



City Research Online

City St George's, University of London

Citation: Parsons, K. (2018). Constructing a National Food Policy: Integration Challenges in Australia and the UK. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London)

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19680/>

Copyright and Reuse: Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).

PhD Thesis

**Constructing a National Food Policy:
Integration Challenges in Australia and the UK**

Kelly Parsons

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Food Policy

Centre for Food Policy

Department of Sociology

City, University of London

September 2017

[This Page Left Intentionally Blank]

CONTENTS

List of Tables	9
List of Figures	11
Acronyms	12
Acknowledgements	13
Declaration	13
Abstract	13
SECTION ONE	16
Chapter One: Food Policy Integration as a Problem	17
1.1 The Research Problem	17
1.2 The Tensions	19
1.3 Old and New Policy Frameworks	21
1.4 Conceptual Framework	22
1.5 The Empirical Focus	24
1.5.1 UK	25
1.5.2 Australia	26
Summary and Chapter Preview	27
Chapter Two: Literature Review	28
2.1 Literature Review Methodology	28
2.2 Food Policy Integration Prior to 2008: Single Domain Approaches Dominate	30
2.2.1 Food Policy as Agriculture Policy	30
2.2.1.2 Agriculture-Environment Links	32
2.2.2 Food Industry Policy	33
2.2.3 UK Nutrition Policy	34
2.2.3.1 Health and Environment Links in UK	35
2.2.3.2 Australian Nutrition Policy	36
2.2.3.4 Health and Environment Links in Australia: Australian Dietary Guidelines	37
2.2.4 Food Safety/Standards Policy	38
2.2.5 Summary	40
2.3 The Public Policy Context	40
2.3.1 Government to Governance	40
2.3.2 The Policy Instrument Paradigm	41
2.3.2.1 What is a National Food <i>Policy</i>	42
2.3.3 What Would Successful Integrated Food Policy Look Like?	42
2.3.3.1 Defining Policy Success and Failure	43
2.3.3.2 Factors Impacting on Successful Policy	45
Conceptual Framework	47
2.4 Policy Integration	47
2.4.1 Why Integrate?	47
2.4.2 What is Integrated Policy?	49
2.4.3 From Integration to Coherence	53
2.4.4 Policy Integration and Governance	55

2.4.5 History of Policy Integration Attempts	56
2.5.4.1 UK	57
2.5.4.2 Australia	58
2.4.6 How Can We Judge Policy Integration?	58
2.4.7 Examples of Policy Integration Attempts	59
2.4.7.1 EPI/Sustainable Development	59
2.4.7.2 Health Inequalities	60
2.4.8 Facilitators and Inhibitors of Policy Integration	61
2.4.9 Some Conclusions on Public Policy Integration	61
2.5 Augmenting the Policy Integration Literature with Historical Institutionalism	62
2.5.1 Origins of Historical Institutionalism	62
2.5.2 What is an Institution?	63
2.5.3 History and Timing Matter	64
2.5.4 Path Dependence	65
2.5.4.1 Mechanisms of Path Dependency	66
2.5.4.2 Critical Change	67
2.5.4.3 More on Layering	70
2.5.5 The Role of Ideas	71
2.5.5.1 Value Conflict	72
2.6 Combining HI with Policy Integration	73
2.7 Summary of Chapter Two	75
Chapter Three: Methodology	77
3.1 Research Objectives and Questions	77
3.2 Research Design	78
3.2.1 Comparative Study	78
3.2.2 Case Study Method	78
3.2.3 Literature Review	80
3.3 Choice of Approach	82
3.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions	83
3.3.2 Balancing Interpretivism and Institutionalism	84
3.3.3 Inductive or Deductive?	85
3.4 Underpinning the research with a Institutionalist theory of Integration	86
3.4.1 Operationalising the Policy Integration Literature	86
3.4.2 Operationalising the Historical Institutional Lens	91
3.4.3 Tools to Organise the Data	96
3.5 The UK and Australian Field Work, and links with CSIRO	109
3.6 Interviews	109
3.7 Documents	112
3.8 Coding Approach and Analysis	115
3.9 Ethics	119
3.10 Summary of Methodology Chapter	119
SECTION TWO: FINDINGS	120
Chapter 4: How has national food policy integration been addressed in the UK and Australia?	121

4.1 History of National ‘Food Policies’	121
4.2 The State Institutions Compared	127
4.2.1 Department of Agriculture	127
4.2.2 Department of Health	129
4.2.3 Department of Industry	130
4.2.4 Food Standards	131
4.2.5 Cabinet Department	132
4.3 Horizontal/Cross-Departmental Governance	133
4.3.1 Illustration of Fragmented Policy Responsibility: Horsemeat Incident	134
4.4 Non-State Institutions Compared	136
4.4.1 Economic Context and Role of Food Industry in Economy	139
4.4.2 Food Trade	141
4.4.3 Civil Society	142
4.5 Food Governance	146
4.5.1 Mechanisms of MLG	149
4.6 Political Institutions Compared	152
4.6.1 Elections	153
4.6.2 The Bureaucracy	154
Chapter Five: Policy Analysis of Food Matters and Food 2030 Projects	156
5.1 OUTSET	156
5.1.1 Originating Actor	156
5.1.2 Food 2030	157
5.1.2 Timeline and Time Taken	157
5.1.2.1 Food 2030	158
5.1.3 Terms of Reference	158
5.1.3.1 Food 2030	158
5.1.4 Political Party and Stage in Electoral Cycle	159
5.1.4.1 Food 2030	159
5.1.5 Government Sponsor/ Lead Department	159
5.1.5.1 Food 2030	160
5.2 CONTENT	161
5.2.1 Definition of the Problem	162
5.2.1.1 Food 2030	162
5.2.2 Goals and Objectives	163
5.2.2.1 Food 2030	164
5.2.3 Framing	164
5.2.3.1 Food 2030	165
5.2.4 Policy Omissions	166
5.2.4.1 Food 2030	167
5.2.5 Degree of Change	168
5.2.5.1 Food 2030	169
5.2.6 Policy Integration	169
5.2.6.1 Food 2030	170

5.3 INPUT	170
5.3.1 Input from Departments	170
Food 2030	171
5.3.2 Mechanism for Coordination	171
5.3.2.1 Food 2030	171
5.3.3 Institutional Reform	172
5.3.3.3 Food 2030	174
5.3.4 Lead Personnel	174
5.3.4.1 Food 2030	175
5.3.5 Advisory Groups	175
5.3.5.1 Food 2030	176
5.3.6 Stakeholder Involvement	176
5.3.6.1 Food 2030	176
5.3.7 Consultation	176
5.3.7.1 Food 2030	177
5.3.8 Political Input	177
5.3.8.1 Food 2030	177
5.4 BUDGET	178
5.4.1 Budget for Policy Development	178
5.4.1.1 Food 2030	178
5.4.2 Budget for Policy Implementation	178
5.4.2.1 Food 2030	178
5.5 OUTCOMES	178
5.5.1 Plans for Implementation and Evaluation	178
5.5.1.1 Food 2030	179
5.5.2 Policy Instruments	180
5.5.2.1 Food 2030	180
5.5.3 Indicators	181
5.5.3.1 Food 2030	181
5.5.4 Final Status	181
5.5.4.5 Food 2030	183
5.5.5 General Discussion of FM and 2030 Project Outputs	183
Chapter Six: Policy Analysis of National Food Plan Project	185
6.1 OUTSET	185
6.1.1 Originating Actor	185
6.1.2 Timeline and Time Taken	1877
6.1.3 Terms of Reference	187
6.1.4 Political Party and Stage in Electoral Cycle	1888
6.1.5 Government Sponsor/ Lead Department	188
6.2 CONTENT	190
6.2.1 Definition of the problem	191
6.2.2 Goals and Objectives	192
6.2.3 Framing	195

6.2.3.1 Food Security	195
6.2.3.2 Innovation, Competition and Efficiency	195
6.2.3.3 Appropriate Role of Government	196
6.2.4 Policy Omissions	196
6.2.5 Degree of Change	197
6.2.6 Policy Integration	197
6.3 INPUT	200
6.3.1 Input from Departments	200
6.3.2 Mechanism for Coordination	202
6.3.3 Institutional Reform	202
6.3.4 Lead Personnel	203
6.3.5 Advisory Groups	203
6.3.6 Stakeholder Involvement	204
6.3.7 Consultation	205
6.3.8 Consultants	208
6.3.9 Political input	208
6.4 BUDGET	208
6.4.1 Budget for Policy Development	208
6.4.2 Budget for Policy Implementation	209
6.5 OUTCOMES	210
6.5.1 Plans for Implementation and Evaluation	210
6.5.2 Policy Instruments	210
6.5.3 Indicators	211
Final Status	211
Chapter Seven: Comparing Integration in the Two Policy Projects	212
7.1 Differing Definitions of Integration	219
7.2 Lead Department	222
7.3 Institutional Reform	223
7.4 Input from Outside Government	223
7.5 Problem Definition and Goals	225
7.6 Departmental Input	228
7.7 Integration of Outputs	230
7.8 Impact of the Electoral Cycle	232
SECTION 3: Discussion of Findings and Conclusion	233
Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion	233
8.1 Conceptual and Operational Ambiguity	234
8.2 Integration as a Process	241
8.3 HI and PI	241
8.4 Practical Implications for Integrated National Food Policy	252
8.5 Conclusion	254
8.6 Contributions	255
8.7 The Historical-Structural Lens	257
8.8 Methodological Reflections	259

8.9 Limitations	260
8.10 Summary of Conclusions	261
8.11 Future Research	262
APPENDICES	267
REFERENCES	412

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Tensions between Food Policy Domains	19
Table 2.1: Literature Search Parametres	30
Table 2.2: Definitions of Policy Success	43
Table 2.3: Policy Development Fundamentals	44
Table 2.4: Examples of Institutional Reform	47
Table 2.5: Policy Integration Definitions	50
Table 2.6: Types of Coordination	52
Table 2.7: Integration or Balancing	52
Table 2.8: Types of Government Policy Capacity	55
Table 2.9: Examples of Good Practice in Cross-cutting Working	56
Table 2.10: Mechanisms of Path Dependency	66
Table 2.11: Strict and Loose Path Dependence	68
Table 2.12: Patterns of Institutional Change	69
Table 2.13: Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy	72
Table 3.1: Research Objectives and Questions	77
Table 3.2: Additional Literature Search	81
Table 3.3: Activities that may be subject to Joining Up	87
Table 3.4: Examples of Centralised Instruments	88
Table 3.5: Types of Instrument for Environmental Policy Integration	88
Table 3.6: Barriers to Integration	89
Table 3.7: How to Measure Integrated-ness	90
Table 3.8: Measures of Policy Integration	90
Table 3.9: Example of Definitions of Institutions	92
Table 3.10: Components of Institutional Analysis	92
Table 3.11: IFAD Guide to Institutional Analysis	94
Table 3.12: Data Required	96
Table 3.13: Framework Tool Justification	98
Table 3.14: Policy System Template Justification	108
Table 3.15: Interviewees	110
Table 3.16: Policy Documents	113
Table 3.17: Examples of Policy System Themes and Sub-Themes	116
Table 3.18: Examples of Policy Project Themes and Sub-Themes – FM	117
Table 3.19: Examples of Generic Themes and Sub-Themes	118
Table 4.1: History of Food Policies in the UK and Australia	122
Table 4.2: Australian Food Industry Stakeholders	137
Table 4.3: UK Food Industry Stakeholders	138
Table 4.4: UK-Australia Food Economics Compared	139
Table 4.5: Agricultural Productivity in Australia	142
Table 4.6: UK Civil Society Groups active in Food Policy	143

Table 4.7: UK-Australia Political Structures Compared	152
Table 5.1: Food Matters Departmental Working Group	170
Table 5.2: Food Matters Project Team	174
Table 5.3: Food Matters Expert Advisory Group	175
Table 6.1 Timetable of National Food Plan Formulation	187
Table 6.2: Changing NFP Objectives	194
Table 6.3: References to Policy Integration in NFP Process	198
Table 6.4: Options for Mechanism to Improve Leadership and Stakeholder Engagement	202
Table 6.5: NFP Food Policy Working Group	203
Table 6.6: The NFP Consultation Process	206
Table 6.7: Attendees of Public Meetings	207
Table 6.8: Written Submissions to the National Food Plan	207
Table 6.9: NFP White Paper Implementation Budget	209
Table 7.1: Summary of Framework Tool Application	213
Table 7.2: References to Integration at Outset of Food Matters and National Food Plan	218
Table 7.3: Integration focus in the UK and Australia	221
Table 7.4: National Food Plan Goals – Possible Tensions	226
Table 7.5: Economic, Environmental and Health Goals in UK and Australian Policies	229
Table 8.1: Barriers to Integration – Revisited	234
Table 8.2: Tensions between Food Policy Domains – Revisited	236
Table 8.3: Activities that may be subject to Joining Up – Revisited	239
Table 8.4: Examples of Centralised Instruments – Revisited	240
Table 8.5: Institutional Venues for Food Policies	242
Table 8.6: Summary of Institutional Factors impacting on Food Policy Integration	246

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Policymaking and the Electoral Cycle	46
Figure 2.2: Levels of Policy Integration	53
Figure 3.1: Research Process	81
Figure 3.2: IIED-Wageningen Framework for Institutional Analysis of Agri-food Chains	93
Figure 3.3 The Framework Tool Diagram	97
Figure 4.1: Australia's Food Regulatory System	150
Figure 6.1: Goals of the National Food Plan White Paper	193
Figure 8.1: Dimensions of Integration identified in the Research	256

Acronyms

AAo: Administrative Arrangements Order	DECC: Department for Energy and Climate Change
ABARES: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences	DEFRA: Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation	DfID: Department for International Development
ACTU: Australian Council of Trade Unions	DIISRTE: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education
ACWP: Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper	DSO: Departmental Strategic Objective
ADG: Australian Dietary Guidelines	DTI: Department for Trade and Industry
AFGC: Australian Food and Grocery Council	EFRA: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Select Committee)
AHDB: Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board	EPA: Environmental Policy Appraisal
AIHW: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare	EPI: Environmental Policy Integration
ANPHA: Australian National Preventive Health Agency	EU: European Union
ANZFA: Australia–New Zealand Food Authority	F2030: <i>Food 2030</i>
ARC: Australian Research Council	FCRN: Food Climate Research Network
ATS: Agritech Strategy	FDF: Food and Drink federation
AWASH: Australian Division of World Action on Salt and Health	FEC: Food Ethics Council
BBSRC: Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council	FF&F: Foresight Food and Farming
BERC: Budget and Expenditure Review Committee	F&HD: Food and Health Dialogue
BERR: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform	FHAP: Food and Health Action Plan
BIS: Department for Business, Industry, Skills	FISS: Food Industry Sustainability Strategy
BRC: British Retail Consortium	FIAL: Food Innovation Australia Limited
BT: British Telecom	FM: <i>Food Matters: Towards a Strategy for the 21st Century</i>
CEO: Chief Executive Officer	FMOYO: Food Matters: One Year On (Report)
CFPA: Council of Food Policy Advisors	F&NP: Food and Nutrition Policy
CIWF: Compassion in World Farming	FOE: Friends of the Earth
CJ: Critical Juncture	FoFR: Forum on Food Regulation
CO: Cabinet Office	FOI: Freedom of Information
COAG: Council of Australian Governments	FPU: Food Policy Unit
CPRS: Central Policy Review Staff	FPIS: Food Processing Industry Strategy
CSIRO: Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation	FSA: Food Standards Agency
DA: Department of Agriculture	FSANZ: Food Standards Australia New Zealand
DCLG: Department of Communities and Local Government	FSTF: Food Strategy Task Force
DFE: Department for Education	GDP: Gross Domestic Product
DH: Department of Health (UK)	GFP: Green Food Project
DIUS: Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills	GFPSC: Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption
DoHA: Department of Health and Ageing	GM: Genetic Modification
DAFF: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	GVA: Gross Value Added
	HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
	HFM: Healthy Food Mark
	HI: Historical Institutionalism
	HiAP: Health in All Policies
	HOL: House of Lords
	IAC: Integrated Advice to Consumers
	IFG: Institute for Government
	IGD: Institute for Grocery Distribution
	JASP: Joint Approach to Social Policy
	JMC: Joint Ministerial Committee

JUG: Joined-up Government	PM&C: Prime Minister and Cabinet
MAFF: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	PMSEIC: Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council
MLG: Multi-Level Governance	PMSU: Prime Minister's Strategy Unit
MOD: Ministry of Defence	QUT: Queensland University of Technology
NAO: National Audit Office	RSC: Roundtable on Sustainable Consumption
NFF: National Farmers Federation	RSPB: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
NFIS: National Food Industry Strategy	SCOPI: Standing Council on Primary Industries
NFP: National Food Plan	SDC: Sustainable Development Commission
NFU: National Farmers Union	SDD: Strategy and Delivery Division
NGO: Non-governmental Organisation	SIGNAL: Strategic Inter-Governmental Nutrition Alliance
NHMRC: National Health and Medical Research Council	SME: Small-Medium Enterprise
NHS: National Health Service	SpAD: Special Advisor
NIAB: National Institute of Agricultural Botany	SoS: Secretary of State
NPAPH: National Partnership Agreement on Preventative Health	SSFF: Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food
NPHP: National Public Health Partnership	STAS: Supermarket to Asia Strategy
NPM: New Public Management	TOR: Terms of Reference
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	TSB: Technology Strategy Board
OPEC: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries	UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
PAR: Programme Analysis Review	WHO: World Health Organisation
PC: Policy Commission	WRAP: Waste and Resources Action Programme
PD: Path Dependence	WTO: World Trade Organisation
PHAA: Public Health Association Australia	
PHRD: Public Health Responsibility Deal	

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors David Barling and Tim Lang for guiding me through an interesting and inspiring research project, which I hope does some justice to their visionary ideas about food policy. I am extremely grateful for the opportunity. I am also grateful to the co-sponsors of my PhD, City, University of London, and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation. Particular thanks go to Ingrid Appelqvist, (and her family), who looked after me so well during my time in Australia, and was a kind, thoughtful and fun person to work with. The project also relied on the participation of a wide range of interviewees, who generously gave their time.

I could not have got here without my wonderful friends at the Centre for Food Policy, in particular Raquel, who started this process with me and has been a huge support, and Rebecca. Both kept me sane and gave me so many laughs too. I look forward to a long working relationship together in the years to come. And thanks to Cey for being my technical support.

Finally, to my lovely family, Mum, Dad and Laura, for being understanding, and supporting me as always. Thanks in particular to Robin for all his support; for being understanding, and putting up with my food (policy) obsession, and constant juggling of too many things at once. And to my Bea for being so totally gorgeous. To my friends, especially Liz and Dawn, for always being encouraging and looking out for me. Finally thank you to Tina, Liz, and Linda and Tony, for all the times you entertained Bea so I could get this finished.

Declaration

I declare that the work presented in this thesis, except those elements specifically declared, is all my own work carried out and finished at City, University of London.

Copyright Declaration

The author accepts the discretion of the City, University of London librarian to allow the thesis to be copied in whole or in part without the prior written consent of the author. This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University library and may be photocopied only in single copies or lent to other libraries for the purpose of study.

Abstract

Calls for an integrated food policy to tackle the new fundamentals of the food system have been regularly made by academics, policymakers, the food industry and civil society for over a decade in many countries but, despite some changes, much of the old policy framework remains entrenched. This gap raises questions about why policy innovation has proved so difficult.

This study responded to that research problem through a qualitative, interpretivist comparative study of how two countries attempted to improve their policy integration, via two specific policy integration projects: the UK's Food Matters/Food 2030 process (2008-2010) and Australia's (2010-2013) National Food Plan. It applied a conceptual framework fusing historical institutionalism and the public policy integration literature, focusing on the policy formulation stage. Fieldwork was conducted in both countries, including interviews with key informants; and publically-available documents about the policy projects and broader policy systems were analysed.

The findings suggest the two policy projects represent a food policy shift from single-domain 'policy taker', towards multiple domain 'policy maker', but both fell short of what might be classed as 'integration' in the literature. The research identifies how tensions between domains are sidestepped, and makes broader propositions around how multiple values and goals co-exist in this contested policy space, and the need for improved value agreement capacity. It also highlights a general lack of focus on integration as a process. It explores how the legacy of historical fragmented approaches, plus political developments and decisions around institutional design, and a more general trend of hollowing out of national government, impact on how integrated food policy can be formulated in a particular country setting. It therefore proposes an emerging 'institutionalist theory of food policy integration', conceptualising the dimensions of integration, and multiple institutional influences on integration attempts.

Keywords: Australia; Food Policy Governance; Integration; Institutions; National Food Policy; UK

SECTION ONE

This Section presents the inputs to the thesis, by first setting out the research problem: why national food policy integration projects have not succeeded. Chapter One continues with a justification of the empirical and conceptual elements of the research design, and introduces the two empirical cases which represent the focus of the study. Chapter Two presents a wide-ranging review of the literature, divided into four themes: approaches to national food policy prior to the case study integration projects; the changing governance of food; policy integration; and the theory of Historical Institutionalism. Finally, in Chapter Three, the research methodology is explained and justified.

Chapter One: Food Policy Integration as a Problem

This chapter is structured in the following way: the problem the research addresses is described, with particular reference to evolving policy frameworks for food. The rationale for a more structural theoretical focus on integration is presented, with reference to how theory has been used as a lens for food policy to date. Then, the empirical focus of the thesis is described.

1.1 The Research Problem

An integrated national approach can be considered something of a philosophers' stone for modern food policy; *'ever sought but always just beyond reach'*, borrowing from Rhodes' (2000) oft-quoted maxim on the challenges of public policy integration more generally. In short, this research set out to explore why.

Calls for an integrated strategy, also referred to as a joined-up food policy or whole-of-government or cross-government approach, have been regularly made for over a decade, and continue to be raised as a policy solution by stakeholders ranging from academics and civil society groups, the food industry, global organisations such as the World Health Organisation, to governments themselves (Lang 1998; Barling et al 2002; Lang and Heasman 2004; 2015; DEFRA 2006; Cabinet Office 2008b; Lang et al 2009; PHAA 2009; Carnell 2009; DAFF 2011; Macrae 2011; AFGC 2012; Government Office for Science 2012; DAFF 2012; Which? 2013; DAFF 2013; Labour Party 2013; Creagh 2013). It remains a live issue: policy integration was given new impetus in the past year, with Target 17.14 of the (2015) Sustainable Development Goals, 'Enhance Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development'. The aim is *'to support sustainable development outcomes by breaking down the silos between policy communities and applying integrated, whole of government, approaches to common global challenges'* (Hawkes 2015 p7).

The backdrop to calls for greater integration of multiple and sometimes contradictory goals in food policymaking is challenges presented by the *'new fundamentals'* of the food system (Barling et al 2008): climate change; water; biodiversity and eco-systems support; energy and non-renewable fossil fuels; population growth; land use; soil; labour; and dietary change and public health (p3). More recently, Morley et al (2016) refer to a *'deepening set of food vulnerability conditions since 2010'*, and the urgent need for a *'clear policy vision and actions for achieving healthy and sustainable diets for all'* (p6). These challenges are well documented in the food policy literature and will not be covered in any detail here (for example see Lang et al 2009; Lang and Barling 2012; Lang and Heasman 2015).

Traditionally, as Lang and Barling (2012) assert, most policy described as 'food policy' has focused on *producing* food – predominantly on agriculture – and been dealt with by ministries of agriculture, not food. This arrangement can be traced back to institutional reforms during the Second World War, a period when *'the UK had its clearest, most just, and integrated food system'* (Lang 1999a p173), where only one department, the much-heralded Ministry of Food, was responsible for food and nutrition across the UK. In 1955 responsibilities for food, diet, nutrition were divided across several agencies/departments, and the Ministry – which had *'developed as an outcrop of the Department of Health'* – was subsumed within the new Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, so pointedly *'transferring its centre of gravity from a*

health perspective to an agro-industrial one' (Foster and Lunn 2007 p200). However, in recent decades broader definitions of food policy, encompassing more than agriculture, have developed in recognition of changes in the food system which have taken place during this period. So, *modern* food policy is defined by Lang and Heasman (2004) as:

'the decision-making that shapes the way the world of food operates and is controlled' and 'those policies and the policy making processes that shape the outcome of the food supply chain, food culture and who eats what, when and how, and with what consequences' (Lang and Heasman 2004 p2).

Similarly Caraher, in Thompson and Kaplan (2014 p804), defines food policy as:

"...more than health and more than just agricultural policies or even nutrition policy as individual strands; it is the interconnectedness and sometimes even the disconnect between these various areas".

Such definitions are rooted in a vision of *'ecological public health'*, pioneered by the UK's Centre for Food Policy, with goals for food policy including: sufficiency of production on ecological terms; preventing diet-related ill-health (within a sustainable food supply); harnessing all sciences to address the nature of production; lowering food's impact on the environment; international development and social justice (Lang et al 2009). According to such definitions, then, food issues are relevant for many areas of government policy beyond simply agriculture: health, environment, rural, trade, industry and innovation, to name the main ones. The problem is that while *relevant* to many, such issues remain the *direct concern* of relatively few and *'cross-cutting policy issues [which] too often fall between the institutions of food governance'* (Lang and Heasman 2015 p256). The result is that food policy remains fragmented at national level and attempts to address food issues through national policies, strategies or plans have historically focused on one or two aspects of food independently; for example either agriculture, food industry processing, food security, nutrition, or food research and development. This *'patchwork of strategies'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p41) is one of several fragmentations which characterise modern food policy: there are challenges for joining-up vertically with other levels of governance; plus along the food chain, in terms of the stages of food production and consumption, where sectoral interests tend to remain in their discrete *'comfort zones'* (Lang and Barling 2012; Lang and Heasman 2015 p6). However, it is the horizontal fragmentation across discrete policy areas; the relationship between policies at the same levels of governance, or *'horizontal interplay'* (Young 2002), which this research set out to address. As Lang and Barling state:

'Policy-making processes are more used to addressing single issue problems, not the connections of, for example, the production sphere with its environmental, natural resource and ecosystem impacts, or the impact of consumption on waste or public health impacts' (2012 p318).

The challenge of a more coordinated approach to food governance, across a horizontally-fragmented policy space, is often exacerbated by a New Public Management-inspired (NPM) policy design based on division of policy responsibilities by specific constituents, a formation which leaves most governments without an institutional place from which to work on food-related matters, and open to criticism of working in policy 'silos'. For example, analysis by the UK Sustainable Development Commission in 2008 identified 19 ministries, agencies and bodies related to food and almost 100 policy areas/responsibilities (SDC 2008). While, an interviewee for the thesis described 16 Australian Federal

government departments with a role in food, plus 54 agencies, replicated across every state (CS-A6). The same ‘*patchwork of regulations and standards*’ with agencies working ‘*at cross-purposes*’ has also been documented in the USA (UCS 2014).

In more scholarly terms, the existence of ‘*organizationally-bound problem perceptions*’ naturally results in ‘*turf wars*’ (Hustedt and Seyfried 2016 p890). The NPM structure also involves certain rules and standard operating procedures which work in opposition to integrated policy and longer-term policy programmes, as will be discussed further in the literature review. All can be considered contributory ‘*forces that promote continuity in policymaking*’ addressing food issues (Weir 2006 p172).

1.2 The Tensions

Surprisingly, considering the frequency of calls to address fragmentation in this policy space, there is little articulation in the literature of the nature of tensions and inconsistencies which result from a lack of coordination and – despite their rhetorical commitment – policy documents avoid explicitly addressing them. One reason may be a perceived issue of generalisability when attempting to identify tensions between the discrete domains of food policy: such analysis depends not only on country-specific conditions but is also, arguably, a matter of interpretation. For example in using the term food security, as Lang and Heasman (2015) note:

‘While few people disagree the world faces a crisis of food (in)security, the term food security can mean different things. To some it is just a matter of raising production; to others it is a matter of access, affordability, utilisation and appropriateness too’ (p10).

Nevertheless, with reference to both academic and grey literature, when plotting the research problem it was possible to attempt an initial sketch of some potential tensions and inconsistencies between policy domains covering food, as outlined in Table 1.1. The research project, the basis of this thesis, was to expand understanding of the dynamics entailed and, where possible, to identify additional tensions.

Table 1.1: Tensions between Food Policy Domains

Policy Domain	Policy Domain	Tension
Nutrition	Trade and Investment	Incentives for Direct Foreign Investment (FDI) agricultural ownership and other support of food industry production may limit government influence over food supply (Thow and McGrady 2014) and may result in: - Increased availability and greater promotion of high calorie, nutrient poor foods - Increased availability of vegetable sources of saturated and trans fats (Hawkes 2015)
Industry/Science/Agriculture	Consumer Protection/Food Safety	Radical new technologies such as genetic modification and nanotechnology vs consumer desire for authenticity and integrity (Lang and Heasman 2015 p5)
Agriculture	Nutrition/Food Safety	Clash between pesticide levels permitted

		in farming, and nutrition policy promoting fruit and vegetable consumption, and food safety policy around washing and peeling fruit and vegetables (Barling et al 2002)
Nutrition	Sustainability	Recommendations to eat fish vs Declining fish stocks (NHMRC 2013; Lang and Heasman 2015 p185)
Agriculture/Trade Policy	Climate Change	Goals to increase food production vs mitigation of GHG emissions from agriculture (Feindt and Flynn 2009; Nilssen et al 2012)
Food Waste	Food Safety	Food waste reduction goals vs food safety advice (FDF 2009 p5; Watson and Meah 2012)
Industry/Trade	Nutrition	Policies supporting food manufacturing innovation and growth, particularly of 'value-added' foods increase levels of processed foods, which tend to be nutrient-poor, energy dense (Monteiro et al 2011)
Nutrition/Education	Industry/Trade/Agriculture	Policies to address obesity via school settings may be viewed as damaging to economy and job generation (Charvel et al 2015)
Agricultural Multifunctionality	Trade/Market Liberalisation	UK Industry Department and Treasury <i>'severely apathetic towards the idea of new forms of state assistance for multifunctional agriculture'</i> and <i>'successive ministers of agriculture are reluctant to contradict the flow of policies from the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and, or especially, from the Treasury'</i> (Marsden and Sonnino 2008 p429)
Self-Sufficiency	Competition	<i>'UK competition policy continues to allow the oligopolistic behaviour of the downstream retailers and the UK as a whole becomes significantly less self-sufficient in food production'</i> (Marsden and Sonnino 2008 p429)
Trade/Market Liberalisation	Biosecurity	<i>'Australia has had very strict quarantine restrictions and fears remain that the WTO is promoting downward harmonisation, thereby increasing the risk of foodborne diseases entering the country and potentially compromising food security (Dibden et al 2011). The concern is that downward harmonisation will diminish Australia's ability to trade in 'clean and green' agricultural products. In endorsing, and following, the WTO's global neoliberal trading regime, the Australian government is encouraging the importation of cheaper, but potentially more risky, foods'</i> (Lawrence et al 2013 p14)

Source: Author

Likewise, potential areas of policy *coherence* are rarely explicitly articulated. A rare example is in Hawkes (2015), which identifies potential synergies and conflicts between a nutrition goal that ‘*all people consume adequate, nutritious and healthy diets*’, with trade policies (p21). Work on reconciling competing food policy tensions is also taking place in the developing area of ‘nutrition sensitive food systems’, where nutrition objectives are incorporated into agriculture (Nugent 2011; Keding et al 2013; Pinstrup-Andersen 2013). A further example is work on sustainable diets, including the current Eat: Lancet Commission; charged with exploring ‘*synergies and trade-offs between food-related human and planetary health*’ (Rockstrom et al 2016).

But formulating a cross-government integrated food policy has proved no less difficult than earlier endeavours addressing cross-cutting issues such as health inequalities and social exclusion. Despite acknowledged problems of organisational fragmentation; joint meetings between health, agriculture and environmental ministers or departments, let alone more formalised cross-government mechanisms, are rare (Macrae 2011), and stakeholders report confusion over which department or tier of government is responsible for which policy issue (DAFF 2012). This problem was thrown into sharp relief during the UK ‘horsemeat scandal’ of 2013, for example, where investigations (NAO 2013; Elliott 2014) concluded that machinery of government changes made in 2010 led to confusion over whether the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, The Department of Health, or the Food Standards Agency should be the first port of call for stakeholders; identified weakened intelligence sharing; and recommended a ‘*co-ordinated, joined-up approach across many Government departments*’ was needed in future (Elliott 2014 p52).

Similarly, attempts at cross-departmental initiatives can be subject to ‘*institutional pressures*’ and forum shopping which hinder their success, as demonstrated by Charvel et al’s (2015) analysis on Mexico’s 2010 multi-sector agreement to prevent obesity. This research aims to add to a nascent body of knowledge on how tensions play out in ‘live’ food policymaking attempts.

1.3 Old and New Policy Frameworks

An integrated approach to food policy involves confronting entrenched policy frameworks (Macrae 2011 p428). This fragmented policy space represents one element of a ‘*different and complex constellation of issues*’ than was addressed by the old food policy framework (Lang and Barling 2012). Placing new public health and environment fundamentals in a public policy context, Lang and Barling (2012) refer to emerging analysis stressing a:

- Shift from top-down government-driven policy frameworks to more market-driven ones (Lang et al 2009, cited in Lang and Barling 2012);
- Power and control over food systems now split between government and commercial interests (Lawrence et al 2009, cited in Lang and Barling 2012);
- Power and influence continuing to move off the land towards retailers and traders, with farms squeezed by new governance of value chains (Gereffi et al 2005; Burch and Lawrence 2007, cited in Lang and Barling 2012);
- Food culture changing from traditionally rule-bound to consumer choice-driven (Schwartz 2004, cited in Lang and Barling 2012).

Items one and two above are further addressed in the Literature Review section on Government to Governance (2.3.1).

The above list from Lang and Barling (2012) usefully sets the scene for the focus of this research into attempts to create an integrated national food policy, by highlighting both the need for (and considerations involved in) creating a new policy framework for food. It also underscores how establishing whether integrated food policy at the national level is possible requires documenting how the current policy framework is organised, and how it structures policymaking opportunities. This research, therefore, aims to extend policy framework analysis undertaken to date, by applying an *institutional* approach to the body of knowledge on public policy integration, to go beyond commonly-made critiques of government's 'silo-working', and provide more detailed insights into how the dominant regime fragments and compartmentalises these problems (Marsden 2013), and what calls for integrated national food policy – with their somewhat rationalist undertones – mean in the 'messy' reality of policymaking. It asks 'what do we actually mean by *integrated* food policy?' And – perhaps more importantly still – 'what do policymakers who have attempted whole-of-government policy projects mean by it?' It does so through an in-depth examination of two of the most significant attempts to create an integrated cross-government national food policy: the UK's *Food Matters: Towards a Strategy for the 21st Century* (2008b) and *Food 2030* (2010) projects (hereafter 'FM/F2030'); and Australia's (2013) *National Food Plan* (NFP). Both (ultimately unsuccessfully) attempted to overcome the challenges of food's fragmented governance.

With the research problem described, attention now turns to further exploring the theoretical focus of the research.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

As mentioned, the research has been theoretically-guided in its design, creating a conceptual framework fusing the body of scholarly knowledge on policy integration with historical institutionalist policy theory to create what is described in the conclusions section as an 'institutionalist theory of food policy integration'. A body of scholarly work on public policy integration has been amassed in particular since the late 1990s and early 2000s, predominantly in the UK but also beyond. By reflecting on this body of work the research should be well placed to go beyond numerous calls for an integrated food policy, and rhetoric employed at the outset of attempts to formulate a national food policy, to examine what is actually meant by the term integration. Because, as mentioned above, while a cross-government approach is a common policy ask, the details of what this actually means – what exactly needs to be implemented, and how this might take place – could be more clearly elucidated.

The policy integration issue is viewed through the lens of historical institutionalism, in order to allow particular focus on applying new integrated governance arrangements to established policy structures. With policy systems historically divided intellectually, constitutionally, and departmentally, '*supporting new approaches means extensively confronting many existing and entrenched policy frameworks and traditions*' (Macrae 2011 p428), making the case for a temporally-sensitive, structural

examination. The field of food policy is considered ripe for application of a more structural theory such as institutionalism for two reasons. Firstly, theoretical applications in the academic study of food policy to date have – on the whole – tended towards idea-, group- or process-based models. For example, the much cited food policy paradigms approach taken by Lang and Heasman (2004; 2015). Networks and Advocacy Coalitions have also proved popular explanatory models in analysing the food policy subsystem, and in particular the role of business interests in determining the policy agenda, as have process models such as Kingdon's Multiple Streams Approach (2003) and Walt and Gilson's (1994) Policy Analysis Triangle (see for example Thow et al 2014; Hawkes et al 2016).

Of course, food policy analysis to date has paid significant attention to institutions in terms of the *organisations* involved in the process. For example, Lang and Heasman's Food Wars (2004; 2015) makes explicit reference to a '*crisis of institutions*' and need to design and rework the '*institutional architecture of food*' (p12). This research attempts to expand such arguments and document more closely the institutional architecture which impacts on policy integration, adding a deeper understanding of *how* this happens. In addition, by broadening the definition of the term institution, the '*new institutionalist*' approach followed in this thesis attempts to go beyond traditional '*old institutionalist*' analysis, to examine not only the organisations themselves, but also the potential influence of rules and practices, the '*standard operating procedures*' (Hall 1986), plus ideas which become institutionalised, and potentially have a similarly structuring effect on policy processes. Food can be categorised as a 'wicked issue' (Peters and Pierre 2017) – a term associated with the notion of joining-up government, and developed to describe issues that don't fit the structure of the policy system in that they cross departmental boundaries – a '*class of problems whose causes are so complex, and whose solutions are so multi-factorial, that they require a multi-agency response*' (Ling 2002 p622). So – while acknowledging that structural analysis may not be considered '*en vogue*' as an approach to food policy analysis, and '*to propose the case for structural change used to be seen as politically outlandish*' (Lang and Heasman 2015 p24) – it is the contention here that a consideration of the structures which bind actors makes renewed sense in any attempt to understand the possibilities for new integrated governance arrangements for food policy (Rayner and Howlett 2009). In doing so the thesis aims to explore Lang and Heasman's contention that '*big structural changes are almost certainly needed due to the consequences of past decisions and practices*' (2015 p23-24).

Pre-requisite for understanding the dynamic between old and new food policy frameworks, is addressing the structure of the policy system; how the institutions – both organisational, procedural and ideational; governmental and non-governmental – influence the formulation process, unearthing potential clues as to the institutional reforms needed to enable food policy to evolve to meet new challenges. Aside from Barling's (2004) examination of '*Food Agencies as an institutional response to policy failure by the UK and the European Union*', and Feindt and Flynn's (2009) paper on food policy change, which looks at UK food policy development in a broad way by applying new institutionalist ideas about policy layering; food-related studies taking a historical institutionalist approach have tended towards a focus on a specific institution, such as Kay's (2005) examination of the Common Agricultural Policy's budgetary system, or Botterill's (2011) examination of the Australian Wheat Marketing Board. However, as examined in the

Methodology Chapter Three, the theory has been argued to be equally suitable for addressing broader empirical applications such as policy (sub)systems, and indeed, beyond food policy, the traditional focus of new institutionalist case studies has tended towards whole policy systems, in particular welfare systems.

The second justification of institutionalism theory is its suitability for explaining instances of policy *constraint*. It is generally agreed the shadow of past food policy falls heavily over the present. Forces of institutional inertia are un-doubtable (Marsden 2013), and despite attempts at policy innovation, accusations of ‘business as usual’ policy outcomes remain commonplace. Failed attempts to challenge the old policy framework with a new more integrated approach – what Lowndes and Roberts describe as attempts to ‘*square the circle*’ of current motivational demands with institutions which contain ‘*legacies of different mixed motivational demands from the past*’ (2013 p13) – are testament to the ‘stickiness’ of food policy. Drawing on paradigm theory, Marsden (2013), for instance, refers to the ‘*paradigm lock-in*’ of conventional (first-order) governance frameworks (p153).

The particular institutionalist approach applied in this research project incorporates a *historical* element. As described in detail in Chapter Two, historical institutionalism is one of several strands of new institutionalism. A historical focus is deemed appropriate given the legacy of food policy conceived as agriculture policy, and a state apparatus ‘*controlled by the ministries most associated with production: usually agriculture and not health or environment*’ (Lang and Heasmann 2015 p133), which – along with the institutional fragmentation of the policy space – potentially has an equally significant influence on attempts to develop a ‘new policy framework’ to respond to modern day challenges. The research explores how attempts to formulate a new integrated policy approach face organisational, practice-based and ideational institutional barriers to significant policy change. For example – in *organisational* terms – the institutional venues for food policy (the key departments which are responsible for food policy), are themselves legacies of past policy decisions about how they should be structured and operated. ‘*Policymakers work within structures inherited from the past to address problems ahead*’ and ‘*there is always a time-lag in capacity*’, in the words of Lang and Heasmann (2015). Practice-based and ideational institutions exist in the form of past decisions on standard operating procedures of departments and rules – or absence of rules – for cross-departmental communication on food issues; and in *definitions* of food policy as agriculture policy, or new ideas about competition and innovation in all policies (Evans and Cerny 2003) which can ‘*act like templates to base political decisions on*’ (Steinmo 2008). As discussed in the Methodology, such notions have links with policy paradigms as overarching frameworks of ideas and standards specifying ‘*not only the goals of policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing*’ (Hall 1993 p279; Cairney 2011). It is hoped, therefore, that this research will contribute to the theoretical understanding of food policy provided thus far by paradigmatic explanations.

1.5 The Empirical Focus

The empirical focus of the research is two specific policy attempts to create an integrated national policy, nested within the broader food policy systems in the UK and Australia. Two of the most significant

attempts to create an integrated cross-government national food policy have been the UK's *Food Matters* (2008) (FM) and *Food 2030* (2010) (F2030), and Australia's (2013) *National Food Plan* (NFP). There is a degree of confluence between the two country cases, both having embarked on these policy processes with an aim to take a more integrated approach to food policy and produce a new framework (Cabinet Office 2008b piii; DAFF 2011piii), though with subtle differences, as examined in Section Three. Further rationale for the selection of these two policy attempts is provided in the Methodology.

While a full historical analysis of the UK and Australian policy systems is beyond the scope of the thesis; inspired by the historical institutionalist theory, these policy attempts are contextualised by the political, bureaucratic and ideational structures within the countries, and the approach taken to integration on a policy system level, for example how food policy is coordinated across government. The specific institutional structures involved and their historical approach to integration is examined and compared in Chapter Four. A summary of the two policy attempts is provided below. Details of the formulation process, catalyst and context, outcomes and reaction to their publication are the focus of the policy analysis in findings Chapters Five (FM and F2030) and Six (NFP), and are therefore not included in this introductory chapter.

1.5.1 UK

The UK case study includes two embedded units of analysis (Yin 2003): the 2008 FM and 2010 F2030 policies. Each unit is described briefly below. The reason behind the two units within the case study is elaborated in the Methodology.

Food Matters: Towards a Strategy for the 21st Century

This report, published by the Cabinet Office in 2008, is described in its foreword by Prime Minister Gordon Brown as '*an overarching statement of government food policy*' (Cabinet Office 2008b pi, iii). The '*towards a strategy*' is said to reflect the intention the report *initiates* a process, rather than represents the final policy framework (FEC 2008). The aims of the report are '*to review the main trends in food production and consumption in the UK; to analyse the implications of those trends for the economy, society and the environment; to assess the robustness of the current policy framework for food; and to determine what the objectives of future food strategy should be and the measures needed to achieve them*' (Cabinet Office 2008b pi, iii). The need for a more joined-up approach to food policy is a strong focus, as are the social and environmental challenges of the food system. However, as discussed in Section Two, it does not address food production in any detail, beyond highlighting challenges. The team behind the report included Cabinet Office Strategy Unit and Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) staff plus 'additional contributions' from departments including the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and Department of Health (DH). A departmental advisory board, working group and a panel of experts supported the formulation of the policy. Outcomes of the project included the report itself (used as a basis to inform the next stage of the policy process, which shifted in sponsorship from the Cabinet Office to DEFRA); a Food Policy Taskforce and Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food; and several specific programmes of work including one to integrate advice to consumers across government; a

‘Healthy Food Mark’ for the public sector, integrating health and environmental principles; and a cross-government research group. A full appraisal of the policy is the focus of Chapter Five.

Food 2030

The second unit of analysis for the UK case study is the 2010 *Food 2030* report, which can be considered the subsequent stage of the policy process to FM. The F2030 ‘Vision’ was published in 2010 by DEFRA, with a foreword by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. It was launched at the Oxford Farming Conference in January 2010 by Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The report has been described as ‘*the first attempt since the 1950s to bring together cross-government policy on food into one overarching food policy framework*’ (SDC 2011). F2030 combines the FM focus on health and the environment, with the issue of food security/production. The vision is that by 2030:

1. *Consumers are informed, can choose and afford healthy, sustainable food. This demand is met by profitable, competitive, highly skilled and resilient farming, fishing and food businesses, supported by first class research and development.*
2. *Food is produced, processed, and distributed, to feed a growing global population in ways which:*
 - *use global natural resources sustainably*
 - *enable the continuing provision of the benefits and services a healthy natural environment provides*
 - *promote high standards of animal health and welfare*
 - *protect food safety*
 - *make a significant contribution to rural communities, and*
 - *allow us to show global leadership on food sustainability*
3. *Our food security is ensured through strong UK agriculture and food sectors and international trade links with EU and global partners, which support developing economies.*
4. *The UK has a low carbon food system which is efficient with resources – any waste is reused, recycled or used for energy generation (DEFRA 2010 p7).*

An election resulting in a change in government not long after F2030 was published led to the project being halted.

1.5.2 Australia

The Australia case study involves only one unit of analysis, the 2013 NFP.

National Food Plan

The NFP, led by the Federal agriculture department, stated:

‘The government believes that an overarching approach will help protect and improve Australia’s enviable food security status and support population health outcomes, among other things, and has committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs’ (DAFF 2011 p1)

The Plan's aim was to:

'...better integrate all aspects of food policy by taking a whole-of-food-system approach covering primary production, transport, storage and distribution, processing, manufacturing, retailing, international trade, consumers, related service sectors and the wider community'
(DAFF 2012 p20)

It was formulated in three stages – Issues Paper, Green Paper and White Paper – all of which are treated as part of one NFP unit of analysis (with a particular focus on the White Paper). The NFP White Paper *'National Food Plan – Our Food Future'* was published in May 2013. The 'vision to 2025' consists of goals grouped in four themes: Growing Exports; Sustainable Food; Thriving Industry and People. A new governmental mechanism was proposed – an 'Australian Council on Food'. An election in September 2013 led to a change of political party and subsequent cessation of the project.

Summary and Chapter Preview

This chapter has provided a justification for the thesis' focus, by outlining the problem the research is attempting to address – the challenges of creating an integrated national food policy – and the context to that problem. The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter Two is a literature review covering four main themes: food policy integration in the UK and Australia prior to 2008; the wider policymaking context; public policy integration; and Historical Institutionalism.

Chapter Three is an examination of the methodology. This includes a description and justification of the specific research methods used – policy document analysis, interviews and the creation of a Framework Tool and Policy System Template to compare the two UK and Australian policy attempts – and also provides an exposition of the methodological decision-making process related to the operationalising the concept of public policy integration and Historical Institutional theory.

Chapter Four is the first of four chapters of findings, and is a comparative analysis of how policy integration has been dealt with in the UK and Australian policy systems, with particular reference to the institutional architecture in each country.

Chapter Five applies the Framework Tool to the UK's FM (2008) and F2030 (2010) policies.

Chapter Six applies the Framework Tool to the Australian NFP (2013).

Chapter Seven triangulates the findings in Chapters Four, Five and Six, to compare and explore how the two policy projects may have been influenced by the wider policy systems in their respective countries.

Chapter Eight is a discussion of the findings. It outlines tentative conclusions drawing on the theory and examines the usefulness of HI in analysing the empirical data. It then presents contributions – both theoretical and practical – a final conclusion, and commentary on the research limitations and possible future research projects arising from the thesis.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

As discussed in the previous chapter, the thesis examines integrated national food policymaking in the UK and Australia using the concept of policy integration viewed through a historical institutionalist (HI) lens, in an attempt to better explain the apparent ‘stickiness’ of national food policy which, despite repeated appeals from across the range of stakeholders, has proved generally resistant to significant change towards integration.

Following Hart (2001), the literature reviewed includes both that on the *topic* of study (the challenge of food policy integration); and *how* the topic is to be studied (the approach to policy analysis) both of which contributed to refining the research focus and establishing the conceptual framework. The following literature review is therefore organised into four main parts. Parts One and Two present the *topical* literature: with Part One exploring how attempts to tackle food issues through national policies, strategies or plans have historically addressed integration, and Part Two providing broader context by outlining changes in policymaking which have impacted on food policy. Thereafter follows a short section highlighting some themes from public policy/public administration/political science literature which are relevant to a study of the influences on integrated policy formulation, to enable assessment of whether these integrated food policy projects can be deemed policy success or failure, and the role of institutions in successful policy reform in other sectors beyond food. In Part Three, the literature on policy integration and its relevance to food policy is examined. The concept of policy integration can assist with questions such as: what is actually meant by integrated public policy? What can we learn from attempts to create cross-government integration across a range of established policy sectors? What are the barriers and enablers of integration? While the main focus of this literature is topical in nature, it also provides some guidance on the methods of study (for example on how integration might be recognised and measured), as discussed in the sections on operationalising the literature in Chapter Three. Finally, Part Four addresses the methods of studying the research problem, by examining the theory of Historical Institutionalism (HI) and explores its potential to answer questions such as: to what extent and how is the status quo maintained in policy terms? To what degree are new pathways and modes of operation able to be established and by what means? And do political institutions allow policymakers to adapt and to innovate? (John 2012).

2.1 Literature Review Methodology

The research methodology is examined in detail in Chapter Three. However, at the outset of this literature review chapter, a few words on the literature review method is required, to provide context. The literature review consisted of six main search areas:

- Policy Integration
- Historical Institutionalism
- Food Policy Development in the UK
- Food Policy Development in Australia
- Policymaking in UK
- Policymaking in Australia

Searches for journal articles were done on the following databases:

1. Ebscohost, which incorporates:

- Academic Search Complete
- Business Source Complete
- Cinahl
- Econlit
- E-Journals
- Greenfile
- Medline
- Regional Business News
- SocINDEX

2. Ovid Online, which incorporates:

- Embase
- Global Health
- Journals from Ovid
- AMED
- Health Management Information Consortium
- Social Policy and Practice

3. Google Scholar

Books on Institutionalism and the policy system in general – in the UK and Australia – were also identified via library searches and reference mining, and public policy handbooks were used to provide context to institutionalist theory. The below is a record of search parameters used in undertaking the literature search. Following initial searches, a snowball approach was applied using references identified in the first phase.

Table 2.1: Literature Search Parameters

Literature search category	Primary Search Terms	Secondary search terms added (AND)
Historical Institutionalism	Institutionalism Institutions Historical + Institutionalism Path Dependence New Institutionalism Discursive Institutionalism Critical Juncture Policy Change 'Food policy institutions' 'Food policy change' 'Policy Layering' 'Policy Stretching'	Food 'Food Policy' UK Australia
Policy Integration	'Policy Integration' 'Joined-Up Government' 'Whole of Government' 'Policy Coordination' 'Policy Silos' 'Cross-cutting policy' 'Departmentalism'	Food 'Food Policy' UK Australia
UK Food Policy	'UK food policy'	
Australian Food Policy	'Australian food policy'	
UK Policymaking	'UK policymaking' 'UK public policy' 'UK civil service' 'Westminster System' 'UK Electoral Cycle' 'Hierarchy of UK government departments' 'Status of UK government departments' 'Status of Defra' 'Status of Cabinet Office'	
Australian Policymaking	'Australian policymaking' 'Australia public policy' 'Australia public service' 'Westminster System' 'Australia Electoral Cycle' 'Hierarchy of Australia government departments' 'Status of Australia government departments' 'Status of DAFF'	

Source: Author

2.2 Food Policy Integration Prior to 2008: Single Domain Approaches Dominate

2.2.1 Food Policy as Agriculture Policy

The Second World War (WW2) is often referenced as the period when '*the UK had its clearest, most just, and integrated food system*' (Lang 1999a p173), and provides a useful starting point to examine how food policy integration has developed since the Ministry of Food was replaced by the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food. Both the UK and Australia were profoundly impacted by WW2, with dramatic

increases in agricultural production, in the former (enshrined in the 1947 Agriculture Act) to respond to chronic food shortages, and in the latter with establishment of the farm sector as ‘*a pillar of national economic and social development*’ in response to ‘*chronic and increasingly serious balance of payments problems*’ and ‘*potential food shortages due to the low productivity and output of the farm sector*’ (Argent 2002 p102). The roots of modern food policy can therefore be found in government interventions stimulated by both World Wars, and the rise of ‘productionism’ as a solution to issues of global food supply (Lang 1999b; Lang et al 2009). However, it was in the 1970s and 1980s that more formal attempts to characterise and evaluate food policy emerged, with the first meetings of the World Food Council, the founding of the International Food Policy Research Institute in 1975, and of the journal *Food Policy* a year later, and the publication of Timmer et al’s (1983) book *Food Policy Analysis* (Maxwell and Slater 2003). The Organisation for Economic Development’s (OECD) 1981 report *Food Policy*, and John Tarrant’s (1980) book *Food Policies* similarly provided some of the earliest examinations of the subject, and highlighted twin pressures of food and energy shortage.

At this time, food policy tended to focus on agriculture, nutrition, or trade independently, rarely crossing boundaries beyond a single policy *domain* (also described in the public policy literature as a subgovernment or subsystem (Jochim and May 2010)). Food policy was also characterised by ‘top-down’ influence of government, be it in the form of taxes and fiscal measures, advice, education and information, or regulations and laws (Lang and Heasman 2004; Lang et al 2009). So for Timmer et al, food policy encompassed ‘*the collective efforts of governments to influence the decision-making environment of food producers, food consumers, and food marketing agents in order to further social objectives*’ (Timmer et al. 1983 ch1 Online). The OECD’s report defined food policy as reflecting ‘*the dominant priorities and objectives of governments*’, priorities that shifted from farming in the post-war period, through to food security and later food safety (OECD 1981 p10). Governments had already invested significantly in increasing food production and distribution. Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy – discussed further in the UK context below – was in place, as were extensive agricultural subsidies in the USA (Lang et al 2009). National and international policies had fostered the widespread adoption of large-scale industrial techniques, focused on monoculture and artificial chemical inputs (Lang and Heasman 2004).

Tarrant describes how ‘*the production and consumption processes are managed by central governments acting through local organisations, and private initiative in both production and consumption may be non-existent*’ (Tarrant 1980 p45). An exception to the above was Australia, which began pursuing an aggressive deregulation agenda in the 1970s, along with its neighbour New Zealand. Australia’s historical context involves a stark shift away from agricultural interventionism via a ‘*bewildering array of support mechanisms*’ in the 1970s, towards ‘*economic rationality*’ (Botterill 2016 p7). An ‘*Australian concept of the state*’ (Encel 1962 p5, cited in Ward and Stewart 2009 p16) emphasising public provision and economic intervention, which in agriculture meant government support such as: price supports; taxation concessions; subsidisation and rural extension services, along with investments in infrastructure to support agriculture, including railways and irrigation schemes (Lawrence 1987; Brett 2011, cited in Dixon and Richards 2016 p196) has been latterly replaced by a ‘*market model of governance*’ (Beresford

2000 p78; Ward and Stewart 2009). While the UK was joining the EEC in the 1970s (removing a valuable export market for Australia and signaling the end of the *'golden era'* of the *'supportive geopolitical environment of British Imperialism'* (Pritchard 2005 p2), and during the OPEC oil crisis, a new Whitlam Labor Government switched policy stance and cut subsidies, beginning the shift from *'agricultural exceptionalism'* to *'economic fundamentalism'* (Argent 2002 p104) (Botterill 2003; Argent 2002; Hattersley 2013). Lawrence et al (2013) note how *'Australia has been a vocal advocate for the removal of trade barriers, particularly for agriculture'*:

'as a leading participant in the Cairns Group of some 19 agricultural exporting nations, Australia has argued for the dismantling of protectionism, pointing to Europe, the US, Korea and Japan as having distorted trade by providing major barriers to the opening up of agricultural markets' (p3).

The Group was named after a meeting in Cairns of agricultural exporter nations' aiming to solidify a common bargaining position, one month prior to the commencement of the Uruguay Round of the GATT – precursor to the World Trade Organisation – in September 1986, and headquartered in the Australian mission in Geneva (Pritchard 2005 p7). So, in contrast with the UK's CAP-influenced system, *'Australian farmers had to produce and export more to stay viable'* (Caraher and Coveney 2004 p4) and *'the abiding concern of agricultural and manufacturing policies in Australia throughout much of its history has been one of international competitiveness'* (Pritchard 2005; cited in Hattersley 2012 p305). Australian policy makers have, as a result, been left with *'few 'policy levers' to assist the domestic farm sector'* (Pritchard 2005 p2).

2.2.1.2 Agriculture-Environment Links

Following on from the point above, in Australia (cf the UK with its CAP influence, as discussed below) it has been suggested an absence of mechanisms through which to make linkages between farming and environmental goals placed limits on the integration of these two policy domains. In contrast, since it acceded to the CAP in 1973, the UK has been bound to provide market protection *'through a combination of guaranteed minimum prices for selected commodities, and tariff protection by taxing imports'* (Lang et al 2009), and later phases of the European policy have linked agricultural production with new objectives related to rural development and environmental impacts (Barling et al 2002; Feindt and Flynn 2009), enabling tentative links between agriculture and environment objectives in the UK.

Drawing a distinction with the European experience, Argent's analysis of the applicability of the concept of Post-Productivist Agriculture (PPA) to Australia concludes that, while a rise in environmental awareness during the 1960s and 1970s has influenced Australia's farm policy, there is at best mixed evidence of a shift *'from a concern with production at all costs to a concern with economic and environmental sustainability'* (Argent 2002 p111). More recently, Shepherd's (2011) content analysis of food policy documents draws distinction between Australia's focus on free markets, trade, competitiveness and profitability and European policies around multifunctional agriculture, concluding that in Australia, *'the environment is understood as an economic resource'*, which *'requires careful management to ensure a secure supply of natural resource inputs into agricultural production'*, in

contrast with the European CAP which *‘has been evolving from a sectoral policy of farm commodity support into an integrated policy for rural development and environmental enhancement’* (p381). While agri-environment policies do exist in Australia, in particular the Landcare Program of local, voluntary, self-help groups to address the environmental degradation in farming, according to Lawrence et al’s (2013) analysis, these hybrid forms of agri-environment governance often fail to address the underlying causes of environmental problems, and have *‘reinforced, rather than challenged, the system of productivism’* (p7). Along with an institutionalised approach to agricultural market liberalisation, Botterill (2016) also draws attention to the influences of Australian agriculture policy’s development *‘in conjunction with or as an adjunct to policy for the secondary industries since Federation’* (p1); the *‘agrarianism’* or *‘cultural and social sentiments surrounding farming as an activity that impose limits on what governments can do’* (p2); and agriculture (along with natural resources) being the country’s main comparative advantage.

2.2.2 Food Industry Policy

While Australia is certainly less interventionist in agriculture compared to many industrialised countries, a period of policy activity in the late 1990s and 2000s, characterised in this chapter as ‘food industry policy’, aimed at facilitating agri-food exports. Policy projects included: the Agri-Food Council, Prime Minister’s Supermarket to Asia Strategy; and the subsequent National Food Industry Strategy; many of which involved pots of funding for businesses, which Pritchard (2005) argues skirted:

‘...a fine line in complying with Australia’s WTO commitments (which prohibit subsidies being made under particular defined headings) and it is understood that various initiatives under these successive programs have been required to seek detailed legal advice from the Attorney-General on their WTO compliance’ (p10).

Details of the schemes are provided in the Food Processing Industry Group Report (DIIS RTE 2012):

- 1992 Commonwealth Government establishment of an Agri-Food Council (AFC), with objectives including improving *‘access of Australian agri-food companies to the Asian market’* and with funding of \$9.9 million over five years (p16)
- 1996 Prime Minister John Howard’s replacement of the AFC with the Supermarket to Asia (STA) program, replaced in 2002 with the National Food Industry Initiative.
- 2007 Commonwealth Government *‘revamping of the NFIS to continue its support of the industry with funding of \$75.7 million over four years’*, administered by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) (p17).

Significance has also been ascribed to a 1988 Industries Assistance Commission report, which:

‘indicated that Australia’s food regulation system was impeding the development of an efficient and competitive export industry, and constraining the adoption of emerging technologies and product innovation because of inherent costs and impediments’, and ‘provided an incentive for government action by numerous federal governments over the subsequent decades’ (DIIS RTE 2012 p16).

The Food Processing Industry Group Report of 2012 (DIIS RTE 2012) signaled a partial return to some themes of the 1990s.

An equivalent stream of policy activity in the UK could not be identified: food export policy remained closely linked with agriculture, having evolved around a goal to expand the domestic agricultural sector, captured in the 1970s White Papers *Food from our Own Resources* and *Farming and the Nation*. The focus then shifted to the agency Food from Britain (FFB), a DEFRA-sponsored non-departmental public body which promoted UK food exports between 1983 and 2009, as the main institutional venue (DEFRA 2013a). FFB closed its operations in March 2009 and no longer functions as a public body, though some of its advice and support role was assigned to the now Department for International Trade and its devolved equivalents. This juncture might be identified as a shift closer to the Australian-style industry policy stream: the food industry has since been the subject of several Export Action Plans, including the 2012 *Driving Export Growth in the Farming, Food and Drink Sector: A Plan of Action* (DEFRA 2012c), and a later *Food and Drink International Action Plan* (DEFRA; DIT 2013), both jointly sponsored by DEFRA and the Department of Trade and Industry. In neither country has there been significant crossover between this industry policy domain and others.

2.2.3 UK Nutrition Policy

While a comprehensive examination of health policy related to food is beyond the remit of this thesis, a brief summary of the main milestones in each country, as identified by reviewing the academic literature, is required to understand how the health and food policy domains have operated, for the most part, in isolation from each other.

Foster and Lunn (2007) trace UK nutrition policy from the post-War ‘*remnants of wartime endeavours, such as fortification*’ aimed at preventing micronutrient deficiencies, through the emergence of chronic diseases in the 1960s, and a shift in focus towards pathogenesis and prevention, to publication of the country’s first dietary guidelines, and the Committee on Medical Aspects of Food Policy (COMA) first report on heart disease in the 1970s. The 1980s saw the first set of guidelines on amounts of fat, salt, sugar and fibre for the UK population, by the National Advisory Committee on Nutrition Education, but it wasn’t until the Conservative government’s *Health of the Nation* white paper, launched in 1992, that the diet-health connection was firmly established (Lang 1999a), in a public health policy with specific nutritional targets, supported by the work of COMA. The same year saw the establishment of the Nutrition Taskforce – a multisector committee involving food manufacture, retail, catering, health, and the voluntary sector – to work with government departments¹ to produce and oversee a broad strategic and operational programme. Outputs of the two-year task force included published targets, the ‘Eat Well!’ programme of action, and a mix of leaflets, guidelines and handbooks from the various project teams on: hospital catering; school food; nutrition training for caterers; product reformulation; and low income (Foster and Lunn 2007). This was followed by a new focus on health inequalities from the incoming Labour government in 1997, followed two years later by *Saving Lives: Our Healthier Nation*, plus the Policy Action Team report 13, addressing poor food access in low income neighbourhoods, where an

¹ Understood to have involved health, education, and the culture, media and sport departments, but links with the environmental domain were yet to be made.

attempt at integration of social policy (with regard to inequalities), health policy (particularly non-communicable diseases), and economic policy (direct financial costs and questions of efficiency) was made, unsuccessfully (Barling et al 2002).

Along with the initiatives mentioned above, health policy has some tradition in joined-up working, through attempts to tackle health inequalities. Exworthy and Hunter contrast *Health of the Nation's* lack of cross-departmental commitment and ownership, with the subsequent *Our Healthier Nation's* acknowledgement of how: '*connected problems require joined-up solutions*' and the considerable energy devoted to joined-up approaches, including Public Management Foundation seminars (Exworthy and Hunter 2011 p203). Cabinet Office capability reviews of the Department of Health, in 2006 and 2009, have since criticised a lack of coordination (Exworthy and Hunter 2011).

By the 2000s the links between food and health were focused on obesity, which had become the primary '*driving force*' of nutrition policy (Caraher et al 2009); with a period of relatively dense policy activity, including the launch of the Five-a-Day programme; Hastings Review review of food promotion and children's diets; roll-out of the National Fruit and Vegetable scheme in primary schools; *Choosing Health: Making Healthier Choices Easier* report, with its six priorities for action including improving diet and nutrition and reducing the prevalence of obesity; and the 2006 launch of the Healthy Start scheme and School Food Trust. In 2007 a major Foresight review '*Tackling Obesities: Future Choices*' was published. The decade culminated with the 2009 *Change4Life* programme, launched as the '*biggest ever movement against obesity anywhere in the world*'. A new focus on public-private partnership emerged during this period, with the *Business4Life* industry consortium of food and fitness companies (Caraher et al 2009), followed two years later by the *Public Health Responsibility Deal* (PHRD), a set of voluntary pledges around reducing ingredients like salt and fat; encouraging fruit and veg consumption; and putting calorie information on menus, and framed as '*a new way of harnessing the contribution that businesses can make*' to delivering public health priorities (Department of Health 2011 p3), and attempting to integrate supply chain practices with state policy goals.

2.2.3.1 Health and Environment Links in UK

While the health and environmental policy domains have remained relatively separate, there have been tentative steps towards integration, with the *Food and Health Action Plan* (FHAP) (Department of Health 2005), published in 2005, as a result of recommendation from the Policy Commission report of 2002, and *Healthy Weight; Healthy Lives*. The Sustainable Development Commission described this as a '*major step towards integrating health within sustainability*', along with other cross-government mechanisms established through a ministerial steering group, and officials group, leading to improved working relationships between the Department of Health, DEFRA, the FSA and the Department for Education and Skills, though '*the implementation group found delivering a strategy that crosses departmental boundaries particularly challenging*' (SDC 2011 p25). Similarly, the 2008 *Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives* strategy contained some '*interesting commitments to alter environments*' which promised to better recognise the links between health and food sustainability, but has since been replaced with a focus prioritising individual consumer behaviour change (SDC 2011 p34). But Caraher et al's (2009) review of

UK nutrition policy raises tensions between attempts to weave sustainability into nutrition policy, arguing it has ‘*muddied the waters*’, supported the food industry’s re-emergence as a key player in nutrition policy, and perhaps diminished the message with this additional policy area (p58; 60).

2.2.3.2 Australian Nutrition Policy

Catford (2000) tracks the focus of public health nutrition action in Australia from the 1970s emphasis on public information and mass media campaigns to community health promotion programmes in the 1980s. Powles et al (1992) pinpoint the 1985 establishment of the first national effort to shift the direction of health policy, the Better Health Commission, as an important national juncture. There was significant State-level activity in Victoria during the 1980s, peaking in 1987 with publication of the *Victorian Food and Nutrition Policy* by the Department of Agriculture & Rural Affairs and the report *Making Healthy Choices Easy Choices: Towards a Food and Nutrition Policy for Victoria*, and establishment of the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (VicHealth); events which are said to have catalysed Federal efforts in this policy area. A somewhat pioneering national food and nutrition policy was published in 1992 (CDHHCS 1992) which, despite ending up with a much stronger focus on nutrition than food, made progressive statements about integration, with underlying principles and objectives that ‘*still reflect contemporary best-practice*’, and is said to have ‘*stimulated the development of complementary nutrition policies in most State and Territory jurisdictions*’ (Lee et al 2013). The policy was influenced by input from Nancy Milio – author of a pioneering book on *Promoting Health through Public Policy* (1981) – and her work on integrated policy in Norway; and Pinstrip Andersen, an economist and former head of IFPRI, who continues to contribute to understanding of crossing policy boundaries. More details are in Table A4 in the Appendix. However links to domains beyond health made in the 1992 Food and Nutrition Policy did not permeate subsequent nutrition policies at the Federal level. Where joining-up has featured within the Australian nutrition policy domain, it has been more vertically focused: the 1990s saw several coordinating mechanisms introduced, including the 1996 National Public Health Partnership (NPHP) – described as ‘*a working arrangement between the health departments of the Commonwealth and the states and territories, to plan and coordinate national public health efforts*’ – and the subsequent attempt at policy coordination via the Strategic Inter-Governmental Nutrition Alliance or ‘*SIGNAL*’, comprised of public health nutritionists, experts and ‘*representatives from the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Australia–New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA) and a representative of the Ministry of Health in New Zealand as an observer*’ (Catford 2000 p67).

Baker et al (2017) identify a shift in political prioritisation during the 2000s, when obesity prevention was linked to economic productivity in a new ‘*preventative health agenda*’ with the launch of *Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020* in September 2009. The Strategy involved a new institutional venue, the Australian National Preventive Health Agency, launched in 2010 as a ‘*key weapon in the Government’s fight against obesity*’, along with a funding of \$872.1 mn over six years from 2009-10, to address the rising prevalence of lifestyle-related chronic disease, supported by social marketing campaigns (Baker et al 2017; DAFF 2011). A Parliamentary committee inquiry report *Weighing it up: Obesity in Australia* (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing 2009) was also published, and a

Food and Health Dialogue public-private partnership, precursor to the UK's later PHRD was launched, signaling the new focus on obesity policy, albeit with mixed results. However, Baker et al's analysis describes how *'norms within the Department of Health and Ageing were seen to have impeded political priority for regulatory interventions'* (2017 p15), and elites within the department were seen to have *'cultivated an institutional culture that selected out regulatory interventions from consideration'*.

In addition to the National Partnership Agreement on Preventative Health described above, Department of Health and Ageing policies which *'interact with the food system'* as identified in the NFP White Paper include the: National Nutrition Policy (see 6.2.4); the *Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy*; and the Australian Dietary Guidelines (DAFF 2013). The Blewett Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy (named after lead author Dr Neil Blewett, a former health minister and member of the executive board of the World Health Organisation) was set up to provide a comprehensive examination of food labelling law and policy (DHAA 2011; Blewett et al 2011). The Review's formulation process provides an interesting comparison to the NFP, in that it was undertaken by an independent panel, rather than a government agency, and involved several public health advocates.

2.2.3.4 Health and Environment Links in Australia: ADGs

The revised set of Australian Dietary Guidelines (ADG), produced in February 2013 by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), offer an insight into Australia's tentative attempts to integrate the health and environmental food domains. The ADG are based on 55,000 pieces of peer-reviewed scientific research; food modelling; Nutrient Reference Values; and key government reports and documents provided by the Working Committee and the NHMRC; evidence from material provided by stakeholders during consultation processes; and the previous dietary guidelines for Australians series and their supporting documentation. Following consultation submissions, more information and/or consideration were requested for: considerations of the environmental impact of dietary patterns, specifically overconsumption and waste management; greater acknowledgment of the complexities of the food system, including the concept of 'triple bottom line' sustainability, and the difficulties in assessing commodities individually and/or in isolation from the whole food system; and acknowledgement of initiatives to improve sustainability at both government and non-government levels (NHMRC 2013 p115). However, despite attempts to link the two policy domains, the new ADG have been criticised for sidelining environmental issues, and labelled a missed opportunity by public health advocates (Crow et al 2013; Selvey and Carey 2013; Australian Science Media Centre 2013). The ADG report states *'increasingly, people seek advice from health professionals to help guide decisions around sustainable food'*, yet sustainability is only mentioned in a short section in the introduction, which offers some general tips for making more environmentally-friendly decisions, mainly focused on waste. In the section on recommended consumption of fish, the classic paradox² between health and environment is raised but not reconciled. The report states that *'To meet recommended food group intakes, fish consumption will need to increase by more than 40%, particularly for men'* but acknowledges straight afterwards that:

² See Table 1.1

'the extent to which Australian fish populations are sufficient to meet the guideline advice needs consideration (NHMRC 2013 p 52).

The appendix on sustainability, which provides a background discussion on sustainable food issues, reiterates the need for improved data/measurement to facilitate sustainable food choices, and highlights the NFP as important for:

'helping Australia's food system respond to new opportunities and challenges', and ensuring 'relevant state, territory and national departments are also promoting policies, programs and regulations that foster and support ecologically sustainable development both broadly and at the food system level' (NHMRC 2013 p134).

Issues of *'duplication and government departments working at cross purposes'* on the ADG, raised by the National Farmer's Federation in its consultation submission to the NFP under the heading *'Frustration from duplication'*, are worth quoting at length given their pertinence to the research focus:

'Early working papers developed by the Council attempted to incorporate sustainability of agricultural production into recommendations of daily food intake. In approaching the NHMRC to discuss this work it was clear that the activities were being undertaken in isolation from efforts of government departments and industry to understand and improve the environmental footprint of Australian agricultural systems. The NFF continues to be frustrated by duplication which occurs within government, the existence of policy silos and an apparent unwillingness of officials to work across government departments, but also the poor understanding of agricultural practices by officials who are developing policy in the area. A National Food Plan needs to promote a consistent approach on agriculture and food issues across government' (NFF 2011).

2.2.4 Food Safety/Standards Policy

This policy domain has developed somewhat differently in each country. A comparative UK-Australia study of food safety policy by Hobbs et al (2002) identifies influences on the UK's approach including a food industry primarily driven by the domestic market, and supermarket food retailers which enjoy considerable market power. The Food Safety Act 1990 was a key event, introducing the due diligence defence, which shifted legal responsibility downstream in the food supply chain, by requiring buyers to take *'all reasonable steps'* to ensure food they receive from upstream suppliers is safe, and upstream firms to demonstrate to downstream that they are handling food correctly leading to the introduction of stringent quality assurance programmes (Fearne 1998, cited in Hobbs et al 2002). A shift in perception of food risk has been suggested, following a series of food crises experienced by the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to this, food safety had been defined as *'direct microbial contamination of foods, elevated micro bacterial counts, unhygienic food handling, poor transportation and storage of foods and improper food preparation'* with food and agricultural production systems regarded as *'being safe unless proven otherwise by technical and quantitative analyses'* (Feindt and Flynn 2009 p401). The 1990 Food Safety Act, with its due diligence focus, led to new prioritisation of supply chain safety, leaving the state *'to act mainly as auditors rather than standard-setters and enforcers of the mainstream process'* (Feindt and Flynn 2009 p404; Lang 1999a). The UK's Food Standards Agency (FSA) – an independent non-ministerial government department with responsibility for protecting public health and the interests of consumers in relation to food (Scudamore 2012 p30) – was established after the BSE crisis, and in response to eroded confidence in the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF) and confusion over fragmentation of responsibilities for food between MAFF and DH (Feindt and Flynn

2009; Scudamore 2012). The aim of the new arms' length body – established by the Food Standards Act (1999) – was to restore public confidence in food safety, and end the *'climate of confusion and suspicion about the way that food safety and standards issues have been handled'* (Cm3830 1998). Food scares have featured less prominently in Australia than in the UK, with the 'Garibaldi Incident' of 1995 – where one person died and 24 were hospitalised after consuming contaminated sausage – a notable exception. A lack of food scares, and less developed consumer and food campaigners compared to the UK experience, have arguably led Australian consumers to view its food as already 'clean and green' (Smith et al 2010), of which more in Chapter Four.

Hobbs et al (2002) note that because, constitutionally, State governments are responsible for enforcement of food law, harmonisation of standards has been a focus in Australia. Martin et al (2003) describe how *'Australia has worked towards uniform food legislation since 1908'* (p429):

'driven by a number of imperatives including: to reduce inconsistencies and inefficiencies with State and Territory legislation; to reduce the cost of food regulation on the food industry; an increase in foodborne illness; a concern that existing requirements were ineffective in reducing the growing burden of foodborne illness; and international developments linking food safety with trade. However, it was not until the end of 2000 that States and Territories formally agreed to a national food safety regulatory system' (p429).

The Australian approach to food standards is also arguably less progressive than in the UK case, where the FSA is unusual in several respects: one is that the agency's Board is responsible for policymaking, and all discussions are held in public, as are meetings of Scientific Advisory bodies. Another is that the FSA has the power to publish ministerial advice (Scudamore 2012). Yeatman (2008) draws parallels between the UK and Australian food safety systems, suggesting that public engagement has been missing from food policy debates in Australia, whereas the BSE outbreak:

'...led to a major overhaul of the food regulatory agencies in many European countries, clearly placing public accountability and transparency at the centre of food and nutrition policy. In Australia, public engagement and transparency in food regulatory policy was curtailed with the separation of policy from food standards setting with the creation of the Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ).'' (p108).

The relatively broader remit and *raison d'être* of the FSA also have implications for its role in food policy integration. The FSA's main statutory objective was to *'protect public health from risks that may arise in connection with the consumption of food (including risks caused by the way in which it is produced or supplied), and otherwise to protect the interests of consumers in all matters connected with food'* (Scudamore 2012 p35). However, for Barling et al (2002), while the *'scope of the FSA's remit offers the potential for joined up policy thinking along the whole food chain'*, *'it has been interpreted in fairly bounded terms'* (p9). There were initial calls for the Agency to deal with the entire food chain, but food safety and nutrition were separated from farm and export policy and its remit was definitively post-farm gate (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005; cited by Carey et al 2016; Barling 2007). As Barling (2004) underscores, the remit of the FSA encompassing *'issues relating to the compositional quality of food, the choice of foods available and the information on which choices can be made'* (MAFF 1998 p8, cited by Barling 2004 p115), has *'allowed it to undertake a range of policy reviews and consultations in areas such as food authenticity and labelling'* and in this sense it had the potential to advance policy discussions around food, and examine *'deeper-rooted links between the systems of food production,*

manufacture, trade, safety and consumption'. But, while the FSA took over many food safety responsibilities from MAFF, Feindt and Flynn (2009 p403) argue it '*gained very few additional powers*', and its role in nutrition policy could have been stronger had a decision been taken to follow more closely recommendations the FSA be called the 'Food and Health Commission', rather than the dividing of responsibilities with the Department of Health whereby: '*the DH retained the public health functions, such as the links between diet and health, including behavioural and lifestyle issues where nutrition is an important factor; while the FSA was ascribed functions relating to food information needed by the public*' (Barling 2004 p116). Nevertheless, it has relatively broad scope in comparison to Australia, where the focus has been vertical dialogue and the enforcement of food standards, linked to '*the need of the export-dependent sector to remain internationally competitive*' (Hobbs et al 2002 p79). Lawrence et al describe how:

'the impetus for the modern food regulatory system in Australia and New Zealand was the publication of the joint Industry Assistance Commission and Business Regulation Review Unit's (1988) Report of an Inquiry into Food Regulation in Australia. It stressed the benefits to food manufacturers and the economic gains to government that would be made from harmonising and reducing food regulation across Australia' (Lawrence et al 2013 p164).

2.2.5 Summary

To summarise this section on food policy integration prior to 2008, it is characterised in the literature by little boundary-crossing between domains, though with tentative links between agriculture and environment in the UK case, and some attempts to link health with environment in both countries. Drawing on ideas from the public policy literature, food's evolution from single domain to more integrated approaches might be understood as the beginnings of a shift from a 'byproduct' policy to a 'primary' policy (Dery 1998; cited in Jordan and Halpin 2006; Lang 1999b), or as a 'policy maker', rather than 'policy taker' (Jordan and Halpin 2006).

2.3 The Public Policy Context

The following section places the two national integration projects in the wider policymaking context, by examining relevant trends in public policy in the previous few decades. Two themes in particular are important for situating the research: the development of national food policy to date, including the shift from government to governance; and definitional issues around national food policies. Examining the shift to governance provides further context on the characteristics of, and tensions between, 'old' and 'new' food policy frameworks. Likewise, to understand modern food policy integration projects, it is necessary to better understand what kind of policy lever they are: why are strategies, plans, and visions the favoured instruments, and are they appropriate?

2.3.1 Government to Governance

Following the primary post-war focus on food policy as agriculture policy, the next phase in the evolution of food policy was characterised by incredible growth by the food industries of the developed world. As a result of this growth, expansion and consolidation, food supply chains ended up being controlled by a handful of powerful companies (Lang 1999b; Lang and Heasman 2004; Morgan et al 2006) as state involvement waned, with ramifications for how national policy can be made in the present day. The

changes are part of a wider shift from government to governance, associated with the spread of an ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism; a term which identifies a transfer of regulatory power from rule of the state to non-state mechanisms (Rose 1999; Guthman 2007). While a full examination is beyond scope, the transitions encapsulated in this term include bifurcation of authority away from the nation-state, ‘upward’ towards transnational organisations and downward towards subnational groups (Rosenau 1992 p256, cited in Havinga et al 2015), and horizontal shifts from public towards semi- and private, creating new levels and arenas of governance (Lang 1999b; Havinga et al 2015). A useful metaphor is that of *‘hollowing out of the state’* or state *‘roll back’*, which Peck and Tickell (2002) identify as a phase of neoliberalism encompassing: *‘the privatisation of public resources and spaces; the minimisation of labour costs; the reductions of public expenditures (at least in the area of social welfare); and the elimination of regulations seen as unfriendly to business, all in the name of ‘letting the market work’*’ (Guthman 2007 p464). A further characteristic is a ‘rationality deficit’, with officials’ increasing reliance on specialist organisations for specialist issue information and advice (Jordan & Richardson 1982; Cairney 2011; Jordan and Cairney 2013).

Yet, the shift from government to governance does not imply an absence of regulation. Peck and Tickell’s (2002) concept of *‘roll out’* describes how the state has responded to the *‘massive instabilities, inequalities and externalities’* resulting from *‘roll back’* with *‘re-regulation: new rules; new rule-making bodies; and new spheres of rule-making’* (Guthman 2007 p465). This shift towards *‘increasingly voluntarist, neo-corporatist regulatory frameworks involving non-binding standards and rules, public-private cooperation, self-regulation, and greater participation from citizen coalitions’* (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, cited in Guthman 2007 p466) is said to have resulted in a reversal of responsibilities, where *‘public policy increasingly plays the role of facilitator through support schemes and payments while market forces play a greater role in regulation’* (McCarthy and Prudham 2004 p1080, cited in Guthman 2007 p467). In the food policy system this has meant an increasingly significant role played by the food industry as public policy becomes a trilateral bargaining of state(s), corporations and civil society (Lang and Heasman 2004) and *‘private entities like retailers and food producers’, ‘take on key roles in policy formulation, implementation and delivery’* (Feindt and Flynn 2009 p388).

2.3.2 The Policy Instrument Paradigm

Codes of conduct, advice, performance league tables and voluntarist partnerships have become more fashionable instruments than legislation and sanctions in the food system (Lang and Heasman 2004), and new alternatives such as self-regulation, co-regulation, management-based regulation, and private systems of governance have emerged, originating from both industry and third parties such as NGOs (Havinga 2006; Barling 2004) for example the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HAACP) system of *‘enforced self-regulation’* (Braithwaite 1982, cited in Havinga 2006). At the same time, public health approaches have tended towards downstream measures focused on individual behaviours and treatment (Sacks et al 2009), such as *‘behaviour change communication’* (Hawkes et al 2013), and food policy programmes are increasingly voluntary in nature, such as the UK’s Public Health Responsibility Deal set of pledges, and the Australian Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, run by the peak body for the food industry (McCarthy and Morling 2015). This policy instrument paradigm provides important context

to what policy options are deemed appropriate when attempting to create a new policy framework, and more generally what integrated policy projects can hope to achieve, as is discussed in Chapter Eight.

2.3.2.1 What is a National Food *Policy*?

Linked to this is how the FM/F2030/NFP policy projects can themselves be understood as particular types of policy instrument, which rose in popularity during the latest phase in food policy development. For the sake of clarity going forward in the thesis, at this point a distinction is required between food policy conceived of as a collection of policies that influence and shape the food system, and the specific output of a food policy project, such as FM. While both can be described as ‘food policy’, the former is more esoteric and may be implicit – agriculture policy as food policy – or explicit, for example energy policy which impacts on food availability. While a food policy is associated with the various descriptors applied to reports issued in the name of government food policy. For example, FM (2008) uses the tagline ‘*Towards a Strategy for the 21st Century*’ and describes itself a *report* but also an ‘*overarching statement of government policy*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p1). F2030 describes itself as a ‘*Strategy setting out the Government’s vision*’ (DEFRA 2010 p3); the output of the NFP process is a *White Paper*, but also describes itself as a *Roadmap* and a *Framework*. Samnakay’s (2016) analysis highlights how ‘*governments frequently invest considerable time and resources in developing policies that are strategic in nature, variously titled as ‘frameworks’, ‘strategies’, ‘plans’, ‘initiatives’, ‘roadmaps’, ‘agreements’ or ‘arrangements’*” (Pittock et al 2015, cited in Samnakay 2016 p1) to address problems such as those relating to climate change, water reform, national productivity, sustainability, health, regional development, and disaster management (Samnakay 2016). But such policies are often poorly defined (Nicklin 2012) and the ways they are developed, framed and implemented is described as variable and unclear. While such definitional differences may appear to be academic nitpicking, in reality they have important implications for assessing policy integration projects; in particular whether their rhetorically-robust aims are realistic, and if such attempts have been successful. By way of further examples to aid such an analysis, McMahon and Phillimore (2013) differentiate between strategic policies and strategic plans: strategic *plans* are tools, which serve a coordination and reporting function across government agencies and departments, while strategic *policies* are thematic. Strategic policies arguably share some attributes with Dror’s conception of ‘metapolicies’: ‘*policies on how to make policies*’ referring to the ‘*characteristics of the policy-making system including structure, processes, patterns, personnel, inputs and stipulated outputs*’ (Dror 1970b p1, cited in Samnakay 2016 p2).

2.3.3 What Would Successful Integrated Food Policy Look Like?

Both the UK and Australian policy projects ultimately failed to be implemented due to a change of government shortly after publication. However, the public policy literature reveals that evaluating policy failure, or success, is more nuanced than might be first assumed, and though a policy may appear to have faltered, there may nevertheless be lasting change from its development. This idea is explored below, along with some of the fundamentals for success which represent the ‘state of the art’ in policy development, to provide a yardstick against which to assess FM/F2030 and the NFP. In addition, during the iterative process of analysing empirical findings from the analysis of food policy attempts, several other strands of public policy literature – in particular covering the impact of electoral cycles and

machinery of government changes in the policy process – were identified as pertinent and are covered in brief.

2.3.3.1 Defining Policy Success and Failure

As Rutter et al (2012) note, while considerable scholarly attention has more recently been paid to policy failure, there has been less on policy success. In their work for the Institute for Government on good policymaking, Rutter et al (2012) draw on Alan McConnell’s three-fold typology of policy success:

Table 2.2: Definitions of Policy Success

Process	Programme	Text
Preserving policy goals and Instruments	Meeting objectives	Enhancing electoral prospects / reputation of governments and leaders
Conferring legitimacy	Producing desired outcomes	Controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing
Building a sustainable coalition	Creating benefit for the target group	Sustaining the broad values and direction of government
Symbolising innovation and influence	Meeting policy domain criteria	

Source: McConnell (2010, cited in Rutter et al 2012)

Adapting the above, Rutter et al (2012) propose the following definition of success:

‘The most successful policies are ones which achieve or exceed their initial goals in such a way that they become embedded; able to survive a change of government; represent a starting point for subsequent policy development or remove the issue from the immediate policy agenda’ (p14).

On the other side of the coin, policy failure, McConnell’s work is also useful, particularly his typology of three forms of failure:

- *Process*: policymakers unable to fashion the type of policy they had hoped for; being considered illegitimate in terms of processes used; being unable to build a sustainable coalition of support; attracting widespread criticism for the process itself.
- *Programmes/Policies*: failure to be implemented as intended; failure to achieve desired outcomes; failure to benefit target groups; failure to meet policy criteria highly valued in that policy domain; attracting opposition to or attracting little or no support for policy goals or means of achieving them.
- *Politics*: reputational damage; out of control agendas; damage to core governance values; opposition to small political benefits that may remain (McConnell 2015).

A connected concept is that of ‘placebo policy’: the idea that policies may fail in some respects but succeed against latent policy goals, such as ‘to manage a difficult issue down or off the policy agenda’, giving ‘the appearance that an issue is being addressed’ while doing little ‘to actually address complex and ‘wicked causes and symptoms’ (Gustafsson 1983; McConnell 2010a, cited in McConnell 2015 p8).

The Institute for Government (IFG), describes itself as an ‘*independent charity and think tank promoting more effective government*’ through working with political parties and senior civil servants, and has undertaken significant investigations involving senior level policymakers in the UK. Its major research projects into making policy better analyse interviews with 50 senior civil servants and 20 former ministers (including seven former Secretaries of State), and the results of a series of ‘*policy reunions*’. The 2011 *Making Policy Better* report identifies a set of ‘*policy fundamentals*’ for policy development. Factors One, Three and Six appear particularly relevant for integrated food policy development:

Table 2.3: Policy Development Fundamentals

Factor	Measure
Goals	Has the issue been adequately defined and properly framed?
Ideas	Has the policy process been informed by evidence that is high quality and up to date? Has account been taken of evaluation of previous policies?
Design	Have policymakers rigorously tested or assessed whether the policy design is realistic, involving implementers and/or end users?
External Engagement	Have those affected by the policy been engaged in the process? Have policymakers identified and responded reasonably to their views?
Appraisal	Have the options been robustly assessed?
Roles and Accountabilities	Have policy makers judged the appropriate level of central government involvement? Is it clear who is responsible for what, who will hold them to account and how?
Feedback and Evaluation	Is there a realistic plan for obtaining timely feedback on how the policy is being realised in practice? Does the policy allow for effective evaluation?

Source: Hallsworth and Rutter (2011)

While clarity of goals and objectives is a policy fundamental in the IFGs analysis, literature on the role of ambiguity in policymaking offers an alternative take. For example, Baier et al’s 1986 paper on implementation and ambiguity makes the point that research on implementation often assumes policies should, and can, be clear, with any failure in this regard due to the deficiencies of the policy-makers. In reality, negotiations and coalition forming that take place during policy formulation – involving horse-trading, persuasion, bribes, threats and management of information – often mean ambiguity is an important characteristic. According to Baier et al (1986 p206) ‘*difficult issues are often ‘settled’ by leaving them unresolved or specifying them in a form requiring subsequent interpretation*’. Indeed, they argue, calls for policy clarity obscure how:

‘particularly where an issue is closely contested, success in securing support for a program or policy is likely to be associated with increasing, rather than decreasing, ambiguity’ because ‘*policy ambiguity allows different groups and individuals to support the same policy for different reasons and with different expectations*’ (Baier et al 1986 p206).

But while ambiguity may increase the chances of acceptance, it can also increase administrative complications. Bajer et al are focusing on implementation, but there are potential lessons here for analysing food policies which have been criticised for broad assessments but lack of specific actions.

2.3.3.2 Factors Impacting on Successful Policy

The following section touches on several barriers which may impact negatively on a policy process, including the institutional structure of the civil/public service and electoral change; and one enabler – institutional reform.

Barrier: Bureaucratic Structure

As will be examined further below, the policy integration literature involves linking wicked problems – of which food is one – with the structure of the policy system, which may refer to organisational structures, but also institutionalised *practices*. The literature review therefore suggested an important role for the standard operating procedures which characterise the policymaking space, in particular how the bureaucracy can constrain attempts to construct an integrated policy, including career structures; reward systems; project-based working; decline in civil service capacity and the increased use of consultants. This is explored further in Chapter Four on the policy systems, including the bureaucracy, in the UK and Australia.

Barrier: Electoral Change

A common theme in both UK and Australian cases is the impact of a change of government on a policy project, in that both the F2030 and NFP integrated food policy attempts were abandoned due to a change in government shortly after their release. Pollitt's (2008) examination of the role of time in policymaking explains that in majoritarian systems such as the UK and Australia:


'...it is widely recognised that the time in the cycle at which to launch radical and possibly unpopular new policies is near the beginning of a term of government. At that point there is plenty of time left for the electorate to get used to the new policy and for the government to shift the agenda on other, less contentious issues' (2008 p54).

Pollitt goes on to describe how:

'...a government's legitimacy is expected to be high during the early 'honeymoon period'. At the other end of the cycle, however, as the next election looms, one may expect controversial policies to be put away in the store-room, while government leaders search for 'safe', populist measures that will induce marginal voters to support their party' (2008 p54).

In the IFG report *Transitions: Preparing for Changes of Government*, Riddell and Haddon (2009) note how *'the wider transition covers a much longer period, beginning well before a general election is called, and continuing well into the first few weeks, months, and years of a new administration' (p4).*

Figure 2.1: Policymaking and the Electoral Cycle



Source: Harris and Rutter (2014)

Linked to Pollitt's comments about populist measures is broader discussion of the UK's adversarial system by Anthony King (2015), which notes that party-political point scoring is incessant and '*ministers for their part evidently feel obliged to blame all the country's ills, whatever they currently happen to be, on mistakes perpetrated by the previous administration*' (p284). This system is contrasted by King with that of the Nordic countries, where government policies are seldom radically changed.

2.3.3.3 Enabler: Potential Institutional Reforms for Food Policy

If, as is suggested by the literature, institutional reform may be necessary to overcome the path dependent nature of the food policy framework and integrate established sectors, examples in other policy sectors are instructive. Institutional reform is identified as a key instrument for addressing longer-term policy problems by Aghion et al (2013), who demonstrate how new institutions can help politics and markets function more effectively, using examples of institutional solutions such as the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments, Ofel (followed by Ofgas, Offer, Ofwat and ORR), the London Olympic Delivery Authority, the Low Pay Commission and others.

Table 2.4: Examples of Institutional Reform

Institutional Solution	Result
Competition Commission and OFT	Institutions made more independent and political lobbying removed from merger decisions, improving competition policy
Bank of England independence to set interest rates after 1997	Created more stable macro-economic environment
Regulators of privatised services: Ofcom, Ofgem, Ofwat	Agencies provide framework rules that protect the public interest, drawing heavily on independent advice
NICE	Helped create better informed and less polarised debate around treatments in NHS
Migration Advisory Committee; Low Pay Commission; Climate Change Committee	Expert opinion used within a clearly defined framework

Source: Aghion et al (2013)

In the IFG policy reunion case study on climate change policy, the poorly performing climate change programme review, a bottom-up process led by DEFRA which was failing to gain compliance from other departments, was aided by institutional reform: the Office of Climate Change led to cross-government analysis of issues and created a ‘safe space’ beyond inter-departmental rivalries, with a new team able to *‘take a fresh look at the issue and was not ‘stuck in the tramlines of old policy (Michael Jacobs, special advisor to the Chancellor)’* (Rutter et al 2012 p118).

Conceptual Framework

The following section outlines the basis of the conceptual framework, which fuses the concept of policy integration with the theory of Historical Institutionalism (the reasoning behind combining these two bodies of literature is provided at 2.5 and 2.6 below). It begins with the results of a literature survey on policy integration. The reasons for integrating, or joining-up, and conceptual definitions are identified, along with inhibitors and facilitators, followed by a short history of attempts to integrate policy, including examples such as environmental policy integration and health inequalities. Finally, at 2.2, links with Historical Institutional theory are highlighted.

2.4 Policy Integration

2.4.1 Why Integrate?

While a governmental institutional structure based on specific policy responsibilities has certain advantages³, the unforeseen and unintended consequence has been fragmentation – primarily ‘departmentalism’ or ‘verticalism’ – which is considered to have prevented public policy goals being achieved (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Ling 2002; Meijers and Stead 2004). Government reforms in

³ Such as: promotion of functional specialisation; increased efficiency; and clear accountability (Page 2005, cited in Russel and Jordan 2009)

many countries have led to cabinet departments which follow their own business plans and *‘act as if they were functioning in a competitive marketplace, rather than as cooperative partners in a unified public sector’*, as the ship of state has become a flotilla (Peters 1998 p12).

As discussed, FM (Cabinet Office 2008b) and the NFP (DAFF 2011; 2012) are two of numerous policy documents in recent years to have called for a more joined-up approach to food policymaking. While food has not been a focus of the public policy literature on integration, it has clear parallels with the oft-cited example of social exclusion, in that it can be considered a so-called ‘wicked issue’ or ‘wicked problem’ for policymakers; cutting across multiple government departments and their individual sectoral responsibilities, for example agriculture, health and business, innovation and skills (Barling et al 2002; Russel and Jordan 2009; Peters and Pierre 2017). Macrae (2011) attributes the complexity of food for policymakers to its location at the intersection of a number of policy systems that historically have been divided intellectually, constitutionally, and departmentally, meaning *‘supporting new approaches means extensively confronting many existing and entrenched policy frameworks and traditions’* (p428). In this sense food is similar to other ‘wicked problems’ which have been the focus of attempts to join up, including social deprivation, health inequalities and sustainable development. Exworthy et al (2003) argue tackling the social determinants of health – the causes of and solutions to which are multifaceted – has been particularly problematic. There are clear parallels with the current crisis of the food system and the multi-faceted responses required to deal with it (Barling et al 2002). Similarly, environmental policy is a prominent example featured in the literature, where integration is seen as crucial to sustainable development to avoid the numerous instances of unexpected, often unwanted environmental externalities of individual sectoral policies (Meijers and Stead 2004). Russel and Jordan description of sustainable development as a *‘wicked issue par excellence as it represents a hugely complicated issue necessitating the integration of economic, social considerations into the policymaking of all sectors’* (Russel and Jordan 2009 p1) resonates with integrated food policy, both in terms of the policy domains it addresses and its goals.

Ling (2002 p622) defines ‘wicked issues’ as *‘a class of problems whose causes are so complex, and whose solutions are so multi-factorial, that they require a multi-agency response’*. According to Clarke and Stewart (1997a; cited in Ling 2002) such issues require: holistic not partial or linear thinking; capacity to think outside and work across organisational boundaries; involvement of the public in developing responses; and a willingness to think and work in completely new ways. In addition to facilitating policy responses to cross-cutting, and often ‘wicked’, issues, added benefits of policy co-ordination identified in the Wiring it up report of the UK Cabinet Office in 2000, include: helping to convey the ‘big picture’ for strategic issues; helping to realise synergies and maximise effectiveness of policy and/or service delivery; exploiting economies of scale; and providing a framework for resolving potential conflicts and making trade-offs (Meijers and Stead 2004). Alter and Hage (1993; cited in Meijers and Stead 2004), add other benefits including: opportunities to learn and to adapt, develop competencies or develop new products; gain of resources – time, money, information, raw material, legitimacy, status; gain of influence over domain; ability to manage uncertainty; and rapid response to changing market demands.

But overcoming departmentalism in favour of policy integration has proved hugely challenging for governments to achieve, leading commentators to label it the ‘besetting sin’ of British Government (Kavanagh and Richards 2001). Beale (1995 cited in Hunt 2006) draws parallels between breaching departmental barriers and breaking down trade barriers, and *Wiring it up* provides multiple examples of barriers to integration, as outlined in Chapter Three.

2.4.2 What is Integrated Policy?

There is some conceptual ambiguity in the literature. Meijers and Stead (2004 p1) identify a range of nomenclature including: policy integration; policy coherence; cross-cutting policymaking; concerted decision-making; policy consistency; holistic government; joined-up government; and policy co-ordination. Offering an Australian perspective, Hunt (2006) adds ‘whole-of-government’. The terms are used imprecisely, perhaps because, as Ross (2005) suggests, joined-up government, for example, was popularised by New Labour, but became a fashionable ‘term of art’ rather than a precise or technical concept. The popularity of the various terms has waxed and waned through the history of public policy analysis, with earlier concerns around ‘coordination’ and ‘holistic’ government, giving way to the concept of joined-up government, and more latterly coherence has arguably become the ‘*newspeak equivalent*’ allowing ‘*renewed appeal to rather well worn practices and ambitions*’ (Hood 2005 p24, cited in Jordan and Halpin 2006 p22), although there are certainly differences in focus:

Table 2.5: Policy Integration Definitions

Term	Definition	Author
Integration	Aims to adjust sectoral policies in order to make them mutually enforcing and consistent	Meijers and Stead (2004)
	Actual execution or implementation of products of coordination through development of common structures and merged professional practices and interventions	Six (2004)
	Policy making in certain policy domains that take policy goals of other – arguably adjacent – policy domains into account.	Tosun and Lang (2013)
	Focused on common, integrated trans-domain policies	Hogl and Nordbeck (2012)
	Primarily concerned with upstream policy making processes and the associated institutional arrangements	Nilsson et al (2012)
Integration and Joined-up policy	Includes dialogue and information (as in policy co-operation), transparency and avoidance of policy conflicts (as in policy co-ordination, policy coherence and policy consistency) but also includes joint working, attempts to create synergies between policies (win-win situations) and the use of the same goals to formulate policy	Geerlings and Stead (2003)
Coordination	Minimising contradictions among policies	Hogl and Nordbeck (2012)
	Joint and holistic working, planning, dialogues between agencies and making decisions	Six (2004)
	Results in one joint policy for the sectors involved	Meijers and Stead (2004)
Co-ordination, coherence and consistency	‘All quite similar’. Imply co-operation plus transparency and some attempt to avoid policy conflicts (but do not necessarily imply the use of similar goals)	Geerlings and Stead (2004)
Joined-up	Consistency between programs, policies and agencies which allows them to work together	Six (2004)
Holistic	Starting with clear and mutually-reinforcing sets of objectives, framed in terms of outcomes, and then working back from that to devise instruments to achieve them	Six (2004)
Coherence	An attribute of a policy that systematically reduces conflicts and promotes synergies between and within different policy areas to achieve the outcomes associated with jointly agreed policy objectives	Nilsson et al (2012)
	Used more to analyse outputs	
	The capacity to produce logically and consistently related policies	Rhodes (1997 ⁴)
Cooperation	Dialogue and information sharing	Geerlings and Stead (2003)

Source: Author referencing author's definitions

⁴ Rhodes 1997b p222, cited in Di Francesco 2001

As can be seen from Table 2.5, there are conflicting definitions. For some coordination is creating a single joint policy for the sectors involved (Meijers and Stead 2004) and integration is ‘*about policy making in certain policy domains that take policy goals of other – arguably adjacent – policy domains into account*’ (Tosun and Lang 2013). While for others integration might be regarded a more ambitious type, focused on common trans-domain policies, while coordination is about minimising contradictions (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012). Metcalfe (1994) contrasts voluntary co-operation with the intervention of a co-ordinator. His ‘*Policy Co-Ordination Scale*’ lists a series of measures of coordination from more down to less:

9. Government Strategy
8. Establishing Central Priorities
7. Setting Limits on Ministerial Action
6. Arbitration of Policy Differences
5. Search for Agreement among Ministries
4. Avoiding Divergences among Ministries
3. Consultation with other Ministries (Feedback)
2. Communication to other Ministeries (Information Exchange)
1. Independent Decision-Making by Ministries (Metcalf 1994 p281).

Also useful is Hustedt and Seyfried’s (2016) examination of coordination’s role in managing turf wars, where ‘*co-ordination seeks to reconcile contestation*’ between departments (or DGs in this instance in their European Commission study) ‘*to arrive at one consistent policy*’:

‘This ‘reconciliation’ thus refers to the resolution of conflicts or disputes on problem definitions, policy goals and instruments. Defending problem perceptions, along with preferred goals and instruments, by seeking to protect their own competences from the interference of others are crucial elements of co-ordination’ (p891).

These authors draw on Scharpf’s early work conceptualising coordination, which distinguishes between the ideal types of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ coordination:

Table 2.6: Types of Coordination

Type of Coordination	Characteristics	Result
Negative	• <i>‘Formal responsible organisational unit initiates the co-ordination process by providing a draft, which is sent to the other affected units for comments and amendments (Scharpf 1973: 87–9). Those affected units check the draft exclusively for the negative effects on their own area of competence’</i> • Transaction costs in negative considerably lower • Problem perception of organisational unit (department) dominates (Hustedt and Seyfried 2016 p891)	Output represents the lowest common denominator
Positive	• <i>‘All affected units are involved from the very beginning by discussing all policy alternatives jointly across all actors, and the effects of all alternatives are simultaneously checked for all affected units (Scharpf 1973: 91)’</i> • Transaction cost intensive • Joint problem perception: less variance in problem and salience perceptions (Hustedt and Seyfried 2016 p891)	Encompassing Policies

Source: Author using Hustedt and Seyfried (2016)

Coffey and Marston’s (2013) review of sustainable development policy in Australia offers another take, proposing a distinction between ‘integration’ and ‘balancing’. The authors argue the approach taken has important implications, with relevance to the prospect of integrating economic goals around food production with other domains such as environment and health.


Table 2.7: Integration or Balancing

Approach	Details	Implications
Balanced	Focuses on need to balance economic, social and environmental objectives, which are in conflict Encourages decision-makers to consider ‘trade-offs’ that arise between three objectives	Lead to continuation of existing practices and dispositions – environmental objectives and often traded off against economic objectives
Integration	Emphasise need for ecological objectives to be fully integrated into other arenas of decision making More than merely seeking to identify ‘win win win’ outcomes of triple bottom line approaches	Require decisions made in economic realm to fully consider the environmental and social consequences Economic objectives may need to be re-assessed

Source: Coffey and Marston (2013)

The following figure from Meijers and Stead (2004) also includes policy ‘co-operation’:

Figure 2.2: Levels of Policy Integration



Source: Adapted from Meijers and Stead (2004)

2.4.3 From Integration to Coherence

More recently, the term ‘policy coherence’ has gained popularity in public policy analysis, adding one more ‘companion C-word’ (Lawson 2002, in Keast et al 2007 p11) to cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Tosun and Lang’s systematic review of integration notes that ‘coherence’ rose to attention in the 1990s, promoted by the OECD and EU Commission due to the need for more coordinated and integrated policies by member states regarding development policy. The concept has since been used variously in the context of EU policy, in environmental policy (mainly related to environmental policy integration) (Nilsson et al 2012) and also as part of the development agenda, particularly in relation to nutrition policy (Hawkes 2015), to refer to *‘an attribute of a policy that systematically reduces conflicts and promotes synergies between and within different policy areas to achieve the outcomes associated with jointly agreed policy objectives’* (Nilsson et al 2012). In their 2012 paper on understanding policy coherence, Nilsson et al make the distinction between *policy coherence* and *integration analysis*, noting that integration *‘is primarily concerned with upstream policy making processes and the associated institutional arrangements’* (p396). Policy coherence is used more to analyse outputs. Nilsson et al also highlight the difference between internal policy coherence (within a particular policy domain) and external coherence, whereby a *‘sectoral policy can be effective in achieving its specific objectives without being coherent in relation to the objectives of other policy areas’* (p396). In a report for the UN Standing

Committee on Nutrition, Hawkes (2015) points to an early definition used by the OECD of ‘the promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives’ (OECD 2003, in Hawkes 2015), which has more recently been extended to ‘policy coherence for sustainable development’ (OECD 2014, in Hawkes 2015). As noted in Chapter One, ‘Enhance Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development’ is Target 17.14 of the (2015) Sustainable Development Goals. According to Hawkes (2015):

‘The OECD has begun to develop methodologies to analyse policy coherence for sustainable development more broadly.....They propose that a way forward is to map out the theory of what the outcomes of policies might be through a ‘results chain’ in the specific context in which they are implemented (OECD 2010). ...There are also existing tools to draw on such as health impact assessments, multi-criteria mapping, problem solution trees and value chain analysis’ (p26).

However, governments require capacity to apply such analytical tools, and yet ‘according to a report on policy coherence between EU policies for development ‘the current global system lacks the basic capacity to prevent, detect or redress incoherent policies’ (Concord 2013)’ (Hawkes 2015 p28) and there is a need for ‘stronger institutional capacities to enable analysis, implementation and greater coordination and cooperation’ (p30). Capacity here refers to smaller and poorer states. But the same arguably holds true for national governments. This more recent work on policy coherence ties well with Page’s (2005 cited in Russel and Jordan 2009) proposal for the kind of research needed in public policy integration, on the types of silo that exist, examining whether they are characterised by high or low levels of conflict.

While joining-up across government departments is a focus of much of the literature, and the focus of the thesis at the outset, distinction can be made between horizontal integration, which refers to joining-up between different sectors or departments, and vertical integration, which refers to coordination between the tiers of government (Meijers and Stead 2004; Hogl and Nordbeck 2012). Young’s (2002) work on institutional fit contrasts:

- *Horizontal interplay*: the relationship between policies at the same level of governance
- *Vertical interplay*: relationships across different (spatial) scales of governance.

Ling (2002) underlines how organisational boundaries can also be interdepartmental, central-local and sectoral (corporate, public, voluntary, community). Similarly, Dixon (2001, cited in Hunt 2006) highlights three levels of joint ways of working: cross-departmental; cross-governmental; and cross-sectoral, to which Hunt (2006) adds ‘intradepartmental’. In an examination of the translation and re-circulation of ideas about health inequalities within policy, for example, Smith (2013 p89) describes the English Department of Health as itself operating ‘as a collection of silos focused on individual activities’.

The literature also features several attempts to classify activities which might be classed as ‘joined-up’. Ling’s (2002) fourfold typology divides these into dimensions concerning:

- The internal life of each organisation (culture and values, information management, training);
- Inter-organisational life (shared leadership, pooled budgets, merged structures, joint teams);
- Delivery of services (joint consultation with clients, developing a shared client focus, providing a ‘one stop shop’ for service users);
- Accountabilities ‘upwards’ and target setting from above (Public Service Agreements and other shared outcome targets, performance measures, shared regulation).

In the *Wiring it Up* report (Cabinet Office 2000), activities that can be subject to joining-up include: organisational change; merged structures and budgets; joint teams (virtual or real); shared budgets; joint customer inter-face arrangements; shared objectives and policy indicators; consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs; and sharing information to increase mutual awareness (Ling 2002). In response to the 1999 *Modernising Government* white paper (with its message that government must make better policy and improve its translation into action), the *Professional Policymaking for the Twenty-First Century* framework was created (Cabinet Office 1999), specifying nine features of modern policymaking: forward looking; outward looking; innovative, flexible, creative; evidence-based; inclusive; joined-up; review; evaluation; learns lessons (Bullock et al 2001). While Russel and Jordan (2009 p1203) provide their own review of centralised instruments, referencing a list devised by Peters (1997). These can be found in the Methodology section 3.4.1 on operationalising policy integration.

While the focus of public policy literature is on joining-up policy domains, an alternative approach to tackling irrational sectoral boundaries is integrating a particular issue – such as health, or sustainability – into other policies. An example is the concept of ‘Health in all Policies’, coined by the Finnish presidency of the European Union in recognition of the need for health arguments to be ‘*made compelling for much more influential sectors with their own distinct mandates and obligations*’ and utilising methods such as Health Impact Assessment (Leppo et al 2009). Similar approaches have been used in environmental policy, as discussed below.

2.4.4 Policy Integration and Governance

Recent work by Kay and Ackrill (2012) on policy capacity is informative for assessing the potential for integrated food policy within the current institutional framework. They build on the Parsons (2004) proposal that a dimension of a government’s policy capacity is its ‘*ability to weave together the multiplicity of organisations and interests to form a coherent policy fabric, which is robust enough to survive the politics of policy implementation*’ (Kay and Ackrill p4). Kay and Ackrill suggest five types of government policy capacity including:

Table 2.8: Types of Government Policy Capacity

Type of Capacity	Details
Value Agreement Capacity	Ability of governments to facilitate agreement about values motivating policy
Selection Capacity	Ability to forge authoritative choices which commit governmental societal actors, which leaves governments with ‘ <i>the challenge of coherent, joined-up policymaking in a context where power may be diffuse, political consensus difficult to achieve and implementation requires strong coordination between multiple policy and market activities</i> ’

Source: Kay and Ackrill (2012 p4-6)

A 2007 policy paper on handling wicked problems by the Australian Public Service Commission supports a focus on Value Capacity, noting the need to ‘*create a shared understanding of the wicked problem*’, and recommending ‘*this needs to be commenced in the pre-project stage to avoid the danger of dealing with the wicked problem too narrowly*’ (APS 2007). The issue of skills and capacity deficit are also raised in a briefing paper from the Northern Ireland Assembly *Ensuring Delivery of Cross Cutting Themes in the Programme for Government* (Campbell 2010), which highlights good practice from other jurisdictions.

Table 2.9: Examples of Good Practice in Cross-cutting Working

Jurisdiction	Example
Scotland	- Attempted to arrange ministerial portfolios and departmental structures around cross cutting-objectives rather than simple sectoral functions e.g.; Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning; Minister for Rural Affairs. - Uses Outcome Agreements for delivery at a national and local level
Sweden	- Set objectives which cut across ministerial and budget boundaries - Budget system allocates money to policy areas rather than organisations
New Zealand	Broad objectives articulated through Strategic Results Areas (SRAs) – Ministers and Public Service Chief Executives (PSCEs) must identify main contribution of own department to the SRAs using Key Results Areas, which are included in performance agreements between the PSCEs and Ministers.
Republic of Ireland	Department of Taoiseach has a policy coordination role

Source: Campbell (2010)

Rayner and Howlett (2009b p170, cited in Vince 2015 Online) add the concept of ‘*integrative capacity*’, referring to ‘*where governance or institutional arrangements exist that can develop and implement integrated policies on a large scale*’ (Vince 2015 Online) and note that new institutions are often a key tool.

2.4.5 History of Policy Integration Attempts

FM and the NFP were the first attempts to produce an integrated national cross-government approach to food in each country. However, in other policy areas, integration has been a policy goal for many years. The following section provides a brief history of how policy integration has been tackled in the two case study countries, and includes reference to the role of institutions.

2.4.5.1 UK

Six (2004) traces examples of government attempts to coordinate back as far as the 1830s, to the Chadwickian public health reforms of British local governance, and other historical milestones are identified as: coordination of urban public health in Victorian times (Six 2004); creation of many central institutions of modern government – including the cabinet, civil service and local authority – to overcome problems of coordination (Bogdanor 2005); the Haldane Committee of 1918, which supported vertical departments over horizontally cross-cutting units (Kavanagh and Richards 2001); Churchill's system of using 'overlords', drawn from the House of Lords, to oversee and coordinate different government departments (Kavanagh and Richards 2001 p5); and the newly-elected Heath government's 1970 White Paper *The Reorganisation of Central Government*, described as '*the most effective blueprint for combating departmentalism*' (Kavanagh and Richards 2001 p5), and followed by establishment of the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), and introduction of Programme Analysis Review (PAR), aimed at evaluating departmental programmes (Kavanagh and Richards 2001).

However, most of the literature focuses on the period from the start of the 1980s, when Conservative government measures to break-up the '*monolithic inward-looking public sector*' – such as the creation of agencies, internal markets, privatisation, market testing, and compulsory competitive tendering – exacerbated challenges of coordinating multi-agency responses to complex problems with each individual organisation incentivised to achieve its own aims at the cost of system-wide objectives (Ling 2002 p618). Richards (NAO 2001 p62) conceptualises these changes in joining-up of public policy as occurring in two clear paradigms. The first, peaking in war-time and post-war was characterised by a large bureaucratic organisational form, and '*planning and co-ordination at the top combined with a pluralist distribution of power between central and local government*'. Change was slow and required consensus among key actors, and '*no-one talked about JUG because they were actually doing it*'. The paradigm that replaced it was characterised by fiscal crisis, individualism, and global competitiveness, resulting in '*massively increased attention to unit costs and their reduction*'. '*The flaw in this efficiency paradigm*' according to the NAO '*was that power was centralised into a Whitehall structure and a culture built on silo principles*' (NAO 2001 p62). Richards argues 'wicked problems' were a product of silo structures. Rational efficient behaviour in individual departments created issues for other silos and led to overall irrationality and inefficiency.

The point of departure for this research – the 2008 FM policy project – followed a long period of focus in the UK government on integration under Prime Minister Tony Blair, with his modernisation agenda. In 1999, Blair referred to the '*scars on my back*' from attempts to get departments to work together; accusing civil servants of operating in '*policy chimneys*' (Kavanagh and Richards 2001). Structural reforms to tackle this included task forces, a Policy Innovation Unit with project teams led by a sponsor or minister from a department with no interest in that policy area, and a role for the Treasury via Public Service Agreements (Kavanagh and Richards 2001).

2.4.5.2 Australia

Australia has also placed ‘*considerable emphasis on a more joined-up approach*’ (O’Flynn et al 2011 p245). Hunt (2006) highlights milestones such as the 1996-2007 Howard government’s focus on intergovernmental coordination via the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) process, with its remit is to debate and co-ordinate government activities across the various levels (see 4.5.1 for more on COAG). Hunt also notes the Howard government’s creation of ‘Centrelink’, a programme to coordinate service delivery in 25 government agencies. At the State level, Keast (2011) tracks the ebbs and flows of joined-up government in the State of Queensland, concluding there is no single path to joined-up working, and successful change is needed both in the ways people and organisations think, behave and work and use language, and in the systems and processes (Keast 2011 p229).

The 2004 *Connecting Government* report, and attempts to coordinate policy addressing indigenous affairs more generally (O’Flynn et al 2011), provide important historical context to the NFP. *Connecting Government* tried to instil a whole-of-government approach at the centre of the Australian public service; focusing on joining-up via structures, systems, skills and cultures, and acknowledging barriers such as accountability, budgetary mechanisms and technology for information and communication (O’Flynn et al 2011 p245). There was undoubtedly commitment at the political and senior administration level: cabinet processes were amended, new inter-departmental taskforces were created and the COAG was reinvigorated. These processes included many of the ‘classic enablers’ of JUG: new coordinating units within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to build linkages between strategic policy making and implementation; the canvassing of new approaches to integrated service delivery; and the creation of a lead-agency model established to assign responsibility to single departments for JUG projects (O’Flynn et al 2011 p246). But inhibitors included: lack of a JUG-supportive architecture; a programmatic focus and a centralised decision-making system. However, although there were ‘*seemingly insurmountable barriers*’ there were some success stories identified in the case study, which were ascribed to two key facilitators: ‘*a craftsmanship approach to leadership; and the cultivation and leveraging of rich, networked relationships within government and across communities*’ (O’Flynn et al 2011 p250). Policy statements and Prime Ministerial speeches in 2009 – the period prior to the announcement of the NFP policy project – focusing on improved service delivery through whole-of-government approaches, signalled a return of integration to the Australian policymaking agenda (Keast 2011).

2.4.6 How Can We Judge Policy Integration?

Underdal (1980, cited in Hogl and Nordbeck 2012) is often attributed with ‘*the first scholarly conception of policy integration*’ (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012 p113). He proposed a three-fold assessment of the basic requirements for a policy to be classed as integrated; *comprehensiveness*, *aggregation*, and *consistency* (examined further at 3.4.1.4). While Lafferty and Hovden’s (2003) list of indicators for horizontal EPI includes: existence of a long term sustainable development strategy; existence of a central authority specifically entrusted with the supervision, coordination and implementation of the integration process; relatively clear designations as to sectoral responsibility for overarching goals; timetables and targets for environmental policy; periodic reporting of progress with respect to targets; an active and monitored

usage of Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment for all government policies. Pollitt's (2003) survey of the JUG literature examines measuring 'joined-up-ness' by: reviewing the policy in terms of best practice; asking the stakeholders; or reviewing the outcomes (see 3.4.1.4).

2.4.7 Examples of Policy Integration Attempts

This research aims to contribute to understanding of integrated (food) policy through empirical investigation of two attempts. In doing so it utilises case studies already in existence; though for Russell and Jordan (2009) there is a dearth of detailed empirical accounts of joined-up government, with research too often focused on implementation at ground level rather than departmentalism at the policymaking stage. However Ling (2002) does examine examples of joined-up policymaking in other countries, including New Zealand's 'Strengthening Families' programme to improve family wellbeing, and collaboration across US Federal and State government, and public and private sector in the series of programmes for delivering childcare, training and community safety (Ling 2002). An example of successful integration in the UK offered by Kavanagh and Richards (2001) is policy towards the EC/EU. The Cabinet Office established a European Unit to coordinate departmental responses during Britain's entry negotiations in 1970, which led to a European Secretariat being created within the Cabinet Office. Underdal (1980, cited in Lafferty and Hovden 2003) examines the successful policy prioritisation of economic policy, which is argued to demonstrate how the principles of a policy sector can indeed be given 'principles priority' across other sectors.

2.4.7.1 EPI/Sustainable Development

Economic policy can be viewed as in the competing mode to environmental policy according to Lafferty and Hovden (2003). Høgl and Nordbeck (2012) describe how the concept of EPI – the '*inclusion of environmental concerns in decision-making processes and outputs as well as the implementation of public policy-making in environmentally-relevant policy domains*' – has found currency with policymakers and scholars, addressing as it does the '*environmental problems in functional and territorially-fragmented governance contexts*' (Høgl and Nordbeck 2012 p113). Jordan and Lenschow identify three categories of tools or instruments that have been used to promote institutional change in relation to EPI: communicative; organisational; and procedural. Communicative tools include national environmental plans and sustainable development strategies, and are aimed at '*increased awareness, longer-term visions and objectives, guidance to addressees and flexibility in the development of operational steps*'. Less popular organisational tools include task forces, liaison officers, or the amalgamation of departments, and '*tend to directly alter decision-making contexts*'. Procedural instruments include green budgeting, policy appraisal, strategic environmental assessments and changes to administrative standard procedures, and '*aim to directly intervene in decision-making processes*' (Jordan and Lenschow 2008b, cited in Høgl and Nordbeck 2012 p119). They conclude that while most OECD countries have instruments in place, the majority are of the softer communicative type. Harder organisational or procedural tools are less popular and, even when procedural instruments are used they are often weakly interpreted in the implementation phase, meaning they may ultimately revert to being communicative tools. As a result '*the core planning activities in driving force sectors such as industry, transport and agriculture remain mostly immune*' (Jordan and Lenschow 2010, cited in Høgl and

Nordbeck 2012 p120). While political commitment to EPI is considered to be widespread, deep disagreement surrounds its actual application. There are few best practices that could be shared between countries, and knowledge about policy outcomes is extremely sparse (Jordan and Lenschow 2010). Barling et al's (2002) paper on joined-up food policy highlights challenges faced by Labour's 'greening of government' initiative, noting that Labour *'inherited a range of institutional devices and forums from the previous Conservative Government including a cabinet committee on the environment, a committee of green ministers and cross-departmental Sustainable Development Unit'*, to which it added a tougher remit for the House of Commons select committees (p5). However, prioritisation of environmental concerns was somewhat unsuccessful, with sustainable development later *'hived-off into the new Defra in June 2001'* (Barling et al 2002 p5). Ross (2005) explains that it was initially proposed to be part of the Cabinet Office, but placed in DETR and then subsequently DEFRA, an institutional switch criticised by the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of Commons, for leading to lack of status; a failure to mainstream sustainable development; and to the environmental strand becoming too much of a focus. In related research, Russel and Jordan (2009) provide a detailed examination of the Labour government's attempts to join-up Whitehall policymaking on sustainable development through the application of Environmental Policy Appraisal (EPA) to individual sectoral policies, finding poor outcomes.

2.4.7.2 Health Inequalities

In their examination of policies to tackle health inequalities following the Acheson Report (Acheson 1998), Exworthy et al (2003) flag up a departmental culture that discourages JUG, arguing inhibiting factors such as departmental competition for resources and defending of departmental territory apply strongly to the area of health inequalities (Exworthy et al 2003 p1915). They conclude: *'though many departments' policies affect health inequalities, few mechanisms exist to leverage over their activities'*, leaving the government's approach *'rhetorically powerful but politically very cautious'* (Evans 2002 p79, cited in Exworthy et al 2003 p1915). Later work by Exworthy and Hunter (2011) highlights how lessons learned from the 1975 initiative 'Joint Approach to Social Policy' (JASP) were ignored in subsequent attempts to join up. These lessons included the need for: sufficient time to be allowed for a joint approach to be embedded (possibly up to ten years); full engagement from the outset of ministers to secure political ownership of the process; and independent resources under the control of those doing the coordinating to incentivise joint working. According to Exworthy and Hunter *'none of these lessons has been learned as subsequent attempts at JUG have proved'* (Exworthy and Hunter 2011 p203). Jochim and May's (2010) work on *'boundary-spanning policy regimes'* in the USA categorises integration projects according to the different subsystems or domains and primary supporters, and the institutions which were utilised. Examples include the 1960s Urban Empowerment movement; the Welfare Responsibility focus of the 1990s, and the Homeland Security regime in place post-September 2001. In their assessment, *'the perception of a crisis is perhaps the most powerful trigger for the emergence of a policy regime'*, though they do acknowledge regimes can emerge from *'the more endogenous forces of coalition building'* (p316). Their ideas resonate with the conceptions of policy change under HI theory discussed below.

2.4.8 Facilitators and Inhibitors of Policy Integration

While there have been some attempts to classify the facilitators of integration, which include *interpretive* factors like: perceived need; consensus between administrators and staff; good historical relations; and maintenance of prestige or power, and *contextual* factors like: standardisation; professionalism; geographic proximity and boundary permeability (Ling 2002); the majority of the literature focuses on inhibitors. Ling's (2002 p616) definition of joining-up as aligning organisations with '*different cultures, incentives, management systems, and aims*' classifies some inhibitors, while Karre et al's (2013) division of inhibitors into *strategic* (political) and *operational* (administrative) dilemmas is also useful. Strategic include: accountability and risk management; political mandate and leadership; and political value conflicts. Operational challenges include: resource and time consuming; turf wars and culture clashes; performance measurement; budgeting and staff turnover. The disconnect between long-term policies needed to address 'wicked problems', and relatively short-term activities of government (associated with electoral cycles and ministerial tenure), is linked to this (Exworthy and Hunter 2011). Bullock et al's (2001) survey of civil servants in all ministerial departments identified barriers including: inadequate time, as joined-up approaches take more time, and make heavier demands on resources; inflexibility of hierarchical organisational structures; risk-averse culture; and securing and maintaining buy-in from other departments.

Pollitt's (2003) study of JUG in Whitehall focuses on the obstacle of fragmented ministerial accountability, and also underlines how cross-cutting policies can be more fragile than single domain, citing *Wiring it Up*'s analysis that '*by their nature cross-cutting policies tend to have more stakeholders; be harder to monitor and evaluate; and run greater risks of failure and communications breakdown*' (Cabinet Office 2000 p2.8, cited in Pollitt 2003). Often drawing on Weberian analyses of bureaucracy and rationalisation, and the ways policy divisions shape activity, the literature highlights how civil servants are '*compelled to focus on small, specific areas of policy activity, making it extremely difficult for them to engage with ideas beyond their immediate area of responsibility*' (Smith 2013 p87). Richards (2000, cited in Hunt 2006) utilises public choice theory to demonstrate the ways that departmental managers act as self-interested utility-maximisers. Any integration may conflict with pre-established positions, which have been entrenched in the policies and routines of the status quo (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012).

2.4.9 Some Conclusions on Public Policy Integration

The consensus is that attempts at horizontal policy integration have been rather fruitless. Lessons learned as long ago as the 1975 'Joint Approach to Social Policy' initiative have been overlooked in subsequent attempts to join up (Exworthy and Hunter 2011). Analysis in 2011 by the IFG on policymaking in the real world, noted that despite ten years of efforts since the Cabinet Office *Wiring it Up* report '*obvious weaknesses in policymaking [which] are widely acknowledged and yet still endure*' (Hallsworth et al 2011 p7). Likewise Russel and Jordan's (2009) findings on sustainable development contradict '*the idea that UK's approach to better coordination has successfully permeated into the culture of Whitehall*' (2009 p1213), and policy on the environment remains highly departmentalised. Karre et al's (2013) recent examination of experiences of integration supports this reading, concluding that, though JUG experiments were ubiquitous, and despite the rhetoric, their impact may have been small, and – in the English case at

least – many developments have been dismantled following the change of government in 2010. For this reason, O’Flynn (2011) talks of ‘*insurmountable barriers*’ and Flinders (2002) proposes Parliamentary Reform as the necessary response to enable policy integration. Rayner and Howlett (2009a) also warn of the ‘*remarkable resilience of pre-existing policy elements*’, warning:

‘while it is currently fashionable to argue that ‘policy silos’ should be replaced by policy integration, such efforts are fraught with risks; notably the very real possibility of creating ineffective instrument mixes or incomplete reform efforts with resulting poor outcomes at the macro, meso or micro-level’ (p100).

Howlett and Rayner’s work on New Governance Arrangements (NGAs) suggests strong links between policy integration and institutionalism. For example, they emphasise the main practical challenge with integrated NGA designs is that they are not applied to a clean slate, as policy development ‘*is usually constrained by previous policy choices which have become institutionalised*’ (2007 p8), with layering cited as the ‘*worst possible way to create an NGA, adding new goals and instruments without abandoning previous ones, most often leading to incoherence amongst goals and inconsistency with respect to instruments*’ (2007 p8). They offer the example of designing Integrated Coastal Zone Management while maintaining unsustainable fishing quotas as part of the design; an example of how NGAs often fail because ‘*powerful interests accept new arrangements only if they can keep favourable goals, instruments and settings*’ (2007 p8). The literature review now builds on this analysis of NGAs, to discuss more fully how Historical Institutionalism can provide a lens through which to view policy integration.

2.5 Augmenting the Policy Integration Literature with Historical Institutionalism

As discussed in Chapter One, the issue of integration of food policy has an important historical component, due to an institutional configuration which lags behind modern definitions of food policy. Historical Institutionalism (HI) was therefore identified as a suitable lens through which to analyse the policy integration projects, which have been rhetorically-committed to a cross-government approach, but thwarted in practice. In choosing to take a historical-structural perspective, the aim is to go beyond agency-centred explanations of departmentalism, focused on ministers pursuing their own agenda, which, as Kavanagh and Richards (2001) note, are partial, by taking account of the structures within which they operate, and providing historical context to those structures, rather than assuming they are merely neutral, functional creations (Thelen 2002). The review revealed synergies between the integration and institutionalist literature, perhaps the clearest link being Bell’s (2002) assertion that one of the *raison d’être* of new institutionalism’s quest to ‘*bring institutionalism back in*’ (following a shift of emphasis in policy analysis away from the state to behaviourism), was institutional restructuring which took place since the 1970s within governments which led to silo-working (see also Howlett and Rayner 2009). The synergies will be returned to at the end of the chapter, but first, an outline of Historical Institutionalism is provided.

2.5.1 Origins of Historical Institutionalism

The HI approach to policy analysis is one of several strands of the so-called ‘New Institutionalism’, which rose to prominence in the 1980s as a reaction to the post-World War II behaviouralist focus on individuals and direct observation. It is ‘new’ in the sense that, previously, political science had focused

on mapping and describing the formal institutions of government – legislature, legal system, state, economic institutions – rather than institutions in a wider sense, and had done so using description rather than explanation or theory building (Bell 2002; March and Olsen 1984; Rast 2012). The new wave of institutionalist scholars loosened the definition of institutions, to include less formal phenomena such as, for example, ideology, of which more below under ‘definitions’. While the study of food policy to date could hardly be charged with being reductionist or individualistic (given the scholarly focus on a systems approach which heeds the interplay between institutions, actors and interests (Lang et al 2009, as described in Chapter One), taking an expanded definition of an institution, and combining this with the policy integration literature to produce a more detailed empirical analysis of the way institutions influenced two particular policy attempts, is considered to present a novel contribution to the theoretical-empirical body of knowledge in food policy.

In the case of HI, a ‘historic turn’ introduced a new way of exploring the relationships between structure and agency and the interplay between individuals, institutions and their policy environment, recognising that ‘history matters’ in social scientific investigation (McDonald 1996; Bates et al 1998, cited in Rast 2012; Cairney 2011).

2.5.2 What is an Institution?

The new institutionalism broadened the notion of an institution, leading to considerable divergence in its definition, and the term is applied in both a narrow or broad sense. Steinmo (2008) is brief, stating that the most common definition is ‘rules’. But there are variations between, for example, Streeck and Thelen’s *‘both formal organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct’* (1992 p2, cited in Peters et al 2005) and Hall’s assertion that institutions are: *‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of policy and economy. As such, they have a more formal status than do cultural norms but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as opposed to conventional, standing’* (Hall 1986 p19, cited in Steinmo 2008). More recently, Hall has described institutions succinctly as *‘sets of regularised practices with a rule-like quality’* (Hall 2010). For Kay (2005) the category can be widely drawn, as in the definition offered by Hall and Taylor (1996 p938, cited by Kay 2005):

‘the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of the polity or political economy. They can range from the rules of a constitutional order to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank–firm relations. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organisation’.

The ambiguity has led to critiques. John (2012) contends that by incorporating norms and values, too many aspects of political life are being considered under one category, and Peters et al (2005) accuse HI scholars of failing to define the concept; with too wide a range of phenomena captured by a single term. They highlight how the term can be used to refer to *‘deliberately created institutions charged with the implementation of public policy’*, and likewise to *‘formal administrative institutions within the state such as civil service departments or legislatures, as well as informal rules, agreements, and customs within the state and between the state and society’*. They argue the term institution should be delimited to either: *‘deliberately created agents or administrative units which may assume a durable character, or informal*

but clearly identified rules and legacies associated with particular institutions or institutional arrangements'. For Kay (2005), the policy system contains various structures at different scales which act as institutions in shaping agents' decision making, which *'are not reducible either to individual level agents or elements in the policy process'*, examples being budget rules, policy networks⁵ and standard operating procedures in government departments and agencies. Other definitions make more specific reference to the role of history, with Thelen classing institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes, which *'reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in politics'* (Thelen 1999 p394).

Though debates over the definition of institutional boundaries exist, Bell (2002) concludes that the one certainty is it is best *'not to think of an institution as a 'thing' but as a process or set of processes which shape behaviour'*. And, as Steinmo adds, whichever definition is applied, institutions are to be viewed as *'important for politics because they shape who participates in a given decision and, simultaneously, their strategic behaviour'* (Steinmo 2008). Unless institutions are circumvented by networks of interests, or power relations, they create the *'musts, mayes and must nots of policy development'*, affecting whether, and how quickly, politicians address public problems, and how policies attract certain 'rent seekers' (Steinmo et al 1992; Strom, Muller, & Bergman 2003, cited in John 2003).

2.5.3 History and Timing Matter

There are fewer definitional issues around the historical element of the HI lexicon (Katznelson 1998): *'institutions are the legacy of concrete historical processes'* (Thelen 1999 p382), which *'reflect, and also reproduce and magnify, particular patterns of power distribution in politics'* (Thelen 1999 p394). Therefore history must not be regarded as simply a chain of independent events (Steinmo 2008), or as a necessarily efficient process, as HI also emphasises historical inefficiencies and how inefficient institutions and policies are maintained. Thelen (2002) describes this as an important corrective to more functionalist perspectives, which can spuriously explain institutional arrangements simply on the basis of the functions they currently perform (Pierson 2000b; Thelen 1999, 2001, cited in Thelen 2002). By ignoring history and analysing contemporary policies as a standalone, other approaches are viewed as dismissing the impact of earlier policy choices (Peters et al 2005). This idea is encapsulated by the concept of 'path dependency' (see 2.5.4). Writing on the role of time in policy analysis, Pollitt (2008) cites Paul Pierson's (2004) contention that *'political science in particular, but social sciences more generally, have become increasingly decontextualised'*. The temporal dimension has been somewhat lost, with knowledge of how things were done in the past treated as increasingly irrelevant (Pollitt 2008 p9). Pollitt's own work examining the impact of NPM reforms proposes a loss of institutional memory; *'a dwindling of the influence of the past'* (Pollitt 2001, cited in Pollitt 2008 p25), noting that:

'Downsizing, contracting out, repeated organisational restructurings and a shift, first from paper to electronic data storage and then from one type of software to another have combined to reduce that which public sector organisations remember of their own pasts – even their very recent pasts in some cases. The consequences are that mistakes are repeated and the tacit craft skills and networking knowhow of long serving staff are lost' (2008 p25).

⁵ Though for Bell (2002) networks are not institutions but are shaped by them

In the study of food policy to date, the temporal dimension has figured significantly, in particular in analyses of the long shadow of the UK post-war productionist strategy for food, which – as discussed in Chapter One – is argued to have subsequently prevailed as the dominant policy paradigm (Lang and Heasman 2004; 2015). The thesis aims to augment this approach, with reference to policy integration.

2.5.4 Path Dependence

HI is based on the premise of ‘path dependence’ (PD). The term conceptualises the way political choices – made at the time an institution is being formed or when a policy is being implemented – have a deterministic impact on policy in the future (Kay 2005; Peters et al 2005). It also highlights how ideas present at the time of formulation of an organisation or policy are reified. Put simply, *‘early policy decisions ‘lock-in’ a policy onto a particular path’*, even if those decisions turn out to be bad ones. Once a system starts in one direction rather than another, it is unlikely to reverse itself and start down a path previously foregone (Gomez 2013 p3; Kingdon 2003). Indeed, past policy decisions themselves *become* institutions and these act as structures that limit or shape current policy options (Kay 2005). Pierson (2000b) concludes that path dependent processes are, then, inherently historical, because they can only be identified through historical analysis. For Peters et al (2005), what appear to be small choices in institutional arrangements – often taken unthinkingly or unwittingly – can, later down the line, have remarkable consequences, and may prove irreversible. By way of example they cite employment services in Britain and the United States, which remained as benefit providers rather than agencies of placement, in the face of numerous attempts to reform them toward the latter.

But PD is more than a *‘story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future’* (Kay 2005). Kay (2005) cites Nobel Laureate Douglass North’s (1990 p98–9) definition of path dependency as a process that constrains future choices: *‘at every step along the way there are choices – political and economic – that provide...real alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision-making through time’*. Kay (2005) points out how references to choice and decision-making are indicative of PD’s economic origins⁶. PD policy studies emphasise the persistence of institutions and policies, and shine a light on the institutional foundations of persistent political projects like the welfare state, or Keynesianism, as the:

‘institutionalisation of a set of persuasive ideas about social and political reality that have been successful in describing reality over long periods of time, as well as prescribing means of solving problems within that reality’ (Peters et al 2005 p3).

There is obvious potential therefore, for examining a food policy framework constrained by a single-issue approach; with its historical definition as either agriculture policy, or nutrition policy.

⁶ The concept borrows from the toolkit economists utilise when analysing how technologies develop, the classic example being Paul David’s (1985) work on the dominance of the QWERTY keyboard (Thelen 1999; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007)

2.5.4.1 Mechanisms of Path Dependency

Several mechanisms have been identified by HI scholars as sustaining the PD trajectory.

Table 2.10: Mechanisms of Path Dependency

Mechanism	Details
Increasing Returns/Positive Feedback	Probability that, once on a particular path, further steps down that path increase with each step, because benefits for policy makers, interest groups, and other players of current activity increase over time compared with other possible options, as do costs of shifting to another alternative (Pierson 2000a; Schneider 2006). At each decision point (or critical juncture), multiple pathways are possible. But once a solution, or path, is chosen, positive feedback processes reproduce new arrangements and prevent reversal of the initial choice. Each step renders the occurrence of the next more likely until, finally, ‘lock in’ occurs, a term borrowed from economics, where it has been used to explain how inferior technologies become locked-in to specific economic trajectories (Arthur 1988, 1989, David 1985, 1986, Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 1995, cited in Howlett and Rayner 2006).
Distributional Effects	Political arrangements and policy feedback empower certain groups while marginalising others, and these distributional biases increase over time so that some policy becomes partially or fully blocked (Ikenberry 1994 and Weir 1992, cited in Thelen 1999). An example is Skocpol’s pioneering work ‘Protecting Soldiers and Mothers’ (1992), which tracked how institutional arrangements affect the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organise, and make alliances (Thelen 1999). With food policy formulation critiqued as subject to strong influence from food industry lobbyists, this mechanism may shed further light on how those power arrangements play out.
Learning	Associated with the work of Richard Rose (1990) on ‘ <i>inheritance before choice</i> ’. Institutions become locked in because people invest significant time understanding and applying the rules of policymaking. New policies are avoided because of up-front costs of retraining, or because staff resist change to a policy they believe to be the most effective (Steinmo 2008, Pierson 2000a, Gomez 2013). Hood (1996, cited in James and Lodge 2003) highlighted how this occurs with the British practice of rotating civil servants across departments, which is said to promote internal learning within the state. March and Olsen (1984) also refer to ‘experiential learning’, whereby the ‘ <i>results and inferences of past experiences are stored in standard operating procedures, professional rules and the elementary rules of thumb for a practical person</i> ’. It is important to recognise though, that learning is not necessarily internal – it can also take place through the process of ‘lesson-drawing’ (Howlett and Rayner 2006).

Source: Author

At this point it is necessary to raise a potential tension between the institutionalist and integration literatures: between criticisms in the policy integration literature of poor institutional memory in modern policymaking – for example Pollitt’s work on the trend towards loss of institutional memory, or ‘*a dwindling of the influence of the past*’ (Pollitt 2001; cited in Pollitt 2008 p25) as outlined above – and the idea of inheritance before choice, or path dependence more generally. The two perspectives might be classified as ‘hollowing out’ of departments (in the case of policy integration), vs ‘filled in’ (Amin and Thrift 1995) in institutionalism. Yet Pollitt has applied the PD concept to a case study of hospitals in Brighton (2008), arguing for clear evidence of the role of administrative mechanisms such as planning and budgeting routines in path maintenance. Pollitt found the field of mechanisms that can produce PD is very open-ended as they may be:

‘...utilitarian/functional, political or cultural in character. They may be material or ideational or a mixture of the two. They range from fairly crude calculations of short-term profit to ‘softer’ longer run processes of socialization into a particular institutional environment’ (p44).

This tension around institutional memory will be revisited in Chapter Eight.

2.5.4.2 Critical Change

Criticisms of the concept of PD are examined below, but now is an appropriate point to explore the charge that HI’s focus on policy constraint comes at the cost of explaining change. Thelen and Steinmo (1992 p16), for example, argue that a:

‘critical inadequacy of institutionalist analysis has been a tendency towards mechanical, accounts that largely bracket the issue of change and sometimes lapse inadvertently into institutional determinism’.

For Peters et al (2005), that which makes PD so appealing – prediction of institutional persistence and explaining the embeddedness of those institutions – diminishes its ability to understand structural change. For HI scholars, change is most often defined as a divergence from the status quo, which, paradoxically, undermines the possibility of institutional explanations for change. Normal restraints are seen to have been lifted and new unexpected policy directions become possible (Weir 2006). Any acknowledgement of change therefore raises the question of whether institutions can be considered determinants of behaviour when they are themselves the objects of strategic action. In response, HI has borrowed biology’s theory of punctuated equilibrium⁷: long periods of institutional persistence can be interspersed with short bursts of change, brought on by an external/exogenous shock or shift (Krasner 1988, cited in Thelen 2002; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). In a more specific definition, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) characterise instances of institutional flux as when structural (economic, cultural, ideological, organisational) influences relax for a short period. Unlike the subsequent stages of a path-dependent sequence, where agency is narrowed, at a critical juncture both the freedom of political actors and the impact of their decisions are heightened.

These formative periods are referred to as ‘critical junctures’ and, along with PD, can be considered a key building block of the HI approach to analysing policy change (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). For Pierson (2000 p135, cited in Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) *‘junctures are critical because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter’*. Choices made during critical junctures in history close off the possibility of alternative options and create institutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes. Later work in the theoretical tradition has moved away from CJs, and the view of change as major, abrupt and discontinuous, with Thelen (2004, cited in Weir 2006) for one, arguing explanations that utilise CJs tend to overestimate crisis periods and underestimate ongoing changes during non-crisis periods. While incremental change is often situated as the opposite of punctuated change, it is in fact a mistake to conflate incremental with small in magnitude, says Mahoney (2010). For example, Howlett and Cashore (2009) point to Coleman et al’s (1996) study of agricultural changes in the EU, Canada and Australia, which demonstrates how, over twenty years,

⁷ Associated with Stephen J Gould, which challenged Darwin’s model of gradual evolution

cumulative incremental changes in policy settings and instruments led to large scale ‘paradigmatic’ change.

HI’s reliance on exogenous shocks as explanations for institutional destabilisation has also been criticised for assigning actors no agency, leading its scholars to look more closely at the dynamics of the processes involved, and the role of ideas (Steinmo 2008; Howlett and Cashore 2009). The choice of approach – exogenous or endogenous – can be considered a result of the theorist’s attitude towards institutionalism (Rayner 2009). Meadwell (2005) distinguishes between ‘strict’ and ‘loose’ versions of PD:

Table 2.11: Strict and Loose Path Dependence

Strong Institutionalism/ Strict Path Dependence	Exogenous explanations tend to be favoured by ‘strong’ institutionalists, who regard structure as trumping agency (Rayner 2009). Meadwell (2005) argues strict path dependence involves three phases: 1. CJ (in which events trigger a move toward a particular path out of at least two possibilities); 2. period of reproduction (positive feedback mechanisms...reinforce the movement along one path); 3. path comes to an end when new events dislodge the long lasting-equilibrium. So every path begins and ends with a critical juncture. Change cannot be explained endogenously – it is ‘<i>associated with the specification of some exogenous variable or event, that is, a variable or event that is uncaused by those variables and events that are associated with reproduction</i>’ (Meadwell 2005 p16). Change comes from outside the system of variables that cause the process of reproduction.
Weaker Institutionalism / Loose Path Dependence	An ‘<i>internal contradiction</i>’ or ‘<i>dynamic conservatism</i>’ explanation is associated with weaker versions of institutionalism (Rayner 2009) With ‘loose’ path dependence ‘<i>institutional change, up to and including a change of paths, can occur without an exogenous shock so that both reproduction and change are built into the logic of institutions</i>’ (Meadwell 2005 p16).

Source: Author from Meadwell (2005)

This links to Thelen’s proposition that institutions can be structured by both mechanisms of *reproduction* such as increasing returns, and mechanisms of *change* such as institutional layering. In their much-referenced book *Beyond Continuity* (2005), Streeck and Thelen identified five patterns of institutional change:

Table 2.12: Patterns of Institutional Change

Displacement	One institution displaces another, through what Mahoney (2010 p18) describes as the ' <i>active destruction of prior arrangements and the active creation of new alternatives in their place</i> '.
Layering	An established institution is made to serve new purposes, creating an explanation which encompasses both the idea of increasing returns and some form of institutional innovation (Thelen 2002; Weir 2006). Reformers must work around existing structures, but yet can bolt on new elements and influence the trajectory of policy. The new institutional layers which are added might be rules, policy processes or actors (Van der Heijden 2011). For Howlett and Rayner (2009), drawing on Beland (2007), layering can refer to the ' <i>process whereby new goals and instruments are added to an existing regime without abandoning previous ones, typically leading to both incoherence amongst goals and inconsistency with respect to instruments used</i> ' (p100). More below.
Conversion	Institutions become directed towards new goals or functions (Thelen 2002), e.g. when new groups become involved, who alter the trajectory rather than simply adapting to the current system, as occurred with works councils in Germany. Thelen (1991, cited in Thelen 2002) describes how these were converted from ' <i>instruments of employer paternalism to an institution that reflected but also substantially shored up labor strength</i> '.
Drift	Failure to adapt policies to take into account socioeconomic changes (Weir 2006). Howlett and Rayner highlight how the <i>goals</i> of a policy may change without a change in instruments used to implement them (2009). Echoing Weir's (2006) observation that drift is not necessarily a neutral process, as it can be a political tool where policies are deliberately not adapted to be more responsive, Rayner and Howlett suggest mechanisms of policy change may be consciously employed by policymakers: ' <i>Where powerful political coalitions are capable of blocking change, allowing policy to drift, or layering new policies on top of old ones may both be attractive options and may also achieve at least some of the policymakers new goals</i> ' (Howlett and Rayner 2009a p103).
Exhaustion	Institutional breakdown and failure (Steinmo 2008). Howlett and Rayner refer to the example of traditional renewable resource policy in explaining how exhaustion can occur when a policy regime becomes undermining over time (2009a p103).
Bricolage	Additional pattern to Streeck and Thelen's five, identified by Van der Heijden (2011). ' <i>The rearrangement or recombination of institutional principles and practices in new and creative ways</i> ', and translation – the ' <i>blending of new elements into already existing institutional arrangements</i> ' (Campbell 2009 p99, in Van der Heijden 2011 p11). Lowndes and Roberts (2013) note that bricolage – a concept taken from anthropologist Levi-Strauss meaning ' <i>patching together of disparate materials at hand</i> ' – ' <i>may be the only route to institutional innovation in the face of path dependency, resource constraint, risk aversion, and a generalized lack of trust (Lanzara 1998 p27)</i> ' (p155).

Source: Author

2.4.5.3 More on Layering

In applying Schickler's (2001) concept of layering to food policy, Feindt and Flynn (2009) point to the way the '*multiple orders*' created by institutional layering can lead to friction between the actors involved, thus providing an endogenous '*ideational tension*' explanation of why policy change occurs. The authors trace the history of food policy back to '*humble beginnings in the 19th century*', when food safety was the focus, through to policies addressing food security, to more recent concerns with quality, environmental impacts, links with nutrition and health and climate change:

'The ideational basis of food policy, the underlying assumptions about important problems and suitable solutions with regard to the population's food consumption have undergone far-reaching change. But the 'old' aims and ideas have never entirely disappeared' (Feindt and Flynn 2009 p387).

Instead new ideas have been layered on top of old. This idea of a continuous incremental layering of ideas is contrasted with – and arguably contradicted by – certain sweeping institutional reforms such as the creation and subsequent abandonment of a Ministry of Food in the early 20th century, and again in 1939-1954 (when it was merged into the Ministry of Agriculture); and the post-food scare absorption of the Ministry of Fisheries and Food into a new Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in 2001. Feindt and Flynn (2009) explain this apparent contradiction by arguing that, rather than resulting from exogenous shocks, crises should be understood as when tensions and contradictions within a political system become more visible, as multiple, competing and often contradictory ideas and institutions are heightened, creating '*choice opportunities*' in Kingdonian terms (Kingdon 2003). Crisis and the perception of policy failure are not important as drivers of change but as '*events that have triggered competing interpretations in the context of multiple orders*', thereby '*opening a political space that can be filled by ideational and institutional innovations*' (p409).

However, citing too ridged-a focus on the political system as a conceptual issue when applied to the multi-level realm of food governance, they propose that layering of multiple policies and institutions, and conversion of existing policies are better analysed with reference to the idea of policy *stretching*, developing Hall's (1993) concept of the stretching of a policy paradigm. They propose the '*productionist food paradigm*' is stretched as new issues (environment; food quality; obesity and health; climate change) arise and are '*solved*' with new institutional ideational layers, allowing full institutional paradigm change to be avoided. Examples proposed include the attempt to re-interpret GM plants from a threat to the environment to a solution to climate change; or the contradiction between policies to maintain rural landscapes and small farms and the health and environmental impact of dairy products. Finally, Feindt and Flynn raise the prospect of whether policy stretching can be viewed as a kind of policy integration, if a policy '*stretches out by integrating principles or goals from other policy areas without being institutionally linked to that area*' (p411).

Layering is linked to the concept of 'Institutional Dissonance', which has also been employed in attempting to explain change in stable policy path. Orren & Skowronek (1994 p320-321, cited in Weir 2006) use this term to highlight how '*at any given time, institutions, both individual and collectively, juxtapose different logics of political order, each with their own temporal underpinnings*'. This theme is

picked up again below at 2.5.5.1 in the discussion of value conflict. Institutional dissonance describes a disorderly politics where institutions abrading against each other create space for agents to promote change, for example changes to the previously '*politically untouchable*' US social security policy through new policy proposals and constituencies (Weir 2006).

In conclusion, in the conceptual approach to institutional change, Rayner (2009) concludes that – while not inviting them to '*let 100 methodological flowers bloom*' – scholars need not choose between path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and adaption, but must be prepared to use all (Rayner 2009 p94).

2.5.5 The Role of Ideas

One of the distinguishing factors of the new institutionalism – and one of its key defences to criticisms of being structurally determinist – is its encompassing of institutions beyond organisations, for example rules and ideas. In general HI scholars have been divided on how much weight to give the role of ideas (Schmidt 2010). The main theoretical tools employed by HI scholars in addressing ideas have been '*learning*' – as described at 2.10 – and '*policy paradigms*'. Dissatisfied with explanations around social learning, Peter Hall developed his now famous concept of ideas as 'policy paradigms' – overarching frameworks of ideas and standards specifying '*not only the goals of policy and kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing*' (Hall 1993 p279; Cairney 2011). Paradigmatic views, once institutionally embedded, have framing effects which act like templates to base political decisions on (Steinmo 2008), and change can be of three different orders:

- First Order: Incremental. Current policy based on lessons learned from previous policy decisions. Policy instruments remain unchanged.
- Second Order: Also characterised by policymakers adapting to past experiences while maintaining overall goals, but accompanied by significant changes to policy *instruments*. Outside interests likely to be more involved in the process of policy change, but their views are used by officials to promote changes sanctioned from within.
- Third Order: A 'paradigm shift' in Kuhnian terms – ideational change, and a change in the overall policy discourse, for example, in the case of Hall's own work, the switch from Keynesian to Monetarist ideas (Hall 1993; Lieberman 2002; Cox 2004; Cairney 2011).

Hall's theory of policy paradigms has been extremely influential, though its applicability to policy change other than the macroeconomic has been questioned, in particular in terms of the role of policy feedback processes (for example Coleman et al (1996) on agricultural policy paradigm shift through gradual accumulation of first and second order changes, where the rise of neo-liberal discourse led to the shift away from the widespread state-assistance paradigm which was prevalent in multiple countries since WW2). Steinmo (2008) says the most interesting current work is from scholars attempting to understand how '*ideas, values and beliefs affect history and politics and who are specifically applying these insights to understanding institutional change more broadly*' (Steinmo 2008 p170). Institutional change should be viewed as a result of the will and ability of powerful actors to introduce new ideas, or new solutions to social action problems. For example, Feindt and Flynn's (2009) work on food policy change as layering. Criticisms of Streeck and Thelen's typology have led them to more recent work around the role of '*change agents*' (Mahoney and Thelen 2010 p22) or '*institutional entrepreneurs*' (Rao et al 2000 p240;

Levy and Scully 2007, cited in Cini 2013): whom Pierson (2004 p137) describes as ‘*skilled social actors*’ who have an interest in developing or changing the institution by leveraging resources, identifying political opportunities, framing issues and mobilizing constituencies’ (Cini 2013 p4). ‘They are also able to make ideas actionable within an institutional setting by means of the discourses they use (Schmidt 2010 p15)’ (Cini 2013 p4).

2.5.5.1 Value Conflict

Value conflict is the focus of complimentary literature to that on the role of ideas in HI: along with the ideas of policy layering or stretching, it can potentially help explain how contested values in food policy co-exist institutionally; and the implications for integration attempts. Thacher and Rein’s (2004) study of ‘Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy’ established this stream of work with a typology of how governments deal with value conflict around a policy issue. They propose three strategies: Cycling; Separation (using firewalls) or ‘Casuistry’ (case-by-case attention to conflicts). Cycling and Firewalling appear particularly relevant for food policy:

Table 2.13: Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy

Strategy for Value Conflict	Characteristics
Cycling	Segregates values temporally Temporarily limiting goals considered to be relevant Attention shifts over time, sub-ordinating one-half of a dilemma and then the other
Firewalls	Segregates values institutionally Pursue one set of values in one institutional structure and a different set of values in another Keeps pathologies of value conflict at bay Each institution faces a simpler task – not to resolve conflicts among values but only to determine the best way to pursue each value in isolation
Casuistry	When values cannot be firewalled, must be considered simultaneously within the same institution Conflicts worked out case-by-case by making situated judgments

Source: Author from Thacher and Rein (2004)

Stewart (2006) draws on Thacher and Rein’s work to consider ways in which ‘*institutionalist accounts of change can be modified to include bureaucratic and political processes for separating, concentrating and routinising values choice*’ (p184). While firewalls can separate values, this can cause tensions elsewhere in the system, through displacement of the conflict. Stewart argues structural separation can be best used when there are ‘*clearly defined jobs to be done, and stable professional paradigms to accompany them*’ (p188), but are less suitable for when ‘*governments need to act consistently across a broad range of functions*’ (p188), concluding that calls for ‘whole-of-government’ responses to problems reflect unresolved conflicts. This suggests potential complementarity to critiques of food policy silos outlined in Chapter One. Voss et al’s (2009) research into designing long term policy points to how ‘*long-range policy is fundamentally characterized by problem-framing procedures*’ (p281), which require consensual social learning to succeed. They highlight the critical issue of the ‘fit’ of new policy designs with existing

governance patterns ‘in prevailing contexts of positivist policymaking, New Public Management, or market liberalism’ (p287), arguing that ‘these paradigms are deeply ingrained in policy discourse, institutions and practices’ (p287) which ‘deform’ the concept of Transition Management (their focus of study).

While the idea of institutional change may be more obviously understood in terms of transformations of existing formal institutions, or indeed actual organisations, Ison et al (2015) examine the role of institutionalised *understandings*; for example the neologisms ‘tame’ and ‘wicked’ problems to highlight how policymakers ‘live in language’ and how ‘institutions act as a form of ‘understandascope’ on the world we experience because institutions tend to contain (reify) understandings that were prevalent when the institutions were first invented’ (p106). The implication being that any institutional innovation which may be central to transforming complex issues will also necessitate innovation in *understanding*. Their definition of institutional change as ‘the deliberate, or purposeful, replacement of existing formal and informal institutions or the creation of new institutions in a socially desired way’ (p106), leads to them regarding changing institutions as ‘crafting’:

... ‘transformation towards governance regimes that are more systemic and adaptive is more than crafting the new; crafting also requires innovations in understandings and practice of those who do the crafting. Crafting may also involve clearing the situation of old, constraining institutions and appreciating extant institutional complexity (Wallis and Ison 2011)’ (p106).

These comments are relevant to literature around what constitutes policy success and failure, as discussed at 2.3.3.1. Broader definitions of policy success/change may, for example, consider a policy to have changed if it successfully transforms the definition of or discourse around the issues in question, for example introducing a consumption focus in a policy area previously dominated by production-focused policies, as could be argued took place with FM (see Chapter Eight).

Carolyn Tuohy has analysed how health care systems have evolved quite differently as a result of choices made at critical historical points. She compares how common external pressures were dealt with by the different policy systems, noting that ‘the working out of a common logic of a given policy arena is mediated by the particular logics of the national systems’, which are ‘accidents of history’ (Tuohy 1999 pviii). Each logic is the product of both:

- *Institutional Mix*: varying proportions of hierarchical, collegial and market mechanisms
- *Structural Balance*: between state actors, professional and private financial interests.

Applying this formula, the UK – with its hierarchical and collegial system, where private interests were dwarfed by the accommodation between the state and professions – is contrasted with strong role of financial interests and market-collegial institutional mix in the USA, with a much smaller state role.

2.6 Combining HI with Policy Integration

The issue of policy integration can be considered through both an *old* and *new* institutionalist lens: there are a set of fragmented organisational structures which need to be integrated for food to be considered from a systems perspective, but – in new institutionalist terms – the architecture also has a structuring effect by fragmenting practices, ideas and norms. For Smith (2013), divisions in policy responsibility

established in the 1970s structure the routes down which research ideas can travel. Policy silos and hierarchies are seen to work as ‘filters’, *‘encouraging those ideas that support existing institutionalised ideas (or ‘policy paradigms’), while blocking or significantly transforming more challenging ideas’* (Smith 2013 p81). And Davies (2009) notes that the challenges of generating consensus are often overlooked, highlighting how value pluralism results in contrasting conceptions of partnership and utilising ‘social defence theory’ to propose that, *‘because political contention is taboo, ‘silo’ practices remain unchallenged within the partnerships, which were thus dysfunctional for joined-up government’* (Davies 2009 p3).

Like explanations with an ideational focus, cultural explanations regard integration as more than simply the implementation of rational structures and procedures (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012). The cultural challenges are summed up by Bardach (1998 p232, cited in Ling 2002), for whom the difficulties in achieving joined-up government are unsurprising given that *‘almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to interagency collaboration. The collaborative ethos values equality, adaptability, discretion and results; the bureaucratic ethos venerates hierarchy, stability, obedience, and procedures’*. Following interviews with senior public executives in Canada and Great Britain, Peters (1998) similarly concludes that structural changes are only a partial solution – changes in *behaviour* are also needed for successful coordination. Taking a cultural/organisation perspective on Whitehall departments, Flinders (2002) argues it is often underestimated that beneath a general Whitehall culture, departments have distinct cultures, *‘which combine grounded philosophical beliefs with established policy frameworks and are heavily influenced by organisational structures’* (Flinders 2002 p64). He quotes Smith, Marsh and Richards (2001, cited in Flinders 2002 p64), who state *‘department cultures are structured patterns that provide the framework within which officials and ministers act’*, leading Flinders to conclude that *‘any attempts to alter the culture of officials, and the incentive structures which are designed to achieve this, must accommodate or at least take into account these distinct departmental cultures’*. This is linked, by Flinders, to historical institutionalist approaches to explaining the policy process, which highlight the ways governing is path dependent (Flinders 2002), and by Kavanagh and Richards (2001), who propose that departments have created a path dependency *‘out of which departmentalism has grown to be the ‘shadow over the future’*’ as, to the frustration of more change-oriented ministers, civil servants in a department will educate the new Minister to *‘ongoing reality’*.

Links between policy integration and institutionalist conceptions of policymaking are picked up by Smith (2013), who draws on the emerging analytical framework of discursive institutionalism in an examination of the role of policy-making institutions in shaping the relationship between health inequalities research and policy. Similarly, Exworthy and Hunter’s (2011) review of attempts to tackle health inequalities regard JUG as a perfect example of path dependency because a combination of previous decisions and existing institutions – which are dominated by vested interests – lead to suboptimal outcomes and inertia.

2.7 Summary of Chapter Two

This chapter examined four strands of literature with relevance to the research objectives; that on food policy and integration prior to 2008; the wider public policy context for that food policy, including a shift from government to governance and some ideas around policy success and failure; the concept of policy integration; and the Historical Institutional model of public policy analysis. In doing so it has highlighted some fruitful crossover in literatures, in particular how HI can consolidate understanding of integration, by highlighting how departmentalism can be understood as path dependent, but also raised a potential tension around institutional memory, to be revisited in the Discussion.

The literature on food policy prior to 2008 characterises food as a '*policy taker*', dominated by single domain approaches, with a separate policy stream on agriculture dominating the field in both countries, though with different models of state support. In Australia, a separate industry policy stream around food was identified, though less conspicuous in the UK case. More recently the domain of nutrition policy has developed, heavily focused on obesity in recent years. The literature also highlights tentative but limited boundary crossing between domains, for example in the UK's linking of agriculture and environmental policy, and the synergies being explored between health and environmental goals in both cases. The literature is directly linked to the research objective to track the historical approach to food policy integration in national food policy in the UK and Australia; prior to FM/F2030 and the NFP. It therefore provides important temporal context to the policy projects, and informs both the first findings chapter on the UK and Australian policy systems, and the discussion of the two projects in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Next, the public policy literature was explored, in terms of both the wider policy context for food and the concept of integration, revealing a changing government role to that of facilitator, and an accompanying policy instrument paradigm focused on alternatives to mandatory rules and regulation, suggesting important realities for how national policy can be made in the present day. Ideas around what constitutes policy success and failure were examined, along with barriers and facilitators of success, including what is known about the role of institutional reform. Subsequently, the literature on public policy integration revealed a long history of governments attempting to tackle policy fragmentation, and food's parallels with several other 'wicked problems' including social deprivation, health inequalities and sustainable development. Significant conceptual ambiguity was uncovered in the literature, around how to define integration, though more clarity was found on the enablers and barriers to integration and how the integrated-ness of a policy might be judged.

Finally, the HI literature highlighted the importance of including a temporal dimension in policy analysis, and introduced the concept of path dependence to characterise instances of policy constraint, as well as proposing a range of definitions of 'institutions', ranging from actual organisations, to ideas, values or 'understandings' which can become institutionalised. This literature also links directly with the research objective to investigate and compare the challenges of constructing a national food policy across a range of policy sectors and departmental responsibilities. The next stage of the research process involved synthesising the findings of the literature review and exploring how these might be applied in the

empirical phase of the project. The public policy context, integration and HI findings were operationalised into specific variables to be identified in the two policy projects, and brought together to create a Framework Tool with which to analyse the empirical data. For example, the HI theory on how early decisions can lock policies in to a particular path (e.g. Kay 2005), was translated to categories on the Terms of Reference set for each policy project, and also which department led the development. Table 3.4.3.1 in the Methodology Chapter provides a full exposition on how the literature was drawn on.

Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter explains how the research project was designed and implemented. First the research questions and design – a comparative study of two cases – are outlined. Secondly, the choice of a qualitative, interpretivist approach is justified, followed by an examination of further theoretical underpinnings of the research: the public policy theory of historical institutionalism as a lens for understanding integration. This section includes a description of how the literature and the empirical focus were bridged, through a process of operationalisation, including the design of two templates to organise the comparative analysis. The various methods used to collect data are then discussed, followed by the approach to coding and analysis, and ethics.

3.1 Research Objectives and Questions

As discussed in Chapter One, food policy currently suffers from a fragmented policy design which has hindered attempts to raise food policy up the political agenda, and led to repeated calls for a more integrated approach. Chapter Two described how the approach to food policy prior to 2008 was, in general, characterised by dis-integrated policy streams for agriculture, nutrition and so on, with only limited boundary crossing between domains. Two policy integration projects – envisaged as an innovative step forward, cross-cutting food's various policy sectors – were initiated in response, one in the UK in 2008-2010, and another in Australia from 2010-2013. The research set out to: explore these two cases of integrated policy innovation; to understand them in the context of historical food policy development; and to examine how they were developed, and what policy learning might be useful for future attempts. Table 3.1 presents the research questions, along with the research objectives they respond to.

Table 3.1: Research Objectives and Questions

Research Objective	Research Question
Track historical approach to integration in national food policy in the UK and Australia; both prior to FM/F2030 and the NFP, and the approach to integration in these projects	1. How has food policy integration been addressed by national governments in the UK and Australia?
Examine FM/F2030 and NFP policy projects to explore how they ended up with their particular content/form/status	2. What factors explain the framing and trajectories of the food policies arrived at?
Investigate and compare challenges of constructing a national food policy across a range of policy sectors and departmental responsibilities, drawing on literature on previous attempts at policy integration.	3. Can an integrated food policy be constructed across a range of established policy sectors?
Highlight lessons for national food policy formulation.	3. Can an integrated food policy be constructed across a range of established policy sectors?

Source: Author

3.2 Research Design

The following section explains two dimensions of the research design; it being a comparative examination of two cases.

3.2.1 Comparative Study

The research takes a comparative approach, continuing a tradition popular in public policy since the 1970s of comparing ‘*policies, inputs, outputs, and outcomes across institutional settings*’ (Cyr & deLeon 1975; Feldman 1978; Leichter 1977; Rose 1991, cited in Gupta 2012 p11). The aim of comparing two policy integration cases is twofold: it enables the depth of qualitative investigation and description needed to understand policy processes which tend to take place behind closed doors (more of which below) and addresses the lack of detailed accounts of the development (as opposed to agenda setting or implementation stage of the policy process) (Russell and Jordan 2009). While moving beyond the individual case introduces the possibility of some predictive value for the research. As Ragin and Becker note (1992; cited in Rihoux 2006 p679):

‘the choice of such a strategy often reflects the intention of scholars to meet two apparently contradictory goals. On the one hand, one seeks to gather in-depth insight in the different cases and capture the complexity of the cases – to gain intimacy with the cases (Ragin and Becker, 1992). On the other hand, one still wishes to produce some level of generalization (Ragin, 1987)’.

Furthermore, cross-national comparative analysis is a common method used in Historical Institutionalism (the theoretical model of public policy underpinning this thesis). As John (2012) attests, the institutionalist approach works best when comparing policymaking between nation states as it highlights the unique character of each country’s formal rules and stresses the values shaping a state tradition.

Hantrais (1999) underscores the multiple definitions of cross-national comparative research, and lack of clear guide to follow due to this diversity (cf large-scale political science comparative projects undertaken in the USA during the post-war period with culturalist perspectives which argue against generalisability or universality (Hantrais 1999)). An attempt to reconcile the two extremes in perspective was therefore attempted: context is considered to have important explanatory value for the examination of the case studies, but not to the extent it acts as a barrier to comparison (Hantrais 1999). In light of the dearth of guidance, literature on comparative study across nation states (e.g. Hantrais 1999) and comparative policy analysis (e.g. Schneider and Ingram 1998) was drawn upon. Two tools for assisting the comparative approach were developed (3.4.3).

3.2.2 Case Study Method

A theoretical sampling approach (Mason 1996, cited in Silverman 2016 p62) to selecting the cases to be compared was used. The possibilities were limited by a relatively ‘small N’ population from which to select (Rihoux 2006 p680). There have only been a limited number of attempts to advance a cross-government approach to food policy to date, and the UK and Australia arguably represent the most explicitly integrative ambitions, with both policy projects espousing similar commitments to cross-government food policy. While the UK example had halted by the point this research project was

initiated⁸, the Australian attempt was in formulation stage, offering the potential for an interesting comparison. The decision to select these cases was facilitated by connections between the UK's City, University of London, and the Australian organisation the Commonwealth Scientific and Industry Research Organisation (CSIRO), discussed further below. The case study method is deemed particularly appropriate for the thesis, given this research tool's aim to '*illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result*' (Schramm 1971, cited in Yin 2015 p15).

3.2.2.1 Unit of Analysis – Defining and Bounding the Cases

One of Yin's (2015) critical methodological questions when undertaking case study research is how to define the case to be studied. At the outset it was considered the two cases would be the specific policy attempts/documents FM/F2030 and the NFP. During the course of attempting to operationalise the literature it became clear that in order to utilise HI ideas about institutions, path dependence, and policy change when examining these policy integration projects, the object of study would need to be stretched to encompass the wider policy systems within which the projects were formulated. The following quote from the Welsh Public Policy Institute, critiquing Welsh food policy projects, supports such an analysis:

*'In this sense the 'gaps' are not just about substantive policy aims and objectives, but also the **modus operandi of food governance itself**. This is thus an important element of the eventual delivery of policies. Indeed, it can affect the very success or otherwise of the actual delivery of strategies'* (Marsden et al 2016 p7)

Secondly, to put those specific integration attempts in historical context and identify potential legacies/influences constraining their formulation – for example, previous policy attempts, the favouring of particular policy levers or particular types of advisory groups – it was necessary to identify how food policy integration has been addressed by national governments in the past. In taking such decisions, the research drew on Kay's (2005) work on the importance of clarity of case definition, as there is '*no unique policy level or scale but rather several levels that may be examined as 'policy''*' (Kay 2005 p556). According to Pollitt (2008), while the concept of PD was traditionally applied at the level of whole systems – e.g. to understand the trajectories of economies or welfare systems – it has also been increasingly used for meso-level subjects – for example budgetary systems – or even for specific policies. Kay cites Hecló's (1972) classic work on policy analysis which notes that policy is a middle-range concept: something 'bigger' than particular decisions but 'smaller' than general social movements (cited in Kay 2005). Kay divides this middle range into a number of scales:

1. The policy system: policy as a system, '*health policy*'
2. The policy subsystem: an element within the policy system, with its '*own set of actors, organisations, goals and instruments*' (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, cited in Kay 2005 p557). e.g. the primary care policy system; the public health policy system
3. The policy programme: '*a specific combination of laws, commitments, appropriations, organizations and personnel directed towards a more or less clearly defined set of*

⁸ By the time the field work was underway a change of government had halted work on implementation of the project.

goals' (Kay 2005 p557). This could also be defined, says Kay, as a policy instrument; *'an identifiable tool or resource of government used for a specific set of purposes'* (Kay 2005 p557).

Howlett and Ramesh (2003 p53) add a further scale, distinguishing between a *'policy universe'*, which they define as *'a fundamental unit containing all possible international, state and social actors and institutions directly or indirectly affecting a specific policy area'*, and a *'policy subsystem'*, which they argue is a subset of the policy universe where *'relevant actors discuss policy issues and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests'*. For the purposes of this research, a further scale below the policy programme is conceptualised – the policy project – to capture the idea of a distinct assignment within the whole policy programme for food, for example a food vision or plan, which may or may not attempt to unify a number of activities taking place within the policy programme, or may propose new actions to be taken. In summary, and after applying the above policy studies typology, this research took an initial focus on two specific integrated food policy projects (one of many projects/activities within the policy programme for food), but was necessarily stretched to encompass the modus operandi of the policy system, resulting in comparison at two levels, but with a primary focus on the former:

- Specific (integrated) national food **Policy Projects** – FM/F2030 in the UK and NFP in Australia.
- The food **Policy System** within which those projects took place (encompassing the various subsystems of agriculture; health; environment, etc).

In bounding the case (Yin 2015) decisions have been taken on what not to include in the research. In the interests of pragmatism, the following areas were deemed beyond scope: international and European food policy; regional and local food policy development; national food policy development in countries other than the UK and Australia; government institutions (departments) with a secondary role in the formulation of food policy. In reality, the boundary of the cases became blurred, due to the appearance of vertical integration as a theme, and the influence of regional levels of government on the capacity for national government to create new integrated policy frameworks. The research remained, however, bounded below the policy universe level, in that international food policy governance was not a focus. While the reasons for the decision to formulate national food policy case studies are analysed, agenda setting was considered to be a significant topic in itself and beyond the scope of the project to address in depth.

3.2.3 Literature Review

The primary literature review methods were outlined in Chapter Two. However, two additional searches on FM/F2030 and the NFP were also undertaken and used to supplement the document and interview data in the findings chapters:


Table 3.2: Additional Literature Search

Literature Search Category	Primary Search Terms	Secondary Search Terms Added (AND)
Food Matters	'Food Matters'	Policy 'Food Policy'
Food 2030	'Food 2030'	Policy 'Food Policy'
National Food Plan	'National Food Plan'	'White Paper' 'Green Paper' 'Issues Paper'

Source: Author

The below diagram provides a representation of the research process.

Figure 3.1: Research Process Diagram



Source: Author

3.3 Choice of Approach

As described above, there is a need for more detailed empirical accounts (of joined-up government), because research too often focuses on implementation at ground level rather than departmentalism at the policymaking stage (Russell and Jordan 2009). As such, a focus on the pre-publication stage of a policy project – in addition to the outputs – meant a qualitative approach was most appropriate. Because much of the policy process takes place behind closed doors, in depth interviews with participants were the most suitable method; the level of detail required from the participants meant a survey was not considered. One alternative was to conduct some Institute for Government-style ‘policy reunions’ (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011): stakeholder focus-groups to discuss how particular policies had been developed and decisions made, and explore interactions between the main participants; including between government departments. However, the difficulty of tracking down participants for one-to-one interviews, and lack of IFG-level clout undermined this option. A further option might have been participant observation of stakeholder meetings – alleviating some of the weaknesses involved in relying on post-hoc recollection from interviewees. However, this was limited by the timing of the field work. The UK project was completed several years prior to the start of the PhD in 2012, and by the Australian field work stage NFP development had concluded.

Policy documents were also an important data set, and at one stage a more quantitative content analysis approach to these was explored; calculating the number and types of reference to ‘integration’ in the policy project reports, as a way of tracking focus on this theme through the development process. However, it quickly became evident that such content analysis is best suited to larger amounts of information, in order to identify clear trends and patterns (Gbrich 2007), and would omit context, for example the way integration was being *defined*. As Braun and Clark (2006) express, *‘the “keyness” of a theme is not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures – but in terms of whether it captures something important in relation to the overall research question’* (p10). There was some use of quantitative secondary data, though, in the comparison of the two policy systems, and specifically the role of food in their respective economies. The research was coded using a thematic style of analysis, as discussed below at 3.8. Further, the policy project reports can be considered *“the public face of public policies”*, borrowing a term McConnell (2010) uses in a different context⁹. Therefore they reveal limited insights and are a snapshot of the end result of the development process, and neglect how *‘in every government department there are ‘deep structures of policy’ – the implicit collection of beliefs about the aims and intentions of the departments and about the relevant actors who influence or benefit from the policy’* (Gordon et al 1993 p9). These are of particular relevance when assessing the influence of particular institutionalised practices and beliefs which may impact on integration attempts. In the context of understanding how food policy integration projects are framed and their trajectory, there is a need *‘to construct an authentic account of the policymaking process that captures its nuances and complexity over the long term’* (Exworthy 2008 p325). As Exworthy (2008) further asserts, *‘the opaqueness of policymaking (and especially non-decisions) is problematic for researchers’* (p325), and the challenge of

⁹To describe the ‘stages’ model of public policy and other similar heuristics for simplifying the policy process

securing suitable interviewees is discussed further at 3.6. Linked to this is a further reason for choosing a qualitative rather than quantitative approach: the contested nature of concepts such as food policy and integration, and the requirement to explore different perspectives. This leads the discussion to ontological and epistemological underpinnings.

3.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

The research is built on constructivist (anti-objectivist) foundations and therefore takes an interpretivist perspective (Yanow 1996), rejecting a positivistic assumption of the objectivity and universality of scientific knowledge in favour of a belief that social reality and knowledge are constructed (Angen 2000; Benton and Craib 2001; Pouliot 2007). In plain language it recognises the role of both researcher interpretation, and of the interpretation, values and meaning employed by actors in the policy process. As explored at section 3.3 above, it acknowledges the need to go beyond the outputs of policy projects to examine what takes place behind closed doors in the policy process – the role of values (as opposed to simply instrumental knowledge), and agents’ construction of definitions, for example, regarding what food policy is, what elements of it need to be integrated, and why. Such definitions are by no means universal, given food policy’s contested nature. While literature and models focused on policy learning and failure tend to presume a shared conception of policy goals – for example in terms of growth and employment as key targets for economic policy – in the special case of food policy, goals are not as consensual. As Feindt and Flynn (2009) explain, there is disagreement over the contemporary food system, with: *‘competing constructions of food that have become politically relevant, for example the notion of ‘cheap, abundant and safe’ to ‘local’, ‘organic’, ‘healthy’ or ‘GM-free’ and ‘various actors might feel differently about the occurrence of policy failure, depending on which characteristics of food they consider relevant’* (p391). Similarly, Morgan (2015) refers to the *‘kaleidoscopic character of the food system and the multiple prisms – social, economic, ecological, cultural, political, psychological, sexual – through which food is viewed, valued and used in society’* (p2).

Therefore, the analysis was informed by the literature on the role of framing in policy processes (e.g. Schon and Rein 1996; Hajer and Laws 2006; Mooney and Hunt 2009; Tomlinson 2013) and discourse (Feindt and Oels 2005; Hajer and Laws 2006; Keller 2011). Recognising the constructed nature of policy projects, the approach taken in the thesis draws particularly on Carol Bacchi’s (2009) method of policy analysis, which examines how policies *‘constitute, or give shape to problems’*, making it *‘critically important to interrogate the problem representations that lodge within public policies in order to see what they include and what they leave out’* (pxii).

Alongside a recognition of the role of meaning in policy formulation, central to an interpretivist approach is the requirement to reflect on the meanings associated with the researcher’s own position – *‘family background, personality, education, training, and other experience’* (Yanow 1996 p408) – and how they may impact on how reality is constructed both by the researcher and between the researcher and interviewees, and analysis of the data. In relation to the researcher’s own interpretation, it acknowledges that, as Birkland highlights:

'the actual act of identifying a problem is as much a normative judgment as it is an objective statement of fact...then one cannot say that any subsequent analysis is strictly neutral' (Birkland 2005 p15, cited in Owen 2014 p6)

This involves recognition of the way the researchers' values have played a role throughout the research process, from choosing the topic of study; through the framing of the research proposal; more normative judgements about the need for a new kind of food policy; the choice of theoretical framework; the choice of interviewees and choice of questions; and the analysis of the findings (Pouliot 2007). In reflecting on how this researcher's own experiences may have shaped their approach, they have been mindful of a previous career in the food civil society sector, where they were involved in attempts to address issues resulting from the current food crisis, and to challenge government on the absence of political attention paid to food. An attempt was made therefore – particularly when analysing findings – to maintain an awareness of instances of researcher bias, and challenge any assumptions about the role of government in the policy formulation attempts in question. The researcher has also worked as a journalist in this field, which may have influenced both how the interviews and analysis were conducted, and participants' perceptions (in terms of assurances given about anonymity of quotes, for instance).

3.3.2 Balancing Interpretivism and Institutionalism

An interesting meta-theoretical issue raised in determining the methodology was the relationship between interpretivism and an institutionalist (more structuralist-leaning) approach to policy analysis – given that they might be considered less than compatible on first assessment (see e.g. Blyth's critique of HI not providing a causal role to ideas, in Marsh 2009). Exploring this dynamic led to a perspective taken in this thesis that, while an institutionalist lens suggests a focus on structures, an expanded definition of institutions lends itself to a more interpretivist approach to policy analysis, by highlighting the role of *'intentions, reasons, traditions, stories, discourses and systems of signs'* in institutional influence (Wagenaar 2006 p429), thus allowing for a role for agency in, for example, designing and interpreting institutions, but with a primary focus on institutions as the dominant force (what Marsh 2009 might label *'thin constructivism'*). It borrows from Yanow's interpretive policy analysis style – as outlined in her book *How does a policy mean?* (1996), which urges policy analysts to *'become sensitive to the expressive, symbolic aspect of policy. Not as an add-on to the 'real' – read instrumental, material, power-related – aspects of policy making, but as an intrinsic aspect of each and every act of policymaking'* (Wagenaar 1996 p433). While utilising the institutionalist lens responds somewhat to critiques of Yanow's version of interpretive analysis that settings are characterised by *'interaction, power play, structural inequality, deep complexity, indeterminacy, dispersed decision making, lack of trust among actors, value pluralism and a fundamental orientation to practice'* (Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1982, 1990; Forester 1999; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003b; Stone 1997; Wagenaar and Cook 2003; cited in Wagenaar 2006 p435).

The thesis navigates issues around allowing a role for interpretive agents within institutions, mindful of Bevir's critique of the positivist tendencies of institutionalist analysis – that institutions are *'often presented in an 'unacceptably reified' form in which established 'laws, rules, norms, govern and explain action'* (Bevir 2005 p16), limiting the agency of individuals (McAnulla 2007 p319). McAnulla's defence

is that the new institutionalist approach is more nuanced: while institutions may constrain or enable certain beliefs or actions, these are not fixed, and likewise, any conception of path dependency is based on *'inertial tendency'* rather than completely deterministic (2007 p320). This research aimed to straddle such debates by arguing for a strong role for ideas, meaning and discourses of actors – for example highlighting the role of actors' differing interpretations of the nature of the policy exercises in question – but situating these ideas and discourses within a historical institutional context, akin to Colin Hay's (2011) concept of *'situated agency'*.

3.3.3 Inductive or Deductive?

The assertion that induction – *'a research strategy that moves from the local to the general'* (Pouliot 2007 p364) – is a key methodological implication of taking an interpretivist approach, further complicated the methodological picture, given dissensus in the literature over HI as an inductive or deductive approach. For example, Pouliot (2007 quoting Adler 2005 p11) argues that, *'the constructivist style of reasoning is inherently historical for it sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being'*, but also adds that *'theorisation destroys meanings as they exist for social agents'* (p364), which contradicts institutionalist authors who argue that HI can be conceived of as both inductive and deductive. Overall there is no clear position – HI is utilised both for theory building but also as *'a framework to be used heuristically to facilitate case-study research'* (Cini 2013 p4). For some, HI's strength is its inductive methodology: it derives its research agenda by identification of empirical puzzles through careful observations, as opposed to abstract deductive first principles (Thelen 2002, Thelen and Steinmo 1992 p10 and Hay and Wincott 1997 p955, cited in Bell 2002). This is contrasted by Thelen (2002 p93) with the tendency of rational choice scholars to derive their puzzles from *'situations in which observed behavior appears to deviate from what the general theory would predict'*. Green & Shapiro (1994, cited in Thelen 1999) highlight how rational choice has produced elegant theories with little empirical evidence, whereas those favouring HI are theoretically weak, and merely stringing details together or telling stories. However, more recent authors characterise HI as taking both an inductive and *deductive* approach – suggesting making such a binary choice is not necessary for the researcher. For instance, Botterill (2011), in her case study of the Australian Wheat Marketing Board, argues HI's detailed case studies serve both to inform and develop the theoretical approach, noting how *'theory provides a lens through which to view a case study and understand particular elements of the story more clearly'* but also that *'empirical examples can sharpen our theories by testing the hypotheses they offer and suggesting further lines of enquiry'* (Botterill 2011 p630). Similarly, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) highlight how institutionalists have been notable for seeking to escape the inductive/deductive dichotomy, producing work that is both theoretically and empirically informed, and allowing institutionalism to escape from the fixed poles of theory and empirical, as it *'worries backwards and forwards between theory and empirical exploration in an iterative fashion'* (Lowndes and Roberts 2013 p20), requiring the researcher to *'reflect at regular intervals on the relationship between the two and respond sensitively to what they are finding in any particular context'* (Lowndes and Roberts 2013 p20). In summary, the research utilised a strategy of being *'theory-informed in a manner which is common to historical institutionalist research; that is, rather than testing key propositions, it uses theory as a guide to empirical exploration and as a means of reflecting on complex processes of change (Hay 2002, 47)'* (Cini 2013 p3).

3.4 Underpinning the Research with a Institutional Theory of Integration - Operationalising

The research is a policy analysis of two specific food policy integration projects, and – while there are certainly practical implications for the policymaking community and beyond – it should be understood as an analysis or study *of* policy rather than *for* policy (Gordon et al 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 2003). In that sense it is *descriptive* rather than *prescriptive*. While there is little explicit guidance in the literature on how to undertake an analysis of policy (cf guides to analysis *for* policy), one clear strategy is to apply a particular model of the policy process. Such models, or concepts, enable the analyst to simplify what might otherwise be overwhelming in its scope given the ‘*staggering complexity of the policy process*’ (Sabatier 2007 p4). As described in Chapters One and Two, the Historical Institutional model/theory of public policy was chosen as appropriate for this project, given that: a.) integration can be understood primarily as a structural problem and observations in the food policy literature propose the need for new structures (Macrae 2011; Lang and Heasman 2015); and b.) HI has strong explanatory value in situations of policy constraint, or inertia, as is suggested with food policy integration. Drawing on Thissen and Walker (2013), institutional accounts can be broadly contrasted with four alternative views of the policy process (p12):

1. As a rational decision-making process
2. As a political game
3. As discourse
4. As a garbage can

Underpinning the research with HI theory assumed it had the strongest explanatory value in examining the empirical cases. However, in this particular case, the gap between theoretical and empirical dimensions was calculated to be particularly large in comparison to alternative models (cf Advocacy Coalition Framework, where there has been considerable work done on how to put the theory into practice; or more popular process-based models such as Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach). As a result there was considerable work done to develop HI theory to the point of practical application. This was necessary not least because of myriad approaches under the HI umbrella, involving different definitions of institutions, how to conceptualise change, and so on. Similar work was also undertaken on the concept of public policy integration, the literature covering which involves multiple definitions, enablers and barriers, and measurements. Given the flexibility in applying the literature in this particular case, it was therefore considered important to explicitly outline the decisions taken in the course of bridging the theoretical and empirical gap. The following section provides an explanation of how the literature was operationalised; or how more ‘*abstract concepts*’ were translated ‘*into observable and measurable quantities*’ (Cairney 2011 p51).

3.4.1 Operationalising the Policy Integration Literature

Operationalising the policy integration literature involved constructing a typology of four dimensions from the literature review, and using these to identify empirical examples in the data:

1. What aspects of policy can be integrated/joined and how
2. What mechanisms are available to do so
3. What are the barriers to integration

4. How integrated-ness can be measured

In order to examine the approach taken to integration in FM/F2030 and the NFP, several categories were developed within the Framework Tool explained at 3.7.6 below, based on the dimensions of public policy integration, which are detailed further now.

3.4.1.1 What Aspects of Policy can be Integrated and How

According to the policy integration literature, the following are activities which may be subject to joining up:

Table 3.3: Activities that may be subject to Joining Up

Activity	Source
Defining new types of organisation (culture and values, information management, training)	Ling (2002)
Defining new accountabilities and incentives (shared outcome targets and performance measures)	
Defining new ways of delivering services (joint consultation with clients, developing a shared client focus, providing a 'one stop shop' for service users)	
Defining new ways of working across organisations (e.g. shared leadership, pooled budgets, merged structures and joint teams)	
Organisational change	Cabinet Office (2000)
Merged structures and budgets	
Joint teams (virtual or real)	
Shared budgets	
Joint customer inter-face arrangements	
Shared objectives and policy indicators	
Consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs	
Sharing information to increase mutual awareness	

Source: Ling 2002; Cabinet Office 2000

3.4.1.2 Mechanisms aiding Integration

Russel and Jordan (2009), referencing a list devised by Peters (1997), identify the following specific centralised instruments:

Table 3.4: Examples of Centralised Instruments

Centralised Instrument	Example
Leadership by the Prime Minister and/or senior ministers to initiate and provide sustained political support for cross-cutting initiatives	None provided
Assignment of responsibility for coordination initiatives to central departments to compel line departments to comply with cross-cutting policy goals	None provided
Allocation of crosscutting issues to particular ministers to ensure they are embedded at a high political level	None provided
Creation of central agencies or integration units to support ministers and departments	The Sustainable Development Unit in DEFRA
Use of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees to set strategic crosscutting goals and to mediate and/or resolve interdepartmental conflicts	The Cabinet Committee on Energy and the Environment
Creation of super ministries which bring related policy areas under one roof	DEFRA formed when the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was merged with part of the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions
Establishment of inter-ministerial committees to set common objectives and share best practice	The Committee of Ministers for Sustainable Development

Source: Adapted from Russel and Jordan (2009 p1203 referencing a list devised by Peters 1997)

In their analysis of how attempts to achieve environmental policy integration have tackled the challenge of ‘*functional and territorially-fragmented governance*’, Jordan and Lenschow (2008b, cited in Hogl and Nordbeck 2012) identify three categories of tools or instruments that have been used to promote institutional change. In this typology, the food plans, or strategies, which are the subject of this thesis fall into the ‘Communicative’ category, and are considered a soft measure.

Table 3.5: Types of Instrument for Environmental Policy Integration

Type of Instrument	Style of Instrument	Example	Usage
Communicative	Soft	National plans/strategies	Common
Organisational	Hard	- Taskforce - Liaison Officer - Amalgamation of Departments	Less common
Procedural	Hard	- Budgeting - Policy Appraisal - Changes to administrative standard procedures	Less common

Source: Jordan and Lenschow (2008b, cited in Hogl and Nordbeck 2012)

3.4.1.3 Identified Barriers to Integration

As outlined in the literature review, the following barriers to integration are identified.

Table 3.6: Barriers to Integration

Source	Barrier to Integration
Cabinet Office (2000)	Failure of policy-makers to consider overall goals of the organisation
	Departments over-prescriptive when specifying means of delivery which may conflict with other departments
	High-profile initiatives often receive more recognition than lower key contributions to corporate goals
	Incentive structures encourage more interest in what an individual department contributes to corporate goal than overall contribution
	Little or no reward for helping someone else achieve their objectives
	Reluctance to support inter-sectoral working because it complicates relationships and lines of accountability
	Inter-sectoral working can mean significant costs fall on one budget while benefits accrue to another
	Skills needed to manage inter-sectoral working are different from fulfilling a departmental brief but not encouraged
	Mechanisms for addressing inconsistencies and conflicts between different departmental approaches are sometimes not effective enough to stop conflicting messages being passed to end users
	Mechanisms to reconcile conflicting priorities between sections can be weak
	Departments tend to defend their budgets which tend to be allocated on a departmental or sectional basis rather than to policies or functions
	Departmental objectives often take priority over corporate goals
Bullock et al (2001)	Inadequate time – as joined up approaches take more time, make heavier demands on resources;
	Inflexibility of hierarchical organisational structures
	Risk-averse culture
	Securing and maintaining buy-in from other departments.

Sources: Cabinet Office 2000; Bullock et al 2001

3.4.1.4 How Integrated-ness can be Measured

It is also necessary to operationalise ‘integrated-ness’ in order to judge if FM, F2030 and the NFP can be considered integrated policies. The most straightforward measure is to assess the policy projects against the various definitions of integration which have been proposed in the literature, for example integration vs coordination vs balancing, as discussed in the previous chapter. Options for assessing whether a policy is indeed integrated have been summarised by Pollitt (2003) in a three-fold typology, which was expanded on by Russel and Jordan (2009) in a paper on the use of appraisal to coordinate policymaking for sustainable development:

Table 3.7: How to Measure Integrated-ness

Measure	How	Advantages	Disadvantages
Review policy against best practice	Benchmark against prescriptions from literature: e.g. 'lodging strategic leadership with one or more senior politicians'; 'creating top-level coordination device'	Relatively simple and resource-efficient	• Prescriptions can be highly context-dependent • Limited to looking at inputs and processes like staff skills/organisational arrangements
Canvass Stakeholders	Surveys supplemented with interviews/focus groups, ideally by independent body	Context-specific	• Timing issues: initial bursts of enthusiasm may dissipate • Does not include evaluation of final outcomes/impacts
Review Outcomes	Assessment/Evaluation	Covers end of the policy process	• More complex, time consuming, expensive • Timing issues – time lapse before outcomes can be measured • Pecking order of objectives may be unclear

Source: Pollitt (2003)

In terms of assessing integrated-ness, Underdal (1980; cited in Meijers and Stead 2004) provides this three-fold assessment of the basic requirements for a policy to be classed as integrated.

Table 3.8: Measures of Policy Integration

Requirement	Measure
Comprehensiveness	Recognition of a broader scope of policy consequences in terms of: time; space; actors; issues
Aggregation	Policy alternatives evaluated from an overall perspective
Consistency	Policy penetrates all policy levels and government agencies

Source: Underdal (1980; cited in Meijers and Stead 2004)

The literature also includes a set of broad recommendations by the OECD in 1996, which were developed to manage coherent policymaking:

1. Commitment by the political leadership is a necessary precondition to coherence, and a tool to enhance it
2. Establishing a strategic policy framework helps to ensure that individual policies are consistent with the government's goals and priorities
3. The existence of a central overview and co-ordination capacity is essential to ensure horizontal consistency among policies
4. Decision-makers need advice based on a clear definition and good analysis of issues, with explicit indication of possible inconsistencies
5. Mechanisms to anticipate, detect and resolve policy conflicts early in the process help identify inconsistencies and reduce incoherence

6. The decision-making process must be organised to achieve an effective reconciliation between policy priorities and budgetary imperatives
7. Implementation procedures and monitoring mechanisms must be designed to ensure that policies can be adjusted in the light of progress, new information and changing circumstances
8. An administrative culture that promotes cross-sectoral co-operation and a systematic dialogue between policy communities contributes to the strengthening of policy coherence (OECD 1996, cited in Meijers and Stead 2004 p11).

Elements of this DEFRA best practice list and OECD recommendations informed the Framework Tool (3.4.2). While survey data was not available, interviewees were asked about the approach to policy integration taken in formulating FM/F2030 and the NFP, and in the policy system more generally.

3.4.2 Operationalising the Historical Institutional Lens

Applying an institutional lens to the issue of food policy integration involved transforming a broad and conceptually-ambiguous theory into something measurable. As such a series of methodological flags have been placed, in terms of how explanations based on institutional constrain can be supported through empirical investigation. The main one is around the issue of definitions of institutions: with so many competing ‘things’ defined as institutions in the literature, some clarity was needed. For example, expanding on the discussion of definitions in the previous chapter, whereas some authors treat institutions and organisations as having little difference between them (Hollingsworth 2000), Douglas North argues institutions are the ‘*rules of the game*’ and organisations ‘*the players*’ (North 1990 p4). In its practitioners guide to institutional and organisational analysis, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) notes that confusion over the distinction is due to overlap on a conceptual level, in that ‘*some organisations – such as governments – embody and represent the rules of the game, as well as having the properties of organisations*’ (2014 p17). In fact, the development literature is a source of some of the most pragmatic guidance on operationalising institutional analysis, although the focus is also on capacity assessment and strengthening. According to IFAD a distinction should be made between:

- *Institutional Assessment*: Assessing the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ that influence society, organisations and individuals’; and
- *Organisational Assessment*: Focused on the nuts and bolts of how organisations are structured and organised, their values and culture, their capacity and performance etc.

In light of these differing definitions, Table 3.10 provides some tentative examples of what might be considered institutions in this research.

Table 3.9: Example of Definitions of Institutions

Definition of institution	Possible Examples
Organisation	Departments with role in food policy
Formal rules (compliance procedures, standard operating procedures, conventions)	Constitutional structure - Length of electoral cycles Adversarial Westminster system Departmental fragmentation/New Public Management Policy instrument approach (e.g. approach to regulation)
Procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the political economy	Neoliberalism Competition State (an institutionalised discourse?)
Informal rules, agreements, and customs within the state and between the state and society	Productionist food system and cheap food Consumers cultural preferences Neoliberalism Food/food industry self-governance

Source: Author

Such definitional disagreements are linked to a range of approaches to institutional analysis, as Hollingsworth points out in the following table, mapping the multiple levels of institutional analysis, along with some practitioners of that approach:

Table 3.10: Components of Institutional Analysis


Institutions	Norms Rules Conventions Habits Values	North 1990 Burns and Flam 1987
Institutional arrangements	Markets States Corporate hierarchies Networks Associations Communities	Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985 Campbell et al 1991 Hollingsworth et al 1994 Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997
Institutional Sectors	Financial System System of Education Business System System of Research	Hollingsworth 1997
Organisations		Powell and DiMaggio 1991
Outputs and Performance	Statutes Administrative decisions The nature quantity and quality of industrial products Sectoral and societal performance	Hollingsworth 1991 Hollingsworth 1997 Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994 Hollingsworth et al 1990 Hollingsworth and Hanneman 1982

Source: Hollingsworth (2000 p601)

The research also drew of the below Diagram from IIED and Wageningen (Vermeulen et al 2008), which presents their framework for institutional analysis of agrifood value chains.

Figure 3.2: IIED and Wageningen Framework for Institutional Analysis of Agrifood Chains

Figure 3.1 Institutions involved in the functioning of agrifood markets



Source: Birner, 2006²

Source Birner (2006 in Vermeulen et al 2008)

IFAD provides a more detailed guide to conducting an institutional analysis. While targeted to development-based analysis, several steps in their process are insightful for this research project.

Certainly this research, drawing on IFAD (Table 3.11) and following the example of Barling's (2007) work on food agencies as an institutional response to policy failure, involves a focus on the role of the organisations with a role to play in food policy integration: the state departments with a role in this policy area, but also aims to go beyond the institutions as organisations definition, to explore formal and informal operating procedures between, as well as within these.

Table 3.11: IFAD Guide to Institutional Analysis

STEPS	Institutional Context
ACTIONS	Identify formal institutional elements: Major policies, strategies and plans (regional, national etc.) Regulatory environment, markets, livelihoods and drivers of change Supporting and opposing forces Strategic opportunities for leveraging wider change Identify informal institutional elements: Traditional or customary institutions, roles, expectations and interests Relationships between formal and informal institutions/organisations Informal modes of association or livelihoods Societally-embedded rules, norms, customs, traditions, values Identify overall capacity at the institutional level Overall institutional strengths and weaknesses Past performance Relationships Overall quality/quantity of human resources
OUTPUTS	SWOT Table Force Field Analysis

Source: IFAD (2014)

3.4.2.1 Bringing in the History: What Period will be Covered?

Along with the *institutional* emphasis of this theory, is its *historical* focus. Like Pollitt and Pierson, and their critique of de-contextualised policy analysis, Baumgartner and Jones have argued ‘*one of the truly great failings of the policy sciences has been the inability to produce longitudinal studies*’ (Baumgartner and Jones 2002 p6; cited in Pollitt p9). While this thesis is by no means a longitudinal study, it aims to shine a light on how past decisions in the food policy system have impacted on the framing and trajectories of the policy projects. But how far back into the past does the research need to go? In practical terms the UK project took place between 2008-2010 at the end of a period of relatively dense policy activity which ramped up at the end of the 1990s due to several food scares. It is at this point that machinery of government changes led to the establishment of the Department of Environment Food & Rural Affairs, and the Food Standards Agency, and when electronic departmental records in the form of annual reports on activity can be accessed. For this reason the analysis of food policy attempts prior to FM/F2030 begins with the Policy Commission on the Future of Food and Farming (Curry Commission) in 2002, and analysis of the main departmental institutions with a role in national food policymaking – DEFRA, FSA, DH and BIS – starts from the early 2000s. However, clearly there are significant developments in national food policy prior to this, as illustrated in the chronology at Appendix Table A3, including the aforementioned food scares, the 1947 post-war Agriculture Act, and the 1956 machinery of government changes which led to MAFF taking over responsibilities from the previous Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ministry, plus some 1970s policies such as *Food from our Own Resources* and *Farming and the Nation*, which will factor in any analysis of historical influences. It is also recognised that, in HI

terms, a fifteen-year period might be considered relatively short. In the Australian case, although not as dense as in the UK in the 2000s, there was significant policy activity around food industry export, including the Supermarket to Asia and National Food Industry strategies, both of which can be viewed as precursors to the NFP, occurred in the early decade. However, the first document analysed in the Australian case was published in 1992 – the *Food and Nutrition Policy*. This was considered important for inclusion given it stands out from the country's other food policies for its attempt to create a cross-domain approach and forward-thinking ideas around integration of nutrition, agriculture and so on.

3.4.2.2 What Definition of Policy Change will be Applied?

Before theoretical questions about the extent to which FM and F2030 and the NFP could be considered policy change towards integration, within a previously constrained system, can be answered, a *definition* of policy change is required. Because – given HI's qualitative research focus – any question of whether there has been a change in the dependent variable – policy – is based less on measurement and more on judgment. One researcher may judge a pattern as *persistence*, another as *change*, resulting in '*intersubjective transmissibility of the findings*' (Peters et al 2005 p1287). Different conceptions of change further increase the likelihood of disagreement over how much change is significant enough to be judged a deviation from the path (Peters et al 2005). Capano notes how the practitioner must define how policy change is to be defined, highlighting the Hogwood and Peters (1983 p25, cited in Capano 2009 p14) quote that '*all policy is policy change*', and noting the difference between defining change in terms of:

- Transformation of the definition of the issues in question;
- Structure and content of the policy agenda;
- Content of the policy programme;
- Outcome of implementation (Capano 2009 p14).

In simpler terms, policy change can take place in terms of:

- The Process
- The Policy Actors' Relationships
- The Basic Policy Values and Goals
- Policy Strategies
- Policy Instruments
- Policy Definitions
- The Institutional Arrangements (Capano 2009 p26).

Clearly there are implications for analysis of the food policy system, and whether FM/F2030 and the NFP can be considered representative of policy change or stability. Explanations using PD '*include an undeniable element of judgement concerning what counts as a major punctuation and what, by contrast, qualifies as only 'within-path' change*' (Pollitt 2008 p103). Can it be argued that these national food policy attempts are *change*, given that they were not implemented and therefore did not change the policy programme significantly, meaning a return to the status quo? Chapter Eight at 8.5 considers these questions further.

As guided by the theory, the following data will be needed to respond to the research questions. The task is split into two levels, allowing a comparison of the Food Policy System and two specific policy projects.

Table 3.12: Data Required

Level of Comparative Analysis	Data Required for Comparison
Policy Project (FM/F2030/NFP)	• FM/F2030/NFP coded by Framework (reports and secondary materials) • FM/F2030/NFP coded by generic themes not featured in Framework (e.g. ‘What is a national food policy’) in NVivo • Interview data coded by Framework themes in NVivo
Food Policy System (UK/Australia)	• Chronology of National Food Policy Developments • National Political Timeline (electoral changes, leadership changes) • How Food Policy is made: mapping the institutions involved • Details on main government departments involved in national food policy over 15 years • Interview data coded by generic themes in NVivo

Source: Author

3.4.3 Tools to Organise the Data

During the process of operationalising the literature, and with the addition of some of the policy context literature (see Chapter 2.3), two tools, or templates, were created. This was considered important in lieu of formal guidance on undertaking a comparative study of this nature, as described at 3.2.1, and in recognition of the pitfalls of comparative approaches whereby *‘when it comes to comparing, in many instances the comparison of the case study material is rather loose or not formalised – hence the scientificity of case studies is often questioned (Ragin and Becker, 1992; Gerring, 2004)’* (Rihoux 2006 p681). These templates would more rigorously order the data into themes to aid comparison of the cases with particular reference to policy integration and institutions. The rationale for this approach is supported by Exworthy’s (2008) acknowledgement that *‘capturing the views of multiple stakeholders and tracing the influence of each organisation’s practices and culture upon the policy process are complex tasks and time consuming’* (p325), and in light of the multiple levels and variables being considered.


3.4.3.1 Policy Project Framework Tool

The template for comparing FM/F2030/NFP – hereafter the Framework Tool – is the most complex, reflecting the primary focus of the research. A method of simplifying and categorising *‘factors which explain the framing and trajectory of the food policies arrived at’* (RQ2) was devised, due to the multitude of factors to be considered; drawing on policy integration, historical institutionalist and broader policymaking literature. Drawing on previous work on analysing policy undertaken by the Institute of Government¹⁰ and the NOURISHING framework of food policies to promote healthy diets (Hawkes et al

¹⁰E.g. ‘The S Factors’ (Rutter, Marshall and Sims 2012) framework for analysing policy

2013), the FT categorises factors identified in the literature review which have a potential to impact on the policymaking process. Inevitably, some categories were initially identified from preconceptions of the nature of food policy making, although every attempt was made to support preconceived ideas about influential factors with reference to the literature, to ensure a suitably robust justification for inclusion (Malterud 2001). Factors are grouped into five categories of variables: OUTSET; INPUT; CONTENT; BUDGET; OUTCOMES. The FT was applied to the coding design in NVivo, and also forms the skeleton for findings Chapters Five and Six. The following diagram summarises the categories of variables.

Figure 3.3: Framework Tool Diagram



Source: Author

Table 3.13 outlines how the variables in the Framework Tool were justified for inclusion.

Table 3.13: Framework Tool Justification

Category	Variable	To Determine	Literature	How To Operationalise
OUTSET	Originating Actor	Did an originating actor (individual or group) influence how policy was formulated The role of ‘political will’	• HI theory on how early decisions can lock policies in to a particular path (e.g. Kay 2005; Peters et al 2005) • Extensive subset of public policy literature on agenda setting • Institute for Government’s (IFG) research on importance of ministers in policy success (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011). • Policy Integration literature on leadership by the Prime Minister and/or senior ministers to initiate and provide sustained political support for cross-cutting initiatives (Russel and Jordan (2009) • OECD (1996) on commitment by political leadership as a necessary precondition to coherence, and a tool to enhance it	Documentary analysis: • Policy documents • Press releases • Media reports (hereafter ‘Documentary Analysis’) Interview Data: Qs on catalyst for policy and main influences on the policy
	Timeline (for policy formulation and implementation)	What timeline set for policy Actual time taken for policy formulation	• Policy Integration literature notes that joined-up approaches take more time (Bullock et al 2001) • IFG research on principles of good policymaking and how perceived urgency of a policy project can influence its success (Rutter, Marshall and Sims 2010). • Sjoblom (2009) on the impact of administrative short-termism and the friction between project-based approaches and long-term policy issues.	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on catalyst for policy and main influences on the policy
	Terms of Reference (ToR)	If ToR set influenced policy content (incl. looking at <i>how</i> they were	• HI literature (Kay 2005; Peters et al 2005) on how early decisions can lock in a policy to a	Interview Data: Qs on ToR and on main influences

		formulated, and by <i>who</i>)	particular path Policy integration literature on shared goals as an important factor in establishing a joined-up policymaking approach (Ling 2002)	
	Political Party and Stage in Electoral Cycle	Impact of party in power at the time of origination and stage of the electoral cycle when policy formulated	- Pollit's (2008) and IFG work on role of timing in policy cycle and government legitimacy - Policy integration literature on disconnect between long-term policies needed to address 'wicked problems', and relatively short-term activities of government (associated with electoral cycles and ministerial tenure) (Bullock et al 2001; Exworthy and Hunter 2011) - Little identifiable literature of relevance on impact of political parties on policy, but was nonetheless considered important to assess how parties influence framing and trajectory of food policy (given that both the UK and Australian policy projects were published by Labour/Labor governments and abandoned by Conservative governments).	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on catalyst for policy and main influences on the policy
	Government Sponsor/Lead Department	Which department took the lead role and how this influenced the policy. What are the characteristics of the lead department? Internal structure, history, focus, size and status. Was any responsibility for coordination been assigned to central departments?	- HI literature on how where a policy is situated institutionally will have important implications for its future path (e.g. Kay 2005; Peters et al 2005). - IFG research on the principles of good policymaking, including on: how main owner must be 'strong and long term' (Rutter et al 2012); implications of centralisation vs decentralisation of policymaking, e.g. tendency to place 'smart thinkers' at centre which can lead to radical proposals out of context with departmental agendas (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011) - WHO's (2001) manual for decision-makers on food and nutrition policies on importance of	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on main influences on the policy; DAFF/DEFRA lead on the policy

			having an influential ‘parent’ ministry to lead the process and for a high-profile advocate were also featured in the Policy integration literature on assignment of responsibility for coordination initiatives to central departments to compel line departments to comply with cross-cutting policy goals (Russel and Jordan 2009) and barriers to integration including departments being over-prescriptive when specifying means of delivery which may conflict with other departments and on how departmental involvement can be dependent on how responsibility for a policy is shared (Cabinet Office 2000)	
Category	Variable	To Determine	Literature	How To Operationalise
CONTENT	Main Themes	What does the policy cover?	N/A – this category is not based on literature	Documentary Analysis
	Problem Definition	What problem is the policy purporting to respond to? Is the problem the policy is trying to solve clear? Is there a common understanding of the issues that is shared across government?	- HI literature on how early decisions – in this case what problems are to be addressed – can lock policy to a particular path (e.g. Kay 2005). Along with explicit objectives and aims, policies can be framed according to particular ideas of ideational institutions present at the time of formulation. Such frames are not likely to be explicit in the policy goals and objectives, but can nevertheless ‘act like templates to base political decisions on’ (Steinmo 2008), by suggesting appropriate policy instruments, and more indirect goals (Hall 1993 p279; Cairney 2011). - Framing literature on ‘problematisation’ (Bacchi 2009), and the critical importance of interrogating what problem representations include and leave out	Documentary Analysis Interview data: Qs on main influences on the policy

	Objectives	What is the policy aiming to do? Are objectives shared across the various departments and agencies involved or individual?	• HI literature on how early decisions – in this case on what the specific goals and objectives should be – can lock policy to a particular path (e.g. Kay 2005) • IFG research on principles of good policymaking - adequate definition and proper framing of goals is one of seven ‘policy fundamentals’ for policy development (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011). • Public Policy literature on role of ambiguity in policymaking (Baier et al (1986) • Policy integration literature on barriers to integration including: failure of policymakers to consider the overall goals of the organisation, departmental objectives taking priority over corporate goals, and departments being over-prescriptive when specifying means of delivery which conflict with other departments (Cabinet Office 2000). • OECD work on policy coherence which identified setting common goals and shared priorities across sectors as the first core step (OECD 2014; cited by Hawkes 2015).	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on main themes
	Framing	To explore if there were ideas embedded in the policy which influenced the outcome of the formulation process	• HI and discursive institutionalist literature on how, along with explicit objectives and aims, policies can be framed according to particular ideas of ideational institutions present at the time of formulation. Such frames are not likely to be explicit in the policy goals and objectives, but can nevertheless ‘act like templates to base political decisions on’ (Steinmo 2008), by suggesting appropriate policy instruments, and more indirect goals (Hall 1993 p279; Cairney 2011). • The work of Feindt and Flynn (2009) examining	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on the policy content; lessons from the process; main influences on

			food policy as a contested space	
	Policy Omissions	What is not featured in the policy and why?	- Framing literature on problematisation and policy silences is relevant (Bacchi 2009) - HI discussions of policy constraint and problem definition (e.g. Steinmo 2008) as above	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on omissions; main influences; lessons from the process
	Degree of Change	What degree of change is the policy purporting to make? How much proposed activity is already happening? How much is ongoing commitments repackaged?	HI literature on how to evaluate policy change (e.g. Capano 2009)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on policy content, process and lessons
	Policy Integration	What approach to policy integration is taken?	Policy integration literature on the multiple facilitators and inhibitors to creating integrated policy	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on how dealt with integration; how compared to other policy attempts; lessons from the process
Category	Variable	To Determine	Literature	How To Operationalise
INPUT	Input from Departments	What type of internal dependencies were involved with the policy? Were they devised jointly or bolted together? Are there any joint teams (virtual or real)?	- Literature on policy integration underlining importance of merged structures and budgets; joint teams (virtual or real); shared budgets; joint customer inter-face arrangements; shared objectives and policy indicators; consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs; and sharing information, in order to facilitate integration (Ling 2002). - Russel and Jordan's (2009) review of the use of centralised instruments, such as agencies, super-ministries, committees etc. - Kay and Ackrill's (2012) work on policy capacity – in particular selection capacity: government's ability to forge authoritative choices which commit societal actors.	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on what other departments were involved and how; how was integration addressed

	Mechanism for Coordination during formulation process	How communication between departments/levels of government was carried out during the formulation process	Policy integration literature on importance of merged structures and budgets; joint teams (virtual or real); shared budgets; joint customer inter-face arrangements; shared objectives and policy indicators; consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs; and sharing information, to facilitate integration (Ling 2002).	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on what other departments were involved and how; how was integration addressed
	Institutional Reform	Modification/creation of new institutions resulting from the project	- IFG research on the use of new institutions to break through policy inertia (Rutter et al 2012) - Policy Integration literature on organisational tools such as taskforces or liaison officers, and centralised instruments, such as agencies, super-ministries, committees etc (e.g. Russel and Jordan 2009; Hogl and Nordbeck 2012)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on what other departments were involved and how; how was integration addressed
	Lead Personnel	Were particular individuals instrumental in the policy formulation process? Any evidence of policy entrepreneurs?	- IFG research on the importance of individual leadership and strong personal relationships (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011) - Studies by Mintrom and Norman (2009) and Goldfinch and t'Hart (2003) on characteristics of policy entrepreneurs	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on main influences; lessons
	Advisory Groups/Stakeholder Involvement	Composition/creation of advisory groups, and level and type of non-governmental stakeholder involvement	IFG research on stakeholder power and importance of building wide constituency of support to lay foundation for political consensus and opening up the policy process with a more inclusive approach, particularly when it was necessary to de-politicise a policy area (Rutter et al 2012)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on main influences; lessons
	Consultation	What kind of consultation, how was it done, what was the result, level of transparency? To identify influencers of	- Public policy literature on features of modern policymaking and need for inclusivity (Bullock et al 2011) - Policy Integration literature on consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade offs (Cabinet	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on consultation; main influences; lessons

		the policy	- Office 2000) - HI literature on networks, for example Bell's (2002) observations on how networks are influenced by institutional factors, for example the Australian system characterised by pressure pluralist networks, which he attributes to the fragmented state and non-state sector with weak leadership and organisational capacity, which results in ad hoc reactive policymaking. - Tuohy's (1999) work on 'Structural Balance' between state actors, professional and private financial interests	
	Consultants	Were external consultants used in any part of the policy formulation process and what did they do and why?	Public Policy literature on 'the invisible public service' and the market for policy advice (Craft and Howlett 2012)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on main influences; lessons
Category	Variable	To Determine	Literature	How To Operationalise
BUDGET	For Policy Development	Amount and type – new or existing, shared or centralised, in kind or additional To determine if there was a political commitment to the project; and whether the way the budget was organised – e.g. was it from one department or several, whether it was new funds or in-kind resources – had an impact on the content and process	Policy integration literature on how departmental budgets can dis-incentivise joint working (Cabinet Office 2000); merged structures and budgets can facilitate integration (Ling 2002; Pollitt 2003), the need for independent resources under the control of those doing the coordinating to incentivise joint working (Exworthy and Hunter 2011) and the use of procedural instruments such as green budgeting (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012).	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on budget; main influences; lessons

	For Policy Implementation	Amount and type – new or existing, shared or centralised, in kind or additional		
Category	Variable	To Determine	Literature	How To Operationalise
OUTCOME	Plans for Implementation and Evaluation	What plans for implementing and evaluating the policy were discussed/put in place, and why was this approach chosen? Is it clear what would constitute success and how it would be measured? Is there evidence of integration at implementation stage?	• IFG research on the principles of good policymaking - incl. ‘policy fundamentals’ such as clarity on who will be held to account; realistic plan for obtaining timely feedback on how the policy is being realised (Hallsworth and Rutter 2011). • Public policy literature on features of modern policymaking (Bullock et al 2011) • Policy integration literature on integration at implementation stage (e.g. Ling 2002; Lafferty and Hovden 2003)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on implementation and evaluation; lessons
	Policy Instruments	What kind of policy instruments were discussed/put in place, and why was this approach chosen? Have all the different policy levers and actions that could be relevant to the desired outcome been considered?	• HI literature on policy constraint and problem definition (e.g. Steinmo 2008) and how policy can be constrained by uncoordinated instruments that characterise an existing set of policies, by layering, drift and conversion (Howlett and Rayner 2007); and how policy instrument change is one indicator of policy change (Capano 2009) • Framing literature on problematisation and policy silences (Bacchi 2009)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on lessons; omissions; outcomes
	Indicators	What indicators for measuring the implementation were discussed/put in place, and why was this approach chosen? To determine what measures of implementation were	Policy integration literature on shared objectives and policy to facilitate integration (Ling 2002).	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on lessons; omissions; outcomes; implementation and evaluation

		included in the policy formulation process, and why they were chosen		
	Final Status	What happened to the policy and why?	Public Policy literature on defining policy success or failure e.g. Rutter and Hallsworth (2011); McConnell (2015)	Documentary Analysis Interview Data: Qs on is national food policy possible; outcomes

Source: Author

3.4.3.2 Policy System Template

As explained above, the initial unit of analysis – two policy projects FM/F2030 and NFP – was supplemented with the additional level of the policy system, when it transpired during the iterative process of operationalising the theory that a historical institutionalist analysis would necessitate a wider scope than the projects themselves. The Template for Policy System Comparison is, therefore, a relatively simple list of elements within the policy system. As such, they do not require lengthy explanation, beyond the below Table.

Table 3.14: Policy System Template Justification

Element of the Policy System	Reason for Inclusion
History of National Food Policies	To explore theory that food policy integration is constrained by history (path dependent), earlier food policy projects must be documented. Pierson (2000b) concludes that path dependent processes are inherently historical, because they can only be identified through historical analysis. Past policy decisions – including on how to address food policy – can themselves <i>become</i> institutions, which act as structures that limit or shape current policy options (Kay 2005)
State Institutions	Policy choices made at the time an institution is being formed can have a deterministic impact on policy in the future (Kay 2005; Peters et al 2005). What appear to be small choices in institutional arrangements – often taken unthinkingly or unwittingly – can, later down the line, have remarkable consequences, and may prove irreversible (Peters et al 2005). Relevant for how institutional design of key departments with role in food policy influence development
Horizontal/Cross-departmental Integration	Institutional arrangements can have a determining factor on the horizontal integration between departments. In addition, the policy integration literature identifies numerous mechanisms for cross-departmental working which might be utilised in the two country cases
Non-State institutions • Food Industry • Civil Society	The food industry and civil society sector can influence framing and trajectory of policy projects. Networks are also themselves influenced by institutional factors, for example the Australian system characterised by pressure pluralist networks, is attributed by Bell (2002) to fragmented state and non-state sector with weak leadership and organisational capacity, which results in ad hoc reactive policymaking
Multi-Level Food Governance	As in categories above, governance arrangements, or lack of, to address food policy play a role in the scope for integration
Political Institutions • Bureaucracy • Electoral Cycle	HI study has traditionally been aimed at assessing the trajectories of economies or welfare systems (Pollitt 2008), making this a natural category for comparison. More specifically, the literature on the policy process highlights the role of bureaucratic practices, and electoral cycles in determining public policy outcomes

Source: Author

3.5 UK and Australian Field Work, and links with CSIRO

The PhD was joint-sponsored by City, University of London, and Australia's Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), the Federal government agency for scientific research in Australia. CSIRO's interest in national food policy processes, and in particular the NFP, stems from its regular involvement in policy consultation on Federal and State government policies. The research proposal was devised by an academic from City, University of London, and supervisor on the PhD, Professor David Barling (now at University of Hertfordshire), and CSIRO's Agriculture and Food Division. The Australian fieldwork took place between November-December 2013, in Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne, and by telephone. The UK fieldwork took place in London, and by telephone, during the early part of 2014. By utilising the contacts of both the PhD supervisors at the UK Centre for Food Policy, and the main contact at CSIRO, Dr Ingrid Appelqvist, and the researcher's own contacts within the civil society sector, supported by a snowball sampling method, access to a high level of participants – in particular policymakers – was achieved, providing the research with a privileged inside track (particularly challenging to secure given the busy schedules of civil/public servants, and reservations about discussing policy process matters – including tensions with departmental colleagues – while still in post).

3.6 Interviews

The policy analysis was supported by semi-structured interviews (SSI) with key stakeholders in the policy projects. These were designated according to Lang et al's (2009) categorisation of primary actors in the food system: Policymakers; Food Industry and Civil Society. There were, however, several interviewees that did not comfortably fit this categorisation (the 'Other' column in Table 3.15). In total n=35 interviews were conducted, most on a face-to-face basis, to capitalise on the potential for an emotional bond to be created with the participant, and allow deep probing into their reflections on the policy processes (Irvine et al 2010), but where necessary over the phone. A set of core questions were used, plus supplemental questions targeted to the interviewee. The Interview Schedule is available in the Appendix. Interviews were recorded, transcribed in full and then coded in NVivo for the key themes. During transcription, Braun and Clarke's (2006) recommendations on the importance of ensuring transcripts present a 'true' representation of the original nature of the verbal account was heeded, in particular in the way punctuation added can alter the meaning of data (p17).

Table 3.15: Interviewees

Country	Policymakers	Further Details	Industry	Further Details	Civil Society	Further Details	Other	Further Details	Total
UK	CS-UK CS-UK2 CS-UK3 CS-UK4 CS-UK5 CS-UK6 CS-UK7	Civil servants from: - Department of Health - DEFRA Three civil servants from Cabinet Office Two civil servants from Food Standards Agency	FI-UK FI-UK2 FI-UK3 FI-UK4	Representatives of two of main trade associations Two former executives of large food companies	NGO-UK NGO-UK2 NGO-UK3	Representative from food campaigning organisation Representative from organic organisation Representative from consumer organisation	FPPT FPPT2 (Food Policy Project Team)	Two former members of Food Policy Project Teams other than FM/2030	16
Australia	CS-A CS-A2 CS-A3 CS-A4 CS-A5 CS-A6 CS-A7	- Civil servants from: - Federal Department of Agriculture - Federal Department of Health - Federal Department of Industry - FSANZ - State Department of Primary Industry	FI-A FI-A2 FI-A3 FI-A4	Representatives from two trade associations A food industry consultant and former executive An executive from large food company	NGO-A NGO-A2 NGO-A3 NGO-A4 NGO-A5	Three representatives from public health organisations Representative from food organisation Representative of private-sector backed think tank	A-A (Academic) FPPT-A (Food Policy Project Team) ST-A (Science and Technology)	Academic focused on food and health policy Former member of Food Policy Project Team Member of Science and Technology Community	19

		Former civil servants from State Department of Primary Industry							
		Former civil servant with experience in both Federal and State Departments of Health							

3.7 Documents

Along with academic literature and interview data, a range of policy documents were collated and analysed, as listed below. A methodological disclaimer is that when analysing policy documents a researcher cannot assume they represent an accurate and truthful record of the policy formulation process, plus only certain documents are made public, archives prove difficult to navigate and partial (Yin 2009). Interviews were therefore used to supplement the findings from the policy document analysis.

Table 3.16: Policy Documents

Policy Document	Research Use
Primary Policy Reports - FM; F2030; National Food Plan Issues Paper/Green Paper/White Paper	Analysis of content of case study policies in response to RQ1 on how integrated food policy has been addressed and RQ2 on framing and trajectory of food policies
Secondary material related to FM; F2030; National Food Plan Issues Paper/Green Paper/White Paper: • Academic material addressing the policies • Consultation submissions • Press releases and briefing papers • Media coverage	Further analysis of case study policies, providing context
Non-case study food policy reports prior to and following FM; F2030; National Food Plan Issues Paper/Green Paper/White Paper: UK • Policy Commission on the Future of Food and Farming • Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England • Food Industry Sustainability Strategy • Public Health Responsibility Deal • Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming • Green Food Project • Agri-Tech Strategy • Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report Australia • Food and Nutrition Strategy • Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy • National Food Industry Strategy • Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper • Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation • Food and Health Dialogue	Analysis of content of non-case study policies in response to RQ1 on how integrated food policy has been addressed and RQ2 on framing and trajectory of food policies

• Australia and Food Security in a Changing World • National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	
Reports and other literature assessing the policy systems including key government departments with responsibility for food policy, such as: • National Audit Office assessments of Departments • Civil Service Capability Reviews of Departments • Select Committee reports on departmental performance	Analysis of factors explaining trajectory and framing of food policies (RQ2) - particularly in terms of institutional strengths and weaknesses

Source: Author

3.8 Coding Approach and Analysis

A thematic approach to analysis was applied, as identified by Braun and Clarke (2006), whereby the researcher searches ‘*across a data set – be that a number of interviews or focus groups, or a range of texts – to find repeated patterns of meaning*’ (p15). This method is ‘*poorly demarcated and claimed, yet widely used*’ (p28), and therefore reference to Braun and Clarke’s guide allowed a more rigorous approach to be followed, akin to the more defined discourse and content analysis methods. Thematic Analysis was, though, deemed suitable given its flexible nature; in that it can apply to different types of data, from policy documents to interviews. Specifically, the research utilised a more explicitly analyst-driven ‘theoretical’ thematic analysis, in recognition of its theoretically-guided nature (Braun and Clarke 2006 p12). As can be seen in the research process diagram, themes were identified from the literature on: food policy prior to 2008; policy integration, public policy context, and historical institutionalism. These were used to create the interview topic guide, and the templates for organising the data (see 3.4.3). The policy reports – FM; F2030; NFP – were imported to NVivo and coded according to the Framework Tool, along with any policy system or general themes they addressed (for example references to multi-level governance of food), and any specific references to integration. The interview transcripts were then coded with the same nodes. Examples of how the themes were organised into either Policy System; Policy Project; or General themes can be found in the three tables below.

Table 3.17: Examples of Policy System Themes and Sub-themes

Level One Themes	Level Two Themes (where existed)	Level Three Themes (where existed)
How is Food Policy made UK	DEFRA BIS FSA DH Cross-departmental communication Institutional Tensions	DEFRA expertise DEFRA sponsors food and farming DEFRA status History of DEFRA DEFRA vs BIS DEFRA vs DH DH vs FSA Fragmented Policy Space UK Mechanisms for cross communication Cabinet Sub Committee Council of Food Policy Advisors Institutional Reform Mechanisms for cross-communication Secondments
How is Food Policy made Australia	DAFF DH Industry FSANZ Dept of Environment Cross-Departmental Communication Institutional Tensions	Fragmented Policy Space Australia DAFF sponsors Agriculture DAFF vs DH Mechanisms for cross-communication Secondments
Other UK National Policies	Policy Commission SSFF FISS Green Food Foresight Food and Farming Public Health Responsibility Deal	
Other Australian National Policies	Supermarket to Asia National Food Industry Strategy PMSEIC Food and Drink Dialogue	

Non-State Actors UK	BRC FDF NFU NGOs Role of consumers	Food industry compared to other industries Fragmented civil society
Non-State Actors Australia	AFGC NFF NGOs Role of consumers	Food industry compared to other industries Fragmented civil society
Multi-level Governance	MLG UK MLG Australia UK Regional Policies Australia Federal System Australia State Food Policies	
Electoral Change		

Source: Author

Table 3.18: Examples of Policy Project Themes and Sub-themes: FM

Level One Themes	Level Two Themes (where existed)
Catalyst	
Terms of Reference	
Project Team	
Departmental Sponsor	Cabinet Office lead
Main Themes	
Input from Departments	
Policy Instruments	
Mechanisms	

Machinery of Government Changes	
Cross Departmental Communication	
Implementation	
Evaluation	
FM Outputs	Integrated Advice to Consumers Healthy Food Mark GM work Cross-government research
FM becomes F2030	Keeping it in the Cabinet Office

Source: Author

Table 3.19: Examples of Generic Themes and Sub-Themes

Level One Themes	Level Two Themes (where existed)	Level Three Themes (where existed)
What is a National Food Policy	Why do food policies happen Other country national food policies	Political will Food low on political agenda
Is an Integrated Food Policy Achievable		
Is an Integrated Food Policy Desirable		
Influences on National Food Policy Development	Food Industry Evidence-based policy Policy Entrepreneurs	
Lessons	Independent from government Long term approach needed Placebo policy	
Assessment of NFP		
Assessment of FM		
Assessment of F2030		

Source: Author

The themes focused primarily at a semantic/explicit level, although there are some instances where the latent themes are discussed, for example in how particular underlying frames are used in the policy documents, for example on the appropriate role of government, and on such occasions the method edged closer to a discourse analysis. Care was taken, as discussed in Braun and Clarke (2006), in acknowledging the *prevalence* of themes – for example phrases like ‘many participants’ – when writing up the analysis, to ensure descriptors fairly represented the weight given to particular themes across the data set.

3.9 Ethics

Ethical approval for the research was submitted and approval granted. Examples of the participant information sheet provided to all interviewees, and consent form, can be found in the Appendix. The most significant ethical consideration was deemed to be preserving the anonymity of interviewees, given many government stakeholders remained in post in government, and therefore did not want to be seen to be breaching employee confidentiality, or criticising their colleagues, and those outside government were mindful of relationships with the state institutions and future access to policymaking projects. Participants were assured of the anonymity of their comments, and were given the opportunity to check the anonymised title assigned to them, to ensure they were not going to be identified.

3.10 Summary of Methodology Chapter

This chapter has outlined the design of the research project: a qualitative, interpretivist comparative study of two case cases, based on a conceptual framework fusing the public policy literature on integration with the HI model of public policy analysis. It explained how the methods of interviewing, document analysis and coding and thematic analysis, were used to collect and treat the data, and how the Framework Tool and Policy System Templates were created, to provide a bridge between the literature and the empirical focus, and assist in analysing the large amounts of data collected. That data is now summarised in the four Findings chapters which comprise Section Two.

SECTION TWO: FINDINGS

The following four chapters present the findings. The intention was to order these findings according to the Research Questions, though due to the interconnected nature of the three questions, and the facets of the problem they address, they are clearly nested.

Chapter Four examines the food policy systems in the UK and Australia and responds to RQ1; it explores how policy integration has been addressed by national governments. However, the two policy projects are themselves manifestations of how policy integration has been dealt with, and therefore chapters Five – on the UK’s FM/F2030 project, and Six – on the Australian NFP, also respond to RQ1. Chapters Four and Five respond primarily to RQ2, as they analyse a range of factors which may have influenced the framing and trajectory of the policies.

Finally, Chapter Seven – along with the Discussion Chapter Eight – triangulates the three prior chapters, to examine whether an integrated policy can be constructed across a range of established policy sectors.

Chapter 4: How has Food Policy Integration been addressed by National Governments in the UK and Australia?

The following is a comparative analysis of the food policy systems of the UK and Australia: how they have historically approached food policy integration in policy projects and the institutional structures which have played a role, to enable an analysis of macro and meso-level determinants of the policy projects FM/F2030 and the NFP.

4.1 History of National ‘Food Policies’

The case study policies FM/2030 and NFP can be understood as the first attempts to create an ‘overtly’ integrated cross-government food policy in the UK and Australia. Part One of the Literature Review involved tracing the historical approach to food policy integration prior to FM/F2030 and the NFP. This next section picks up that narrative with reference to projects prior to the case studies. As addressed in Chapter One, historically the tendency has been to address food issues through national policies, strategies or plans focusing on one or occasionally two aspects concerning food independently; for example either production, manufacturing, food security, or nutrition. But there are notable differences – and some parallels – between the UK and Australia in the focus of these discrete policy projects. Table 4.1 illustrates how the UK has taken a relatively more integrated approach, while Australia has favoured a single-domain policy design, with the exception of its 1992 Food and Nutrition policy (CDHHCS 1992), and PMSEIC report on food security (PMSEIC 2010). While prior policies do not claim to be as comprehensive as the case study policy projects, they are nevertheless important ‘*relics of earlier policy initiatives*’ (Rayner and Howlett 2009a p99), and an influence on the content and trajectory of the case studies.

Table 4.1: History of Food Policies in the UK and Australia

Country	Food Policy	Date	Domains Covered	Approach to Policy Integration	Type of Integration Addressed
UK	Policy Commission on Food and Farming	2002	Primary focus on agriculture, but also makes links with environment and health. Less focus on manufacturing sector. Links between farming outputs – other than fruit and vegetables – and nutrition avoided Highlighted need to reorient food and farming ‘with more emphasis on environmental protection and greater engagement with the needs of the consumer’ (SDC 2011 p24) and to ‘reconnect’ the food supply chain (Lang and Rayner 2003) Notes nutritional problems looming ‘because people are eating too much of the wrong things and too little of the right ones’, but links this with more processed and pre-packaged foods - ‘much of which is unhealthily high in saturated fats, salt, sugar and additives’ (p96-7), at the same time as farmer’s share of the retail price has steadily fallen as they have become ‘simply a raw material supplier for the food processing industry’ (p97) However recommendations do not address tensions - for example between red meat/dairy and health. Focuses on better labelling, the need for a proper strategy on nutrition, reducing HFSS processed foods, procurement, increased fruit and veg consumption	No explicit mentions of policy integration as a goal, but remit incorporates economic, environmental and health objectives. Recommends bodies responsible for health promotion make effective links to food production and preparation, and suggests overarching link from farm to nutrition policy need to be better understood with better links between consumers and producers	• Supply Chain • Horizontal
	Strategy for	2002	As above, primary focus on farming, but does	As above, no explicit mention but links farming with	• Supply Chain

	Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England		include health and environmental issues in key principles (developed with the Sustainable Development Commission). Highlights Food and Health Action Plan role in influencing production of healthier food. Includes indicators on environmental outcomes e.g. reduced GHG emissions, soil and water quality, and nutrition indicator on consumption of fruit and vegetables	environmental and health impacts and discusses importance of all three elements of sustainability	Horizontal
	Food Industry Sustainability Strategy	2006	Focuses on sustainable production but also includes chapter on social considerations, and stresses contribution of industry to improving nation's health. Focuses beyond farm gate	No explicit mention but notes sustainability should not be considered in environmental, social or economic 'silos', nor should domestic position be considered separately from international; or production in isolation from patterns of consumption as ' <i>all are inter-linked and need to be positively influenced to improve the food industry's sustainability</i> ' (DEFRA 2006 p11)	- Horizontal - Vertical - Supply Chain
	Public Health Responsibility Deal	2011	Public Health focus, no links made with environment. Post-farm gate only	Not a focus	None
	Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming	2011	Key challenges focus more on food supply and environmental challenges, and hunger, but does make specific references to need to change consumption patterns and only policy where issue of meat production and consumption is addressed directly. Makes direct links between economic and environmental domains. However, no policy recommendations/actions are attached	Makes several specific references to integrated policymaking but no actions proposed in response. The critical importance of interconnected policy-making is a 'major conclusion' of the report. Argues policies <i>outside</i> food system must be developed in much closer conjunction with that for food, and degree to which silos break down will be a major determinant of whether and how multiple challenges facing food system can be addressed coherently	Horizontal
	Green Food Project	2013	Focus is on production and how this links with environmental challenges. Consumption - and health - not a focus, and dealt with separately in a later phase of the project (see below)	Focus is on opportunities and tensions in concept of 'sustainable intensification' ie – between production and sustainability. No specific references made to integration	Horizontal
	A UK Strategy for Agricultural Technologies (Agri-Tech Strategy)	2013	Focus on agriculture and productivity, and environment in the context of technology and innovation. Health not addressed. Focus is mainly pre-farm-gate	Not a focus	None
	Sustainable	2013	Focus on consumption, including health and	Notes need for a joined-up overarching vision of what	Horizontal

	Consumption Report: Follow-up to the Green Food Project		environmental challenges through analysing healthy and sustainable diets. Production not a focus as dealt with in earlier phase of project (see above), but does highlight need for addressing trade-offs between different aspects of sustainability and notes synergies between health and environmental domains are potentially strong but less obvious synergy with economic goals	‘good’ looks like across social, environmental and economic interests, and a mechanism for identifying potential trade-offs between different aspects of sustainability Concludes Government leadership is needed and must be integrated (i.e. key government departments for food such as DEFRA and DH working together more effectively)	• Supply Chain
Australia	Food and Nutrition Policy	1992	Primary focus on health, but some links made with environment, and also economy (to a lesser extent). Production not strong focus, although there are links made between policy domains and activities e.g. research and consultation with meat supply chain about supply of lean red meat in retail sector. Also highlights need for food producers to improve skills and knowledge on dietary issues and more links between food policy and nutrition policy	Discusses links between ‘food’ and nutrition policy. States the policy requires coordinated effort between: • Health, education, transport, primary industry, and manufacturing industry sectors • Public, private and non-government agencies • Different spheres of government • The Australian consumer Makes some links between domains in implementation program.	• Horizontal • Vertical • Supply Chain
	Prime Minister’s Supermarket to Asia Strategy (STAS)	1997	Focus on productivity with no links made with environment or health	No explicit reference but Pritchard (1999) notes that one priority of the Strategy was it ‘ <i>should embody a ‘whole-of-Government’ perspective, where traditionally, various government agencies had competed for policy relevance</i> ’ (p293)	• Supply Chain • Horizontal (in context of economic goals only)
	National Food Industry Strategy	2002	Strategy has four ‘integrated themes’ of which three are primarily economic and one is environmental sustainability. Defines sustainability as resource-use efficiency and positions environmental management as supporting sustainability of food industry by reducing costs, ensuring resources in future and becoming more internationally competitive (p29). Health not a focus	Not a focus	None
	Creating Our Future:	2006	Focus on agriculture and productivity, with no	One of identified foundations for success in agricultural	Vertical

	Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation		mention of health and only minor references to post-farm gate supply chain	and food industries is <i>'genuinely cooperative and consistent approach by governments – Australian, State, and Territory is essential for policies and programs affecting the sector'</i> (DAFF 2006a)	
	Food and Health Dialogue	2009	Public Health focus, no links made with environment and focus is on post-farm gate only	Not a priority, although one primary foci was to provide <i>'a framework for government, public health groups and industry to work collaboratively'</i>	State/non-state
	Australia and Food Security in a Changing World	2010	Primary focus on agriculture and environment, and touches on health in a minor way. Does not focus on consumption. Does acknowledge need for more integrated approach to food policy to achieve food security, support growth in food sector and address diet-related health issues	No explicit reference but states that <i>'Food production and processing is a fundamental part of Australia's economy and the health and wellbeing of its citizens. Food, however, is not currently dealt with in a way which brings together food related policy, regulatory agencies and research organisations. Different policy, regulatory and program areas related to food should be brought together to ensure that government takes a consistent approach to food and food security. A national approach would bring a high level of coordination, build a strategy for a resilient food value chain and emphasise the link between food and population health'</i> . (p2) Recommends establishment of a National Food Security Agency to address the problem of <i>'lack of a nationally-coordinated approach to food'</i> : <i>'At present, the diversity of issues related to food production, food trade and the role of food in community health are dealt with by several separate agencies. An integrated approach to food policy is required to achieve food security, support growth in the food sector and address diet-related health issues'</i> (p63)	Horizontal Supply Chain
	National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	2009	Focus on productivity and innovation. Nutrition and sustainability issues dealt with in separate cross-sectoral policies. Research and Technology Dairy Strategy makes no links with health or environmental domains for example. Food and Nutrition RD&TT Strategy discusses food-related diseases in the	Reference was made in the evaluation consultation to how <i>'In some jurisdictions primary industries issues are spread across a number of Ministers and it can therefore be difficult to engage all Ministers and ensure they are aware of and engaged in the RD&E Framework'</i> (Allen Consulting Group 2012 p20)	Vertical (and Horizontal between States) Supply Chain

			context of producing and manufacturing healthier foods, and need to understand why consumers request but do not always choose healthier foods. Discusses environment in terms of need to use natural resources more effectively, including reduction of food waste as a potential saving for all stages of supply chain, and energy intensive nature of manufacturing to add value		
	Food Processing Industry Group Report	2012	Productivity focus. No links made with environment. Health domain mentioned in relation to market opportunity of healthy foods	Notes that ' <i>Each State and Territory, and in some cases, discrete areas within a State (e.g. the Gippsland Food Plan) deliver programs, initiatives and assistance tailored to region-specific needs</i> ' with ' <i>a lack of integration, coordination and integrated design between the different levels of government in some cases</i> ' (p20)	Vertical
	Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper	2015	Focus on agriculture. Environmental driver - primarily drought management - positioned as constraint on production. No links made with health apart from as market opportunity.	States '<i>Unsurprisingly, many areas of policy affect agriculture, including tax, education and training, foreign investment, environmental law and industrial relations among others. The Government is taking a whole of-government approach to this White Paper process because only a comprehensive approach to all of the policies that impact Australian agriculture can help the sector be prepared for the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead</i>' (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p11). Highlights importance of intergovernmental cooperation as critical to improving competitiveness: '<i>Many of the policy ideas raised in the Green Paper would require the Government to work with the States and Territories to deliver improved outcomes for Australian agriculture, and the community more generally</i>' (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p18).	• Horizontal (in terms of impacts on agriculture) • Vertical

Source: Author

4.2 The State Institutions Compared

An institutional analysis of food policy integration requires addressing how responsibility for food governance is shared between organisations in the policy field. The following section provides a comparative discussion of key departments involved, and non-state institutions in each country.

In the UK, policy relating to food is the responsibility of several government departments, most prominently the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Health (DH), though there are many additional departments with a role in food policy: a study in 2008 identified 19 ministries, agencies and bodies and almost 100 policy areas/responsibilities (SDC 2008). Similarly, Australian food policy has primarily been the remit of the departments of agriculture and health, although more recently the Department of Industry has taken a more formal role as sponsor of the food manufacturing industry, and – as highlighted in Chapter One – there are 16 Australian Federal government departments with a role in food, plus 54 agencies, replicated across every State (CS-A6) (see Appendix A).

4.2.1 Department of Agriculture

In the UK, DEFRA is the main department involved in the formation of national food policy, and was responsible for the F2030 Report, the second unit of analysis in the UK case study. The department was formed in 2003 when the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) merged with part of the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and with a small part of the Home Office, in response to a shake-up of food policy following several food scares. These scares undermined the reputation of MAFF, and highlighted tensions between its dual role as champion of agriculture and responsibilities for food (Carmichael 2006). It had gained a reputation as a *‘clientelist ministry overly preoccupied with the well-being of its producer groups, to the neglect of consumers and the wider public good’* and was at the *‘bottom of the pile in terms of Whitehall reputation’* (Ward and Lowe 2007 p413). NGO-UK3 describes how *“the legacy of previously being MAFF carries through culturally”*, and it is *“quite agriculturally-focused for a department that has food in the name”*, although *“they are tedious advocates of agri-environment schemes”* and *“also do highly progressive stuff on sustainable consumption in some sectors, but really struggle with food and the politics around that”*, flagging up the issue of eating less meat. The department is an important player in attempts to integrate UK food policy, in that it has responsibility for the domains of farming and the environment, and with an overall remit for food:

‘For the first time, one department has brought together the interests of farmers and the countryside, the environment and the rural economy; the food we eat, the air we breathe, and the water we drink. We do all this by integrating environmental, social, and economic objectives – putting sustainable development into practice every day – and by championing sustainable development as the way forward for government’ (DEFRA 2001 Mission Statement, cited by Shepherd 2011 p386).

Barling (2004) describes this institutional design linking environment with agriculture and rural affairs as an affirmation of the European Commission’s policy direction on CAP reform towards multifunctional agriculture. However there are tensions, typified by the issue of eating less meat, in that:

“on the one hand they know they ought to do it from an environmental point of view, and that is part of their remit, and yet equally they know they can’t do it because they will get a hammering. So I think the sponsor

department of that sector, the idea that they are an economic department, is always lurking in the background” (NGO-UK3)

While the inclusion of ‘food’ in DEFRA’s title is believed to have been a last minute decision (Barling et al 2002), and “*people just call it DEFRA, and often think the F stands for farming anyway*” (CS-UK3), it did send a “*powerful signal*” (CS-UK3) and its focus on food advanced in subsequent years: machinery of government changes in October 2008 led to the department taking on ‘*an enhanced role on food*’ (DEFRA 2009), with DEFRA’s Secretary of State chairing a new cabinet sub committee, which resulted in ‘*much more dialogue between Government departments on food-related policies*’ (DEFRA 2009), and the subsequent F2030 report described DEFRA as coordinating ‘*all UK Government policies on food*’ (DEFRA 2010 p5). At the same time, a new Departmental Strategic Objective (DSO) was introduced ‘*to ensure a sustainable, secure and healthy food supply*’, joining existing objectives for sustainable production and consumption, and a thriving farming and food sector (DEFRA 2009). Yet, the environment-food/farming link was somewhat weakened when the department lost its responsibility for climate change policy in 2010, and the climate team at DEFRA was merged with the energy team from the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) to create the Department of Energy and Climate Change. The potential for food policy integration offered by the institutional design of DEFRA is also mediated by potential for intra-departmental fragmentation. According to FI-UK3:

“...you get that internal struggle there. At times it feels like two departments. And the way the ministerial remits are laid out, effectively what you get is a food minister, or a food and farming minister, an environment minister, who tends to do fish as well, and one other – it is never quite clear what they do – and then the Secretary of State...”

A 2012 Civil Service Capability Review highlighted the challenge of DEFRA’s diverse and complex strategic portfolio, urging the department to ‘*provide an authoritative voice in Whitehall and beyond on the economic importance of environmental goods and services*’ (Civil Service 2012). It is also interesting to note that, while the combination of food, farming and environment in one ‘super ministry’ makes sense in policy integration terms, the design appears to have been accidental rather than inspired (White and Dunleavy 2010; Ward and Lowe 2007). Indeed, for Ward and Lowe (2007), this ‘*accident of history*’ had the negative consequence of marginalising rural affairs in favour of ‘*stronger policy areas around climate change and sustainable development*’ (p417). As mentioned above, removal of the climate change remit arguably weakened links between farming and environmental objectives, as FI-UK describes, resulting in a dis-joint between DEFRA and DECC because:

“DECC tend just to look at energy and climate change in isolation, they are very target driven, driven by carbon budgets, by keeping the lights on and so on, and they are too busy delivering against those agendas to worry too much about the land, food, water, energy nexus, which is essential”.

In contrast to the long history of (and the more extensive literature on) the UK’s department, in Australia the agriculture portfolio became a separate department only relatively recently, in 1998, and there are fewer documents to analyse. Prior to the creation of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF; now Department of Agriculture and Water Resources), agriculture was within other departments, for example, Trade and Customs, Markets and Migration, or Commerce, and later Primary Industry (DAFF 2010). A further distinction is Australia’s separate ministries for agriculture and environment. Food is not a significant focus for the environment department: according to a Department of Environment website search for ‘food’, and private correspondence with the Department via email, any

food-related work is focused on waste. FI-A2 highlights predictable tensions between the agriculture/industry portfolios and environment “*because their objectives are not necessarily completely aligned*”:

“The overall principles you’d think they would support – that we want to create an environment for business to grow and flourish, but they would add on the end at minimal environmental cost, or at least at an environmental cost we are prepared to tolerate. Then it becomes almost a matter of opinion about what you are prepared to tolerate” (FI-A2)

Linked to this, sustainability policy is relatively less developed in Australia, with most activity focused on quality assurance/food safety. Smith et al (2010) trace this back to the 1996 establishment of Food Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ), which significantly influenced how food regulation developed. Several industry-led programmes were designed to meet FSANZ requirements, including: horticulture code of practice Freshcare; Safe Quality Foods 2000; and Great Grains (Baines et al 2000, cited in Smith et al 2010), resulting in a focus on ‘clean’ food supply chains, at the expense of ‘green’. This has been compounded by the challenges of harmonising the various quality assurance schemes, and reluctance from retailers to address environmental standards (Smith et al 2010).

4.2.2 Department of Health

Food related public-health activities represent a relatively small part of both UK and Australian departmental remits. In a 2003 review of food and health strategy in the UK, Lang and Rayner state the frequently observed truth ‘*that the DH is the ministry of the NHS, not of health*’ (p68). A later 2007 Capability Review supports this view, noting that the Department ‘*too often operates as a collection of silos*’ with ‘*a high proportion of staff drawn from the NHS and other non-civil service backgrounds combined with a number of restructuring exercises*’ having ‘*contributed to a sense that the Department lacks its own culture distinct from that of the NHS...*’ (Civil Service 2007 p18). NGO-UK and FI-UK4 confirm the analysis from a food sector perspective, with NGO-UK describing the department as “*obsessed with the NHS*” and FI-UK4 noting:

“The Department of Health primarily sees its responsibility of making sick people well, rather than preventative medicine. So their priority for the nutrition end of health is lower than for the pharmaceutical end of treatment. And they don’t talk to BIS, except via the research councils, because all the research councils report into BIS. The DH does social welfare of health and nutrition, but it doesn’t fund any research into food and health. So this is the problem.”

However, interviewees did point out the contrast between food’s profile at the time of FM where CS-UK6 describes the DH as not really having an approach to food policy, “*it was all about the NHS, I don’t think they even had an approach particularly to health, to wider health*”, compared with “*better understanding now*” (CS-UK7, speaking in 2017), with CS-UK6 highlighting recent cross-government work on the 2016 *Childhood Obesity: A Plan for Action*, and “*more of the join-up across the prevention agenda, and the join-up with the NHS, with central government departments around the costs of ill health, of unhealthy lifestyles, often due to diets*”. CS-UK6 adds that “*it has taken quite a number of years to have that kind of [cross-government] approach embedded more, which is effectively what the food report [Food Matters] was trying to do back then, but through the back door on limited resource*”.

Similar characteristics to the UK at the time of FM are found in the Australian case. Interviewees described the implications of the Department of Health’s broad responsibility and how food can get lost as a result, with NGO-A saying “*nutrition is really seen to be a lower order priority*”, and CS-A4:

“The trouble is though, with food, you’d think chronic disease and food would be a really high priority for public health, but in fact it’s not. When you put the acid test on them to put a whole lot of money into some of these areas they say ‘oh well, no actually public hospitals and this other thing and this other thing’, and it is not the high priority that you think it might be. Even though we know the long term costs for the health sector, dealing with food-related issues and diet-related issues is pretty low down on the priority list for public health.”(CS-A4)

NGO-A3 describes the DH as “*not at the table*” on Australian food policy, citing the example of state-level front of pack labelling where:

“It is coming out of the Department of Primary Industry, that is, the representative. Health isn’t there. And they are the lead agency, but health is a lesser element....And this is about labelling on helping consumers make healthier decisions. It is completely unbelievable”.

A review of the Department’s annual reports 2000-15 reveals a focus on food safety, with food policy generally defined in relation to food regulation. For example the reports consistently refer to giving ‘*food policy advice*’ to FSANZ. Linked to this, NGO-A points to silos at work within the department, with public health nutrition of a lower, status, with more junior staff¹¹:

“...the more public health nutrition things in the healthy living branch, in one section of the department, and then in a completely different section of the department what they call food policy unit, which is actually a food regulation policy unit, and so you’ve got quite a separation there. And then, the food regs people are more likely to talk to the agriculture people than the healthy living people are. I think the healthy living people are fairly junior and a bit closeted in terms of their perspectives. At least the food reg policy people are broader, they understand the trade implications, and the commercial implications, and so on, because they are at the table of the food regulatory standing committee and so on. So they are much more tuned in to those imperatives than the healthy people” (NGO-A)

Both countries’ health departments have attempted to ‘agencify’ public health, possibly as a response to tensions highlighted above. Public Health England was established in 2013, with a staff of 500 scientists, researchers and public health professionals, and the aim ‘*to bring together public health specialists from more than 70 organisations into a single public health service*’ (<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england/about>). The Australian National Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) was established in 2010 ‘*with the capacity to lead, facilitate, coordinate and be a catalyst for the ‘ramping up’ of prevention and health promotion efforts*’ (ANPHA 2011). But while a dedicated agency may be viewed as a positive step in prioritising public health, this type of reform has also faced criticism in both countries, for fragmenting responsibilities (Parliament of Australia 2014; Siddique 2014). ANPHA was abolished as part of Federal budget cuts in 2014, ‘*with all essential ongoing functions and employees transferred to the Department of Health*’ to streamline and ‘*better coordinate preventive health efforts within the Commonwealth health portfolio*’ (Department of Health 2014).

4.2.3 Department of Industry

In both the UK and Australia, there has been ongoing tension over the agriculture department’s suitability as sponsor of the food industry, culminating in Australia in the 2010 re-allocation of policy responsibility for the food processing

¹¹ Although according to NGO-A, changes were afoot to possibly merge the healthy living branch, and the food regulations branches at the time of the interviews.

sector to the Innovation, Industry, Science and Research portfolio. This shift took place during the NFP formulation process, and was followed shortly by the 2012 Food Processing Industry Strategy (FPIS), as outlined at Table 4.1. FI-A3 draws attention to the implications for food policy integration of multiple strategies being developed, with:

“...everyone working on the same problem independently, and if you read this [FPIS]...and the National Food Plan, you'll see a lot of overlap...so it is a good illustration of where we work divergently” (FI-A3).

UK food industry representatives also spoke of the Department of Industry as more closely aligned to their needs, and the department has taken a more active role in food policy in recent years. NGO-UK3 describes its role as having been “*evolving*”, and with a similar policy focus to Australia, but covering different parts of the food supply chain: in 2013 an Agricultural Technologies Strategy (ATS) was published by the UK department (see Table 4.1 and Appendix Table A1). NGO-UK3 says the relatively close work with DEFRA on the ATS “*wasn't really on the cards five years ago*” and is an interesting development. In a more recent development, the Food and Drink Trade and Investment sector team from the Industry Department were ‘*integrated with DEFRA's Food Policy Unit to create the Great British Food Unit*’ which:

‘supports the growth of the food and drink industry – the UK's largest manufacturing sector – both in the UK and through boosting exports. It brings together teams from DEFRA and DIT and with wide support from UK businesses’ (DEFRA; DIT 2016 p24).

4.2.4 Food Standards

The literature review described how both countries deal with food standards policy via agencies, but with quite different approaches, due to the different rationales behind each agency's creation. CS-A describes the Food Standards Agency's (FSA) design as a non-ministerial department as “*really, really important*”, because “*previously with MAFF...it was really about what the minister wanted, what the government's policy of the day was...so it was a radical departure to have a consumer-led department basically*”. CS-UK notes one of the challenges was it was originally intended to be food safety only, but “*just towards the end the nutrition side of it was also deemed to be part of the FSA's remit...but there were some shared responsibilities with DH. And that did make for some tensions.*” An example given is around joining-up policy objectives in the Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives policy, where the two departments had differing approaches to non-milk extrinsic sugars. CS-UK7 describes tensions over obesity policy, with DH's level of ambition conflicting with an FSA approach tending to view things as “*pretty technical, like levels of reformulation, or portion size*”, and pointing to the FSA's non-ministerial “*neither here nor there*” design, “*so it couldn't take part in some of the discussions and move policies forward in ways a department would be able to*”. CS-UK3 describes the tension between the FSA and DH remits, noting the FSA's “*...primary focus is protection of consumers around safety, and safe food, and authenticity and secure food, and there is a real danger it wanders too much into the guardianship of what a good diet looks like*”. FI-UK3 also points out that the FSA “*reports to the the DH but in fact most of its work is with DEFRA*”. Whereas the Australian equivalent is quite different, says NGO-A2 contrasting the two agencies, explaining the FSA:

“...was really unique in that the agency was able to publish its advice to ministers, which really held ministers extremely accountable for their actions because it obvious to the public if they weren't following the advice of an agency that they had set up themselves to advise them, and that was really novel. FSANZ is not equivalent at all - similar mandates but it is not set up in the same way and the culture isn't adequate to fulfil that remit - people just see themselves as a regulatory agency”.

Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is described on its website as *‘an independent statutory agency established by the Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991 (FSANZ Act)’* and is part of the Australian Government’s Health portfolio. Its vision is of *‘A safe food supply protecting and supporting the health of people in Australia and New Zealand’* (FSANZ n.d. Accessed December 2016). As discussed in the literature review, because constitutionally the State governments are responsible for enforcement of food law, harmonisation of standards has been a focus in Australia (Hobbs et al 2002). ST-A describes how *“it took us many decades to get in place a single food standards framework here in Australia. Before the NFA, which evolved into FSANZ, it really was a fiasco”*. This has led to stronger vertical dialogue on food standards, and the enforcement of food standards, and at the primary industry end of the food chain, but very little on manufacturing policy for example (ST-A) although more recently *“the PISC is trying to engage the health guys in a bit of dialogue”*, so there are *“some attempts being made at the moment to improve communication between the primary industry and health interface, but it is pretty small”* (ST-A). The character of FSANZ has also been shaped by its predecessor the Australia New Zealand Food Authority, which was seen as *“being a bit uppity, having its own agenda”* according to CS-A5.

4.2.5 Cabinet Department

The UK Cabinet Office (CO), and its Australian equivalent the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet (PM&C), are not traditionally involved in food policy, but are addressed here due to the role of the CO’s Strategy Unit in FM. Known as ‘the corporate centre’ for government the CO is led by the Cabinet Secretary, who the NAO describes as the Prime Minister’s most senior policy advisor, and has historically encompassed the most senior positions in the civil service (NAO 2015). Several central government functions are housed within it, including the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) at the time of FM. The PMSU had been operating since 2002, one of several machinery of government changes at the centre (plus introduction of the Spending Review) since the end of the 1990s/early 2000s, as part of the ‘Modernising Government’ agenda and a general desire to overcome barriers to long-term thinking created by the electoral cycle. The PMSU’s remit was: *‘to carry out strategy reviews and provide policy advice in accordance with the Prime Minister’s policy priorities; to support government departments in developing effective strategies and policies - including helping them to build their strategic capability; and, to identify and effectively disseminate thinking on emerging issues and challenges for the UK Government e.g. through occasional strategic audits’* (PASC 2007 p9). It was akin to a think-tank - standing *‘close enough to the issues, politics and personalities in government to understand the contexts and challenges, but distant enough from everyday matters and from those closely associated with existing policy to provide new thinking’* (PASC 2007 p10). Another notable characteristic was the Unit’s staff: drawn not just from the civil service but also the private, wider public and voluntary sectors, with the aim of bringing varied skills and experience and a *‘fresh perspective’* (PASC 2007 p10).

The Public Administration Select Committee has described the unit as *‘widely praised’*, a pertinent example to this research project (given DEFRA’s sponsorship of F2030) being former DEFRA Director of Strategic and Sustainable Development Jill Rutter’s comments about its work on the future of the fishing industry:

‘where PMSU, working with DEFRA, spent a year throwing quite a lot of people at quite an intractable problem and came up with interesting and different solutions which DEFRA on its own would not have generated’ (PASC 2007 p10).

The PMSU was closed in 2010. Rutter¹² highlighted the long-term policy implications of losing the unit, with its focus on issues not immediately on the political radar and not sitting neatly within departmental boundaries, and ability to challenge departments, when government lacks the capacity to develop forward looking policies (Rutter 2010).

Australia's PM&C has many parallels to the CO. It describes its role as '*to provide fresh thinking and sound advice to government*'; it has a coordination role '*across the Government in economic, domestic and international issues*' and also develops policy (DPM&C n.d. accessed January 2017). Hamburger et al's (2012) analysis describes how the department serves '*as an incubator for new government activities that a prime minister wanted to have promoted*', with '*education, arts policy, indigenous affairs, environment policy*' all having entered public service as units within it (p384). Much like the UK CO, '*activists for particular policy areas have long sought the cachet of attaching their issue to PM&C, believing that political visibility and potential power would inevitably follow*' (Hamburger and Weller 2012 p384). The Australian food industry is a pertinent example: the chair of its peak body – herself a former Liberal Party politician – raised the proposition prior to the NFP:

'...one of the things I learnt in government was that unless you ended up with a central driver to pull different departments together, it was really hard to do it, because departments tended to grab or hold on to their little silo bits of a particular approach. So we really want a national food and grocery agenda for this country which includes food safety and obesity, but also industry and carbon costs and how we better handle things like food waste and packaging. To pull all those things together will only happen in my experience, if PM and C really take control, as it took the Cabinet office in the UK to do exactly the same issue. In terms of the implementation of the policy, obviously that will be back in the departments where it is most appropriate: the health issues back in health, the agricultural issues back in agriculture. But to pull a policy together it won't happen if it's not done centrally, in my experience' (Carnell 2009).

Like the Cabinet Office, the mechanism of the task force has been associated with the PM&C, and was a notable feature of John Howard's term in office. The PM&C introduced several units inspired by the British example, including a Strategy and Delivery Division (SDD) to conduct '*projects commissioned by the Prime Minister, by Cabinet or by the department's executive that focus on creating achievable plans for high-level goals*' (Truswell and Atkinson 2011 p16) and a Cabinet Implementation Unit, akin to the Delivery Unit in the Cabinet Office, focused on roll-out of policies not initiation (Hamburger and Weller 2012). It is not clear whether either of these entities continue to function¹³.

4.3 Horizontal/Cross-Departmental Governance

The above characterisations of the key departments involved in food policymaking in both countries provide part of the context for the cross-government food policy projects. They point to a stronger capacity for food policy integration in the UK, with its history of institutional innovation (Barling et al 2002), plus DEFRA's role in the greening of policies and broader remit for food, allowing it focus to move beyond farm gate, resulting in '*a much greater emphasis on food supply chains and on understanding the links between production and consumption*' (Feindt and Flynn 2009 p403). However, it can also be argued the creation of the FSA led to fragmentation, as will be examined in the following section on the horizontal interplay between departments. How the departments interact, and the tensions between particular portfolios, are analysed, to provide flesh on the bones of broader critiques of silo-working. The findings

¹² By then Programme Director of the Institute for Government think tank

¹³ They are not listed on PM&C's website as of 2017

highlight two problems: first, confusion over policy responsibility for food, with *‘the most pressing food and nutrition challenges falling between the cracks’* (Lawrence 2010). ST-A describes the potential disconnect between the elements of the supply chain, with involvement from both the industry and agriculture departments, *“because neither department tends to take a through-chain approach to things”* as *“their area of focus and the culture of departments is quite different”*.

Secondly, specific tensions exist between policy domains. Many of the more generic critiques of fragmentation come from the food industry, which is faced with multiple entry points to policymakers and feels acutely impacted by departmentalism. The point is reiterated by peak body the AFGC¹⁴:

‘Broadly speaking, the Department of Agriculture administers a number of the technical requirements for food production, transport and export, the Department of Industry has general policy responsibility for the sector, and the Department of Health maintains critical engagement on the impact and contribution of food on health. There are a number of government agencies, including Food Standards Australia and New Zealand, which provide technical and policy support for the food industry. While other sectors face operational requirements from multiple government departments (such as mining companies meeting environmental requirements administered by the Department of Environment) one is hard pressed to find a sector other than food where core business is the responsibility of so many government departments’ (AFGC 2014a p36).

The same issues are expressed several times by Australia’s peak body for farmers, the National Farmers Federation in its consultation submission to the NFP Issues Paper:

‘The breadth of the policy areas covered in the issues paper illustrates the complexity of dealing with policy and regulation related to food and agriculture. It serves to highlight that food and agriculture cannot be seen as the responsibility of a single government agency, but requires a whole of government approach. Over the past decade it has been NFF’s experience that we have knocked on the doors of different government departments and met with officials only to find they are unaware of work being undertaken by other government departments or engaged in work that duplicates or is at odds with other areas of government policy. The NFF sees the National Food Plan as an opportunity to address this issue and develop a whole of government approach to food and agriculture’ (NFF 2011).

The AFGC’s solution for institutional reform involves a new public servant with a food remit:

‘Acknowledging the role of food in everyday lives it may be unrealistic to propose that a single minister and department be responsible for all food sector issues, however a much more reasonable proposition is that a single individual in the Government Executive champions food industry policy. The AFGC has previously advocated for a Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister to have responsibility for co-ordination of food sector policy’ (AFGC 2014b p36).

4.3.1 Illustration of Fragmented Policy Responsibility: The Horsemeat Incident

Issues around departmental responsibility for food were thrown into sharp relief in the UK in 2013, during the horsemeat scandal, where processed beef products were found to be contaminated with horse meat, with stakeholders reporting confusion over which government department or agency – DEFRA, FSA, DH, Public Health England – should be their point of contact (Abbots and Coles 2013; NAO 2013). A Table outlining the policy responsibility split is in the Appendix Section B. In reality, while responsibilities for food safety, composition and authenticity issues are divided institutionally, they intertwine, as *‘the horsemeat incident turned out to be primarily authenticity (substitution*

¹⁴ During consultation for the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper, developed in the aftermath of the failed NFP

of beef with horse) but the possibility of phenylbutazone (bute) contamination meant it could have been a safety issue' (NAO 2013 p7). Staff and local authorities reported confusion about which department was taking the lead, and:

'local authorities said they continue to be unclear on whom to contact, or get information from, in certain areas of food policy. They find that each department has a different approach and way of working which requires duplication of effort on their part' (NAO 2013 p7).

The Final Report of the Elliott Review into the Integrity and Assurance of Food Supply Networks underlined the importance of clarity around government responsibilities and the need for a *'co-ordinated, joined-up approach across many Government departments'*, stating that:

'There needs to be stronger partnership working between Government departments which have a role in protecting the consumer from criminal activity in food systems. Responsibilities need to be clearly identified, clearly communicated, executed quickly and effectively and widely understood within and outside Government' (Elliott 2014 p52).

Elliot also laments a lack of arrangements *'for regular high-level round table meetings between the FSA Chair and both the Secretaries of State for Health'* (p53).

In addition to confusion over the division of policy responsibilities, food policy also involves departmental rivalries, with particularly prominent tensions between the portfolios responsible for production – mainly agriculture, but latterly industry departments too – and health. UK interviewees flagged up tensions between DEFRA and the Department of Health and FSA, around:

"some of the primary producers here which DEFRA would be supporting and some of the problems DH and FSA run into in terms of saturated fat, so dairy produce is a classic example. Where DEFRA tends to be quite heavily lobbied by the agricultural sector, whereas DH has a different constituency, there has definitely been some tensions." (FI-UK)

The FSA itself is also described as a 'huge' source of tension between the two departments, because:

"it is the Food Standards Agency, not the food safety agency. So labelling and nutritional composition, and the designing of the dietary standards, that is really an area where there is a huge amount of tension. Between the farmers, the manufacturers, the retailers and the health lobby. You see it at the moment with sugar, but before with fat, salt" (FI-UK3)

Other tensions in the UK data include between DEFRA's domestic vs Department for International Development's overseas food production goals (FI-UK3), and the Department of Communities and Local Government and DEFRA on *"things like farming and water policy* (FI-UK3) (see Chapter Eight Table 8.2 for more details on tensions). The views of Australian policymakers in State governments on obesity measures (Shill et al 2011) also indicate conflicts between policies and departmental – and other agency – agendas, with economic considerations perceived to take precedence over health. One of Shill et al's research participants from a health department specifically referenced the potential for a State/Territory and national food strategy, describing:

'... tensions [between departments]. . . because [it is the role of industry portfolios] . . . to argue for innovation of industry and increased sales of [State] produced food. And that can happen even if there is potentially a public health detriment' (Shill et al 2011 p168).

Similarly, Mannan (2004 p196) reports *'tensions and jealousies between agriculture and health, particularly over funding issues'*, and for Powles et al (1992) Australia's less extensive public sector provision of welfare services

compared, for example, to the UK or Scandinavia, help to explain how agricultural or economic priorities continue to take precedence over nutrition. The fragmentation is exacerbated by Health and Primary Industry both having their own food policy units/groups, with a clear inconsistency between the Health's responsibility to '*promote public health and safety through leadership in Commonwealth food policy issues*' and Agriculture's '*food industry policy agenda, which aims to build a globally competitive food industry*' (Yeatman 2008). CS-A2 confirms this analysis, remarking that "agency to agency you wind up with huge differences of opinion between an agricultural primary industries agency and a health department" and describing how "the health people often think we should legislate about fat people". UK interviewees highlighted similar gaps between departments. NGO-UK2 describes how "it is really depressing how siloed the approach is", and at meetings their organisation has held they have heard civil servants from one department commenting on how useful it is "as I get to meet my colleagues in BIS", for instance. And there are similar tensions between food production and health, what FI-UK4 labels a "fight at ministerial level, DH and BIS and DEFRA", which they ascribe to an underlying:

"bogus conflict of it is all industry's fault vs it is the people who choose to eat it's fault. That is where the tension is – that is real tension. There is scarcely an open discussion at all – it is really difficult to have one."
(FI-UK4)

However, relative to Australia, UK relations between food business and civil society appear less adversarial, potentially due to a longer history of working on government food policy projects together. In the Australian case, tensions play out particularly voraciously between non-state actors:

"...Particularly in the food system, more so than in the other policy areas I've worked in, you get people with strong personal views and passions, and things they have decided they want to achieve, and very much siloed behaviour and bloody mindedness. So you get on one side, health and the Ag department fighting viscously over small petty things, and it is extremely tiring and it slows the system down hugely." (CS-A5)

4.4 Non-State Institutions Compared

The findings now move beyond the government realm, to non-state actors. The following section discusses the two countries, with reference to their food industry and civil society sectors. Much like in the above section on state institutions, policy integration barriers are apparent, in relation both to fragmentation of the food supply chain, and between the commercial and civil society sectors. With policymakers likely to be less cognisant of the specifics of the food sector, due to an overall trend towards limited subject expertise within the bureaucracy, as discussed below, this fractured and often contradictory vision of what a food policy should address is problematic for integration efforts.

The main split of food industry representatives in both countries is between the pre- and post-farm gate stages of food production. Three key bodies represent the UK food industry: the Food and Drink Federation (FDF) and British Retail Consortium (BRC) covering post-farm gate, and the National Farmers Union (NFU); while Australia's main peak bodies are the Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) – which includes both retail and manufacturing – and the National Farmers Federation (NFF). In the UK case, Feindt and Flynn describe how '*a number of industry bodies became influential without formal institutionalisation by a government or legislative body*', for example the BRC, with its key role in developing supplier certification for the food industry (2009 p392). The following table contains any food industry stakeholder that appears multiple times as a listed advisor on an Australian national food policy (as listed in Appendix Table A5).

Table 4.2: Australian Food Industry Stakeholders

Organisation	Policies ¹⁵
AFGC	F&NP; STA; NFIS; F&HD; NFP
NFF	STA; NFIS; PMSEIC
Simplot	FPIS; NFP
Woolworths	F&HD; NFP

Source: Author

Other Australian food industry stakeholders mentioned by interviewees include:

- Cattleman's Association (NGO-A)
- Cattle Council of Australia (NGO-A)
- Crop Life (NGO-A)

The Global Foundation, which describes itself as a charity but has strong links with the Australian food industry, is identified by Carey et al (2016) as a significant actor in the NFP process.

Both UK and Australian peak bodies have been criticised for under-representing food businesses below the big players, for example in the UK where:

“you’ve got a few big players 20-30 big players, who will be really active and put people on the committees of the FDF, go on government working parties etc then you’ve got the rest, a huge number of small companies just like you’ve got a huge number of farmers” (FI-UK3).

Similarly, the NFP Green Paper submission of the State Government of Victoria highlights ineffective engagement with small to medium enterprises (SMEs) on national issues, noting ‘*much of the stakeholder engagement that occurs at the Commonwealth Government level focuses on major national peak bodies*’ (State Government of Victoria 2012). These peak bodies play an influential role in food policy formulation according to interviewees. However there are also distinctions between the two cases. The UK retail sector, represented by the BRC since 1992, is characterised as viewing itself as independent (FI-UK4) from the manufacturing sector, as represented by the FDF (established 1913), while the AFGC covers both groups in Australia. Of the farm peak bodies, the UK's NFU – established 1908 – has a much longer history, and has had a close relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture, links between farmers and the

¹⁵ Key:

- F&NP: Food and Nutrition Policy (1992)
- STA: Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy
- NFIS: National Food Industry Strategy
- PMSEIC: Australia and Food Security in a Changing World
- F&HD: Food and Health Dialogue
- FPIS: Food Processing Industry Strategy
- NFP: National Food Plan

state having been enshrined in the 1947 Agriculture Act, setting the tone for food policy (Feindt and Flynn 2009), though this relationship has undoubtedly been impacted by machinery of government changes which led to MAFF being replaced by DEFRA. Australia's NFF was established relatively recently, in 1979, following a period of significant pluralism within the farm sector. Yet arguably, ties between policymakers and the food industry have overall been closer than in the UK, judging by the period of policy activity around agri-food industry strategy in the late 1990s to mid-2000s, with the Agri-Food Council, Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy and National Food Industry Strategy. These projects have been developed closely with industry, and the 2006 Caring for our Country report, was written by the ex-head of the NFF for DAFF.

Organisations which appear as listed stakeholders on multiple food policies in the UK (see Appendix Table A2), or whose involvement has been mentioned in interviews are:

Table 4.3: UK Food Industry Stakeholders

Organisation	Food Policies ¹⁶
ADHB	FF&F; GFP; GFPSC; ATS
BRC	FISS; F2030 ¹⁷ ; GFP; GFPSC
British Hospitality Association	FISS; GFP
Cargill	FF&F; ATS
Dairy UK	FISS; GFPSC
FDF	FISS; F2030 ¹⁸ ; GFP; GFPSC; FF&F; ATS
National Farmers Union	FISS; GFP; GFPSC; FF&F; ATS
Sainsbury's	PC; ATS
Syngenta	FF&F; ATS
Unilever	PC; FF&F

Source: Author

¹⁶ Key:

- PC: Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food
- FISS: Food Industry Sustainability Strategy
- FM: Food Matters
- F2030: Food 2030
- FF&F: Foresight Future of Food and Farming
- GFP: Green Food Project
- GFPSC: Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption
- ATS: Agritech Strategy

¹⁷(FI-UK2)

¹⁸(FI-UK)

Much like departmentalism between state institutions, the split in responsibility between trade bodies along the supply chain contributes to fragmentation of food policy. For example in its 2013 consultation submission to the Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper, the AFCG makes the following remarks, echoed by the UK experience as reported by CS-UK4:

‘The future of agricultural production cannot be considered in isolation from the agri-food processing sector as revenue, costs and profits are determined by the actions of the entire agri-food supply chain. As has been seen recently, factory closures in the food processing sector have a negative impact on farm returns. The Government’s aim of increasing farm profitability and strengthening rural and regional communities therefore fundamentally relies on a strong domestic agri-food processing sector’ (AFCG 2013).

‘Defining sustainable common interest across a group that broad is not straightforward. They might all stand up and vote for the fact the government should spend more time thinking about food, but then after that they are going to start partitioning into different groups’ (CS-UK4).

FI-A3 argues that for successful food policy projects, industry must start “*talking as one*”:

“...because once that happens people will start to recognise it as an industry. Currently, even the food industry doesn’t represent itself as a coherent group anyway ...it is very divided.”

4.4.1 Economic Context and Role of Food Industry in Economy

The next section compares the broader food industry picture in both countries, by examining the economic context in terms of value to the national economy, and approach to trade.

Table 4.4: UK-Australia Food Economics Compared

Measure	UK	Australia
Value of Agri-food Sector	The entire agri-food sector ¹⁹ from farm to sale to the consumer, contributed £109 billion to the UK economy in 2014 and supports approximately 4 million jobs (13.5% of national employment) (Food and Drink Export Action Plan 2016).	According to statistics from the NFP White Paper, in 2011–12 primary production generated annual earnings of \$42.6 billion, food and beverage manufacturing earned \$91.2 billion (2010–11) and retail \$135.8 billion. (DAFF 2013) Equivalent in sterling = £166.1 billion.
Gross Value Added ²⁰	The agri-food sector contributed £96.1 billion or 7.3% to national GVA in 2012 (DEFRA 2012d)	Australian Industry GVA by the food and beverage manufacturing sector was \$24.4 billion in 2012–13. (Department of Agriculture 2014). No figure could be identified for the entire agri-food sector.
Retailing	Food and Drink represents £177.5 bn in retail sales (51% of UK total) (IGD 2017)	The value of food and liquor retailing in Australia grew by 4 per cent in 2012–13 to \$141.4 billion

¹⁹ The UK food sector is defined by DEFRA as food manufacturing, food wholesaling, food retailing and non-residential catering. The agri-food sector is the food sector plus agriculture and fishing. DAFF’s definition of the Australian food industry encompasses production of raw materials used in food (the farm and fishing sectors), the export, import and processing sectors and domestic sales to consumers, but not non-residential catering as in the UK definition.

²⁰ Gross Value Added: The difference between the value of goods and services produced and the cost of raw materials and other inputs used up in production.

		(Department of Agriculture 2014)
Food industry employment	In GB [n.b. not UK] 3.6 million or 13% of national employment in Q3 2013	The food industry employed 1.64 million Australians in 2011–12 (around 15 per cent of total national employment) (DAFF 2013)
Percentage exported	No figure identified	Over 60 per cent of total production - mainly bulk commodities - is sold abroad, feeding an estimated 40 million people (PMSEIC 2010 p1,15; DAFF 2010, cited in Lawrence et al 2012)
Value of Exports	£18.9 billion of which: Highly processed – £11.1 billion Lightly processed – £6.4 billion Unprocessed – £1.4 billion (DEFRA 2012d)	Australian food exports 2012-13 = \$31.8 billion. A high proportion (an average of 31 per cent 2007-2010) of exports are unprocessed (Department of Agriculture 2014)
Top export products	Drink is the largest export category by far, followed by cereals, and meat and fish categories, while fruit and vegetables have the largest trade deficit (DEFRA 2012d).	Primary exports: Livestock; seafood and horticulture; and grain (Spencer and Kneebone 2012). The largest food categories in processed exports are meat (39 per cent), dominated by beef and lamb; dairy (14 per cent) and drinks (17 per cent; mostly wine) (Spencer and Kneebone 2012).
Top export markets	Top export markets are Republic of Ireland; France; USA; Germany; Spain; Netherlands; Italy; Belgium; Singapore; Hong Kong (Source: Food and Drink Action Plan 2012)	‘Japan was the largest destination for Australian food exports in 2012–13, accounting for \$4.4 billion or 13.7 per cent of total shipments. Although still Australia’s single largest destination for food, Japan’s share is significantly lower than a decade ago (Figure 22). China, the second-largest destination, accounted for \$3.1 billion or 9.9 per cent. In contrast to Japan, China’s share of Australia’s food exports has trebled in the past 10 years’ (Department of Agriculture 2014 p24)
Value of Imports	£40.2bn of which: Highly processed – £14.4billion Lightly processed – £17.8billion Unprocessed – £8.0billion (DEFRA 2012d)	\$11.3 billion (DAFF 2013)
Trade Balance	The Food Production to Supply Ratio ²¹ in 2011 was 63% for all food and 78% for indigenous type food (DEFRA 2012d)	Australia’s net exports of food, the difference between the value of food exports and food imports, increased by 5.3 per cent to \$20.2 billion in 2012–13 (Department of Agriculture 2014)
Top Import Products	Value of imports is greater than the value of exports in food and feed, but not in drink, where there is a trade surplus largely due to exports of Scotch Whisky. ‘Fruit and vegetables’ has the largest trade deficit. In 2013 imports cost £9.0 billion while exports were worth £1.0 billion,	Although the farm sector is estimated to produce 93% of foods consumed domestically, it imports 19% and 34% of vegetables and fruit – and significant amounts of processed food (PMSEIC 2010 p1,15, cited in Lawrence et al 2012; Spencer and Kneebone 2012). Australia’s trade deficit in fruit, nuts and vegetables is notable for its recent increase (to \$701 million in 2010–11, 29 per cent higher than in 2009–10). This

²¹Food Production to Supply Ratio = farmgate value of raw food production (including for export) divided by the value of raw food for human consumption. It provides a broad indicator of the ability of UK agriculture to meet consumer demand.

	giving a trade gap of £8.0 billion. The second largest groups in terms of imports in 2013 were meat and beverages with imports of £5.9 and £5.2 billion respectively. (DEFRA 2012d)	has been explained as due to the strength of the Australian dollar and adverse weather effects on export (DAFF 2011).
Top import markets	Twenty four countries accounted for 90% of UK food supply in 2012. The UK supplied over half (53%). The leading foreign suppliers were the Netherlands (5.9%), Spain (5.0%), France (3.5%), Irish Republic and Germany (2.9% each). (DEFRA 2012d)	‘New Zealand remains the major source of Australia’s food imports, accounting for \$2.1 billion or 17.8 per cent of the total value of Australian food imports in 2012–13, followed by the USA, China and Singapore’. (Department of Agriculture 2014 p27)

Source: Author from various as cited

4.4.2 Food Trade

Each country has a quite different approach to trade. As presented above, and examined at the start of the Chapter, Australia has a long history of food exports, rooted in its role as a settler state and supplier to Britain. It is a net exporter, with neighbouring Asian markets an important focus. According to DAFF Statistics 2012-13 the combined share of North Asian countries in the total value of Australian food exports was 35 per cent (\$11.2 billion). This focus has been ramped up in recent years, as highlighted by the NFP White Paper statement that by 2050 world food consumption is expected to be 75 per cent higher than in 2007, with almost half of this increased demand coming from China, offering an important opportunity for Australia’s food industry (DAFF 2013). The NFP also highlights an intention to re-focus exports more toward processed foods over commodities:

‘While we will continue to be a reliable and trusted supplier of quality staple foods there is also an opportunity to supply growing markets with high-value food products that meet increasing preferences for safe, premium goods’ (DAFF 2013 p6).

Australia branded the 21st century the ‘Asian Century’, in recognition of the importance of Asian markets to its economy, and a White Paper was published in October 2012 outlining ‘*Australia’s vision and plan for how Australia will be a more prosperous and resilient nation and become fully part of the region*’ (DAFF 2013 p17). One of 25 national objectives of the Asian Century White Paper was for Australia’s agriculture and food production system to be globally competitive, with productive and sustainable agriculture and food businesses, and Australian food producers and processors recognised globally as innovative and reliable producers of more and higher-quality food and agricultural products, services and technology to Asia. As of the end of September 2013, the ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ website, which housed the Asian Century White Paper, had been archived (www.asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au), but interviewees described the ideas behind it as still alive. This focus on Asia is not new; Beeson and Jayasuriya situate Australia’s ‘*turn to Asia*’ (2009 p360) within the 1980s focus on the region in diplomatic initiatives of the Hawke and Keating governments. Food industry interviewees also highlighted the late-1990s *Prime Minister’s Supermarket to Asia Strategy*.

While remaining a net exporter, pressures on the sector have intensified of late. Botterill (2016) describes a general trend of agricultural productivity growth for decades, with volume and value of production increasing, yet representing

a declining percentage of national income and exports due to declining terms of trade and pressures on income, providing the following comparison (drawn from Miller and Stoeckel 1982 and Commonwealth of Australia 2015):

Table 4.5: Agricultural Productivity in Australia

Year	Percentage of GDP	Percentage of Exports
1951	29	90
2014	2	15

Source: Botterill (2016)

Similarly, Dixon and Richards (2016) report that *‘on a range of indicators – other than yields of bulk commodities such as wheat, sugar and beef – Australia’s once vibrant (in terms of technological adaption) and economically significant agricultural sector looks less than robust’* (p194), due to factors including:

- Weather variability
- Decrease in commodity process
- Increase in farm indebtedness
- Higher farm costs
- Erosion of farm equity

In contrast with Australia’s export focus, the UK’s strategy of colonial food imports represents its historical legacy, and it remains a net importer. Marsden (2013) describes UK agriculture as having been *‘on a slow slide away from self-sufficiency since the 1980s, so that we have become dependent on more food importation at a time when resource shortfalls may mean that its delivery is not guaranteed’* (p127). The *‘UK as suffers a huge food trade gap of £21bn’* and *‘is reliant on the rest of Europe for food’*, representing a *‘drain on the national balance of payments’* (Lang and Schoen 2016 p1). Its food security vulnerabilities rose up the political agenda during FM/F2030, with the 2007-8 food price spike (see Chapter Five).

4.4.3 Civil Society

Here, again, there are notable differences between the cases. The UK, for example, can be considered to have a relatively mature civil society sector within the food policy sub-system. NGOs were active throughout the 1980s and 1990s, forming an *‘extraordinarily effective lobby’* (Lang 1999a p175). This is certainly the impression of civil society interviewees from Australia, who made contrast with Australia’s nascent NGOs. Lang (1999a) describes how *‘a food movement’* of public health professionals, specialists and a new generation of NGOs developed which:

‘systematically, through crises in 1982-97, [it] promoted its arguments and achieved legislative and institutional reform on three key fronts: the new food adulteration, the public health, and the reform of state institutions’ (p175).

These later joined forces with environmental organisations, aided by a twenty-year old alliance, which today brings together around 100 diverse NGOs in the sector: *Sustain: the alliance for better food and farming* (Lang and Heasmann 2015; Morgan 2015). According to Lang and Heasmann’s analysis:

‘...such alliances have become important for food democracy, because they reflect a political realism that NGOs have to be better organised, less single-issue dominated, and more active in both appealing to the public and trying to influence policy processes’ (2015 p260).

However, while more unified than Australia, FPPT-UK says fragmentation remains an issue:

“I think the problem with the discourse of food in civil society is that it has got canelised down almost political channels. I joke that when we talk about food in the UK we talk about GM or make your own ciabatta. It’s very important that we regulate GM appropriately, and I’m a foodie as well, but these are second order issues compared to the macro food policy issues of lifestyle and obesity” (FPPT-UK)

Morgan (2010) discusses tensions in the ‘alternative food sector’ between the ‘local and green’ and ‘global and fair’ communities, illustrating these via their fragmented perspectives on carbon labelling.

A 2011 Food Issues Census report by think tank The Food Ethics Council (FEC 2011) identified 322 food and farming organisations²² representing a diverse range of organisations covering diverse issues. The main players in the food and farming civil society space that have been listed stakeholders in multiple food policies are:

Table 4.6: UK Civil Society Groups Active in Food Policy

Organisation	Food Policies ²³
Food Ethics Council	FM; GFPSC
National Consumer Council	PC; FISS; FM;
National Trust	PC; GFPSC
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds	PC; FISS; GFP; GFPSC
Soil Association	PC; FF&F

Source: Author

Other groups which came up as actively involved, via the literature review, policy analysis or interviews included:

- Sustain (NGO-UK; Lang and Heasman 2015; Morgan 2015)
- Soil Association (NGO-UK3; Morgan 2015)
- Friends of the Earth (FOE 2010)
- Which? (NGO-UK2)
- WWF (Farmers Guardian 15 January 2010)

²² Which responded to its survey

²³ Key:

- PC: Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food
- FISS: Food Industry Sustainability Strategy
- FM: Food Matters
- F2030: Food 2030
- FF&F: Foresight Future of Food and Farming
- GFP: Green Food Project
- GFPSC: Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption
- ATS: Agritech Strategy

In Australia, many civil society groups play a similarly active role in food policy, but the connections between them are less well established. The main groups include the Public Health Association Australia (PHAA) (FI-A2; CS-A3; NGO-A2); Sustain Australia (Caraher et al 2013 p79); Obesity Coalition (CS-A3; NGO-A; NGO-A3) and National Heart Foundation (CS-A3; FI-A2; NGO-A2). A more recent version of the UK's 20-year old alliance, Sustain Australia (formerly The Food Alliance) was established in 2009 to *'promote food policy that integrates ecological, public health, social justice and economic objectives'* (Caraher et al 2013 p79).

Carey et al (2016), in their analysis of the NFP, identify the PHAA – the national peak body for public health – as having *'played a significant role in advocating for the development of an integrated national food policy'* (p4), with its 2009 report calling for an overhaul of food policy, recommending the government establish an integrated national food policy, across all areas of government, specifically incorporating agriculture and fisheries, health, education, social exclusion, treasury, innovation and the environment (PHAA 2009). The Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance was actually founded in response to the NFP, as a network involving over 100 community groups (Caraher et al 2013). It developed a 'People's Food Plan' to increase inclusivity in food policy and bring attention to *'the contradictions of a food system based on a cheap food supply and diminishing farmer income streams'* (Dixon and Richards 2016 p199). Other groups highlighted by interviewees include: Australian Division of World Action on Salt Health (AWASH) (FPPT-A; NGO-A2); consumer group Choice (A-A; NGO-A2; CS-A4); Slow Food (Swinburn and Wood 2013; A-A); FoodBank Australia (A-A); Greenpeace (FPPT-A); Madge (A-A); and Friends of the Earth (A-A). Interviewees pointed to the lack of unity between NGOs, with groups tending to work in isolation, for example NGO-A2's comment *"it is so different from the UK where people are working together, compared to here"*. This is echoed by A-A, who draws on experience in both jurisdictions:

"I've been on panels here in the UK with the RSPB, Friends of the Earth representing animal welfare, consumer groups, all seem to agree you could establish food systems which are biosensitive, and nutrition sensitive. The RSPB want to work with the agriculturalist and so on. So the strength of civil society in this country blows me away. The willingness via years of the Sustain project among others, to share platforms, to work together on policy projects to imagine futures where co-existence is possible."

This is contrasted with Australia where, because of the Federated system *"...so much of the civil society sector is state based, but you don't have those boundaries in the UK. In Australia, for example, Friends of the Earth is Federated and needs to have representatives of three state bodies on the governing body. This Federated structure adds complexity, and can be tedious"* (A-A). This sentiment is again echoed closely by NGO-A4, with specific reference to food policy integration:

"I mean we talk about government policy being siloed but even at the civil society level we are siloed, we don't have the same level of integration between the public health groups and the environmental and community and social equity groups – we're not integrated ourselves, so the idea we would form a group that would then form more of a platform for the food sector feels like quite a big stretch and a long way off. I think we've got a lot more work to do here in our civil society groups, just even talking to each other and getting on the same page about what an integrated food policy might look like. We might need to get our own act in order first, before we can reasonably expect government." (NGO-A4)

Similar conclusions over the need for cohesion among experts and advocates were reached by Baker et al in their 2017 examination of obesity policy processes in Australia.

Perhaps less surprisingly, fragmentation also characterises relations between the two key non-state institutions: food industry and civil society, though to differing degrees. That both have called for more government attention on food policy but with different agendas was raised by civil society representative NGO-A and a civil servant:

“Australians have not been smart enough at getting a broader range of public health and industry and consumer people together. So it comes back to a few people in the public health space like the Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance, or PHAA or the Obesity Coalition group, so small number of players against the AFGC. Neither side has been embracing of ‘well we’re talking about a whole system here, so how about we talk to the small farmers, how about we talk to the logistics guys’. ... In Australia, maybe it is because we are smaller, there is the AFGC vs the public health nutrition groups, and a small number of public health nutrition groups, and AFGC have got more resources and an entrée to government which we don’t often have, so it is a them vs us rather than a much broader constituency come to the table” (NGO-A).

CS-A5 refers to the relationship as ‘the great debate’:

“...so at one end you have the public health groups, very concerned about the tidal wave of obesity, and they feel it is the food industry’s fault, and the industry needs to be constrained to protect consumers against their evil machinations, to do with deliberately some feel putting high levels of high salt, fat, sugar in foods to get people addicted – the big tobacco argument....Then at the other end you have the rabid free-marketer food industry types....the standard lines I hear again and again that they should be able to make what claims they want as long as they are roughly true, and let’s get rid of this nanny state, no such thing as bad foods its bad diet, and people just need to exercise to compensate for what they eat and it is all about self-management.” (CS-A5).

Linked to this tension is the strength of influence of various groups. For example contrasting FPPT-A and NGO-A:

“the diabetes group, the Low GI symbol team, the National Heart Foundation, Greenpeace, AWASH... and they are very passionate and so have spent a lot of time contributing to policy and they also comment on policy once published – and you will see in the newspapers and magazines, they will critique it and those get published, and so I believe they have a lot of influence” (FPPT-A).

“The industry groups are much more in-house with government than the public health people, absolutely. I think in part it is because with the Department of Agriculture there has always been a strong link between industry and agriculture. With health, the food regulatory policy area, there has been some strong links with industry but I think that is changing a bit. It surprised me, shocked me, that when the food policy unit was first established, about 2002, I rang them up one day and the person I wanted to see wasn’t there and so the receptionist said ‘and what food industry are you from’ – that was her immediate assumption. And to me that was quite indicative” (NGO-A).

In an attempt to provide evidence of the often ‘assumed truth’ of food industry power and influence in Australia, Cullerton et al (2016) undertook a social network analysis to examine the food industry capacity to influence decision-making in comparison to nutrition professionals. The study concluded that an advantage was present both in terms of strategic overall network position and also in terms of range of access points to decision makers. Nutrition professionals were densely clustered together with limited links to decision makers, mainly based around other nutrition professionals.

Appendix Table A5 illustrates the above, by providing a list of stakeholders/advisors to a number of (national) food policies, coded by stakeholder type; State, Industry or Civil Society.

4.5 Multi-level Food Governance

While the focus of the research is horizontal integration, the theme of vertical interplay – the relations between Federal and State food policy – comes through strongly in Australian data, necessitating a consideration of the multi-level context of national governing. Food governance in Australia takes place in a complex multi-tiered policymaking system involving the Australian Government, States and Territory governments, and the New Zealand Government (Powles et al 1992; Shill et al 2011). Shill et al (2011) identify over 560 local councils, eight State/Territory parliaments, the Federal Parliament, and links to international systems. The Constitution and Commonwealth legislation define State/Territory powers, while local government powers are defined under State/Territory legislation. The NFP Issues Paper (DAFF 2011) notes that ‘*Section 51 of the Australian Constitution defines 40 specific areas over which the Commonwealth has power to make laws*’ (p80). Powers of relevance to the food industry are listed as including:

- Fisheries
- Quarantine
- Patents of Invention (including plant breeder’s rights)
- Broader provisions for trade, external affairs, taxation, railways, industrial relations and corporations (DAFF 2011 p80).

Therefore State governments are responsible for any issue not identified under section 51, including the following matters identified as relevant to the food industry in the NFP Issues Paper:

- Food safety
- Transport
- Education
- Health
- Environment
- Land Management (DAFF 2011 p80).

Appendix Table A9 lists the division of Federal and State regulations affecting food supply and consumption as presented in the NFP White Paper. However, different elements of food policy have different governance dynamics, for example in an analysis on obesity policymaking, Baker et al (2017) identify how:

‘Parliament legislates exclusively in the areas of advertising standards with implementing regulation established by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, and general taxation with tax policy the responsibility of the Commonwealth Treasury. Other areas are governed jointly with state governments through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and various interministerial councils. For example, food standards (including labelling) policy is made by the Australia and New Zealand Ministerial Forum on Food Regulation, standards are set by the statutory authority Food Standards Australia New Zealand, and State and Territory governments enact the standards into legislation’ (p142).

As in many other areas of public policy, the Federal division of powers creates tensions in the policy process (Fenna 2004) and represents a potential barrier to aims to integrate *national* food policy. Coleman and Skogstad’s comparative study of Australian and Canadian agricultural policy, highlights how under the Federal model, ‘*policy coordination behind a strategy of action must occur across the two levels of government since the national and sub-national governments share jurisdiction in agriculture*’ (1995 p247), noting that further complication arises when ‘*the political economy of agriculture differs significantly across regions*’, with some States focused more heavily on food production than others, and differing commodity foci. This analysis is updated by a civil servant interviewee:

“Some jurisdictions which have the large industry areas are very pro industry and others are less so because they don’t have the industry base and often it can depend on personalities too, in those roles, if they are more public health-focused or more industry-focused it can actually shape the opinions that come through in the various communities and what policy comes forward” (CS-A3).

Such issues are particularly relevant to the NFP, given the State role in health and environmental policy. Also notable was the number of Australian interviewees referring to vertical issues when asked about policy integration of food in the country, for example FI-A’s comment that *“they are all working in their own little universes frankly”*:

“You’ve got Victoria doing some very good stuff, but off their own bat, and very little collaboration or interaction with the other States and Federal.... In South Australia they’ve got a very independent research and industry assistance programme which is very good, but it is a home-built version, and in West Australia they are in the process of building their own now. Queensland of course do everything their way, being Queensland, and in New South Wales we don’t bother” (FI-A)

Indeed there is a noticeable sense of animosity when those working at a Federal level refer to State food policy activities and vice versa:

“...we have States that can enact their own legislation in contradiction to Federal legislation. So even in the National Food Plan you will find State legislation - stuff that’s in contradiction to the national intent and regulations. So the way the States operate is just contrary to the concept of a National Food Plan...” (FI-A3)

This view is echoed by comments from CS-A5 and FI-A4:

“The Commonwealth- States thing is boring beyond belief and a real impediment, and petty jealousies between jurisdictions, and the State’s rights – it is almost a little bit like Americans are so passionate about small government and the right to bear arms, it comes from our founding here, when our constitution was drafted it was deliberately done so States retained a lot of power and independence, but begrudgingly needed something at the Federal level to make things tick, and now States have all the power apart from a few things been given to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth shouldn’t overstep, and so the State bureaucrats are imbued with this....so the silo mentalities is quite real and it is very difficult to get the State and Commonwealth to work cooperatively together – on the Commonwealth side as well” (CS-A5).

FI-A4 refers to specific instance of inter-government clashes over particular food policies:

“Federal government needs greater control...there should be less opportunity for veto. We often find even some of the smaller States, if they band together they can get together for example on dietary guidelines or front-of-pack labelling” (FI-A4)

Specifically regarding the NFP, CS-A2 says *“the relationship between Commonwealth and the States was not always a good one, it was a bit fraught”*. This issue of disconnect between Federal and State policy approaches was exacerbated by the issue of differing partisanship says CS-A4:

“When the NFP was under discussion, remember it was a Labor government in power, and a Liberal-National Coalition in Victoria...it was very clear that the States wanted to ensure there was no encroachment of what the Federal government was going to do within the State government’s responsibilities and boundaries” (CS-A4).

In contrast, discussion of vertical integration by UK interviewees was far less common, and no government-produced source on national-regional food policy responsibilities could be identified²⁴, with the following section compiled mainly from academic and other grey literature. There are both global and – in particular – European regional

²⁴ Despite requests to DEFRA

influences and constraints on the national food policymaking system (Barling et al 2002), along with devolved powers on food-related policy domains. UK ministries ‘sometimes issue policy statements that relate to the entire UK, and at others, statements that apply only to England’ (MacMillan and Dowler 2011 p3). Appendix Tables A10; 11 and 12 provide a brief summary on government food policy responsibilities in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, from the only identified source. Power was devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1999, including for agriculture, forestry and fishing in Scotland and Wales, and for agriculture in Northern Ireland (SDC 2010; Marsden and Sonnino 2008). ‘Roles and responsibilities differ somewhat between these three, reflecting their different histories and economic circumstances’, say MacMillan and Dowler, explaining that:

‘some aspects which fall under a ‘food policy’ remit are the responsibility of the UK government with negotiated response from devolved administrations (such as the Waste and Resources Action Programme [WRAP]; UK biodiversity support programme; animal vaccination strategies, etc), whereas others are devolved to the administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.’ (2011 p3)

By way of example of the sometimes confusing approach, key actions in FM are positioned as England only, whereas F2030 is labelled a ‘UK Government strategy’. FM describes the split as follows:

‘Within the UK, responsibility for many policies that impact on food, such as agriculture, economic development, health, enforcement of food standards and public sector food, is devolved – to the Scottish Executive, the Welsh Assembly Government, and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Westminster is responsible for these policy areas in England, as well as having UK-wide reserved power on issues such as fiscal matters, competition and advertising, and negotiating at EU level. In this complex system of controls and influence, there are relatively few areas where the national government has a direct regulatory role. But it continues to have an important role in the food system – representing society’s interests and concerns, tackling market failures and establishing stable frameworks with clear goals, within which investments can be made with confidence’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p27).

As a result some proposals in the report are:

‘...focused on England alone; others have a pan-UK, European or even global relevance. The key actions in the report are reserved issues or apply to England only; however, the Government will continue to work closely with the Devolved Administrations on topics of common interest as the policy framework set out here is developed’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p28).

FM (2008b pxiii) refers specifically to two areas of devolved responsibility – waste; and budgetary autonomy and decision-making on public procurement – and notes that for example, the Government will consult with Devolved Administrations about Courtauld Commitment-type agreements on food waste and their possible extension beyond England. F2030 is less clear, noting that:

‘This is a UK Government strategy. Many aspects of food policy are devolved. There are separate food policy arrangements²⁵ in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. We are working with the Devolved Administrations to ensure that as the UK, we share a common understanding of the future of food policy and can collaborate whenever it makes sense to do so’ (DEFRA 2010 p6).

The devolved countries have also pursued food policy projects, with varying attention to integration. Though a comprehensive examination is beyond scope; Scotland has introduced several food-related national policies, including: the 1996 *Scottish Diet Action Plan*; 1999 *Scottish Food and Drink Strategy* and *Recipe for Success*, the country’s first

²⁵ Footnotes in the document refer to food policy *projects* undertaken by each country e.g. Scotland’s *Recipe for Success*’ rather than any details of the food policy arrangements themselves


formally-titled national food and drink policy (2009). It is currently²⁶ formulating a new ‘Good Food Nation’ policy. In Wales, previous food-related national policies have included the *One Wales; One Planet* sustainable development strategy in 2009; the *Local Sourcing Action Plan* of 2010; and *Food for Wales, Food from Wales 2010:2020 – Food Strategy for Wales*, and the 2014 *Towards Sustainable Growth - an Action Plan for the Food and Drink Industry 2014-2020*. Northern Ireland’s policies have included: Foresight Leadership group’s *Vision Twenty/Twenty* report (Investni 2006), focused on creating a competitive agri-food sector through integrating food, diet and health, and the 2013 *Going for Growth – A Strategic Action Plan in Support of the Northern Ireland Agri-Food Industry* (SDC 2011).

4.5.1 Mechanisms for Multi-level Governance

An important facilitator of policy integration is mechanisms to cross horizontal or vertical boundaries. The UK’s focus on horizontal mechanisms – of which Australia has had very little – is discussed in Chapter Five. Conversely, a number of formal vertical mechanisms are in place in Australia, whereas in the UK none could be identified. Figure 4.1 - an overview of Australia’s Food Regulatory System - is followed by a description of bodies with a role in food policy.

²⁶ July 2017

Figure 4.1: Australia's Food Regulatory System



Source: DAFF 2011

4.5.1.1 COAG

The Council of Australian Governments (COAG), established 1992, includes the Federal government, the governments of the six States and two mainland Territories and the Australian Local Government Association, and is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its remit is to debate and co-ordinate government activities across the various levels (DAFF 2011). One interviewee describes the role of COAG in food policy terms:

“So you’ve got your COAG Ministerial councils, which I think are really quite important in terms of Federal policy development - obviously they include representatives from all the States in relation to agriculture” (NGO-A4)

However, there are question marks over COAG's capacity to integrate successfully: in a 2013 article Menzies examines the 'under-institutionalised' management of inter-governmental relations, describing how *'there are no mandated institutions to develop or drive a longer-term intergovernmental agenda'*. For Menzies COAG is a *'reflection of Commonwealth expansionism since the 1970s'*, and highlights defects in its structure and operation including:

'lack of collaboration with States and coercive practices, ad hoc practices, unsuitability for responding to the complexity of the global economy, lack of strategic agenda, lack of respect of State and Territory contribution, lack of transparency, and the centralising impact of decisions, closed and anti-democratic decision-making and poor meeting procedures and practices' (Menzies 2013 p383).

Historically, several other ministerial bodies have a link to food, including the: Standing Council on Primary Industries (SCoPI); Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation (FoFR).

4.5.1.2 SCoPI

SCoPI was the peak forum to pursue and monitor priority issues of national significance affecting Australia's primary production sectors. Priority issues are: reform of the national biosecurity system; promoting the ongoing productivity and sustainability of the agriculture, fisheries and forestry industries; and undertaking coordinated action across jurisdictions to strengthen long-term food security. However it appears this forum is no longer operating (ABC.net 2013).

4.5.1.3 FoFR

The Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation (formally the Australia and New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council) is chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary for Health and Ageing, and includes a minister from New Zealand and the health ministers from Australian States and Territories, as well as other ministers from related departments (such as Primary Industries, Consumer Affairs) as have been nominated by their jurisdictions. The Forum is primarily responsible for the development of domestic food regulatory policy and the development of policy guidelines for setting domestic food standards. It can also adopt, amend or reject standards (www.health.gov.au). The Food Regulation Standing Committee supports the Forum on Food Regulation, and is responsible for coordinating policy advice to the Forum and ensuring a nationally consistent approach to the implementation and enforcement of food standards (www.health.gov.au).

The State Government of Victoria's NFP Green Paper submission critiques the current approach to Commonwealth food policy engagement with State and Territory governments through COAG and FoFR, and requests *'further discussion amongst all jurisdictions on how to improve intergovernmental engagement on food policy, both within and beyond these ministerial bodies'* (State Government of Victoria 2012 p4). The submission also outlines the impact of the Food Regulation Agreement (which appears to have been enacted in 2008) which *'was designed to ensure a balanced approach to food policy by enabling ministers responsible for primary industries to be members of the FoFR along with health ministers'*, but has led to an imbalance due to jurisdictions with a marginal food industry having equal voting power (State Government of Victoria 2012 p5). The bodies are also criticised for lack of transparency (Lawrence et al 2013). The NFP Green Paper describes the current approach to food policy by the Australian Government as using the following mechanisms to coordinate policy development, implementation and review:

- Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO): made by Governor General, and defining responsibilities of Commonwealth ministers and portfolios
- Rigorous cabinet decision-making process
- Interdepartmental committees
- Intergovernmental forums – including bi-national food regulation system with New Zealand
- Variety of stakeholder liaison forums (DAFF 2012 p44).

CS-A6 explains there were lower level mechanisms operating at the time of the NFP, including a Secretaries Committee on Food a group of their deputies, meeting every six weeks, and a couple of different reference groups.

In the UK, nothing akin to COAG's SCoPI or FoFR could be identified. According to a 2015 House of Lords Constitutional Select Committee report, '*formal structures underpinning inter-governmental relations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the four administrations*' which also establishes a '*core quadrilateral forum, the Joint Ministerial Committee*' (JMC) (HOL Constitution Committee 2015). The select committee findings provide some insights into the JMC – with its role to facilitate joint policy-making and coordination – and its potential role in food governance. The UK's arrangements are said to be far less formal than most other countries, with Professor Nicola McEwen, in evidence to the Select Committee, describing the UK's inter-governmental relations as "*weakly institutionalised and focused more on communication than coordination*". Most inter-governmental relations are '*conducted informally and bilaterally, at both official and ministerial level*' and the JMC is described as '*not well regarded*'. The report of the Smith Commission, set up in 2014 following the Scottish referendum, recommended new sub-committees be set up, in policy areas including rural policy, and agriculture & fisheries.

4.6 Political Institutions Compared

As demonstrated by the section on food governance above, and the differences between the UK and Australian structures, any examination of institutional influences on food policy integration, must examine macro-institutional variables. The following section therefore extends the food governance discussion to the political and bureaucratic institutions in both countries.

Table 4.7: UK-Australia Political Structures Compared

UK	Australia
Bi-Constitutional (consensual devolved regimes and a majoritarian UK central government) (Flinders 2010) Westminster System – (parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability through elections; adversarial style of politics) Majoritarian (governing process dominated by a single party)	'Washminster' System – Mix of North American Federal and Westminster (Ward and Stewart 2009) Majoritarian (governing process dominated by a single party)
Constitutional Monarchy	Form of Constitutional Monarchy
Parliamentary (Executive as part of Legislature)	Parliamentary (Executive as part of Legislature)
No written constitution (uncodified)	Written Constitution (since 1900)

Bicameral – House of Commons; House of Lords	Bicameral – Upper House (The Senate) and Lower House (House of Representatives)
Fixed Term Parliaments – Five Years	Fixed Term Parliaments – Three Years

Source: Author

Table 4.7 warrants qualification with discussion of two major changes in political institutions in the two countries, which provide context on their capacity to produce national integrated food policy. The first is the shift from government to governance, discussed in Chapter One. The second: the rise of what has been characterised as the ‘Competiton State’ (CS), a term developed to encapsulate restructuring of the welfare state from rapid expansion of its social and economic role around the time of WW2, leading to high public sector costs; through to attempts by governments to make social policy more efficient, and the so called ‘marketisation’ of welfare (Evans and Cerny 2003). While a full examination of the CS thesis is beyond scope, similar trends can be identified in the UK (Cerny and Evans 2004; Horsfall 2013), and Australia (Radcliffe 2010), and of particular relevance is their enthusiastic embrace of the international trend towards New Public Management (NPM), characterised by ‘*enhanced competition and the disaggregation of public service functions*’ (Dunleavy 1994, cited in Beeson and Firth 1998).

4.6.1 Elections

The electoral cycle, a related macro-institutional variable, was raised by numerous interviewees as a significant influence on food policy integration. The two countries have different cycles. In the UK, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 set the interval between general elections at five years. Prior to this elections could be called at any time (<http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/general/>). While in Australia, national elections are held at least every three years, as specified in the Constitution (www.aec.gov.au). Between 1945-2015 there were 18 UK general elections, giving an average period of government between elections of 3.3 years, compared to the Australian 2.48 years. But during this sixty years there were only seven changes in UK government, while in Australia between 1945-2007 the government changed only five times over the 25 Federal elections held (Ward and Stewart 2009). Both countries are therefore characterised by a relatively short political cycle, with significant implications for longer-term policy issues, with reasonable infrequency of changes of government which might somewhat mitigate the issue. Menzies (2013) nevertheless argues that Australia’s short political cycle, due to its system of ‘dual democracy’ where rarely a year goes by without a State or Federal election, results in the ‘*constant churn of leaders and agendas*’. This, says Menzies, is particularly damaging in terms of inter-government relations, because ‘*the shifting array of partisan make-up and personalities*’ inhibit momentum in intergovernmental agreement (p385).

In the UK, the focus of many interviewees echoed comments made by the President of the National Farmers’ Union in evidence to an Environment Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee: who lamented ‘*I am on my third Secretary of State and third minister*’ (Peter Kendall, NFU; EFRA 2009 - Securing Food Supplies Oral Evidence 2008-9). Interviewees noted that food policy, obesity, sustainability, “*don’t suit the political cycle*” (FI-UK3) because “*whenever we get a change of government they assume everything the previous government did was a load of rubbish so they put it in the bin*” (FPPT-UK2) or “*throw the baby out with the bathwater*” (NGO-UK), and ministers “*all want answers within four years and they want a policy they can deliver within a shorter period*” (FI-UK3). “*New governments want a fresh*

start, turn the page, everything is rejected that happened before, and then two years into a new term there is a recognition these things are important so we better have another study” (FPPT-UK2). In reality, this reading of the situation may be coloured by experiences post-2008. Prior to this a Labour government held power for ten years.

4.6.2 The Bureaucracy

Like many other countries, as described in the literature review on policy integration, both the UK and Australia embraced an NPM-based form of bureaucracy in the 1980s, with private business principles applied to the public sector, such as privatisation and the introduction of quasi-markets and including increased use of Quangos, to reform of civil service, and this organisational – or even institutional – structural legacy persists (Cairney 2011). This institutional design has important implications for capacity to integrate food policy, both organisationally, and ideationally, due to a trend towards lack of sector expertise in the civil service to see beyond the silo. For example, in a UK Demos 2004 report *The Dead Generalist*, Ed Straw argues the structure, and rules around moving civil servants regularly from post to post, results in poor project management knowledge, lack of institutional memory and isolation from professional networks, which spread good practice (Straw 2004). More recently, Hallsworth and Rutter (2011) raised the need to better value civil service expertise, because current structures limit the career progression of subject experts apart from to management, leading to the loss of knowledge management. This issue of internal sector-specific knowledge is said to be institutionalised through current bureaucratic reward systems based on tangible outputs like briefings, white papers, consultation documents, which marginalises those longer-term approaches to problems which are not associated with such ‘badges of success’ outputs. This analysis is echoed in Anthony King’s (2015) book on Whitehall, *Who Governs?*, which emphasises lack of ‘institutional memory’ (subject-specific knowledge and expertise), and the drastic reduction in senior officials and rapid rate of turnover of both ministers and officials. One of the striking findings of the IFG’s policy reunions work was how – contrary to common practice where civil servants rotate on a frequent basis – in the successful policy examples, civil servants remained in a specialised subject post for many years. Hallsworth et al highlight several further ‘systemic barriers’ to good policymaking generally, and working across departments specifically, based on interviews with policymakers, including the tendency to place ‘smart thinkers’ with the ability to provide fresh perspectives in the centre of government, which can result in the centre ‘*coming up with sort of radical proposals that were out of context with the rest of [departmental] agenda*’ (Hallsworth et al 2012 p66). A further problem identified was the balancing act between using flexible pools, to overcome institutional inertia, with the lack of long-term thinking that comes with a project-based approach to policymaking:

‘That’s often the hardest bit: it’s not the technical thing...it’s knowing why people are saying that this needs to be done this way, or that way, from where they’re coming from as a farming organisation, or as an environmental organisation, or as an industry sector. You can’t get that instantly; you need to get to know your stakeholders’ (Senior Civil Servant, cited in Hallsworth et al 2012 p72).

Hallsworth et al also cite an NAO report (2001) which identified a lack of: ‘*authoritative subject experts, who really understand their subject areas and are able to build up networks across departments and with other subject specialists outside central government*’ (p31, cited in Hallsworth et al 2012 p73).

The Government’s administrative arm is referred to as the ‘public service’ in Australia. It ‘*administers Australian Federal government policy with responsibilities for making, monitoring, and enforcing regulation*’ (Parkin, Summers,

&Woodward, 2002)’ (Baker et al 2017), and like the UK is made up of ‘core’ agencies such as Treasury and Prime Minister and Cabinet; and line departments responsible for particular policy areas (Ward and Stewart 2009). Several reforms over the past three decades have restructured the bureaucracy, adding new rules and operating procedures. For example, Thompson describes reforms undertaken in 1986 as the ‘*most radical changes in the history of the Australian public service*’: an amendment of the Public Service Act which gave departmental secretaries increased power on staffing. There followed a restructuring in 1987 involving creation of 16 super-ministries and abolition of the Public Service Board; moving closer still towards a ‘*managerialist model of governing*’ (Thompson 1991 p134).

In Australia, as elsewhere, the subsequent Hawke-Keating government’s public service reforms around NPM led to a focus on ‘*results, outcomes and performance*’ (Keating 1993b p1, cited in Beeson and Firth 1998). However, as discussed in the literature review on policy integration, the paradigm of ‘*performance management*’ and application of the private sector concept of ‘*corporate governance*’ to the public service has significant consequences for integration projects (Halligan 2005). According to Ward and Stewart (2009), reforms to the public service since the 1980s have led to a service characterised by more short-term contracts, often linked to a performance bonus, and more involvement of the Cabinet in appointing senior public servants, leading to criticisms of loss of independence. Radcliffe (2010) describes similar issues to the UK, with a crisis of capacity for state actors: a brain drain in the public sector; cost-cutting and higher staff turnover has meant a decline in internal policy capacity, and a more general ‘hollowing out’ (Rhodes 1994, cited in Radcliffe 2010 p 124). A paper ‘*Dumbing down in Canberra*’ in 2001 (McAuley 2001) concluded that ‘*the assets of specialisation, continuity and experience have been lost*’; and speaking in 1998, a former civil servant quoted by Bell (2004) vocalises the trend:

‘there is a serious danger that public service departments will become short term in their focus and that serious policy-related research and advice will be left to lobby groups, private consultants and think tanks – which are seldom sources of disinterested advice and whose perspectives tend to be narrow’ (p24).

Interviewees in both countries (from the food industry in particular), suggested a lack of policymaker subject knowledge was problematic and hindering more coherent approaches to food policy, for example FI-UK’s comments: “DEFRA still struggles to understand food, it understands agriculture a bit, but not as much as it used to....they don’t have enough of the right kind of people and they certainly don’t have enough people going out....literally going around factories, looking at how things work, understanding the processes”. Similarly, ST-A in Australia says “quite frankly there are people in the department responsible for manufacturing, who are responsible for food policy, who only have a limited knowledge of the food industry for starters, because they are manufacturing generalists and career public servants. But those people only have the scantest knowledge of agriculture, and a lot of the guys in primary industries don’t have much understanding of manufacturing”, the latter point highlighting the disconnect in supply chain oversight. CS-A2 links this to the current bureaucratic practice of “fast-cycling” generalists, and a tendency towards “window dressing” rather than “high quality debate and resolution”, which is a pity because “you need to be able to hammer these things out”.

With the policy systems context now provided, the findings section moves to analysis of the two integration projects FM/F2030 and the NFP.

Chapter Five: Policy Analysis of Food Matters and Food 2030 Projects

The following is an analysis of the FM and F2030 policy formulation processes, using the Framework Tool (FT). As outlined in the Methodology, the FT comprises five categories of variables which can impact on, or help explain, the outcomes of an integrated policy project: what happens at the OUTSET of the policy process; the CONTENT of the policy itself; the INPUT into the policy process; the budget assigned to the policy process; and the OUTCOMES of the policy process. The chapter examines each category of variables in turn, with reference to the data from interviews and documentary analysis. FM and F2030 are treated as two stages of a single policy formulation project, as outlined in the Methodology. Findings for both stages are included under each variable to allow the relationship between the two sets of data to be discussed.

5.1 OUTSET

5.1.1 Originating Actor

FM was published in 2008 by the Cabinet Office. According to interviewees, Nick Pearce, at the time head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, came up with the idea of looking into food as one of several options for policy projects. The role of the Prime Minister's Special Advisors (SpAds) is therefore significant:

[It was] *"one of first set of projects Strategy Unit asked to take forward by Number Ten when Brown came in. It was really an idea from Nick Pearce, who subsequently ended up leading the policy unit and the Strategy"* (CS-UK4).

How much chance entered into the decision to go ahead with food over other possible topics under consideration is not clear:

"Nick's interest wasn't just about global food prices, his perspective on food was much much broader. One of the other topics he talked about doing a project on...and wait for this...you may not believe it but it is true...was a project on beauty. [laughs...um] I think he was thinking particularly of the built environment, the pleasantness of the places in which we live, but I don't think, knowing Nick it was exclusively the built environment, but anything that was considered beautiful. So there was this interest alongside the big heavy duty political topics in some of these other issues that wouldn't normally catch the attention of perhaps politicians or policymakers. So I guess Nick was interested in things like the quality of food that people were eating, was it healthy" (CS-UK2).

The SpAds are said to have been interested in several aspects of food at the outset, from mandatory food standards to land use, food waste, and fruit and veg stalls (CS-UK5). Two influences were identified as prompting food as a topic: 1. An interest in the "Westminster Village" of exploring ideas of "new politics"; and 2. a general perception that food was "everywhere" at that time:

"There was this idea of a disconnect between the political class and the population. So that was floating around. And then it was at a time there was food stuff everywhere...you couldn't open a newspaper or turn on the TV without somebody pushing a food story at you – chefs, food as a popular culture thing, a lot of commentary about some of the environmental and other aspects, but generally a sense the nation had become interested in food, of food as aspirational" (CS-UK4).

Jamie Oliver's School dinners TV series and 'Feed me Better' campaign in 2005 are one example: a high profile chef taking unprecedented interest in a food policy issue. CS-UK3 adds that *"obesity was a growing issue, and the government could see that was going to be a very big challenge, and how we eat and how it is produced"*. NGO-UK3

suggests a recognition “there was stuff going on that the government was behind the curve on” as important in empowering the policy. The influence of this cultural shift is supported by FM’s foreword by Prime Minister Gordon Brown:

“The rise of popular interest in food policy issues, and growing public awareness that what we choose to eat impacts on everything from animal welfare to our health and the protection of the environment, has led to massive transformation in Britain’s food culture over the past 10 years. This cultural change, along with more recent events in global food markets, has brought new and urgent policy challenges to the fore, which governments must act to meet” (Cabinet Office 2008b pi).

A point of disagreement in the findings is the role of the UK Prime Minister in catalysing the policy project, with some interviewees proposing an active role for political and personal reasons (CS-UK5; NGO-UK; CS-UK), including “looking for an issue to make his own having been in Blair’s shadow for all those years” (CS-UK), and others more dismissive of Brown’s role, for example CS-UK, saying “if I’m brutally honest with you I’m not sure how much it came to his attention” (CS-UK2). One of the apparent common misconceptions by interviewees – and highlighting the methodological challenges of post-hoc policy analysis – was that the food price spike of 2007-8 was the catalyst for the policy, possibly an example of Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009 p256) ‘Silent Spring phenomenon’, where ‘in remembering we often revise chronology to let a single symbolic event carry the meaning of a complex process (Popkin 1991 p112, cited in Baumgartner and Jones 2009 p256). In fact “the project was commissioned way before the food price spike happened” (CS-UK4) and “food prices became an issue about a third of the way through the project, at which time another group – led by Treasury and Cabinet Office – was set up to specifically look at food prices” (CS-UK5).

5.1.2 Food 2030

The project was a response to the earlier FM report from the Cabinet Office, as stated in the introduction to F2030:

‘This new strategy for food has been drawn up following the publication of the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit’s report in July 2008. Food Matters called for better integration of food policy across government and highlighted two challenges: climate change and obesity. 2008 also saw food prices rise sharply for the first time in a generation, provoking riots in some parts of the world. In August 2009 we published our assessment of UK food security and set out what we need to do to maintain it. This document brings all of the challenges together for the first time’ (DEFRA 2010 p1).

5.1.2 Timeline and Time Taken

There is no specific timeline in the FM report. The perceived urgency of the project is not clear from the data, although it is noteworthy that there was not considered to be enough time for an extensive public consultation (CS-UK4), and a member of the working group describes “a very tight deadline”, with “a massive amount of work that was done in a very short space of time” (CS-UK). The process took in total 10 months from start to finish. The Strategy Unit was commissioned to undertake the food policy project in September 2007. The next two months were spent pulling a project team together, and on background research, which led to the publication of a paper: *Food: An Analysis of the Issues*. This was a discussion paper – explicitly not a statement of government policy – presenting ‘an analysis of a number of the key issues pertaining to food and food policy in the UK’ (Cabinet Office 2008a). It examines trends shaping food consumption and production and their implications for society, the economy and the environment, based on desk research and analysis and discussions within and outside Government. With chapters on: Consumer Demand;

The UK Food Chain; Global Markets; Food Security; Food and the Environment; Diet and Health; and Food Safety, the paper *'maps the key trends in the food system, the drivers behind them and the issues arising'*, noting that *'the sustenance, enjoyment, wealth and employment provided by our diet are accompanied by large environmental and health costs'* and that there are *'a number of areas where the current debate on food may need to be refocused or refined'* (Cabinet Office 2008a p13;14,15). This issues analysis – the first in the three-phase FM formulation process – was followed by an analysis of how well current policy fitted the issues identified, and finally, policy recommendations were published in the final report (Food Ethics Council 200b).

5.1.2.1 Food 2030

The Vision, published in January 2010 (15 months after FM was published in July 200b), utilises a 20-year timeline. For Marsden (2010), while the 2030 timeline *'is appealing and legitimate... it can also be used as a 'long grass tactic'*, meaning challenges *'can be raised but not faced'* because *'if the frame of reference is global and the time horizon flexible and extendable...real traction and delivery mechanisms can be put off for another day'* (p444). A farming trade press editorial responding to F2030 makes a similar assessment, noting that *'those producers struggling to make money today will look at the Food 2030 strategy and ask 'How does it help me right now?'* (Farmers Weekly 2010).

5.1.3 Terms of Reference

It appears that no formal Terms of Reference (ToR) in a traditional sense were issued for the FM project. The report itself states the Strategy Unit was commissioned *'...to examine our approach to food policy right across the board', outlining actions needed 'to ensure our long-term food security, the sustainability of food production and consumption, and the promotion of public health'* (Cabinet Office 2008b pi). The request from Number Ten to do something on food was not specific, and a scoping exercise in response to the request *"became the terms of reference"*. However, one of the priorities set out in scoping the project take a *"consumer come citizen focus – starting post-farm gate"* and looking at a consumer perspective *"to distinguish it from other things that had been done like Curry etc"* (CS-UK4).

5.1.3.1 Food 2030

No specific ToR could be identified for F2030. However, it was a response to FM, which potentially represented the ToR. DEFRA work around the time on food security was also influential. In response to the 2007-8 food price spikes, DEFRA published several reports, including the 2009 *Ensuring the UK's Food Security in a changing World* (Defra 2009b), and 2010 *UK Food Security Assessment* (Defra 2010b), featuring a suite of food security indicators focused on the themes of food availability, access, affordability, safety and resilience, with the aim of creating a more structured evidence base. Each of the themes featured headline and supporting indicators (EFRA 2014), and were developed *'through stakeholder engagement, and with input from the Council of Food Policy Advisers'* (DEFRA 2010 p4). It is interesting to note integration raised as an issue again in 2014, with the EFRA report on Food Security noting:

'...it is not entirely clear to us which department has the primary responsibility for leading on UK food security and its delivery, nor what priority these issues are given in other departmental strategies, and therefore how this may affect their specific contributions in relation to resourcing and delivery of the Government's food security strategy. The Food and Drink Federation pointed to the Environmental Audit Committee report of 2012 which concluded that the Government did not have a strategy which unified policy areas which impact on production, supply and demand which could drive the whole system towards greater sustainability' (EFRA 2014).

5.1.4 Political Party and Stage in Electoral Cycle

At the time FM was formulated, the Labour government had been in power for over ten years (since 1997). The party had already taken quite a strong policy lead on food, having made significant machinery of government changes in the early 2000s, reforming the department of agriculture and creating a new organisation, the Food Standards Agency. The changes were in response to a series of food scares in the UK, as discussed in Chapter Four. A period of fairly dense policy activity followed, culminating in FM in 2000.

FM was initiated towards the middle of the electoral cycle (2005-2010). The Prime Minister had, however, recently changed, from Tony Blair (in post since 1997) to Gordon Brown (previously Chancellor of the Exchequer for ten years).

5.1.4.1 Food 2030

The Labour government remained in power during the F2030 formulation process. However, the stage in the electoral cycle was contrasted by interviews with FM, where:

“...there was a lot of optimism around the 1999-2001 period. We’d come out of Mrs Thatcher’s rule for 18 years, then we had the Blair start off, and they were very fresh and new and consultative, they had a huge majority and they could get things done” (FI-UK3).

Whereas with F2030:

“One of the biggest problems is the timing of this report, it came out just towards the end of the Labour administration. Had it come in at the beginning of it I think it would have made real difference” (CS-UK).

The comments echo NGO Fife Diet’s description of F2030 as a ‘policy at the fag-end of a Brown Government’ (www.thefifediet.co.uk – accessed April 2016). The issue was also raised (somewhat naively?) in a F2030 briefing by an IGD economist, shortly after its release, asking:

‘How will the imminent General Election affect governmental approach? It is possible that the next government will take an entirely different view of the issues in Food 2030 but, at present, this seems unlikely. The food challenges will remain the same whichever party is in charge and, in any case, much of the thinking behind Food 2030 will have come from Defra civil servants rather than political heads of department. What may change however, is departmental budgets – the ability and willingness of the government to pay for the necessary activities’ (IGD 2010).

5.1.5 Government Sponsor/ Lead Department

The FM policy project was led by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, which was housed in the Cabinet Office (CO), an arrangement which featured strongly in interviews. The particular role, image, status and modus operandi of the CO as the lead department of the policy project – and more specifically the PMSU – was discussed at length, in terms of the positive impact of the department’s gravitas, the ability to co-opt other departments to the policy project, the ability to work on cross-cutting issues, the ability to work nimbly, swiftly and so on. FI-UK3 likened the CO to the Treasury, noting that *“an endorsement from them it is worth having”*; while for NGO-UK3 the CO role *“made the other departments a bit more constructive in their involvement than they might otherwise have been if it had been led out of another department.”* CS-UK stressed it was important FM was *“taken out of any individual department’s leadership”*, and *“when the Cabinet Office says something needs to be done, they bring in any relevant input that is required, so they*

set aside individual and department approaches if you like.” This is echoed by CS-UK7’s recollection the CO team were “quite forceful in what they wanted us to do”. NGO-UK2 says the project team “*had the authority as it was something the PM commissioned, which is different to DEFRA commissioning it or whatever*”, and CS-UK4 underlines how “*the point was that the initiative did not come out of DEFRA or the farming environment, but came from centre and nothing like it attempted before*”. The strong connection between the CO and joined-up policy work was also raised by CS-UK 2:

“It is important to understand that the Strategy Unit in the Cabinet Office, like its predecessors, was very well placed to work on cross-cutting issues and sometimes issues that might not be on the front row of policy priorities like schools, health, crime; the really big political issues”.

It is interesting to note the insinuation from this civil servant that food would not be considered a front row policy issue or political priority. CS-UK7 adds that “*clearly the fact that it was pulled together by the Cabinet Office must reflect the fact they didn’t think the departments were working well enough together, or that there was an obvious lead department*”.

5.1.5.1 Food 2030

While there was widespread praise for the centralised sponsorship of FM, the challenges of taking forward a policy which is devised centrally but progressed via a specific department, in this case DEFRA, were raised. CS-UK4 for example says:

“As soon as you put things in a department, rather than running them effectively from Number Ten, you are at an immediate disadvantage in trying to make this cross-Whitehall narrative a reality, with the Department of Health, for example, and the gravity effect of being pulled on to DEFRA type issues inevitably takes hold.”

Similarly, FI-UK4 says:

“The Cabinet Office can write great stuff, but unless it can get senior ministers and ministries to adopt a strategy it can’t do any more, and it is not its job either. The guy who wrote Food Matters.....said ‘well we’ve done our job, that’s it. It is up to ministries to pick it up’. Well of course there isn’t a ministry to pick it up, there are several ministries, all of which find this a bit embarrassing because it means they would have to talk to each other. Now strictly speaking DEFRA is still responsible, but the DEFRA minister can’t go around bullying BIS and Department of Health or Treasury, essentially DEFRA is a minor ministry, so it is infernally complicated” (FI-UK4).

NGO-UK3 concurs that at the time of F2030, DEFRA was “*catastrophically weak in terms of its relationships with any other bit of government, so effectively it was on a hiding to nothing*”. The remarks raise a fundamental issue for integrated food policy: policies may be formulated centrally, utilising innovation thinking and better cross-government oversight, but implementation might take place by a decentralised department. This is raised by CS-UK4, and expanded on by Professor Tim Lang during an EFRA Select Committee hearing on UK food security:

“So it is not necessarily entirely fair, if what followed didn’t quite deliver on some things, not necessarily a surprise. It is difficult to keep those kind of things going from a single department and without the glue, not enough concrete common interest between Department of Health and DEFRA and so forth to bind them all together” (CS-UK4).

‘At the civil servant level that process also needs to happen. It must happen across Whitehall, it cannot just be left to DEFRA—back again to the Chair’s question. Even though I personally would like DEFRA to be the lead and it is seen by the Cabinet, I understand, as taking that lead, it cannot deliver a coherent food security sustainability policy—call it whatever we will— unless it is also dealing with the Department of Health, the

Food Standards Agency, DFID, the Treasury. It must be cross-sectoral or else it will not resolve the problems that we have (Professor Tim Lang; EFRA 2009; Securing Food Supplies Oral Evidence 2008-9)

Could the FM work have remained within the Cabinet Office, and not being passed to DEFRA? Probably not, according to CS-UK2, unless “*it had been considered really, really important*” because of pressure towards new projects. This would have been more likely in the early years of the Blair/Brown government than in the later years, when certain Strategy Unit projects would be picked up and overseen by the Delivery Unit. Dedicated units were set up in the CO, for example, following work on social exclusion. And “*if food or any other issue was sufficiently important there is nothing to stop anyone using a mechanism such as that to push it through*” (CS-UK2), but in general PMSU worked with departments through the course of a project to “*get them to buy in*” (CS-UK2) so they could take over the work subsequently. FPPT-UK2 says “*with hindsight, what probably should have happened was retaining responsibility within the Cabinet Office for oversight. So to throw the ball to DEFRA without retaining accountability within the Cabinet Office was probably a weakness*”.

5.2 CONTENT

As outlined in Chapter One, the report is positioned as ‘*an overarching statement of government food policy*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b pi,iii), which aims ‘*to review the main trends in food production and consumption in the UK; to analyse the implications of those trends for the economy, society and the environment; to assess the robustness of the current policy framework for food; and to determine what the objectives of future food strategy should be and the measures needed to achieve them*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b pi, iii). FM consists of seven chapters, the first of which covers an introduction and overview of the main trends and challenges in the food system, including poor diet and environmental impacts, and ‘*raising output to feed a larger, wealthier human population*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p35). Subsequent chapters discuss ‘*future food policy*’: noting several future strategic policy objectives, as listed below at 5.2.2; ‘*Supporting the consumer*’ – focused on what government can do to accelerate cultural change around food; ‘*Engaging the Supply Chain*’ – noting issues around food business competition, public trust and confidence and food safety, and public health consumption issues, proposing salt reduction policy as a template for future action, plus the need to work on Five-a-Day and tackling waste and climate change. Chapter Six on ‘*Leadership, food and the public sector*’ focuses mainly on procurement and introduces a new Healthier Food Mark instrument, while the final chapter is on ‘*Delivering the Government’s Vision*’, and outlines a series of new governance arrangements plus a list of actions (see Appendix Table B1 for a longer summary of FM content).

Food 2030

The strategy is structured around six core issues. For each issue chapter, context is provided, goals are listed, and actions – for government, industry, consumers – are specified. The context is similar in content to FM. Government’s role in creating a sustainable and secure food system is positioned as: encouraging change through voluntary, regulatory or economic approaches; leading by example; enabling change; building evidence and providing policy leadership (DEFRA 2010 p8). A final ‘*Delivering Food 2030*’ chapter highlights the importance of working together, as underlined in the EFRA report *Securing food supplies up to 2050*, and states principles for engaging with partners to deliver F2030: mutual trust, openness and transparency; early engagement on issues; working collaboratively;

constructive challenge; acknowledging disagreement; and basing discussions on evidence. The goals and the actions for or involving government are summarised under Outcomes: Final Status. A summary of the content of F2030 can be found in Appendix Table B2.

5.2.1 Definition of the Problem

FM defines the problem it is addressing in two ways: 1. Social and environmental challenges of the current system and 2. The more integrated approach needed for food policymaking (Cabinet Office 2008b p55). The report positions the food system as a:

‘...stage on which some of the major societal challenges of our time are being played out – most obviously lifestyle-induced health issues (such as obesity), the collective response to the threat of climate change (both mitigation and adaptation) and the wider search for environmentally sustainable economic growth’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p52).

Environmental and public health challenges are outlined at length, with a focus on poor diets, food’s environmental impacts, food industry consolidation, lack of skills, and the challenge of food security. The policy integration problem is defined as the need for a clearer policy framework that:

‘...fits the different elements together more effectively and ensures that all are pursued with increased vigour and coherence’ because *‘UK food policy today is somewhat less than the sum of its parts’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p41).

It notes that:

‘...the UK has not had a comprehensive and formal statement of ‘food policy’ since the Second World War. Today, a patchwork of strategies addresses different aspects of the food system and the market failures in each discrete area’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p41).

Many specific references are made throughout on the implications of this policy fragmentation, for example that *‘the relationship between different elements is not always clearly spelled out and the relative importance of objectives in different areas is not always clear’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p41) (though the report itself does not outline relationships or rank objectives). This approach to defining the problem was broadly appreciated by interviewees, with particular reference made to its attempt to encompass the whole food chain. FI-UK4, for example, appreciated that *“it didn’t regard food as the stuff you buy in shops, or the stuff farmers grew, it recognised it was all of those things”* and also its recognition that *“our farming needed a boost, which it did, it said private sector industry is strong in the UK, it also recognised quite rightly that we had some red-hot retailers that were in danger of screwing down the chain so hard that they would put some farmers out of business”*. Although in reality, the policy did not address food production significantly.

5.2.1.1 Food 2030

Similarly, F2030 describes a multi-faceted problem, encompassing considerable environmental and health pressures, for example:

‘But we face big challenges today which mean we need to think differently about food. We can’t just carry on as we are. We need to produce more food without damaging the natural resources – air, water, soil and marine resources, biodiversity and climate – that we all depend on. We need to feed more people globally, many of whom want or need to eat a better diet. We need to tackle increasing obesity and encourage healthier

diets. And we need to do all these things in light of the increasing challenge of climate change and while delivering continuous improvement in food safety' (DEFRA 2010 p3).

Like FM it makes some links between domains, noting:

'Diet will have a huge impact not only on our health and our economy, but most importantly on sustainability' (p4).

Food security becomes a more prominent theme in F2030: the report describes itself as *'bringing together for the first time'* the challenges identified in FM (integration, climate change and obesity), with those identified in the August 2009 assessment of UK food security (p4). The strategy is described as *'a response both to the big food challenges – sustainability, security and health – and to the call for more joined up food policy'* (p4). While production issues were largely absent from FM, they are reintroduced by 2030, leading Marsden to describe the report as:

'quite unique in both its policy scope and spatial scale, re-introducing national and international food security – defined as having enough food, in the right place, at the right time – as a key concern both nationally and internationally. Not since the late 1970s, when successive governments produced policy documents entitled Food from our own Resources (1974) and Farming and the Nation (1974) have national food security and production concerns been so much on the policy agenda' (2010 p443).

UK food security is a key part of the vision to 2030: *'Our food security is ensured through strong UK agriculture and food sectors and international trade links with EU and global partners, which support developing economies'* (p7). The F2030 launch press release also focuses on the importance of food security, and challenges facing the country to maintain a secure food supply at time of rapid population growth and climate change (DEFRA 2010), a theme picked up in opinion pieces following the launch, for example:

'Government's U-turn on food security, for example, is a significant step. Two years ago Mr Benn [Hilary Benn the Agriculture Minister] would not entertain the idea of a food security crisis. This week he says food security is as important to the country's future wellbeing-and that of the world's – as energy security' (Farmers' Weekly 2010).

5.2.2 Goals and Objectives

The aims of FM were:

'...to review the main trends in food production and consumption in the UK; to analyse the implications of those trends for the economy, society and the environment; to assess the robustness of the current policy framework for food; and to determine what the objectives of future food strategy should be and the measures needed to achieve them' (Cabinet Office 2008b piii).

It is notable that the aim is to determine what the objectives of *future* food strategy should be, a sentiment reinforced by the interviewees involved in the policy project that this was seen to be the *first step* in a process, rather than the food policy itself: the report also identifies four main strategic policy objectives for government, stating that these should be to secure:

- *Fair prices, choice, access to food and food security through open and competitive markets;*
- *Continuous improvement in the safety of food;*
- *The changes needed to deliver a further transition to healthier diets; and*
- *A more environmentally sustainable food chain* (Cabinet Office 2008b p43).

A further objective is the better integration of food policy.

5.2.2.1 Food 2030

The report states it *'sets out the priorities for the UK government on food'* (p4) and *'the steps we can take to get there'* (p3). No specific objectives are laid out, aside from the generic *'vision for a sustainable and secure food system for 2030'* (p7) and six core issues for the food system (p9) (see Appendix Table B2 for details) are explicitly referenced.

5.2.3 Framing

Along with the explicit content, two frames identified in the FM report relate to the role of government and the importance of productivity, competition and innovation. The Government's core role in the UK food system is framed as being to:

...correct market failures where they arise (the food economy may be distorted by market failures caused by poor information, imperfect competition, the failure to price externalities and the under-provision of public goods); and to ensure that social equity is safeguarded (Cabinet Office 2008b p36).

It notes that *'generally, this will be achieved through the tax and benefit system, but special measures may be needed in some cases to ensure that the more vulnerable in society have adequate access to nutritious food'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p38). A potential contradiction appears between some of the more interventionist language used in the four main strategic policy objectives (see above) and more cautious tone used when discussing the government's role, and the importance of goals not interfering with *'individuals' freedom of choice about what to eat'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p36). The language used is again more circumspect when stating that:

'Editing food choices can be a complex and contentious issue. It can attract charges of 'nannying' and can seem to contradict the agenda of informed consumer choice' (Cabinet Office 2008b p61)

The following statement on public sector food is bolder:

'There is reliance on advice, voluntary guidelines and reform of the procurement system, but their impact is inevitably limited while demand drivers remain unchanged' (Cabinet Office 2008b p105).

While another passage hints at a less interventionist ambitions:

'A host of social, economic and environmental issues that we face as a society, from poverty to climate change, are manifest in the food system, but these are rarely food-specific problems. Tackling these issues through interventions in the food system is unlikely to be the best solution – it is generally better to target the source of the problem' (Cabinet Office 2008b p40).

Although the framing in the latter quote does not mitigate against intervention – indeed one reading could assume even further intervention into deeper structural issues impacting on society – there is a suggestion that the problems are in a sense 'bigger than food' and therefore not the remit of a government 'food policy'. The pivotal role of consumers features in statements about how the new framework for food policy *'is intended to ensure that the Government is equipped to play its part in the continuing transformation of the UK's food system. But it is the decisions of consumers and industry, and the values and preferences of society at large, that will determine how fast and how far that process moves'* (pxiv). Later, it identifies how Government can *'support consumers in the choices they make'* (p5), but later still acknowledges *'the transition to a truly sustainable food system requires the collective support and cooperation of business, consumers and government'* (p42). Chapter Four focuses on how government can support consumers, through providing information and advice, but notes:

‘There are, however, likely to be limits to the extent to which better information and advice can change behaviour, particularly where consumers face complex trade-offs between difficult ethical or environmental outcomes. In these cases there is evidence that consumers expect food retailers and others to help ‘edit’ food choices on their behalf’ (p49)

A narrative of *productivity, competition and innovation*, appears several times within the document, with framing around how *‘well-functioning, open and competitive markets are the best means of securing fair prices for consumers and fair dealing along the supply chain’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p37), and also in Chapter Three’s vision of future food policy, where it is envisioned the UK food supply chain will *‘continue to be a major source of wealth creation and employment, competitive internationally and continually developing the skills and capability of its workforce’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p37); *‘be populated by diverse, successful, innovative food businesses – small businesses and large, high-tech and traditional production, niche and universal’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p37) and where *‘competition along and across each part of the food chain will encourage innovation, a focus on the consumer and the best use of resources’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p37).

5.2.3.1 Food 2030

Government’s role in food policy/choices is repeated verbatim from FM (see 5.2.3). F2030 also reiterates appropriate policy levers:

‘To play our part in delivering 2030 we will: encourage change through voluntary, regulatory or economic approaches. Government will favour voluntary industry-led and owned measures wherever possible, but we recognise that regulation may be required in some instances’ (p8)

The role of consumers is more strongly emphasised than in FM. Those with a role to play in food policy, and in delivering the strategy, are listed in the following order: consumers; food producers; food businesses; food manufacturers, retailers and caterers; and Government, noting Government can *‘help to lead the change’* (p3). The role of consumers is highlighted in actions to take the strategy forwards including:

‘Consumers can support healthy and sustainable food, and can try to throw less food away’ (p3).

‘Consumers adopt healthy, sustainable diets’, whereby: ‘People make use of the opportunities available to learn more about food, creating a greater demand for healthy, sustainable food’ (p18).

‘Consumers can help develop a lower-carbon food system by creating demand for food with a smaller environmental footprint’ (p47).

The title of the F2030 launch press release also focuses on the role of non-government stakeholders: *‘Consumers can help secure Britain’s Food Future’* (DEFRA 2010), says *‘people power can help bring about a revolution in the way food is produced and sold’* and food businesses *‘would follow consumer demand for food that is local, healthy and has been produced with a smaller environmental footprint’*. It states *‘government and food businesses needed to support consumers by providing more accurate information about the origin and nutritional content of the food they buy’*.

‘Ensuring a resilient, profitable and competitive food system’ is one of six core issues of F2030 and a key action under this is for the food and farming sectors to *‘improve competitiveness and efficiency’*, through sharing best practice and

skills, technology etc (p29). This framing is also employed when discussing food's contribution to the economy, stating that *'looking forward we will work to help ensure it can thrive as an innovative, competitive and resilient sector, and a sustainable source of growth and jobs'* (p3). It also appears in the chapter on Increasing Food Production Sustainably, which emphasises how *'sustainable increases in food production can be achieved through improving productivity and competitiveness, while conserving and enhancing the natural environment'* (p35); *'production must become increasingly competitive and responsive to demands from the market and consumers while allowing food businesses to be profitable'* (p35); and *'by focusing on productivity and resource efficiency, the food sector will be able to compete effectively in an increasingly global economy'* (p35).

5.2.4 Policy Omissions

Three main policy omissions were identified in the policy analysis: Labour Issues; Meat; and GM. The latter two in particular were raised by interviewees as deliberately downplayed in the published report. More generally, certain types of policy intervention were side-lined, it having been difficult to mandate or regulate *"whether it be of the food industry, public sector standards"* (CS-UK5). The production end of the food chain was also viewed to be lacking from the final document; though, in fact, this was not in scope from the outset. On labour and low wages, NGO-UK 3 expressed frustration FM *'ducked the labour issues, and questions of low pay in the food sector'* which resulted in a *'very consumption focused'* report:

"I think they partly were thinking, yes that's interesting...but equally that's probably the classic area, even more than the health impacts or diet, where it is too big a thing for a food policy to bite off and chew - the idea of low wages, because it is a completely cross-sector issue, even if it is one felt particularly acutely and also caused particularly acutely by what goes on in the food sector, it has got no unique claim to fame about it, but if you are looking for explanations of food poverty, low wages and crap benefits are pretty significant. And it felt like in lots of areas of complexity the FM team was quite brave in acknowledging them, whereas on that they basically didn't even put it on the map, and that was a bit of a pity" (NGO-UK 3).

The report specifically acknowledges that meat and GM are *'difficult issues'*:

'In the same way as technological innovation helps to expand the realm of what is practically feasible, cultural change and open discussion of 'difficult issues' can help expand the scope of current understanding, unpacking controversial food-related issues 'ahead of the curve'. The role for the Government is to facilitate these debates rather than necessarily to lead them. Current issues that would be useful to explore include the health and environmental aspects of meat and dairy consumption, and the use of technology in food and food production' (Cabinet Office 2008b p64).

It returns to the topic of meat, in a cautiously-worded paragraph:

'Some meat and dairy products can be high in fat, particularly saturated fat. High levels of saturated fat in the diet can raise cholesterol levels and increase the risk of heart disease. Some studies have also linked higher consumption of red and processed meat to an increased risk of developing certain types of cancer. But meat and dairy products are important sources of dietary iron, calcium, zinc and other vitamins and minerals. Iron deficiency anaemia is one of the most common nutritional deficiencies in the UK, particularly in young children and women of child-bearing age' (Cabinet Office 2008b p16).

The carefully chosen words were a tactic for issues which were *"going to get into sticky areas"*, according to CS-UK4 and CS-UK2, who describes meat as *"scaring the horses"* at one moment during the project:

"... in the last general election didn't the greens propose that meat eating should be banned in public places one day a week , and obviously that did them a great deal of harm during the elections, especially in Germany

which doesn't surprise me in the least. But I know with this project, there was a moment that the political fear in their eyes...because that's political suicide" (CS-UK 2).

Links to public policy literature on the role of ambiguity in policymaking are discussed in Chapter Eight.

5.2.4.1 Food 2030

The FM omissions of labour issues, GM, and in particular meat continue through this stage, reverting to an argument about lack of evidence on the latter:

'Livestock production is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions globally, and there are some groups that advocate a diet with less meat as a way for consumers to reduce the environmental footprint of their diet. But the evidence to inform appropriate consumer choices and policy responses is currently unclear' (p47)

This approach was the focus of several critiques in the media, for example an opinion piece by a Guardian newspaper journalist stating *'the Strategy also fudges the issue of emissions from our high meat consumption, noting it but saying there is not enough evidence for the government to act further'*, contradicting the conclusions of the Sustainable Development Commission that *'the UK should cut its consumption of meat and dairy from intensive grain-fed systems'* (Lawrence 2010). This criticism is extended to GHG emissions more broadly in the aftermath of publication, with a WWF/FCRN report *'How low can we go'*, accompanied by comments from WWF's Mark Driscoll in the farming press:

"In terms of cutting emissions, the Government has, once again, focused much of its efforts on production systems and resource efficiency with little recognition of the need to address consumption - the issue of livestock consumption is mentioned but neatly side-stepped under the guise of 'lack of information'" (Farmers Guardian 15 January 2010)

CS-UK3 provides a civil servant's perspective, on how cautious wording allows buy-in from different sides, noting that:

"...a positive agenda, like your five-a-day, something positive you can do...great. Telling people to eat less red meat or cut down on fat is much harder, even though we all sort of know...and all the evidence points that way".

The debates over GM are also 'sidestepped':

'GM, like nanotechnology, is not a technological panacea for meeting the varied and complex challenges of food security, but could have some potential to help meet future challenges. Safety must remain our top priority and the Government will continue to be led by science when assessing the safety of GM technologies' (p61)

The role of multi-level governance in UK food policy was also under-represented according to Marsden (2010), who highlights a lack of attention to the role of EU policy, and supply chain relations. The strategy is described as *'at best chaotic and at worst idealistic about eliding the different strategic UK versus global strategic foci'*:

'Not least, what is remarkable about the strategy is its lack of reference to the (potentially resilient) EU policy and internal market infrastructure, or, for that matter, the realisation that the UK, in most agri-food policy areas (like trade, CAP, food regulation, environmental policy) is managed and negotiated in Brussels' (p444-5).

And on the missing discussion of fragmentation in the food chain:

'Nowhere in the strategy does this critical issue enter the logic. Whilst there are many references to 'working in partnership' with all stakeholders in the food chain, none of the stark competitive realities of working in these asymmetrical chains are confronted' (p445).

5.2.5 Degree of Change

CS-UK4 describes how *"nothing like it had been done before"*, underlining how *"the point was that the initiative did not come out of DEFRA or the farming environment, but from the centre"*. Certainly the focus was innovative. The question of what degree of change from previous policy in this area FM represented is difficult to assess though, in large part due to its characterisation as a *'policy framework'*. The *'towards a strategy'* tagline has been suggested to reflect an intention the report initiates a process, rather than represents the final policy framework (Food Ethics Council 2008). This lack of clarity came through from interviewees, and even Project Team Leader Andrew Jarvis in oral evidence to the EFRA investigation *'Securing Food Supplies up to 2050'*, who states of FM (2008): *'under this report DEFRA is tasked with developing a vision and strategy, which I understand they are hard at work on and it is due later this year'* (EFRA 2009 p48). FI-UK4 notes: *'it is a Cabinet Office document, it was a sort of introduction identifying the strategic issues, but it is not the strategy document for the government of the time'*. NGO-UK2 distinguishes between *'Food Matters, which was the analysis of the whole issue, and Food 2030, which was the policy really wasn't it, or strategy'*. CS-UK4 says the proposal was not a joint interdepartmental programme, but was attempting to say *"there's all these things happening and they are holistically interconnected and it would be good if you at least recognised that in the way you are making decisions"*.

The ambitiousness of the policy is also unclear due to somewhat contradictory statements; for example the contrast between *'Many of the elements required for a comprehensive food policy are already in place'* (Cabinet Office 2008b piii) and *'The evidence suggests that there is much more to be done to address the public health and environmental issues arising from food consumption, and a need to do so in a joined-up way'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p4). The rather less ambitious aims of the report itself to review; analyse; assess and determine the objectives of a *future* food strategy (Cabinet Office 2008b piii) can also be contrasted with the bolder description in the foreword of an *'overarching statement of government food policy that sets a benchmark for the action we must take – both in the UK and globally – to ensure our long-term food security, the sustainability of food production and consumption, and the promotion of public health'* (Cabinet Office 2008b pi), and also with the four main strategic policy objectives identified for government – fair prices; continuous improvement in food safety, transition to a healthier diet and more environmentally-sustainable food chain – which potentially represent a significant degree of policy change from the status quo. The explicit focus on consumption-related issues, rather than food production, is also a significant change from previous food policy, as is the unprecedented attention given to the need for a more integrated approach (see below). CS-UK4 makes the observation that new thinking can represent significant policy change, remarking:

"There are particular decisions made where you can make sure there is integration, but if you have got people in DEFRA thinking ok I've got a problem, there's a health angle, and what is it, that is an outcome as that wouldn't necessarily have happened before. Securing that is a challenge because there is such a turnover of staff in the civil service, even more so in recent years than previously. So you can have somebody thinking in a new way and then they are off to another policy area and you have to start again."

5.2.5.1 Food 2030

Echoing FM, F2030 states:

'Many of the things we need to do to move towards a sustainable, secure and healthy food system are already in place, for example the Change4Life campaign, the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan, and our approach to ensuring the UK's continued food security' (p4).

However, there is a feeling the F2030 report under-delivered, particularly in terms of concrete actions, and fell back on a description of established activities, for example:

'Our assessment is that the strategy is a hotchpotch of existing measures like the Change4Life health and WRAP campaigns, and reiterates the UK's current position on European farm policy, world trade and others. It is disappointing to see how far the government has backpedalled from the relatively interventionist agenda of the Food Matters report 18 months ago' (FEC 2010).

Similarly, civil society groups criticise the strategy's reach, with Fife Diet stating *'it's good at stating the problem [but] its very poor at addressing any of the thorny difficult issues we need to face up to'*, labelling it *'policy retread'* and *'inertia dressed up as change'*, and FOE remarking that: *'Hilary Benn rightly recognises the need to fix the way we farm, but yet again has failed to choose the right path to fair and planet-friendly food'* (FOE 2010).

5.2.6 Policy Integration

As discussed above, policy integration is a strong theme throughout FM. It describes how *a 'patchwork of strategies addresses different aspects of the food system and the market failures in each discrete area'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p41) and the *'need to make sure that the multiple, and sometimes competing, cross-cutting issues facing food policy are managed appropriately'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p111), arguing *'new arrangements are needed to ensure the successful delivery of a more integrated approach'* (Cabinet Office 2008b pxiv). A number of its proposals *'are intended to get different parts of government working together more effectively'* (Cabinet Office 2008b p7). The importance of integration is even given the Prime Ministerial seal of approval in the foreword: *'I particularly welcome its proposals for ensuring that the Government's food policies are developed in a more coordinated way in future'* (Cabinet Office 2008b pi). Interviewees were generally positive about this focus on the need for a joined-up policy approach. For example CS-UK describes it as a *"milestone"*, *"because it did make people think about food as a whole system"* and identified potential for integrated work to be done, and *"where tensions were"*, plus the gaps and where there was overlap:

"So from that point of view it shone a light on what might be a really innovative way forward in terms of thinking of FM as a framework under which you could influence...where the decisions made had to take account of food, of nutrition, of food safety, agriculture, all of that had to be considered at the same time rather than separately. And that was very innovative" (CS-UK)

Yet, according to CS-UK4, this approach brought its frustrations, given the implicit nature of much of what is described as food policy, and the fact there is *"not much which is food policy and nothing else"*, and there's a food angle to all sorts of policy debates, which means *"you get a number of people in a room trying to have a conversation about food policy but you are actually discussing poverty, welfare, nutrition or productivity"*, raising questions about *"what is the kernel of food policy, that isn't another type of policy visited in the food aspect"*.

5.2.6.1 Food 2030

Integration is less of a focus, and references to it mainly relate to specific activities stemming from FM, for example integrating advice for consumers or government research on food, although it does raise the issue of tensions, noting that the government's role is *'providing policy leadership by finding ways to reconcile the big choices and tensions between achieving our vision for food and other major challenges'* (p8). In contrast with the positive reception to how FM addressed integration, interviewee FI-UK2 remarks that F2030 didn't do as well, because:

"DEFRA is not necessarily the best department to be leading food policy because it is so wedded in the agricultural production end of that, it wasn't necessarily seen as an honest broker in those discussions so it didn't really ever overcome that, it was seen as a DEFRA policy rather than a government policy" (FI-UK2)

However, for CS-UK3, F2030 was *"more ambitious in some ways"* than FM, *"because it tried to set out what is a long term strategy covering all of the issues associated with food, across the economic, environmental and social sphere"*.

5.3 INPUT

The INPUT factors influencing the framing and trajectory of the policy are: Input from other government departments in the policy formulation; Mechanisms for Coordination; Institutional Reform; Lead Personnel; constitution and role of advisory groups and other stakeholders; form of the consultation and use of consultants; approach to evidence; and political input.

5.3.1 Input from Departments

The FM Departmental Working Group is listed below.

Table 5.1: Food Matters Departmental Working Group

Name	Department
Nick Pearce	10 Downing Street
Brian Harding	DEFRA
Will Cavendish	Department of Health
Gill Fine	Food Standards Agency
Rebecca Lawrence	HM Treasury
David Mattes	BERR
Clive Fleming	Better Regulation Executive
Bronwen Jones	DEFRA
Lesley Forsdike	Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
Noreen Graham	Department for Children, Schools and Families
Terri Sarch	Department for International Development
Alison Ross	Department of Health
Clara Swinson	Department of Health

Geoff Dessent	Department of Health
Rosemary Hignett	Food Standards Agency
Brendan Bayley	HM Treasury

Source: Cabinet Office (2008b)

The report also lists in its appendix ‘*Additional Contributions From*’ a number of government personnel from the DH, three from the FSA, three from the Strategy Unit, and one from WRAP (Cabinet Office 2008b).

According to interviewees, there were two levels of involvement; a smaller working group of DEFRA, FSA and DH, and a wider circle of DTI, BERR and DFE on school food (CS-UK5), with DEFRA and the FSA taking the most active roles, and less input from the DH. Chair of the FSA, Deidre Hutton, with her consumer affairs background, took an active interest, and much of the statistical material came from the FSA. Engagement from the DH was reportedly not as good, with interviewees describing the department as “*particularly problematic in terms of engagement*” (NGO-UK3), and “*harder work*” as “*they had a bit of form in terms of engaging with initiatives like this and then dropping out as soon as they could. And they subsequently did*” (CS-UK4), so involvement was “*very limited compared to DEFRA and the FSA*” (CS-UK). CS-UK gives the example of the Healthier Food Mark initiative (see 5.5.4.3), arguing the DH “*were never going to push it*”. NGO-UK3 characterises the DH at the time as “*seen as prehistoric in their lack of attention to food*”.

Several individuals were seconded from departments to the Cabinet Office project team for the project.

5.3.1.1 Food 2030

Interview data suggests departmental input may have declined by this phase. For example FI-UK2 comments:

“I did go to meetings where there were representatives of certainly DfID, DECC and DH, but I know the DH public health section very well from our work with them and it was not a priority for them....so other departments outside DEFRA were not treating it with the same kind of importance as it was there and I think partly that might have been the Secretary of State. Obviously Hilary Benn was quite interested in the subject, and was driving it through DEFRA, I don’t think it was picked up by other Secretaries of State outside DEFRA”.

5.3.2 Mechanism for Coordination

While it is clear that several innovative mechanisms were set up due to the recommendations in FM, the primary mechanism *during* the process was a Cross Departmental Working Group (Table 5.1).

5.3.2.1 Food 2030

It is not clear what mechanisms were used at this phase of development, although the Food Policy Task Force; Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food, and Council of Food Policy Advisors were in place (see 5.3.3).

5.3.3 Institutional Reform

FM led to establishment of several significant mechanisms for coordinating food policy across government including a Food Strategy Task Force (FSTF), the first Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food since WW2, a joint research group for food and, later, a Council of Food Policy Advisors (CFPA) and Food Policy Unit was also set up in DEFRA (DEFRA 2009d). Under *Action 7.1: A Food Strategy Task Force* the report notes the Prime Minister asked the Cabinet Office to establish a cross-government Food Strategy Task Force *‘to ensure that different parts of government work effectively together to address the challenges raised by trends in global food markets and the issues raised by this report* (Cabinet Office 2008b p112). The FSTF was to be chaired and supported by the CO, and involve ‘senior officials’ from DEFRA, BERR, HM Treasury, DH, DfID, Department for Children, Schools and Families, and FSA, with other departments represented as needed. Its role:

- oversee and coordinate work on food issues across government, including the Government’s medium-term response to the developments in international food markets;
- drive forward delivery of the measures announced in this report;
- join up food policy through improved coordination and communication of relevant activities in different government departments; and
- ensure that common positions are reached on issues relevant to supporting delivery of low-impact, healthy, safe food and that those positions are properly disseminated (Cabinet Office 2008b p112).

The report also notes:

‘The work of the Task Force will be transparent, and updates and reports on its work and impact will be published on an annual basis. Task Force sub-groups, also constituted on a cross-Whitehall basis, will be tasked with taking forward individual key actions from this Strategy Unit report (and other issues if required). These sub-groups will be chaired by the department that has the lead responsibility on that proposition, and progress will be reported through the Task Force’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p112).

No updates or reports could be identified however. According to other documentary sources, the FSTF, meeting on a quarterly basis, comprised CO civil servants plus a number of other departments²⁷. Sub groups were set up on: Global food markets; Food communications; Developing a vision for a sustainable and secure food system; Joint Food Research Strategy; Healthier Food Mark; and Integrated Advice to Consumers (DEFRA 2009). However, according to a participant, there were issues, including inconsistency of chair and also membership, and it would have worked more effectively had there been named individuals *“that sit on a group that remain sitting on that group and don’t send deputies – they need to have the time, commitment and permission to make time to attend those meetings, or you don’t get the consistency”* (CS-UK). The FSTF was proposed as a short- to medium-term mechanism for coordination, with a recommendation for the longer term that the government *‘consider the arrangements needed to incentivise the effective delivery of its food policy objectives within the performance management framework covering the next Spending Review period (2011–14)’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p112). Action 7.2 is listed as *‘Improving food policy outcomes through the*

²⁷The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Department for Health, the Chief Scientific Adviser, the Department for International Development, the Treasury, the Food Standards Agency, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, the Department for Energy and Climate Change, and the Devolved Administrations (HC Deb (10 Dec 2009) Column 596W).

performance management framework’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p112). In an EFRA investigation into F2030, DEFRA Secretary of State (SoS) Hilary Benn and Permanent Secretary Bronwyn Jones were questioned on the FSTF, and it is established that the FSTF operated for a year, after which it became a DEFRA-led committee. Activities included production of the F2030 document, plus *‘doing a bit of horizon scanning, what is coming up, and making sure that we are more joined-up than we have been in the past’* (Jones; EFRA investigation of DEFRA’s Food Strategy, Oral Evidence January 2010). It is described as answerable to the Cabinet Committee *‘through Hilary’* [Benn, DEFRA Minister]. Under Action 7.3, a Joint Research Strategy for Food is proposed as an additional mechanism. The report states:

‘...closer coordination of the food-related research supported by different parts of government would help to ensure that policy is supported by the best evidence’, and therefore ‘the Government will put in place a cross-departmental strategy to ensure the coordination of departmental research and development relating to safe, low-impact food and a healthier diet’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p113).

5.3.3.1 Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food

The Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food (DAF) was established to provide secretaries and ministers of state from all the departments a *‘dedicated opportunity to discuss and take decisions on food policy across the piece’* (DEFRA 2009). No details of membership, meetings or attendance could be identified, and members of the FM project team were not party to DAF meetings, and therefore it is not possible to establish how significantly the issue of food was taken by the new committee. In a 2009 House of Commons debate Michael Jack MP made reference to this lack of information, commenting:

‘...apart from the Council of Food Policy Advisers, nobody has a clue what the rest of these good people have been doing. Nobody knows how many times the ministerial Sub-Committee on Food (DA(F)) has met, let alone what it has been discussing’ (HC Deb (18 Jun 2009) Column 513).

Similarly, in its 2009 *Securing Food Supplies up to 2050* report, EFRA cautiously welcomed the new groups working on food policy, but argued *‘the Task Force and the Sub-Committee must be used as a way of facilitating action, rather than a substitute for it’*, calling for *‘as much information as possible about the groups’ decisions and the work resulting from’* to be published on the internet (EFRA 2009 p37). In accordance with the literature on barriers to institutional reform, DAF was not easy to set up and *“there was quite a lot of scepticism”* (CS-UK4) because the Cabinet Office doesn’t like setting things up and taking on additional obligations:

“...a lot of Cabinet Office exists to make the machinery of government work, and their view is that if you give departments half a chance they will have the Cabinet Office running millions of different projects, and their job isn’t to run the government so much as to facilitate them. So there is general resistance about setting up new things, but Number Ten backing I suppose meant it was agreed to.” (CS-UK4)

Summarising the influence of the FSTF and DAF, CS-UK3 describes how:

“we met and there was coordination between the departments and quite a lot of alignment of the government of the day’s agendas on health and on consumption and production. But it was quite early days, so it was tentative rather than ‘here is an agenda that really binds us together’. It was where was there a happy overlap rather than how do we force everyone to point in the same direction”.

5.3.3.2 Council of Food Policy Advisors

A CFPA was established in 2008 by Hilary Benn MP, to ‘provide independent advice on a wide range of food policy issues’ (DEFRA 2009d); an idea that had previously been mooted by the Centre for Food Policy (Lang et al 2005). It was chaired by Dame Suzi Leather and supported by 15 members, with priorities to be: Sustainability metrics for a low impact, healthy diet; Public sector food procurement; Increasing consumption of 5-a-day; and Sustainable meat and dairy consumption (DEFRA 2009c). The activities of the CFPA are more transparent than the other mechanisms discussed above, with minutes of meetings and reports made available online. In Select Committee oral evidence on DEFRA’s F2030 strategy, Hilary Benn provides some highlights of the group’s work, including initiating the Fruit and Vegetable Task Force, and refining the Healthier Food Mark (EFRA 2020; investigation of DEFRA’s Food Strategy, Oral Evidence January 2010). However, civil servant interviewees questioned the efficacy of the group, arguing “the way it was set up was never really going to work because they were only ever advisory”, and therefore “a bit toothless” (CS-UK); “a terrific group of people, but it never really had a clear mandate or scope and quite frankly wandered around all over the place having interesting conversations, and never really to my mind fulfilled its potential”, partly because “it tried to boil the ocean” and “partly ministers lost interest” and the group “couldn’t narrow down their scope to things that government could actually do something about” (CS-UK3). This is linked to how the CFPA was set up, supported as it was by DEFRA, because “if you don’t have an infrastructure with your own secretariat there is a limit to what the council can do”, and also the establishment of the Food Environment Research Agency, which started getting involved with sustainability and “slightly confused matters as to what their responsibility was, and what DEFRA’s was” (CS-UK).

5.3.3.3 Food 2030

By the time of F2030, DAF was still in place, as was the CFPA:

‘The Secretary of State for EFRA chairs a dedicated Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food, formed in October 2008. And to make sure the Government gets the best advice on food policy, a Council of Food Policy Advisers was established at the same time, for a duration of two years’ (DEFRA 2010 p5).

In oral evidence to EFRA, it was confirmed that F2030 had been approved by DAF, and that the committee had met overall four times (EFRA, DEFRA’s Food Strategy, Oral Evidence January 2010). The CFPA was disbanded in 2010, and it appears that all three groups were wound up, although no official notice on DAF or the FSTF could be identified.

5.3.4 Lead Personnel

FM (2008) was led by a small project team which utilised advisory groups from relevant departments (see below).

Table 5.2: Food Matters Project Team

Name	Department
Elen Watkin	DEFRA
Jonathan Eddy	DEFRA
Andrew Jarvis	Strategy Unit

Louise Horner	Strategy Unit
Stephen Aldridge	Strategy Unit

Source: Author

Several interviewees emphasised the role of project leader Andrew Jarvis “*should not be underestimated*” (CS-UK). Jarvis was described as “*a big push on this; he made it happen*”, and “*the hours he worked, all hours of the day was just incredible*” (CS-UK). He was brought in from outside government, which was flagged as beneficial as “*he didn’t have to think what is this going to do to my civil service career*” (NGO-UK). He was also admired for being “*very good at getting people on board, good at discussing but also at knowing when to stop discussing and just get on and get things happening*” (CS-UK2).

5.3.4.1 Food 2030

No details of the project team were identified. There are no details in the strategy document itself and nothing on the archived web pages, and interviewees could not recall.

5.3.5 Advisory Groups

The FM ‘Expert Advisory Group’ is described as ‘*acting as a sounding board to the project team*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p7). It is notable that, while on other food policies, advisory groups tend to include representatives of the food industry and NGOS, in this case no food industry representatives are listed; aside from a farmer, with the expert advisors being drawn from academia, a think tank and the Consumer Councils.

Table 5.3: Food Matters Expert Advisory Group

Name	Institution	Role
Dr David Barling	City University	Senior Lecturer
Professor Tim Lang	City University	Professor of Food Policy
Dr Tom MacMillan	Food Ethics Council think tank	Executive Director
Sir Donald Curry	Government advisor on food and farming policy	Chairman of the Sustainable Farming and Food Strategy Delivery Group
Dr Susan Jebb	Medical Research Council	Head of Nutrition and Health Research
Ed Mayo	National Consumer Council	Chief Executive
Martyn Evans	Scottish Consumer Council.	Director
Chris Pomfret	University of Cambridge	Senior Associate

Source: Cabinet Office (2008b)

According to interview data, the advisory group were invited to seminars and lunchtime talks, which would be followed by a closed meeting of the departmental representatives (NGO-UK3).

5.3.5.1 Food 2030

No details of advisors could be identified, either from the report or on archived web pages. However two interviewees flagged the role played by the Government's Chief Scientist Sir John Beddington, describing him as *"very influential"*, because he *"clearly got it in the Foresight report"* (FI-UK) and was *"excellent at seeing food as being a really important part of the big picture in terms of climate change, water, carbon footprint, and food and within that nutrition and health"* (CS-UK). However, his influence was limited because *"his role as a scientific adviser is not a delivery role, not a political role, it is simply giving the advice"* (FI-UK). A number of civil servants underlined the important role *Foresight: Future of Food and Farming* played in raising the profile of food issues within government: *"really getting different parts of government to begin to take this seriously"* because of the realisation food issues were *"going to have a big impact on public services, finance, and so on"* (CS-UK7). CS-UK3 described it as a *"hugely impressive"* and *"wildly ambitious"* piece of work, *"a case study in really excellent policymaking"*, noting that *"it has been hugely influential"* and changed the *"nature of the discourse"*, as it *"is pretty much unchallengeable"* on the big five areas it flags up as challenges and *"creates a line in the sand that is quite difficult to rub out"*. CS-UK3 argues the fact it was globally focused also helpfully *"de-politicised it a bit"*.

5.3.6 Stakeholder Involvement

A list of 120 stakeholders are thanked in the report. These include representatives from the food industry and farming, civil society groups, government offices, and academia (Cabinet Office 2008b p124).

5.3.6.1 Food 2030

No details are included. See 5.3.7 for stakeholder involvement in the consultation.

5.3.7 Consultation

The consultation for FM was characterised by those involved as informal, short and not particularly consultative in policymaking terms, due in part to the nature of Strategy Unit projects – the policy ideas had to be developed quickly. *"The team that worked on the report went out and talked to lots of people, so it was an informal consultation"* (FPPT-UK2) but they were *"not under any obligation to talk to anyone outside government really"* and *"there was no budget for a massive public consultation and there wasn't really time"* (CS-UK4). The project team were somewhat able to *'make it up as they went along'*, because it was a Strategy Unit project, rather than a formal government review. The consultation involved stakeholders being invited to discuss food policy issues on a one-to-one basis, plus some *"innovative"* and *"quite creative sessions with external facilitators"*, plus regular stakeholder meetings and presentations to departments (CS-UK5). Consultees commented on the unusual approach, remembering it as being *"terribly informal"* and *"brusque and no nonsense"*:

"It didn't feel like the normal civil service consultation where people witter on for ages about nothing in particular. If you said something he [Andrew Jarvis] thought didn't stand up he challenged you, or the researchers would challenge you, and you'd have to justify it...I think they just hauled people in, tell us everything, give us your best shot, right out, next" (NGO-UK)

This approach offered the opportunity to speak more frankly than in traditional consultations because:

“They can ask you questions, they can press you, you can ask them questions, you could go off the record if you wanted to. So stuff you would never write down you could say. Don’t tell anyone I said this but it would be useful for you to know x and y. Which is vital information, but stuff you wouldn’t write down. So as a process as well as an end product it was great” (NGO-UK)

However, the need for a more comprehensive consultation following FM was specified in the report itself, which notes:

“This report has laid the foundations of such a vision and a strategy. But the new framework for food outlined here needs to be tested in an open and collaborative process involving the public and stakeholders. The Government therefore plans to launch a process of consultation about the future policy framework for food that is detailed in this report” (Cabinet Office 2008b p48)

5.3.7.1 Food 2030

No details of the consultation are provided in the report itself or on archived DEFRA web pages on F2030, aside from references to an ‘eConsultation process’, no listing of consultation submissions. However, ad hoc submissions were found via Google searching, and consultation questions were ascertained from these. These were fairly generic and did not explicitly follow up actions or recommendations from FM. There was a general feeling from interviewees that the consultation was repetitive and somewhat unnecessary, “*tediously*” consultative, as NGO-UK3 encapsulates: “*everyone was thinking get on with it, we’ve been asked these questions twenty times already. Whereas with FM they did just get on with it basically.*”

5.3.8 Political input

The role of the key political actors – in particular Prime Minister Gordon Brown – was discussed at 5.1.1. The role of the CO in mobilising support and managing opposition (see 5.1.5) is also pertinent, given the central department’s relative clout in bringing the other departments on board and theoretical ability to negotiate turf wars. However, as discussed under OUTCOMES: Final Status, the need to manage opposition was lessened by the broad brush content of the FM report, it being the first stage in a process culminating in F2030 being published two years later.

5.3.8.1 Food 2030

The Foreword to the report is written by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, leading the IGD (2010) to conclude ‘*the report clearly has backing at the highest level, with the preface being provided by the Prime Minister himself*’. However it is not clear how engaged the Prime Minister was by this point, given the policy was no longer CO-led. More prominent in interview data was discussion of Secretary of State for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs, Hilary Benn. For example FI-UK’s remark that “*his heart was in the right place*” and:

“... coming from a DfID background he understood the sustainable development context as well. And had he been given time to follow it...he had made a good start, but then the election happened and it wasn’t followed through. So I think he probably was the sort of person who could have, had he had another three to four years at it maybe begun to get somewhere”.

CS-UK4 also made reference to Benn’s “*Town Hall background*” and vegetarianism, which meant he “*engaged with the proposition in a different way than David Miliband would, or Owen Patterson*”.

5.4 BUDGET

5.4.1 Budget for Policy Development

The budget for the policy was provided out of existing resources. The Strategy Unit-based FM project team was funded out of existing departmental budgets, as were secondees and other work undertaken by departments involved. As such the *“Treasury did not have a great deal of involvement”* as the project was not *“really looking at spending money”*, because the recommendations – with the possible exception of the public food activities – *“didn’t involve spending money directly”* and *“the coordination, the systems approach, isn’t hugely expensive, if you actually then have to develop policy instruments, if you have to recreate an agricultural advisory service, or something, that would come with a price tag, but that is a little way down the line”* (CS-UK4).

5.4.1.1 Food 2030

No budget for the policy could be identified, but CS-UK3 noted *“most of the budgets you needed for Food 2030 was admin, people”*, adding that *“the Food Policy Unit [in DEFRA] was extremely well resourced at that time because it was a big political priority for our ministers”*. When asked if money would have been useful to encourage involvement from other departments, CS-UK3 said: *“maybe, but you’d have to have a hell of a lot of money, because the sort of money DEFRA spends is tiny compared to DH or DCLG”*.

5.4.2 Budget for Policy Implementation

While it has not been possible to definitively confirm, it appears there was no budget for implementation of FM. The actions were able to be undertaken within existing departmental budgets. This may have been due to FM being viewed as a first stage in a process which would lead to F2030, where the need for additional resources would have been greater.

5.4.2.1 Food 2030

No budget details for the policy could be identified.

5.5 OUTCOMES

Outcome-related factors influencing the framing and trajectory of the policy include: plans for implementation and evaluation; approach to policy instruments; use of indicators and the end status of the policy project.

5.5.1 Plans for Implementation and Evaluation

The report notes *‘The Prime Minister has asked the Cabinet Office to establish and support a Food Strategy Task Force to monitor ongoing developments in the food system and food markets, to drive forward implementation of all the measures and to publish regular reports on progress’* (Cabinet Office 2008b p111). The *Food Matters: One year on* report (FMOYO), published by DEFRA in August 2009, provided an update on progress over the previous year and identified priorities for the forthcoming 12 months. Noted progress includes:

- Establishment of Council of Food Policy advisors

- Change4Life campaign
- Roundtable on skills in farming
- Funding for Anaerobic Digestion Demonstration Programme
- Calorie information on menus scheme
- Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition
- DEFRA promotion of sustainable food and farming via various campaigns
- Roundtable on ways to increase production and consumption of fruit and veg
- DEFRA assessment of food security
- Pilots of the Healthier Food Mark to be launched later in the year (DEFRA 2009d).

Work still to do identified in the report includes addressing the following issues:

- Feeding the global population and the combined pressures of increasing demand and decreasing resources
- The burden of diets on the economy and society
- The challenges for the food and drink industry of the economic climate.

The report explains that a 'Food 2030' vision for a sustainable and secure food system was being developed, with the objectives of:

- Defining what is meant by sustainable and secure food
- Setting a roadmap to achieving the goal; and
- Building buy-in with stakeholders.

The report also notes the launch of the Foresight project to examine the challenges of feeding a growing world population.

In assessing progress on government leadership on food, the report notes how, following machinery of government changes in October 2008, DEFRA took an enhanced role on food and that its Secretary of State is chair of the new Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food. It highlights:

'...there is now much more dialogue between government departments on food-related policies which means that opportunities to link policy initiatives are identified earlier, giving greater coherence to our work' (DEFRA 2009d p12).

The report also notes the Food Strategy Taskforce '*provides a mechanism to discuss and take decisions at the most senior level within government*', with six sub-groups in place and immediate priorities as outlined above at 5.3.3.2 (DEFRA 2009 p12). General priorities for the next twelve months identified in the report include: further improvements in food safety; tackling obesity, improving dietary health and reducing food waste through clearer and accessible information; developing a better understanding of what a healthy, sustainable diet looks like; determining the food industry's potential to reduce GHG emissions; developing a more thorough understanding of the links between low income, diet and social exclusion; and responding to the Competition Commission's groceries inquiry (DEFRA 2009d). A second update was due to be published in Summer 2010 but no record could be found.

5.5.1.1 Food 2030

In its final '*Delivering Food 2030*' chapter, F2030 highlights the importance of working together (p71). As discussed in Chapter Eight, it is not clear how much constructive challenge and acknowledging disagreement actually took place.

DEFRA is described as ‘*accountable, on behalf of HM Government, for the delivery of this strategy*’ (p71), and a series of actions are listed, but while ‘*for each priority the document offers a detailed vision of what ‘success’ will look like, [although] in most cases this is expressed in aspirational terms rather than being measurable*’ (IGD 2010). No details relating to evaluation could be identified.

5.5.2 Policy Instruments

The FM narrative around role of government in food policy was examined at 5.2.3 above. This framing gives some clues as to the approach to policy instruments taken in the policy process. Interviewees revealed that mandatory instruments were favoured by the project team – for example in the introduction of a mandatory Healthy Food Mark – but were ultimately not deemed politically acceptable, because the DH “*can’t tell NHS chief executives what to do*” (NGO-UK), leading CS-UK4 to conclude “*in food policy the power doesn’t lie in the obvious place*” and Whitehall actually has few powers (CS-UK4). Available instruments mentioned in the report itself include:

- Information, publicity campaigns, advice and product labelling
- Product reformulation
- Restrictions on advertising foods high in fat, salt and added sugar – and bans on vending such foods in schools
- Choice editing
- Community activities, such as volunteering at community allotments or manning fruit and vegetable stalls
- Children learning about healthy eating and cookery at school
- Standards applied to food served in the public sector

However, the focus in FM is on information provision as the primary instrument. This is discussed further under OUTCOMES: Final Status, in relation to the Integrated Advice to Consumers proposal. The choice of policy instruments in the report is discussed more broadly by CS-UK4, who attempts to explain the reasons behind the approach, arguing it is part of a wider debate on what Whitehall is institutionally set up to “fix”:

“...because when you take out what is dealt with by the market, what’s regulated at EU level and what happens in the home and is probably going to stay in the home, there’s not a huge amount left and that was the problem that administration faced on all sorts of issues – they started talking about influencing consumers and behaviour change etc...but they had a pretty small toolkit, all the food safety stuff set in Brussels, Common Agricultural Policy set in Brussels, most trade stuff in Brussels or multinationals, supermarkets decisions. Whitehall’s power to change these things on its own in most of the spaces is really limited, which is why you end up with initiatives sponsoring productivity etc” (CS-UK4).

5.5.2.1 Food 2030

As discussed under Framing, government’s role in creating a sustainable and secure food system is seen as: encouraging change through voluntary, regulatory or economic approaches; leading by example; enabling change; building evidence and providing policy leadership (DEFRA 2010 p8). For Marsden (2010), the strategy ‘*fails to promote the design of new innovative tools of government intervention to drive the strategy forward*’, relying on “*‘business as usual’ models of policy delivery, employing largely voluntaristic notions of partnership and encouragement*’ (446). The focus on information-based levers is reiterated post-F2030 in Select Committee discussions, where Hilary Benn describes how he

does ‘not envisage the Government saying, ‘You should eat this much of that on a Monday and this much of that on a Tuesday, if that is what one is defining as a sustainable diet’. He is:

‘a great believer in information because, ultimately, when it comes to what we eat we are responsible; we are responsible as parents and we are responsible as individuals for what it is we choose to eat. The evidence is very clear about the link between a good diet and good health. I think government's role in those circumstances is to make sure that we have the information, the guidance and the encouragement’ (EFRA, Oral Evidence on DEFRA Food 2030, January 2010).

CS-UK3 points to the:

“real lack of comfort around the state telling people what to do, and it might lead you to some policy choices that are unpalatable...so you get into some moral and ethical questions about the role of government and role of the individual very quickly, which politicians of every side feel very very uncomfortable about”.

5.5.3 Indicators

Indicators are mentioned in FM in reference to the Government’s announcement of new performance management framework at the Comprehensive Spending Review in 2007:

‘This includes 30 Public Service Agreements (PSAs), which set out the key priority outcomes that the Government wants to achieve for the Spending Review period from 2008 to 2011, each supported by a handful of outcome-focused indicators. Many of these new PSAs and indicators are cross-governmental, requiring departments to work together towards an agreed outcome’ (Cabinet Office 2008b p112).

No specific indicators are mentioned for the actions and recommendations made in the report.

5.5.3.1 Food 2030

The last section of the document describes key indicators for measuring success, although some are described as ‘*under development*’.

5.5.4 Final Status

Appendix Table B6 lists actions proposed in FM, along with progress on those actions as far as could be determined during the policy analysis. However the main outputs are discussed below. Much of the content of Table C6 is taken from FMOYO, which includes an Annexe with details of the actions specified in FM and progress over the past 15 months. FM actions specify the lead department responsible and a clear timetable for delivery, which CS-A describes as “quite novel”. It is interesting to note that, of the actions listed in FM, many are the responsibility of lead departments other than DEFRA, the home of F2030. It is not clear at which point between the publication of FM in May 2008 and FMOYO in August 2009, the CO handed over the lead to DEFRA, and what the details of this handover were. However, because of the existence of FMOYO, evaluating progress is quite straightforward. The following section provides more details on what might be considered the main outputs of FM.

5.5.4.1 Food Matters GM report

In August 2009, DEFRA and the FSA published ‘*GM Crops and Foods: Follow-up to the Food Matters Report*’ (DEFRA; FSA 2009), outlining work undertaken in response to two parallel FM action points on GM crops and foods, to publish: ‘*an analysis of the potential impacts on the livestock sector arising from global trends in GM production*

and the current operation of the GM approval system in the EU’; and *‘an analysis of the extent to which changes in the market are putting a strain on the regulatory system for GM products (including animal feed) and the implications for UK consumers’*. CS-UK describes how the joint DEFRA-FSA work was *“an area of potential conflict”* but they were able to *“get some movement”*, which was *“really important because it fostered very good relationships between DEFRA and FSA on that particular issue, and it helped to clear the decks in terms of what needed to be done.”*

5.5.4.2 Cross-Government Research Strategy

Further details of the Strategy can be found in the Hilary Benn’s oral evidence on ‘DEFRA’s Food Strategy’, which notes the document came out the day after F2030 and *‘was a truly integrated effort across government and the research councils, and so on’* (EFRA 2010).

5.5.4.3 Healthier Food Mark

FMOYO reports this voluntary scheme is to be defined and ready for piloting by Autumn 2009; draft criteria for nutrition and sustainability have been developed and discussed at a stakeholder event; the Office of Government Commerce will ensure through the Collaborative Food Procurement Programme that full consideration be given to commercial implications of HFM; and evaluation will run alongside pilots until Summer 2010, followed by a full consultation with aim of going live in 2011. The report also notes the DH will seek to align the mark with other initiatives including: nutritional standards in schools; DH Improving Nutrition Standards – Joint Action Plan; Food for Life; and the sustainability agendas. Archived web pages – updated December 2009 – from the DH website explain the team is testing the revised Mark with organisations in Phase 2 of the pre-consultation pilot. This is the last update made on the HFM web page. Two interviewees remarked on the difficulties of maintaining this action in FM, and the failure to make the mark mandatory as was initially envisaged, noting a hard fight around keeping it in FM, and while *“Number Ten were pushing for mandatory food standards”*, it became voluntary; in NGO-UK’s words shifting from *“legally binding standards for hospital food”* to a *“crappy voluntary thing”* because *“between the industry, the Department of Health and the NHS that was too difficult to agree upon”* (CS-UK4; CS-UK5), which NGO-UK ascribes to *“the internal politics about what the NHS machinery could or couldn’t do”*. CS-UK4 goes further, remarking that *“Department of Health hated it from the beginning. They spent an unbelievable amount of money on consultants doing trials, Deloitte or somebody, and then they killed it off”*. CS-UK7 adds, more pragmatically, that these sorts of things *“were quite easy to agree at a senior level, at a ministerial level, about it being a good idea”* but often the *“devil was in the detail”*.

5.5.4.4 Integrated Advice to Consumers

One of the key actions was to create a system of Integrated Advice to Consumers – on food safety, nutrition and sustainability – crossing all government sources. CS-UK explains this process of creating a one-stop-shop for information uncovered contradictions, differences in nuance, and was *“going in the right direction”* and *“really motoring”* in addressing these, even in the thornier areas of adding a sustainability dimension to the advice, and work was being done on creating a shared definition and approach to measurement:

“...we spent a lot of time talking about sustainability – and the impact of sustainability, and what it actually meant, and how could it be measured, and it moved it from being a quick fix of sustainability and the three pillars, into being a low impact, healthier diet.”

It is not exactly clear what happened to the stream of work following the change of government in 2010 but CS-UK4 suggests *“the plug was pulled”* and FI-UK2 says *“we had just started to talk to them about the criteria that we would use...and we had two discussions with the FSA, but of course that all stopped under the new government”*.

5.5.4.5 Food 2030

Appendix Table B7 presents the actions to be taken following F2030, and any outcomes related to these which could be identified. Unlike FM, neither the lead department responsible for the action or timetable are specified. Progress on the actions to be taken is harder to assess in this case, for two reasons: many of the actions proposed are vague, and it is not clear whether they refer to ongoing existing activities in the government’s policy programme for food, or are new developments, though most seem to be the former. This links with CS-UK3’s comments around Labour being *“guilty of wanting strategies that boiled the ocean and not having enough practical specifics that they would be held to account for driving that delivery forward”*. CS-UK3 adds that: *“some of the business cases in Food 2030 frankly weren’t very well developed, they were ideas, strategies, they were based around principles as much as evidence and analysis”*. The second reason is there are no follow up documents available akin to FMOYO. The change in government not long after F2030 was published meant no implementation or evaluation documents were made public.

5.5.5 General Discussion of FM and F2030 Project Outputs

Along with comments on the specific actions listed above, interviewees spoke more broadly about the different outputs of FM and F2030. These comments tended to focus on the particular nature of the FM report – a precursor to a Strategy – which enabled it to skirt around some of the institutional tensions which are present when attempting to reconcile a cross-government approach to food. One participant described FM as *“pulling a trick”* (CS-UK4) as it presented *“a story about what was going on and what the challenges were, and set out some core policy objectives one might have for the food chain, and then some structures through which it might seek to pursue those”* but didn’t *“crack the problem of how to deliver on a day-in day-out basis this joined-up approach and establish an ongoing commitment from government about what it wanted to do”*. This reading is supported by FI-UK2, discussing how inherent tensions were yet to be addressed during the F2030 stage of the formulation process:

“...we had started to raise them, because I remember we had a meeting with the FSA, and we raised all those issues and we had the usual interesting discussion around that, but we didn’t get to how you would judge which was the most important factors within that criteria. But there was the will to discuss it if the government had wanted to carry on doing it” (FI-UK2)

FI-UK concurs that F2030:

“didn’t really get past the analytical phase...so it identified issues and problems, but had not got round to the point of agreeing actions and responsibilities and governance for those, and that was the point when the shutters came down”.

Similarly, NGO-UK2 comments that *“the actual document that came out was good”* because the *“overarching objectives brought together the different issues”*, *“but then our concern was about how do you actually deliver on that”*:

“The challenge was still then the relative priority given to those, and with DEFRA the concern was always that you are talking about farmers interests versus public health, is the weight going to be on economic development. But it didn’t quite get to that stage, that was the next stage” (NGO-UK2).

Charged with the task of *“cracking the problem”* of delivering FM, F2030 is characterised as limited by Whitehall’s small toolkit, and CS-UK4 acknowledges *“it would have been...it is...easier to produce a paper like that than to change the ways the system is working”* and argues the DEFRA team *“would have needed a huge amount of entrepreneurialism and luck in order not to just get bogged down in the process.”* This is linked to comments by FI-UK2, about *“cynicism around food policies”*, which *“come around about every five or six years”* but *“don’t actually go very far, they sit on the shelf and then somebody dusts them down and does them again”*. CS-UK3 raises the issue of the partisan nature of the project, noting that:

“the harsh reality is the Labour party is associated with Food 2030 and overly ambitious strategies that never got you anywhere, and it is not surprising that the incoming government wanted to be known as a no nonsense party that sorted out the economy wanted to distance themselves from it, even though privately most of them read it and said ‘yeah that looks about right’....So in a way you had the worst of both world’s from both political parties”.

Chapter Six: Policy Analysis of National Food Plan Project

The following is an analysis of the NFP policy formulation process, using the Framework Tool (FT) categories of variables: OUTSET; CONTENT; INPUT; BUDGET and OUTCOMES. The NFP policy formulation actually consisted of three separate phases – and three policy reports: Issues Paper (2011); Green Paper (2012) and White Paper (2013). These three reports are considered using a single application of the FT (rather than a separate application for each phase as was the case with FM and F2030), because not all factors are relevant for all phases.

6.1 OUTSET

The OUTSET factors influencing the framing and trajectory of the food policy are: the role of the originating actor; political party in power; timeline set; the government sponsor; and the Terms of Reference set.

6.1.1 Originating Actor

The NFP was an election commitment by the incumbent Gillard Government in 2010. The Campaign Media Statement from Minister of Agriculture Tony Burke states a NFP will be devised:

‘We will look at how we can continue to grow more food, more sustainably and will consider domestic and international food security; food safety and nutrition; issues which affect food affordability; and the sustainability of our food systems, from producers on the land, through to food businesses, manufacturers and retailers’ (Australian Labor 2010).

While the genesis of the policy is, as described by one interviewee, a bit murky, in general the catalyst for the election commitment is widely assumed to have been lobbying from the food industry, including farmers but predominantly the post-farm gate sector. CS-A5 describes how “it came out of pressure particularly from the farms around the way they were treated by supermarkets, the deep loathing of imported food and their strong desire to export their food”. CS-A5 adds: “The food industry had also been calling for a national food plan, and also a national nutrition policy, because they saw this great debate issue as being quite intractable, and they felt if there was a high-level strategic direction at the top it would help settle down some of those arguments and take some of the tensions out of the system”. Peak body the Australian Food and Grocery (AFGC) was strongly indicated in interviews: it had been “pushing very hard, under the previous chief executive, for a holistic approach to food policy”, and also for “a department with responsibility, holistically, for food” (S&T-A). FI-A2 points to a National Press Club address by its CEO in 2009, which called for a national food and grocery agenda and proposed a shift in sponsorship of the food industry out of the agriculture department and into the department for industry:

‘But even though we are the largest manufacturing industry in Australia, we are not actually in the industry portfolio; we are not the responsibility of Minister Carr. Why? Who knows, but we’re not and we think we should be’ (Carnell 2009).

The speech is said to have caught the attention of government because “whenever you suggest changing portfolio responsibility it gets the politicians attention. Because somebody is going to win and somebody is going to lose” (FI-A2). It did later switch department.

The historical context to the food industry’s position, as touched on in the Literature Review and in Chapter Four, is of a period of sustained policy activity and government support from the end of the 1990s, to something of a fall from

grace by the end of the 2000s. Interviewee FI-A2 describes how the industry benefitted from: “...the national competition policy, which was developed under the previous government, started to come into full swing in the 1990’s” and “essentially identified regulation as a cost upon industry”. But government support for industry innovation subsequently decreased, a shift which FI-A2 attributes to emerging tensions between economic and health policy goals, involving consumer advocates, and accompanied by unwanted media coverage:

“We had a complete revamping of the food standards code in late 1990s, which resulted in a lot of debate, particularly between food industry and consumer advocacy organisations, about what appropriate food regulations were. So there were a lot of headlines, even at the same time as the food industry being recognised as being able to provide this enormous potential growth, we had a lot of criticism. And then of course as we went into the 2000s the obesity debate kicked off in a big way. And I think the industry almost ran into a brick wall. We had the government running summits in 2002/3 about what to do to fix obesity, and essentially the food manufacturing sector was held up as the major contributor” (FI-A2)

In February 2009, civil society group Public Health Association Australia (PHAA) also called for an overhaul of food policy, recommending the government establish an integrated national food policy across all areas, incorporating agriculture and fisheries, health, education, social exclusion, treasury, innovation and the environment (PHAA 2009). A number of public servants interviewed understood the election commitment to be aimed at appeasing groups in the country that questioned its food security, along with additional factors negatively impacting on the pre- and post-farmgate food stages of the supply chain (CS-A5; CS-A). CS-A and FI-A3 also highlight the influence of research taking place at the time around societal changes: “feedback from CSIRO, AFGC, from companies, even the universities, that things weren’t working properly” (FI-A3). A theme which will be returned to later is how stakeholder groups including farmers, industry and public health were pushing for government action, but there were differing conceptions of what the NFP represented in policy terms, “all three of them had utterly different things in mind, different views of what it should look like” (CS-A5). Policy transfer from the UK was also mooted as a driver by several interviewees, for instance FI-A2 describes how when FM came out in the UK:

“...we thought this is potentially a good idea. And the thing that impressed us the most about that was that it came out of the department of Cabinet. It suggested a very comprehensive document, it also gave the rationale for it very well. Which was that food manufacturing is not only a significant part of the economy but integral to lives of everyone in Britain, contributes to health and wealth of the nation. And that is how I described it when I was advocating for a national food policy” (FI-A2).

According to Caraher et al’s (2015) analysis of stakeholder involvement in NFP formulation, the Global Foundation (GF) was also an important influence. GF describes itself as ‘a not-for-profit organisation focused on serving the longer-term public good and backed by private sector and philanthropic sponsors and a diverse membership base’ (www.globalfoundation.org.au). One of the main strands of work highlighted on its website is around food – specifically linking Australia with Asia ‘for future food security’. It describes how ‘for more than 10 years, the Foundation has been the leading contributor to the development of an Australian national food plan, to better organise efforts for Australia to become a global food superpower’. Carey et al note that The Foundation:

‘established a Food Security Working Group in 2009 that included representatives of Woolworths (one of Australia’s two main retailers), the Australian Food and Grocery Council (the national peak body representing food manufacturers)(31), the National Farmers’ Federation (the national peak body representing farmers) and the CSIRO (Australia’s national science agency)’ (2016 p5).

6.1.2 Timeline and Time Taken

The Timeline for the NFP to be implemented is suggested in its ‘Vision for the year 2025’.

Table 6.1 Timetable of National Food Plan Formulation

Date	Event
August 17 2010	Election Commitment by Gillard Labor Government
August 21 2010	Incumbent wins Election Change of Agriculture Minister
Autumn 2010	National Food Policy Working Group (2010-2012)
June 2011	National Food Plan Issues Paper published
Summer 2011	National Food Plan Issues Paper Consultation 48 written consultation questions – 279 submissions 19 Roundtable Meetings Departmental Secondments to DAFF end
July 2012	National Food Plan Green Paper Published (states White Paper due to be finalised later in 2012)
17 July to 30 Sept 2012	National Food Plan Green Paper Consultation 23 written consultation questions - 401 written submissions = more than 5000 pages 28 public meetings across Australia - held in every State and Territory - attended by more than 700 people Eight CEO-level roundtable meetings, attended by more than 120 people Public webcast panel discussion, with questions and comments submitted by stakeholders
May 2013	National Food Plan White Paper published
September 2013	Election – Labor loses to Coalition

Source: Author

The NFP Green Paper, published in July 2012, says it is intended to inform discussion on the development of the White Paper, due to be finalised later in 2012. In reality the White Paper was not published until May 2013. Interview data reveals a lack of resources allocated to formulation, plus a somewhat unusual three-stage process and double consultation. Lack of resources were particularly problematic with the Issues Paper, which took a long time to put together as “*they didn’t put any resources into it*” (CS-A6), followed by a consultation, and then a lengthy three months of Green Paper public consultation resulting in 5,000 pages of documents (CS-A6). In fact, the Green Paper was described as “*an Issues Paper all over again*”, in that it did not present a developed set of options to select from but rather laid out the issues again, often expanding on these, and raised some possible responses (CS-A6).

6.1.3 Terms of Reference

The lack of ‘official’ ToR, were considered “*one of the failings of the process*” (CS-A6), in that “*...people wanted a food plan, [but] no one knew what they wanted the food plan to do. No one had thought about what is the scope – what is in scope what is not in scope*” (CS-A6). The Issues Paper acted as a de facto ToR, but its breadth – along with changing staff, and a changing minister, each one bringing “*different expectations about what they thought the job was*” (CS-A6) – compounded the problem of scoping the policy. These differing expectations are crystallised in the remark of one public servant involved that “*it wasn’t necessarily health policy it was food policy*” and “*the NFP was really there for the agricultural industry and the food industry, and the food industry wasn’t necessarily there as a determinant of*

all health issues, and health, any nutritional health reporting or papers or white papers or whatever they might want to do”, adding:

“...so it was around the production of food, given that we can produce, and making sure we’ve got enough, we can export and those sorts of things, it wasn’t around what we should be eating, you know. That was not what the question was about. It wasn’t about nutrition, it wasn’t about health, it was a food plan” (CS-A).

When pushed about the health aims of the plan this understanding was reiterated:

“Well I think when we talk about health we talk about the soils, making sure you have good soils because you don’t want mineral depleted soils, I think that is what you mean when you say that. The question wasn’t around what should we be eating, what should we be making. These are choice things...what we should be eating is a choice thing” (CS-A)

6.1.4 Political Party and Stage in Electoral Cycle

The NFP was an election commitment by the Labor government. This is mentioned in both the Issues Paper and the White Paper. Interviewees remarked on the political circumstances of the Labor party at the time the NFP reached White Paper stage, which impacted the final version of the policy and its influence when published. For FPPT-A, *“politics started to play a bigger role in terms of already beginning to look ahead to see what was going to be the change in government, what their policies were going to be, how would they react to something like this”*, meaning the policy *“got sanitised”*, *“to try and make it fit with whichever government happened to come in”*. FI-A2 describes how during the final months of policy development *“the government was in strife”*, where a bizarre political atmosphere made it *“very difficult for the government to get airplay for good things”*, leading to the release being *“a bit of a fizzle”*. This is echoed by NGO-A5, describing the NFP as becoming *“a political victim”* and getting *“buried”* – launched on a Sunday at Brisbane Farmers’ Market. For (S&T-A):

“...the minister was in political survival mode by the time it came along and it clearly wasn’t going to win the government too many votes. So at that point all they were focused on was what was actually going to win them an extra vote, and the National Food Plan wasn’t.”

This is also said to have impacted on the way implementation was addressed in the formulation process, because by the time the plan was released *“people could see the national government was a dead duck, and thought we don’t want to waste our effort developing implementation plans the incoming government might simply throw out” (S&T-A)*. This issue of electoral change figured heavily in the interviewees’ analysis of the NFP’s trajectory, with one drawing parallels with an State-level attempt to create an integrated plan which *“never saw the light of day”* because the government of Victoria changed (NGO-A4). The issue of impact of electoral cycles is returned to in Chapter Eight.

6.1.5 Government Sponsor/ Lead Department

The NFP was sponsored by the Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). A civil servant involved pointed to the influence of administrative orders²⁸, which assigned the issue of food security to DAFF as of 2010, and a change in the approach to White Paper policy formulation:

“So that means the only other place that this National Food Plan would have gone would have been to Prime Minister and Cabinet itself. And that used to be the model for a lot of White Papers, but under the previous

²⁸ Updated with each new government and providing the scope of portfolio responsibilities

government it changed where those White Papers were decentralised to the responsible portfolio agencies” (CS-A6).

Several interviewees were clear on the impact that agriculture department sponsorship had on the formulation process and content.

“...having the policy led by DAFF [which] signalled from the very start this was what was important, and everything else was clearly going to take a back seat” (NGO-A4).

“My view was this would be a plan for industry, and it was a plan for industry. It was tokenistic. But it was worse than I expected” (NGO-A3).

A number of interviewees specifically raised tensions between sponsorship by DAFF and the initial aim to create an integrated approach encompassing health/nutrition:

“...there was tensions between departments, because they can’t take the lead, so the lead was DAFF and that caused a great deal of angst for the Federal Department of Health.” (CS-A4).

“It was an interesting process. It started pretty firmly in the agriculture sector. So that was the original discussion. The amount of feedback that received, they did pick up on a lot of the health people’s comments and profiled the food and nutrition components much more prominently in the Green Paper, then that basically fell away for the White Paper... I certainly heard that the fallout of the food and nutrition components was really a fall out between public servants. So the health people I don’t think they were comfortable with nutrition and public health stuff being within a policy platform being advanced by the agriculture sector” (NGO-A).

“...it is heavily focused on agriculture because they had the control, and there were perhaps elements where there was push back from health and saying ‘that’s us not you’, so it was less of a joint effort in the end and more an Ag paper” (CS-A3).

The negative impact of a focus on agriculture at the expense of manufacturing and retail was expressed by a food industry interviewee:

“...there was a larger Ag focus, so it missed the balance between the agriculture and manufacturing industry. We said over and over again that people don’t eat wheat they eat bread, they don’t eat cows they eat meat. And almost everything we eat is processed to some extent, there are very few food products that don’t go through some kind of quality assurance, some kind of handling or storage mechanism” (FI-A2).

While CS-A2 was more sanguine about the influence of the lead department:

“I just think it was a fairly lame attempt – and not having money behind really gave the impression that it was a bit of window dressing. And I don’t think it’s the agency’s issue” (CS-A2)

Interviewees from the civil service, food industry and civil society stated a preference for sponsorship by Prime Minister and Cabinet:

“If you are in a department and something comes from the Prime Minister’s office, departments feel obliged to respond, albeit begrudgingly because they have other work to do” (CS-A7).

“For the policy to have been led within the department of Premier and Cabinet would have been a good start... and then having a clear mechanism for what the integration would be between those departments, how would they be involved in the development of the policy, how would the different goals be brought together” (NGO-A4).

The AFGC had previously made clear its preference for a central department to develop a national food policy, because while “*everyone said it's a great idea*”, departments are not set up to work on cross-domain projects:

“...when you talk to health they say but we can't do it because it that's got all that environment stuff in it. We can do the health bit, we can't do the environment or the industry bit. So right across the people I've spoken to, that's been the outcome and that's the reason we're calling for PM and C to take a leadership role here. In Health, and really we work really closely with Health on things like obesity and advertising, a great relationship. But they're not in the business of ETSes or environment or food waste or any of those areas, similarly with DAFF, SIM...and the list goes on” (Carnell 2009).

The food industry provided specific recommendations for centralised sponsorship in consultation submissions:

“We suggested in our submissions that the whole national food plan actually be domiciled within the department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and we suggested a parliamentary secretary to run the whole thing, and suggested it didn't mean more money because you could just second people from the other departments, and run the nutrition part, the environment, the trade, the industry part, just run the damn thing and let's get this thing up and running.” (FI-A2).

However one civil servant notes that though the policy lead was DAFF “*it didn't mean we didn't have Prime Minister and Cabinet all over the paper in the end*” (CS-A). And another, CS-A7, describes how – although departments do feel an obligation to respond to the PM's office – centralised sponsorship proved problematic in their previous experience working in Canberra when deputy PM Julia Gillard championed the social inclusion agenda from PM&C but: “*it didn't change much at all. It is like turning around a tanker....the institutional imperatives. Departments are caught up with the metrics of history, stakeholder demands, elections, all so often trump big picture ideas about integrated policy.*”

6.2 CONTENT

The CONTENT factors influencing the framing and trajectory of the policy are: Definition of the problem; Goals and Objectives; Framing; Policy Omissions; Degree of Change; and Policy Integration.

The NFP was formulated through a Green-White Paper process. In a sense this suggests more political weight than previous plans, policies and strategies. Though according to CS-A7:

“A White Paper means that other departments are consulted, that there are opportunities for comment, it heralds the government saying ‘we are serious about this’, but it doesn't necessarily translate into real change, law or financial support.”

The document consists of eight chapters, the first covering the vision to 2025 – which includes the goals in Figure 6.1. Chapter Two covers ‘*Trends, Opportunities and Challenges*’, and describes the rising world population, in particular in Asia, ‘*potential constraints on growth*’, strengths in food production, and features a section on consumers, and poor diet. Chapter Three is about ‘*Growing Exports*’, stats on the food industry, plus how the goals to 2025 will be achieved, including through new activities such as research funds to better understand consumer market opportunities in Asia, and to facilitate exports. Chapter Four on ‘*Thriving Industry*’ has a similar format, with goals and actions to support these. As discussed at 6.5.4, it is often not clear which activities are new and which are ongoing. Chapter Five covers ‘*Families and Communities*’, and focuses on food security issues, along with listing many of the ongoing activities targeting healthy and nutritious food. There is also a focus on ‘*informing our community*’, covering consumer information including labelling. Chapter Six looks at Global Food Security, outlining how Australia contributes, and

Seven is about ‘*Sustainable Food*’, with a focus on sustainability to support productivity, on land use, soils, water, native vegetation and pollinating insects, pests and weeds. There is also a section on food waste. Appendix Table C1 more fully summarises the White Paper contents. Finally, Chapter Seven is about ‘*Delivering the National Food Plan*’, and features a table of goals and ‘*pathways*’ to achieve the goals. Appendix Table C3 provides this list of actions along with any progress on them that could be identified.

6.2.1 Definition of the problem

The problem the NFP is aimed at addressing is not made explicit in the policy documents. However, based on the plan’s aim (as stated in the Issues Paper) to ‘*better explain and better integrate Australia’s approach to food policy*’ and the government’s stated recognition that ‘*improvements could be made to its current approach to food policy, for example by addressing any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies, or explaining its policies in a single framework*’ (DAFF 2011 pvi), it can be assumed the current policy approach is deemed problematic. However, this sentiment is not carried through to the end of the process. By White Paper stage the government’s policy approach is presented as less problematic:

‘While food can be an important element in many issues, the role of the National Food Plan is not to solve every challenge with some connection to food. Its role is limited to ensuring that Australia has a sustainable, globally competitive and resilient food supply that supports access to nutritious and affordable food. The government deals with the broader issues through a range of policies’ (DAFF 2013 p14).

While food security and food industry productivity are a focus, these are not really presented as problems per se, which is considered by CS-A6 as “*where the plan is weakest*”. Rather, goals are expressed as ‘*protecting and maintaining*’ food security, and the food industry is characterised as thriving and able to cope with challenges such as those related to the environment, although the Issues Paper does concede food security is not simply a matter of quantity, but also affordability and quality (DAFF 2011 pvii). Several consultation submissions, including that of the State Government of Victoria, argue the definition of food security should be expanded to emphasise ‘*individual and community food security in urban and regional communities*’ and ‘*more emphasis should also be given to the importance of the nutritional quality of food, as well as food quantity and safety*’ (State Government of Victoria 2012 p9).

Similarly, environmental issues are played down: the Issues Paper notes how climatic factors ‘*may pose a challenge to agricultural productivity growth*’. The framing of environmental issues as potential barriers to productivity is a running theme, but the industry’s ‘*environmental performance credentials to meet national and international obligations and consumer preferences for food including how it is produced, transported and sold*’ are proposed as responding to the problem (DAFF 2011 pxii). The Green Paper describes environmental problems associated with food more fully, acknowledging the fragility of Australia’s natural resources, but also linking to constraint of productivity specifically, noting for example ‘*Australia does face some long-term challenges to food production from climate change and limits to our natural resources including land, energy and water*’ (DAFF 2012 p6) and ‘*ongoing efforts are needed to ensure production growth is not limited by natural resource constraints*’ (DAFF 2012 p196). The White Paper presents environmental issues as a constraint on growth (rather than issues in their own right) even more strongly, and positions challenges as in the past, for example stating ‘*historically, using natural resources for food production in Australia has had environmental costs such as soil erosion and degradation of inland waterways*’ but ‘*more recently we have been working to improve the condition of our natural resources*’ (DAFF 2013 p74). Or in the future: ‘*in the years ahead Australia’s food system will face challenges, such as climate change, population growth, changing economic*

conditions, competition for resources and diet-related health issues' (DAFF 2013 p6). Although two of the most significant environmental issues for the country – soil quality and water availability – are raised (DAFF 2013 p75; 77). Health is highlighted as a problem to be addressed by the NFP in the Issues Paper, which states *'the burden of disease due to poor nutrition is related primarily to the excessive intake of energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods'* (DAFF 2011 p21). However, by the Green Paper health has been separated into a stand-alone policy of its own, as discussed further below, under CONTENT: Policy Omissions (6.2.4).

6.2.2 Goals and Objectives

One key aim was to create a whole-of-government food policy, outlining the government's vision to 2030. This is explicitly referenced in the 2011 Issues Paper:


'Australian governments have an extensive range of general economic policy measures and programs, regulations and other initiatives that respond to these forces and affect the food supply and demand. The Australian Government has not, however, defined an overarching approach to food policy. The government believes that an overarching approach will help protect and improve Australia's enviable food security status and support population health outcomes, among other things, and has committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs' (DAFF 2011 p1).

However, a shift of emphasis on integration took place (see 6.2.6). The Issues Paper also features some general objectives around food industry productivity and food security, stating that *'one key objective of a national food plan would be to improve productivity'* (DAFF 2011 p2) and that *'our nation's food supply is secure, and we need to remain vigilant in protecting that food security in the years to come. At the same time we want to ensure our food industry can make the most of the rapidly developing market opportunities for food industry goods and services, especially in Asia'* (DAFF 2011 piii). By Green Paper stage, a specific *'proposed outcome'* for the NFP is stated as: *'A sustainable, globally competitive, resilient food supply, supporting access to nutritious and affordable food'* (DAFF 2012 p48). To achieve this, seven *'high-level objectives'* are listed:

1. Identify and mitigate potential risks to Australia's food security
2. Reduce barriers to a safe and nutritious food supply that responds to the evolving preferences and needs of all Australians and supports population health
3. Support the global competitiveness and productivity growth of the food supply chain, including through research, science and innovation
4. Maintain and improve the natural resource base underpinning food production in Australia
5. Reduce barriers food businesses face in accessing international and domestic markets
6. Contribute to global food security
7. Contribute to economic prosperity, employment and community wellbeing in regional Australia.

These objectives have evolved by White Paper stage to a set of goals to 2025, under four headings of *'Growing Exports'*; *'Thriving Communities'*; *'People'* and *'Sustainable Food'*:

Figure 6.1: Goals of the National Food Plan White Paper



Source: DAFF 2013

The goals in Figure 6.1 can also be found listed at Appendix Table C.3.

The below table compares the goals and objectives stated at each stage of the NFP formulation process, tracing the themes of integration, food security, productivity, health and sustainability, highlighting how a more mixed focus at the outset shifts to a production focus:

KEY

Policy Integration	⊕
Food Security	▲
Productivity	⌂
Health	♥
Sustainability	●

Table 6.2: Changing
NFP Objectives

In its 2010 election commitment the Australian Government indicated that the key aims for a national food plan were to integrate food policy by looking at the whole food supply chain, to protect Australia's food security, and to develop a strategy to maximise food production opportunities. DAFF 2011 p1	▲ ▼	1. Identify and mitigate potential risks to Australia's food security	▲	1. The value of Australia's agriculture and food-related exports will have increased by 45 per cent (in real terms), contributing to an increase in our gross domestic product. 2. Australia will have stronger food trade and investment relationships with countries across the region and the capabilities to promote Australian interests. 3. Australia will have a globally recognised food brand that is synonymous with high-quality, innovative, safe and sustainable food, services and technology.	▼
A national food plan, when finalised, would seek to better explain and better integrate Australia's approach to food policy, from production through to consumption, and be consistent with the government's market-based policy approach and commitment to fiscal discipline DAFF2011 p2		2. Reduce barriers to a safe and nutritious food supply that responds to the evolving preferences and needs of all Australians and supports population health	♥		
The government believes that an overarching approach would help protect and improve Australia's enviable food security status, and support population health outcomes, among other things, and has committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs. DAFF 2011 px	▲ ♥	3. Support the global competitiveness and productivity growth of the food supply chain, including through research, science and innovation	▼		
The government recognises that improvements could be made to its current approach to food policy, for example by addressing any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies, or explaining its policies in a single framework. DAFF2011 p2		4. Maintain and improve the natural resource base underpinning food production in Australia	●		
Our nation's food supply is secure, and we need to remain vigilant in protecting that food security in the years to come. At the same time we want to ensure our food industry can make the most of the rapidly developing market opportunities for food industry goods and services, especially in Asia. DAFF 2011 piii	▲ ▼	5. Reduce barriers food businesses face in accessing international and domestic markets	▼		
One key objective of a national food plan would be to improve productivity by identifying potential policy and regulatory reforms across the food chain, consistent with Australia's high levels of food safety. DAFF 2011 p2	▼	6. Contribute to global food security	▲		
In articulating a whole-of-chain approach government hopes to identify: Domestic and international food security threats and opportunities Issues that affect food affordability How to support the nutritional requirements of the Australian population and help address burden of obesity and diet-related disease Sustainability of Australia's food systems, at all points along food supply chain How to ensure appropriate economic, taxation, labour market and education policy settings for a robust food supply chain. DAFF 2011 p2	▲ ♥ ●	7. Contribute to economic prosperity, employment and community wellbeing in regional Australia	▲		
				4. Australia's agricultural productivity will have increased by 30 per cent, helping farmers grow more food using fewer inputs. 5. Innovation in Australia's food manufacturing industry will have increased, building scale and capability through collaborations to make the most of emerging opportunities in the Asian region. 6. Australia's agriculture and fisheries workforce will have built its skills base, increasing the proportion with post-school qualifications. 7. Australia's infrastructure and biosecurity systems will support a growing food industry, moving food cost-effectively and efficiently to markets and supporting new export opportunities. 8. Participation by Australian food businesses in the digital economy will have increased, driving productivity gains and innovation and creating connections with global markets. 9. Australia will be among the top five most efficiently regulated countries in the world, reducing business costs.	▼
				10. Australia will have built on its high level of food security by continuing to improve access to safe and nutritious food for those living in remote communities or struggling with disadvantage. 11. Australia will be considered to be in the top three countries in the world for food safety, increasing the reputation of Australia's exports. 12. Australians will have the information they need to help them make decisions about food. 13. Australian children will have a better understanding of how food is produced. 14. Australia will have contributed to global food security by helping farmers in developing countries gain access to new agricultural technologies.	▲ ♥
				15. Australia will produce food sustainably and will have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes. 16. Australia will have reduced per capita food waste	●

6.2.3 Framing

Along with explicit goals and objectives, certain ‘frames’ which underpin the policy can be identified in the NFP policy documents: Food Security; Innovation, Competition and Efficiency; and Appropriate Role of Government. A full list of examples is in Appendix Table C4.

6.2.3.1 Food Security

One NFP frame is ‘abundance’. This is a theme which was picked up by interviewees, particularly those in civil society, but also civil servants. As discussed at 6.2.1, Australia is portrayed as food secure in all three iterations of the NFP.

6.2.3.2 Innovation, Competition and Efficiency

Innovation, competition and efficiency feature strongly in all NFP iterations. The Issues Paper states *‘it is important that Australia fosters an innovative, efficient, competitive and sustainable customer-focused food industry to ensure Australia’s food security and contribution to global food security’*. *‘Potential benefits’* of such an approach are *‘a more affordable and nutritious food supply with a reduced environmental footprint and opportunities for growth in regional economies’* (DAFF 2011 p2). The connection between benefits to consumers is repeated, linking a competitive food sector with *‘greater benefits for all Australians, including improvements in food quality, greater consumer choice, competitive grocery pricing, and sufficient growth in food supplies to meet expanding demand’* (DAFF 2011 p31). Similar links are made in the Green Paper around government support for *‘maintaining a sustainable, globally competitive, resilient food supply that supports access to nutritious and affordable food’* (DAFF 2012 p61) and feature strongly again in the White Paper, including as the first and second of the NFP’s priorities laid out in the Executive Summary:

‘First, Australia must compete strongly to capture a share of these new global opportunities. We need to build on our strengths and capitalise on our advantages, growing our exports and building market share against strong competition from others. Second, Australia must have a competitive and productive food industry. The industry brings food to our tables, provides one-in-six Australian jobs and is the lifeblood of many regional towns’ (DAFF 2013 p6).

It is interesting to note that the results of the stakeholder consultation are dismissed, with clear links here to the competition frame:

‘While some stakeholders have called for further regulation of the major supermarkets, we need to be careful to ensure regulation does not stifle competition or impose unnecessary red tape and costs on businesses that may lead to higher food prices for consumers. We will continue to work to improve the competitiveness of our food industry in partnership with industry and the community. Businesses and individuals with concerns about potential anti-competitive or unconscionable conduct can contact the ACCC. Consumers can also use their purchasing power as a significant driver for change’ (DAFF 2013 p50).

By White Paper, the competition frame is explicitly linked several times to the Asian Century, noting for example that *‘Food businesses must continue to innovate to meet the growing need for food in the Asian century’* (DAFF 2013 p34).

6.2.3.3 Appropriate Role of Government

Framing can also focus on particular policy instruments, evident in the NFP Green and White Papers in particular, where references to ‘freedom’ and the power of consumers are combined with preferences for minimal regulation. The Green Paper positions government as *‘not seeking to tell industry and consumers what to do’* but rather providing policy direction so food businesses and interest groups can *‘address challenges and opportunities’* (DAFF 2012 p21). It is later reiterated *‘the major participants in the food system are individuals and businesses’* (DAFF 2012 p30), although elsewhere there is a recognition there are issues for government to solve, with the roundabout statement that *‘some issues are for industry and others to solve, not government’* (DAFF 2012 p123). The White Paper also focuses heavily on freedom to choose: *‘Australians are free to make their own choices about food: Farmers decide the food they produce and people decide what to eat’* (DAFF 2013 p18), with the government only intervening *‘to prevent harm or meet our international obligations’* (DAFF 2013 p18). The importance of *‘free and open markets’* is emphasised, although there is recognition that this should be balanced with government intervention *‘where appropriate to address market failures’* (DAFF 2013 p18).

6.2.4 Policy Omissions

The key omission in the final NFP White Paper is health policy. While the Issues Paper states an aim to *‘support population health outcomes’* (DAFF 2011 p2) and an objective to identify *‘how to support the nutritional requirements of the Australian population and help address the burden of obesity and diet-related disease’* (DAFF 2011 p2), and the Green Paper notes how protecting and promoting public health and nutrition outcomes was seen as extremely important by consultees, by White Paper stage the decision had been taken to remove health from the NFP:

‘The issue of health and nutrition is significant and therefore requires a specific, strong and multifaceted focus separate from, but complementary to, the National Food Plan. To guide programs and health and nutrition policies, we are developing a National Nutrition Policy’ (DAFF 2013 p14).

As a result, *“there is virtually nothing of health left in the White Paper”* (NGO-A4). Focus shifted from the Green Paper’s seven principles, where *“health came into one of those”* to the White Paper *“where health became relegated to one of the 16 different themes...under People”* (NGO-A4). This ‘hiving off’ as it was often referred to was viewed as *“the big disappointment”* (NGO-A3), resulting from integration challenges where *“health and environment were the two most difficult - health was the most difficult one”* (CS-A6), which NGO-A had heard *“was really a fall out between public servants”*, because *“the health people I don’t think they were comfortable with nutrition and public health stuff being within a policy platform being advanced by the agriculture sector.”* CS-A2 supports this reading, stating that the hiving off of nutrition was a *“pragmatic solution but not ideal outcome”*, reflecting *“how far apart they are”*. NGO-A3 goes further, arguing *“that is part of the tactic, so they split it, and then delay”*.

Progress on the National Nutrition Policy appears to have halted. The Department of Health website states: *‘The Department of Health and Ageing is leading the Development of the Nutrition Policy with input from States and Territories’* with a National Nutrition Committee made up of *‘senior level*

representatives from the State and Territory health departments and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’ providing advice on the policy development process (Department of Health 2013, accessed October 2016). It describes how *‘the Policy is anticipated to provide an overarching framework to identify, prioritise, drive and monitor nutrition initiatives’*, and will be finalised in 2014 (Department of Health 2013, accessed October 2016). However, the page was last updated in April 2013. The page also notes that a ‘scoping study’ is underway. In fact the scoping study – acquired and disseminated by an academic via a lengthy freedom of information request – provides interesting insights, particularly in terms of drivers to link the health and environmental domains in Australian food policy, and strongly supports whole-of-government approaches. The 784-page study, by Queensland University of Technology’s School of Public Health and Social Work and School of Exercise and Nutrition Sciences (Lock 2015), the result of reviewing over 15,700 abstracts and 389 full reports (QUT 2013 p4), concludes *‘a new comprehensive nutrition policy is required urgently’* (QUT p7-8) and recommends key principles should encompass food, nutrition and health, but also social equity and environmental sustainability. It states *‘environmental sustainability is critical to ensure the supply of healthy foods both now and into the future’* (QUT p12). The study also addresses policy integration²⁹, recommending *‘Development, implementation and evaluation...should be underpinned by strong whole-of-government governance mechanisms with cross-sectoral and expert representation’* (QUT p14), because *‘the evidence is that whole-of-government approaches are the most sustained internationally’* and highlights the barrier of electoral cycles, so *‘a bi-partisan approach could enhance sustainability’* (QUT p14).

6.2.5 Degree of Change

The degree of policy change shifts over the formulation process. As discussed under 6.2.2, the Issues Paper proposes *‘an overarching approach will help protect and improve Australia’s enviable food security status and support population health outcomes, among other things’* and states the government has *‘committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs’* (DAFF 2011 p1). However, the framing of the policy problems – in particular the downplaying of food security, environmental challenges and hiving off of health – suggests significant policy change is not necessary (see 6.2.3). Further evidence is the change in prominence given to integration through the process.

6.2.6 Policy Integration

As stated in the Issues Paper *‘in its 2010 election commitment the Australian Government indicated that the key aims for a national food plan were to integrate food policy by looking at the whole food supply chain, to protect Australia’s food security, and to develop a strategy to maximise food production opportunities’* (DAFF 2011p1). Table 6.3 presents quotes from the policy documents referring to policy integration, and related themes. In summary, the early stages of the NFP present the difficulty of working without an overarching framework; the need to better integrate food policy along the supply chain; and between production to consumption; and the beneficial impacts of doing so – namely to *‘protect and improve Australia’s enviable food security status, and support population health outcomes’* (DAFF 2011 pvi).

²⁹ Recommendation Four

Table 6.3: References to Integration in in NFP Issues Paper	Green Paper	White Paper
There are currently many government policies, programs and regulations to address food-related policy issues, as outlined in this paper. There is, however, no overarching food policy framework. The development of a national food plan will address this need by better integrating food policy along the whole food supply chain—from paddock to plate. (piii) Australian governments also have an extensive range of policies, programs and regulations that respond to these forces and affect food supply and demand. The Australian Government has not, however, defined an overarching approach to food policy. The government believes that an overarching approach would help protect and improve Australia’s enviable food security status, and support population health outcomes, among other things, and has committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs. (pvi) The government recognises that improvements could be made to its current approach to food policy, for example by addressing any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies, or explaining its policies in a single framework. (pvi) And while Australian governments have many policies and programs that affect food supply and demand these can sometimes work against each other. Greater coordination and clarity of goals will help Australia maintain its enviable food security status, improve the quality of its food, support population health outcomes and build a competitive and vibrant industry. (p1) A national food plan, when finalised, would seek to better explain and better integrate Australia’s approach to food policy, from production through to consumption, and be consistent with the government’s market-based policy approach and commitment to fiscal discipline. (p2)	The National Food Plan will better integrate all aspects of food policy by taking a whole-of-food-system approach covering primary production, transport, storage and distribution, processing, manufacturing, retailing, international trade, consumers, related service sectors and the wider community. (p20) The plan will provide a framework for continual improvement and response to emerging issues as well as management of policy trade-offs and allocation of public resourcing. (p21) This is the first time a whole-of-food-system approach to policy has been undertaken by the Australian Government, and it is expected the discussion between all levels of government, industry and the community on food issues will continue to evolve. (p21) Government policies often interact and this is particularly so in the area of food, where agriculture, fisheries, trade, regional, environmental, health and broader economic policy are all closely associated. In developing the National Food Plan, the Australian Government wants to clearly articulate the direction of policies affecting the food system, thereby increasing transparency and providing policy certainty to industry and the wider community. (p25) Effective cooperation between different tiers of government in Australia is of utmost importance to ensure the best policy results. State and Territory governments can legislate to address many aspects of food policy, particularly where regulation is required. (p44) Key policy approaches (and related programs and regulations) are managed by a number of Australian Government portfolios as depicted in Figure 3.3. While these arrangements are considered to be effective and deliver a good mix of economic, environmental and social benefits for the Australian community, there are some challenges. For example, there is complex interaction between government bodies when formulating policy, making operational decisions or regulating the food system – with a large number of bodies directly or indirectly involved as policy or	While food can be an important element in many issues, the role of the National Food Plan is not to solve every challenge with some connection to food. Its role is limited to ensuring that Australia has a sustainable, globally competitive and resilient food supply that supports access to nutritious and affordable food. The government deals with the broader issues through a range of policies. (p14) Australia’s food system has many elements and players, and interactions between them can be complex. Positive actions in one area can have unintended negative effects in another. In such a complex system there is often no ideal solution to a problem, so it is important that we carefully weigh up the benefits and costs of our decisions and decide on the compromises we might need to make. (p18) State, Territory and local governments play important roles within the food system. To ensure that food policy is integrated and coordinated across all levels of government we are committed to working with the States and Territories on food-related policy through the Council of Australian Governments Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation, the Standing Council on Primary Industries and other relevant forums. We will also encourage strong links between the Australian Council on Food and these Council of Australian Governments forums. (p19) We will encourage collaboration and the integration of food into regional plans by providing opportunities for regions with an interest in food to

One stakeholder concern about food policy is that it is not sufficiently coordinated or consistent, and some have suggested formal mechanisms should be instigated to address this. One example cited is the United Kingdom which established a Cabinet sub-committee dedicated to food policy. (p8)	operational agencies, or as regulators. (p46) The Australian Government does not propose to change these arrangements but rather to become smarter at coordinating across agencies to ensure its policies continue to help the Australian food system adapt to changing economic, environmental and social pressures. (p48) The government proposes to establish the National Food Plan as a framework to shape ongoing activities within the food system. The intent of the framework would be to establish an integrated approach to food-related policies and programs to benefit food businesses and consumers. (p48) Leadership, stakeholder engagement, and monitoring and evaluation have been identified as possible high-level focus points to improve food-related policy integration. Within these areas the government believes improving consultation mechanisms and fostering whole-of-food-system dialogue is paramount. (p52) There was general recognition of the value of efficient and effective government regulation in certain areas, such as food safety, but common concern about the lack of integration and coherence of food-related policy and regulation across the supply chain. Stakeholders emphasised the need for more efficient and effective regulation. (p122)	come together and discuss best practice and regional branding. (p54)

Source: Author from DAFF (2011); (2012); (2013)

The Issues and Green Papers highlight the issue of gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies which can occur in food policy (DAFF 2011 pvi); policy trade-offs (DAFF 2012 p21), and how policies and programs that affect food supply and demand are numerous and can sometimes work against each other (DAFF 2011 p1), specifically mentioning how ‘government policies often interact and this is particularly so in the area of food, where agriculture, fisheries, trade, regional, environmental, health and broader economic policy are all closely associated’ (DAFF 2012 p25). However, despite a claim of increasing transparency and providing policy certainty, there is no analysis available of policy overlaps, conflicts or trade-offs in any of the documents, and interviewees were not aware of one. Interviewees spoke of the policy’s shifting ambitions through the process, in relation to its attempt to integrate the different aspects of health, agriculture, environment and so on, with CS-A2 concluding: “it set out to do that, and ended up not being able to”, and highlighting a lack of “buy in from the other departments”. NGO-A describes the approach to integration as falling apart through the course of the process, noting while the Green Paper had given stakeholders some optimism:

“...if we’d been realistic along the way we probably would have realised it’s not going to work that way. I don’t think there is enough history within Australia of having that cross-government department more systems-based approaches to things. And we need to be smarter at breaking down some of those barriers”.

NGO-A4 makes the distinction between what the public policy literature might classify as ‘policy integration’ and ‘policy coordination’, arguing it “still purported to be a whole-of-government policy at the end” and “with the release of policy two [Green Paper] it still seemed to talk about a whole-of-government policy” but:

“...what it ended up as was not a whole-of-government policy in terms of a policy that tries to resolve any conflicts or integrate policy tensions and deal with them. It was a whole-of-government policy in terms of coordinating different aspects of policy into a document without any attempt to resolve the tensions between those different aspects of policy. So whole-of-government coordinated policy, as opposed to whole-of-government integrated policy.”

The imprecise use of terms such as policy integration, whole-of-government and ‘over-arching’, without clear reference to *what* is going to be integrated or *how* it will be achieved, is discussed in Chapter Eight.

6.3 INPUT

INPUT factors are: Input from government departments in the policy formulation; Mechanism for Coordination; Institutional Reform as a result of the policy; Lead Personnel; Advisory Groups and other stakeholders; the form of the Consultation and use of Consultants; and Political Input.

6.3.1 Input from Departments

The Issues Paper makes specific mention of input from other departments, listing collaboration with 12 portfolios³⁰. Interview data reveals the reality of the contributions made by departments outside

³⁰Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency
 Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
 Department of Finance and Deregulation

agriculture, with an enlightening comment from one civil servant of their department's role as *"just contributing to the agriculture department's National Food Plan in all its development, including discussion paper, issues paper and then all of the cabinet submissions that went forward. And the department was on a secretaries steering committee"* (CS-A), suggesting the plan is viewed as an agriculture department policy, rather than a jointly-owned policy. The departments are described as having met: *"on a regular basis, the secretaries of the department, initially, and then they devolved that down to the deputy secretaries, who would meet on a fairly regular basis especially in the last twelve months"* (CS-A). Along with meetings, secondments were made from several departments prior to the Green Paper being published, including someone from the Department of Health for eight to nine months, which was *"really useful"* until *"they just pulled the pin"* (CS-A6), plus a shorter secondment from the Department of Industry (CS-A6; CS-A).

There was close collaboration between the departments of Agriculture and Industry (CS-A), but weaker links with other departments, with the Department of Environment *"disinterested"* due to the contact person assigned by that department, and Department of Health *"like a fortress"* due to their concerns *"not to have anything that was being done by another department intruding on their autonomy or patch"* (CS-A6) leading the department to *"almost dismiss"* the NFP *"to put in bluntly"* (CS-A4), because in any such cross-departmental initiative there is an issue of *"who takes the glory"*, and many of the other agencies involved were not engaged other than to *"repel all borders"* (CS-A6). CS-A3 describes the health department's input as not having a direct role in drafting it, but just being on the working group, as *"it was very much agriculture focused"*. Similar dynamics were present in the State of Victoria's project to integrate its various food policy domains, says CS-A7, whose attempts to instigate an informal food and nutrition group were constrained because *"the nutrition team and the food safety team were at war"* and the agriculture representatives were even *"more free market focused than the Treasury"*. CS-A2 supports this view, remarking from an agriculture perspective that:

"we had an attempt at a food strategy in Victoria, and I sat down with the health people, and they believe things that are simply is not true...so they would stay things like 'educating people doesn't work we've got to stop them eating this stuff' and 'we need to force the food industry to stop putting salt, fat, sugar into food', which are there for a few reasons, often for food safety, and for flavour and the like...so my response is 'we shouldn't peddle beliefs here, we should peddle or use evidence'".

As a result efforts to engage the department of primary industries on levers to improve public health,

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
 Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
 Department of Health and Ageing
 Department of Infrastructure and Transport
 Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research
 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
 Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government
 Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities
 The Treasury (DAFF 2011)

including for example growing more fruit and vegetables, or less meat, did not progress.

6.3.2 Mechanism for Coordination

As at 6.3.1, input from departments is mentioned in the 2011 Issues Paper, but it is not clear if any official mechanisms were put in place for the development process. NGO-A4 suggests not, noting their own advocacy for mechanisms during the formulation of the policy itself, “*not waiting until after the policy had been developed to then decide how to coordinate amongst government*”. However, official Mechanisms for Coordination referred to in the Issues Paper include the Cabinet, informal arrangements between portfolio departments and between governments via the COAG standing arrangements.

6.3.3 Institutional Reform

The Issues Paper notes stakeholder concern that food policy ‘*is not sufficiently coordinated or consistent, and some have suggested formal mechanisms should be instigated to address this*’, with the UK’s Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food cited as an example (DAFF 2011 p8). The Green Paper presents several potential new governmental mechanisms to improve food-related policy integration, stating ‘*the government believes improving consultation mechanisms and fostering whole-of-food-system dialogue is paramount*’ (DAFF 2012 p52).

Table 6.4: Options for a Mechanism to Improve Leadership and Stakeholder Engagement

Type of Mechanism	Details	Decision-making powers?
Ministerial Food Forum	Relevant Australian Government ministers, including the ministers for agriculture, fisheries and forestry, health, industry and innovation, environment and trade, and the Treasurer To improve the integration and coordination of food policy issues and ensure regulatory decision-making delivers better tailored outcomes for the food system	YES
Ministerial Food Forum (as noted above) plus a Stakeholder Committee on Food	Stakeholder Committee to include agriculture, fisheries and food business representatives, with participation by health, community and consumer representatives, to provide advice to the government on food policy issues,	MFF YES SCF NO
Australian Food Council	Comprising relevant Australian Government ministers and representatives of agriculture, fisheries and food businesses together with health, community and consumer representatives to consider long-term strategic challenges and opportunities for Australia’s food system	NO

Source: Author from DAFF (2012) p53

While some consultees had been lobbying for a more innovative Minister of Food, or a single food agency mechanism, this was “*strongly pushed away*” (CS-A6), and by White Paper stage an ‘Australian Council on Food’ is presented as the preferred option (DAFF 2013 p19). This option was preferred by S&T-A because of their prior experience of such arrangements in the National Food Industry Strategy and Prime Minister’s Supermarket to Asia Council development processes:

“...the forums that were provided there got some real dialogue going between industries and government, and I think that made a difference because the ministers could actually get a better understanding of where the industries were coming from...”

In its Green Paper submission, the State Government of Victoria is critical of all three options, arguing they ‘*do not provide the opportunity for states and territories to engage on national food policy matters*’ (State Government of Victoria 2012). When asked to compare to the UK case, when a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food was established, CS-A remarks: “*...effectively we have a sub committee of cabinet anyway*”, including “*the agriculture, industry and transport minister etc*”, which “*looked at the various versions before it went to cabinet, so that was the economic sub committee*”.

6.3.4 Lead Personnel

The background of lead civil servant Trysh Stone was not in food policy, but natural resource management, specifically international fisheries. Stone was brought in to the formulation process mid-way, the previous lead having left just before the Green Paper was released. The team on the project – known as the NFP TaskForce – was small, with initially 4-5 staff but at its peak ten (CS-A6).

6.3.5 Advisory Groups

The following Group was set up in 2010 to advise government on NFP development:

Table 6.5: NFP Food Policy Working Group

Name	Organisation
Michael Luscombe	Woolworths
Jock Laurie	NFF
Malcolm Jackman	Elders
Michael Byrne	Linfox Logistics
Dr Alastair Robertson	CSIRO
Terry O’Brien	Simplot Australia
Simone Tully	OBE Organics
Janine Allis	Boost Juice
Kate Carnell	AFGC
Nick Stace	Choice
Alison Watkins	Graincorp
Jeff Lawrence	ACTU
Dr Peter Williams.	University of Wollongong

Source: Sweet (2010)

The group was criticised by the public health advocates, for example in a December 2010 article ‘*How government silos are scrambling food policy*’ on the Croakey Blog, Associate Professor Mark Lawrence writes about ‘*an extraordinary disconnect in Australian food policy development*’, whereby the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation Council highlights the need for an integrated health, social, economic and environmental response to food and nutrition challenges, yet ‘*the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) hosted the first meeting of a food policy committee that will lack the capacity to address three of these four critical policy considerations identified in the PMSEIC report*’. The PHAA described the group as ‘*stacked with industry, manufacturing and sales*’, due to there being no voice of public health, and contrasted it with the UK’s FM report:

‘The PHAA calls on Senator Ludwig to immediately redress this imbalance and take an holistic view of food as was done in the United Kingdom when they released their national food policy, Food Matters. Food has such a significant impact on the health of all Australians that the food policy working group must include the public health perspective’ (Sweet 2010).

In the Green Paper the National Food Policy Working Group is described as having been ‘*established by the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as a source of high-level strategic advice on the food industry across the food supply chain*’ (DAFF 2012 p22). Along with the official advisory group, Carey et al’s (2016) examination of the influences on the NFP finds that charity the Global Foundation (see 6.1.1) ‘*used its ‘unique, bipartisan model of public–private cooperation on policy development to enable key food industry stakeholders to collaborate with each other, and with government*’, noting the Foundation describes itself as the ‘*architect of Australia’s first national food plan*’ and concluding the GF:

‘...operated beyond the formal submission and lobbying processes and was successful in gaining the confidence of politicians and civil servants. As a result, the Food Security Working Group established by the Global Foundation played an important role in shaping the Plan’ (Carey et al 2016 p9).

6.3.6 Stakeholder Involvement

There are several references to involving stakeholders in the formulation process throughout the NFP iterations, for example the Issues Paper statement: ‘*in developing a national food plan the Australian Government will bring farmers, manufacturers and processors, distribution and logistics companies, retail and food service companies, consumers, public health professionals, and agricultural and food scientists together to develop a common understanding of the strategies needed to maximise Australia’s food production opportunities while minimising risks*’ (DAFF 2011 p2). While the Green Paper describes the government as ‘*developing the National Food Plan, working with industry, peak bodies, consumers and other State and Territory governments*’ (DAFF 2012 piv) and lists ‘*consultation mechanisms*’ used to gain feedback on the NFP including:

- National Food Policy Working Group
- Food Processing Industry Strategy Group
- Ministerial Advisory Council on Regional Australia
- Other government jurisdictions through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Standing Council on Primary Industries (SCoPI) (formerly known as the Primary Industries Ministerial Council) and the COAG Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation (FoFR) and their subsidiary committees
- Dedicated collaborative arrangements between relevant Australian Government portfolios (15 in total), to ensure development of the NFP is a whole-of-government initiative.

There is also mention in the Green Paper of FoFR arrangements, under which:

‘...a framework for stakeholder engagement is being developed with industry. This stakeholder framework seeks to articulate and recognise key stakeholders, and present a systematic, consistent process for the FoFR and its subordinate committees’ (DAFF 2012 p53).

A further consultation group was established in September 2012, according to a communique issued by DAFF (undated and no longer available). The Communique announces Agriculture Minister Joe Ludwig and Assistant Treasurer, the Hon David Bradbury have convened a forum on Food Sector Relationships:

‘...bringing together representatives from along the food supply chain. Representatives of the major supermarket chains, farmers, food producers and manufacturers came together in Sydney to talk about how to improve relationships as part of consultation on Australia’s first National Food Plan’ (Australian Government undated).

Participants of the Forum on Food Sector Relationships are all food industry representatives. No further details of its activities could be identified.

6.3.7 Consultation

The Green Paper describes ‘a highly consultative policy development process involving circulation of an issues paper, followed by this green paper for stakeholder comment, concluding with the release of a National Food Plan white paper that articulates its policy position’ (DAFF 2012 p21). The following breakdown of the consultation process is based on information in the Green Paper, and a Green Paper Consultation Summary Report.

Table 6.6: The NFP Consultation Process

Stage of Formulation	Details of Consultation	Consultation Period	Submissions
Issues Paper	48 written consultation questions 19 Roundtable Meetings between 9 August and 2 September 2011. Attended by around 180 stakeholders from across supply chain and other sectors to provide feedback on Issues Paper. Roundtable meetings held in every capital city and a number of regional locations, including Geraldton, Barossa Valley, Armidale, Kununurra, Townsville, Toowoomba, Devonport and Bendigo.	10 weeks	279 submissions from broad range of stakeholders including individuals, businesses, peak industry and community groups, public health advocates, non-government organisations and governments
Green Paper	23 written consultation questions 28 public meetings across Australia - held in every state and Territory - from 30 July to 14 September 2012. Attended by over 700 people 28 locations selected to represent urban, peri-urban, rural and remote communities, and covering different types and ideas of food production. Eight CEO-level roundtable Meetings, attended by more than 120 people Public webcast panel discussion, with questions and comments submitted by stakeholders'	17 July to 30 September 2012 (10.5 weeks)	401 written submissions, over 5000 pages

Source: Author from DAFF (2012); DAFF (2013b)

A page on the DAFF website – now archived – provided the following breakdown of attendees at the first tranche of 19 public meetings, attended by 80 stakeholders.

Table 6.7: Attendees of Public Meetings

Farming and fishing sector including individual farmers, grower associations, corporatised farming groups and peak bodies	39
Food and beverage processing sector	21 (8 of which were small to medium businesses - SME's)
Various advocacy, community and consumer groups	16
Research and development providers	15
Regional development associations	11
Education and training sector	14
Major health and nutrition groups	13
Various other parts of supply chain including, resource management, distribution, logistics, packaging, retail, business, among others	50

Source: <http://www.daff.gov.au/nationalfoodplan/development/issues-paper/face-to-face-meetings.html> (accessed July 2013).

According to Carey et al's (2016) analysis of the NFP process, there was the following approximate breakdown of written submissions, based on cross-checked categorisation by the researchers into the tripartite approach of civil society; private sector and government.

Table 6.8: Written Submissions to the National Food Plan

Industry and agricultural stakeholders	30%
Individuals	20 %
Local, regional and state governments	7 %
Public health sector	5 %
Academic institutions	3 %
Civil society groups across a wide range of sectors, including groups focused on social justice, animal welfare, consumer rights and environmental issues.	Remainder

Source: Carey et al (2016)

The public consultation process was criticised as inadequate by civil society groups because *'public meetings were over-subscribed and some people were excluded from the process'* (Carey et al 2016 p6). A press release issued by the Australia Food Sovereignty Alliance on 10 August 2012 describes 'full house' signs being up and argues this is not *'representative of genuine consultation'* (AFSA 2012). NGO-A4 picks up this critique, noting a lack of transparency, and describing a two-tier consultation process, with *"the open public ones that were had and then the invitee only process that it always felt like was the one that mattered – the closed door one. And we never got invitations to the closed door one, despite trying to get them several times"*. While ST-A considered *'the consultation process was actually pretty good'*, in general the feeling from interviewees was that the extent of consultation impacted negatively on the policy content, causing a dilution, with FPPT-A concluding all of the *"reiterations, all of the dialogues they had and feedback and input they had from the stakeholders, I think it ended up getting further and further diluted"*. CS-A3 points to how a real divergence in views from stakeholders, either

between Commonwealth and ground level or between industry and NGOS, lead policy leaders to try for a middle ground:

“...and when looking for that middle ground you actually lose a lot of the context and a lot of the reason why you might be doing it. So you shift away from what you originally thought would be this grand plan, this grand policy, to playing somewhere in the middle where you have tried to work with your stakeholders to work out what they want, which is often different, depending on who you are talking to, and you end up with something in the middle. And often unfortunately it is a very weak policy because of that”.

ST-A echoes the point, drawing on previous experience with consultations on other projects when remarking that trying to accommodate everybody is a flawed approach, and the NFP process:

“probably leaned too far towards give everybody what they want rather than ultimately the minister, the ministers, showing leadership, deciding what was really important and focusing on those things.”

6.3.8 Consultants

The firm Cox Inall was hired to assist with the public consultation part of the NFP, but consultants were not involved in the analysis.

6.3.9 Political input

The Agriculture Minister at the time the NFP was announced was Tony Burke, having been in the department for several years before the NFP was formally adopted as a policy aim for the Gillard Government. However, following the 21 August 2010 election, Burke moved to become Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, with Joe Ludwig taking the Minister of Agriculture post, having previously been Cabinet Secretary and Special Minister of State. So, while it was Tony Burke that announced the NFP, it was Joe Ludwig who fronted the Issues Paper and was in post through the formulation process. When asked how much the NFP was supported politically, CS-A comments *“as far as I know quite heavily”*, adding *“it didn’t reach Prime Minister for us, but every agriculture minister we had – and the previous one, Ludwig was very much pro-industry, pro looking at these things”*. But adds:

“there was a lot of change towards the end of the development of the paper in terms of ownership politically. So it was owned very much by the agriculture minister but then the PM’s department took it over and it changed in terms of its ownership politically within Canberra.” (CS-A).

However, several interviewees pointed to the timing of the launch of the plan, coinciding with the run up to another election, as having an impact on the political will behind the NFP (CS-A6; NGO-A5; S&T-A), with NGO-A5 stating *“there was a lot going on at that time, so it was a bit of a victim [laughs] of our political goings on at the time”*, and S&T-A describing a minister in *“political survival mode”*.

6.4 BUDGET

6.4.1 Budget for Policy Development

Aside from people costs, which were absorbed by the departments responsible for those member of project team staff (DAFF) and secondees (other departments), the *“\$1.5 mn over four years”* budget for developing the NFP came from within the Department of Agriculture, to be used on *“consultants,*

analysis, printing, communications, that sort of thing” but in reality was not fully utilised (CS-A6). Several interviewees pointed to the lack of financial contribution from other departments outside agriculture as a barrier to successful formulation and implementation, with CS-A3 speaking from experience on other projects that shared budgets engender *“joint ownership if you are contributing resources”* and *“gives you an element of responsibility”*, whereas *“participating in a working group doesn’t give you that ownership”*. Also speaking from experience of running policy projects, FPPT-A argues:

“...there needs to be resources, and I mean money. There needs to be a decision made there will be money put aside from each of these departments which will be put into a kitty, and that kitty will be used not just to develop the strategy but mostly identified for implementation – so that means there will be real people with real time dedicated to implementing the national food policy”.

6.4.2 Budget for Policy Implementation

The White Paper lists the following sums which will be invested by government.

Table 6.9: NFP White Paper Implementation Budget

Sum	Activity
\$28.5 million	Asian Food Markets Research Fund
\$5.6 million	Build on relationships with trading partners in key and emerging markets by – expanding the network of specialists that support agricultural trade in Asia – having market access liaison officers for key food sectors
\$2 million	Develop a brand identity for Australian food and related technology.
\$2.2 million (part of \$28.5 listed above)	Research and analysis of food industry trends to help business and governments plan infrastructure to support a growing industry to 2025.
\$1.5 million	Develop resources and provide professional development to support teaching about food and agriculture through the Australian Curriculum
\$1.5 million	Support community food initiatives by providing grants to community groups to support the establishment and development of initiatives like community gardens and farmers’ markets
TOTAL\$39.1 million	

Source: Author from DAFF (2013)

A number of other investments are listed in the White Paper but these appear to be ongoing spend not new budget as a result of the NFP. The listed investments specific to the Food Plan amount to \$39.1 mn. FI-A2 and CS-A2 argue the sums involved were not substantial enough to make any significant impact, with FI-A2 describing the NFP as *“hamstrung by the fact it became clear there was no additional money”*, and CS-A2 describing the document as *“pretty predictable”* and *“not having money behind really gave the impression that it was a bit of window dressing”*. FI-A2 and CS-A6 point to the timing of

the plan and the political situation whereby “*budgets started to get tight*” whereas when NFP discussions first started “*even though we had the global financial crisis it seemed that Australia sailed through it without any real impact*” (FI-A2), and “*one of the lines of attack of the then opposition*” to the minority government was “*around the ability to manage the budget*” (CS-A6).

The budget for implementing the NFP came from the agriculture department, despite attempts to get other departments to contribute (CS-A6). CS-A6 and CS-A4 describe the reality of departmental involvement with no budget, when “*one thing that does drive the civil service, the public service, to actually put forward new policies, is money*” (CS-A6) and “*nobody is going to drop something and put it into new area, unless there is some kind of incentive to do it*” (CS-A4). If a department is asked to change what they are doing and pay for it out of existing budgets: “*the answer is no, we are doing the best we can, with the money that we have. To do more on dietary related illness is to take money from breast cancer kind of thing*” (CS-A6), and without political drive to manage those kind of trade-offs, inertia occurs. CS-A2 extends the point to the food industry, arguing “*the only way to get real attention from the industry is to hang some big dollars out there*”, arguing for any government spending to be matched by the private sector. CS-A4 raises an alternative approach based on joint investment, which was explored in the attempt to create an integrated food plan in the State of Victoria, utilising a single bid under the Budget and Expenditure Review Committee (BERC) system.

6.5 OUTCOMES

Outcome-related factors influencing the framing and trajectory of the policy include: Plans for Implementation and Evaluation; approach to Policy Instruments; use of Indicators and, finally, the End Status of the policy project.

6.5.1 Plans for Implementation and Evaluation

The White Paper notes the NFP will keep on track via guides to progress including: the Australian Council on Food; the five-yearly publication of a State of the Food System report to highlight key information about the food system and analyse trends; and a five-yearly review (DAFF 2012 p11). A decision was taken not to produce a public implementation plan with indicators of success, due to a pre-election political climate where measuring success became less important than actually “*getting a grants programme out, rolling out money and handing out small amounts of money to people in local communities*” (CS-A6) and people didn’t want to waste the effort developing an implementation plan the next government might abandon (S&T-A). Appendix Table C2 outlines progress made on the NFP White Paper goals.

6.5.2 Policy Instruments

The approach to policy instruments in the three NFP iterations is based on allowing ‘*businesses to meet consumer preferences, provided food is safe and product claims comply with Australian consumer laws*’ (DAFF 2011 piii), and there is a preference for ‘*non-regulatory measures to improve information available about food, including voluntary labelling, industry codes of practice, voluntary Australian standards and self-regulation*’ (DAFF 2012 p114). This ‘*market-based approach—facilitating well-*

functioning markets’ is said to have *‘replaced past approaches that were characterised by more direct interventions, involving measures such as price controls and import tariffs, which were shown to generally have higher costs than benefits to the industry and Australian consumers’* (DAFF 2012 p124). Responding to calls for stronger levers, the position is that, for example, *‘the Australian Government does not plan to enforce a mandatory scheme regarding general sustainability outcomes’* and – in response to calls for further regulation of the major supermarkets: *‘we need to be careful to ensure regulation does not stifle competition or impose unnecessary red tape and costs on businesses that may lead to higher food prices for consumers’* (DAFF 2013 p50).

6.5.3 Indicators

As discussed above, a decision was taken not to create a public implementation plan with specific indicators. However, the White Paper does mention developing – with industry – sustainability indicators for agriculture (DAFF 2013 p83) and reporting on fish stocks, which is done via the *‘Fisheries Status Reports for fisheries managed by the Commonwealth’* (DAFF 2013 p83). Distinction is made between the need to create a set of bespoke sustainability indicators for agriculture and existing Sustainability Indicators for Australia used *‘to monitor key stocks of social and human, nature and economic capital’* (DAFF 2013 p83). It is not clear what work was done on these prior to the change of government, but it is likely to have been limited given the comments around the political climate above.

6.5.4 Final Status

By White Paper stage a large amount of feedback and potential content had amassed. The final document was therefore the result of significant refining, which led to certain themes becoming a focus and others not so. CS-A6 provides an insight, stating there were actually three whole White Papers written, all very different, as part of a refinement process which also involved considerable deliberation over the four key themes and *“how to cut the cake”* because *“the food system is so interlinked”*. The Asian Century White Paper (see 4.4.1) was also influential: CS-A6 explains the NFP goals had to relate to ACWP goals. Because health and environment did not figure in the ACWP, these themes were difficult to work in and ended up being linked to the *‘Productive and Resilient Economy’* ACWP goal.

The Final Report featured a table of actions. Despite being in caretaker mode during this period, some elements of the plan were starting to be implemented prior to publication, and continued for the short period before the Federal election and subsequent change in government. Appendix Table C3 provides an analysis of which actions could be identified as being implemented. The main activities appear to have been pieces of research into infrastructure and the Asian market, and a grants programme. It proved difficult to assess progress on most actions however, as many of them were existing activities, and there was also a general lack of follow up documents, in large part because the White Paper was archived following the election.

Chapter Seven: Comparing Integration in the Two Policy Projects

The following chapter synthesises the findings in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Firstly, a summary of the results of applying the Framework Tool (FT) to the two policy projects is provided. Table 7.1 represents a snapshot summary of the application of the FT to FM/F2030 and the NFP. The Table is grouped into variables regarding the elements of the policy process which were analysed and compared: OUTSET, INPUT, CONTENT, BUDGET, and OUTCOMES. These represent the findings outlined in Chapter Five (FM/F2030) and Chapter Six (NFP). The remainder of the chapter is a narrative analysis, placing these findings in the context of the Chapter Four findings on the policy system factors which also impacted the framing and trajectory of the policy projects, for example how the different approaches to integration can be understood with reference to how integration was tackled in previous food policies in each country; and how input from inside and outside government is influenced by the wider policy system.

Table 7.1: Summary of Framework Tool Application

OUTSET VARIABLE	Food Matters	Food 2030	National Food Plan
Catalyst	Seemingly random, food as part of the zeitgeist (but not as a serious policy issue?)	Food Matters	Lobbying by stakeholders, mainly food industry and rising number of food-related calls on government e.g. challenges for manufacturing; food security campaigning
Timeline for Formulation	10 months	15 months	33 months
Timeline for Implementation	Immediate	2030	2025
Terms of Reference	Informal – Project team asked to particularly focus on consumption to avoid crossover with Policy Commission on Food and Farming	Respond to conclusions of Food Matters report	Poor definition, scope continued to broaden through process. Lack of shared goals, mixed interpretations and expectations
Political Party/Electoral Cycle	Labour government (11 years in power) Initiated following change in party leader Published towards end of electoral cycle	See FM	Labor government (six years in power) Initiated following change of party leader Published at end of electoral cycle
Lead Department	Cabinet Office (Strategy Unit)	Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

CONTENT VARIABLE	Food Matters	Food 2030	National Food Plan
Type of Policy	‘Report’ ‘Towards a Strategy’	‘Strategy’ ‘Vision’	White Paper
Definition of Problem	Strong Analysis	Strong Analysis, drawing on FM	Changes through policy formulation process. Less focus on environmental and health challenges, more on productivity.
Goals and Objectives	Focus on consumption-related objectives, apart from need for a sustainable food chain. Also goal of policy integration.	No specific objectives, in favour of generic vision for a sustainable and secure food system for 2030. Tensions between goals are not addressed e.g. between increasing food production and health and sustainability	Change through policy process – scope narrows to productivity by White Paper stage
Policy Omissions	Meat Labour Issues GM Production	Meat Labour Issues GM	Health
Degree of change they represent	Significant change due to focus on demand side	Significant as a cross-government approach, supply side issues are reintroduced, becomes less interventionist	Changes through process, appears as new approach at outset but reverts to historical production focus by final iteration
Policy Integration	Demonstrates strong understanding of importance of policy integration Introduces several mechanisms - see below Centralised departmental sponsorship in Strategy Unit with its legacy of joined-up government policy work	Some references to policy integration but less of a focus than FM Mechanisms from FM remain in place – see below	Starts process relatively strong on need for a whole of government approach, but by White Paper stage the ambitions have been reduced significantly Mechanism is less robust than in UK case – see below

INPUT VARIABLE	Food Matters	Food 2030	National Food Plan
Input from Departments	Able to engender strong input from some departments due to Cabinet Office status	Not clear what input took place	Gaining input from departments was challenging
Mechanism for Coordination (of formulation process)	Cross-Departmental Working Group, involving secondees	Not clear – no details of team provided	Secondments used at initial stages (up to Green Paper)
Institutional Reform	Cross-Government Food Policy Taskforce Cabinet Sub Committee on Food	Cross-Government Food Policy Taskforce Cabinet Sub Committee on Food Council of Food Policy Advisors	Australian Food Council comprising relevant Australian Government ministers and representatives of agriculture, fisheries and food businesses together with health, community and consumer representatives Push back against Ministerial Food Forum (with decision-making powers) option
Lead Personnel	Project team had understanding of food policy as a cross-domain issue/could take an overview	Not clear	Lead civil servant with no background in food policy
Advisory Groups	Range of experts Involved informal but deep discussion	Based on eConsultation	Broad traditional consultation on issues Paper and Green Paper
Consultants	None Used	None Used	Used to manage consultation
Political Input	Not clear how much Prime Minister Gordon Brown was involved DEFRA SoS Hilary Benn had background in DfID	Not clear what Prime Ministerial interest level was Hilary Benn still involved	No evidence of Prime Ministerial interest Minister changed during process

BUDGET VARIABLE	Food Matters	Food 2030	National Food Plan
For Formulation	Appears all were financed out of existing departmental budgets (but NFP had a specific assigned budget for the project)		
For Implementation	None identified		Budget for marketing and research on Asian markets, and food industry innovation grants Very small budget for local food projects which was later dropped.

OUTCOME VARIABLE	Food Matters	Food 2030	National Food Plan
Implementation	Specific actions assigned to departments with timetable for completion	Vague goals and no assignment of responsibility beyond 'government'; 'food industry' etc.	Does not specify lead or timetable for individual goals
Policy Instruments	Mandatory proposals for food standards were made voluntary; main focus on information provision	Focus on information and continuing ongoing policy programme	Focus on role of non-state actors and provision of information, plus reformulation via Food and Health Dialogue
Indicators	No specific indicators for actions and recommendations made in the report	Some indicators to measure success are included, others are 'under development'	No indicators linked to the outputs of the report but mentions sustainability indicators for Australia and need for complimentary set of indicators for agriculture specifically

Evaluation	One Year On update report gives good detail of progress to date	No equivalent update report	Plans were to measure progress using five-yearly State of the Food System report
Final Status	Several concrete outcomes incl: GM Report, Cross-government Research Strategy, Healthier Food Mark, Integrated Advice for Consumers	Several FM outcomes progressed during F2030 Additional concrete outcomes of F2030 included food growing in schools taskforce, and an Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan. Vague nature of goals means difficult to determine which activities already in operation and which new	Several activities underway including grants programmes, research into Asian markets, funding of five new agricultural counsellors in strategic markets and research into 'Infrastructure and Australia's food industry: Preliminary economic assessment' . Vague nature of goals means difficult to determine which activities already in operation and which new

Source: Author

Both the UK's FM/F2030 and Australia's NFP originated with similar visions of integration, based around the need for an overarching approach to food policy (Cabinet Office 2008b pi; DAFF 2011 pvi; p1):

Table 7.2 References to Integration at Outset of FM and NFP

UK	Australia
Many of the elements required for a comprehensive food policy are already in place. But central government needs to better integrate them and to work with the public, food chain businesses and other stakeholders, and in consultation with other tiers of government, to put a new policy framework in place' (2008b piii). The UK needs a stronger and more integrated approach to food policy. Many of the issues we face as a society – poverty, public health, climate change and others – have a food dimension. But direct interventions focused on the food system will often not be the solution because the root of the problem often lies elsewhere. Nonetheless, food cuts across many aspects of public policy and managing the multiple challenges in a consistent, joined-up manner is far from straightforward. The UK needs a clearer public policy framework for food and the machinery in government to help deliver it. The key elements of that framework should be a new shared vision for the food system of the future, a set of core strategic objectives that respond to central aspects of that vision, and an integrated statement of strategy that sets out how to move forward (px, xi). The UK has not had a comprehensive and formal statement of 'food policy' since the Second World War. Today, a patchwork of strategies addresses different aspects of the food system and the market failures in each discrete area (p41).	There are currently many government policies, programs and regulations to address food-related policy issues, as outlined in this paper. There is, however, no overarching food policy framework. The development of a national food plan will address this need by better integrating food policy along the whole food supply chain—from paddock to plate (piii). Australian governments also have an extensive range of policies, programs and regulations that respond to these forces and affect food supply and demand. The Australian Government has not, however, defined an overarching approach to food policy. The government believes that an overarching approach would help protect and improve Australia's enviable food security status, and support population health outcomes, among other things, and has committed to developing a national food plan to address these needs (pvi). The government recognises that improvements could be made to its current approach to food policy, for example by addressing any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies, or explaining its policies in a single framework (pvi). And while Australian governments have many policies and programs that affect food supply and demand these can sometimes work against each other. Greater coordination and clarity of goals will help Australia maintain its enviable food security status, improve the quality of its food, support population health outcomes and build a competitive and vibrant industry (p1).

Source: Author from Cabinet Office (2008b); DAFF (2011)

Closer examination of the different references in the documents reveals neither policy project is explicit about what is meant by integration. The reports refer to integrating several different aspects – from goals, to budgets, to links in the supply chain – and utilise a range of related concepts including joined-up government; whole-of-government; coordination; and coherence, with no reference to their different meanings and level of ambition.

7.1 Differing Definitions of Integration

Connected to this is differing conceptions of the policy projects, uncovered by analysis of interview data and policy documents including consultation submissions. In the Australian case in particular, a failure to specify the scope of the project through clear Terms of Reference seemed to exacerbate conflicting expectations, held by both the departments feeding in to the NFP, and by stakeholders: the food industry for example, having a clear agenda in calling for a national policy, around a ‘holistic approach’ rationalising its points of entry to government and raising the profile of food as an economic (and to a lesser extent a health and environmental) issue. This is quite separate from why the public health lobby had been pushing for a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. In contrast, it is possible the use of informal Terms of Reference for FM, its task being to examine “*food policy across the board*”, was helpful in allowing the freedom for a broad focus to be taken in the UK case. However, there is a contradiction in this priority to take a consumer focus, starting post-farm gate, and the project’s capacity to go beyond integration of social and environmental goals and address economic drivers³¹, as discussed below. In some respects this means FM could be judged *less* integrative than earlier policies such as the 2002 Policy Commission, which attempted to make tentative links between agriculture, environment and health, and F2030.

Likewise, a failure to specify the target of integration means it is not clear what is in scope, making it challenging to assess whether integration is actually being addressed in the way it was conceived of, or is conceived of in the literature. So, for example, certain references chime with a traditional joined-up government focus on multiple policy domains, with FM noting ‘*food cuts across many aspects of public policy and managing the multiple challenges in a consistent, joined-up manner is far from straightforward*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b px, xi) and the NFP Green Paper stating the ‘*need to become smarter at coordinating across agencies*’ (DAFF 2012 p48) due to the ‘*complex interaction between government bodies when formulating policy, making operational decisions or regulating the food system – with a large number of bodies directly or indirectly involved as policy or operational agencies, or as regulators*’ (DAFF 2012 p46). The Green Paper makes specific mention of how policies interact in the area of food, ‘*where agriculture, fisheries, trade, regional, environmental, health and broader economic policy are all closely associated*’ (DAFF 2012 p25). Defining integration as a cross-cutting approach across departments also underpins the FM cross-Whitehall Food Strategy Task Force to ‘*coordinate work across government on food issues*’ (Cabinet Office 2008b pxiv). Given both countries are characterised by embedded departmentalism, as highlighted in Chapter Four, objectives to join up *across* government are a natural response.

But elsewhere in the documents, the level of ambition appears reduced to bringing together the programs and policies of government related to food into one document, rather than attempting to ‘*adjust sectoral policies in order to make them mutually enforcing and consistent*’ (Meijers and Stead 2004). For example, the NFP Issues Paper proposes two different approaches the government could take to improve its current approach to food policy: ‘*addressing any gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies, or* [emphasis added]

³¹ Though the difference between domestic and global production drivers is a caveat when evaluating whether the project integrated supply-side drivers

explaining its policies in a single framework' (DAFF 2011 pvi), and the Green Paper states the need to *'establish an integrated approach to food-related policies and programs*' (DAFF 2012 p48). FM goes slightly further, remarking how *'many of the elements required for a comprehensive food policy are already in place. But central government needs to better integrate them*' (Cabinet Office 2008b piii), and contrasts the many strategies and policies whose relationship *'is not always clearly spelled out and the relative importance of objectives in different areas is not always clear*' (Cabinet Office 2008b p42). Sometimes references address more specific types of integration such as activities, for example where FM refers to the need to *'meld together*', *'the practicalities of decision making and coordinated research*' (Cabinet Office 2008b p5); its proposal, for integrating *'online advice to consumers on food nutrition, sustainability and safety*' (DEFRA 2010 p14); the idea of *'joining-up and integrating research across Government, private sector and third sector*' (DEFRA 2010 p65) and need for *'better coordination of departments' food-related research spending*' (Cabinet Office 2008b pxiv). The NFP also talks specifically about the need for *'greater coordination and clarity of goals*' because Australian governments have many policies and programs that affect food supply and demand that *'can sometimes work against each other*' (DAFF 2011 p1).

Particular links are made in the UK case between the health and environmental domains, both in reference to the need to *'address the public health and environmental issues arising from food consumption, and a need to do so in a joined-up way*' (Cabinet Office 2008b p4), and its proposals to integrate nutrition and sustainability advice for consumers (notoriously problematic in the Australian case with regard to Dietary Guidelines), and to link health and sustainability through public procurement. These connections echo tentative steps taken in the UK's earlier 2002 Policy Commission; Strategy for Sustainable Food and Farming (2002); and Food and Health Action Plan (Department of Health 2005) projects. Conversely, Australia has no such legacy and historically prioritised the 'clean' over the 'green', and as such health-environment links are absent from the NFP which – with the exception of food waste – treats food sustainability as a production rather than consumption issue, and makes no attempt to relate the two domains. For example, NGO-A's remarks that *"food certainly hasn't been profiled as has happened in the UK and elsewhere, in terms of sustainability issues and viability issues and focus on workforce, support of agrarian farmers and anything sensible like that, its really been a strong trade focus."*

Yet elsewhere in the FM and NFP documents, integration is about making links between production and consumption (Cabinet Office 2008b pi; DAFF 2011 p2), and *'better integrating food policy along the whole food supply chain*' (DAFF 2011piii) and *'taking a whole-of-food-system approach covering primary production, transport, storage and distribution, processing, manufacturing, retailing, international trade, consumers, related service sectors and the wider community*' (DAFF 2012 p20). In both policy development processes, an early rhetorical commitment to integration becomes diluted by the final stage, more so in the Australian case. F2030 retains the robust integration mechanisms put in place by FM but loses commitment to the cause expressed in the earlier report, with integration only mentioned a handful of times. In the NFP, by White Paper stage the commitment to *'integrate food policy*' (DAFF 2011) and create an overarching framework appears downgraded significantly in the passage on the NFP's role not being to *'solve every challenge with some connection to food*' (DAFF 2013 p14) (see 7.2).

There is also a shift of focus from horizontal to vertical integration in the White Paper. The roles played by State, Territory and local governments within the food system are underlined, along with the need to *‘ensure that food policy is integrated and coordinated across all levels of government’* (DAFF 2013 p19). This is reflective of a broader tendency in the Australian case – perhaps due to its lack of heritage in discussion of food’s social and environmental links in comparison to the UK – to associate food policy integration with a vertical focus (in terms of how interviewees responded to questions about food policy disconnects in the country, and the importance of vertical interplay between Federal and State levels of government in food governance which came through in the policy analysis of the system). Where horizontal integration has been a focus in Australia, in half of the cases this was limited to integration of economic objectives with other policy portfolios, with no focus on health or environment (see Table 7.5). Conversely, vertical integration was not a strong theme in UK interviews, and there appear to be no obvious government documents discussing the relationship between Whitehall and the Regions on food governance, perhaps signifying its prioritisation. Table 7.3 illustrates the historical focus in each country.

Table 7.3: Integration focus in the UK and Australia

Country	Food Policy	Type of Integration Focused On
UK	Policy Commission on Food and Farming	Supply Chain Horizontal
	Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England	Supply Chain Horizontal
	Food Industry Sustainability Strategy	Horizontal Vertical Supply Chain
	Public Health Responsibility Deal	None
	Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming	Horizontal
	Green Food Project	Horizontal
	Agri-Tech Strategy	None
	Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report	Horizontal Supply Chain
Australia	Food and Nutrition Policy	Horizontal Vertical Supply Chain
	Prime Minister’s Supermarket to Asia Strategy (STAS)	Supply Chain Horizontal (in context of economic goals only)
	National Food Industry Strategy	None
	Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation	Vertical
	Food and Health Dialogue	State/non-state
	Australia and Food Security in a Changing World	Horizontal Supply Chain
	National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	Vertical (and horizontal between States) Supply Chain
	Food Processing Industry Strategy	Vertical
	Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper	Horizontal (in terms of impacts on agriculture) Vertical

Source: Author

Moving away from definitions; there are differences in how integration was operationalised in each project, in terms of departmental sponsorship of the policies; how problems to be addressed were defined; mechanisms supporting integration, and input from other departments, advisors and via consultation, many of which can be linked to institutions at the policy system level.

7.2 Lead Department

Central sponsorship is a key tool of policy integration (Ling 2002; Russel and Jordan 2009 p1203) and was utilised effectively in situating FM in the Cabinet Office, a department with considerable status within government due to its proximity to the Prime Minister and role as the ‘corporate centre’ (NAO 2015), and specifically the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU), with its remit to ‘*provide a cross-departmental perspective*’ and ability to take a step back and provide ‘*new thinking*’ on intractable problems (PASC 2007). This institutional venue was therefore highly appropriate for an integrated policy project, both in that FM was able to draw on the considerable expertise of the PMSU in terms of joined-up government, and PMSU’s ability to draw staff from outside the civil service secured project leaders with a broader understanding of the issues of the food system. This arguably contributed to the project team’s capacity to step outside siloed approaches to food policy, and take a systems view, albeit with a consumption focus, aiding a ‘*craftsmanship approach*’ (O’Flynn et al 2011 p250).

In contrast, the NFP was sponsored by DAFF, despite lobbying by non-state stakeholders³² for a centralised portfolio. This led to certain interpretations about the primary focus and responsibility, creating a path dependency at policy project level and limiting opportunities to apply an integrated approach (Coffey and Marston 2013). DAFF’s lead role positively discouraged participation from other key departments with a role in food, in particular the Federal Department of Health, which viewed the NFP as intruding on its turf, and did nothing to address more systemic issues around how the agriculture and health domains have been particularly resistant to integration. Beyond health, the general perception was of either ‘*contributing to the agriculture department’s national food plan*’ (CS-A) rather than of a jointly-conceived project crossing departmental boundaries, or general disinterest in the project’s overarching aims. These findings reflect similar issues experienced in South Africa, where the 2002 Integrated Food Security Strategy was ‘*seated uncomfortably*’ under the leadership of the National Department of Agriculture’ (Drimie and Ruysenaar 2010 p316).

The role of centralised sponsorship of FM has been identified as an important factor in the higher level of departmental input into the UK project: in the absence of any budgetary incentives for departments to undertake work beyond their immediate responsibility, the status of working with a high-profile unit within the Cabinet Office supported participation; absent in the Australian case. A NFP project leader with no background in food policy, taking over the development process mid-way through, presented an additional constraint. There is also a sense that FM benefitted from political backing at the highest level, having originated in the Prime Minister’s own department, and from a Minister already familiar with the

³² Often referencing the UK example

terrain (SoS Benn having moved from the Department for International Development), while the NFP was perceived to lack the Prime Ministerial backing of previous policies such as the Supermarket to Asia and National Food Industry Strategy, and the Minister leading the project switched during the process.

While a centralised venue for FM presented an opportunity for agents to innovate and engender a degree of policy change from the traditional production-focused path of national UK food policy, as the process moved to F2030, an institutional switch from CO to DEFRA undermined earlier capacity to steward the integration process (Drimie and Ruysenaar 2010), and overcome the traditional forces of continuity through fresh thinking and co-opting of other departments to a common agenda. It can be argued that F2030 represented a partial return to established policy projects where production goals dominated, though due to the vagueness of the document itself, and the lack of implementation on which to judge it, this may be too harsh a conclusion. Certainly the rising issue of food security, resulting in DEFRA's 2009 report *Ensuring the UK's Food Security in a changing World*, and suite of food security indicators, in response to the 2007-8 food price spike, was an important influence in the refocusing on production. Even so, as noted in Chapter Five, this does raise an important tension in the use of central departments as an enabler of integrated approaches, particularly given the level of stakeholder support for centralised approaches in both the UK and Australia. Had FM been considered a big enough political priority, the development process might have remained within the CO, perhaps with a 'food unit' akin to the unit for social exclusion. Without strong backing, any food policy will be implemented by a single department, and will be open to the risk of single-domain dominance and barriers to cross-government working experienced in the Australian case, and potentially by DEFRA in the F2030 stage of the UK case.

7.3 Institutional Reform

While integration is less visible in the F2030 report itself, the cross-government coordination established during FM remained in place. Ministerial committees, in particular, are a key institutional mechanism to address integration (Russel and Jordan (2009 p1203) and the establishment of a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food, along with a Food Policy Taskforce – while difficult to evaluate due to lack of transparency in their operating processes – plus the later addition of a Council of Food Policy Advisors, provided some architectural means to overcome food's siloed approach. This also underlined the importance of considering food in departments beyond DEFRA, as a system crossing multiple domains. New mechanisms were proposed in the NFP Green Paper, including a Ministerial Food Forum akin to the UK's cabinet committee, with decision-making powers, but this was not deemed politically palatable. The favoured mechanism in the NFP White Paper was a public-private Australian Council on Food, with no decision-making powers (DAFF 2013), reverting to the public-private model favoured in earlier projects such as the Supermarket to Asia Strategy and National Food Industry Strategy.

7.4 Input from Outside Government

Australia's historic '*structural balance*' (Tuohy 1999) between state and food industry actors is reproduced in the selection of NFP advisors: the groups set up to input into the policy. The Food Policy Working Group, which featured predominantly food industry representatives, and little representation of health or social policy, and a later 'Forum on Food Sector Relationships' (formed to talk about how to

improve relationships in the food supply chain), were drawn almost entirely the economic domain. The expert advisory group on FM represented a broader interest group, comprising academics and consumer-focused advocates, with one former farmer³³.

The short and informal process of consultation with stakeholders utilised in developing FM, enabled by the fact it was a CO project and not a formal government review requiring a traditional consultation, allowed a deep level of discussion with a broad range of stakeholders and, for some, a more frank exchange of views than are traditionally presented in written consultation. The formal review took place during the F2030 e-Consultation, fulfilling the FM '*requirement to test the framework in an open and collaborative process*', though this was criticised for repeating ground covered by FM, and consultation questions missed the opportunity to refine the project further by following up specific recommendations or actions in FM.

The NFP, by contrast, was highly consultative, with feedback sought on both the Issues Paper, and Green Paper resulting in a total of 680 submissions and 55 meetings held. But despite this lengthy process, the consultation was problematic; criticised for under-representing non-food industry stakeholders, with industry disproportionately represented in submissions (Carey et al 2016). Concerns over bias in the consultation of stakeholders even led to the establishment of a new civil society group, which developed its own 'people's' food plan to improve inclusivity in food policymaking. These issues are reflective of Australia's more fragmented, less developed civil society sector, which has a tendency to operate within single issue silos. There is, for example, less experience of integrating the health and environment civil society policy communities, exacerbated by the Federal nature of some groups. There have been efforts to unify the food movement, in an attempt to emulate the UK's more unified sector. The fragmented nature of Australia's non-state food sector also appears worsened by a relatively more antagonistic relationship between food industry and civil society groups, possibly due to the UK's practice at working together on food policy platforms, which in Australia have tended to be more industry-stakeholder led. As such, the empirical cases suggest support for public policy analysis that '*the impact of interest group activity on policy coherence is negative where, 'The constituencies for various components of these policies, are much stronger than the constituencies for the policy areas as a whole' (May et al 2005b p58)*' (Jordan and Halpin 2006 p23). In the UK case there is at least more of a sense that the '*political rhetoric*' of integrated food policy is '*matched by an appropriate interest group population*' (Jordan and Halpin 2006 p24). These divergent institutionalised patterns for state/non-state relations can be traced back to the policy system level: Australia's food policy processes have, to date, relied heavily on input from the food industry, with advisory boards of almost all business representatives (with the exception of the 1992 Food and Nutrition Policy and PMSEIC Food Security Report). In the UK, concerns over departmental clientelism during a period of multiple food safety crises appear to have precipitated a somewhat different style of working, with a stronger civil society presence to balance economic interests, a greater focus on consumer

³³ Sir Donald Curry, former Chair of the 1992 Policy Commission on Food and Farming

consultation, and transparency, via the Food Standards Agency, and – in the case of the first major national UK food policy since the war, the Policy Commission on Food and Farming – what might be viewed as a more arms-length relationship with policymakers.

The food industry was instrumental in Australia's decision to attempt a national integrated food policy, following ongoing lobbying for a more coordinated Federal government approach and support for a sector facing numerous challenges, and this, in turn, influenced the scope of the policy from the outset, including how the problem was defined and what solutions were deemed appropriate. This is contrasted with how FM arrived on the political agenda; conceived independently from business, and with a quite different target: examining food as a cultural phenomenon, taking an innovative focus on consumption, rather than the traditional productionist-bent, and with food understood as of significant societal interest though not '*a really big political issue*' (CS-UK2).

7.5 Problem Definition and Goals

These differing origins are discernible in the problematisation in the two projects. For FM, there are issues to be faced and multiple challenges to be managed (Cabinet Office 2008b px, xi): the societal and environmental challenges of the system, along with a fragmented approach which results in food policy which is 'less than the sum of its parts' are the primary focus, while in the NFP social and environmental challenges are presented less starkly, with the latter often depicted as a constraint to productivity, particularly by White Paper stage, and the use of past and future frames to downplay the significance of, for example, soil erosion or climate change. By F2030 in the UK case, the problem of ensuring food security is added to the challenges of integration, climate change and obesity highlighted in FM (DEFRA 2010 p4). Examining the goals of the two policy projects provides insights into how integration of multiple social, environmental and economic policy directions was managed. FM, for example, has four strategic policy objectives for government: fair prices, choice, access; safety; healthier diets and environmental sustainability. Supply-side goals are not within the remit of the project, and therefore – while the food industry is *described* – there are no fundamental clashes between its goals. Applying a term Jordan and Lenschow (2010) use to describe EPI, food's '*reverse integration*' – the idea that the health and environmental goals identified in FM may be overridden by economic objectives in the food sector – is not addressed. By F2030, there are no objectives per se, but the '*vision for a sustainable and secure food system for 2030*' (DEFRA 2010 p7) involves several potential flash points between ensuring a resilient, profitable and competitive food system, and sustainable consumption and production goals.

Similarly, in the NFP's first two iterations – which present a more mixed focus on food security, health, productivity and sustainability – potential tensions between economic, social and environmental goals remain unaddressed, and by the White Paper health goals have been almost entirely removed, with production the predominant theme. Environmental goals around '*producing food sustainably*' are vague in comparison to 'Growing Exports' and 'Thriving Industry' objectives; which involve specific targets. This focus on economic goals is indicative of the wider Australian food economy characterised by an institutionalised imperative towards increasing production and exports to remain viable, in the absence of

a policy of agricultural exceptionalism, in contrast to the UK – a net importer and cushioned by the EU Common Agricultural Policy.

Table 7.4: National Food Plan Goals – Possible Tensions

National Food Plan Stage	Goal	Potentially Conflicting Goal
Issues Paper	Protect Australia's food security <i>'In articulating a whole-of-chain approach the government hopes to identify: domestic and international food security threats and opportunities issues that affect food affordability how to support the nutritional requirements of the Australian population and help address the burden of obesity and diet-related disease sustainability of Australia's food systems, at all points along the food supply' chain how to ensure appropriate economic, taxation, labour market and education policy settings for a robust food supply chain'</i> (DAFF 2011 p2)	Maximise food production opportunities.
Green Paper	High Level Objective 1: Identify and mitigate potential risks to Australia's Food Security High Level Objective2: Reduce barriers to a safe and nutritious food supply that responds to the evolving preferences and needs of all Australians and supports population health High Level Objective 4: Maintain and improve the natural resource base underpinning food production in Australia	High Level Objective 3: Support the global competitiveness and productivity growth of the food supply chain
White Paper	Growing Exports: Australia's agricultural productivity will have increased by 30 per cent, helping farmers grow more food using fewer inputs Support food manufacturing innovation and growth through the first phase of the Australian Research Council's \$236 mn Industrial Transformation Research Program Australian's will have the information they need to help them make decisions about food	Sustainable Food: Australia will produce food sustainably and will have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes Australia will have reduced per capita food waste Support industry-initiated self-regulatory and co-regulatory approaches to labelling of food in relation to consumer values issues

Source: Author from DAFF (2011); (2012); (2013)

The coherence of NFP goals was raised in the State Government of Victoria's Green Paper submission, which states specifics, not '*vague references to balancing the needs of environment, food production and regional communities*' should characterise the policy:

'It is incumbent on the Commonwealth Government to ensure that, within its development of the National Food Plan White Paper, these apparently contradictory policy directions are reconciled and explained more clearly, with reference to detailed evidence and actions' (State Government of Victoria 2012 p7).

Indeed, despite rhetoric around how '*policies and programs that affect food supply and demand [these] can sometimes work against each other*' (DAFF 2011 pvi) and the need for '*greater coordination and clarity of goals*' (DAFF 2011 p1), an explicit attempt to do is lacking in the NFP documents. Similarly, while F2030 describes government's role as '*providing policy leadership by finding ways to reconcile the big choices and tensions between achieving our vision for food and other major challenges*' (DEFRA 2010 p8), the tensions between the different elements of its vision appear under-analysed.

A key tactic for managing tensions during formulation of the policies was omitting certain issues altogether. The starkest example is nutrition policy in the NFP process: a shift from the Issues Paper aim to '*support population health outcomes*' and '*help address the burden of obesity and diet-related disease*' (DAFF 2011 p2), to a separate National Nutrition Policy, suggesting significant challenges with integrating production and health policy objectives. Only with reference to earlier iterations of the NFP does the relative policy silence on health become apparent. The use of vague goals is a less drastic tool, for example in the NFP White Paper, where economic goals are specific while environmental and social goals are broad.

The tension between supply and demand objectives is also evident in the way certain issues are covered in the UK case, in particular meat. In-keeping with its consumption focus, FM makes a relatively bold statement ~~'on the need to reduce meat and dairy in the diet in comparison to earlier policies'~~ *'a healthy, low-impact diet would contain less meat and fewer dairy products than we typically eat today'* (p16).

However, it also utilises cautious wording to present a more neutral overall position; contrasting studies linking red and processed meat consumption to cancer and how '*some meat and dairy products can be high in fat*', with meat and dairy as important sources of dietary iron, calcium, zinc and other vitamins and minerals (Cabinet Office 2008b p16). This approach was a deliberate attempt to avoid getting into "*sticky areas*", with any proposals for meat reduction considered "*political suicide*" (CS-UK2), an approach echoed in F2030, where '*unclear evidence*' is the reason for avoiding tackling livestock production and consumption in the policy (DEFRA 2010 p47). Labour issues and GM – also potential flash points for economic and social objectives – are similarly sidestepped in the UK case. In general, it should be reiterated that FM did not bring the supply and demand elements together, yet for FI-UK, you "*can't segment it in that way*", and "*you have got to tackle both*".

7.6 Departmental Input

Such instances support the conclusion that the agriculture and health domains – with their differing institutionalised definitions of *food as what is produced* vs *food as what people eat* – represent the most challenging prospects for integrated food policy, also suggested by the way the representative departments interacted during the policy projects, and wider systemic relationships beyond. The classic inhibitor of joined-up policymaking – defence of departmental territory – is in evidence in the Australian case in particular, but even in FM (a consumption-focused project run from the centre of government) relations with the health department were reported to be problematic. Situating these policy projects within the historic approach to food policy integration in each country enables an examination of how links with nutrition have traditionally been marginalised. Where food and health has been a focus more recently – for example in the parallel Food and Health Dialogue in Australia and UK Public Health Responsibility Deal – conversely the agricultural domain has largely been sidestepped. Institutionally, both countries are also similarly constrained by a national health department focused on primary care, with public health playing a minor role, despite attempts to ‘agencify’ the issue and better prioritise preventative health, and food-related health more minor still.

These agriculture-health tensions can be contrasted, in the UK case at least, with links between production and environmental policy objectives, which appear to represent a less problematic prospect for integration – ideologically, if not yet fully realised. Economic and environmental values, and even to some extent health, have historically been more natural bedfellows in UK food policy, since the 2002 Policy Commission’s focus on reorienting farming towards environmental protection; supported institutionally by the integration of food, farming and environmental policy within the ‘super-ministry’ DEFRA, and by the European Common Agricultural Policy’s shift towards multi-functional agriculture. Borrowing from Jordan and Halpin’s study of rural policy integration in Scotland (2006 p33), CAP funds have provided *‘the means to bind together the farmers’ aims for sustaining their farm operation at the same time as accommodating the environmentalist desire for environmental integrity’*.

Australia’s key food policy sponsor DAFF has a narrower remit, with environmental policy dealt with in a separate department, and responsibility for food processing removed from its portfolio to the department of industry in 2011. Historically, the links between food production and the environment have been notably absent from key Australian food policies prior to the NFP, and an institutional setting characterised by market liberalism has limited recourse to linking subsidies with environmental goods. It is therefore understandable that, while sustainability is represented in the three iterations of the NFP, in particular in the Green Paper as discussed above, it is more narrowly framed as a constraint on productivity, compounded further by lack of input from the environment department into the development of the policy.

Table 7.4 compares the focus on economic, environmental and health domains in policies in each country, by revisiting Findings Table 4.1. The UK’s policies are notably more integrative in their focus on multiple domains in comparison with Australia, where economic domains have dominated. This table

also helps to explain why the NFP ended up with a similar framing and trajectory as earlier policies, which had an explicit production focus.

Table 7.5: How Economic, Environmental and Health domains have been addressed in Policies Prior to and Post FM/F2030 and NFP

Country	Food Policy	Domains Covered
UK	Policy Commission on Food and Farming	Primary focus on agriculture, but also makes links with environment and health
	Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England	As above, primary focus is on farming, but does include health and environmental issues in its key principles
	Food Industry Sustainability Strategy	Focus is on sustainable production but also includes chapter on social considerations, and stresses contribution of industry to improve nation's health
	Food Matters	Strong focus on consumption, including environmental and health challenges and the links between these. Describes issues around food production but does not tackle these in the actions. Purposely steers clear of tackling farming
	Food 2030	Vision of future covering health and environment (as FM), but bringing in production/food security
	Public Health Responsibility Deal	Public Health focus, no links made with environment and focus is on post-farm gate only
	Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming	Key challenges focus more on food supply and environmental challenges, and hunger, but does make specific references to the need to change consumption patterns and issue of meat production and consumption is addressed directly and most robustly relative to other policies
	Green Food Project	Focus is on production and how this links with environmental challenges. Consumption - and health - is not a focus, and is dealt with separately in a later phase of the project (see below)
	Agri-Tech Strategy	Focus on agriculture and productivity, and environment in the context of technology and innovation. Health is not a focus. Focus is mainly pre-farm-gate
	Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report	Focus on consumption, including health and environmental challenges through analysing healthy and sustainable diets. Production is not a focus as was dealt with in earlier phase of the project (see above)
Australia	Food and Nutrition Policy (1992)	Primary focus on health, but some good links made with environment and economy. Production not a strong focus, but some links made between policy domains at implementation stage on specific projects
	Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy (STAS)	Focus on productivity with no links made with environment or health
	National Food Industry Strategy	Focus on economic with some links to environment but as a support to economic
	Creating Our Future:	Focus on agriculture and productivity, with no mention of

	Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation	health
	Food and Health Dialogue	Public Health focus, no links made with environment and focus is on post-farm gate only
	Australia and Food Security in a Changing World	Primary focus on agriculture and the environment, and only touches on health in a minor way
	National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	Focus on productivity and innovation. Nutrition and sustainability issues dealt with in separate cross-sectoral policies
	Food Processing Industry Strategy	Productivity focus. No links made with environment. Health domain mentioned in relation to the market opportunity of healthy foods
	National Food Plan	Primary focus on productivity, with environmental challenges positioned as a constraint on growth and health hived off into a separate strategy
	Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper	Focus on agriculture and environmental driver - primarily drought management - positioned as a constraint on production. No links made with health apart from as a market opportunity

Source: Author

7.7 Integration of Outputs

While policy integration might be more closely associated with upstream policy development, implementation can also be used to address silos (Cabinet Office 2000; Ling 2002). Examining the implementation plans for the two projects reveals FM engendered some cross-departmental working and addressing of inconsistencies through its project outputs. These included joint working between DEFRA and FSA on GM analysis; between DEFRA and BIS on packaging waste strategy; between DH and FSA on the Healthier Food Mark; and between DEFRA, DIUS, DH, FSA, and DfID on the cross-departmental research strategy. However, actions specified in F2030 and the NFP are vaguer – e.g. it is not clear but seems likely that many of them are existing programs and policies rather than new initiatives – and fail to specify which departments are involved. This makes it harder to establish how much cross-departmental implementation was expected prior to the work being halted when the government changed. F2030 does mention joint work between DEFRA, FSA and Wrap on labelling and storage advice; and the FM-initiated projects Healthier Food Mark and Integrated Advice to Consumers are continuing, both of which require cross-departmental implementation. The NFP mainly refers to established programs, offering little opportunity for joint implementation/delivery.

Both FM/F2030 and NFP are underpinned by a commitment to ‘softer’ communicative tools, reflecting the overarching policy instrument paradigm as discussed in Chapter One, and the shift to a competition state as touched on in Chapter Four, whereby competition, innovation and efficiency have become the implicit but powerful goal underpinning policies. In FM this primacy is linked in particular to the benefits to the consumer (fair prices), and by F2030 has become one of six core issues of the Vision, linked directly to resource efficiency. In the NFP, links are made between competition and food security, and to the potential benefits of a more affordable and nutritious food supply with a reduced environmental footprint. By the White Paper the requirement for competition, efficiency and innovation becomes explicitly linked to Asian markets, and benefits to consumers are highlighted in terms of improvements in

quality, greater choice, competitive pricing, noting that while stakeholders have called for regulation of supermarkets, this might stifle competition and lead to higher prices.

Linked to this; framing around the appropriate role of government in both projects emphasises the role of individuals and businesses, or the decisions of consumers and industry. There are multiple references to freedom to choose in the NFP, and in F2030 the role of consumers is emphasised, and reiterated in the launch press release on how '*consumers can help secure Britain's Food Future*' (DEFRA 2010), bringing to mind the concept of governmentality (Rose 1999) and Guthman's description of '*regulatory control at the site of the cash register*' (2007). A clear preference for non-regulatory measures focused on information – advice, labels, voluntary codes of practice – is expressed throughout the NFP, and justified by past approaches characterised by direct interventions being shown to have higher costs than benefits to the industry and consumers (DAFF 2012 p75), though no specific evidence of this is provided. FM does note the limitations of such a focus, referencing how reliance on advice, voluntary guidelines and reform of procurement will have limited impact if demand drivers remain unchanged; highlighting the role of choice editing (p40) and raising the role of societal values (pxiv). Indeed, it is ironic that, while FM is the first stage of the policy development process, and positioned as an 'analysis' to inform a future strategy, or '*introduction to the strategic issues*' (NGO-UK2; FI-UK4), it arguably pushes the boundaries further than F2030 or NFP in terms of proposing new integrative policy programs – such as the Integrated Advice to Consumers and Healthy Food Mark – albeit within the constraints of a communicative instrument paradigm. It is reported that mandatory instruments were favoured by the policy team but not deemed politically acceptable; an example of how such policy tool choices are not simply judged on objective technical criteria, but '*tied to governance modes and policy logics*' (Howlett 2009 p82). UK institutional reforms, including the Cabinet Sub Committee on Food also introduce organisational tools (Jordan and Lenschow 2008b, cited in Hogl and Nordbeck 2012 p119). It is notable that neither FM nor F2030 appear to have had any funds attached to their implementation, whereas the NFP commits funds to research obstacles to Asian exports (echoing earlier Australian food policy projects) and also to community food initiatives.

In this sense, FM/F2030 represents a relatively significant degree of change compared to the NFP, in that it led to several original initiatives and mechanisms, as is addressed in examination of the theory of policy change in the Discussion. However, both the UK and Australian projects illustrate Samnakay's contention outlined in Chapter One, that such strategic policies, often presented as 'plans', 'initiatives', 'roadmaps' or 'frameworks', tend to be poorly defined, much of their content being description of challenges and summary of ongoing activities, leaving them '*rhetorically powerful but politically very cautious*' (Evans 2002 p79; cited in Exworthy et al 2003 p1915). For example the actions of both F2030 and NFP are characterised by references to 'supporting', 'maintaining', 'continuing' and 'encouraging'. This also lends support to the reduced intervention capacity of the state, in the era of food governance (Rosenau 1992; cited in Havinga et al 2015), where few levers remain at Whitehall or Canberra's disposal.

7.8 Impact of the Electoral Cycle

Finally, an important factor in the trajectory of the policies, perhaps the most important factor, abandonment due to changes in government, had little to do with integration at all – though a lesson from earlier health inequalities integration projects is the need for sufficient time to be allowed for a joint approach to be embedded (possibly up to ten years) (Exworthy and Hunter 2011). Regardless of how successfully they tackled integration, both the UK and Australian projects were ultimately bound by electoral political institutions – the relatively short electoral cycles, and adversarial style of two-party politics associated with a Westminster system – which sit uneasily with the need for longer-term thinking such as is needed in food policy. As vehicles for values and ideas, elections can impact on policy direction, due to ideological preferences of new government administrations, including halting previous policy change. FM was developed relatively quickly at a point 11 years into a Labour government, at a time of high legitimacy. It followed a period of relatively dense policy activity around food responding, in part at least, to several food system crises, but by F2030, the government's legitimacy was significantly weakened. Similarly, the NFP is characterised as a political victim, becoming 'sanitised' to fit whichever new government won the imminent election, at a time of tightening economic circumstances.

SECTION 3: Discussion of Findings and Conclusion

This final section of the thesis is a discussion of the findings presented in Section Two and Conclusion.

Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusion

This research set out to respond to the problem of failed food policy integration projects in the UK and Australia by posing the following questions:

1. How has food policy integration been addressed by national governments in the UK and Australia?
2. What factors explain the framing and trajectories of the food policies arrived at?
3. Can an integrated food policy be constructed across a range of established policy sectors?

Chapter Seven presented a summary of the findings outlined in Chapters Four-Six. It describes how food policy integration has been addressed by national governments in the UK and Australia, with reference to two specific policy projects attempting an integrated national approach, by situating those projects within the wider policy system of each country. This design facilitated an examination of both how food policy integration had been addressed, and also the factors – at project and system level – which impacted on the final policy project outputs, thus responding to both RQs 1 and 2. The findings reveal that, at the outset, both projects were conceived as a departure from the customary approach of tackling food policy within one or two domains in each project, as represented in Table 7.4, committing rhetorically as they did to an overarching approach across a range of established policy sectors. The early stage of the UK process also represented a significant commitment to integration at a *practical* level, through a new institutional venue for the project; new mechanisms for joining-up; and project outputs requiring joint working between multiple departments. However, particularly in the Australian case, but also by the later phase in the UK, early commitments appear constrained by several system-level drivers, as identified in Table 8.6 below, and by processual factors including: a failure to specify the target of integration; sponsorship by a single domain; lack of attention to contested values and inconsistencies in project goals; the primacy given to competitiveness; and a clear preference for non-regulatory measures focused on information. These, in totality, led to an undermining of the project aims in both cases and help to explain both their trajectory – from integrative to less integrative – and the framing of the final policy documents. Measured against the barriers to integration identified in the literature review, there is evidence in the findings of particular influence of the following factors:

Table 8.1: Barriers to Integration - Revisited

Barrier identified in Literature	Examples identified in Findings
Departments over-prescriptive when specifying means of delivery which may conflict with other departments (Cabinet Office 2000)	Issue of Cabinet Office proposals for (Action 6.1) <i>'New Healthier Food Mark standards for food in public places'</i> , which was initially conceived as a mandatory scheme but deemed impractical by DH, NHS, industry, and made voluntary
Little or no reward for helping someone else achieve their objectives	See in particular NFP on lack of budget for formulation
Departments tend to defend their budgets which tend to be allocated on a departmental or sectional basis rather than to policies or functions	
Failure of policy-makers to consider overall goals of the organisation	General lack of focus on coherence of goals in Australia and in UK later phase
Mechanisms for addressing inconsistencies and conflicts between different departmental approaches are sometimes not effective enough to stop conflicting messages being passed to end users	
Mechanisms to reconcile conflicting priorities between sections can be weak	
Inadequate time – as joined-up approaches take more time, make heavier demands on resources	Both projects thwarted by changes in government
Departmental objectives often take priority over corporate goals	FM buy in appeared relatively good (aided by the status of Cabinet Office), whereas by F2030 somewhat weakened by DEFRA status and ability to co-opt NFP suffered from difficulties bringing other departments on board with the project
Securing and maintaining buy-in from other departments.	

Source: Author

Both cases highlight how, what might appear a relatively straightforward policy ask – for integration – underplays the complexity represented by the concept, and also underestimates the weight of history acting against it. These two issues are addressed next.

8.1 Conceptual and Operational Ambiguity

At the outset, the research objectives demonstrated a bias towards cross-departmental policy integration. But the findings reveal considerable conceptual ambiguity around the term policy integration – and related terms such as coherence, coordination, whole-of-government and joined-up government – which in turn grant an ambiguity to policy projects over *what* is to be integrated and how ambitious that process should be. The level of ambition, for example, can range from collating all relevant policies and programs in a single place (often referred to in policy projects as a 'framework'); minimising contradictions/creating consistency/creating synergies between individual policies and programs (involving questions of how contradictory goals will be balanced); the creation of trans-domain policy objectives (including introducing new domains into existing policy areas); to the creation of one joint policy. Assessing FM/F2030 and NFP against the definitions in the literature review; if coordination is

aimed at minimising contradictions, then the outward manifestations of these projects – the reports themselves – would struggle to qualify as coordination let alone coherence or integration. In Hustedt and Seyfried's terms (2016 p891), FM might be considered closer to '*positive coordination*', in that some affected units were involved from the outset, and there was some attempt to link units, but there is also a sense of units checking the draft '*for the negative effects on their own area of competence*' rather than jointly-building, and of the problem perception of separate departments dominating (as was the case with the NFP). Though, admittedly, this is partly speculation, and it is not known how much of the silence around contradictions is a political victim of signing-off the documents, rather than representative of how coherence was addressed behind the scenes.

Building on the horizontal focus taken at the outset of the research, the findings suggest the type of integration can refer to silos operating in one of four directions:

- Horizontal cross-government policy domains/departments
- Sections of the supply chain
- Vertical levels of government
- State and non-state stakeholders

But this is not explicitly addressed in either policy project. In the Australian case, the initial focus is on integrating food policy by '*looking at the whole supply chain*' (DAFF 2011 p1) and examining food policy '*from production to consumption*', and specifically mentions a '*whole-of-chain*' approach. Yet it also links this to food security and affordability, nutrition and the burden of diet-related disease and sustainability (2011 p2), suggesting more of a horizontal focus, echoed in the Green Paper goals which include population health and improving the natural resource base (framed in terms of its importance to production). However, much of the commentary around integration by Australian interviewees was directed at the vertical – the problematic fragmentation between Federal and State levels of government – suggesting that, in reality, energies of both state and non-state stakeholders are dedicated more to weaving the vertical '*warp*' and less to the horizontal '*woof*' (Parsons 2004). Unsurprisingly given its development within the UK's home of joined-up government, and the relative lack of attention paid in the UK policy system to national-regional separation of food policy powers, FM predominantly focuses on cross-government integration. Though this is limited by the fact it does not actually cover agriculture, and one project team member at least described it as *not* attempting a joint interdepartmental programme. By F2030 the approach to integration is less clear: it is widely described by stakeholders as '*holistic*'. It refers to the need to promote integration in Europe and for joining-up, without specifying of what or how in the manner of FM.

FM overcomes silos in a limited sense, in that it steps beyond agriculture, nutrition or food standards, in a department with the capacity for innovative thinking, and acknowledges specific incoherent policies; e.g. related to information provision for consumers. Yet the opportunity is arguably undermined by its failure to outline or address tensions between production and consumption goals, as is the case for all six policy documents analysed. At the outset the issue of cross-domain tensions is recognised, and the need for addressing gaps and inconsistencies between them raised, as is the need for reconciling big choices and tensions. But nowhere are these addressed explicitly, and are only implicitly raised in the wider policy

analysis and literature review. As such, there appear to be no ‘*mechanisms to anticipate, detect and resolve policy conflicts early in the process [to] help identify inconsistencies and reduce incoherence*’, as recommended by the OECD (1996, cited in Meijers and Stead 2004), and significant contradictions continue to co-exist, as illustrated in Table 8.2, which augments Table 1.1 from Chapter One with further tensions between food policy’s multiple values and goals identified during the research process. Though it is possible discussion of these tensions takes place behind closed doors, for political reasons, the tendency for staff involved to move on and take this knowledge of food’s particular policy challenges with them can be seen to hamper momentum for a food systems approach becoming mainstream. The findings from Australia in particular, where there are clear ideological divides in how food issues are conceived between departments, in particular health and agriculture, support the need for tensions to be transparently addressed.

Table 8.2: Tensions between Food Policy Domains - Revisited

Policy Domain	Policy Domain	Tension
Nutrition	Trade and Investment	See Table 1.1, Chapter One
Industry/Science/Agriculture	Consumer Protection/Food Safety	
Agriculture	Nutrition/Food Safety	
Nutrition	Sustainability	
Agriculture/Trade Policy	Climate Change	
Food Waste	Food Safety	
Industry/Trade	Nutrition	
Nutrition/Education	Industry/Trade/Agriculture	
Agricultural Multifunctionality	Trade/Market liberalisation	
Self-Sufficiency	Competition	
Energy- Biofuels	Food Security	
Trade/Market liberalisation	Biosecurity	
Agriculture	Overseas Development	<i>“DEFRA are very much, particularly recently, driven by self-sufficiency and can we buy more from the UK, compared to the UK looking at the value of investment in overseas food production, and also helping food production abroad” (FI-UK2)</i>
Agriculture	Planning	<i>“You see tensions between the Department of Communities and Local Government and DEFRA on things like farming and water policy. Planning permissions, for example – farmers would like bigger more intensive livestock units, getting planning permission for those is really difficult.” (FI-UK3)</i>
Agriculture	Nutrition	Policies to maintain rural landscapes and small farms vs health and environmental impact of dairy products (Feindt and Flynn 2009) <i>“...some of the health issues, particularly around some of the primary producers here</i>

		<i>which DEFRA would be supporting and some of the problems the Department of Health and Food Standards Agency run in to in terms of saturated fat, so the dairy produce for example is a classic example. Where DEFRA tends to be quite heavily lobbied by the agricultural sector, whereas the Department of Health has a different constituency, there has definitely been some tensions between those two.” (FI-UK)</i>
Agriculture and Food Manufacturing	Employment	<i>“You see it a bit with things like working time directives ad conditions of employment – agriculture tends to find that difficult. Food manufacturing and retail businesses tend to be populated by lower paid people, particularly the retail part.” (FI-UK3)</i>
Market Protection	Free Trade	<i>‘Conservative environment shadow Nick Herbert backed the Competition Commission’s call for a supermarket ombudsman and ‘honest labelling’ at the Oxford Farming Conference. Yet the Tories face their own big contradictions. How do they square their overt localism and support for farmers with their equally strident commitment to a global free trade free-for-all? The government and the Conservatives both say food is important. The announcements in Oxford [Farming Conference on Food 2030 etc] show that neither takes it seriously enough to address the problems face on’ (Food Ethics Council 2010).</i> <i>‘Australia both fights any biosecurity protections where its export sectors are at stake and modifies national protections in order to avoid retaliatory actions from trading partners (Dibden et al 2011), as seen recently with New Zealand and Chinese apples and US Queen bees. Smaller domestic industries - including apple orchards - appear to have suffered as a result’ (Dixon Unpublished)</i>
Biosecurity	Food Security	Bio-security containment vs ecosystem needs, as in the examples of the European honeybee, fisheries and kangaroo in Australia (Dixon Unpublished)
Agri-Environment	Free Trade	Absence of government supports for agriculture removes levers to implement agri-environment schemes (Shepherd 2011)
Food Manufacturing	Environment	<i>‘Transforming agricultural raw materials into value-added foods with the required functionality, safety and shelf life requires significant amounts of energy and it has been estimated that up to 40% of value added to agricultural products is achieved by energy intensive manufacturing such as sterilisation, drying, evaporation, freezing, and refrigeration. Furthermore, the storage and transport of chilled and frozen foods consumes large amounts of energy’</i>

		(Appelqvist and Ball 2013 p21)
Public Health	Communications	<i>“The Health Minister wanted to do something about advertising and children’s TV, but the Minister for Communications, who was responsible for advertising, had more clout in Cabinet and did not want to alienate the big media companies”</i> (CS-UK7)

Source: Author

Along with tensions, the FMOYO Report also highlights potential overlaps between key Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSO), for example DEFRA’s new DSO ‘to ensure sustainable, secure and healthy food supplies’; the FSA’s newly adopted strategic objectives: to improve food safety and to improve the balance of the diet, and the key strategic objective for the DH to help people stay healthy and well (DEFRA 2009a).

The ability to integrate can be understood as closely linked to government capacity to: think outside and work across organisational boundaries (Ling 2002); to facilitate agreement on values motivating policy; and commit actors to work (Kay and Ackrill 2012). However, Value Agreement Capacity, in particular, is weakly represented in the case studies, and the findings provide empirical weight to the contention raised in Chapter One that ‘*stronger institutional capacities to enable analysis, implementation and greater coordination and cooperation*’ (Hawkes 2015 p30) are required. For example, CS-UK6’s assertion “*it is a lot about leadership...about difficult conversations, about all the brokering that needs to go on between government departments*”. If whole-of-government policy is a specifically a response to conflicting domains, it follows that conflicts between values and their corresponding goals must first be mapped and agreed before they can be overcome. If not, as demonstrated by the two empirical cases:

‘...efforts to integrate policies can easily slip into sub-optimality if inconsistencies in tools and incoherent policy goals fail to be removed and are allowed to remain in place during the replacement process’ (Rayner and Howlett 2009 p102).

Similarly, Selection Capacity – the ability to forge authoritative choices which commit governmental societal actors – was hampered by policy projects led by single domains, though it was improved in the FM example due to a centralised, high-status sponsor.

Values and goals are two of several elements – as identified in the review of public policy integration literature – which integration can target, the others being: teams; practices (including decision-making); structures; budgets; accountabilities; and delivery (including tools). Testing Table 3.4 on activities that may be subject to joining-up against the empirical data, it is evident that certain elements were easier to accommodate within existing institutional structures than others, though the applicability of many of the categories is not always obvious (particularly given that identifying what happened at implementation stage is problematic in both the UK and Australian examples).

Table 8.3: Activities that may be subject to Joining Up - Revisited

Activity	FM/2030	NFP
Defining new types of organisation (culture and values, information management, training)	Not Clear	Not Clear
Defining new accountabilities and incentives (shared outcome targets and performance measures)	Performance measures in UK departments were identified in FM but remained departmental	Unlikely given most programmes were ongoing
Defining new ways of delivering services (joint consultation with clients, developing a shared client focus, providing a 'one stop shop' for service users)	Not Clear	Not Clear
Defining new ways of working across organisations (e.g. shared leadership, pooled budgets, merged structures and joint teams)	FM instigated a Task Force to work across departments, plus a Cabinet Sub Committee	Not Clear
Organisational Change	Not Clear	Not Clear
Joint Teams (virtual or real)	Yes	Yes
Shared Budgets	Not Used	Not Used
Joint customer inter-face arrangements	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
Shared Objectives and Policy Indicators	Not clear how much input other departments made	Not clear how much input other departments made
Consultation to enhance synergies and manage trade-offs	Synergies and trade-offs were not explicitly addressed in F2030 consultation questions but could have been part of deeper discussion with stakeholders during FM	Synergies and trade-offs were not explicitly addressed in consultation questions
Sharing information to increase mutual awareness	Started to happen following Food Matters – e.g. between FSA and DEFRA on the Integrated Advice to Consumers work	Unlikely to have been taking place given dynamics during development process

Source: Author using Ling (2002); Cabinet Office (2000)

However – again unsurprisingly, given its institutional location in the home of joined-up government – the FM approach to integration measures up relatively well in its use of centralised instruments:

Table 8.4: Examples of Centralised Instruments - Revisited

Centralised Instrument	FM/2030	NFP
Leadership by Prime Minister and/or senior ministers to initiate and provide sustained political support for cross-cutting initiatives	Project was perceived to have Prime Ministerial backing at outset, due to conception and development within Prime Minister's Strategy Unit	Did not appear to enjoy level of Prime Ministerial support of previous food industry policies
Assignment of responsibility for coordination initiatives to central departments to compel line departments to comply with cross-cutting policy goals	Yes	No
Allocation of crosscutting issues to particular ministers to ensure they are embedded at a high political level	Not Clear	Not Clear (but unlikely given dynamics in development process)
Creation of central agencies or integration units to support ministers and departments (e.g. Sustainable Development Unit in DEFRA)	Food Policy Unit was created in DEFRA in 2009	No
Use of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees to set strategic crosscutting goals and to mediate and/or resolve interdepartmental conflicts	Yes	No (apart from Australian Food Council)
Creation of super ministries which bring related policy areas under one roof (e.g. DEFRA)	Not created for the purpose, but DEFRA's super-ministry status appears to have facilitated links between farming, food and environmental objectives	No
Establishment of inter-ministerial committees to set common objectives and share best practice	Yes (Although not clear if common objectives and best practice were a focus)	Yes (Although not clear if common objectives and best practice were a focus)

Source: Adapted from Russel and Jordan (2009 p1203; referencing a list devised by Peters 1997)

FM/F2030 also goes beyond the use of softer communicative instruments, by introducing the organisational tool of a Task Force (Jordan and Lenschow 2008b, cited in Hogg and Nordbeck 2012), although both projects shy away from procedural instruments such as Budgeting or Policy Appraisal. However, the findings also demonstrate that centralised policy projects are not necessarily the panacea they are considered to be by some stakeholders, due to inbuilt institutional tensions between the need for food policy to be coordinated centrally but implemented departmentally. Centralised projects themselves can also suffer from inertia, as CS-A7 explained with reference to Australia's earlier centralised work on integrating social exclusion. Similarly, while institutional reforms such as cross-government committees and taskforces can be important facilitators (as demonstrated in the UK case), these can be dismantled, with a return to de-centralised single-domain working. Options with more longevity identified in the literature review include creation of a Food 'Unit' or 'Agency' within an existing department. The DEFRA Food Policy Unit (FPU) established in 2009 is an example, though this particular approach is at risk of dismantling. The FPU became the Great British Food Unit in 2015, with a re-focus on boosting

exports. This unit also appears to fall short of Australia's PMSEIC recommendations for a National Food Security Agency, and was also housed with a specific policy domain, in DEFRA, somewhat undermining its potential for engendering joined-up working (cf the Cabinet Office-based Social Exclusion Unit). More ambitious alternatives might involve a redesign of the institutional architecture to create a new (food) ministry; or instating a food minister. A further more pragmatic option being utilised or explored elsewhere (Brazil and more recently Scotland) is using a rights-based approach enshrined in law. However, these options sit outside the current policy instrument paradigm in the case study countries, and are therefore likely to be highly contested, as was the case with the Australian Ministerial Food Forum during the NFP process, and the ANPHA, for example.

8.2 Integration as a Process

In summary, the above discussion highlights a lack of recognition of the importance of integrated policy as a *process*, rather than simply an end-state to be delivered, with implications for the different kind of policymaking expertise required to develop such projects; as compared to single domain policies. These capacity requirements are arguably amplified in the case of food policy, which also demands an understanding of food as a multi-value and systemic issue, as suggested by contrasting the FM project team and the NFP project team leader, with their respective backgrounds in and outside of food policy. It is also connected to tensions between a governance drive towards overcoming clientelism – in particular in terms of the frequent changes in bureaucratic personnel – and a resulting rationality deficit (Jordan & Richardson 1982, cited in Cairney 2011). As revealed in Chapter Four, interviews in both countries suggested a sense – from the food industry, in particular – that lack of policymaker subject knowledge is problematic and hindering more coherent approaches to food policy. It is also possible this proposed rationality deficit in modern governments – whereby they are '*dependent on the flow of information from their clients*' – also risks leaving them unable to preserve sufficient distance from clients '*necessary for independent decisions*' (Jordan & Richardson 1982, cited in Cairney 2011), thereby actually undermining the rationale of overcoming clientelism. This issue of structural balance appears particularly salient in the Australian case, where '*private sectoral groups...have been drawn directly into policy formulation, participating in the design of programs*' (Coleman and Skogstad 1995 p260), with implications for the range of input into the NFP.

8.3 Historical Institutionalism and Policy Integration

Taking a historical view of the changing institutional venues for policies around food over the past fifteen years, and of machinery of government changes to the key departments, supports the contention raised in Chapter One that food policy currently suffers from a form of 'under-institutionalisation', due to a governance time-lag: what was structurally appropriate for more narrow conceptions of food policy – for example food as agriculture policy – no longer fits the needs of the policy system, creating a mismatch between the recognition of the problems that integration is to address and the real possibility of solutions. For example, machinery of government changes which transfer responsibility for issues between departments, such as moving food manufacturing from agriculture to industry; the changing and fragmented responsibilities for food labelling in the UK system; or the transfer of water policy in and out of the Australian agriculture department, suggest a lack of fit between modern systemic definitions of

food policy and existing governance frameworks. Equally, the changing institutional venues in Table 8.4 suggest a poor fit between single domain sponsorship which segregates goals along silo lines, and the need for more systemic policies. As such, in HI terms this can be classed an example of institutional drift: a failure to adapt policies to account for socioeconomic changes (Weir 2006).

Table 8.5: Institutional Venues for Food Policies

Country	Food policy	Departmental Sponsor
UK	Policy Commission on Food and Farming	DEFRA
	Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England	DEFRA
	Food Industry Sustainability Strategy	DEFRA
	Food Matters	Cabinet Office
	Public Health Responsibility Deal	Health
	Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming	Government Office for Science
	Food 2030	DEFRA
	Green Food Project	DEFRA
	Agri-Tech Strategy	Industry (with DEFRA)
	Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report	DEFRA
Australia	Food and Nutrition Policy (1992)	Health
	Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy (STAS)	Agriculture
	National Food Industry Strategy	Agriculture
	Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation	Agriculture
	Food and Health Dialogue	Health
	Australia and Food Security in a Changing World	Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council
	National Food Plan	Agriculture
	National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	Primary Industries Ministerial Council
	Food Processing Industry Strategy	Industry
	Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper	Prime Minister & Cabinet

Source: Author

The HI lens also magnifies how institutional design can impact on capacity to develop an integrated approach; how small choices made at the time institutions are conceived can have unforeseen consequences, impacting the scope of future decision making. For example, the decision to create the UK Food Standards Agency as a non-ministerial body constrained options for awarding departmental

responsibility to progress to F2030, which had to be situated within DEFRA, despite the consumer-citizen leaning of FM. There were even questionmarks over the FSA's ability to attend the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food, reflecting the agency's unusual design as "*neither in nor out of the club*" (CS-UK4). Similarly, the decision to house Australia's food standards body FSANZ in the Department of Health – a decision said to have been influenced by criticisms of the UK agriculture department's handling of food scares – arguably supported a definition of food policy as food *regulation* policy within the DH, thereby limiting a broader outlook.

The findings also highlight a further implication of food's under-institutionalisation: the tactic of passing responsibility for certain strands – perhaps to avoid institutional dissonance – on to other policy projects, which can lead to elements of food-related policy 'falling through the cracks'. For example, nutrition policy in Australia, where the Australian Dietary Guidelines reiterated the need for improved data/measurement to facilitate sustainable food choices, and highlighted the NFP as important for '*helping Australia's food system respond to new opportunities and challenges*', and ensuring '*relevant state, territory and national departments are also promoting policies, programs and regulations that foster and support ecologically sustainable development both broadly and at the food system level*' (NHMRC 2013 p134). Yet the NFP argued the need for a separate National Nutrition Policy to cover off health aspects and respond to certain recommendation of the Blewett Labelling Logic project, but then the Nutrition Policy did not materialise and recommended links remain un-made.

This problem has parallels with a failure of policy learning *between* policies over time, and a sense food policies are often 'reinventing the wheel', as highlighted in consultee complaints about poor links between the findings of the 2006 Corish Report and the 2013 NFP; and also even between FM and F2030. Here, reflecting on institutions as standard operating procedures – as opposed to organisations or ideas – offers explanatory value, in particular how project-based working practices can impact attempts at joint working, suggesting the need for '*less high profile and time dependent 'projects*' (Marsden and Sonnino 2008 p430). There are links with Sjoblom's (2009) work on the impact of administrative short-termism, which speaks to the friction between a wider governance trend towards project-based approaches and long-term policy issues. In this sense, the policy projects – in particular the Australian, and to a lesser extent UK – display an inbuilt contradiction between long timelines for implementation and a lack of ongoing institutional support for doing so. For example, joint project teams are inevitably disbanded, and – had the policies not been abandoned – there would potentially be several changes in government over their lifespan, which does not appear to be accounted for in implementation plans. Though the UK did have several cross-government mechanisms in place to provide support, most of these did not survive a subsequent change in government.

In sum, by introducing a temporal dimension to analysis, HI theory maximises the potential to examine organisational inhibitors of food policy integration, and provides considerable flesh on the bones of Lang and Heasman's contention that '*big structural changes are almost certainly needed due to the consequences of past decisions and practices*' (2015 p23-24). However, because of its new institutionalist roots, theoretical flexibility also supports an understanding of structures at the *ideational* level, in

particular how value conflict – or institutional dissonance between departmental cultures and different parts of the food system – is structured to avoid political contention. The findings demonstrate examples of how – despite rhetoric around creating a shared vision, or addressing gaps and inconsistencies – in practice, the requirement to balance competing goals, or strike trade-offs among values in food policy is sidestepped. Multiple values and goals co-exist with the aid of several strategies for managing value conflict. A typology of strategies is therefore proposed, of:

1. Firewalling
2. Cycling
3. Ambiguity

Firewalling between departments – pursuing a set of values in one institutional venue and a different set of values in another – can be considered the default position for food policy historically, and this concept performs well empirically, for example in the decision to create a separate National Nutrition Policy to the NFP, with its heavy focus on food industry productivity. Similarly, FM and its focus beyond the farm-gate to avoid covering the same ground as the earlier Policy Commission, might be classed as a form of ‘cycling’; of separating conflicts temporally by subordinating one-half of a dilemma and then the other, in this case food production and consumption. Such tactics for managing value pluralism have clear implications for the possibility of integration.

Where issues are clearly contested, the use of more ambiguous policies can also be a political tactic for securing support for a policy program, *‘allowing different groups and individuals to support the same policy for different reasons and with different expectations’* (Baier et al 1986 p206). Empirical examples include the issue of meat in the UK case and, in the case of the NFP, the tendency to bring everything into scope at the outset allowing different stakeholders to maintain their own appropriate expectations. Neither case, overtly at least, addressed the underlying tensions between those conflicting values. Yet while such value pluralism exists, it is likely that *‘silo practices remain unchallenged’*, limiting joined-up government (Davies 2009). The policy integration projects themselves can, in HI terms, be considered to have been ‘layered’ *‘on top of earlier paradigms, policy programmes and institutions, many of which appear to be dominant’* (Voss et al 2009 p292), rather than tackling the dislocations. Linked to this is recognition that – much like the contested nature of sustainability (Moragues-Faus and Morgan 2015) – terms such as ‘food policy’ and ‘integration’ mask *‘a whole system of competing expectations, agendas and values’* (Fish et al 2010 p183, cited by Shepherd 2011). It should not be assumed food policy itself enjoys a shared understanding, or universal framing, among the fragmented domains it addresses. While the research set out with reference to the definition of food policy in the modern systemic sense it is understood within much UK discourse, the Australian case, with its conflicting interpretations between departments, and stakeholders, underscored the folly in taking such definitions for granted.

Traditional definitions of food policy appear to persist in some parts of Australian policymaking, despite civil society attempts to broaden understandings, as suggested by ST-A’s contention that national food policy is an *“entirely context sensitive term”*, whereby some people are referring to *“a policy for maintaining the health of and growing the food industry”* while others *“consider a more holistic framework, that takes in not just industry, but also other aspects like national food security, diet and*

nutrition etc”. Overall, in comparison the UK demonstrates a somewhat more nuanced and united definition. The social constructionist foundations of the thesis have enabled attention to be paid to these conflicts over values and meaning which hinder integration, thus overcoming the *‘instrumentalist orientation of the capacity building approach’* which tends to overstate the role that knowledge can play – the idea that *‘if we just have more knowledge we will have better policy’* (Parsons 2004 p49). In the case of both FM/F2030 and the NFP, knowledge of food’s significant challenges is demonstrated in the policy documents, but this in itself has not translated to policy success, suggesting the need to *‘shift from instrumentalist ways of thinking towards post- or non-instrumentalist approaches to design’*, which *‘involves understanding forms of knowing and modes of knowledge which are more tacit, emergent and embedded in specific contexts, practices and local experience’* (Parsons 2004 p49). The need for better ideational uptake (Jochim and May 2010) of *‘more inclusive food narratives’* (Moragues-Faus and Morgan 2015 p1558) underlines the importance of producing – ideally jointly devised – definitions in the Terms of Reference, which was not the case in the case study policy projects. Though, with recognition, particularly in the case of ‘food policy’, of the challenges involved with multiple stakeholders agreeing a *‘non- reductionist definition that does justice to the multifunctional character of the food system’* (Morgan 2009; in Morgan 2015 p1380)

Finally, with recourse to literature on constructive, or discursive, institutionalism – where institutions are understood as shaping behaviour through frames of meaning – several narratives to explain deliberate or legitimise political action can be identified in the two policy projects. While relevance to integration may not be immediately obvious; framing around the proper role of government; importance of competition and innovation; definitions of food security, or the weight given to environmental challenges; represent a barrier to food policy innovation generally, by limiting the scope of any actions, and to the aim of integrating economic, social and environmental goals, by giving particular weight to certain domains over others. As such the policy projects are ‘layered’ over existing ideas, not applied to a clean slate, and are *‘constrained by previous policy choices which have become institutionalised’* (Rayner and Howlett 2009 p8).

In summary, applying an HI lens to these food policy integration attempts has provided a deeper understanding of the problems of embeddedness of fragmented approaches, by highlighting institutional forces – predominantly forces of continuity – operating at multiple levels within the two countries. The different levels of institutional analysis utilised above and in synthesising the findings in Chapter Seven are summarised in Table 8.6, which theorises factors influencing the policy projects, and represents an embryonic attempt at an institutionalist theory of policy integration. These initial ideas raised during the research process require further testing and refinement.

Table 8.6: Summary of Institutional Factors impacting on Food Policy Integration

Definition of Institution	Level of Institutional Analysis	Focus	Observations - Australia	Observations - UK
Institutions as Organisations	Department	Institutional Design	Agriculture became separate department relatively recently (1998), previously part of Primary Industries (also includes mineral and energy industries, including gas and petroleum, and electricity) No specific remit for 'food' in Department of Agriculture's title	Creation of DEFRA as a 'super department' encompassing farming, food and environment provides better focus point for food-related policy activities, and links between production and environment enabled, though weakening of environmental team in 2009 with creation of Department of Energy and Climate Change
		Institutional Reforms with Unintended Consequences	Creation of FSANZ as agency of Health Department led to focus on regulation and harmonisation of standards and a focus on 'clean' rather than 'green' Machinery of Government changes moving food industry responsibility from Agriculture to Industry department further fragmented oversight	Decision to design FSA as a non-ministerial department limited choices for venue shift from Cabinet Office following FM stage
Institutions as Formal Structures/Rules	Constitution	Overarching Constitutional Structure	Impact of the Federal system and separation of powers - responsibilities are fragmented and policy levers may be outside of jurisdiction. E.g. Environment is responsibility of States and Territories in Australia so doesn't feature strongly in the NFP resulting in lost opportunity to integrate these different food-related domains. If States are not part of formulation are unlikely to buy into the national policy States already have food plans which may clash	Impact of EU multifunctional agriculture focus on related UK's interpretation of CAP reform and its gradual greening ' <i>potentially re-embeds agriculture in its environment</i> ' (Marsden and Sonnino 2008 p423)

			with National Plan	
		Electoral System/Cycle	Average period of government between elections of 2.48 years, clashing with long-term policy projects. NFP launched at the end of a government term, immediately before election	Average period of government between elections of 3.3 years, clashing with long-term policy projects. Food 2030 launched at the end of a government term, immediately before an election
		Bureaucratic Structure	New Public Management–inspired division of policy responsibilities results in predominance of single-domain institutional venues. In the case of the NFP: DAFF	New Public Management–inspired division of policy responsibilities results in predominance of single-domain institutional venues, overcome somewhat at FM stage but re-confined to DEFRA by F2030 stage
Institutions as the ‘Rules of the Game’	Bureaucratic Working Practices	Project-based working on policy projects can limit long-term thinking and leads to loss on institutional memory/lack of policy capacity. Mistakes are repeated and tacit crafting and networking skills lost. Non-government actors control knowledge of food policy development	Head civil servant driving the NFP with no background in food policy. Lack of expertise within departments – particularly a bugbear of the food industry Complaints in consultation responses that the same issues have been covered in previous policy formulation processes	Lack of expertise in department is a bugbear of food industry e.g. criticisms of Food 2030 by the FDF: clash between food waste recommendations and food safety Complaints in consultation responses that the same issues have been covered in previous policy formulation processes. Project team working on FM were not retained to work on F2030. Using a new consultation process led to the same issues being covered again
		Departmental competition for resources and rewards system for policy outputs based on contributing to departmental success – no rewards for contributing to cross-cutting goals	Difficult to persuade other departments to participate in NFP due to lack of budget allocated	Cabinet Office status may have enabled better input from other departments, whereas by F2030 DEFRA’s ability to co-opt constrained
		Government’s approach to	Numerous calls for NFP to be run from	Cabinet Office Strategy Unit practices meant projects

		centralisation in policymaking	department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, but civil servant interviewee notes overall governance trend towards decentralisation. [However, Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper in 2015 was housed in Prime Minister and Cabinet.]	unlikely to be retained within that department after initial stage
		Structural Balance between State and food industry	History of food industry-led policy formulation (e.g. Supermarket to Asia Strategy, National Food Industry Strategy, Creating our Future)	History of policy development relatively more independent/arms length in response to criticisms over food scares and agriculture as a clientelist ministry? E.g. 1992 Policy Commission (although the chair himself was agribusiness)
		Food Policy as single domain approach	History of food policy as addressed via single domains, e.g. agriculture; nutrition; trade, constrains potential for new integrated governance arrangements crossing multiple domains	
Institutions as Informal Rules	Ideational System	Frames create path dependency by acting as an ‘understandascope’, promoting and limiting certain policy options	Example frames identified: • Market Liberalisation of Agriculture • Appropriate role of government • Competition, efficiency and innovation • Abundance, food security	Example frames identified: • Agricultural Exceptionalism • Appropriate role of government • Competition, efficiency and innovation
		Clash of institutional norms between departments; ‘Institutional Dissonance’ in food policy definitions	Differing departmental definitions of food policy e.g. in Australia agriculture department defines food policy as food production policy, while health defines as food regulation/standards	Less evidence of clashing, more of overlapping, e.g. Strategic Objectives as reported in FM ‘One Year On’ Report in 2009: DEFRA: Departmental Strategic Objective to ensure sustainable, secure and healthy food supplies; plus others on sustainable production and consumption and a thriving farming and food sector. FSA: Adopted two Strategic Objectives: to improve food safety and to improve the balance of the diet. DH: Key strategic objective to help people stay healthy and well and has been working with departments and industry to promote healthier food

Source: Author

As demonstrated by Table 8.6, the concept of institutions, both in an old institutionalist sense (actual organisations), and new institutionalist sense (rules, practices and ideas), has provided a rich heuristic for examining how and why food policy integration efforts may have been constrained. Turned on its head, Table 8.6 also provides pragmatic clues which might contribute to a more successful framing and trajectory for integrated projects in the future; including the need to consider the influence of institutional design of departments and the possibility of machinery of government failure; the stage in the electoral cycle and how long policy development must take in order not to fall foul; the need for suitable structures and incentives for practitioners; and how to ensure a legacy beyond the project end. There are more practical implications for future projects at 8.4 and 8.6.

Moving on from definitions of institutions, concepts in the HI toolkit including path dependency; critical juncture; and its conceptions of policy change, are next for discussion. As identified in the methodology section on operationalising HI, the concept of path dependence was deemed appropriate for both system- and project-level application in this research, and offers an effective shorthand for the various levels of institutional dis-integration embeddedness found in the policy system, which lead to suboptimal outcomes. It also helps to help to convey how a particular institutional venue – for example a department of agriculture – can influence content and trajectory in an individual policy project. However, it proved challenging to identify the mechanisms sustaining path dependence theorised in the literature. A case could be made for the mechanism of learning, where past experiences are stored in standard operating procedures, professional rules (Rose 1990; March and Olsen 1984), in terms of institutionalised *practices* (such as the tendency for policymakers to conceive of goals and outcomes in isolation). But departments are criticised by stakeholders for *lack* of institutional memory on policy *content* – for example ‘reinventing the wheel’ between one policy project and another (Pollitt 2001; cited in Pollitt 2008 p25), echoing Pollitt’s conclusions around how public sector organisations are undermined in remembering their own pasts due to lack of capacity (2008).

The positive feedback mechanism also performs less well empirically in this instance. It proposes that once on a particular path, further steps down that path increase with each step, because the benefits for policy makers, interest groups, and other players of the current activity increase over time compared with other possible options, as do the costs of shifting to another alternative (Pierson 2000a; Schneider 2006). However, in the case of the two integrated food policy projects, there appears – outwardly at least – to be a commitment to innovation to overcome siloed approaches, certainly from the interest groups in both projects, and from the civil servants involved in FM. Nevertheless, while the mechanism of distributional effects – how institutional arrangements affect the capabilities of various groups to achieve self-consciousness, organise, and make alliances (Thelen 1999) – did not speak loudly in these empirical instances, there are clearly historically close alliances in the Australian case in particular, between food industry stakeholders and policymakers, as discussed at 7.4, and Cullerton et al’s (2016) social network analysis supports a stronger food industry capacity to influence decision-making in comparison to nutrition professionals (see 4.4.3).

Linked to this is how HI theorises policy change in the context of the case studies. For Peters et al (2005), that which makes PD so appealing – prediction of institutional persistence and explaining the embeddedness of those institutions – diminishes its ability to understand structural change, and this critique is supported here, due to issues of applicability. The concept of a Critical Juncture (CJ) in an otherwise path dependent dis-integrated process, was challenging to translate empirically. The concept appears to work better at the policy system level, where several possible CJS can be theorised. For example, the series of food safety crises in the UK, and scandal over the agriculture ministry's perceived clientelism had ramifications for institutional design in both countries (the creation of DEFRA, the decision to house FSANZ in the health not agriculture department in Australia) and fits the conception of a stable path punctuated by an exogenous shock. The decision to end agricultural exceptionalism and deregulate food production can be viewed as a critical juncture which set the Australian food system on a path characterised by pressure to export and focus on harmonization of food standards, which has arguably constrained its ability to conceive of policy integration more broadly, in horizontal terms for example. In the same vein, the Second World War can be considered a critical juncture, setting both countries – although for slightly different reasons – on a quest for productivity, resulting in a path dependent primacy of the economic domain over others. However, links to the embeddedness of food policy fragmentation are not direct.

The concept of a CJ was harder to apply at the policy project level, given that neither FM or the NFP was in response to an exogenous shock or shift, with FM resulting from a more incremental social interest in food; and the NFP a response to stakeholder calls. These examples align more closely to the notion of weak institutionalism and 'loose' path dependence (as opposed to strong and strict), where *'institutional change, up to and including a change of paths, can occur without an exogenous shock so that both reproduction and change are built into the logic of institutions'* (Meadwell 2005 p16). This in itself raises important questions about successful integration: in Jochim and May's (2010) work on boundary-crossing policy regimes (which can be likened to policy integration projects), crises were deemed important triggering events, suggesting that the absence of a dramatic crisis (in the traditional sense of a highly politically-salient event such as urban riots; a terror attack or a food safety scare) at the outset of FM and NFP, may have undermined progress. Though, several of the new regimes listed by Jochim and May did result from a more *slowly evolving* crisis, and to a lesser extent from coalition building. In the Australian case the environmental and social challenges of the food system were certainly less strongly emphasised in the NFP than in FM, but FM was also described in interviews as a more exploratory, as opposed to a crisis-response, project.

Continuing the consideration of the role of policy change in these two empirical cases; if the fragmented governing of food policy is considered to be path dependent, the two policy projects attempting to overcome these structural constraints must be considered as – at least potential – policy *change*. Reverting to Capano's (2009 p14) four possible illustrations of policy change (Definition of the issues in question; Structure and content of the policy agenda; Content of the policy programme; Outcome of implementation of policy), the case study policies might be judged policy change in terms of the first and second of these categories. The first – transformation of the definition of the issues – somewhat

characterises the UK policies, in that several interviewees argued a new discourse around food consumption was opened up. For example CS-UK4's remarks around the validity of:

"...changing the debate, the way people think about things, that's ok. Even translating to how individual businesses make decisions, rather than in concrete crunching policy propositions. That's not necessarily a problem, depending on – if you think the solutions lie in Whitehall mandates, that is a problem – if you think solution is a far more mixed bag of interventions by wider group of actions and shifting a system maybe that is the way things do need to work."

Certainly FM was the first time demand-side policy issues had been seriously considered. There also appears to be a more unified understanding of food policy in its broader definition in the UK, as compared to the Australian case, which may have been influenced by the work done in FM/F2030, although this link is, of course, not testable. There is also a case to be made for the influence of the Foresight (2011) *Future of Food and Farming* report, and its chief protagonist Sir John Beddington. Although it did not lead to specific policy activity, several interviewees mentioned the report's positive impact on advancing the discourse around food policy as a systems issue. CS-UK3 extends the point, arguing that while: *"some people think that the government should have a view on the big issues of the day regardless of whether or not the state can actually solve them"* - they disagree, and feel *"there is a real danger of government trying to occupy a space where it doesn't actually have the levers and can't actually change things"*:

"It is fine to have a vision that goes wider, but then in terms of what the government actually does about it, it has to be things you think you actually stand a chance of being able to deliver" (CS-UK3).

The institutional reforms which accompanied FM can also be considered to have altered the structure and content of the policy agenda, as new cross-government ways of working were introduced and food moved – temporarily – further up the policy agenda. However, despite attempts to introduce new policy levers such as the Integrated Advice to Consumers and Good Food Code of Practice, the policy programme arguably remained very similar post-F2030, with a focus on communicative policy instruments and reversion to food policy as agriculture policy as demonstrated by the UK's AgriTech Strategy. In the case of the NFP, there is little evidence of Capano's four indicators.

While overall reflections on the research are provided in the Conclusion at 8.5, this is an appropriate point to continue reflecting more directly on the usefulness of HI as a lens through which to view policy integration. As described above, HI without doubt proved a rich source of conceptual tools and provided considerable flexibility due to the many strands of institutionalism in existence. In retrospect, and drawing on the typology of institutionalisms provided by Lowndes and Roberts (2013 p31), the conceptual framework is characterised by a *'border crossing'* (Thelen 1999) approach encompassing three strands:

- *Historical* Institutionalism: Focusing on how choices made about institutional design influence future decision making of individuals
- *Empirical* Institutionalism: Which most resembles a traditional approach and focuses on different institutional types and their practical impact on government performance
- *Constructive or discursive* institutionalism: where institutions are understood as shaping behaviour through frames of meaning.

However, there is an awareness that a rich, flexible theory can be in danger of becoming a multi-theoretic approach focusing on so many levels it is ‘*difficult to draw firm conclusions about which institutional characteristics facilitate or constrain*’ (Coleman and Skogstad 1995 p260; John 2012). This is exacerbated by the fact ‘institution’ is such a slippery concept. Even in the body of scholarly literature it can be difficult to discern which definition is being applied, and – while every attempt has been made to be clear on this point in direct recognition of problems experienced when reviewing the literature – it is possible the thesis reproduces some of this conceptual obscurity.

Such conceptual problems can said to be reinforced because HI scholars look for cases of successful institutionalisation and persistence, meaning ‘*the strength of path dependency is almost certain to appear substantial if the cases selected for analysis are primarily those in which a pattern has persisted across time*’ (Peters et al 2005 p1278) and in this sense there is a danger of seeing institutions everywhere. If HI fails to address such limitations, PD is in danger of being relegated to a ‘*concept in search of a case*’, with all historical policy studies considered to be path dependent (Kay 2005 p569). Overall this conceptual ambiguity, and the lack of direction in the HI literature on how to apply the theory empirically, led to a considerable amount of work on operationalising it (cf utilising an Advocacy Coalition Framework model, which is more empirically-oriented) and there were many queries which – because of the plethora of applications and interpretations – remain unresolved, for example how critical the mechanisms are to the concept of path dependence, or whether it is possible to identify path dependence without a critical juncture at the outset. Nevertheless, as stated above, the theory presented an invaluable source of conceptual tools and ideas.

Reflections on the theoretical contribution to the body of food policy knowledge are provided in the Conclusion.

8.4 Practical Implications for Integrated National Food Policy

The discussion now moves away from theoretical underpinnings, to examine some additional practical implications suggested by the research. These connect, in part, to RQ3 on whether it is possible to develop an integrated national food policy across established policy sectors.

Returning to an issue raised above, one implication is the potential ‘*expectations gap*’ (Downs 1957) between calls for stronger government leadership on integrated food policy to overcome silos, and lack of policy capacity at national level to ‘*weave together the multiplicity of organisations and interests to form a coherent policy fabric, which is robust enough to survive the politics of policy implementation*’ (Parsons 2004; Kay and Ackrill 2012). Or as CS-UK4 remarks of the UK attempt: “*somehow the concrete actions government can do are never going to be quite up to the description of the challenge*”. Parsons (2004) argues both coherence and capacity are subcategories of what Giddens calls ‘*transformative capacity*’, and concern the ‘*capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends on the agency of others*’ (Giddens 1986 p93, cited in Parsons 2004 p44). Specifically, the policy projects suggest an overestimation of Selection Capacity (to commit actors) (Kay and Ackrill 2012), due to power diffusion, resulting from responsibility for food policy being devolved upwards (to Europe) and to a less

clear extent downward to the devolved regions in the UK, and downward to States and Territories in Australia. Plus, levers for implementation are often outside of departments charged with formulation, for example the experience of the Healthier Food Mark and Department of Health following FM. This echoes Caraher et al's (2009) earlier assessment of the health-related policy document *Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives*, which noted problematic links between policy promises on fast food outlets via '*planning regulations to allow local authorities to manage proliferations of fast food outlets*' and the need to rely on departments such as Communities and Local Government (p61-62). Added to this, as noted in the literature review section on food governance, levers often – and increasingly – reside with non-state actors. Interviews revealed a growing feeling in the food industry that government food policy has become irrelevant to it, for example, FI-UK2 commenting: "*we don't need a food policy, frankly, as a sector, to tell us what to do*", because "*the government has become pretty peripheral to us now, because they don't intervene and they don't have the capacity to intervene*", and noting the industry doesn't need help on resilience, climate change, obesity, as it knows about the issues and is "*trying to do our bit*".

Thus, following Downs (1957), there is a danger the strong rhetoric around integrated food policy projects inflates public expectations beyond that which can realistically be provided by politics and the state (Flinders and Kelso 2011 p5), and the '*subsequent performance undermines public confidence, thereby fuelling disenchantment and apathy*' (Flinders and Kelso 2011 p4). This is not to suggest the current *modus operandi* is the right one: clearly the current approach to addressing the new fundamentals of the food system is not working. But it does raise questions about the appropriateness of governments claiming to address the bigger policy picture on one hand, when they are unwilling/unable to deliver significant action on the other. Situating FM/F2030 and the NFP as '*metapolicies*' on the spectrum of policy instruments (thematic in nature, and communicative, aimed at '*increased awareness, longer-term visions and objectives*'), rather than harder organisational or procedural tools, supports a characterisation of '*strong diagnosis but weak cure*' or, borrowing from the literature on joined-up government and health inequalities, '*rhetorically powerful but politically cautious*' (Evans 2002 p79, cited in Exworthy et al 2003 p1915). Again, how one judges success depends on what measure of policy change or success is being applied.

The findings on the role of institutional design in supporting or hindering integration of food policy also have significant implications for praxis. Supporting Immergut's findings in her classic HI study of health care policy (1992), interest groups and parties (and policymakers themselves) will '*have to pursue different political strategies in different countries due to the different political/institutional configurations*', for example contrasting where design seems to facilitates links between domains – for example between farming, food and the environment in the UK's DEFRA – and where such links are harder to make.

With the Discussion now presented, this chapter turns to concluding thoughts, proposing some theoretical and practical contributions, reflecting on the research design, and suggesting limitations of the study.

8.5 Conclusion

The rationale for this research project was the observation that calls for an integrated food policy to tackle the new fundamentals of the food system have been regularly made for over a decade. But while food policy dis-integration is an established problem, and there is strong support for a more holistic approach to national food policymaking, two of the most significant projects attempting to address this failed in their endeavours. The thesis responds with a comparative policy analysis of two countries' food policy integration projects: the UK's FM/F2030 process (2008-2010) and Australia's 2010-2013 NFP. Drawing on a conceptual framework fusing historical institutionalism with public policy integration, it proposes what might be described as a new 'institutional theory of food policy (dis)integration'. It explored how the established national policy frameworks in both countries have impacted on the way policy integration has been defined and implemented during these two specific cross-government policy projects, following the HI tradition of demonstrating how *'the content of new policies is heavily dependent upon the organizational structures of policy production'* (Amenta and Ramsey 2010 p24).

Chapter Two traced how national governments in the UK and Australia tended to design food policy prior to 2008 with a single domain approach, though there were certainly efforts to align agriculture, the environment and – to a lesser extent – health in the UK from 2002, and two Australian attempts at boundary crossing. The two policy projects, FM/F2030 and NFP, were the first explicit attempts at an overarching framework for food policy, although they fell short of what might be classed as 'integration' in the literature. The findings suggest the legacy of historical approaches to integration, plus political developments and decisions around institutional design, and a more general trend of hollowing out of national government policy capacity, impact on how integrated food policy can be formulated in a particular country setting; for example, the role of: market liberalisation of agriculture; a focus on harmonising standards; and pressure to build food export markets in Australia; and of food safety scares and the EU Common Agricultural Policy in the UK.

A new institutional venue and mechanisms for cross-government working – as established in the UK case – imply the potential to overcome the path dependent nature of dis-integrated national food policymaking. However, though there were certainly elements of innovation in the UK, both ideationally and organisationally, in both countries constraints operating at multiple levels, from the policy system to the ideational, limited their ambitions (which were somewhat more confused in the NFP from the outset). There were also significant process-related influences on how integration was tackled in both projects, which undermined success. Following the typology of policy failure developed by McConnell (2015), the projects fit the '*Process*' category, with policymakers unable to fashion the type of policy they had hoped for. The findings suggest, with direct reference to RQ3, that it may not be possible to construct an integrated national policy across a range of established policy sectors, certainly without a different approach recognising the barriers identified here, and significant capacity building. Even with the right process in place, national policy projects in the fashion of FM/F2030 and the NFP may not be the most effective approach; given that the considerable enablers in place during FM did not translate into policy success. The integration goal itself can be argued to engender more ambiguous policy documents, due to their upfront ambitions to encompass all issues and stakeholders, which in turn can lead to anemic

outcomes (Jochim and May 2010 p309). Following Jordan and Halpin (2006 p21) the '*project to rid policy practice of incoherence*' may simply be '*too heroic*' and out of step with the reality of policymaking capacity, and there are clearly fundamental question marks over integration projects: abandon them or improve them? It would be prudent, therefore, to explore and disseminate credible alternatives to whole-of-government national policy projects, as expanded on below under Future Research.

In Chapter Eight, institutions operating at multiple levels within the two countries which maintain the dis-integrated status quo have been theorised, from the formal constitutional and bureaucratic structuring of the policy space, and the design of the main departments with policy responsibility for food, through to standard operating procedures which limit cross-agency collaboration, both organisationally and ideationally, and the embedded nature of historic approaches to food policy formulation. The role of institutionalised ideational filters concerning what food policy is for; appropriate policy levers; and collaboration between state and non-state actors in integrated food policy formulation have also been addressed.

In light of the above, the research concludes that, both projects may represent the germination of a new style of explicit integrated 'food policy'. But building the capacity to craft a truly integrated food policy across a range of established policy sectors and stakeholders will require more consensual definitions and explicit analysis and reconciliation of contradictory goals; robust mechanisms to aid cross-departmental, cross-government and cross-sector working, including shared budgets and implementation; and potentially a new institutional venue with both the potential for fresh thinking but combined with the ability to support a policy through to implementation. However, this may ultimately prove too 'heroic' an endeavour, and alternative policy designs should be further explored.

In reaching these conclusions, the research delivers both practical (many of which have been addressed above) and theoretical contributions to the body of knowledge on food policy specifically, and public policy more broadly, as discussed next.

8.6 Contributions


A conceptual framework drawing on the public policy integration literature has applied new academic rigor to understanding the challenge of departmentalism in food policy. In doing so it has provided conceptual clarity by exposing and synthesising dimensions of the integration process, summarised in Figure 8.1. As discussed at 8.11, more work is needed to conceive a continuum of food policy integration, utilising the range of definitions in the public policy literature. In more practical terms it goes some way to address Russell and Jordan's (2009) assertion of the dearth of detailed empirical accounts of joined-up government, because research too often focuses on implementation at ground level rather than departmentalism at the policymaking stage. In doing so, it responds to remarks by, for example Keast et al (2007), that '*failure to understand the attributes of the various integration modes*' has contributed to the overall failure of policy integration projects. It aims to both augment conceptual understanding, but

also be of value in practical terms, and applicable beyond food, flagging points of clarification worthy of attention in any future attempt to create an integrated policy:

1. What *kind* of integration – level of ambition and direction – is the project aiming at?
2. What is to be integrated? Is the focus to be – one or all of either – upstream values and goals; downstream programmes; or administrative elements such as structures for coordination, budgets and accountability?
3. What *mechanisms* will be utilised to support integration?

A synthesis of the dimensions of integration which may need to be addressed in any similar attempts is proposed at Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1: Dimensions of Integration identified in the Research



Source: Author

A potentially useful conceptual contribution is the distinction between ‘*Integrated Food Policy*’ and ‘*Food Policy Integration*’. While these terms have been used indiscriminately, the conceptual distinction between an integrated food policy, created across multiple domains, and food policy integration, whereby food policy is inserted into other sectoral strategies, is worthy of clarification. These two concepts are connected to how far food is moving from being a ‘policy *taker*’ – in essence still remaining part of other separate policy domains – to a ‘policy *maker*’ where it is the subject of its own bespoke policy (Jordan and Halpin 2006).

Constructivist foundations have enabled an emphasis on how food policy’s conflicting values are firewalled and temporally separated in individual policy projects, and the crucial role of ideational – as

well as operational – integration, suggesting the need to more explicitly identify and assess conflicting policy goals at the outset of any project, and to identify where goals may be aligned. In the Australian case, its loosely defined Terms of Reference, supported by what appear to be a particularly divergent set of departmental belief systems around food, allowed competing expectations of the purpose of the policy project to co-exist: in the phrasing of Jochim and May (2010), this suggests the ‘*ideational uptake*’ was poor, with actors in the regime unable to understand or embrace its purpose. The same observation of poor ideational uptake can be made regarding the concept of integration: as Figure 8.1 demonstrates, there are multiple dimensions of integration which are not subject to a universal framing in the food policy community, leading to potential working at cross-purposes and a general lack of clarity. Put another way, and echoing the experiences of Environmental Policy Integration, the normative principle has failed ‘*to permeate all the stages of the policy-making process, but especially the earliest ones*’ (Jordan and Lenschow 2010 p153).

8.7 The Historical-Structural Lens

As noted in Chapter One, food policy scholars have tended to favour paradigmatic, process or policy network explanatory models of explanation, and therefore it was deemed appropriate to explore the value of a more structural approach. However, in doing so, a conscious effort was made to ensure agency was not superseded, by applying a social constructionist perspective and attending to the interactions between institutional structures and policy players. By providing an account of the structures they operate within, it has demonstrated that agency-centred explanations of departmentalism, focused on ministers pursuing their own agenda within policy silos (a rational choice model), and lobbying efforts of the food industry (network model) can be considered partial.

Examining the ways integrated policy design faces acute problems of institutions embedded at multiple levels, through locating the policy projects in their historical context, has highlighted how governing in dis-integrated single domains can be understood as path dependent. This represents a new contribution both to the public policy literature, and understanding of food policy specifically. It highlights that, while the institutions of food policy reflect certain political power distributions, around the primacy of agricultural productivity, and there is undoubtedly strong policy coalition support for the status quo in some respects – for example, a focus on production as the primary goal and on the individual choice instrument paradigm – barriers to policy innovation are bigger than lobbying efforts of the food industry, and their role in and influence on policy projects is rooted as much in historical relations with the state. The theory therefore can be considered to measure up well to conceptions of policymaking as a ‘political game’, or network or coalition-based models of food policy, proving itself to have explanatory merit in addition to these. It is, perhaps, less useful when applied at the agenda-setting phase of the policy process, which in these empirical cases lent itself to a ‘garbage can’ type explanation (Cohen et al 1972), given the element of chance which appeared to characterise how food reached political attention (as opposed to an exogenous shock or crisis), and the role of individual policy entrepreneurs in the UK case. The HI lens did suggest an enhancement of paradigmatic explanations of inertia, by examining in detail how values and ideas are structurally managed.

However, as highlighted above, by taking a theoretically-guided approach focusing on a particular explanatory variable – institutions – as opposed to, for example, a process-based model of public policy used more as an organising principle, the research is open to criticism of finding what it wishes to, particularly when analysing in a post-hoc fashion. As Argent explicates, the danger is that narrative – by offering a compelling account of empirical findings – acts as a *‘Trojan horse for the author’s unacknowledged value positions and arguments’* (Sayer 1989a in Argent 2002 p107). Argent is referring to postproductivism, as a *‘binary metanarrative’*, which *‘uncritically sifts historical events and processes into its constituent categories in order to uphold its own original hypothesis’* (Argent 2002 p111). The same contention might be made about the use of institutionalist explanations for policy fragmentation, particularly given the identification of institutions operating on so many levels.

This critique is hopefully mitigated by the thesis aiming its outputs at a level of ‘political analysis’ rather than ‘political science’, *‘because there are no certainties or endpoints, and no pure truth is ever located’* (Hay 2002). In this sense it remains true to its inductive-deductive approach, by presenting some theoretical ideas based on the data, just as it drew on HI theory to identify influences, and structure and explain the findings, but without making excessively rigid conclusions or predictions. It is also pertinent to point out that, while presenting multi-levels of institutional constraint may be problematic for pinpointing causes, it does enable a recognition of the interaction between the levels which may otherwise go unnoticed if a single definition of institution is selected. In this sense it exemplifies Amenta and Ramsey’s (2010) assertion that HI is associated with *‘configurational explanations’* which *‘typically involve the interactions of more than one institution, and different aspects of these institutions, as well as different slow moving processes, and possibly short-term and contingent factors (Pierson and Skocpol 2002)’* (p22). For example, the cases illustrate how, even if constraints at one level are overcome – such as the use of mechanisms to break down barriers to cross-domain working – projects may yet be thwarted by another level, for example the electoral system or policy instrument paradigm. Similarly, while ideational barriers may have been breached somewhat in the case of FM, bureaucratic barriers to securing any new understanding food as a systemic issue might remain in place, due to turnover of staff in the civil service. As CS-UK4 remarked: *“... you can have somebody thinking in a new way and then they are off to another policy area and you have to start again.”*

Linked to this, is a more theoretical issue raised by the use of HI as a lens on integration: what appears to be a contradiction between institutionalist ideas around path dependency, and public policy literature on loss of institutional memory, as raised in the literature review. One possible reconciliation of this tension between the two bodies of literature is that while path dependency might be understood to occur in a structural sense, by constraining innovation towards more boundary crossing governance arrangements (through e.g. bureaucratic barriers), there is less determination of policy detail/content. This acknowledges the impacts of higher staff turnover, decline in civil service capacity, and the rise of project-based approaches (the ‘dwindling of the past’ in Pollitt’s (2008) terms), and allows the tendency to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and critiques of poor understanding of the food sector and loss of continuity to operate alongside the inertial path dependency of single-domain approaches to food policy.

In addition to the contributions listed above, the research has produced a number of original indexes created from the literature review and other data, including a food policy chronology for each country (none in existence could be identified), and also – as far as is known – the first significant typology/summary of food policy projects in the UK and Australia. These are available in the Appendix (A1; A3; A4; A6).

8.8 Methodological Reflections

As discussed above, taking a historical-structural approach to policy integration involved a conceptual framework which was in many ways strong on theory, but involved considerable translation. One method for doing so was the Framework Tool, created to ensure sufficient attention was paid to integration and institutional factors when analysing the policies. By creating a template for each policy document analysis, it also ensured the comparative element could be completed satisfactorily, and was invaluable for helping to organise huge amounts of data. It was also useful to apply as a shorthand version for the policies prior to and post the case studies, providing a quick way of comparing and highlighting differences. But, as understanding of the crossover between integration and institutions developed through the research process, some categories ended up being less relevant, some were repetitive, and the FT had to be refined significantly. Organising factors into a framework of this kind also runs the risk of potentially obscuring that which was not identified from the outset as salient.

A further reflection relates to the definition of integration. As highlighted earlier in the Chapter – in discussion of how terms such as ‘food policy’ and ‘integration’ mask ‘*a whole system of competing expectations, agendas and values*’ – at the outset, the research objectives for the thesis demonstrated a conscious bias towards cross-departmental policy integration. An evolving understanding about the complexities of integration, and findings which revealed that in reality the Australian case was characterised more by vertical and supply chain than horizontal, meant the analysis altered its emphasis somewhat, despite attempts to remain true to the initial focus of the research.

There was also an issue of manageability of the case studies. While every effort was made to bound the cases from the outset, as described in the methodology, it was not anticipated it would necessitate analysis of both FM and F2030 in the UK – because it was only understood later that both could be considered stages in a single policy project – and three iterations of the NFP; the Issues Paper; Green Paper and White Paper documents. In hindsight it was essential to examine all stages of each country’s policy project, as the changing approach to integration provides an important illustration of possible path dependence.

Finally, it could be argued the method for selecting historical examples of ‘food policy’ prior to and post FM/F2030 and NFP was flawed, though perhaps unavoidably so. In operationalising HI theory, it was necessary to identify and analyse – though in less detail – previous approaches to food policy integration, in order to provide temporal context and determine whether the case study projects could be considered policy change or not. The policies were selected on the basis they were highlighted as significant in the history of food policy development in each country, either in the literature review, references by

interviewees, or through analysis of the FM/F2030 and NFP reports and their accompanying documents (including consultation submissions). The policies were then categorised in terms of which policy domains they addressed and avoided, to check for any patterns or themes which might be useful in explaining the influence of institutional structures. But this was not a systematic review of the field, and it is possible that inclusion or omission of certain policies was subject to researcher value judgments about their relevance, and therefore the process might not be directly replicable.

8.9 Limitations

Other limitations relate to the availability of comparable data from the UK and Australia, both in terms of interviewees and grey and academic literature. For example, interviewees responded to different questions in different ways, meaning certain themes were covered extensively in the UK but hardly at all in Australia and vice versa. It was difficult to balance comparative information on both: often one country had more information than the other, and some information was not comparable. An example is the level of information on the UK departmental characteristics, which was not available in Australia. Similarly, while every effort was made to give equal attention to both cases, there was much more scholarly literature relating the UK, meaning parts of the literature review may appear UK-centric.

A further identified limitation is the use of post-hoc policy analysis. SSI allowed flexibility for probing on different aspects of the food policies, and provided a significant insight into the policy formulation process beyond that available from the policy documents themselves (Yeo et al 2014), but there were issues with this method. In particular, in the UK case the policy development took place between two and four years prior to field work, and was complicated by the two case study units of analysis – FM and F2030 – relatively close to each other in timing. As a result, it appeared some participants conflated the FM and F2030 policies, while relying on memory to recall quite specific details of the policy formulation process; alerting the researcher to potential inaccuracies in analysis. Indeed, the issue of whether FM and F2030 were separate policies, or two stages in one policy formulation process, was particularly acute, and it was not always clear which policy interviewees were referring to, and several mistakenly attributed characteristics to one which were actually related to the other – which on occasion were picked up, but instances might have slipped through.

Another challenge was limited access to consultation submissions in the UK case. For FM there was no formal government consultation, meaning no documents were available, and F2030 consultation submissions were partial³⁴. This was not an issue with the NFP, where there were numerous consultation documents to access – in fact there were too many, and as a result only a selection were examined fully. There are also possible flaws around relying on policy documents as key sources. Though there was triangulation using interview data, the post-hoc nature of the discussions, plus challenges of securing interviews with members of the policy teams, and time limitations placed on interviews with busy civil servants, meant the documents were often relied on more heavily than might be optimal. For example, conclusions around the lack of explicit attention to gaps, inconsistencies and tensions between policy

³⁴ A Freedom of Information request to DEFRA was dismissed due to being too onerous and not justifiable

domains in the final documents is not necessarily representative of discussions which went on during the development process, and often interviewees could not, or would not, reflect on how the earlier iterations of the final reports might have differed. Clearly when such reports have been through a signing-off process there is potential for dilution of content, including removal of any reference to tensions.

Finally, and linked to the previous point, it proved difficult to evaluate the final policy outputs of the projects, due to a lack of clarity in the documents themselves about which of the activities they referred to were new, and which were ongoing. This highlights a dual problem of transparency and evaluation of food policy projects of this type: without a clear idea of where innovation lies, they are difficult to hold to account. This is, of course, partly due to their nature – particularly if we understand them as policies about policies – but also potentially one of the reasons the nature of activities being summarised is not clarified may be to give the *appearance* of government action, representing an example of ‘placebo policy’ in action (Gustafsson 1983).

8.10 Summary of Conclusions

This chapter has offered a number of conclusions from the research project, summarised – methodological and theoretical reflections aside – as follows:

1. The two policy projects FM/2030 and NFP represent a food policy shift from single-domain ‘policy-taker’ to multiple domain ‘policy-maker’, though both fell short of what might be classed as ‘integration’ in the literature, and lessons from attempts to integrate in other policy fields were not applied.
2. Institutional venues impact on the trajectory of policies, but centralised policy projects are not necessarily the panacea might be considered to be, due to inbuilt institutional tensions between the need for food policy to be coordinated centrally but implemented departmentally.
3. Food Policy is characterised by Institutional Drift – a lack of fit between modern systemic definitions of food policy and existing governance frameworks – demonstrated by shifting venues for policies and machinery of government changes which transfer responsibility for certain food-related issues between departments.
4. There is conceptual and empirical ambiguity around policy integration and related nomenclature.
5. There was a failure to address tensions and the requirement to balance competing goals or strike trade-offs among values in food policy is mainly sidestepped.
6. Multiple values and goals co-exist with the aid of strategies for managing value conflict including Firewalling; Cycling; and Ambiguity. In addition, passing certain strands on to other policy projects can lead to elements of food-related policy ‘falling through the cracks’.
7. Tactics for managing value pluralism in this contested space, by their nature undermine integrated approaches.
8. Value Agreement Capacity must be improved, and innovation is needed in the political space assigned to food, to create capacity to address the tensions within an institutional structure representing a better fit with modern food policy’s requirements.
9. The policy projects display an inbuilt contradiction between long timelines for implementation and a lack of ongoing institutional support for doing so.
10. There is a general lack of recognition of the importance of integrated policy as a *process*.
11. It is possible the strong rhetoric around integrated food policy projects inflates public expectations beyond what can realistically be delivered given the considerations above.
12. An emerging ‘institutionalist theory of food policy integration’, can help address some of the above, by conceptualising the dimensions of integration, and multiple institutional influences on integration attempts.

8.11 Future Research

The following final section of the chapter provides suggestions on how the research findings might be augmented to further enhance understanding of the research problem of food policy integration. These are split into research enhancing the conceptual understanding, and that which is of more practical value.

One of the contributions of the research is an attempt to synthesise the dimensions of integration which should be considered when attempting a policy project with integration as a goal. Future research should explore these dimensions and further ‘unpack’ their contribution to understanding (Keast et al 2007 p12). For example, little has been written about the potential for a ‘Food in All Policies’, more poly-centric alternative style of integration to the creation of a trans-domain whole-of-government policy. This could draw on learning from Sustainable Development and ‘Health in all Policies’, exploring the role of Health Impact Assessments of agricultural policies in, for example, Slovenia, Netherlands, Wales, and Canada (Lock et al 2003); and utilising the public policy literature on ‘mainstreaming’ (e.g. Verloo 2005; Jordan and Halpin 2006), which was identified but not explored. It would also be useful to consider how a ‘Food in all Policies’ approach might operate alongside the health and environmental/sustainable development frameworks which already exist, given the potential for added confusion regarding food’s crossover with health and sustainable development, and food’s often low political prioritisation. Similarly, little literature could be identified on vertical integration, for instance how food policy responsibility is split between Westminster and the devolved nations (cf Australia where there are relatively recent government documents outlining the split of Federal-State responsibilities for food policy), and how this might be improved.

As mentioned above at 8.1, there is work to be done to better conceptualise the different levels of integration which policy projects may choose. An initial attempt has been made in the synthesis diagram of dimensions of integration (Figure 8.1) to propose a ‘spectrum of integrated-ness’ akin to the spectrum from Cooperation (fully fragmented) to Collaboration (fully connected) cited in Keast et al (2007 p12). This might range from integrated food policy at one end – which might be creation of a trans-domain policy (Hogl and Nordbeck 2012), which tackles conflicts, and balances and trades-off objectives, and perhaps, in that process therefore adjusts sectoral policies to make them mutually enforcing and consistent (Meijers and Stead 2004) (essentially the creation of a new policy domain) – to *collation* of the various programmes and policies into one document, without addressing how they relate to one another, as appeared to be the case in FM/F2030 and the NFP. Where a ‘Food in all Policies’ approach fits along the spectrum requires further consideration, as does the usefulness of distinguishing between *integration* – defined by Nilsson et al (2012) as related to *upstream* policy making processes and associated institutional arrangements – and *coherence*, which the same authors describe as used more to analyse *outputs*.

In terms of *what* is to be integrated, this research has highlighted the potential role of shared budgets in the success of integrated food policy projects. A starting point to examine this further might be the Australian State of Victoria attempt at an integrated food policy, which is understood to have explored using a joint BERC-bid (Budget and Expenditure Review Committee) across several departments. More

broadly, there are potential insights to be gained around the relationship between the different elements which can be subject to integration. For example, it may be the case that advances in integration of, say, values and beliefs, or goals, are a pre-requisite for better integration of practices and instruments, for example, because there is a need for joint buy-in of a wider understanding of food policy as a system before more pragmatic changes can be made. Applying this to the empirical cases, had the F2030 Vision been advanced to the point where the relationship between economic/production and health and environmental goals had been fully addressed, new instruments may have been suggested. Conversely, integration of values might be more likely to evolve as a result of practices and instruments crossing several domains being identified and established, thereby making a more tangible case for a shared vision of the food system. For example, had the FM Integrated Advice to Consumers programme been implemented, the links between nutrition and environmental objectives may have led to a (wider) cognitive shift.

Further research should also examine the dynamics between the different levels of dimensions of integration. This might, for example, identify a better fit between a particular direction of integration (horizontal), level of ambition (In all Policies), elements to be integrated (practices) and most appropriate mechanisms (taskforce). In addition, there is a need to improve understanding of alternatives to a whole-of-government instrument; assessing how integration might be tackled on a less ambitious scale than policy projects examined here, to explore whether integrated policies really are *‘the best available option to replace ‘widespread dissatisfaction with the disorganised character of the existing policy regime’ (Rayner and Howlett 2009a, b p166)’* (Vince 2015 Online). Approaches to consider might include a commodity chain approach, such as Australia’s RDE Framework, and bilateral cross-departmental food policy working, what Howlett et al might consider a *‘policy patching’* approach to *‘promoting coherence and integration in complex environments’* in *‘as efficient and effective a way as those designs that are consciously created as interlocking packages of measures’* (2015 p7). New research could build on work already initiated by the Australian Food Alliance³⁵, around stretching the *“scope of policy initiatives that originate from one area or government department (e.g. Department of Health or Primary Industries) so they also achieve policy objectives in other dimensions (e.g. environmental sustainability or social equity)”* (Caraher et al 2013 p90). According to the authors, whose analysis warrants quoting at length:

“Approaching the development of integrated policy this way has a number of benefits – it provides a way for government departments to experiment with working in an integrated way on discrete policy initiatives without committing ‘lock stock and barrel’ to a comprehensive ‘whole of government’ food policy approach. It also enables the validity of an integrated approach to be demonstrated on discrete projects and provides opportunities to gather evidence of the benefits of the approach in order to present a case for a more comprehensive action in future. Finally, it recognises that when government chooses not to act, it is still possible to achieve an integrated way of working that delivers benefits across multiple policy dimensions through projects that involve other groups of actors” (p90).

A further stream of future study should address potential governance structures to improve capacity for food policy integration. A lack of capacity for integrated thinking and working was identified in the findings as a barrier. There is a need to extend understanding of the potential for institutional reform of

³⁵ Now Sustain Australia

governance structures to improve capacity for integration. Examples include cross-ministerial committees or bodies, such as the UK Cabinet Sub-Committee on Food; the Dutch Alliance for Sustainable Food – which brings together the Central Bureau for the Foodstuffs Trade, the Dutch Food Industry Federation and the Dutch Federation of Agricultural and Horticultural Organisations – and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA); Brazil’s CONSEA (National Council on Food Security); and the National Nutrition Councils in Norway and Finland – which Barling et al (2002) note act as ‘*an institutional coordinator for an integrated approach to policy advice on food supply and public health*’ (p17). This analysis would also extend the literature review on the role of institutions in overcoming policy inertia (e.g. Aghion et al 2013; Rutter et al 2012), exploring what food policy can learn from examples such as the Office for Climate Change – an attempt to ‘silo bust’ within Whitehall – and its role in supporting cross-government analysis of issues, and the Pensions Commission, with its open and highly rigorous approach, and successful building of consensus around the evidence base, which enabled policy change to take place (Rutter et al 2012). It could also build on findings in the thesis on the impact of departmental design on capacity for cross-boundary food policy development, for example comparison of how DEFRA’s design as a ‘super-ministry’, encompassing both environment and food and farming policy has enabled links between these domains to be better supported (cf Australia where environment and agriculture are in separate departments and there has been considerably less crossover by the two streams).

Future research should also be done on synergies between food policy domains, to test the conclusion arrived at by Jordan and Halpin in their (2006) analysis of attempts to create an integrated rural policy in Scotland that ‘*prizes for all*’ is not a realistic approach in food policymaking (p37), due to irreconcilable objectives. The thesis attempts an initial catalogue of tensions between goals of policy domains. It also highlights the need for a better understanding of the potential for synergies in policy goals across multiple domains. Extending the work of Thow (2009); Thow and Hawkes (2009) and Hawkes (2015) on nutrition and trade, this stream of work could identify and analyse potential synergies in food policy goals. It should also draw on reviews of the links between for example, agriculture and nutrition policy identified in reviews and modelling exercises such as Haby et al 2016; Green et al 2013; Arnoult et al 2010; and Lock et al 2010. While some links are made in this body of literature, for example in terms of the relationship between healthy eating policy (for example dietary guidelines) and agricultural production, labour, land use etc, there is a need for more clarity on how these might apply to integrated policy projects. The outcome would be a new catalogue of policy synergies which have been identified (and even demonstrated). The outputs could be used at the outset of any future integrated food policy project, as a starting point for the creation of joint objectives.

Finally, the research to date could be extended to produce a guide on considerations when attempting to produce an integrated food policy. While the case for raising food up the policy agenda – and ensuring food features in all relevant government policies, in a coherent way – is becoming more widely accepted, there is a lack of practical guidance for policymakers and other stakeholders on how this can be done. This research should seek to consolidate the identification of lessons about how to develop an integrated food strategy, from the thesis findings on the UK and Australian attempts to create a whole of government food policy, by exploring other policy projects and building up a bigger empirical bank of

cases from which to draw lessons. The outcome would be a guide to the steps to consider when attempting integrated food policy development, which might include:

- The different dimensions of integration and how to operationalise them
- Role of policy venues and mechanisms
- Role of stakeholders
- Tensions and synergies to be explored
- Possible integrated policy programme ideas

In conclusion to this section on future research opportunities, and reflecting on the research potential uncovered during the creation of this thesis, there is now an opportunity to refine and polish understanding, benefitting both food policy scholarship and the real world of policymaking.

-Ends-

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Chapter Four	266
Table A1: Policies prior and Post Food Matters/2030	267
Table A2: Stakeholders to UK Food Policies	283
Table A3: UK Food Policy Chronology	296
Table A4: Australia Food Policies Prior and Post National Food Plan	300
Table A5: Stakeholders to Australian National Food Policies	334
Table A6: Australia Food Policy Chronology	340
Table A7: UK departmental responsibilities	345
Table A8: Policies that interact with the Australian food system by Portfolio	349
Table A9: Division of Federal and State Regulations	351
Table A10: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Scottish Government	353
Table A11: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Welsh Assembly	354
Table A12: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Northern Ireland Executive	355
Table A13: Policy Responsibility Split - UK FSA, DEFRA, DH	356
Appendix B: Chapter Five	357
Table B1: Summary of Food Matters Content	357
Table B2: Summary of Food 2030 Content	358
Table B3: References to Policy Integration in Food Matters	363
Table B4: References to Policy Integration in Food 2030 (2010)	365
Table B5: Progress on Actions recommended in Food Matters:	366
Table B6: Progress on Actions Recommended in Food 2030	373
Appendix C: Chapter Six	376
Table C1: Summary of Content of National Food Plan White Paper	376
Table C2: Progress on Actions Recommended in National Food Plan	387
Table C3: NFP White Paper Goals	401
Table C4: Examples of Framing in NFP	403
Copy of Consent Form	409
Copy of Interview Schedule	410
REFERENCES	412

Appendix A: Chapter Four

Appendix A presents a series of Tables supporting Chapter Four. They were created in during the research, through analysis of policy documents and other grey and academic literature. They include a shorthand application of the Framework Tool to ‘food policies’ in the UK and Australia prior and subsequent to the case study policy projects FM/F2030 and the NFP, plus lists of stakeholders involved in those prior and post policy projects. A Food Policy Chronology for each country, which was used to track historical developments, was also created, as no cross-domain examples could be found in existence, bar a short example in SDC 2011 (p16-17). These chronologies were also used to explore the role of political cycles and parties. The latter part of Appendix A includes tables on UK and Australian food policy governance, collated during the research process but beyond the detail needed for the chapter itself.

Table A1: Policies Prior and Post Food Matters/Food 2030

Policy	Outset	Content	Input	Budget	Outcomes
	Originating Actor; Timeline; Terms of Reference; Political Party; Lead Department	Definition of Problem; Goals and Objectives; Framing; Policy Omissions; Degree of Change; Policy Integration; References to Other Policies	Input from Departments; Mechanism for Coordination; Institutional Reform; Lead Personnel; Advisory Groups; Stakeholder Involvement; Consultation; Consultants; Political Input.	For Formulation; for Implementation	Plans for Implementation and Evaluation; Policy Instruments; Indicators; Final Status
Policy Commission on the Future of Food and Farming	Published: 2002 Commission of Inquiry into the state of farming and food in response to the 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak	Five Chapters: 1: Vision for future of farming and food industry in England 2. Comparison of Chapter One Vision to present day 3. How to set industry back on road to profit 4. The food industry’s environmental responsibilities 5. Food industry’s connections with	Board of members of the Commission are listed in Table A3. Involved written consultation and ‘roadshow’ around the country to meet stakeholders	See Below - Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England	See below for government response: <i>Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England</i> Independent implementation strategy group set up (SDC 2011 p24)

	(SDC 2011) Departmental Sponsor: Reports to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Remit: <i>‘Advise the Government on how we can create a sustainable, competitive and diverse farming and food sector which contributes to a thriving and sustainable rural economy, advances environmental, economic, health and animal welfare goals, and is consistent with the Government’s aims for Common Agricultural</i>	wider society, and public’s perceptions and concerns about food (Policy Commission 2002 p6-7) Highlighted need to reorient food and farming <i>‘with more emphasis on environmental protection and greater engagement with the needs of the consumer’</i> (SDC 2011 p24) and to <i>‘reconnect’</i> the food supply chain (Lang and Rayner 2003) Makes 105 specific recommendations, including for several new strategies – on healthy eating, organic food production, and animal health; a new Food Chain Centre; compulsory COOL; a new research priorities board; a farming advice line; reform of the CAP and a cross-government group on procurement. Highlighted <i>‘public money for public good i.e. social and environmental benefits rather than production subsidies’</i> (SDC 2011 p24) Viewed as victory for environmental health lobbyists due to inclusion of conservation and organic targets; commitment to support environmental measures under the CAP; horizon-scanning process for future science and technology requirements (Lang and Rayner 2003) Failed to focus sufficiently on public health and missed opportunities to link food and health for example improving fat production efficiencies and cheese production in niche markets which will contribute to heart disease and NHS costs; and encouraging consumers to eat more fruit and vegetables but servicing increased demand by imports rather than locally (Lang and Rayner 2003) Approach to Policy Integration:			In a 2009 retrospective, Lord Curry reported the following outcomes of the Policy Commission: • Farmers are now adjusting to life in a de-coupled world • There is an increased focus on the market place • There is an increased interest in regional and local food • The industry is becoming more professional in its approach to business • Stewardship schemes have been very successful • The public are beginning to reconnect to farming through initiatives such as the Year of Farming and Food, Open Farm Sunday and Farmers’ Markets • Many farmers have diversified and many more are now working together. • Healthy eating and obesity, (‘which we were also concerned

	<i>Policy reform, enlargement of the EU and increased trade liberalisation</i>’ (Policy Commission 2002 p5). Led by Sir Donald Curry, a cooperative agri-businessman and livestock farmer (Ward and Lowe 2007) Curry is said to have been ‘<i>given a strong steer by the Labour Government Prime Minister’s Office that it should focus on the economic and environmental sustainability of the food and farming industries</i>’ (Ward and Lowe 2007 p417).	Remit for the project incorporates economic, environmental and health objectives (p5). Vision is of ‘<i>a profitable and sustainable farming and food sector, that can and does compete internationally, that is a good steward of the environment, and provides good food and a healthy diet</i>’ (p9). Vision also envisages that ‘<i>bodies responsible for health promotion make effective links to food production and preparation as well as diet in the information they provide</i>’ (p10). Notes that ‘<i>a lot of the environmental damage in the countryside over the last 50 years has to be laid at the door of modern farming techniques. But this does not mean it has been farmers’ fault. In ramping up production after the war farmers were responding to public policy signals that this is what their country wanted</i>’ (p95). Argues ‘<i>public policy on food and farming must take account of its connection with the health of the population</i>’ (p95) and the overarching link right through from farm to nutrition policy needs to be better understood, and articulated so more coherent policies can be devised across government departments, notably DEFRA, DH, Social Exclusion Unit and the FSA (p96). Stresses need to recognise interrelation of health problems and problems of farming and food industry: ‘<i>this challenge needs the Government and all parts of the food chain to work together. Just as we cannot think about the food chain without thinking about consumers, so we cannot address consumers’ concerns in isolation</i>’			about’), are now high on the Government’s agenda (Farm Management Unit 2009). Specifically led to establishment of: • The IGD ‘Food Chain Centre’ which ran for five years (SDC 2011 p24) • The DH ‘Food and Health Action Plan’ (DEFRA 2002) • Organic Action Plan for England (DEFRA 2002)

		(p97).			
Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England	Published: 2002 (December 12) Departmental Sponsor: DEFRA	Identifies key principles for sustainable farming and food Document is described as a ‘<i>strategic framework for continuing to develop and take forward policies</i>’ (DEFRA 2002 p45) Specific programme proposals generally echo those in the Policy Commission report which it is responding to. Devised key principles with Sustainable Development Commission for sustainable food and farming: • Produce safe healthy products • Support viability and diversity of rural and urban economies • Enable livelihoods from sustainable land management • Operate within biological limits of natural resources • High standards of environmental performance • Safe and hygienic working environment • High animal welfare Sustain land for growing food and supplying other public benefits (p12). Included ‘<i>commitment to work with key sectors of food industry beyond farm gate to develop a Food Industry Sustainability Strategy</i>’ (see entry below) (SDC 2011 p24). Approach to Policy Integration:	Input: ‘<i>Curry chaired a group that oversaw delivery of the Sustainable Farming and Food Strategy until 2009</i>’ (Farm Management Unit 2009) Submissions received from over 1000 organisations during consultation on Policy Commission’s conclusions and views of 1000 or so people in regional roadshows (DEFRA 2002 p10) Discussions with Sustainable Development Commission (DEFRA 2002 p12) Implementation group involved a ‘<i>small membership drawn from key organisations with expertise in farming, food and the countryside</i>’ (DEFRA 2002 p45)	‘<i>Backed by £500 mn of investment from the government over 2003-6, most devoted to co-financing requirements (to match CAP funding) of new types of agri-environmental payments to farmers</i>’ (Ward and Lowe 2007 p417).	‘<i>The government will develop the approach to monitoring and evaluating the strategy: based on the evaluation plan already published in draft</i>’ (DEFRA 2002 p49). Strategic outcomes – grouped under the headings economic, environmental and social sustainability – are presented, along with indicators for those outcomes. A larger suite of core indicators is reported as under construction (DEFRA 2002 p50) By the time of publication of a 2005 DEFRA Annual Report outlining progress on the SSFF, the indicators had been revised to: • Productivity of farming: GVA per person compared to rest of EU • Labour productivity of the food chain beyond farm gate • Cost of trade-distorting support • River water quality: nitrogen and phosphorus levels from

		No specific mentions of policy integration, but does note <i>'farming has shaped our landscape, but there are negative environmental impacts from the production processes of all elements of the chain. It has wide ranging impacts on our health, on animal welfare and on rural communities'</i> (p9). Challenges faced by sector are categorised in terms of food's underperformance across all three elements of sustainability – economic, environmental and social (primarily focuses on jobs and tourism but does acknowledge food production impacts on diet) (p11). Proposes strengthening links between public health and food producers, highlighting <i>'the network of food and health leads in the Regional Government Office public health teams are supporting work on food and health led by PCTs. Dedicated Five a Day coordinators in each region will help support new community initiatives funded by the New Opportunities Fund, many of which will link farmers directly to low-income consumers'</i> (p38). Highlights the Food and Health Action Plan to influence production, manufacture and preparation of healthier food and provision of information to consumers (p38).			• agriculture in rivers • GHG emissions from farming and the food chain • Soil organic matter content in agricultural topsoils • Favourable condition of SSSIs • Farmland birds index • Fruit and vegetable consumption • Animal health and welfare • Gap in productivity in rural areas (DEFRA 2005 p150) Initiated the Public Sector Procurement Initiative (SDC 2011 p24). <i>'The review of the PSFPI by Deloitte for DEFRA concluded it had begun to be effective in shifting the £2 bn public procurement sector towards more sustainable delivery...but that it had much further to go'</i> (SDC 2011 p24).
Food Industry Sustainability Strategy	Published: 2006 Departmental Sponsor: DEFRA	Described in its foreword as building on the SSFF and setting out key priority areas for action beyond the farm gate - manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and food service providers (DEFRA 2006 piii). States <i>'the FISS is not intended to be definitive. Rather it</i>	Members of the FISS Stakeholder Group are listed in Table A2.	No budget details identified	Includes <i>'targets for making progress in key areas, and a wide range of key performance indicators to measure industry progress'</i> (DEFRA 2006 p2).

		<i>seeks to tackle a manageable number of priority areas identified by the FISS Stakeholder Group and confirmed by public consultation</i> (DEFRA 2006 p2). The following chapter headings are provided: Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Sustainable Consumption and Production – encourages industry to engage with benchmarking programmes and commits government to investigate the lifecycle impacts of an average food shopping trolley, and also reports on the establishment of the Environment Direct service – to give ‘<i>clear independent advice to consumers on the impacts of choices they face</i>’ (DEFRA 2006 p3). Chapter 3: Corporate Social Responsibility – challenges the food industry to develop a set of CSR criteria and to report to Ministers on this by Winter 2006. Chapter 4: Primarily Environmental – Encourages industry to adopt energy best practice with the help of the Carbon Trust, and reduce its carbon emissions. Also seeks to increase levels of food industry engagement with Government best practice programmes Envirowise and WRAP (DEFRA 2006 p3). Chapter 5: Primarily Social – encourages industry to work in partnership with government and other stakeholders to bring about improvements in nation’s health, and reiterates challenges set out in the Public Health White Paper. Stresses contribution expected of industry to help achieve government objectives: • Increase fruit and veg consumption to at least 5 a day • Increase dietary fibre to 11 grams a day • Reduce salt intake to 6 grams a day • Reduce sat fat to 11% of food energy • Maintain current trends in reducing total fat to			FISS One Year On Summary Report (DEFRA 2007) and FISS Review Summary Report (DEFRA 2007b) published in 2007. Defra 2007 notes that: The work of the Champions groups on Energy and Climate Change; Water; Waste; Food Transportation; Ethical Trading and CSR resulted in 78 recommendations for actions to help drive the FISS forward. A 12-week web-based stakeholder consultation on the outcomes was launched in June 2007. A list of activities which took place post-FISS are provided, however it is not clear which of these are FISS-specific and which were ongoing activities. New targets for food industry were developed following the work of the Champions groups. Most targets were deemed feasible. No mention made of the equal opportunities target. The Ethical Trading group altered the terminology to Sustainable Sourcing and recommended the government establish a Sustainable Sourcing Forum, and to develop its own vision of what a sustainable

		35% of food energy • Reduce intake of added sugar to 11% of food energy (DEFRA 2006 p4). Also challenges industry to: play a full part in achieving FSA target of 20% reduction of foodborne illness by 2006; halve the rate of under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in skilled and managerial grades; cut all deaths and serious injuries by 10% by 2010 and to further develop the business case for ethical trade and address potential for confusion and duplication. . Chapter 6: Primarily Economic – priority to ensure food industry is promoted as an employer of choice and identify shortfall in skills and training needs. Encourages food retailers and manufacturers to reduce by 40% adult workers who lack qualifications at NVQ level 2 and above by 2010. Chapter 7: Better Regulation – the government commits to introducing a Food Industry Better Regulation Group – a high level forum for industry and government. Approach to Policy Integration: Reference to integration: <i>‘The Group recognised that sustainability should not be considered in environmental, social or economic ‘silos’. Also, given the global nature of the food market, nor should the domestic position be considered separately from the international. Nor should production be considered in isolation from patterns of consumption. All are inter-linked and need to be positively influenced to improve the food industry’s sustainability’</i> (DEFRA 2006 p11).			supply chain looks like. A review of the FISS by the Sustainable Consumption Round Table (The Sustainable Development Commission and National Consumer Council) criticised its proposal for a <i>‘voluntary agreement without sanctions’</i> and for attempting to influence the entire sector, which retailers reported had led them to disengage, leading the authors to conclude that <i>‘no party finds the FISS document particularly satisfactory or compelling as it stands’</i> (SCR 2005).
Public Health Responsibility Deal	Published: 2011 Departmental Sponsor:	Framed as <i>‘a new way of harnessing the contribution that businesses can make’</i> to delivering public health priorities, as set out in the overall strategy for public health <i>‘Healthy Lives, Health People’</i> (Department of	List of plenary group members (listed <i>‘invited members’</i> , updated 24 September 2013) is in	No budget details are available	The number of organisations involved was reported on the website in 2013 to be over 500 (Petticrew et al 2013).

	Department of Health	Health 2011 p3) Also positions personal responsibility narrative: ‘We aspire to good health and yet we persist in behaviours that undermine it. We make personal choices about how we live and behave: what to eat, what to drink, and how active to be. We make trade-offs between our behaviour today and the impact of these immediate choices on our longer-term health’ (Department of Health 2011 p3). However also acknowledges ‘we do not have total control over our lives or the circumstances in which we live’ and ‘a wide range of factors constrain and influence what we do’ (p3). Consists of three elements: 1. Core Commitments 2. Supporting Pledges (which define the operating principles and processes) 3. Collective and organisation-specific pledges (Petticrew et al 2013) Food Collectives Pledges address: 1. Out of home calorie labelling 2. Salt reduction 3. Artificial trans-fat removal Approach to Policy Integration: Not a focus of this project.	Table A2. The plenary group, chaired by Secretary of State for Health Andrew Lansley, oversaw the development, and included senior representatives from the business community, NGOs, public health organisations and local government (Department of Health 2011 p4). Five Networks – Food, alcohol, physical activity, health at work and behaviour change established.		Public health organisations have been critical of the PHRD. ‘Six public health organisations that were involved in the RD Alcohol Network publicly withdrew their support from the process before the RD was announced. They had concerns that ‘the interests of industry had been prioritised over potential benefits to public health, and no commitment had been made on alternative actions the Government would take if pledges did not reduce alcohol-related harm’ (Petticrew et al 2013 p2). MacGregor et al (2015) also criticise the deal for ‘derailing’ the FSA’s salt reduction strategy, by failing to set adequate targets via the RD and relaxing reporting mechanisms. The authors estimate the lost salt reduction equates to 6000 deaths from stroke and heart attack.
Foresight: The Future of Food and Farming	Published: 2011 Departmental Sponsor: Produced by	211- page report, presented along with 56 studies that contributed to its production. Explores pressures on global food system between now and 2050 and identifies decisions policy makers need to take today, and in the years ahead, to ensure a global population rising to nine	Details of stakeholders are at Table A2. A High Level Stakeholder Group consisted of a host of international experts from	No budget details identified	States that ‘Progress linked to the Report will be reviewed by the project’s minister-led, High-level Stakeholder Group in early 2012 - the Project’s ‘One Year

	Government Office for Science (based in the Department for Business, Industry and Skills) but departmental sponsors are listed in the One Year Update report as DEFRA and DfID.	billion or more can be fed in a fair and sustainable way (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-of-food-and-farming Accessed December 2016). The Project's evidence reviews are said to '<i>contain a comprehensive set of cutting-edge studies of future developments in science, technology, policy and practice relevant to the challenges facing the global food system</i>' (GOS 2012 p14). Identifies five key challenges for the future: 1. Balancing future demand and supply sustainably – to ensure food supplies are affordable 2. Ensuring there is adequate stability in food supplies – and protecting the most vulnerable from volatility that does occur 3. Achieving global access to food and ending hunger 4. Meeting the challenge of a low emissions world 5. Maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem services while feeding the world (Garnett 2011). Thirteen synthesis reports were grouped around these five key future challenges and provide detailed analysis around the Project's robust scientific evidence base (GOS 2012 p14). Approach to Policy Integration: The report makes several specific references to integrated policymaking: <i>'A major conclusion of this Report is the critical</i>	the UN, the EU, the World Bank, industry and civil society. The Report was overseen by a Lead Expert Group (LEG), chaired by Professor Charles Godfray, which provided the best available scientific scrutiny for the Project (GOS 2012 p9). The Project is described as building on the 'Food Matters Report published by the UK Cabinet Office in the wake of the food price spikes of 2008, which called for a major new Foresight Project to examine future global food systems' (GOS 2012 p9)..	Review' (Foresight 2011b p2). Actions listed are mainly related to using the report's findings to support continuing activities. However there are some specific actions related to policy integration listed for government departments DEFRA and DfId: DEFRA will: '<i>champion a more integrated approach by governments and international institutions to global food security that makes links that makes links with climate change, poverty, biodiversity, energy and other policies</i>' (Foresight 2011bp3). DfId will: '<i>Develop a joined-up approach to addressing nutrition, which includes health and agriculture inputs, and which is based on strengthened evidence. This will include continued investment in the development of bio-fortified crops</i>' (Foresight 2011b p3). A One Year On report updating on activities reports that '<i>the Project's departmental sponsors, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural</i>

		importance of interconnected policy-making. Other studies have stated that policy in all areas of the food system should consider the implications for volatility, sustainability, climate change and hunger. Here it is argued that policy in other sectors outside the food system also needs to be developed in much closer conjunction with that for food. These areas include energy, water supply, land use, the sea, ecosystem services and biodiversity. Achieving much closer coordination with all of these wider areas is a major challenge for policy-makers' (Foresight 2011 p12). <i>'The potential threats are so great that they cannot be met by making changes piecemeal to parts of the food system. It is essential that policy-makers address all areas at the same time'</i> (Foresight 2011p12). <i>'Many current institutions are concerned with only one aspect of the system (productivity, sustainability, equity, trade and hunger); the degree to which these silos break down will be a major determinant of whether and how the multiple challenges facing the food system can be addressed coherently'</i> (Foresight 2011 p55). <i>'Without much closer linkages and integration, there is a risk that policies in all such areas will become increasingly inefficient or ineffective, and frustrated by competing aims'</i> (Foresight 2011 p41). Makes direct recommendation on the need to change consumption patterns as a key priority action through <i>'the full range of options to change consumptions patterns including raising citizen awareness, approaches based on behavioural psychology, voluntary agreements with the private sector, and regulatory and fiscal measures'</i> (p36).			Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department for International Development (DfID), have used the Report to inform and help shape actions across several of their major priorities' (GOS 2012 p1).

		Addresses tensions between production and consumption in the following passages: <i>‘Constraints on modifying consumption can include resistance from consumers, and also from business and producers whose interests may be adversely affected by changing diets. Also, public good campaigns can sometimes be undermined by commercial interests; for example the five-a-day message promoting consumption of fruit and vegetables in the UK has been used to promote foodstuffs that do not belong to these categories and which do not offer the same nutritional benefits. However, dietary change can have multiple benefits, and hence there are some synergies across different areas of policy, such as health and sustainability, which could help achieve action.’ (p21).</i> <i>‘Resistance from business and producers: changing diets inevitably favours the producers of one food type over another. However, the types of food most likely to be least recommended are those further along the food chain (meat, processed foods) where more value has been added. Larger and more powerful corporate entities and lobby groups are more likely to suffer disproportionate economic impact and this asymmetry is likely to act against change. Advertising by the private sector is designed to influence consumer preferences and involves sums of money unlikely to be available to public and third-sector organisations’.</i> (p102) Addresses the issue of meat production and consumption directly, stating that although a complex issue, an ‘unequivocally beneficial’ option for policy is <i>‘the role of a moderate intake of livestock products; communicating this to the consumer should be a priority for public health (recognising the power of vested</i>			

		interests in promulgating contrary messages)’ (p22). <i>‘Policy-makers involved in public health and in particular with tackling the obesity epidemic may also want to take more active steps to reduce the consumption of meats containing saturated fats. This Report does not discuss in detail how public health measures can reduce these health-related problems (see the Foresight report on obesity), but there is potential for positive outcomes for strategies to limit excessive meat consumption on both health and sustainability’</i> (p103). Makes direct links between economic and environmental ‘domains’: <i>‘This Report has stressed the close connection between the development of policy for the environment, and for food supply and security. Although there has been a considerable coming together of the two domains in recent years, there are still areas of food system-related policy that pay insufficient attention to ecosystem services and biodiversity’</i> (p149). Recognises the need for economic assessment and evaluation of ecosystem services and biodiversity and moves to internalise the costs of these negative environmental externalities are critical to provide incentives for their reduction and a focus on where desirable environmental goals are congruent with market incentives (p150).			
Green Food Project	Published: 2013 Departmental Sponsor: DEFRA	Described as <i>‘resulting from the Natural England White Paper commitment to examine how we might increase food production in England, whilst simultaneously enhancing the environment, this project examines how we might address the sustainable intensification of agriculture and how we might reconcile any tensions</i>	Steering Group and Synthesis Group members are listed at Table A2.	No budget details identified but it is likely the project and implementation were only based	<i>‘...the project will be used to shape future DEFRA food and farming policy, and the way in which we contribute to the global debate on food security’</i> (GOS 2012 p20).

		<i>that this challenge</i>' (GOS 2012 p20). Describes itself as for the first time bringing together <i>'a group of interested organisations to jointly scope out the challenges, then have a fully open debate about the food system'</i> with the <i>'aim of reaching consensus, where possible, about where there is a clear way forward and where we need to do much more work'</i> (DEFRA 2012a p3). Refers to the Foresight Future of Food and Farming report as setting out the challenges very clearly. Five 'test cases' were examined in the following sub-groups: Wheat; Dairy; Bread; Curry; and Geographical Areas. Approach to Policy Integration: Focus is based on the opportunities and tensions in the concept of 'sustainable intensification' ie – between production and sustainability. No specific references made to integration.		on existing resources and in-kind support	Specific actions listed include: • Develop research programme to address evidence gaps identified • Commissioning further work on agricultural price changes • Manage a debate on novel technologies • DEFRA supported industry-led review on new entrants to farming industry • Create industry –wide commitment to recording and recognition of skills development • NFU assessment of data on competitiveness and resilience in farming • AHDB to analyse economic and environmental risks and benefits if structural change in farming industry • Feed analysis of future scenarios into the National Ecosystem Assessment Follow On Project • Second phase of work

					on diet and consumption (see below). No further updates on Green Food Project activities could be found. The Project's documents are still available to view on the current gov.uk website (as of August 2017).
Agri-Tech Strategy	Published 2013 Departmental Sponsor: Industry	Badged as first ever recognition by UK Government of an 'agri-tech' sector (comprising public and private sector agricultural research through the supply chain spanning seeds, agro-chemicals, machinery, engineering and other inputs across arable and livestock agriculture, horticulture, and food processing and packaging and retailing). <i>Vision: 'That the UK becomes a world leader in agricultural technology, innovation and sustainability; exploits opportunities to develop and adopt new and existing technologies, products and services to increase productivity; and thereby contributes to global food security and international development' (BIS 2013 p7)</i> Chapter breakdown: 1. Ministerial Foreword 2. Industry Foreword 3. Executive Summary 4. The Vision and Mission 5. The Challenge and the Opportunity 6. Our response: building on UK strengths i. The UK Science Base ii. UK Food and Farming Supply Chain	Steering Group members are listed At Table A2		The Leadership Council is described as looking at a range of indicators to measure the success of the strategy. Indications of success are listed as: • Increased productivity in the sector • UK recognised as global leader in agricultural informatics • Growing investment in scientific and commercial skills • Faster and more widespread adoption of best practice and innovation • Regulatory framework that better supports innovation and increased investment in R&D. (BIS 2013 p9).

		iii. UK Access to Global Markets 7. Implementing the strategy 8. Actions 9. Benefits: what the strategy will deliver 10. Indicators: what success looks like UK strengths in institutes and universities contrasted with decline in infrastructure to support industry in applying science and technology to help modern farming and food production; and aspects of regulatory regime and skills gaps which hinder. Strategy sets out range of actions: • Improve translation of research into practice through a £70 mn investment in a Agri-Tech Catalyst • Increase support for new technologies through £90 mn funding for Centres for Agricultural Innovation • Establishing a Centre of Agricultural Informatics and Metrics of Sustainability A Leadership Council is established to oversee delivery. Approach to Policy Integration: Not a focus of this project.			
Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report	Published: 2013 Departmental Sponsor: DEFRA	Second phase of Green Food Project, which was itself a response to Natural England White Paper. Involved three working groups, which came up with conclusions and recommendations: Principles of a Healthy and Sustainable Diet – formed a	Steering Group members are listed Table x above on ‘Advisors/Stakeholders to National Food Policies’.	No budget details identified but it is likely the project and implementation were only based on existing	No further updates on Green Food Project activities could be found. The Project’s documents are still available to view on the current gov.uk website (as of August 2017).

		set of draft key principles for healthy and sustainable eating Consumer Behaviour – explored interventions through three lenses – food practice; a meal occasion; and a meal type. Concluded there is a need for more effective leadership and a more robust government framework. Sustainable Consumption and Growth: looked at consuming better with less impact, to explore potential for growth from changes to what people buy and eat and for creating value through innovation and resource efficiency. Approach to Policy Integration: The Consumer Behaviour working group expressed support for Best Foot Forward report’s findings that it was vital to have a joined-up overarching vision of what ‘good’ looks like across social, environmental and economic interests. Need a mechanism for identifying potential trade-offs between different aspects of sustainability. Recommended development of action and research briefs and associated roadmaps and establishment of cross-government group to sponsor delivery of vision. The Sustainable Consumption and Growth group concluded that – government leadership is needed and must be integrated (ie key government departments for food such as DEFRA and DH working together more effectively; vital to look across whole supply chain; need government steer on integration between consumption and production side approaches; need for agreement on what ‘good’ looks like. Synergies between health and environmental sustainability are potentially		resources and in-kind support	

		strong but less obvious how these have synergy with economic goals. Recommend broadening of thinking to capture value of ecosystem services. Need for focused additional research on the implications of a healthy, sustainable diet for whole population and for food industry.			

Source: Author

Table A2: Stakeholders to UK Food Policies

Food Policy	Name	Organisation	Job Title
Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food - Members	Helen Browning	Soil Association	Chair
	David Varney	BT	Chair
	DeAnne Julius	Former Member of BoE Monetary Policy Committee	Not specified
	Deirdre Hutton	National Consumer's Council	Chair
	Fiona Reynolds	National Trust	Director General
	Graham Wynne	RSPB	Chief Executive
	Iain Ferguson	Unilever	Senior Vice President
	Mark Tinsley	Not specified	Farmer
	Sir Donald Curry (Chairman)	Farmer and Former Chair of Meat and Livestock Commission	Farmer
	Sir Peter Davis	Sainsbury's	Group Chief Executive
Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food	No Advisors Listed		
FISS Stakeholder Group	Not specified	Association of Convenience Stores	Not specified
	Not specified	Association of Independent Meat Suppliers	

	Not specified	British Beer & Pub Association	
	Not specified	British Frozen Food Federation	
	Not specified	British Hospitality Association	
	Not specified	British Meat Manufacturers' Association	
	Not specified	British Poultry Council	
	Not specified	British Retail Consortium	
	Not specified	British Soft Drinks Association	
	Not specified	Cold Storage & Distribution Federation	
	Not specified	Countryside Agency	
	Not specified	Dairy UK (formerly Dairy Association Ltd)	
	Not specified	Environment Agency	
	Not specified	Federation of Wholesale Distributors	
	Not specified	Food & Drink Federation	
	Not specified	Gin & Vodka Association	
	Not specified	GMB Trade Union	
	Not specified	Government Office for the Regions	
	Not specified	Hotel & Catering International Management Association	
	Not specified	National Consumer Council	
	Not specified	National Farmers Union	
	Not specified	Provision Trade Federation	
	Not specified	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds	
	Not specified	South West Regional Development Agency	
	Not specified	Sustain	

	Not specified	Sustainable Development Commission	
Food Matters - Additional Contributions From	Chris Hauserman	DEFRA	Not specified
	Jessica Prout	Department of Health	
	Tom Quested	Food Standards Agency	
	Gabrielle Owtram	Food Standards Agency	
	Tanya Green	Food Standards Agency	
	Jonathan Millen	Strategy Unit	
	Shaun Chau	Strategy Unit	
	Wil Brown	Strategy Unit	
	Mark Barthel	WRAP	
Food Matters - Departmental Advisory Group	Nick Pearce	10 Downing Street	Head of Strategic Policy
	Brian Harding	DEFRA	Director
	Will Cavendish	Department of Health	Director
	Gill Fine, Director	Food Standards Agency	Director
	Rebecca Lawrence	HM Treasury	Head, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Team
	David Mattes	BERR	Not specified
	Clive Fleming	Better Regulation Executive	
	Bronwen Jones	DEFRA	
	Lesley Forsdike	Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)	
	Noreen Graham	Department for Children, Schools and Families	
	Terri Sarch	Department for International Development	

	Alison Ross	Department of Health	
	Clara Swinson	Department of Health	
	Geoff Dessent	Department of Health	
	Rosemary Hignett	Food Standards Agency	
	Brendan Bayley	HM Treasury	
Food Matters - Expert Panel	Dr David Barling	City University	Senior Lecturer
	Professor Tim Lang	City University	Professor of Food Policy
	Dr Tom MacMillan	Food Ethics Council think tank	Executive Director
	Sir Donald Curry	Government advisor on food and farming policy	Chairman of the Sustainable Farming and Food Strategy Delivery Group
	Dr Susan Jebb	Medical Research Council	Head of Nutrition and Health Research
	Ed Mayo	National Consumer Council	Chief Executive
	Martyn Evans	Scottish Consumer Council.	Director
	Chris Pomfret	University of Cambridge	Senior Associate
Food Matters Project Team	Elen Watkin	DEFRA	Not specified
	Jonathan Eddy	DEFRA	Not specified
	Andrew Jarvis	Strategy Unit	Deputy Director, Strategy Unit (team leader)
	Louise Horner	Strategy Unit	Not specified
	Stephen Aldridge	Strategy Unit	Director
Food 2030	No advisors listed	No advisors listed	No advisors listed
	Allison Dowling, ,	Diageo GB	Corporate Affairs Director
	Amanda Sourry, ,	Unilever UK & Ireland	Chairman
	Andrew Opie, ,	British Retail Consortium	Director of Food Policy

	Dame Carol Black	Department of Health	Expert Adviser on health and well-being at work
	Cathryn Higgs, ,	The Co-operative	Food Policy Manager
	Fiona Dawson, ,	Mars UK	Managing Director
	Fred Turok	Fitness Industry Association	Chair
	Gillian Taylor	Sainsbury's	Head of Public Affairs
	Henry Ashworth	Portman Group	Chief Executive
	Ian Sarson	Compass Group	Managing Director
	Jeremy Beadles	Heineken UK	Corporate Relations Director
	Melanie Leech	Food & Drink Federation	Director General
	Paul Lincoln	UK Health Forum	Chief Executive
	Martyn Jones/Guy Mason	Morrison's Supermarket plc	Group Services Corporate Director/Head of Government Affairs
	Paul Kelly	ASDA	Director of Corporate Affairs
	Dame Sally Davies	Department of Health	Chief Medical Officer for England
	Simon Burton	Tesco	Interim Group Government Affairs Director
	Sue Davies	Which?	Chief Policy Adviser
	Susan Jebb	Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, Oxford	Professor of Diet and Population Health
	Tim Lefroy	Advertising Association	Chief Executive
	Ufi Ibrahim	British Hospitality Association	Chief Executive
Foresight F&F - High Level Stakeholder Group	Eckhard Deutscher	OECD Development Assistance Committee	Chair
	James O'Shaughnessy	Prime Minister's Office	Director of Policy
	Iain Ferguson	Tate & Lyle Plc	Chief Executive

Dr Namanga Ngongi	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	Director
Professor Doug Kell	BBSRC, Research Councils UK	Chief Executive Officer
Laurie Lee	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	Deputy Director, Agriculture Development, Global Development Program
Anne Guttridge	Cargill Europe	Supply Chain Manager
Martin Bwalya	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme	Head
Professor Andrew Rosenberg	Conservation International	Senior Vice President, Science and Knowledge
Brian Harding	DEFRA	Director, Food and Farming Group
Jim Paice MP	DEFRA	Minister of State for Agriculture and Food
Robert Watson	DEFRA	Chief Scientific Adviser
John Barrett	DFID	Deputy Director, Food Group – Policy and Research Division
Stephen O’Brien MP	DFID	Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Development
Tim Wheeler	DFID	Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser
Tariq Banuri	Division of Sustainable Development, UN	Director
Tassos Haniotis	European Commission	Current Head of the Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis, Director General for Agriculture,
Alexander Julius Muller	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	Assistant DG, Natural Resources Dept
Ross Warburton	Food and Drink Federation	President
John Bensted-Smith	Former Head of Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis, European Commission	Director General for Agriculture
John Beddington	Government Office for Science	Government Chief Scientific Adviser

Professor Joachim Von Braun	IFPRI	Former Director General
Ajay Vashee	International Federation of Agricultural Producers	President
Dr Jeff McNeely	International Union for Conservation of Nature, World Conservation Union	Chief Scientist
Pedro Arcuri	Labex Europe	Coordinator of EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation)
Professor Richard Mkandawire	New Partnership for Africa's Development	Director
Peter Kendall	NFU	President
Jon Lomoy	OECD	Director of Development Cooperation Directorate,
Phil Bloomer	Oxfam	Current Head of Programme Policy
Sam Bickersteth	Oxfam (now at DFID)	Head of Programme Policy
Patrick Holden	Soil Association	Director
Michael Jacobs	The Prime Minister's Office	Former Senior Policy Adviser
Achim Steiner	UNEP	Executive Director
Dr Jan Kees Vis	Unilever	Director, Sustainable Agriculture
Josette Sheeran	United Nations World Food Programme	Executive Director,
Nina Fedoroff	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Former special Adviser on Science and Technology
Dr Will Martin World	World Bank	Manager for Agricultural and Rural Development,
Helena Leurent Director,	World Bank	Head of Agriculture and Rural Development,
Nancy Roman	World Food Programme	Head of Public Policy and Communications
Dr Harsha Vardhana Singh	WTO	Deputy Director General

Foresight F&F - Project Advisory Group	Brian Harris	BBSRC	Not specified
	Huw Tyson	BBSRC	
	Hannah Smith	Cabinet Office	
	Hannah Wadcock	Cabinet Office	
	Eric Boa	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux International	
	Phil Abrahams	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureaux International	
	Lucy Hayes	DECC	
	Nafees Meah	DECC	
	Andrew Randall	DEFRA	
	Katherine Riggs	DEFRA	
	Matt Wieckowski	DEFRA	
	Paul Bradley	DEFRA	
	Charles Perry	Department of Health	
	Nicola Watt	Department of Health	
	Alan Tollervey	DFID	
	Tim Bostock	DFID	
	Jackie Vale	Environment Agency	
	Julian Smith	Food and Environment Research Agency	
	Patrick Miller	Food Standards Agency	
	Sasha Maisel	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	
	Elizabeth Warham	Government Office for Science	
	Brendan Bayley	HM Treasury	
	Naomi Jefferies	HM Treasury	

	Ian Astley	MOD	
	James Petts	Natural England	
	John Speers	Northern Ireland Executive	
	Sinclair Mayne	Northern Ireland Executive	
	Kathy Johnston	Scottish Government	
	Chris Lea	Welsh Assembly	
	Nina Prichard	Welsh Assembly	
Foresight F&F - Project Lead Expert Group	Ian Crute	ADHB	Not specified
	Lawrence Haddad	Institute of Development Studies	
	Sherman Robinson	Institute of Development Studies	
	Camilla Toulmin	International Institute for Environment and Development	
	Mike Gale	John Innes Foundation	
	David Lawrence	Syngenta (Non-Executive Director)	
	Jules Pretty	University of Exeter	
	Charles Godfray	University of Oxford	
	James Muir	University of Stirling	
Green Food Project - Steering Group	John Godfrey	AHDB	Not specified
	Andrew Opie	BRC	
	Tony Cooke	British Hospitality Association	
	Harry Cotterell	Country Land and Business Association	
	Jim Paice MP (Chair)	DEFRA	
	Robin Mortimer	DEFRA	
	Sarah Hendry	DEFRA	

	Andrew Kuyk	FDF	
	Caroline Drummond	Linking Environment and Farming	
	Sarah Palmer	National Federation of Young Farmers Clubs	
	Peter Kendall	NFU	
	Martin Harper	RSPB	
	Charles Godfray	University of Oxford	
	Mark Driscoll	WWF	
Green Food Project - Synthesis Group	Chris Durham	DEFRA	
	Lee Davies	DEFRA	
	Peter Costigan	DEFRA	
	Rachel Muckle	DEFRA	
	Richard Brand-Hardy	DEFRA	
	Stuart Platt	DEFRA	
	Tara Garnett	FCRN, University of Surrey	
	Tim Benton	Global Food Security Programme	
	Phil Bicknell	NFU	
	Will Peach	RSPB	
	Charles Godfray (Chair)	University of Oxford	
	Peter Jackson	University of Sheffield	
GFP - Sustainable Consumption - WG volunteer - Consumer Behaviour	Rob Moore	Behaviour Change	Not specified
	Edward Gardiner	Behavioural Design Lab	
	Vicky Grinnell-Wright	Best Foot Forward	
	Natan Doron	Fabian Society	

	Peter Andrews	FDF	
	Claire Oxborrow	FoE	
	Vicki Hird	FoE	
	Dan Crossley (Chair)	Food Ethics Council	
	Lorna Hegenbarth	NFU	
	Mary Roberts	National Federation of Women's Institutes	
	Dick Searle	Packaging Federation	
	Barney Smyth	The Sustainable Restaurant Association	
	Tim Burns	Waste Watch	
	Rachel Blain	Which?	
	Andrew Parry (Chair)	WRAP	
GFP - Sustainable Consumption - WG volunteer - Principles of a Healthy and Sustainable Diet	Maureen Strong (Chair)	AHDB	Not specified
	Joyce D'Silva	CIWF	
	Richard Warren	Dairy UK	
	Lindsay Harris	DEFRA	
	Mark Bush	DH	
	Sue Dibb	Eating Better	
	Selina Paine	FDF	
	Louise Symington	National Trust	
	Helen Ferrier	NFU	
	Lucy Bjork	RSPB	
	Ailsa Jackson	Scottish Government	
	Sophie Elwes	The Sustainable Restaurant Association	

	Sue Riley	WRAP	
	Duncan Williamson	WWF-UK	
	Tara Garnett (Chair)	FCRN	
GFP - Sustainable Consumption - WG volunteer - Sustainable Consumption and Growth	Alice Ellison	BRC	Not specified
	Natan Doron	Fabian Society	
	Andrew Kuyk (Chair)	FDF	
	Sian Thomas	Fresh Produce Consortium	
	Dick Searle	Packaging Federation	
	Ed Franklin	The Sustainable Restaurant Association	
	Tim Burns	Waste Watch	
Agri-Tech Strategy	David Willets MP (co-Chair)	BIS	Minister of State for Universities and Science
	Lord de Mauley (Co-Chair)	DEFRA	Minister for Science
	Judith Batchelar (Co-Chair)	Sainsbury's	Director of Brand
	Ian Crute	AHDB	Chief Scientist
	Tina Barsby	NIAB	CEO
	Sir John Beddington	Former Government Chief Scientific Advisor	Former Government Chief Scientific Advisor
	Martin Douglas	Cargill	CEO
	George Freeman MP	APPG on Agricultural Science and Technology	Chairman
	Iain Gray	TSB	Chief Executive
	Jim Godfrey	TSB SAF-IP	Chairman
	Douglas Kell	BBSRC	Chief Executive
	David Lawrence	Syngenta	NED and Chairman of Science and Technology Advisory Board

	Ian Noble	Pepsico	Senior Director for Breakthrough Foods
	John Shropshire	G's Group	CEO
	James Townsend	Velcourt Group plc	CEO
	Bob Webb	Scotland's Rural College	Principal
	Tim Wheeler	DfID	Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor

Table A3: UK Food Policy Chronology

Political Party	Prime Minister	Year	Food Policy Development
Labour	Atlee	1947	Agriculture Act
Conservative	Eden	1956	MAFF takes over responsibilities from Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ministry
	Heath	1973	UK accession to the Common Agricultural Policy of the Common Market
Labour	Wilson/ Callaghan	1976	Food from our Own Resources White Paper
	Callaghan	1979	Farming and the Nation published (February)
		1983	Food Hygiene Advisory Committee abolished Food From Britain agency established
		1986	BSE first appears in UK (Knowles et al 2007)
		1988	Series of food poisoning incidents attributed to the consumption of eggs and cheese lead to Department of Health warning to the general public to avoid eating raw eggs
	Thatcher/Major	1990	Food Safety Act
	Major	1992	Major government sets targets for dietary risk factors and reduction of obesity
		1994	Meat Products (Hygiene) regulations
		1995	National Meat Hygiene Service established Food Hygiene (General Food Hygiene) regulations
		1996	Nutrition Task Force abolished Human variant of BSE identified. EU bans export of British Beef
	Major/Blair	1997	Labour's 1997 election manifesto food-specific electoral promises: reform MAFF and CAP
	Blair	1998	Professor Philip James report published WHO European Region publishes strategy for preventing nutrition-related disease
			Ethical Trading Initiative established
		1999	Tethers and close-confinement stalls for breeding sows banned EU lifts ban on export of British Beef
		2000	Competition Commission report on investigation into supermarkets launched Food Standards Act Food Standards Agency launched WRAP (Waste Resources Action Programme) launched Red Tractor label introduced to Assured Food Standards

		2001	Sustainable Development Commission launched
			Foot & Mouth Disease outbreak in the UK
			Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs created from MAFF and DETR
		2002	UK Supermarket Code of Practice introduced (March)
			Policy Commission on the Future of Food and Farming
			National 5-a-Day Programme launched
			Establishment of Food Chain Centre
		2003	Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England published (December)
			The Regional Food Strategy for England/Food from Britain published
			Sustainable Food & Farming Research Priorities Group (gets mentioned in DEFRA 2004 Five Year Plan and in FISS in 2006)
			Action Plan to Develop Organic Food and Farming in England published
			Public Sector Food Procurement Initiative launched
			Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission 'GM Nation' consultation concludes there is little public appetite for GM crops in the UK
			Report of the Chief Medical Officer 'Obesity: Defusing the health time bomb'
		2004	Hastings Review concludes food promotion impact on children's diets
			National School Fruit Scheme rolled out to all English regions
			Choosing Health: Making Healthy Choices Easier white paper
			Gangmasters Licensing Act passed
			Animal Health and Welfare Strategy published
		2005	Wanless Report for HM Treasury identifies diet as key preventable factor to lower NHS costs
			Sustainable Food and Farming Strategy published
			Jamie Oliver's School Dinners Tv series and 'Feed me Better' campaign
			Report of the Sustainable Food & Farming Research Priorities Group published
			School Food Trust (now Children's Food Trust) established
			Courtauld Commitment launched
		2006	FSA Salt Awareness Campaign
			Department of Health 'Food and Health Action Plan' published
			Food Industry Sustainability Strategy launched
			The Economics on Climate Change: The Stern Review published
			Food Industry Better Regulation Group established
			Natural England agency created (through amalgamation of Countryside Agency, English Nature and Rural Development Service)
			Office for Climate Change created

	Blair/Brown	2007	Love Food Hate Waste consumer campaign launched
			Foresight Tackling Obesities report published
			Eatwell Plate guide launched
			Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund launched
			School Food nutrition standards introduced
	Brown	2008	Sustainable Development Commission 'Green, Healthy and Fair' report published (February)
			Jamie Oliver's Ministry of Food TV series airs (September to October)
			Food Matters
			Council of Food Policy Advisors established (October)
			Food Strategy Task Force established
			Cabinet Sub Committee on Food
			Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives White Paper (included proposal for Healthy Food Code of Good Practice) (January)
			Competition Commission second enquiry into supermarket practices/recommendation of independent ombudsman for GSCOP
			Committee on Climate Change established
			Ensuring the UK's Food Security in a Changing World published by DEFRA
			BBSRC Diet and Health Research Industry Club established
			Funding withdrawn from Food From Britain agency
			Department of Energy and Climate Change created
		2009	The Vital Ingredient: chemical science and engineering for sustainable food published (January)
			Change4Life launched (social marketing component of the Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives) (January)
			FSA Organic Review
			First group of eateries display calorie information on menus
			Food and Environment Research Agency created from merger of several existing agencies
			EFRA Securing food supplies up to 2050: the challenges faced by the UK published
			Fruit and Vegetable Task Force launched
			Groceries Supply Code of Practice launched
Labour/Conservative	Brown/Cameron	2010	UK Food Security Assessment published
Cons/Lib Coalition	Cameron/Clegg		DEFRA/FSA GM Report published (August)
			Food Matters One Year On report published
			2030 Food Vision
			UK Cross Government Strategy for Food Research and Innovation published (January)
			MOG changes to the FSA
			Marmot review Fair Society, Healthy Lives published

Conservative	Cameron		Food Fairness Inquiry
		2011	Foresight project 'The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and choices for global sustainability' published (January)
			Innovation in EU Agriculture, House of Lords Inquiry
			Launch of Public Health Responsibility Deal
		2012	Liberal Democrat party conference calls for National Food Strategy to be adopted by government
			Green Food Project
			Rural Development Agencies replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships
		2013	Groceries Code Adjudicator established
			Agri-Tech Strategy published
			Public Health England agency of Department of Health created
			Horse Meat Scandal
			Department of Health announces agreement on a standard format for the provision of front-of-pack nutrition information
			Green Food Project Sustainable Consumption Report
		2014	Food Crime Unit established
		2015	Food Standards Scotland launched

Table A4: Australia Food Policies Prior and Post National Food Plan

Policy	Outset	Content	Input	Budget	Outcomes
	Originating Actor; Timeline; Terms of Reference; Political Party; Lead Department	Definition of Problem; Goals and Objectives; Framing; Policy Omissions; Degree of Change; Policy Integration	Input from Departments; Mechanism for Coordination; Institutional Reform; Lead Personnel; Advisory Groups; Stakeholder Involvement; Consultation; Consultants; Political Input.	Formulation; Implementation	Plans for Implementation and Evaluation; Policy Instruments; Indicators; Final Status
Food and Nutrition Strategy	Date published: 1992 Departmental Sponsor: Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services Foreword by Peter Staples, Minister for Aged, Family and Health Services commends the ‘Oversighting Committee’ and its chair Professor Paul Nestel’s (Chief of the CSIRO Division of Human Nutrition) role in developing the consensus policy. (DHHCS piii). Foreword describes the policy as having ‘<i>identified key areas for action in education/information, food supply, people with special needs and monitoring and surveillance</i>’ (DHHCS piii). Terms of Reference cited at the end of the report are: 1. Oversight the development of a draft National Food and Nutrition Policy for consideration by Government in May 1992 2. Plan and oversight broad based public	States ‘<i>the fundamental aim of food and nutrition policy is to make healthy food choices, easy choices</i>’ (DHHCS p1). Builds on initiatives arising from the National Better Health Program, which in turn arose from the work of the Better Health Commission, established March 1985, as ‘<i>the first concerted national effort to change the basic direction of health policy</i>’ (DHHCS p1). Covers the following themes:	Members of the Oversighting Committee are listed in Table A5. Later a Food and Nutrition Policy Implementation Consultative Group (PIC) was instituted, and functioned between 1992-96, consisting of: • Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services • Australia New Zealand Food Authority • Food Industry Council of Australia • National Health and Medical Research Council • Consumers Federation of Australia • AusAid • Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission • Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry and	The Program is said to have received funding of \$4.3 mn between 1992-95 under the National Health Advancement Program and the budget for the program in 1995-96 was \$1.25 mn (CDHFS 1998 p4).	Priority Implementation Objectives listed as: • Improve knowledge and skills necessary for Australians to choose a healthy diet • Incorporate food and nutrition objectives into a broad

	consultation with State/Territories, key government departments, industry, professional and consumer groups in the policy development process 3. Respond as required to various issues raised in the context of developing a National Food and Nutrition Policy 4. Advise on the intersectoral issues which promote or hinder the achievement of nutritional goals and targets (DHHCS p23).	• Social Justice • Quality of the Food Supply • Community Participation and Accountability • The Food and Nutrition System and its Wider Interaction <i>‘Australia is a major world producer and exporter of agricultural products, and there is substantial unrealised export potential of value added and manufactured food. Increasing the innovation and competitiveness of the local market would assist in realising this potential and help ensure that a diverse supply of high quality and nutritious food continues to be available locally’ (DHHCS p9).</i> Approach to Policy Integration: Describes the 1992 Food and Nutrition Policy as ‘closely linked to other	Energy • Commonwealth Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (CDHFS 1998 p4).	range of policy areas and sectors • Support community based initiatives towards improving the diet of people with special needs • Regularly monitor the food and nutrition system (p13). The policy was to be implemented ‘through strategies which support the Dietary Guidelines for Australians, involving key sectors in the food system, and foster community participation’ (p3). An extensive

		<i>relevant government policies, notably the food industry strategy, the support for Australian food export marketing, and ecologically sustainable development. ' (DHHCS p2).</i> <i>States that 'by beginning to link food and nutrition policies, Australia is now in the forefront of international activity in this area. The strategy arising from this linkage acknowledges the importance of the food system as a major employer and contributor to the economy, and the importance of good nutrition in reducing ill-health in the community. The Strategy includes demand and supply side action which support and reinforce food choices for a healthy diet being made easier' (DHHCS p2).</i> Makes links between actors: <i>'Effective food and nutrition policy requires</i>		summary report on the Food and Nutrition Policy was published in 1998, covering the first three years (Implementation Phase). Funded projects included: Demonstration projects Teaching/Learning Resources Information Resources Research and Policy. Most outputs were categorised as teaching/learning resource or demonstration. Examples of activities aimed at incorporating food and nutrition objectives into other policy areas: Research and consultation with meat supply chain about supply of lean red meat in

		<i>food producers to increase their skills related to knowledge of dietary issues and apply these to product development; food marketers to understand nutrition issues and consumer perceptions; government to support generic promotion of ADGs; educators to teach the nutritional benefits of foods and the link between food and nutrition. The food system needs also to interact with wider activity – changes in planning of transport and local government services, for example, may enhance the availability of nutritious foods. The food and nutrition policy needs to be wide ranging and to ensure the impacts of individual programs are examined throughout the food and nutrition system’ (DHHCS p9).</i> Says the policy requires coordinated effort between: • Health, education, transport, primary industry, and			retail sector ‘Real Meal’ Hotel Award Scheme Both pilot projects failed to be adopted in the longer term.

		manufacturing industry sectors • Public, private and non-government agencies • Different spheres of government • The Australian consumer. Makes the following reference to environmental issues: <i>‘The food system must be both economically viable....and maintain the quality and integrity of the environment. Major issues in agriculture include the conservation of scarce resources such as top soil, water and finite reserves of fossil energy and the amelioration of land degradation problems associated with salinity, deforestation and chemical contamination. The food processing industry is a minor user of energy and aims to contribute to ecologically sustainable development through improved manufacturing methods which will efficiently use raw</i>			

		materials and improve product storage. The food industry does, however, provide a visible element of the domestic waste stream but is actively participating in promoting waste management solutions' (DHHCS p10-11).			
Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy (STAS)	Date published: 1997 Departmental Sponsor: Not Known According to a report by the Australian National Audit Office, 'a report for the Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Council in November 2000 identified globalisation of food processing and retailing as the key force exerting pressure on the industry. It considered that the emergence of global retail chains would result in major changes to the structure and operation of the food industry' and therefore decided on a food industry action agenda, as the vehicle for establishing a National Food Industry Strategy to succeed the STA Strategy'. (ANAO 2006-7 p11) A biography of its Chair Jim Kennedy – a food industry executive and Director of Australian agribusiness Craig Moystn Pty, notes that 'in 2002 he completed a five year assignment as executive director of the Prime Ministers Supermarket to Asia Council, involved in building branded food exports' (http://www.craigmostyn.com.au/about/board-of-directors Accessed December 2016). A paper by Jim Kennedy on 'The Challenge of	'The main strategies adopted by Supermarket to Asia to improve food exports include: • undertaking a catalyst role in influencing both government and industry processes • working towards achieving a national approach to food exports through work with State government food industry councils and State agencies • undertaking the Supermarket to Asia Ltd work program and the Food and Fibre Chains Program • undertaking market access work, including involvement in preparations for the next round of WTO negotiations	Input: 'The Supermarket to Asia Council, comprising senior representatives of government and industry, was established by the Prime Minister in September 1996 to provide the leadership and drive necessary to do this. Supermarket to Asia Ltd services the Council by coordinating the various elements of the Strategy and undertaking a work program on its behalf.' (Kennedy n.d.) Eight working groups were created on: • Food quality and safety • Competitiveness • Asian marketing • Small to medium enterprises • Market access • Communications transport and logistics • Research and innovation (Pritchard 1999). Pritchard (1999) identifies Supermarket to Asia as 'the cornerstone of a new set	No specific details of funding were identified. However, the Kennedy Report states that 'The May 1998 Commonwealth Budget provided funding to continue the Supermarket to Asia Strategy for another three years.' (Kennedy n.d.)	The role of Supermarket to Asia was expanded to include the new Food and Fibre Chains Program. (Kennedy n.d.)

	<i>Growing Exports</i>’ – located on the http://www.proceedings.com/ Conference Proceedings website (via a Google search accessed December 2010) states that ‘The Supermarket to Asia Strategy was developed jointly by industry and government to meet the challenges of growing Australia’s food sales to Asia.’ (http://www.proceedings.com.au/abts1999/papers/Jim_Kennedy.pdf Accessed December 2016, hereafter Kennedy n.d) According to Pritchard (1999) ‘In 1992, the Australian government established a set of policies aimed at boosting Australian agri-food exports to Asia. The centrepiece of these policies was the formation of the Agri-Food Council, a peak advisory body comprising government, corporate, farmer, and union representatives. In 1996, the newly elected government of Prime Minister John Howard repackaged the Agri-Food Council within an umbrella strategy called the <i>Supermarket to Asia</i>’. ‘Supermarket to Asia undertakes a catalyst role aimed at: • <i>developing a market-led export culture</i> • <i>identifying and removing barriers to trade</i> • <i>building points of product difference</i> • <i>improving competitiveness through the chain</i>’ (Kennedy n.d.) ‘Council’s activities fall into two broad areas: 1. <i>Implementation of the Supermarket to Asia Strategy involves working to a planned work program designed to develop opportunities and export capacity</i>	• <i>adopting an extensive communication’s strategy</i>’ (Kennedy n.d.) Key principles: 1. ‘<i>The strategy should be inclusive, in the sense of focusing on activities throughout the food chain: farming, processing, marketing, retailing, and related transport and communication links. Previous policy approaches had, in general, given preferential attention to on-farm activities</i>’ (Pritchard 1999 p293) 2. ‘<i>A detailed work plan for the council should focus on selective interventions to bolster particular exports to particular markets and should put priority on joint efforts of industry and government to open hitherto closed Asian food markets.</i>’ ‘<i>The Supermarket to Asia Council would be located, in an organisational sense,</i>	<i>of relations, alliances, and allegiances between agri-food producers and the state that are constructed on policies and discourses that emphasize competition, enterprise, and efficiency within local arenas of production</i>’.		

	2. <i>Having the Supermarket to Asia secretariat pursuing a representational and motivational role, including that relating to coordinating delivery of government programs to exporters. These activities include widespread involvement with food companies, industry organisations, and state and Federal Government departments</i>’ (Kennedy n.d.)	<i>outside the government bureaucracy. This, it was argued, would engender a greater sense of "policy ownership" by industry. Accordingly, in 1996 an independent company (Supermarket to Asia Ltd) was established. The company is owned jointly by the Australian Food Council (the peak industry lobby group), the National Farmers' Federation, and the Australian Supermarket Institute and has responsibility to implement the Supermarket to Asia Council's decisions</i>’ (Pritchard 1999 p293). Approach to Policy Integration: Pritchard (1999) notes that one priority of the Strategy was it ‘<i>should embody a "whole-of-Government" perspective, where traditionally, various government agencies had competed for policy relevance. This unity would be achieved through the formation of a high-</i>			

		level Supermarket to Asia Council, chaired by the prime minister and comprising key ministers and industry representatives' (p293). As above, it was argued the strategy should be inclusive of the entire supply chain, not simply on-farm activities (Pritchard 1999 p293)			
National Food Industry Strategy	Date published: 2002 Departmental Sponsor: DAFF The NFIS succeeded the STAS, via the vehicle of a food industry action agenda (industry action agendas being a part of government strategy at the time, with an aim of fostering industry leadership). The action agenda was used to <i>'engage stakeholders in the development of the Strategy, with industry identifying the actions and tasks that needed to be taken to realise its full potential'</i> (ANAO 2006-7). <i>'The Strategy envisaged that by 2007 the Australian food industry would be a significant global player with a sustainable and profitable role in the global food product system'</i> (ANAO 2006-7). The Strategy is <i>'intended to provide the framework for developing and implementing a partnership between the food industry and the Government. It is to deliver</i>	The NFIS included: 1. Establishment of high-level industry council to oversight the development of the industry and implementation of the Strategy 2.A Product and Service Innovation Strategy, which would build on R&D activities and infrastructure, and establish a Food Innovations Grant programme 3.A Food Trade initiative to develop and implement an international food market entry strategy with a focus on market access, trade development and	An Industry Council was established, stakeholder details are in Table A5.	The Government budgeted \$114 mn to deliver the Strategy over a five year period (1 July 2002 to 30 June 2007). Originally \$102.4 mn was provided to deliver the Strategy. This was increased in late 2005 by and	The DAFF 2004-5 Annual Report states that: <i>'The mid-term review of the NFIS completed during the year showed that the NFIS programmes are well established and have made significant progress towards achieving the strategy's objectives. The review's recommendations will help refine and refocus the NFIS and the</i>

	<i>that shared vision of increased output, profitability, investment, innovation, export sales and employment in the Australian food industry’ (ANAO 2006-7 p12).</i> According to the DAFF Annual Report 2004-5: ‘<i>The Department worked with the National Food Industry Strategy (NFIS) Ltd, the industry-owned company responsible for managing some programmes under the NFIS, to develop and consolidate Australia’s presence in key food export markets in Asia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America’</i> (p3)	promotion 4.A strategy to build more competitive supply chains and improve national safety and quality systems Approach to Policy Integration: Not a focus of this Strategy		additional \$12 mn for the FIG programme. NFIS Ltd received \$88.5 mn to provide secretariat services to the National Food Industry Council and to deliver four key programmes : 1.FIGs: match dollar for dollar funding for Australian-based food processing firms to undertake R&D projects 2.Food Centres of Excellence: Provide grants 3.Food Market	<i>development of future food industry policy’ (p3)</i> According to the ANOA report of 2006-7, ‘<i>As at September 2006 the Strategy provided funding for:</i> • <i>72 FIG projects</i> • <i>Two Food Chain Centres of Excellence</i> • <i>Eight Market Development Projects</i> • <i>13 Major Food Chain Projects’</i> (p13). The ANOA review of the NFIS, as part of an audit of DAFF, highlighted some problems with the way it had

				Development: between the food industry, State food agencies and the Australian Government, to facilitate an integrated market strategy 4. Food Chain: Provide funding for industry demonstration projects. (ANAO 2006-7 p12). DAFF retained \$25.9 mn of the funding to administer initiatives involving government activities and manage the contract with NFIS	been implemented, including: 1. <i>'DAFF did not develop a plan for implementing the NFIS that set out tasks, resources, timeframes, milestones risks and responsibilities'</i> (ANAO 2006-7 p114). 2. DAFF identified Conflicts of Interest as a major risk - given that industry representatives (along with government) would be assessing applicants from within its own industry and having access to potentially confidential material - and built provisions into the Contract with NFIS Ltd, but measures were not fully applied

				Ltd (ANAO 2006-7 p26).	(ANAO 2006-7).
Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation	Date published: 2006 Departmental Sponsor: DAFF Known as The Corish Report, after Chair Peter Corish, past-president of the National Farmers' Federation. Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group commissioned in March 2005 to help guide the development of future directions in Australian government policies and programs affecting the agriculture and food sector and identified principal issues and challenges for the sector. No background provided in the report on the catalyst to its creation.	Report structured into four main parts: Markets; Competitiveness; Natural Resources; Adapting to Change. Outlined foundations for success in agricultural and food industries: • Stronger emphasis on innovation in production and marketing • Sound economic policies supported by investment in infrastructure • Whole of chain paddock to plate approach • Policies must focus on achieving greater self-reliance as business operators • Reduce Regulatory burden • Relevant information must be communicated in a more timely, accessible and	Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group established in 2004, but no details of membership could be ascertained. DAFF's 2006 annual report notes that during 2005-6 the '<i>Department contributed actively to the Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group, and provided it with secretariat services</i>' (DAFF 2006b p65).	No budgetary details identified	A response from the Government was published six months after the Corish Report, outlining its agreement with the foundations for success laid out in the Report along with several immediate actions '<i>as a demonstration of its intention to act on Corish Report recommendations</i>' (DAFF 2006a p3). All recommendations are agreed with apart from that on short stay visas which the government argues has already been dealt with; and the changes proposed to the National Transport Commission's role and tax offset arrangements.

		accurate manner. Partnership approach between businesses and governments No mention of health and only minor references to post-farm gate. Approach to Policy Integration: One of the identified foundations for success in agricultural and food industries is <i>‘Genuinely cooperative and consistent approach by governments – Australian, State, and Territory is essential for policies and programs affecting the sector’</i> (DAFF 2006a).			No details of evaluation or implementation could be found. However in the National Farmers’ Federation submission to the National Food Plan Issues Paper the following comments are instructive: <i>‘It must be noted that past efforts to deliver a national plan for agriculture has had limited success in generating lasting change in the Government’s approach to food production policy and regulation. The Report Creating Our Future: Agriculture and food policy for the next generation was a comprehensive report produced by the Government’s Agriculture and</i>

					<i>Food Policy Reference Group in 2006, and which sought to identify the gaps in programs and policy which exist. Unfortunately many of the report findings still remain valid and remain un-actioned. This must not be allowed to happen with the development and implementation of the National Food Plan' (NFF 2011)</i>
Food and Health Dialogue	Date published: 2009 Departmental Sponsor: Department of Health and Ageing Public-Private Partnership model: Joint government-industry-public health initiative '<i>aimed at addressing poor dietary habits and making healthier food choices easier and more accessible for all Australians</i>' (http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/fhd accessed December 2016) In a 2014 systematic interim assessment of the FHD, published in the MJA, Elliot et al describe the dialogue	Specified high-level objectives: Raise "the nutritional profile of foods through reformulation, consumer education and portion standardization" and provide "a framework for government, public health groups and industry to work collaboratively across all levels of the food supply chain to improve dietary intakes" (Elliot et al 2014; Jones et al 2016).	Executive Group chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary for Health and Ageing. Membership is listed in Table A5.	<i>'Minutes from the Dialogue's last known Executive Group meeting on 28 May 2013 identified \$800,000 allocated for a further 2 years' work' (Jones et al</i>	Elliot et al's 2014 review was undertaken in ' <i>the absence of any reported plans for formal evaluation of the Dialogue</i> ' to determine how it was delivering on goals four years after launch. It concluded that targets were set for 11 of 124 action areas for food

	as ‘the entity to which State, Territory and Federal governments and the Australian food industry consistently refer when questioned about actions required to control the large national disease burden caused by poor diet’ (p92).	A Reformulation Working Group specified priority categories: Breads • Ready to eat breakfast cereals • Processed Meats • Simmer Sauces Later categories: • Soups • Savoury Pies • Potato/Corn/Extruded snacks • Savoury Crackers • Cheese • Processed Poultry • Noodles • Condiments Approach to Policy Integration: Not a focus of this project, although one of the primary foci was to provide ‘a framework for government, public health groups and industry to work collaboratively’ (See above).		2016).	reformulation and portion standardisation, of which none had been achieved. It also criticises late and missing reports on progress, and a lack of reporting on the extent the population has been exposed to reformulated foods, foods of standardised portion size or nutrition education, or how reformulation has affected purchasing or measures of diet-related disease burden. According to a 2016 evaluation by Jones et al ‘between 2013 and 2015 the Dialogue process apparently lapsed. In November 2015, the government announced a

					successor to the Dialogue, the 'Healthy Food Partnership.' Details of the Healthy Food Partnership are scant but the high level objectives appear broadly similar' (p1). A review of the reformulation targets requested by the new Healthy Food Partnership, undertaken by the Heart Foundation, reports a 'significant reduction' in most categories apart from cheese (Heart Foundation 2016),
Australia and Food Security in a Changing World	Date published: 2010 Departmental Sponsor: Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council(PMSEIC) PMSEIC was the Australian government's principal source of advice on science, engineering and innovation issues between 1997 and 2013 (http://www.science.gov.au/scienceGov/Pages/publicationsReports.aspx Accessed January 2017).	Provides detailed examination of the challenges and opportunities, based on a (somewhat contradictory) framing: <i>'Food production in Australia is challenging due to our generally</i>	Expert Working Group members are listed in Table A5.	No details on budget for development or implementation could be identified.	The Implementation Plan specified in the Report recommends three stages of activities to be initiated in either the first 12 months, second year or third year.

	The report sets out to ‘<i>explain the nature of the food security challenges and outline opportunities and possible solutions to the problems</i>’ (PMSEIC 2010 pv). Terms of Reference, with a planning horizon of at least 20 years, were as follows: 1. Identify main food security risks and opportunities for Australia posed by global climate change 2. Determine the biophysical challenges to food security including: science for increasing the nutritional value of food; supply of key nutrients inherent in the soil through trade; nutritional requirements of humans. 3. Identify challenges and opportunities for increasing productivity to match the expected increased demand for food and nutrition, whilst supporting sustainability, through the reduction of inefficiencies in current agricultural and fisheries practices and introduction of appropriate science and technology-led innovation. 4. Outline current research to mitigate the impact of these challenges or support these opportunities, as well as the availability of current projection tools 5. Determine the gaps in the research and research capacity, suggesting ways these gaps could be closed. 6. Sketch the possible environmental and social impact of adopting new agricultural practices and technologies 7. Formulate options for government consideration that could have a positive and transformational impact on the long term food	<i>ancient and infertile soils, variable and in many cases harsh climates and significant degradation such as soil erosion, acidification, and salinization. However, effective R&D, low levels of government subsidy, a culture of innovation and dense social networks to communicate innovation have resulted in highly efficient production systems and increasing attention to management of impacts on the environment’ (p11).</i> The majority of the 82-page report is given over to an executive summary and analysis of the problem. Only the final seven pages address what should be done. Recommendations: 1. Establish a National Food Security Agency (NFSA) in response to the problem of ‘<i>lack of a nationally-</i>			No follow up to the report or evaluation could be identified. No record of a Australian Food Security Agency could be identified, although it is possible an institution was established but the name was altered.

	security in Australia within a global context (p7-8).	<i>coordinated approach to food': 'At present, the diversity of issues related to food production, food trade and the role of food in community health are dealt with by several separate agencies (Figure 5.1). An integrated approach to food policy is required to achieve food security, support growth in the food sector and address diet-related health issues. A National Food Security Agency would have responsibility for the implementation of the recommendations in this report'.</i> (p63) 2. Increase investment in agricultural R&D,			

		with research programs to be selected and supported through the NFSA. 3. Develop incentives to recruit future generations of innovative farmers, researchers and professionals. 4. Better engaging the community and partner organisations to elevate status of food. Approach to Policy Integration: The Report makes the following references: <i>‘Food production and processing is a fundamental part of Australia’s economy and the health and wellbeing of its citizens. Food, however, is not currently dealt with in a way which brings together food related policy, regulatory agencies and research</i>			

		<i>organisations... Different policy, regulatory and program areas related to food should be brought together to ensure that government takes a consistent approach to food and food security. A national approach would bring a high level of coordination, build a strategy for a resilient food value chain and emphasise the link between food and population health'. (p2)</i> <i>'Actions taken in any one area can have widespread ramifications, ranging from the health of the environment to public health' (p45).</i> <i>'From a societal perspective, building the concept of food – production, preparation and consumption – into multiple areas of social and environmental planning is required. This includes raising the standard and position of food in government institutions as well as in</i>			

		<i>healthcare systems’ (p62).</i> <i>Notes that ‘there will be a demand for R&D and the delivery of innovations to underpin productivity of agriculture and also to meet human health needs....For example, the development of intensive agricultural systems or research to deliver health-promoting attributes in fresh produce’ (p45).</i> <i>States that ‘to create better linkages across the food value chain, nutrition scientists need to be working with agricultural scientists, food technologists and engineers, as well as food marketers’ (p62).</i>			
National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework	Date published: Statement of Intent in 2009. Individual strategies published variously following the launch. Departmental Sponsor: Primary Industries Ministerial Council Joint development by: • PIMC • Australian, State and Territory governments • Rural R&D Corporations	The expected outcomes, when implemented: • Research capability will become more collaborative and efficiency and effectiveness of R&D will be markedly	The former PISC R&D Subcommittee comprises representation from: • New South Wales Government • Northern Territory Government • Queensland Government • South Australia Government • Tasmania Government • Victoria Government	No details of the budget for development or implementation could be identified.	An evaluation commissioned by the Department of Primary Industries Victoria, and undertaken by Allen Consulting Group in 2012, provides the following findings

	• CSIRO • Universities Aim: ‘encourage greater collaboration and promote continuous improvement in the investment of RD&E resources nationally’ (Allen Consulting Group 2012 pvi). 14 sectoral strategies: • Beef • Cotton • Dairy • Fishing and Aquaculture • Forestry • Grains • Horticulture • New and Emerging Industries • Pork • Poultry • Sheep Meat • Sugar • Wine • Wool Eight cross-sectoral strategies: • Animal Welfare • Biofuels and Bioenergy • Climate Change • Water Use in Australian Agriculture • Animal Biosecurity • Food and Nutrition • Plant Biosecurity • Soils	improved • Agencies will retain and build capability in fields strategically important to their jurisdictions and industries • State jurisdictions will decide what their research role is in specific sectors - ie lead or support role or ‘link’. • National research capability will be an integral part of the wider innovation agenda. The process of developing the Strategies - which form Schedules of Intent is: 1. Outline a set of national priorities for each sector and cross sector 2. Identify gaps in national research capability 3. Establish process to distribute	• Western Australia Government • Australian Government • CSIRO • Council of Rural RDCs • Dairy Australia • Grains Research & Development Corporation • Rural Industries Research & Development Corporation • Australian Council of the Deans of Agriculture	and recommendation. The RD&E has: Created a national approach to primary industries RD&E Been successful in promoting collaboration and cooperation and breaking down State barriers Reduced duplication and reallocated resources Provided a greater understanding of national capability Increased knowledge and information sharing. Improvements include a general need for parties to reaffirm commitment to the Framework and the performance of some categories has been

	States that <i>‘Australia’s primary industries cannot afford a fragmented or duplicative RD&E system if they are to continue to improve their productivity and sustainability’ and the Framework ‘provides the structure and institutional arrangements needed to strengthen national research capability and better address cross-sectoral and sectoral R&D’</i> (http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/innovation/national-primary-industries Accessed December 2016).	resources across priority areas 4. Establish process to monitor and review the effectiveness of the system 5. Establish a process to manage intellectual property and innovation to ensure benefits are captured 6. Establish a process for research findings to be made readily available and adopted promptly. Approach to Policy Integration: Reference was made in the evaluation consultation to two issues related to policy integration and the timing of policy processes: <i>‘There were concerns about the impact that changes to Government; both Federally and at State and Territory level could have on the direction and</i>			disappointing and needs improvement. Also, consultation revealed that cross sector strategies had been less successful than sector ones – as they rarely have a single party leading development, resulting in a lack of leadership, accountability and momentum, plus a lack of resources is problematic.

		<i>success of primary industries RD&E, and particularly individual strategies'</i> <i>'In some jurisdictions primary industries issues are spread across a number of Ministers and it can therefore be difficult to engage all Ministers and ensure they are aware of and engaged in the RD&E Framework' (Allen Consulting Group 2012 p20).</i>			
Food Processing Industry Strategy	Publication Date: 2012 Departmental Sponsor: Industry Involved establishment of a group of processed food industry leaders, trade union leaders, an academic and researcher in 2011 to; identify the strengths and weaknesses of this complex sector, and look for opportunities to enhance innovation, improve the sector's long-term productivity and competitiveness, and boost the industry's strategic planning capability (DAFF 2012). The group met on six occasions, and the secretariat had bilateral discussions with members out-of-session and working groups met to brainstorm and develop recommendations (DIIRSTE 2012 p21). Consultants were engaged to collect data, conduct an industry survey and other reviews (DIIRSTE 2012 p21).	Outlines challenges to the manufacturing industry including a sustained high dollar and highly concentrated retail environment (p9). Discusses opportunities to capitalise on opportunities of the demand for Australian produce from Asia, in particular substantially transformed foods which it has not focused on historically. Recommends: Creation of a Food Innovation Hub/Network to catalyse collaboration between researchers and	Chaired by Mike Lawson, Head of Manufacturing Division of the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education. DAFF had observer status. Other group members are listed in Table A5.	The Strategy Group was supported by a small secretariat within DIIRSTE (DIIRSTE 2012 p21). No further details on the budget for development or implementation could be identified.	No details on implementation could be identified. A food innovation hub - The Food Industry Innovation Precinct, run by FIAL (Food Innovation Australia Ltd) – a government-funded initiative is currently in operation.

		industry Industry utilise the Australian Research Council Competitive Grants Program Government support new markets and the Australian brand Regulatory reform and program efficiencies, including regulatory arrangements between the Commonwealth and States, and a cost-benefit analysis of Commonwealth taking over regulation of food processing and safety. Improvement in marketplace relations via the Produce and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct and clarification of the rules on industry collaboration (p12-13). Approach to Policy Integration: Notes that <i>'Each State and Territory, and in some cases, discrete areas within a State (e.g. the Gippsland Food Plan)</i>			

		<i>deliver programs, initiatives and assistance tailored to region-specific needs' with 'a lack of integration, coordination and integrated design between the different levels of government in some cases' (p20).</i>			

Agricultural Competitive ness White Paper	Publication Date: 2015 Departmental Sponsor: Prime Minister and Cabinet. (But joint press release issued by Prime Minister Tony Abbot and Minister for Agriculture Barnaby Joyce). <i>‘Development of a white paper on the competitiveness of the agriculture sector was an election commitment by the Government in The Coalition’s Policy for a Competitive Agriculture Sector’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p3).</i> Terms of Reference for the policy were to consider: • Food security in Australia and the world through the creation of a stronger and more competitive agriculture sector; • Means of improving market returns at the farm gate, including through better drought management; • Access to investment finance, farm debt levels and debt sustainability; • Competitiveness of the Australian agriculture sector and its relationship to food and fibre processing and related value chains , including achieving fair returns; • Contribution of agriculture to regional centres and communities, including ways to boost investment and jobs growth in the sector and associated regional areas; • Efficiency and competitiveness of inputs to the agriculture value chain — such as skills, training, education and human capital; research and development; and critical infrastructure; • Effectiveness of regulations affecting the agriculture sector, including the extent to	Issues Paper: 48-page document published in 2014. Foreword by Barnaby Joyce states that <i>‘We cannot let the paper be just a profound motherhood statement. The task initially is to invite the agricultural sector and the Australian public to be part of this process. From the feedback we receive we will assess a range of alternatives before selecting a plan that allows us to take agriculture in this nation forward over the long term’</i> (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 pii). Policy context provided: 1. Government’s broader policy agenda to boost productivity, lower business costs, generate more jobs and strengthen the economy. 2. The Government’s commitment to reducing the burden of ineffective regulation 3. Commitment to return	No details of the advisors or stakeholders could be identified Departmental input: <i>‘The Prime Minister and the Minister for Agriculture will oversee the development of the White Paper, with responsibility for day-to-day management of the process resting with the Minister for Agriculture in consultation with relevant Ministers. A cross-agency taskforce within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) will develop the White Paper. It is overseen by an inter-agency committee co-chaired by Deputy Secretaries from PM&C and the Department of Agriculture. This committee will ensure the broad range of policies that affect the agriculture sector are included in the process to produce a comprehensive plan for the sector’</i> (http://agwhitepaper.agriculture.gov.au/supporting-information/key-documents/terms-of-reference Accessed December 2016). Consultation: <i>‘An extensive consultation process was also conducted involving face-to-face meetings in 34 regional and metropolitan centres across Australia. Over 950 people were directly consulted through this process. They included farmers, processors, retailers,</i>	White Paper describes delivering a <i>‘\$4 billion package to grow agricultural competitiveness’</i> (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p3). Details \$11.4 million to boost ACCC engagement with the agricultural sector including a new Commissioner expert in agriculture and \$13.8 million in a two year pilot programme to provide knowledge and	No details of implementation or evaluation are provided in the White Paper.

	which regulations promote or retard competition, investment and private sector-led growth; • Opportunities for enhancing agricultural exports and new market access; and • Effectiveness and economic benefits of existing incentives for investment and jobs creation in the agriculture sector. Out of scope were: • Fisheries and forestry sectors • Human nutritional health issues.	the Budget to surplus Consultations are based around the nine elements of the Terms of Reference eg food security; improving market returns etc. Almost 700 submissions were made to the Issues Paper Consultation (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p9). Green Paper: 172-page document published in 2014. Stakeholders were invited to ‘comment on the broad directions and specific policy ideas raised in the Green Paper and provide further policy suggestions’ (piii). Each chapter outlines the issues, what the government is currently doing and the policy ideas raised in the consultation. Chapter headings include: Infrastructure; Competition etc. Reference is made to one of the policy proposals of the National Food Plan:	traders, researchers, financiers, representative bodies, government agencies, State and Territory Agriculture Ministers, and many others. Hundreds of other people were also made aware of the development of the White Paper through presentations to conferences, meetings and other groups’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p1). Issues Paper Consultation period: 6 February 2014 – 17 April 2014. ‘During the nine-week issues paper consultation period, over 950 people were directly consulted. Meetings were held in 34 regional and metropolitan locations. Two types of meetings were held in most regional centres: 1. Roundtable meetings—small groups of key stakeholders invited based on recommendations by industry representative groups, research organisations and local members of Parliament. 2. One-on-one meetings—open to any interested member of the public. Dates were advertised in local news, on the White Paper website, and by local members of Parliament and industry groups. Attendees at both the roundtable and one-on-one meetings included farmers, agribusiness individuals, supply chain companies, local members of Parliament, and non-	materials on cooperatives , collective bargaining and innovative business models plus \$20.4 million to streamline agricultural and veterinary chemicals approvals.	

		<i>‘The Government has chosen to terminate the previous Government’s Leveraging Australia’s Brand for Food programme, but remains interested in options and stakeholder views in this area’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p9).</i> Makes the following reference to sustainability: <i>‘With the greater knowledge our capacity for both robust and environmentally sustainable development is greater than ever before. But to take advantage of this capacity, we need to ensure environmental regulations and processes affecting new development are based on science and not emotion’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 pix).</i> White Paper Commits government to five principles: 1. A fairer go for farm businesses, to keep families on the farm as the	<i>government organisations and community groups. The taskforce also met with a wide range of businesses, financial institutions, research institutions (including universities and rural Research and Development Corporations), supply chain companies, State government agencies, and industry representative groups (including the Agricultural Industry Advisory Council); and presented at events such as the National ABARES Outlook 2014 conference (which had more than 800 attendees over two days) and the National Farmers’ Federation Members’ Council.’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p114).</i> Green Paper Consultation: • Released 20 October 2014 • Submissions closed 12 December 2014 • 357 submissions received • Meetings with around 150 stakeholders around Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p3).		

		cornerstone of agriculture 2. Building 21st century water, transport and communications infrastructure. 3. Strengthening our approach to drought and risk management 4. A smarter approach to farming based on a strong research and development system 5. Access to premium markets Activities around the theme of '<i>A fairer go for farm businesses</i>' include: • A better tax system for farm businesses • Improvements to the ACCC • Support for Cooperatives • Cutting red tape – eg streamlining agricultural and veterinary			

		chemicals approvals. • Improved Country of Origin Labelling • Other infrastructure support includes the following (which appear to be existing initiatives): • \$500 million National Water Infrastructure Fund • Expansion of CSIRO's TRANsport Network Strategic Investment Tool • \$29.5 billion National Broadband Network (NBN) rollout • Additional \$60 million on top of the \$100 million Mobile Black Spot Programme to improve mobile coverage across regional Australia. •			

		Similarly, support for drought, access to premium markets and research and development systems appear to be existing initiatives. <i>States ‘during 2014, the Government took action to repeal over 10,000 unnecessary and burdensome regulations and over 1,800 redundant Acts of Parliament (Commonwealth of Australia 2015f). This has contributed to removing around \$2.45 billion in red tape (Commonwealth of Australia 2015g)’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2015 p32).</i> Approach to Policy Integration: <i>Notes that ‘A broad range of ideas were aired during the consultation process. This paper seeks to present many of these ideas and options from stakeholders. Not all of these will be able to be pursued by the Government as some of them conflict with broader Government policy</i>			

		<i>directions, while others would not be affordable in the current budget environment'</i> (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p9). <i>'Unsurprisingly, many areas of policy affect agriculture, including tax, education and training, foreign investment, environmental law and industrial relations among others. The Government is taking a whole of-government approach to this White Paper process because only a comprehensive approach to all of the policies that impact Australian agriculture can help the sector be prepared for the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead'</i> (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p11). Highlights the importance of intergovernmental cooperation as critical to improving competitiveness: <i>'Many of the policy ideas raised in the Green Paper would require the Government to</i>			

		<i>work with the States and Territories to deliver improved outcomes for Australian agriculture, and the community more generally'</i> (Commonwealth of Australia 2014 p18).			

Table A5: Stakeholders to Australian National Food Policies

Food Policy	Name	Organisation	Job Title
Food and Nutrition Policy (Oversighting Committee) (1992)	Professor Paul Nestel (Chair)	CSIRO	Chief - Division of Human Nutrition
	Gavin Rutherford	Media Council of Australia	Executive Director
	Bruce Bevan	Australian Supermarket Institute	Executive Director
	Louise Sylvan	Australian Consumers' Association	Manager of Policy and Public Affairs
	Ken Pettifer	Department Industry, Technology and Commerce	Manager of Processed Food Products Section
	Harris Boulton	Grocery Manufacturers of Australia	Executive Director
	John Wood	Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs	Director - Attorney General's Department
	Tim Scholz	United Farmers Stock Owners of SA	President
	Gae Pincus	National Food Authority	Chairperson
	Marea Vidovich	Australian Nursing Federation	Assistant Federal Secretary
	Colin Binns	Curtin University School of Public Health	Head
	Lawrie Erwin	Department of Primary Industries and Energy	Director of Australian Quarantine Inspection Service
	Liz Furler	Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services	Assistant Secretary of Health Promotion Branch
	Vicki Taylor (Secretary)	Commonwealth Department of Health, Housing and Community Services	Director of Nutrition Section, Health Promotion Branch
Food and Nutrition Policy Implementation Consultative Group (1992)	Not specified	Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services	Not specified
	Not specified	Australia New Zealand Food Authority	

	Not specified	Food Industry Council of Australia	
	Not specified	National Health and Medical Research Council	
	Not specified	Consumers Federation of Australia	
	Not specified	AusAid	
	Not specified	Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission	
	Not specified	Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry and Energy	
	Not specified	Commonwealth Department of Industry, Science and Tourism	
Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Strategy (1997)	John Howard	Commonwealth Government	Prime Minister (Chairman)
	Tom Fisher	Commonwealth Government	Deputy Prime Minister (Deputy Chair)
	John Anderson	Department for Primary Industries and Energy	Minister for Primary Industries and Energy
	John Moore	Department for Industry, Science and Tourism	Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism
	David Mortimer	Department for Transport and Regional Development	Minister for Transport and Regional Development
	Reg Clairs	Australian Supermarket Institute	Chairman
	Gary Ringwood	AMCOR Ltd	Executive Director Operations
	Dr Malcolm McIntosh	CSIRO	Chief Executive Officer
	Enzo Allara	Australian Food Council	Chairman
	Professor Adrienne Clarke	Melbourne University	Professor of Botany
	Joe de Bruyn	Shop, Distributive and Allied Employee's Association	National Secretary
	Malcolm Irving	Supermarket to Asia Ltd	Chairman
	George Kailis	MG Kailis Group	Managing Director
	Fay McGuigan	McGuigan Brothers Wines Ltd	Export Manager

	Donald McGauchie	National Farmers Federation	President
	Paul Bourke	Supermarket to Asia	Executive Director
National Food Industry Strategy (2002)	Warren Truss MP	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Chair)
	Senator Judith Troeth	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	Parliamentary Secretary (Deputy Chair)
	Joe de Bruyn	Shop, Distributive & Allied Employees Association	National Secretary
	Reg Clairs AO	Supermarket to Asia Ltd	Company Director
	Dianne Davidson	Davidson Viticultural Consulting Services	Managing Director
	Ian Donges	National Farmers Federation	President
	John Doumani	Arnott's Biscuits Ltd	Managing Director
	William Duncan	Mars Confectionary Australia	Managing Director
	Michael Eyles	Food Science Australia	Chief Executive
	Mike Ginnivan	Tassal Ltd	Managing Director
	Mitchell H Hooke	Australian Food & Grocery Council	Chief Executive
	Malcolm Irving AM	O'Connell Street Associates Pty Ltd	Not specified
	Barbara Isaacson	Australian Persimmon Export Company	Executive Director
	Jim Kennedy	Supermarket to Asia Ltd	Chief Executive
	Paul Little	Toll Holdings Ltd	Managing Director
	Iain MacGregor	Bakewell Foods Pty Ltd	Managing Director
	Phil Naylor	Australian Retailers Association	CEO
	Ray O'Dell	Consolidated Meat Group	Executive Chairman
	Andrew Reeves	Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd	Managing Director, Australia
	Barry Watts	Not Specified	Consultant
Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation (2006)	No advisors specified		
RDE Framework (Established 2009)	No advisors specified		
Food and Health Dialogue Executive	Honorable Catherine King MP	Department of Health and	Parliamentary Secretary for Health and

Membership (2009)	(Chair)	Ageing	Ageing
	Mr Gary Dawson	Australian Food and Grocery Council	CEO
	Dr Lyn Roberts	National Heart Foundation of Australia	CEO
	Mr Andrew Hall	Woolworths Ltd	Director Corporate and Public Affairs
	Dr Manny Noakes	CSIRO	Senior Dietician and Research Scientist
	Mr Michael Moore	Public Health Association of Australia	CEO
	Ms Patricia Carter	SA Health	Principal Advisor-Public Health Nutrition, Health Promotion Branch
	Ms Tracey Monaghan	McDonald's Australia	Director of Quality Assurance ANZ
	Mr Steve McCutcheon	FSANZ	CEO
Food and Health Dialogue Reformulation Working Group (2009)	Not specified	Department of Health and Ageing (Chair)	Not specified
	Not specified	National Heart Foundation of Australia	
	Not specified	CSIRO	
	Not specified	Woolworths Ltd	
	Not specified	Australian Food and Grocery Council	
PMSEIC: Australia and Food Security in a Changing World (2010)	Professor Peter Langridge (Chair)	University of Adelaide	CEO, Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics
	Professor Robin Batterham AO (Deputy Chair)	Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering	President
	Dr Joanne Daly	CSIRO Agribusiness	Group Executive
	Professor Michael D'Occhio	University of Queensland	Head, School of Animal Studies
	Dr Chris Guppy	University of New England	Senior Lecturer, School of Environmental and Rural Sciences
	Dr Mark Howden	CSIRO	Theme Leader, Climate Adaptation Flagship
	Mr Dennis Mutton	Independent Consultant	Independent Consultant
	Dr Sam Nelson	National Farmers' Federation	Manager – Rural Affairs
	Professor Linda Tapsell	Illawarra Health and Medical Research Institute/University	Director

		of Wollongong	
National Food Policy Working Group (2010)	Michael Luscombe	Woolworths	Managing Director
	Jock Laurie	NFF	President
	Malcolm Jackman	Elders	Chief Executive
	Michael Byrne	Linfox Logistics	Not specified
	Dr Alastair Robertson	CSIRO	
	Terry O'Brien	Simplot Australia	
	Simone Tully	OBE Organics	
	Janine Allis	Boost Juice	
	Kate Carnell	AFGC	
	Nick Stace	Choice	
	Alison Watkins	Graincorp	
	Jeff Lawrence	ACTU	Secretary
	Dr Peter Williams.	University of Wollongong	Not specified
Food Processing Industry Strategy Group (2012)	Mike Lawson (Chair)	Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education	Head of Manufacturing Division
	Brian Crawford	Australian Meat Industry Employees	Not specified
	Rebecca Dee-Bradbury (Deputy Chair)	Kraft Foods	
	Charlie Donnelly	National Union of Workers	
	John Doumani	Fonterra Australasia	
	Jennifer Dowell (Deputy Chair)	Australian Manufacturing Workers Union	
	Mike Gidley	University of Queensland	
	Jodie Goldsworthy	Beechworth Honey	
	Stuart Grainger	Don KRC	
	Bob Hamilton	Earlee Products	
	Peter Lancaster	Food Spectrum Group	
	Peter Margin	Bega Cheese	Non-executive Director
	Terry O'Brien	Simplot Australia	Not specified
	Professor Alastair Robertson	CSIRO	
	Felicity Robson-Rous	One Harvest	
	Libby Hay (Observer)	Lion	

National Food Plan Issues Paper (2011)	Robin Poynton (Observer)	One Harvest	Not specified
	Not specified	Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry	
	Not specified	Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency	
	Not specified	Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations	
	Not specified	Department of Finance and Deregulation	
	Not specified	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	
	Not specified	Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs	
	Not specified	Department of Health and Ageing	
	Not specified	Department of Infrastructure and Transport	
	Not specified	Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research	
	Not specified	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet	
	Not specified	Department of Regional Australia, Regional Development and Local Government	
	Not specified	Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities	
Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper (2015)	Not specified	The Treasury	
	No stakeholder list identified		

Table A6: Australia Food Policy Chronology

Political Party	Prime Minister	Year	Food Policy Development
Coalition	Menzies	1958	Coles and Woolworths move into the grocery business
Coalition	Holt	1966	
Coalition	McEwen	1967	
Coalition	Gorton	1968	
Coalition	McMahon	1971	
Labor	Whitlam	1972	
		1974	Principles of Rural Policy in Australia Green paper published
Coalition	Fraser	1975	
		1979	Federal Department of Health (as then was) announced a 'food and nutrition policy'
			Adoption and distribution of a set of dietary goals and guidelines for Australians by the Department of Health.
			National Farmers Federation established
Coalition	Fraser	1980	
Labor	Hawke (due to double dissolution of parliament)	1983	
		1983	Conference on 'Agriculture and Human Nutrition: How close are the links?' held in north-east Victoria (organised by a regional officer of the Victorian Department of Agriculture)
			Adoption and distribution of a set of dietary goals and guidelines for Australians by the National Health and Medical Research Council.
Labor	Hawke	1984	
		1985	Establishment of the first national effort to shift the direction of health policy, the Better Health Commission (Powles et al 1992).
		1986	Australia Made, Australia Grown logo introduced

Labor	Hawke	1987	
[Labor]	[John Cain Jnr]	1987	Victorian Food and Nutrition Policy, published by Department of Agriculture & Rural Affairs
			Making Healthy Choices Easy Choices: Towards a Food and Nutrition Policy for Victoria report published
			Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (VicHealth) established.
		1988	Food and Nutrition Policy Summary Report - Three Years On (Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services)
			Health for all Australians: report of the Health Targets Implementation (Health for All) Committee to Australian Health Ministers published
[Labor]	[John Cain Jnr]		Interdepartmental Committee on Food and Nutrition (IDC) with representation from Health, Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Education and Industry, Technology and Resources formed in Victoria
		1989	Research and Development network established
			Landcare program established
			National Better Health Program implemented (1989-1992)
Labor	Hawke	1990	
Labor	Keating (succeeded leader Bob Hawke)	1991	
		1991	Reform of Australia's food standards setting process completed. National Food Authority created. National Food Standards Agreement with States and Territories.
		1992	Agri-Food Council established
			Food and Nutrition Policy published
			Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet – National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development published
		1994	Australia's Food & Nutrition (first edition) published by Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
		1995	Bi-national agency created - NFA becomes the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA)
			National Nutrition Survey established
Labor	Keating	1993	
Coalition	Howard	1996	

		1996	Establishment of Food Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ)
			Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Council established
		1997	Australia's Weight: a strategic plan for the prevention of overweight and obesity launched by National Health and Medical Council
[Liberal]	[Olson]		'Towards 2010' food policy published in South Australia
		1998	Department of Agriculture established (previously Department of Primary Industries and Energy)
			Blair Review into food regulation burden published
Coalition	Howard	1998	
		1999	Joint Select Committee on Retailing Sector report 'Fair Market or Market Failure?' published, recommending establishment of ombudsman for produce and grocery industry
		2000	Eatwell Australia Policy Launched
Coalition	Howard	2001	
		2001	Eat well Australia: an agenda for action for public health nutrition (2000–2010) launched
			Primary Industries Standing Committee launched
			National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander nutrition strategy and action plan launched
			Stephanie Alexander Kitchen Garden Programme launched in Victoria
		2002	National Food Industry Initiative - five-year National Food Industry Strategy (NFIS) operated from 2002-07.
		2003	National Obesity Taskforce established
			Dietary Guidelines for Australian Adults and Dietary Guidelines for Children and Adolescents in Australia, published by the National Health and Medical Research Council
Coalition	Howard	2004	
		2004	Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group established by Department of Agriculture
			Allen Consulting Group report - Environmental Sustainability in the Australian Food Industry
		2005	National 'Go for 2&5' campaign launched
		2006	Assessing the Environmental Performance of the Food Value Chain: An extension of the Signposts for Australian Agriculture Framework (framework and guidelines proposed for consistent environmental reporting)
			Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation - Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group, published ('The Corish Report')

Labor	Rudd	2007	
		2007	Amendments made to FSANZ's legislation after ministerial food regulation review
			Australian National Children's Nutrition and Physical Activity Survey undertaken (linked to NNS)
			FOODmap report. Comparative analysis of Australian food distribution channels.
		2008	Measure Up campaign launched in October (to raise awareness of excess abdominal weight)
			Parliamentary Inquiry into Obesity
			Report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices for standard groceries published
			Protecting Children from Junk Food Advertising (Broadcasting Amendment) Bill 2008 (December)
		2009	Public Health Association of Australia publishes the Future of Food Report, calling for a national integrated food policy addressing public health, sustainability and equity from paddock to plate.
			Food Alliance NGO established
			Launch of Food & Health Dialogue
			Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative and Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children become effective
			Paddock to Plate: policy propositions for sustaining food & farming systems. The Future Food and Farm Project Propositions Paper published by Australian Conservation Foundation, Melbourne.
			Parliamentary committee inquiry report Weighing it up: Obesity in Australia published
			National Primary Industries Research Development and Extension Framework launched
			Preventative Health Taskforce 'Australia the Healthiest Country by 2020' report launched
			Mandatory fortification of bread with folic acid introduced
			Senate Economics References Committee Inquiry into the Food Standards Amendment (Truth in Labelling Laws) Bill.
			Productivity Commission study - Performance Benchmarking of Australian and New Zealand Business Regulation: Food Safety.
[Labor]	[Bartlett]	2009	Tasmanian Food Security Council established
Labor	Gillard (via leadership challenge)	2010 (June)	

		2010	Election commitment to a National Food Plan (17 August)
Labor	Gillard	2010	(21 August)
			Australia and Food Security in a Changing World - Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council
			Ready For Tomorrow: A Blueprint for Regional and Rural Victoria published
			National Food Policy Working Group established between the food industry and government (2010-2012)
			Senate Economics References Committee report: Milking it for all it's worth – competition and pricing in the Australian dairy industry (first of two reports, second in Nov 2011).
			Taking Preventative Action – A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020 –The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce.
[Labor/Liberal]	[Brumby/Baillieu]	2010	Joint Victorian Committee of Food Regulators established
		2011	National Food Plan Issues Paper (June)
			Blewett 'Labelling Logic' Review released
			Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation and the Standing Council on Health supports development of a national nutrition policy for Australia and refers the policy development to the AHMAC, to be commenced within two years. (AIHW 2012)
			Standing Council on Primary Industries (SCoPI) launched as part of new system for COAG
			Australian National Preventative Health Agency (ANPHA) established
			Series of Food Innovation Workshops held in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, facilitated by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation on behalf of Department of Health and Ageing
			Final Senate Economics Reference Committee Report on impacts of supermarket prices decisions on dairy industry (November)
			CSIRO Technology Roadmap for Environmentally Sustainable Food Manufacturing published (January)
			Victorian Food Supply Scenarios: Impacts on availability of a nutritious diet. Victorian Eco-Innovation Lab
			Australia in the Asian Century Issues Paper published (December)
[Labor]	[Anna Bligh]	2011	'Food for a growing economy: An economic development framework for the Queensland food industry' published (Queensland)
[Labor]	[Baillieu]	2011	Melbourne Food Policy Discussion Paper and Food Policy launched
		2012	National Food Plan Green Paper published (July)

			Australia's Food & Nutrition (second edition) published by Australian Institute of Health & Welfare
			Asian Century White Paper published (October)
			Farming Smarter not harder report, Centre for Policy Development.
			Food Strategy Group Industry Processing Final Report (September)
			Select Committee on Australia's Food Processing Sector Inquiry into Australia's food processing sector
[Liberal]	[Baillieu]	2012	'Food City: City of Melbourne Food Policy' published
			Gippsland Food Plan launched
[Labor]	[Giddings]	2012	'Food for All Tasmanians: A Food Security Strategy' (March)
[Labor]	[Weatherill]	2012	South Australian Food Strategy 2010-2015 published (fifth iteration)
		2012	New South Wales, South Australian and Australian Capital Territory governments point-of-sale legislation introduced (April)
Labor	Rudd (via leadership challenge)	2013 (June)	
		2013	National Food Plan White Paper published (May)
Coalition	Abbott	2013 (Sept)	
		2013	National Health and Medical Research Council released revised Australian Dietary Guidelines
		2014	Australian National Preventative Health Agency (ANPHA) closed
Coalition	Turnbull (via leadership challenge)	2015	
		2015	Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper published

Source: Author

Table A7: UK Departmental Responsibilities in relation to Food/Supermarkets (where not devolved)

Department	Food-related Policy Responsibilities
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)	National Minimum Wage Working Time Directive Fair markets Competition policy Retail Policy Forum Fuel blockades Globalisation – trade Corporate manslaughter Employment laws/ tribunals Women’s Unit/ Equality Import/ trade/ anti-dumping Consumer Affairs Trading Law Enforcement Energy costs/ regime Productivity Work life balance Company law Intellectual property Sunday opening Credit sharing Consumer and trading standards
Cabinet Office (CO)	Social Exclusion Task Force Strategy Unit Food Policy Review
Communities and Local Government (CLG)	Communities Planning policies Urban regeneration Regional government – Regional Spatial Strategies Local government – Local Development Frameworks
Competition Commission (Non-Departmental)	Market investigations

Public Body)	Planning and competition
Department of Children, Schools and Families (DCSF)	National Curriculum Skills and basic skills
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)	Farming policy Food supply chain Animal welfare Sustainability – FISS Life Cycle Assessment Sustainable consumption Prescribed Designations of Origin Waste policy - packaging, WEEE etc. Organics Horticultural regime Energy crops Biotechnology Fisheries
Department for Innovation, Skills and Universities	Skills and basic skills Innovation Research and Development
Department for International Development (DfID)	Trade with developing countries Global sourcing
Department for Transport (DfT)	Freight Passenger transport Aviation Congestion charging/ toils Road User Charging Drivers Hours Local deliveries Supply chain efficiency Transport planning
Department of Health (DH)	Public Health Diet and nutrition (5 a day) Physical activity
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)	Age discrimination Pensions Welfare to work

	Disability Social security payments
Environment Agency (EA) (England and Wales; Non-Departmental Public Body)	Packaging and waste regulation Environmental impact assessments Legal compliance Water quality
Food Standards Agency (FSA) (Non-Ministerial Government Department)	Food safety Nutrition Obesity Labelling
Home Office (HO)	Equality and Diversity Migrant labour
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)	International tax arbitrage Tax gap Child Trust Funds Duty Packaging and waste regulation Environmental impact assessments Legal compliance Water quality Levels
HM Treasury (HMT)	International Tax Arbitrage Rating Corporate Taxation Productivity Pensions Planning Competition RPI/ONS – new inflation index Poverty and inequality Sunday opening Tax gap
Ministry of Justice	Devolution
Ofcom (Non-Ministerial Government Department)	Advertising Price
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (Non-Ministerial Government Department)	Code of Conduct Market Share Suppliers Planning and competition

Source: SDC (2008)

Table A8: Policies that Interact with the Australian Food System by Portfolio

Overall Policies	Agriculture and Fisheries	Agriculture and veterinary chemical policy Biosecurity policy Commonwealth fisheries harvest strategy: policy and guidelines Commonwealth policy on fisheries bycatch Rural research and development policy statement
Australia in the Asian Century White Paper Competition and consumer policy Fiscal and monetary policy Tax policy	Education, Labour and Skills	Australian Curriculum Fair Work Act 2009 Skills policy
	Environment, Climate Change and Energy	Clean Energy Future Plan <i>Energy White Paper 2012</i> Murray-Darling Basin Plan <i>National Waste Policy: Less Waste More Resources</i> National Water Initiative <i>Sustainable Australia, Sustainable Communities: A Sustainable Population Strategy for Australia</i>
	Health and Ageing	Australian Dietary Guidelines Government response to <i>Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy</i> National Nutrition Policy (to be released in 2014) National Partnership Agreement on Preventative Health <i>Taking Preventative Action – A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020</i>

	Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education	<i>A Plan For Australian Jobs: the Australian Government's Industry and Innovation Statement</i> Government Response to Food Processing Industry Strategy Group: Final Report of the Non-Government Members Food Industry Innovation Precinct National Research Investment Plan
	Infrastructure, Transport and Emergency Management	<i>Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy</i> Draft National Land Freight Strategy Infrastructure Australia <i>National Ports Strategy: Infrastructure for an Economically, Socially and Environmentally Sustainable Future</i> National Urban Policy
	Regional Australia	Regional policy
	Social Disadvantage	National Indigenous Reform Agreement – Closing the Gap Social Inclusion Agenda <i>The Road Home: A National Approach to Reducing Homelessness</i> Welfare and income support policy
	Trade and Foreign Aid	Foreign aid policy <i>Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity</i>

Source: DAFF (2013)

Table A9: Division of Federal and State Regulations affecting Food Supply and Consumption

Activity	Key Australian Government Regulation	Key State/Territory Government Regulation
Land Use and Environment	• Environmental protection • International treaties and conventions covering world, natural and cultural heritage and marine protected areas • National Pollutant Inventory • Water access and regulation	• Environmental protection/assessment and native vegetation legislation • Land use, planning and building • Weed and vermin control • Water access and regulation • Fire Control
	Aboriginal land rights/native title	Laws relating to Indigenous Australia's cultural heritage, including native title
Primary Production	• Licensing and approval of chemicals, fertilisers and pesticides • Fisheries	• Use of chemicals, fertilisers and pesticides • Livestock and animal welfare • Fishing/aquaculture licensing and permits • Boating regulation and licensing • Fishing equipment and port requirements • Fisheries landing and marketing requirements (size limits) and by-catch • Fisheries restricted areas
Biosecurity	• Quarantine and biosecurity • Export certificates/controls	• Domestic quarantine and biosecurity • Pest/disease/weed control

	• Export approval for wildlife trade	
Food and Packaging	• Food and packaging standards (national and international)	• Food safety regulation including primary production and processing food • Certification and labelling packaging requirements
Transport	• National land transport regulatory frameworks • Shipping and maritime safety laws and international maritime codes and conventions • Fuel tax	• Transport including vehicle and machinery licensing • Government-owned public/private transport infrastructure • Transport access regimes
General	• Industrial relations • Immigration • Competition laws/access regimes • Marketing legislation • WTO obligations • Market access and trade and investment agreements	• Industrial relations • Occupational health and safety legislation and policy • Insurance requirements • Interstate certification arrangements (marketing)
	• Foreign investment screening regime • Taxation	• Taxation

Source: Productivity Commission (2007, cited in DAFF 2011)

Table A10: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Scottish Government

Department	Responsibility
Children, Young People and Social Care Directorate	Workforce and capacity issues
Climate Change and Water Industry Directorate	Climate change Water
Environmental Quality Directorate	Waste and Pollution Reduction
Lifelong Learning Directorate	Skills for life and work Transitions to work
Marine Directorate	Food and fish
Planning Directorate	National planning framework
Public Health and Wellbeing Directorate	Equality Unit Health Improvement Strategy Social Inclusion
Rural Directorate	Agriculture Animal health and welfare
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (Non-Departmental Public Body)	Packaging and waste regulation Environmental impact assessments Legal compliance Water quality
Transport Directorate	Bus, freight and roads Aviation, ports and mobility Transport strategy

Source: SDC (2008)

Table A11: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Welsh Assembly

Department for Children, Education, Lifelong Learning and Skills	Skills Workforce learning
Department for Economy and Transport	Freight Passenger transport Economic policy
Department for Environment, Sustainability and Housing	Waste Environmental policy Built and natural environment
Department for Public Health and Health Professions	Public health Diet and nutrition Physical activity
Department for Rural Affairs and Heritage	Agriculture Fisheries
Department for Social Justice and Local Government Directorate	Local government policy

Source: SDC (2008)

Table A12: Devolved Policy Responsibilities - Northern Ireland Executive

Department of Agriculture and Rural Development	Fisheries Farming Organics Food industry Rural development
Department for Employment and Learning	Skills and training Employment rights
Department of the Environment	Planning Local government policy Waste Water Natural and built environment Climate Change
Department for Enterprise, Trade and Investment	Consumer affairs Economic development policy Companies registry
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety	Health Promotion
Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister	Equality Fair employment Economic policy

Source: SDC (2008)

Table A13: Policy Responsibility Split - UK FSA, DEFRA, DH

Department	Policy Responsibility
Food Standards Agency	Food safety aspects of food labelling, and for investigating incidents in the UK, including misleading labelling and food fraud
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs	Food composition, authenticity and labelling policy in England, where it does not relate to food safety or nutrition. Leads on EU labelling negotiations for the UK
Department of Health	Nutrition labelling and health claims policy, and leads on relevant EU negotiations.
Public Health England	Identifying and investigating outbreaks of foodborne infection
Local Authorities	Delivery and enforcement of food safety and food authenticity, tasked by and submitting results to the FSA

Source: NAO (2011)

Appendix B: Chapter Five

Appendix B contains supporting material to Chapter Five, the Framework Tool application to FM/F2030. The tables here summarise the content of the reports of the two policy projects, including any references made to integration. There is also a table for each project tracing progress on the recommendations, compiled using grey and academic literature searches on the policy actions or programmes listed.

Table B1: Summary of Food Matters Content

Chapter	Number of Pages	Title	Details
1	7	Introduction	Outlines key themes in the report; the place and role of government in the UK food system; and the context and purpose of the report and the project it emerged from. States that while <i>'many of the elements required for a comprehensive food policy are already in place...central government needs to better integrate them, and to work with the public, food chain businesses and other stakeholders, and in consultation with other tiers of government, to put a new policy framework in place'</i> (Cabinet Office 2008b:iii).
2	27	Trends and challenges	Overview of main trends and challenges in food system. Draws on Strategy Unit paper 'Food: An analysis of the issues' (Cabinet Office 2008a). Discusses poor diet and environmental impacts in food chain; the structure and characteristics of the food chain; food security; food production, noting that <i>'The scale of the challenge of raising output to feed a larger, wealthier human population, adapting to climate change and mitigating food-related emissions, all at once, is not to be underestimated'</i> (Cabinet Office 2008b:35).
3	12	Future food policy	States many of the policies needed are already in place, but central government needs to better integrate the different elements and work with the public, food chain businesses, other stakeholders and other tiers of government to put a new policy framework in place' (Cabinet Office 2008b:36). Next step is DEFRA and FSA consultation with aim to create a 'final statement of the vision and strategic objectives for food policy by October 2009' (Cabinet Office 2008b:36). Notes that future strategic policy objectives should be to secure: fair prices, choice, access to food and food security through open and competitive markets; a further transition to healthier diets; a more environmentally-sustainable food chain, but that while <i>'Food touches on many areas of public policy [but] is the direct concern of relatively few'</i> (Cabinet Office 2008b:40). Also highlights areas where legitimacy of government action is uncertain – e.g. influencing healthier dietary choices – but <i>'in the same way that scientific innovation can expand the limit of what is technically possible, cultural change can, over time, alter the boundaries of government's licence to operate – as has happened with smoking and drink-driving'</i> (Cabinet Office 2008b:40). Describes <i>'UK food policy today'</i> as <i>'somewhat less than the sum of its parts'</i> (Cabinet Office 2008b:42), arguing for a <i>'strategy for food capable of tackling the core issues in a more integrated manner – connecting</i>

			<i>responses to health, environmental, economic and food safety challenges in coherent way</i> '. Lists four key concerns of food policy: Open and competitive markets; Food safety; Public health; and The environment.
4	17	Supporting the consumer	Examines what government can do to accelerate cultural changes to catalyse transition to safer, more environmentally-sustainable food system, and healthy diets. Theory and model of changes in 'cultural capital' are highlighted in 'Achieving Culture Change: A policy Framework' (Cabinet Office 2008b). Outlines potential information-related barriers to change and the need for government to provide set of more integrated messages. Contrasts ideas about 'Choice editing' making sustainable food choices easier with charges of 'nannying' and reports government's role as to inform consumers of evidence.
5	27	Engaging the supply chain	States that food chain businesses are key partners in drive to transform food system, and reducing distortions in agricultural trade would create more efficient market for food and fairer platform to build sustainable food system on. Highlights issue of food business consolidation/competition; public trust and confidence and food safety and public health consumption issues, including industry's key role, noting achievements in salt reduction as a ' <i>template for future industry-government collaboration</i> ' (Cabinet Office 2008b: 77), and a new 'Healthy Good Food Code of Practice' policy programme, and the need for more work on 5-a-day and tackling waste and climate change.
6	16	Leadership, food and the public sector	Describes previous policy work in the area of public sector food improvement and proposes a new Healthier Food Mark in England for public sector caterers.
7	11	Delivering the government's vision	States ' <i>Government has accepted all the recommendations in this report, which will be taken forward as government policy</i> ' and ' <i>longer term need to make sure the multiple and sometimes competing cross-cutting issues facing food policy are managed appropriately</i> ', and achieving the different objectives for food policy in an integrated way requires effective, joined-up working. Government needs stronger arrangements in place to deal with cross-cutting issues. Describes the formation of a Food Strategy Task Force, chaired and supported by Cabinet Office to: join up food policy through improved coordination and communication; orchestrate UK response to developments in international food markets; monitor food security, drive through recommendations in Food Matters report; and ensure common points are reached on delivery of low-impact, healthy, safe food. Work will be transparent and updates and reports will be published on annual basis. Proposes incentivising of delivery of food policy objectives under the Public Service Agreements (PSAs), and stronger arrangements to coordinate departments' food-related research.

Source: Author

Table B2: Summary of Food 2030 Content

Chapter	Number of Pages	Title	Goals for 2030	Actions for/involving Government
1	10	Encouraging people to eat a healthy, sustainable diet	- People from all parts of society should be able to choose and eat a sustainable diet with reliable access to affordable, healthy and safe food. - People feel connected to their food and treat it as a source of wellbeing and enjoyment, for example through leisure activities such as growing and cooking food. - People take responsibility for their health through the food they choose to eat, understand the impacts their diets can have on their health and the environment, buy what they need and do not waste food. - People are aware of the origins of their food, and understand the environmental and social impacts of their choices. They know that buying some food from developing countries can reduce poverty for some of the world's poorest communities. - The neglected crisis of under-nutrition has been effectively tackled, particularly in the poorest countries and for the poorest families. By 2015, the first millennium development goal on poverty and hunger is achieved and the proportion of underweight children in the world is halved (compared to 1990 figures).	-Help individuals access existing support -Take forward the 'Healthy Food Code of Practice' (from the 'Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives' cross-government strategy 200b) -Continued public awareness campaigns about food safety -Identify and fill gaps in evidence to define a healthy, sustainable diet -Deliver information on above via Eatwell website -Understand better the role of labelling schemes -Develop a 'meanwhile lease' for land -Support a feasibility study for a community land bank -Provide additional funding to the Growing Schools Programme -More consumer education -Encourage community groups to educate people on food skills -Food manufacturers and retailers producing marketing/educational aids
2	11	<i>Ensuring a resilient, profitable and competitive food system</i>	- The whole supply chain is able to support profitable businesses, and provides good value for consumers as well as fair prices for suppliers. - Intellectual property rights are protected and respected encouraging innovation and investment in research. Provision is also made for transferring ideas and innovations to relevant sectors as well as sharing best practice. - New enterprises, including social enterprises, enter the market stimulating diversity and competition. - The food system manages risks responsibly – financial, environmental, and	-Apply better regulation principles, including preference for voluntary agreements. Reduce administrative burden of inspection and enforcement -Investments made in advance to pre-empt and adapt to new pressures -Food businesses manage economic and environmental risks in their supply chain

			food safety risks. The food system is able to respond rapidly to changes in world markets and changes in prices, through an increased focus on international trade with less distortion, helping to promote sustainable competitive farming and global food security. - Training opportunities are available and support is provided for career development. - The food, farming and seafood industries are seen as attractive sectors for new entrants. - Food, farming and fishing businesses are provided with clear and consistent guidelines which give them confidence to make investments in improving their long term environmental and economic sustainability. - Government policy, including regulatory flexibility, allows businesses throughout the food chain to do the right thing for themselves, society and the environment as well as responding to consumer demand. - There is international cooperation over research, innovation, and knowledge sharing on methods for reducing the food system's contribution to climate change and other environmental impacts of food production. - Food businesses use inputs efficiently, in particular reducing their energy and water demand. As a result of this, waste is reduced, and cost savings are made. Environmental and social goods are valued, and incentivised.	-Clear and unambiguous COOL -Better environmental and welfare information -Make it easier for small local businesses to access public sector procurement contracts -Profit and risk spread more fairly in supply chain via fairer supply chain practices -Encourage greater uptake of EU Protected Name Scheme
3	11	<i>Increasing food production sustainably</i>	- Benefits of natural environment are valued, ensuring a sustainable supply of natural resources from which people can benefit now and in the future. Extraction and use of natural resources is balanced so that farmers, fishermen and food businesses can continue to produce food, while ensuring our natural environment is healthy, can function effectively and be resilient to challenges such as climate change. - Increase in availability of and access to food in developing countries, in support of our MDG 2015 targets and beyond, including through increasing smallholder productivity and sustainable agricultural growth, sustainable fish production, improving market efficiency, reducing post-harvest losses, continuing trade reform, establishing appropriate land tenure arrangements, empowering women farmers and encouraging livelihood diversification. - Fairer international trading systems and international markets working better through trade reforms, and the end of import restrictions and subsidies to producers. - Profitable, thriving, competitive UK food sector to continue to play its part in	-Help foster internationally competitive industry without reliance on subsidy or protection, via policies aimed at reforming the CAP -Develop new technologies and techniques for sustainable agriculture and land use - Agri-skills Action Plan to recognise existing and develop new skills -Improve supply chain relationships via £600m RDPE funding and work through Task Forces like Fruit and Vegetable -Applied research into how food production and consumption links to the value of ecosystem services -Use principles for decision-making on converting land/intensifying production based on proper assessment of costs/benefits of ecosystem services

			keeping us food secure. UK farming should produce as much food as possible, as long as it is responsive to demand, and recognises the need to protect and enhance natural resources. Our ability to take advantage of global growth in demand will depend primarily on the competitiveness of UK agricultural production, as well as the nature of the demand. So we need to create the conditions for competitive, sustainable, domestic production to thrive. - Fish and seafood products provide for an increasing proportion of our diet, and are a valued, accessible and readily available source of sustainable protein, supported by a strong UK fish and seafood sector. - Fishing and aquaculture industries are profitable and balance economic return with responsible long-term stewardship of marine resources and protection of the marine environment and are flexible, skills-led, and attractive industries to young talent. Innovation and resilience in fish and seafood production allows fish to continue to provide an alternative source of protein that can cope with shifting demand. The industries are supported by reform of the Common Fisheries Policy that integrates fisheries management and conservation.	-Encourage development and dissemination of sustainable production methods to increase output without undermining natural resource base -Protect and enhance farmed environment through Environmental Stewardship Schemes -Adapt or develop new farming and fishing techniques to support sustainable production -Build on L'Aquila Food Security Initiative and FAO World Summit outcomes to pursue sustainable agricultural development -Improve the global governance and sustainability of fisheries £1.1 bn committed by DFID for sustainable agricultural development to reduce post-harvest losses in developing countries -Develop and implement sustainability criteria for biofuels/bioenergy at global and EU level.
4	11	<i>Reducing the food system's GHG emissions</i>	- Businesses in the food system decouple greenhouse gas emissions from productivity, where technology exists, in order to deliver economic benefits while making absolute emissions reductions. - Consumers play an essential role in driving demand for food with a low environmental footprint, while business plays an equally important role in influencing demand and responding to consumer needs. By 2030 consumers will be better informed about the climate impact of their food, empowered to change their behaviour and have the ability to exercise choice on environmental grounds to reduce this impact. - Emissions from businesses across the food chain are reduced in line with the relevant targets for workplaces and transport in the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan recognising that some sectors may be able to reduce emissions more easily than others. - Agricultural emissions are reduced per unit yield, as well as absolutely, to deliver the sector's commitment of a 3 million tonne CO₂e reduction in England in the Low Carbon Transition Plan. Policies and measures for reducing GHG emissions of UK agriculture will be designed to avoid simply exporting the climate impacts of our food choices to overseas	-Clearer information on climate impacts of food -Incentives for retailers to supply climate-friendly products -Support low carbon initiatives by food chain suppliers -Set trajectory for reducing emissions -Work with industry on emissions reduction plans -Continue to provide advice services, appropriate regulation and financial services to drive decarbonisation of UK food -Assist businesses with loans from Carbon Trust

			economies. - The UK will play a lead role in developing low carbon supply chains, deploying research and innovation, and transferring technology and best practice in order to help global partners, particularly developing countries, to reduce their climate impacts.	
5	7	<i>Reducing, reusing and reprocessing waste</i>	- Supply chains are efficient and minimise waste. - Consumers are food- and waste-conscious and plan, store and use food effectively. - Food packaging is designed in a way that minimises its environmental impact, but retains its purpose in protecting and prolonging the life of food products. - Surplus food is: shared with or redistributed to vulnerable people; used to generate energy through anaerobic digestion; used to produce fertiliser through anaerobic digestion or composting to help grow more food. - Internationally, post-harvest losses are reduced through better storage facilities in developing countries, and the UK demonstrates international leadership in developing technological solutions to producing energy from waste food.	-WRAP research, advice, support and £3.5 mn grant funding for LAs seeking to introduce food waste collection -Joint work between DEFRA, the FSA, WRAP and food industry to improve clarity and consistency of labelling and storage guidance -Development of Anaerobic Digestion Implementation Plan.
6	8	<i>Increasing the impact of skills, knowledge, research and technology</i>	- Food research and innovation funded by the public and private sector is developed with end-users of that research, and is effectively translated into practice in primary production, to promote a thriving agri-food sector, and allow businesses to be more sustainable and efficient in meeting economic, environmental and social goals. - Knowledge, best practice and skills are accessible and exchanged across the food system. - Farmers, fishermen, and employees within the agri-food sector recognise the importance of maintaining and developing their skills and have access to opportunities to learn through advice, informal and formal education, and encourage new entrants to join the sector. Similarly, new entrants are attracted to careers in food research and development. - People are well informed, and can participate in debate about the risks and opportunities posed by the use of new technologies in the food sector. - The UK is a world leader on food research and innovation and is co-operating with a range of international partners, through various mechanisms including the EU framework initiatives and Sustainable Development Dialogues, to find solutions to international challenges including reducing GHG emissions from primary production.	-New research programme on food security, coordinated by BBSRC -New Sustainable Agriculture and Food Innovation Platform led by Technology Strategy Board and co-funded by DEFRA and BBSRC -DfID Doubling investment in R&D to £80 mn by 2013 -Major Foresight study looking at how future population of 9bn can be fed healthily and sustainably -New BBSRC Advanced Training Partnership Scheme to provide specialist high-level training to meet industry needs -Make research priorities and outputs widely available -Evidence-based policy development and appropriate and proportional regulation.

Source: Author

Table B3: References to Policy Integration in Food Matters

<i>To ensure that the UK's food policy framework could meet these new challenges, in September 2007 I commissioned the Strategy Unit to examine our approach to food policy right across the board. This report sets out the conclusions of that work, providing an overarching statement of government food policy that sets a benchmark for the action we must take – both in the UK and globally – to ensure our long-term food security, the sustainability of food production and consumption, and the promotion of public health. (Foreword by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Cabinet Office 2008b pi)</i>
<i>This report has benefited from the support and advice of many organisations and individuals across the country – and I particularly welcome its proposals for ensuring that the Government's food policies are developed in a more coordinated way in future (Foreword by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Cabinet Office 2008b pi)</i>
<i>Many of the elements required for a comprehensive food policy are already in place. But central government needs to better integrate them and to work with the public, food chain businesses and other stakeholders, and in consultation with other tiers of government, to put a new policy framework in place (piii).</i>
<i>The UK needs a stronger and more integrated approach to food policy. Many of the issues we face as a society – poverty, public health, climate change and others – have a food dimension. But direct interventions focused on the food system will often not be the solution because the root of the problem often lies elsewhere. Nonetheless, food cuts across many aspects of public policy and managing the multiple challenges in a consistent, joined-up manner is far from straightforward. The UK needs a clearer public policy framework for food and the machinery in government to help deliver it. The key elements of that framework should be a new shared vision for the food system of the future, a set of core strategic objectives that respond to central aspects of that vision, and an integrated statement of strategy that sets out how to move forward (px, xi).</i>
<i>New arrangements are needed to ensure the successful delivery of a more integrated approach to food policy. The Cabinet Office will chair a new cross- Whitehall Food Strategy Task Force that will coordinate work across government on food issues (including the Government's medium-term response to developments in global food markets) and ensure progress in delivering the measures in this report (pxiv).</i>
<i>A Joint Research Strategy for Food will be prepared to ensure better coordination of departments' food-related research spending (pxiv).</i>
<i>The evidence suggests that there is much more to be done to address the public health and environmental issues arising from food consumption, and a need to do so in a joined-up way (p4).</i>

<i>The various elements of food-related policy need to be melded together into a more cohesive whole – from the high-level vision to the practicalities of decision making and coordinated research (p5).</i>
<i>A number of the proposals set out here are intended to get different parts of government working together more effectively, to strengthen the way policy is delivered, and to fill gaps where they exist (2008b p7).</i>
<i>The UK has not had a comprehensive and formal statement of ‘food policy’ since the Second World War. Today, a patchwork of strategies addresses different aspects of the food system and the market failures in each discrete area (p41).</i>
<i>A clearer framework is needed that fits the different elements together more effectively and ensures that all are pursued with increased vigour and coherence. Despite the strength of many of the strategies and policies described above there is a sense, reinforced by the stakeholder consultations conducted for this project, that UK food policy today is somewhat less than the sum of its parts. The relationship between different elements is not always clearly spelled out and the relative importance of objectives in different areas is not always clear (p42).</i>
<i>In view of the developments in food markets, globally and nationally, effective, action-orientated and coordinated work across government to address food policy issues is clearly a priority (p111).</i>
<i>There is also a longer-term need to make sure that the multiple, and sometimes competing, cross-cutting issues facing food policy are managed appropriately. Achieving the different objectives for food policy in an integrated way requires effective, joined-up working. To achieve these outcomes the Government needs to have stronger arrangements in place to deal with cross-cutting issues. In the short and medium term, new arrangements are needed to bring together key departments to ensure that food policy issues are well managed across Whitehall. It is proposed that a task force should be established to help orchestrate the UK’s response to developments in international food markets, to monitor the outlook for food security and to drive through the recommendations made in this report (p111).</i>
<i>In the longer term, the Government should consider the arrangements needed to incentivize the effective delivery of its food policy objectives within the performance management framework covering the next Spending Review period (2011–14) (p112).</i>

Source: Author

Table B4: References to Policy Integration in Food 2030 (2010)

<i>EU engagement will therefore continue to be a priority, particularly in emphasising the importance of integrated food policy that meets the needs of Europe's citizens, and enables a competitive and sustainable food system that supports global food security. (p6)</i>
<i>We will also promote the importance of integrated food policy in Europe and beyond, that emphasises the needs of the consumer and a competitive and sustainable food system that supports global food security. (p8)</i>
<i>Government is also integrating its online advice to consumers on food nutrition, sustainability and safety based on the evidence currently available. (p14)</i>
<i>This strategy is a response both to the big food challenges – sustainability, security and health – and to the call for more joined up food policy (P4)</i>
<i>Government Joining-up and integrating research across Government, private sector and third sector (p65)</i>
<i>Defra coordinates all UK Government policies on food. The Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs chairs a dedicated Cabinet sub-committee on food, formed in October 2008. And to make sure that Government gets the best advice on food policy, a Council of Food Policy Advisers was established at the same time, for a duration of two years. (p5)</i>
<i>Alongside Food 2030, a cross-Government Strategy for Food Research and Innovation has been launched to provide a framework to coordinate food research and innovation. (p5)</i>
<i>The government's role is 'providing policy leadership by finding ways to reconcile the big choices and tensions between achieving our vision for food and other major challenges' (p8)</i>

Source: Author

Table B5: Progress on Actions recommended in Food Matters

Recommendation	Lead	Implementation Timetable	Progress
Action 3.1 Government to adopt Strategic Policy Objectives for food: 1. Fair prices, choice, access to food and food security through the promotion of open, competitive markets 2. Continuous improvement in the safety of food 3. Changes needed to deliver healthier diets 4. More environmentally sustainable food chain	All Departments	Immediate	The Strategic Policy Objectives are broad and rather vague and therefore evaluation is difficult. The FMOYO report notes the following: DEFRA has a new Departmental Strategic Objective to ensure sustainable, secure and healthy food supplies and a consultation on indicators has been published. The existing objectives are: sustainable production and consumption and a thriving farming and food sector. The FSA is developing its strategy 2010-2015 and has adopted two Strategic Objectives: to improve food safety and to improve the balance of the diet. A key strategic objective for the DH is to help people stay healthy and well and DH has been working with departments and industry to promote healthier food choices. The DH has been taking forward implementation of the Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives obesity strategy. A future food strategy is being developed, with an online discussion on 'Food 2030' being launched (DEFRA 2009d)
Action 3.2 Government will test and refine the new strategic framework for food set out in the report as part of an open and collaborative process to be run over the next year	DEFRA leading a partnership of DEFRA, DH, FSA	By October 2009	This is presumably referring to the consultation process for Food 2030 which took place between 2008-2010, though the exact timetable is not clear. It is described in the FMOYO report as a process to '<i>test and refine the new strategic framework for food set out in Food Matters</i>' (DEFRA 2009d). The following progress update is in FMOYO: DEFRA, DH and FSA are looking at economic, environmental and social sustainability and synergies between those goals and the tensions. Where there are tensions we are convening further discussions to unpick the issues and come up with solutions.

			Publishing short discussion paper on secure and sustainable food Series of workshops on key themes/priorities being planned with stakeholders, following on from workshops held in February and March (DEFRA 2009d)
Action 4.1 FSA will provide one-stop-shop to consumers looking for information on nutrition, food and sustainability and food safety	FSA with input from Food Strategy Task Force	Programme of work to be published by end October 2008	The FMOYO progress update states that: Work to develop the new website will start later in 2009 Scoping work completed on a new 'Eatwell' website. [NB Eatwell plate was already launched in 2007]. New site will address gaps including on local food and food security and will integrate messages on environmental impacts and current healthy eating advice. Implementation phase of website expected to run for 18 months from Autumn 2009-early 2011. A news article published in the FSA's 'Bite' magazine, in January 2011, explained that the website was forthcoming, and that the project was being led by the FSA's former Eatwell manager, Liz Niman. As discussed in Chapter Five under Integrated Advice for Consumers, this project was not completed (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 4.2 FSA to launch new programme focused on food eaten out of home, working with food businesses and consumers to understand what information would be helpful and improve nutritional standard on offer.	FSA	Initial proposals to be published by December 2008	According to the FMOYO progress update: Calorie labelling due to start appearing Summer 2009 Three strands of FSA work: 1. working with caterers to provide healthier options via the 'Flexible Framework'. Over 40 companies have made public commitments. 2. Engaging small businesses – guidance will be developed. 3. Calorie Labelling – taking forward the commitment in Healthy Weight: Healthy Lives/. To date 20 companies have agreed to voluntarily introduce. Will be evaluated and decision made on roll-out (Defra 2009d).
Action 4.3 FSTF to ensure campaigns, public consultations and engagement efforts on	FSTF	Immediate	According to the FMOYO progress update this work is ongoing and has benefitted campaigns including ensuring DH's Change4Life is aligned with other departmental activities such as DCMS's Swim4Life and DEFRA's Muckin4Life.

food-related issues are better coordinated across departments			Future FSA activity on salt will be closely coordinated with Change4Life. DH and DCSF are looking at developing voluntary principles to underpin all forms of promotion and marketing of food and drink to children (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.1 Government is considering Competition Commission's recommendations on its Groceries Market Investigation (published April 2008)	BIS	Initial response published by July 2008	Progress updated in FMOYO: Government published its response to the Inquiry in 2008 Competition Commission has since consulted publicly on its proposals for a new GSCOP and government will consider its findings and recommendations carefully. A Groceries Supply Code of Practice was launched in 2009 and a Groceries Code Adjudicator established in 2013 (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.2 Government will develop a 'whole food chain approach' with industry for identifying most important and high-risk food safety hazards	FSA	Initial paper scoping the issues to be published by December 2008	According to FMOYO: High level analysis has been undertaken and reported to FSA board. More detailed analysis of priority food groups being carried out. The FMOYO report also provides a summary of the conclusions of the analysis (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.3 DEFRA working with FSA will publish analysis of potential impacts on UK livestock sector of global trends in GM production FSA, working with DEFRA, will publish analysis on extent changes in market are putting strain on regulatory system for GM products	DEFRA, FSA FSA, DEFRA	December 2008 December 2008	In August 2009 (eight months late according to initial timetable), DEFRA and the FSA published '<i>GM Crops and Foods: Follow-up to the Food Matters Report</i>', outlining the work undertaken in response to the two parallel action points on GM crops and foods specified in Food Matters. More details below.
Action 5.4	DH	5ADAY action plan to be finalised by	According to the FMOYO report:

DH will target messages aimed at increasing F&V consumption in specific population groups Government will work with industry to increase range of products that will count towards 5ADAY target, improve product placement and clarity of message		September 2008	The action plan will be published in Autumn 2009. DEFRA's Secretary of State held a round table meeting of representatives in F&V industry in July 2009. A summary of progress of 5-a-DAY is provided (DEFRA 2009d). A Fruit and Vegetables Task Force was established in October 2009. In Oral Evidence to the EFRA Select Committee on 'DEFRA's Food Strategy', Hilary Benn credits the idea of the taskforce to the Council of Food Policy Advisors. The Taskforce published a report outlining its proposals in August 2010. At its final meeting on 12 October 2010, the task force agreed an action plan to deliver the proposals outlined in the report (DEFRA website archive accessed August 2016).
Action 5.5 Government's Chief Scientific Advisor will commission a major new Foresight project on the future of the global food system.	Foresight (GOS; Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, DEFRA, DfiD)	Project launch September 2008, completion by end 2009	According to the FMOYO report: The project's scoping is well underway. DEFRA and DfiD ministers – Jim Fitzpatrick and Mike Foster – co-sponsor the project. Advisory groups have been convened (DEFRA 2009d). Foresight project 'The Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and choices for global sustainability' was published in January 2011 (one year late) (See Table A1)
Action 5.6 Government will work towards introduction of 'smarter' system for GHG emission calculation from UK agriculture	DEFRA	Research to be completed by 2013 in time to support a new global climate change agreement	THE FMOYO reports the following progress: Research is underway to define the UK GHG inventory, to reduce uncertainty in the estimates and test effects of mitigation options DEFRA will commission further work on inventory methodology which will also feed into DEFRA's work on carbon budgets for agriculture. A background summary on DEFRA's work on this area is provided (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.7 Government will promote the role of agriculture in the mitigation of and	DEFRA	European Union event with key partners in Autumn 2008	According to FMOYO: A seminar was held with the French in June 2009.

adaption to climate change			DEFRA is working with major partners such as France and Germany to promote. Background summary of the UK-France High Level Experts' Seminar on Agriculture and Climate Change is provided (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.8 A new strategy for dealing with food packaging waste in England will be developed, set within the framework provided by the Waste Strategy for England (2007)	DEFRA, BERR	October 2008	FMOYO reports that: The strategy 'Making the most of packaging' was published in June 2009 Lead departments are DEFRA and BIS. Government will work with delivery bodies Background summary to the strategy is provided (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 5.9 Government will work with WRAP and food industry to secure a new voluntary agreement to cut food waste in supply chain and home	WRAP, with DEFRA and FSA	Launch dialogue with industry 2008, to be completed by Feb 2009	According to FMOYO a new agreement is expected to be signed by companies in early 2010. A summary of WRAP's work in this area is provided, though it is not clear how much of this is linked to Food Matters actions e.g Love Food Hate Waste multi-media campaign launched in 2007 is listed under progress to date (DEFRA 2009d).
Action 6.1 New Healthier Food Mark standards for food in public places. Voluntary scheme initially, piloted in central government, HM Prison Service and NHS Services. Government will then decide whether to make mandatory for central government and prisons.	DH, FSA	Scheme defined and ready for piloting by December 2009, possible mandatory standards in place by 2012 for central government and its agencies and prisons	FMOYO reports that the time line is for this voluntary scheme to be defined and ready for piloting by Autumn 2009. Progress listed in the report: Draft criteria for nutrition and sustainability have been developed and discussed at a stakeholder event in Birmingham in April. The Office of Government Commerce will ensure through the Collaborative Food Procurement Programme that full consideration given to commercial implications of HFM. Evaluation will run alongside pilots until Summer 2010, followed by a full consultation with aim of going live 2011. DH will seek to align the mark with other initiatives including: nutritional standards in schools; DH Improving Nutrition Standards – Joint Action Plan, Food for Life, and the

			sustainability agendas (DEFRA 2009d). Archived web pages from the DH website explain that - updated December 2009 - the team is testing the revised Mark with organisations in Phase 2 of the pre-consultation pilot. This is the last update made on the HFM web page.
Action 7.1 Cabinet Office will chair a new Food Strategy Task Force which will coordinate departments' work on food issues and the government's response to developments in the international food markets, and track and ensure progress in delivering the measures in this report.	Cabinet Office	Established by October 2008, reviewed in December 2010	FMOYO (DEFRA 2009d) reports that: FSTF established in October 2008 and meets roughly quarterly. Sub groups have been set up on: Global Food Markets Food Communications Developing a Vision for a Sustainable and Secure Food System Joint Food Research Strategy Healthier Food Mark IAC No records of FSTF activities could be identified.
Action 7.2 Government will consider how best to incentivise efforts to reduce public health and environmental harms associated with food and to support the food economy within the performance management framework for the next Spending Review	FSTF, Cabinet Office	In advance of next spending review	The FMOYO report states that 'with the four strategic policy objectives for food now embedded in departments' aims we are not currently proposing introducing a new formal performance measure on food' (DEFRA 2009 p25). DEFRA will be measuring and reporting on progress towards achieving goal of safe, sustainable and equitable food system and developing a set of indicators on sustainability with have been published for consultation.
Action 7.3 Government will establish a cross-departmental strategy to ensure coordination of research and development	DEFRA lead with DIUS, DH, FSA, DfiD plus other departments	Launched by September 2008, published by July 2009	In the FMOYO report the lead department is now the Government Office for Science. Progress outlined in the report: Outline strategy has been developed under lead of John Beddington

	and Research Councils and other funders		Food Research Partnership has been established Strategy expected to be published in Autumn 2009 (DEFRA 2009d). The UK Cross Government Strategy for Food Research and Innovation was published in January 2010.
Action 7.4 FSTF will report to the Prime Minister on progress made in implementing the actions identified in this report in Summer 2009 and Summer 2010.	FSTF	First progress report by July 2009, second by July 2010	The FMOYO is the first progress update.
Action 7.5 DH and FSA will publish joint statement clarifying roles and responsibilities for the Healthy Food Code of Good Practice	DH, FSA	End July 2008	FMOYO reports that: DH and FSA sent a joint letter to interested parties July 2008, setting out which department leads on particular aspects of the Healthy Good Food Code of Practice (Part of Healthy Weight; Healthy Lives) (DEFRA 2009d).

Source: Author

Table B6: Progress on Actions Recommended in Food 2030

Actions for/involving Government	Progress
-Help individuals access existing support -Take forward the 'Healthy Food Code of Practice' (from the 'Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives' cross-government strategy 2008) -Continued public awareness campaigns about food safety -Identify and fill gaps in evidence to define a healthy, sustainable diet -Deliver information on above via Eatwell website -Understand better the role of labelling schemes -Develop a 'meanwhile lease' for land -Support a feasibility study for a community land bank -Provide additional funding to the Growing Schools Programme -More consumer education -Encourage community groups to educate people on food skills Food manufacturers and retailers producing marketing/educational aids	Most actions in this category are vague and therefore difficult to identify outcomes prior to Food 2030 being shelved. However the following developments were tracked down: Definition of a healthy, sustainable diet: Work on this continued in DEFRA's Green Food Project (Sustainable Consumption). See Chapter 4 for details. Food Growing in Schools Taskforce launched in 2011 by Agriculture Minister Caroline Spelman. [Run by Garden Organic?]
-Apply better regulation principles, including preference for voluntary agreements. Reduce administrative burden of inspection and enforcement -Investments made in advance to pre-empt and adapt to new pressures -Food businesses manage economic and environmental risks in their supply chain -Clear and unambiguous COOL -Better environmental and welfare information -Make it easier for small local businesses to access public sector procurement contracts -Profit and risk spread more fairly in supply chain via fairer supply chain practices -Encourage greater uptake of EU Protected Name Scheme	Not able to identify progress
-Help foster internationally competitive industry without reliance on subsidy or protection, via policies aimed at reforming the CAP -Develop new technologies and techniques for sustainable agriculture and land use -Agri-skills Action Plan to recognise existing and develop new skills -Improve supply chain relationships via £600m RDPE funding and work through Task Forces like Fruit and Vegetable -Applied research into how food production and consumption links to the value of	Actions in this category are vague and therefore it was not possible to identify outcomes prior to Food 2030 being shelved.

ecosystem services -Use principles for decision-making on converting land/intensifying production based on proper assessment of costs/benefits of ecosystem services -Encourage development and dissemination of sustainable production methods to increase output without undermining natural resource base -Protect and enhance farmed environment through Environmental Stewardship Schemes -Adapt or develop new farming and fishing techniques to support sustainable production -Build on L'Aquila Food Security Initiative and FAO World Summit outcomes to pursue sustainable agricultural development -Improve the global governance and sustainability of fisheries £1.1 bn committed by DFID for sustainable agricultural development to reduce post-harvest losses in developing countries -Develop and implement sustainability criteria for biofuels/bioenergy at global and EU level.	
-Clearer information on climate impacts of food -Incentives for retailers to supply climate-friendly products -Support low carbon initiatives by food chain suppliers -Set trajectory for reducing emissions -Work with industry on emissions reduction plans -Continue to provide advice services, appropriate regulation and financial services to drive decarbonisation of UK food -Assist businesses with loans from Carbon Trust	Actions in this category are vague and therefore it was not possible to identify outcomes prior to Food 2030 being shelved.
-WRAP research, advice, support and £3.5 mn grant funding for Local Authorities seeking to introduce food waste collection -Joint work between DEFRA, the FSA, WRAP and food industry to improve clarity and consistency of labelling and storage guidance -Development of Anaerobic Digestion Implementation Plan.	An Anaerobic Digestion Strategy and Action Plan was published by DEFRA in 2011.
-New research programme on food security, coordinated by BBSRC -New Sustainable Agriculture and Food Innovation Platform led by Technology Strategy Board and co-funded by DEFRA and BBSRC -DFID Doubling investment in R&D to £80 mn by 2013 -Major Foresight study looking at how future population of 9bn can be fed healthily	The Foresight study is outlined at Table A1.

and sustainably

- New BBSRC Advanced Training Partnership Scheme to provide specialist high-level training to meet industry needs
- Make research priorities and outputs widely available
- Evidence-based policy development and appropriate and proportional regulation.

Source: Author

Appendix C: Chapter Six

Appendix B contains supporting material to Chapter Five, the Framework Tool application to NFP. C1 summarises the content of the reports of the two policy projects, including any references made to integration. C2 traces progress on the NFP's recommendations, and was compiled through grey and academic literature searches on the policy actions or programmes listed. Two other tables list the White Paper goals (also included in Figure 6.1), and examples of framing from the NFP, which were too numerous to include in the main body.

Table C1: Summary of Content of National Food Plan White Paper

Chapter	Number of Pages	Title	Key Points
1	7	Framework for food policy	The NFP has been informed by extensive public consultation and draws on the principles and goals set out in the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, and identifies what can be done to support the food system. The vision to 2025 consists of the following goals: <i>Growing Exports</i> • Agriculture to have increased by 45 per cent • Stronger food trade and investment relationships with countries across the region • Globally recognized food brand that is synonymous with high-quality, innovative, safe and sustainable food, services and technology. <i>Sustainable Food</i> • Will produce food sustainably and have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes • Will have reduced per capita food waste <i>Thriving Industry</i> • Agricultural productivity increased by 30 per cent • Innovation in food manufacturing increase, and emerging opportunities in Asian region maximized • Agricultural and fisheries workforce will have built skills base • Infrastructure and biosecurity systems will support growing food industry

			• Participation in the digital economy will have increased • Will be one of the top five most efficiently regulated countries in the world <i>People</i> • High level of food security built on with continued improvement of access to safe and nutritious food for those in remote communities or struggling with disadvantage • Considered top three countries in the world for food safety • Australians will have information they need to help them make decisions about food • Children will have better understanding of how food is produced • Will have contributed to global food security by helping farmers in developing countries access new agricultural technologies. Policy principles: <i>‘Australia’s food system has many elements and players, and interactions between them can be complex. Positive actions in one area can have unintended negative effects in another. In such a complex system there is often no ideal solution to a problem, so it is important that we carefully weigh up the benefits and costs of our decisions and decide on the compromises we might need to make’</i> (DAFF 2013 p18). <i>Policy principles that will guide actions in implementing the plan</i> • Access to enough safe and nutritious food for all Australians • Freedom to choose • Sustainable production • Vibrant industries • Vibrant communities • Free and open markets • Good global citizenship • Evidence-based decisions • Consultation and transparency • Minimal and effective regulation
2	3	Trends, opportunities and challenges	World population projected to reach 8 bn by 2025, and middle class predicted to grow from 1.8bn in 2010 to 4.9 bn in 2030 – and 85% of the population growth will be in Asia. Demand for food projected to increase most strongly in Asia – doubling between 2007 and 2050. Rising incomes mean changes in diets in Asia, including greater demand for meat and processed foods. Food products most projected to be sought after by 2050 are beef, wheat, dairy products, sheep meat and sugar. Potential constraints on growth include strong competition from other food exporting nations; climate change and constraints on the planet’s natural resources.

			[Data on Australian food production is provided]. Current strengths in food production are in raw and moderately processed products. In coming decades there will be opportunities to produce higher value products – commodities, processed foods or services. Consumers: Nutrition and diet are likely to be a growing influence on consumer choice. Despite availability of sufficient quantities of high-quality food, a significant number of Australians have a poor diet. Today ranked as one of the fattest nations in the world. Obesity has more than doubled in past 20 years. Nearly two thirds of adults estimated to be overweight or obese in 2011-12.
3	7	Growing Exports	Australian food industry makes an important contribution to national economy – employing 1.64 million in 2011-12. Export-focused food producer – can't depend on domestic market alone to support further growth in food industry. Opportunities of a growing population, particularly in Asia. Goal for 2025 is 'the value of Australia's agriculture and food-related exports will have increased by 45 per cent (in real terms), contributing to an increase in GDP' (DAFF 2013 p26). Growing more is not enough, also need to expand access to export markets and give food producers competitive edge. The government will continue to maintain and expand market opportunities and improve market intelligence sharing. The goal for 2025 is for '<i>stronger food trade and investment relationships with countries across the region and the capabilities to promote Australian interests</i>' (DAFF 2013 p28). Activities to build business-to-business links will include 1. <i>Asian Century Business Engagement Plan</i> – grants scheme to enhance links to Asia and help identify and secure opportunities; 2. <i>Food Industry Innovation Precinct</i> (FIIP) – one of precincts announced as part of the \$1 bn 'A Plan for Australian Jobs', aimed at strengthening and establishing links between businesses, advisors, education bodies, research institutions and government; 3. <i>Food and Beverage Supplier Advocate</i> – will be appointed to support links between food suppliers and their customers, collaborating with industry and government. Will link in with the FIIP. Activities to improve understanding of new markets will include: 1. <i>£28.5 mn Asian Food Markets Research Fund</i> – to support projects that help businesses meet future Asian market needs and preferences; 2. <i>What Asia Wants: Better Understanding Future Asian Food Demand</i> report series – assessment of trends in Asian food demand and identification of opportunities. The FIIP will also focus on developing Asian insight capability. Activities to facilitate export opportunities will include: 1. <i>Enterprise Connect</i> – capability development program to support SMEs to improve performance; 2. <i>Growth Opportunities and Leadership Development</i> (GOLD) initiative – advanced business support to high growth-potential SMEs engaged in Industry Innovation Precincts; 3. <i>Export Markets Development Grants</i> scheme – existing scheme offering financial assistance to SMEs that are aspiring

			and current exporters. Activities to build on Australia's reputation will include: 1. <i>Australia Unlimited Campaign</i> – building on this to promote strengths and emphasise quality of Australian food to overseas markets. The goal for 2025 is for Australia to have a '<i>globally-recognised food brand that is synonymous with high quality, innovative, safe and sustainable food, services and technology</i>' (DAFF 2013 p32).
4	22	Thriving Industry	Food industry logistics have become more technical. Innovation is a fundamental driver of food business success. Food businesses must continue to innovate to meet the growing need for food in the Asian century. Australian government supports industry and innovation through 'A Plan for Australian Jobs', which outlines how £1 bn will be invested. Boosting agricultural growth – has been strong growth relative to other sectors of the economy (average 2 percent between 1970s and mid 1990s) but this has grown little since. Aim - to boost by 30 percent by 2025, helping farmers to grow more food using fewer inputs (DAFF 2013 p35). RD&E is a key element of government support and will be addressed through the following activities: 1. Currently support through investments worth around \$700 mn annually, including <i>Rural Research and Development Corporation</i> (RDCs) and programs run by CSIRO, universities, cooperative research centres and other government agencies. 2. Will invest £28.5 mn in a new <i>Asian Market Strategic Research Fund</i>, to boost private and public R&D investment in ways that help businesses export more products and services. 3. <i>Rural Research and Development Plan</i> (released 2012) – reiterates commitment to maintaining RDC model, which is a partnership between government and industry. Want to improve priority setting and coordination across the system. 4. Development of whole of government strategic research priorities as part of implementation of the <i>National Research Investment Plan</i>. 5. <i>National Primary Industries RD&E Framework</i> - helps coordinate efforts to increase cross-sectoral research and national collaboration by bringing together governments, CSIRO, universities and RDCs. Innovation in food manufacturing will be supported by the following activities: 1. First and second phases of the Australian Research Council's \$236 mn <i>Industrial Transformation Research Programme</i> – focusing on food-related research, including future food storage, food processing, manufacturing capabilities and product opportunities. 2. <i>Food Industry Innovation Precinct</i> – part of A Plan for Australian Jobs – to help sector become more strategic, commercially-targeted and coordinated in a sustainable way. 3. <i>Industry Innovation Network</i> – will be an internet accessible resource to facilitate open access to data and information sharing, linking businesses to potential suppliers, partners and customers. Welcoming biotechnology – it will be essential to meeting future food needs. Government will keep encouraging development an

		adoption of new technologies. Will work with industry and State and Territory governments to develop a National Strategy for Biotechnology in Agriculture – with targeted consultations during 2013-14 to identify constraints farmers face in adopting new technologies. Aim is to move towards national consistency on biotechnology. Adapting to climate change and drought – being addressed through the following activities: 1. Introduction of a <i>carbon price</i> – to help reduce GHG emissions, drive investment in energy efficiency and promote innovation; 2. \$1 bn <i>Land Sector Package</i> – part of the <i>Clean Energy Future Plan</i> – includes the <i>Carbon Farming Futures Program</i> to identify opportunities to reduce GHGs, store carbon in vegetation and soils and enhance sustainable agricultural practices. 3. <i>Carbon Farming Initiative</i> – voluntary scheme that creates opportunities for farmers and land managers to earn income from carbon credits; 4. Clean technology <i>Food and Foundries Investment Programme</i> – help for food processors to adjust through funding to implement emission reduction technologies. Building a skilled workforce – food industry employs about one sixth of Australian workforce. Skills needed will change as production, processing and logistics become more complex and technological. Primary industries workforce currently has high proportion (54 per cent compared to all industry average of 35 per cent) of workers without post-school qualifications. Goal for 2025 – ‘Australia’s agriculture and fisheries workforce will have built its skills base, increasing the proportion with post-school qualifications. This will be achieved via the following activities: 1. <i>National Vocational Education and Training System</i> - \$9 bn over five years from 2012-13, through the States and Territories, for improving access to skills and qualifications. 2. <i>Agrifood Skills Australia/Manufacturing Skills Australia</i> – funded by government, to ensure nationally-recognised skills standards and qualifications support skills requirements of the food industry. Securing business inputs – Many food businesses face input costs that rise faster than the price of what they sell. Will continue to push for well-regulated and competitive markets. Investing in infrastructure and biosecurity systems – Aim to implement a national infrastructure framework to help governments and businesses plan and prioritise. Goal for 2025 – ‘Australia’s infrastructure and biosecurity systems will support a growing food industry moving food cost-effectively and efficiently to markets and supporting new export opportunities’ (DAFF 2013 p45). Activities will include: 1. <i>National Broadband Network</i> - will give food businesses better access to commercial information, training and opportunities to collaborate; 2. <i>Nation Building Program</i> – since 2008 \$60 bn has been allocated towards transport infrastructure; 3. <i>Infrastructure Australia</i> – established to advise on national priorities, investment mechanisms and impediments. A well-regulated industry – Goal for 2025 is that ‘Australia will be among the top five most efficiently regulated countries in the

			world’ (DAFF 2013 p48). Government will continue to work with State and Territory governments to improve regulations across the economy and reduce gaps and overlaps, including through COAG. The Productivity Commission will undertake a regulatory review of the food system, from paddock to plate, building on past work, but going beyond food safety regulations to look at the disproportionate impact of regulation on small food businesses. Creating competition – Following an Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices in 2008 we have promoted competition in the retail grocery sector through initiatives such as: establishing mandatory unit pricing. We support a comprehensive and industry-led approach to improving commercial relationships along the supply chain. Empowering our food regions – Regional Development Australia network brings together all levels of government and local leaders. Local solutions are funded via the Regional Development Australia Fund (RDAF), for example \$67.5 mn in infrastructure for the food industry. Committed to communities defining their own future and developing a regional food plan. Regional food plans will feed into the five-yearly review of the NFP and form the development of future national food plans. Regional food plans won’t replace State or national policy or strategic direction, but will allow regions to align their goals and challenges with policy across all levels of government.
5	14	Families and Communities	Maintaining food security – Australia in enviable position of having adequate quantities of high-quality food. Produce enough food today to feed 60 bn people (PMSEIC 2010). Food affordable and accessible for most Australians – only spend 17 per cent of average income on food. But some people find it difficult to access and afford nutritious food. Estimates of food insecurity vary. The National Health Survey 2004-5 estimates 2 per cent for the general population to 24 per cent in some risk groups including indigenous Australians and people in disadvantaged areas. The Australian Health Survey (2012-14) will include further information. Goal for 2025 – ‘Australia will have built on its high level of food security by continuing to improve access to safe and nutritious food for those living in remote communities or struggling with disadvantage’ (DAFF 2013 p56). Activities to reduce food insecurity - which cannot be achieved by governments alone and needs combined effort with industry and the community - will include: 1. National Disability Insurance Scheme – supports people with disabilities; 2. Funding to FoodBank Australia; 3. Outback Stores – we have established a company that subsidises stores that are not commercially viable but important in remote communities; 4. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Chronic Disease Fund – will continue to implement initiatives to promote nutrition and healthy, active lifestyles. Over the first four years (from July 2011) the fund will provide \$833 mn; 5. National Strategy for Food Security in Remote Indigenous Communities – will continue to work with States and Territories to review this. Maintaining food security in emergencies – While Australia has high level of food security overall, natural disasters, adverse weather conditions and other unexpected events can disrupt food production, supply and distribution. Recent efficiency trends in the food chain could reduce the sector’s resilience. Approach is guided through the <i>Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy</i>, which aims to support delivery of essential goods and services during emergencies.

		Ensuring safety of food supply – One of the safest supplies in the world. Goal for 2025 for Australia to ‘be considered to be in the top three countries in the world for food safety, increasing the reputation of Australia’s exports’ (DAFF 2013 p60). Will continue to work with producers, processors, importers and State, Territory and New Zealand government regulators to continue to develop and maintain food standards based on the best available scientific evidence. Food and culture – food and eating broader than dietary requirements and nutrition, food plays a social, symbolic, political and economic role in our lives. Accessing healthy and nutritious food – despite availability of a high-quality, nutritious and safe food supply, many Australians have poor diets. One of highest rates of obesity in the world. Nearly two thirds of adults and one quarter of children either overweight or obese. Will be addressing this trend through the following activities: 1. National Partnership Agreement on Preventative Health (NPAPH) – investing \$932 mn over nine years (2009-18) to implement initiatives that promote healthy behaviours and tackle diet-related diseases. Included establishment of the Australian National Preventative Health Agency, to support the development and implementation of evidence-based approaches to preventative health intervention; 2. Australian Dietary Guidelines – based on latest scientific evidence and maintained by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), and promoted by public health sector, industry, educators, researchers and the broader community. Recently reviewed and released in early 2013; 3. 2011-13 Australia Health Survey – results will be used to ensure measures and advice are correctly targeted; 4. Food & Health Dialogue – food industry encouraged to voluntarily reduce salt, saturated fat, sugar and energy, and increase the amount of fruit, vegetables and fibre/wholegrain cereals in manufactured and pre-prepared foods. Plus working with Quick Service restaurants to improve nutritional quality, reduce standard portion sizes and inform customers; 5. National Health Eating and Physical Activity Guidelines for Early Childhood Settings (Get up and Grow) and National Healthy School Canteen Guidelines – provide practical information and advice on nutrition and physical activity; 6. Reviewing information on children’s exposure to the marketing of energy-dense, relatively nutrient-poor foods, and the reporting on the effectiveness of industry initiatives and codes and standards aimed at limiting exposure. Developing a guideline framework to provide a consistent method for future monitoring of children’s exposure to advertising and marketing of unhealthy food on tv; 7. Working with industry, public health and consumer stakeholders to develop an agreed labeling system for nutrition information on front-of-pack. Also regulating the way nutrition and health claims are made; 8. National Nutrition Policy – being developed, to guide programs and health and nutrition policies, with input from State and Territory governments, industry, public health organizations. Informing our community – Goal for 2025 is that ‘Australians will have the information they need to help them make decisions about food’ (DAFF 2013 p63). Australian children particularly low levels of food literacy. Not just about labels, participation in community gardening builds understanding about food and production. Supporting food choices through labeling – 2011 report of a review of food labeling ‘Labelling Logic: review of food labeling law and policy 2011’. We are implementing our agreed response. Some issues raised in the review relate to health and nutrition as

			opposed to meeting consumer expectations for information, and these will be dealt with via the National Nutrition Policy. Also looking at ways to improve country of origin labeling (COOL). Agreed to amend requirements to include all unpackaged beef, sheep and chicken meat, and will consider extending mandatory COOL to all remaining unpackaged primary food products. In October 2012 the ACCC provided guidance to provide clear advice on COOL claims. Will be assessed through the Australian Consumer Survey in 2015. Education – Goal for 2025 is that ‘Australian children will have a better understanding of how food is produced’ (DAFF 2013 p67). We support the inclusion of food and agriculture in the curriculum. Committed to working with State and Territory and non-government education authorities, through the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) to ensure the curriculum is implemented in schools. Over next two years will invest \$1.5 mn in developing innovative resources and professional development to support teachers. Will build on the Stephanie Alexander Kitchen Garden Program, which teaches primary school children how to grow, harvest, prepare and share fresh food. Beyond labels and the classroom, to encourage more participation in community gardens, farmers’ markets and other activities we will extend support with \$1.5 mn in new funding.
6	5	Global Food Security	As a wealthy country and responsible global citizen Australia has an obligation to help alleviate suffering caused by food insecurity around the world. Goal for 2025 – ‘Australia will have contributed to global food security by helping farmers in developing countries gain access to new agricultural technologies’ (DAFF 2013 p70). Our expertise in agricultural and fisheries technology, water resources management, economics and policy allows us to provide technical assistance to developing countries. This is done through sharing expertise via organizations such as the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and CSIRO. This aim will be supported by the following activities: 1. Australian International Food Security Centre (AIFSC) – we will strengthen international agricultural research partnerships, including through the AIFSC, which helps accelerate uptake of technologies and practices by smallholder farmers to improve availability of safe nutritious food; 2. Supporting a rules-based multilateral trading system and open markets that allow food to move freely; 3. Reducing trade barriers, combined with improving agricultural policy settings and governance; 4. Aid for Trade program – providing trade-related development assistance through this program which helps developing countries effectively negotiate and implement international and regional trade agreements.
7	13	Sustainable Food	Historically, using natural resources for food production in Australia has had environmental costs such as soil erosion and degradation of inland waterways. Recently been working to improve condition of natural resources. Committed to supporting sustainable and innovative practices to increase productivity, build a resilient landscape that can cope with a changing climate, and protect our natural assets, and to demonstrate sustainability through development, with industry, sustainability indicators for agriculture and reporting on fish stocks. Goal for 2025 – ‘Australia will produce food sustainably and will have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes’ (DAFF 2013 p74). Land use – State and Territory governments are responsible for land use planning. The following activities will be used to support protection of agricultural land, and multiple land uses: 1. <i>Sustainable Australia, Sustainable Communities: A Sustainable Population Strategy for Australia</i> – will help ensure

			population change is compatible with the economic, environmental and social wellbeing of Australians. Includes being able to produce food for local community and the world; 2. <i>National Urban Policy</i> – will continue to collaborate with State and Territory governments on this policy which includes the potential loss of productive land to urban expansion and development; 3. <i>Multiple Land Use Framework</i> – will collaborate with State and Territory governments on this draft policy for the minerals and energy resource sector, which includes land access and land use issues related to agriculture; 4. <i>Standing Council of Primary Industries</i> – the benefits of a more coordinated approach to protecting agricultural land; 5. <i>Australian Collaborative Land Use and Management Program (ACLUMP)</i> – working with State and Territory governments to continue to invest in collecting, storing and analyzing land use data and making his available. Soil – Australia’s soils are ancient, strongly-weathered and nutrient poor. Activities to address this will include: 1. <i>Advocate for Soil Health</i> – to raise awareness of importance of soil in agricultural productivity, engaging with stakeholders from scientists to farmers; 2. <i>Caring for our Country</i> program – Providing information, establishing trial sites and demonstrations; 3. <i>Carbon Farming Futures Program</i> – aims to reduce emissions or sequester carbon in soils; 4. <i>Australian Collaborative Land Evaluation Program</i> – aims to improve the collection, storage and accessibility of soil information and data for the community. Water – Australia is the driest inhabited continent and many inland water environments are degraded. Activities to address this will include: 1. <i>National Water Initiative</i> – State and Territory governments are implementing water reforms, including water planning and entitlement reform, improving information about water availability and use, enhancing water markets and improving institutional arrangements; 2. <i>Murray-Darling Basin Plan</i> – finalized in November 2012. Plan that restores rivers to health, supports strong regional communities and sustainable food production; 3. <i>Water for the Future</i> initiative - \$15 bn investment, in infrastructure to improve water use efficiency; 4. <i>National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for Coal Seam Gas</i> – being developed with State and Territory governments to help ensure a balance between agricultural, urban and coal seam gas developments; 5. <i>National Water Quality Management Strategy</i> - working to protect and enhance water quality; 6. <i>Caring for our Country</i> program – increasing the adoption of sustainable and innovative management practices to reduce the risk of run-off from agricultural land, improve health of the Great Barrier Reef lagoon and increase farm profitability. Native Vegetation – The following activities will be used to support farmers to manage native vegetation: 1. <i>Caring for our Country</i> program – assist farmers to adopt practices that improve productivity and increase growth of native grasses to reduce soil erosion and loss of nutrients; 2. <i>Biodiversity Fund</i> – helps farmers manage native vegetation on their property to improve biodiversity;

			3. <i>Australia's Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-2030</i> and <i>Australia's Native Vegetation Framework 2012</i> – have been developed in collaboration with State and Territory governments, and guide management of native vegetation. Pollinating insects, pests and weeds – the following activities will take place: 1. <i>Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority</i> is reviewing the science on pesticides and bee health; 2. <i>Caring for our Community</i> program – through this we will build partnerships with industry, farmers, other governments and the community, to help exchange information about how to best mitigate the impact of animal pests and weeds; 3. <i>National Surveillance Framework for Weeds</i> – will be developed for land managers and communities to be better informed; 4. <i>Biodiversity Fund</i> – to prevent the spread of invasive species to food-producing farmland. Industry and Community Participation – collaboration between government, industry, research providers, community, food producers and consumers will be supported by the following activities: 1. <i>Caring for our Community</i> program – funds groups to build on their own resources and expertise to encourage farmers and fishers to adopt sustainable and innovative management practices; 2. <i>Landcare</i> – government will continue to support the Landcare community through support for training, capacity-building and leadership development. Sustaining our marine and aquatic environment – Australia has world's third largest marine area, however because of limited nutrient upwelling and low run-off from landmass, seas are typically nutrient poor and not very productive. More than 90 per cent of fish caught in Australia come from fish stocks assessed as sustainably-fished. Activities to support sustaining the marine and aquatic environment will include: 1. Recently commissioned review into the legislation and policy frameworks that have supported Commonwealth fisheries for over 20 years, released in March 2013, and announced that public consultation will take place to reform an implementation plan for the recommendations of the review; 2. <i>Caring for our Country</i> program – helping fishers adopt sustainable and low environmental impact practices; 3. <i>National Aquaculture Policy Statement</i> – commits all Australian governments to working with the aquaculture industry to achieve maximum sustainable growth, while also meeting national and international expectations for economic, environmental and social performance. Improving our demonstration of sustainability – will be supported through the following activities: 1. <i>State of the Environment Report 2011</i> – provides information on the current condition of the Australian environment, as well as risks and drivers of environmental change, including those linked to agricultural production; 2. <i>National Plan for Environmental Information</i> – has been established as a first step towards long-term reform of Australia's information base. Aimed at improving the quality, accessibility of environmental data for decision-making,

			including on food production; 3. <i>Fisheries Status Reports</i> – will continue to produce these for fisheries managed by the Commonwealth to communicate our sustainability for fisheries; 4. <i>Sustainability Indicators for Australia</i> – have been developed and are aimed at helping inform assessments of whether national and community wellbeing is maintained or improved over time. Monitor key stocks of social and human, nature and economic capital. These are not designed to measure the sustainability performance of particular industries or sectors, so a separate set of indicators will be developed for the agricultural sector. Reducing Waste – Goal for 2025 is ‘Australia will have reduced per capita food waste’ (DAFF 2013 p86). Activities to support this will include: 1. Review of the food safety elements of food labels to maximize the effectiveness of food safety communication; 2. New grants program for community food initiatives will assist local communities to redistribute food through supporting food rescue services and other initiatives; 3. <i>National Waste Policy: Less Waste, More Resources</i> – Implementation of this policy, which sets approach to waste management to 2020. Includes a strategy to divert food and other organic waste from landfill to more productive uses such as compost and soil amendments; 4. Inclusion of information on links between food, nutrition and environmental sustainability in the <i>Australian Dietary Guidelines 2013</i>; 5. Numerous State and Territory initiatives, including the <i>NSW Love Food Hate Waste</i> campaign.
8	12	Delivering the National Food Plan	This section is a table, summarising all goals identified in the document, with goals for 2025, along with accompanying five-year goals, and then a list of pathways for how the goals will be achieved. No timetables are assigned to the pathways, and no departmental responsibility is assigned to the tasks.

Source: Author

Table C2: Progress on Actions Recommended in National Food Plan

2025 Goals	Pathway to achieve goal	Progress
1. The value of Australia's agriculture and food-related exports will have increased by 45%	1.1 Pursue progress in WTO multilateral trade negotiations	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	1.2 Negotiate and implement regional and bilateral trade agreements that deliver significant benefits to agriculture and food sectors	
	1.3 Work in a targeted, effective and persistent manner to reduce barriers to trade through bilateral negotiations	
	1.4 Work to resolve technical market access negotiations	
	1.5 Assist with developing international standards	
	1.6 Work with trading partners to improve the implementation of measures affecting trade, consistent with WTO rules	
	1.7 Seek recognition of Australia's food safety management system as meeting the requirements of our trading partners	
	1.8 Improve coordination of market intelligence to address trade barriers and enable industry to take advantage of trade opportunities Establish dedicated market access liaison officers for specific food industries	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity. Dedicated officers for specific food industries might be a new initiative under the NFP but it was not possible to establish.
	2.1 Expand resources in Australia's diplomatic network to pursue food related market assess, with	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity. A press release issued by the DA in September 2015 announces funding of five new

	a larger footprint across Australia Enhance representation in key and emerging markets by increasing the number of overseas agricultural counsellors	agricultural counsellors in strategic markets to ‘promote our agricultural credentials with trading partners across the globe from January 2016’ (Department of Agriculture 19/09/2015).
2. Australia will have stronger food trade and investment relationships with countries across the region and the capabilities to promote Australian interests	2.2 Support Australian industry to build business-to-business links and enhance business relationships	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	2.3 Work with industry to identify emerging food needs and preferences of Asia and how Australia is best placed to respond: - Establish an Asia Food Markets Research Fund to support projects that help Australian businesses meet future Asian market need and preferences - Research Asian market opportunities through the ‘What Asia Wants: better understanding future Asian food demand’ report series	No further details on the Asia Food Markets Research Fund could be established, suggesting it has not been implemented. A 300+ page report by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, ‘What Asia wants: Long-term food consumption trends in Asia’, was published in October 2013 (ABARES 2013). No further details of actions related to the report could be identified.
	2.4 Provide client-focused trade facilitation services for food products, services and technology across a diverse range of markets	Not possible to establish implementation.
3. Australia will have a globally recognised food brand that is synonymous with high quality innovative safe and sustainable food services and technology	3.1 Work with Australian businesses to use targeted marketing, promotion and appropriate branding Work with industry to develop and deliver a Brand Australia Global Food Strategy	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity The Austrade project was developed by Austrade (the trade, investment and education promotion agency, and part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) under the title ‘National Food Brand’. According to a presentation published by Austrade in May 2014, on the ‘National Food Brand’ project, 2014 budget decisions meant that National Food Brand funding will not continue after June 30 2014 (Austrade 2013)
	3.2 Promote Australia’s world-class food safety	

4. Australia's agricultural productivity will have increased by 30 per cent, helping farmers grow more food using fewer inputs	management and biosecurity systems	The pathway is vague and difficult to evaluate. This can be classed as an ongoing activity.
	4.1 Maintain and improve a world-leading rural research and development system	
	4.2 Encourage an effective rural extension system, involving the private and public sectors	
	4.3 Encourage innovation by food businesses using economy-wide measures where possible (for example, general research and development tax incentives, the IP system)	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	4.4 Support targeted initiatives, including investment, collaboration, programs and better regulation	
	4.5 Remove impediments to adoption of technology and know-how that are safe for people and the environment (includes biotechnology)	
	4.6 Focus research, development and extension investments on strategic needs, taking into account needs of producers, supply chains and end consumers	
	4.7 Create opportunities for farmers in domestic and international carbon markets	
	4.8 Provide farmers and landholders with incentives to reduce GHG emissions or store carbon through the Carbon Farming Initiative	The Carbon Farming Initiative was a Gillard Government election commitment in 2010 (Macintosh 2013). Described as ' <i>a project-based, baseline-and-credit offset scheme for emissions and removals from the land use, land-use change and forestry</i> ', the CFI was introduced in 2011. This can therefore be classed as ongoing activity from prior to the NFP.
	4.9 Ensure government investment in research, trialling and extension elements are targeted at mitigation and adaption opportunities	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	4.10 Build the capacity of food businesses and the	

	community to prepare for and adapt to climate change	
	4.11 Support farm families in times of drought and other challenges	
	4.12 Help farmers move away from government-funded crisis assistance towards risk management and preparedness	
	4.13 Ensure that government interventions do not discourage people and farm businesses from adapting	
	4.14 Ensure the development of a national adaption framework for agriculture that includes consideration of and collaboration with food businesses	A specific adaption framework for agriculture could not be identified.
	4.15 Encourage domestic and foreign investment in the food industry, including with: Appropriate support for investment promotion and attraction initiatives Increasing transparency of foreign investment in agricultural land	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	4.16 Encourage well-regulated and competitive markets for food business inputs	
	4.17 Facilitate access to plant and animal genetic resources consistent with international obligations	
5. Innovation in Australia's food manufacturing industry will have increased, building scale and capability through collaborations to make the most of emerging	5.1 Establish the Food Industry Innovation Precinct to help enhance the capability of food businesses through training, improved networking and collaboration	The Food Industry Innovation Precinct was one of several precincts announced in February 2013 as part of the 'A Plan for Australian Jobs', and therefore predates the NFP. The Food Industry Precinct – since renamed a Food and Agribusiness Growth Centre by the Coalition government – is operated by Food Innovation Australia Ltd (FIAL), an organisation which was already in existence. FIAL has consulted with

opportunities in the Asian region	[Earlier pages in the document also state that the NFP will appoint an ‘experienced business leader as the Food and Beverage Supplier Advocate to encourage business-to-business links between food suppliers and their customers’ (DAFF 2013 p29)]	members and formulated a Food and Agribusiness Sector Competitiveness Plan, which was presented to the Federal Government Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science, the Hon Greg Hunt MP on 31 July 2016 (FIAL 2016). No further details of the Food and Beverage Supplier Advocate could be identified post-launch of the NFP.
	5.2 Support food manufacturing innovation and growth through the first phase of the Australian Research Council’s \$236 mn Industrial Transformation Research Program	It appears the program is ongoing, though no specific details of the food manufacturing element could be identified from public sources (ARC 2016).
6. Australia’s agriculture and fisheries workforce will have built its skills base, increasing the proportion with post-school qualifications	6.1 Ensure the education and training system is responsive to food industry training and skills development needs	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	6.2 Make it easier for more Australians to join the food industry workforce, including people from Indigenous, youth, aged and mobile groups	
	6.3 Identify possible improvements to migration programs that may help the food industry address labour demands	
	6.4 Build Asia awareness in the food industry through skills and workforce development initiatives	
7. Australia’s infrastructure and biosecurity systems will support a growing food industry, moving food cost-effectively and efficiently to markets and supporting new opportunities	7.1 Build on our evidence base about the food industry and consumer demand to better inform infrastructure planning and other decision-making Commission an analysis of the food industry’s future infrastructure needs to 2025	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity. An ABARES report - ‘Infrastructure and Australia’s food industry: Preliminary economic assessment’ – was published in November 2013. No further action following the report could be established (ABARES 2013).
	7.2 Ensure the needs of the food supply chain are appropriately factored in to national infrastructure	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.

	prioritisation, planning, investment and regulation	
	7.3 Encourage private investment and effective public-private partnerships to deliver food-related infrastructure projects for the community	
	7.4 Help our food industry avoid higher production costs by supporting our animal and health status in a way that minimises regulatory burden. The key to achieving this is our strong and integrated biosecurity system, and over the coming years we aim to: Build a more integrated and coordinated system of onshore biosecurity Implement national eradication strategies, on a risk-return basis, for new plant, animal and disease incursions	
8. Participation by Australian food businesses in the digital economy will have increased, driving productivity gains and innovation and creating connections with global markets	8.1 Enable and encourage food businesses and consumers to take up new opportunities from the National Broadband Network	
9. Australia will be among the top five most efficiently regulated countries in the world, reducing business costs	9.1 Work with State and Territory governments to improve the effectiveness of national regulatory frameworks	
	9.2 Work to reduce regulatory burdens on business where this delivers a net benefit to the community	
	9.3 Minimise scope for new regulatory burdens through application of best practice regulation impact assessment	
	9.4 Continually review the effectiveness of the	

	stock of regulation that affects the food supply chain	
	9.5 Productivity Commission review of regulation across the food supply chain	An inquiry was announced by the subsequent Turnbull coalition government in November 2015, with a media release from Agriculture Minister Barnaby Joyce noting that ‘the inquiry will focus on regulation with a material impact on domestic and international competitiveness of farm businesses and the productivity of Australian agriculture’ (Department of Agriculture 20/11/2015).
	9.6 Promote competition and fair trading along the supply chain (primarily through strong competition and consumer laws and independent enforcement)	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity.
	9.7 Encourage food businesses to build relationships and codes of conduct that create a productive and efficient supply chain • Build food supply chain relationships	
	9.8 Support and monitor industry self-regulation efforts to ensure they promote fair trading, and are consistent with competition laws	
10. Australia will have built on its high level of food security by continuing to improve access to safe and nutritious food for those living in remote communities or struggling with disadvantage	10.1 Maintain a competitive and productive food industry producing food sustainably	
	10.2 Maintain an open access market policy approach to allow the importation of food	
	10.3 Work with industry to improve the resilience of the food supply chain under the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy	No further details of food-related activities under the CIRS could be established.
	10.4 Maintain a strong economy and improved opportunities for employment among disadvantaged groups	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	10.5 Support socially and financially disadvantaged Australians through income support	

	and programs to improve individual food security	
	10.6 Continue to support programs to help disadvantaged families budget and prioritise spending towards goods and services such as food	
	10.7 Provide support to non-government organisations that assist people experiencing food insecurity through government grants and the taxation system	
	10.8 Implement initiatives under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Chronic Disease Fund to promote nutrition and healthy, active lifestyles in Indigenous communities and improve and strengthen linkages between Australian Government, State and Territory programs	
	10.9 Review the National Strategy for Food Security in Remote Indigenous Communities and implement any changes arising	Food Security in Remote Indigenous Communities is an initiative under the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and is not specific to the NFP (NAO 2014).
	10.10 Monitor food security and consumption to identify as-risk populations, inform targeted program development and enable the evaluation of health impacts of programs	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	10.11 Improve access to healthy and fresh food in remote areas in the Northern Territory through the strengthened community stores licensing and support scheme	
11. Australia will be considered to be in the top three countries in the world for food safety, increasing the reputation of Australia's exports	11.1 Maintain a risk-based regulatory approach to food safety through a partnership between the Australian Government, State and Territory governments and the New Zealand Government	
	11.2 Develop and maintain effective food standards	

	that are based on the best available scientific evidence and are consistent with international standards, as appropriate	
	11.3 Continue to take a proactive approach to managing food safety including: • Targeting of food safety interventions • Seeking efficiencies in collection and understanding of data, setting of priorities for food safety research and development • Building collaborative national and international partnerships and linkages to share information, data and best practice	
	11.4 Monitor and investigate foodborne illness and increase our capacity to predict and investigate potential emerging issues	
	11.5 Promote and educate consumers on safe food handling through provision of clear product information, education materials and programs	
	11.6 Participate in the development of risk and evidence-based international food standards to promote internationally consistent management of food safety	
	11.7 Continue to develop and maintain collaborative industry and government partnerships to allow for effective response to food safety emergencies, including the efficient recall of unsafe food from the marketplace	
12. Australian's will have the information they need to help them make decisions about food	12.1 Improve the information on food labelling by adopting a framework to guide decision-making	
	12.2 Support industry-initiated self-regulatory and	

	co-regulatory approaches to labelling of food in relation to consumer values issues	
	12.3 Improve consumer and industry understanding of COOL including: • Consider extending mandatory COOL to all remaining unpackaged primary food products • Progress a compliance and enforcement program to determine the level and nature of any misconduct by suppliers • Assess consumer awareness and responsiveness to COOL as part of the next Australian Consumer Survey 2015	New COOL label rules were introduced in July 2016. They introduce 'Grown In'; 'Produced In', 'Packed In' and 'Made In' labels and businesses have two years to comply (DIIS 2016).
	12.4 Develop a Ministerial Policy Guideline to guide how both regulatory and non-regulatory measures would apply to a new technology requiring pre-market approval	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	12.5 Implement relevant government agreed actions in response to Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy	
	12.6 Support industry-led initiatives that complement food labelling to provide additional consumer-value information	
	12.7 Continue to assist the community to establish and manage community food initiatives, including through a new grants program	According to coverage from ABC news, the fund has not been implemented (ABC.net 2014)
	12.8 Support community food initiatives through increased coordination and promotion, making information more accessible • Fund a community initiatives program	

13. Australian children will have a better understanding of how food is produced	13.1 Develop teacher resources and professional learning to support teaching about food and agriculture through the Australian Curriculum Invest in developing resources	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
14. Australia will have contributed to global food security by helping farmers in developing countries gain access to new agricultural technologies	14.1 Provide technical and development assistance to help developing countries use resources more efficiently and improve agricultural productivity	
	14.2 Share our research and development expertise to help developing countries increase their production of food	Target date not yet here so cannot evaluate.
	14.3 Increase the amount of aid we provide to 0.5 per cent of gross national income by 2017-18, more than doubling it from 2010-11 levels	
	14.4 Strengthen our international agricultural research partnerships to assist global economic development and food security	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	14.5 Work through international trade forums to advocate for all countries to adhere to the rules of the global trading system	
	14.6 Advocate for appropriate global, regional and national economic and trade policies, together with good governance	
	14.7 Provide trade-related development assistance to support developing countries' participation in global markets	
	14.8 Continue to provide funding to international humanitarian relief organisations to ensure emergency food assistance is available during crises	

15. Australia will produce food sustainably and will have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes	15.1 Through the Caring for our Country Program: • Assist farmers to adopt sustainable and innovative practices • Increase the knowledge and capacity of farming, regional, community and other groups involved in natural resource management • Work with industry, corporate, institutional, sectoral, market and supply chain based initiatives to promote sustainable production and support adoption of sustainable farm practices	The program has been running since 2006 and therefore is not a result of the NFP and the activities listed in the NFP pathways are unlikely to be new.
	15.2 Invest in research on sustainable food production, including developing a cross-sectoral soils research, development and extension strategy	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	15.3 Raise awareness of sustainable food production and the importance of soil through an Advocate for Soil Health	The Advocate was appointed in 2012, prior to release of the NFP (Department of Agriculture 17/03/2016).
	15.4 Continue to work with States and Territories to implement the National Water Initiative and the National Water Quality Management Strategy	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	15.5 Continue rollout of the \$15 bn-plus Water for the Future initiative reforms, including reforms for on and off-farm water use efficiency	
	15.6 Continue to implement the Murray-Darling Basin Plan and deliver further on-farm irrigation efficiency out to 2024 through agreements with States and Territories and consistent with the plan's Sustainable Diversion Limit adjustment mechanism	
	15.7 Continue to invest in research on pollinating	

	insects and work with stakeholders to implement the Honey Bee Industry and Pollination Continuity Strategy Should Varroa Become Established in Australia	
	15.8 Implement a national surveillance framework for existing weeds and pests, building on existing systems that strengthen community capacity for managing new incursions	
	15.9 Regulate the amount of fish that can be taken and the way in which this occurs in order to support sustainable and productive fisheries and marine environments	
	15.10 Through Caring for our Country: Assist fishers to adopt sustainable and low environment impact practices through investment in extension and projects to drive innovation Invest in activities to further restore and maintain Australia's urban waterways and coastal environments	The program has been running since 2006 and therefore is not a result of the NFP and the activities listed in the NFP pathways are unlikely to be new.
	15.11 Continue to invest in and promote community-based organisations, Landcare, farming systems groups and regional community leaders to address natural resource management issues, build capability, plan and raise awareness	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	15.12 Support a network of facilitators to provide advice and support to Landcare and other groups that deliver natural resource management outcomes. Landcare facilitators will interact with schools to promote agricultural learning and understanding of food	
	Establish a new sustainable agriculture advisory	No details of a new committee could be established.

	committee to provide advice to government on national sustainability priorities across industries; support the National Landcare Council to continue to provide advice on Landcare and matters concerning natural resource management	
	15.14 Implement the National Plan For Environmental Information initiative to improve the quality and accessibility of environmental information	Pathways vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity
	15.15 Invest in programs and surveys that support the collection, analysis and distribution of data and information on land use, soil, ground cover, weeds, pest animals, land management practices and the motivations of resource users	
	15.16 Work with the agricultural industry to develop ways to clearly identify and communicate our clean, high quality and environmentally friendly credentials, including the development of sustainability indicators for agriculture	
	15.17 Work with industry to assess and minimise the presence of agvet chemical residues on produce	
	15.18 Continue to produce Fisheries Status Reports for fisheries managed by the Commonwealth	
16. Australia will have reduced per capita food waste	16.1 Implementing the National Waste Policy: Less Waste More Resources	
	16.2 Implementing the Community Food Initiatives [sic]	Pathway vague and difficult to evaluate. Can be classed as ongoing activity. As noted previously, according to coverage from ABC news, the Community Food Initiatives Fund has not been implemented (ABC.net 2014)

Source: Author

Table C3: NFP White Paper Goals

Theme	Goals
Growing Exports	1. The value of Australia's agriculture and food-related exports will have increased by 45 per cent (in real terms), contributing to an increase in our gross domestic product.
	2. Australia will have stronger food trade and investment relationships with countries across the region and the capabilities to promote Australian interests.
	3. Australia will have a globally recognised food brand that is synonymous with high-quality, innovative, safe and sustainable food, services and technology.
Thriving Industry	4. Australia's agricultural productivity will have increased by 30 per cent, helping farmers grow more food using fewer inputs.
	5. Innovation in Australia's food manufacturing industry will have increased, building scale and capability through collaborations to make the most of emerging opportunities in the Asian region.
	6. Australia's agriculture and fisheries workforce will have built its skills base, increasing the proportion with post-school qualifications.
	7. Australia's infrastructure and biosecurity systems will support a growing food industry, moving food cost-effectively and efficiently to markets and supporting new export opportunities.
	8. Participation by Australian food businesses in the digital economy will have increased, driving productivity gains and innovation and creating connections with global markets.
People	9. Australia will be among the top five most efficiently regulated countries in the world, reducing business costs.
	10. Australia will have built on its high level of food security by continuing to improve access to safe and nutritious food for those living in remote communities or struggling with disadvantage.
	11. Australia will be considered to be in the top three countries in the world for food safety, increasing the reputation of Australia's exports.

	12. Australians will have the information they need to help them make decisions about food.
	13. Australian children will have a better understanding of how food is produced.
	14. Australia will have contributed to global food security by helping farmers in developing countries gain access to new agricultural technologies.
Sustainable Food	15. Australia will produce food sustainably and will have adopted innovative practices to improve productive and environmental outcomes.
	16. Australia will have reduced per capita food waste.

Source: Author from DAFF (2013)

Table C4: Examples of Framing in NFP

Frame	Policy Document	Examples
Food Security	Issues Paper	<i>Our nation's food supply is secure, and we need to remain vigilant in protecting that food security in the years to come.</i> (DAFF 2011 piii) <i>While the food supply chain has proven its resilience, including through the natural disasters that occurred in Queensland during the summer of 2010–11, Australia should continue to ensure the food supply chain's resilience to respond to unexpected disruptions and emergencies.</i> (DAFF 2011 p16)
	Green Paper	<i>Australia is in the enviable position of being able to comfortably feed our people. Through a combination of excellent management, great good fortune and an inventive spirit, our food industry has grown from strength to strength</i> (DAFF 2012 piii)
	White Paper	<i>Australia has a strong, safe and stable food system and high levels of food security.</i> (DAFF 2013 p6).
Innovation, Competition and Efficiency	Issues Paper	<i>It is important that Australia fosters an innovative, efficient, competitive and sustainable customer-focused food industry to ensure Australia's food security and contribution to global food security. Potential benefits may include a more affordable and nutritious food supply with a reduced environmental footprint and opportunities for growth in regional economies.</i>(DAFF 2011 p2) <i>Competition in the Australian food sector is essential to ensuring efficient use of resources and encouraging rapid uptake of new technologies in food production and services. A competitive food sector creates incentives for businesses to be productive and innovative, which leads to greater benefits for all Australians, including improvements in food quality, greater consumer choice, competitive grocery pricing, and sufficient growth in food supplies to meet expanding demand.</i>(DAFF 2011 p31)
	Green Paper	<i>The Australian Government is committed to Australia maintaining a sustainable, globally competitive, resilient food supply that supports access to nutritious and affordable food.</i>(DAFF 2012 p1) <i>Australia has a highly competitive and growing food industry, which contributes significantly to the national economy, particularly the</i>

		<i>prosperity of regional Australia.(DAFF 2012 p128)</i> <i>A competitive and productive food industry will ensure the security and profitability of Australia's domestic food supply and provide opportunities for wider economic growth. A successful food industry will also provide ongoing economic opportunities across Australia including employment. (DAFF 2012 p49)</i> <i>Competition between food businesses, fostered by the government's competition policy approach, will usually encourage innovation and improved product price, quality and variety to meet consumer needs. At the same time, consumer laws ensure minimum standards of business behaviour and product safety.(DAFF 2012 p115)</i> <i>A key objective of the market-based approach to economic policy is to improve competition and productivity across the economy, allowing resources to gravitate to their most valued use. Competition in domestic industries can, in turn, improve international competitiveness of domestic firms by encouraging improvements in productivity, flexibility, innovation and efficiency. (DAFF 2012 p125)</i> <i>The Australian Government is committed to innovation to drive Australia's competitive future. It supports a national innovation system to deliver cutting-edge science and research, international competitiveness and greater productivity. (DAFF 2012 p145)</i>
	White Paper	<i>First, Australia must compete strongly to capture a share of these new global opportunities. We need to build on our strengths and capitalise on our advantages, growing our exports and building market share against strong competition from others. Second, Australia must have a competitive and productive food industry. The industry brings food to our tables, provides one-in-six Australian jobs and is the lifeblood of many regional towns. The Australian Government wants the food industry to seize the opportunities of the Asian century and become a larger part of our national economy, providing rewarding careers for Australians and strengthening our regional communities. Third, we must make sure there is food on the table at home. All Australians must have access to enough safe and Fourth, Australia must produce its food sustainably. Our continued ability to produce food depends on having healthy natural resources. We need to work to improve our soils, use our land, water and marine resources wisely and protect Australia from introduced pests and diseases. Beyond the economic benefits we gain from our clean, green credentials, it is our obligation to ourselves and future generations of Australians. (DAFF 2013 p6)</i> <i>Vibrant industries—We strive for strong and competitive businesses that are responsive to change, open to global opportunities and provide rewarding jobs and careers. We encourage innovation, adaptability and resilience in our food industries. Where appropriate, we will work with businesses and employees to support adaptation to changing circumstances. (DAFF 2013 p18)</i> <i>Innovation is a fundamental driver of food business success. It gives businesses an edge in creating new products and services that consumers want or in adapting to environmental changes such as climate change. Food businesses must continue to innovate to meet the growing need for food in the Asian century. (DAFF 2013 p34)</i>

		<i>Competitive markets benefit all Australians and position our businesses to succeed in the Asian century. Competition creates a strong incentive for businesses to reduce costs, employ resources more efficiently and innovate. Competition between businesses places downward pressure on prices and improves the quality and range of goods and services available to consumers in Australia. High-quality goods and services will also be sought in markets overseas. Competition helps businesses access inputs that are competitively priced, such as machinery, energy and fertilisers. This helps them reduce their costs of production and compete more effectively. (DAFF 2013 p44)</i>
Appropriate Role of Government	Green Paper	<i>The government is not seeking to tell industry and consumers what to do. Rather, it is articulating its policy direction with regard to the food system. This will help food businesses, food-producing regions and interest groups address challenges and opportunities over the medium to long term and also help inform public debate on food issues. (DAFF 2012 p21)</i> <i>Role of governments in the food system - The major participants in the food system are individuals and businesses that produce, buy and sell food from one another in accordance with applicable laws. (DAFF 2012 p30)</i> <i>Some issues are for industry and others to solve, not government. (DAFF 2012 p123)</i>
		<i>Freedom to choose—Australians are free to make their own choices about food: Farmers decide the food they produce and people decide what to eat. (DAFF 2013 p18)</i> <i>We will only intervene to prevent harm or meet our international obligations. (DAFF 2013 p19)</i> <i>We will provide information so people can make informed food choices. (DAFF 2013 p18)</i> <i>Free and open markets—Free and open markets deliver overall benefits to Australians, with balanced government intervention where appropriate to address market failures. (DAFF 2013 p18)</i> <i>Minimal and effective regulation— Regulations will aim to achieve the desired results with least possible regulatory burden. We will aim to harmonise regulation where it is appropriate and there is a national interest and/or shared responsibilities between jurisdictions. (DAFF 2013 p19)</i> <i>While some stakeholders have called for further regulation of the major supermarkets, we need to be careful to ensure regulation does not stifle competition or impose unnecessary red tape and costs on businesses that may lead to higher food prices for consumers. We will continue to work to improve the competitiveness of our food industry in partnership with industry and the community. Businesses and</i>

		<i>individuals with concerns about potential anti-competitive or unconscionable conduct can contact the ACCC. Consumers can also use their purchasing power as a significant driver for change. (DAFF 2013 p50)</i>
Policy Instruments	Issues Paper	<i>The government's policy is to allow businesses to meet consumer preferences, provided food is safe and product claims comply with Australian consumer laws. Australia's consumer laws give consumers basic protection from misleading and deceptive conduct and representations and guarantee basic product quality and product safety. These broad rules are enhanced through specific food regulation under the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code, which provides for specific rules on the content, processing, packaging and labelling of food products (DAFF 2011 piii).</i>
	Green Paper	<i>Successive Australian governments have approached food policy as part of a broader set of policies designed to produce economic, environmental and social benefits for all Australians. They have also been guided by the principle that government should minimise interventions in the economy, environment and society except where a strong rationale exists to do otherwise. In other words, society's general needs and expectations are almost always best met by allowing individuals and businesses the freedom to choose how to conduct themselves. (DAFF 2012 p44)</i> <i>In relation to environmental sustainability, the Australian Government does not plan to enforce a mandatory scheme regarding general sustainability outcomes. The government believes commercial imperative, combined with other government measures (such as environmental legislation and natural resource management initiatives), is adequate to ensure food production systems operate in a manner suited to Australia's natural resource base. (DAFF 2012 p116)</i> <i>The Australian Government also supports a range of non-regulatory measures to improve information available about food, including voluntary labelling, industry codes of practice, voluntary Australian standards and self-regulation. (DAFF 2012 p114)</i> <i>The Australian Government plays a leadership role on animal welfare by working with the State and Territory governments, which are responsible for animal welfare arrangements within their jurisdictions, to develop model codes of practice for the welfare of animals. The model codes aim to ensure farm animals are treated humanely and responsibly. (DAFF 2012 p116)</i> <i>Similarly, industry has developed a number of codes of practice setting out specific standards of conduct in relation to its customers. Codes of practice can either be mandatory (prescribed as regulations under fair trading laws) or voluntary (a form of industry self-regulation). Examples relevant to the food industry include the Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct, the Produce and Grocery Industry Code, and the Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children. (DAFF 2012 p116)</i> <i>This market-based approach—facilitating well-functioning markets—replaced past approaches that were characterised by more direct interventions, involving measures such as price controls and import tariffs, which were shown to generally have higher costs than benefits</i>

		to the industry and Australian consumers.(DAFF 2012 p124)
	White Paper	<i>We will provide information so people can make informed food choices. (DAFF 2013 p18)</i> <i>Minimal and effective regulation— Regulations will aim to achieve the desired results with least possible regulatory burden. We will aim to harmonise regulation where it is appropriate and there is a national interest and/or shared responsibilities between jurisdictions. (DAFF 2013 p19)</i> <i>While some stakeholders have called for further regulation of the major supermarkets, we need to be careful to ensure regulation does not stifle competition or impose unnecessary red tape and costs on businesses that may lead to higher food prices for consumers. (DAFF 2013 p50)</i> <i>We promote nutritious and healthy food and provide information to help consumers understand the effects of food choices on their health. The Australian Dietary Guidelines provide information on how to achieve a healthy diet, including the types and amounts of foods, food groups and dietary patterns that promote health. Based on the latest scientific evidence, the guidelines are maintained by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and promoted by the public health sector, industry, educators, researchers and the broader community. (DAFF 2013 p62)</i> <i>The Australian Government works with the food industry, public health groups and individuals to help Australians meet nutritional goals set by the Australian Dietary Guidelines. Through the Food and Health Dialogue, the food industry is encouraged to voluntarily reduce the amount of salt, saturated fat, sugar and energy and increase the amount of fruit, vegetables and fibre/wholegrain cereals in manufactured and pre-prepared foods. The Food and Health Dialogue is working to make healthier food choices easier in quick service restaurants by improving nutritional quality, reducing standard portion sizes and educating customers. (DAFF 2013 p62)</i> <i>One of the most worrying trends is childhood obesity rates. We are committed to helping children better understand the importance of making healthy food choices. To promote healthy behaviours in children, we provide practical information and advice on nutrition and physical activity including through the National Healthy Eating and Physical Activity Guidelines for early Childhood Settings (Get Up and Grow) and the National Healthy School Canteen Guidelines. We are also committed to the Stephanie Alexander Kitchen Garden National Program. (DAFF 2013 p63)</i> <i>The Australian Government reviews information on children's exposure to the marketing of energy-dense, relatively nutrient-poor foods, particularly those that target children. We also monitor reporting on the effectiveness of industry initiatives and codes and standards that aim to moderate children's exposure to advertisements for energy-dense, relatively nutrient-poor foods. We are developing a guideline framework to provide a consistent method for future monitoring of children's exposure to advertising and marketing of unhealthy food on television. (DAFF 2013 p63)</i>

		<i>To help consumers make healthier food choices, governments around Australia are working with industry, public health and consumer stakeholders to develop an agreed labelling system that will see easy-to-understand nutrition information placed on the front of food packages. (DAFF 2013 p63)</i>

Source: Author

Copy of Consent Form

Consent form



**CITY UNIVERSITY
LONDON**

Kelly Parsons
PhD Researcher
Centre for Food Policy
School of Arts and Social
Sciences

City University London
Northampton Square
London EC1V 0HB

Title of Study: Constructing a national food policy: Policy integration and co-ordination pathways and challenges in Australia and the UK.

Please initial box

1.	I agree to take part in the above City University London research project. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the participant information sheet, which I may keep for my records. I understand this will involve: • be interviewed by the researcher • allow the interview to be videotaped/audiotaped • make myself available for a further interview should that be required	
2.	This information will be held and processed for the following purpose(s): For use in the PhD thesis In presentations and journal articles I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that could lead to the identification of any individual will be disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party. No identifiable personal data will be published. The identifiable data will not be shared with any other organisation.	
3.	I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being penalized or disadvantaged in any way.	
4.	I agree to City University London recording and processing this information about me. I understand that this information will be used only for the	

	purpose(s) set out in this statement and my consent is conditional on the University complying with its duties and obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998.	
5.	I agree to take part in the above study.	

Name of Participant Signature Date

Name of Participant Signature Date

Copy of Interview Schedule

Pre-interview

- Email introduction and a request for interview.
- If interview agreed, arrange face-to-face meeting where possible, or telephone/Skype interview.
- Provide participant with consent form.

Consent Form

- Explain that the interview will be recorded and that the content will be confidential and kept anonymous, via a pseudonym.
- Read through consent form with participant, and ask them to sign two copies: one for researcher, one for participant.
- Explain that participants are free to stop for breaks whenever required during the interview, and can withdraw at any time, and should not hesitate to contact the researcher with questions.

Interview

SEE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS BELOW

Post-interview

- Thank participant.
- Request that they be available to answer clarification/follow-up questions.
- Explain that the overall findings of the research will be sent to them in summary form.

Interview Questions:

1. **What is your experience of how national food policy is formulated in the UK/Australia**

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- What cross-departmental communication takes place on food?
- What mechanisms are in place for this?
- What is the system for rotating civil servants between departments and how might this impact on coordination on food policy?
- What do you see as the main tensions between different departmental approaches to food?

2. What has been your involvement with formulation of this and previous and subsequent national food policies?

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- How did the content and process of this attempt to create a national policy compare to previous and subsequent attempts?

3. What/who do you view as the biggest influences on the content and outcomes of the policy?

[Seek clarification of the following, where necessary: what other departments were involved and how; what terms of reference were set; which advisors and stakeholders were invited to contribute; the impact of the consultation process; what institutional structures were put in place to facilitate the policy; what plans for implementation/evaluation were put in place?]

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- What do you view as the main themes/priorities for the policy?
- How much attention was paid to previous national food policies/regional or State policies?
- What priority was given to export/growth in the policy?

4. How well do you think the policy formulation dealt with integration?

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- Was integration a priority in the policymaking process for this national food policy?
- How was integration addressed?
- How successful was this?
- What do you think should be done to create better integrated national food policy?

5. How did the content of the policy change during the formulation process?

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- What policy alternatives were dismissed?
- What ways did you find to overcome challenges in the policy making process?

6. What were the outcomes of the policy process?

Follow-up questions/prompts:

- What would have been the best outcome from your point of view?
- What lessons for national food policy formulation and implementation can we take from Food Matters/2030/National Food Plan?

References

- ABARES, 2013. *What Asia wants: Long-term food consumption trends in Asia*. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Science.
- ABBOTS, E. and COLES, B., 2013. Horsemeat-gate: The discursive production of a neoliberal food scandal. *Food, Culture & Society*, 16(4), pp. 535-550.
- ABC.NET, 21/02/2017, 2014-last update, Federal Government Scraps Food Grants Programme [Homepage of ABC.net], [Online]. Available: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2014-02-21/food-grants-scrapped/5274530> [17/05, 2017].
- ABC.NET, 2013. Confusion over future of agriculture ministers forum [Homepage of ABC.net]. Available: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2013-12-16/primary-industry-council-confusion/5158980>. [17/05, 2017].
- ACHESON, D., 1998. *Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health Report*. London: Department of Health.
- AFGC, 2014. *AFGC Submission Agricultural Competitiveness Green Paper*. Canberra: Australian Food and Grocery Council.
- AFGC, 2012. *AFGC Response To: National Food Plan Issues Paper*. Barton: Australia: Australian Food and Grocery Council.
- AFSA, 2012. *Fair food movement calls for genuine public consultation on National Food Plan*. Australia: Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance.
- AGHION, P., BESLEY, T., BROWNE, J., CASELLI, F., LAMBERT, R., LOMAX, R., PISSARIDES, C., STERN, N. and VAN REENEN, J., 2013. *Investing for Prosperity. Skills, Infrastructure and Innovation, Report of the LSE Growth Commission*. London: LSE Growth Commission.
- ALLEN CONSULTING GROUP, 2012. *Evaluation of the National Primary Industries RD&E Framework, report to the Department of Primary Industries Victoria*. Canberra: Allen Consulting Group.
- AMENTA, E. and RAMSEY, K.M., 2010. Institutional theory. *Handbook of politics*. Springer, pp. 15-39.
- AMIN, A. and THRIFT, N., 1995. Institutional issues for the European regions: from markets and plans to socioeconomics and powers of association. *Economy and society*, 24(1), pp. 41-66.
- ANAO, 2006-7. *The National Food Industry Strategy: Audit Report No.11 2006-07*. Canberra: Australian National Audit Office.
- ANGEN, M.J., 2000. Evaluating interpretive inquiry: reviewing the validity debate and opening the dialogue. *Qualitative health research*, 10(3), pp. 378-395.
- ANPHA, 2011. *Australian National Preventative Health Agency: Agency resources and planned performance*. Canberra: Australian National Preventive Health Agency.
- APPELQVIST, I. and BALL, G., 2013. *National Food and Nutrition Research and Development and Technology Transfer Strategy*. Sydney: CSIRO.
- ARC, 25/11/2016, 2016-last update, Industrial Transformation Research Program [Homepage of Australian Research Council], [Online]. Available: <http://www.arc.gov.au/industrial-transformation-research-program> [17/05, 2017].
- ARGENT, N., 2002. From Pillar to Post? In search of the post-productivist countryside in Australia. *Australian Geographer*, 33(1), pp. 97-114.
- ARNOULT, M.H., JONES, P.J., TRANTER, R.B., TIFFIN, R., TRAILL, W.B. and TZANOPOULOS, J., 2010. Modelling the likely impact of healthy eating guidelines on agricultural production and land use in England and Wales. *Land Use Policy*, 27(4), pp. 1046-1055.
- AUSTRALIA, 2013. *Brand Australia Global Food Strategy Research*. Powerpoint Presentation edn. Canberra: Austrade.
- AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, Undated. *Forum on Food Sector Relationships Communique*. Canberra: Australian Government.
- AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 2012. *Australia in the Asian Century white paper*. Canberra: Australian Government.
- AUSTRALIAN LABOR, 2010. *Campaign Media Statement from the Minister of Agriculture Tony Burke*. Canberra: Australian Labor.

- AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, 2009. *Towards a National Food and Nutrition Policy. Learnings from a dialogue to inform the advocacy approach of the Dietitians Association of Australia and the Public Health Association of Australia*. Canberra: Australia: The Australian National University Centre For Dialogue.
- AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 2007. *Tackling wicked problems: A public policy perspective*. Canberra: Australian Public Service Commission.
- BACCHI, C., 2009. *Analysing policy*. Pearson Higher Education AU.
- BAIER, V.E., MARCH, J.G. and SAETREN, H., 1986. Implementation and ambiguity. *Scandinavian Journal of Management Studies*, 2(3-4), pp. 197-212.
- BAKER, P., GILL, T., FRIEL, S., CAREY, G. and KAY, A., 2017. Generating political priority for regulatory interventions targeting obesity prevention: an Australian case study. *Social science & medicine*, 177, pp. 141-149.
- BARLING, D., 2007. Food supply chain governance and public health externalities: upstream policy interventions and the UK State. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, 20(3), pp. 285-300.
- BARLING, D., 2004. Food Agencies as an Institutional Response to Policy Failure by the UK and the EU. *Qualities of Food*, pp. 108-128.
- BARLING, D. and LANG, T., 2010. *Reflections on Food 2030, its past and future*. Food Ethics Council, Brighton, Volume 5 Issue 2.
- BARLING, D., SHARPE, R. and LANG, T., 2008. *Rethinking Britain's food security*. Soil Association, Bristol.
- BARLING, D., LANG, T. and CARAHER, M., 2002. Joined-up Food Policy? The Trials of Governance, Public Policy and the Food System. *Social Policy & Administration*, 36(6), pp. 556-574.
- BATES, R.H., GREIF, A., LEVI, M., ROSENTHAL, J.L. and WEINGAST, B.R., 1998. *Analytical Narratives*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University.
- BAUMGARTNER, F.R. and JONES, B.D., 2009. *Agendas and instability in American politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- BEESON, M. and FIRTH, A., 1998. Neoliberalism as a political rationality: Australian public policy since the 1980s. *Journal of Sociology*, 34(3), pp. 215-231.
- BEESON, M. and JAYASURIYA, K., 2009. The politics of Asian engagement: Ideas, institutions, and academics. *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 55(3), pp. 360-374.
- BELAND, D., 2007. Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift. *Social Science Quarterly*, 88(1), pp. 20-38.
- BELL, S., 2004. 'Appropriate' policy knowledge, and institutional and governance implications. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 63(1), pp. 22-28.
- BELL, S., 2002. Institutionalism: old and new. *Government, politics, power and policy in Australia*, pp. 363-380.
- BELL, S., 2004. 'Appropriate' Policy Knowledge, and Institutional and Governance Implications. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 63(1), pp. 22-28.
- BENTON, T. and CRAIB, I., 2001. *Philosophy of social science: Philosophical issues in social thought (traditions in social theory)*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- BERESFORD, Q., 2000. *Government, Money and Globalisation: Public policy in context*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- BERMAN, S., 2001. Ideas, Norms, and Culture in Political Analysis. *Comparative Politics*, 33(2), pp. 231-250.
- BEVIR, M., 2005. *New Labour*. Psychology Press.
- BIS, 2013. *A UK Strategy for Agricultural Technologies*. London: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
- BLEWETT, N., GODDARD, N., PETTIGREW, S., REYNOLDS, C. and YEATMAN, H., 2011. *Labelling logic: review of food labelling law and policy*. Council of Australian Governments/Australia and New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council: Canberra.

- BOGDANOR, V., 2005. *Joined-up government*. Oxford University Press.
- BOTTERILL, L., 2003. From Black Jack McEwen to the Cairns Group: Reform in Australian agricultural policy. *National Europe Centre Paper*, (86).
- BOTTERILL, L.C., 2016. Agricultural policy in Australia: deregulation, bipartisanship and agrarian sentiment. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), pp. 667-682.
- BOTTERILL, L.C., 2011. Life and death of an institution: the case of collective wheat marketing in Australia. *Public Administration*, 89(2), pp. 629-643.
- BRAUN, V. and CLARKE, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology*, 3(2), pp. 77-101.
- BULLOCK, H., MOUNTFORD, J. and STANLEY, R., 2001. *Better policy-making*. London: Cabinet Office.
- CABINET OFFICE, 2008a. *Food: An Analysis of the Issues*. London: Cabinet Office.
- CABINET OFFICE, 2008b. *Food Matters: Towards a Strategy for the 21st Century*. London: Cabinet Office.
- CABINET OFFICE, 2004. *Strategy Survival Guide Overview*. London: Cabinet Office.
- CABINET OFFICE, 2000. *Wiring it Up*. London: Cabinet Office.
- CAIRNEY, P., 2013. Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple Theories in Public Policy Studies? *Policy Studies Journal*, 41(1), pp. 1-21.
- CAIRNEY, P., 2011. *Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- CAMPBELL, J., 2010. *Ensuring Delivery of Cross Cutting Themes in the Programme for Government. Briefing Note 89/10*. Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Assembly.
- CAPANO, G., 2009. Understanding Policy Change as an Epistemological and Theoretical Problem. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 11(1), pp. 7-31.
- CAPOCCIA, G. and KELEMEN, R.D., 2007. The study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. *World Politics*, 59(03), pp. 341-369.
- CARAHER, M., CRAWLEY, H. and LLOYD, S., 2009. *Nutrition policy across the UK: Briefing Paper*. London: The Caroline Walker Trust.
- CARAHER, M. and CAREY, D., 2010. Issues on food sustainability in Australia. *Nutridate*, 21(4), pp. 2-6.
- CARAHER, M., CAREY, R., MCCONELL, K. and LAWRENCE, M., 2013. Food policy development in the Australian state of Victoria: a case study of the Food Alliance. *International planning studies*, 18(1), pp. 78-95.
- CARAHER, M. and COVENEY, J., 2004. Public health nutrition and food policy. *Public health nutrition*, 7(05), pp. 591-598.
- CAREY, R., CARAHER, M., LAWRENCE, M. and FRIEL, S., 2016. Opportunities and challenges in developing a whole-of-government national food and nutrition policy: lessons from Australia's National Food Plan. *Public health nutrition*, 19(01), pp. 3-14.
- CARMICHAEL, N., 2006. From Maff to DEFRA—a Policy Changing Journey for Agriculture. *Journal of Farm Management*, 12(10), pp. 643-648.
- CARNELL, K., 2009. *National Press Club Address by Kate Carnell, Australian Food and Grocery Council*. Canberra: National Press Club.
- CATFORD, J., 2000. Eat Well Australia: Developing a national strategic framework for public health nutrition. *Asia Pacific Journal of Clinical Nutrition*, 9(S1), pp. S65-S71.
- CERNY, P.G. and EVANS, M., 2004. Globalisation and public policy under New Labour. *Policy studies*, 25(1), pp. 51-65.
- CHARVEL, S., COBO, F. and HERNÁNDEZ-ÁVILA, M., 2015. A process to establish nutritional guidelines to address obesity: Lessons from Mexico. *Journal of public health policy*, 36(4), pp. 426-439.

- CINI, M., 2014. Institutional Change and Ethics Management in the EU's College of Commissioners. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 16(3), pp. 479-494.
- CIVIL SERVICE, 2007. *Capability Review of the Department of Health*. London: Civil Service.
- CIVIL SERVICE, 2012. *Capability Review of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs*. London: Civil Service.
- CIVIL SERVICE AND DEFRA, 2012. *Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Capability Action Plan*. London: Civil Service; Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
- CM3830, 1998. *The Food Standards Agency: A Force for Change*. London: The Stationary Office.
- COFFEY, A. and ATKINSON, P., 1996. *Making sense of qualitative data: Complementary research strategies*. Sage Publications, Inc.
- COFFEY, B. and MARSTON, G., 2013. How neoliberalism and ecological modernization shaped environmental policy in Australia. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 15(2), pp. 179-199.
- COHEN, M.D., MARCH, J.G. and OLSEN, J.P., 1972. A garbage can model of organizational choice. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp. 1-25.
- COLEMAN, W.D. and SKOGSTAD, G., 1995. Neo-liberalism, policy networks, and policy change: Agricultural policy reform in Australia and Canada. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 30(2), pp. 242-263.
- COLEMAN, W.D., SKOGSTAD, G.D. and ATKINSON, M.M., 1996. Paradigm shifts and policy networks: cumulative change in agriculture. *Journal of public policy*, 16, pp. 273-302.
- CDHHCS, 1992. *Food and Nutrition Policy*. Canberra: Commonwealth Department of Health Housing and Community Services.
- COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND FAMILY SERVICES, 1998. *Food & Nutrition Policy. Summary report, the first three years, Implementation Phase*. Australia: Commonwealth Department of State and Family Services.
- COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 2015. *Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 2014. *Agricultural Competitiveness Issues Paper*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- CORTELL, A.P. and PETERSON, S., 1999. Altered states: Explaining domestic institutional change. *British Journal of Political Science*, 29(1), pp. 177-203.
- COX INALL, 2011. *National food plan issues paper consultation report*. New South Wales: Cox Inall Communications.
- COX, R., 2004. The Path-dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian Welfare States Remain Distinct. *Social Policy & Administration*, 38(2), pp. 204-219.
- CRAFT, J. and HOWLETT, M., 2012. Policy formulation, governance shifts and policy influence: Location and content in policy advisory systems. *Journal of Public Policy*, 32(2), pp. 79-98.
- CREAGH, M., 03/07/2013, 2013-last update, Feeding the Nation [Homepage of Huffington Post], [Online]. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mary-creagh/feeding-the-nation_b_3538908.html [10/05/2017, 2017].
- CROTTY, M., 1998. *The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process*. Sage.
- CROW, T., FORBES-EWAN, C., COLLINS, C., SACKS, G. and CLITON, P., 2013. New Australian dietary guidelines: experts respond.. Available at <http://theconversation.com/new-australian-dietary-guidelines-experts-respond-12259>. Accessed August 2017.
- CSIRO, 2012. *Submission on the National Food Plan Green Paper*. Victoria: Australia: The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.
- CULLERTON, K., DONNET, T., LEE, A. and GALLEGOS, D., 2016. Exploring power and influence in nutrition policy in Australia. *Obesity Reviews*, 17(12), pp. 1218-1225.
- DA, 17/03/2016, 2016-last update, Advocate for Soil Health [Homepage of Department of Agriculture], [Online]. Available: <http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/natural-resources/soils/advocate-for-soil-health> [17/05, 2017].

DA, 20/11/2015, 2015-last update [Homepage of Department of Agriculture], [Online]. Available: <http://minister.agriculture.gov.au/joyce/Pages/Media-Releases/pc-examine-regulation-of-aus-ag.aspx> [17/05, 2017].

DA, 19/09/2015, 2015-last update, Coalition Government expands overseas counsellor network [Homepage of Department of Agriculture], [Online]. Available: <http://minister.agriculture.gov.au/joyce/pages/media-releases/overseas-counsellor-network-expanded.aspx> [17/05, 2017].

DAFF, 2013. *National Food Plan: White Paper*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2013b. *National Food Plan green paper consultation summary report*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2012. *National Food Plan green paper*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2011. *Issues paper to inform development of a national food plan*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2010. *Annual Report 2010-11*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2006. *Creating Our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2006b. *Annual Report 2005-6*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAFF, 2002. *National Food Industry Strategy*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.

DAVIES, J.S., 2009. The Limits of Joined-Up Government: Towards a Political Analysis. *Public Administration*, 87(1), pp. 80-96.

DEFRA, 2013a. *Consultation on the abolition of Food from Britain*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2013b. *Food Statistics Pocketbook 2013*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2013c. *Government Progress in Mainstreaming Sustainable Development*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2013d. *Sustainable consumption report: Follow-up to the green food project*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2012a. *Green Food Project Conclusions*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2012b. *Business Plan 2012-2015*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2012c. *Driving Export Growth in the Farming, Food and Drink Sector: A Plan of Action*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2012d. *Food Statistics Pocketbook 2012*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2010. *Food 2030*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2010b. *UK Food Security Assessment*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2009. *Food Matters: One Year On*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2009b. *Ensuring the UK's Food Security in a Changing World*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2009c. *First Report from the Council of Food Policy Advisors*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

DEFRA, 2007. *Highlights of progress made during the first year of the Food Industry Sustainability Strategy*. London: Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs.

- DEFRA, 2007b. *Food Industry Sustainability Strategy Review. An online review of the Five 'Champions' Groups' reports on Energy Use and Climate Change, Ethical Trading, Food Transportation, Waste and Water. Summary report from Session 1*. London: Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs
- DEFRA, 2006. *Food Industry Sustainability Strategy*. London: Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs.
- DEFRA, 2002. *Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food: Facing the Future in England*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
- DEFRA and DIT, 2016. *UK Food and Drink - International Action Plan 2016-20*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department for International Trade.
- DEFRA and FSA, 2009. *GM Crops and Foods: Follow-up to the Food Matters Report*. London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Food Standards Agency.
- DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 2014. *Australian Food Statistics 2012-13*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture.
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 2014. *Annual Report 2013-14 Vol I*. Canberra: Department of Health.
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 24/04/2013, 2013-last update, National Nutrition Policy [Homepage of Department of Health], [Online]. Available: <http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/phd-nutrition-health> [April, 2016].
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 2011. *The Public Health Responsibility Deal*. London: Department of Health.
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 2005. *Choosing a Better Diet: a food and health action plan*. London: Department of Health.
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, 2009. *Food and Health Dialogue*. Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing.
- DHAA, 2011. *RELEASE OF FINAL REPORT OF REVIEW OF FOOD LABELLING LAW AND POLICY*. Canberra: Australia: Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing.
- DIBDEN, J., HIGGINS, V. and COCKLIN, C., 2011. Harmonising the governance of farming risks: agricultural biosecurity and biotechnology in Australia. *Australian Geographer*, 42(2), pp. 105-122.
- DI FRANCESCO, M., 2001. Process not outcomes in new public management? 'Policy coherence' in Australian government. *The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs*, 1(3), pp. 103-116.
- DIIS, No Date, No Date-last update [Homepage of Department of Industry, Innovation and Science], [Online]. Available: <https://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustrySectors/FoodManufacturingIndustry/Pages/Country-of-Origin-Labeling.aspx> [17/05, 2017].
- DIISTRE, 2012. *Food Processing Industry Strategy Report*. Canberra: Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education.
- DIXON, J. and RICHARDS, C., 2016. On food security and alternative food networks: understanding and performing food security in the context of urban bias. *Agriculture and human values*, 33(1), pp. 191-202.
- DOWNS, A., 1957. An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 65(2), pp. 135-150.
- DPM&C, No Date, No Date-last update, Who we are [Homepage of Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet], [Online]. Available: <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/#> [09/05/2017, 2017].
- DRIMIE, S. and RUYSENAAR, S., 2010. The integrated food security strategy of South Africa: an institutional analysis. *Agrekon*, 49(3), pp. 316-337.
- EFRA, 2012. *House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Second Report: Food Security*. London: House of Commons Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
- EFRA, 2010. *House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Defra's Food Strategy Session 2009-10*. London: House of Commons Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
- EFRA, 2009. *Securing food supplies up to 2050: the challenges faced by the UK*. London: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee.

ELLIOTT, T., TREVENA, H., SACKS, G., DUNFORD, E., MARTIN, J., WEBSTER, J., SWINBURN, B., MOODIE, A.R. and NEAL, B.C., 2014. A systematic interim assessment of the Australian Government's Food and Health Dialogue. *The Medical Journal of Australia*, 200(2), pp. 92-95.

ELLIOTT, C., 2014. Elliott review into the integrity and assurance of food supply networks—final report. *A national food crime prevention framework*.

EVANS, M. and CERNY, P., 2003. Globalisation and social policy. *Developments in British social policy*, 2, pp. 19-40.

EXWORTHY, M. and HUNTER, D.J., 2011. The challenge of joined-up government in tackling health inequalities. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 34(4), pp. 201-212.

EXWORTHY, M., 2008. Policy to tackle the social determinants of health: using conceptual models to understand the policy process. *Health policy and planning*, 23(5), pp. 318-327.

EXWORTHY, M., BLANE, D. and MARMOT, M., 2003. Tackling health inequalities in the United Kingdom: the progress and pitfalls of policy. *Health services research*, 38(6p2), pp. 1905-1922.

FARMERS GUARDIAN, 2010. New report focuses on food chain emissions. Farmers Guardian, UK, 15/01/2010.

FARMER'S WEEKLY, 2010. Food 2030: Balanced delivery will be the key to success. Farmer's Weekly: UK.

FEC, 2010, Food 2030 - Defra's vision for food published [Homepage of Food Ethics Council], [Online]. Available: <http://www.foodethicscouncil.org/node/399> [April, 2016].

FEC, 2011. *Food Issues Census*. Brighton: Food Ethics Council.

FEC, 2008. *Food Policy: Inconvenient Truths. A report of the July 2008 meeting of the FEC's Business Forum*. Brighton: Food Ethics Council.

FEINDT, P.H. and FLYNN, A., 2009. Policy stretching and institutional layering: British food policy between security, safety, quality, health and climate change. *British Politics*, 4(3), pp. 386-414.

FEINDT, P.H. and OELS, A., 2005. Does discourse matter? Discourse analysis in environmental policy making. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 7(3), pp. 161-173.

FENNA, A., 2004. Australian public policy. Pearson Longman.

FIAL, 2016. *Food and Agribusiness Sector Competitiveness Plan*. State of Victoria: Food Innovation Australia Ltd.

FIFE DIET, No Date, No Date-last update, Food 2030 [Homepage of The Fife Diet], [Online]. Available: <http://fifediet.co.uk/tag/food-2030/> [April, 2016].

FLINDERS, M., 2010. *Democratic drift: majoritarian modification and democratic anomie in the United Kingdom*. Oxford University Press.

FLINDERS, M., 2002. Governance in Whitehall. *Public Administration*, 80(1), pp. 51-75.

FLINDERS, M. and KELSO, A., 2011. Mind the gap: Political analysis, public expectations and the parliamentary decline thesis. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 13(2), pp. 249-268.

FOE, 05/01/2010, 2010-last update, Government food vision serves up business as usual [Homepage of Friends of the Earth], [Online]. Available: http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/food_vision_05012010 [April, 2016].

FOOD AND DRINK FEDERATION, 2009. *FDF's Response to Defra Food 2030 Consultation*. London: FDF.

FORESIGHT, 2011. *The Future of Food and Farming. Final Project Report*. London: Government Office for Science.

FORESIGHT, 2011b. *Foresight Future of Food and Farming: ACTION PLAN*. London: Government Office for Science.

FOSTER, R. and LUNN, J., 2007. 40th Anniversary Briefing Paper: Food availability and our changing diet. *Nutrition Bulletin*, 32(3), pp. 187-249.

- FSANZ, No Date, No Date-last update, About FSANZ [Homepage of Food Standards Australia New Zealand], [Online]. Available: <http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/about/Pages/default.aspx> [09/05/2017, 2017].
- GEERLINGS, H. and STEAD, D., 2003. The integration of land use planning, transport and environment in European policy and research. *Transport Policy*, 10(3), pp. 187-196.
- GODFRAY, H.C.J., BEDDINGTON, J.R., CRUTE, I.R., HADDAD, L., LAWRENCE, D., MUIR, J.F., PRETTY, J., ROBINSON, S., THOMAS, S.M. and TOULMIN, C., 2010. Food security: the challenge of feeding 9 billion people. *Science*, 327(5967), pp. 812-818.
- GOLDFINCH, S. and HART, P., 2003. Leadership and institutional reform: Engineering macroeconomic policy change in Australia. *Governance*, 16(2), pp. 235-270.
- GOMEZ, E.J., 2013. Exploring the utility of institutional theory in analysing international health agency stasis and change. *Health policy and planning*, 28(7), pp. 769-777.
- GORDON, I., LEWIS, J. and YOUNG, K., 1977. *Perspectives on policy analysis*. Public.
- GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE, 2012. *Foresight Project: Global Food and Farming Futures - One Year Review, January 2011-March 2012*. London: Foresight, Government Office for Science.
- GRBICH, C., 2012. *Qualitative data analysis: An introduction*. Sage.
- GREEN, R., CORNELSEN, L., DANGOUR, A.D., TURNER, R., SHANKAR, B., MAZZOCCHI, M. and SMITH, R.D., 2013. The effect of rising food prices on food consumption: systematic review with meta-regression. *BMJ (Clinical research ed.)*, 346, pp. f3703.
- GUTHMAN, J., 2007. The Polanyian way? Voluntary food labels as neoliberal governance. *Antipode*, 39(3), pp. 456-478.
- HABY, M., CHAPMAN, E., CLARK, R. and GALVÃO, L., 2016. *Agriculture, food and nutrition security interventions that facilitate sustainable development and have a positive impact on health: an overview of systematic reviews (Protocol)*. PROSPERO database.
- HAJER, M. and LAWS, D., 2006. Ordering through discourse. *The Oxford handbook of public policy*, pp. 249-266.
- HALL, P.A., 2010. Historical institutionalism in rationalist and sociological perspective. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, pp. 204-223.
- HALL, P.A., 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain. *Comparative politics*, pp. 275-296.
- HALL, P.A., 2010. Historical institutionalism in rationalist and sociological perspective. *Explaining institutional change: ambiguity, agency, and power*, pp. 204-224.
- HALL, P.A., 1986. Governing the economy: The politics of state intervention in Britain and France.
- HALLIGAN, J., 2005. Public management and departments: contemporary themes–future agendas. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 64(1), pp. 25-34.
- HALLSWORTH, M. and RUTTER, J., 2011. *Making policy better: Improving Whitehall's core business*. London: Institute for Government.
- HAMBURGER, P. and WELLER, P., 2012. Policy advice and a central agency: The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 47(3), pp. 363-376.
- HANTRAIS, L., 1999. Contextualization in cross-national comparative research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 2(2), pp. 93-108.
- HARRIS, J. and RUTTER, J., 2014. *Centre Forward: Effective support for the prime minister at the centre of government*. Institute for Government.
- HART, C., 2001. *Doing a literature search: a comprehensive guide for the social sciences*. Sage.
- HATTERSLEY, L., 2013. Agri-food system transformations and diet-related chronic disease in Australia: a nutrition-oriented value chain approach. *Agriculture and human values*, 30(2), pp. 299-309.

- HAVINGA, T., 2006. Private regulation of food safety by supermarkets. *Law & policy*, 28(4), pp. 515-533.
- HAVINGA, T., CASEY, D. and VAN WAARDEN, F., 2015. Changing regulatory arrangements in food governance. *The Changing Landscape of Food Governance: Public and Private Encounters*, pp. 1.
- HAWKES, C., 2015. *Enhancing Coherence between Trade Policy and Nutrition Action*. United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition.
- HAWKES, C., BRAZIL, B.G., CASTRO, INÊS RUGANI RIBEIRO DE and JAIME, P.C., 2016. How to engage across sectors: lessons from agriculture and nutrition in the Brazilian School Feeding Program. *Revista de saude publica*, 50.
- HAWKES, C., JEWELL, J. and ALLEN, K., 2013. A food policy package for healthy diets and the prevention of obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases: the NOURISHING framework. *Obesity reviews*, 14(S2), pp. 159-168.
- HAY, C., 2011. Interpreting interpretivism interpreting interpretations: The new hermeneutics of public administration. *Public Administration*, 89(1), pp. 167-182.
- HEART FOUNDATION, 2016. *Report on the Evaluation of the nine Food Categories for which reformulation targets were set under the Food and Health Dialogue*. Brisbane; Queensland: Heart Foundation.
- HEART FOUNDATION, 2011. *Submission to Queensland Government Food for a growing economy: An economic development framework for the Queensland food industry*. Brisbane; Queensland: Heart Foundation.
- HECLO, H., 1974. *Modern social politics in Britain and Sweden: From relief to income maintenance*. Yale University Press New Haven.
- HOBBS, J.E., FEARNE, A. and SPRIGGS, J., 2002. Incentive structures for food safety and quality assurance: an international comparison. *Food control*, 13(2), pp. 77-81.
- HOGL, K. and NORDBECK, R., 2012. 6. The challenge of coordination: bridging horizontal and vertical boundaries. *Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness*, pp. 111.
- HOL CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE, 2015. *Constitution Committee - Eleventh Report Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom*. London: House of Lords.
- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND AGEING, 2009. *Weighing it up: Obesity in Australia*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia: House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing.
- HOLLINGSWORTH, J.R., 2000. Doing institutional analysis: implications for the study of innovations. *Review of international political economy*, 7(4), pp. 595-644.
- HORSFALL, D., 2013. There and back again: Convergence towards the competition state plan. *Policy Studies*, 34(1), pp. 53-72.
- HOWLETT, M., 2009. Process sequencing policy dynamics: Beyond homeostasis and path dependency. *Journal of Public Policy*, 29(3), pp. 241-262.
- HOWLETT, M. and CASHORE, B., 2009. The dependent variable problem in the study of policy change: Understanding policy change as a methodological problem. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 11(1), pp. 33-46.
- HOWLETT, M., and RAMESH, M., 2003. *Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems*. Oxford University Press Toronto.
- HOWLETT, M. and RAYNER, J., 2007. Design principles for policy mixes: cohesion and coherence in 'new governance arrangements'. *Policy and Society*, 26(4), pp. 1-18.
- HOWLETT, M. and RAYNER, J., 2006. Understanding the historical turn in the policy sciences: A critique of stochastic, narrative, path dependency and process-sequencing models of policy-making over time. *Policy Sciences*, 39(1), pp. 1.
- HOWLETT, M. and CASHORE, B., 2009. The Dependent Variable Problem in the Study of Policy Change: Understanding Policy Change as a Methodological Problem. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 11(1), pp. 33-46.
- HUNT, S., 2006. ANU-Digital Collections: Whole-of-government: does working together work?. Canberra: ANU.

- HUSTEDT, T. and SEYFRIED, M., 2016. Co-ordination across internal organizational boundaries: how the EU Commission co-ordinates climate policies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(6), pp. 888-905.
- IFAD, 2014. *A FIELD PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE: Institutional and organizational analysis and capacity strengthening*. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development.
- IGD, 2017, Key Industry Facts [Homepage of IGD], [Online]. Available: <https://www.igd.com/About-us/Media/media-toolkit> [August, 2017].
- IGD, 11/01/2010, 2010-last update, Food 2030 - The Key Points [Homepage of IGD], [Online]. Available: <http://www.igd.com/our-expertise/Nutrition-food-and-farming/food-and-farming/4098/Food-2030---The-key-points/> [April, 2016].
- IMMERGUT, E.M., 1992. *Health politics: interests and institutions in Western Europe*. CUP Archive.
- IRVINE, A., DREW, P. and SAINSBURY, R., 2010. *Mode effects in qualitative interviews: a comparison of semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews using conversation analysis*.
- ISON, R.L., COLLINS, K.B. and WALLIS, P.J., 2015. Institutionalising social learning: Towards systemic and adaptive governance. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 53, pp. 105-117.
- JAMES, O. and LODGE, M., 2003. The limitations of 'policy transfer' and 'lesson drawing' for public policy research. *Political studies review*, 1(2), pp. 179-193.
- JAMES, P., 1997. *Food Standards Agency: an interim proposal*. London: MAFF.
- JOCHIM, A.E. and MAY, P.J., 2010. Beyond subsystems: Policy regimes and governance. *Policy Studies Journal*, 38(2), pp. 303-327.
- JOHN, P., 2012. *Analyzing public policy*. 2 edn. London: Routledge.
- JONES, A., MAGNUSSON, R., SWINBURN, B., WEBSTER, J., WOOD, A., SACKS, G. and NEAL, B., 2016. Designing a healthy food partnership: lessons from the Australian food and health dialogue. *BMC public health*, 16(1), pp. 651.
- JORDAN, A. and LENSCHOW, A., 2010. Environmental policy integration: a state of the art review. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 20(3), pp. 147-158.
- JORDAN, G. and CAIRNEY, P., 2013. What is the 'dominant model' of British policymaking? Comparing majoritarian and policy community ideas. *British Politics*, 8(3), pp. 233-259.
- JORDAN, G. and HALPIN, D., 2006. The political costs of policy coherence: constructing a rural policy for Scotland. *Journal of public policy*, 26(01), pp. 21-41.
- JORDAN, G. and RICHARDSON, J., 1982. The British policy style or the logic of negotiation. *Policy styles in western Europe*, pp. 80-110.
- KAPLAN, PAUL B THOMPSON-DAVID M, 2014. *Encyclopedia of food and agricultural ethics*. Netherlands: Springer.
- KARRÉ, P.M., VAN DER STEEN, M. and VAN TWIST, M., 2013. Joined-Up government in the Netherlands: experiences with program ministries. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 36(1), pp. 63-73.
- KATZNELSON, I., 1998. The doleful dance of politics and policy: can historical institutionalism make a difference? *The American Political Science Review*, 92(1), pp. 191-197.
- KAVANAGH, D. and RICHARDS, D., 2001. Departmentalism and joined-up government. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54(1), pp. 1-18.
- KAY, A., 2005. A critique of the use of path dependency in policy studies. *Public administration*, 83(3), pp. 553-571.
- KAY, A. and ACKRILL, R., 2012. *Policy capacity for the transition to a biofuels economy: a comparative study of the EU and USA*. Contributed Paper prepared for presentation at the 86th Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society, University of Warwick, United Kingdom.
- KEAST, R., 2011. Joined-up governance in Australia: How the past can inform the future. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 34(4), pp. 221-231.

- KEAST, R., BROWN, K. and MANDELL, M., 2007. Getting the right mix: Unpacking integration meanings and strategies. *International Public Management Journal*, 10(1), pp. 9-33.
- KEDING, G.B., SCHNEIDER, K. and JORDAN, I., 2013. Production and processing of foods as core aspects of nutrition-sensitive agriculture and sustainable diets. *Food security*, 5(6), pp. 825-846.
- KELLER, R., 2011. The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). *Human Studies*, 34(1), pp. 43.
- KENNEDY, J., No Date. *Supermarket to Asia: The Challenge of Growing Food Exports*. Not Known: Not Known.
- KING, A., 2015. *Who Governs Britain?* Penguin UK.
- KINGDON, J.W., 2003. *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. 2 edn. New York; London: Longman.
- KUHN, T.S., 1970. *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago and London.
- LABOUR PARTY, 2013. *Feeding the Nation: Creating a Resilient, Growing Food Industry*. London: The Labour Party.
- LAFFERTY, W. and HOVDEN, E., 2003. Environmental policy integration: towards an analytical framework. *Environmental politics*, 12(3), pp. 1-22.
- LANG, T. and SCHOEN, V., 2016. *Food, the UK and the EU: Brexit or Bremain?* UK: Food Research Collaboration.
- LANG, T., 2002. *Should the UK have a food policy council*. A briefing for the agri-food network.
- LANG, T., 1999a. The complexities of globalization: The UK as a case study of tensions within the food system and the challenge to food policy. *Agriculture and human values*, 16(2), pp. 169-185.
- LANG, T., 1999b. *Food Policy for the 21st Century: Can It Be Both Radical*. For hunger-proof cities: Sustainable urban food systems, pp. 216.
- LANG, T. and HEASMAN, M., 2015. *Food wars: The global battle for mouths, minds and markets*. Routledge.
- LANG, T. and BARLING, D., 2012. Food security and food sustainability: reformulating the debate. *The Geographical Journal*, 178(4), pp. 313-326.
- LANG, T., BARLING, D. and CARAHER, M., 2009. *Food policy: integrating health, environment and society*. OUP Oxford.
- LANG, T., RAYNER, G., RAYNER, M., BARLING, D. and MILLSTONE, E., 2005. Policy councils on food, nutrition and physical activity: the UK as a case study. *Public health nutrition*, 8(1), pp. 11.
- LANG, T. and HEASMAN, M.A., 2004. *Food wars: the global battle for mouths, minds and markets*. Earthscan. .
- LANG, T. and RAYNER, G., 2003. Food and health strategy in the UK: a policy impact analysis. *The Political Quarterly*, 74(1), pp. 66-75.
- LAWRENCE, G., RICHARDS, C. and LYONS, K., 2013. Food security in Australia in an era of neoliberalism, productivism and climate change. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 29, pp. 30-39.
- LAWRENCE, M., 02/05/2010, 2010-last update, How governmental silos are stuffing up food policy [Homepage of Crikey], [Online]. Available: <https://www.crikey.com.au/2010/12/02/how-governmental-silos-are-stuffing-up-food-policy/> [09/05/2017, 2017].
- LAWRENCE, G., LYONS, K., WALLINGTON, T. and MYILIBRARY, 2010. *Food security, nutrition and sustainability*. London: Earthscan.
- LAWRENCE, M., 2010. *Australian food policy Political process and scientific evidence*. Food Ethics Council, Brighton: UK, Volume 5; Issue 2.
- LEPPO, K., OLLILA, E., PENA, S., WISMAR, M. and COOK, S., 2013. Health in all policies. *Seizing opportunities, implementing policies*. Helsinki, Finland: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
- LIEBERMAN, R.C., 2002. Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change. *The American Political Science Review*, 96(4), pp. 697-712.

- LING, T., 2002. Delivering joined-up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems. *Public administration*, 80(4), pp. 615-642.
- LOCK, M., 15 August 2017, 2015-last update, *Governance in National Nutrition Policy - FOI Request Highlights lack of Transparency* [Homepage of Linked In], [Online]. Available: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/governance-national-nutrition-policy-foi-request-highlights-mark-lock> [15 August, 2017].
- LOCK, K., GABRIJELCIC-BLENKUS, M., MARTUZZI, M., OTOREPEC, P., WALLACE, P., DORA, C., ROBERTSON, A. and ZAKOTNIC, J.M., 2003. Health impact assessment of agriculture and food policies: lessons learnt from the Republic of Slovenia. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 81(6), pp. 391-398.
- LOCK, K., SMITH, R.D., DANGOUR, A.D., KEOGH-BROWN, M., PIGATTO, G., HAWKES, C., FISBERG, R.M. and CHALABI, Z., 2010. Health, agricultural, and economic effects of adoption of healthy diet recommendations. *The Lancet*, 376(9753), pp. 1699-1709.
- LOWNDES, V. and ROBERTS, M., 2013. *Why institutions matter*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- MACGREGOR, G.A., HE, F.J. and POMBO-RODRIGUES, S., 2015. Food and the responsibility deal: how the salt reduction strategy was derailed. *BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online)*, 350.
- MACINTOSH, A., 2013. The Carbon Farming Initiative: removing the obstacles to its success. *Carbon Management*, 4(2), pp. 185-202.
- MACMILLAN, T. and DOWLER, E., 2012. Just and sustainable? Examining the rhetoric and potential realities of UK food security. *Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics*, 25(2), pp. 181-204.
- MACRAE, R., 2011. A Joined-Up Food Policy for Canada. *Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition*, 6(4), pp. 424-457.
- MAHONEY, J., 2010. Conceptualizing and Explaining Punctuated Versus Incremental Change, *Paper presented at the 2010 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September*.
- MAHONEY, J. and THELEN, K., 2010. A theory of gradual institutional change. *Explaining institutional change: Ambiguity, agency, and power*, pp. 1-37.
- MALTERUD, K., 2001. Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines. *The Lancet*, 358(9280), pp. 483-488.
- MANNAN, M.A., 2011. On food and nutrition policy activities in the USA, Australia, and Norway. *Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition*, 22(2), pp. 191-202.
- MARCH, J.G. and OLSEN, J.P., 1984. The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life. *The American Political Science Review*, pp. 734-749.
- MARSDEN, T., 2013. From post-productionism to reflexive governance: Contested transitions in securing more sustainable food futures. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 29, pp. 123-134.
- MARSDEN, T., 2010. Food 2030: towards a redefinition of food? A commentary on the new United Kingdom government food strategy. *The Political Quarterly*, 81(3), pp. 443-446.
- MARSDEN, T., MORGAN, K. and MORLEY, A., 2016. *Food Policy as Public Policy: A Review of the Welsh Government's Food Strategy and Action Plan*. Cardiff: Public Policy Institute for Wales.
- MARSDEN, T. and SONNINO, R., 2008. Rural development and the regional state: Denying multifunctional agriculture in the UK. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 24(4), pp. 422-431.
- MARSH, D., 2009. Keeping ideas in their place: in praise of thin constructivism. *Australian journal of political science*, 44(4), pp. 679-696.
- MARTIN, T., DEAN, E., HARDY, B., JOHNSON, T., JOLLY, F., MATTHEWS, F., MCKAY, I., SOUNESS, R. and WILLIAMS, J., 2003. A new era for food safety regulation in Australia. *Food Control*, 14(6), pp. 429-438.
- MAXWELL, S. and SLATER, R., 2003. Food policy old and new. *Development policy review*, 21(5-6), pp. 531-553.
- MCANULLA, S., 2007. New Labour, old epistemology? Reflections on political science, new institutionalism and the Blair government. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60(2), pp. 313-331.
- MCAULEY, I., 2000. Dumbing down in Canberra: a guide to the public service reform industry [Series of two parts. Part 1]. *Dissent*, (2), pp. 31.

- MCCARTHY, D. and MORLING, P., 2015. Using regulation as a last resort: Assessing the performance of voluntary approaches. *Sandy, Bedfordshire: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds*.
- MCCONNELL, A., 2015. What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate the maze. *Public Policy and Administration*, 30(3-4), pp. 221-242.
- MCCMAHON, L. and PHILLIMORE, J., 2013. State and territory government strategic plans: Exercises in managing, monitoring and marketing. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 72(4), pp. 404-418.
- MEADWELL, H., 2005. Institutions and political rationality. In Lecours, A. ed., 2005. *New institutionalism: Theory and analysis*. University of Toronto Press.
- MEIJERS, E. and STEAD, D., 2004. Policy integration: what does it mean and how can it be achieved? A multi-disciplinary review, *Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: Greening of Policies-Interlinkages and Policy Integration*. Berlin 2004.
- MENZIES, J., 2013. Reducing Tensions in Australian Intergovernmental Relations Through Institutional Innovation. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 72(3), pp. 382-389.
- METCALFE, L., 1994. International policy co-ordination and public management reform. *International review of administrative sciences*, 60(2), pp. 271-290.
- MILIO, N., 1981. *Promoting health through public policy*. Philadelphia: F.A. Davis
- MINTROM, M. and NORMAN, P., 2009. Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(4), pp. 649-667.
- MONTEIRO, C.A., LEVY, R.B., CLARO, R.M., DE CASTRO, INÊS RUGANI RIBEIRO and CANNON, G., 2010. Increasing consumption of ultra-processed foods and likely impact on human health: evidence from Brazil. *Public health nutrition*, 14(1), pp. 5-13.
- MOONEY, P.H. and HUNT, S.A., 2009. Food security: the elaboration of contested claims to a consensus frame. *Rural Sociology*, 74(4), pp. 469-497.
- MORAGUES-FAUS, A. and MORGAN, K., 2015. Reframing the foodscape: the emergent world of urban food policy. *Environment and Planning A*, 47(7), pp. 1558-1573.
- MORGAN, K., 2015. Nourishing the city: The rise of the urban food question in the Global North. *Urban Studies*, 52(8), pp. 1379-1394.
- MORGAN, K., 2010. Local and green, global and fair: the ethical foodscape and the politics of care. *Environment and Planning A*, 42(8), pp. 1852-1867.
- MORGAN, K., MARSDEN, T. and MURDOCH, J., 2006. *Worlds of Food: Place, Power, and Provenance in the Food Chain: Place, Power, and Provenance in the Food Chain*. Oxford University Press.
- NAO, 29/07/2016, 2016-last update, *Health Portfolio Overview* [Homepage of National Audit Office], [Online]. Available: <https://www.anao.gov.au/work-program/portfolio/health/portfolio-overview> [09/05/2017, 2017].
- NAO, 2015. *A Short Guide to the Cabinet Office* London: National Audit Office.
- NAO, 25/09/2014, 2014-last update, *Food Security in Remote Indigenous Communities* [Homepage of National Audit Office], [Online]. Available: <https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/food-security-remote-indigenous-communities> [03/04, 2017].
- NAO, 2001. *Joining up to improve public services. Report by the controller and auditor general* London: The Stationary Office.
- NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, 2013. *Food safety and authenticity in the processed meat supply chain*. London: National Audit Office.
- NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, 2001. *Joining Up to Improve Public Services*. London: National Audit Office.
- NATIONAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 2013. *Australian Dietary Guidelines*. Canberra: National Health and Medical Research Council.
- NFF, 2012. *NFF response to the National Food Plan Green Paper*. Brisbane; Australia: National Farmers' Federation.

- NFF, 2011. *National Farmers' Federation Submission on the Issues Paper to Inform the Development of a National Food Plan*. Brisbane; Australia: National Farmers' Federation.
- NGUYEN, N., HOGAN, L., LAWSON, K., GOODAY, P., GREEN, R., HARRIS-ADAMS, K. and MALLAWAARACHCHI, T., 2013. *Infrastructure and Australia's food industry: Preliminary economic assessment*. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, report, 13.
- NHMRC, 2013. *Australian Dietary Guidelines*. Available at: <https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines-publications/n55>.
- NICKLIN, G., 2012. Strategic Thinking, Shared Meaning-Making and the Interpretive Turn in Policy-A Case Study. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 71(1), pp. 45-54.
- NILSSON, M., ZAMPARUTTI, T., PETERSEN, J.E., NYKVIST, B., RUDBERG, P. and MCGUINN, J., 2012. Understanding policy coherence: analytical framework and examples of sector-environment policy interactions in the EU. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, 22(6), pp. 395-423.
- NORTH, D.C., 1990. *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- NUGENT, R., 2011. *Bringing agriculture to the table*. Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
- OECD, 1981. *Food Policy*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- O'FLYNN, J., BUICK, F., BLACKMAN, D. and HALLIGAN, J., 2011. You win some, you lose some: Experiments with joined-up government. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 34(4), pp. 244-254.
- ORREN, K. and SKOWRONEK, S., 1994. Beyond the iconography of order: notes for a new institutionalism. *The dynamics of American politics: Approaches and interpretations*, pp. 311-330.
- OWEN, G.T., 2014. Qualitative methods in higher education policy analysis: Using interviews and document analysis. *The Qualitative Report*, 19(26), pp. 1.
- PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 2014. *Australian National Preventive Health Agency (Abolition) Bill 2014* Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
- PARSONS, W., 2004. Not Just Steering but Weaving: Relevant Knowledge and the Craft of Building Policy Capacity and Coherence. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 63(1), pp. 43-57.
- PASC, 2007. *House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee Governing the Future Second Report of Session 2006-07 Volume I*. London: Public Administration Select Committee.
- PECK, J. and TICKELL, A., 2002. Neoliberalizing space. *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 380-404.
- PETERS, B.G., 1998. Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-Ordination. *Public administration*, 76(2), pp. 295-311.
- PETERS, B.G. and PIERRE, J., 2017. Food Policy as a Wicked Problem: Contending with Multiple Demands and Actors. *World Food Policy*, 1(1), pp. 1-9.
- PETERS, B.G., JON PIERRE and KING, D.S., 2005. The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism. *The Journal of Politics*, 67(4), pp. 1275-1300.
- PETTICREW, M., EASTMURE, E., MAYS, N., KNAI, C., DURAND, M.A. and NOLTE, E., 2013. The Public Health Responsibility Deal: how should such a complex public health policy be evaluated? *Journal of Public Health*, 35(4), pp. 495-501.
- PHAA, 2012. *PHAA submission on National Food Plan Green Paper 2012*. New South Wales: Australia: Public Health Association Australia.
- PHAA, 2009. *A Future for Food: Addressing public health, sustainability and equity from paddock to plate*. ACT: PHAA.
- PHE, No Date, No Date-last update, About Us [Homepage of Public Health England], [Online]. Available: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england/about> [05/05/2017, 2017].
- PIERSON, P., 2011. *Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton University Press.
- PIERSON, P., 2000. Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. *American political science review*, pp. 251-267.

- PIERSON, P., 2000. Not just what, but when: Timing and sequence in political processes. *Studies in American Political Development*, 14(1), pp. 72-92.
- PMSEIC, 2010. *Australia and Food Security in a Changing World*. Canberra: Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council.
- POLICY COMMISSION, 2002. *Farming & Food: A Sustainable Future: Report of the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food*. London: Cabinet Office.
- POLLITT, C., 2008. *Time, policy, management: governing with the past*. OUP Oxford.
- POLLITT, C., 2003. Joined-up Government: A Survey. *Political studies review*, 1(1), pp. 34-49.
- POULIOT, V., 2007. "Subjectivism": toward a constructivist methodology. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(2), pp. 359-384.
- POWLES, J., WAHLQVIST, M., ROBBINS, J., KING, C. and HICKS, N., 1992. The development of food and nutrition policy in Australia, with special attention to the State of Victoria. *Asia Pacific J Clin Nutr*, 1, pp. 47-60.
- PRITCHARD, B., 2005. Implementing and maintaining neoliberal agriculture in Australia (Parts I and II). *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 13(2).
- PRITCHARD, B., 1999. Australia as the Supermarket to Asia? Governments, Territory, and Political Economy in the Australian Agri-food System. *Rural Sociology*, 64(2), pp. 284-301.
- QUT, 2013. *Scoping study to inform development of the National Nutrition Policy for Australia*. Queensland: QUT School of Public Health and Social Work and School of Exercise and Nutrition Sciences.
- RADCLIFFE, S., 2010. Non-rational aspects of the competition state—the case of policy consultancy in Australia. *Policy Studies*, 31(1), pp. 117-128.
- RAST, J., 2012. Why History (Still) Matters Time and Temporality in Urban Political Analysis. *Urban Affairs Review*, 48(1), pp. 3-36.
- RAYNER, J. and HOWLETT, M., 2009a. Introduction: Understanding integrated policy strategies and their evolution. *Policy and Society*, 28(2), pp. 99-109.
- RAYNER, J. and HOWLETT, M., 2009b. Conclusion: Governance arrangements and policy capacity for policy integration. *Policy and Society*, 28(2), pp. 165-172.
- RAYNER, J., 2009. Understanding Policy Change as a Historical Problem. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 11(1), pp. 83-96.
- REIN, M. and SCHÖN, D., 1996. Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice. *Knowledge and policy*, 9(1), pp. 85-104.
- RHODES, R., 2009. *The Australian study of politics*. Palgrave-Macmillan.
- RHODES, R., 2000. New Labour's Civil Service: Summing-up Joining-up. *The Political Quarterly*, 71(2), pp. 151-166.
- RICHARDS, D. and KAVANAGH, D., 2000. Can joined-up government be a reality? A case study of the British Labour Government 1997-2000, *Australian Political Studies Association 2000 Conference 2000*, pp. 4-6.
- RIDDELL, P. and HADDON, C., 2009. *Transitions: preparing for changes of government*. Institute for Government London.
- RIHOUX, B., 2006. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic comparative methods: Recent advances and remaining challenges for social science research. *International Sociology*, 21(5), pp. 679-706.
- ROCKSTRÖM, J., STORDALEN, G.A. and HORTON, R., 2016. Acting in the Anthropocene: the EAT-Lancet Commission. *The Lancet*, 387(10036), pp. 2364.
- ROSE, N., 1999. *Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge University Press.
- ROSE, R., 1991. What is Lesson-drawing. *Journal of public policy*, 11(1), pp. 1-22.

- ROSE, R., 1990. Inheritance before choice in public policy. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2(3), pp. 263-291.
- ROSE, R., 1984. *Do parties make a difference?* Springer.
- ROSS, A., 2005. The UK approach to delivering sustainable development in government: a case study in joined-up working. *Journal of Environmental Law*, 17(1), pp. 27-49.
- RSC., 2005. *Sustainable consumption: The role of food retail*. London: Roundtable for Sustainable Consumption.
- RUSSEL, D. and JORDAN, A., 2009. Joining up or pulling apart? The use of appraisal to coordinate policy making for sustainable development. *Environment and planning*, 41(5), pp. 1201.
- RUTTER, J., 16/11/2010, 2010-last update, *Strategy Unit RIP* [Homepage of Institute for Government], [Online]. Available: <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/strategy-unit-rip> [09/05/2017, 2017].
- RUTTER, J., SIMS, S. and MARSHALL, E., 2012. *The 'S'factors: Lessons from IFG's policy success reunions*. London: Institute for Government.
- SABATIER, P.A., 2007. *Theories of the policy process*. 2 edn. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- SACKS, G., SWINBURN, B. and LAWRENCE, M., 2009. Obesity Policy Action framework and analysis grids for a comprehensive policy approach to reducing obesity. *Obesity reviews*, 10(1), pp. 76-86.
- SAMNAKAY, N., 2017. Thinking Strategically in Federal Policy: Defining the Attributes of High-level Policies. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 76(1), pp. 106-121.
- SCHARPF, F.W., 1986. Policy Failure and Institutional Reform: Why Should Form Follow Function?. *International Social Science Journal*, 38(2), pp. 179-189.
- SCHMIDT, V.A., 2010. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth 'new institutionalism'. *European political science review*, 2(1), pp. 1-25.
- SCHNEIDER, A.T., 2006. Patterns of Change in the Use of Imprisonment in the American States: An Integration of Path Dependence, Punctuated Equilibrium and Policy Design Approaches. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59(3), pp. 457-470.
- SCHNEIDER, A.L. and INGRAM, H., 2008. Social constructions in the study of public policy. *Handbook of constructionist research*, pp. 189-211.
- SCUDAMORE, J., 2012. *Future arrangements to secure food standards and safety in Scotland*. Edinburgh: Scottish Government.
- SELVEY, L.A. and CAREY, M.G., 2013. Australia's dietary guidelines and the environmental impact of food" from paddock to plate". *The Medical journal of Australia*, 198(1), pp. 18-19.
- SHEPHERD, J., 2011. Creating whose future: Sustainable agricultural policy for Australia? *The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability*, 7(3), pp. 377-395.
- SHILL, J., MAVOA, H., ALLENDER, S., LAWRENCE, M., SACKS, G., PEETERS, A., CRAMMOND, B. and SWINBURN, B., 2011. Government regulation to promote healthy food environments—a view from inside state governments. *Obesity reviews*, 13(2), pp. 162-173.
- SIDDIQUE, H., 2014. *Top 10 causes of death in London boroughs highlight health inequalities*. London: The Guardian.
- SILVERMAN, D., 2016. *Qualitative research*. Sage.
- SIX, P., 2004. Joined-Up Government in the Western World in Comparative Perspective: A Preliminary Literature Review and Exploration. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 14(1), pp. 103-138.
- SIÖBLOM, S., 2009. Administrative Short-Termism—A Non-Issue in Environmental and Regional Governance. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 11(3), pp. 165-168.
- SKOCPOL, T., 1992. *Protecting soldiers and mothers*. Cambridge Univ Press.
- SMITH, K., LAWRENCE, G. and RICHARDS, C., 2010. Supermarkets' governance of the agri-food supply chain: is the 'corporate-environmental' food regime evident in Australia? *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 17(2), pp. 140-161.

- SMITH, K., 2013. *Institutional filters: the translation and re-circulation of ideas about health inequalities within policy*. Policy Press.
- SPENCER, S. and KNEEBONE, M., 2012. *FOODmap: An analysis of the Australian Food Supply Chain*. Canberra: Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry.
- STATE GOVERNMENT VICTORIA, February 2013, 2013-last update, *Victorian Committee of Food Regulators* [Homepage of State Government Victoria, Department of Primary Industries], [Online]. Available: <http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/agriculture/about-agriculture/food-regulators-committee> [18/03/2013, 2013].
- STEINMO, S., THELEN, K. and LONGSTRETH, F., 1992. *Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge University Press.
- STEINMO, S., 2008. Historical institutionalism. *Approaches in the social sciences*, pp. 150-178.
- STEWART, J., 2006. Value conflict and policy change. *Review of policy research*, 23(1), pp. 183-195.
- STRAW, E., 2004. *The Dead Generalist: Reforming the civil service and public services*. London: Demos.
- STREECK, W. and THELEN, K., 2005. Institutional change in advanced political economies. *Beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies*, pp. 1-39.
- SUPERMARKET TO ASIA TASK FORCE, 1997. *Prime Minister's Supermarket to Asia Council Action Plan*. Not Known: Not Known.
- SUSTAIN, 2010. *Government's food 'vision' offers only more of the same*. London: Sustain: the alliance for better food and farming.
- SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, 2011. *Looking Back, Looking Forward: Sustainability and UK food policy 2000-2011*. London: Sustainable Development Commission.
- SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, 2008. *Green, healthy and fair: A review of government's role in supporting sustainable supermarket food*. London: Sustainable Development Commission.
- SWEET, M., 2010. *Behind the scenes of the food policy turf wars*. Crikey Blog.
- SWINBURN, B. and WOOD, A., 2013. Progress on obesity prevention over 20 years in Australia and New Zealand. *Obesity Reviews*, 14(S2), pp. 60-68.
- SWINBURN, B., SACKS, G., VANDEVIJVERE, S., KUMANYIKA, S., LOBSTEIN, T., NEAL, B., BARQUERA, S., FRIEL, S., HAWKES, C. and KELLY, B., 2013. INFORMAS (International Network for Food and Obesity/non-communicable diseases Research, Monitoring and Action Support): overview and key principles. *Obesity reviews*, 14(S1), pp. 1-12.
- TARRANT, J.R., 1980. *Food policies*. John Wiley & Sons.
- THACHER, D. and REIN, M., 2004. Managing value conflict in public policy. *Governance*, 17(4), pp. 457-486.
- THELEN, K., 2002. The explanatory power of historical institutionalism. Mayntz, Renate (Hg.): *Akteure-Mechanismen-Modelle. Zur Theoriefähigkeit makro-sozialer Analysen*. Frankfurt, New York, , pp. 91-107.
- THELEN, K., 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1), pp. 369-404.
- THELEN, K. and STEINMO, S., 1992. Historical institutionalism in comparative perspective. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective*, .
- THISSEN, W.A. and WALKER, W.E., 2013. *Public Policy Analysis*. Springer.
- THOMPSON, E., 1991. Democracy undermined: reforms to the Australian public service from Whitlam to Hawke. *The Australian Quarterly*, 63(2), pp. 127-142.
- THOW, A.M., 2009. Trade liberalisation and the nutrition transition: mapping the pathways for public health nutritionists. *Public health nutrition*, 12(11), pp. 2150-2158.
- THOW, A.M. and MCGRADY, B., 2014. Protecting policy space for public health nutrition in an era of international investment agreements. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 92(2), pp. 139-145.

- THOW, A.M., ANNAN, R., MENSAH, L. and CHOWDHURY, S.N., 2014. Development, implementation and outcome of standards to restrict fatty meat in the food supply and prevent NCDs: learning from an innovative trade/food policy in Ghana. *BMC Public Health*, 14(1), pp. 249.
- THOW, A.M. and HAWKES, C., 2009. The implications of trade liberalization for diet and health: a case study from Central America. *Globalization and health*, 5(1), pp. 5.
- TIMMER, C.P., FALCON, W.P., PEARSON, S.R. and WORLD BANK. AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPT. ECONOMICS AND POLICY DIVISION, 1983. *Food policy analysis*. Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore.
- TOMLINSON, I., 2013. Doubling food production to feed the 9 billion: a critical perspective on a key discourse of food security in the UK. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 29, pp. 81-90.
- TOSUN, J. and LANG, A., 2013. Coordinating and integrating cross-sectoral policies: A theoretical approach, 7th ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux 2013.
- TRUSWELL, E. and ATKINSON, D., 2011. Supporting heads of government: a comparison across six countries. *Institute for Government*.
- TUOHY, C.H., 1999. *Accidental logics: The dynamics of change in the health care arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada*. Oxford University Press.
- UK GOVERNMENT, 2012. *Sustainable Food: Government Response to the Committee's Eleventh Report of Session 2010-12 - Environmental Audit Committee*. London: UK Government.
- UKTI, 2013. *1,000 UK food and drink companies set for export success*. London: UKTI.
- UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 2004. *How Would a National Food Policy Be Different Than the Set of Policies We Have Now?* Available at: <http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/ask/how-would-national-food-policy-be-different-set-policies-we-have-now#.WZRjR62WyUk>. Accessed August 2017.
- VAN DER HEIJDEN, J., 2011. Institutional layering: A review of the use of the concept. *Politics*, 31(1), pp. 9-18.
- VERLOO, M., 2005. Displacement and empowerment: Reflections on the concept and practice of the Council of Europe approach to gender mainstreaming and gender equality. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 12(3), pp. 344-365.
- VINCE, J., 2015. Integrated policy approaches and policy failure: the case of Australia's Oceans Policy. *Policy Sciences*, 48(2), pp. 159-180.
- VOSS, J., SMITH, A. and GRIN, J., 2009. Designing long-term policy: rethinking transition management. *Policy Sciences*, 42(4), pp. 275-302.
- WAGENAAR, H., 2006. Interpretation and Intention in Policy Analysis. *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis*, pp. 429.
- WALT, G. and GILSON, L., 1994. Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis. *Health policy and planning*, 9(4), pp. 353-370.
- WARD, I. and STEWART, R.G., 2009. *Politics one*. Palgrave Macmillan Australia.
- WARD, N. and LOWE, P., 2007. Blairite Modernisation and Countryside Policy. *Political Quarterly*, 78(3), pp. 412-421.
- WATSON, M. and MEAH, A., 2012. Food, waste and safety: negotiating conflicting social anxieties into the practices of domestic provisioning. *The Sociological review*, 60(S2), pp. 102-120.
- WEIR, M., 2006. When does politics create policy? The organizational politics of change. In: I. SHAPIRO, S. SKOWRONEK and D. GALVIN, eds, *Rethinking political institutions: The art of the state*. New York: New York Univ. Press, pp. 171-186. .
- WHICH?, 2013. *The Future of Food: Giving Consumers a Say*. London: Which?.
- WHITE, A. and DUNLEAVY, P., 2010. *Making and breaking Whitehall departments: a guide to machinery of government changes*. London: Institute for Government.
- [WWW.AHMAC.GOV.AU](http://www.ahmac.gov.au), Australian Health Minister's Advisory Council. Available: <http://www.ahmac.gov.au/site/home.aspx> [18/03/2013, 2013].

[WWW.COAG.GOV.AU](http://www.coag.gov.au) , Council of Australian Governments (COAG) website. Available: www.coag.gov.au [10/01/2013, 2013].

[WWW.DAFF.GOV.AU](http://www.daff.gov.au), October 2012, 2012-last update, National Food Plan. Available: <http://www.daff.gov.au/nationalfoodplan/national-food-plan2012>].

[WWW.FOODLABELLINGREVIEW.GOV.AU](http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au), 10 December 2011, 2011-last update, Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy. Available: www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au [16/03/2013, 2013].

YANOW, D., 1996. *How does a policy mean?: Interpreting policy and organizational actions*. Georgetown University Press.

YEATMAN, H., 2008. Window of opportunity—positioning food and nutrition policy within a sustainability agenda. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health*, 32(2), pp. 107-109.

YEO, A., LEGARD, R., KEEGAN, J., WARD, K., MCNAUGHTON NICHOLLS, C. and LEWIS, J., 2014. In-depth interviews. *Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers*, 2, pp. 177-210.

YIN, R.K., 2015. *Qualitative research from start to finish*. Guilford Publications.

YIN, R.K., 2009. *Case study research: Design and methods*. Sage publications.

YIN, R.K., 2003. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Third edition. London: Sage Publications.

YOUNG, O.R., 2002. *The institutional dimensions of environmental change: fit, interplay, and scale*. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.