colonization of people’s lifeworlds, ‘a colonization that has ensured that the future has collapsed’, a colonization that robs people of the capacity to exercise control over the spatio-temporal conditions shaping their everyday existence. Under the hegemonic influence of ‘digital capitalism’, it appears that ‘the whole psychosphere of the human being becomes subject to the movement of capital, now operating at digital speeds’. With the rising numbers of workers who are ‘precariously employed on temporary, short-term, sporadic, and intermittent bases’, both capital and labour are expected to be constantly ‘on the move’. In other words, ‘flexible workers’ need to be prepared to relocate, journeying from place to place in the constant competition over jobs and, in some cases, even in the struggle for survival. The personal consequences of the post-Fordist work model are reflected not only in the fragmentation of life experiences but also in the undermining of collective bases for solidarity and, in many cases, in the ‘corrosion of character’.

Shifts in the relationships between the person, labour time, work, production, and capital accumulation have opened out an infinitely expanding present, a present in which the future cannot be known or sensed and is beyond the grasp of human intervention. The eternal present of postfuturism is a present in which the future—or more precisely the time after the present—can no longer deliver on hopes, dreams, or promises.

In short, the postfuturist condition describes a spatio-temporally specific situation characterized by the lack of belief in a worthwhile yet-to-come.

VI.

In the sixth section of her chapter, Adkins provides some cursory remarks on the idea of ‘pragmatic futures’. As she emphasizes, it would be mistaken to assume that ‘the exhaustion of the future’ is simply caused by ‘an intensification or acceleration of time’. One of the most interesting aspects of contemporary forms of capitalism is that, under its hegemonic influence on the circulation of marketized objects, ‘the commodity is far from closed off’. In fact, as Adkins points out, ‘rather than comprising a substance made up of spent units of labour time, the commodity is dynamic and in process, with the labour of users comprising a key source of innovation’ and of ceaseless transformation. Owing to its ‘open-ended and continuously shifting character […], the commodity moves in an unpredictable and unknowable manner’. Hence, it is not enough to acknowledge that the commodity is situated within time; under the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism, time is situated within the commodity. Time and the commodity […] therefore unfold together.”
To the extent that, in contemporary capitalism, the commodification and the temporalization of social relations are intimately interconnected, the logic of the market and the logic of time are deeply entangled in a world driven by constant transformation, acceleration, and cross-border interaction. A pragmatic account of time in general and of the future in particular, therefore, needs to explore both the conceptual and the empirical implications of the fact that ‘the emergence of a social which is processual, non-linear, experimental, and open-ended in character’\textsuperscript{469} poses serious challenges to classical sociological conceptions of development. Recognition of the methodological imperative to study ‘events as they happen’\textsuperscript{470} not only involves abandoning the uncovering mission concerned with the unearthing of ‘causality or depth’\textsuperscript{471} but also ‘requires that the sociologist – as the pragmatic school may very well agree – engage not in the search for explanatory systems but in a search for better description’\textsuperscript{472} Thus, the plea for a ‘descriptive turn’ is motivated by the ambition to do justice to the eventful nature of social life, by highlighting that occurrences, since they form the basis of all histories, are empirical manifestations of all past-, present-, and future-oriented performances.

Arguably, such an open-ended conception of the historical construction of reality is capable of accounting for the pivotal sociological role played by both the experiential and the experimental resources of humanity. Under the influence of the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism, ‘the commodity […] is continuously worked upon and updated in an iterative process of experimentation’,\textsuperscript{473} improvisation, and actualization. Just as ‘time is actualized in events and situations’,\textsuperscript{474} events and situations are actualized in time. Adkins proposes to use the term ‘temporalization’\textsuperscript{475} to indicate that, in her view, we need to face up to the ‘collapse in the distance between time and events’,\textsuperscript{476} in order to understand that temporality and performativity represent two inseparable components permeating all forms of human sociality. Adkins’s chapter is a powerful reminder of the fact that it is imperative to problematize the tangible consequences of ‘a shift in time in which futures, the new, and change actualize and unfold with events’.\textsuperscript{477} The challenge for pragmatic sociologists of time, then, is to shed light on the constitutive role of happenings in shaping the development of society by virtue of its members’ performative construction of temporality.

Notes
1 See Fowler (2014).
2 Ibid.: 67, 69, 70, and 73 (italics added).
3 Ibid.: 67 (italics added).
4 Ibid.: 67 (italics added).
5 Ibid.: 67 (italics added).
6 Ibid.: 67.
7 Ibid.: 67 (italics in original).
Arguably, Boltanski had a significant impact on the development of Bourdieu’s conception of language. On the key elements underlying Bourdieu’s account of language, see, for instance: Adkins (2013); Fowler (2013); Grenfell (2013); Inglis (2013); Kögler (2013); Lawler (2013); Outhwaite (2013); Robbins (2013); Susen (2013a); Susen (2013c); Susen (2013d); Susen (2013e); Turner (2013).
50 Ibid.: 72.
51 Ibid.: 72.
52 See ibid.: 72.
53 Ibid.: 74.
56 Ibid.: 74.
57 Ibid.: 74.
58 Ibid.: 74.
59 Ibid.: 74.
60 Ibid.: 75 (italics added).
61 Ibid.: 75.
62 Ibid.: 75.
63 Ibid.: 75.
64 Ibid.: 75.
67 Ibid.: 76.
68 Ibid.: 76.
69 Ibid.: 76 (italics added).
70 Ibid.: 76.
71 Ibid.: 77 (italics added).
73 Fowler (2014: 78).
74 Ibid.: 78.
76 Fowler (2014: 78).
77 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). See also Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]).
78 Fowler (2014: 78).
79 On this point, see ibid.: 78.
80 Ibid.: 78.
81 Ibid.: 78.
82 Ibid.: 78 (italics in original).
83 Ibid.: 79 (italics added).
84 See Weber (2001 [1930]).
85 Hill (1991 [1974]).
89 Ibid.: 79.
90 Ibid.: 79.
91 Ibid.: 79.
92 Ibid.: 79 (italics added). 93
   Ibid.: 79.
94 Ibid.: 79 (italics added).
97 On this point, see, for example, Susen (2012a: 287, 306–307, and 316n.24).
100 Ibid.: 82. On this point, see also Simmel (1978 [1907]: 404 and 484–485).
101 Boltanski (2009a). See also Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
102 See, for instance: Fabiani (2011); Stavo-Debauge (2011); Susen (2012b); Wagner (2010). See also Stones (2014) and Susen (2014 [2012]).
103 See, for example: Fabiani (2011); Stavo-Debauge (2011); Susen (2012b); Wagner (2010).
106 See ibid. See also Susen (2014 [2012]: 15).
109 Ibid.: 83 (italics added).
110 Ibid.: 84.
111 Ibid.: 85.
113 See Quéré and Terzi (2014).
114 Ibid.: 91.
115 Ibid.: 91.
116 Ibid.: 91.
117 Ibid.: 91.
118 See ibid.: 92–94.
119 On this point, see ibid.: 92.
120 Ibid.: 92. On this point, see Boltanski (2006: 11) and Boltanski (2009b: 2).
123 See ibid.: 92.
124 Ibid.: 92 (italics in original).
125 See ibid.: 92.
126 Ibid.: 92 (italics in original).
127 Ibid.: 93 (italics in original).
129 Ibid.: 93 (italics in original). See also ibid.: 95–96 and 99–101.
130 Ibid.: 93 (italics added).
131 Ibid.: 93.
132 See ibid.: 94, 97, and 119–124.
133 Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
135 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 94). See also ibid.: 120–123.
136 Ibid.: 94 (italics in original).
137 Ibid.: 94.
140 Ibid.: 95 (italics in original).
141 See ibid.: 95–106.
144 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 95).
146 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 95).
147 Ibid.: 95 (italics added).
148 Ibid.: 95.
151 Ibid.: 95 (italics in original).
152 Ibid.: 95 (italics added).
153 Ibid.: 95 (italics in original).
154 Ibid.: 96.
155 Ibid.: 97.
156 Ibid.: 97 (italics in original) See also ibid.: 92.
157 Ibid.: 97 (italics in original).
160 Ibid.: 98.
161 Ibid.: 98 (italics in original).
162 Ibid.: 98.
164 Ibid.: 99 (italics in original).
165 Ibid.: 99 (italics in original).
167 Ibid.: 99 (italics in original).
168 Ibid.: 99 (italics added).
169 Ibid.: 99 (italics added).
170 Ibid.: 99.
171 Ibid.: 99–100 (italics added).
172 Ibid.: 100 (italics in original).
173 Ibid.: 100.
174 Ibid.: 100 (italics in original).
175 Ibid.: 100 (italics in original).
176 Ibid.: 101.
177 Ibid.: 101 (italics in original).
178 See ibid.: 101. On these points, see also Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 69–70).
180 Ibid.: 101.
181 Ibid.: 102 (italics added).
182 Ibid.: 102.
183 Ibid.: 102 (italics added).
184 Ibid.: 103 (italics added).
185 Ibid.: 103.
186 Ibid.: 103.
188 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 105).
189 Ibid.: 105.
190 Ibid.: 105.
191 Ibid.: 105.
193 See ibid.: 106–119.
195 See Kaufmann (2012).
197 Ibid.: 106 (italics in original).
198 Ibid.: 106.
199 Ibid.: 106.
200 Ibid.: 106.
201 Ibid.: 106 (italics added).
202 Ibid.: 106.
203 Ibid.: 106.
204 Ibid.: 106.
205 Ibid.: 107 (italics added).
206 Ibid.: 107.
207 Ibid.: 107.
208 Ibid.: 107.
209 Ibid.: 108.
210 Ibid.: 108.
211 Ibid.: 108 (italics in original).
213 See, for instance, Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
215 On these points, see ibid.: 109. See also Dewey (1939) and Dewey (1989 [1939]: esp. Chapter 5).
218 See Knight (1971 [1921]).
220 Ibid.: 110.
224 Ibid.: 111 (italics added).
225 Ibid.: 111 (italics in original).
226 Ibid.: 111.
227 Ibid.: 111.
228 Ibid.: 111 (italics added).
229 Ibid.: 111.
230 Ibid.: 112 (italics added).
234 Ibid.: 114 (italics in original).
235 Ibid.: 114 (italics added).
236 Ibid.: 114 (italics in original).
237 Ibid.: 115 (italics in original).
240 Ibid.: 115.
241 Ibid.: 115.
242 Ibid.: 115.
243 See ibid.: 115.
244 Ibid.: 116 (italics added). For quoted passage, see Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 91).
246 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 118) (italics in original).
247 Ibid.: 118 (italics in original).
248 Ibid.: 118 (italics in original).
249 Ibid.: 118–119 (italics added).
252 Ibid.: 119.
253 Ibid.: 119–120 (italics added).
254 See ibid.: 120–123.
255 Ibid.: 121.
256 Ibid.: 121.
258 Quéré and Terzi (2014: 122).
259 On this point, see, for instance, Mesny (1998) and Mesny (2002).
261 Ibid.: 122.
262 Ibid.: 122.
263 Ibid.: 122–123.
265 Ibid.: 123 (italics added).
266 Ibid.: 123 (italics added).
267 Ibid.: 123.
268 Ibid.: 124.
269 Ibid.: 124.
271 Ibid.: 124.
272 On this point, see ibid.: 123–124.
273 See Bogusz (2014).
274 Ibid.: 129 (italics added).
275 On this point, see ibid.: 129.
276 See, for example, Dodier (2005) and Thévenot (2011).
278 Ibid.: 129.
279 Ibid.: 130.
280 Ibid.: 130.
281 Ibid.: 130.
283 See esp. Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002);
Boltanski (2012 [1990]); Boltanski, Darré, and Schiltz (1984); Boltanski and Honneth (2009);
Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot (1983); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999);
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
285 Ibid.: 130 (italics added). On this point, see also, for instance: Boltanski and Honneth (2009);
Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a).
286 Bogusz (2014: 130).
287 Ibid.: 130.
288 See esp. Dewey (1930 [1929]).
290 See ibid.: 131.
291 Ibid.: 132.
292 Ibid.: 132.
293 Ibid.: 132.
294 Ibid.: 132.
295 Ibid.: 132.
296 Ibid.: 132.
297 Ibid.: 132.
298 Ibid.: 132.
299 Ibid.: 134 (italics in original).
300 See ibid.: 135 and 140, 141, and 142.
301 Ibid.: 135.
302 Ibid.: 135.
303 Ibid.: 135.
304 Ibid.: 136.
305 Ibid.: 136 (italics added).
306 See Boltanski (1987 [1982]).
307 See Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
308 See Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]).
309 See Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
311 Ibid.: 138.
312 Ibid.: 138.
313 Ibid.: 142.
314 Ibid.: 142.
315 Ibid.: 142 (italics in original).
316 Ibid.: 142.
317 Ibid.: 142.
318 Ibid.: 142.
319 Ibid.: 143.
320 Ibid.: 135 and 143 (italics added).
Ibid.: 145.
Ibid.: 146.
Ibid.: 146 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 146.
Ibid.: 146 (italics added).
Ibid.: 142.
See Lemieux (2014).
Ibid.: 154 (italics added).
Ibid.: 154 (italics added).
Ibid.: 154 (spelling modified) (italics added).
Ibid.: 154 (italics added).
Lemieux (2014: 155–155, 163, and 165n.5).
Ibid.: 155 (italics in original).
See, for instance, de Fornel, Ogien, and Quéré (2000).
Ibid.: 155 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 156.
Ibid.: 156. See also ibid.: 165n.7.
Ibid.: 156 (italics added).
Ibid.: 156 (italics added).
Ibid.: 156.
Ibid.: 156.
See ibid.: 156–158 (spelling modified) (italics added).
Ibid.: 156.
See ibid.: 157.
Ibid.: 157 and 163. See also ibid.: 166n.16.
Ibid.: 157 (italics added).
Ibid.: 157 (italics added).
Ibid.: 158 (spelling modified) (italics added).
Ibid.: 158 (italics added).
Ibid.: 158 (italics added).
See ibid.: 158–160 (spelling modified) (italics added).
Ibid.: 159 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 159.
On this point, see Susen (2012b: 704–705).
368  Ibid.: 160.
369  See ibid.: 160–161 (spelling modified) (italics added).
370  Ibid.: 161 (italics added).
371  Ibid.: 160.
374  Ibid.: 160.
375  See ibid.: 161–162 (italics added).
376  See, for instance, Lahire (1998).
378  Mead (1967 [1934]: 142).
379  See, for example, Lepetit (1995).
381  Ibid.: 164 (italics added).
383  See, for instance: Thévenot (1998); Thévenot (2001); Thévenot (2006); Thévenot (2011).
385  See ibid.
386  Ibid.: 174. See also ibid.: 175.
387  Ibid.: 174 (italics in original). See also ibid.: 175.
388  Ibid.: 174 (italics in original).
389  Ibid.: 174 (italics in original).
390  Ibid.: 174 (italics in original).
391  Ibid.: 175 (italics in original).
392  Ibid.: 174 (quotation modified: ‘my’ replaced by ‘their’).
393  Ibid.: 176 (italics in original).
394  Ibid.: 176 (italics in original). On this point, see Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 1).
396  Ibid.: 177.
397  Ibid.: 177.
402  Ibid.: 179.
403  Ibid.: 179.
404  Ibid.: 179.
405  Ibid.: 180.
406  Ibid.: 180.
407  See ibid.: 183–184.
See ibid. See also Susen (2014 [2012]: 184).

Ibid.: 184 (italics in original).


See Boltanski (2009a: 129).]


See Boltanski (2009a: 129).]


It should be noted that Boltanski does not use this term in On Critique.

See Boltanski (2009a: 190): ‘dominer par le changement’ (italics in original).]

See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).

See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).

See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999).


Ibid.: 192 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 193 (italics in original).

On this point, see ibid.: 194.

Ibid.: 196.

Ibid.: 195 (italics added).

Ibid.: 196.

Ibid.: 197 (italics in original).

See Susen (2014 [2014]).


Boltanski (2011 [2009]). See also Boltanski (2009a).

Stones (2014: 211).

Ibid.: 211.

Ibid.: 211.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

See ibid.: 212.

See ibid.: 212–214.

Ibid.: 212 (italics in original).


Ibid.: 212 (italics added).

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 212.

Ibid.: 213 (italics added).

Ibid.: 213.

Ibid.: 213.

Ibid.: 213.

Ibid.: 214.

Ibid.: 214.


Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215 (italics added).

Ibid.: 215.
Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215.

Ibid.: 215 (italics added).

Ibid.: 216.

Ibid.: 216.

Ibid.: 216.

Ibid.: 217.

Ibid.: 218.

Ibid.: 218.

Ibid.: 218.

Ibid.: 218.

Ibid.: 218.

Ibid.: 219 (italics added).


Ibid.: 219.

See ibid.: 219.


Ibid.: 219.


Ibid.: 220 (italics added).

Ibid.: 220 (italics added).

Ibid.: 220 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 220 (italics added).

On this point, see Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010).

Stones (2014: 221).

Ibid.: 221.

See ibid.: 221–224. On this point, see also Susen (2012b: 704–705).

Stones (2014: 221).

Ibid.: 221. On this point, see Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 99, 103, 124, 125, and 155).


Stones (2014: 221).

Ibid.: 661 (italics added).

Ibid.: 221.

Ibid.: 221.

Ibid.: 222.

Ibid.: 222.

Ibid.: 222.

Ibid.: 222.
527 Ibid.: 222 (italics added).
528 Ibid.: 222 (italics added).
529 Ibid.: 222 (italics added).
530 Ibid.: 223.
533 Ibid.: 224.
534 See ibid.: 224–231.
535 Ibid.: 224 (italics added).
536 Ibid.: 225 (italics added).
537 Ibid.: 225.
538 Ibid.: 225 (italics added).
539 Ibid.: 225.
540 Ibid.: 225 (italics in original).
541 Ibid.: 225.
542 Ibid.: 225 (italics added).
543 Ibid.: 225.
544 Ibid.: 225.
545 Ibid.: 226.
546 Ibid.: 226.
547 On this point, see ibid.: 226.
548 On this point, see ibid.: 226.
552 Ibid.: 226.
553 Ibid.: 227.
554 Ibid.: 226.
555 Ibid.: 227 (italics added).
556 Ibid.: 227 (italics added).
557 Ibid.: 227 (italics added).
558 Ibid.: 226.
559 Ibid.: 227 (italics in original).
560 Ibid.: 227 (italics added).
561 Ibid.: 227.
564 Stones (2014: 229).
565 Ibid.: 229.
566 Ibid.: 229.
567 Ibid.: 228 and 229.
568 In a recently published article, I have proposed a typology that distinguishes between ‘foundational fields’, ‘contingent fields’, and ‘ephemeral fields’. See Susen (2013d: 236n.121). Drawing an analogy between Boltanski’s account and my typology, ‘contexts’ may be theorized in terms of ‘foundational fields’, just as ‘situations’ may be understood in terms of ‘ephemeral fields’. Arguably, ‘contingent fields’ lies somewhere in the middle. We may
add, however, that all three types of field – that is, ‘foundational fields’, ‘contingent fields’, and ‘ephemeral fields’ – contain both contextual and situational dimensions.

See Bourdieu (1980: 43): ‘De toutes les oppositions qui divisent artificiellement la science sociale, la plus fondamentale, et la plus ruinuse, est celle qui s’établit entre le subjectivisme et l’objectivisme.’ See also Bourdieu (1990 [1980]: 25): ‘Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up between subjectivism and objectivism.’ On this point, see also, for instance: Susen (2007: 149–157); Susen (2011a: 456–458); Susen (2011b: 368, 374, and 394); Susen (2011d: 51–53 and 73–74).


Ibid.: 230.

Ibid.: 230.

Ibid.: 230.

Ibid.: 230 (italics added).

Ibid.: 230.

Ibid.: 231 (italics added).

See Wagner (2014).

Ibid.: 235 (italics added).


Ibid.: 236.

Ibid.: 236.

Ibid.: 236.

Ibid.: 236 (italics added).

Ibid.: 236.

See ibid.: 237.


Ibid.: 238.

Ibid.: 238.

Ibid.: 238 (italics added).

Ibid.: 238.

Ibid.: 238 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 238.

Ibid.: 238.

Ibid.: 238.

On this point, see ibid.: 238–239.

Ibid.: 238 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 239 (italics added).

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 240.

Ibid.: 240.

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 239.

Ibid.: 240.

Ibid.: 240.


Ibid.: 267 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 268.

Ibid.: 269 (italics in original).

See Boltanski (2008c: 180n.2).

Ibid.: 180n.2. Robbins’s translation; original text in French: ‘[…] par l’intermédiaire de mon frère aîné, Jean-Elie […]’. See Robbins (2014: 269 and 287n.5).


Ibid.: 271 (italics added).

Ibid.: 271 (italics added).

Ibid.: 271 (italics added).

Ibid.: 271 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 271.

Ibid.: 271.

Ibid.: 272 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 271.

Ibid.: 271.

Ibid.: 273.


Ibid.: 276 (italics added).

Ibid.: 275 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 276 (italics added).

Ibid.: 276 (italics added).

Ibid.: 276 (italics added).

Ibid.: 276 (italics added).

Ibid.: 276 (italics added).


Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968).


See ibid.: 277.


Bourdieu (1968).

Boltanski (1966).

Boltanski (1969a).

Boltanski (1969b).


Ibid.: 282 (italics in original).

Bourdieu (1972).

Bourdieu (1977 [1972]).


Ibid.: 283.

Ibid.: 283. On the centrality of the concept of ‘reflexivity’ in Bourdieu’s later works, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1990); Bourdieu (2001); Bourdieu (2004); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992b); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a).


Ibid.: 283.

Ibid.: 283 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 283 (italics in original).


Ibid.: 284.

Boltanski (1973b).


Bourdieu (1989). See also Bourdieu (1996 [1989]).

773 Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975a).
774 Boltanski (1973a).
775 Goffman (1971 [1959]).
776 Goffman (1971).
777 Goffman (1973 [1956]).
779 Boltanski (1973a: 146) (italics added). Robbins’s translation; original text in French:

‘[...] prend le parti d’emprunter au vocabulaire indigène des groupes et des classes sur lesquels porte objectivement ses analyses, les catégories de pensée et les mots dont, par un usage systématique et contrôlé, il fait une utilisation quasi conceptuelle […]’. On this point, see Robbins (2014: 285 and 288n.30).
782 Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976).
783 Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]).
784 Boltanski (2008c).
786 Ibid.: 285.
787 Boltanski (1982). See also Boltanski (1987 [1982]).
791 See Nachi (2014).
792 Ibid.: 293.
793 Ibid.: 293.
794 Ibid.: 293 (italics in original).
795 Ibid.: 293–294 (italics in original). On this point, see, for instance: Thévenot (2001); Thévenot (2006); Thévenot (2009); Thévenot (2011); Thévenot (2014).
797 Ibid.: 294.
798 Ibid.: 294.
801 Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
802 Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]).
804 On this point, see ibid.: 298. See also Nachi (2006a).
806 Nachi (2014: 300).
807 Ibid.: 300.
808 Ibid.: 301.
809 Ibid.: 301.
810 Ibid.: 301.
811 See ibid.: 302–306.
812 Ibid.: 302 (italics added). On this point, see ibid.: 302–303.
813 In linguistics, one of the most influential examples of this perspective can be found in Chomsky (1965).
814 Nachi (2014: 303). See also ibid.: 304 and 305 (italics added).
In philosophy, one of the most influential examples of this perspective can be found in Merleau-Ponty (2012 [1945]).

See also ibid.: 303–304 (italics added).

On this point, see, for instance, Ricœur (1969). See also Kögler (1996 [1992]).

See ibid.: 305.

See ibid.: 306–309.

Boltanski (2011 [2009]).

Boltanski (2008c).

On this distinction, see Nachi (2014: 308–309).

Ibid.: 308 (italics in original).

See Susen (2014 [2014]).


See Nash (2014).


On this point, see Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]: xiv).


855 See Blokker and Brighenti (2011b: 392).
857 On this point, see ibid.: 356.
858 Ibid.: 356.
859 Boltanski (2012 [1990]). See also Boltanski (1990a).
862 Ibid.: 357.
863 Ibid.: 357 (italics added).
864 Ibid.: 357.
865 See ibid.: 357–361.
866 Ibid.: 352.
868 Nash (2014: 358) (italics added). On this point, see also, for instance, Blokker and Brighenti (2011a) and Honneth (2010).
870 Ibid.: 358 (italics added).
871 Ibid.: 358 (italics added).
872 Ibid.: 358.
873 Ibid.: 358.
874 Ibid.: 358.
878 On this problem, see, for instance: Holloway (2005 [2002]); Holloway (2005); Holloway (2010); Holloway (2012); Holloway and Susen (2013); Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2012a).
880 Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
882 Ibid.: 359 (italics added).
884 On this problem, see Susen (2012b: 710–719).
886 Ibid.: 359.
887 Ibid.: 359.
889 See Berger and Luckmann (1967).
892 Ibid.: 359.
893 Ibid.: 360 (italics added).
894 Ibid.: 360 and 361.
895 Ibid.: 352.
896 Ibid.: 352 (italics added).
897 Ibid.: 352.
898 Ibid.: 361 (italics added).
899 Ibid.: 361.
900 Ibid.: 361.
901 On this point, see Sassen (2008 [2006]).
905 Ibid.: 364.
906 On this point, see ibid.: 364. See also Mitchell (1999).
908 Ibid.: 364.
909 On this point, see ibid.: 361–364.
910 Ibid.: 362 and 365.
911 Ibid.: 365 (italics added).
912 See Blokker (2014).
913 Ibid.: 369 (italics added).
914 See ibid.: 370–373.
915 Ibid.: 370 (italics added).
922 Ibid.: 371.
923 Ibid.: 371.
924 Ibid.: 371.
927 Lamont and Thévenot (2000).
928 Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]).
929 Boltanski (2011 [2009]).
935 See ibid.: 374.
936 Ibid.: 375.
937 Ibid.: 375.
938 See, for instance: Butler, Laclau, and Žižek (2000); Laclau (1989); Laclau (1992); Laclau (1993); Laclau (1996); Laclau (2007); Laclau and Mouffe (1987); Mouffe (1992); Torfing (1999).
940 Ibid.: 375 (italics added).
941 Ibid.: 375 (italics added).
942 Ibid.: 375.
943 Ibid.: 375.
946 Ibid.: 376.
947 See ibid.: 376–377.
948 See ibid.: 377–379.
949 See ibid.: 379–381.
950 Ibid.: 376.
954 Ibid.: 379 (italics added).
955 See ibid.: 379.
958 On this point, see ibid.: 380–381. See also Straume (2012).
960 See ibid.: 381–386.
961 Ibid.: 381.
962 On the ‘end of ideology thesis’, see, for example: Bell (2000 [1960]); Donskis (2000); Rubinstein (2009); Waxman (1968). See also, for instance: Boltanski (2008c); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]).
966 Ibid.: 385.
967 Ibid.: 385. On this point, see also, for instance, Susen (2011c).
968 See Basaure (2014).
970 See esp. the following: Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]). See also, for example: Boltanski (1990a); Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski (2004); Boltanski (2009a); Boltanski and Chiapello (1999); Boltanski, Darré, and Schiltz (1984); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Susen (2012b).
972 Ibid.: 391.
973 Ibid.: 391.
974 Ibid.: 391 (italics in original).
975 Ibid.: 391 (italics added).
976 Ibid.: 392.
977 Ibid.: 392 (italics added).
978 Ibid.: 392 (italics added).
979 Ibid.: 392 (italics added).
980 See ibid.: 392.
981 Ibid.: 393.
983 On this point, see Basaure (2011b) and Basyaure (2011c).
985 See ibid.: 391 and 396.
986 See ibid.: 395, 396, and 405.
987 See ibid.: 392, 393, 394, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 403, 405, 407, and 408.
988 Ibid.: 395 (italics added). See also ibid.: 396, 397, 399, 400, and 406.
989 Ibid.: 395.
990 Ibid.: 395.
995 See ibid.: 397–399.
996 Ibid.: 399 (italics added).
997 See ibid.: 398, 399, 400, and 406.
998 Ibid.: 399 (italics added).
999 Ibid.: 397, 399, and 400 (italics added).
1000 Ibid.: 399.
1001 Ibid.: 400 (italics added).
1002 Ibid.: 400 (italics added).
1003 Ibid.: 404 (italics added).
1004 Ibid.: 404 (italics added). On this point, see ibid.: 403–407.
1007 See Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) and Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
1009 Ibid.: 404.
1010 Indeed, Karl Marx made this point a long time ago; see Marx (2000 [1844]).
1011 See Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
1012 Basyaure (2014: 405).
1013 Ibid.: 405.
1018 See Eulriet (2014).
1019 Ibid.: 413.
1020 Ibid.: 414.
1021 Ibid.: 414 (italics added).
1022 See ibid.: 415–418.
1023 See ibid.: 415–418.
1024 Ibid.: 415.
1025 Ibid.: 415.
1026 See ibid.: 415–416.
1027 Ibid.: 415.
1028 Ibid.: 415.
1029 Ibid.: 415.
1033 Ibid.: 551.
1035 Ibid.: 417.
1036 Ibid.: 419 (italics added).
1037 Ibid.: 420.
1038 Ibid.: 420.
1039 See Outhwaite and Spence (2014).
1040 On these points, see Outhwaite’s various contributions, notably the following:
   Outhwaite (2000); Outhwaite (2006c); Outhwaite (2006a); Outhwaite (2006b);
   Outhwaite (2006 [2000]); Outhwaite (2008); Outhwaite (2012). See also Spence
   (2012).
1043 See, for instance, the work of Bernhard Peters; on this point, see Wessler (2008) and
   On this point, see Outhwaite and Spence (2014: 439n.2).
1044 Outhwaite and Spence (2014: 426).
1045 Ibid.: 426.
1046 Ibid.: 426.
1047 Ibid.: 426.
1048 See, for instance: Barry (2001); Caporoso (1996); Jensen and Richardson (2004);
   Majone and Tame (1996); Walker (2002a); Walker (2002b); Walters and Haahr
   (2005).
1049 See, for example: Adler-Nissen (2011); Adler-Nissen (2013); Georgakakis (2012);
   Mérand (2011); Mérand, Foucault, and Irondelle (2011); Kauppi (2005).
1050 Bourdieu (1993). See also Bourdieu (1999 [1993]).
1052 See Honneth (2007 [2000]).
1054 See Habermas (2001 [1998]).
1058 See Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010: esp. 161). See also Outhwaite and Spence
1060 Ibid.: 427.
1061 Ibid.: 427.
1062 Ibid.: 427 (italics in original).
1063 Ibid.: 428.
1064 See ibid.: 428.
See ibid.: 428, 434, and 436.


See, for instance: Abbas and McLean (2003); Bjola (2005); Deitelhoff and Müller (2005); Edwards (2004); Heng and de Moor (2003); James (2003); Janssen and Kies (2005); Johnston Conover and Searing (2005); Lagendijk (2004); McDonald (2005); Morgan (2002); Niemann (2004); Ulbert and Risse (2005). On this point, see Susen (2007: 272n.40).

See, for example: Bidet (2002); Blokker (2011); Borghi (2011); Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Delanty (2011); Fairclough (2002); Gadrey, Hatchuel, Boltanski, and Chiapello (2001); Schmidt (2007); Silber (2011).


See, for instance: Haas (1992); Robert (2010); Zito (2001).


See ibid.: 434.


On contemporary conceptions of ‘network society’, see, for example: Castells (1996); della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter (2006); Elliott and Urry (2010); Kali and Reyes (2007); Latour (2005); Mérand (2011); Negroponte (1995).

1142 Ibid.: 452.
1143 See ibid.: 452–453.
1144 Ibid.: 453.
1145 Ibid.: 453.
1146 Ibid.: 453 (italics added).
1147 Ibid.: 453.
1148 Ibid.: 453.
1149 Ibid.: 453 (italics in original).
1150 Ibid.: 453.
1151 Ibid.: 453.
1152 Ibid.: 453 (italics in original).
1153 Ibid.: 453 (italics in original).
1156 Ibid.: 454 (italics added).
1159 Ibid.: 454 (italics added).
1160 Ibid.: 454.
1161 Ibid.: 454 (italics added).
1162 Ibid.: 454.
1163 Ibid.: 454.
1166 Ibid.: 454.
1170 Ibid.: 455 (italics added).
1171 Ibid.: 455 (italics in original).
1172 Ibid.: 456.
1173 Ibid.: 456 (italics added).
1177 Ibid.: 457.
1178 See ibid.: 458.
1179 Ibid.: 458. On this point, see, for example: Calhoun and Derluguian (2011c); Calhoun and Derluguian (2011a); Calhoun and Derluguian (2011b).
1182 Ibid.: 458.
1183 Some Marxist scholars, such as Wallerstein, regard the financialization of the economy as the ‘unavoidable final stage of global capitalism’. See ibid.: 458. On this point, see Wallerstein (2011).

Ibid.: 460.

Ibid.: 460.

Ibid.: 460 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 460 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 461.

Ibid.: 462.

On this point, see, for instance: Holloway (2010); Holloway (2012); Holloway and Susen (2013). See also Reich (2012).

On this point, see Skocpol and Williamson (2012).


Ibid.: 465 and 466.

Ibid.: 465.

See Karsenti (2014 [2005]).


Boltanski (2013 [2004]).


Ibid.: 471.

Ibid.: 471.

Ibid.: 471.

Ibid.: 472 (italics added).

Ibid.: 472 (italics added).

Ibid.: 472 (italics added).

Ibid.: 472 (italics added).

Ibid.: 472.

Ibid.: 472.

Ibid.: 472 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 472.

Ibid.: 472.

Ibid.: 473 (italics added).

Ibid.: 473.

Ibid.: 473.

Ibid.: 473.

Ibid.: 473.

Ibid.: 473 (italics added).

Ibid.: 473 (italics added).

See ibid.: esp. 473 and 475.


Ibid.: 473 (italics added).


Ibid.: 474 (italics added).

Ibid.: 475 (italics added to ‘made’; ‘do’ italicized in original).

Ibid.: 475 (italics added).

Ibid.: 475 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 476 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 476.
Ibid.: 476 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 477 (italics added).
Ibid.: 477.
Ibid.: 480.
Ibid.: 481.
Ibid.: 482 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 485.
Boltanski (2012 [1990]). See also Boltanski (1990a).
See Boltanski (1990a: 213–221).
See Anspach (1987).
See Lefort (1978).
Ibid.: 486 (italics added).
Ibid.: 487.
Ibid.: 487.
Ibid.: 487.
Ibid.: 487.
Ibid.: 487.
Ibid.: 488.
On this point, see ibid.: 485–493.
Ibid.: 490.
Ibid.: 490.
Ibid.: 490.
Ibid.: 490.
Ibid.: 490.
Ibid.: 491. One example of this attempt can be found in Jetté (2003).
See, for instance: Corcuff (1998); Frère (2006); Jetté (2003); Silber (2003); Silber (2011).

See, for instance, Mauss (1990 [1924]).


See, for instance: Bajde (2012); Caillé (2000); Chanial (2008); Hénaff (2009); Petitat (1995); Petitat (2006); Silber (2007).


See Fuller (2014).

Ibid.: 501 (italics added).

Ibid.: 501 (italics added).

Ibid.: 501.

Ibid.: 501.

Ibid.: 501 (italics added).

Ibid.: 502 (italics added).

Ibid.: 502 (italics added).

Ibid.: 502 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 502 (italics added).

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.


Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502 (italics added).

Ibid.: 502 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 502 (italics added).


Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.


See Fuller (2014).

Ibid.: 501 (italics added).

Ibid.: 501 and 502 (italics added).

Ibid.: 501. See Rawls (1999 [1971]).


Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

Ibid.: 502.

See ibid.: 505 (Table 20.1).

See ibid.: 505 (Table 20.1).

Ibid.: 504.

Ibid.: 504 (italics added).

Ibid.: 504.

Ibid.: 504.

Ibid.: 504.

Ibid.: 504.

See also ibid.: 511. On this point, see also Fuller (2011) and Fuller (2013).
Fuller (2014: 506) (italics in original). See also ibid.: 511.


Ibid.: 501 and 506.

Ibid.: 506.

Ibid.: 507 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 507.

Ibid.: 507 (italics in original). On this point, see also Fuller and Lipinska (2014).


Ibid.: 507.

Ibid.: 507 (italics in original).

See ibid.: 507.

Ibid.: 507 (italics added).

Ibid.: 508.

Ibid.: 508.

Ibid.: 508 (italics added).

Ibid.: 508.

Ibid.: 508 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 509 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 509.

Ibid.: 509.

Ibid.: 509 (italics added).

Ibid.: 509 (italics added).

Ibid.: 509 (italics added).

Ibid.: 509 (italics added). See also ibid.: 513. In addition, see Fuller and Lipinska (2014).


Ibid.: 509.

Ibid.: 510 (italics added).

Ibid.: 510 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 510 (italics added).

See ibid.: 510.

Ibid.: 510 (italics added).

Ibid.: 511.

Ibid.: 511 (italics added).

Ibid.: 511–512 (italics in original).

Ibid.: 512 (italics in original).

See ibid.: 512.

Ibid.: 512.

Ibid.: 513. On this view, see, for instance, Dawkins (2006 [1976]).


Ibid.: 513.

Ibid.: 509 and 513 (italics added).

Ibid.: 513.

Ibid.: 513 (italics added).

Ibid.: 514.

See ibid.: 513–514.

See Adkins (2014).
Ibid.: 525.
Ibid.: 526.
Ibid.: 526. See also ibid.: 533.
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]).
Ibid.: 526 (italics added).
Ibid.: 526.
See ibid.: 526–529.
Ibid.: 527.
See ibid.: 527.
Ibid.: 527.
Ibid.: 527.
Ibid.: 527.
Ibid.: 528 (italics added).
See ibid.: 529–533.
Ibid.: 529 (italics in original).
See, for instance, Adkins (2009) and Adkins (2011).
Ibid.: 529 (italics added).
Ibid.: 530 (italics added).
Ibid.: 531.
Ibid.: 531.
Ibid.: 532.
Ibid.: 532 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 532 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 532 (italics in original).
Ibid.: 532.
See Berardi (2011: 532).
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