WHAT MAKES URBAN FOOD POLICY HAPPEN?

Insights from five case studies
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The objective of this report is to provide insights into the factors that enable the development and delivery of urban food policies and how these enablers can be harnessed and barriers overcome. By exploring a series of case studies, the report shares lessons that cities of all sizes and at all stages of food policy development — from small towns that are taking their first steps in designing food-related policy, to big cities that are striving to maintain highly-developed, integrated policies — can learn from as they work to improve their food system.
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URBAN FOOD CHALLENGES

Cities are at the forefront of one of the most pressing problems of our times — food.

According to the United Nations (UN), 54% of the world’s population were living in urban areas in 2016 — and that figure is predicted to rise to 66% by 2050. This includes ‘megacities’ with populations of over ten million (of which there were 29 in 2015), large cities of five to ten million (44 in 2015), as well as small and medium-sized towns with under one million inhabitants, where most of the future urban growth is predicted (UN Habitat, 2016; United Nations, 2014).

Wherever people live, they must eat to survive and thrive, ideally several times a day.

Globally, food systems are failing to answer this imperative. Despite progress in percentage terms, as many as 795 million people were still food insecure in 2015 (FAO et al., 2015). Two billion suffer from the ‘hidden hunger’ of micronutrient deficiencies, 159 million children are stunted, and over 1.9 billion adults are obese or overweight (IFPRI, 2016). Food systems are also contributing to problems like climate change, waste, environmental degradation and economic inequality. In the context of a rapidly urbanizing world, these problems have become serious challenges for cities, and cities have become increasingly implicated in food system problems that extend far beyond their own borders.

Food systems are estimated to be responsible for up to 29% of global human-induced greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (Vermeulen et al., 2012). Food-related emissions add to the sizeable environmental and climate footprint of cities, underlining the position of cities as a key locus for tackling climate change. Meanwhile, vast volumes of food are wasted, not just by consumers within cities but at every stage of the food supply chain, including a considerable amount spoiled in transit (FAO, 2015). In many places, landfill sites are nearing capacity, and rotting food causes greenhouse gas emissions and toxic leachates into groundwater (El-Fadel et al., 1997). If cities do not rise to the challenge of redistributing, re-using, composting or disposing of spoiled and wasted food in a sanitary manner, it can present a major environmental health hazard (Dubbeling et al., 2016b).

As cities grow, urban food demand also has a huge impact on rural areas and agricultural supply chains (Marsden, 2013; Sonnino, 2009). Cities are dependent on outside food sources and their needs usually exceed the capacity of the surrounding agricultural region. While urbanization presents opportunities for rural producers, many — especially smallholders in less developed countries — lack the resilience, resources, knowledge and infrastructure to access new markets (IFAD, 2016). The food demands of cities also create intense competition for land, as development encroaches on peri-urban agricultural land (Minten et al., 2017).

Ensuring a stable supply of food also requires the development of infrastructure and logistics, which in turn requires concerted planning by cities (FAO, 2001). Another challenge related to food supply infrastructure is ensuring food is safe. Poor infrastructure, particularly in less developed countries in the global South, can mean that food is produced, stored or transported in unsanitary conditions before reaching urban consumers, leading to risks of foodborne disease (Argenti, 2000; Resnick, 2017). Within cities, long work hours and informal housing mean many working people rely on street food vendors. While such artisanal jobs present economic opportunities, vendors may not have access to clean water, refrigeration, hygienic food preparation areas, or basic food safety training (Bricas, 2017).
Labour conditions in the urban food service sector represent another challenge. Pay and conditions for many of these jobs are poor; workers — from abattoirs to factory production lines, in fast food restaurants and school canteens — are considered as low-skilled labour, and have few opportunities for training or professional advancement (Freudenberg & Silver, 2013).

A positive aspect of urban food systems is the diversity of food available within most cities. Yet because cities are characterized by extremes of opulence and poverty, this disproportionately benefits wealthier groups while many of the urban poor face a daily struggle in providing nutritious food for their families (Ruel et al., 2017). Such food insecurity is exacerbated in times of economic crisis and supply disruption (Bohstedt, 2014; Morgan & Sonnino, 2010). This includes relatively affluent countries of the global North, where referrals to ‘food banks’ have recently spiked on the back of increasing urban poverty (Dowler et al., 2011).

The problem of food access in cities is also spatial. Inhabitants of cities do not merely need enough food, but access to healthy, nutritious diets. Yet many urban neighbourhoods are poorly served by markets and stores selling foods contributing to a healthy diet — particularly less affluent neighbourhoods that hold limited commercial opportunities for retailers (e.g. Russell & Heidkamp, 2011; Wrigley et al., 2003; Whelan et al., 2002). Cheap, convenient, prepared items with low nutritional value — particularly those subject to heavy marketing — tend to be ubiquitous, contributing to disproportionately high incidences of obesity and diet-related ill-health (Hawkes et al., 2017; Morgan & Sonnino, 2010).

Cities, then, have a key role in addressing food system challenges for their own populations, for the rural producers that serve them and for the
global community. To address them, there is vital need for concerted policy action at all levels.

This imperative has been recognized at the global level. A ‘New Urban Agenda’ was adopted by the UN Habitat III conference in October 2016 (Quito, Ecuador) to guide the urbanization process over the next 20 years. This roadmap makes explicit commitments to improving food security and nutrition, strengthening food systems planning, working across urban-rural divides and coordinating food policies with energy, water, health, transport and waste (United Nations, 2016). In addition, the need to ‘make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ features as one of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). It is becoming evident that the food challenges associated with urban areas — outlined above — must be addressed in order to make sustainable development a reality.

At the local level, too, a growing number of city governments are confronting the challenges head on by developing urban food policies (see definition in Box 1). How such policies have emerged is the subject of this report.

**FIGURE 2 – SDG 11: MAKE CITIES INCLUSIVE, SAFE, RESILIENT AND SUSTAINABLE**

source: UN DESA, 2017

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1. By using the term ‘policy’ this report focuses on government actions. These actions, as it shows, often involve civil society and other actors. However, this report does not include examples of grassroots, citizen-led action independent of governments.
BOX 1: WHAT ARE URBAN FOOD POLICIES?

An urban food policy is a concerted action on the part of city government to address food-related challenges. Urban food policies often emerge through significant involvement of civil society and other actors, as the examples in this report show; however, grassroots, citizen-led actions that are independent of governments do not constitute urban food policies per se.

Urban food policies run across a spectrum from integrated approaches to single-issue policies (Bricas, 2017; Calori and Magarini, 2016). Integrated urban food policies refer to policies seeking to address multiple food systems challenges, and typically require multiple government departments and policy areas to be bridged and novel governance bodies to be established. The process of developing integrated urban food policies often starts with an assessment of all the food-related challenges faced by the city, and the whole range of policy levers the city has at its disposal to deal with them (Bricas, 2017).

However, most urban food policies consist of targeted actions with specific goals, such as addressing a specific public health or environmental concern (e.g. obesity, food waste). Such actions can pave the way for — and be incorporated into — integrated food policies at a later stage and may also have benefits in other policy areas.

Urban food policies in and of themselves can only be seen as one contributing factor in broader scale food systems change (Barling et al., 2002). As part of what can be termed ‘multi-level governance’, i.e. the patchwork of overlapping policies at the local, national, regional and global level, cities have limited (and variable) powers and responsibilities to deal with food issues within their boundaries. Many problems associated with the food system are contingent on imperatives at the national and international levels, e.g. trade, economic, agriculture and public health policies, and cannot be fully addressed at the city level.
FOOD POLICY ACTION AT THE CITY LEVEL

Over the last two decades, hundreds of cities around the world have developed food policies or governance structures (see, for example: Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015; Centre for a Livable Future, 2015; Forster et al., 2015; Jégou & Carey, 2015; Morague-Faus et al., 2013). These city governments — each with their own particular set of policy powers and responsibilities, and differing degrees of autonomy from the national level — are acting to address the food-related challenges they face (see examples in Box 2). The governments of these cities have made a clear statement: food policies can solve problems. Actions are not confined to the global North or global South, to rich or poor cities, or large or small ones.

That urban governments are now taking action to address food system challenges is not new per se. Guaranteeing a stable food supply for the urban population was a constant concern for city states and governments from earliest civilization at least until the Industrial Revolution, after which national governments progressively asserted responsibility for provisioning and sanitation (Daviron et al., 2017; Steel, 2008). What is new, however, is the scale and complexity of the challenges outlined above, that cut across the entire food system. It is these challenges that urban food policies of the late 20th and early 21st century are seeking to address.

Often cities have been prompted to act in response to the emergence of specific problems or crises (Bricas et al., 2017). As the examples in Box 2 show, some are most concerned about lack of access to nutritious food — that is, food insecurity (e.g. the Public Policy on Food Security, Food Sovereignty and Nutrition in Medellín, Colombia); some about obesity (e.g. the

2. Around 40% of signatory cities of the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (as of early 2017) are in low and middle income countries (LMICs) in the global South.
Healthy Diné Nation Act, Navajo Nation, US); some about climate change and waste (e.g. protection of the ‘greenways’ in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Fasso, and the zero waste policy in San Francisco, US), others about a sluggish local economy and providing jobs (e.g. urban agriculture policy in Cape Town, South Africa; and the Central Market programme in Valsui, Romania). In other cases, cities have been prompted into action by the desire to leverage existing policy responsibilities (e.g. public food procurement) to achieve new ends, or to rethink urban planning systems more broadly (e.g. the Policy for Sustainable Development and Food in Malmö, Sweden). Elsewhere, cities have recognised that food problems are linked and that integrated strategies can help provide solutions to a range of different urban challenges (Bricas et al., 2017) — as was the case for the Toronto Food Strategy, Canada.

Recognition of cities’ potential to bring about change is reflected in the many networks and collaborations that have been established to foster cooperation and cross-learning between cities in policy areas related to food, and to promote their activities. Box 3 contains examples of national, regional, and global collaborations around urban food policy. Of these, the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP) has attracted particular attention since its launch in late 2015. Some 140 signatory cities (as of April 2017) have committed to working towards “sustainable food systems that are inclusive, resilient, safe and diverse” — and to encouraging others to do the same (MUFPP, 2015). There has also been increasing collaboration around the concept of City Region Food Systems (CRFS), which entails the “complex network of actors, processes and relationships to do with food production, processing, marketing, and consumption” and “flows of people, goods and ecosystem services” across a regional landscape comprising urban, peri-urban and rural areas (Dubbeling et al., 2016c, p.16). This territorial perspective is significant because it aims to maximize ecological and socio-economic links and to foster co-governance by both urban and regional actors (Jennings et al., 2015) — even if it does not encapsulate the impacts of urbanization and urban food systems that ripple out beyond the surrounding region (Wiskerke, 2009). In a similar vein, and in response to the effects of changing urban-rural dynamics both within and outside of cities, the UN Committee on World Food Security is preparing policy recommendations on ‘Urbanization and rural transformation: implications for food security and nutrition’, which are due to be put forward for adoption in late 2017 (CFS, 2016).
BOX 2: EXAMPLES OF CITY FOOD POLICIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD

Microgardens programme, Dakar, Senegal
Aims to improve food access and economic opportunities in the context of high levels of poverty and food insecurity, while ensuring environmentally friendly use of waste materials where there is a lack of space for food growing. Supported by city government and funded by FAO, the City of Milan and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it involves providing growing space access and training in soil-less systems using cheap, locally-available substrates. It has provided 4,000 families with income and healthy food and participants’ families eat more vegetables. (Sources: Forster et al., 2015; Ba & Ba, 2007; Baudoin, 2010).

Public Policy on Food Security, Food Sovereignty and Nutrition, Medellin, Colombia
Aims to provide an adequate, balanced, healthy diet for all, in the context of high food insecurity where half the population is under- or overweight. Also supports sustainable agriculture, fair trade, gender equality and population growth due to migration. Managed by the Food Security Unit in the Medellin government, it involves food provision and educational programmes. The Committee is chaired by the Mayor and involves actors from city departments, NGOs, academia, business and the health sector. It is monitored by the University of Antioquia. (Source: FAO, 2016).

Food gardens for informal settlements, Medellin, Colombia
Aims to improve infrastructure, social cohesion and food security, and to provide training and economic opportunities in the context of social problems and sprawling informal settlements following the civil war. Managed by the Urban Development Agency and funded by city utilities company EPM and NGO Fondación Terra Salva, it involves training on cooperative agroecological growing, a school garden, and bartering of surpluses with the food bank. By 2014, 700 families had benefited and the number of growing spaces was expanded from 7 to 21. (Sources: Laidlaw, 2015; Baker & Brandwijk, 2016).

Food Poverty Action Plan, Brighton and Hove, UK
Aims to prevent people at risk of food poverty from reaching crisis point, in the context of rising food bank referrals due to unemployment, housing costs and brings educational and social benefits. Ensuring access to sufficient healthy, nutritious food also supports long term public health, educational and social benefits. Development of the plan was driven by Brighton and Hove Food Partnership, with the input of Brighton and Hove City Council and 50 organizations. The 78 actions — from strategic initiatives to practical projects — are delivered by the partners. Progress and priorities are assessed at an annual meeting. (Source: Brighton & Hove Food Partnership, 2015).

Urban agriculture programme in Rosario, Argentina
Aims to supplement food hand-outs, to give poor people an income, and to support land regeneration, social inclusion, and economic growth, following the economic crisis of the
early 2000s that led to food insecurity and civil unrest. A partnership between the City’s Social Promotion Division, Centre for Agro-ecological Production Studies and Pro Huerta, it provides tools, seeds and agroecology training and promotes cultivation of urban space. By 2013 there were 400 gardeners, 22 hectares of city land were under cultivation and three businesses for processing surplus produce had been established. (Sources: RUAF, 2015; Roitman & Bifarello, 2010).

**Participatory Urban Agriculture Project (AGRUPAR), Quito, Ecuador**

Aims to improve food security and create jobs in the context of economic crisis and heavy rural migration that led to high levels of poverty and food insecurity. AGRUPAR also promotes social inclusion, diverse diets and environmental management. It is part of the Economic Development Agency, CONQUITO. The pilot programme was funded by the City, UN-Habitat, and IDRC. The project provides seeds and training in organic agriculture and encourages successful groups to sell surpluses. Between 2002 and 2015 it created 2,700 gardens covering 2924 hectares, and trained 19,200 people. Good additional incomes (on average $151/month) are generated from selling surplus. (Sources: Forster, Egal, et al., 2015; Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015).

**Greater Philadelphia’s Food System Plan, US**

Aims to increase the security and economic, social and environmental benefits of the regional food system, in the context of one in ten households experiencing food insecurity and two in three adults being overweight or obese. The plan was developed by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (the official planning authority for Greater Philadelphia) and the Greater Philadelphia Food System Stakeholder Committee. It contains policy recommendations for city and regional governments relating to farming and sustainable agriculture, economic development, health, fairness and collaboration, a number of which have been taken up. (Source: Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015).

**Protecting the Greenways in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Fasso**

Aims to mitigate effects of climate change and support market gardeners, whose livelihoods were threatened by changes to environmental conditions, by promoting multifunctional productive land use in open spaces. A management committee included the Mayor and various city actors, National Water and Forest School, and NGOs. UN Habitat and RUAF supported and coordinated the scheme, which involved forest production, gardening, recreational and educational activities, digging wells and building walls. Over 15,000 new plants were planted, drainage was improved, and families were able to reduce their food spend by eating home-grown produce. (Source: Sy et al., 2014).

**Bristol Food Policy Council, UK**

Aims to improve resilience of the city’s food system in the context of concern over the food industry’s reliance on fossil fuels. The work of the Food Policy Council also supports the local economy, public health, and community cohesion. It sits outside the city coun-
Urban food policy involves more than just the central government. It includes government actors, community groups, NGOs, and the private sector. It advocates for policies that support healthy, sustainable, resilient food systems, facilitates initiatives, delegates tasks/programmes and oversees progress, and raises awareness of issues. (Sources: Moragues-Faus & Morgan, 2015; Carey, 2013; Halliday, 2015).

**Food Waste and Yard Waste Plan, Hong Kong**
Aims to reduce landfill food waste, as Hong Kong’s landfill sites are nearly full and there is concern over rotting food contaminating groundwater and emitting gases that affect air quality. It also boosts emergency food provisioning through re-use and donation. The main driver is the Hong Kong Government’s Environment Bureau. The steering committee is made up of local government and food chain actors. The campaign includes a business charter, a restaurant accreditation scheme and training of community ‘ambassadors’. (Sources: Environment Bureau, 2014; Food Wise Hong Kong, 2013; Environmental Protection Department, 2016).

**Policy for Sustainable Development and Food, Malmö, Sweden**
Aims to reduce climate change contribution of food in public canteens, in the context of Sweden’s food system being responsible for 25% of GHG from private consumption. It also brings economic benefits through sourcing food locally where possible, and public health benefits. The policy originated with civil servants and a politician, and is run by City Environment department in cooperation with other city departments. The main activities are reducing meat served in public canteens and working towards the aims of 100% of public food procurement being organic by 2020. By the end of 2015, 55% of food in public canteens was organic; so far there has been a small reduction in GHG emissions. (Sources: Moragues-Faus & Morgan, 2015; The City of Malmö, 2010; Andersson & Nillson, 2012).

**Re-using cooking oil, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**
Aims to protect water resources and preserve infrastructure and drinking water safety by discouraging the disposal of used cooking oil in drains. It also seeks to bring economic benefits through job creation. The main actors are the Secretary of State for Environment, Rio de Janeiro’s State Environmental Institute and private firms. The programme involves collection of cooking oil by cooperatives for re-use by private firms to make soap and biodiesel. Three million litres of oil are collected each year, and to date 400 jobs have been created at oil collection cooperatives. (Source: C40 Cities, 2012).

**Zero waste, San Francisco, US**
Aims to send zero waste to landfill/incineration by 2020, in the context of the city running out of landfill space and concern over toxic gases and groundwater contamination. The main actors are the Department of the Environment and the city’s refuse hauler, Recology; there is wide cooperation across city departments and input from other organizations and citizens. The policy comprises a range of city ordinances, outreach and education, and promotion of environmental product design. So far, 80% of waste is diverted, 300
tons of food scraps are collected daily, and 100 million fewer plastic bags are used each year. (Source: SF Environment, 2016).

**Flagship Food Boroughs in London, UK**

Aims to reduce childhood obesity and adult diabetes, as high food poverty means people eat cheap, unhealthy food. The programme also aims to improve academic performance, food skills and culture. The flagship borough councils are Lambeth and Croydon. The programme is supported by the Mayor of London and the London Food Board, and major supermarkets; the national Department of Education has provided funding. Many activities focus on schools (education, school meals, breakfast and lunch clubs). Some also concern food growing and the provision of food vouchers for low-income families. (Source: GLA, 2016).

**Healthy Diné Nation Act, Navajo Nation**

Aims to curb high obesity and diabetes rates, generate income for health and education programmes and farming initiatives, in the context of poor access to healthy food. The actors are the Diné Community Advocacy Alliance, Navajo Nation leaders, and the Navajo Tax Commission. The policy centres on increasing sales tax on unhealthy foods and removing it from healthy foods. (Source: Barclay, 2015).

**Toronto Food Strategy, Canada**

Aims to support the social determinants of health in the context of wide inequalities and food insecurity. Also seeks to create a liveable city, to reduce environmental impacts and to support the economy. The main actors are the Board of Health, Toronto Public Health, Toronto Food Policy Council, and many government departments. It leverages city government resources and structures to address issues under the themes of healthy food access, community and inclusion, food literacy, economic development, infrastructure and supply chain, and the food environment. (Sources: Mah & Thang, 2013; Forster et al., 2015).

**New York City Food Standards, US**

Aims to reduce chronic disease prevalence in the context of high levels of obesity, especially in minority and low-income neighbourhoods — thereby reducing the strain on Medicare and helping to prevent families falling into poverty if the main breadwinner cannot work due to illness. The standards were created by a mayoral executive order; funding came from the federal Centres for Disease Control. The department of Health and Mental Hygiene advises agencies on implementation. Standards are compulsory in public sector food settings. In 2015 agencies’ compliance was at 96%, and there was also interest from private hospitals and businesses. (Sources: Forster et al., 2015; Office of the Mayor, 2008; Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2006).

**Urban agriculture policy, Cape Town, South Africa**

Aims to facilitate economic opportunities for the poorest residents, to help feed families, and to promote social equality. The Urban Agriculture Unit is housed within the Direc-
torate for Economic and Human Development. There is an inter-departmental working group and cooperation with NGOs. Commitment has been made to urban agriculture in planning processes. Assistance is provided to between 50 and 60 food gardens each year, with provision of technical and business skills training. (Sources: Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015; Visser, 2015; City of Cape Town, 2007).

**Central market, Vaslui, Romania**

Aims to boost the local economy and incomes of the many local small-scale farmers producing fruit and veg nearby, but who were not selling in the city as supply was dominated by supermarkets. It also aids sustainable development and reduced CO2 emissions. Vaslui City Hall provided €3.5 million funding for construction of a market for direct sales of surplus produce from smallholdings. There are special rent conditions for local producers and regular events for local specialty produce. (Source: Jégou & Carey, 2015).

**Licensed fruteros in Oakland, US**

Aims to improve food safety and enable fruteros (mobile food vendors) to professionalize and earn a steady income, where previously vending was illegal and hygiene standards low. It was initiated by the fruteros, who formed an association and partnered with Alameda County Public Health Department, Community Health Academy and Berkeley School of Public Health to lobby the City of Oakland. Under the resulting ordinance the City provides permits to fruteros, subject to them meeting standards at regular inspections. Media reports indicate that there have been improvements in food safety and in fruteros' living situations. (Sources: City of Oakland, 1997; NPLAN, 2009; Moody, 2008).

**Street food safety training, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire**

Aims to improve food safety and quality, to help vendors manage businesses, and identify social problems (e.g. child labour), after a FAO assessment found most vendors had no permit. Actors were the city government, community health services and national Ministry of Health. It involves ‘training of trainers’ — technical staff are trained first, then pass on the knowledge to vendors. Over 200 street food vendors, mostly women, from ten districts of Abidjan received training. (Source: Forster et al., 2015).

**Food traceability platform, Shanghai, China**

Aims to ensure food safety problems can be traced, where previously food safety information was split across several departments with no common traceability platform. It also gives oversight of retailer and restaurant practices. The City government worked with US-based Ecolab Inc. Oversight is provided by Shanghai Food and Drug Administration, with some involvement of city and district governments and agricultural authorities. Use of Shanghai Food Safety Information Tracing Management Regulation Program is mandatory for food businesses. Performance of restaurants and food shops is published online using a series of icons. (Sources: Forster et al., 2015; Jian, 2014).
A GROWING BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ON URBAN FOOD POLICIES

In the wake of these developments, researchers and practitioners have been documenting the policies and initiatives that cities and city regions have introduced to date (e.g. Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015; Deakin et al., 2016; Forster et al., 2015). Much research has involved synthesizing common lessons from case studies to provide, for example, practical, step-wise guidance on devising integrated food strategies (Morague-Faus et al., 2013), insights into managing multi-stakeholder policy processes (de Zeeuw & Dobbeling, 2015), and guiding principles or perspectives to inform policy design (Calori & Magarini, 2015; Wiskerke, 2015).

Efforts are also underway to develop indicators and monitoring frameworks for urban food policies, with a view to ensuring that advice to policymakers is underpinned by solid evidence and ensuring efficient use of resources (Prosperi et al., 2015). For example, a recent project under the auspices of the UK Sustainable Food Cities Network has yielded a conceptual framework for measuring up urban policy actions against health, economic, environmental and governance outcomes and indicators (Moragues-Faus et al., 2016). Meanwhile, the FAO Food for the Cities Programme and RUAF are collaborating under the City Region Food Systems project to develop their own set of indicators. Other work on monitoring of urban food policy is thematic. RUAF and the World Bank Group are developing a set of metrics concerning food businesses and investments, while an EU-funded project led by the City of Copenhagen, in partnership with the Nordic Cities EAT Initiative, is developing and pilot-
The report seeks to answer three specific questions:

1. What factors have enabled urban food policies to be developed and delivered?
2. What are the barriers to developing and delivering these policies?
3. What can be learned from these experiences for cities at different stages of policy development about how to harness the enablers and overcome barriers to make change happen?

The report addresses these questions primarily through an in-depth analysis of the innovative and diverse ways in which five cities developed urban food policies. It looks at the processes of policy development, design and delivery, including the effects of power structures and political arrangements on the policy process, and the role, dynamics and power relationships between key actors. Each case study was selected as an interesting candidate for analysis for the following reasons:

- **Belo Horizonte's approach to food security (Brazil).** One of the first integrated food/food security policies to be developed in the world, this case involved the establishment of a dedicated food agency within city government. It also shows a high degree of institutionalization, with the policy having survived for over 20 years, through numerous changes in city government.

- **Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act (Kenya).** This case represents a U-turn on the part of city authorities following restructuring of sub-national government in Kenya. The policy was established in the ‘space’ between a new national imperative for urban agriculture policy and bottom-up initiatives to support and advocate for urban farmers.

- **Amsterdam Approach to Healthy Weight (The Netherlands).** This initiative mainstreams a major food systems challenge throughout the whole city government. Rather than considering childhood obesity as a public health matter, it requires all departments to contribute through their policies, plans and day-to-day working.

- **Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan (Canada).** This case involves the establishment of an innovative governance body to promote collaboration between several local governments within a city region, as well as a range of other organizations with an interest in the food and farming economy — including large-scale farmers who were responsible for its initiation.

- **Detroit's urban agriculture ordinance (US).** This case required the City of Detroit to negotiate over state-level legislative frameworks, in which the large-scale farming interests had a major stake, so as to have the authority to develop and implement its ordinance.

For each case study, the policy and the problem it seeks to address are described, followed by a narrative account of the processes and structures through which it was developed, adopted and implemented. A short summary of the enablers, barriers, and roles of key actors involved concludes each case study. In Section 3, common enablers and barriers are drawn out from the various cases and the broader literature, allowing a number of lessons to be identified for cities seeking to put urban food policies in place, as well as insights into next steps for urban food policies and a related research agenda. The case study selection process, data collection methods, and more details on the analytical framework are set out in the Appendix.
GLOBAL NETWORKS RELEVANT TO URBAN FOOD POLICY

The global WHO Healthy Cities Project was launched in 1978 to promote health and well-being through action at the local government level, including actions related to the food environment, health inequalities and social determinants of health. The WHO European Healthy Cities Network — one of six regional networks — consists of almost 100 cities and towns, while the 30 national Healthy City networks count over 1,400 cities and towns as members.

100 Resilient Cities is an initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation to help cities in the network become more resilient — not just to shocks such as floods and earthquakes, but when faced with chronic physical, social and economic stresses. Such stresses include food security, water scarcity, endemic violence, unemployment, etc.

The 2013 Bonn Declaration of Mayors, signed by the Mayors of 20 global cities, recommended that development plans on urban resilience and adaptation include an ecosystems-based approach for developing city-region food systems for food security, urban poverty eradication, and biodiversity (ICLEI, 2013).

NETWORKS EXPLICITLY CONCERNED WITH URBAN AND REGIONAL FOOD POLICY

The Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP) has been signed by 140 cities (as of April 2017). The cities have made a commitment to working towards ‘sustainable food systems that are inclusive, resilient, safe and diverse’ — and to encouraging others to do the same (MUFPP, 2015).

The CITYFOOD network on resilient city-region food systems and urban agriculture was launched by ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability and RUAF Foundation in 2013 as a platform for information, training, technical and policy advice between cities, and to help them access financial assistance (Dubbeling, 2013).

The City-Region Food Systems (CRFS) initiative is a collaboration of organizations that are actively working to promote ecological and socio-economic integration between urban and rural areas and to foster co-governance (Forster et al., 2015). The seven member organizations are FAO’s Food for the Cities, ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability, Habitat International, The Prince of Wales International Sustainability Unit, International Urban Food Network, Ecoagriculture Partners, and RUAF Foundation.

The C40 Food Systems Network is a workstream of C40. In cooperation with the EAT Initiative, it supports the efforts of 80 global cities to develop and implement measures to reduce carbon emissions and increase resilience in food systems (C40, 2016).

EUROCITIES’ food working group is a ‘creative hub’ for sharing information, ideas and best practice on urban food between members of the network of elected local governments in 130 European cities (Eurocities 2016).
**Food Smart Cities for Development** was an EU-funded project (2014-16) to develop a network of 12 ‘Food Smart Cities’ and associated partners, and a common reference framework for drafting, developing and implementing local food-related policies (WFTO, 2015).

The URBACT Thematic Network ‘Sustainable Food in Urban Communities’ (2012-2015) was an EU-funded project involving ten European cities to explore ways to develop low-carbon and resource-efficient urban food systems (Jégou & Carey, 2015).

**NATIONAL URBAN AND REGIONAL FOOD POLICY NETWORKS**

The UK **Sustainable Food Cities Network** has 48 member cities that are developing cross-sector partnerships to promote healthy and sustainable food. The network is funded by the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and run by three civil society organizations (Sustain, the Soil Association and Food Matters).

Members of the Association des Régions de France signed the **Rennes Declaration for Territorial Food Systems** in July 2014, through which they committed to promoting agriculture and food policies for territorial development, economic development, and sustainable use of natural resources.

In the Netherlands, 12 cities, one province and three ministries signed the CityDeal **‘Food on the Urban Agenda’** in early 2017. Not only will the cities and province include food in their own plans and strategies, but they are also collaborating to build an integrated food strategy for the whole country.

The **US Conference of Mayors’ Food Policy Task Force** was established in 2012 to promote best practice in food policy in cities across the country and to lobby for federal Farm Bill policies that could favourably impact the urban food environment.
BELO HORIZONTE’s approach to food security

BELO HORIZONTE IS A PIONEER IN INTEGRATED URBAN POLICY TO ADDRESS FOOD INSECURITY. THE CITY’S APPROACH HAS ENDURED FOR OVER 20 YEARS, WITH ITS CORE PRINCIPALS INTACT. ITS LONGEVITY IS DUE LARGELY TO INSTITUTIONALIZATION WITHIN CITY GOVERNMENT (IN A DEDICATED MUNICIPAL AGENCY KNOWN AS SMASAN), A DEDICATED CADRE OF CIVIL SERVANTS, AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, LEADING TO SUPPORTIVE FEDERAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS.
In the early 1990s, Brazil was in the grip of economic crisis and food prices were rising beyond the means of many citizens. In Belo Horizonte, a city of 2.5 million people, around 11% of the population was living in poverty and 20% of children were going hungry each day (Lappe, 2009). In an effort to redress the inequality and improve citizens’ access to sufficient, healthy and nutritious food, in 1993 the city established an integrated approach to food security policy that remains in place today.

The guiding principle behind the policy is the human right to food. This means that instead of focusing on charitable or emergency food provisioning, it has mainstreamed the pursuit of inclusive, universal food and nutrition security into public policy.

The policy encompasses a range of different programmes, which are managed by SMASAN — the ‘Municipal Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security’. The programmes fall under six workstreams:

- **Subsidized food sales**, e.g. four Popular Restaurants that serve nutritious meals at (or below) cost.
- **Food and nutrition assistance**, e.g. the School Meals Programme; the Food Bank.
- **Supply and regulation of food markets**, e.g. ABastaCer (low-cost food) stores that sell food staples at a price fixed by the municipality; Straight from the Country, through which associations of small-scale producers sell directly to consumers.
- **Support for urban agriculture**, e.g. school gardens, community plots, container growing.
- **Food and nutrition education**, e.g. online resources and a policy knowledge centre.
- **Job and income creation**, e.g. professional food courses in schools and for mature students.

Through these programmes, Belo Horizonte has built a government-led alternative food system that runs in parallel to the conventional, market-led system (Rocha & Lessa, 2009; Rocha, 2007). Programmes are delivered in partnership with civil society and private companies, as well as other municipal departments. Between them the programmes reach around 300,000 Belo Horizontinos — 12% of the population — every day (Souza et al., 2014).

According to SMASAN, in 2015 the School Meals programme served 155,000 children in the public school system, while the Popular Restaurants served over 11,000 meals per day. SMASAN supported 133 school vegetable gardens and 50 community gardens, while the Straight from the Country programme supported 20 family farmers and there were 21 grocery stores in the ABastaCer programme.

According to the Human Development Atlas of Brazil, poverty rates in Belo Horizonte have steadily declined from 17.23% in 1991 to 5.6% in 2010. Infant Mortality Rates declined from 34.6 per thousand in 1993 to 13.9 in 2010, while Child Mortality rates (under five years) declined...
These statistics indicate that the approach has been effective, although they cannot, of course, be attributed solely to SMASAN.

This case study examines how Belo Horizonte’s food security policy was established and how its influence was ensured. It shows how cross-departmental integration and public legitimacy were achieved, and how this unique approach to food security has managed to survive for over 20 years, through several changes in municipal leadership, with its core principles intact.

Belo Horizonte’s food and nutrition security policy began in 1993 when Mayor Patrus Ananias created the Municipal Secretariat for Food Supply® (SMAB, now known as the SMASAN®), an agency under which all food-related policies and programmes were to be centralized.

The context for its creation included favourable policy winds at the federal level, in response to both political and public pressure for action over food insecurity. The opposition Workers’ Party,

8. Secretaria Municipal de Abastecimento

9. The name was changed in 2011 to represent the broader concept of food and nutrition security and the connection with the human right to food.
led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), had been advocating for a national policy on food security from the early 1990s, while bottom-up pressure came from the Citizens’ Action Campaign Against Hunger and for Life, led by popular activist Herbert de Souza (Rocha, 2001). The response of President Itamar Franco (of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) was the 1993 Plan Against Hunger and the creation of the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA), made up of civil society and federal ministry representatives. Together with the Brazilian Forum for Food and Nutrition Security that was formed in 1998, it would eventually be responsible for some of the country’s most innovative federal food security programmes (Rocha et al., 2016).

10. Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional. Two thirds of members are from civil society, and the rest are from different federal ministries. The first council lasted only two years as it was dismantled by incoming President Cardoso, but it was re-established by President Lula in 2003.

11. Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional, made up of social organizations, researchers, government staff, and other food security and nutrition professionals.
This movement across Brazil was reflected in Belo Horizonte, where civil society groups were advocating for local policy to address food insecurity and forging contacts within the city government. Such popular support meant that food security was, politically, a very powerful idea. Mayor Ananias (a member of the Workers’ Party) made addressing food and nutrition security in Belo Horizonte his keystone project. By determining that SMAB was to have equal standing alongside traditional municipal departments, such as Education, Public Health and Social Welfare, Ananias sent a clear signal that food was a municipal priority and imbued the new agency with political clout to start delivering on its mission (Rocha, 2001). The Mayor’s support for this agency was unwavering throughout his five-year term and he allocated municipal funds to it: the initial annual budget under Ananias was around US$18m.

The Mayor decided that the new agency would be responsible for all policies and programmes related to food in Belo Horizonte, including those that previously fell under the remit of other municipal departments. However, the transfer of responsibilities was not always smooth. For instance, the Department of Education was originally unwilling to cede the School Meals Programme and the accompanying budget allocation (Rocha, 2016). In time, and with the political backing of the Mayor, several city departments played a helpful partnership role in delivering the programmes, such as facilitating access to target social groups in the places they frequent (e.g. without the cooperation of the Department of Education, SMASAN would not be able to deliver the School Meals Programme in the school setting), and overseeing quality assurance (e.g. the Agency for Urban Cleaning and Municipal Environment ensures safety, hygiene and quality of ABastaCer produce). According to Rocha (2001), the very existence of SMASAN enables the municipality to address food issues more efficiently, and in a more integrated way, than in cities where responsibility for food is split between several municipal departments, such as education, public health, and social welfare.

GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Today SMASAN employs 180 civil servants, including nutritionists, agronomists, technicians and social workers. It is led by a director who is appointed by the Mayor of Belo Horizonte. This means that each change in municipal leadership is likely to bring a change in SMASAN’s leadership — and appointees do not necessarily have a background in, or knowledge of, food and nutrition security issues. The director is ultimately responsible for the approach and activities of SMASAN, but internally they are guided by a technical team of civil servants, many of whom have been in post since the agency was first established and have extensive knowledge and expertise.

At the time of this research there were also three adjunct entities involved in SMASAN’s governance, the first two of which are required under national legislation: the Municipal Council of Food and Nutrition Security12 (COMUSAN); the Intersectoral Chamber of Food and Nutrition Security of Belo Horizonte13 (CAISAN-BH); and the Municipal Forum of

12. Conselho Municipal de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional
13. Câmara Intersetorial de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional de Belo Horizonte
Food Supply and Food Security\textsuperscript{14} (FOMASA). All three of these entities feed into policy and programme development. Their roles and responsibilities are as follows:

- **COMUSAN** is a 24-member advisory board and a vehicle for civil society involvement in SMASAN. Created in 2003, it is intended to ensure SMASAN’s programmes are relevant to Belo Horizontinos. One third of COMUSAN’s members are representatives of municipal departments, while the remaining two thirds are from the education and research sectors, social movements, consumer groups, the food industry, the farming sector, and professional organizations, all of whom participate on a voluntary basis. COMUSAN’s work in developing, implementing and monitoring programmes is supported by a secretariat of SMASAN staff, which brings a degree of formality and accountability\textsuperscript{15}.

- **CAISAN-BH** is an inter-sectoral (inter-departmental) body that was created in 2015 in fulfilment of federal requirements under the National System for Food and Nutrition Security, as explained below. It is intended to give municipal departments a formal role in SMASAN’s governance, and to ensure integration and transparency. It is made up of civil servants from SMASAN and the departments of social policies, health, education, social assistance, rights and citizenship, and environment. CAISAN-BH is chaired by the director of SMASAN (Rocha, 2016).

- **FOMASA** is a board composed of actors from agricultural associations, the food and farming industries, restaurants, supermarkets, cooperatives, and representatives of the state agency for rural extension and technical assistance (EMATER-MG)\textsuperscript{16}. It was created in late 2015 by municipal decree on the initiative of the then-director of SMASAN, to give the private sector a greater voice\textsuperscript{17}.

It is somewhat early to judge the effects of either CAISAN-BH or FOMASA. However, an interviewee reported that CAISAN-BH’s first year was marred by patchy attendance by departmental directors, which weakened discussions and the potential for action, and lack of representation of some key municipal departments or teams — notably Planning and the City Hall budget team. The absences were attributed partly to SMASAN’s failure to make the case for involvement, and partly to these teams being unused to collaborating in multi-departmental groups.

Since the establishment of FOMASA, meanwhile, there have been concerns about excessive private sector influence. The private sector’s interests are, ultimately, profit-oriented, and one interviewee was wary of the views and interests of economically-stable groups being prioritized over those of vulnerable groups.

\textsuperscript{14}. Fórum Municipal de Abastecimento e Segurança Alimentar

\textsuperscript{15}. COMUSAN’s predecessor as a civil society advisory board to SMAB/SMASAN, COMASA (Conselho Municipal de Abastecimento e Segurança Alimentar, ‘Municipal Council of Food Supply and Food Security’), was beset by personal and political conflicts. COMASA existed from 1993 until its collapse in 1998 (Rocha 2001). Since membership was entirely voluntary the conflicts (details of which have not been recorded) led members to stop attending meetings so that eventually the board could no longer perform its function.

\textsuperscript{16}. Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural do Estado de Minas Gerais.

\textsuperscript{17}. FOMASA was an initiative of the then director of SMASAN who, according to a member of COMUSAN, had strong ties to the food industry and a tendency to view food security (and not food and nutrition security) as just a matter of appropriate food supply. A new Mayor, Alexandre Kalil, came to power in January 2017 and will appoint a new director for SMASAN.
There was a fear that, should this emphasis continue, SMASAN would eventually become a secretariat dedicated only to managing food supply, to the detriment of programmes to promote the human right to food.

Under the National System for Food and Nutrition Security (see below), CAISAN-BH has a legal obligation to interact with COMUSAN; this interaction is facilitated by their overlapping memberships. CAISAN-BH is responsible for drawing up the Municipal Policy and Plan for Food and Nutrition Security, based on the outcomes of a conference convened by COMUSAN. Thus, COMUSAN plays a crucial role in ensuring public participation in policy development, thereby ensuring it is informed by the needs and priorities of the people and, consequently, has a high degree of legitimacy with Belo Horizontinos.

Indeed, legitimacy and trust have also ensured high take-up of food provided through SMASAN’s programmes. Great emphasis is placed on nutritional standards, quality, food safety and cleanliness, standards that set SMASAN’s work apart from government programmes of the past that were renowned for providing ‘poor quality food for poor people’ (Rocha & Lessa, 2009; Dubbeling et al. 2016a).

I see that intersectoral work is not easy, especially because it involves people, power and political interests of each sector. [Yet], I understand that it is necessary to raise awareness among partners about the relevance of their engagement in developing programs that help overcome the problems faced in everyday life, and to improve the ability for intersectoral action, without denying the specific interests of partners.

Civil servant within SMASAN

HOW THE POLICY AND SMASAN HAVE SURVIVED

SMASAN has survived for over 20 years with its core principles intact — but not without some challenges.

One difficulty has been the waning of high-level support for SMASAN, which left it with less influence over the city’s political priorities than it enjoyed under Mayor Ananias. In 2005, during the term of Mayor Fernando Pimentel (like Ananias, a member of the Workers’ Party), SMAB lost its status as a stand-alone department and became a sub-division of the Department of Social Policies. As a result, while its core activities remained the same (with some natural evolution of programmes), the agency slipped down the pecking order and its political clout and efficiency have been declining ever since, according to a civil servant within SMASAN.

The fact that the directorship of SMASAN is a political appointment, and is therefore liable to change with electoral cycles, can also pose a threat to its programmes — and the core values underpinning them. The director under Ananias was Maria Regina Nabuco, an academic expert on food security who defined the approach and put together a team of experienced and committed staff-members, some of whom are still in post. Subsequent directors have not always understood or agreed with the principles of the human right to food, social justice, universality, and food quality. Some have not realized that it would undermine the integrity of the programme to allow food companies to sponsor school meals under the guise of ‘curriculum support’. Others have questioned the universality of the programmes, seeing value only in serving those who are food insecure at a given moment (Rocha, 2016).

Despite these difficulties, four factors have safeguarded SMASAN and Belo Horizonte’s food and nutrition security policy:

Firstly, a supportive federal policy framework has continued — and been strengthened — over the last two decades. Food and nutrition security became institutionalized as a responsibility of the federal state in the 2000s, under President Lula. The Lula government introduced its flagship anti-hunger policy, *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger), in 2003. The following year it created the Ministry for Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger, and Ananias was appointed as its head. Then, in 2006, Congress passed Brazil’s National Law on Food and Nutrition Security (LOSAN)\(^\text{19}\), implementation of which required development of a National System for Food and Nutrition Security (SISAN)\(^\text{20}\). In 2010 the Constitution of Brazil was amended to include the human right to food.

This federal framework has provided institutional structures and policies that have complemented and supported Belo Horizonte’s approach at the municipal level. In particular, under SISAN all levels of government (federal, state and local) must form Intersectoral Chambers for Food and Nutrition Security (CAISAN) composed of representatives from relevant government departments. As noted above, CAISAN-BH was created in 2015 in fulfilment of this requirement. Governments must also support and participate in Municipal Councils for Food and Nutrition Security (COMUSAN), work-

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19. *Lei Orgânica de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional*. This law was passed following a major advocacy effort by the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security and the Brazilian Forum for Food and Nutrition Security.

20. *Sistema Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional*. 
ing alongside civil society representatives. In addition, SISAN includes a pact for municipalities to strengthen food and nutrition security. The pact — signed by Belo Horizonte — consists of a set of actions, against which the city’s performance is reviewed annually.

The supportive federal framework has also brought funding to supplement SMASAN’s municipal budget, which is used primarily to pay the wages of 180 staff and has always accounted for less than 2% of the total city budget (Rocha, 2016; Souza et al., 2014). For instance, grants from the Fome Zero programme funded construction of three of the city’s four Popular Restaurants and the refurbishment of the original one. Fome Zero also provides incentives for the Popular Restaurants to source fruit and vegetables from family farms via its Food Acquisition Programme.

Secondly, working in partnership has been fundamental to programme delivery. Businesses and civil society organizations provide co-ownership, meaning SMASAN’s programmes are not tied to one politician or administration and are therefore harder for new city leaderships to dismantle (Rocha & Lessa, 2009). Partnerships with other municipal departments and with external organizations have also helped to overcome budgetary constraints — although such arrangements may present barriers to ongoing municipal commitment, since credit for success goes to mainstream city departments, rather than to SMASAN. This can weaken the case for retaining a dedicated food agency when a new municipal government takes office (Rocha & Lessa, 2009).

Thirdly, Belo Horizonte’s approach to food and nutrition security has attracted the attention of academics, the media, and international organizations (Rocha, 2001; Rocha & Lessa, 2009; Lappe 2009; Souza et al., 2014; Gopel, 2009). It has inspired civil society actors and academics in other parts of the world to propose a similar approach in their cities, such as Windhoek in Namibia, and Cape Town, South Africa (Gerster- Bentaya et al., 2011; World Future Council, n.d.). According to a member of COMUSAN, such external recognition means that even leaders who are not wholly invested in the policy deem it worthwhile to continue with cost-effective or federally-subsidized programmes when they provide such good public relations. Moreover, Belo Horizonte is a signatory of the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP) and is already well on the way to fulfilling many — though not all — of its commitments (Rocha 2016). Thus, international momentum for food security and sustainability at the city level provides a framework for a new era of food policy in Belo Horizonte.

Fourthly, throughout its history SMASAN has had a dedicated team of civil servants who defend its core principles. In particular, members of the original technical team selected by Nabuco have engaged in reasoned argument and endeavoured to educate newly-appointed directors (Rocha, 2016). So far they have been largely successful.

Our secret is the ethics in our work, respect for the people we serve, a philosophy of work dedicated to the neediest population of the city, those who never had access or rights to anything. . . We wanted to show something new, something which would be ahead of its time from a social and democratic perspective. And this was something innovative, not only for the city, but for all of Brazil.

SUMMARY OF ENABLERS

This case study has shown that the main enablers for developing Belo Horizonte’s approach to food and nutrition security and establishing SMAB/SMASAN were political commitment of the then-mayor, and strong support from within the community and the civil society sector — both in the city and as part of a wider Brazilian movement — which made the very idea of addressing food security a powerful one that politicians would be wise to address. Ongoing policy processes, including the development of a new Food and Nutrition Security Plan, have been enabled by public participation through members of COMUSAN, which ensures policy is relevant to needs in the city.

A key enabler in delivery has been the central location of SMASAN within city government, which sent a clear message on the importance of food and nutrition security and meant the agency had strong political influence in its early days. Implementation has been enabled by core funding from the city government, as well as additional funding from federal programmes. Project partners, including other government and state agencies and private businesses, have provided additional resources and access to target users. Moreover, the core values of the approach — universality and nutritious, safe and high quality food — have promoted wide take-up of food provision under SMASAN’s programmes.

The longevity of Belo Horizonte’s approach to food and nutrition security is thanks largely to its institutionalization within city government — as well as subsequent institutionalization of the human right to food at the federal level, which provides supportive framing. Although the political nature of the directorship of SMASAN has made its underlying values somewhat vulnerable to electoral cycles, not least with the perceived increased influence of private sector interests via FOMASA, to date they have been successfully upheld thanks to civil servants’ insistence, as well as a desire to maintain Belo Horizonte’s good reputation thanks to positive publicity.
### TABLE 1 - KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

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<th>ACTORS</th>
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| Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva | • Opposition leader in 1990s, raised awareness and support for addressing food security through lobbying  
  • President 2003-2011, institutionalized food security and nutrition |
| Herbert de Souza | • Leader of the Citizens Action Campaign Against Hunger and For Life  
  • Mobilized popular support for food security, making it a powerful idea |
| Mayor Patrus Ananias | • Mayor of Belo Horizonte 1993-1998  
  • Made food security a political priority, created SMAB and insisted other departments hand over food responsibilities |
| Subsequent Mayors/ Administrations | • Re-structured SMAB under Department of Social Policies |
| SMAB/SMASAN civil servants | • Possess knowledge and institutional memory of SMASAN  
  • Educate and seek to influence new directors to retain core principles |
| Director of SMASAN | • Political appointee  
  • Determines approach of SMASAN and influence of different sectors, according to ideology |
| Various municipal departments | • Some are programme partners (provide funding and/or access to target social groups)  
  • Director-level membership of CAISAN-BH advises SMASAN and ensures integration and transparency |
| Civil society groups | • Some are programme partners |
| Private sector | • Membership of COMUSAN advises SMASAN; enables public participation |
| Academics, media and international organisations (FAO, World Future Council) | • Publicize Belo Horizonte’s food and nutrition security work  
  • Draw global attention and accolades |
THE NAIROBI URBAN AGRICULTURE PROMOTION AND REGULATION ACT 2015 REPRESENTS A MAJOR U-TURN IN ATTITUDES TO URBAN FOOD PRODUCTION AT THE CITY LEVEL. IT CAME ON THE BACK OF SUSTAINED CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS TO UNIFY AND AMPLIFY THE VOICES OF URBAN FARMERS AND TO BUILD SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF KENYA’S CONSTITUTION IN 2010 LED TO THE DEVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURE AND REASSIGNMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS WHO WERE SUPPORTIVE OF, AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT, URBAN AGRICULTURE TO THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT.
In the late 1970s/early 1980s massive in-migration from the countryside, coupled with a downturn in the Kenyan economy during the era of trade liberalization\textsuperscript{21}, privatization and exchange rate reform (Gertz, 2009), meant many of the country’s urban poor were food insecure. Urban agriculture — whether for subsistence or to supplement meagre incomes — became a means of survival. By the mid 1980s, around 20% of Nairobi’s population were either growing food crops or rearing animals for food (Egziabher et al., 1994).

Yet for decades they were doing so illegally. Nairobi City Council\textsuperscript{22} staunchly opposed farming in the city, believing it to be a threat to public health and land rights. It enforced its opposition through interpretation of national laws\textsuperscript{23}, and officials harassed anyone who tried to produce food on open land (Kweyu, 2014).

In August 2015, the Nairobi City County Assembly passed the Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act, marking a complete U-turn over urban agriculture in the Kenyan capital, from hostility to active promotion and regulation. The Act is intended to boost food security by facilitating food production in the city, to promote job creation, value addition and value chain development, to protect food safety and environmental health, and to regulate access to land and other resources (Nairobi City County, 2015).

Now, the Nairobi City County Government is explicitly responsible for training farmers, for ensuring their access to organic waste, and for developing marketing infrastructure. It must also monitor and regulate quality and hygiene standards, and promote animal welfare and traceability. The Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act falls under the remit of the Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Forestry and Natural Resources Sector, and implementation is led by the Executive Committee Member for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, currently Dr. Bernard Mugenyo, who is charged with preparing a strategic plan for urban agriculture. The Act establishes the Nairobi City County Urban Agriculture Promotion Advisory Board to advise the executive member on promotion and development of the sector\textsuperscript{24} (Nairobi City County, 2015).

This case study explains how such a dramatic policy change came about. In particular, it shows how civil society actors created an enabling environment for urban agriculture despite the opposition of local government — and paved the way for policy development once the institutional barriers had been swept away.

\textsuperscript{21}In 1980 Kenya became one of the first countries to sign a Structural Adjustment Loan with the World Bank, heralding the gradual replacement of import-substitution policies with liberalized trade over the next two decades.

\textsuperscript{22}Nairobi City Council was replaced by the Nairobi City County Government in 2013, following restructuring of the sub-national level of government.

\textsuperscript{23}The \textit{Local Government Act} and the \textit{Public Health Act} were used to prevent rearing of chickens, cows, goats and rabbits, and the \textit{Land Control Act} was used to target those who grew crops on open land.

\textsuperscript{24}The Nairobi City County Urban Agriculture Promotion Advisory Board is made up of a Chair; four members with expertise in urban planning, agriculture, public health, and economics; and a Chief Officer Responsible for Agriculture to serve as secretary to the Board.
SUPPORTIVE POLICY AT THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS

With urban agriculture spreading across East Africa, in 2003 the government of Zimbabwe—backed by a consortium of international funders—hosted a regional meeting of Ministers for Local Government. The outcome of the meeting was the Harare Declaration on Urban and Peri-urban Agriculture, in which the Ministers from Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe agreed to develop policies and instruments for integrating urban and peri-urban agriculture into urban economies (Mushamba et al., 2003). Another meeting for regional stakeholders was convened by the UK’s Department for International Development (DIFD-UK) and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) around the same time.

Dr Diana Lee-Smith, co-founder of Kenyan NGO the Mazingira Institute and, at the time, regional coordinator of Urban Harvest, also attended the Harare meeting. She recalled that the director of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) subsequently agreed to start developing the draft national Urban and Peri-Urban Agriculture and Livestock Policy, known as UPAL (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). The director of KARI became Kenya’s Permanent Secretary for Agriculture in late 2005 and consultations were carried out with actors from across Kenya, including individual farmers.

This high-level momentum faltered when changes in leadership caused UPAL to slip down the agenda. The entry into force of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010 delayed it further: the sub-national level of government was re-structured and agriculture was devolved to the 47 newly-formed counties. Consequently, the draft policy document had to be sent out for approval by the new county governments. As of 2017 it has not been adopted.

While these institutional changes delayed adoption of UPAL, they did, however, enable development of the Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act in two respects.

Firstly, the devolution of agriculture led to the creation of an Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Forestry and Natural Resources Sector within Nairobi’s new City County Government; previously no institutional structures or mandate for

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25. Three United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF and FAO), the International Development Research Centre (a Canadian government initiative); and RUAF Foundation (Resource Centres on Urban Agriculture and Food Security).

supporting agriculture existed at the city level. Moreover, some highly knowledgeable and supportive civil servants from the restructured national Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock Development, who had been involved with the UPAL process, were re-assigned to Nairobi.

Secondly, clause 36(f) of the Urban Areas and Cities Act (Republic of Kenya, 2011), part of the legislative package to enact the Constitution, requires all cities and municipalities to provide a framework for regulating urban agriculture. Moreover, the right to food is enshrined in the constitution (adopted in 2010), which includes measures that the state must undertake to re-alize this right.

As a result, when the Nairobi City Council was replaced by the Nairobi City County Government in 2013, the latter had an obligation to draw up an urban agriculture policy, and also had the expertise on hand to do so.

CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

While the policy process for UPAL was taking place at the national level, efforts were underway on several fronts to change prevailing attitudes to urban agriculture within Nairobi. These efforts paved the way for securing political commitment for a policy to promote and regulate urban agriculture.

Firstly in 2004, concerned over urban farmers’ treatment by law enforcers, the Mazingira Institute called an open meeting for everyone interested in food growing in Nairobi. This meeting led to the foundation of the Nairobi and Environments Food Security, Agriculture and Livestock Forum (NEFSALF), which is credited as one of the most important drivers of institutionalization of urban agriculture in Kenya (Gore, 2016). On the one hand, NEFSALF builds the expertise and capacity of farmers by providing training in agricultural techniques (including ensuring food safety). On the other hand, it helps farmers — who were previously marginalized and disempowered — to organize into a more powerful lobby group. For over a decade NEFSALF spoke out as the collective voice of urban farmers against raids and advocated for local policy support. It had some important wins: in 2005 a delegation to the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner and the City Council forced both to soften their hard-line stance on urban livestock; in 2006 Nairobi Province was selected as the pilot for the National Agricultural Extension Program and Nairobi small-scale farmers have been among top national prize-winners.

There was this forum of farmers who originally were extremely downtrodden, poverty-stricken people with no voice, ... and because of the forum they became a voice in public. They began to articulate their issues and appear in the media. And take a stand on things. ... In my opinion that’s how policy works. That’s the key. The farmers have a voice... That’s really the story from the bottom up.

Civil society actor

27. This came about as a result of enthusiastic participation of many civil society organizations, since one of the provisions of the Constitution is for public participation in law-making.
Secondly, actors from the Mazingira Institute fostered strong and trusting relationships with civil servants at the national level through their involvement in international and national level policy processes over many years. Independent analysis by an associate professor at Ryerson University in Canada found that collaborative dialogue was crucial in establishing conditions for support for urban agriculture prior to devolution (Gore, 2016), not least because — as mentioned above — some of these civil servants were reassigned to Nairobi in 2013.

Thirdly, in addition to the work of Mazingira and NEFSALF, several other NGOs have run projects in Nairobi that have helped raise the profile of urban agriculture and built a critical mass of support for it. These include the French NGO Solidarités International, which established a sack gardening project in the slums, and projects run by the Aga Khan Foundation, the Undugu Society, and a number of church organizations. Media outlets have picked up on the trend. National newspaper The Daily Nation has a popular pull-out supplement called Seeds of Gold, which publicizes small farmer initiatives, many of which are in cities.

Once the institutional barriers to Nairobi developing a policy on urban agriculture had been removed, advocates (both within the local government and from civil society) impressed on policymakers the need to provide a regulatory framework. They no longer met with objections — and not only because of the legal obligation under the 2011 Urban Areas and Cities Act. The government had responded to the bottom-up pressure, training and capacity-building in the community, and long-standing direct advocacy efforts; political will now existed. According to a 2014 newspaper interview with Anne Lokidor, then Executive Committee Member for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, the Nairobi City County Government acknowledged that Nairobi residents would continue to practice urban agriculture with or without regulation. Putting regulations in place would help ward off future food safety and sanitation problems, help to develop the agricultural economy and encourage value addition through processing (Kweyu, 2014).

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28. Solidarités’ sack gardening project was funded by the French government
DRAWING UP THE POLICY

When the Nairobi City County Government finally gave the green light for development of its urban agriculture policy, officials were able to borrow heavily from the pending national law (UPAL), for which farmers in Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu and other cities had played a consultative role.

This expedited the process, although the constitutional requirement for public participation meant a new round of consultation was required. This involved farmers organizing meetings in the sub-counties to discuss current issues, and their input was taken into account in drafting the policy. Mazingira Institute and other organizations also commented on draft documents.

The draft bill then entered internal processes within the County Assembly. According to a representative of the Nairobi City County Government, it was championed through these processes by Members of the County Assembly from the peri-urban areas where farming is most commonly practiced, in the face of some resistance from members from other areas, and concerns from planning officials that the city did not have space for farming. The objections were allayed through dialogue.

EARLY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the Act was in its early stages at the time of writing. While it was too soon to discern any impacts, the Act assigns responsibility for collecting and collating data on agricultural activities to the county government, and makes provision for monitoring the social, economic and environmental effects — even though no indicators of progress towards the objectives are given.

Members of the Nairobi City Council Urban Agriculture Promotion Advisory Board29 had not been announced at the time of writing and, according to a Nairobi City County representative, regulations to operationalize it were still to be published in the government’s official journal. However, the contents of the Act were already being applied at a high level, as urban agriculture has been incorporated into the recently concluded County Master Plan and its Strategic Plan 2015-2025.

Other sectors (departments) of the Nairobi City County government have yet to embrace the new Act, and remain sceptical about the purported benefits or the relevance to their work, reflecting the fact that urban agriculture has not previously played a part in urban administration, nor in the education of urban planners, public health workers or local government officials.

Efforts are now underway to break down remaining prejudices. Mazingira Institute has cooperated with the Nairobi City County Government to provide inter-sectoral training for staff members. According to Lee-Smith, a key tool in shifting the views of public health professionals has been the circulation of recent study findings from Kampala, Uganda, which showed that the nutrition benefits resulting from rearing animals for food in the city outweighed the public health risks (Yeudall et al., 2007). More is also known about mitigation of the risks to food safety (Cole et al., 2008). Work published by key actors from Mazingira Institute — such as a book chapter identifying housing, food and transport as three areas

29. The Board will guide the Executive Member on promotional activities. Board members are to include actors with expertise in urban planning, agriculture, public health, and economics.
that are critical to the future of Nairobi (Lee-Smith & Lamba, 2000) — has featured on international syllabuses for planning students and is informing the outlook of graduates as they enter professional life.

**SUMMARY OF ENABLERS**

This case study has shown that a key enabler for developing the Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act has been strong civil society activity over a sustained period of time, which led to a groundswell of community and media support and the establishment of trusting relationships with civil servants. This bottom-up pressure and preparatory work made the promotion of urban agriculture a powerful idea that captured the public imagination, and was critical for generating political commitment to promote and regulate urban agriculture once a conducive institutional environment was established.

The policy process was participatory, involving NGOs and consultations with urban farmers, the latter having been empowered to defend their interests by being helped to organize into a collective lobbying group and through training. Supportive civil servants who had been re-assigned to Nairobi’s new agriculture department, as well as some politicians, served as champions for the policy through the County Assembly.

While delivery is still in its early stages, it will be enabled by measures to educate civil servants within the city government and to break down prejudices around urban agriculture, as well as by drawing on the experiences of other cities to demonstrate the value — and improve the safety — of urban agriculture.

*Very often this [the urban agriculture phenomenon in East Africa] is painted as an international initiative coming from outside interests and pushing urban agriculture to people in Africa, and it’s not. And never has been.*

Civil society actor
### TABLE 2 - KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>ROLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor, landless urban farmers</td>
<td>• Growing food to support families illegally for three decades&lt;br&gt;• Became empowered working collectively through NEFSALF, achieved significant wins through lobbying&lt;br&gt;• Participated in consultations for the new Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi City Council (de-funct) and law enforcers</td>
<td>• Welded power over urban farmers, actively opposing urban agriculture and conducting raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazingira Institute (Nairobi-based environmental and human rights NGO)</td>
<td>• Convened meeting that created NEFSALF; hosts NEFSALF&lt;br&gt;• Advocated for urban agriculture and farmers’ rights over three decades, including fostering contacts with civil servants&lt;br&gt;• Co-founder Dr Diana Lee-Smith conducted early research into urban agriculture prevalence and participated in process leading to UPAL development in role as African regional coordinator of CGIAR Urban Harvest programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGOs, e.g. Solidarité, Aga Khan University, Undugu Society, PCEA Church</td>
<td>• Ran visible urban agriculture projects, especially in the slums&lt;br&gt;• Attracted media attention and contributed to the enabling environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>• Reported positively on urban agriculture initiatives, contributing to an enabling environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International development agencies (e.g. DFID-UK)</td>
<td>• Convened stakeholders in the region through ILRI for initial discussion&lt;br&gt;• Enabled civil society lobbying through funding (e.g. NEFSALF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of KARI, later Permanent Secretary for Agriculture</td>
<td>• Began process for national UPAL with stakeholder meeting at KARI&lt;br&gt;• Advanced national policy process in latter role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants (previously in Ministry of Agriculture, now City County government)</td>
<td>• Participated in development of draft UPAL&lt;br&gt;• Supported urban agriculture within City County government after devolution, and instigated policy development process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Livestock Executive, Nairobi City County Government</td>
<td>• Key figure in implementing the Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Amsterdam’s approach to healthy weight mainstreams a major food systems challenge throughout the whole city government. Rather than considering childhood obesity a public health matter, it requires all departments to contribute through their policies, plans and day-to-day working. To ensure efficacy, and to provide sound evidence to support continuing political commitment across electoral cycles, impacts are continuously monitored, and adjustments are made to the policy where necessary.
The health of Amsterdam’s youth is in jeopardy. In 2013 around 21% of under-18s in the Dutch capital were overweight or obese\(^{30}\) — with children from immigrant families and families with low income and low social status particularly affected (City of Amsterdam, 2013).

The effects of overweight and obesity in childhood — poor health and greater risk of serious illness, social stigma, poor concentration and low educational attainment — can last a lifetime.

In 2012, Amsterdam set its sights on eradicating overweight and obesity in the city by the year 2033. Introduced the following year, the Amsterdam Healthy Weight Programme\(^{31}\) (AAGG) is aimed at all children under the age of 19 and their parents, care-givers and teachers, but there is a particular focus on children who are already obese and those from high risk social groups (City of Amsterdam, 2013; City of Amsterdam, 2015; City of Amsterdam, 2014).

Unlike obesity programmes in other cities — and previous attempts to address the problem in Amsterdam — the AAGG is not simply a public health plan. Rather, it contains integrated actions across the departments of public health, healthcare, education, sports, youth, poverty, community work, economic affairs, public spaces and physical planning, and organizations from outside local government. What is more, it seeks to address the structural causes of obesity — that is, the individual lifestyle factors and values and psychological aspects underlying them, the social and physical environment, and living and working conditions that make it difficult for people to ensure their children eat healthily, sleep enough and exercise adequately. The city aims to facilitate healthier behaviours by making the healthy choice the easy choice, and creating a healthier urban environment.

Day-to-day running of the programme is informed by seven understandings or principles:

- Eradicating overweight and obesity is a long-term task that will take a generation;
- The programme, actions and activities must be sustainable;
- The programme is inclusive — of all people and across all policy areas;
- Addressing childhood obesity is a matter of shared responsibility;
- The approach is evidence-based — ‘learning by doing, doing by learning’;
- Choices must be made to focus efforts;
- Prevention first, but do not forget children of the present.

The AAGG has 10 pillars for action. The first six, mainly aimed at preventing children from becoming overweight or obese, are:

1. the first 1000 days (from the start of pregnancy until age two)
2. schools-based (including pre-schools and primary schools)
3. neighbourhood-based\(^{32}\)
4. healthy environment (healthy urban design, healthy food environment)

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30. Around 27,000 children, of whom an estimated 2,300 were morbidly obese
31. Amsterdamse Aanpak Gezond Gewicht
32. The ‘neighbourhood-based’ pillar is the practical entry point for activities under all the other pillars. It serves to translate the approach of the AAGG to the ultra-local level in ten of the city’s most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Signals are also picked up from these neighbourhoods about the reach and effectiveness of the AAGG on the ground, which helps inform development of the overall approach.
5. teens
6. children with special needs

The seventh pillar is curative:
7. helping children who are overweight or obese to regain a healthier weight

The final three pillars are secondary or facilitative:
8. learning and research philosophy
9. digital facilities
10. communications and methodologies for behavioural insights

This case study explains the origins of the AAGG, how the policy was developed and how it is being implemented. It shows how Amsterdam was able to take a strong stance on obesity that diverged from policy framing at the national level, and how the programme team has engaged and mobilized partners — from within local government, civil society and, to a degree, the private sector— to work towards an ambitious common goal.

A POLITICAL CHAMPION

The impetus for developing the AAGG came from 2012 data showing that childhood overweight and obesity in Amsterdam was above the Dutch average, and that children from certain social groups were particularly at risk. The City Council’s Alderman (Deputy Mayor) responsible for public health, care and sports, Eric van der Burg of the VVD (the liberal-conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy), understood the gravity of the problem and propelled childhood obesity to the top of the city’s agenda. As a result of van der Burg championing the issue, in late 2012, the College of Mayor and Alderpersons, the executive governing the city, formally committed to Amsterdam’s new approach to childhood obesity.

This initial commitment did not include funding — and deliberately so. The Alderman insisted that implementation should draw on existing resources from across city departments, to show what could be achieved through cooperation and taking joint responsibility. Directors of all departments were instructed to provide the programme manager — who was paid by the Department of Social Development — with any assistance required.

Following the municipal elections in March 2015, the follow-up plan for 2015-18 was put to the vote by the new Mayor and College of Alderpersons — and again it passed unanimously. By now inter-departmental cooperation had been established and annual funding of €2.5 million was assigned to the AAGG out of the city budget. This is supplemented by additional funds of around €2.81 million from national government, mostly consisting of short-term funding for specific projects or objectives.

33. 15% of under 18s across the whole of the Netherlands are overweight (City of Amsterdam, 2013).
34. The College of Alderpersons is the Mayor’s executive council. Each alderperson has a policy portfolio. Amsterdam’s policies are developed through cooperation between the City Council and the Mayor and College of Alderpersons.
35. At the time the VVD was the largest party in the Dutch coalition government.
36. The incumbent Mayor Eberhard Edzard van der Laan was reappointed for a second term in 2014 and Alderman van der Burg also held his seat, but there were some changes amongst the other six Alderpersons, from various political parties.
37. Around 0.04% of Amsterdam’s total annual budget of €6.3 billion.
In the opinion of Alderman van der Burg, the city is responsible for tackling the obesity epidemic, on the grounds that when people lack the knowledge and capability to maintain a healthy weight of their own accord, it is the (local) government’s job to help them. In this respect the Alderman has gone against the grain of his own political party, which maintains that a healthy lifestyle is a matter of individual (parental) responsibility. The Dutch government — in which the VVD has been the senior coalition partner since 2010 — runs information campaigns to persuade people to eat healthily, whilst favouring voluntary commitments by food companies on healthy food and advertising (Coosje Dijkstra et al., 2016).

The different policy approach at the national level has not prevented Amsterdam from charting its own course over obesity. Under the national Public Health Act of 2000, local governments are responsible for devising, implementing and funding public health policies that are tailored to local issues and circumstances. However, some aspects of the urban food environment, such as advertising directed at children and the low cost of unhealthy food, are outside the control of local governments. Consequently, the AAGG focuses primarily on actions that fall within the sphere of control and influence of local government and takes a public stand on issues outside of its control when the opportunity arises.

38. This includes all children, but it is especially true for those whose parents or care-givers lack the knowledge and skills to ensure they have healthy lifestyles.

39. Such as the ‘Wheel of Five’ (Schijf van Vijf), a graphic depiction of a healthy diet by food type, and slogans such as ‘two hundred grams of vegetables and two pieces of fruit a day’ (Voedingscentrum, 2016; Coosje Dijkstra et al., 2016).

40. For example, in 2015 Amsterdam became the first city in the Netherlands to join the national ‘Stop Kindermarketing’ Alliance to curb advertising aimed at children.
**PARTICIPATORY, RESEARCH-BASED POLICY DESIGN**

The programme manager put together an inter-departmental and multi-disciplinary team to draw up the first AAGG programme plan, which included actors from the departments of Health, Housing and Social Support, Sports, and Work and Income (City of Amsterdam, 2013).

Some early inspiration was drawn from the French EPODE\(^{41}\) programme (known as JOGG\(^{42}\) in the Netherlands), a method that mobilizes the whole community in a collective effort to prevent obesity. However the team found that while EPODE is applicable in small communities, it does not provide a practical method for designing and implementing an integrated programme in a metropolitan context.

To develop a model that would be applicable in Amsterdam, the working group enlisted the help of academics, including Professor Karien Stronks, a well-known specialist on the links between poverty and public health (e.g. Stronks et al., 2014; Stronks & Droomers, 2014). Stronks’ Rainbow Model (based on Dahlgren & Whitehead, 1991) for identifying factors at various policy levels that influence healthy or unhealthy weight in individuals and in groups of children was adapted to the Amsterdam context, and incorporated into the underlying framework of the programme in 2014. Another significant contributor has been Professor Jaap Seidell, a renowned obesity specialist who has shown that addressing obesity requires a change in the way people live their lives, not just a change in diet (e.g. Seidell, 1999; Seidell et al., 2012; Seidell, 2012).

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41. *Ensemble, Prévenons L’Obésité des Enfants* (‘together, let’s prevent childhood obesity’)  
42. *Jongeren Op Gezond Gewicht* (‘young people at a healthy weight’)

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**FIGURE 7 – THE RAINBOW MODEL: MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH**

![Rainbow Model Diagram](source: Dahlgren & Whitehead (1991))
MAKING THE MARATHON MANAGEABLE

The programme team laid out the overarching policy framework in an initial plan for 2013-14. Using the analogy of the sustained effort required to run a marathon, the plan outlines the steps to address childhood obesity over a 20-year period, at the end of which all children under the age of 19 are to be a healthy weight. The ‘marathon’ is broken down into a series of shorter ‘races’ with specific targets:

- 2018 – the 5000 metre race: a healthy weight for 0-5 year olds in Amsterdam
- 2023 – the half marathon: a healthy weight for 0-10 year olds in Amsterdam
- 2033 – the marathon: a healthy weight for young people in Amsterdam

In 2015 the team released the follow-up plan for the 5000 metre stretch. The Plan contains actions to meet the interim goal of all under fives being a healthy weight (City of Amsterdam, 2015).

This step-wise approach is intended to reduce the threat posed by electoral cycles. The next municipal elections will take place in 2018, and initial evidence on the outcomes will help make the case for continuing the AAGG should there be a change of city administration.

LEARNING BY DOING, DOING BY LEARNING

The guiding principle of ‘learning by doing, doing by learning’, means that the AAGG, and activities and policies under it, are subject to constant, rolling review. Two new teams were established to

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FIGURE 8 – AMSTERDAM’S MARATHON MODEL TOWARDS HEALTHY WEIGHT

START

5000 M. RACE (2018)
Healthy weight for 0-5 year olds in Amsterdam

1/2 MARATHON (2023)
Healthy weight for 0-10 year olds in Amsterdam

MARATHON (2033)
Healthy weight for all young people in Amsterdam

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43. The City collects data on obesity prevalence part of the Youth Health Care system in the Netherlands, under which every child has an appointment with a nurse at fixed points up to the age of 18. This enables the AAGG team to track weight status of children, their physical activity, screen time and consumption of sugary drinks, fruits and vegetables.
facilitate this: an external ‘academic expert team’ (including Professors Stronks and Seidell), and an internal ‘public health service expert team’ made up of staff who track and interpret health data\textsuperscript{43}. The role of both teams is to provide new evidence-, practice- and eminence-based\textsuperscript{44} insights on obesity, to advise on interventions, to consult on lessons to be drawn from experience, and to participate in new research.

The AAGG uses a dedicated online platform\textsuperscript{45} to keep track of the progress of all the projects and activities. The programme team actively consults with the internal ‘public health service expert team’ concerning questions, dilemmas or unexpected outcomes. Where practice or evidence shows that an intervention is not yielding expected results, remedial actions are taken rapidly to avoid wasting valuable resources. For example, a new policy for schools to provide children with only tap water to drink had the unexpected effect of increasing sugar consumption, because some parents perceived juice to be healthier than water and, thinking their children were missing out on vitamins, gave them more juice to drink outside of school. When the AAGG team realized that this was cancelling out the benefits of the tap water policy, they addressed it by engaging and educating parents (see below).

AAGG is also supported by Sarphati Amsterdam\textsuperscript{46}, which reviews the efficacy and sustainability of measures to tackle childhood obesity, such as the impacts of school gardens on children’s vegetable consumption in deprived areas (Coosje Dijkstra et al., 2016).

**GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES TO PROMOTE CROSS-DEPARTMENTAL INTEGRATION**

In 2012, the Mayor and Alderpersons assigned responsibility for programme development to the director of the Department of Social Development. While the director of Public Health might have been a more obvious choice, this sent a clear signal that children’s weight is not just a public health issue, but that all departments have an equal obligation to act and develop supportive policies.

In 2015, at the end of the strategic phase and once inter-departmental responsibility was established, coordination for the current phase (2015-18) was transferred to the Public Health Service, which has expertise in developing interventions, and compiles databases on health indicators.

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\textsuperscript{44.} Eminence-based means based on the opinions of prominent health professionals or medical specialists.

\textsuperscript{45.} www.uitvoeringgezondgewicht.nl

\textsuperscript{46.} Sarphati Amsterdam is a research institute founded in 2015 by the City of Amsterdam in partnership with several universities in the city. Research is based on a dynamic cohort of children under 19 in the city (around 180,000 at any time).
An inter-departmental working party has been established for each of the ten pillars of the AAGG, to enable close integration across city departments and services, and within local areas and communities — and, as a result, ensure that no child at risk of obesity goes undetected (City of Amsterdam, 2013).

The AAGG team also works closely with complementary city programmes, such as Moving Amsterdam, the Amsterdam Poverty Programme and the Amsterdam Food Strategy, which originally focused on urban agriculture, local economy and sustainability but now has a workstream on healthy weight. The respective programme managers of each initiative constantly seek ways to be mutually supportive, which has helped to put public health on more agendas within the city and helps avoid duplicate spending of precious city funds.

**OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO CROSS-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING**

Several barriers to cross-departmental cooperation nonetheless had to be tackled. For example, the Public Health Service and the Department of Physical Planning needed to work closely together to implement actions under the ‘healthy urban environment’ pillar. Thinking about food in public spaces was relatively new to public health officers, while planners had little understanding of how their work affected public health, having previously focused on large-scale infrastructure and housing projects. The key to changing mindsets in both departments was their shared involvement in the Amsterdam Food Strategy and Moving Amsterdam. Encouraged by these experiences, Public Health and Physical Planning began cooperating over specific, small-scale activities and sub-
sequently formalized their relationship by each assigning an officer as a contact point for the other department⁴⁷.

Another example concerns the Board of Education, which was approached by the AAGG team to endorse Jump-In, the programme to promote healthy eating and drinking and exercise in schools. The Board initially declined on the grounds that schools have to be selective about topics they can address alongside their core role of educating children. Undeterred, the team went knocking on doors of individual school directors. This was more fruitful as teachers at the operational level appreciated the educational benefits of addressing overweight and obesity: overweight children have psychological problems that affect learning ability and school atmosphere, and healthy children ultimately leave school with more qualifications. Once a critical mass of schools had signed up, the team returned to the Board of Education, and this time secured endorsement.

ENGAGING EXTERNAL PARTNERS

Implementation of the AAGG also relies on partnerships with non-governmental partners, such as local civil society and community-based organizations, universities, small and large retailers, and Zilveren Kruis, the principal health insurer in Amsterdam⁴⁸.

The way in which the AAGG team works with non-governmental partners varies from pillar to pillar.

Community groups, religious organizations and citizens are particularly involved in the ‘neighbourhood-based’ pillar of the AAGG. The AAGG team holds public meetings to determine programmes that would be most beneficial to each neighbourhood, and to help individuals and community groups change their practices and policies to promote healthier eating and exercise.

It was at one such meeting in a neighbourhood in Eastern Amsterdam that a mother asked a question about fun and healthy activities for Mothers’ Day. The ideas shared in response promoted an ‘oatmeal revolution’, with dozens of women and organizations preparing oat-based breakfasts and sweets with their children — and even using oats in healthier versions of traditional Ramadan recipes.

For the ‘curative’ pillar (focused on already obese children), engagement of more than 20 umbrella organizations in the civil society, sport, welfare, care and healthcare domains was obtained through the Healthy Weight Pact, an initiative of Zilveren Kruis and the AAGG team in 2012⁴⁹. Signatories of the Pact committed to ensuring overweight children receive appropriate care — and it served to introduce them to the preventative work of the AAGG too.

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⁴⁷. The Department of Physical Planning has now adopted Moving Amsterdam and the AAGG serves as advisor.

⁴⁸. In 2012, health insurers were important actors as they funded children’s care at the local government level. In Amsterdam — and the rest of the country — standards of care for obese children were inadequate. In 2015 the role of health insurers changed when decentralization of the youth care system gave new responsibilities for children’s care, mental health, and protection services, and parental education, to local governments.

⁴⁹. The Pact, and the curative pillar to which it applies, is based on the idea that a care plan for treating overweight and obesity should strengthen a family’s own management system by reducing threats (e.g. psychological problems) and providing positive tools (e.g. parenting skills). All actors involved in the chain of care participate in this vision. The AAGG commissions a number of interventions designed to strengthen the chain of care and, thanks to an agreement between Zilveren Kruis and the AAGG, each family with an obese child is assigned a Central Care Manager (from the youth public health team) to coordinate the care plan and act as a point of contact for all professionals involved.
The early commitments under the Pact notwithstanding, the AAGG team had to take an experimental approach to some of its external relationships, and has adapted its approach to overcome barriers. For instance, the team seeks to work with retailers who are willing to experiment with stocking healthier food. Some small retailers have been amenable to the idea in principle, but they fear they will lose business if they remove confectionery and sugary drinks from the shelves. As a result, the project team has developed a strong business case based around demand for healthy products. Of the larger retailers, so far only Ahold (Albert Hein) has agreed to trial changes in store layout and the use of sales assistants as coaches to start discussions with customers. The AAGG leaders hope to engage retailers beyond these pilots, whilst remaining selective about the companies they will partner with — particularly big firms which claim to heed the national government’s call for voluntary action on obesity but continue to produce and market food products with a relatively high fat and sugar content.

ENGAGING WITH PEOPLE AFFECTED BY THE PROBLEM

The AAGG team has learned over time that it is vitally important to engage with the people affected by the problem. For example, the unexpected outcome of the school tap water policy mentioned above had come about because parents had not been adequately involved in the policy process. They moved to address the problem by developing an educational programme using interactive theatre to engage and inform parents in a bid to change their attitudes to after school ‘sugar compensation’.

In addition, the team has learned that the most useful information can be obtained by listening to individuals’ needs and wishes, rather than asking pre-set questions. This is particularly applicable in the ‘area based’ and ‘health care’ pillars. For example, during a conversation with a youth public health care nurse, the mother of a morbidly obese child mentioned that that she feared visiting the paediatrician. The nurse offered to accompany the mother and scheduled an appointment. During the appointment, the nurse ensured that the mother understood the paediatrician and could comply with their recommendations. In this way, the nurse established a good relationship with the mother, and the mother felt confident enough to ask for a bicycle that would help her to get around more easily during school hours. The nurse introduced the mother to a welfare partner, who helped arrange for her to receive a bicycle and cycling lessons — and as a result of her increased mobility she began visiting the market to buy healthy foods. This positive outcome meant the mother was willing to discuss her child’s weight and lifestyle with the nurse, and agreed to visit health professionals regularly.

50. Ahold is an interesting partner because it has influence at the national and international levels, as well as at the local level.
OUTCOMES TO DATE

While it is still somewhat early to judge the success of the AAGG, the indications so far are promising. Outcomes monitoring has shown that overweight and obesity prevalence is leveling off, with a 10% decrease in prevalence in children of all age groups between 2012 (just before the programme began) and 2014. There was an even greater decrease — of 18% — among very low social economic groups (City of Amsterdam, 2016). A causal relationship with the AAGG is not certain, however, and national data from the Dutch Bureau of Statistics indicate a levelling out of the percentage of children and adolescents (age 4-20 years) affected since 2012\textsuperscript{51}.

SUMMARY OF ENABLERS

This case study has shown that, in his role as Alderman, van der Burg played a key enabling role in instigating the AAGG, as he identified the need to address childhood obesity from statistical data and secured political commitment. Powers afforded to the city under the 2000 Public Health Act enabled development of the programme, despite opposing views on weight management at the national level. The ongoing involvement of academics in policy design and delivery facilitated a robust, research-based framework, while continuous gathering of impact data means the programme can be adjusted along the way.

While core funding from the city has enabled implementation, this was of secondary importance to establishing strategic, integrated ways of working between government departments. The initial institutional home of the AAGG was chosen to this end. Budgetary constraints have been addressed not only by obtaining supplementary funds under national programmes but also by close monitoring of impacts to ensure no money is wasted on ineffective actions — as well as close involvement with other city strategies to avoid duplication.

\textsuperscript{51} In 2012 13.2\% of 4 to 20 year olds in the Netherlands were overweight, compared to 11.8\% in 2013, 12.5\% in 2014, and 12.1\% in 2015.
The AAGG focuses actions on using local government powers and responsibilities to render the urban food environment healthier, and it is keenly aware of their limits. In so doing, it has found a way to pursue its objectives in spite of the conflict that exists between Amsterdam’s approach to obesity and that of the national level in the Netherlands. Despite being a top-down policy, with no civil society involvement in the initial policy development, it has generated considerable support by listening to community needs. This also encourages take-up of services by those who need them most.

Although as yet untested, the AAGG team has sought to enable longevity by breaking down the 30-year strategy into shorter periods that correspond with election cycles. The intention is to ensure there is solid, fresh impact data available to support ongoing political commitment.

### TABLE 3: KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>ROLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alderman van der Burg</td>
<td>• Made childhood obesity a political priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Instigated the AAGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor and College of Alderpersons</td>
<td>• Provided political commitment and funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Required all city departments to contribute to addressing obesity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Social Development</td>
<td>• Provided initial programme leadership to demonstrate that obesity is not just a public health issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar working groups</td>
<td>• Enable integrated day-to-day working across government departments and other city strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health service expert team</td>
<td>• Tracks programme outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>• Contributed to conceptual model for AAGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Participate in expert team to provide new evidence-, practice- and eminence-based insights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarphati Amsterdam</td>
<td>• Reviews efficacy and sustainability of childhood obesity measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Care Managers (from youth public health team)</td>
<td>• Work with parents and caregivers of obese children to coordinate care, listen to individual needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools/teachers</td>
<td>• Support AAGG objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Implement Jump-In programme to promote healthy eating and drinking and exercise in schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents and caregivers of obese children</td>
<td>• Reinforce policies outside of the school environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Work with healthcare professionals to ensure individualised care for obese children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Empowered to improve families’ lifestyles by professionals listening and responding to their needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community groups</td>
<td>• Participate in public meetings to provide local information to AAGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Make decisions about their own healthy environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE GOLDEN HORSESHOE FOOD AND FARMING PLAN INVOLVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE BODY TO PROMOTE COLLABORATION BETWEEN SEVERAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN A CITY REGION, AS WELL AS A RANGE OF OTHER ORGANIZATIONS WITH AN INTEREST IN THE FOOD AND FARMING ECONOMY — INCLUDING LARGE-SCALE FARMERS. IT UNDERLINES THE VALUE OF ESTABLISHING CLEAR TERMS OF REFERENCE AND MEDIATION TOOLS, AND FORGING INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES TO MANAGE THE COMPLEXITIES OF FOOD SYSTEM PLANNING AT THE URBAN-RURAL INTERFACE.
The Golden Horseshoe geographical region stretches around the Western shores of Canada’s Lake Ontario, including the Greater Toronto Area and neighbouring cities, towns and rural communities. It is one of the most densely populated parts of North America, and an influx of educated, affluent professionals has led to rapid development and expansion of the cities.

Yet historically the Golden Horseshoe has been an important agricultural region; more than a million acres of productive farmland remain in the Greenbelt and in the shrinking peri-urban and rural spaces between the urban hubs. Agriculture and the dependent food and beverage processing industry make a significant contribution to the local economy — around CDN$12.3 billion a year (Walton, 2012a). A 2003 study in the Greater Toronto Area found that urbanization has caused dramatic changes to agricultural operations. Many farmers have switched from land-extensive operations to higher-value, intensively grown commodities like soft fruits, vegetables and flowers. As the farming community shrinks, so too does access to support services (Planscape, 2003). This places the future of the food and farming industries in the Golden Horseshoe in jeopardy — with serious implications both for the local economy and for long-term food security.

In 2011/12 seven municipalities of the Golden Horseshoe — the cities of Hamilton and Toronto, and the top-tier Municipal Regions of Durham, Halton, Niagara, Peel, and York — adopted a common plan to help the food and farming sector remain viable in the face of land use pressures at the urban-rural interface, as well as other challenges such as infrastructure gaps, rising energy costs, and disjointed policy implementation.

The Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan 2021 (GHFFP) (Walton, 2012a) is a ten-year plan with five objectives:

- to grow the food and farming cluster;
- to link food, farming and health through consumer education;
- to foster innovation to enhance competitiveness and sustainability;
- to enable the cluster to be competitive and profitable by aligning policy tools; and
- to cultivate new approaches to supporting food and farming.

Implementation is overseen by the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Alliance. The Alliance is a powerful voice in lobbying over food and farming matters in the region, as its membership includes representatives of all seven municipalities, provincial bodies, farm organizations, and other commercial, civil so-

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52. The core Golden Horseshoe area covers 10,097km², while the Greater Golden Horseshoe extends further inland and covers 33,500km².

53. E.g. piped water, natural gas, and three-phase power for running heavy machinery.

54. The five Municipal Regions are the top tier municipalities. Each is comprised of several second tier municipalities — cities, towns or townships. The Regions contain areas of urban, sub-urban and rural character to varying degrees.

55. The Alliance is not an incorporated body, but the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) acts as its agent in financial affairs, procurement and human resources. This means the Alliance has the benefit of professional approaches without having to hire administrative staff. Grant applications clearly convey that the Alliance is the applicant and TRCA is the agent.
ciety and research entities with an interest in the sector56.

This case study examines how the GHFFP was drawn up, and how the political engagement of seven municipal governments — spanning urban and rural areas — was secured. It demonstrates how, since the GHFFP has become the policy of these local governments, they contribute to implementation through programmes and projects they support. Moreover, the Alliance serves as a platform for harmonized implementation of Provincial policies, and enables collective lobbying of Ontario policy makers.

ORIGINS OF THE GHFFP

The GHFFP has its roots in an earlier plan, the Greater Toronto Area Agricultural Action Plan (GTAAAP)57, which was launched in 2005 and applied to the City of Toronto and the surrounding cities, towns and rural areas within the Regions of Durham, Halton, Peel and York. The GTAAAP was instigated by farmers who were concerned that several new provincial land use policies considered protection of agricultural land from a planning perspective but did not address economic viability58. They were able to convince the leaders of the councils of Durham, Peel, Halton and York to fund studies on the state of agriculture in the region, paving the way for a wide-ranging Action Plan with ownership across the Greater Toronto Area59. By mid-2009 many of the actions in the GTAAAP were complete. It had become apparent that the City of Hamilton and the Region of Niagara faced similar issues relating to the rural-urban interface as Greater Toronto, and should be included in any follow-up plan and governance body.

PREPARING THE PLAN

In 2009 a meeting brought together members of the GTAAAC (including representatives of its five member municipalities and the GTA Agriculture Federations that represent farmers),...
municipal actors from the City of Hamilton and the largely rural Region of Niagara, Friends of the Greenbelt (a grant-making foundation), and the Greater Toronto Countryside Mayors’ Alliance. Attendees acknowledged that the economic viability of agriculture is intrinsically connected to that of the wider food sector, including processors, food manufacturers and research and development centres. The follow-up plan would therefore take a food systems approach and respond to the broader economic development considerations of the whole food sector, not just farmers.

Funding to develop the new plan, to establish governance structures, and to draw up terms of reference, was obtained from the Friends of the Greenbelt. The three-phase process — research, consultation and drafting of the plan — was supervised by an informal steering group of actors put together by the committee overseeing the previous plan, with representation from across the food system in Golden Horseshoe.

In line with the broader scope, the steering group included economic development actors from the municipalities in addition to the planning professionals already involved in the previous plan. This was a challenge because the two professions have markedly different ways of working and use quite different language, even when essentially they share the same vision. As a result, the writing process was long and labour-intensive, requiring determined mediation by consultants from the land use planning consultancy Planscape to reach consensus wording.

I remember being in meetings where we would be agonising over how should we say things, so it means the same to everyone... those kinds of conversations were so common that at one point, I can remember some of the folks in the room were just ready to throw in the towel and say ‘enough! we’ve had enough!’ but I think in the end we were all happy that we stuck it out because it has guided our work so well.

Member of the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Alliance

IMPLEMENTING THE GOLDEN HORSESHOE FOOD AND FARMING PLAN

The role of the Alliance is to provide political leadership and guidance for implementation of the GHFFP. The Alliance initiates some projects in partnership with other organizations (such as the Asset Mapping project described below), but its capacity is limited; its only employee is the executive director, Janet Horner, whose job is to coordinate activities and network. As a result, much of the implementation lies in the hands of member organizations, as it is aligned with and informs their work.

In particular, the municipalities within the Golden Horseshoe play a central role in implementation. The GHFFP was formally adopted by all seven municipalities following intense efforts by steering group members, which in-
volved submitting to each municipal council a version of the background report tailored to their circumstances and priorities, to find political champions, and to attend debates and votes. The GHFFP has now become the official policy of the municipalities, and as such is used to make the case for municipal programmes that will contribute to its objectives.

For example, in 2013 the City of Toronto’s Economic Development Committee adopted a motion to expand and relocate the Toronto Food Business Incubator (TFBI), noting that assisting food start-ups was in line with the objectives of the GHFFP (Williams, 2013). Similarly in 2016 the same committee voted to form a working group to advise on the barriers and opportunities for public food markets in Toronto and to develop a strategy, thereby linking urban demand with local food supply (Fragedakis, 2016).

In the City of Hamilton, meanwhile, there has been close, ongoing cooperation between the Alliance and the multi-departmental steering group that led development of Hamilton’s own Food Strategy, to ensure that it is in line with the GHFFP’s projects and goals. Alliance members are currently assisting Hamilton with two projects to enable local food procurement, one for long-term care facilities and the other for Mohawk College of Applied Arts and Technology.

And in the Region of Halton, Canada’s fastest developing region, the new Agricultural Strategy has been built around the same five objectives as the GHFFP and its integrated approach. For instance, Halton’s strategy recommends a number of actions to improve citizens’ food literacy under the pillar ‘Link Food, Farming and Health’.

The municipalities also aid implementation of the GHFFP by designating a representative (and a stand-in) to sit on the Alliance — either an elected official or an officer from the planning or economic development departments with a reporting relationship to their council. This promotes harmonized policy between the municipalities. For example, municipal representatives reported back to their councils on how their neighbours were interpreting Ontario land use policy, as some municipalities were favouring applications for farm buildings for value-adding activities while others blocked them,
posing a barrier to farm development. Moreover, through their representatives the municipal councils worked together on the Alliance’s submission to Ontario’s land use planning review for Greater Golden Horseshoe (Crombie, 2015)\(^2\). By working collectively and speaking with a common voice, they had a more powerful influence over provincial policy than they would have had individually. In another example, the zoning regulations developed by the City of Hamilton to promote urban agriculture are now being shared with other areas that are seeing increasing food growing activity.

Furthermore, the terms of reference of the Alliance require municipal representatives to participate in the working group that supervises Alliance-led projects. This provides human resources that otherwise would be sorely lacking, and the municipal actors take turns to serve as project managers.

### FUNDING MATTERS

Core funding for the Alliance is provided by the municipalities, which each contribute CDN$30,000 per year. This is a relatively small sum for individual municipal budgets, but together the contributions enable the employment of the executive director and the part-funding of projects. The municipal funding goes into a common pot for the Alliance to administer according to need.

However one of the more urbanized municipalities has, in the past, placed conditions on its support, insisting that its funding be spent on projects of its choosing and in which its staff have a role. One interviewee attributed these conditions to the political leaders being city-based and lacking ‘passion’ for food and farming issues, even though the farmers in this municipality are outspoken.

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\(^2\) The final report of this review included all the points raised in the submission and recommends a systems approach to supporting food and farming within the land use policy framework.
in their support and there is a long legacy of community-led food initiatives. Another attributed the constraints to the fact that this municipality’s financial contribution came out of a particular project budget rather than as a discrete line of expenditure under the Council budget. Either way, the requirements have complicated the smooth running of the Alliance, requiring the executive director to attend more meetings to ensure continuing commitment.

The core budget is supplemented by funds from other sources. Some money is provided by Friends of the Greenbelt, while additional project funding is sought from external partners.

The Alliance tends to carry out projects in stages so that it can point to initial results when pitching for funds for subsequent stages. For example, initial funding of CDN$20,000 for the Asset Mapping project63 was provided by the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Farming and Rural Affairs (OMAFRA) for the production of a data template. The next tranche of funding, from Agriculture and Agri-food Canada’s Growing Forward 2 programme, enabled standardized data requests that led to release of the first version of the platform, containing 17,000 data points, in late 2013. Based on these results, OMAFRA funded the platform’s expansion to 60,000 data points, which was released in August 201664.

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63. Asset Mapping has been a major project to collect data on all the agri-food activities within the area including farms, food processors, industry suppliers and distributors, infrastructure, service centres, and the service industry. The data is collated into a web-based platform for planning and economic development professionals to use to analyze trends and identify changes over time.

64. OMAFRA enabled the Asset Mapping project practically as well as financially, by supporting the Alliance in negotiations with the Provincial government to gain access to ‘high security’ farm sale data. These data were crucial to building a comprehensive platform.
awkward for them to be seen to promote the economic interests of the food and farming sector over others. Other Alliance members understood the conflict and offered informal support to ‘Land over Landing’ instead, including suggesting that the airport be built on a smaller, lower grade plot of land.

Even though the Food and Farming Alliance Action Plan has these sort of specific actions, my personal perspective is that it’s not just about checking things off on the list, [...] it’s more about the process of engagement, moving the bar forward, being opportunistic, and having ways of engaging multiple stakeholders in the conversation that’s important. [...] It’s about what happened in that work and the relationships that were developed to get there.

A second area of conflict — between the Alliance and external organizations — concerns the place of large-scale commodity farming operations in the Golden Horseshoe, and in particular in Rouge Park, a 40km2 area of parkland straddling the York-Durham border that is set to become Canada’s first urban national park. Some organizations hold that only small-scale, ecological agriculture is appropriate within a national park, but this vision would exclude many of the commodity farmers who currently lease land in the Rouge area — and who are members of bodies represented on the Alliance. The Alliance maintains that so-called ‘big agriculture’ must be involved in the conversation since it is an important economic driver. It advocates for incremental shifts of the policy framework — at the local, provincial and national levels — from exclusively facilitating export-oriented rotation cropping to encouraging a broader range of crop insurance options and support for domestic production and supply.
At the time of writing this tension remains unresolved, but merely getting actors with such conflicting viewpoints around the discussion table is regarded as an achievement in itself, since they rarely encounter each other face-to-face. Executive director Janet Horner has played a key role in mediated conversations; one interviewee credited her ability to give all points of view a fair hearing without being constrained by her own background in conventional agriculture.

Conversely, the main modus operandi of the Alliance, face-to-face meetings, has presented a barrier to the participation of some groups of actors. For example, no major food company is represented on the Alliance, because business executives cannot regularly take time out for meetings that are unrelated to daily business activities. However, the executive director has sought their involvement in special events on a one-off basis so that they still have some degree of engagement. For instance, executives from a large company took part in an advocacy day at the Ontario Legislative Building in Queen’s Park, Toronto, calling for greater support for small and medium-sized food businesses across the province. The presence of a corporation that makes a major contribution to Ontario’s economy lent weight to the Alliance’s message; while for the corporate representatives this was an exciting, new way of working that showed how diverse actors from across the food sector can join forces to address politicians with a common message.

**REVIEW AND NEXT STEPS**

The GHFFP and Implementation Plan are intended to be living documents that will be adjusted throughout the ten-year timeframe as requirements change. A ‘five year report card’ containing success stories form implementation to date is due to be published in late 2017. However, as the GHFFP was put in place without the development of indicators, the Alliance can check off completed tasks but cannot always measure the impacts for the food and farming sectors. Nonetheless, it is expected that the review exercise will yield insights that will lead to some adjustments.

**SUMMARY OF ENABLERS**

This case study has shown that a key enabler in developing the GHFFP was previous work between many of the actors which — together with a background report — highlighted areas where action was needed. The policy development process was inclusive and involved a major summit, while external consultants enabled consensus to be achieved between actors from different disciplinary backgrounds. The GHFFP is subject to periodic review and amendment to take account of lessons learned.

When it comes to delivery, the political commitment of the seven municipalities has been crucial, obtained by framing the proposal in terms of each one’s situation and political priorities. This makes the idea of taking action a powerful one, that it would be difficult for politicians to ignore. Political commitment has enabled supportive policies and programmes to be introduced by municipal governments, and there are strong channels of information and influence between the Alliance — located in a neutral space — and key power centres, since the municipal representatives each have a reporting relationship with their respective councils.

Significantly, political commitment is accompanied by funding, which in most cases can be used as the Alliance sees fit (to pay a staff member and for some projects), and human resources are provided by the municipal representatives serving as project managers. Budgetary constraints are overcome by seeking partners to co-fund projects.
The Alliance is a powerful entity in food- and farm-related policy because it has brought together a spectrum of respected actors and organizations, including seven municipalities, to speak with a collective voice. It plays an enabling role with respect of institutional structures, serving as a platform for resolving issues stemming from the division of policymaking powers and responsibilities between the province and municipalities. Conflict and ideological differences, where they occur, are generally handled through mediation; where no resolution to conflicting agendas or interests is possible, creative ways are found to achieve similar ends. The Alliance is an efficient and accountable governance body, as it has robust terms of reference to ensure members attend meetings — and therefore decisions can be taken.

**TABLE 4: KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>ROLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers (mostly intensive, commodity farmers working under GTA Federations of Agriculture)</td>
<td>• Noticed exclusion of farming economy from Provincial strategies&lt;br&gt;• Represented farmers’ interests to GTA Regional Chairs&lt;br&gt;• Represented on Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTAAC</td>
<td>• Implemented GTAAP&lt;br&gt;• Formed initial steering group for GHFFP&lt;br&gt;• Since creation of Alliance, holds topical discussion events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial steering group</td>
<td>• Carried out research for GTFFP development&lt;br&gt;• Negotiated wording between members&lt;br&gt;• Facilitated adoption by municipalities by framing GHFFP in terms of each one's priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planscape</td>
<td>• Consultants wrote draft GHFFP&lt;br&gt;• Mediated between planners and economic developers over wording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal councils</td>
<td>• Adopted GHFP, provide funding&lt;br&gt;• Provide representatives who serve as conduits for information and influence, and bring human capacity to working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive director of Alliance</td>
<td>• Paid employee of Alliance&lt;br&gt;• Has legitimacy as leader; coordinates activities, mediates and builds relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>• Members’ contributions vary but collectively provide strategic guidance and make decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External project partners</td>
<td>• Provide project funding, aid implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large food manufacturers</td>
<td>• Engage in advocacy events on one-off basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of the Greenbelt</td>
<td>• Funds some projects, funded development of GHFFP and governance structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAFRA Agriculture and Agri-food Canada</td>
<td>• Advisors&lt;br&gt;• Funders of Asset Mapping project</td>
</tr>
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</table>
DETROIT’S URBAN AGRICULTURE ORDINANCE

DETROIT’S URBAN AGRICULTURE ORDINANCE REQUIRED THE CITY OF DETROIT TO NEGOTIATE OVER STATE-LEVEL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS, IN WHICH THE LARGE-SCALE FARMING INTERESTS HAD A MAJOR STAKE, SO AS TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT ITS ORDINANCE. DETROIT’S EXPERIENCE ILLUSTRATES THE PIVOTAL ROLE PLAYED BY INDIVIDUALS WITH LEGITIMACY IN BOTH PLANNING POLICY CIRCLES AND THE FOOD GROWING COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY OF ALTERING THE POLICY PROCESS TO ENABLE PARTICIPATION OF ACTORS WITH DIVERGENT VIEWS.
In the second half of the 20th century, the City of Detroit in the US state of Michigan experienced severe economic and social decline. The protracted collapse of the motor industry from the late 1950s onwards disproportionately impacted the city’s African-American residents, who were already suffering severe discrimination via segregation and housing policies. Racial unrest subsequently rose, culminating in the race riots of 1967. Many affluent white residents fled the violence, resulting in home and business foreclosures — including the shuttering of food retailers. By the 2000s, Detroit’s population had decreased from around 2 million to less than 700,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) and every major chain supermarket grocery store in the city had closed (Zenk et al., 2005; Smith & Hurst, 2007). Vast areas of city land became vacant, the blighted urban environment bred crime, and the city’s remaining predominantly black residents suffered disproportionately high rates of unemployment, diet-related disease, food insecurity, and other injustices including, ultimately, lower life expectancy (Gallagher, 2007).

With fewer tax-paying residents, Detroit has been starved of revenues and has struggled to maintain social services — let alone deal effectively with swathes of vacant publicly-owned land and abandoned lots. The culmination of a financial crisis that had effectively been brewing for 60 years came in 2013 when Detroit, then under emergency administration and $20 billion in debt, filed for bankruptcy; it exited bankruptcy in December 2014, leaving city leaders in charge of a long-term restructuring process.

Within the context of long-term social and economic struggle, a community farming movement has taken root in the city’s neglected, mainly African-American, neighbourhoods, and proliferated since the early 2000s (White, 2011). The movement has aimed to use farming as a means to improve the urban environment, foster social cohesion, and increase access to healthy food. With 35 square miles of vacant city-owned land, there is huge potential for food production projects of all kinds and sizes.

City policy has played a role in supporting urban farming in Detroit. First, in 2008 the City of Detroit adopted a food security policy drawn up by the Detroit Black Community Food Security Network that featured urban agriculture as one of eight work areas towards ensuring food security for all residents in the context

85. Detroit’s fortunes were slightly more positive between 1994 and 2001, during a bout of urban revival under then-Mayor Dennis Archer.

86. Detroit has a long history of food growing. In the 1890s the ‘Potato Patch Plan’ sought to put poor residents to work growing food in vacant lots (Levenston, n.d.); and between 1975 and 2002 the City operated the Farm-A-Lot scheme, which provided residents with seeds and access to publicly-owned lots on which to grow them (Greenbaum, 2014). Since Farm-A-Lot ended, Keep Growing Detroit’s Garden Resource Program grew from supporting 80 gardens in 2004 to 1400 gardens and farms in 2015 (Sands, 2015).

67. The Detroit Black Community Food Security Network is a not-for-profit organization established in 2006 to address food insecurity within the City’s Black community and to ensure that the majority African American population participates in and leads the food movement locally. It was the first African American organization of its kind in the US. Its leader, Malik Yakini, is a widely respected activist who helped create the Detroit Food Policy Council and was its first Chair.

68. The other seven work areas in the food security policy are: access to quality food; hunger and malnutrition; impacts/effects of an inadequate diet; citizen education; economic injustice in the food system; the role of schools and other public institutions; and emergency response. The policy also recommended the formation of the Detroit Food Policy Council, a monitoring and advisory body that was duly created in 2009, with 21 members from across the food system and city government (from the Mayor’s Office, City Council, and the Department of Health and Wellness Promotion).
of poor neighbourhood access to fresh, unprocessed foods, and high rates of hunger, obesity and diet-related illness⁶⁹ (DBCFSN, 2008). Then, in 2012, the Detroit City Plan was updated to feature urban agriculture as a desirable activity, acknowledging the environmental, economic and social benefits. Urban agriculture also features in the 2013 Detroit Future City Strategic Framework⁷⁰, which makes it a priority for all city stakeholders to seek to reverse the decline and usher in stability through economic revival, addressing land use issues, improving city services, and fostering civic engagement (DEGC, 2012). Lastly, in 2013 the City adopted its first ever urban agriculture zoning ordinance⁷¹, thereby formally permitting, promoting and regulating certain types of food production as a viable land use.

69. The food security policy acknowledged at the most accessible stores in the city were party stores, dollar stores, fast food restaurants and gas stations. While most neighbourhoods had a grocery store within reasonable distance, they tended to stock very limited quality fresh, unprocessed foods — and many people could not reach stores selling healthier foods due to lack of a car and poor public transportation (DBCFSN, 2008).

70. Development of the Detroit Future City Strategic Framework was led by the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation, a non-profit organization that works closely with the City of Detroit and other partners. Implementation is driven by the DFC Implementation Office, an independent non-profit organization governed by a board of directors and funded by the Kresge Foundation, Erb Family Foundation, John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, Michigan State Housing Development Authority and Americana Foundation.

71. A second ordinance on raising livestock within the city has been drafted and is expected to be adopted in 2017.
The adoption of the urban agriculture ordinance was of key significance because although vegetable growing in the city was not illegal prior to 2013, neither was it a recognized land use within the city’s existing zoning ordinances. This meant it was not possible for the City to sell vacant public land for food growing purposes. With no regulatory framework, there was no way of knowing whether produce was safe or laced with heavy metals from contaminated soil, and there was no basis for arbitrating in disputes between farmers and non-farming neighbours. Moreover, as urban agriculture gained momentum in the 2000s across the US, some affluent, white people were returning to the city to farm, in some cases seeking to acquire public land to establish for-profit enterprises. Often they neglected to consult — or even consider — the predominantly black residents who had developed their own visions for land use. There was a clear need for formal procedures to ensure equitable and just farming for all interested parties (Morrell, forthcoming).

The ordinance provides definitions for key urban agriculture terms and determines whether each can be practiced by default (‘by right’, i.e. only requiring a permit) or with special permission (‘conditional’, requiring more extensive site review). Activities that are generally allowed, either by right or conditionally, include urban gardens (under one acre, for personal, commercial or group use), urban farms (over one acre for personal, commercial or group use), greenhouses, and hoop houses. Farmers’ markets, hydroponics, aquaponics and aquaculture are generally prohibited in residential areas, but may be permitted in some, either ‘by right’ or on a ‘conditional’ basis.

The ordinance also contains clauses on nuisance caused by urban farming and the procedures for establishing a new food growing initiative.

This case study examines the processes that paved the way for Detroit’s first urban agriculture ordinance, the policy development process, and implementation to date. It shows how Detroit was able to overcome the institutional barrier of the Michigan Right to Farm Act to have authority over urban agriculture — yet implementation has been hampered by entrenched perceptions, distrust and lack of understanding, both within the city government and the farming community.

**THE NEED TO REGULATE URBAN AGRICULTURE IN DETROIT**

The impetus for developing an urban agriculture ordinance came from a senior planner with the Detroit City Planning Commission, a body of nine commissioners that is served by staff in the Legislative Policy Division and that is responsible for the city’s zoning ordinances. The planner, who was involved with the food growing community in a personal

I think urban agriculture is regarded not as real agriculture but more of a kind of soft community-based activity and [is] not taken seriously yet as a viable means of production and an economic driver. And I think that’s because we haven’t gotten there yet. And we are still trying to. There are a few, but very few, who are engaged in urban agriculture and able to do it for a living. So that is part of the learning that we still have to get to, but that — just because it hasn’t yet reached that level yet — doesn’t mean it is not an important part of what happens in our community.

Offical employed by the City of Detroit
capacity, noticed that urban agriculture was increasingly popular, and that businesses and social entrepreneurs were proposing large-scale farms in the city (e.g. Recovery Park and Hantz Farms73). They approached the commissioners and made the case for creating a legal framework for it.

Having obtained the commissioners’ agreement, in 2009 the planner formed the urban agriculture workgroup to begin drawing up an ordinance. The original workgroup was made up of actors from organizations with a history of working on community agriculture projects and representatives of several city departments74 (City of Detroit, 2013b).

SECURING EXEMPTION FROM STATE LAW

The first step was to research similar ordinances across the US, as well as agriculture policy in the state of Michigan. It quickly emerged that the Michigan Right to Farm Act represented a major barrier to Detroit’s autonomy and authority to regulate urban agriculture. The Right to Farm Act protects commercial farm operations in Michigan from nuisance complaints.

73. Recovery Park is non-profit organization formed in 2008 to provide opportunities for ex-offenders and recovering addicts, who usually face barriers to employment. Its model includes a 60 acre farm project (of which 35 acres are city land), produce from which is sold through a for-profit sister entity. Hantz Farms purchased 140 acres of city land from the City in 2012. The land was originally intended for the world’s largest urban farm but a strategy change — possibly influenced by resistance from small-scale urban gardeners and their allies — led to its development as commercial tree-growing operation.

74. Initial workgroup members were representatives from Detroit Black Community Food Security Network; the Greening of Detroit; Earthworks Urban Farm; Michigan State University; Wayne State University; and City departments, including Planning and Development; Recreation; Health and Wellness, Promotion; and, Buildings, Safety, Engineering and Environmental.

75. The Right to Farm Act was enacted in 1981 in the wake of complaints against established farm operations by people who had migrated to the countryside following the economic decline of Detroit and the 1967 riots. Many found the reality of rural life fell short of their bucolic lifestyle dreams; the noise, dust, smell and light pollution of large-scale agricultural operations was a nuisance. After a number of established farmers lost lawsuits brought by newcomers, the Michigan Farm Bureau lobbied for legal protection.
as long as they adhere to a set of voluntary Generally Agreed Agricultural and Management Practices (GAAMPs). What is more, the Right to Farm Act explicitly supersedes any local government rules, regulations or ordinances relating to agriculture across the whole of the state, making no distinction between rural and urban settings. While some people have argued — and continue to argue — that the Right to Farm Act provided an inherent ‘right to farm’ to urban farmers and was therefore in their interests (as discussed below), for the City of Detroit it meant that any city ordinance relating to agriculture would be unenforceable under state law.

It was clear that Detroit would need to secure exemption from the Right to Farm Act before work on the draft ordinance could continue. Following an approach from the senior planner, the Michigan Department for Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) convened a high-level meeting of Detroit City Planning Commission members, members of Detroit’s ordinance working group, and representatives of the Michigan Farm Bureau, which represents the state’s large-scale farming sector. An interviewee from MDARD said that while there was sympathy for Detroit’s predicament and no objection to enabling urban agriculture per se, the Farm Bureau would entertain no discussion of amending the Right to Farm Act, since opening it up for discussion might result in farmers having to cede hard-won ground over other aspects.

To Farm Bureau representatives, the Right to Farm Act was sacred. But for the City of Detroit, local authority was sacred. A series of further meetings took place as the actors sought a solution that would allow Detroit to move forward with its ordinance without compromising the interests of Farm Bureau members and large agribusinesses, or the safety net provided to them by GAAMPs.

Eventually, at a meeting of the Michigan Commission of Agriculture and Rural Development in December 2011, MDARD proposed an administrative fix that would leave the Right to Farm Act unchanged but amend the preface to the GAAMPs with the wording:

“This GAAMP does not apply in municipalities with a population of 100,000 or more in which a zoning ordinance has been enacted to allow for agriculture provided that the ordinance designates existing agricultural operations present prior to the ordinance’s adoption as legal non-conforming uses as identified by the

76. There are eight GAAMPs covering: manure management and utilization; pesticide utilization/pest control; nutrient utilization, care of farm animals; cranberry production; site selection and odour control for new and expanding livestock facilities; irrigation water use; and farm markets. The GAAMPs are the responsibility of the Michigan Commission of Agriculture and Rural Development. Each GAAMP is reviewed annually to take into account new scientific knowledge and environmental stewardship technologies.

77. The Right to Farm Act supersedes local rules following a 1999 amendment that was needed because rural residents had taken to lobbying township local authorities to change land use zoning from agricultural to residential use, so that pre-existing farm operations would have to close. The Right to Farm Act makes no distinction between rural and urban settings since at the time farming was an exclusively rural occupation and no-one foresaw that within a few years a new breed of urban farmer would start cultivating land within the city limits.

78. In the weeks before this administrative fix was proposed, two State Senators, Virgil Smith (Democrat) and Joe Hune (Republican), prepared a Bill seeking to amend the Right to Farm Act itself to exempt cities of 600,000 or more. The Bill was not introduced because, according to a statement on Senator Smith’s website, MDARD had asked the Senators to wait until after the Agriculture Commission meeting on December 14 so that it could propose an ‘administrative fix’ that would leave the Right to Farm Act intact (Smith, 2011).
Right to Farm Act for purposes of scale and type of agricultural use.\textsuperscript{79} (MDARD, 2011).

This solution was satisfactory to the Farm Bureau. Detroit City Planning Commissioners also agreed as an initial, intermediate step, although they did raise concerns about its legality, prompting verbal reassurance by a representative of the Attorney General’s office that it was within the scope of the Right to Farm Act\textsuperscript{80}.

The motion to amend the preface of the GAAMPs — and thus to provide Detroit with a de facto exemption from the Right to Farm Act — was carried at the same meeting. The reasons for this unusual haste are not recorded, but the MDARD interviewee suggested it was because of the presence of Detroit City Planning Commissioners who could give interim agreement there and then. However, this did mean there was no opportunity for public comment, as is the norm during the annual cycle for GAAMPs amendments that runs from late August to February. As a result, there has been uncertainty among small-scale farmers about their rights — not only in Detroit but also in other urban areas with populations over 100,000. According to Wendy Banka, president of the Michigan Small Farm Council, which was formed in the wake of the 2011 amendment to advocate for small farmers’ rights, the administrative fix paved the way for an even more significant change to the GAAMPs in 2014 concerning livestock farming in residential areas — both rural and urban.

While the Detroit City Planning Commission no longer regards the solution to be interim and is not pushing for a statutory exemption via the Right to Farm Act itself, the Michigan Small Farm Council maintains that it was not legal for the GAAMPs to be amended in order to change the meaning of the Right to Farm Act. Consequently, it believes that many urban farmers have lost their ‘right to farm’ and claims the change was used to force Detroiters to give up farm animals\textsuperscript{81}. The Michigan Small Farm Council has continued to campaign for the amendments to be reversed.

**DRAWING UP THE ORDINANCE**

Once the institutional barrier posed by the Right to Farm Act had been overcome, the workgroup — now expanded to include a representative of MDARD and some other orga-
nizations\textsuperscript{82} — reconvened to start work on the draft ordinance again.

Research into urban agriculture ordinances of other cities in the US showed that the most controversial aspect was keeping animals within the city — indeed, in Detroit growing vegetables and fruit was not illegal, it was just not legalized. Keeping animals, on the other hand, was explicitly illegal. As a result, the senior planner who led the process decided to focus first on growing produce and to return to the question of livestock in a separate ordinance at a later date. This would prevent the animal aspects causing the whole endeavour to fail.

A slightly different process was followed for the two ordinances.

For the first urban agriculture ordinance the senior planner drew up proposals and the workgroup met all together at regular intervals to provide feedback. The planner’s background as a community activist with experience in community gardens, food security and food sovereignty, including as an affiliate with the Detroit Black Food Security Network, meant this individual could bring pre-existing knowledge of the issues to the task and had credibility and trust of the urban agriculture community — in addition to professional planning expertise.

Once the draft ordinance had been drawn up, in September 2012 the Detroit City Planning Commission sought wider input from the community that would actually use it, by holding community meetings in three different parts of

\textsuperscript{82} The expanded workgroup was made up of representatives from the following organizations: Freedom Freedom Community Garden; Earthworks Urban Farm; Detroit Black Community Food Security Network; Greening of Detroit; Neighbors Building Brightmoor; Hantz Woodlands; Recovery Park; Genesis HOPE Community Development Corporation; Community Development Advocates of Detroit; Lower Eastside Action Plan; Detroiters Working for Environmental Justice; Green Door Initiative; Wayne State University (Law and Planning departments); Michigan State University; Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. It also included as representatives from the following City departments: the Planning and Development Department; Buildings, Safety Engineering and Environmental Department; Law Department; Detroit Water and Sewerage Department; and the Detroit City Council Research and Analysis Division (City of Detroit 2013b).
the city, in partnership with the Detroit Food Policy Council. The meetings — which were attended by almost 200 people in total — also informed Detroit’s farmers about the forthcoming ordinance. After this, the draft ordinance was circulated to City departments for review, before progressing to a public hearing at the City Planning Commission (City of Detroit, 2013b), which voted to recommend that the City Council adopt the ordinance. The City Council did so, unanimously, in March 2013 and the ordinance came into effect the following month. After the ordinance was adopted the City Planning Commission obtained an amendment to the Master Plan to include urban agriculture as a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the City Planning Commission still considers it to be a pilot policy that is open to further amendments once it has been tried and tested.

The process towards the second ordinance, on urban livestock, commenced in 2013. This time, according to the City interviewee, the senior planner for the Detroit City Planning Commission met with stakeholders separately rather than holding workgroup meetings, so as to avoid uncomfortable encounters between those keeping livestock illegally and city departments responsible for enforcing the current ban. This encouraged the farmers to be open about their activities and their needs. The urban livestock ordinance, which contains both zoning and animal control elements, has not yet been passed, but the Planning Commission expects it to go before the City Council in 2017. For this ordinance, a Council member has agreed to act as champion.

IMPLEMENTING THE ORDINANCE

The workgroup was intended to continue meeting as an ongoing advisory group on urban agriculture after the adoption of the first ordinance, in order to help the city devise regulations and policies related to agriculture and related programmes and activities (City of Detroit, 2013b). However at the time of writing, there was no ongoing formal governance structure, although the Detroit Food Policy Council continues to provide support to the senior planner as they advocate for further policy reform in support of urban agriculture.

To date, engagement from across municipal departments has been low, despite steps to make the process more collaborative: several departments were involved in the workgroup, the draft was circulated for comment before adoption, and the ordinance itself requires site plans to be reviewed by the departments of Planning and Development, Public Works, Water and Sewage, and other agencies if deemed necessary (City of Detroit, 2013a). An interviewee attributed the low engagement largely to lack of understanding about what urban agriculture entails and how to support it; this individual acknowledged that inter-departmental education efforts had been insufficient. For many Detroit officials there is an entrenched perception that development and housing are suitable land uses within a city and agriculture is not — even though at present the City is not in an economic position to support ambitious development projects.

83. See footnote 57.
84. The interviewee said that it plans to allow several months between the passing of the livestock ordinance and its entry into force in order to educate city departments and ensure there is a smooth, transparent process in place, that is understood both within the City Council and by the public. The need for an extended period before implementation was not anticipated for the first ordinance.
The procedures for making publicly-owned land available for food growing has also been a source of tension, with the Detroit Land Bank Authority’s current processes seen to be overly complex and opaque. The Detroit Food Policy Council is championing improved processes since, at present, the process is neither easy nor transparent. Mayor Mike Duggan has stated a preference for vacant land to be put in the hands of local residents, but there has been some concern in the media that piecemeal sell-off of land for small, non-profit food growing projects will prevent the acquisition of large areas for commercial farming that will create jobs and tax dollars (Gallagher, 2015). From the perspective of some small-scale farmers, however, it seems developers and proponents of large-scale commercial projects are receiving preferential treatment, while residents who wish to farm land in their neighbourhood are subject to another set of rules that are opaque and bureaucratic (Hester, 2016).

As for farmers, there is somewhat paradoxical evidence on the impact of the ordinance. On the one hand, take-up of permits for ‘by-right’ projects has reportedly been low. Some people who have practiced urban agriculture covertly for many years, and with no enforcement issues, see acquiring a permit as a waste of time and money — the cash-strapped city is unlikely to pursue and sanction permit-less farmers. On the other hand, there are anecdotal reports that the number of registered urban gardens in Detroit has continued to grow since 2013, as would-be gardeners are emboldened by the existence of a regulatory framework and no longer feel compelled to hide their food growing projects — whether they hold a permit or not (Sands, 2015). This would indicate that permit take-up may not be a fair indicator of the ordinance’s success, and that ultimately the City has realized much of its aim merely in establishing this regulatory framework.

The Detroit City Planning Commission, meanwhile, has the authority to amend the ordinance as it deems necessary, but there is no public information on indicators or procedures for monitoring the impacts.

**SUMMARY OF ENABLERS**

The senior planner within the Detroit City Planning Commission was a key figure in initiating the urban agriculture ordinance and enabling

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85. The Detroit Land Bank Authority is the agency responsible for returning Detroit’s vacant, abandoned, and foreclosed property to productive use.

86. Mayor Duggan took office in January 2014 and has announced that he will stand for re-election in 2017.

87. Figures were not available, but Keep Growing Detroit previously reported that its Garden Resource Program supported a network of about 1,400 gardens and farms in 2015, with almost 20,000 Detroiters engaged in some capacity (Sands, 2015).
its development. With experience in professional urban planning and in the urban farming community, this individual was regarded as a legitimate leader both in the eyes of City and of community actors. Consequently, the senior planner secured the participation of a variety of city and state departments and representatives of the farming community. They also had in-depth awareness of the concerns, priorities and working methods of both groups.

For its part, the City Planning Commission enabled the planner to initiate the ordinance’s development by granting its support, both for the proposal and approval of the draft ordinance, thereby helping to secure the City Council’s backing. Indeed, the institutional home of the ordinance within the City Planning Commission — the guardian of all city ordinances — is helpful as this body’s recommendations hold some sway with the City Council.

Policymaking was research- and evidence-based; the planner reviewed other cities’ ordinances and learned from their experiences. This not only helped ensure the ordinance was appropriate and technically sound, but it also led to the identification of barriers that were subsequently overcome. The first of these was the realization that the Michigan Right to Farm Act posed an institutional barrier to development and implementation of a city-level ordinance; this was overcome by finding an alternative to amending the Act that would not compromise the interests either of Michigan Farm Bureau members or of the City of Detroit. The second potential barrier was the likelihood of livestock becoming a contentious issue in policy development and adoption, in response to which livestock was hived off from the initial ordinance.

The convening of the workgroup ensured the ordinance was developed through a multi-actor, multi-sector process. This secured the participation of actors who would be most affected by it, and met their needs. However, neither this participatory process nor subsequent outreach efforts have enabled extensive take-up of permits or widespread engagement across city departments.

The workgroup has not continued as a governance body though the implementation stage, despite initial plans. This may have contributed to some actors’ disengagement, although the Detroit Food Policy Council has at least partially filled the gap through its advocacy work, and the senior planner is in charge of monitoring and updating the ordinance as required.

The openness to learn from experience and adapt the policy accordingly, together with renewed educational efforts around the impending livestock ordinance, might enable greater engagement in the future.
## TABLE 5: KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
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| Senior planner with Detroit City Planning Commission | • Initiated and led ordinance development process  
• Initiated discussions about RTFA with Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development |
| Detroit City Planning Commission            | • Guardian of City planning ordinances  
• Gave approval for draft urban agriculture ordinance to be developed  
• Gave approval for GAAMPs preface amendment to enable ordinance  
• Recommended adoption of ordinance by Detroit City Council |
| Detroit City Council                        | • Adopted ordinance                                                                                                                                 |
| Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development | • Mediated process to overcome barrier of the Right to Farm Act |
| Michigan Farm Bureau                        | • Represents big farm interests in Michigan  
• Refused to open up Right to Farm Act for review  
• Agreed to the proposed GAAMPs amendment |
| Michigan Small Farm Council                 | • Represents collective interests of small-scale farmers in Michigan, following exclusion from GAAMPs amendment discussions  
• Campaigns for GAAMPs amendment to be reversed |
| Small scale urban farmers and community farming groups | • Growing food within communities for many years  
• Some participated in work group and consultations |
| Entrepreneurs proposing large-scale urban farms | • Proposed large-scale farms  
• Participated in workgroup |
| Various city departments                    | • Participated in workgroup, but generally low engagement in implementation  
• Some departments have a role in site plan review |
| Detroit Land Bank Authority                 | • Responsible for returning vacant land to use  
• Makes decisions on sale of land for food production |
| Detroit Food Policy Council                 | • Advocates for simpler, more transparent Land Bank and permitting decisions, to enable farming projects of all sizes |
3.1. ENABLERS TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND DELIVERY

The urban food policies in this report took shape within a variety of political-economic contexts and had very different origins in terms of the actors and sectors that instigated and led the process and the main purpose, problem or policy domain around which the policy was framed. The set of enablers for each policy was thus specific to the context. Nevertheless, some common enabling processes emerged from the urban food policies studied. The processes were less about how and by whom the policy was initiated than building an effective policy process thereafter. In addition, a number of ways in which these enablers could be harnessed were identified from the case studies.

Table 1 sets out the factors that enabled the urban food policies featured in this report to be developed and delivered (column 1), and how each factor enabled change (column 2). Though not all the factors were present for all of the case studies, all of the cities displayed at least five of them. The absence of any one of these enabling factors presented barriers to policy development and delivery, with the most problematic barriers being: unsupportive national level policy; absence of necessary powers and responsibilities at the local city level; lack of acknowledgement or management of conflicts and ideological differences; insufficient funding; and restrictive conditions on how funding can be used.

The 15 enabling factors in Table 1 are categorised under six themes: (i) data, monitoring and learning (ii) ‘vertical’ multi-level governance (iii) ‘horizontal’ city level governance; (iv) participatory policy process; (v) funding; and (vi) political commitment.

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<th>ENABLING FACTORS</th>
<th>HOW THE ENBLER PROMOTES CHANGE</th>
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<td><strong>DATA, MONITORING AND LEARNING</strong></td>
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| Enabler 1: Background and baseline research has been carried out to inform the policy. | • Enables design of policy that addresses relevant challenges, is relevant to needs of intended users, appropriate, effective and achievable.  
• Promotes political commitment where findings are used to make the case for the policy. |
| Enabler 2: Impacts are monitored and new data are collected throughout implementation. | • Provides inputs to improve the policy design where needed.  
• Provides evidence of efficacy to help secure ongoing or renewed political commitment and provide examples to other cities. |
| Enabler 3: Policy is continually or regularly reviewed and renewed. | • Enables policy to be adapted in light of learned experiences, new data or unexpected impacts, or to improve efficacy. |
| **‘VERTICAL’ MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE** |
| Enabler 4: The necessary policy powers and responsibilities exist at the local city government level.  
Enabler 5: Policy at the national level is supportive. | • Allows the city to move forward with policy development and delivery.  
• Provides supportive structures and programmes that the city can draw upon. |
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<tr>
<td><strong>‘HORIZONTAL’ CITY-LEVEL GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
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| Enabler 6: The ‘institutional home’ of the policy lends it strategic importance and/or provides channels of influence. | • Ensures awareness of the policy within city government and that it is taken seriously.  
• Facilitates support for the policy from other departments. |
| Enabler 7: A governance body has been established to oversee the policy, that promotes accountability and efficiency. | • Ensures input from a wide range of actors into policy development (initial and ongoing). Some departments have a role in site plan review.  
• Provides rules of engagement, thereby increasing buy-in and holding actors to account. |
| Enabler 8: Multiple city government departments are engaged with and committed to the policy. | • Enables development of policy with multiple benefits in different policy areas, that is more ambitious, integrated and effective.  
• Increases likelihood of the policy being written into other departments’ plans.  
• Increases likelihood that other departments will serve as implementation partners, bringing capacity, access to target groups and co-funding. |
| **PARTICIPATORY POLICY PROCESS** | |
| Enabler 9: Policy is developed through participatory process, involving both communities and city government (regardless of top-down or bottom-up origins) and actors across the food system. | • Provides a rounded perspective of the issues to be addressed.  
• Encourages shared ownership of the policy, mobilizing resources, problem-solving and innovation capacity, and fostering partnerships between sectors.  
• Community involvement generates popular support, making the idea to take action a powerful one for politicians to address.  
• Community involvement enables policy that is relevant to needs and promotes take-up by intended users.  
• City actors can facilitate bringing policy proposals to the attention of decision-makers. |
| Enabler 10: Conflicts and ideological differences between actors are acknowledged and managed. | • Increases the likelihood of reaching consensus in policy development and reduces impediments to delivery. |
| **FUNDING** | |
| Enabler 11: Part-funding is provided by city government. | • Enables a minimum of implementation. |
| Enabler 12: Overall funds obtained are sufficient for implementation. | • Enables complete delivery of the policy. |
| Enabler 13: There are no restrictive conditions attached to funding. | • Enables funds to be used as needed to advance the policy’s objectives, without constraint by any other agenda. |
| **POLITICAL COMMITMENT** | |
| Enabler 14: High-level political commitment from city government is secured and leveraged. | • Gives legitimacy to the policy.  
• Enables civil servants to commence work on implementation.  
• Promotes institutionalization of policy within overarching city plans and visions.  
• Promotes engagement across multiple city departments, leading to incorporation of food issues into plans and programmes in related policy areas. |
| Enabler 15: Political commitment transcends electoral cycles. | • Enables long-term delivery, and tackling of complex issues that cannot be resolved in a four or five year electoral cycle. |
ENABLER 1
Background research and baseline data collection is carried out

Conducting background research and collecting baseline data enables the development of policies that are appropriate, effective and achievable. Research also promotes political commitment where evidence is used to make the case for the policy.

In three of the case studies — Golden Horseshoe, Detroit, and Amsterdam — the policymaking process was preceded by a research phase. The nature of the information needed, how it was collected, and how it was used, varied from case to case.

In Golden Horseshoe, a background report was commissioned on the state of the food and farming economy, funded by Friends of the Greenbelt. This enabled the steering group to identify priority action areas, provided baseline data for monitoring impacts, and underpinned the case for each of the seven municipalities to adopt the Food and Farming Plan. The utility of this kind of preliminary research is supported by Carey (2013), who draws on experiences of conducting a baseline study of Bristol’s food system in the UK, with a small amount of funding from Bristol City Council, and Moragues et al. (2013) in their ‘how to’ guide drawn from multiple city experiences.

In Detroit, the research involved reviewing similar ordinances in other US cities, federal and state policies, and technical standards. This was intended to ensure the resulting ordinance would be appropriate, legal, and would not pose a threat to public health or the environment.

In Amsterdam, academic experts in obesity and public health helped design the underlying framework, tailoring conceptual models where necessary. This means the standard of science on which the approach is based is far higher than could have been achieved through an in-house literature review and, as such, one would expect it to be more effective.

Summary of ways to facilitate background research and baseline data collection:
» conducting a preliminary baseline study of the urban food system;
» identifying how other cities have tackled similar problems;
» involving academic experts in the policy process.

ENABLER 2
Impacts are monitored and new data are collected throughout implementation

Monitoring of impacts and collection of evidence and data on an ongoing basis is helpful as it provides inputs to improve the policy when it is reviewed (see Enabler 11 below). It might also provide evidence of the policy’s efficacy to help secure ongoing or renewed political commitment, especially following municipal elections.

Of the case studies in this research, only in Amsterdam was there a robust and transparent system for monitoring the impacts of actions under the AAGG, in the form of an online platform. The insights from this in-house monitoring are fed back into a revised policy, with the aim of boosting ef-
fectiveness (see also Enabler 8 below). In addition, academic researchers provide ongoing insights on a consultancy basis, as well as continuously compiling evidence on children’s weight. Even so, it has not been possible to make a definite connection between the policy and reduced incidence of overweight and obesity among children in the city to date — although the fact that the end of the current phase is timed to coincide with the 2018 municipal elections suggests an expectation that cause and effect claims may be possible by then.

In some other cases there is an intention to monitor impacts and food system issues on a continuous basis, but so far this has not been done rigorously or in a transparent fashion. For example, the asset-mapping programme in Golden Horseshoe is intended to facilitate identification of new issues to be addressed, but since the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan was put in place without the development of indicators, the ‘five year report card’ due to be published in late 2017 will contain ‘success stories’ of completed actions without measurement of the impacts for the food and farming sectors. In Detroit, the lead planner remains continuously abreast of technical developments, and the impact of the ordinance is said to be closely monitored in order to inform updates, but there is no transparent, publicly available monitoring framework.

Summary of ways to ensure impacts are monitored and new data are collected throughout implementation:

» establishing indicators to monitor progress and outcomes on a regular or continuous basis.

ENABLER 3
Policy is continually or regularly reviewed and renewed

The continual or regular review and renewal of policy enables it to be adapted in light of learned experiences, new data or unexpected impacts, improving efficacy.

In nearly all the case studies in this report, the urban food policy, although formally adopted through city council procedures, was not considered set in stone but was kept open to potential amendment should the need arise. Two ways of updating urban food policies were identified. The first is the ‘learning by doing, doing by learning’ approach that is one of the underlying principles of the Amsterdam AAGG. This allows for rapid response to impacts (or lack of them) and emerging data and is closely connected to the evidence-based approach that requires continual monitoring and data collection (see Enabler 2 above). Similarly, in Detroit the urban agriculture ordinance is only ever considered to be a draft that is subject to updates as and when needed.

The second way of updating policies is by scheduling reviews at pre-determined points. This was also identified in Amsterdam, where the AAGG ‘marathon’ is broken down into a series of shorter ‘races’ with specific targets, each with a renewed strategic plan. Likewise programmes under Belo Horizonte’s approach to food security, which has endured for more than two decades, have evolved over time, although the underlying principles of the policy remain in place. In Golden Horseshoe, meanwhile, reviews and updates to the Food and Farming Plan are scheduled, notably at the mid-term point. This is not so much an evidence-based review, but a process of checking off
completed actions, identifying which have proved problematic and why, and developing a renewed action plan.

Summary of ways to promote continual and regular review and renewal of the policy:

» adopting a ‘learning by doing, doing by learning’ approach, and keeping the policy open to amendment where needed;
» monitoring impacts and emerging research, to inform the review process;
» scheduling reviews and stock-taking, with a view to renewing plans where necessary.

ENABLER 4
The necessary policy powers and responsibilities exist at the local city government level

The existence of the necessary policy powers and responsibilities at the local, city level enables cities to move forward with policy development and delivery. These powers are generally assigned by national governments. When a city lacks the powers and responsibilities it needs, this can prevent the city from developing or delivering the policy, or constrain its potential for action.

The experiences in Amsterdam and in Belo Horizonte show that keen awareness of what powers and responsibilities lie at a city’s disposal can enable change to be brought quickly, cheaply, and with minimal contestation. First and foremost, cities can exploit opportunities to incorporate changes into programmes and services they already deliver. This includes public procurement, school meals, and social services. Beyond this, Amsterdam’s AAGG shows the utility of recognizing where the limits of its authority lie. It avoids trying to change aspects of the food environment that are outside of its control — such as food advertising and product formulation — unless an easy opportunity such as a campaign presents itself. In this way, it avoids wasting too many resources in areas where it cannot deliver effective change, and focuses on those where it can.

Distribution of powers represented a key barrier across several of the case studies. In Detroit, the Michigan Right to Farm Act meant the City had no authority to regulate urban agriculture. This placed the entire ordinance development in jeopardy. City actors managed to overcome the barrier however, by seeking — and obtaining — new powers over agriculture through the amendments they negotiated.

In Golden Horseshoe, the division of responsibilities between the province and its municipalities led to inconsistent implementation of land use policies. To overcome this, the Alliance did not seek to change the distribution of powers and responsibilities but rather served as a new platform for harmonizing implementation on the one hand, and for giving the municipalities a more powerful, collective voice in new provincial policies on the other.

In Nairobi, on the other hand, the former city government’s lack of responsibility for agriculture meant development of an urban agriculture policy was not possible for years, and city level advocates of urban agriculture had no way of bringing the institutional change needed. Therefore, they had to bide their time. They built relationships, expertise and popular support in preparation for the eventual devolution of agriculture to the City County level.
Summary of ways to ensure the necessary powers and responsibilities exist at the local level:

» identifying and making maximum use of the powers and responsibilities that lie with city government, including services that are already being delivered — while acknowledging the limits;

» seeking reassignment of powers and responsibilities to enable the city to achieve its ambitions;

» joining forces with other cities or municipalities to promote consistent implementation or regional/national policy across administrative borders;

» if division of powers and responsibilities cannot be changed, biding your time and developing contacts and popular support.

ENABLER 5

Policy at the national level is supportive

Supportive multi-level policies mean the city may be able to draw on national structures and programmes to aid with delivery. If policy framing is unsupportive, not only is there less material assistance to draw upon but also the policy may be counteracted or undermined by imperatives outside the city's control.

The case studies showed that coherence between city and national-level policies can have an impact on policy development and delivery. However, they also demonstrated that, far from being passive actors in the process, cities are sometimes able to influence the national level and help forge a favourable environment.

The case of Belo Horizonte is somewhat unusual in that the inception of the food security policy in the early 1990s was fanned by favourable political winds from the federal level. Moreover, over the last two decades food security has been institutionalized at the national level, paving the way for structures, programmes and funding opportunities that have aided delivery of SMASAN's programmes. As noted in the discussion of electoral cycles below (Enabler 15), federal institutionalization has also helped to ensure the longevity of Belo Horizonte's policy.

In the case of Amsterdam's AAGG, on the other hand, the city government's approach contrasts starkly with that of national policy. Although the AAGG has successfully bid for top-up funding from some project-based national funding pots, by and large it has not been able to draw on supportive structures to assist with delivery of its policy. It also means the city government is constrained in its capacity to improve further elements of the food environment in Amsterdam since some aspects that are outside of its control — such as advertising and product formulation — are shaped by the national approach (see Enabler 4 above).

Such a contrast between city level and national policies is common, according to Sonnino and Beynon (2015), who draw on experiences in the UK cities of Bristol, Manchester and Cardiff, and Philadelphia and New York in the US. They suggest that it is not incidental, but that cities are deliberately seeking to fill the vacuum left by national policies. Rather than just dealing with downstream impacts of national policy, some are striving to build vertical capacity by influencing
higher level policies — the upstream, structural causes — to bring about more significant, sustained transformations.

To do this, cities may position themselves as pioneers or ‘pilots’ — indeed Belo Horizonte served as a test case for elements of SMASAN’s work that were later taken up in the federal Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme (Dubbeling et al., 2016a). Others lobby directly for policy change at higher levels, such as the city of Philadelphia’s call for regional tax incentives to promote fresh foods for local markets (Sonnino, 2014); or the Golden Horseshoe Alliance’s collective response to a consultation on provincial land use policy (see Enabler 4 above).

The case studies in this report show that some individuals have influence at more than one level, and can therefore play a pivotal role in influencing higher levels of policy. This includes politicians, such as the Mayor of Belo Horizonte, who introduced the food security policy and later in his career held an influential national level position. It can also include civil society actors who actively build contacts at different levels, such as those in Nairobi who fostered strong and trusting relationships with civil servants at the national level, paving the way for policy development once a window of opportunity opened in the city.

In addition, networks of cities are a vehicle for leveraging greater influence and amplifying the voices of cities in key policy debates. For example, Dutch cities have signed the CityDeal ‘Food on the Urban Agenda’ to work together on an integrated food strategy for the whole country; and in the US, the Conference of Mayors’ Food Policy Taskforce, with representation from 17 cities, sought to influence the federal Farm Bill over how agriculture affects cities.

Summary of ways to promote supportive national level policy framing:

» positioning the policy as a city-level test-case with scale-up potential;
» lobbying regional and national level policymakers for change, and participating in consultations;
» identifying people who have influence at multiple levels (politicians or civil society) and engaging them to make the case for more supportive policies;
» joining countrywide and international networks for a louder, collective voice in policy-making at multiple levels.

ENABLER 6
The ‘institutional home’ lends the policy strategic importance or provides channels of influence

An ‘institutional home’ is the space within which the governance body or policy resides, be it a city government department or agency, a civil society organization, or a neutral space outside of all structures. An institutional home that makes a clear statement about the policy’s strategic importance for the city, or provides channels of influence to decisionmakers, promotes awareness of the policy within city government and can help ensure it is taken seriously.

In four of the case studies — Detroit, Nairobi, Belo Horizonte and Amsterdam — the food policy’s
institutional home is within local government structures. The one case with an external home is the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan; in this case a neutral space outside of the municipalities was necessary, as embedding it within one of them could have impaired implementation across the other six. In Detroit, the urban agriculture ordinance resides with the City Planning Commission, which is the guardian of all the city ordinances. In Nairobi, the creation of the agriculture department was key to the policy’s development, so it is logical that it should host it and drive implementation.

In Belo Horizonte and Amsterdam, however, the choice of institutional home is more deliberate, and makes a clear statement. Establishing SMASAN as (initially) a stand-alone agency on a par with existing departments underlined the importance of food security in the Brazilian city. In Amsterdam, the decision to locate the AAGG in the Social Development Department rather than the Public Health Service sent the message that obesity is not just a public health matter and that all departments need to cooperate to address it.

The institutional home is also significant for the channels of influence it offers to decision-making in city government. The stronger these channels, the more potential there is for incorporating issues into the top-level urban agenda. In Belo Horizonte, the demotion of SMASAN from central agency to a sub-agency of the Department of Social Welfare means it is somewhat removed from the locus of power and potentially less influential. In Detroit, the City Planning Commission makes recommendations to the City Council that hold some sway; after the ordinance was adopted the City Planning Commission obtained an amendment to the Master Plan to include urban agriculture as a desirable activity.

That said, the case of Golden Horseshoe shows that it can be possible to create strong channels of influence even if the institutional home is outside municipal structures. The Alliance’s terms of reference explicitly state that municipal actors must have a reporting function — and therefore a channel of influence — to their council. These channels are crucial to effective implementation of the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan.

Summary of ways to ensure the ‘institutional home’ lends the policy strategic importance or provides channels of influence:

Choose a home that:
- makes a statement on the policy’s importance for the city;
- encourages cooperation between city departments;
- provides channels of influence to decisionmakers within city government.

ENABLER 7

A governance body has been established to oversee the policy, that promotes accountability and efficiency

A governance body that promotes accountability and efficiency ensures input from a wide range of actors into policy development and provides rules of engagement, thereby increasing buy-in and holding actors to account.
Most of the policies in this report had some form of dedicated governance body to guide or oversee implementation, monitor process, evaluate outcomes, and identify issues to be addressed. They are all, however, very different: in Belo Horizonte, in addition to the dedicated city government agency (SMASAN), there are three advisory bodies involving different sectors and city departments; the Golden Horseshoe Alliance constitutes a multi-sector governance body for the region’s Food and Farming Plan, without affiliation to any single municipality; Amsterdam’s AAGG has a core team and a multi-departmental working group within city government for each of its ten pillars; the Nairobi Urban Agriculture Promotion and Regulation Act sets out the structure of a governance body involving a small number of external experts; and in Detroit custody of the urban agriculture ordinance lies with the Detroit City Planning Commission, although the Detroit Food Policy Council assists with some implementation issues.

The merits of various governance models have been discussed in previous research. For example, Pothukuchi and Kauffman (1999) compared the pros and cons of a dedicated food department, a food policy council, or a planning department with explicit responsibility for food. Many practitioners favour multi-sector ‘food policy councils’ or ‘food partnerships’, although there is much diversity between them (Burgan & Winne, 2012; Harper et al., 2009; Stierand, 2012). Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015) recommend that food policy councils be independent from city government but with strong ties to it, and not dominated by political parties or dependent solely on city funding so as not to be vulnerable to electoral cycles.

The wide-ranging policies and political contexts studied in this report make it difficult to draw conclusions about the best type of governance body. What is clear, however, is the importance of ensuring key actors regularly attend meetings, and are held to account for their contribution (or lack of it).

Firstly, ensuring key actors attend meetings is essential to build co-ownership of the policy. Some inter-departmental directors are conspicuously absent from Belo Horizonte’s multi-departmental advisory board (CAISAN-BH). This is partly because a strong enough case has not been made for their presence and partly because the directors are not used to working in partnership. Their absence — if it continues — is likely to affect implementation of the city’s forthcoming food security plan. In Amsterdam, on the other hand, the strategic case for all relevant city departments to be involved in the AAGG was strongly made following adoption of the AAGG by the Mayor and College of Alderpersons. In spite of the initial teething problems described in the case study, all necessary departments are now represented in the programme’s working groups.

Secondly, holding actors to account over their commitments is crucial to ensure the governance body functions as intended and decisions can be taken. In the late 1990s COMASA, the original civil society body for Belo Horizonte’s food security policy, collapsed. There was no mechanism for resolving conflicts or for ensuring that voluntary members attended — without which its ability to act as an effective advisory board is severely undermined. Conversely, Golden Horseshoe has rules of engagement and accountability mechanisms (e.g. for dispensing with actors who fail to deliver on their commitments). Meetings are well attended, which enables decisionmaking since meetings must have a quorum for voting to be valid. The importance of establishing clear rules of engagement is supported by Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015) on the grounds that it improves buy-in. They suggest asking actors to sign an agreement, although they accept there could still be attendance issues due to inevitable turnover of staff.
Summary of ways to ensure existence of governance body that promotes accountability and efficiency:

» creating a governance body with clearly defined functions such as (but not limited to) guiding or overseeing implementation, monitoring the process and evaluating outcomes, and identifying issues to be addressed;

» drawing up robust terms of reference so that all members know what is expected of them;

» asking members to sign an agreement over their participation;

» making a strong case for involvement of all departments/organizations whose involvement is helpful, ideally at director level.

ENABLER 8

Multiple city government departments are engaged with and committed to the policy

The committed engagement of multiple city government departments promotes the development of policy with multiple benefits in different areas, and increases the likelihood of the policy being written into other departments' plans. It also increases the likelihood that other departments will serve as implementation partners, bringing additional capacity and, sometimes, co-funding or providing access to target groups.

As noted above, the Amsterdam case shows that the engagement of multiple city departments enables a more integrated policy that is relevant to multiple policy agendas. Similar findings emerged from the Belo Horizonte study, where some city departments serve as partners in specific projects or programmes, providing access to target groups, greater capacity, and sometimes co-funding.

Securing the engagement of the relevant departments, however, was a recurrent challenge. Even in the cases of Amsterdam and Belo Horizonte, where city leaders decreed that all departments must cooperate on the policy, there have been some difficulties. The problems tend to be due to entrenched prejudices about the relevance of food to different policy agendas (Detroit, Nairobi, Amsterdam), turf wars over programme responsibilities and associated budgets (Belo Horizonte), or different ways of working and accepted language (Golden Horseshoe, Amsterdam). Overcoming these problems takes concerted efforts to change mindsets, break down prejudices, and promote new ways of working. Three ways of doing this were identified in the case studies.

The first way is through practice — that is, inter-departmental working to encourage initial rapprochement of views and working practices, before expanding the relationship. This method was used in Amsterdam, where departmental directors were instructed to work together during the initial strategic phase, to demonstrate the relevance of obesity to multiple policy agendas and how much could be achieved by using existing resources cooperatively.

The second way is through cross-departmental training, such as the interactive sessions run by the Mazingira Institute for the Nairobi City County Government. The sessions draw on research findings and experiences with urban agriculture in other East African cities, which is testament to
the importance of impact monitoring so that evidence is available where and when it is needed. Inter-city networking over food policy helps promote information sharing. Such educational efforts are ideally ongoing, rather than just one-off events, as personnel can change. In the Detroit case, one-off attempts to educate city departments when the urban agriculture ordinance was first introduced were ineffective.

The third way is through facilitation or mediation by a consultant, who helps actors to acknowledge their different frames of understanding and to find a common language. It can be helpful if the facilitator/mediator is an outsider (i.e. not from local government or from another city) so they can adjudicate without suspicion of political preference. It was through such mediation that the steering group of the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan drew up a plan that was acceptable to both planners and economic developers, and which paved the way for cooperation in implementation.

Summary of ways to promote multiple city departments’ engagement with, and commitment to, the policy:

» finding small, practice-based ways to cooperate at first, then expanding once the relationship is established;

» education and training to demonstrate the relevance of food to different policy areas and to break down prejudices, ideally on an ongoing rather than a one-off basis;

» facilitation or mediation to explore frames of understanding and find a common language.

ENABLER 9
Policy is developed through a multi-actor, multi-sector policy process

The participation of both communities and city government (regardless of whether the policy was initiated ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’), and a range of actors from across the food system is helpful in a number of respects. Firstly, it enables a rounded perspective of the issues to be addressed through discussions. Secondly, it encourages shared ownership of the policy by different social groups and sectors (e.g. public, private, civil society), which mobilizes resources, problem-solving and innovation capacity and can foster partnerships between the sectors. Thirdly, involvement of community actors specifically can generate popular support, making the idea to take policy action a powerful one for politicians to address. Fourthly, community involvement enables policy that is relevant to needs and promotes take-up by intended users. Fifthly, involvement of city government actors, for their part, can facilitate bringing policy proposals to the attention of decision-makers. These benefits have been documented by Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015) in their paper on processes and tools for multi-stakeholder planning.

In all of the case studies in this report, except Amsterdam’s AAGG, both city government officials and local communities were involved in the policy process. This finding is consistent with major reviews of urban food policy experiences, which have identified the importance of engaging both the community and public sectors early on in the policy process (e.g. Burgan & Winne, 2012; Morague-Faus et al., 2013).

In both Belo Horizonte and Nairobi, the policy processes were formally initiated and led by city government actors. However, citizens have been involved as part of an initial working group or
through consultation in an effort to ensure that the policy is relevant to community needs. In both of these cases the foundations for participation were laid by civil society pressure that created considerable popular support. Addressing food insecurity and promoting urban agriculture became important rallying points in Belo Horizonte and Nairobi respectively, which were hard for the elected governments to ignore. Moreover, in Nairobi civil society actors worked hard to build strong, trusting relationships with civil servants (initially at the national level, but later transferred to the city) over a period of years. In so doing, they ensured ‘inside’ support and access to channels of influence within city government.

In Amsterdam, on the other hand, community groups were not involved in designing the policy framework and childhood obesity was not widely considered a priority within communities. Nonetheless, in implementation the AAGG team holds regular public meetings to learn how it can contribute to community needs, while also improving the food environment. In this way, it has generated popular support and reduced the risks of being regarded as authoritarian and imposing.

Actors’ networks emerged as a way to engage a range of participants in the policy process. In the case of Golden Horseshoe, the core steering group for the GHFFP comprised actors who had worked together previously, including representatives of the municipalities, the farming community, and a range of actors from the food and farming sector. Those actors drew on their networks to introduce new participants, thereby widening representation. In Detroit, too, the lead actor had personal connections with the urban agriculture and food security movements, and was able to engage farming groups in the policy process by drawing on that network. In addition, Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015) suggest carrying out an ‘inventory’ of key stakeholders to invite, so as to ensure none are inadvertently excluded.

That said, it can be very difficult to involve people who will be most affected by the policy. For instance, poor, disempowered and marginalized citizens may be hard to identify since they are unlikely to have personal connections in policymaking circles and, even if they do, may be daunted by the idea of participating. In Belo Horizonte this gap is bridged by involving organizations that work with target groups and are aware of the issues they face. In Nairobi, civil society groups helped poor farmers to organize into a collective lobbying group, allowing them to call out oppression and, in due course, to participate in policy making.

At the other end of the spectrum, while the involvement of major food companies in the Golden Horseshoe Alliance is seen as desirable, executives have struggled to take time away from their jobs to attend meetings. Instead, food company representatives are not formal Alliance members, but the executive director has adapted usual ways of working to accommodate them, consulting with them on a one-to-one basis and inviting them to participate in special events, such as lobbying days.

Even when key actors are willing and able to participate, unexpected sensitivities or hurdles can emerge during the process that require swift adaptive action. In Detroit the lead planner realized that using a working group to draw up a second ordinance on raising animals in the city would bring together people engaged in illegal activities with authorities under an obligation to crack down on them. As a result, the leader conducted one-on-one meetings instead, so that all actors could talk freely without fear of sanction. The need to adapt processes in light of emerging issues has also been acknowledged by Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015); although they set out a stage-by-stage guide to participatory policy processes, they accept that in reality they are often non-linear.
While these examples show that it can be possible to represent the views and interests of hard-to-engage groups indirectly, there is certainly a need for more research on how governance models and procedures can be adapted to enable their direct participation.

What is more, the role of the private sector is often contentious — and especially so for large-scale industrial producers and suppliers. In Belo Horizonte, SMASAN has a long history of partnership with small businesses and family farms, but the creation of FOMASA sparked concerns that excessive private sector influence could dilute the policy’s core values. In Amsterdam, the AAGG avoids engaging private firms that pay lip service to public health without fundamentally changing practices.

Summary of ways to ensure policy is developed through a multi-actor, multi-sector process:
» holding public meetings to listen to community needs and wishes, and incorporate them;
» building strong and trusting relationships with civil servants over a period of time;
» using actors’ professional networks and contacts to invite relevant people and organizations to participate;
» conducting an ‘inventory’ of key people and organizations to invite to participate in policy development;
» working through representative organizations of sectors or community groups, if direct participation is not possible;
» helping disempowered, marginalized groups to organize so they can have a voice;
» adapting the policy process to enable the participation of people from all relevant sectors and community groups, including if unexpected hurdles occur along the way.

ENABLER 10
Conflicts and ideological differences between actors are acknowledged and managed

The acknowledgement and careful management of conflicts (including conflicts of interest) and ideological differences increases the likelihood of reaching consensus in the policy process and avoiding impediments to delivery. Participatory policy processes by definition tend to include actors from different disciplinary backgrounds, those who have dramatically different ideologies and opinions and, sometimes, conflicting political economic interests.

For managing conflict and achieving consensus in the policy process, the importance of a strong and legitimate leader, who can take a neutral position and mediate between opposing viewpoints, should not be underestimated. In Golden Horseshoe, independent consultants were engaged to lead the policy development and to achieve consensus wording that was acceptable both to planners and economic developers. The executive director of the Alliance plays an ongoing leadership role. Similarly the planning officer who led development of Detroit’s urban agriculture ordinance had legitimacy both in the eyes of planning professionals and farmers, having been involved in community agriculture projects in a personal capacity. Consequently, this individual understood the priorities and modus operandi of both.
More broadly, dialogue and mediation have been essential. In Nairobi, the objections to urban agriculture expressed by some County Assembly Members and planning officers was dealt with by those who supported it through dialogue and reasoned argument. Similarly, in Belo Horizonte civil servants have dialogued with incoming directors of SMASAN on how their ideological position relates to the city’s approach to food security, making the case for preserving the core values.

Sometimes, however, it is clear that actors are not going to shift their positions — either because they are deeply entrenched or because they have conflicting political economic interests. For example, discussions over Rouge Park in Golden Horseshoe involved urban actors and advocates for small-scale ecological farming, rather than the intensive commodity agriculture practiced by many Alliance members. Discussions, led by a skilled mediator, have not resulted in agreement, but have at least allowed these diverging viewpoints to be confronted.

In other situations, workarounds can be found to achieve similar ends, without needing to resolve the conflict. In the ‘Land Over Landing’ episode in Golden Horseshoe, the economic interests of farmers — to retain farmland — were pitted against the wider economic interests of the region — to build a new airport. As the municipality’s Alliance representative could not promote the farming economy at the expense of the general economy, those actors who could lent informal support to the ‘Land Over Landing’ campaign behind the scenes. In Amsterdam, too, leaders of the AAGG consider that the interests of major food manufacturers — to generate profit — conflict with their own interests — to eliminate childhood obesity. Therefore, they prioritize working with (mostly small) retailers who are willing to pursue health outcomes as well as commercial gain. Lastly, the Generally Agreed Agricultural and Management Practices (GAAMPs) preface amendment in Detroit was a workaround to deal with the barrier posed by the Right to Farm Act, but without compromising either the interests of Michigan Farm Bureau members (to avoid amending the Act) or the City of Detroit (to obtain local authority over farming).

Summary of ways to manage conflicts and ideological differences between actors:
» appointing a leader or mediator for policy development and delivery, who has cross-sectoral legitimacy and is adept at finding consensus;
» promoting dialogue and reasoned argument throughout policy development, adoption procedures, and delivery;
» bringing actors with opposing viewpoints around the table, since even if there is no consensus the discussions can promote understanding of the differences;
» recognizing where conflict cannot be resolved and seeking ways to work around the barriers.

**ENABLER 11**

Some funding is provided by city government

The provision of some core funding by the city government enables a minimum of implementation. Sometimes budgetary provision from the city (or municipalities) is secured at the same time as — and forms part of — political commitment (see Enabler 14). This was the case in Belo Horizonte and Golden Horseshoe, and it is significant because it means the city is not merely rubber-stamping principles or intentions, but providing resources to enable action. In Amsterdam,
however, there was a somewhat conflicting view that upfront funding of the AAGG by city government could inhibit collaborative working across different departments. As such, funding was not the initial cornerstone of implementation. It was only sought — and obtained — with the second political commitment in 2015, once the strategic approach had been established.

It is almost always difficult to obtain any budget from local government, since food policy has not been traditionally seen as a core responsibility — and it can be even harder in times of economic constraint, when even basic services are threatened with budget cuts. One observation that could help make the case for funding is that that while food policies can have significant and manifold social, economic and environmental impacts, budgetary allocations tend to account for only small proportions of the overall annual city spending: SMASAN’s core funding is less than 2% of Belo Horizonte’s annual budget, while the AAGG’s core funding is around 0.04% of Amsterdam’s.

Summary of ways to obtain some funding is provided by city government:
- seeking municipal resources at the same time as political commitment, unless there are strategic reasons not to;
- seeking funds under the city’s main budget, for multi-year security and to minimize administrative barriers on spending;
- making the case for funding by pointing out the benefits in proportion to percentage of city budget.

ENABLER 12
Overall funds obtained are sufficient for implementation

Irrespective of the origin of the funding, it is crucial that overall funds obtained are sufficient for implementation.

While the amount of city government funding varied considerably in the cases we studied, invariably public sector budgetary allocations were considered insufficient to cover all aspects of policy delivery. The case studies in this report showed two main ways in which this barrier can be overcome — or at least mitigated: seeking additional funds from other sources, and finding creative ways to make existing resources go further.

With regard to funding from other sources, core budgets may be supplemented by other city departments that serve as implementation partners. As such, they can provide co-funding from their own budgets, where a project or policy also delivers on their objectives. As documented by Rocha and Lessa (2009), in Belo Horizonte the Secretariat of Education co-funds programmes with educational benefits, while those with social assistance benefits and health benefits are co-funded by the Social Assistance and Health departments respectively. A potential downside of this is that the co-funding departments, rather than SMASAN, tend to be credited with achievements.

In Amsterdam and Belo Horizonte, some supplementary funds have been obtained from national government programmes. Usually these budgets have to be used for designated purposes. For example, in Belo Horizonte the federal funds from Fome Zero had to be used for school food, in-
frastructure and procurement. In Amsterdam, funding from national programmes is usually short term (1-3 years) and project-based, requiring ongoing efforts to identify funding opportunities, write bids and provide accountability.

In Belo Horizonte, Amsterdam and Golden Horseshoe, the actors leading implementation have formed partnerships with non-governmental organizations that can provide supplementary funds for specific projects. The key to this is identifying how the food-related work contributes to the policy agenda of the prospective partner. For example, the objectives of the Golden Horseshoe Food and Farming Plan are consistent with those of the charitable Friends of the Greenbelt fund, which has financed several projects, as well as the initial development of the Food and Farming Plan. Another way to secure external funding when working with a new partner for the first time is demonstrated by the Golden Horseshoe’s Asset Mapping project: by starting small with minimal seed funding, the Alliance used early results to show the value of the approach and secure larger sums for its expansion.

Secondly, where funds are short, there is a particular imperative to ensure they are used prudently. In Amsterdam, budgetary efficiency is promoted through regularly monitoring whether policies and programmes are delivering expected results — and providing value for money. In addition, there is close integration between the AAGG and other municipal departments and strategies, which has helped avoid duplicate spending. Moreover, as mentioned above, initially the AAGG received no city funding at all, as departments were expected to fund work out of existing budgets to promote cooperation. A similar innovative approach to budgetary constraints is recommended by Carey (2013), based on her analysis of the Bristol Food Policy Council in the UK, which receives no funding from Bristol City Council.

Summary of ways to ensure that funds obtained are sufficient:
» seeking supplementary funding from national level programmes, charitable funds and project partners;
» identifying how food work relates to the agenda of prospective partners;
» starting with pilot projects and seeking larger sums for scale up later;
» funding as much as possible out of existing departmental budgets, and streamline with other strategies to avoid duplicate spending;
» monitoring outcomes to ensure no funds are wasted on ineffective actions.

There are no restrictive conditions attached to funding

The final funding enabler is for funding to come without strings attached, i.e. without restrictive conditions that require the policy to conform to other agendas. This means that decisions on how to spend them are made by the policy’s dedicated governance body, in line with the objectives of the policy initiative and without the need to cater to any other agenda.

Sometimes, when funds come with conditions attached, they can only be used for certain pieces of work and not for others. This is not necessarily problematic if the funding was sought with that work in mind, as is the case when Amsterdam’s AAGG seeks funding from national level pro-
grammes, and when Belo Horizonte received funds from the national Fome Zero programme to improve infrastructure for its Popular Restaurants. Indeed, how money is to be used will generally form part of a funding bid to national level programmes and charitable funds, and will be taken into consideration by those making decisions over allocations. It can be problematic, however, if the agenda and interests of a funder would constrain or contradict those of the policy initiative, such as funding from fast food companies wishing to give the impression of a positive contribution to public health. For this reason, civil servants in Belo Horizonte have upheld the policy not to allow food manufacturers to contribute to the School Meals Programme, either financially or in-kind by providing free products.

It can also be a problem if the funder retains decisionmaking power over how the budget is to be administered. This was the case with one of the Golden Horseshoe municipalities, whose $30,000 funding contribution comes from a specific project budget and, as such, can only be used by the Alliance for certain compatible projects (rather than, for example, paying the executive director’s salary or overhead costs) and with the direct involvement of municipal representatives. This meant there was a risk of the Alliance’s agenda coming second to that of the municipality, casting doubt over implementation of the Food and Farming Plan.

This problem was not encountered in other cases, where budget allocations formed part of cities’ overall annual budgets — whether as a stand-alone budget line (Amsterdam) or as an earmarked share of a departmental budget (Belo Horizonte) — and where those directly involved in the food policy made the spending decisions. Moreover, funds are more likely to be relatively secure year-on-year when they come from the overall city budget than when they fall under a specific, time-limited project.

Summary of ways to ensure that no restrictive conditions are attached to funding:

» being alert to the agenda and interests of the funder at the time of application;
» seeking funds from the city government’s main budget, rather than under a ring-fenced budget line or specific project.

ENABLER 14
High-level political commitment from city government is secured and leveraged

Once an urban food policy draft or proposal has been developed by a working group, the logical next step is to seek adoption or approval by city government. Indeed, political commitment is a pre-requisite for an urban food policy to be considered as such; without it, it remains a proposal (see definition of urban food policy in Box 1 above). However, securing political commitment is nonetheless regarded as an enabler because it allows civil servants to get to work on implementation, because high-level commitment can be leveraged to enable the policy to be written into overarching city plans and visions, and because it can flow down into city departments, promoting integrated working across policy areas. What is more, the case studies provide useful lessons on how political commitment can be secured.

All the urban food policies studied in this report were formally adopted through Council processes. In the case of Nairobi, Detroit, Amsterdam and Belo Horizonte this represented a green light for
civil servants within city government to get to work on implementation. As discussed above, political commitment is often accompanied by funding for a minimum of implementation. In Golden Horseshoe, Detroit and Amsterdam, formal adoption paved the way for the policy to be incorporated into other plans and strategies, extending its reach into multiple policy areas and institutionalizing it within the policy fabric of the city.

In all the cases but Detroit, political commitment was secured with the help of one or more political champion. In Amsterdam and in Belo Horizonte, a politician was closely involved in instigating the respective policies, in response to a problem faced by the city. They participated in the policy development process, then championed it through to adoption.

In other cases, however, political champions were recruited by civil society actors. In Nairobi, civil society groups successfully shifted entrenched political views about urban agriculture, leading to some local politicians being prepared to support the policy through formal processes. In the Golden Horseshoe, where the policy proposal originated outside of municipal structures, political champions for each municipality were secured by members of the Alliance. Here, it was beneficial to frame the need for the Food and Farming Plan in terms of the existing political priorities of each municipality, thereby making clear the benefits of championing the Plan. Drawing on experiences in urban agriculture policy in the global South, Dubbeling and de Zeeuw (2015) recommend starting to develop contacts with political decision-makers as early as possible in the process, to be sure they are on board by the time the policy is voted on.

Summary of ways to secure and leverage formal high-level political commitment from the city government:
» recruiting politician(s) to champion the policy through formal procedures, starting as early as possible;
» framing the policy in terms of political priorities or problems;
» identifying opportunities to embed the policy in other city policies, plans and strategies.

**ENABLER 15**

**Political commitment transcends electoral cycles**

Sustaining political commitment across electoral cycles is essential in order to facilitate continuity in implementation and to address complex issues that cannot be addressed over a four or five year electoral cycle, but require a lot longer, sometimes decades. There is a danger that newly-elected city leaders may not see the value of a previously-adopted policy, or wish to distance themselves from the policies that are closely associated with the previous administration. If this happens, the policy and all associated programmes can disappear almost overnight. Indeed, Caraher et al. (2013) reported that this happened in Victoria, Australia, when efforts to establish a state-level food strategy came to an abrupt end after the 2010 election.

Of the case studies in this report, Belo Horizonte provides particularly helpful lessons for promoting ongoing commitment and mitigating the threat of electoral cycles, as it has survived for 23 years, through several administrations. In particular it shows that finding the right institutional
home and funding arrangements, and embedding a policy within city plans, helps to sustain it over time; institutionalization of food security at the federal level in Brazil has also helped protect Belo Horizonte’s policy (as acknowledged under Enabler 5 above).

A second factor in protecting Belo Horizonte’s policies has been the cadre of civil servants who uphold their core principles. Of course, civil servants may not remain in their posts and may lack power to make decisions, but ensuring that information, values and ways of working are documented and handed over from outgoing to incoming staff helps provide continuity over the long term.

A third factor has been publicity about the novel approach to food and nutrition security. Hyperbolic though it may be, Belo Horizonte is internationally renowned as ‘the city that ended hunger’, so that any politician’s attempt to dismantle the policy risks harming the city’s reputation. This publicity was garnered through municipal actors’ openness to journalists and academics.

Fourthly, the programmes run by SMASAN in Belo Horizonte are co-governed by civil society organizations and the private sector, which means it is harder for an incoming municipal government to take a unilateral decision to end a programme.

A fifth way of mitigating the threat of changing political winds is close monitoring of the policy’s outcomes and impacts. In both Belo Horizonte and Amsterdam, the difficulties of tracking progress (on food security and obesity rates respectively) back to specific policies is acknowledged. Nonetheless, the team in Amsterdam were seen to be alert to the need to promote sustained commitment in order to minimize the risks of a change in city government and carry out systematic and transparent evaluation of both processes and outcomes, and key milestones towards the policy’s objectives are timed to coincide with election years. The intention is that efforts deployed and their positive outcomes will be fresh in politicians’ minds during the 2018 municipal elections, and can be used to make the case for renewal of the policy.

Summary of ways to secure political commitment that transcends electoral cycles:

» institutionalizing the policy by providing an institutional home, funding, and embedding it in city plans and strategies;
» ensuring information and values are retained by a cadre of civil servants;
» attracting and enabling publicity so policy is closely associated with the city’s reputation;
» establishing co-governance with non-public sector organizations;
» monitoring and evaluating outcomes to support the case for continued support.
3.2 HARNESING THE ENABLERS

What can be learned from these experiences for cities about how to make change happen? From the process of identifying enablers, six key insights emerged from which policymakers in cities at any stage of food policy development can learn, adapting them to local context where necessary. Each of these insights corresponds to one of the thematic categories into which the enablers are grouped in Table 1 above.

The first insight concerns data, monitoring and learning. There is great benefit in investing in collating or gathering data on the food challenges faced by the city, both at the outset and in relation to the policy’s impact, so as to inform gradual policy improvements. In addition, it is helpful to learn from the solutions other cities have put in place and to regularly review the effectiveness of approaches taken. Where there are time and cost limitations, the involvement of academic experts may be helpful. Establishing clear indicators is also crucial to ensuring that new data are collected, and that progress and outcomes can be monitored on a regular or continuous basis throughout implementation.

The second insight concerns ‘vertical’ governance. It is important to identify and leverage the powers the city has to address the food challenges at hand. This includes, first and foremost, looking at the services that the city already delivers (e.g. school meals, waste management, education, social welfare, etc.) to see how the food policy can be incorporated for little additional cost by changing working practices. It can also be helpful to audit all the powers or policy levers that exist at the city level, across all policy areas — whilst identifying the limits so as to avoid wasting time and resources on issues that are outside of the city’s control. Lastly, where higher-level policies constrain or counteract local policy it can lobby for change, and where the city lacks the authority to implement the policy it wants, it can seek to negotiate new powers.

The third insight concerns ‘horizontal’, city-level governance. The deliberate engagement and active involvement of all relevant city departments is crucial for developing ambitious, integrated policy that yields synergistic positive outcomes on multiple fronts. Ideally the engagement should be at director-level so that the policy informs decision-making. Sometimes, where the policy is driven by high-level politicians, director-level involvement can be a requirement. In other cases it is necessary to make a strong case for the relevance of food to each department’s core agenda, drawing on research and providing training in order to break down prejudices. It can also be helpful to find small ways to cooperate initially, then expand to larger partnerships once the benefits are established.

The fifth insight concerns funding. It is vital to obtain sufficient funds for implementa-
tion, and to make optimum use of them. Some core funding from city government is important to enable a minimum of implementation. To obtain this, it can be helpful to point to the potential multiple benefits across city agendas that make the policy good value for money. It is usually necessary to secure additional funding from other sources, however, such as national programmes, charitable foundations, other city departments’ budgets, and private sector or civil society partners. Whatever the source, the agenda and interests of the funder should be considered, in case there are restrictions attached to how money can be used. To make optimum use of money, streamlining with other city programmes avoids duplicate spending, and close continual monitoring of outcomes ensures no funds are wasted on ineffective actions. Lastly, where funds are perpetually short, there may be creative ways to work towards objectives without requiring funds, such as incorporating the policy into existing service delivery.

The sixth insight concerns political commitment. **There is a fundamental need to obtain, leverage and sustain political commitment to the policy.** Political champions who make the case for a policy by framing it around city priorities are very helpful for obtaining commitment. Thereafter, as part of implementation, commitment should be leveraged by writing the policy into city strategies, both over-arching and relating to specific policy areas. This helps to institutionalize the policy and provides protection against electoral change. Other ways of promoting sustained political commitment, particularly across electoral cycles, include using data from monitoring and evaluation to show value, establishing co-governance with non-public sector organizations so that the policy is not tied to a single politician or party, retaining a cadre of civil servants to uphold core values and transfer information, and courting positive publicity so that the policy is associated with the city’s reputation.

### 3.3 WHERE NEXT FOR URBAN FOOD POLICY?

**Integrated food policies**

This report has taken an in-depth look at a limited selection of policies, most of which are focused on specific priorities. There is tremendous scope for these policies to become even more innovative and ambitious. They can progress from single policies to more deliberately integrated policies that take stock of all the food-related challenges within the urban context, use all the policy levers the city has at its disposal, and involve all actors and sectors inside and outside of government. There is an opportunity to think not just ‘what can the city do for food’ but also ‘what can food do for the city’ (Mah & Thang, 2013), and ‘what can food do for sustainable development.’

The question is, how do cities move from single- to integrated food policies?

To date international organizations are playing a coordinating role through projects that work with a select few cities to help them devise a comprehensive approach or strategy — such as the FAO ‘NADHALI’ Project on ‘Developing Sustainable Food Systems for Urban Areas’, with Nairobi (Kenya), Dhaka (Bangladesh) and Lima (Peru) serving as pilots for supporting decisionmakers in urban food systems planning. Other recent multi-city projects include Smart Cities for Development and URBACT (Jégou & Carey, 2015).

It is also clear that there are numerous lessons that can be learned by cities, when they look outward to other urban food policies in their own countries, regions, and elsewhere in the world. Indeed, Calori and Magarini (2015) recommend that cities seeking to advance from single to integrated policies should employ criteria, approaches and instruments that have already been established elsewhere.
There is also potential for greater cooperation between cities and the research community. Such cooperation would enable academic and community researchers to help solve problems proactively, rather than reacting to and reporting on practical experiences thus far. A cooperative platform between academic researchers and urban food policy networks of the type listed in Box 2 could be an effective way of ensuring that what is learned — from success and failure — in urban food policy can be analyzed independently and shared widely for the common good of food system transformations.

In addition to integration between policy areas, there is also a need for more interconnected food policymaking between the local, national and international levels. At present, disjointed policies through the ‘vertical’ levels means there is a risk of undermining progress, and opportunities for mutual support are missed. Greater understanding of how efforts to build sustainable food systems at the local level are affected by policies and imperatives at the national and international levels is one of the objectives of the three-year process, ‘Towards a Common Food Policy for the EU’, initiated by IPES-Food in 2016 (IPES Food, 2017).

Research needs

The analysis in this report also gives rise to five core research needs. Firstly, research is needed on the role of power in policy. The inclusion of political economy considerations in this report identified several ways in which power, and how it was obtained or exercised, contributed to enablers that drove food policy forward. For example, the elevation of an issue to the status of ‘powerful idea’ or rallying point thanks to civil society activism; the need for marginalized or disempowered actors working collectively to be able to participate or have a more powerful voice in policy making; and the active acknowledgement of actors’ political economic interests, so as to better identify conflicts and solutions to work around them, and to ensure that funding sources are appropriate. However, more research into the political economy of policy development could do more to identify how power can be managed or levered for effective change.

Secondly, to promote productive cooperation between city government and the community, research is needed on governance models and procedures that can enable people’s participation and ensure their voices are heard. While ‘food policy councils’ have considerable traction as a helpful model of cooperation (e.g. Harper et al., 2009; Stierand, 2012), there is huge variation between them and in many cases some actors are excluded — whether intentionally or not. In particular, it can be difficult to engage certain groups — such as poor and food insecure families, and small-scale farmers, either because they cannot be reached, or because the typical ways of working are alien to them (Halliday, 2015).

Thirdly, in several of the case studies in this report there were tensions over participation by the private sector in urban food policy — especially for large scale industrial producers and suppliers, whose interests are closely associated with many of the problems in modern food systems and, as such, may be incompatible with urban policy objectives to transform the dynamics of food systems. While Dubbeling et al. (2016a) have made some inroads into investigating how far, and on what terms, private sector involvement in City Region Food Systems is desirable and necessary, the next question is how it can be encouraged and facilitated practically, without compromising the desired outcomes and the participation of other sectors and actors who work in different ways?

Fourthly, the introduction to this report highlighted the utility of territorial approaches to urbanization and the food system, such as City Region Food Systems — an imperative also included in the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP, 2015). However, of the cases studied
in this report only two — Belo Horizonte and Golden Horseshoe — include policies and programmes that promote territorial integration at the urban-rural interface. The latter provides a particularly interesting model of cooperation between neighbouring municipalities, although there were reports of tensions with one of them. This raises the question, what governance models promote effective rural-urban linkages that are relevant for middle-sized and smaller towns as well as major conurbations and capitals? In particular, work is needed on how to encourage neighbouring local governments to work together over policies affecting productive areas in and around cities, the livelihoods of those who live and work in them, public spaces like markets and food hubs, and management of natural resources including land/soil, water and forests.

Fifthly, this research reinforced the need for better evaluation of the impacts of urban food policies, including indicators that enable the benefits to be clearly attributed to the policy initiative. Even when statistics appeared to show positive trends in addressing a target problem — such as improved food security in Belo Horizonte and reduced childhood obesity in Amsterdam — it is not always possible to attribute it to one policy, as opposed to the cumulative effect of several interventions or other, incidental socio-economic forces. Several efforts to develop indicators and monitoring frameworks are underway by organizations and networks, including FAO Food for Cities, RUAF, the Nordic Cities EAT Network, and the UK Sustainable Food Cities Network (as noted in the introduction). It is vital that the outputs of this work be transmitted to cities — in both the global North and South — for it to inform their monitoring procedures and ultimately strengthen urban food policy design and delivery.

Addressing these research needs should help to shed further light on the power of urban food policies to spark the transformation of global food systems that is urgently required.
CASE STUDY SELECTION

There is an extensive literature documenting examples of urban food policy, including a number of recent reports, books and book chapters, as well as international conferences at which local governments have taken the opportunity to present their policies (see Box 4, below). This meant that there was a rich set of examples to draw on to fulfil the goal of this report, to provide insights into the factors that enable the development and delivery of urban food policy.

The question we faced was: what are the examples that can be most helpful in providing lessons on the enablers of change? A priori this was not possible to say. Indeed, in theory, there was no reason not to believe that all of the examples could not provide important lessons, and thus the scope of choice was extremely wide.

Notably, we set out to study policy processes and not to evaluate policies’ impacts. Urban food policy cannot be universally assumed to deliver positive impacts; detailed evaluation is required in order to gauge their benefits — or, indeed, lack of benefits. While we initially sought only examples that had been rigorously evaluated, we found that monitoring and evaluation is, in the vast majority of cases, lacking.

We based our eventual choice of case studies on three considerations:

1. Policies that have actually been implemented in practice. We went through the existing documented examples to identify examples where there was proof they had been implemented in practice — for example, cases where the policy had been formally adopted through city council processes, where an action plan had been drawn up or specific programmes initiated under the policy, or where a governance body had been established to oversee implementation. Some policies that had, in fact, been implemented may well have been excluded from our list due to lack of immediate evidence, but at this stage it was long enough to provide the basis for a further selection.

2. Diversity of experiences. For example, we sought representation of:
   • different governance mechanisms and pathways to policy development, such as ‘top-down’ initiation and leadership from within city government vs policy initiation in response to ‘bottom-up’ civil society pressure;
   • different parts of the world, with examples from the Global North and the Global South;
   • different issues as the primary focus, such as food security, public health and local economy;
   • different territorial coverage, from cities with clearly defined administrative limits to wider city regions comprising several local governments.

3. We then assessed each of the policies to see if there was adequate information about the policy, and if viable contacts could be found within the cities who could talk to us and share information about the policy process. The final five were those which proved most convenient in practice to pursue in terms of viable contacts that were available to be interviewed.

Since the aim was an in-depth analysis, the number was necessarily limited. This meant that many issues — such as food safety and food waste — were not covered as primary objectives, and nor were some policy levers, such as public procurement. In addition, we did not achieve ideal global spread, with the notable absence of a case study from Asia.

Appendix

Methods of data collection and analysis

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BOX 4: RECENT LITERATURE, DIRECTORIES AND CONFERENCES DOCUMENTING URBAN FOOD POLICIES

Books and reports:

The Governance of City Food Systems: Case Studies From Around the World (Deakin et al., 2016).

E-book containing eight in-depth case studies of urban food policies, which were originally presented at a symposium at the Milan World Expo in 2015 entitled The Governance of the Smart City Food Agenda.

Milan Urban Food Policy Pact: Selected Good Practices from Cities (Forster et al., 2015a). Documents 49 urban food policies, organized by the main issue they sought to address (governance, sustainable diets and nutrition, social and economic equity, food production and urban-rural linkages, food supply and distribution, waste).

Food and the Cities: Food policies for sustainable cities (Calori & Magarini, 2015). Book containing 42 examples of urban food policies from around the world, grouped according to recurrent themes (governance, education, waste, access, wellness, environment, agricultural ecosystems, production, business and finance, trade).


Urban food policies and programmes: an overview (Baker & de Zeeuw, 2015). Book chapter that draws on recent literature to provide a (non-exhaustive) inventory of urban food policies and programmes and categorises them under the main objectives of: equitable access; nutrition and public health; local economy and food security; and environmental sustainability, diversity and resilience.

Directory of Food Policy Councils, produced by The Centre for a Livable Future at Johns Hopkins University (Centre for a Livable Future, 2015).

A Rough Guide to Urban Food Strategies (Morague-Faus et al., 2013). Guide drawing on experiences of cities and organizations that participated in the EU-funded 7th framework programme FOODLINKS.

Conferences:

International meeting on Urban food policies: markets, catering, and urban-rural connections held in Montpellier, France, in November 2015.

Annual AESOP Food Planning Conference, held each year since 2010, which attracts practitioners from city governments and civil society as well as academia. Papers presented are usually compiled into a book or special journal edition (e.g. Wiskerke & Viljoen, 2012; special issues of International Planning Studies in 2009 and 2013).
DATA COLLECTION

We collected data on the case study policies through document analysis and through interviews. We sought information on the processes of development and delivery of the policy, and were informed by frameworks used in earlier works on political economy of food, nutrition and health policies (Shiffman et al., 2007; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1993).

DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

All documents analysed were in the public domain and were sourced online, primarily through Google searches. Websites of organizations known to be involved were also searched, as were the online archives of local newspapers. Documentary sources included: policy documents, minutes from council meetings and other organizations, websites of local authorities and other organizations, media reports, and academic articles.

INTERVIEWS

For each case study, semi-structured interviews were carried out with at least two actors who had been involved with the development and/or implementation of the policy, from different organizations. A third interview was carried out where an additional point of view was deemed necessary. Wherever possible, interviews were carried out by Skype or telephone, and were recorded and transcribed. Where Skype or telephone interviews were not possible, either due to language barriers or lack of time on the part of the interviewee, questions were sent by email and the interviewee was asked to respond in as much detail as possible.

DATA ANALYSIS

Data were analysed through a political economy lens88, in line with the conceptual frameworks employed by Shiffman and Smith (2007) who highlight the central role of power — of actors, of ideas and framing, of political contexts, and of the issues themselves — in the policy process. Analysis was also informed by Pinstrup-Andersen’s (1993) conclusions that to understand the policy process it is essential to understand the relative power of key actors in the process, as well as their goals and rationales, vested interests, interactions, and dependencies and competitive relationships. This perspective is consistent with the explanation of political economy provided by IPES-Food (2015), although the focus of this earlier work was on national and international food policies.

IDENTIFYING COMMON ENABLERS, BARRIERS AND LESSONS

The results of the political analysis of the policy process for each of the case studies formed the basis of the next stage of the report — identification of common enablers and barriers.

First, we examined each of the five case studies to identify factors that had advanced the policy process (enablers), and those that had held it back (barriers).

Next, the enabling factors and barriers from all the case studies were mapped alongside each other, and we sought common factors that occurred in more than one case. Not all of the factors were present in all of the cases, but in order to be considered ‘recurring’ they had to

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88 The authors acknowledge that the term ‘political economy’ has historically been used to refer to the intersection of the political and economic spheres, but its precise definition shifted during the course of the 20th century and it is used in various different ways by different academic disciplines (Clark, 1998). The authors therefore emphasize that the meaning of ‘political economy’ in this report is based on the cited precedents within the food policy literature to shed light on the effect of political arrangements and power relations on the policy process.
occur in at least two of the five. Notably, too, in all of the case studies at least five of the recurring factors were present.

Finally, once a set of recurring enablers and barriers had been drawn up, we explored ways in which they could be organized into thematic categories. Once the enabling factors and barriers had been categorised, we returned to the case study data and mined it once again to draw out lessons on how the enabling factors were harnessed, and ways in which the barriers were overcome.
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Notes
WHAT MAKES URBAN FOOD POLICY HAPPEN?

Bina Agarwal is former president of the Int. Society for Ecological Economics, and an expert on land rights & food security who has published award-winning books on gender and land issues and received the Padma Shri prize from the President of India.

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Phil Howard is an expert in food system changes and the visualization of these trends. He has authored prominent contributions to the public debate on concentration, consolidation and power in food systems.

Molly Anderson is a specialist in hunger, food systems, and multi-actor collaborations for sustainability who has led inter-disciplinary academic programmes and participated in regional food system planning.

Claude Fischler has headed major French research institutions and served on national and European-level food safety committees, and has a long track-record of innovative inter-disciplinary research on food and nutrition.

Steve Gliessman founded one of the first formal agroecology programs in the world, and has more than 40 years experience of teaching, research, publishing and production experience in the field of agroecology.

Hans Herren is a World Food Prize (1995) and Right Livelihood Award (2013) Laureate, and has managed international agriculture and bio-science research organizations as well as playing a leading role in global scientific assessments.

Martin Khor is Executive Director of the South Centre, an inter-governmental organisation helping to assist developing countries in trade and climate negotiations, and a former director of the Third World Network.
Olivier De Schutter is co-chair of IPES-Food. He served as UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food from May 2008 until May 2014 and was elected to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2014.

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Paul Uys has 40 years of global retail experience specializing in brand creation, product development and sustainable sourcing, and now advises several bodies on sustainability issues, including the Marine Stewardship Council.
Report by the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food)

Executive Summary:  http://www.ipes-food.org/images/Reports/Cities_execsummary.pdf

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