Quantitative analysis of the leakage of confidential data

Hunt, S., Clark, D. & Malacaria, P. (2002). Quantitative analysis of the leakage of confidential data. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 59(3), pp. 1-14. doi: 10.1016/S1571-0661(04)00290-7

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Abstract

Basic information theory is used to analyse the amount of confidential information which may be leaked by programs written in a very simple imperative language. In particular, a detailed analysis is given of the possible leakage due to equality tests and if statements. The analysis is presented as a set of syntax-directed inference rules and can readily be automated.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages (Satellite Event for PLI 2001)
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: School of Informatics > Department of Computing
School of Informatics > Centre for Software Reliability
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/191

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