A note on ex-ante stable lotteries

Schlegel, J. C. (2018). A note on ex-ante stable lotteries. Economics Letters, 164, pp. 90-93. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.017

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Abstract

We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent–object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability, one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Uncontrolled Keywords: Matching, School choice, Lotteries, Ex-ante stability
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19678

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