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Mobilizing Charity
Non-uniformed voluntary action during the First World War

Volume 1

Peter Russell Grant
A thesis presented to Cass Business School, City University, London, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2012
Lt Col Sir Edward Ward in the uniform of Commandant-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary (National Portrait Gallery)
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ABSTRACT

Keywords: Charity; First World War; Voluntarism; Philanthropy; Management; Social Capital

This study proposes that the voluntary sector in the UK underwent major managerial and state-directional change during the period of the Great War, as a concerted response to but also enabling it to make important contributions to the war effort. It provides an important challenge to that scholarship which presents charity and voluntary activity in this period as marking a downturn from the high point of late-Victorian philanthropy, as representing far less serious activities than those undertaken by munitions workers, and VADs; with charitably-minded civilians’ efforts alienating rather than encouraging to men at the front. The study seeks to demonstrate that such a depiction is incorrect; suggesting that the degree of negativity that surrounds much previous work on voluntary action in this period is reaching a myth-like status.

The study draws on previously unused primary sources in publicly available archives; notably regarding the developing role of the UK’s Director General of Voluntary Organizations (DGVO) from 1916, and regulatory legislation of the period; and on the activities of specified local charities, in particular areas, notably Croydon and Blackburn. It utilises a cross-disciplinary approach drawing on philanthropic, social, military and political history as well as the history of management. The career of the DGVO, Sir Edward Ward, is examined in detail and analysed from the perspectives of both contemporary and current management practice.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries did not represent the zenith of charitable activity, this came during the war itself. Charitable donations rose to an all-time peak and the scope and
nature of charitable work shifted decisively. Far more working class activists, especially women became involved, though there were significant differences between the suburban south and industrial north of England and Scotland. Far from there being an unbridgeable gap in understanding or empathy between soldiers and civilians the links were strong and charitable contributions were enormously important in maintaining troop morale. This bond significantly contributed to the development and maintenance of social capital in Britain, which, in turn, strongly supported the war effort.

Issues of developing social capital within voluntary organisations, and a review of the nature of the deference exchanges occurring within charitable activity at this time follow. Finally, the extent to which responsiveness to wartime needs was able to trigger managerial change, if not a managerial revolution among active voluntary organisations is considered. A series of appendices illustrate key aspects of charities’ development and direction during this period.
Foreword

The afternoon after Britain declared war on Germany the Labour Party called an emergency meeting of all sections of the Labour and Socialist movement ‘to consider the industrial and social position of the working classes as affected by the war’. The outcome was not a condemnation of the war but the establishment of a new grouping, the War Emergency: Workers’ National Committee (WNC). The WNC soon comprised 35 members including leading figures from the trades unions (such as Ben Tillett), members of the Parliamentary Party (including Ramsay MacDonald), the Co-operative movement, Fabian Society (one of whose representatives was Sidney Webb), the British Socialist Party and four women members (including Margaret Bondfield). They issued what amounted to a ‘war manifesto’ to protect working class interests during the war. The preamble stated:

The nation is only at the beginning of a crisis, which demands thorough and drastic action by the State and the municipalities. Any bold far-reaching change, which will probably be resisted by official bureaucracy, can only be made possible by the strong pressure of well-organised, well-directed popular agitation.

The committee drew up a programme of twelve demands:

1. All war relief should be merged and taken over or administered by the Government.

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1 The Labour Year Book 1916, (Co-operative Press, London, 1915), p 37. The WNC reflected the nature of Labour at the time, which was more of a loose alliance than a party in the modern sense. For a succinct summary of the formation and work of the WNC see Royden Harrison, ‘The War Emergency Workers’ National Committee 1914-1920’ in Asa Briggs and John Saville, Essays in Labour History 1886-1923, (London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1971).


3 Winter and Prost, Great War in History, p32.

4 They number 1 to 13 but for some reason there is no number five, perhaps it was deleted in drafting?
2. Labour representation (both men and women) on all national and local committees established in connection with the war.

3. Full provision out of public funds both for dependents allowances and comforts for soldiers and sailors.

4. Rates of allowances and war pensions should be adequate (these were given in some detail).

5. Establishment of co-operative canteens in all camps and barracks.

6. Provision of public works for the unemployed displaced by the war.

7. The government should actively encourage the increase of homegrown food supplies.

8. People should be protected against exorbitant price increases, especially for food.

9. A comprehensive programme of municipal housing.

10. Maternity and infant centres should be established for workers.

11. Provision of free school meals.

12. A continuation of state control of the railways, docks etc after the war.

At the time, it might have been argued, depending upon one’s political persuasion, that these demands were either utopian or a dangerous socialist threat. Yet, by 1918, virtually all of them had, at least to some extent, been achieved.\(^5\) Not only that, most had happened without direct popular action and many with the support of those entirely opposed to the Labour Party and its Socialist ideals. Moreover, the innovations were carried out either initially or, in some cases, almost entirely through voluntary organisations rather than political parties. In the process, the relationship between charities and the state was

\(^5\) The only one that had not was number nine, which could not really be classed as directly war-related and 12 which was a post-war demand.
transformed. The transformation included the first direct state control of charities, through the creation of a Director General of Voluntary Organizations and the first compulsory registration of non-endowed charities. How did this come about and what legacy did it leave behind? This question is at the centre of this present analysis.

6The term ‘voluntary organisations’ is used throughout to denote all those bodies run by volunteers whereas ‘charities’ is a narrower term denoting only those voluntary bodies falling within the definition of the 1601 statute of charitable uses. Likewise, I adopt the term ‘voluntary action’ to mean activity, which is undertaken ‘without coercion or compulsion that is deployed through voluntary organisations in the provision of welfare services.’ Susannah Morris, ‘The Greatest Philanthropic Tradition on Earth’?
PART I – SCENE SETTING
1 Introduction: Key Research Question and Methodology

This study proposes that the UK voluntary sector underwent significant managerial change during the First World War. It seeks to answer five main questions:

- What was the extent of wartime charitable activity?
- What impact did this have on Britain’s war effort?
- What role was played by statutory agencies in enabling charity to be used in the most effective way?
- What was the state reaction to charity and was this reaction effective?
- What was the legacy of charitable activity in the First World War?

To answer the question ‘was the extent of wartime charitable activity significant enough to have an impact?’ the following points are relevant:

- What evidence exists to come to an overall conclusion about sums raised and was this ‘financial capital’ great enough to have an impact?
- How many people were involved – were the numbers significant enough to have any impact?
- Were those involved drawn from a wide enough cross-section of society for any social capital thesis to be sustainable?
- Were there mechanisms in operation that could support a thesis of voluntary activity building social capital?

These questions needed to draw upon existing literatures on voluntarism as well as those dealing with the individual and society in the framework of total war and to examine the particular social and psychological impacts of the Great War itself.
In considering the impact of charitable activity on Britain’s war effort it is relevant to ask what happened during the war to this provision, what was the role of the state and how did any new mechanisms operate? There were two official responses during the war:

- The creation of the office and department of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations.
- Legislation to control and regulate charities concerned with the war effort through the 1916 War Charities Act.

What brought about these two state interventions; what was their intended purpose; what effect did they have and how do they relate to other state interventions during the war? These issues needed to draw upon the literatures of management theory and social history to reach conclusions as to the extent to which the changes that occurred during the war could be considered significant.

In considering the legacy of wartime charitable activity, what was the longer-term impact of non-uniformed voluntary activity within the overall history of the sector? Was the First World War a passing phase or a significant watershed?

- What happened both immediately after the war and when a further total war broke out in 1939?
- What was the impact on individuals involved in voluntary action?
- Is it possible to draw any long-term conclusions as to the significance of non-uniformed voluntary action in the period?

Here it was necessary to examine theories of long-term social change to place any changes in their social, political and historical context and locate any conclusions within recognised concepts of institutional and organisational change mechanisms. If the conclusion suggested that significant, long-term institutional change was present it was also necessary to go
further and postulate a credible mechanism that might have been operating at both an individual (personal) level and at a society wide level.
Further Questions and Primary Sources

An initial impetus for this study came from a paper presented by Dr Susannah Morris to the Voluntary Action History Society in 2005, ‘The Greatest Philanthropic Tradition on Earth? Measuring the extent of voluntary activity in London 1874-1914.’¹ Morris suggested that previously accepted views of the late-Victorian period as a ‘golden age’ for philanthropy were ill-founded, not because there was less charitable activity and giving than previously thought but because there was a greater continuity of giving in the preceding period.² My own interest in the Great War – the period immediately after that covered by Dr Morris’s paper - led me to ask whether this tradition of giving continued during the war and what effect did the war have on philanthropic activity?

It proved to be a complex issue, as there are few published sources; however, I began to investigate three points:

1. Upon what sources were writers who have covered voluntary action during the war years relied in order to draw their limited conclusions?

2. What primary source material was available to test their theories?

3. What do these sources tell us about the extent and organisation of non-uniformed charitable activity?

The first resulted in an answer that often confronts historical investigation – they are often relying on each other and, where their comments are based on primary sources, those sources are extremely limited. Most were based on obvious sources such as The Times and

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² Morris’s views are strongly supported by Matthew Hilton and James McKay in their introduction to their edited volume The Ages of Voluntarism: How we got to the Big Society, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), pp 1-26.
its Red Cross fund, well-known published memoirs (such as those of Vera Brittain) and the few comments of military figures, war poets or politicians.

The second point was therefore of great importance. Were these rather superficial views all that were possible due to a lack of primary material? Studying voluntary action in the primary sources is not straightforward. However, though they have been hitherto neglected significant primary sources on voluntary action during the First World War do exist. Within British Parliamentary Papers, there is a final extensive report by Sir Edward Ward on his work. An exceptional and neglected resource is the published local histories of the contribution specific towns made to the war effort. There are numerous references to voluntary action and charity work in published and unpublished diaries and memoirs and figures for charitable giving published in annual directories. Several county and town libraries still contain these collections though very few scholars have yet made use of them. An extensive search was undertaken for local histories to supplement those of which I already had knowledge. Catalogues from the British Library, Imperial War Museum and National Archives were used for this, utilising Boolean phraseology (incorporating ‘local’, ‘First World War’, ‘Great War’, ‘volunteer’, ‘charity’). Bibliographies of books were also

3 Report of the National Scheme of Voluntary Effort resulting from the Formation of Departments of Director General of Voluntary Organizations, Cmd 173 x 185 HMSO, 1919.
4 These were often based on local collections of wartime material, which was stimulated by the creation in 1920 of the Local War Records Committee. The background to the Local War Records Committee is given in ‘Report of the Secretary to the Local War Records Committee on the Year’s Work, September 30, 1920 to September 30, 1921: Local War Records’, History, Vol. 6, No. 24, January 1922, pp 247-258.
consulted for any histories that may have been missed. These were then examined to see if they contained any details about home front activities in general and voluntary action in particular.\(^6\) The collections of the National Archives, British Library, Imperial War Museum, Institute of Historical Research and Bodleian Libraries as well as local archives throughout England were consulted or contacted to ascertain if they had any further collections relating to voluntary charitable action.\(^7\)

In all 51 local histories were consulted, of which 37 were published by 1925 and 12 are post-1995. The recent publications utilise primary records whereas the early post-war publications rarely quote their source material (though much was derived from firsthand accounts or newspaper reports). Of these the two containing the greatest information about voluntary action were John Lee’s *Todmorden and the Great War 1914-1918: A local record*, (Todmorden, Waddington and Sons, 1922) and Alderman H Keatley Moore, (ed.), *Croydon and the Great War: together with the Croydon roll of honour*, (Corporation of Croydon, Croydon, 1920). In addition Croydon Local Studies Library also has a collection of primary written and visual material documenting the War Supplies Clearing House. Todmorden has a number of other more recent published histories of voluntary activities covering the First World War period and I also accessed the diaries and notebooks of a toolmaker from the town.\(^8\)

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6 Many only document the military activities of the area.
7 For local archives I consulted the Access to Archives database [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/). When Croydon and East Lancashire had been selected for special study I visited the local records departments in both Croydon and Blackburn.
8 For example Freda, Malcolm and Keith Heywood, *In a League of Their Own: Cricket and Leisure in 20\textsuperscript{th} Century Todmorden*, Todmorden, Upper Calder Valley Publications, 2011; Diaries and Notebooks of John Greenwood, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick, GRD MSS 129; MSS 129/D/1 and MSS 129/P/2. They cover the period 1914 to 1931.
The events leading to the creation of the DGVO’s office can be traced through correspondence between the War Office and GHQ France in the National Archives, Kew.\(^9\)

Those preceding the passing of the 1916 Act are held in HO 45/10804/308566 - Commissions and Committees: War Charities Committee, 1916 - 1919 and the underlying police files (MEPO, various). Finally, there are three, largely untapped and extensive holdings relating to wartime charitable work that can be consulted in detail:

- At Kew CHAR 4/1 to 4/21 the Registers of individual charities, which give the names, and, in many cases, the occupations of those engaged in charitable activity.
- At the London Metropolitan Archives LCC/MIN/6243 - LCC/MIN/9565, 89 volumes of detailed correspondence between individual charities, the London County Council, Charity Commissioners, Metropolitan Police etc.
- At the Kent County Archives (Centre for Kentish Studies) Acquisition # 6632, Great Chart Sailor’s and Soldier’s War Fund. Twenty-two volumes of letters from servicemen to their village comforts fund between 1915 and 1918.

Because archives are not organised with subjects such as ‘charity’ or ‘voluntary action’ in mind one often has to follow a trail back to its source through a convoluted series of leads and red herrings. For example, how can one reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the total amounts raised for charity? There are no official figures for the UK but most of the secondary sources rely on a single amount quoted early in the war by the liberal politician Charles Masterman (though most do not credit the source).\(^10\) Masterman mentions that he

\(^{9}\) Mainly WO 107/15, General Correspondence 1915 July-1916 June.
had gleaned the figures from another unidentified writer. Careful reading of Masterman’s text suggested that his source was a writer called W.E. Dowding (in a series of articles contributed to the magazine *TP’s Journal of Great Deeds*). None of the secondary sources has credited Dowding and his figures only relate to the early part of the war. It was therefore necessary to test his figures against sources that cover the entire war as indicated below:

**Figure 1: Ascertaining Wartime Levels of Giving**

A similar trail of investigation was required in researching the activities of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations. Several sources mention that a DGVO existed and some give his name, Sir Edward Ward. None explains:

- Why the office was established;
- What it did and how it was organised;
- Who Ward was and why was he given the job;


- If it worked and what its relationship was with the military and voluntary sector;
  or
- How it was affected by the passing of the War Charities Act.

As I investigated Sir Edward Ward’s role in wartime voluntary activity it became clear that he was the pivotal figure. Therefore, the thesis looks in detail at both his career prior to taking up the office of DGVO and at his ideas and managerial practice. This sheds a great deal of light on the third of my key research questions – the mechanisms influencing the impact of wartime charitable action.12

The creation of the DGVO was not the first state intervention into charitable activity in the war. There had been an attempt to ‘requisition’ the assets of dormant charities for war-related relief and the creation of a National Relief Fund though neither, as will be shown, had entirely positive impacts. After a number of high-profile cases of potential (rather than actual) charity fraud the government were pressed into passing a War Charities Act in 1916 to regulate the activities of war-related collecting charities. I examine both the results and legacy of this legislation and finally look briefly at the post-war impact of wartime voluntary action.

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12 Similar comments could be made about the 1916 War Charities Act itself. Few writers mention it at all yet it was the first major piece of legislation regulating non-endowed charities in the UK. Even the standard text on charity law, Peter Luxton, *The Law of Charities*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), is mistaken when it claims that the 1960 Charities Act was the first to register non-endowed charities.
Conceptual Framework

Because of the cross-disciplinary nature of the study it clearly required an overall conceptual framework synthesising what are quite different analytical and historiographical approaches into a unified whole. This entailed examining what happened (how the government, army etc responded to the needs and demands of both servicemen and voluntary workers) against models of classic management theory. This would need to include an analysis of the cultural, economic, political and social landscape within which wartime non-uniformed voluntary action took place, for both primary and secondary sources, coupled with a retrospective analysis of the models of action adopted against modern theories of management.

Figure 2 illustrates the thesis concepts and the relationship between its main components. At the centre is managerial change and the intensity of shading of the four elements affected by managerial change indicates the extent to which they are covered in the thesis. Influencing these are the ideas of social capital and the deference exchange and these all sit within an overall framework of wider social, political and economic change.
Figure 2: Mobilizing Charity Concept Diagram
Another way of looking at the overall structure of the work is from the perspective of parallel learning. I will argue that the development of charitable activity can be divided chronologically into three broad phases:

- **Phase 1: August 1914 to late 1915** – A period of the enthusiastic amateur (a parallel to the ‘Business as Usual’ approach) characterised by little organisational management, and a continuation of the Victorian paternalistic approach.

- **Phase 2: Late 1915 to late 1916** – An increasing introduction of business methods best exemplified by the establishment of the office of the DGVO.

- **Phase 3: From late 1916 onwards** – Further centralisation and regulation of charitable activity following the passing of the War Charities Act.

Each phase can be analysed against the managerial conceptual framework(s) previously outlined, as summarised in Figure 3.
The two sets of conclusions - on social impact and management impact – are not unrelated, especially around the concept of social capital. Social capital is a legitimate concept in a discussion on management history and science especially as social responsibility and ethics are increasingly seen as a critical aspect of management strength.¹ In the course of my research however, I discovered that the parallel structure caused a particular problem.

Analysis after each chronological phase would not allow easy comparison across the phases

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and so, in practice, a different version was adopted – turning the model on its side and adopting a looser, more interactive approach as shown in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Thesis Structure – Design as Implemented**

![Diagram of Thesis Structure](image)

There are, of course, some dangers of a cross-disciplinary approach notably an awareness of ‘The Mandy (Rice-Davies) principle’ – statements that are coloured by self-interest and self-justification.\(^2\) Especially in secondary literature this is a drawback for all historical investigation but can also be present in primary sources, especially when we have no idea whether the archive material is everything that was produced at the time or not. Often, it is not a complete picture; someone has selected or weeded the files. There is clear evidence of weeding in the National Archive files at various times in the last 100 years (especially in the police files) but not, for example, at the London Metropolitan Archive where the files appear to be comprehensive. For example, in chains of correspondence, there are no obvious gaps and some of the information missing from Kew is present. There is a further issue associated

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with contemporary published sources of the First World War related to the narrowness of the use of those contemporary accounts, as discussed by Braybon in relation to women’s symbolic role in the war.³

Another familiar problem is not being sufficiently aware of one’s underlying philosophies or prejudices and demanding that one’s conclusions are accepted without question. Therefore, ethics, morality and historiography are closely related. The logical conclusion of this line of thought is a metahistory, a rhetorical project by which the historian attempts to persuade readers that his or her speculations are actually facts. The ultimate metanarrative is the myth and this approach appears to be at the root of many of the popular ideas about the First World War, which are no more than modern myths.⁴ However, revising metahistory Spiegel cautions that ‘to the extent that revision is understood as the result of the combined effect of psychological, social and professional determinations, it is unlikely that there will ever be genuine consensus about the sources of revision in history, since all historians bring to their work differing congeries of psychological preoccupations, social positions, and professional commitments.’⁵

Booth and Rowlinson elucidate an amusing, but perceptive danger in relation to management history. They caution against either the ‘Flintstones method’ or the ‘Simpsons

method’. The Flintstones lived in the supposed Stone Age town of Bedrock, which was, of course, a society identical to the United States of the late 1950s and ‘60s. Therefore, the ‘Flintstones method’ ‘assumes that any society from the prehistoric to the present faces the same organizational problems as our own.’ For example one management historian has described ancient Greek enterprises as ‘multinationals’ and compares them to those that exist today. The Simpsons is set in Springfield, ‘which is a classic post-modernist pastiche. The series systematically conceals the State in which Springfield is located... Springfield is fictionalized in the same way that an organization is often fictionalized in organization studies.’ What is described is an attempt at a universal model but one that has never really existed. Just as Bart Simpson never grows up so the fictionalised organisation exists in a non-dated, extended present. Of the two it is more likely that a ‘Flintstones’ approach may predominate in a study devoted to a past of now almost a century ago. Studies of previous managerial organisations are not unique, not even in a war-related context. Recent attempts include Pringle and Kroll’s analysis of the Battle of Trafalgar from the perspective of resource-based theory and Grattan’s own study of the strategic approach of the Allies in the First World War. Grattan’s is obviously the most applicable here and his argument is that there was poor strategic co-operation between the allies and that this led to the wrong

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7 ‘Management and Organizational History: Prospects’, p 6. It might be argued that this is simply a restating of the classic Rankeian view that the past cannot be judged by the standards of the present.
9 Booth and Rowlinson, ‘Management and Organizational History: Prospects’, p 7. There is an entire website devoted to the location of Springfield: http://www.snpp.com/guides/springfield.list.html. Is it also a reference both to the birthplace of Abraham Lincoln and of the Springfield rifle thus introducing more complex allusions?
strategy being adopted – attrition on the Western front. Whilst much of his analysis is sound, for example suggesting that greater collaboration might have been more fruitful, Grattan rather falls into one of his own traps (outlined in ‘Crafting Management History’) by not fully taking into account the political realities of the situation.
Arrangement of Primary and Secondary Material

Throughout the study, I use both new primary research sources and secondary material. Whilst these are indicated in the text, it will be helpful to summarise their use here (see Table 1). The table sets out these sources indicates where in the study they are located and links them to the key ideas that the study explores.

Clearly not all archival sources were researched and given the volumes of material in, especially, the London Metropolitan Archives; some had to be scanned quite rapidly. I did consider looking more closely at local archival holdings. I had correspondence with the archivists at the National Library and National Archives of Scotland and the Glasgow City Council Archives to ascertain whether there was more material available on wartime charities in Glasgow. I also asked the same question of the librarian in Blackburn and the archivist at the Lancashire archives. All of these sources reported that their holdings on the topic were limited and so I did not visit them in person.
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2 Literature Review

As this is a cross-disciplinary study, it draws on a wide range of literature, most notably:

- The literature of voluntary action and its history.
- Social histories of war, notably of the First World War, and both contemporary and historical examinations of the British Home Front in 1914-18.
- Theories of social change and war – to what extent and in what ways does war impact upon society? What mechanisms operate at an individual level that help bring about these changes?
- Concepts of social capital and how it can be built and maintained.
- Management theory and management history.

In this section I examine the current status of these literatures for their relevance to the study in question.
Literature of Voluntary Action and the Home Front

The First World War saw the greatest act of volunteering ever in Britain. Two-and-a-half million men volunteered to fight in a conflict that cost more than 700,000 of them their lives.¹ There was, however, another act of volunteering between 1914 and 1918 on at least the same scale, though without the same life-and-death consequences. This was the voluntary effort at home, especially to support the men at the front, in health and sickness, but also to aid numerous other charitable causes. In 1929, one commentator on the war suggested, in relation to wartime voluntary activities that ‘a book might be written on the conduct of these activities, which, as social life ceased to exist, absorbed the energies of people in all ranks of life.’² Yet it remains a phenomenon about which little has been written. Even in the relatively few publications that cover the home front, it is not given significant space. For example, two books were published in 2006 on the home front in the Great War. One, Home Front 1914-1918, How Britain survived the Great War, (Kew, National Archives, 2006) by Ian Beckett does give charitable effort some coverage whereas the other, The Home Front: Civilian Life in World War One, by Peter Cooksley (London, NPI Media, 2006) seems preoccupied with aircraft and airships. Another with virtually nothing to say on voluntary action is E.S. Turner’s Dear Old Blighty, (London, Michael Joseph, 1980) and Richard Van Emden and Steve Humphries oral history, All Quiet on the Home Front: An oral history of life in Britain during the First World War, (London, Hodder Headline, 2003) again contains very little reference to non-uniformed voluntary activity. Even books specifically concentrating on women’s contribution to the war effort often ignore charity work. For example Diana Condell and Jean Liddiard’s Working for Victory? Images of Women in the


To some extent the exception to this rule, and certainly the current definitive account of the home front in 1914-18, is Adrian Gregory’s *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). Sheffield has called *The Last Great War* ‘the most important book on the British Home Front of the First World War to appear since Arthur Marwick’s *The Deluge*, published over 40 years ago, which is largely superseded.’ I’m less certain about Sheffield’s second assertion as *The Last Great War* is not attempting the same objective as *The Deluge*, Gregory is less concerned with the impact of the war on long-term social change than he is about the recovery of contemporary opinion. Thus he covers war enthusiasm (or more correctly the lack of it), the role of propaganda, the mass volunteering for the armed forces (though not so much for non-uniformed activity), the role of religion and an analysis of the importance of the idea of sacrifice and its role in

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3 Quoted on the Amazon website http://www.amazon.co.uk/Last-Great-War-British-Society/dp/0521728835 (accessed on 8/9/11)
balancing the demands made on different social groups. In doing so he challenges many of
the myths that have embedded themselves in, at least, the public consciousness such as the
naive joy expressed on the outbreak of war, the total disillusion that later set in and the
supposed manipulation of public opinion through devious propaganda. I would agree with
Batten’s summation that The Last Great War ‘will undoubtedly become the standard text on
the British population’s experiences during the First World War.’4 However the book does
have certain limitations. The main one is that it is, by necessity, limited in scope and so does
not cover charitable activity in any detail. In fact Gregory’s comments are somewhat
piecemeal, for example mentioning that ‘over 400 charities were registered in Scotland
before 1917’ but not the thousands more that were registered in England and Wales. 5 Some
of his statistics regarding charities are also incorrect, for example that ‘at the end of the war
there were 6,000 charities for the war-disabled.’6 There were not, this was the total number
of charities then registered, only a proportion of which dealt with the war disabled.7
Nevertheless in the main Gregory’s analysis is supportive of my arguments and I make
significant use of his work.

In a similar fashion most histories of British philanthropy and voluntary action either give
little space to the First World War or treat it as some kind of aberration or passing phase in

4 Richard Batten, ‘A Forgotten Front: A review of The Home Front: Civilian Life in World War One and
The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War, Ex Historia, 43, available at
http://humanities.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/collegeofhumanities/history/exhistoria/vol
ume2/Richard_Batten.pdf (accessed on 8/9/11)
5 The Last Great War, p 98. I’m not entirely sure what he means by ‘registered’ as the War Charities
Act did not apply to Scotland at that time, he may mean registered under the DGVO scheme.
6 The Last Great War, p 265.
7 Other factual errors include: (p 88) the suggestion that the lyric ‘Send out my brother, my sister or
my mother, but for God’s sake don’t send me’ was an anonymous soldier’s song. It was composed for
the revue Around the Map and recorded by the highly popular music hall star, Alfred Lester; (p 313,
note 77) he gets his murderers confused. George Joseph Smith simply drowned his victims, it was
John George Haigh who used acid to dispose of the remains of his victims in the 1940s; (p 129) by the
time of the First World War Todmorden was in Yorkshire, not Lancashire.

Geoffrey Finlayson recognised this omission (or something close to it) when he commented that ‘studies on the influence of war on welfare in the twentieth century... have concentrated almost exclusively on the provision of statutory welfare in Britain to the exclusion of an examination of voluntarism.’ He went on to note that though there are many references to socialism and collectivism there are few on self-help and charity and that ‘the debate on the effects of war on welfare has quite ignored, except by implication, the influence of war on voluntarism and social welfare.\(^8\)

One reason for this omission is that there are fewer published sources. As Marr has pointed out, whereas there are a mountain of memoirs recording the heroism of the men at the front there are very few recording the lives of those who stayed at home and there are also relatively few histories of the home front in the First World War, in direct contrast to that of

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the Second. Where charity is mentioned (usually fleetingly) it is seen in terms of an outbreak of sock-knitting in 1914 carried out exclusively by middle and upper-class women and having absolutely no impact whatsoever on the course of the war. This misrepresentation of charitable activity began during the war itself with Punch quick to satirise the aristocratic lady fumbling with her needles and has been repeated ad nauseam ever since. Early culprits include Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth, (London, Virago, 1978, p 101) and she has been followed by E.S. Turner’s Dear Old Blighty (London, Michael Joseph, 1980) who, where he does mention charity (p 31), does so disparagingly. DeGroot in Blighty (p 31) repeats the comments and Samuel Hynes too is patronising and derogatory (Hynes, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture, London, Pimlico, 1992, pp 91-93).

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9 Andrew Marr introduction to Tommy’s War: A First World War Diary, (London, HarperPress, 2008) p xii. In my researches, I think there may not be more than low double figures of home front memoirs and, of these, only the recent Tommy’s War is actually in print. See also Gregory, The Last Great War, p 5.

Mr Punch in Wartime, (London, Educational Book Company, n.d. c 1920) pp 22 and 130. 11

The approach of much of the existing literature to non-uniformed voluntary action has, therefore, been superficial at best. Its conclusions are consistent across the literature and can perhaps be summed up as concluding that:

Charitable activity mushroomed on the outbreak of the First World War being primarily directed towards the National Relief Fund, Belgian Refugees and the Red Cross. It was mainly a middle class phenomenon best characterised by those ladies who undertook a frenzied spate of sock knitting. Overall it was an amateurish exercise that had little real impact either on the home front or with the troops. As

11 A slightly different tone but still mocking the ‘lady bountiful’ approach was taken by the magazine later in the war. Examples here include ‘Our Spoilt Warriors’ (19/04/16) which satirises the upper-class lady canteen volunteer and ‘Resourceful Tommy’ (12/07/16) that does the same for women entertaining the wounded. See Helen Tripp, ‘Mr Punch and Tommy Atkins: British Soldiers’ Social Identity during the First World War’, University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, No. 4, 2002 at www.sussex.ac.uk/history/documents/4-tripp-mr-punch-and-tommy-atkins (accessed on 16/05/10).
the war dragged on and became more serious in its social consequences charitable activity significantly declined and there was little long-term impact either on individuals or upon the transition of social welfare from the private to the state realm.

It is certainly true that there was a phase of frenetic knitting and stitching which spread throughout the country on the outbreak of war and what they produced was sometimes not exactly what was needed:12

A ‘needlework mania’ gripped the country. One correspondent to The Times complained that his wife and daughter, whose abilities as seamstresses were limited, had turned his parlour into ‘a sort of factory’. My heart goes out to poor suffering Tommy Atkins if he is to be condemned to endure these miserably cut, uncomfortable and irritating garments.13

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12 As Emily Galbraith, who was touring Scotland with her minister father soon after war was declared, related. ‘Everyone started knitting for the war effort. I remember we were staying of the shores of Loch Fyne and the women were knitting and they appealed to my father if it was right or wrong to knit socks on Sundays for the soldiers, and my father said it was quite right and they were all very pleased.’ Richard Van Emden and Steve Humphries, All Quiet on the Home Front: An oral history of life in Britain during the First World War, (London, Hodder Headline, 2003), p 17.
13 DeGroot, Blighty, p 68 quoting The Times of 28 August 1914.
Figure 6: When and where to knit


However, even shoddily produced goods could be helpful because ‘many men in the trenches used these unwanted, and often unsuitable, items for cleaning their rifles and wiping their cups and plates.’\(^{14}\) Yet despite the tone of condescension in some contemporary writings on the subject, the production of most comforts quickly became better organised. To characterise First World War charitable activity as a whole in terms of middle-class sock-knitters is akin to characterising the British Army’s approach to the war solely in terms of its organisation in August 1914. A key perpetrator of this image has been Arthur Marwick, still perhaps the leading historian to cover the home front of 1914-18. His seminal work *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War* was published in 1965 during the intense revival of interest in the First World War that encompassed the mammoth BBC television

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series *The Great War* (1964) as well as the Theatre Workshop’s highly influential musical
*
*The Deluge* has little to say about charitable voluntary action other than in relation to work
for Belgian refugees and prisoners of war and so is another example of what might be
termed the dismissive school of thought on the topic, those considering it too trivial to be
worth recording or investigating in more detail. However, by 1977 when Marwick wrote
*Women at War 1914-1918* to accompany the major Imperial War Museum exhibition on the
subject he was more explicit and, largely, condescending.\(^{15}\)

One could perhaps forgive these misreadings if the primary sources available to refute them
were non-existent or even hard to find. Yet this is not the case. Though archives generally do
not have easily referenced sections on ‘Charity’ or ‘Voluntary Action’, many of the key
documents from the period do survive. The National Archives, for example, contain copies of
the application forms of (virtually) every organisation that registered under the 1916 War
Charities Act. These forms give the names, addresses and, sometimes, occupations of the
officers of the charity. These can be supplemented by searches through the census records
thus building a picture of the gender and class of these people. In London, the Metropolitan
Archives contain 89 volumes of correspondence and documentation relating to war charities
in the capital. Here, the archivist confirmed that I was the first person to use the collection
systematically.

A prime purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the middle-class, sock-knitting image of
First World War charity is yet another of the myths that has surrounded that traumatic

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\(^{15}\) Marwick, *Women at War*. See for example p 35 on the uselessness of ‘sock knitting’, p 12 on the
lack of impact of charitable work and pp 142-143 for rather patronising remarks about charitable
organisations and the Women’s’ Institutes (which first came to Britain, from Canada, in 1915).
period of British history. There was, it transpires, a massive increase in charitable voluntary activity during the First World War. Around 11,000 new charities were created, a 30% increase on the number in existence pre-war. The value of their fund-raising was significantly more than £100 million (probably reaching £150 million), at least equivalent to the income for ‘good causes’ through today’s National Lottery, and their organisational and managerial legacy was significant. Charitable activity in the war was, especially in many industrial towns and cities, a phenomenon of working class solidarity with many more organisations run by ordinary women and men than by well-to-do matrons. It was a highly significant phenomenon; easily the most significant charitable cause that had ever been supported in Britain and it had profound effects upon both the war effort and the relationship between voluntary organisations and the state.

Though there were moves in the direction of state control of charitable activity in support of the war effort this was not a coherently developed policy of government nor was it by any means a steady, linear process. Rather it was motivated by specific events, or crises, such as concerns as to wasted effort or lack of co-ordination in the supply of comforts for the troops. In 1915 this, together with public pressure and embarrassments over perceived shortages, led to the establishment of the post of Director General of Voluntary Organizations under Sir Edward Ward. However, Ward’s remit was coordination of supply, not regulation of abuses. Legislation, in the form of the 1916 War Charities Act, was almost a last resort entered into when abuses of the charitable system became a significant public issue. Where state intervention did occur, it was often due to a failure to integrate the dual charitable impulses of mutual aid and philanthropy with the requirements of a budding state welfare system.
Literature of social change and war

Concentrating specifically on ‘non-uniformed’ organisations, another purpose in this study is to examine the role these played in the war and the extent of voluntary action, through both examples and new use of primary sources to determine the impact of this activity both on the home front and in the trenches. Part III follows the changes that came about in voluntary action as the war continued, especially the development of state control over the voluntary sector, both through legislation and semi-official structures. Finally, Part IV draws broader conclusions. It examines the changes that did (or did not) come about in the nature of voluntary action during and immediately after the war and considers the role voluntary action played (or did not play) in wider changes occurring in British Society. In these respects, the study examines two key relationships: firstly the external relationship between voluntary and charitable activity and the state; secondly the internal social relationships of voluntary action itself. With regard to the latter, the study considers the two strands of voluntary action, mutual aid and philanthropy, and how the relationship between them changed due to the war. These debates rest upon a clear understanding of the literature relating to social change and war.

One of the first historians to tackle the issue of the war’s influence on wider political, economic and social issues was A.L. Bowley in Some Economic Consequences of the Great War published in 1930. ‘Bowley suggested that post-war changes could be divided into three categories: those mainly unconnected with the war; those accelerated (or retarded) by the
war; and those directly attributable to the war – the destruction of life and capital.\textsuperscript{16} He considered that some post-war technological changes, such as the transition to oil-fired ships, fell into the first category whereas the development of aviation, the emancipation of women and the growth of democracy in Britain were in the second. In the mid-1960s Bowley’s ideas were taken up by Arthur Marwick in \textit{The Deluge}. It is an indication of the importance of Marwick’s book that the debate as to whether or not, in Trotsky’s words, ‘war ... is a great locomotive of history’, has taken \textit{The Deluge} as its marker ever since.\textsuperscript{17} The arguments fall, very broadly, into those that see war as a catalyst for change and those that stress the continuities in social history, a ‘gigantic crossroads, or merely a transient episode, in the domestic history of British society’.\textsuperscript{18} Most writers agree what the changes were, for example the Russian Revolution or the decline of the Liberal Party, but not which of Bowley’s categories they fit. Of course it should also be possible to take a middle view, that the war had a major impact in some areas and relatively little in others.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[(17)] Trotsky made the remark in a speech to the Comintern on 28 December 1922. There is an interesting discussion on its origins on the ‘Russian front’ website \url{http://russianfront.com/2009/08/14/war-revolution-locomotives-and-history/}, accessed on 04/05/10.
\item[(19)] Here I am struck by a comment by Harris in the introduction to her social history of Britain between 1870 and 1914 when she wrote: ‘Many features of pre-war society – changes in the structure of family life, the emergence of the labour movement, the challenge of feminism, the investigation of poverty, the rise of aesthetic modernism, and the growth of moral and religious uncertainty – seem to anticipate concerns of the later twentieth century; and it is perhaps too easy to assume that they are part of a historical continuum. On the other hand, other aspects of Edwardian life – the fashionable predominance of a leisure aristocracy, the sheer intensity of the poverty of the poor, the omnipresence of infant death, the restricted scope of central government, and the ingenuous confidence in the future of the British Empire (and indeed of European civilization in general) – seem so utterly remote from a later age that it is tempting to see them as part of a wholly vanished society, swept away by a sudden, extraneous, and unpredictable cataclysm, as utterly and irrevocably as
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Some historians, and other writers, have, in trying to answer these questions have concentrated too much on a small number of conscientious objectors and pacifists rather than the vastly more numerous and influential patriots who supported the war throughout. Perhaps this trend has something to do with a modern desire to denigrate patriotism often equating it, quite a-historically, with jingoism and racism. The tendency is, perhaps, explained by the nature of the conflict itself. War, especially the first modern, mass technological war, pushed both combatants and non-combatants alike to extremes of emotion, of hate and compassion. This was true not only of differences between individuals but also of contradictory emotions within the same individual (Siegfried Sassoon being a classic case). In such circumstances, patriotism and jingoism can be seen as different sides of the same coin and the war as providing an internal dialectic that can reconcile what some writers have seen as irreconcilable divisions.

As Winter and Prost noted the trend towards the study of war and society emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, in part as a reflection of contemporary events, most especially the Vietnam War. 20 Marwick’s view, that the demands of total war could lead to positive social change has remained controversial but as Todman has pointed out, in this respect, Marwick’s book stands in close proximity to that of Paul Fussell.21 Marwick had taken as the foundation of his argument the earlier work of Titmuss, first expressed in his Problems of

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21 ‘Marwick’s work became the first point of reference for many of those who wrote about the military, political or cultural history of the war. It was easily accessible, conveyed its author’s historical passion, and seemed to provide scholarly backing for widely held beliefs. Indeed it has become a sort of ur-text, its version of the war accepted and cited uncritically by generations of historians and students.’ Dan Todman, The Great War Myth and Memory, (London and New York, Hambledon, 2005), p183.
Social Policy (1950) but extended in his highly influential lecture of 1955, ‘War and Social Policy’, published in 1958 in Essays on the Welfare State. Marwick pointed out that most historians of the nineteenth century ended their studies in 1914 whilst those examining the twentieth tended to open their analysis in 1918, thus ignoring the crucial war years despite the fact that many notable social changes tended to cluster around them. The question for Marwick became to what extent the war caused or accelerated those changes or, as he later put it, what difference was there between ‘society at war’ and ‘society not at war’.

Originally, in The Deluge, Marwick proposed seven ways in which war brought about social change. Later he simplified and refined these down to just four ‘dimensions’:

- Firstly, that war has an obvious destructive and disruptive dimension. This, though clearly entailing regression, also creates an impulse towards rebuilding or reconstruction in different formats from those existing prior to war.
- Second is the test dimension. War, especially prolonged industrialised war, tests existing social structures and if they are inadequate (as, for example, in Tsarist Russia) they collapse.
- Third is the participation dimension. Though Marwick rejected the determinism of Andreski’s Military Participation Ratio (which propounded the idea that the greater the participation of the underprivileged in the war effort the greater their political gains) he nonetheless retained its overall thrust in that ‘such participation will provide the possibility of social gains, or, at minimum, of developing new consciousness and self-esteem.’
- Finally, there is the psychological dimension; perhaps inevitably the most ephemeral of the four as it is less easy to discern its overall effect on society. ‘War is an enormous emotional experience, during which loyalty to one’s own group, or those with whom one comes to identify in wartime (one’s trade union, the working class,
other women, the entire nation) intensifies, as does hostility to ‘out-groups’
(principally, of course, the enemy).’

By 1988, as he himself noted, Marwick’s view that war had this transformational effect was ‘not in the high tide of fashion.’ It had been challenged by a group of ‘revisionist’ historians (the same term used today for those who challenge the Liddell Hart / A.J.P. Taylor view of the military prosecution of the war) who, to a greater or lesser degree, denied that war brought about social change. Angus Calder and Henry Pelling were early critics followed by a bevy of others, depicted by Marwick as being mostly ‘feminists, or socialists, or both.’

There was certainly some truth in Marwick’s assertion that the revisionists tended to have ideological objections to his theory. A keystone of Marwick’s thesis was that he saw change as being unguided, rather than brought about by the conscious volition of politicians, whereas those taking an opposite view either believed that change could only be initiated through the conscious actions of militants or, taking a more purely Marxist line, saw change as the result of longer term class influences. Important critics of Marwick whose work touches on this current study include Pugh (on the enfranchisement of women), Turner (on the state and civil society) and DeGroot (on wider issues).

It is impossible for a huge event like the First World War to have had no influence on social change. ‘Habits such as cigarette smoking, the cinema, gambling [and] the use of contraceptives’ all became far more widespread due to the common experience of the six million men in the armed forces. However, these are less significant changes than the overall impact on, for example, health or women’s status in society. Only a small number of

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22 Arthur Marwick introduction to Total War and Social Change, (London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1988), pp xv – xvi. It is the psychological dimension that remains least explored by historians and yet it may be the most crucial (see Chapter 14).
22 Marwick, Total War, p xvii.
modern writers have gone significantly further than Marwick in suggesting that the war was an overwhelming turning point in British history and ‘swept away a whole world and created a new one’, though the majority who were writing during and immediately after the war favoured this ‘radical change’ view. Sidney Webb ‘acted in the belief that with proper guidance, the war experience could be transformed into a powerful vehicle for progressive social change’ and in 1916 the historian W.H. Dawson spoke for many when he wrote ‘who does not feel that since August 1914 England has in many ways broken with her past and entered an entirely new epoch in her history, marked by transformations of every kind?’ Other contemporary writers to summarise the war’s positive impact included the Quaker philanthropist Seebohm Rowntree and the journalist W Basil Worsfold. Rowntree expressed the view in 1918 that ‘we have seen accomplished within a few brief months or years reforms to which we should have assigned not decades but generations.’ The subtitle to Worsfold’s 1919 book, *An endeavour to trace the influence of the war as a reforming agency*, suggests a degree of pre-judgement but among the positive results he discerned were advances in agriculture, education, the participation of labour in industry, productivity and technology as well as incidentals such as daylight saving. In his views on health, he anticipated Winter by suggesting that in Britain ‘apart from the losses arising from the actual fighting ... the operation of the war ... has tended to preserve life, rather than destroy it.’

Even writing at a distance of some 50 years Robert Roberts, who lived in a poor district of

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30 Worsfold, *The War and Social Reform*, p 143.
Salford at the time, thought ‘the war was the greatest leap forward in working-class living standards that had ever occurred.’31 A good argument can easily be made here for the benefit of hindsight. The First World War was a traumatic experience for most people and during and after such an event it is hardly surprising that the participants thought everything had changed. Many other periods display the same kind of contemporary analysis, somewhat over-emphasising the nature and extent of change whether it be the period of the French Revolution or the ‘cultural revolution’ of the late 1960s. Contrary to these contemporary views, most modern historians have attempted to revise Marwick’s thesis, either wholly or in part.

At the extreme are a group of writers who maintain exactly the opposite view from Marwick that the war, far from accelerating positive social change, resulted in a triumph of conservative or even reactionary values. Pugh sees the growth of state control during the war as being a victory for reactionary Unionists, determined to prosecute the war to the full.32 This takes a very narrow view of political decisions and their consequences and it is no surprise that Pugh takes a similar line in the discussion of the war’s impact for women.33 Reimann is another supporter of the view that the war enhanced conservative values, especially in the cultural field, concluding that a number of reactionary cultural values were reinforced including the superiority of Anglo-Saxon morality, gentlemanly notions of sport, the persistence of popular faith and the continuing validity of gender stereotypes.34

Unfortunately, much of his evidence is highly flawed. For example, he entirely misrepresents

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34 Aribert Reimann ‘Popular Culture and the Reconstruction of British Identity’ in Hartmut Berghoff, and Robert von Friedeburg, (eds.), Change and Inertia: Britain under the impact of the First World War, (Bodenheim, Philo Cop., 1998), pp 100-120.
the development of football as regaining its ‘gentlemanly profile’ during the war, when it in fact came even more under the ownership of the working class during it and professionalised after it, with for example, many southern teams joining the paid ranks in the 1920s.\(^{35}\) Reimann automatically assumes that the strengthening of a ‘collective sense of national character’ must be a reactionary, conservative trend when it is far more complex and open to different interpretations.\(^ {36}\) There is also, at the very least, conflicting evidence regarding the persistence, or decline, of faith during the war and of gender stereotyping.\(^ {37}\) Of the social histories of the war Van Emden and Humphries’ All Quiet on the Home Front has already been referenced. Written to accompany a Channel 4 documentary both the book and film suffer from the taint of metanarrative. This is succinctly revealed in the summary about the film on the Channel Four website: Secret History: World War I – Horror on the Home Front: First shown on Channel 4 in December 2002: Elderly witnesses vividly describe the terrible hardships that were experienced by many civilians in Britain during

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\(^{35}\) Inevitably, he interprets the Captain Nevill incident on the first day of the Somme (see p 121) as a personal gesture, wholly about ‘a gentlemanly notion of “honour”’ rather than a social, external one to do with troop morale. For the working class dominance of football in the Army see James Roberts, “The Best Football Team, the Best Platoon” The role of football in the proletarianization of the British Expeditionary Force 1914-1918’, Sport in History, Vol. 26, No. 1, April 2006, pp 26-46.

\(^{36}\) See the section of patriotism and morale, Chapters 13 and 14.

\(^{37}\) Reimann’s arguments also lack conviction due to his very partial use of primary sources and partial view of the military history of the war. He dismisses soldiers’ letters as reliable evidence because those that survive in the IWM show ‘a significant bias towards the English middle classes’, and because ‘only a very detailed analysis of individual correspondences over many years’ can reveal their writers’ true beliefs. He should have looked a little further afield than the IWM, as very many letters from working-class soldiers do survive and close textual analysis of the kind he suggests can distort as much as much as less rigorous readings (for example a person’s views can change). He considers that ‘the small contingent of British regulars which went to fight the highly-trained German armies in Belgium at the end of August 1914 carried with them a sense of military inferiority which coincided with their nick name of the ‘contemptible little army’. This allegation is doubly wrong. If the British army of 1914 had a fault in this area, it was probably over confidence rather than inferiority. They wore the epithet ‘contemptible’ as a badge of pride and irony as they thought precisely the opposite. The suggestion that the German army was better trained is simply extraordinary. The British army was a highly trained professional force, the Germans, though very well trained, were in the main a conscript and reservist one.
World War I. The distortion does not come from the witnesses themselves but from the framing comments and material. It is impossible to say how selective the producer (Humphries) was with the oral testimonies collected but there is no doubt that it was edited to fit the theme of unrelenting misery on the home front, a contention unsupported by the overwhelming majority of evidence and interpretation. 

Most commentators take a more balanced view. The position of DeGroot is that the war was more of a ‘winter storm which swelled the rivers of change’ and his overall view is neatly summed up in his chapter heading: ‘The social legacy of the war: three steps forward, two back.’ Another with a foot in both camps is Winter whose pioneering study ‘The Impact of the First World War on Civilian Health in Britain’ argued that, overall, the war had positive results for the health of the country, most notably with regard to infant mortality and that of the poorest. Whilst a number of writers have questioned these findings, they have not been conclusively disproven. However, on the issue of national identity he aligns himself

38 http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/e-h/homefront.html, accessed on 04/05/10.

39 For example Humphries and van Emden refer to ‘the desperate food shortages of 1917’ (p 221). Were they really ‘desperate’? What would they have called the shortages in Germany? In a discussion on how people were poorer because of the war (p 245) they suggest this was exacerbated by many people having to pay income tax for the first time and making it sound as if tax thresholds had been lowered. In fact the example shows a rise in gross wages as far more people reached the threshold for paying the tax. Perhaps most outrageous of all is the claim (p 231) that ‘most men died in their late-forties to mid-fifties.’ This is, of course, utter nonsense. The life expectancy for males at birth during the war was around 50 (see ‘A Century of Change: Trends in UK statistics since 1900’, House of Commons Research paper 99/111, December 1999). If one reached manhood, your life expectancy was significantly higher. Humphries and van Emden almost comically reveal their failure to understand simple statistics by immediately quoting as an example of how most men died in early middle age a person who ‘had a heart attack and was run over by a steamroller.’


41 DeGroot, Blighty, p 291.


43 For example, Linda Bryder questions Winter’s sources as not being indicative of the poorest in society as he utilises Prudential Assurance records. ‘The First World War: healthy or hungry?’ History Workshop Journal, No. 24, Autumn 1987, 141-157. Glen Matthews in his essay ‘Poverty and the poor
with the revisionists by contending that the war reconsolidated ‘the conservative myth of Englishness’.\(^{44}\) Harris’ overall view is broadly positive, with the war leading to ‘major contribution[s] to the development of the country’s health services … and, especially, the development of housing provision.’\(^{45}\)

A key area of debate is with regard to the gains, and losses, made by various classes during the war. At the political level a fundamental question is with regard to the decline of the Liberal and rise of the Labour parties. During the war we will see how many of the representatives of labour were brought into the decision-making structures of the state but there is other evidence that the war might have held back the political ambitions of those representing labour. Several of the leaders of the Labour Party, including its first Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and first Chancellor, Philip Snowden, remained true to their pacifist principles throughout and were consequently vilified by the majority of the working-class whilst the war lasted. You therefore have on the one hand a group of historians who argue that the decline of Liberalism was terminal even before 1914 and another who maintain that there is no conclusive evidence that Labour was poised to replace the Liberal

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\(^{45}\) Bernard Harris, *Origins of the British Welfare State*, p 182. He also draws attention to W.G. Runciman’s argument that the conventional historical assumptions about the significance of the periods 1914-18 and 1939-45 should be reversed: ‘The policies initiated by Lloyd George’s government in the fields of health, housing, education and unemployment relief were progressively, if sometimes haltingly, expanded by its successors. Those initiated by Attlee’s government were progressively eroded by its successors.’ p 166.
Party as the main opponents of Conservatism. The former include Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974) and, perhaps more persuasively as they back it up with detailed evidence at a local level, Keith Laybourn and Jack Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour 1890-1918, (London, Croom Helm, 1984). The latter are led by Bernard Waites in a number of publications of which his PhD thesis (supervised by Marwick with whom he also collaborated on a number of occasions) is probably the most comprehensive and well‐argued,46 They also include Rex Pope, War and Society in Britain, though, overall, Pope’s view is that ‘the war of 1939-45 had a greater and more lasting impact’ than the First World War.47

Closely linked to this debate is whether the war accelerated the advance of the working class (in both economic and political terms) and had a positive or negative impact on poverty. One can probably be more categorical with regard to the latter. Despite the fact that levels of primary poverty had been declining since the middle of the nineteenth century there is strong evidence that the war in ‘raising the general standard of living [for the poorest] vastly alter[ed] the prevailing cultural norms by which poverty was judged in everyday life.’48 In other words, the war helped change poverty in Britain from an absolute concept to a relative one. This view is supported through both contemporary and modern research.49 Waites summarises the changes, not necessarily caused by the war but certainly influenced by it as:

An elimination of much of the poverty of pre-war England, a redistribution of national income in favour of the salariat and manual workers, a narrowing of working-class wage differentials, a reduction of some of the large incomes derived

47 War and Society in Britain, pp 30 and 93.
49 Contemporary studies include that of Bowley and Hogg, quoted in Philips, p 123. Modern studies are quoted by Pope, War and Society in Britain, p 27 and Gregory, The Last Great War, pp 285-286.
from wealth and some redistribution of that wealth, an expansion of the educational opportunities that led to white-collar employment and a strengthening of civic integration by the steps taken to include the working class and the Labour movement within a community of citizenship.

This leads him to conclude ‘that the war was instrumental in bringing them as a linked series and compressing them within a brief span of time.’

There is greater contention around the notion of gains for the working class as a whole. One fact is that, for many in certain industries like the docks or shipping, the war years were one of regular employment for the first time. For many others there were ‘considerable opportunities for working overtime, as important a gain for many of them as higher rates of pay.’

There was not always a steady improvement through the war, and Gregory uses the example of mill workers in Todmorden where wages lagged behind prices until the end of 1915 but then, in the second half of the war and spurred by working class action and strikes, the government acted to redress the balance. Waites’ rather compelling evidence is that there was a levelling out of wage differentials in the working class and a consequent decline in the relative earnings of the skilled artisan of, in Hobsbawm’s phrase, the ‘labour aristocracy’.

Waites’ view is that differentiation was marked more by lifestyle than income but has been questioned by Reid who argues that the pre-war gap between skilled and unskilled labour has been exaggerated. However, both Waites and Reid agree that there

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52 Gregory, The Last Great War, pp 198-199. His evidence is taken from Lee Todmorden, p 145.
53 Though Waites is critical of this Marxist term and of Hobsbawm’s analysis and Paul Thompson found little evidence of ‘labour aristocrats’ in his oral study of the period.
was a greater homogenisation of the working class than in the past but that this did not fundamentally alter the relation between broader class groups.55 In other words, though there was less poverty and the working class had strengthened their bargaining position the war ‘did not fundamentally disturb those processes of social differentiation which are generic to a capitalist market society’.56 In Chapter 14 I look further at the issue of class relations and the strengthening of working class unity but for now there is certainly room for both Waites’ view of a narrowing of wage differentials between elements of the working class and that of Wilson who considers that ‘by 1919 ... Britain contained a working class with a greater sense of cohesion than had been the case in the past.’57

If there were, generally, gains for the working class there were also comparative losses for certain elements of the middle classes, not least in the disproportionate death rates of middle class men in the armed forces.58 Economic differences within the middle class were compressed by the war (just as they were within the manual working class). By the autumn of 1915:

Many professional incomes and salaries fell substantially behind inflation.... The emergence of two non-official charitable agencies – the Professional Classes War Relief Council and the Professional Classes Special Aid Society – is evidence of [this] relative deprivation.... Up to Christmas 1916, over £10,000 was disbursed to help

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56 Waites, A Class Society at War, pp 279-280.
pay the school fees of 617 children and numerous schools had been persuaded to waive or reduce the fees of children from professional families.\(^5\)

However, it is certainly not the case that large sections of the middle class were pauperised by the war. It was mainly those on fixed incomes who were worst hit, especially the clergy and the upper reaches of the old professions, such as law and medicine.\(^6\) This may explain some of the disillusionment expressed by writers from the late 1920s and ‘30s who were drawn disproportionately from the ranks of middle class professionals.

It is however with regard to ‘the role and status of women in which debates over the effects of war on society have raged most furiously.’\(^6\) During the war itself, there were certainly some significant changes. An estimated two million women replaced men in employment, increasing the proportion of women in the workforce from twenty-four to thirty-seven per cent.\(^6\) Their average wages rose from 13s 6d a week in 1914 to 35s in 1918, a faster rate than men’s did, and the proportion of women in trades unions increased at a greater rate than that of men.\(^6\) Women moved into many areas of employment for the first time and even Lloyd-George had a female driver. However, many of these gains were short lived, not outlasting demobilisation and their longer-term impact has been contested.

\(^5\) Waites, Thesis pp 37 and 97.
\(^6\) The average women’s wage was half that of the average man in 1914, two-thirds in 1918. Ian Beckett, \textit{The Great War 1914-1918}, (Harlow, Pearson, 2001), p 329. The proportion of men in unions increased from 29.5% in 1914 to 41.8% in 1918, women from 8% to 21.7% respectively. The rates carried on increasing in the first two years after the war (to 54.5 and 23.9%) but both had fallen by half by 1932. Thom, \textit{Nice Girls and Rude Girls}, p 140.
Most contemporary commentators were, once again, unequivocal in their belief that the war had significantly changed both the role of women and men’s views of them. Millicent Garrett Fawcett spoke for many when she wrote in 1920 that the war had ‘revolutionized the industrial position of women. It found them serfs and left them free. It not only opened to them opportunities of employment in a number of skilled trades, but, more important even than this, it revolutionized men’s minds and their conception of the sort of work of which the ordinary everyday woman was capable.’ Braybon suggests that contemporary sources tended to be ‘highly biased’ as they came from those ‘who either sought change or dreaded it’ but this is too sweeping, a large number of contemporary comments come from neutral sources, or women with no previously entrenched view. It is also possible to argue that Fawcett and others were writing without benefit of hindsight and what happened later may have changed their view, though this is rather less straightforward when it comes to Fawcett’s claim that men’s minds had changed.

Modern views on women and the First World War can broadly be divided into three approaches. The first two, taking their cue from Marwick, argue that the war was a major watershed in women’s emancipation or in relations between men and women. These can, in turn, be split between those who, like Marwick, consider the changes to have had positive effects for women and those whose view is entirely the opposite, that it set back the cause of feminism. Then there are those who, echoing the approaches I noted with regard to class, see more continuity than change in the immediate post war period and thus conclude that

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64 Millicent Fawcett, The Women’s Victory and After: Personal reminiscences 1911-1918, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1920), p 106. One woman who hoped that war service was exceptional was the anti-suffrage campaigner Mary (Mrs Humphrey) Ward whose views sometimes closely parallel those now expressed by some radical feminist historians who deny the war had any effect at all on women’s status.

the war had no great lasting effect in relations between the sexes. The debate has been
enlivened and foregrounded by developments in gender history, often written by feminist
historians, many of them strongly influenced by postmodernist approaches first developed
in the fields of literary or cultural studies.

Ranged alongside Marwick in the view that women’s status, confidence and economic
power were boosted by the war is Woollacott who used extensive research in the IWM in
her study of women munitions workers. She sees them as a powerful symbol of modernity
who challenged the gender order through their patriotic work and challenged class
differences through their increased spending power, mobility, and changing social
behaviour.66 However, she is also careful to say that her book is based on what happened
during the war, not after it, and she does not suggest that making munitions was a liberating
experience that turned working class women into proto-feminists.67 Gullace’s thesis is that
‘the cultural environment created by the war reconfigured the way Britons understood the
rights and obligations of citizenship;’ that this re-definition promoted new ideas about
gender and civic participation and promoted women’s suffrage.68 Thus, she gives far greater
credence than most recent historians have to the idea that the war assisted women in their
struggle for the vote. Both Gullace and, especially, Woollacott put forward a strong case,
with significant evidence.

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66 Angela Woollacott, On Her Their Lives Depend: Munitions Workers in the Great War, (Berkeley and
67 Woollacott, On Her Their Lives Depend, p 11.
during the Great War, (New York and Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), p 2. Other, more
modest, claims for advances in women’s role are put forward with regard to, for example,
expectations of marriage (Dina Copelman, ‘A New Comradeship between Men and Women: family,
1986), pp 175-193) and drinking habits and frequenting pubs (David W. Gutzke, ‘Gender, class and
public drinking in Britain during the First World War, Histoire Sociale / Social History, Vol. 27, 1994, No.
54, pp 367-391).
Far less convincing, though probably significantly more influential, has been the work of Gilbert and Kent.\footnote{Notably: Sandra Gilbert ‘Soldier’s Heart: Literary men, Literary Women and the Great War’ in (among others) Margaret Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz, (eds.), \textit{Behind the Lines: Gender and the two world wars}, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987) pp 197-226. Susan Kingsley Kent, \textit{Making Peace: Reconstruction of Gender in Inter-war Britain}, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983) and ‘Love and Death: War and gender in Britain, 1914-1918’ in Frans Coetzee, and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee, (eds.) \textit{Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War}, (Providence, Berghahn Books, 1995) pp 154-174.} Both argue that men were, figuratively, destroyed or ‘un-manned’ by the war. They argue that there was an unbridgeable gulf between men and women’s experience of war and that this led to a greater separation of the sexes, with enhanced hostility towards women amongst soldiers both during and after it. Kent goes further in arguing that, though pre-war feminists believed in working together with men, by 1918 progressive women decided instead to operate in a ‘separate sphere’. Braybon puts forward some cogent arguments to question this proposition but still does not entirely dismiss it as she fails to raise the main weakness in the Gilbert / Kent analysis.\footnote{Gail Braybon, ‘Women and the War’ in Stephen Constantine, Maurice W Kirby, and Mary B Rose, (eds.) \textit{The First World War in British History}, (London, New York, Sydney and Auckland, Edward Arnold, 1995), pp 143-144 and ‘Winners of Losers: Women’s symbolic role in the war story’, pp 100-102} Much of their evidence for the hostility of soldiers towards women relies on writers such as Sassoon and D.H. Lawrence and the work of Fussell and Eric Leed, which, I would contend, is discredited in this respect.\footnote{Fussell’s \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory} was first published in 1975 and was quickly acclaimed as a classic, winning both the National Book Award and the National Book Critics Circle Award. It was named as one of the hundred best non-fiction books of the twentieth century by the Modern Library and was deemed worthy of a twenty-fifth anniversary edition by its publishers, Oxford University Press, in 2000. In the book, Fussell suggests that the war entirely changed the way in which writers could depict conflict, initiating a new modernism of thought and expression and it remains an innovatory and highly significant work for its attempt at a fusion between literary criticism and history. It contains many insights that had escaped other writers – for example the link between Graves’ \textit{Goodbye to All That} and his later investigations of myth in \textit{The White Goddess} and other works. However many people have looked to \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory} as going beyond a limited analysis of a small group of writers and accepted it as ‘laying bare not just a fragment of the war but its essence’ and even being a work of historical accuracy. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, ‘Paul Fussell at War’, \textit{War in History}, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1994, p 72. It is extremely worrying that many people regard the book as a history of the war. A typical comment from the Amazon website on it is that of Mr A.L. Browne from Bangor, Northern Ireland, who suggests ‘If you only read one account of the Great War, this should be the one.’ http://www.amazon.co.uk/product-}
Kent’s analysis is a strange re-statement of many of Fussell’s arguments that repeats many of his generalisations and misreadings but gives them a feminist slant. For example she indulges in many unsubstantiated generalisations, whether it be that virtually all pre-war feminists ‘vigorously attacked the notion of a separate sphere’ or that up to 1915 the war was ‘often depicted as a remasculinization of English culture’. Like Fussell, she reads too much into popular songs, seeing heavy overtones of prostitution in I’ll Make a Man of any One of You. There is clearly a sexual innuendo to the song, but the singer is offering the man the shilling not the other way round. Unfortunately, Kent’s views are often repeated as representing the authoritative feminist view on the war when they are far from that.

Those who suggest that war had little impact in women’s role and status can cite significant evidence that many of the gains made failed to last very long. For example, as quickly as the end of 1918, 750,000 women had been made redundant. Even during the war itself there were examples of extremely reactionary moves of which regulation 40D, under the Defence of the Realm Act, is perhaps the most notorious. They often focus on the issue of the women’s vote, which was granted to most of those over thirty in 1918. Both Pugh and Holton consider that the argument in favour of women’s suffrage had been won before the war. Pugh emphasises the importance of the suffragists of Fawcett’s NUWSS over their

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73 Kent, ‘Love and Death’, p 159.
74 Beckett, The Great War, p 333.
75 The regulation stated that ‘no woman who is suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form shall have sexual intercourse with any member of His Majesty’s Forces’. Any woman guilty of violating the regulation, even with her own husband, could be imprisoned for six months.
more militant sisters in Pankhurst’s WSPU in winning this debate, and his is a detailed and subtle case. He considers that ‘women’s voluntary work probably carried more weight with the press than with the politicians’ which a fair point. He also concedes that though the war ‘had little impact on the decision to give women the vote, it did almost certainly help to influence the form that enfranchisement took.’77 Pope goes further in stating that ‘there is little evidence that war service caused a change in attitudes towards women’s political rights’.78

One problem with several of the approaches that seek to minimise the effects the war had on women’s status and women’s suffrage in particular is that they suffer from counterfactual argument. They concentrate too much on what would have happened if the war had not taken place rather than analysing what actually occurred when it did.

Even if one accepts, as I think the evidence shows, that the war did not lead directly to significant concrete gains for women there is still an aspect of Marwick’s argument that remains intact. This is that there was a change in ‘mentalities’ and a growth in women’s self-realisation and self-confidence. By the time he came to contribute to the Open University textbook, The Impact of World War One, in 2001, Marwick saw this raising of women’s consciousness as the most crucial in the changed role and status of women in the post-war years.79 He thus supports the views of, for example, Woollacott or another feminist literary historian Claire Buck, who concluded that ‘even though women were forced out of [previously male dominated] jobs at the end of the war, their experience of “Screws and Shells and Overalls” marked British twentieth-century society and contributed to women’s

77 Pugh, The March of the Women, p 286.
78 Pope, War and Society in Britain, p 29.
economic, social and sexual emancipation. Braybon has some difficulty in accepting this psychological change and, it is true, it is very difficult to prove conclusively. She was somewhat puzzled that ‘many women were devastated by the deaths of male relations or friends yet ... could genuinely say, sixty years later, that they had thoroughly enjoyed those four years of war. Women interviewed by the Imperial War Museum remembered feelings of grief or anxiety, yet nevertheless the pride in their wartime work remained.’ She should not have been surprised by this. People are complex, they do not have the simple, causal, reactions that historians sometimes like to ascribe to them. For example, in the Second World War my mother lost her closest friend amongst her male relatives, yet consistently sees the war years as amongst her happiest and most liberating, she finds it perfectly normal to separate the two experiences. Where Braybon is on stronger ground is when she suggests that ‘it cannot be reiterated too often that the experiences of women differed dramatically between geographical areas, trades, age groups and classes.’ Though many writers have suggested that middle-class women gained the most in terms of enhanced freedom from paternalistic family ties this sometimes ignores these differences. For example, working

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81 Braybon, ‘Women and the War’, p 160.
82 Braybon, ‘Women and the War’, p 145. Cyril Pearce, for example, points out how women became more influential in the ILP in Huddersfield during the war, Comrades in Conscience: The story of an English community’s opposition to the Great War, (London, Francis Boutle, 2001), p 200.
class charity organisers in industrial Blackburn clearly had far more power in their organisations than did their counterparts in suburban Croydon.\textsuperscript{84}

What can one conclude regarding the war as ‘an accelerator of change’? There is no doubt that war pushes people to extremes: of hate and compassion; heroism and cowardice; patriotism and jingoism. My own view is that, as in Bowley’s original thesis, you can divide the changes that took place during and after the war into three categories:

- Things that would have happened anyway and at much the same speed – this is where I would place women’s suffrage.
- Things that would have happened, but probably much more slowly. Here I would include state control of certain areas, the increased influence of trades unions and advances in medical treatment.
- Things that would not have happened for a very long time or even not at all. These were very few and confined mainly to scientific and technological advances such as aircraft or tanks.

The big problem is that there is still a wide gulf, and a lot of argument, between the first two categories. However, I would contend that there is actually more common ground between the more thoughtful writers of the pro- and anti-\textit{Deluge} model than it might appear. One notable characteristic of social advances and revolutions is that they spark off reactionary backlashes. Examples are many and include the ‘Festival of Light’ in reaction to the ‘permissive 60s’ or the various machinations of the pro-life lobby in reaction to the liberalisation of abortion laws in Britain and America. If one takes the right cut-off point for one’s analysis, it is possible to discern a conservative ascendancy in many areas of wartime social advance. However if one takes a different time-frame, sometimes a few years later,

\textsuperscript{84} See Chapters 5 and 6.
the social change can be seen to have re-asserted itself. Whether one selects the 
advancement of women or the rise of trade unionism, this is surely possible in relation to 
the First World War. The immediate result may have been a re-assertion of conservative 
values but the longer-term trend was in favour of reform. Causation is still extremely difficult 
to determine – did the war really speed up change – but the apparently contradictory 
viewpoints of, say Laybourn and Waites or Woollacott and Braybon become easier to 
reconcile. I would agree with Gregory that there were elements of both trends discernable. 
He asks himself whether the war was ‘conservative or radical in its social and cultural results’ 
and comes up with the answer that it was ‘neither and both. Britain went into the war a 
complex mix of conservative and progressive elements, and came out with a slightly 
different mix.’85 He might also have added, from the examination of localism in his book, 
that social change was also heavily influenced by geography. It is certainly possible to argue 
that in more progressive areas like the mill towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where the 
working class and women already had greater influence, positive social change was more 
evident than in traditionally more conservative areas, including much of London and the 
South East.86 So perhaps we should view the impact of the war not as a ‘deluge’ or even a 
‘winter storm’ but a narrowing of some of the channels of social change whose pressure 
caused rapids in some tributaries but hardly affected others. In the end, despite my many 
reservations about his work, perhaps Marwick was not too far from the reality in his 
conclusion to his, often significantly flawed, book Women at War when he wrote that 
‘change is not constant and not always in one direction. There were many setbacks, but

85 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 292.
86 See Chapter 6.
many of the developments of more recent times had their distant origins in the upheavals of the First World War.87

87 Marwick, Women at War, p 163.
Literature of social capital

A central theme of the study is what was the impact of voluntary action on ‘social capital’ – the contribution to winning the war? A brief definition of social capital would be that it includes ‘networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings which facilitate cooperation within or among groups’ and that this provides a flow of mutually beneficial collective action, contributing to the cohesiveness of people in their societies. John Field identifies the central idea of social capital as being ‘that social networks are a valuable asset.’ They ‘provide a basis for social cohesion because they enable people to cooperate with one another – and not just with people they know directly – for mutual advantage.’ Peter Hall has noted that ‘at the core of the conventional definition of social capital is membership in voluntary organisations’ which should share two common features: ‘at least some face-to-face interaction with others’ and that ‘they should engage their members in common endeavour, thereby nurturing capacities for collective action rather than simply self-help.’

The idea of social capital has leapt to prominence in the social sciences in the last 15 years. Though the concept has a long history, modern theories were largely developed by Bourdieu, Coleman, Fukuyama and, most notably, Putnam whose essay Bowling Alone has proved to be the seminal text. Putnam argued that civil society, those groups and voluntary

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88 Oxford English Dictionary.
91 Before 1981, the number of journal articles listing social capital as a key word totalled twenty, between 1991 and 1995 this had risen to 109 but between 1996 and 1999, the total was 1,003. ‘Social Capital a Review of the Literature’, Office for National Statistics, 2001. Available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/socialcapital/downloads/soccaplitreview.pdf, accessed on 16/05/10. A Google Scholar search on the same date produced over 2.5 million hits on the term.
92 Both Adam Ferguson and Charles Montesquieu acknowledged the importance of civil society, in the 1840s Alex Tocqueville discussed at length the close relationship between voluntary associations and democracy in America and the ideas have much in common with Marx and Engels’ concept of
associations that act independently of the state and the market, plays a key role in the accumulation of social capital. Recent research has identified that the quantifiable effects of strong social capital include lower crime rates, better health, improved longevity, better educational achievement, greater levels of income equality, improved child welfare, lower rates of child abuse, less corrupt and more efficient government and enhanced economic achievement.  

A brief definition of social capital has already been provided but in order not to over-complicate the analysis in this study, I adopt what Halpern has referred to as the ‘big tent’ definition:

Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions [that] underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together.  


93 For details of these studies see ‘Social Capital a Review of the Literature’ pp 6-7. There are, however, those who have expressed reservations about voluntary organisations in building social capital. See for example Helmut Anheier and Jeremy Kendall, ‘Interpersonal Trust and Voluntary Associations: Examining three approaches’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 53, No. 3, September 2002, pp 343-362.

Of what is social capital composed? Most writers suggest that it has three basic components: a network (without which there could be no social element), a cluster of norms, values and expectations that are shared by group members, and sanctions – punishments and rewards – that help to maintain the norms and network. Could the voluntary organisations of the First World War be defined as having networks, norms and sanctions? Certainly, in their most organised form, through the DGVO, this is easy to agree. The various bodies formed a cohesive network where they were all part of larger whole contributing their part to the war effort. There were both formal and informal norms of behaviour adopted by the different bodies and there were rewards (thanks from the troops, badges of service) and sanctions (the withholding of thanks or striking off the approved list) in place. Even between the less organised bodies, the same elements were certainly present, though not perhaps in such a clear form.

Putnam also determined that there are three distinct levels within social capital: bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding social capital refers to relations amongst relatively homogenous groups such as family members and close friends, church groups or sports clubs. Bridging social capital refers to relations with more distant friends, colleagues and associates who share a common aim or principle. Therefore, this includes political organisations or trade unions. Finally, linking social capital refers to relations between individuals and groups in different social strata in a hierarchy and so provides the cohesion at a national level, especially in times of crisis or war. It is important to have a balance between these levels because an excess of one can have negative outcomes. For example, an excess of bonding social capital without sufficient bridging social capital being present can

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95 See Chapter 9.
lead to extreme divisions within a society, as for example has been the case with the various sectarian communities in Northern Ireland.96

You can combine the two dimensions of social capital (its components and levels) into a model of social capital as it operated at a relatively simple level during the war:

Table 2: Matrix of social capital for wartime voluntary bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bonding</th>
<th>Bridging</th>
<th>Linking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Networks</strong></td>
<td>Small scale local organisations (workplace or street based etc)</td>
<td>Larger voluntary sector bodies (YMCA, Red Cross etc)</td>
<td>National scale bodies (DGVO, War Refugees Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms</strong></td>
<td>Local, denominational or trade links etc</td>
<td>Shared values, often class based</td>
<td>Common purpose in wartime to support the country, cutting across class boundaries. Patriotism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions</strong></td>
<td>Esteem or opprobrium of friends and colleagues</td>
<td>Prestige of ‘being a member’, rules etc</td>
<td>Official recognition and ‘rules’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the core of the concept of social capital lies the notion of trust, and the higher the trust factors the greater the generation of social capital. There is also, as Putnam has noted, a ‘close correlation between social trust and associational membership’, which ‘is true not only across time and across individuals, but also across countries.’97 The main arena for the

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generation and transference of trust is the network and a number of factors combine in its development. Some of these are described below with comments on their applicability to wartime voluntary organisations:

- The most basic form of trust is self-interest. A person will trust someone if they know it will serve the other person’s self-interest. There is clearly an element of self-interest in all voluntary activity, true altruism is virtually impossible, everyone gets some benefit from knowing that they are helping someone else. Self-interest is the strongest element in the mutual aid relationship and is present in the deference exchange, as we will see later.

- Shared attributes, where two people have similar characteristics such as gender, class, ethnicity or religion. This form of trust was very evident in the number of voluntary bodies started to assist those from the same town, workplace or church.

- Long relationships, which is the main component of trust that was less valid in the context under discussion. However, it probably contributed to some networks such as those relating to geographic areas or long-established regiments.

- The exchange of gifts, which was clearly of major importance particularly with regard to troop comforts. Sunderland has noted that ‘gifts require the presence of large amounts of social capital before they are given’ and that it is only in very high-trust communities that gifts are provided to members of the community who lack the means to reciprocate in kind.98 Thus the giving of troop comforts was an indication of extremely high levels of social capital. Sunderland also suggests that gifts reinforce trust if there is some kind of reciprocation, even if it is not in the form of a gift of equal value. So one can suggest that appreciative letters back to givers

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and comforts funds would further strengthen the bonds of trust between the givers and the troops. This argument, which is supported by empirical research, is significant proof that the idea of a split between home and war fronts is a fiction.99

- Social and personal norms, institutions and routines, rules of conduct that are common to all members of a group. These become of greater importance during times of war when countries seek common ideals with which to identify in order both to reinforce their society norms and to differentiate themselves from those of their enemies. It is when these norms are brought under stress or are seriously questioned that support for a conflict can begin to break down as, for example, happened during the Vietnam conflict when broad sections of the American public began to question the reasons why the country was pursuing the war. At the level of the network, ‘personal trust and moral norms are exclusive to the individual, determined by conditioning, early attachment experiences, learning over time and perhaps genetic inheritance.’100 This point means that the strong associational ties provided by both philanthropy and mutual aid in the period prior to the war were highly significant and this also has important consequences with regard to the deference exchange concept.101

The partial antitheses of trust relationships are power relationships, such as by one class over another, by the state in relation to an individual or group or, of course, within the hierarchy of an army. However, ‘the extent to which the dominant party can take advantage of his power ... is dependent on two factors – the value the weaker partner places on the benefit he desires and the nature of the alternatives; whether they are numerous, easily

100 Sunderland, Social capital, trust and the industrial revolution, p 9.
101 See Chapter 14.
obtainable and adequate substitutes.\textsuperscript{102} In addition, there is the fact that though someone has power they may choose not to wield it, and this withholding of power can, paradoxically, strengthen social capital rather than weaken it. One can see obvious examples of this phenomenon during the war, for example in the way government needed the cooperation of labour and its representatives, or how the army adapted to the influx of overwhelming numbers of civilians.

The next question is how can you measure social capital? There is significant debate about the best methods of measurement but recent work in the UK has adopted the following framework:

\textbf{Table 3: UK Social Capital Measurement Framework\textsuperscript{103}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Examples of indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social participation                     | • Number of cultural, leisure, social groups belonged to and frequency and intensity of involvement  
  • Volunteering, frequency and intensity of involvement  
  • Religious activity |
| Civic participation                      | • Perceptions of ability to influence events  
  • How well informed about local / national affairs  
  • Contact with public officials or political representatives  
  • Involvement with local action groups  
  • Propensity to vote |
| Social networks and social support       | • Frequency of seeing / speaking to relatives / friends / neighbours  
  • Extent of virtual networks and frequency of contact  
  • Number of close friends / relatives who live |

\textsuperscript{102} Sunderland, \textit{Social capital, trust and the industrial revolution}, p 13.
nearby
- Exchange of help
- Perceived control and satisfaction with life

Reciprocity and trust
- Trust in other people who are like you
- Trust in other people who are not like you
- Confidence in institutions at different levels
- Doing favours and vice versa
- Perception of shared values

Views of the local area
- Views on physical environment
- Facilities in the area
- Enjoyment of living in the area
- Fear of crime

Clearly many of the above indicators are extremely hard to measure in an historical context and a much simpler form of measurement is required, selecting the key indicators. Though there are drawbacks, the key measure of social capital is the density of voluntary organisations in an area and, at an individual level, the number of voluntary organisations of which a person is an active member.\textsuperscript{104} Nevertheless, the top six components of the social capital index developed by Putnam in \textit{Bowling Alone} were, in order of correlation:

1. Agreeing that ‘most people can be trusted’ (0.92)\textsuperscript{105}
2. Serving on a committee of a local organisation (0.88)
3. Agreeing that ‘most people are honest’ (0.84)
4. Voting in presidential elections (0.84)
5. Serving as an office-holder of some club or organisation in the last year (0.83)
6. The number of non-profit organisations per 1,000 (0.82)\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{104} Halpern points out that there are drawbacks to this simplified approach, \textit{Social Capital}, pp 32-33.
\textsuperscript{105} These are the average of the standardised scores across 14 components, where 1.00 would be the highest standard,
\textsuperscript{106} Quoted in ‘Social Capital a Review of the Literature’, p 17.
Of these, it is impossible retrospectively to collect attitudinal data, which rules out numbers 1 and 3, and 4 is not feasible for the period given the limits of the franchise and the lack of elections between 1910 and 1918. This leaves the strongest indicators as being 2 and 5 where we see evidence of significant increases during the First World War, especially amongst working class women in the north of England.\textsuperscript{107} There is obviously a question as to whether these measurements of social capital remain constant or have changed over time. Sunderland’s work on social capital in Bolton during the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century as well as other historical studies confirms that utilising data on formal networks and membership of associations is a valid approach to the measurement of social capital.\textsuperscript{108} Sunderland’s work also demonstrated that neighbourhood gift giving reinforced trust at a local level during the period under question and that levels of trust varied both over time and between communities.\textsuperscript{109} Sunderland also introduced the ideas of trust cycles and a trust equilibrium, ‘a level of social capital that facilitates economic growth and social stability’.\textsuperscript{110} Whilst not proposing a causal relationship between social capital and economic performance Sunderland’s concept certainly has some validity and links both with Putnam’s conclusions that levels of social capital have fallen in the US since the economic boom years

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{107} See Chapter 6.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Sunderland, \textit{Social capital, trust and the industrial revolution}, pp 5, 206. He also found that, at this period, women were only committee members in all female charities and that levels of trust varied significantly across the Lancashire mill towns.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Sunderland, \textit{Social capital, trust and the industrial revolution}, pp 208-209. Sunderland links his trust cycles to the concept of the Kondratiev wave, super-cycles in economic performance lasting from between 40 and 60 years.
\end{itemize}
of the 1950s and to Hall’s work on the 1940s and ‘50s in Britain.\textsuperscript{111} Based on Sunderland’s work the following model of social trust over time in Britain may be postulated:\textsuperscript{112}

Figure 7: Trust over time in the UK (after Sunderland – schematic representation)

![Figure 7: Trust over time in the UK (after Sunderland – schematic representation)](image)

What all writers are agreed on is that levels of social capital are distributed very unevenly across the population and vary significantly according to social class with, not surprisingly, higher levels of associational life amongst the middle classes.\textsuperscript{113} Whilst this has worrying implications for today’s society it was less true of the nineteenth century where, though levels of middle class association were still significantly higher, ‘trust was more important to

\textsuperscript{111} Hall, ‘Social Capital in Britain’, pp 430 and 446.

\textsuperscript{112} In more recent years research has indicated that Britain retains relatively high levels of social participation but levels of trust have fallen, see Paola Grenier and Karen Wright, \textit{LSE Centre for Civil Society International Working Paper Number 14}, 2004 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/pdf/IWP%2014%20Wright%20and%20Grenier.pdf, accessed on 17/05/10. They question the findings of Hall, ‘Social Capital in Britain’, which he drew in 1999, that ‘levels of community involvement measured by associational membership, charitable endeavour and informal sociability [remain] resilient in Britain,’ p 433. Grenier and Wright conclude that this is only true of middle class associations. Other research has suggested that levels of trust in the UK are higher than in the US, Germany, Italy and most of eastern Europe but lower than in Ireland, the Netherlands or Scandinavia. Liam Delaney, and Emily Keaney, ‘Sport and Social Capital in the United Kingdom: Statistical Evidence from National and International Survey Data’, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, December 2005 p 23.

\textsuperscript{113} Hall’s conclusions (‘Social Capital in Britain’) were that levels of association were stable amongst the working class but Grenier and Wright (Working Paper Number 14) discern significant falls.

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the working class than their middle class counterparts’ as, often, their very survival depended upon it.\textsuperscript{114} Another possible conclusion that we can draw from the study of First World War voluntary organisations is that those run by the middle classes only replaced other social networking activities that were suspended for the period of the war (for example arts and cultural activities, hunt balls or country house weekends). On the other hand those headed by working class people, especially women, were a major addition to existing social capital, as many people became office holders for the first time.\textsuperscript{115}

A potential measure of social capital at the wider institutional level is that adopted by the UK Office of National Statistics. It comprises the following dimensions:

**Figure 8: The Perspectives of Social Capital**


\textsuperscript{114} Sunderland, *Social capital, trust and the industrial revolution*, p 49.

\textsuperscript{115} See Chapter 6.
In an historic context, the model needs some modification, as direct social surveying methods are not possible. The model in Figure 8 was modified from the above, taking into account where evidence for each perspective might be gathered:

**Figure 9: The Perspectives of Social Capital and Evidence from the Historical Context**

![Diagram of perspectives]

The above analysis would allow the study to reach a series of conclusions as to the overall impact of non-uniformed voluntary activity in the First World War.

A further issue from theories of social capital concerns the extent to which government policies can affect levels of social capital and the evidence is overwhelmingly that they can, both positively and negatively. Where the state can act as an enabler and allow voluntary effort to flourish, indications are that social capital can be strengthened.\(^{116}\) Britain was relatively successful in this in the twentieth century, adopting an approach to social policy...

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that encouraged extensive use of volunteers, with large amounts of government funding for the voluntary sector or acting as an initiator and then standing back.\textsuperscript{117} On the other hand ‘government action can ... inadvertently end up by destroying social capital, and reducing people’s capacity for cooperation to tackle problems’ if they ignore the principles of building social capital, especially those that affect vulnerable people.\textsuperscript{118} This is, I will argue, precisely what happened in Germany in the latter period of the war.\textsuperscript{119}

Overall, from an analysis of the key literature of social capital, it is possible to suggest that social capital was at its height in Britain during the two World Wars of the twentieth century, and significantly underpinned support for those conflicts. Indeed one could also argue that, in a democracy, high levels of social capital are a necessary pre-condition for total war to be possible and that today, when it is weaker, that total war may be unsustainable.

This study will argue that, crucially, the war provided Britain with a distinct advantage over her main adversary, Germany, in the reservoir of social capital on which it was able to draw. Voluntary action contributed significantly both to maintaining morale on the home front (a visible sign of ‘pulling ones weight’) and with troops and prisoners of war. Contrary to received opinion, through war poets such as Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves and writers including Paul Fussell and Eric Leed, the vast majority of troops welcomed charitable efforts on their behalf and were kindly disposed towards benevolence on the home front.

With regard to the debate regarding social capital, the study also examines the notion of charitable works as a means of social control. Did charity and philanthropy act ‘as a means

\textsuperscript{118} Field, \textit{Social Capital}, p 134.
\textsuperscript{119} See Chapter 16.
by which the dominant professional and commercial classes confirmed their power and status? There is a good deal of support for this argument in the pre-war context, but this study will argue that voluntary action during the war acted as an integrating mechanism between social classes that helped initiate changes in the relationship between ‘top-down’ philanthropy and ‘bottom-up’ mutual aid and that this trend continued into the post-war period. These changes were intimately connected with parallel changes in the British class system and economy and partly expressed in a significant shift in what I term the ‘deference exchange’, an idea developed from Howard Newby’s original conception of the deference dialectic. Paradoxically the paternalism / deference nexus (most succinctly referred to as the ‘deference exchange’) had the effect of providing a shared perspective that, during the war, assisted the role of voluntary action as a socially cohesive force but, with the armistice, the operation of a deferential dialectic led to a significant breakdown of this nexus and a new configuration of philanthropy and mutual aid. In reaching conclusions regarding the support that voluntary activities gave to building and sustaining social capital it is insufficient, in my view, to concentrate on society-wide influences. To be fully convincing the argument needs to have a focus on individual social relationships. What influences at a personal level built the foundations for a nation-wide reservoir of social capital? My contention is that a critical influence was a transformation amongst many ordinary people in the nature of deference and this psychological phenomenon is, therefore described in some detail.

Literature of Management History

One of the questions the study attempts to answer is the question as to whether the activities of voluntary bodies during the First World War can be described as a managerial revolution within the sector. This entails a discussion of some of the contemporary thinking relating to the science of management together with a consideration of how agreed best practice (as identified both in 1914-1918 and today) were translated into effect during the war. Just how effectively was voluntary action managed and did this mark a step change from previous standards?

In answering this critical question, I utilise the work of the pioneering French management writer Henri Fayol who was undertaking his major theoretical work at precisely this time. Fayol’s ideas have not only stood the test of time, they are the basis of much of our current thinking on managerial effectiveness. ¹²² Though not well known at the time I argue that in certain areas, most notably the operation of the work of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations, Fayol’s principles were being put into action. It is no coincidence that at the heart of many pre-war innovations, in the organisation of Army supplies and, most especially at the War Office from 1901 to 1914, was the DGVO himself, Sir Edward Ward. Ward was a highly skilled manager who utilised many of Fayol’s principles whether it was in the organisation of ‘native’ labour in West Africa, supplying the garrison at the siege of Ladysmith, organising the Royal Tournament or supplying books to the Army. However,

where Ward really instituted major change was in two areas. The first was in his work as DGVO but the second was perhaps even more remarkable. He brought together a team to institute the first training programme in Britain in business principles for army officers and civil servants. The leading members of the committee were: the founder of modern geopolitics and principal of the London School of Economics, Halford Mackinder; the leading military advisor to the government at the time and later C-in-C of the British Expeditionary Force, Sir Douglas Haig, and the versatile Fabian economist (and leading member of the WNC) Sidney Webb. Perhaps no one other than Ward could have co-ordinated such disparate talents towards a single objective, the recognition that management training was essential for military effectiveness and civil-military relations. For this achievement alone, Ward should have a leading place amongst management pioneers within the context of voluntary organisations, albeit in the service of state aims.

The utilisation of Ward and his work as DGVO as a central ‘case study’ depend upon an understanding of management history as a separate discipline and yet as recently as 2001, a leading writer on the topic wrote that ‘management history ... has had little or no attention or acknowledgement’ whereas ‘there has been a substantial investigation of business and accounting history’.\textsuperscript{123} I would suggest that part of the reason for this neglect is that within the academic world of the Business School it is thought that management history should be a science like, say, astronomy, a continuous progression of discovery (or perhaps exploration) of underlying scientific facts. Historians, who have long ago rejected the idea of history as pure science, have then rather used this as an excuse, if they needed one, for not

systematically teaching the subject. Interestingly, and often without realising it, many historians have approached their subject from a managerial perspective – not least in discussions in the field of military history and the difference in effectiveness of various commanders and their strategies.

Another reason for a lack of concentration on management history has been a lack of definition of its boundaries. Thompson and others have attempted to address this issue by trying to define some of the content of the management / history interface. Thompson provides a list of possibilities for historical evolution and this study has relevance with regard to several of these:

- Management practice – why were decisions on organising wartime volunteering taken?
- Management practice as it has differed between countries – how does what happened in England compare to other allies and to Germany?
- Management structures and organisational systems – what were these systems and how efficient were they?
- Management thought and theory – what management ideas were being utilised and do they stand up to present day scrutiny?
- Management skills and competencies, and the education and training systems to develop them – was there any evidence that any of the organisational models were underpinned by sound teaching and theory?

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• Management careers – what were the competencies of those in senior managerial positions, where had they developed their skills?\textsuperscript{125}

Management history is certainly an eclectic discipline. Wren has illustrated the development of management thought in the modern era as below, demonstrating its acquisitive nature:\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} Andrew Thompson, 'The Case for Management History', pp 108-111.
Lamond too has suggested that management history needs to be eclectic taking aspects from the history of ideas, primary source examination and case studies and elements of social history and social constructionism.\textsuperscript{127} Grattan has provided another important

\textsuperscript{127} David Lamond, 'Matters of Judgement: Some thoughts on method in managerial history', \textit{Journal of Management History}, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2006, 237-243. This eclecticism is supported by others, such as Evans who notes how history is far more expanded and diverse than it was fifty years ago (he was
contribution to how management historians should approach their subject.  

He suggests that one should take a ‘crafting’ approach to the subject, taking his lead from Henry Mintzberg’s highly influential Harvard Business Review article ‘Crafting Strategy’ in which the author likened the process of successful strategy formulation to that of the potter.  

Grattan expands Mintzberg’s analogy to construct a compelling argument in relation to the study of management history. He begins by suggesting that the process of historiography follows the pattern:

Collection → Selection → Interpretation → Narration

It is during the process of interpretation ‘that the notion of crafting is most evident, as the historian engages with the material in the search for insight and revelation, whilst maintaining impartiality and objectivity.’ With regard to narration the historian needs to do more than tell a story, but making it clear when a deduction is being made, which is the point where the ‘crafting’ is taking place: ‘as with the potter, the historian has to be controlled and accurate whilst employing his or her art to portray human behaviour in the past in an interesting and satisfying artefact.’ He makes a number of specific recommendations for the management historian:

writing in 1999) ‘and that the idea that one method (and therefore, one methodological discussion) is appropriate for the collection of social, intellectual, political, labour, economic and other histories that populate the field seems, prima facie, no longer defensible.’ Evans, In Defence of History, p 147. Evans is also interesting in relation to later sections of this work with his views on the post-modernist approach.

129 ‘My thesis is simple: the crafting image better captures the process by which effective strategies come to be. The planning image, long popular in the literature, distorts these processes and thereby misguides organizations that embrace it unreservedly.’ Henry Mintzberg, ‘Crafting Strategy’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, July/August 1987, p 66.
130 Grattan, ‘Crafting Management History’, p 178.
131 Grattan, ‘Crafting Management History’, p 180.
• Taking note of the legal and economic setting – hence an emphasis on the legislative background for wartime voluntary activity.
• The industry context and what was achievable at the time – so a comparison between, for example, the model of the DGVO and other existing work rather than with modern charitable causes.
• Appreciating what is was like at the time, based upon the knowledge of the time and without unfairly using hindsight – a fault to be found with a great deal of previous writing on the war and its impact.\(^\text{132}\)

Where Grattan suggests that management history differs from other disciplines is in its utilisation of the ‘considerable body of theory assembled by academics in the study of management science’.\(^\text{133}\) Other disciplines use theory but not in the wholesale way management theory can be utilised. ‘Thus the management historian can show whether the events under study accord with current theory... If they do not, the historical analysis can trigger a re-evaluation and possible revision of the management theory. The historian can use quasi-scientific methods by declaring hypotheses, which can be proved or disproved, but these statements cannot be verified by means of independent experiment.’ Of course:

These theories of management are not laws. Historiography seeks to add meaning to evidence, but is unlikely to determine causality. Analysis can provide a plausible explanation for why the events occurred as they did, but it is unlikely to be the sole one... History and management science can apply scientific methods, but can never

\(^\text{132}\) This is especially prevalent in literature dealing with conscientious objectors and the ‘Shot at Dawn’ debate over soldiers executed where many authors superimpose today’s values on those of the period. Examples include the recent *We Will Not Fight: The untold story of World War One’s conscientious objectors* by Will Ellsworth-Jones (London, Aurum, 2008). For the ‘shot at dawn’ thesis see the work of Julian Putkowski.

\(^\text{133}\) Grattan, ‘Crafting Management History’, p 181.
be a science. Again, in analysis, the crafting analogy is appropriate, when data are
manipulated in an imaginative, empathetic way.\textsuperscript{134}

With regard to management history a group of leading writers have concluded, ‘the most
interesting material is that which is generally unrelated to management. Only the historian’s
imagination will limit his / her discoveries,’ the conclusion reached is that an analysis from a
management history perspective is a legitimate and robust one.\textsuperscript{135}

Equally, utilising an adaptation of management theory is a legitimate approach to questions
raised in this study and, following Grattan’s advice, I have considered the question, ‘did the
First World War mark a management revolution in the organisation and impact of voluntary
action’ from two managerial perspectives.

The first is Volberda’s concept of organisational flexibility, which seeks to identify those
organisations that are most adaptable to meeting the significant changes faced by business
organisations.\textsuperscript{136} The model developed by Volberda aims to guide management in
understanding and identifying different types of flexibility and in creating and sustaining
flexible organisations. His rationale for the study of organisational flexibility was to provide a
synthesis of the many alternative approaches to the issue. Flexibility had become a very
popular business theme by the late 1980s because it was perceived as an effective response
to shorter product life cycles and an increased fragmentation of market demand, but the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Grattan, ‘Crafting Management History’, p 182.
\item Charles D Wrege, Regina A Greenwood and Sakae Hata, ‘What we do not know about
Management History: Some categories of research and methods to uncover management history
\item Henk W. Volberda, \textit{Organizational Flexibility: Change and Preservation}, (Netherlands, Wolters-
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
concept lacked a rigorous theoretical underpinning. After efficiency in the fifties and sixties and quality in the seventies and early eighties, flexibility was widely regarded as the third wave of competition.

Volberda used a synthetic research approach including both an analytical and a clinical component with the objective of making the model as valid and relevant as possible. After fine-tuning though interviews with practitioners, the model and its diagnostic tool, the Flexibility Audit and Redesign (FAR) method, were put to the test in three extensive case studies.

The model consists of five building blocks. Three forces determine how the paradox of flexibility gets resolved: management capabilities, organisational design and the effect of changing competitive forces. Management shapes the current flexibility, the organisational conditions define the potential for flexibility and the competitive forces determine what is required. The level of metaflexibility determines how fast the flexibility mix can be adjusted over time. In response to how these aspects interact with each other, organisations develop different organisational forms: the chaotic, the rigid, the planned and the flexible. Volberda concluded that an organisation has to shift from what he termed the ‘planned’ towards the ‘flexible’ mode and vice-versa. The risk of the planned mode is transformation into a rigid organisation because of strategic drift. On the other hand, the risk of the flexible mode is turning into a chaotic organisation, caused by strategic neglect. Volberda’s model provided a sound theoretical foundation of flexibility and demonstrated how managers can effectively build and sustain flexible organisations. Volberda depicted the forces at work and the required response as in Figure 11:
The model is most relevant in rapidly changing environments where effective priority setting is essential to adjusting actual or potential flexibility. Volberda debunked the idea that a single permanent organisation form exists and proposed, instead, a cyclical process wherein organisations ideally migrate between a flexible and a planned form (but avoid the chaotic and rigid). This process helps organisations deal with the flexibility paradox where change to maximise effectiveness needs to be simultaneously managed with operational fine-tuning aimed at maximising efficiency. The model emphasised a large role for management in the dynamic adaptation processes and overcame previous conceptions that suggested environmental constraints largely determine the ways organisations develop over time.

In the stresses of a total war situation such differences are emphasised for organisations and any model of management that was able to cope in these circumstances would show itself
to be robust and effective. It would of course also be necessary to demonstrate that any effective form of management using this model was new during the war and not simply a continuation of an existing form of organisation and this is what I seek to do in Chapter 15.

Using a single model, especially one that is not contemporaneous with the war, could be open to the criticism of hindsight and so a management model that was in existence at the time should also be utilised. The period around the First World War was one in which modern management theory was first taking shape. The best-known theories of the period stem from the work of Frederick W Taylor and his attempts to improve the efficiency of industry through his concept of ‘scientific management’. However, more relevant to the management of businesses, rather than the organisation of their resources, are the ideas of the French mining engineer and theorist Henri Fayol.

The birth of scientific management can be traced to the publication in 1895 of Taylor’s paper *A Piece-Rate System* that was followed by his books *Shop Management* (1903) and *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911). Taylor is the central figure in the development of management thought and ‘he is still considered by management and business historians as number one on a list of the most influential contributors in the twentieth century.’

Taylor’s best-known idea is task allocation, an analysis of each task in a process then dividing it according to the nature of the task and the abilities of the workers. His innovations in industrial engineering, particularly in time and motion studies, led to dramatic improvements in productivity in the United States where his principles were applied in the early twentieth century. However, though Taylor advocated creating intimate and friendly cooperation between management and workers, he has also been credited with destroying...

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the soul of work, of dehumanising factories and making men into production-line
automatons. This criticism is generally unfair as those who bastardised his theories were
mainly responsible for these effects, which Taylor would have denounced as unscientific and
likely to lead to reduced, rather than improved production. Much of early European
criticism stemmed from when Taylor’s ideas spread beyond America and were adopted in
France by both Renault and Michelin immediately prior to the First World War, leading to
significant outbreaks of worker discontent.138 Though there was interest in Taylor’s ideas in
Britain ‘there was much less movement in Britain away from the rule-of-thumb approach to
problem-solving and on to systematic management.’139 Though there were some British
writers on the topic, such as Slater Lewis, Alexander Church and Edward Elbourne, they did
not gain any significant influence and Elbourne was actually highly critical of Taylor’s ideas.
Thus, whilst there was great interest being shown in the concept in the US, Germany, France
and Japan the consensus of writers on management history is that ‘the new managerial
methods expressed in both systematic and scientific management to a large extent passed
Britain by for a generation.’140 However, this view is based on a study of British business and
industry rather than less obvious places such as the army and philanthropy. The London
School of Economics was the only place where Taylor’s ideas were being taught where the
promoters of the Army Administration Course were enthusiastic about applying its principles
to the British military and, during the war, ideas of scientific management came to far
greater prominence.141

138 See Daniel Nelson, A Mental Revolution: Scientific Management since Taylor, (Ohio State University
139 John F. Wilson, and Andrew W. J. Thomson, The Making of Modern Management: British
See Chapter 9 for the LSE Course. There is also some evidence of similar principles being applied in
philanthropic circles. See Stephen P. Walker, ‘Philanthropic Women and Accounting: Octavia Hill and
Though Fayol was writing and practising management prior to the First World War there is no evidence that British managers, in whatever context, were aware of his ideas before 1914. His main publication *Administration Industrielle et Générale* was published in French in 1916 but not translated into English until 1929. Is it therefore relevant to utilise his theories in an analysis of what happened during the war? There are a number of reasons why I believe it is. Firstly, they are contemporary views based on observation of management practice at the time, Fayol was ‘the earliest manager to systematically examine his own personal experience and try to draw from it a theory of management.’ Secondly, as Smith and Boyns have pointed out, ‘Fayol was the first of the modern management writers to propound a theoretical analysis of what managers have to do and by what principles they have to do it.’ Thirdly, Fayol’s theories are still highly relevant in modern management practice, ‘his principles of authority and responsibility, unity of command, good orders, esprit-de-corps etc are the common currency of management parlance... many who have never read Fayol’s book have learned his principles at second or third hand and applied them to their own organisations.’ Wren considers that ‘Fayol’s ideas continue to be fundamentally sound’ and that ‘his work was seminal and enduring’ and Fells argues convincingly that Fayol’s elements of management are not refuted (as some writers have claimed) but are reinforced by more recent findings by, for example, Hales, Kotter and

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142 In fact, even in France at the time his work was largely overshadowed by that of Taylor. Wren, *The History of Management Thought*, p 212.
Mintzberg.\textsuperscript{146} Fourthly, Fayol ‘is generally credited with being the first to distinguish between technical and managerial skills’ and was the first to propound the need for systematic management education, which is precisely what the idea of the Army Administration course at the LSE set out to achieve.\textsuperscript{147} Finally recent support for my thesis that the LSE course demonstrates an adherence to Fayol’s principles comes from Tadman who suggests that the reorganisation of the War Office anticipated Fayol’s work and Vines who has suggested that Douglas Haig’s ‘natural role was that of a military manager’ and that his management style was ‘characterised by Fayol’s management theory.’\textsuperscript{148}

The main ideas put forward by Fayol fall into three areas:

- His six essential qualities for managers;
- His fourteen principles of management; and
- His five functions or elements of management.\textsuperscript{149}

The question again is whether one or more of the solutions to the organisation of voluntary activity in the war followed these concepts that have withstood the test of time since their formulation.


\textsuperscript{147} Wren, The History of Management Thought, p 73. See Chapter 9 for the LSE Course.


\textsuperscript{149} See Chapter 15.
PART II – THE CHARITABLE RESPONSE
3 The pre-War charitable scene

Charitable Voluntary Action in Previous Conflicts

The earliest charitable support connected with Britain’s armed conflicts was not the result of voluntary action but of state intervention. In 1681, Charles II established the Royal Hospital Chelsea for army veterans and this was followed 13 years later during the reign of William and Mary with the equivalent institution for seamen at Greenwich. The first notable public support had to wait until the Napoleonic Wars, possibly the first time a conflict impinged upon the daily lives of significant numbers of the British public. The Lloyd’s Insurance Market raised the Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund in 1803 to support impoverished servicemen and their families, a role it continues to provide to this day.

In many respects, it was the Crimean War of 1854-6 that was a watershed in the conduct of modern warfare, not least in its relationship to charitable causes. The graphic despatches of Times correspondent William Russell exposed the gross mismanagement of the war together with its impact on the welfare of the troops. The most famous humanitarian response was that of Florence Nightingale and her Sisters of Mercy and their activities were substantially paid for by public subscription. The Times established the Soldiers’ Sick and Wounded Fund after a spontaneous outpouring of

Chapter Summary
- Voluntary action in previous wars
- Was the ‘Golden Age of Philanthropy’ the pre-war period?
- Existence of voluntary action pre-1914
- Is philanthropy a social control mechanism?

150 At the height of the wars there were significant numbers engaged, some 350,000; 200,000 in the army and 150,000 in the navy, about 10% of the male working population of the time. Sources
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_casualties.html
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/history/historical-periods/1660-1815/
donations in the wake of Russell’s reports and a sum of £7,000 was collected in a few weeks. It was this fund rather than any official channel that managed and resourced Nightingale’s mission.\textsuperscript{151} Other Crimean War funds included such descriptive bodies as the Central Association in Aid of the Wives and Families of Soldiers Ordered on Foreign Service and the Association for the Relief of Widows, Orphans, Wives and Families of Seamen and Marines.\textsuperscript{152} These organisations raised significant amounts and even the fund established in New South Wales for the dependants of British soldiers contributed over £60,000 to the cause.\textsuperscript{153}

The second Anglo-Boer War was the first where a significant number of volunteers joined the professional army in conflict. The roughly 90,000 volunteers were supported by a far more extensive network of charitable organisations than had been the case in the Crimea.\textsuperscript{154} The Mansion House Fund was one of the first in the field soon after the outbreak of hostilities in 1899. Started by the Lord Mayor of London, its purpose was to bring financial relief to Uitlander refugees made destitute because of the war. Funds in excess of £200,000 were raised in Britain and South Africa with their disbursement in the hands of a Central


\textsuperscript{152} Crimean War – Loyal Addresses and Contributions to the Patriotic Fund from Australian Colonies, Australian Archives, Canberra, A5954/1, 1195/4.


\textsuperscript{154} Will Bennett, Absent-Minded Beggars: Volunteers in the Boer War, (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1999).
Committee in Cape Town.\textsuperscript{155} An Imperial Patriotic Fund was established and again colonial contributions were significant, £100,000 coming from Australia alone.\textsuperscript{156} A number of funds were organised by newspapers, both national and provincial and considerable sums were raised in this way, £254,000 by readers of the \textit{Daily Telegraph}.\textsuperscript{157} Even more significant was the work of the Soldiers and Sailors Families Association, which raised more than £1.2 million to provide support for 200,000 dependants of servicemen.\textsuperscript{158}

Perhaps the best-known example of fund raising during the Boer War was Rudyard Kipling’s poem \textit{The Absent-Minded Beggar}. The poem was commissioned by Alfred Harmsworth, publisher of the \textit{Daily Mail}, and achieved huge popular success, especially after Sir Arthur Sullivan set it to music. Heavily promoted by the \textit{Mail}, an ‘Absent Minded Beggar Relief Corps’ was set up to aid wounded soldiers and sailors and their families and send medical supplies and comforts to South Africa which raised £250,000.\textsuperscript{159} Despite such popular and dramatic interventions, Thompson has noted that the charitable efforts of the Boer War are another forgotten chapter in British philanthropic history.\textsuperscript{160} Six million pounds was estimated to have been raised during the war by voluntary effort, a figure Thompson describes as ‘staggering... equivalent to just under £410 million [in today’s prices] and to be compared, say, to the £40 million raised worldwide by Bob Geldof’s Band Aid and Live Aid

\textsuperscript{155} http://www.eastlondon-labyrinth.com/history/boer-war-04.jsp, accessed on 06/04/10. Mansion House Funds were a regular philanthropic response by Lord Mayors to disasters of all kinds and others in this period included those for the relief of distress in Ireland (1880), victims of the Trafalgar Square riots (1886), survivors of the Titanic and as a memorial to Captain Scott which raised £75,000 (both 1912).


\textsuperscript{159} Fowler, ‘The Absent-Minded Beggar’.

\textsuperscript{160} This neglect is currently being addressed through an inter-disciplinary project led by Dr John Lee of the University of Bristol. Entitled ‘Following “The Absent-Minded Beggar”’ the project began with a conference in June 2010.
appeals in 1985, and the £170 million raised by Comic Relief since its inception in 1988.\textsuperscript{161} I would not disagree with Thompson’s conclusion, however it should be considered in context when compared to the sums raised during the First World War, which were (at least) twelve times as much.

Thompson is astute in his summary of the meaning of this significant public support. It was essentially humanitarian in nature, there are even a few instances of pro-Boers making donations, but was bolstered by feelings of patriotism and loyalism. ‘Above all’ he concludes, ‘the war funds are testimony to the dynamism of provincial philanthropy at this time, to the strength of civic pride, and to the depth and public sympathy and solidarity with British soldiers.’\textsuperscript{162} These traits were still present in 1914-18 but, if anything, had become more complex as will be discussed later. Next, it would pertinent to examine the nature of the dynamic philanthropy of which Thompson speaks.

\textsuperscript{161} Andrew Thompson, ‘Publicity, Philanthropy and Commemoration: British Society and the War’ in David Omissi and Andrew S Thompson (eds.), \textit{The Impact of the South African War}, (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002), p 107.

\textsuperscript{162} Thompson, ‘Publicity, Philanthropy and Commemoration: British Society and the War’ p 112.
A ‘Golden Age’?

Several writers on Victorian and Edwardian philanthropy in the UK have argued that it marked a golden age of charity with levels of giving expanding significantly in the later part of the nineteenth century. The scale of charitable giving was certainly significant, as Harris has noted:

The annual income and expenditure of registered and unregistered charities, friendly societies, collecting societies, benefit-paying trade unions and other benevolent and self-help institutions vastly exceeded the annual budget of the poor law – which in turn vastly exceeded the expenditure on social welfare of central government until just before the First World War.

Others have questioned this contention and the statistics on which it is based. Recent research by Morris has refuted some of this received wisdom suggesting that there are grounds for questioning the degree to which voluntary activity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was at all exceptional in its scale, growth, redistributive effect and supremacy over the poor law. Morris’s detailed examination of successive editions of Howe’s Classified Directory to the Metropolitan Charities has revealed a somewhat different picture. Income of London charities in 1883-4 was £4,447,436 and there were 1,013 charitable institutions in London. By 1912, this total had reached about £8.5 million and in 1913 just under £9 million per annum, which meant that voluntary income grew

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approximately in line with national income. Owen gives roughly similar figures gleaned from the *Annual Charitable Register and Digest*, published by the Charity Organisation Society:

**Table 4: Income of Metropolitan charities pre-1914**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Legacies</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>8,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>3,823</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>2,539</td>
<td>8,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,719</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>8,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>2,677</td>
<td>8,565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Poor Law Commission estimated that London charities accounted for fifty-seven per cent of national charitable income, which, in 1913, was therefore around £14 million a year. By far the largest proportion were charities connected with the propagation of Christianity (especially overseas missions) who accounted for over forty per cent of the income. These activities, as noted by Kidd, ‘often reflected the enthusiasms and anxieties of the charitable rather than the practical needs of the poor’. Excluding religion, total charitable income in 1913 was about £8 million. These figures are significant when one considers that they are approximately two-thirds of the sum distributed at this time for national poor relief through the Poor Law by local authorities. However, Morris’ figures do indicate that there was no dramatic expansion of income during the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of

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166 The figures exclude self-help or mutual charities such as friendly societies.
167 The COS Digest probably includes many smaller organisations omitted by Howe.
169 These were £12 million in 1911/12, *Annual Charities Register and Digest 22nd Edition 1913*, (Longman and Charity Organisation Society, London).
the twentieth centuries and her research does rather contradict Prochaska’s claim for the ‘massive redistribution of wealth’ and temper Thane’s assertion of the ‘large sum ...
distributed from rich to poor annually’. It appears then that the pre-war charitable scene was not quite as rosy as some have depicted, particularly in relation to secular organisations. However, this did not mean that the ground for potential rapid expansion of voluntarism was not fertile. Clearly conditions must have existed which could account for the extraordinary response, not least to Kitchener’s call for a new national army, with 1.2 million recruits by the end of 1914, an act which has rightly been described as ‘one of the most impressive mass movements ever witnessed in British history.’ How was such a dramatic event possible?

It is helpful here to distinguish between different types of charitable activity or voluntary action. It is a distinction already noted in the figures but more specifically expressed by William Beveridge in this lecture entitled ‘Voluntary Action for Social Advance’, where he defined voluntary action as consisting of two main types – mutual aid and philanthropy. Beveridge explained that ‘it is Mutual Aid when consciousness of a common need leads to combined action to meet that need, to helping oneself and one’s fellows together. It is philanthropy when the driving force is not consciousness of one’s own needs, but what I have described as social conscience’ or, as Morris, explains it philanthropy entails ‘a hierarchical transfer between haves and have nots’ whereas mutual aid entails ‘a horizontal transfer between those with similar income levels.’

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If philanthropy was not on the increase in pre-First World War Britain, mutual aid certainly was. The late Victorian and Edwardian period was marked by a massive upsurge in mutual aid bodies and other clubs and associations. Cornes and Hughes-Wilson summarise the situation eloquently:

People in the lost world of pre 1914 were much more sociable and lived in a society with much more obviously defined communities, groups, extended families and even neighbours. Clubs and institutions of every kind flourished to an astonishing degree, for all classes and conditions of men and women, before the First World War.... In 1914 people 'belonged'. The men who went off to war in 1914 were from a generation of 'joiners'.173

The clearest and most widespread of mutual aid organizations for ordinary people were the trade unions and friendly societies and the war years saw a significant increase in union membership. By 1914, union membership had doubled from under two million at the turn of the century and was to double again, to eight million, by 1920. Friendly societies were in their heyday and 'by 1900 the membership of affiliated and ordinary friendly societies had risen as high as 5,400,000 (in a United Kingdom population over twenty of about twenty-four million').174


Whereas the union and friendly society movements stemmed from a clear motive for personal gain, many other organisations had more altruistic motives, the ‘equally powerful drive to better oneself, or even others, in order to make the world a better place.’175 This state of affairs had not occurred accidentally. It had been fuelled by increasing educational standards and far higher rates of literacy, indeed it has often been noted that the First World War itself was a uniquely literary war.176 Educative self-help was encouraged by many from the upper and middle classes who realised the political benefits of certain manifestations of voluntary action. Rose has commented that ‘especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, after the achievement of mass literacy but before radio and television, working-class culture was saturated by the spirit of mutual education. Every day, information and ideas were exchanged in literally millions of commonplace settings – parlours and kitchens, workplaces and shops.’177 Better education led to an increasing propensity for sections of the working class to engage in charitable activities, as has been noted by Prochaska and here he is on much more solid ground. He suggests that ‘the respectable working class, often identified with church and chapel, was particularly noticeable in its charitable activity... Philanthropy was a test of respectability, and one had to

175 Cornes and Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone, p 28.
176 Most famously by Paul Fussell in The Great War and Modern Memory. Literacy rates in the UK were well over ninety percent by the end of the century. This point had been reached from rates of around fifty percent for women and under seventy percent for men in 1850. Paul Sturges, ‘The Public Library and Reading by the masses: Historical Perspectives on the USA and Britain 1850 1900’. 60th International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions, General Conference - Conference Proceedings - August 21-27, 1994. See also Hynes, A War Imagined, p 28. John Lee has also pointed out that the period from around 1880 to 1920 was one ‘when men and women of letters held the nation’s attention’ to an extent unmatched before or since. ‘Following The Absent-minded Beggar’: A case history of a fund-raising campaign of the South African War, paper read at the Voluntary Action History Society seminar, 22 November, 2010.
177 Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2001), pp 78-83. Rose’s evidence includes the facts that in 1881 6% of the male population were members of self-improvement societies; that in 1903, 500 out of 900 Working Men’s Clubs had libraries and that Co-operative societies could spend 2.5% of their profits on education.
be far down the social ladder, on poor relief or a recipient of charity, to be altogether free from social obligation.\textsuperscript{178}

The impetus to voluntary activity was stimulated by organisations that were aimed at developing the healthy body and mind in accord with late-Victorian concepts of educational improvement, manliness and athleticism. Nowhere was the mechanism more clear than in the transformation of sport during the second half of the nineteenth century into a rational recreation aimed at ‘the creation of a healthy, moral, and orderly work-force.’\textsuperscript{179} From its genesis in the Victorian public school the principles of athleticism were proselytised in an explosion of organised sports clubs in the later decades of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{180} These clubs provided a forum in which to foster the organisational and leadership skills of a section of society who, through the extension of voting rights, were achieving a greater political role.

Beck describes how:

Britain, the first industrial country, became also the first modern sporting nation in which codification and institutionalization transformed fragmented and localized ‘games’ into national ‘sports’... British sport’s organizational revolution was based essentially upon a series of developments, which were not necessarily sequential:

- Formation of national administrations for individual sports;
- Regulation and ordering through the adoption of standard written rules;

\textsuperscript{178} Prochaska, ‘Philanthropy’, p 29. One massive voluntary movement was the Sunday Schools. By the mid-nineteenth century three quarters of working class children were attending and in 1901 a total of six million people were enrolled. Sunday Schools were not all religious in nature as there was a significant Socialist Sunday School movement, for example there were well over 30 of them in Glasgow alone just before the war. T. W. Laqueur, Religion and Respectability: Sunday Schools and working class culture, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976).


• Formation of clubs, and the proliferation of local, regional and national league and cup competitions;

• Extension of the administrative structures’ spatial parameters locally, regionally, nationally and internationally.\textsuperscript{181}

This was not only a leisure revolution but a bureaucratic and managerial one too.

The epitome of this ideal and first to follow this course was cricket, not just as played by wealthy public-school amateurs but at all levels. The years of the mid- to late-nineteenth century, approximately 1865 to 1890, were the most crucial in the history of village cricket. It underwent a revolution with an explosion in the formation of clubs and a change from haphazard to constitutional organisation. In this era, changes in society as a whole and first class cricket in particular filtered down to village level. Among the upper and middle classes cricket achieved unique status as a moral and physical character-building mechanism. This philosophy was expounded to those sectors of the working class whose greater involvement in British political life was being sought. In the late nineteenth century, skilled, upper-working class men were being groomed for greater social and political responsibilities. In towns and villages throughout Britain cricket was seized upon as an ideal aid to this process. Cricket provided an opportunity for men of all classes to mix whilst maintaining such essentials as qualities of leadership and discipline and the subordination of personal glory to the general good of the team. The cult of cricket was particularly prevalent among those sections of the middle class charged with the task of guiding working class opinion – clergymen, schoolmasters, squires, doctors and the like. They had assimilated this ideology at the public schools and universities where cricket had come to be regarded with almost

\textsuperscript{181} Peter J Beck, ‘Leisure and Sport in Britain, 1900-1939’ in Christopher John Wrigley, (ed.), \textit{A Companion to Early Twentieth-Century Britain} (Blackwell Companions to British History), (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers), 2003, p 461.
religious fervour. These local opinion leaders were prominent among the founders of most of the village cricket clubs of the period (and, one might add, the officers of the First World War). The formation of cricket clubs was seen as a social service and a duty that would bring educational benefits to the lower-middle and upper-working classes at a time when they were also being given a greater say in the country as a whole by an extension of the franchise. 182

In the social revolution in sport in the late Victorian and Edwardian period, there was also a class struggle for its control. In cricket, despite the integration of professionals and amateurs in the first class game and the northern leagues, the public-school educated elite remained firmly in charge. 183 The same was not true for some other sports. Rugby split in two with public-school amateurs controlling the game in the midlands and south of England (and Scotland) but with a more egalitarian system (mainly lower middle-class local business interests) to the fore in Wales and, especially in the separate League form, in northern England.

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183 See James Walvin, Leisure and Society 1830-1950, (London and New York, Longman, 1978), p 96. It is also interesting that ‘Lancashire, Britain’s first industrial region, led the way in commercialized sport’ Beck, Leisure and Sport in Britain, 1900-1939, p 461. Timothy Chandler has suggested that the process of change in public school sport was not as top-down as Mangan has concluded (broadly a form of social control) but was a form of ‘mutual adaptation’ as much initiated by the pupils as the masters. Timothy J.L. Chandler, ‘Emergent Athleticism: Games in two English Public Schools 1800-60’, International Journal of the History of Sport, No. 5, December 1988, 312-330.
Football, the most popular sport of all (especially in cities where it was far easier to play than cricket), provides the best example of this conflict, partly because of its growth as a spectator as well as a participatory sport. Clergymen and businessmen encouraged the growth of urban football and their success was remarkable. It coincided with the growth of free time in most industries and resulted in an explosion of both participation and, in the rapidly developing professional clubs of the midlands and north, watching the game.\textsuperscript{184}

Though the impetus towards the formation of football clubs had, like cricket, been initiated by the public-school brigade the game soon took on a life of its own, ‘clubs sprang up independently from working-class institutions. Even when the clubs were guided by others, control was soon wrested from their grasp.’\textsuperscript{185} In support of this view, Holt has pointed out that ‘research on religion and leisure in Birmingham has revealed that most of these sporting initiatives [the formation of football clubs] came from ordinary church members rather than from the clergy.’\textsuperscript{186} Though the social elite retained control of the sport’s bureaucracy through the London-based governing body the Football Association, the shift in the balance of power in football was emphasised in 1883 when Blackburn Olympic, a professional club of working-class players, won the FA Cup by beating the Old Etonians.\textsuperscript{187} The amateurs never won again and ‘after the formation of the Football League ... in 1888 a plethora of other competitive combinations rapidly developed, the whole a stunning manifestation of the voluntary principle.’\textsuperscript{188} As Walvin concludes, ‘public schools undoubtedly created many new sports, and even more sportsmen, but the changes in social and economic fortunes among

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{184} Walvin, Leisure and Society, pp 87-88.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Walvin, Leisure and Society, p 88.
\item \textsuperscript{187} There was, briefly, a democratic alternative to the FA in 1884 when the British Association was formed to regularise professionalism. However this was short-lived as the FA ‘executed a remarkable volte-face and gave official sanction to professionalism in football in the summer of 1885.’ Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p 142.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Mason and Riedi, Sport and the Military, p 148.
\end{itemize}
low income groups enabled working men to colonise some of these sports. Thus, sport demonstrated two parallel developments: top down – best epitomised by cricket in the south of the country and bottom-up – football, most especially in the industrial midlands and north. This colonisation of sport by the working class has a parallel in the history of charity and voluntary action during and after the war.

Sheffield has noted the link between sport and the development of the character necessary for leadership in a very different context. He cites an official manual for officers which stated that ‘there is a close analogy between cricket’ and the training of troops, the ‘players play the game under the agreed laws and, under the orders of their Captain ... the platoon commander,’ the umpires adhere strictly to their allotted role, and the spectators ‘keep away from their pitch.’ Sheffield takes the argument further than this arguing that ‘sport channelled aggression into cooperation, taught self- and corporate discipline, made boys physically fit and created team spirit. By teaching boys to take rapid decisions on the playing field, games prepared them to take similar decisions on the battlefield.’ Others have challenged this contention and Sheffield recognises that there is a world of difference between the sedate playing field and the Western Front. However, his conclusion is that ‘these criticisms are exaggerated, not least because leadership on the battlefield occupied a relatively small proportion of the military leader’s time. Even if sport was not much direct use in a battlefield situation, it certainly was in developing ‘the ability to deal with and

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189 Walvin, Leisure and Society, p 95.
190 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-man relations, morale and discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War, (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999), p 47.
191 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, pp 44-45.
handle men’. As I have argued with regard to cricket, there was also a filtering down of
attitudes in that ‘the public schools games ethic, in a diluted form, influenced the working
classes’ and ‘a mutual interest [in sport] could bring officers and men together’. 193 Given the
psychological importance of sport to both officers and men one of the most famous (or
infamous) actions of the war can be re-interpreted:

When viewed against this background, the provision of footballs by Capt. W.P. Nevill
for his company of 8/E.Surreys to kick into action on 1 July 1916 becomes
comprehensible. Far from being an act of public school bravado or the ludicrous
action of a man obsessed with sport it can be seen as a shrewd psychological stroke.
Nevill intended the footballs to distract his men from the terrors of their baptism of
fire.194

Sheffield is therefore convinced that ‘far from being a ludicrous anachronism, the public
schools games ethic played an important role in the war on the Western Front.’195 Corrigan
has done detailed research on the amounts of football played by British troops. From an
analysis of over 500 War Diaries he concludes that the ‘British Army spent more time playing
football than fighting the Germans’ and is convinced that ‘because they spent more time
playing football there was no major breakdown in discipline.’196

In the pre-war period, uniformed boys’ organisations were also influential in spreading the
gospel of athleticism. It has been claimed that these organisations ‘assisted in producing a
working class that, like the middle class, was trained for war, in Orwell’s phrase “not

193 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, pp 46 and 45-46.
196 Gordon Corrigan ‘Myth and Reality in the Great War’ lecture given at the National Army Museum, 1
November, 2008. Mason and Riedi document how during the war sport became fully integrated into
the military (Chapter 3) being recognised as ‘improving fitness, relieving boredom, providing
distraction … and building morale, officer-man relations and esprit de corps’. Sport and the Military,
pp 80-81.
technically but morally.”

DeGroot has also suggested that ‘a wide array of youth organisations were established, all combining religion, athleticism and military discipline.’

The degree of militarism inculcated by these organisations is debatable but the extent of athletic education they exhibited is not. Of these, the best known was the Boy Scouts founded by Boer War hero, Sir Robert Baden-Powell as a response to the ill health of recruits for South Africa. Within two years of its establishment, in 1908, the Scouts claimed 100,000 members and by 1914 over forty per cent of boys belonged to some kind of youth organisation.

The Boys Brigade, founded by Glasgow businessman William Alexander Smith, was especially active in promoting what has become known as Muscular Christianity. ‘The Brigade was among the first voluntary movements to introduce working-class boys to organised sports, hitherto the preserve of the public schools.’ In Smith’s perfect world, boys would talk ‘to each other in the most perfectly natural way about the Company Bible-Class before all their comrades on the football field.’

The Church Lads’ Brigade, the organisation of the established Anglican Church, was another body that used military-style training within a religious context. Its success at instilling spirituality amongst its members is questionable whereas its military aspect ‘proved a national asset, as it contributed 120,000 of its current and past membership to the fighting forces [during the First World War].’ Winnington-Ingram [the Bishop of London] was especially proud of the Church Lads’ Brigade; under his presidency, its London branch recruited a battalion of 1,000 men which subsequently earned a personal commendation from Lord Kitchener.

The support of somewhat extreme nationalists such as Winnington-Ingram has led some writers to suggest that ‘youth

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197 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p 69.
198 DeGroot, Blighty, p 37.
200 DeGroot, Blighty, p 37.
movements were, for the most part, developed as instruments for the reinforcement of social conformity... part of what the sociologist might term the culturally organised processes of formal and informal social control mechanisms. Springhall argues that these organisations were formed for negative reasons, to prevent deviance, rather than for positive ones, of promoting social cohesion. He supports this contention by reference to the fact that, in seeking to extract funding from middle-class supporters, youth movements often suggested that they had this deterrent effect on deviance. One needs to be very careful in making the assumption that just because the organisations said that they had this effect that it was actually true. Many youth charities today promote their activities to potential wealthy supporters as diverting young people away from crime. However, there is little research evidence to demonstrate the truth of this assertion and these charities would certainly not say that this negative outcome was their main objective, they would use far more positive terms like ‘raising self esteem’ or ‘promoting cohesion’. Springhall’s entire argument is somewhat a -historical, using modern values to interpret the past. He considers it patronising for Edwardian youth organisations to stress middle class behavioural norms and denigrate working-class life and ‘street culture’. It is extremely unlikely that such an approach would have been seen as patronising at the time. It would far more likely have been viewed as a good thing, bettering oneself. It is Springhall’s approach that is patronising, or certainly belittling, as it suggests that working class recruits to these bodies were too foolish to realise that they were being controlled and patronised. The alternative is that they knew that one purpose of the movements was to change their values but that they willingly

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203 This was most certainly true of the inner city youth charity of which I was Director between 1987 and 1994.

204 Springhall, Youth, Empire and Society, p 40.
colluded in this process because it brought benefits to both sides of the exchange of values.\textsuperscript{205} Springhall’s misuse of hindsight ends with a regret that there were no radical left wing youth organisations until the advent of the Woodcraft Folk in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{206} This is to miss the point; of course, the youth organisations were not formed to challenge the status quo in society, but equally they did not make the working class ‘content with their lot’. In that they were mechanisms for instilling class values, they were also encouragements to social mobility within the system.\textsuperscript{207}

It would therefore be wrong to over-emphasize the militaristic nature of the uniformed boys’ organisations of the period as Springhall does.\textsuperscript{208} Some commentators have cited the Scouts, and especially the Boys Brigade, as examples of how militaristic British society as a whole was and thus that it was itching to go to war in 1914.\textsuperscript{209} Whilst not entirely without foundation, in that Britain was certainly more militaristic in 1914 than in 1939 or today, it is an exaggerated view. Firstly, the army in 1914 was still more-or-less the preserve of the very highest and very lowest stratas of society and viewed at best with suspicion, at worst with contempt by both the business and respectable working class.\textsuperscript{210} Secondly, the key motivation of men like Smith and Baden Powell was to build overall character (body and

\textsuperscript{205} This argument is developed further in the section on the deference exchange Chapter 14.
\textsuperscript{206} Springhall, \textit{Youth, Empire and Society}, p 126.
\textsuperscript{207} There is evidence that clubs and associations influenced the organisation of some quasi-military bodies. Mitchinson, for example, demonstrates the democratic structure of the Volunteer Training Corps (with even an uncanny similarity to the Russian Soviets) and how they too ‘were sometimes instigated by the local vicar, the scout master, the eccentric retired colonel or simply by well-meaning and dutiful citizens.’ K.W. Mitchinson, \textit{Defending Albion: Britain’s Home Army 1908-1919}, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 111-112.
\textsuperscript{208} Springhall, \textit{Youth, Empire and Society}, p 125.
\textsuperscript{210} See for example the comments of working class people in Salford in Robert Roberts, \textit{The Classic Slum: Salford life in the first quarter of the century}, (Manchester, University of Manchester Press, 1971), p 145.
mind) not simply martial qualities. For example, in 1910-11, the government tried to incorporate both bodies into a homogeneous national cadet force but, despite the offer of substantial financial aid, they both refused.211

Research into boys’ organisations of the period demonstrates that their members were predominantly from the same sections of society as those identified as forming the majority of members of pre-1914 cricket clubs, the sons of the respectable, upper-working class.212 These movements were part of a major national trend that was encouraged and supported by those in power as a natural and positive development towards political inclusivity in the years preceding the war. They also provide an example of paternalism and deference at work. An approach purely based on a paternalistic, philanthropically inclined, middle-class eager to improve the condition of their fellow citizens would not have been successful if the working class members had not co-operated. Some commentators see this as a clear example of social control and there are some examples where the working class resisted the leadership of their ‘betters’. As Morris has suggested, sometimes ‘the rise of organised sport entailed its own class battles’. One example being ‘the day in the 1870s when Christ Church Football Club walked out on the local vicar, crossed the road to the Gladstone Hotel and formed Blackburn Rovers Football Club’ leading to the development of professional football.213 However, the integrative trend, part philanthropy part mutual aid, of cricket and boys’ organisations was, at this point in history, more prominent than the ‘social action’

211 Tim Jeal, Baden-Powell: Founder of the Boy Scouts, (London, Century Hutchinson, 1989). For a more general argument that Europe was less militaristic than many have claimed see Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War, (London, Allen Lane, 1998), Chapter 1.
212 See for example DeGroot, Blighty, p 40.
model of the Christ Church footballers but both trends contained the fuel for an upsurge of voluntary action in 1914.\footnote{214}

Whilst sport and the uniformed organisations were almost entirely restricted to the male population there is equal, if not greater, evidence of the potential for voluntary action among the women of pre-1914 Britain. In the 1890s, it has been estimated ‘that half a million women volunteers worked full time in charity and another 20,000 were paid officials in philanthropic societies.’\footnote{215} Again though, the greatest potential lay in the middle and upwardly-mobile working classes through organisations ‘which imbued them with leadership skills, civic consciousness, and a commitment to service’.\footnote{216} Many of these reflected the traditional paternalism, or in this case, paternalism / deference relationship noted with respect to men and boys above. The largest of these were probably the Mothers Union and related church-led bodies. Although membership figures are fragmentary, Prochaska has suggested that a million women and children attended their meetings in the Edwardian period. ‘In Lambeth alone there were fifty-seven meetings run by Anglicans and

\footnotetext{214}{There is statistical evidence from the present day that being a member of a club is of direct, positive benefit to young people. Researchers from the Institute for Public Policy Research examined what became of thousands of children born in 1958 and 1970 and ‘found that they were more likely to be happy, in a good relationship, have good qualifications and be earning a decent income if they had joined such clubs, especially if it involved wearing a uniform, when they were young… So convinced is the Institute of the benefits of “structured and purposeful extracurricular activities.”… that it is calling on the government to extend the official school day to ensure all youngsters reap the rewards.’ Isabel Oakeshott, ‘Dib dib dib – the way to a better life’, \textit{Sunday Times}, 22 October 2006 and Richard Ford ‘Uniform way to end class divisions’, \textit{The Times}, 6 November 2006, p 3.}


\footnotetext{216}{Jacqueline de Vries, ‘Women’s Voluntary Organizations in World War 1’, introductory essays to the microfilm collection \textit{A Change in Attitude: Women, War and Society, 1914-1918}, edited by Susan Grayzel (Woodbridge, CT, Thomson Gale, 2005).}
nonconformists, with 3,600 members. The Mothers’ Union could boast over 9,000 branches and 435,000 members, many of them cottage wives, during the First World War.²¹⁷

There were though many voluntary organisations with a significant membership of working class women, such as the Co-operative Movement and the non-conformist churches, but again it was women from the ‘respectable’ working class who were dominant.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ As Waites has observed ‘the wives of labourers were relatively untouched by social institutions such as the Cooperative Society and Women’s Cooperative Guild which were so significant for artisan families. Bernard Waites, ‘The Effect of the First World War on Class and Status in England, 1910-20’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 1976, pp 32-33.
Social Control or Social Capital?

A crucial aspect of the entirety of voluntary action, and especially philanthropy, is one that is still the subject of considerable debate today and that is the extent to which it was a means of social control. By social control is meant ‘a conscious attempt by the establishment to *impose* middle-class values on the working class and thereby avert negative consequences for the dominant class.’219 The crucial factor here is *imposition*, manipulation of the working class for negative rather than positive, educative motivations.220 It is self-evident that the first part of this theory is true – there was a desire by the middle and upper classes to provide a rational alternative to negative pursuits and this was mirrored by many mutual aid organisations controlled by the working class themselves. It is the second part that is more contentious i.e. was this a deliberate attempt to reduce radicalism? There is certainly some evidence that supports this view with plenty of contemporary statements from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries that suggest that without political reform or positive action the working class would turn to extreme politics from Chartism to socialism. The evidence for and against this thesis is examined in more detail in Part IV but it is worth stating here that in the period before the First World War it is possible to suggest that things changed. As the nineteenth century moved on and it became increasingly certain that the working class would play a greater role in the political life of the country, establishment attitudes changed, and they changed to an even greater extent in the decade before, and most especially during, the war. Secondly, those who propound the social control view see

219 Davis Smith, ‘Voluntary Tradition’ p 15, my emphasis.
220 Davis Smith has summed up this contention saying: ‘Proponents of the social control thesis argue that one of the key motivations behind establishment support for voluntary agencies (both mutual aid and philanthropic) was the desire to provide a rational alternative to wasteful working-class leisure pursuits (particularly the pub) and the belief that the most certain way to reduce support for political radicalism was to provide material assistance during time of greatest hardship’. Davis Smith, ‘Voluntary Tradition’, pp 17-18.
very little difference between the two strands of voluntary action. This is a condescending view that ignores the fact that many of those most prominent in propounding mutual aid organisations were among the most radical politically, including the Fabian Society and prominent members of the Labour Party. Mutual aid certainly had an element of ‘bettering oneself’ but it also sprang from the necessity for the working class to defend itself against the worst excesses of capitalism. This aspect is one recognised by Bourne in his discussion of the composition and beliefs of the British Army during the war. He suggests that:

The existence of this rich diversity of [pre-war] working-class ‘civil society’ is indicative of much wider community solidarity. It would be easy to sentimentalize this. Working-class people did not choose community solidarity because of their innate moral superiority to the thrusting, individualistic, selfish bourgeoisie. They were forced into it by the demands of their situation. Community solidarity was the product of shared adversity. This produced a quite extraordinary degree of mutuality.221

One reason the social control thesis has been reinforced was the clash between many radicals and established charitable organisations that occurred during the decades leading up to the war. G.D.H. Cole gave a lucid summary of this battle when he wrote in 1945:

‘Mutual’ activities ... made their main appeal through most of their existence to the better-paid sections of the working class. Not even Trade Unionism has reached, save at rare moments, the ‘bottom-dogs.’ ... It is, on the other hand, precisely among those who are least able to organize themselves that the philanthropists have naturally been busiest; and it is an important social truth that the two movements of philanthropy and mutual self-help have tended to meet – and often to clash – in

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proportion as their respective clienteles have come to overlap. The clash occurred with the greatest sound and fury in the eighteen-eighties, when Socialism, re-born under Marxian influence, took up the case of the unemployed... There had been a similar clash in Chartist days ... but the battle then was between the Chartists and the State, with voluntary philanthropy playing but a small part in it, whereas in the ’eighties the philanthropists had armed themselves with a social philosophy of their own, and had equipped this philosophy with an organized means of expression and self-defence.222

The main ‘organized means’ was the Charity Organization Society (COS), founded in 1869, with two prime motivations. The first was the co-ordination of charitable activity in order to avoid duplication and waste – a laudable if ultimately futile goal. The second was the propagation of their view of ‘scientific philanthropy’ itself comprising two main ideas. The first was that the poor could be divided into two categories, those who through no fault of their own had fallen on hard times and who, with some assistance from charity, could re-establish their place as respectable members of society and those who refused to help themselves and were therefore beyond help. The second view, based on this assumption of deserving and undeserving poor, was that there should be a rigid division between which category was helped by the state and which by charity.223 Whilst the state had an obligation to prevent total destitution, it was charity’s role not to waste their resources on undeserving cases, only to assist deserving ones. It is very easy to criticize this view as both reactionary and misguided. Poverty, then as now, was more often caused by unemployment, sickness or simply old age, it had little to do with freedom of choice. Consequently this second major

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plank of COS philosophy was as doomed as the first. Hardly surprisingly the COS’s ideas brought philanthropy into direct conflict with both revolutionary and reforming socialists.\textsuperscript{224} The latter, who were the considerable majority, rightly saw state intervention as being of far greater efficacy in tackling social issues than even ‘organised’ charity. Despite these clashes the COS view was remarkably persistent and it took the First World War finally to lay it to rest.

It is from this battle, and the work of the reforming Liberal government of the post-1905 period, that a closely related idea to that of social control has developed amongst commentators on voluntary action. This is the proposition that in the early twentieth century the state, coming to a realisation both of the extent of social problems and their responsibility for them, extended their remit to the social sphere and that, as a result, voluntary action declined into insignificance. Such a proposition was re-enforced by Labour social reformers anxious both for the state to take on this mantle and to emphasise their own role in the development of state intervention. I again have some difficulties with this proposition. Firstly, as has been shown by the work of Morris, the role of charity in the nineteenth century has tended to be over-emphasized. Equally, the role of the state in the social sphere has been under estimated. True the Liberal government significantly speeded up intervention but, as Davis Smith has noted, ‘there was a well-established tradition of statutory support for voluntary action going back well into the early years of the [nineteenth] century.’\textsuperscript{225} Secondly, the failure of ‘scientific philanthropy’ and the advance of

state control of social services has misled many writers into a belief that voluntary action as a whole significantly declined. Invariably this is a ‘fact’ that is asserted with little concrete evidence beyond the obvious one that the state was intervening more in the realms of health, education etc whereas private philanthropy was doing less. What these commentators have not done is look more systematically at the resources of charity in the post-1914 period. The questions they should have been asking were ‘did the income of charities decline or rise?’, ‘did the numbers of people involved in voluntary action decline or increase?’ This study will only look in detail at the war and its immediate aftermath but it is clear that neither resources nor activity fell at all significantly. We should not be surprised at this. In the post-1945 euphoria, following the full creation of the welfare state, there were many, especially on the left, who confidently predicted the death of charity. With institutions like the National Health Service and free education, they argued, what would be the need? Inevitably though, standards change, the material possessions of the poorest families today would be considered luxuries by those of a few decades ago and, as needs change, so does voluntary action to meet it. Generally then it will be the contention here that voluntary action did not decline, instead it adapted to new needs and new circumstances, sometimes in response to extensions in state intervention, sometimes even in advance of them.

If, ultimately, the ideas of the COS proved an antediluvian cul-de-sac others, especially around notions of mutual aid, did not. When speaking of the impact of voluntary action on the nineteenth-century working class Prochaska firmly rejects the negative view of voluntary action as social control noting that:

226 For example Prochaska in several of his writings.
Participation in charitable causes was a passport to social status and social integration, but it was also a part of the pattern of working-class education and leisure... Humble men and women honed a basic education and often developed skills in bookkeeping, secretarial work, fund-raising, and general administration. In voluntary societies, unlike the wider world over which they had little control, working-class campaigners could make decisions that had meaning for their own lives and those around them. In the context of the political transformation taking place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the view that charitable work represents ‘a nursery school of democracy’ is especially apt.\textsuperscript{227}

Though Prochaska is again somewhat guilty of over-stating the case for charitable action, I would extend this educative role to the wider sphere of all mutual aid, he gets, I think, close to the truth. If one relates the evidence of participation in associative, philanthropic and mutual aid organisations to the model of the perspectives of social capital (see Figures 8 and 9) then there is clearly a case that, except for the very lowest strata of society, there was a significant degree of:

- Participation, social engagement and commitment shown by middle and working classes alike;
- Control and self-efficacy on the part of both classes;
- A very strong and clear perception of community level structures;
- Some indication of social interaction, social networks and social support, though without very clear indications of cross-class interaction or participation in the same associative structures;

• Indications of trust, reciprocity and social cohesion within the class structures though, again, some evidence that this was often lacking between the classes.

When it came, the First World War acted as a catalyst to further, massive, voluntary action that re-enforced many of these positive elements and, in some cases, began to break down the class barriers that inhibited others. This was especially true for many women and De Vries has suggested that it was the ‘pre-war membership boom in women’s social, service and political organizations’ that had a significant impact in that it ‘provided … the “social capital” necessary for winning the war.’\(^{228}\) This involvement of women in war was something entirely new. These ‘women volunteers came from a portion of society untapped in earlier wars, the vast network of organised women’s groups and associations that had been growing for several decades before the turn of the twentieth century.’\(^{229}\) During the war, these women ran a host of voluntary organisations. Even where the nominal figurehead was a man and men dominated the executive committee, it was often the women who did the day-to-day work, and it was not only leisured middle and upper class women who acted in this capacity as, again, many writers have asserted.\(^{230}\)

The wider impact of the pre-1914 explosion of organised sports clubs, boys’ organisations, clubs, societies, associations and women’s organisations is beyond the scope of this study but the influence of pre-war voluntary action during the war itself was profound. Not only did it pre-dispose a large cross-section of society – especially the upper working and middle classes – towards charitable endeavours, it had many other effects. These ranged from the positive and progressive, unified bodies working across class boundaries, to the less altruistic,

\(^{228}\) Jacqueline de Vries, ‘Women’s Voluntary Organizations in World War 1’.
\(^{229}\) Margaret Vining and Barton C Hacker, ‘From Camp Follower to Lady in Uniform: women, social class and military institutions before 1920’, Contemporary European History, No. 10, 2001, p 353.
\(^{230}\) See Chapter 6.
including restrictive trade union measures to prevent the use of unskilled, especially female, labour. Most often, the positive predominated. The massive voluntary effort of 1914-18 was the basis of a strength in social capital that gave Britain a distinct edge over her main adversary, Germany. As will be demonstrated, in Britain, voluntary action survived and even flourished under the somewhat half-hearted attempts at state control both during and after the war. In Germany state control under military direction after 1916 stifled what began as an almost equal flow of voluntary effort.231

The unique and cataclysmic nature of the war also brought about a greater fusion, or integration, of the two elements of voluntary action for social advance, philanthropy and mutual aid, breaking down many of the barriers that had previously existed most often identified through class differences. This integration was sometimes quite explicit and deliberate but more often, accidental and un-stated. Nevertheless, many of the voluntary and charitable movements of the war years combined the two impulses, often in harmonious partnership but occasionally producing class or culture clashes that had repercussions at national level. It was often where integrative partnership broke down that state intervention was required. After the war though there was a moving apart of the trends fuelled, to no small extent, by the partial breakdown of the paternalism / deference exchange, the two strands were never as distinct again. The developments in voluntary action through the years of war also cemented the transformation of the accepted view of what charity was ‘for’. In 1914, the Victorian view of charity as being there to treat the worst excesses of the industrial state probably had equal status with the more modern conception that charity should treat underlying causes. By 1918 it will be argued, the new idea, which

231 See Chapter 16.
was much more comfortable with charity working hand-in-hand with state welfare, had decisively gained the upper hand.

The third section of this study explores these points in more depth. Before that, the first part examines the rapid development of wartime charity and tries to determine both its extent (in financial terms) and its impact (in terms of its reception by servicemen and the wider community) which is a crucial part of the ‘social capital’ argument. Part III follows the encroachment of state control. It examines the reasons why the state decided to intervene in charitable activity and the form this took through parliamentary legislation (both successful and abortive) and semi-official channels, most notably the Director General of Voluntary Organizations, the highly efficient Sir Edward Ward.
In the first weeks following the outbreak of war in August 1914, two immediate and significant problems were the focus of attention for charitable and fund-raising efforts. The first was the initial depressive effects of the war on British industry and the second the influx of thousands of refugees from Belgium. In many ways, these initial responses also set the pattern for the sometimes uneasy relationship between voluntary and official action that was to characterise the entire war. The effect of rapid increases in prices and unemployment affected mainly two categories of people. Firstly, there were the needy dependants of servicemen, especially reservists and territorials and shortly thereafter, those of volunteers. Secondly, there were those whose trades had been disrupted such as the cotton industry, builders or those working on luxury goods.\(^2\) Parliament saw unemployment as their first concern and on 4 August a Cabinet Committee was established under the Chairmanship of Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board (LGB), ‘to advise on the measures necessary to deal with any distress that may arise in consequence of the war’. A special department was formed at the LGB and it quickly began to organise work at


local level. Local authorities were called on to form their own committees with representatives of the municipal authorities, boards of poor law guardians, trades unions and philanthropic organisations. The newly formed Intelligence Department of the LGB was strengthened and expanded and acted as a central bureau of information on the state of trade and industrial conditions in the different districts. Four sub-committees, dealing with London, Agricultural Districts, Urban Housing and Women’s Employment, quickly followed with their individual remits. The Women’s sub-committee was appointed on 20 August and was ‘to consider and report upon, schemes for the provision of work for women and girls unemployed on account of the war.’ Unemployment amongst women was more serious than amongst men as they were over-represented in both the cotton and luxury goods trades and by September nearly a million were unemployed or on short time. Disastrous, and long-term, unemployment was widely expected to follow the outbreak of war by those of all political hues. Ramsay MacDonald warned that ‘there are places like West Ham, where the whole population will encamp on the doorstep of the workhouse before the month is over’. In fact, concern about the depressive effects of the war proved unfounded. Very quickly, the Agricultural sub-committee was disbanded ‘owing to the absence of distress

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4 *Memorandum on the steps taken for the prevention and relief of distress due to the war*, PP 1914 Cd 7603, lxxi.
5 Marwick, *Deluge*, p 34. Among the effects were that ‘textile employment fell 43 per cent in the first five months of the war, clothing manufacture by 21 per cent, and women were badly affected by layoffs and short-time working. Large numbers of domestic servants and needle-workers were sacked.’ Deborah Thom, ‘Women and Work in Wartime Britain’, in Grayzel, *Women, War and Society*. Another group seriously affected were female white-collar workers, many of whom were very poorly paid at the time. This was true even of those working at the heart of the City of London where ‘the closing of the Stock Exchange also threw a large number of typists and shorthand writers (mainly women) out of work. Many such women, continually living as they did below the poverty line, were desperately hard hit by the war’. Millicent Garrett Fawcett, ‘War Relief and War Service’, *Quarterly Review*, 225, January 1916, p 113.
6 Wilson, *The Myriad Faces of War*, p 149.
among the rural population. Even in the parts of the country thought most likely to be affected, such as the cotton towns of West Yorkshire and Lancashire, the situation was not anything like as serious as had been expected. After ‘a good deal of unemployment in the first few months of the War, the contrary proved to be the fact later, and the cotton trade, particularly the heavy goods section ...experienced a period of prosperity such as had never been known before’. By the end of the year Samuel’s Committee was able to report that ‘happily, the fears of a widespread dislocation of trade which were entertained in some quarters at the beginning of the War have not been realised. Except in a few districts and in a few particular industries unemployment has proved to be much less serious than was anticipated.’

The various measures undertaken were very much an extension of the social welfare principles already employed by the Liberal government and, though charities also assisted, were met largely through government action. The wartime depression of employment was a temporary phenomenon and ‘the period of depression in England that followed the outbreak of war gradually disappeared as industry adapted itself to new demands [and] early in the year 1915 a shortage of labour rather than unemployment had become a matter of public concern.’

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7 Report of the special work of the Local Government Board arising out of the war (up to 31st December 1914), PP, Cd. 7763, xxv, p 299.
8 John A. Lee, Todmorden and the Great War 1914-1918: A Local Record, (Waddington and Sons, Todmorden, 1922), p 133.
9 Report of the special work of the Local Government Board, p 299.
From the *Railway Review* (weekly journal of the National Union of Railwaymen), 11 September 1914.

The situation with regard to the dependants of servicemen was more problematic, partly because it was not the province of a single government department. Both the War Office and Home Department had some responsibility and coordination between them was often fraught as was the case later with the regulation of charities. On the outbreak of war the only organisation concerned with allowances and pensions for servicemen and their
dependants was the Commissioners of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea. Their rates of relief remained unchanged from the Boer War and the massive demands of the new conflict were way beyond their means. The only other source of immediate help came through local Poor Law Guardians and the existing mechanisms, rules and rates of relief were again unsuited to such emergency needs. There were also two other charitable organisations in existence who provided some assistance to servicemen’s families, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Family Association (SSFA) and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Help Society, but on the outbreak of war they had very few resources.

It was therefore clear that if something were to be done quickly then this would have to be through charitable means. Indicating the somewhat haphazard and spontaneous responses to the outbreak of war there were two royal appeals. The first on 6 August was under the name of the Prince of Wales for a National Relief Fund, whereas the second, on behalf of his grandmother, Queen Alexandra, was specifically for the SSFA. This rather embarrassing situation was quickly remedied when on 11 August it was agreed to amalgamate the two schemes under an Executive Committee. Though the Fund was established to help alleviate all distress caused by the war, in practice 60% of the proceeds were directed towards naval and military distress. The NRF utilised the network of 300 Local Relief Committees established by the LGB in towns with a population of 20,000 or more, or counties for smaller population centres, to coordinate relief efforts. These committees, though closely involved

11 Later on in the war the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation also became involved but before it was given an extended role in the provision of pensions it confined its activities to ‘financial assistance for the families of those who fell in action’. See Graham Wootton, The Politics of Influence: British Ex-Servicemen, Cabinet Decisions and Cultural Change 1917-57, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963), Chapter 3.
12 Containing three members of the Cabinet, the Committee was chaired from October 1914 by Sir George Murray.
13 Extracted from the Final Accounts of the National Relief Fund in Final Report of the National Relief Fund, March 1921, PP, Cmd. 1272, HMSO, 1921.
with the NRF, were also at liberty to raise their own funds and were not centrally controlled. They had significant autonomy and this could lead to disagreements with the NRF in London. In some areas, due to the boom in industry later in 1915, their work became less critical though their early efforts were considerable. One such area, Todmorden (then in Lancashire now in West Yorkshire), was typical in this regard where the council responded by calling a public meeting on 14 August to elect a Relief Committee and set the fund going by utilising £104 left over from the Distress Fund raised at the time of the Boer War. The meeting provided a foretaste of many of the NRF’s future problems in that the proceedings were somewhat lively on the question of the constitution of the committee with some significant debate between the representation of capital and labour but ‘eventually a large and representative committee was appointed.’ They unanimously agreed to join the national scheme and to request an immediate £250 grant from it to meet urgent cases but later also agreed to form a local fund that eventually raised four times the amount contributed by the NRF. Initially the committees had a great deal of work. ‘During September, October and November the Central Committee sat every night dispensing relief, except Saturdays and Sundays, the meetings usually lasting from 6.30 to ten o’clock or later’. But despite the competing fundraising efforts of other charities such as the Belgian Refugees and Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild the Mayor was able to announce on 4 December that ‘for the time being no further subscriptions were required as the fund in hand was sufficient for some time to come.’ The subscriptions to that date were £1,904 16s towards the local fund and £549 18s 5d for the National Fund.

14 Their independence is demonstrated in the report of the Fund in Scotland, Report by the Scottish Advisory Committee on the administration of the National Relief Fund in Scotland up to 31st March 1915, 1914-16. Cd. 8129, p 5.
15 Lee, Todmorden, p 56.
16 Lee, Todmorden, pp 56-57.
Though some charity leaders, in the existing COS, Guild of Help and Social Welfare movement, were quick to see that the local representation committees had major implications for the relationship between charity and the state there was no existing national organisation that could identify and recommend potential beneficiaries and administer the NRF on the ground. This role was vital, as the increase in work was so massive with ‘the number of wives in receipt of allowances at the outbreak of war [increasing] in a fortnight from 1,500 to 250,000.’ The only bodies that fitted the bill were the previously mentioned SSFA, created in 1885 to help support dependants of those participating in the Egyptian expeditionary force, and the even smaller Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Help Society. They rose from obscurity to become highly significant social welfare networks within a short time from the outbreak of war. Macadam, no great lover of unregulated charitable activity, praised the mobilization of the SSFA saying that ‘the resurrection of this moribund body at lightning speed is one of the triumphs in the history of voluntary effort.’

Just how rapid this increase in activity was is revealed by its work in Liverpool where ‘the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Family Association rose from a body of 13 members with no subscription list to a body with 29 district heads, some 700 voluntary workers and an expenditure of £1,000 a week within the first few weeks of war.’

The system was a somewhat uneasy alliance for many reasons, not least the confusion between entitlements and charitable gifts. Marwick has called the NRF ‘an attempt to

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18 Fawcett, 'War Relief', p 117.


20 D'Aeth, 'War Relief Agencies', p 147.
integrate private charity and public appeal into Government action.\textsuperscript{21} This led to an unsurprising backlash when ‘Labour leaders criticised the SSFA for treating payments as charity, to be given only if working-class women met their expectations of good behaviour’. Labour insisted the money was a right and should be administered by the state. Most of the fieldwork for the SSFA was done by middle-class ‘lady visitors’ who ‘acted as the advocates, disciplinarians, trouble-shooters, and morality police of soldiers’ wives.’\textsuperscript{22} There was considerable debate and controversy as to whether benefits should be extended to ‘unmarried wives’ and whether they should be withdrawn if women were found to be spending too much time in public houses.\textsuperscript{23} Not surprisingly many women resented this intrusion and the officious and patronising manner of some visitors. Even more outrage was caused when the police were given powers to supervise the conduct of soldiers’ wives as a ‘timely warning to those particular individuals who would by misconduct forfeit their allowances.’\textsuperscript{24} To the members of the WNC Baker’s tone conveyed the very worst aspects of outdated philanthropy and provoked an angry resolution protesting ‘against this Order [which is] a document full of gratuitous insult to all British women and to every man fighting for his country [and] holds the women of Great Britain up to the contempt of all other nations.’\textsuperscript{25} Even at this early stage in the war, it was clear that these attitudes could not be maintained and that working class support was essential and the Order was not carried out. Despite a continuing uneasy relationship between labour and the NRF, the left did see some merit in its method of organisation. The \textit{Daily Herald} wanted to make local relief committees

\textsuperscript{21} Marwick, \textit{Deluge}, p 43.
\textsuperscript{22} George Robb, \textit{British Culture and the First World War}, (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), p 79.
\textsuperscript{23} These were recurring issues at the major conference for members of the SSFA, Guilds of Help, COS and others held at Westminster Hall between 10 and 12 June 1915, documented as \textit{Proceedings} (London, Longman Green and Co, 1915).
\textsuperscript{25} Minutes of WNC Executive Committee meeting, 7 December, 1914, WNC, Publications.
into ‘citizen organisations’, rather than mere dispensers of charity.\textsuperscript{26} This was again a far-sighted comment. The committees did become more representative and inclusive and gave the working class an entrée to local corridors of power. The initial NRF mistake of failing to include trade unionists and other representatives of working people was, generally, not repeated. As the war went on, working class membership of official committees at both local and national level became the rule rather than the exception.\textsuperscript{27}

Because the NRF was not state-controlled, the exact remit and powers of the SSFA were also something of a mystery. Individual branches or even individual officials had wide discretion in how they applied the funds and this led to major inconsistencies. The other main problem, one still common to emergency appeals to this day, was that of delays in the distribution of the funds. There was even criticism that the Fund itself was unsure of its role and wasteful of resources with ‘business firms [pouring] money into the fund, some several times repeating donations of thousands of pounds, notwithstanding the fact that nobody knew for what object it was all to be used.’\textsuperscript{28} By April 1915, the NRF had realised the remarkable sum of £5 million but only £2 million had been handed out. Both the press and the WNC persisted in their criticism and some of the more militant areas outside England were on the verge of open revolt at the dictates of the London-based body.\textsuperscript{29} Something of a crisis was reached in April 1915 when the South Wales Miners’ Federation decided to discontinue contributions to the NRF and Glasgow declared independence setting up its own fund because they were dissatisfied with its administration.\textsuperscript{30} Despite placatory letters from the Prince himself to the Lord Provost of Glasgow, the die had been cast and movement towards full state

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Daily Herald}, 10 August 1914.
\textsuperscript{27} For example with conscription tribunals and war pensions committees.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{The Times}, 13 April 1915, p 5.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{The Times}, 21 April 1915, p 5.
intervention followed. A Select Committee, under Sir George Murray, was established which recommended that ‘the care of soldiers and sailors disabled in the war should be assumed by the State’31 His report led to the Naval and Military War Pensions Act of 1915 and in 1916 the Ministry of Pensions also took over the administration of separation allowances. There were still some clashes, both over the use of funds for military separation allowances and when the new state-controlled system ‘borrowed’ money from the NRF to meet its early obligations. 32 Though the WNC was unable to fully overturn either of these decisions their criticisms were being taken far more seriously by the government who realised the problems of the NRF and its ad hoc nature. Increasingly thereafter, it was the state that was assumed to be the natural home for such major issues.

The National Relief Fund was too much an expression of outdated paternalistic philanthropy impinging on an area ripe for integration into the embryonic welfare state. More than anything else it was the moral issue of paternalistic middle and upper class ‘do-gooders’ passing judgement that doomed the entrepreneurial approach. Even at this early stage in the war, there had been decisive changes from Victorian values of philanthropy. Women were simply not prepared to ‘go through humiliating processes modelled on the charitable assessments of the Charity Organisation Society’ and Robb is therefore perfectly correct in his view that ‘the traditional philanthropic ideal of moral reform was out of step with wartime democratic sentiment.’33 Nevertheless, the NRF raised an enormous sum from all

31 Sir George Murray in his address to the 1915 Conference on War Relief and Personal Service, Proceedings, p 61. For more on the issue of disability pensions see Gregory, The Last Great War, pp 264-266. Gregory also criticizes support for disabled veterans as displaying ‘Victorian attitudes [of] self-congratulatory philanthropy’, which is certainly true.
32 The WNC again protested in two resolutions, the latter invoking both the name of the Prince of Wales and long-established charity law. WNC Executive Committee Minutes, 3 February, 1916, WNC, Publications.
sections of society, though mainly in the early part of the war.\textsuperscript{34} It was also a significant precursor for state intervention in the social welfare field and demonstrated that even at a time of enormous expenditure on the war the British economy could sustain the cost. Separation allowances ultimately cost the government almost half a billion pounds, nearly as much money as soldiers’ pay. It was ‘the unprecedented circumstances of the war that had made such massive social spending possible.’\textsuperscript{35} It could therefore be said that the NRF, by its being brought under state control, brought the potential of a welfare state a step closer and, by the reaction of labour that now had to be taken far more seriously to maintain national unity it put another nail in the coffin of paternalistic philanthropy.

\textsuperscript{34} The total was just under £7 million of which over 70 per cent was raised in the first nine months, \textit{Final Report of the National Relief Fund.}

\textsuperscript{35} Susan Pedersen, ‘Gender, Welfare and Citizenship in Britain during the Great War’, \textit{American Historical Review}, Vol. 95, 1990, pp 983-1006. The totals paid out year-on-year were (to nearest £ million):

\begin{tabular}{ll}
August 1914 – March 1915 & £15 million \\
April 1915 – March 1916 & £53 million \\
April 1916 – March 1917 & £78 million \\
April 1917 – March 1918 & £113 million \\
April 1918 – March 1919 & £125 million \\
\end{tabular}

'Mighty and generous Great Britain’ - Belgian Refugee Relief

‘The readiest opportunity for private philanthropy was provided from the very beginning of the war by the Belgian refugee problem.'\textsuperscript{36} The response to this influx demonstrates many similar aspects to other issues of voluntary and philanthropic activity during the Great War. There was an initial explosion of voluntary effort, some attempts at co-ordination and, later, state intervention, partly in reaction to expressions of public disquiet. In common with the NRF, the co-ordination of relief began with private enterprise but increasingly came under state direction. However, unlike the case of the NRF much of the voluntary effort was immediate, spontaneous and ‘bottom-up’ rather than initiated from above. The first work of registering Belgian refugees and of providing French and Flemish interpreters was done by a voluntary organisation – the London Society for Women’s Suffrage, a branch of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies – NUWSS. ‘It provided 150 interpreters for this work in a few days, and work was carried on at all the London Centres from early morning till midnight.’\textsuperscript{37} The example of the NUWSS was quickly followed by many others so that ‘within a matter of days of the first refugees arriving, a network of relief charities sprang up, most of which were very small and only cared for one or two Belgian families, usually in houses donated by local well-wishers.’\textsuperscript{38} Very quickly, there was more concerted action. On 24 August, two eminent women, Lady Lugard and the Hon. Mrs Alfred Lyttleton, joined forces with Viscount Gladstone to form the War Refugees Committee (WRC) to coordinate relief efforts. The prominent pro-suffrage Tory peer Lord Hugh Cecil became its chairman and ‘on the first day of its operation the Committee received 1,000 letters offering accommodation for the refugees, and within two weeks offers of hospitality for 100,000 people had been

\textsuperscript{36} Marwick, Deluge, p 43.
\textsuperscript{37} Helen Fraser, Women and War Work, (New York, G Arnold Shaw, 1918), p 44.
made by all social classes. At its peak, the WRC directly employed over 500 people, virtually all of them volunteers, and there were over 2,000 local committees in existence. However, the WRC suffered from exactly the same type of problems as the NRF. It was criticised for inefficiency and ‘rapidly forfeited the advantages of massive public sympathy by its initial mistakes.’ They had a huge number of volunteers but were unable to organise them so that many were turned away disillusioned. This is recognised as a problem in today’s relief funds and was also an issue in volunteering for the army in the early days of the war. Even Viscount Gladstone described the first week of the WRC as a ‘period of hopeless confusion’.

These problems, the sheer numbers and the role Belgium had played in Britain’s entry into the conflict ensured that there was an almost immediate government response. The first inclination of Home Secretary Reginald McKenna had been to build huge camps for the refugees, possibly in Southern Ireland. This idea, with its overtones of Boer concentration camps, was rapidly dropped though some large venues were utilised. For example, Earls Court exhibition centre was in use throughout the war accommodating over 100,000 Belgians for short periods. As early as 9 September the WRC had come under the auspices of

39 Fowler and Gregson, ‘Bloody Belgians!’. For more detail on the formation of the WRC see Katherine Storr, Excluded from the Record: Women, refugees and relief 1914-1929, (Bern, Peter Lang, 2010), pp 17-20, 43-44 and 52-62.
40 Tony Kushner, ‘Local heroes: Belgian refugees in Britain during the First World War’, Immigrants & Minorities, Vol. 18, No.1, 1999, pp 1-28. In December 1915 when the government took over paying WRC workers the number of volunteers inevitably fell. However there were still staff at the Aldwych headquarters in mid-1916. Storr, Excluded from the Record, p 61.
41 First report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Local Government Board to consider and report on questions arising in connection with the reception and employment of the Belgian refugees in this country, PP,1914, Cd. 7750, vii, p 473.
43 By June 1915, there were 265,000 Belgians in the country, the largest refugee movement in British history.
44 Turner, Dear Old Blighty, p 77.
the LGB. The fact that the local committees formed to relieve industrial distress had less to do than anticipated meant that they could be utilised for this new role. At Samuel’s suggestion, ‘the machinery for relieving English victims of the war’s economic disruptions was finally put to use relieving foreign victims of its military campaigns.’ At the same time, the government was keen to ensure that it was not seen as in any way favouring refugees over the needs of British citizens and thus discouraging voluntary activity. It therefore stressed the voluntary element in its official reports both during and after the war. However this co-operation between government and the voluntary sector was another step towards the kind of partnership that many non-COS theorists had argued for and became increasingly familiar as the war continued.

By December, when the immediate unemployment crisis was by no means over, there were worries that Belgians might distort the labour market and the President of the LGB established a departmental committee, with Sir Ernest Hatch as Chairman, to find a solution to the problem. It recommended that Belgians ‘should not be employed under conditions other than those prevailing for British workers, and those at work on Government contracts … should be engaged through the Labour Exchanges… A Central Authority should be established to assist local refugees and employment committees to organize workshops etc.’ In accordance with the report a Belgian Refugees Commission, also under Hatch’s chairmanship, was formed between January and July 1915 to put its recommendations for providing occupations for Belgian refugees into effect. Following the example of the refugee industrialist Charles Pelabon, whose Twickenham shell factory employed over 6,000 of his

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45 Cahalan, *Belgian Refugee Relief*, p 82. Kushner notes that relations between the WRC and the LGB were ‘often strained’, ‘Local heroes’, p5.


48 *First report of the Departmental Committee*, p 473.
fellow citizens, one result of this approach was the establishment of an entire refugee town at Birtley, Durham, geared to the manufacture of munitions. Elisabethville was a joint venture between the government and the armaments company Armstrong Whitworth and eventually it housed around 6,000 people. 49

Despite official intervention, most organisations helping our ‘gallant allies’ remained entirely voluntary. ‘The great majority ... were the spontaneous creations of local people. Very often an individual or group of friends and neighbours began by offering to take refugees and then enlisted the entire community to help.’ 50 This led to a mushrooming of activity with hundreds of communities across Britain establishing funds. It was again women who usually supplied the driving force for local activity and many of them had learned their trade in the pre-war campaign for the vote. 51 Folkestone, the major port of entry for refugees, became almost Belgian in character. 52 However, many other towns all over the country also did their bit. 53 One that more than pulled its weight was Croydon, south of London. A Belgian Refugee Committee was formed in the town in mid-August but, after the national War Refugees Committee started work, a local branch was quickly established under the official title of the Central War Refugees Committee for Croydon (CWRCC). They held their first meeting on 27 October 1914, with a view to coordinating local activity or stimulating it in

49 Turner, Dear Old Blighty, pp 81-82. Fowler and Gregson, ‘Bloody Belgians!’
50 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief, p 17.
51 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief, p 174-175.
52 ‘[It was] swamped with refugees first, and then later with wounded soldiers, volunteers put in 14 hours a day, seven days a week, providing beds and meals for the needy. Local branches of the Salvation Army, Friends’ Meeting House, and a local catholic mission, pitched in to provide beds for nearly 9,000 refugees and serve almost 71,000 meals in the six-week period between December 20 1914, and February 6 1915. Local branches of other organizations, such as the Girls Friendly Society, helped by raising vegetables and providing wholesome activities for young refugee women. By the war’s end, this small city [sic] had served 500,000 meals to 120,000 Belgian refugees.’ De Vries, ‘Women and Work’.
areas where nothing had so far been organised. They were, however, at pains to point out that they did not want to step on the toes of existing work. The CWRCC was formed under the auspices of the Guild of Help (one of the major existing national charities for the support of the poor and needy) and their main task was finding accommodation. There was some discussion about whether or not they should fund-raise, as there was initial confusion about what financial support the local authority would provide. It was ascertained from the LGB that the Corporation had no powers to use its own funds for the refugees and so, over the next eighteen months it was the CWRCC who were responsible for local activity. By December the Committee had assisted in establishing twenty-eight hostels (defined as those establishments with five or more refugees) with 423 inmates with a further 139 accommodated in forty-four private houses. These figures rose to a peak of forty-seven hostels (643 refugees) and forty-six houses (120 refugees) by 12 January 1915. The ‘Greyhound’ pub was converted into a reading room with free Belgian newspapers and there was a local branch of the refugees own organization, the ‘Comité Belge’, who sought the CWRCC’s assistance in acquiring wool for refugees to knit socks for the Belgian army. 54

Though the CWRCC remained in existence until April 1919, the Committee did not hold a meeting after April 1916, suggesting that the refugee issue had largely been solved by the second year of war. Even small towns far removed from the ports of entry did their bit. Todmorden received their first refugee on 16 October and by February 1915 over fifty were accommodated in the area. Here too activities started to run down by 1916 when ‘several of the refugees returned to Belgium, others to France, while others found employment

54 Even so, support for legitimate refugees did not always mean that the CWRCC was immune from concerns about ‘dubious foreigners’. In February 1915, they became concerned that German spies may have infiltrated the refugee community and ‘agreed that the notice about the two families suspected of being German should be given to the Police.’ Suspicions apparently fell particularly on two girls but before they could be traced, they had left the area and so it is impossible to say if this was simply a manifestation of the spy scare of the early days of the war or if there were genuine grounds for suspicion. Minutes of the Croydon War Refugee Committee (compiled by the Hon. Sec. Miss Muriel Scarff), Croydon Local Studies Library.
elsewhere in the country, with the result that by the end of 1917 very few remained in the Borough.55 Not far away in Saddleworth, the first Belgian refugees arrived ‘on a black night, wearing sabots and with their worldly possessions wrapped in a large cloth, two families were welcomed by Edwin Hudson of the Distress Committee in a language of which they understood nothing.’56 Reaction in Saddleworth was probably typical of many practical, but caring, working class communities for:

Although the newly established Belgian Fund had swollen considerably, it was reported that some people were hesitant about giving too much before they had actually seen what they were getting for their money. The Committee was assured that once the Belgians had been seen on the streets, donations would swiftly follow.57

There were few significant problems encountered between the British and the Belgian refugee community though there were a few examples of tension.58 Perhaps the most acute happened in Barrow-in-Furness in 1917. It came after some refugees purchased houses and tried to evict the tenants but this was, perhaps, more an expression of discontent about housing conditions than about Belgians. The Commission on Industrial Unrest visited the town and were told by a local magistrate that ‘this is a very sore point. As sure as you and I are here, there will be Satan’s row if Belgian people are allowed to buy houses and the working classes in Barrow-in-Furness are turned out into the streets. There will be a riot.’59

55 Lee, Todmorden, p73.
56 K.W. Mitchinson, Saddleworth 1914-1919: The experience of a Pennine Community during the Great War, (Manchester, Saddleworth Historical Society, 1995), p 44.
57 Mitchinson, Saddleworth, p 44.
58 However, there was some amongst the refugees themselves. At Elizabethville in December 1916, there was unrest during which the Belgian gendarmes, who policed the town, shot dead a worker. Beckett, Home Front, p 155.
59 Quoted in van Emden, and Humphries, All Quiet on the Home Front, p 225-226.
After threats of strike action, Barrow was designated a special area for housing, tenants were protected and new temporary accommodation for workers hastily constructed. There were also some comments about the ungratefulness of certain refugees (many of them from the upper and middle classes). The good people of Eye, in Northamptonshire, had some of their confidence undermined by the indolence of their refugee family. They had a subscription list for Belgians with weekly collections being made by Boy Scouts and had rented a house. However, their refugees left when charitable support ceased. The father, Pierre Sinnaghel, had refused to work, despite the intervention of a Belgian priest and Belgian schoolmaster, and this was described as ‘a very sad end to what was a promising beginning, and a great disappointment to those who worked so hard for them and gave so willingly of their support.’

Saddleworth too had its problems, finding some of its guests sullen and ungrateful.

The issue of the refugees faded later in the war as other causes came to prominence but the experiences of Eye and Saddleworth seem to have been somewhat untypical. Of those local histories commenting on the Belgians, nearly all report positive relationships with many refugees expressing their extreme gratitude for their reception. Valedictions such as the following from the de Bruyn-Vermeulen family of Antwerp are typical:

> During the ten months [of their stay] we have been able to appreciate the character of the English people, their patriotism, and their compassion for us and our unhappy countrymen. During all this time we have felt among friends, and often we forgot our sorrow. We shall always remember Britain as the country of generosity, the country of hospitality, freedom and ardent patriotism – the country that will make

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61 Mitchinson, *Saddleworth*, p 45.
every Belgian refugee say: ‘I have two countries – my own dear Belgium, and this country: mighty and generous Great Britain.’

There were, however, few attempts at integration and the overwhelming majority of refugees, like the de Bruyn-Vermeulen’s, returned home after the war.

Obviously, the largest number of Belgians remained at home, the vast majority behind enemy lines. As one refugee commented those in Britain were in many ways the lucky ones, ‘we were so happy in England! We were in paradise compared with those who stayed in Belgium. We don’t know how to thank all those who have been so good to the Belgians.’

A huge international effort was begun for their assistance, which has many similarities with Band Aid and other campaigns for famine relief in Africa today. The main driving force came from the United States under the weighty patronage of future President Herbert Hoover.

Hoover established two committees on 22 October 1914: The Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) under American direction and the Comité de Secours et d’Alimentation (Comité National) under Belgian direction. In March 1915, relief operations were extended to France and a third committee established, the Comité d’Alimentation du Nord de la France (Comité Français). In May 1917 a further group, the Spanish-Dutch Committee for the Protection of the Relief in Belgium and Northern France, under the Spanish Ambassador in London was added. The CRB set themselves three tasks: provisioning of the entire population; conduct of financial relief, and exchange operations and care of the destitute, of which it was estimated there were around three million out of a total civilian population of seven million. The CRB’s overall fund raising was huge, with a very significant proportion coming from Britain. Eventually they had no fewer than 55,000 voluntary members on the

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distributing committees in all countries. The largest proportion of their income was from government sources: $387m from the United States Government, $109m from the British and $205m from the French. However, there were also significant contributions from voluntary sources with the largest cash sums donated by Britain and the Empire, $14m in cash, $3m in kind. Americans gave $6m in cash, $28m in kind.64

If there were few problems with individual refugees the same cannot be said about the administration of some of the charities established for the benefit of Belgium and its people. There were significant difficulties because of the profusion of organisations that were created. Unlike the main Belgian charities, some of these bodies were on or over the borderline of legality but the War Refugees Committee also clashed with the British branch of the CRB, headed by the Comte de Lalaing, the Belgian ambassador in London.65 The WRC lacked funds whereas the CRB did not (it was especially supported through the Daily Telegraph’s appeal). Though there was a clear difference between the two, the former for Belgian refugees in Britain, the latter collecting funds solely for use in Belgium, many people seemed to think the two were linked or even one and the same. The outcome of this rivalry was that ‘an unalterable hostility developed between the two bodies’ and ‘the experience with the [CRB] Fund was to spur the [War Refugees] Committee towards energetic support for the tighter control of war charities.’66 Mirroring the concerns expressed over the National Relief Fund the press began to find examples of what they saw as maladministration. Prominent among them was Robert Donald editor of the Daily Chronicle and his leader article of 12 February 1916 proved highly influential in the debate over the control of charitable activity that followed and which is explored in more depth in Chapter 10. Donald

65 See Appendix 7 for the dubious activities of the Belgian Soldiers Fund.
had investigated Belgian relief charities and concluded that there were far too many of them (over 50) and that they were run on ‘exceedingly unbusiness-like lines’ with no audited accounts and, often, not even a proper committee. Anyone could set up a fund and it seemed very easy for him or her to assemble an impressive list of patrons, none of whom had any idea about how the funds were being administered. He called for government action to introduce ‘vetting’ of Belgian relief funds and suppress those that failed to meet adequate standards.67 Some action was taken almost immediately. The Charity Commissioners established a Belgian sub-committee and later on the LGB was given the power to regulate Belgian relief charities.68 The LGB report on their work refers to the Daily Chronicle campaign but the regulations were permissive rather than compulsory. Therefore the LGB scheme was not quite what critics had been demanding and fell well short of the Chronicle’s plea for closer scrutiny and legislation which led Donald to throw his weight behind calls for the regulation of all war-related charities.

The pattern set with regard to both initial distress, through the NRF, and refugees followed a similar course, which was to be repeated for later charitable efforts. There was an immediate, and significant, voluntary response to the problem with some attempts at national coordination. Later there was criticism of the operation of the bodies involved and demands for official or legislative action. As the war continued, the problems of unemployment and Belgian refugees declined and other philanthropic causes rose to prominence. These first two causes, of industrial distress and Belgian refugees, also came very much within the category of top-down philanthropy whereas many later initiatives were far closer to mutual aid or, at least, looking after one’s own.

5 Supporting Tommy – charity goes to war

Correspondence.

To the Editor,
"New Church" Times:

Sir,

May I use the columns of your periodical to ventilate a grievance. On many occasions lately when proceeding to and from my work (I am a window cleaner at Wulverghem) I have been pestered by thousands of women selling flags for some charitable (sic) cause. Only yesterday a forward female had the audacity to ask me to buy a flag to assist in the purchase of a blue body-belt for a bucolic Belgian. This, sir! I maintain is monstrous, and the sooner something is done the better. ‘Only last Sunday I gave a franc to provide Warm Woollens for War-worn Walloons and now, what with the Daylight Saving Bill and other things which deserve your attention life is becoming too much of a trial. Surely you will move in this matter.

I am, Sir,

Yours, etc.,

WALTER WIGGINS.

Figure 13: The New Church Times (aka Wipers Times) bemoans the proliferation of flag days (29 May 1916, p 14)

Having responded to the initial demands caused by the threat of significant unemployment and the influx of Belgian Refugees voluntary effort decisively shifted.

As Britain’s armies expanded exponentially, charitable activity concentrated on British and Empire troops both at the front and when they were wounded or invalided. Almost as quickly as the establishment of the NRF,
other bodies, both existing and new, sprung into action. Medical supplies were a priority as the government had made few plans for supplying hospitals with necessities and providing comforts for soldiers. The Regimental Associations, British Red Cross and Order of St John performed some of these services but were soon overwhelmed by the level of need. Entire communities mobilized to support their local regiments and area hospitals with many of the early responses initiated by middle and upper class women, often the only direct way they could support the war effort.¹ A typical example was that of the Duchess of Bedford who established a hospital at Woburn Abbey. In common with many upper-class ladies, this entailed something of a change from her pre-war lifestyle of leisure, ‘the Duchess is herself the Matron-in-charge ... keeps all the records, is up at half-past five in the morning, and spends her day in the endless doing, thinking and contriving that such a hospital needs.’² The Duchess’ example was followed by many other aristocratic and landed families and Mrs Humphrey Ward estimated that ‘altogether about 700 country houses large and small have been offered to the War Office’ for use as military hospitals, rest homes for troops or other war-related function, 112 were loaned to the Red Cross alone for such purposes.³ Another group of privileged ladies, Americans married to Englishmen and resident in this country, established The American Women’s War Relief Fund. They rapidly provided a fleet of motor ambulances; founded the American Women’s War Hospital in Paignton and operated an

¹ ‘In the tiny but prosperous Cheshire town of Alderley Edge, for example, women quickly organized new groups like the Surgical Requisite Guild which began to raise money and sew items necessary for soldiers in hospital. Like volunteer groups elsewhere, the Alderley Edge women formed unexpected partnerships, teaming up with the boys at the nearby Royal School for Deaf and Dumb to supply more than 90 hospitals with splints. And elsewhere in the town of Alderley Edge, Girl Guides ran a laundry and raised vegetables for the local Red Cross hospital.’ De Vries, ‘Women and Work’.
Economic Relief Committee in London running work schemes employing 405 unemployed women producing clothing and equipment for the hospital. To support all this work they had, by August 1915, raised £62,000 in cash.

Bodies who already possessed the equipment and expertise were the first to react. Among existing organisations quickly, and literally, into the field was the Salvation Army, who dispatched an advance party to Brussels in August 1914. The YMCA too rapidly mobilized its resources calling on its previous work with the army in South Africa. The principle architect of the YMCA’s wartime mission was its dynamic national secretary, Sir Arthur Yapp, who re-branded the organisation the ‘Red Triangle’. They opened more than 250 recreational centres in Great Britain within ten days of the outbreak of war and the first YMCA secretaries to serve with the BEF arrived in France long before they had received official permission from the War Office. In Britain the public face of the YMCA were the dozens of huts and canteens providing free refreshments established in towns and cities, notably those adjacent to main railway stations and which remained open day and night. The Euston Station buffet, organised most prominently by Miss Margaret Boulton (as fund raiser) and Miss Marietta Feuerheerd (as manager), had 30,000 customers a month by December 1915 and by 1916 there were 30,000 women working in YMCA huts at home and abroad. Later in the war the Red Triangle was joined by the Blue Triangle, organised by the YWCA to support the newly created WAACs.

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Royal Patronage and Ladies of Leisure

The most significant ‘knitting and stitching’ organisation was Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild (QMNG) which was established immediately on the outbreak of war following the Queen’s letter to the press on 4 August. Because it enjoyed royal patronage and produced a lavish history with a foreword by John Galsworthy the QMNG is sometimes seen as the archetypal war charity.\(^8\) It was, in fact, only partially representative of even early efforts and no more representative of the bulk of war charities than, say, Robert Graves’s *Goodbye to All That* was representative of the bulk of experience of the British army.

Though its stated purpose was, ‘to alleviate all distress occasioned by the war’ it concentrated mainly on the production and distribution of clothing and other items to servicemen as well as hospital requisites. With the prestige of the Queen’s endorsement branches of the Guild blossomed all over the Empire, from Canada to Ceylon, in Britain and on the continent where there was a branch in The Hague. In November 1918, there were 630 branches with 1,078,839 members, excluding those in North America. The total production of the Guild by 1918 amounted to 15,577,911 articles with an estimated value of £1,194,318. St James’s Palace was utilized as a clearing depot making it, in the words of the Guild’s official report, into an enormous ‘dry-goods store’. The significant work-force of the Guild could quickly be put to use in emergencies, for example following the first German gas attack at Ypres in April 1915 when ‘workers of the Guild in St James’s Palace cut, at fever-speed, three million eye-pieces for gas masks, out of cinema film.’\(^9\) It was clear that some of

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\(^8\) *Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild: Its work during the Great War*, (London, St James’s Palace, 1919). It should be noted that prior to the First World War direct Royal involvement in charities was not common. It was the activities of King George, Queen Mary and their family that established this tradition.

\(^9\) *Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild: Its work during the Great War.*
the ‘leisured’ women who joined the Guild were unused to the work as it was commented that ‘many women of these sewing parties have no idea how to put the garments together’.10

Much more serious was the potential in the first months of war for the work of the Guild to exacerbate the unemployment situation amongst women working in the textile and clothing industries. There was ‘vigorouos opposition from the working women’s organizations’ to their activities as they were seen as providing many of the same items made by women who were now unemployed.11 Opposition was also expressed by the WNC whose executive included several well-known and influential women from the Labour movement such as Mary Macarthur (of the Women’s Trade Union League), Margaret Bondfield (later the UK’s first female Cabinet Minister) and Susan Lawrence (of the London County Council). In a resolution drafted by Sidney Webb, the committee urged all ‘benevolent persons’ to ‘avoid doing positive harm by confining themselves’ to activities that would not impinge upon work done by working women.12 Their reaction shows the tension that existed in these early days between well-intentioned but patronising voluntarism and the Labour movement. The committee ‘took a firm stand in opposition to appeals which were being sent out urging women to volunteer for work rendered necessary by the war when more than half a million women were out of employment.’13 Their appeal produced a swift reaction from the Palace that would have been unlikely even a month before. On 17 August, the Guild made an announcement in the press to indicate that the intention was to work in partnership, not opposition. Representatives of working women were called into consultation to ensure that

12 Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War, p 193.
‘everything possible was done to safeguard the interests of women workers’.\textsuperscript{14} The ‘Queen’s Work for Women Fund’ was started with the funds raised being turned over to the Central Committee on Women’s Employment to provide work or assistance for unemployed women. The Central Committee also began to issue contracts for the provision of army uniforms and though there were some teething problems (the existing patterns had to be modified to take account of the inexperience of the firms in producing service dress) ‘the result was that the manufacturing difficulties were removed, full employment in the tailoring trade began at once, and the Army Supply Department was also greatly benefited by the prompt fulfilment of orders.’\textsuperscript{15} The Queen further poured oil on the waters by placing a personal order through the Central Committee for 75,000 woollen body belts that were to form part of her Christmas gift to the troops. These were produced by women formerly employed in the carpet trade in Kidderminster, Belfast, and elsewhere who had been badly hit on the outbreak of the war.\textsuperscript{16} Despite this, some problems remained as the wages paid to those working for the Guild were sometimes extremely low and, until the employment situation stabilised, relations between the Guild and the Labour movement remained tense.\textsuperscript{17}

As well as the female members of the Royal Family, most of the wives of the BEF’s commanders also involved themselves in voluntary work. Lady Smith-Dorrien, wife of the then commander of 2nd Army, made a valuable contribution, of which the WNC did approve, as being additional to existing paid labour. In April 1915, she heard from a nurse that it was proving impossible to safeguard the valuables of sick and wounded soldiers in casualty clearing stations and hospitals. She contacted her husband to ask whether the supply of closable bags for this purpose would be useful and 2nd Army’s Assistant Director of Medical

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Labour Year Book, 1916}, p 80.
\textsuperscript{15} Abbott, \textit{The War and Women’s Work}, p 651.
\textsuperscript{16} Abbott, \textit{The War and Women’s Work}, p 652.
\textsuperscript{17} Susan Bruley, \textit{Women in Britain Since 1900}, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p 39.
Services, General Porter, replied in the affirmative requesting an immediate 50,000.\textsuperscript{18} The first depot was established in Lady Smith-Dorrien’s house at 5 Eaton Gate but in 1916 moved to larger premises and a further expansion in 1917 led to another move. Besides the London HQ depots were established in Scotland, Bedford and, eventually, the USA with over 12,000 people contributing to the scheme. The bags themselves were initially of unbleached calico but this was soon changed, as bright colours were more easily distinguishable and popular amongst the men. The bags were distributed through the official DGVO scheme with 40,000 a month going to Medical Stores depots and smaller quantities direct to hospitals and Casualty Clearing Stations. Activities were uninterrupted by Sir Horace’s removal from his post after the Second Ypres, by the war’s end Lady Smith-Dorrien’s Hospital Bag Fund had produced over two million items.\textsuperscript{19}

Overall, activities led by upper and middle-class women were more typical of the early months of the war and certainly had their drawbacks. The first, the danger of voluntary labour replacing paid work, has already been noted. The second was the entirely un-coordinated nature of the activity. Both were a concern to the WNC, which was ‘quick to point out the counter-productive tendencies of the rash of “Lady Bountiful” proposals to make and donate clothing and necessities to the British Army and the poor.’\textsuperscript{20} It was thus by a slightly stumbling mix of royal patronage, voluntary effort, working class agitation and central control that the situation stabilised into a reasonably efficient, and certainly extensive, system of clothing production. QMNG was one organisation that was considered

\textsuperscript{18}The bags were well liked by the troops who gave them the nickname ‘Blighty Bags’. John Brophy and Eric Partridge, \textit{Songs and Slang of the British Soldier, 1914-1918}, (London, Eric Partridge, 1931), p 86.

\textsuperscript{19}Report of Lady Smith-Dorrien’s Hospital Bag Fund and letter from Lady Smith-Dorrien’, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Women’s Work Collection (WWC), BO 2 19/3.

\textsuperscript{20}Winter, \textit{Socialism and the Challenge of War}, p 193.
sufficiently independent, or more likely prestigious, to be excluded from the coordinating scheme undertaken by the Director General of Voluntary Organizations.21

21 When the war ended a considerable sum of money collected by the Guild was left unspent and so QMNG was one of the many wartime charities who were able to leave a lasting legacy, which survives to this day. Queen Mary decided to use these funds to endow a Maternity Home, for the benefit of wives and children of servicemen. The Home opened in October 1919 in temporary premises at ‘Cedar Lawns’, North End Road, Hampstead, a house provided by Lord Leverhulme. The foundation stone of a new building at Upper Heath, on a site again provided by Leverhulme, was laid on 12 October 1921 and was designed to provide 16 beds. The new maternity home was occupied in July 1922. In August 1939, the Home was evacuated to Eynsham Hall, Oxfordshire, but moved again to Freeland House, Oxfordshire, in the autumn of 1941. It returned to Hampstead in the winter of 1945-1946. In April 1946, the management of Queen Mary’s Maternity Home was taken over by the London Hospital and, in February 1972, it was transferred to the Royal Free Hospital. With the closure of New End Hospital, Hampstead, in 1986 and its subsequent sale, funds became available for the development of Queen Mary House as a Care of the Elderly Unit, which opened under the management of the Royal Free Hampstead NHS Trust in 1991. ‘Summary of Queen Mary’s Maternity Home’ archive at http://www.aim25.ac.uk/cgi-bin/search2?coll_id=3993&inst_id=23, accessed on 20/09/06.
Eggs for the Wounded, Conkers for the Guns – Schoolchildren do their bit

Middle class girls were also giving their time towards the national voluntary effort from the first days of the war. The Girls’ Patriotic Union was formed under the auspices of the Association of Head Mistresses and by November 1914 boasted a membership of 290 schools, both Girls’ High and Public Schools. The Union’s first printed report included many activities that were indicative of the class of ‘young ladies’ involved and, though well intentioned, might not have had a significant impact on the war effort:

- Girls in a boarding school have asked that they may have no sugar in their tea.
- Others have asked that they may not have customary prizes. Many have given up their weekly pocket money, thus denying themselves sweets; and so on... And in some places outside hockey and net-ball matches have been given up and the money thus saved has been devoted to the relief of distress.  

However, very quickly, rather more pragmatic and effective work began to be carried out, often in direct cooperation with less privileged partners. Schools linked with local hospitals to provide supplies; older girls from London volunteered their time to work in a former workhouse processing Belgian refugees whilst others translated newspapers for French-speaking refugees and ‘one school sends its contributions regularly to the local Labour Bureau to provide paid employment.’  

Later on the Girls’ Patriotic Union supplied four recreation huts for France (one each for the army, navy, airmen and the WAACs). They also became involved in the founding of the ‘greatest of the wartime charitable institutions’ the

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22 ‘Girls’ Patriotic Union of Secondary Schools, First Report, November 1914’, IWM, WWC ED 4/5. One is reminded of the King’s pledge not to drink alcohol for the duration of the war, other than for ‘medicinal’ purposes.
23 Girls’ Patriotic Union, First Report.
'Star and Garter’ Home for Disabled Sailors and Soldiers.\textsuperscript{24} They raised the considerable sum of £5,500, which endowed fourteen rooms at the new establishment in Richmond.

However, schools efforts were by no means confined to the upper classes; it was not long before every school in England was regularly and directly engaged in the immense voluntary effort. Even the smallest schools, such as Stanbury Board School in the Yorkshire village of the Bronte sisters, Haworth, with a school roll not far above 100, became involved. In November 1914 30 shillings was raised by selling national flags painted by the children. In April 1915, a first hamper of comforts for soldiers knitted by the children was despatched containing six large scarves, three wool helmets and seven pairs of socks. The wool was provided free of charge by a local spinner and production soon reached an industrial scale. Knitted comforts were supplied to Keighley Military Hospital and later in 1917, 60 soldiers from the hospital were entertained in the school.\textsuperscript{25} By the time of a visit by Miss Cockshott, a member of the Worth Valley Education Sub-Committee, in June 1917 hundreds of under vests, mufflers, helmets, hot-water bottle covers and other items had been sent away either to the Keighley Hospital or direct to the front. On this visit, Miss Cockshott pressed the boys to knit and sew as well as the girls.\textsuperscript{26} Help for the convalescent soldiers became almost an obsession with communities vying with each other to provide care for ‘their’ heroes and the troops took full advantage. Whilst you often read stories of working class soldiers taking sedate afternoon tea at stately homes it was far more common for the local community to stand them a few (or even more than a few) drinks at the pub or social club. This led to some

\textsuperscript{24} Fowler, ‘War Charity Begins at Home’, p 22.
\textsuperscript{25} The programme including a whist drive, tea, a walk on the moors (conducted by the headmaster) and a concert. Apparently, the appearance of no fewer than fifteen motor cars at one time to convey the invalids caused ‘quite a sensation’ in the village.
\textsuperscript{26} Diary or Log Book, Stanbury Board School, Haworth, Yorkshire at Haworth village website http://www.haworth-village.org.uk/history/school/stanbury_school.asp, accessed on 20/09/06.
rather overdoing the hospitality, so much so that in October 1916 the War Office issued new regulations restricting convalescents from venturing outside their hospitals after 5.30. How successful this new rule was, or how widely it was breached, is not reported.

In East Anglia the headmistress of St Matthew’s District School, Ipswich, reported that ‘the girls really put their backs into the war effort.’ On 4 August a branch of the ‘League of Young Patriots’ or ‘Princess Mary’s League’ was started and by 9 October three-quarters of the girls had joined. They began by knitting socks for Belgian refugees but by 1916 even the youngest children were contributing directly to war production. On 2 July (the day after the commencement of the Battle of the Somme), the Young Patriots despatched 42 rifle covers and 42 sandbags. The logbook also records that on 2 May 1917 ‘the First Class Girls [aged 7 and 8 years] spent the whole time in making sandbags’ a task in which the Boys of the school also joined. By 5 December 1917, the school could boast that ‘today we have sent off the last consignment of Sandbags and Grenade bags, making a complete total of 931 sandbags and 2,209 grenade bags.’ Participation in these activities was stimulated by many visits made by servicemen to the schools they had attended. All the logbooks speak of frequent talks by soldiers either home on leave or invalided out. Many returned to thank the children for their assistance in the supply of comforts for the troops and sometimes they expressed their appreciation in more direct ways such as at Tattingstone National School, Suffolk, where a solider and former pupil visited in December 1916 and left enough money at the village shop for every child to have a farthing’s worth of sweets. In Kent, some children were

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27 Extracts from the Log Books of East Anglian Schools, compiled by Mrs S.M. Hardy, IWM, MISC 68, Item 1056.
even luckier when ‘no doubt against all the rules, children living near Broomfield [near Maidstone] enjoyed occasional flights in exchange for cigarettes and home-made cakes.”

Children even contributed to the production of explosives. It was discovered that the horse chestnut could be used as an alternative to acetone (an essential element in the manufacture of cordite) and an experimental factory was established in Kings Lynn. It was in this experiment that the children of Tattingstone participated and on 30 November 1917 when ‘two sacks of chestnuts weighing 3 cwts 2 qrs were sent this week to the Minister of Propellants.” Nobody really knew why they were collecting horse chestnuts. The government was, naturally, reluctant to reveal the motive behind its scheme since the Germans could very well copy this novel form of acetone production. A question was asked in the House of Commons but the answer given simply stated that they were required for ‘certain industrial purposes’ and promoted as aiding food production rather than killing Germans. The veil of secrecy drawn over the horse chestnut's final use even led to accusations that voluntary effort was being used to provide personal profit. The horse chestnut scheme was not one of the great successes of the war. Despite somewhere between 3,000 and 4,500 tons being collected, the Propellant Supplies Branch of the Ministry of Munitions was slow to organise the collection from depots and the Board of Education received many complaints. Corsham Council School in Wiltshire alone collected seven-and-a-quarter tons but their county authority were writing to the Board on 31 January 1917 that, owing to the failure to collect the nuts, ‘the children are greatly disappointed, and

29 Extracts from the Log Books of East Anglian Schools.
30 ‘How did horse chestnuts help the war effort during the First World War?’ IWM online collection at http://collections.iwm.org.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.1267, accessed on 20/09/06.
will obviously attempt similar efforts in the future with reluctance.’31 As a result, only 3,000 tons reached the King’s Lynn plant and letters in The Times tell of piles of rotting horse chestnuts at railway stations. Another accusation that the Ministry of Munitions and Board of Education had to scotch was that the nuts were being used in the production of poison gas.32 Even so the chestnut scheme spread nationwide, and beyond schoolchildren collectors, as the Croydon War Supplies Clearing House minutes for 21 November 1917 show when ‘it was reported that 4-and-a-half tons of acorns and chestnuts had been collected.’33 It is likely that the acorns would have ended up as pig feed, but perhaps not, as they too could be utilised for acetone production. On 7 September, 1917 a conference was held between officials of the Agriculture Food production Department, Sir Frederick Nathan of the Ministry of Munitions, Captain Desborough of the Admiralty and Mr Ainsworth of the Board of Education. The Admiralty thought acorns potentially even more productive than chestnuts and both they and Munitions wanted to utilise schoolchildren in their collection. Mr Ainsworth resisted this as there would be payment by the Ministry to farmers and his superiors supported him. Clearly it was acceptable for children to be involved in explosives production but not if it was a commercial scheme.34 An unintended outcome of the chestnut programme was that the Board of Education was inundated by suggestions for the collection of dozens of other products that correspondents considered would aid the war effort. Some of these were relatively sensible, for example, sweet or Spanish chestnuts were acceptable, but it was difficult to think of a use for the stalks of Jerusalem artichokes recommended by

31 The National Archives, Kew, (TNA), ED 10/74.
32 Letter from Miss Agnes Fry to Board of Education, 29 September 1917, TNA, ED 10/74.
33 Croydon War Supplies Clearing House, Minute Book, Croydon Local Studies Library.
34 TNA, ED 10/75.
the Rev C.R. Garnett-Botfield of Oswestry. Unsurprisingly, the great chestnut collection was not repeated in autumn 1918.

Rather more prosaic was the cultivation or collection of food products. On 24 July 1918 R.H. Carr of the Ministry of Food wrote to the Secretary of the Board of Education that ‘owing to the comparative failure of the Country’s fruit crop ... it is a matter of extreme difficulty to provide enough Jam to meet the requirements of the Forces and the civilian population ... the systematic collection of Blackberries throughout the country has become a matter of paramount importance.’ He was asking children to become involved and was offering ‘substantial remuneration’ of 1d per pound. This time the Board overcame their scruples regarding commercial operations (no doubt, because there was no intermediary) and so agreed to the proposal. This time children were released from school to take part, but not for more than three half-days. One school involved was Tattingstone who reported that ‘half a day [was] given this afternoon under the National Blackberry Scheme. The result was very good. 364lbs being sent to Burton and Saunders [a factory in Ipswich].

By far the largest of the food schemes with which schools became involved was the National Egg Collection to provide fresh eggs for wounded soldiers. Started in November 1914 it reached a peak of 1.4 million eggs a week. One hundred thousand honorary collectors, many of them from schools or members of the Scouts, Guides or Church Lads Brigade collected these at over 2,000 centres. Overall, wounded soldiers got a steady supply of nourishing

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35 TNA, ED 10/74.
36 The scheme was however revived during the Second World War see Berry Mayall and Virginia Morrow, You can help Your Country: English children’s work during the Second World War, (London, Institute of Education, 2011) pp 126 and 128.
37 TNA, ED 10/73.
38 Extracts from the Log Books of East Anglian Schools.
food from various voluntary sources. Sometimes it might have proved just a little too rich if the efforts of Lord Selborne and Edward Carson (among others) in September 1915 was anything to go by. They helped amass 3,000 brace of grouse, partridge and pheasants for war hospitals, but perhaps they were reserved for officers. Often the children wrote short messages or just their name and address on the eggshells and received notes of thanks back from the men on the receiving end of the gifts. Typical was this from a Wiltshire soldier pleased to get a reminder of home

   In the battle of ... I had the misfortune to be shot through the head; I was taken to hospital, and after being made comfortable in bed my first meal consisted of an egg bearing your address, and as I come from Wootton Bassett I thought I must write and thank you for it. I wish you could see the joy on the poor fellows’ faces when they get the eggs; it would fully repay you for all your trouble. Again thanking you,
   Yours truly, T. Tucker.39

One girl, Kathleen Sawyer from Swindon, was surprised to receive an eggshell back from France in 1917 that had been eaten by her own uncle and the 3 November edition of the campaign’s magazine *Eggs Wanted* carried a picture of Kathleen on its front cover holding her uncle’s eggshell.

Outside school, the war gave the uniformed boys’ organisations even greater scope for direct contributions with Baden-Powell’s Scouts in the forefront. Their duties included guarding against sabotage, acting as messengers, organising relief measures, establishing first aid, dressing or nursing stations, assisting refugees and soup kitchens, working as bellboys on Birmingham’s trams and helping with the flax harvest. All of which ‘released

large numbers of men for more urgent tasks and for military service’.40 Another role Scouts performed was that of air raid wardens. Describing the largest raid of the war, by Gotha bombers in January 1918, Michael MacDonagh described the Scouts contribution:

While I was waiting by the statue of Queen Boadicea – standing in her chariot defying the Roman legions – I saw an entrancing sight. This was the departure from Scotland Yard on bicycles of policemen, with whistles, reinforced now by Boy Scouts with bugles, to spread the news through London that the raid was over. They came out in hundreds, dispersing in all directions at their highest speed, blowing their whistles and sounding their bugles which were to dissipate the fears of millions of apprehensive Londoners.41

Upper and middle class boys from the public and endowed Grammar schools also carried out a huge range of war work. The High Master of Manchester Grammar School listed the following as being just some of the activities taken by his pupils by mid-1916, noting that pupils in the Boy Scouts were most prominent in the work:

- Acting as orderlies in recruiting offices and hospitals;
- Saturday collections of waste paper;
- Coastguard patrols;
- Distributing recruiting posters;
- Manufacturing leg rests, bedside tables and other items to furnish a house for Belgian Refugees and an even making artificial limbs in the school workshops;

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41 MacDonagh, *In London during the Great War*, January 30 1918, p 260. MacDonagh’s book is a neglected gem that gives a revealing insight into the feelings and thoughts of its author, a Times journalist brought out of retirement for the war, and a broad description of London through the war years.
• Packaging troop comforts;
• Forgoing school prizes to donate funds to the Red Cross and YMCA;
• Postal work at Christmas (for which they were paid 6d an hour but donated much of this to funding a Scouts motor ambulance for France);
• In the summer holidays working in munitions, in YMCA huts or fruit picking.42

In replacing men in this way, Scouts performed some of the same roles as women during the war and if a young woman was not clipping your tram ticket a Scout was probably collecting it. It was not long before the Scouts had their own front-line heroes, ex-Scouts serving in large numbers in the armed forces. The most famous was John Travers Cornwell who, though mortally wounded, continued to serve his gun on H.M.S. Chester during the Battle of Jutland. Cornwell’s heroism originally went unnoticed but later press coverage and public pressure led to his being given a reburial with full military honours and a posthumous VC.

There is no doubt that the Scouts played a very significant part in the war and Wilkinson goes so far as to consider that ‘it is no exaggeration to say that Kitchener’s New Army depended on a boy-scout spirit and resourcefulness for its morale, and on the dissemination of public school loyalties and values among lower middle-class and working-class men.’43

Some individual children went even further. In Burnley (between Blackburn and Todmorden in Lancashire) two young girls performed heroic deeds on behalf of local charities. Amy Foster became known as ‘Hieland Lassie’ on account of the Highland costume she wore when collecting funds for soldiers parcels. One of 11 children of Teddy and Maud Foster, Amy also worked tirelessly for St Dunstan’s both during and after the war. Jennie Jackson,

daughter of a miner from Towneley Colliery, was born in 1907 and, as ‘Little Kitchener’, became perhaps the best known child fund raiser of the war. ‘Her role began when, shortly after the outbreak of war, her mother saw two soldiers sharing a cigarette while walking in Towneley Holmes, which prompted her to think of ways of supplying tobacco to the men in the trenches.’\textsuperscript{44} Kate Jackson made a perfect replica military uniform for Jennie and, after gaining permission from the Chief Constable, Jennie began collecting coppers at the corner of Market and St James’ Streets but soon gravitated to touring local pubs, clubs and factories as well. Her phenomenal success was such that in February 1916 Jennie decided to collect for a field ambulance which was built in Burnley and handed over to the army by Queen Alexandra, with Jennie proudly present. In all she raised a total of £4,000 (roughly equivalent to £200,000 today) and received the War Medal of the British Red Cross Society. Two of her brothers fought in the war, William, who died at Loos in 1915 and Richard, who won the Military Medal at Ypres. At the 1919 Great March of Peace in London Jennie received her highest honour, becoming the only child to be permitted to join the march and witnessing the unveiling of the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey. Her mother went on to become head of the women’s section of the Royal British Legion in Burnley and Jennie herself lived to the age of 89, dying in 1997.\textsuperscript{45}


Local Activity - Croydon War Supplies Clearing House

Charities of every size and description sprang up. Some were for very specific purposes such as those for the relief of air raid victims and even potentially unpopular causes such as the dependants of conscientious objectors (though only two, one in London the other in Watford) or distress among enemy aliens. Though there were only four bodies formed for this latter purpose one was the highly efficient Prisoners of War Information Bureau which was the official body dealing with German PoWs and internees in the UK.46 Most were of course for humans in need but many animal casualties (especially horses) were provided for, most notably by the RSPCA Fund for Sick and Wounded Horses, Our Dumb Friends’ League Blue Cross Service and the Purple Cross. There was an early dispute for recognition with the British Army but it was resolved when the Blue and Purple Cross agreed to provide their services to the French Army.47

We have already noted the importance of ‘localism’ in pre-war British society and this is a factor often ignored by historians of the period. Different parts of the country were very different in their class and work structures and, not surprisingly, reacted very differently to the strains the war placed on their communities. These regional differences and the aspects of the war they affected are well summed up by Grieves in the introduction to his outstanding compilation of sources from Sussex:

47 The Blue Cross, whose President was Lady Smith-Dorrien, later also served the Italian Army whilst the Purple Cross maintained three hospitals for horses at Vesoul, Foulain and Bordeaux, Kelynack, Pro Patria, pp 56 and 116 however these later closed through lack of funds and the charity was refused registration by the London County Council. London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), MIN 8335 (Vol. 1), Case No 40. For more on unusual animal charities and those involving militant women activists see Appendices 2 and 3.
In the history of British Society in the Great War locality matters alongside the
dimensions of nation, class and gender... The micro-histories of individuals and
communities challenge long held preconceptions, which were often generated by
the interpretative lens of living through the Second World War and the Cold War...
The existence of local communities of volunteer soldiers, uniformed philanthropic
carers, essential war workers, convalescent men, resilient relatives and mourners
have become central to understanding the complex, ambiguous and sometimes
paradoxical consequences of total war for the young and old, male and female,
soldier and civilian, participant and bystander, propertied and cottager, and villager
and town dweller.48

He specifically does not mention non-uniformed volunteers not, I think, because he
underrates their contribution but because their contribution has not yet become central to
the debate. Grieves goes on to suggest that the study of local, primary sources can assist the
historian in exploring four themes:

- Popular attitudes towards the war;
- The interwoven lives of soldiers and civilians;
- The persistent linkages of the battle front and the home front and;
- What were the continuities and ruptures that were experienced in local
  communities in the Great War?

I would agree entirely with Grieves and therefore these local sources can help answer
several of the questions posed in this thesis:

- To what extent were home front and battlefront linked?
- Did this help or hinder relationships between civilians and soldiers?

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48 Grieves, Sussex in the First World War, p ix.
• What did this mean in supporting or hindering the development of social capital?
• What were the social consequences of the war and were they positive or negative?

One of the largest and best-coordinated local schemes was the Croydon War Supplies Clearing House (CWSCH). It was also an early attempt to prevent duplication of activity and in its final report it made claim to being the blueprint for the scheme later run by the Director General of Voluntary Organizations.49 Formed in October 1914 the CWSCH’s main function was ‘to obtain detailed information respecting all appeals made by recognised organizations providing comforts for the men of the allied fighting forces.’ It opened its first depot at 110 George Street in the centre of the town on 2 November appointing Mrs Iredell as Lady Superintendent. Its first collections were for the benefit of Belgian refugees but it rapidly expanded to 14 depots supplying all local hospitals with comforts, hospital requisites, games, books etc. The Boy Scouts did much of the fetching and carrying and the executive of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway agreed to transport goods in bulk free. Like the later official DGVO scheme the aim in Croydon and other towns with centralised comforts funds was coordination not standardisation or the stifling of individual enterprise. In this, the CWSCH was extremely successful and very soon assumed the characteristics of a major business enterprise. In December 1914 they held a ‘shopping week’ for Red Cross comforts which sent £350 of goods to France and this was followed by a Christmas Pudding appeal. In March 1915, there was a condensed milk appeal, supported by the major local employer Nestlés, which collected 63,451 tins valued at £925. The committee felt confident enough in its financial base to take out a bank overdraft that was repaid by holding whist

49 This and subsequent extracts are taken from ‘Croydon War Supplies Clearing House: Summary Report 1914-19’, (probably written by Mr H. Terrell Peard the Chairman and Joint Secretary), Croydon Local Studies Library. Croydon’s claim is probably exaggerated as several other towns had followed a similar pattern. For example, Eye, in Suffolk, set up a co-ordinating ‘Patriotic Association’ on 15 August 1914 and Dowding said in May 1915 that ‘in many places clearing houses were established.’
drives and a golf tournament. In July 1915, Union Jack Flag Day raised £330 and the CWSCH funded and ran its own cinema at the Addington Park War Hospital. In October 1915 CWSCH became part of the national DGVO scheme with the energetic Mr A.G. Norris assuming the role of local secretary. In December 1915, a massive sale of donated items was held at the Town Hall. Opened by Queen Alexandra the sale ran for seven days from 11am to 11pm raising the impressive sum of £8,746, equivalent today to more than £500,000.50 There was another Christmas Pudding Fund that year, realising £380, but the Report recorded that many unfortunately failed to reach their destination:

It is sad to relate that a considerable portion of the puddings consigned to our local Queens Regiment stationed in India, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, and the portion that did get through and followed the regiment to Mesopotamia, were not fit to eat on arrival, having been spoilt by excessively hot weather.

However, this was only a minor setback as the CWSCH moved on to further ventures. There were fund raising matinees and performances at the ‘Hippodrome’ and appeals for footballs and boxing gloves. In February 1916 a waste collection (for bottles, rags, wool, paper and even bones) was started which over two years added a further £354 to the funds. In June 1916, Mr Norris resigned to join the fighting forces and, on his recommendation, a campaign was launched to fund a YMCA hut for France. ‘Hut Week’ held in September realised no less than £6,458, which supplied several ‘Croydonian’ huts and even a ‘Croydonian Travelling Cinema’ for France. This was followed by a YMCA appeal for books. Croydon’s citizens were clearly avid readers as this produced 55,000 volumes and ‘besides surprising ourselves with this result, we heard the YMCA were obliged to take further premises to accommodate them.’ 1918 saw only two special efforts, a matinee at the Hippodrome in conjunction with

the West Croydon Cadet School (£309) and a Flag Day in aid of St Dunstan’s which produced a war record for such events of £1,274.

CWSCH finally ceased its activities on 17 April 1919. The final balance sheet showed they had despatched 436,993 parcels to the Front or hospitals and 176,823 through the DGVO scheme. These included a motor car and driver for the Red Cross (sent out in December 1914) and a harmonium for the YMCA for religious services in camp. The total sum collected amounted to £20,683 and the final balance of just over £317 was used to endow a bed in Croydon General Hospital’s children’s ward to be named after the Fund and with preference to be given to children of ex-servicemen.
Summary – Techniques and Types of Support

One needs to draw a distinction between the work done by organisations new to the field (such as Lady Smith-Dorrien’s Fund, newspapers or schoolchildren) and those undertaken by existing charities, often national bodies (like the Red Cross). Existing organisations, like the NUWSS and the YMCA were in a much better position to re-focus their activity to war help and the improvisation so typical of the early months of the war was far easier for bodies with an existing organisation and trained volunteers. You could perhaps equate these two strands of charity with the small, but well trained and organised, regular Army of 1914 with the hastily improvised and, initially, enthusiastic rather than efficient Kitchener battalions.

In all, there was an enormous range of charitable activity undertaken, but with a significant bias towards comforts for troops and medical supplies.\(^{51}\) There were also very significant local variations in the nature and type of support. For example, in December 1919 Croydon had 19 organizations registered under the War Charities Act. They included: four of a general nature (including the CWSCH); three for Belgian refugees; three work-place related; two for the Red Cross; two for hospitals and one each church related, for Christmas gifts, for children and a local branch of the Comrades of the Great War. Todmorden, on the Lancashire / Yorkshire border, though one-sixth the size of Croydon, had twenty-eight: seven for soldiers’ comforts (there was less coordination than in Croydon); six for general purposes; five church related; four work-place related; two each for hospitals and Belgian refugees and one each politically connected, for the YMCA and a Sewing Guild.\(^ {52}\) Todmorden also had no fewer than seventy-two unregistered war charities in addition.

\(^{51}\) Further examples can be found in Appendices 1, 2 and 3.
\(^{52}\) War Charities Act 1916: Index of Charities Registered Under the Act to 31 December 1919, (London, HMSO, 1920). Todmorden was selected for study as it has a detailed wartime history (lee, Todmorden) which documents its sources of information and data.
Unregistered charities were smaller organisations usually confined to the employees of a single work place, a church or a street and they were far more numerous in industrial, working class areas (Croydon only had a handful). Of those in Todmorden, eleven were based on a single street or small neighbourhood, nineteen on churches and no fewer than thirty-eight on workplaces.

By the end of the war charities fell into the following main categories, the proportion of the total in each is also given.53

Table 5: Main categories of war charities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Categories of War Charities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comforts for British and Empire Troops</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical support (including hospitals and supplies)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for disabled servicemen</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relieving distress at home</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post war remembrance (including war memorials) and celebration</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid for refugees and overseas</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to prisoners of war</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As classified by the Charity Commission the ‘top ten’ categories (with numbers of entries, rounded to the nearest ten) were as follows:

53 Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief, suggests nine main categories: enemy aliens, refugees, war-devastated regions, prisoners of war, convalescent soldiers, the Red Cross, soldiers on leave, comforts for soldiers and civilian distress in England.
Table 6: ‘Top Ten’ Charity Commission categories of war charities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Comforts for HM Forces</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Discharged and disabled servicemen</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hospital amenities (including comforts, extra food, outings etc)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4=</td>
<td>Christmas treats for Soldiers</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4=</td>
<td>Refugees (all countries but over 70% Belgian)</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Welcome Home Funds</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10=</td>
<td>Distress prevention and relief</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10=</td>
<td>Hospital requisites (medical supplies etc)</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between them, these organisations used an astonishing range of fund-raising techniques.

Many of these are still in use today and we have seen examples of some already, such as flag days, which, though not invented during the First World War, mushroomed after 1914.\(^{54}\)

Direct mail to potential donors was used for the first time to any significant extent. The YMCA and Church Army employed it extensively to attract donors along with leaflets proclaiming ‘£25 will buy this, £50 that’ etc. Subscription lists (which had already had a long history) were published for many of the larger funds in the national press, most notably for

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\(^{54}\) For an example of the ubiquitousness of flag days from a contemporary source (along with highly insightful illustrations) see Tommy’s War: A First World War Diary written in 1913-1918 by Glaswegian clerk Thomas Livingstone though not published until 2008 (London, HarperPress), pp 49 and 248.
The Times appeal, thus acting as an incentive to the better off to keep up with their peers and this was a technique adopted at much more modest levels as well:

A north-country agricultural village did so well [in raising funds for the NRF] that an inquiry was sent to the chairman of the parish council, if haply he had hit upon a money-raising method that might be recommended to others. It has not been recommended – till now. The village committee had written the names of the subscribers on the blackboard outside the schoolroom every day! How thin is the dividing line between advertisement and publicity!\(^55\)

Payroll giving was again not new but increased significantly. One example of this was in Birmingham where ‘weekly collections have also been made in most of the large factories, and about 50,000 workpeople have contributed over £20,000 to the [National Relief] Fund.’\(^56\) Those employed by the city council in Manchester utilised a similar method ‘the officials taxing themselves on the amount of their salaries, the taxes varying from 2¾ to 5 per cent’.\(^57\)

The annual ‘Our Day’ in aid of the Red Cross was a forerunner of appeals like Comic Relief and Children in Need, a single day on which everyone was expected to do something for charity, the more unusual or eye-catching the better. Dressing up in silly clothes, performing prodigious feats of endurance, or eating for charity is by no means a modern invention.\(^58\)

Our Day was not just a British affair; activities took place throughout the Empire. Though the


\(^{58}\) ‘Our Day’ was held in the third week of October each year on the anniversary of the Red Cross and Order of St John joining forces in 1914.
Dominions were most prominent, other countries also played a part. For example, in the Dutch East Indies the Samarang and Mid-Java committee raised 78,372 guilders in 1917, a total they were determined to better a year later. So on Saturday 19 October 1918 at 9pm they held a ‘Concert and English Comedy’ (tickets £2.50 and 1.50) which comprised songs followed by a production of The Importance of Being Earnest. Britain’s allies joined in the fun with Algernon being played by M R. Dubois St Marc, Chef Francais of Peek and Co. Helpfully the committee provided a plot synopsis in Dutch. Fund raising from overseas was commonplace. In addition to the significant national examples already given (such as Our Day and the American Women’s War Relief Fund) there were many small-scale local ones. To support the efforts in Saddleworth a Colne Valley Society was established in Holyoke, Massachusetts, by a former Saddleworth painter and decorator, William Escott. Escott’s relatives in Saddleworth and Mossley were serving in the 7/Dukes, and in late 1916, he and his supporters collected £25 to endow a bed in Netley Hospital. There were still sufficient funds remaining to send to Saddleworth for distribution to sick and wounded soldiers of the district.59

59 Mitchinson, Saddleworth, p 56.
Figure 14: A War Development in Charity Sales and How the Great suffer for the Red Cross

At the other end of the scale came some of the massive events of the Red Cross. They held a number of sales of donated valuables at Christies. The 1915 sale brought in £50,000 but the largest of all was in 1918 over a period of no fewer than sixteen days from Monday 8 to Thursday 25 April. Pageants with plenty of dressing up and were extremely popular and often highly elaborate. These also had the bonus of being able to mobilize the entire

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60 It included porcelain, silver, jewels, furniture, sculpture, manuscripts (including a Beethoven score and letters from the Brontes, Dickens, Elizabeth I, and Nelson), drawings and etchings (including a collection donated by the King) and many paintings. These included works from old masters such as Gainsborough (‘Portrait of Captain Thomas Cornewall’) and Bassano (‘Christ Mocked’) donated by the Duke of Norfolk, through giants of the Victorian era such as Lord Leighton, Burne-Jones, Alma-Tadema’s ‘The Staircase’ and Watts’ ‘Ariadne in Naxos’ to contemporary artists such as William Orpen, Augustus John, Glyn Philpot and C.W. Nevinson. The final two were available for hire to the highest bidder to produce a specially commissioned work. Philpot, perhaps best known today for his striking portrait of Siegfried Sassoon, offered do a portrait but Nevinson would paint anything ‘except a pet Pekinese or a fashionable portrait’.

W.K. Haselden, Daily Mirror, 26 July 1916 and 29 June 1918.
community from the youngest to oldest, often playing patriotic characters like Britannia or Robin Hood but also with villains, most notably the Kaiser himself, portrayed as well. In an era where people were used to producing their own entertainment and probably a majority could sing or play an instrument such fund-raisers were a natural recourse. Then there were the slightly more quirky ideas. For example, ‘women all over the country subscribed in name-groups, according to their initials, from A to Z, so that each group might give money or present an ambulance, a bed or a canteen to the work. The Marys subscribed a fully-equipped motor kitchen.’ A couple involving animals give a flavour as to just how memorable these quirkier ideas could be. In Wiltshire it was noted that ‘everyone will recollect the interest excited in the streets of Swindon when Mr Hoare appeared with his Shetland pony, “Kitty”, who soon became quite proud of her collecting-box and the attentions lavished upon her, or when Mr Tarrant turned out with his organ and monkey.’

However, for inventiveness and generosity it would be difficult to beat the example of Forfar’s ‘Mons Cat’:

There were many novel ways and devices for raising funds at the Free Gift Sales, but few were as popular and effectual as the sale again and again of the Mons Cat. This cat was found at an old farmhouse near St Quentin and came unscathed through nine engagements including Hill 60. It was brought to Forfar from Belgium by a wounded soldier and purchased by Mr William Lamond, cattle dealer, South Street. It was ‘snowballed’ at all the sales and always bought back by Mr Lamond himself. The cat had to its credit, thanks to the generosity of its owner and others, no less than £3,000.

As this would today be the equivalent of around £150,000 this was some cat.

62 Bavin, Swindon, p 183.
63 D.M. Mackie, Forfar and District in the War, (Forfar, Forfar War Memorial Committee, 1921), p 198.
This gives some idea of the range and diversity of charitable activity and we have seen some of the amounts of money raised. Many fell into the categories previously noted and were rather disorganised or over-paternalistic (sometimes both) whereas others delivered much needed support or cemented local ties with the fighting force, but what can be said of the overall charitable effort during the war and what were the attitudes towards it amongst soldiers?
6 Financial Capital - the extent of war-time charitable giving and who gave it

‘Nobody has yet tried to count the full value of the immense outpouring of generosity, the multitude of sacrifices the War has called forth. Nobody is able to count it.’

W.E. Dowding

We have already seen the extent of some of the charitable and voluntary activity that took place after 1914 in, for example, the amounts raised for the National Relief Fund. Though this was one of the largest schemes there were dozens of others whose fund raising or value of goods and services contributed provided substantial sums. The single largest charity operating between 1914 and 1918 was, not surprisingly, the British Red Cross Society. Their total wartime income was an enormous £22 million of which the majority came via The Times appeal. As troop comforts became a

Chapter Summary
- Numbers of charities and how much they raised
- Effect on existing charities
- Numbers of people involved
- Gender and class analysis of charity officers

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2 It may be worthwhile first to give a comparison between the value of money from the First World War period and today to give some idea of the scale of voluntary effort. Today £1 from 1914 would be worth about £72 but because of wartime inflation, £1 from 1916 would equal £50 today and by 1918 would only be worth £36 in 2008. To put it another way the Disasters Emergency Committee Tsunami Earthquake Appeal (following the Asian Tsunami of Christmas 2004) raised £372 million. A similar effort in 1914 would have raised £5.2 million, almost what was raised for the National Relief Fund alone. In most cases hereafter I use the ‘median’ comparison from 1916 of £1 equals £50.
Source: Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/, accessed on 10/04/10. These figures are calculated against the retail price index. If one used average earnings instead the comparisons would be: 1914 £373; 1916 £283; 1918 £179 and so the comparative amounts quoted hereafter would need to be multiplied approximately five-fold. The latter would be a more accurate one for the value of giving, the former for its purchasing power.
3 Of this, actual donations were £16,510,023, Red Cross Reports, pp 58 and 70. At the commencement of the war the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St John established a joint committee to administer the Times Fund and co-ordinate their activities.
major part of the voluntary effort on the Home Front, it was estimated that ‘during the first year of the war alone some £5 million of comforts were supplied to the army and navy.’\(^4\)

There were also the numerous charities, many connected with the Church, operating in theatres of war. To give an idea of the scale of these the Church Army established more than 800 canteens and recreation rooms on the Western Front and in Italy. The YMCA had ten in the Ypres Salient alone, turning over 260,000 francs (about £13,000) in March 1918.\(^5\) The YMCA’s overall contribution was impressive, as Snape has demonstrated ‘although [the YMCA] defrayed a substantial amount of its costs through the sale of refreshments and merchandise, the net cost of its work during the First World War was eventually estimated at a staggering £8,000,000.’\(^6\) Charities collecting in aid of disabled veterans were also highly successful and we have noted the connection between the Girls’ Patriotic Union and the Star and Garter Home. The Star and Garter campaign was also supported by the British Women’s Hospital Committee for whom the famous actress May Whitty supervised hundreds of charity theatricals, benefit performances and appeal concerts. In their first month they raised £20,000, within eleven months £150,000 and within a year and a half £225,000.\(^7\)

Another significant philanthropist for the disabled was the theatre owner Sir Oswald Stoll. In 1919, the *Daily Telegraph* estimated Stoll’s war-charity work had raised £260,993.\(^8\) These,

\(^4\) Messenger, *Call to Arms*, p 469. His source is the 12th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, XXXII, (London and New York, 1922), p 1062. This entry was written by Agnes Conway, Hon Curator of the Women’s Work section of the Imperial War Museum whose research was both extensive and intensive, and so this estimate can be viewed with some confidence.


\(^8\) Cohen, *War Come Home*, p 119.
however, are individual examples, just how many organisations were there and how much, overall, did they raise?
Numbers of charities and how much they raised

The first problem is that it is quite difficult to agree on a definition of a wartime charity. Do you include just new organisations, omitting those that pre-existed but turned their efforts to war-related causes, like the Red Cross? As we will see, the legislators drawing up the War Charities Act in 1916 were faced with exactly the same problem. The only accurate statistics are to be gleaned from the published figures of the Charity Commission recording those who registered officially following the passing of the 1916 Act. Even after the war ended new ‘war charities’ were being created (for example to build war memorials or support disabled servicemen) so the date also affects the figures. There were some who, whilst clearly connected with the war, were deemed not to be ‘war charities’ in the definition of the Act.9

Then one needs to consider both those who operated only before the 1916 Act and any who were simply too fleeting or unofficial to show up in statistics. Thus, the number of organisations in the War Charities register must be considered a minimum number. If we take 1920 as the cut-off date, the total number of war charities was 17,899:10

Table 7: Number of registered War Charities 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Charities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered 1916-1920</td>
<td>11,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempted from Registration</td>
<td>6,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused Registration</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


9 A rough and ready calculation of the number of charities that were newly created compared to ones that already existed and turned their activities to war-related work is provided in T.N. Kelynack’s Pro Patria. Probably the most comprehensive contemporary reference to wartime charities. Kelynack includes 132 organisations in his survey of which forty (thirty per cent) were pre-existing. If this were an accurate reflection, (it almost certainly was not as Kelynack only covers organisations with national coverage) then there would have been just over 23,000 war-related charities.

10 This is a sensible date as the figures include Scotland which did not come under the auspices of the Act until March 1919.
This is a huge number, especially when compared with the number of charities operating before the war, 36,865 in 1913, an increase of nearly fifty per cent.\(^{11}\)

If the number of organisations operating is difficult to calculate accurately the amounts they raised is even more problematic as no official figures were ever compiled.\(^{12}\) However, there are a number of indicators that can assist in estimating a figure. The first can be made from figures given by contemporary commentators. The earliest national estimate would seem to have been calculated by the journalist and social commentator W.E. Dowding.\(^{13}\) Following ‘a year’s intimate study of the war funds’ Dowding’s calculations came from careful research of what organisations had raised and his results were publicised by the Liberal politician and head of the British War Propaganda Bureau, Charles Masterman, in an article in the *Contemporary Review* in July 1915.\(^{14}\) Referring to Dowding’s calculation, Masterman said that in the opening ten months of the war some £25 million, in money or in kind, had been donated.\(^ {15}\) Masterman reported that Dowding was working on a book that would cover ‘every description of fund from the largest to the smallest.’\(^ {16}\) Unfortunately, Dowding did not publish a book; instead, in November 1915, he published an article, also in the *Contemporary Review*.\(^ {17}\) His conclusion at this stage of the war was that ‘in money and in

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\(^{11}\) 61st Report of the Charity Commissioners of England and Wales 1914 xxv, Cd. 7310, p 785.

\(^{12}\) In contrast, Australia produced an excellent official history of wartime charitable effort: Ernest Scott, *Official Histories – First World War: Volume XI – Australia during the War*, (7th edition, Canberra, 1941). This demonstrates that the total raised in Australia by those organisations officially recorded was £13,802,301 or £2.80 per head of population. These figures are useful to compare with my estimates for the UK.

\(^{13}\) Dowding was the former editor of the *Free Trader*, had published two books on tariff reform in 1913 and published articles on other aspects of the war such as the effect of the Registration Act on women.


\(^{17}\) The book was probably abandoned due to his ill health as Dowding died in October 1917.
kind the United Kingdom has given nearly thirty millions’. He also partly explained how he had arrived at this calculation:

The joint fund of the Red Cross Society and the St John Ambulance Association has gathered over one and a-half millions ... the Belgian Relief Fund over one million; the National Committee for Relief in Belgium ... a million... I estimate that altogether the Belgian people have received help in various ways worth between six and seven millions. The multifarious gifts in kind to our sailors and soldiers must have totalled a value of at least five millions. And lastly, to the five and a-half millions sent to Buckingham Palace [for the NRF] there must be added the two and a-half millions raised for precisely similar purposes in certain localities, for distribution in those localities.\(^1\)

A similar figure to Dowding’s (minus the ‘in kind’) was given in a parliamentary debate on 8 December 1915 when the Labour MP Will Anderson raised the issue of government control over wartime charities and asked whether some form of registration would be introduced (which it was some seven months later).\(^2\) He quoted a figure that by that date some £20 million had been collected for these causes. His source was a statement at Marlborough Street police court in the last week of November where the sum of £20 million was given as an official estimate of the money collected for war charities since the commencement of the war.\(^3\) Around the same date another semi-official, Home Office, estimate was that £27

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\(^1\) Dowding, ‘Study of War Giving’, p 628.
\(^2\) Dowding, ‘Study of War Giving’, p 630.
\(^3\) Proceedings of the House of Commons (Hansard), 5th Series, Vol. 76, 8 December 1915, Col. 1391. William Crawford Anderson was MP for Attercliffe, Sheffield. A member of the anti-war ILP he was its Chairman between 1911 and 1913 and Chairman of the national Labour Party in 1914 and ‘15. As such he was a significant figure in calls for peace following the 1917 Russian Revolution, advocating the immediate formation of workers’ and soldiers’ councils based on the soviet model.

\(^4\) Truth, LXXVIII, No. 2032, 1 December 1915, p 873.
million had been raised.\textsuperscript{22} In February 1916, the \textit{Daily Chronicle} reported that ‘it is estimated in the past 18 months £29,000,000 have been subscribed by the British people to benevolent objects at home and abroad connected with the war.’\textsuperscript{23}

What veracity can be placed on these figures? There are two immediate ways they can be verified. The first is the audited figure we have from the NRF, which had realised £5 million by April 1915. This would mean that for Dowding’s figures to be correct all the other funds combined would have had to have been worth approximately four times more. This is not an unreasonable assumption given, for example, that \textit{The Times} Fund had raised £3.4 million by February 1916. It would therefore seem that Dowding’s figure was likely not to be a significant over estimate. Another way of confirming his figure is to look at an average case. If there were 10,000 charities operating at any one time then the average raised by each would need to be £125 a month. Even if only just over 6,000 were up and running during the early part of the war then that would be an average of £200 a month. The Croydon War Supplies Clearing House was raising over £400 a month in cash during this period. Admittedly, CWSCH may have been above average but it was not primarily a money-raising organisation being more concerned with donations of goods. Again, from these figures, contemporary estimates do not appear over-excessive. In fact, it may well have been an underestimate if Croydon and Todmorden’s fund raising was typical of the rest of the

\textsuperscript{22} Quoted in a report by Detective Inspector John Curry of the Metropolitan Police, 18 November 1915, TNA, MEPO 2/1675. It is unclear whether this is the police source used by Anderson and \textit{Truth}. The statement was made by Treasury Counsel Herbert Musckett in the case of Millie Back (see Appendix 8) quoted in \textit{The Times} report ‘Twenty Millions for War Funds’, 23 November 1915, p5. Another estimate was one of ‘over £30 million’ raised by early summer 1916 quoted by E.C. Price in the Charity Organisation Review, August 1916, p 47. It is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that the source of all of these estimates was Dowding’s calculation.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Daily Chronicle}, 15 February 1916.
country. In these towns, they had raised well over four times the amount collected for the NRF for other causes by mid-1915.\textsuperscript{24}

The next question is, if £20-£27 million had been raised by the end of November 1915 how much had been raised by the end of the war. Again, we can only theorise but a straightforward rounding-up would not be inaccurate. Some have argued that donor fatigue set in or that the sums raised by charities remained steady throughout the war, meaning that when inflation is taken into account they fell in real terms. One of these is Trevor Wilson, usually a most reliable and meticulous researcher, who has stated that:

\begin{quote}
As the war went on, these forms of gift in cash and kind diminished, and increasingly the state was looked to as the proper supporter of the war’s victims. This was evidence of the scale of the problem but also the way in which the conflict was diminishing the incomes of the charitably inclined.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

By the charitably inclined, Wilson was speaking of the upper and middle classes, especially those on fixed incomes, whose spending power most certainly did decrease as war-time inflation hit them hard. My own researches have however found no evidence to back up his assertion that charitable donations declined, either in gross or real terms. Certainly, the state took over in many areas, such as dependants allowances and pensions, but charity moved from these into new areas. As the war continued, a number of high-impact new funds such as those devoted to disabled ex-servicemen and war memorials also helped compensate for any losses. Nevertheless, there was another compensatory reason why

\textsuperscript{24} There were 25 war-related charities in Huddersfield in November 1915 when the local newspaper contended ‘that Huddersfield stands at the head of all the municipalities in the country in the amount of money raised on behalf of war funds.’ Huddersfield Chronicle, 13 November, 1915 quoted in Pearce, Comrades of Conscience, p 89.

\textsuperscript{25} Wilson, Myriad Faces of War, p 775.
charitable income did not decline and Wilson himself suggests it earlier in the same book. When he quotes Masterman, he goes on to point out that:

These donations, according to Masterman, came from all classes: ‘with regular subscriptions by the weekly wage-earners – in Birmingham alone (for example) 20,000 of such wage-earners contributing their weekly pence; in Northumberland and Durham the trade unionists voting a weekly levy on wages for the trade unionists of Belgium. ‘On the Clyde and in Glasgow [one of the most generous areas for charitable donations as will be shown] also, according to this informant, nothing was more remarkable than the ‘regularity and the amounts paid by the workers themselves towards one or other of these national purposes.’26

Masterman also noted that ‘all these huge funds have been collected at a time when the City and high finance have been badly hit, and many of the wealthiest contributors to normal charities are unable to provide a penny.’27

It has been well documented, for example by Winter in a number of publications, that the income of a significant proportion of the middle and upper classes declined in real terms between 1914 and 1918. Those on fixed incomes, savings or those who relied on rents found that their buying power eroded. For example, ‘many civil servants or retired people … were impoverished by wartime inflation. Some skilled workers and men in clerical and service jobs did not do well either, and in some cases suffered a decline in real wages.’28 Conversely many working class people saw a real increase in their incomes and ‘income gains were greatest, both absolutely and relatively, among the poorest paid and least skilled of the

26 Wilson, Myriad Faces of War, p 159.
labouring population. It would seem possible therefore, that as middle class incomes were squeezed and they were able to give proportionally less to charity but that this loss was more than compensated for by a corresponding rise in working class giving.

Here one might point to research that indicates that poorer people contribute proportionally more of their income to charity. One study (in 2001) produced the following findings relating charitable giving to income:

Figure 15: Charitable giving as a percentage of income (2000)


In his study ‘Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries’, Morgan comments on the ‘regressivity’ of both Lotteries and voluntary charitable contributions. His findings are

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consistent with both Lotteries and charitable donations being regressive in their impact i.e. of poorer people contributing a significantly higher proportion of their incomes in both cases.

Cathy Pharoah, Co-Director of the Centre for Giving and Philanthropy in the UK, has confirmed that this trend for poorer people to contribute higher proportions of their income to charity goes back to the start of statistical collection of this data in the early 1970s and ‘can be assumed to go back earlier, but how far I don’t know.’

Though there is no equivalent, systematic statistical evidence stretching back to the period of the First World War there is plenty of circumstantial evidence and research that backs up this trend going back well into the nineteenth century. ‘Poor-to-poor’ (or, at least, working class to working class) charity was recognised as being highly significant by many social commentators. In The Condition of the Working Class Engels, no lover of bourgeois philanthropy, noted that ‘although the workers cannot really afford to give charity on the same scale as the middle class, they are nevertheless more charitable in every way.’

Prochaska has backed this assertion noting that ‘a survey of rather more prosperous working-class families in the 1890s showed that half of them contributed funds to charity each week’ and, for example, that ‘well over half the income of several hospitals in the North of England came from “workmen” [and] the Methodist Missionary Society raised millions of pounds from humble subscribers in the nineteenth century, largely through its sophisticated network of local associations.’ He concludes that:

The availability of records of wealthy, middle-class institutions has distorted our understanding of charitable experience... But the relative dearth of evidence for

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31 Correspondence with the author, 23 October 2006.
32 Quoted in Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service, p 20.
organized working-class benevolence should not lead us to underestimate its extent. Working men and women established their own Sunday schools, charity schools, soup kitchens, wash-houses, temperance societies, Salvation Army shelters, boot and clothing clubs, servants’ institutions, navvy missions, sick clubs, mothers’ meetings, and visiting societies.33

Prochaska points out that, not surprisingly ‘the respectable working class, often identified with church and chapel, was particularly noticeable in its charitable activity’ and that this motivation was not solely altruistic but also, as with middle and upper class philanthropy, carried implications of self-interest. This was especially the case ‘when they cooperated with their wealthier neighbours, as in hospital provision, education, or foreign missions.’ This ‘dual motivation’ has been commented on in charitable activity up to the present day. One small-scale research study in 1907 conducted by the Head of Cambridge House, a charitable settlement in Camberwell, discerned many examples of both spontaneous charity, more selfless but with an understanding that donor and recipient roles could easily become reversed, and ‘organised’ giving, carrying with it overtones of ‘social improvement’. The study concluded that ‘there reveals itself an unostentatious, wholly unselfish charity of the poor amongst themselves, which is startling in its extent. The poor breathe an atmosphere of charity.’34 In the light of this evidence, it is probable that if middle class donations to charity fell, donations from workers whose pay was, in general, at least keeping pace with inflation increased to compensate.

33 Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service, pp 20-21.
34 There were significant amounts of non-family charity including providing Sunday Dinner for a neighbour; landlords / ladies providing help for their lodgers; gifts of clothing. Men’s clubs took regular collections, ‘whip-rounds’, for specific needy people. There were soup kitchens organised by working men and women for the needy and examples of neighbourhoods where those in work paid the rent of anyone unemployed. They found a bus conductor who gave free rides to blind people by paying the fares himself and there were collections amongst schoolchildren to help those worse off. William Conybeare, Charity of Poor to Poor: Facts collected in South London at the suggestion of the Bishop of Southwark, (London, SPCK, 1908). For more evidence of ‘poor-to-poor’ charity see Harris, Origins of the Welfare State, Chapter 6.
What evidence is there of at least a steady state of donation? One indicator is the sums raised by street collections in London later in the war and the year after victory. These show a rise that more than compensated for inflation:

**Table 8: Amounts raised from London street collections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Collections</th>
<th>Amount Raised (£)</th>
<th>Adjusted for inflation (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>268,736</td>
<td>268,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>391,864</td>
<td>281,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>416,640</td>
<td>285,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TNA, HO 45/11217

An even more reliable indicator that donor fatigue may not have been that significant is to examine the income of the largest of all wartime fund raising efforts, *The Times* Fund.

Started on 1 September 1914 the full income figures for the fund are as follows:

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35 Tony Allen in his pamphlet *Charity Flags and Flag Days 1914-1918*, (Holgate Publications, York, 1999), p 2 says £25 million was raised through this means during the war though he does not say from where this figure comes. If true, it would again suggest that my final minimum total could be a significant underestimate.

36 The 1916 pound was worth £1.39 in 1918 and £1.46 in 1919 (http://www.measuringworth.com, accessed on 11/04/10)
### Table 9: Income per quarter to The Times Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income by end of Month</th>
<th>Income that quarter (£)</th>
<th>Yearly Total (£)</th>
<th>Yearly Total Adjusted for Inflation (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1914</td>
<td>550,228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1915</td>
<td>472,229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1915</td>
<td>313,759</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1915</td>
<td>319,591</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1915</td>
<td>700,347</td>
<td>1,655,807</td>
<td>1,655,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1916</td>
<td>1,042,339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1916</td>
<td>358,566</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1916</td>
<td>551,048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1916</td>
<td>1,030,125</td>
<td>2,652,300</td>
<td>2,244,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1917</td>
<td>866,113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1917</td>
<td>514,472</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1917</td>
<td>533,397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1917</td>
<td>871,568</td>
<td>2,944,107</td>
<td>2,058,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1918</td>
<td>1,015,191</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1918</td>
<td>1,574,046</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1918</td>
<td>742,494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1918</td>
<td>213,604</td>
<td>4,203,299</td>
<td>2,555,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1919</td>
<td>2,811,662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1919</td>
<td>819,799</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1919</td>
<td>821,361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Raised</td>
<td><strong>16,121,939</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,666,426</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,676,493</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *The Times* passim.

The peaks of fund raising towards the end of each year are mainly attributable to the four ‘Our Days’ designated for special efforts and activities for the Fund.\(^{38}\) The remarkable thing

\(^{37}\) Taking 1915 values as the basis for further years.  
\(^{38}\) The specific days with gross amounts were (income from UK only): 
21 October 1916 £377,724
about these figures is that, adjusted for inflation, the income remained so constant throughout the war. If this is thought to be evidence with an urban, or London, bias then Armstrong’s research on rural Kentish charities is relevant. He found that ‘these charitable efforts do not appear to have flagged as the war continued.’39

As a final confirmation of at least a steady state of donation one straightforward statistic is the date of formation of charities registered under the War Charities Act. Clearly, this does not cover those that had ceased operation by 1916 or did not register and, it might be argued, takes no account of the scale of the organisation; however, it gives some sort of guide. Taking one example: of the 150 charities registered in Blackburn (at any time during the war): fifteen per cent were formed in 1914; seven per cent in 1915; ten percent in 1916; twenty-nine per cent in 1917 and a sizable thirty-nine per cent in 1918; not conclusive, but certainly not an indicator of declining interest. Assuming this steady state theory then the total value of funds raised for war-time charities based on Dowding’s and other contemporary estimates was not less than £75 million.

Another method of calculating a national figure is to use reliable local statistics. Though many local histories of the Great War were produced only a handful of them attempted a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 October 1917</td>
<td>£709,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October 1918</td>
<td>£1,670,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Red Cross Reports*, p 23. Like many appeals today, such as Comic Relief or Children in Need, some of those funds took some time to come in and be accounted for. This was especially the case after the final Our Day appeal that was so quickly followed by the Armistice.

39 Armstrong, ‘Kentish Rural Society during the First World War’, p 123. Further evidence on this point is provided by church collections for the Red Cross and by Bruce Scates. The former stayed relatively stable during the war: £85,000 in 1915; £68,000 in 1916; £45,600 in 1917 and £84,400 in 1918 (Red Cross Reports, p 31). Scates, who discovered that in Australia ‘even when the war was at its most divisive, at the height of the conscription campaigns of 1916 and 1917, there was no apparent decline in the comforts working class communities sent in for suffering soldiers.’ ‘The Unknown Sock Knitter’, p 35.
comprehensive listing of amounts raised. Seven of those who did, plus Glasgow, are listed below together with a calculation of amounts raised per head of population.

Table 10: Amounts raised in local communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Amount Raised (£)</th>
<th>Population (1911)</th>
<th>Amount Raised per head (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>190,061&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>288,458</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>586,026&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>357,144</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartlepool</td>
<td>93,969</td>
<td>63,923</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>227,222</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preston</td>
<td>230,454</td>
<td>117,088</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todmorden&lt;sup&gt;42&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>38,377</td>
<td>25,404</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crieff (Scotland)</td>
<td>17,735</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>3,500,000&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How likely are these figures to be typical across the entire country? The first point is the consistency of the per-head totals with the exception of the two Scottish examples. Crieff is perhaps not surprising in that smaller communities might well have raised more per head

<sup>40</sup>In 21 months, total estimated up to £470,627.
<sup>41</sup>Excludes income from flag days.
<sup>42</sup>This is definitely an underestimate as Lee’s figures exclude many events that took place associated with local charities such as fund raising by the, extremely influential, Todmorden Cricket Club (see Heywood, In a League of Their Own, p 44).
<sup>43</sup>Estimated as follows: Figures given in the Glasgow Herald are that the city had raised £4,000,000 by the end of the war. However, this included their estimate of the monetary value of ‘clothing, food, and comforts despatched to the troops’ which was £240,275 after two years (9%). They also included some, though relatively few, funds raised nationally across the whole of Scotland (like those for Belgian refugees). I have reduced the overall figure by £500,000 (12.5%) to compensate. Main source, ‘War Philanthropy: Glasgow Raises £4,000,000’, Glasgow Herald, 26 December 1919, p 3. The article concludes that they consider the overall figures to be an under-estimate as the figure to the end of 1915 excluded ‘private committees ... connected with Churches and individual regiments’ and ‘in kind’ contributions. The former could be quite considerable as, in some areas (e.g. Todmorden) they accounted for up to twenty per cent of the charities in the area.
than larger ones, but how can one explain the apparent anomaly of Glasgow? 44 This is, perhaps, the most significant of all the statistics as it was the only place, as far as I have been able to ascertain, that collected comprehensive, systematic information on wartime charitable giving. These were accurately audited at least until the end of 1915 and later presented before a government committee and in a detailed newspaper report at the end of the war. 45 In April 1915 Thomas Dunlop, the Lord Provost, gave a summary of Glasgow’s work to date:

The generosity of Glasgow in connection with the War, as shown by the contributions to the various official funds, is represented by a cumulo sum of over £652,000, or nearly 13s per head of the population of the city. 46 This does not take into account numerous private efforts of individuals, self-constituted committees, and churches who are working independently in various directions.

The response that Glasgow has always shown herself ready to make in the hour of national crisis warranted large expectations. I do not think the final record that will be handed down to future generations will show the men of the present as lacking in any of the qualities that have characterised their predecessors. 47

It could perhaps be partly explained by the fact that Glaswegians contributed relatively little to national, London-based, UK appeals; for example, opposition to the NRF led to a Glasgow-based version being started. Or perhaps it reflected the city’s historical generosity; it was, for

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44 W.E. Dowding discussed this issue in an unpublished article draft (‘Town or Country: Which is the more generous?’ IWM, WWC BO2 49/4) concluding that the closer personal relationships existing in rural areas might be more effective.

45 ‘War Philanthropy’, Glasgow Herald and John S. Samuel, European War: Statement of the funds raised in Glasgow for war relief purposes from August 1914 to December 1915 prepared for the Lord Provost, [Glasgow, City Chambers, 1916].

46 If this figure were multiplied up over the full period of the war it would indicate a Glasgow per-head figure of £4.80.

example, the first city in the UK to utilise flag days for wartime charities. By April 1915, £50,000 had been raised at twelve such days.48 W.E. Dowding also indicated that Glasgow newspaper funds were especially effective.49 However the likeliest explanation is also the one given to account for the fact that fundraising did not decline during the War; that giving from working class donors rose with their incomes, coupled with Glasgow being more systematic at recording donations from working class sources and organisations. Perhaps more compelling is evidence that Glasgow contributed disproportionately in virtually every aspect of support for the war. Recruitment figures were higher in Glasgow; there was one Glaswegian in the army for every twenty-three Englishmen (twice the English enlistment rate). The city also contributed out of proportion to supporting war bonds. In ‘Tank Week’ in January 1918, Glasgow raised £14 million, breaking all records.50 Yet this was in a city considered by some, both at the time and since, as a hotbed of industrial unrest.51 The explanation again lies in the relative prosperity of many working class Glaswegians, as the city became a hub of wartime production.

The towns in Table 10 are reasonably different (in size and geography) and cannot be considered over-prosperous or impoverished. They cover both highly urbanised and rural areas where networks of giving may have differed significantly. The sums raised do not contain any donations made by people in these places directly to UK national charities, The

48 These included a Union Jack Day on behalf of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Families Association; a Belgium Flag Day; a French Flag Day; an Irish Flag Day on behalf of the Belgian refugees in Scotland: a Women’s Flag Day on behalf of the Queen’s Work for Women Fund; a Scottish Flag Day on behalf of Scottish home industries; a Red Cross Flag Day; a Princess Mary’s Day for Christmas gifts for the soldiers and sailors; a Tobacco Flag Day to provide smoking material for our soldiers and sailors; a Navy Flag Day to provide comforts for our sailors and a Wounded Horses Flag Day. W.E. Dowding draft of unpublished book on Flag Days, IWM WWC, BO2 52/17. Dunlop, ‘Go-Ahead Glasgow’, p 323.
50 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 228.
51 Glasgow was also one of the main centres of anti-war opposition and of the shop stewards movement.
*Times* appeal for example, and so must be something of an underestimate. If the median figure per head above (£2.32) were multiplied up over the entire country, you get a total of £107 million, significantly above the first estimate of £75 million.52 If the overall average (£2.90) is used which, given the greater precision of the Glasgow figure may be more accurate, it would yield a national figure of £133 million.53 If the Glasgow figure were repeated nationally, the total would be over £200 million. More research and more examples are needed to confirm the validity of these findings but they may be more accurate than those of Dowding and his contemporaries.

To these cash figures, we need to add the value of goods donated or produced for troop comforts and hospitals and contributions that came directly from officers and regimental associations for the comfort of their troops. Especially in the early years of the war - prior to the establishment of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations – ‘it was extremely common for officers to use their own money to buy gifts for their men.’54 Such gifts were not only welcomed but also helped in the officer / man bond with soldiers having ‘affection for officers who took pains to attend to the needs of individual men.’55 What figure can be put on these in kind gifts? Here we have Frederick D’Aeth’s (of the Liverpool Council on Voluntary Aid) estimate that the figure was equivalent to £5 million in the first year of the war and the Glasgow figure of £240,000 after two years. Again, from studies of a range of

52 The British population was around 46 million, including Ireland (4.3 million) which, admittedly, is something of a ‘special case’.
53 It is also noticeable how close this figure comes to the Australian figure of £2.80 per head that we noted earlier.
organisations, these are not an over-estimate, and this would add a further £20 to £30 million to the total figures.\(^{56}\)

Overall then, the total fund-raising effort for the war was certainly not less than £100 million, was more likely to have reached £125 to £150 million and may have been greater than that. This meant that for every man of the six million who served in the forces during the war around £20 was contributed to his support and to other causes, worth about £1,000 today. At the time of the war, the total value of all charity investments was £34 million and annual charitable income, we recall from Chapter 3, was just £14 million.\(^{57}\) Therefore, war causes more than doubled pre-war charitable income. With regard to fund-raising for domestic purposes, the increase is even more dramatic, as forty per cent of pre-war charity income went to overseas missionary activity. The amount was also greater than the total annual government expenditure in every year up to the Boer War.\(^{58}\) At the ‘median’ modern value of the wartime pound (£50 in 1916), £100 million would be the equivalent of five billion today, or rather more than £1 billion a year. This is roughly equivalent to the total sum raised for ‘good causes’ by the UK National Lottery.\(^{59}\)

\(^{56}\) The ‘Glasgow calculation’ is £240,000 \(\div\) 24 (months) \(\times\) 52 (months, the duration of war) \(\div\) 784,000 (population of Glasgow) \(\times\) 46,000,000 (total population of GB) = £30,510,204.

In addition, other hidden figures might be added. One example was the money that came through the exhibition of the most popular official film made during the war, The Battle of the Somme. The film is discussed in more detail in Chapter 13. E.S. Turner notes that 40% of the takings for the film (probably representing the film distributor’s percentage) were donated to charity (Turner, Dear Old Blighty, p 134). As more than 20 million people saw the film in its first two months of release this would have raised around £100,000 given that an average ticket cost about 3d.


\(^{59}\) One might also compare it to fund-raising figures for World War Two. Probably the largest philanthropic fund of that war was the US National War Fund, ‘the most ambitious venture in united fund-raising the United States had yet seen’. This raised a total of $750 million, worth around £187.5 million in 1940-45, or £131 million at 1916 values. So this massive effort in the US, a far richer country that the UK 25 years earlier, probably achieved no greater gross response. Robert H Bremner, American Philanthropy, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp169-170.
Effects on existing charities

There is a further question that should be asked before leaving this subject and that is what the impact was on existing charities and existing charitable giving. Was some of the income of war charities simply displaced from existing causes? There is some evidence of a detrimental effect on charitable giving in the early war years. Between 1913 and 1916 both the number of endowed charities registered and the value of new endowments went down. However, the figures from the Charity Commission for the entire war period demonstrate that there was certainly no obvious adverse effect on endowed charities.

**Table 11: Income of endowed charities 1913-1918**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>New endowments (£)</th>
<th>Total investments (£)</th>
<th>Income from investments (£)</th>
<th>Number of charities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>890,127</td>
<td>32,509,761</td>
<td>934,533</td>
<td>36,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>509,884</td>
<td>33,622,526</td>
<td>961,569</td>
<td>36,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>275,445</td>
<td>34,167,136</td>
<td>1,026,057</td>
<td>32,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>388,610</td>
<td>35,545,274</td>
<td>1,073,478</td>
<td>30,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>559,765</td>
<td>37,098,272</td>
<td>1,147,085</td>
<td>33,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,166,712</td>
<td>40,930,233</td>
<td>1,264,360</td>
<td>29,637</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Charity Commissioners for England and Wales Annual Reports.

Figures for London charities for the period are also available from two different sources and these specifically exclude both war-related charities and those whose work shifted to wartime causes. The number of charities surveyed by Howe went down from 897 in 1912-13 to 885 in 1917-18 (a decline of just 1.3%) but two of the years (1913-14 and 1917-18) actually show slight rises in numbers. Again, the pre-war trend had already been downwards

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60 The actual number probably did not fluctuate quite so much, as these figures are compiled from those who submitted accounts during that year, which some may not have done.
(from 933 in 1910-11 or a 4% drop by 1912-13). The income of these charities actually shows an *increase* in income of over £1 million a year during the period:

Table 12: Income of London non-war-related charities 1912-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Income of London Non-War-Related Charities 1912-1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>£8,088,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>£8,705,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td>£8,443,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>£8,590,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>£8,335,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>£9,098,997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Howe’s Classified Directory to the Metropolitan Charities, 39th to 44th editions.*

These figures include, of course, investment income as well as donations but do not take inflation into account. Those from the *Annual Charities Register and Digest* are very similar but also include figures for direct charitable contributions and point to immediate post-war trends:

Table 13: Charitable contributions to, and overall income of Metropolitan charities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Charitable contributions (£)</th>
<th>Total income (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>3,800,153</td>
<td>8,672,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>3,534,105</td>
<td>8,307,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>3,523,405</td>
<td>8,920,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3,318,025</td>
<td>7,660,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>3,800,919</td>
<td>8,437,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>3,805,307</td>
<td>8,195,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>4,618,387</td>
<td>9,884,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>5,348,742</td>
<td>10,880,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5,434,235</td>
<td>13,606,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Annual Charities Register and Digest 22nd to 31st editions, 1913-1922.*

Finally, there is the view of contemporary commentators. W.E. Dowding was clear that the massive contributions to war causes had been achieved ‘without any diminution ... in
support of the permanent charities.\textsuperscript{61} What can reasonably be concluded is that the dramatic increase in charitable effort and giving to war-related causes had no catastrophic effect on existing charities. Indeed the significant post war increase in charitable income tentatively suggests that the stimulus to charitable activity during the war may have continued into peacetime, with people now donating at a higher rate to existing charitable causes, at least while higher wages and full employment continued. Finlayson confirms that war-related charities did not have a negative impact on existing causes even after the war saying that ‘contrary to expectations, therefore, World War One did not destroy the contributory principle – nor did it deplete the finances of organisations in the mutual-aid side of the voluntary sector.’\textsuperscript{62} Overall, if you looked at the figures for the income of existing charities without knowing their historical setting, it would be difficult to realise that such a cataclysmic event as the First World War had even taken place.

\textsuperscript{61} Dowding, ‘Study of War Giving’, p 628.
How Many People Were Involved?

The above evidence suggests that the value of wartime charitable activity was significantly greater than has previously been realised. One might also ask how many people were involved in this effort. Though not having a direct monetary value it was again highly significant. This is an even more elusive question as it requires a definition of what constituted a contribution and therefore what to count. To take just a few examples, in the first year of the war more than 20,000 new workers entered the field of personal case work for the Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Family Association. By May 1915 over 60,000 volunteers were assisting the British Red Cross and in Birmingham ‘in the distribution of relief over 2,000 persons are working voluntarily; 3,000 assisted in the street collection, and 3,500 took part in the house-to-house collection.’\textsuperscript{63} There were 53,000 subscribers to the Active Service League, an early attempt led by the sister of Field-Marshal French to co-ordinate charity volunteering prior to the DGVO.\textsuperscript{64} Of course, many people could only spare an hour or two a week but thousands spent their entire time on war charity work, many of them members of the leisured middle and upper classes who otherwise would probably never have done any ‘real’ work in their entire lives. Virtually every schoolchild was involved in at least one of the national campaigns whether it was collecting eggs for the wounded or horse chestnuts for explosives, and seven million children contributed £35,000 to the Jack Cornwell VC Memorial Fund to commemorate the boy hero of the Battle of Jutland.\textsuperscript{65} If we try to confine the question to just those who regularly and consistently gave a significant amount of their time to charitable work there is again some indirect evidence. Inevitably the fact that, by


\textsuperscript{65} Gregory, \textit{The Last Great War}, p 98.

\textsuperscript{65} Cohen, \textit{War Come Home}, p 30.
definition, these people had to have time to give meant that certain sectors of the population were over-represented: women more than men; older people more than younger; the better off rather than the working class, but not as disproportionately as some have claimed.66

Local histories again provide some help as they sometimes list the numbers engaged in wartime charitable work. In Stamford, Lincolnshire, 176 women were awarded the Voluntary War Workers badge issued by the office of the DGVO for regular helpers.67 In Stamford in 1911 there were 3,590 women aged fifteen to seventy so this represents five per cent of the female population and is probably an underestimate as it only includes those whose work was eligible and who bothered to apply for the badge. In Bradford the numbers engaged in regular war charity work were put at 2,000 men and 5,000 women from an adult population (excluding those in the services) of about 100,000, giving estimates of four per cent of men and ten per cent of women. In nearby Leeds with a population of 445,000 there were 10,000 women involved in voluntary activity by the spring of 1915.68 All of these examples represent a huge increase on the pre-war numbers involved in charitable work. For example, in 1911, the number of volunteers for the entire Guild of Help network, the largest social welfare organisation at the time, was 8,000 and they were considered ‘uniquely successful in enrolling citizens for charitable work.’69 These locally extrapolated figures might indicate that something like 400,000 men and 1.2 million women were regularly engaged in working for wartime charities. They can be partially substantiated by reference to the total number of

66 For example DeGroot, Blighty, p 64.
67 W.F. Markwick, Stamford and the Great War, (Dolby Brothers, Stamford, 1919), p 23.
people (mainly women) who applied for and received the DGVO badge. In his final report, Sir Edward Ward gave the total number of badge holders as 400,000. To qualify for the badge a volunteer had to work on a regular basis for a period of at least three months for one of the charities registered with the DGVO. These numbered 2,983 or approximately one-sixth of the total number of wartime charities. If the badge holders also represented one-sixth of all regular charity workers then this would give an overall number of 2.4 million. The number of people regularly volunteering to help wartime charities would certainly seem to run to one or two million; a figure that would compare favourably with the 2.6 million men who volunteered for the armed forces. It is also highly significant in relation to the numbers of women who were employed on other activities during the war. There were 57,000 WAACs, 60,000 female VADs and 260,000 in the Women’s Land Army. There were 950,000 ‘munitionettes’, still fewer than the likely numbers who were regularly working for charities.

70 These estimates are for those working for charitable causes but one might also add the many other causes run by volunteers. A good example is the network of tribunals set up to hear appeals against conscription. Gregory estimates that between 20,000 and 40,000 people served on these. The Last Great War, p 103.
Gender and class analysis of office holders of wartime charities

Was charity work as middle class an activity as is usually suggested? Croydon’s War Supplies Clearing House certainly had a preponderance of middle class volunteers but how typical was it? Examining contemporary local histories is bound to give a partial result as they tend to concentrate on the dignitaries who fronted the major charities rather than on those who worked for them or who ran smaller organisations. Instead, the detailed records from the original central register of charities were analysed.71 Evidence from two contrasting areas revealed a more complex picture. In Croydon, the Mayor, Howard Houlder, chaired six of the thirty-eight registered charities while his wife, Mary, chaired two more. The town clerk, John Newnham, the Borough Treasurer, William Gunner, and the Borough Accountant, James McCall, served on a total of twelve committees. Overall, the impression is very much of a top down process: a small number of larger charities run by experienced, middle and upper-middle class office holders. The picture in Blackburn was entirely different. In the industrial North smaller charities based on the workplace or church/chapel were more characteristic. Of the 148 Blackburn charities, forty-one per cent were workplace based and thirty-nine per cent based on a church or chapel. The figures in Croydon were only five per cent in each category. This resulted in a remarkable geographical concentration of charity workers. For example at 93 Queen’s Road lived William Jones, Secretary of the Audley Range Congregational Church Charity. The Treasurer, William Oldham, lived at number 147 and another Committee member, Jones’s brother Frank, lived at number 127. Between them, at number 107, was the Chairman of the Blackburn Parkside Manufacturing Co Soldiers Comforts Fund, George Burke, whilst a few doors down at number 31 resided William Howorth, committee member of the Chapel Street School Soldiers and Sailors Comfort Fund.

71 Registers of Individual Charities, TNA, CHAR 4/1 TO 4/21.
At number 20 was Ellen Carr, chair of Daisyfield Co-Operative Society Women’s Guild Soldiers and Sailors Comfort Fund; at 149 William Harrop, chair of the Furthergate Congregational Church and School Soldiers and Sailors Comfort Fund; at 63 Joseph Broughton, Secretary of Oxford Street Primitive Methodist Church Charity and, at 105, its Chairman Nathaniel Brown; at 111 Joseph Smyth, Chairman of St Jude's Blackburn Soldiers Comforts Fund; at 89 Charles Gregson, committee member of St Matthew's Blackburn Soldiers Comforts Fund and at 103 its Treasurer, John Swarbrick; no fewer than twelve charity officers in a quarter-mile long street. In two of the streets parallel to Queen’s Road, Pringle Street and Audley Range, lived another nineteen charity officials, an astonishing concentration of charity organisers and a pattern very much indicative of a bottom-up approach.
To determine how typical these preliminary findings were I undertook a more detailed examination of these and three other areas with regard to the gender and class of charity office holders. For further study, two areas were selected, Croydon and Todmorden, as these have already been examined in some detail and each has an excellent published local history of the period. They also provide a strong contrast in demographics and social make-up. Croydon was a relatively prosperous, traditional south-eastern suburb of 169,000 though with some industry in the form of metalworking and car manufacture. Todmorden, on the borders of Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire, was one the smaller (25,000) towns of the Lancashire cotton belt, an industry with several interesting characteristics. Overall

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72 Only the north side of Queen’s Road was built up at the time, the area shaded in yellow on the map.
73 Moore, Croydon and the Great War; Lee, Todmorden.
wages in cotton were not especially high, round about a pound a week, with a labour force that was highly differentiated but that employed a majority of women. The aristocrats of labour were the spinners, who were exclusively male. In weaving, both men and women were employed and, almost uniquely for the period, women received equal pay to men. Also unusually, there were a high proportion of married women in the workforce. If any area were likely to demonstrate a high proportion of working-class women active in any sphere the Lancashire cotton towns would be an obvious selection.\textsuperscript{74}

However, detailed records of exempted charities in Croydon (and the rest of Surrey) and registered charities in Todmorden are not available at the National Archives. I therefore included unregistered charities in metropolitan Kent and registered charities in Blackburn as these areas closely match the social characteristics of Croydon and Todmorden respectively.\textsuperscript{75} As a comparison, registered charities in Coventry were also examined. This was an area of specialist high technology industry, cycles and Britain’s nascent car and

\textsuperscript{74} Alan Fowler, ‘Impact of the First World War on the Lancashire cotton industry and its workers’ in Christopher John Wrigley, (ed.), A Companion to Early Twentieth-Century Britain (Blackwell Companions to British History), (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2003), pp77-85. It was also where my maternal grandparents and their families were working during the First World War and were involved in wartime charitable activities. Also, according to some commentators the West Riding of Yorkshire and the cotton towns were unusually strong in their anti-war feeling and so might be expected to demonstrate lower than average activity in support of war-related causes. See, for example, Pearce, Comrades in Conscience.

\textsuperscript{75} Exempted charities were defined as organisations that did not appeal to the public for funds, for example restricted to a work place, a single church or street or were raised in response to a specific event. However, each registration district interpreted the Act in a different way, so some areas erred on the side of registration, and here registered charities outnumbered exempted bodies. For example in London, church based funds that made any appeal outside divine service were deemed to be making a ‘public appeal’ and so had to register (see Chapter 10) whereas in Todmorden they did not. In Todmorden there were many more exempted charities than registered ones, several of the former would certainly have been registered in other areas, including Blackburn where exactly the same kinds of charity were registered. As previously indicated, smaller charities based on workplace or church / chapel were more characteristic of the industrial North. Over the whole of England and Wales sixty-four per cent of wartime charities were registered, with thirty-six per cent receiving exemption; in Todmorden the figures were more than reversed: twenty-eight per cent registered to seventy-two per cent exempted.
aircraft industries. It also experienced significant social unrest during the strikes of 1918. Social class categories for Todmorden being unavailable (the town was not differentiated in the 1911 Census) those in Blackburn were utilised for both towns.

For registered charities the occupation of the Chairman and two further committee members, and often those of the Secretary and Treasurer as well, are recorded. The occupation of those persons applying for exemption is sometimes recorded but rarely what position in the organisation they held. I attempted to discover the occupation of remaining office holders through searches of the 1901 and 1911 Censuses. This is an imprecise exercise, especially as only some could be traced in this way and people may have changed job. However, social mobility was not great in this period and so the data is probably reasonably robust. Those women listed as ‘married women’ or ‘spinster’ have, where possible, been classified by their husband or father’s occupation.

The social class classification adopted is modified from that of T.H.C. Stevenson, the medical statistician in the General Register Office. His 1913 classification mixed occupational and industrial groups. While Stevenson conceived society as divided into three basic social classes (the upper, middle and working classes), in fact he produced an eight-tier classification by introducing intermediate classes between the upper and middle classes and between the middle and working classes; and adding three industrial groups for those working in mining, textiles and agriculture.
Table 14: Stevenson’s 1913 classification of social class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stevenson’s 1913 Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While individual occupations have been reallocated to different classes, the overall shape of the model changed very little during the next sixty years. The classes are now usually described as follows:

Table 15: Social class classifications used in this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification was found more useful as it avoids artificially separating skilled manual workers employed in the textile industry (a very large category in Todmorden and Blackburn) from other categories of skilled manual workers such as those employed in the engineering, cycle and aero works in Coventry. More recently devised systems were rejected as being both over-complex and too difficult to relate to contemporary statistics and views on class.
Firstly, I looked at the gender of charity officials, which produced the following results:

**Table 16: Gender of officials in wartime charity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of Charity Officials</th>
<th>% Male</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croydon (Registered) (n = 189)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kent (Exempted) (n = 46)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (Registered) (n = 82)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn (Registered) (n = 733)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todmorden (Exempted) (n = 181)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interesting feature here is the consistency of the figures with the exception of Coventry. This may be explained by the nature of the social structure of the town and its industries resulting in the fact that women made up only twenty-six per cent of the workforce in Coventry (1911 Census figures) compared to thirty-five per cent in Croydon (the largest number being domestic servants) and forty-five per cent in Blackburn (the majority as weavers).\(^7\)

In the case of those holding named office (Chair, Secretary and Treasurer) it is only possible to consider the registered organisations as it was not a requirement to indicate these against exempted bodies (though it was sometimes done the numbers are too small to consider):

**Table 17: Percentage of women in named office in charities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Women in Named Office</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Treasurer</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croydon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) As a comparison a survey of twenty-five forces-related charities in 2010 showed that seventy-five per cent of their trustees were men. Source: Charity Commission register accessed on 14/06/10.
These figures indicate that women were relatively underrepresented in the most prestigious office of Chair. *Chairman* was certainly the rule and this is no surprise. It is also not surprising that women were underrepresented as Treasurers, a role often filled by a bookkeeper, accountant or bank manager, almost exclusively male preserves. The higher representation of women Secretaries would lend support to the contention that men were more likely to act as the figurehead of charities but that women tended to do the majority of the day-to-day work. The other feature is the significantly larger number of women holding named office in Blackburn. This result needs to be considered in conjunction with the results on social class (below) but may well be an indication of the social structure of work in the mill towns of West Yorkshire and Lancashire.

The next analysis is that of the social class of office holders based on the considerations, selections and assumptions noted above:

**Table 18: Social class of office holders of charities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class of Office Holders (%)</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III (N)</th>
<th>III (M)</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croydon</strong> (<em>n</em> = 135)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Kent</strong> (<em>n</em> = 33)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coventry</strong> (<em>n</em> = 63)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blackburn</strong> (<em>n</em> = 552)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Todmorden</strong> (<em>n</em> = 79)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results can then be compared with the occupational make-up of each area. The figures in the next tables are taken from the 1911 Census. As Todmorden is not separately identified, the statistics for Blackburn are used in both comparisons. This analysis has to be treated with some caution as I have allocated the occupational classifications from the
census to the class categories utilised here. In the census tables, it is impossible to separate the semi-skilled from the more skilled textile workers. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have placed all the textile workers in Class IV and therefore the Class III (M) and IV figures might better be looked at as a combined total than being distinct. In some categories, a somewhat arbitrary split has had to be made between those in authority and others. This has been done with local and national government workers (split 1:4 between classes I and III (N)) and those in the armed forces (split 1:19 between classes I and III (M) which is approximately the proportion of officers to other ranks).

As there are clear occupational differences between men and women separate results are provided for each sex as well as one for the combined totals in each area:
Table 19: Social class percentages (1911) in Croydon, Coventry and Blackburn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class based on Occupational Categories(^{77})</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III (N)</th>
<th>III (M)</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croydon – Males</strong> (n = 48,746)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croydon – Females</strong> (n = 25,714)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croydon – Combined</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coventry – Males</strong> (n = 37,364)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coventry – Females</strong> (n = 13,435)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coventry – Combined</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blackburn – Males</strong> (n = 44,110)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blackburn – Females</strong> (n = 35,499)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blackburn – Combined</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For comparison the national divisions by class in 1911 were:

Table 20: Proportion of population by class (1911)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Class Categories (1911)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III (N)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III (M)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To compare the class of charity office holders to the class make-up of the district the results from Table 18 were matched against the combined figures from Table 19 to produce the following figures that indicate whether each class group was under or over-represented on the charity committees. Positive figures (+) show an over-representation by that ratio, negative figures (-) an under-representation, an exact correlation is indicated thus (=) and the blanks indicate where there were no representatives of that class on a committee.

Table 21: Ratio of over/under representation of class groups on charity committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio of Over/Under Representation of Each Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croydon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn (registered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With 3M and 4 merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todmorden (exempted) (Blackburn /Todmorden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With 3M and 4 merged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures indicate that in every area Class Group I was, not surprisingly, significantly over-represented (charities today would show the same tendency) but that this was less marked in Coventry and, especially, with the exempted charities in Todmorden. The over-representation of Class Group II was fairly even with the exception of Coventry where this may have evened up the relatively smaller proportion of Class I representatives. Skilled non-manual workers were the group whose proportion on committees most closely matched that in the general population. Manual workers of all kinds were underrepresented but this under-representation was significantly more marked in Croydon that in the other towns. The over-representation of Class III (M) and under-representation of Class IV in Blackburn and Todmorden probably has more to do with the categorisation problem mentioned above than being a true reflection.

This analysis can be further explored by looking at the overall class composition of charity committees. How many were entirely composed of upper and middle-class members, how many of only working-class members and how many of members of both or all classes? These are shown in the following table:
Table 22: Class composition of charity committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% with all members from Class I</th>
<th>% with all members from Classes I &amp; II</th>
<th>% with no members from Classes I &amp; II</th>
<th>% with at least one member from Classes I &amp; II and one from Classes III to V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croydon (n = 37)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kent (n = 13)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (n = 17)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackburn (n = 148)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todmorden (n = 50)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures reinforce the findings from the analysis of individual class above. In the South 60% or more of the charities operated without any committee representation from the working classes whereas only about twelve to thirteen per cent did so in the Midlands and North. Equally, virtually no charities in the south were entirely run by working class members (the single exception was, unsurprisingly, the Croydon branch of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers). In Coventry and Blackburn, the figures demonstrate the greatest social mix on committees with over fifty per cent having members of both upper/middle and working classes. In the smaller Yorkshire charities, an overwhelming seventy-six per cent of organisations operated with no input from upper or middle class representatives.
What these tables demonstrate is that there are clearly significant differences in the makeup of charity committees in Southern, suburban locations and those in the industrial Midlands and the North. This can be partially explained by the class structure of the areas in question and, perhaps, by the differing views on class in these communities (here the nature of the paternalism / deference interplay examined in Chapter 14 may be of significance). Despite these factors, it is clear that working class people were far more likely to be involved in the organisation and running of wartime charities in the Midlands and North than in the suburban South. There is little difference in the social class of officials in the registered and exempted charities in the South, whereas there are between the registered charities in Blackburn and the exempted ones in Todmorden. More research needs to be carried out to confirm these findings and other areas need to be analysed but the above results may help to give further credibility to the argument that the working classes contributed a far greater degree of support to wartime charitable activity than previously considered and that this strengthened as the war went on, when the majority of the smaller charities were formed.
7 Alienation or solidarity - the reaction to charity

‘I do not think that one will be far wrong in accepting the conclusions I have reached from the evidence which I have put forward. It is better evidence than that of the poets, who exaggerate the importance of their themes.’

How was the outpouring of charitable and voluntary effort received by the fighting forces?
As the largest proportion was directed towards their aid, both in the trenches and if they were wounded or taken prisoner, this is a critical question. Were soldiers resentful of this charity seeing it as the reaction of an out-of-touch and over-patriotic civilian population? Did some react negatively because they believed that the state should be providing for their needs? Alternatively, did the majority react favourably, gratefully receiving the gifts and assistance and generously thanking their givers? These questions are important from the perspective of the social capital thesis. To what extent was there a united response to ‘charitable’ works? If reaction were split, with a negative response by servicemen this would seriously undermine the view that voluntary support led to the accumulation of social capital which, in turn, assisted Britain’s war-winning effort.

Much received wisdom says that there was significant resentment, or at least cynicism, on the part of the troops towards charitable efforts and the home front in general. This view is

one of the many myths that have become accepted about the war. Stephen has suggested
these include the views that:

The soldiers sympathized with their opposite numbers in the German trenches, and
felt bonded to them by a universal horror of experience. The men hated the top
brass, who were seen as malevolent and murderous incompetents. All women at
home handed out white feathers to any man not in uniform, and parents cheerfully
sent their sons out to die. ²

The proposition certainly has some validity in relation to the relief of distress early in the war
among servicemen’s families. We have seen the resentment that was caused by the
enquiries of the SSFA’s volunteers which one left-wing commentator summed up as ‘the
charity-mongering excesses of unemployed members of the upper and middle classes,’ but
what about the greater proportion of work carried out immediately after the initial efforts of
the NRF? ³

It is true that a large number of soldiers did express feelings of difference from the home
front, that civilians simply could not understand, or soldiers could not explain what trench
conditions were really like; there is probably no war in which the soldiers have not expressed
such feelings. ⁴ The close contact between the Western and home Fronts provided perhaps

² Martin Stephen, The Price of Pity: Poetry, history and myth in the Great War, (London, Leo Cooper,
⁴ Richard Holmes emphasises this point in several of his books notably Acts of War: The behaviour of
get dangerously close at times to suggesting that only those who have direct personal experience of
an event have any claim to express a view about it. For the specific problems this causes around First
World War literature see Claire Tylee, The Great War and Women’s Consciousness: Images of
militarism and womanhood in women’s writings 1914-64, (London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1990)
pp 256-257. It would lead to such works as Tolstoy’s War and Peace or the plays of Shakespeare
being dismissed as neither author had been through the events they depict.
the only opportunity in modern war where soldiers could stay so closely in touch with what was being said at home; when one could leave a front-line trench in the middle of a major battle and be sitting at home or in a London restaurant within a few hours such feelings of unreality are hardly surprising.⁵ This close communication meant that in the First World War soldiers’ alienation was made far more manifest and was more likely to be expressed.⁶ In addition, the extreme form of this alienation, outright hostility or resentment, was highly selective. It was alienation from certain individuals, particularly those seen as slackers (including striking workers and conscientious objectors) and, especially, those elements of the press that soldiers felt were distorting the facts. For example ‘Ian Hay criticized striking munitions workers and miners in both [his bestselling books on the early days of the war] The First Hundred Thousand and its sequel Carrying On, in which they were grouped with conscientious objectors, politicians, and male ballet dancers as “pet aversions”’ another was the bombastic Daily Mail war correspondent William Beach Thomas.⁷ Hiley has correctly interpreted this phenomenon suggesting that

We should not assume that they were more sensitive to it than working-class readers at home, or that their feelings of alienation extended to the whole of the press. The soldiers of the BEF were simply discovering that peculiar mixture of involvement and ironic detachment that we now associate with all popular culture in the twentieth century.⁸

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⁵ Andrew Marr has noted that you could send your laundry home from the front for your mother to wash and return. Introduction to Tommy’s War, p xii.
⁶ The next closest example is probably Vietnam where the ‘balance’ was the other way round; widespread discontent with the war at home and significant hostility to the anti-war movement amongst GIs.
⁸ Nicholas Hiley, “‘You Can’t Believe a Word You Read’: Newspaper reading in the
Turning to positive evidence, are there examples of positive reactions from soldiers to the home front and, if so, are they representative? The first evidence is from those who worked on the home front at the time. It was clearly the view of Millicent Garrett Fawcett that the work of war charities provided a positive bond with soldiers that helped to win the war.9 Masterman backed up her views. His hyperbolic but heartfelt summary of the ‘temper of the people’ in July 1915 was that, to whatever part of the country he travelled, everyone was determined to ‘endure to the end, however great that sacrifice, however bitterly that end may be delayed’.10 Dowding expressed a similar view suggesting that voluntary action was building social capital when he wrote that:

We preserve our own calm determination, and we forge constant links between the men out there and the people here at home. The woman who knits mittens is doing more than knitting mittens. She is knitting tokens of love, and admiration, and confidence, and gratitude that will hearten the fighting men, and keep her own spirits up. Thus, there is a rich psychological value in the voluntary work of a nation in such days as these.11 Dowding got to the crux of the issue when he concluded elsewhere that the British ‘welded that innate comradeship which is the main driving force of a nation at war... To put it positively, the voluntary making, or buying, or giving, or doing of something is one of the many ways in which the morale of the nation is preserved.’12 Though Dowding’s comments are sentimentalised, he is expressing a complex symbiotic relationship, discussed in more

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9 Notably expressed in War Relief and War Service.
11 Letter to the Daily Telegraph, 21 September 1915. This view is supported by Bruce Scates in ‘The Unknown Sock Knitter’.
detail in Chapter 13. Some might argue that the views of Fawcett, Dowding and Masterman are tainted as they are the very civilians detested by the troops (especially Masterman, given his role as an official propagandist) but there is more than adequate back-up for their conclusions from recent scholarship and, it should be pointed out, those who fought in the trenches did not have a monopoly of the truth.

An eloquent, exposition of servicemen’s responses to the public and their philanthropic efforts is presented by Cohen. Even though she is specifically referring to responses by disabled ex-servicemen, her findings still hold true; indeed one might have expected those who had been disabled by the war to have greater resentment than others. With respect to the war writers views she says that ‘the literary lights of the 1920s and 1930s took as an article of faith the ex-serviceman’s hostility to his fellow citizens, but it is doubtful this sentiment, which so aptly expressed modernism’s disdain for the public, was broadly shared.’\textsuperscript{13} In other words writers simply transposed their own, post-war, views retrospectively, the same process that is at work in so much later writing on the First World War. Cohen suggests this view was then taken up in more academic circles. However, she concludes that:

In the course of my research, I found very little evidence, whether published or unpublished, to support the idea that disabled ex-servicemen were hostile toward the public. From secondary sources as well as the literature of the time, I had expected bitterness, anger, or at the very least grousing. Yet in the thousands of letters from disabled veterans that I read in philanthropic and state archives, I found almost nothing of the sort. For example, in the more than 600 letters of application

\textsuperscript{13} Cohen, \textit{War Come Home}, p 17.
to the War Seal Mansions, only one man referred to the public’s obligation with any sort of ire.\textsuperscript{14}

Gregory supports Cohen’s conclusions and is dismissive of the ‘myth’ saying ‘the idea that civilians were indifferent to the suffering of the soldiers is manifestly absurd’.\textsuperscript{15} I would entirely concur with Cohen’s view, which is fully supported by my own research.\textsuperscript{16}

Representative of comments about charity workers is this from Trooper George Jameson of the 1/1 Battalion, Northumberland Hussars:

I’d give full marks to the Salvation Army. They had one place I used to drop into often. And it was a most uncomfortable spot to be in. It was at Vimy. The main road came through Vimy and down onto the plain that way. Well, you didn’t take that main road if you could avoid it, it was under constant shellfire. At night it got even worse, as the Germans reckoned that transport used it at night, so they would keep strafing it the whole time. But tucked into the side of the hill was the Salvation Army. And they used to have tea and whatever going all hours of the day. How they survived there I don’t know. Wonderful people. In the middle of nowhere to suddenly walk into a place and get a piping hot pot of tea, it was a great reviver.\textsuperscript{17}

All of the major religious charities worked in close proximity to the fighting. In 1917, the YMCA was opening centres close to dressing stations and casualty clearing stations on the Western Front:

Prior to the capture of Messines ridge in June 1917, the YMCA and the RAMC arranged for thirty-four temporary centres to be opened near the dressing stations

\textsuperscript{14} Cohen, War Come Home, p 8 and note p 214.
\textsuperscript{15} Gregory, The Last Great War, p 135.
\textsuperscript{16} Most notably in the ‘Great Chart Sailor’s and Soldier’s War Fund, Letters to family and friends 1915-1918, Centre for Kentish Studies, Acquisition # 6632. Henceforth ‘Great Chart Letters’.
\textsuperscript{17} Quoted in Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices of the Great War, (Ebury Press, London, 2002), p 172.
of the attacking divisions so that every wounded man could be provided with food, a hot drink and a postcard that was to be sent to his family.\textsuperscript{18}

This policy exposed many of the voluntary workers to danger of death and injury from shellfire and capture by the enemy. In the wake of the German offensive in spring 1918, the Church Army lost at least 55 huts and the YMCA a similar number. At the same date, perhaps the best-known recreation centre, Talbot House also refused to retreat when ordered. A senior staff officer who recognised that its closure would be harmful to the morale of the troops endorsed this defiance.\textsuperscript{19} Toc H had been established in December 1915 in premises rented from a Flemish brewer in the town of Poperinghe, six miles west of Ypres, by Neville Talbot senior Anglican chaplain of 6\textsuperscript{th} Division but it was run by Philip ‘Tubby’ Clayton. Operating on remarkably egalitarian lines, it was designated ‘Everyman’s Club’ and had the motto ‘all rank abandon ye who enter here’ on the door, Toc H contributed greatly to the welfare of its patrons and it was indeed patronised by all ranks. Frequent visitors included Lord Cavan commander of the Guards Division (Clayton’s cousin) and General Plumer. Snape suggests the success of Toc H lay in its ‘amalgam of the classic Anglo-Catholic “slum” mission and the typical pre-war soldiers’ home’ with Clayton’s remarkable personality and his ability to make ‘an unlimited number of friendships without losing individual interest in the case of any one of them.’\textsuperscript{20} Perhaps most remarkable of all Talbot House’s activities was its series of meetings called ‘grousing circles’ designed as a pressure release, where other ranks could express grievances to officers under ‘Chatham House Rules’. The Army Staff sanctioned the meetings, and they led to several changes in approach or policy.\textsuperscript{21} Such a way of expressing grievances to senior staff was a significant benefit in a citizen army and would be considered

\textsuperscript{18} Snape, \textit{God and the British Soldier}, p 209.
\textsuperscript{21} Snape, \textit{God and the British Soldier}, p 218.
quite progressive today. Though Clayton found that, after the war, the army reverted to
many of its old habits the fact that the ‘grousing circle’ existed at all may come as quite a
shock to those who perpetuate the myth of the uncaring Army staff. Snape considers it
significant that ‘the French army had no equivalent of this ubiquitous network of practical
support, an important consideration given the mass mutinies it suffered in 1917.’ The
activities of Talbot House and its fellow organisations were a great bolster to morale, which
accounts for the fact that they were still hugely appreciated long after the war as Snape
discovered. Critics could discount comments like this as they were about those charity
workers who were sharing the troops’ dangers, but soldiers were just as appreciative and
supportive of those who remained in comparative safety at home. For example supplies to
prisoners of war could be life-savers as the following letter from Sergeant C Lowman of the
Hampshire Regiment, to his local prisoners of war support organisation and written in
February 1919, demonstrates:

I have just returned from Turkey where I have been a prisoner for the last three
years. I was captured at Kut with General Townshend. Owing to the hardships we
endured in the siege and the terrible way we were treated after falling into the
hands of the Turks my constitution was completely wrecked. I now feel it my duty to
write and thank you for your kindness in sending us parcels and medical comforts
which I am sure saved the lives of many prisoners in Turkey. I have been in hospital

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22 Snape, God and the British Soldier, p 213.
23 He quotes examples from D.H. Barber’s researches and from a Mass Observation survey during
World War Two. Snape, God and the British Soldier, p 216: from D.H. Barber, The Church Army in
World War Two, (London, SPCK, 1946, p 8) and from Mass Observation FR 1421, Report on feelings
about the Salvation Army, Mass Observation archives, University of Sussex.
since last October, when the English first arrived at Constantinople, but am getting much stronger now. Again many thanks for all you have done.24

Even the gift of a simple scarf picked up from the stores produced a generous letter when the recipient, Frank Fielder of the Royal Field Artillery, found the address of the young girl who had knitted it, Lucy Bateson of Preston. He wrote that ‘I will keep it forever, and take it to my home in London, when I go home for good, as a souvenir from you, although I have never seen you, I appreciate it very much indeed.’25 Another prisoner of war, the author and poet F.W. Harvey, expressed the importance of contact with home saying that ‘the most valued letters of all were those written in rich Gloucestershire dialect to tell me, with eagerness contemptuous of all stops, the news of my dear little village… These letters did more to alleviate the lot of prisoners than ever their kind writer could know.’26 One of the largest repositories of servicemen’s comments lies in a remarkable collection of letters from the villagers of Great Chart, near Ashford, in Kent. The archive is that of the Great Chart Sailor’s and Soldier’s War Fund and runs to no fewer than twenty-two volumes. These are just a sample that demonstrate the great importance of an attachment to a locality for the servicemen:

From Pte G. Barnes, 1st Royal West Kents, 5th Division, 3 April 1915:

I know that you are all thinking about us when we are away trying to do our little bit and I am sure we shall do it. My dear friends I can’t explain to you how thankful I was to receive your parcel which I tell you it could not have come at a more convenient time as it was a very wet day and we all came off duty that morning and

25 IWM, MISC 16, Item 351, Letters from soldiers to a small girl who had sent them knitted comforts.  
26 Harvey, Comrades in Captivity, p 65.
not happen to be on any fatigue duties so we all sat down in our tents and smoked your health and had a few sweets.27

Private Barnes died on 21st May 1915, from ‘fever, exhaustion and gas’ as a result of the severe fighting for the capture of Hill 60.

From Sgt William Brunger 1/5th Buffs, Kamptee, India, 8 July 1915:

Dear Friends of Great Chart, I consider it the highest honour of my career to address my letter thus... What a great amount of thought and trouble must be taken in the arranging and dispatching of them all. For myself it will always be one of my most cherished possessions and I shall attach the greatest importance to its preservation.28

From 1757 Pte William Harding, E Coy, 1/5th Buffs, Kamptee, 5 August 1915:

It gives us all great pleasure to know that so many friends have taken our welfare to heart, and although we are so many miles away we are still respected by all our dear Friends at home ... It is with great pride that I read of all brave men who have given their services in time of need. More especially do I look with pride upon the role of honour from my own little village, and although our little village is small, we all hope its deeds will bear out its name Great Chart.29

From Sgt Ernest Ottaway, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, but attached to A Battery, 62nd Brigade RFA, France, 23 December 1915:

I have just received your two Xmas parcels quite safely, and what with one gift and another, I shall soon be thinking that this is quite the right place to come to, if one is to enjoy the Xmas season properly. We’ve been sending the Germans quite a

28 Great Chart Letters, Vol. 5.
29 Great Chart Letters, Vol. 5.
number of presents lately too – sometimes as many as a thousand a day – each present packed in a strong metal case. Somehow though, I don’t think the Hun likes us much, in spite of the attention we pay him... We are all tired of war – are we not – altho’ of course we shall not dream of a rest until Mr Wilhelm the Elder and his army of misguided heroes are properly settled with.  

Despite the caveats you need to put on the content of letters (for example censorship and the desire not to upset those at home) it takes little imagination to understand how such tokens helped in establishing and maintaining a soldiers’ morale. These documents help to demonstrate that that the troops’ response to charitable efforts was overwhelmingly positive. A similar view on the importance of such local contacts in maintaining morale and connections with the home front is Grieves’s collection relating to Sussex and the letters to the Ashurst Wood Comforts Fund.  

Both his study and McCartney’s examination of the Liverpool Territorials have, in the view of Meyer, ‘highlighted the ways in which the fighting front and the home front were consistently entwined throughout the war, challenging the argument that the community of fighting men formed a distinctive culture of their own that was both alien to and alienated from civilians on the home front.’

It is clear that cynicism towards the public at home is, at best, an exaggeration. It is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the gap between front-line and home front experience, a natural divide in all wars; on a small number of high-profile literary examples and, even then, is an exaggeration of the attitudes of the writers quoted. Of course, there was a huge range in soldiers views about the war. There were possibly just as few over-enthusiastic uncritical supporters of the war in 1918 as there were thoroughly disillusioned pacifists but

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31 Grieves, Sussex in the First World War, pp 76-84.
the majority fell somewhere in between. Liddle, who put together the largest private collection of private papers from the period, over 4,000, is someone whose views should carry some weight. 33 He rejects the idea that every soldier reacted with ‘automatically triggered outrage’ to the horrors of war or that disillusionment was universal. If there was any naïve early enthusiasm it was succeeded by a stoic, if grudging, readiness to ‘stick it out’ in the hearts and minds of the majority of British soldiers. ‘Food, drink, warmth, security, links with home, and the respect of one’s pals were the things which preoccupied the average soldier’. 34 Simkins enlists the support of another writer on this point. ‘[Ian] Beckett summarizes the principal characteristics of the British working-class civilian soldier of the period as being “a phlegmatic acceptance of fate or sheer bloody-mindedness” mixed always with sardonic humour.’ Humour, often ironic, often black, has always been a prominent feature of the British soldier’s make up and in the First World War it reached its zenith. One manifestation was the soldiers’ songs that, despite the use to which they were put in Oh What a Lovely War!, display stoicism rather than disillusion. Stephen has noted that ‘soldiers’ songs seemed to change less in tone than did pure poetry. Apart from the early optimism of the British Expeditionary Force, the plain footslogger had looked at the war with a shrewd eye from early in 1915.’ 35 Because of this tendency, a tendency of soldiers in every war, to

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34 Stephen, Never Such Innocence, p 94. Brophy and Partridge, Songs and Slang of the British Soldier, divide soldiers songs into eight categories:
1. Satire on war and mock heroics e.g. Hush Here Comes a Whiz-bang or I Don’t Want to be a Soldier.
2. Satire on the military system e.g. We Are Fred Karna’s Army.
3. Satire on Superior Officers e.g. The Old Barbed Wire or They Were Only Playing Leapfrog.
4. Panegyrics of civilian bliss, past and present e.g. When this Blasted War is Over or I Wore a Tunic.
5. Celebration of drink and other comforts e.g. Here’s to the Good Old Beer or Drunk Last Night.
6. Nonsense and burlesque e.g. Wash me in the Water or refrains like ‘Inky pinky parley vous’.
7. Sex ribaldry e.g. Mademoiselle from Armentieres.
regard war cynically and without false optimism, it is even more difficult to date songs to a particular stage of the war than it is poetry, and their national origin can easily be forgotten. For example, the ‘disillusioned’ I Want to Go Home was written in 1915 and both The Long, Long Trail and When this Lousy War is Over are pre-war, the latter by some 50 years. The first was written by a Canadian and the other two are American in origin and one of the most popular songs to come out of the Battle of the Somme, Gillymong (from the village of Guillemont) is far from depressing. Stephen reasons that, through their simplicity and directness, songs can sometimes convey a deeper ‘truth’ about the war than far more ‘intellectual’ poems. He concludes that ‘the soldiers in their songs are in their way expressing something so basic and simple that it slips through the fingers of the great poets.’ The same might be said for some of the cartoons and humour of the period. ‘The most famous British cartoon figure of the war, Bruce Bairnsfather’s “Old Bill”, bears reproduction in whatever season simply because he offers no glorification of war. He is sardonic, scornful of the “brass hats”, but above all a symbol of endurance.’

Though Carrington says that Bairnsfather became less popular later in the war (his front line experience lasted only until April 1915), there were plenty of other sources of humour to take his place, notably the multitude of trench newspapers. The most famous of these, the Wipers Times, was reprinted in 1930 and lest it be felt that Generals failed to appreciate being mocked by their juniors,

8. Sentimental and pathetic songs (very few examples in this category).

36 The Long, Long Trail was written for a Yale College reunion in 1912; When this Lousy War is Over dates from the American Civil War; a verse of Gillymong composed by Rifleman Stevens, 10th Kings Royal Rifle Corps goes:

I was strolling along in Gillymong
With the Minnewerfers singing
Their old sweet song
And I said to old Fritz
‘We’re here to stay!
And we’ll kick your arse from here To Moonlight Bay

Arthur, When This Bloody War is Over, p 92.

37 Stephen, Never Such Innocence, p 95.

38 Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, p 732.
the reprint carried a foreword by Lord Plumer in which he stated that ‘a perusal of its numbers will give the reader a vivid and correct impression of the cheerfulness which prevailed, notwithstanding all the sacrifices, hardship and privations the troops were called upon to undergo.’ The editor of the *Wipers Times*, Fred Roberts, also included his own dedication, which is accurately summed up by Malcolm Brown:

[Roberts] had satirized the war, mocked and joked about it in every possible way, but he had supported it. Whatever the faults and the failures, he and his kind believed it should have been fought and won. He would not now be persuaded [by the ‘disillusioned school’ of war writers so popular at the time] that the whole business was a misguided act of folly. There *had* been ideals worth fighting for, even if they now seemed to a new generation to be tarnished and unworthy. In this context the dedication of the 1930 volume is worthy of note. Doubtless devised by Roberts himself, it reads:

TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE SALIENT AND THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR

The ‘truth about the war’ was, clearly, *his* truth as he saw it – not the new truth being promulgated to the disadvantage of the old.\(^40\)

With regard to officers like Roberts, Simkins goes on to note the strength of the ‘public school ethos’ quoting Parker, no supporter of the philosophy, who says that ‘The stress of war may have caused some to become sceptics, but the majority of young officers held on to their beliefs: “The schools and their ethos exacted a loyalty which seems to have been virtually unshakable.’” Finally, for all ranks, Simkins recognises the value of voluntary action and its role in developing and maintaining social capital when he says:

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\(^{39}\) Malcolm Brown, Introduction to *Wipers Times*, p x.

\(^{40}\) Brown, Introduction to *Wipers Times*, p xx.
British military historians are in broad agreement that the nature of British society in
1914-18 provided a bedrock of social cohesion which prevented the BEF from total
collapse, even during the crisis of March and April 1918. There may be some truth in
the view that the huge network of welfare facilities – including canteens and YMCA
and Church Army huts – as well as provision of concert parties and organized sports,
offered the British soldier comfortably familiar recreational and cultural outlets
which were not enjoyed to the same extent by men of other armies.41

This is a view shared by many other writers who have carefully studied the full extent of
opinion during the war. Winter (an American incidentally) has added a huge amount to our
knowledge of the social and demographic history of the period and reached a perceptive
conclusion regarding the immense contribution voluntary action played in strengthening
social capital in Britain. He suggests that a de-centralised state with strong voluntary
institutions gave Britain ‘an essential resource in wartime’ that enabled its people to see the
war through to victory. Far from there being a division between the civilians and the troops
there was a ‘commonality of purpose [which] fused home and battle front.’42

We should not be surprised that an event as traumatic and complex as the First World War
produced complex and often ambiguous feelings in its participants rather than the simple,
black-and-white ones so many writers suggest. A good example of how many must have felt

41 Simkins, ‘Everyman at War’, p 302. Social cohesion is not synonymous with social capital. It has a
much less agreed meaning but perhaps was summed up best by the Chief Executive of Leicester City Council when he commented that ‘a cohesive community is a community that has naturally many
cross-links, where people from different race, age, background, feel free and happy to mix together in
Report, together with formal minutes, (House of Commons ODPM: Housing, Planning, Local
Government and the Regions Committee, 2004), p 5. Social cohesion therefore is much closer to
bonding social capital (see page 80).
42 Jay Winter, ‘Popular Culture in ‘Wartime Britain’’, in Aviel Rosenthal and Richard Sites (eds.), The Arts,
about the war came from a former company sergeant-major. ‘When I left France wounded after two years there I felt and still feel that war is a vile, soul-destroying and uncivilising evil. But if I were a younger man I would fight again’. 43 Alternatively, this from a veteran, Private Stan Small, 10th Battalion, the Devonshire Regiment, who said:

Now I’m retired and my family aren’t here I sit and think about it. And the Western Front. Men getting up and going over the top at five in the morning. Men hung up on barbed wire. Lose perhaps 1,000 men to the Germans with their machine guns hidden in their concrete posts. Bubububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububububu! Men falling like corn before the reaper. I can’t understand it. Can you? Having to do it because some general says so? Your life’s your own, nobody else’s. But the awful thing is that that war was the most exciting thing that ever happened to us.’ 44

42 Quoted in Holmes, Acts of War, p 395.
PART III - THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CONTROL
8 Immediate Responses – The 1914 Bill

Existing Charity Law

The intervention of the state in the operation of charities began with the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. The Preamble to the Statute is still used as the primary definition of what constitutes a charity.¹ The four heads are the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community.²

Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the only recourse for redressing irregularities in charities or restructuring or redefining their purpose was the tediously slow and inordinately costly Court of Chancery. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, publicity surrounding charity scandals ‘produced the impetus for parliamentary reform.’³ The Scottish politician Henry Peter Brougham was the primary force for reform and parliament established a Commission under his chairmanship in 1819. Over the next twenty years, the Commission produced forty volumes of reports exposing charitable chicanery and praising good practice. The final reports of the Brougham Commission (published between 1837 and 1840) recommended the establishment of a permanent Charity Commission.⁴ However, it took Parliament nearly another twenty years, a further Royal Commission and scandals in the 1840s and early 1850s, to pass the legislation establishing the Commission in 1853. Even then, the legislation was

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¹ Filtered through the important definition of Lord Macnaghten in 1891 in the case of Pemsel (AC 531 HL).
² This definition has only recently been amended through the 2006 Charities Act to include a test of public benefit.
⁴ There had been non-permanent Charity Commissioners since 1818.
watered down in the Lords (who resented intrusion into areas of upper-class privilege and philanthropy) and so it was defective in a number of respects. The Commission’s powers only extended to charitable endowments, excluding ‘collecting charities’ that were free to spend the funds subscribed as they saw fit. Also excluded were a group of rich and important charities that Tory opposition had ensured lay outside the Commission’s remit. These included universities, cathedrals, collegiate churches and the fee-paying schools of Eton and Winchester. The Commission could not order that a charity’s accounts be audited and any financial maladministration had to be gross and overt before they could act. There were severe limitations on the powers of the Commission to apply cy près schemes (for example to modernise outdated trusts) and these schemes still had to go through Chancery or be presented to Parliament. The Commission were understaffed and underfunded and suffered a ‘bad press’ for being slow and unaggressive.

In 1860, the Commission did get an extension to its judicial powers through the Charitable Trusts Act, which enabled it to circumvent Parliament and Chancery, the only real extension of its power until 1960. The Commission were strongly influenced by the doctrine of the Charity Organisation Society and were ‘particularly concerned to try to modernize large numbers of endowed dole charities in which neither the terms of the trust nor the policy of the trustees took any account of the need to discriminate between deserving and undeserving claimants.’ Following a supportive court case in 1881, the Commissioners were

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5 *Cy près* means ‘as close as possible.’ When a gift is made by will or trust and the named recipient of the gift does not exist, has dissolved, or no longer conducts the activity for which the gift is made, then the estate or trustee must make the gift to an organisation that comes closest to fulfilling the purpose of the gift.

6 Fishman, ‘Charitable Accountability’, p 749.

granted extraordinary powers in the case of London through the City of London Parochial Charities Act of 1883.8

Despite these advances, the Charity Commission was not highly regarded nor did it achieve its original objectives, especially in relation to fraudulent activity. Just as the later War Charities Act failed in this respect, the expectations on an over-stretched, under-resourced Charity Commission were simply unrealistic. It is also noteworthy that the Commission was regarded as ‘a central agency imposing its will without regard for local sensibilities’.9 This too became critical with regard to the administration of wartime charity legislation. Neither did it have any control over the non-endowed, collecting charities that exploded in number on the outbreak of war. Chesterman has summed up the Commission’s situation in the Edwardian period as being:

Bogged down in detailed and scarcely world-shattering activities affecting a relatively small proportion of the country’s charitable resources. The ubiquitous COS attempted to supplement its efforts with regard to one of the exempt categories – unendowed voluntary societies – but as it lacked compulsory powers it could do little more than refer clear cases of fraud in charity administration for prosecution.10

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8 The case was Re Camden’s Charity [1881] 28 ChD 310. The Act empowered the Commission to take over and reorganise the City’s parochial charities with a view to improvement of ‘the physical, social and moral condition of the poorer inhabitants of the metropolis.’ This Act helped establish both the City Parochial Foundation, to this day one of the UK’s most progressive grant-making foundations, and City University.


10 Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare, p 74.
A Knee-Jerk Reaction

The first attempts at state control of charities during the war came within a month of its outbreak. The instigator was Sir Melvill Beachcroft, Chairman of the London County Council, but acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Social Welfare Association for London, who saw an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: gain control over wasteful dole charities and provide additional funds for war relief. The rapidity of the official response suggests that he had already discussed his proposals with Sir Charles Cook, the Chief Charity Commissioner, and Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board. We have already seen how many people feared that the war would cause significant social problems and Sir Melvill’s proposals were something of a knee jerk response to meet these potential demands. In a letter to the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette on 3 September 1914, Sir Melvill noted that the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws had found that the income of London charities was a significant £7.5 million a year.¹¹ He believed that some of these funds could be directed towards war relief and that the powers of charity trustees should be extended to allow them to divert funds into the NRF. ‘Would that heroic and suffering Belgium had at its disposal but a fraction of the charitable endowments available in London alone for doles of food and money!’ bemoaned Sir Melvill.¹² Within days an Emergency Bill was drafted ‘to enable the income of certain charities to be applied temporarily to the Prince of Wales’s National Relief Fund.’¹³ The period proposed was initially three years, later amended to six months beyond the duration of the war.

¹¹ This had risen to nearly £9 million by 1913 as we have seen.
¹² All extracts in this section from TNA, CHAR 3/83.
¹³ Charities Emergency Bill, 1914, Bill 399.
The first reading of the Bill was on 9 September. Introduced by Herbert Samuel it immediately ran into problems. Questions were raised as to exactly which charities would be affected, and potentially lose funds, and as to why only the NRF, seen by many as a quasi-government organisation, would benefit. To many MPs, it looked as if the government were trying to get their hands on private charitable funds. This was a cause that united opinion from the right, who opposed government control, and the left, who felt they should use state funds instead. Immediately after the first reading Samuel met with the Charity Commissioners to say that he expected significant opposition at second reading unless a list of ‘50 or 60 particular cases’ of the charities the Bill was expected to lever funds from could be cited. At the second reading, on the following day, he stated that there were over 6,000 charities but he suggested that the Bill might be delayed, as the Charity Commissioners would need more time to draw up an accurate list.14 This was getting rather too much for the Bill’s opponents. J.F.P. Rawlinson (Unionist, Cambridge University) summed up the mood when he attacked the ‘vague’ wording of the Bill, disputing both its need and its all-embracing nature:

> It looks suspiciously as if the Commissioners desired to get hold of these charities... I do not think that advantage should be taken of this emergency to bring forward such an extraordinary Bill as that which is before us at the present time... There is a certain amount of humour in some of these emergency Bills, which cast an extraordinary sidelight on certain Government offices.15

Given such vehement opposition, a vote on second reading was not taken.

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14 There is a pencilled note on his speech at this point with: ‘?60,000’, the latter would have been a more accurate figure and probably indicates the haste with which this legislation was being drafted.

15 *Proceedings HoC*, Vol. 66, 10 September 1914, Col. 691.
Following this setback Sir Horace Monro, Permanent Secretary to the LGB, wrote to Sir Charles Cook asking whether it was worth reviving or not. Monro stated that Samuel ‘feels that a very strong case will have to be presented if the House of Commons are to be induced to pass a Bill, in any shape, authorising the alienation of Charity funds towards the National Relief Fund.’ Sir Charles clearly didn’t think so as he instead wrote an open letter to the press asking that Charity trustees with ‘unapplied funds’ who were willing to have them applied to the NRF should contact the Commissioners, the implication being that they would look sympathetically to amending their charitable objectives in order for them to do so. He was obviously resigned to substituting a voluntary scheme for an official, compulsory one. On 15 September, the *Morning Post* published a further letter from Sir Melvill Beachcroft stating that he knew several dole charities that met Cook’s definition and urging others to contact the Commissioners. However it was clear that most charities had no intention of responding or, alternatively, had more pressing demands as by 22 October the Commission had received replies from only 287 charities pledging funds of a mere £8,707. In a further letter, Sir Melvill admitted that this was a poor response. It was therefore no surprise when in November, the LGB and Commission decided not to proceed with the Bill and, by this time, it was also clear that the NRF was receiving sufficient income from other sources.

At the end of November 1915, there was a half-hearted attempt to revive the legislation. Sir Ernest Soames (of the National Debt Office) wrote to the Commissioners saying that now there was a coalition government such a bill had a far greater chance of success. ‘These Dole Charities, as you agreed, are nothing but waste – and in many cases harmful waste,’ he stated indignantly. Sir Charles Cook didn’t think things had sufficiently changed and in his reply concluded that ‘the opposition last year to our very mild proposal came from all

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16 Soames to Sir Charles Cook, 25 November 1915.
quarters and appeared to rest on a general dislike, based on very spurious grounds, for any interference with the trusts of charities.\textsuperscript{17}

The somewhat ignominious failure of the 1914 Bill probably acted as something of a disincentive to further proposed charity legislation and cannot have helped the reputation of the Charity Commission. The next steps that were taken towards government influence or legislation over wartime charitable activity did not come until the end of 1915. They were in response to real evidence of a lack of co-ordination and waste rather than in anticipation of it and were initiated by the War Office rather than the Home Department or Charity Commission.

\textsuperscript{17} Cook to Soames, 25 November 1915.
9 The Greatest Supply Officer since Moses - The Director General of Voluntary Organizations

(To the tune My Bonnie Lies Over the Ocean)

My tunic is out at the elbows,
My trousers are out at the knee,
My puttees are ragged and frazzled
The Q.M. says nothing for me. ¹

Genesis of the Scheme

Following the first flush of response to the war, especially concerning the hardships of soldiers’ dependents and Belgian refugees, there was a flourishing of voluntary activity geared towards medical supplies and troop comforts. Medical services were already systematised and state-controlled, or quickly became so, and so voluntary action could, most especially for women, be directed to existing medical support agencies. These included Voluntary Aid Detachments, which had been in existence since 1909 and were administered by the Joint War Committee of the British Red Cross and Order of St John; the Women’s Sick and Wounded Convoy Corps founded by Mrs St Clair Stobart in 1907 and the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY), founded in the same year by Captain Edward Baker. By 1912 the VADs, of whom two-thirds were women,

¹ My Tunic is out at the Elbows, soldiers’ song quoted in Max Arthur, When this Bloody War is Over, p 55.
had a strength of 26,000 and reached 90,000 by 1918. Even so, with the enormous demands created by the war there were immediate shortages of medical supplies and comforts for wounded men both abroad and at home.

There had been organised comforts for soldiers’ during the Boer War and some formations had existing voluntary support bodies, usually in the form of Regimental Associations. The St John’s Ambulance had acted as a central body for the collection of gifts in kind and all subscriptions from the public had been channelled through the Red Cross.2 The War Office was aware of the issue of troops’ comforts at the outset of the war and at a Directors meeting on 16 August, 1914, chaired by the BEF’s Quartermaster General (QMG) Sir William Robertson agreed ‘to take up the question of private packages being sent to the troops and ascertain what was done during the South African War.’3 What they found regarding the Boer War experience was that the officer in charge of troop comforts, Sir Wodehouse Richardson the Deputy Adjutant-General for Supplies and Transport, was against the whole idea of parcels being sent out for individual soldiers by their families.4 This was because they often contained inappropriate items like bottles of brandy or beer, inflammable wax matches or even a decomposing pig’s head. Then there was the question of profiteering by companies taking advantage of the public’s patriotic generosity, by packaging items up into soldier’s gift boxes and selling them at inflated prices. Richardson’s conclusions were unequivocal, that the sending and receiving of comforts should be a privilege and not a right: ‘My own opinion ... is that no parcels for individuals should be accepted, but that all gifts

2 They raised a total of £178,950, Central British Committee of the Red Cross, Report on Voluntary Organisations in Aid of the Sick and Wounded during the South African War, (London, HMSO, 1902), p 4.
3 QMG Directors Meeting minutes, 16 August 1914, TNA, WO 107/21.
4 Sir Wodehouse Richardson, With the Army Service Corps in South Africa, (Richardson and Co, London, 1903), p 125.
should be either for general distribution or for distribution to individual regiments or brigades... I feel very strongly about this parcel nuisance, which should be stopped as soon as possible. Richardson’s views were partially supported by the Red Cross in their report on the Boer War. They were concerned with the lack of co-ordination and stated that ‘in connection with the formation of these several funds and of private committees throughout the country, there was much danger of overlapping and of undesirable competition.’

Sir Edward Ward, the future DGVO, was a close colleague of Richardson’s in South Africa (Ward was Director of Supplies in Natal and then at Army Headquarters) and though he took on board some of Richardson’s recommendations when he launched the DGVO scheme he rightly recognised that to maintain public confidence and morale the sending of parcels must be maintained as the right of both individuals and organisations. However, the sheer scale of the current war soon caused significant problems. Did the items collected or sent match the needs of the troops? There is plenty of anecdotal information that they sometimes did not. For example, a soldier with five mufflers but no socks or, as in the case of the Second Battalion of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, too many socks: ‘socks were sent from home in such quantities for the first two years of the War that men were throwing them away after only one wearing.’

5 Richardson, With the Army Service Corps, p 126.
6 Report on Voluntary Organisations during the South African War, p 5.
There was duplication of effort and unfairness in distribution. Prisoners of war were a case in point as ‘some lucky prisoner might receive three or four parcels a month, while his neighbour got none at all.’\textsuperscript{8} Quality control was a further problem as not all charities produced their goods to high standards. Captain John Liddell of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders wrote to his family in November 1914 criticizing the oddities being sent:

\begin{quote}
The people who send them mean very well, but apart from the fact that these huge bales stop everything else coming through the post, the Government ones [i.e. ones made to Government specifications] are far more appreciated by the men, and with reason, as they are really tophole garments, and some of the efforts that arrive are very thin and shoddy.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{8} Fowler, ‘War Charity Begins at Home’, \textit{History Today}, September 1999, p 19.
\textsuperscript{9} Quoted in Beckett, \textit{Home Front 1914-1918}, p 66.
The situation was even more critical with regard to more costly, technological, items funded by charitable contributions. For example motor ambulances were being supplied by different sources and were all of different makes and types meaning that maintenance was a serious problem.\(^{10}\) One group, from the clan Mcrae, wanted to provide an ambulance solely for clan members. As Pedersen points out this ‘suggests a certain naivety about the organisation of the battlefield. Presumably the envisaged ambulance would be able to “home in” on wounded clansmen while barring its doors to any casualties of inferior birth.’\(^{11}\)

Captain Liddell’s complaint of postal services being overloaded was reinforced at a QMG Directors’ meeting in November 1914 when Robertson reported that ‘the number of gifts was stupendous, and recently the First Army Corps had wired to him asking him not to send any more.’\(^{12}\) Then there was the question of whether comforts were going to the right people. Middle class regiments, such as the Civil Service Rifles or Honourable Artillery Company, might be well provided for. But what about some of the New Army battalions? Should the supply of such essentials as warm clothing, blankets or field glasses really be left to the vagaries of charitable collections?\(^{13}\) There were many examples where the entrepreneurial spirit led to inconsistency of supply of important items. In winter 1914-15, the War Office made an appeal for blankets and later for respirators. There was an immediate, but un-coordinated public response, which quickly led to over-supply.\(^{14}\)

\(^{10}\) *War Diary*, Director of Transport, 28 November 1914, TNA, WO 95/71. This is another familiar problem today for example over the provision of minibuses for community use with no funding for maintenance.

\(^{11}\) Sarah Pedersen, ‘A surfeit of socks?’, p 60.

\(^{12}\) QMG Directors’ Meeting minutes, 8 November 1914, TNA, WO 107/21.

\(^{13}\) In the case of National Reservists organised for home defence many essential items of military equipment were indeed supplied by charity. For example ‘the people of Leigh clubbed together to buy some miniature rifles and ammunition for the NR guards employed at a local prisoner of war camp.’ Mitchinson, *Defending Albion*, p 94.

\(^{14}\) Dowding, ‘Study of the War Giving’, p 634. Dowding later welcomed the formation of the DGVO’s office, letter to the *Daily Telegraph*, 21 September 1915.
overall situation was that ‘the outbreak of war found voluntary effort on behalf of the Army entirely unorganised... No societies existed for the purpose of providing comforts and gifts for combatant troops at home and abroad.’ With regard to the hundreds of bodies that sprang up to fill this vacuum, ‘there was no regular organisation existing dealing with the distribution of gifts... A great amount of waste of time, labour and money resulted, unsuitable patterns of articles were produced and overlapping became a very serious matter.’

It was not too long before official attention became focussed on the issue. In the debate on the King’s speech on 12 November 1914 Sir Harold Elverston, Liberal MP for Gateshead, questioned the Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna, on the matter in the House of Commons. He referred to recent appeals for 300,000 socks and 300,000 belts but ironically extended the principle to inquire whether ‘the nation would be content to leave to voluntary effort the equipment of the mechanical instruments of war?’ He felt a clear distinction should be drawn between what were, in reality, necessities – including clothing, bedding and military equipment - and what were luxuries, ‘let the public supply our men at the front with what may really be termed luxuries, but do not let them depend upon private generosity for what are real necessities.’ McKenna’s response was somewhat superficial in that he suggested the question was better asked of the War Office, though he did promise to raise the specific issue of blanket supply with colleagues in that department. He also referred to the natural desire of many civilians to ‘do something personally for the individual soldier’ but

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15 Report of the National Scheme of Voluntary Effort resulting from the Formation of Departments of Director General of Voluntary Organisations, PP 1919, Cmd. 173, x, p 185. ‘Overlapping’ of charities, and hence waste of effort, had long been one of the bugbears of the Charities Organisation Society and so would have been a familiar cry to those engaged in charity.


in trying to distinguish between comforts and essentials his reply smacked not a little of confusion and pedantry, considering such items as scarves and balaclavas as ‘comforts’ as ‘they perform a useful function and add to the comfort of the soldier, but they would not in ordinary circumstances be served out as part of his kit... It does not increase his fighting capacity, but it adds a little to his comfort.’\(^{18}\) This probably came as little ‘comfort’ to the sentry in the Ypres salient standing up to his knees in icy water and with no change of socks back in his dugout.

From McKenna’s remarks, the Home Department appeared somewhat indifferent but the War Office was considering the matter seriously, and at the very highest level it began to cause significant concern. This is revealed in the correspondence between Major-General Sir John Cowans, Army Quartermaster-General (QMG) (and a member of the Army Council) at the War Office throughout the War and Lt-Gen Ronald Maxwell who had become the QMG at GHQ in France. Up to January 1915, the issue of troop comforts was hardly mentioned and with regard to the 1914 Christmas Pudding scheme Cowans wrote to Maxwell with ‘many thanks for your letter about the pudding distribution. The scheme seems to have been very well worked out and reflects great credit on all concerned.’\(^{19}\) It was certainly Maxwell’s view, echoing the reports General Robertson had received from 1\(^{st}\) Corps, that the clothing needs of troops at the Front were being adequately met and that any significant supply of clothing comforts from home was superfluous. He was clearly irritated at the beginning of February 1915 when a letter from Lady French, wife of the Commander-in-Chief, appeared in the press appealing for comforts including shirts, socks, undergarments, woollen caps and gloves because ‘there has been a very marked falling off in those gifts of

\(^{19}\) TNA, WO 107/14.
late.’ Maxwell’s suggestion to Cowans, on 4 February, was that ‘the requirements of the troops at the front have been fully met, and would suggest that the sending out of gifts of clothing and necessaries for general distribution should now cease.’ Unsurprisingly, Maxwell was taking the official military view and regarded complaints as meddling by uninformed civilians, however eminent. Cowans took a more considered, political, stance, especially after an exchange of correspondence with Miss J.R.L. French, daughter of the C-in-C. She wrote to him on the 5 February saying the situation was rather confused and that ‘one day one is told that comforts are very badly wanted and the next that they are an encumbrance... Your statement to my sister a little time back [was] that anything and everything was wanted, and that we could not send too much.’ Cowans therefore turned down Maxwell’s request for an unequivocal press statement because ‘so long as officers are actually writing home asking people to send out comforts, it is a little difficult for us to put in this notice although I am sure it is really desirable.’ Instead, he suggested that officers in France should be told they could get warm clothes etc ‘in the proper way’ and not to write letters to the press. Maxwell duly issued a note to Armies and the Cavalry Corps to pass down the line to all officers to this effect. Somewhat unfortunately, this statement came just after the issue escalated further. It was raised in the House of Commons by James Hogge, Liberal MP for East Edinburgh and a leading campaigner for state pensions for disabled servicemen, who quoted Lady French’s letter. On this point Mr H.T. Baker (Financial Secretary to the War Office) replied that it seemed to be a case of misunderstanding or

20 Daily Chronicle, 2 February 1915.
21 TNA, WO 107/14.
22 TNA, WO 107/14.
25 Debate on the Army Estimates, House of Commons, Proceedings HoC, 5th Series, Vol. 69, 10 February 1915, Column 629. Hogge became the first President of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilized Sailors and Soldiers in 1919.
misinformation. ‘I wish to say that our most recent information about the supply of those articles at the front was that the quantity was so great that thousands had to be kept in store. There is an apparent contradiction somewhere’ he responded with puzzlement.26 After making the specific point Hogge put forward a possible solution asking ‘could there not be some centralisation with regard to the distribution of those comforts which are collected apart from those which are supplied to the troops by the War Office? There must be an enormous wastage going on [and] there is certainly an incongruity somewhere.’27 Whilst not making any specific promises Baker agreed that there was merit in the suggestion and that ‘it will not be lost sight of.’ There was little chance of this happening and, though the matter never reached the same proportions, or seriousness, as the 1915 shell scandal, the comforts scandal continued to the end of the year. An article in the *Globe* on 9 February reported that the men of the 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were ‘in need of clothing of all descriptions’. Maxwell’s enquiries ascertained that there might have been some delay in supply to the Argylls but that the C.O. now reported ‘that his unit was well supplied with warm clothing’. Maxwell’s note to Cowans was that ‘the reply speaks for itself. The newspapers are a nuisance. The best plan is to pay no attention to them.’28 This was all very well from the perspective of GHQ but was not easy from the point of view of Whitehall. It was also a little suspicious that the Argylls’ needs had been fulfilled on 10 February; the day after the *Globe* article had appeared. There was also correspondence on the issue of boots to the Royal West Surreys (1st Queens) in March but then things appear to have settled down until the autumn. In late March, Lord Kitchener finally approved a communiqué being issued that no further supplies of warm clothing need be sent and that Lady French was closing her appeal (no doubt there had been some embarrassment between the Field

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27 *Proceedings HoC*, Vol. 69, 10 February 1915, Column 630.  
Marshal and his wife over their less than complementary statements). This was followed in June by an Army Council Instruction forbidding officers ‘to advertise their personal wants or to make any such appeal to public charity on behalf of the troops.’\(^29\) This, of course, did not prevent officers from making indirect appeals in their private correspondence.

Two cases, the second probably the most serious to date, occurred in October and November. Though the latter was after the creation of the office of the DGVO it happened before his reforms could take effect and was based on events in October. The first concerned the supply of shirts and sweaters for the 1\(^{st}\) Somerset Light Infantry about which their second in command wrote to a comforts fund. The second began after Lt V.E. Reynolds, an officer of the 10\(^{th}\) Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, part of 17\(^{th}\) Division, wrote to his wife. She wrote to Thomas Marlowe, editor of the *Daily Mail* with a view to publication but, probably realising the potential embarrassment immediately after official action had been taken, he passed it on instead to the War Office for investigation. Mrs Reynolds claimed that ‘the plight of some of his poor men is pitiable. They are most of them without socks at all, many without shirts, and their boots are in a terrible condition.’\(^30\) Cowans immediately wrote to Maxwell asking him to investigate this and other complaints. ‘If you are quite satisfied that the system admits of their getting everything they want, there is really nothing more to be said’, Cowans stated but he clearly thought otherwise for he finished by saying that ‘it does seem strange that there should be smoke without any fire.’\(^31\) Before Maxwell could reply Cowans sent on three further letters from ‘officers who have written home to say that their men are absolutely desperate’ and he commented that ‘it certainly is a most

\(^{29}\) *Messenger, Call to Arms*, p 470.
\(^{30}\) Letter on file, TNA, WO 107/15.
\(^{31}\) Cowans to Maxwell, 19 November 1915, TNA, WO 107/15.
extraordinary thing how absolutely continuous these appeals are.\textsuperscript{32} Maxwell completed his investigations and replied on 21 December. Again, he concluded that there were really no difficulties and that ‘every complaint received has proved to be without the slightest foundation and the waste of time involved in the investigation is lamentable.’\textsuperscript{33} On the latter point he was certainly justified and, in addition to the time taken to investigate complaints on the ground, this matter had now taken up considerable amounts of the time of two of the country’s most senior Generals for a period of some ten months. However, on the first point, he was being somewhat economical with the truth. This is confirmed in his own correspondence, for Maxwell enclosed a letter written to him by Brigadier General Harold Tagart, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Third Army, in which Tagart noted that the problem was partly due to the official allowance of only two shirts and three pairs of socks per man and that the soldier would ‘continue to want more. So should I in his place, but that can’t be helped.’\textsuperscript{34}

The Reynolds incident was a considerable irritation to the War Office and GHQ and could have become a major scandal if the \textit{Daily Mail} had published Lt Reynolds’s wife’s letter. As it was, the unfortunate Reynolds was made to write a contrite apology to his Adjutant in which he stated that ‘the letter referred to was a private one to my wife, and I had no intention whatever that it should be used for publication. I much regret that this was done and have taken steps to ensure that this shall not occur again,’ which he no doubt did by admonishing his, rather public spirited, wife.\textsuperscript{35} It is interesting, though, what this letter \textit{does not} say, i.e.

\textsuperscript{32} Cowans to Maxwell, 30 November 1915, TNA, WO 107/15.
\textsuperscript{33} Maxwell to Cowans, 21 December 1915, TNA, WO 107/15.
\textsuperscript{34} TNA, WO 107/15.
\textsuperscript{35} Letter from Lt V.E. Reynolds, 4 December 1915, TNA, WO 107/15.
that his original contention that his men lacked clothing was untrue which you would have
expected him to say, and his C-in-C demanded, if it were the case.36

What was the truth of the matter? There is probably room for both Maxwell’s assertions of
exaggeration and officer’s individual complaints to have some validity. A letter from one
sapper on the Western Front is perhaps indicative of this situation:

The things most suitable for us out here are eatables and Camp Coffee, Cocoa, Oxo.
These are things we can easily make under such difficulties as are experienced in
war time. Regarding woollen goods we are fairly well off, but shirts are very much
needed as we cannot get much washing done and one never knows how quickly one
may have to move.37

Mismatches in supply were almost inevitable, a shortage in one item reported in the press
leading to an upsurge in either official issues or donations that, in turn, led to a glut in supply.
Such problems are well known among today’s disaster relief funds. However, there certainly
were some shortages in some units and Maxwell’s irritation is probably less defensible than
Cowan’s more measured approach.38

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36 Victor Eustace Reynolds was an artist who trained at the Slade and taught at Haberdasher’s Aske’s
School. He had enlisted in the University and Public Schools Corps before being commissioned into
the West Yorkshire Regiment in May 1915. Sadly, Lt Reynolds did not live to return to his wife. He
died on 4 May 1916, and is buried in Cite Bonjean Military Cemetery, Armentieres.
37 Corporal B.H. Jeffrey, Divisional telegraphs, 3rd Signal Company RE, 3rd Division, letter of 31
38 One historian has commented that ‘Maxwell ran Q Branch like a private fiefdom’ and Sir Douglas
Haig’s view was that Maxwell was ‘in the habit of doing too much himself’ rather than delegating to
his staff. Though it may be unfair to Maxwell this was also the officer who, for the first day of the
Somme, promised Sir Henry Rawlinson eighteen trains to evacuate the wounded but only provided
three. Later in the war, Cowans and the Army Council lost confidence in him and he was replaced at
the end of 1917 as being too old. To be fair to Maxwell, Douglas Haig seems to have held a higher
opinion of him than he did of Cowans. In 1917, Haig said of Cowans: ‘I felt it a waste of time speaking
to Cowans: he knows so little of the essentials which make for success in war…. He is feeble because
he listens to too much gossip – e.g. he has an idea that “Tanks” will never be of any use, when as a
matter of fact they have already accomplished so much as to show that they are here to stay.’ Diary
entry, 15 August 1917. Conversely Asquith expressed a very high opinion of Cowans ‘whose
In September a *Times* leader demonstrated the situation had become close to a national scandal:

> There have admittedly been many drawbacks to the efforts which have been made by numberless private individuals since the war began. In some cases things have been supplied for which there was no demand; in other cases the wrong kind of the right thing has been made and sent to the front... It should not be a task of insuperable difficulty to devise some scheme which will dovetail the work and money of volunteers into the normal official sources of supply.\(^3^9\)

These incidents led Cowans to consider what action the War Office could take to both solve the problem and remove public criticism. In this, he was assisted when the office of Financial Secretary to the War Office was taken up at the end of May 1915 by Henry Forster, the former first-class cricketer and future President of MCC and Governor-General of Australia. Forster had two sons serving in the war (both of whom died) and had been pondering the issue for some time and he instigated enquiries into the supply of troops’ comforts to ascertain whether greater co-ordination was required.\(^4^0\) Forster conferred with Cowans before he reported on his findings and made the following announcement in the House of Commons on 18 November 1915:

> When I was appointed to my present office I made inquiries as to whether or not there was any real waste in connection with the splendid work which people had undertaken. I found that there was waste of effort on the part of voluntary workers, and, what I thought more regrettable, waste of a great deal of material. I thought it

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\(^3^9\) *The Times*, 21 September 1915, p 9.

\(^4^0\) His younger son John was killed at the Marne and his elder, Alfred, died of wounds in March 1919.
would be a good plan, if it could be done, to organise the bodies of workers who are good enough to give their time and trouble to the provision of comforts for the troops, and to see whether or not we could not systematise the whole movement throughout the country with a view to the prevention of waste.\footnote{Proceedings HoC, 5th Series, Vol. 69, 18 November 1915, Column 2070-2071. Clearly The Times had already been tipped off as the leader quoted above also noted Ward’s appointment.}

By the date of his announcement the scheme had been in operation for over a month. The first official notification had been on 20 September stating that:

The Army Council hope shortly to announce the formation of a central organization under the direction of Colonel Sir Edward Ward ... for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of the various committees and individuals now engaged in supplying comforts and luxuries for the troops and of directing into the most useful channels their kindly energies.\footnote{The Times, 21 September 1915, p 8.}

Notices had appeared in the press on 11 October and Sir Edward Ward had been given the impressive title Director General of Voluntary Organizations. On 1 October, he was charged with ‘coordinating and regulating all voluntary organisations throughout the country.’\footnote{The Times, 11 October 1915, p 11.}
The Saviour of Ladysmith

Edward Willis Duncan Ward was born in Oban on 17 December 1853, the only son of Captain John Ward RN and Mary Hope, daughter of John Bowie. He was privately educated and in 1874 entered the commissariat of the Control Department. This was the precursor of the Army Service Corps (ASC) but at that time, though comprising military officials it operated separately from the Army. In 1885 he was promoted Assistant Commissary General and saw active service in the Sudan campaign where his work was commended by Sir Garnett Wolsey. In 1888 when the ASC was formed, he was commissioned with the rank of Major, being promoted Lieutenant Colonel in 1890. The now Lord Wolsey assisted Ward’s career and he was posted to Ireland until 1895, holding a staff appointment in Dublin from 1892. In 1895-96, he was Assistant Adjutant General for the Ashanti expeditionary force in West Africa to suppress the slave-raiding and human sacrifices practised by the Ashanti chief Prempeh.44

The expedition leader, Sir Francis Scott, summed up the logistical problems Ward faced. In hostile conditions ‘a rapid advance had to be made through 150 miles of tropical forest in a country practically destitute of supplies. And, above all, the perils of a climate notorious for its unhealthiness had to be encountered.’45 In Ashanti, Ward demonstrated an early flair for innovative management techniques, overcoming the difficulties with aplomb and being particularly sensitive in his handling of the 100,000-plus native carriers. Another senior officer on the expedition was Robert Baden-Powell who was appreciative of Ward’s efficiency:

The whole of this mass of usually blundering natives was working just like clockwork all along the line within three days of its organisation in the hands of Colonel Ward and his never-tiring staff. Not a load gets lost or even delayed, not a man is in arrears of his daily pay.\textsuperscript{46}

Ward achieved this by the simple, but effective, steps of giving ‘native’ overseers greater responsibility for managing porters and by using local labour rather than those ‘trusted’ workers from further afield but who had less immunity to local strains of disease.\textsuperscript{47} Ward had previously set out his key guidance in the handling of ‘native’ labour stating that:

- Labour should be as local as possible;
- Immediate superiors should be drawn from the natives themselves;
- Pay should be fair and remitted to the labourers families;
- It was imperative that all British officers dealing with the labourers should both speak their language and understand their culture.\textsuperscript{48}

Operating on these principles the Army Service Corps Journal noted that ‘our dealings with the large number of native carriers etc were conducted both amicably and cheerfully, and the kindest feelings existed on all sides’ and concluded that the expedition had considerably added to the ASC’s reputation.\textsuperscript{49} Ward’s summing up stated that ‘as far as my researches have led me, I cannot find that on any previous expedition have the wants of the soldier been so well provided for as on this occasion’ and this view was clearly shared by his superiors as, on his return, he was made a companion of the Order of the Bath (CB).\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{46} Major R.S.S. Baden-Powell, \textit{The Downfall of Prempeh: A diary of life with the native levy in Ashanti 1895-96}, Chapter 6, accessed at http://pinetreeweb.com/bp-prempeh-01.htm on 22/10/06.

\textsuperscript{47} This had not been done before because it was felt that local labourers might be more prone to mutiny or desertion but Ward’s view was that this was more usually caused by bad management and poor conditions both of which he improved.


\textsuperscript{49} Army Service Corps Journal, March 1896, p 255.

\textsuperscript{50} Ward, ‘To Kumasi’ p 1029.
Back in London, Ward was made Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) Home District and for the next five years was given charge of the annual Royal Military Tournament, which raised funds for service charities, in those days held at the Agricultural Hall in Islington. Under his guidance, ‘the success and popularity of the Military Tournament went forward by leaps and bounds.’ In its early days the Tournament had made a loss but by 1896 was returning a profit of £4,000 for service charities. In the first year under Ward profits tripled to £12,000 and though this declined slightly to £7,500 in 1900 when Ward relinquished his role there was an immediate drop in the following year to just £2,000 and five figure profits were not achieved again until 1923.

Ward’s strengths lay in organisation and in 1897, he published the then definitive handbook for military supply services, the *Handbook of Army Service Corps Duties in Peace and War* and when, in September 1899, war loomed in South Africa, he was appointed Chief Supply Officer for Natal. He was one of the first officers sent out, sailing on 16 September on board the ‘Tantallon Castle’ in company with several others who became prominent during 1914-18 including Sir Henry Rawlinson and the ill-fated Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (then a Captain). On 9 October 1899, the Boers gave the British an ultimatum that they withdraw their troops from the borders of the South African Republics. The British refused and two days later the Anglo Boer War commenced. The mounted Boer commandos immediately swept into the British Colony of Natal, pushing back the British troops. In only twenty-one days, they were at the doors of the town of Ladysmith, the last major obstacle facing them.

53 *Dictionary of National Biography*, 1922-30, pp 883-884, compiled by Sir Charles Harris who became Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office in succession to Ward.
before they reached the coast, where Ward was in charge of supplies. The British troops, under the command of General Sir George White, were told that their duty was to stand firm in the town and to prevent it from being taken. So began the Siege of Ladysmith. Pitted against 12,000 British troops were 21,000 Boers who encircled in the town. Realising the possibility of a siege, Ward had ‘caused enormous quantities of supplies to be sent up from the base to Ladysmith. The articles were not even tallied or counted as received, in spite of the remonstrances of the consignors; but by means of Kaffir labourers, working night and day, the trucks were off-loaded as fast as possible, and again sent down the line to bring up more food.’\(^5^4\)

The siege began in early November and lasted three-and-a-half months. Ward’s organisational skills were tested to the limit but he was more than up to the task. A diarist of the siege recognised some similarities in Ward’s new role with that of his pre-war responsibilities saying ‘Colonel Ward has just been put in command of the whole town, and already I notice a method in the oxen, to say nothing of the mules. What is it all but a huge military tournament to be pulled together and got up to time?’\(^5^5\) Conan Doyle clearly agreed when he wrote that ‘the supplies were adequate, and the besieged were fortunate in the presence of a first-class organiser, Colonel Ward of Islington fame.’\(^5^6\) Despite attempts by General Sir Redvers Buller to raise the siege, it continued into the New Year by which time the supply situation was getting desperate and ‘the fate of Ladysmith now lay in the hands of Colonel E.W.D. Ward.’\(^5^7\) In addition to the troops, Ward also had to feed some 6,000

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\(^5^4\) H.W. Nevinson, *The Diary of a Siege*, (London, Methuen, 1900), entry for 19 October 1899. Nevinson was correspondent for the Daily Chronicle.

\(^5^5\) Nevinson, *Diary*, 19 October.


\(^5^7\) Ruari Chisholm, *Ladysmith*, (London, Osprey, 1979), p 193. The Boer’s were clearly amazed that the town was holding out for so long. On 6 January when they met a delegation from the Imperial Light
civilians. Dried peach leaves were utilised instead of tobacco and horsemeat became a
‘valuable and much relished addition to the pitifully scanty rations’. Meat was in especially
short supply but there were plenty of horses, for whom fodder was rapidly running out, and
so ‘about the middle of the siege they had to kill horses in the town for consumption. The
patients were allowed the soup that was called “Chevrill”. They liked it very much.’ To help
raise morale Ward also took responsibility for editing the short-lived periodical the
*Ladysmith Lyre*, his qualification for the job being, in his own self-deprecating analysis, that
he was the only person with a supply of paper. Finally, between 20 and 27 February 1900,
Buller fought a successful battle at Pieters and on 27 February 1900, the British pickets on
Wagon Hill saw the Boer besiegers trek away across the veldt and Buller’s troops marched
into Ladysmith. The siege was over and there were tremendous celebrations in the town.
Though there were outbreaks of disease, especially typhus, not a single person – military or
civilian, black or white – had died through malnutrition.

Despite the lifting of the siege neither White, in defending the town, nor Buller, in his
attempts to relieve it, had exactly covered themselves in glory. White should never have got
into the position in the first place and both should have better coordinated their attempts to
raise the siege. Though treated as heroes at the time it was no surprise when Lord Roberts

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Horse during a truce, the Boers asked how it was that the British were ‘as fat as pigs’ when they were
meant to be starving. Ward had specially selected the plumpest, healthiest-looking men to form the
59 Memoirs of Katherine Louisa (Oswell) Nealon, Nursing Sister at Ladysmith, 1900 Published on the
Website of the South African Military History Society at http://samilitaryhistory.org/dianurse.html
accessed on 21/09/06.
60 Speech to the Authors’ Club reported in *The Times*, 23 May 1905. Ward clearly had a good sense of
humour as demonstrated both in the punning title of the ‘Lyre’ and when a formal complaint was
lodged with him by the ladies of the town who were indignant about the soldiers who bathed naked
in the river on Sundays. Ward sensibly suggested that the ladies not look. Byron Farwell, *The Great
61 Excerpt taken from British Battles.com http://www.britishbattles.com/great-boer-
war/ladysmith.htm accessed on 21/09/06.
replaced Buller and that White too returned to England, on the grounds of ill health, later becoming Governor-General of Gibraltar. It was the more junior officers, and especially Ward, who deserved praise for their conduct during the siege. Without Ward’s organisational expertise it is likely that supplies would have run out and the garrison forced to surrender (which indeed Buller had suggested). Sir George White was full of praise for Ward, recognising the part he had played in saving his own reputation, and called him ‘the best commissariat officer since Moses’. In his despatches he wrote that ‘I cannot speak too highly of this officer... I consider him an officer of the highest administrative ability... He is unquestionably the very best Supply Officer I have ever met, and to his resource, foresight and inventiveness, the successful defence of Ladysmith for so long a period is very largely due.’62

He was promoted to the post of Director of Supplies for the entire South African field force, where he was one of the first to realise the advantages of mechanical transport. In this position, he was also a considerable success. Ward’s colleague in the ASC in South Africa, Sir Wodehouse Richardson, was highly complementary about his skills as he noted in his diary:

Colonel Ward has done very well indeed. He is tactful and a persona grata with the headquarters staff or, at any rate, with many of them, and that goes a long way. Anyhow, I hear no complaints from officers who come down country, and generally the first thing one complains about is one’s food.63

Ward’s obituarists agreed. The Times stating that overall ‘the energy and foresight which he... displayed... contributed largely to Lord Roberts’s final victory’ and a fellow officer

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62 Sir George White despatches of 2 December, 1899 and 23 March 1900, quoted in the Army Service Corps Journal, May 1901, pp 45 and 47.
63 Richardson, With the Army Service Corps, 17 July 1900, p 136.
concluded that ‘it can truthfully be said that his burly form, with his magnetic personality, unfailing good temper and geniality, ready to face any trouble or worry, no matter how great, with a cheerful smile, was one of the outstanding features of the siege.’ In his despatch of 2 April 1901 Roberts himself fully more than concurred in this view: ‘His readiness and resource, his imperturbable good temper, his power of organisation, and thorough knowledge of his duties deserve the thanks of all ranks in the Army. Colonel Ward is an officer who stands quite by himself as a Departmental Officer of genius and character.’

On his return to England in late 1900 Ward was created a full colonel and knighted and he was one of only a handful of officers singled out for praise in the otherwise highly critical Royal Commission report on the war. In complementing the work of the ASC the report stated that

Much of the success of the war is to be credited to officers whose names are not much known to the public, such as ... Sir Edward Ward [of whose] direction of food supplies Lord Kitchener said, ‘I consider that the soldier was better fed than in any previous campaign,’ and this statement is supported by a mass of other evidence.

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65 Despatch from Earl Roberts to the Secretary of State for War, 2 April, 1901, quoted in the Army Service Corps Journal, May, 1901, p 56.
66 The Times, 26 August 1903, p 4. Even the official German account of the war, which was highly critical of the British in every other respect, concurred in praising the ASC. The Official German Account of the War in South Africa Prepared by the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin, authorised translation by Colonel W.H.H. Waters, (London, John Murray, 1904), especially pp 7-8.
Ward and the modernisation of the War Office

On his return Ward became First Secretary to Sir Ralph Knox, Permanent Secretary at the War Office. At first, his duties appear to have been somewhat mundane but in 1901 Ward succeeded Knox under William St John Brodrick, becoming the first military holder of the role since the 1870s.67 His appointment was not greeted with universal acclaim and there were ‘many who shook their heads over this appointment, declaring that no soldier could possibly satisfactorily fill this important Civil Service post.’ However, Ward remained at the head of the War Office clerical establishment for thirteen years controlling an organisation several sizes larger than that controlled by his civilian predecessors, ‘the smooth working of which was obviously due in no small measure to the organizing capacity of the man.’68 His military obituarist (anonymous but also possibly Wheeler) concluded that ‘it is doubtful ... whether any more popular high official had ever retired from Government service.’69 It may be argued that this praise is no more than the usual hyperbole of the obituarist but it is strongly supported by the evidence and significantly underplays Ward’s organisational skills. These were rooted in his experience in his service career but also in his far-sighted, indeed innovatory, approach to the use of business methods in military management, which will be explored in more detail in the next section.

67 ‘His principle job was to receive newspaper representatives at the War Office and prevent them from getting in touch with high officers... Col Ward became a most efficient hand-shaker. He had a most charming way of dealing with inquisitive reporters and could get rid of the most persistent enquirers without giving offence.’ Newspaper cutting in TNA, HO 45/13806, Ward of Wilbraham Place, actual source unknown. Tadman has suggested that the role of Permanent Secretary, at least prior to 1904, was unlike that elsewhere in Whitehall. ‘At the War Office this official was never more than a house manager, nor could it ever be otherwise. The reason was that there were a number of different areas of highly complex technical specialisation, and no man, whether a politician or a professional, could ever be master of them all.’ Tadman, ‘War Office’ p 266.
Ward was initially seen as too much of an official by some sections of the military and, by Brodrick’s successor Hugh Arnold-Forster who took over in October 1903, as too much of a soldier.\textsuperscript{70} His tenure coincided with ‘the first major reorganisation of the War Office since the Crimean War despite all the Commissions and Enquiries that had taken place in the interim.’\textsuperscript{71} These changes took place in the aftermath of the South African War and the Commission of Enquiry chaired by Lord Elgin but gathered pace with the establishment of the Esher Committee late in 1903. Esher was in no doubt as to his mission, ‘I shall propose to take the War Office administration right through, from top to bottom, and endeavour to make it a first class \textit{business} machine’ (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{72} Esher recognised that the non-military failings of the war were at Government at senior War Office level and, with his exemplary record and enthusiasm for business methods, Ward was ideally placed to both contribute to and enact the reforms. In 1902-03 Ward chaired the Committee that reorganised the establishment of the Civil Department of the War Office but for a time things did not go smoothly in his new role as a senior civil servant. Brodrick’s attempted reorganisation of the home Army into six districts was a fiasco, opposed by both expert military and public opinion (on cost grounds). With Brodrick discredited, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour needed to find a new Secretary of State. Five candidates refused the post including Lord Esher, but eventually Balfour offered the post to Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster,

\textsuperscript{70} Dictionary of National Biography.
\textsuperscript{72} Esher to Lord Knollys, the King’s Secretary, 27 September, 1903, quoted in Tadman, ‘The War Office’ p 249. As early as 1900 Esher had espoused a number of principles by which the War Office should be reformed which were later included in Henri Fayol’s management ideas including the chain of command; unity of command; appropriate decentralisation of decision making and centralisation of appropriate functions. The ideas were expressed in a letter to Queen Victoria dated 10 December, 1900. See M.R.D. Foot, ‘Lord Esher on War Office Reform’, \textit{Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research}, Vol. 88, No. 355, Autumn 2010, pp 244-248.
a former journalist, who had written extensively about army reform. 73 Balfour, however, made his appointment conditional upon accepting the assistance of a committee, under the chirmanship of Esher, charged with the task of reorganising the department. 74 As Spiers has noted ‘contemporaries were astonished by the rapid production of reports [by the Esher Committee] which were so radical in their implications.’ 75 In February and March 1904 it announced a complete overhaul of the War Office, the removal of the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, and the heads of the four military departments and their replacement by an Army Council and a properly constituted General Staff, with a Chief who was to be the Government’s sole military adviser. The reforms included a separation of responsibilities in Army and War Office such as administration from training and command. This meant that Ward’s role effectively shrank to just that of Secretary to the Army Council but he ‘loyally concentrated on making the new machinery work.’ 76 The fact that he was highly valued, at least by Esher and the Army, was demonstrated by the fact that he was the only member of the Army Council to retain his post in the reorganisation. One reason was that Ward was a supporter of the reforms and, indeed, a close confidant of Esher. Along with Sir George Clarke, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, Ward worked hand-in-glove with Esher. 77 As one commentator has noted ‘the result was friction-free government in army and

73 Esher occupied an unusual position in British political life being both highly influential, especially through his close relationship with the King, but without direct political office.
74 The War Office Reconstruction Committee comprised Esher, Admiral Sir John (Jackie) Fisher and Sir George Clarke the former Governor of Victoria.
76 Dictionary of National Biography.
77 However one commentator, Nicholas d’Ombrain, dissents from this view. In his opinion: ‘Ward quickly assumed the prerogatives of permanent officials anxious to protect their office’ over his ‘demotion’ at the hands of the Esher Committee. D’Ombrain cites Arnold-Forster’s comments on this issue and then moves immediately on to the clash between Clarke and Ward (and the other civilians at the War Office) under Haldane. He states that ‘the first of Clarke’s many caveats to Haldane when he went to the War Office [in 1904] had been to keep a tight rein on Ward, who, having long resented the encroachments of the CID [Committee for Imperial Defence], felt no compunction in attacking the Committee for allegedly giving orders to the War Office. Clarke’s contempt for Ward and his officials was heartily seconded by the new professionals in the Army and elsewhere. Repington was appalled by Ward’s pretensions, regarding him as in any case quite useless at his job.’ War Machinery and High
defence matters in which Arnold-Forster was the only loose part, rattling ominously but without damage to the rest of the machinery.\textsuperscript{78} It is only fair to point out however that, as Beckett says, ‘in carrying out the “clean sweep” of Roberts and his colleagues, Esher, Fisher and Clarke were usurping all established procedures’ and there is more than a grain of truth in Brodrick’s belief that Esher’s influence was akin to power without responsibility and the letters of Clarke and Esher suggest that they were as much Secretaries of State as was Arnold-Foster himself.\textsuperscript{79} It is therefore not surprising that Arnold-Foster did not prove to be a success in his role. He had an inflated view of his own abilities, a ‘genius for reform which he fancied he possessed, and talked or wrote others into thinking he possessed, but in which he was really more deficient than many less able men which rather led others to ignore or

\textit{Policy}, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), pp 152-153. There are a number of problems with d’Ombrain’s argument. Firstly, it unfairly emphasises differences between Ward and Clarke during the Arnold-Forster era by concentrating on just one incident. Generally Ward supported Clarke and Esher’s position versus Arnold-Forster and so to quote the latter in support of Clarke is rather disingenuous. Secondly, he conflates two clashes some seven years apart but it is true that, with the advent of Haldane, Ward and Clarke did find themselves on ‘opposite sides’. What actually happened was that Clarke resigned in July 1907 to become Governor of Bombay lamenting his ‘inability to influence Haldane against a large and costly standing Army’ whereas Ward supported this (d’Ombrain, p 14). D’Ombrain then quotes a highly suspect witness (Repington) to the fact that Ward was held in ‘contempt’ by the professionals. Clarke (and d’Ombrain) attack all Ward’s officials, including his successor Sir Charles Harris, whom Haldane highly praised as having ‘a fine intelligence’ and being both ‘very ingenious and very industrious’ (see Dudley Sommer, \textit{Haldane of Cloan: His Life and Times 1856-1928}, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p 175). D’Ombrain concludes by bemoaning the fact that ‘the permanent officials gained a major advantage over the soldiers, for Ward was reinstated in his former dignity as Permanent Under-Secretary of State’ when Seely succeeded Haldane in 1912 and compares the situation with that at the Admiralty where ‘happily, a similar situation was not to be found’ (d’Ombrain, p 153). Even assuming d’Ombrain’s analysis to be correct (which I would dispute) one should ask who was right regarding the Haldane reforms, Ward or Clarke, and which department was more efficiently organised on the outbreak of war, the War Office or the Admiralty? Tadman supports my view as in his opinion it was the military members of the War Office who supported management reforms and the politicians who often thwarted them (Tadman, ‘The War Office’, p 279).

\textsuperscript{78} Peter Fraser, \textit{Lord Esher a Political Biography}, (London Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973), p 21.
by-pass him.'\textsuperscript{80} Sommer’s conclusion was that ‘Arnold-Forster lacked tact and lectured the Generals rather than persuaded them.'\textsuperscript{81} He was, in Spiers’s words, ‘a man in a hurry,’ one reason being his own health, as he had suffered a heart attack in 1903.\textsuperscript{82} Despite Ward’s usually genial personality there were a number of clashes between the two men. In early 1904, Arnold-Forster objected to an apparent conspiracy between Ward and Clarke to announce appointments without the Secretary of State’s approval. In September, a more serious breach of confidence occurred over Arnold-Forster’s proposals to make all enlistments in the army for nine years (from the current three). Ward leaked the Army Order to Esher saying it was for his ‘secret information, as I am not supposed yet to have seen it’\textsuperscript{83} Clearly Ward realised that what he was doing could be construed as a breach of trust and there was some suggestion of him leaving the War Office to return to South Africa as Governor of Natal. Fraser suggests that Ward was being disloyal to Arnold-Forster by passing information to Esher but one can put a more positive interpretation on Ward’s actions. He felt he had a dual loyalty, to his political boss but also to his King as the holder of His Majesty’s commission. He was certainly not the only officer to act in a similar way when confronted with this situation and he clearly felt that Esher had a firmer grasp of political and military realities than did Arnold-Forster. At the end of 1904, there was an even more serious clash between Ward and his chief. As Secretary to the Army Council all decisions published by it were under Ward’s signature and yet many of them were taken without his

\textsuperscript{80} Wheeler, War Office Past and Present, p 267.
\textsuperscript{81} Sommer, Haldane of Cloan, p 163. Correlli Barnett’s view of him was that ‘Arnold-Forster [was, like Brodrick] another man with a cut-and-dried scheme of army reorganization not closely enough related to the real situation. Nor had Arnold-Forster himself, a cold personality, the temperament of the successful reformer. Instead of biding his time, disarming opposition with dinners and reason, and above all listening in order to learn, Arnold-Forster plunged in with fixed ideas.’ Correlli Barnett, Britain and her Army 1509-1970, (London, Allen Lane, 1970), p 357.
\textsuperscript{83} Spiers, Army and Society, p 124.
knowledge or input. In November, two decisions were published that were inaccurate, one of them of a particularly delicate nature as it stated that a paper was being prepared which was to show the strength of the Army if all of the re-organisation proposals of the Secretary of State were put into effect. Ward sent an irritated memo to Arnold–Forster in which he pointed out that he had not seen the relevant papers and that, as things stood, he ‘was therefore unable to carry out what the report of the Esher Committee described as my “main function”, viz “to correlate the business of the War Office and to secure the harmonious action of the administrative machine as a whole.”’ He pointed out that he had raised this issue on a number of occasions and had made recommendations that would have prevented the problem occurring ‘and I wish accordingly to place on record a disclaimer of any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of decisions circulated for the information of the [Army] Council.’

Such a step was a serious one for a senior civil servant to take with his political superior and especially so for a soldier to his putative commanding officer. Ward’s suggestion had been that decisions should not become operative until they had passed through his hands so that he might ‘prevent the various departments acting independently’. This was the system used at the Admiralty, which all agreed worked well, but what Arnold-Forster proposed was that Ward should act as little more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for these decisions. This led to a further memo from Ward pointing out that Arnold-Foster’s system would lead to a lack of co-ordination and poor management and concluded that ‘I regret that I cannot say that the procedure you suggest meets my views.’ This was strong stuff, and it could easily have become a resignation issue but, in the event, Arnold-Foster compromised and agreed that

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84 Letter from Ward to Arnold-Forster, 21 November 1904, TNA, WO 32/9224.
85 Letter from Ward to Arnold-Forster, 2 December 1904, TNA, WO 32/9224.
papers had to pass through the Secretary who ‘will, where necessary, add any information as to procedure or precedent.’ In some ways, it could be argued that Ward rather ‘got away with it’ as this confrontation came hot on the heels of his disclosure of the Army Order on length of service to Lord Esher. Arnold-Forster had been hoodwinked into believing that Esher had simply been shown a copy of the Order in Ward’s room at the War Office when he had, in fact, been sent a copy.

This was not however the end of the matter. In early 1905, Arnold-Forster produced new proposals for the chairing of War Office Directors’ meetings, up to this point chaired by Ward. Under the new scheme, the meetings would be chaired by whoever was the senior Director present. This was again a recipe for disaster. At a time of significant change, what was required was a strong co-ordinating role which Ward, with his foot in both camps and proven diplomatic skills, was ideally placed to perform. Arnold-Forster’s lack of grip on his department was indicated by the fact that the proposal was rubbished by his own deputy, the Under-Secretary of State the Earl of Donoughmore, the Civil Member of the Army Council. In a memo of 28 February, Donoughmore pointed out that the Esher Committee had stated that ‘the main function of the Secretary [to the Army Council] must be to correlate the business of the War Office & to secure the harmonious action of the whole.’ The new rules would, he felt, prevent this. Furthermore, he continued:

The Esher Committee ... recognised the necessity for a central guiding hand, & selected the Secretary of the War Office to perform this function. If it is now decided that he is not to do so, I really cannot see for what purpose of any importance he exists at all.

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86 Memo attached to Ward letter, TNA, WO 32/9224.
His conclusion was that, ‘War Office business has been a complete tangle for want of such a guiding hand.’\textsuperscript{87} This was not at all complimentary to the way his superior was running the department. Ward added his own comments to Donoughmore’s note and a complete set of alternative proposals, bemoaning the fact that ‘I am asked to issue these rules as a Council decision ... without any opportunity, on my part, of expressing my opinion on a subject with the care of which I have been specially charged.’\textsuperscript{88} Arnold-Forster was clearly losing the battle and quickly compromised. His hand-written conclusion to these notes agrees to most of Ward’s proposals with Donoughmore taking the Chair at Directors’ Meetings. In reality, the Under Secretary attended few meetings leaving Ward in the Chair.

Later in 1905, Arnold-Forster found himself defeated on two further issues by Esher and the Army Council. The first, reductions to the budget for the Volunteer force was over-rulled, explicitly, in Cabinet. The second, Arnold-Forster’s wider proposals on his ‘New Army Scheme’ was dealt with more subversively, along the lines noted above, making maximum use of Esher’s contacts with Balfour, the King and their private secretaries.\textsuperscript{89} Ward placed his principles and his loyalty to his country above loyalty to his political superior. He strongly disagreed with Arnold-Foster’s laissez faire approach, which he considered would undermine the attempts being made to place the administration of the War department on a more business-like footing. All in all this was not a satisfactory state of affairs and could not have continued indefinitely but despite Arnold-Forster’s failings, Balfour did not, and did not wish to, replace him.

\textsuperscript{87} Memo of 28 February 1905, TNA, WO 32/8782.  
\textsuperscript{88} Memo of 1 March 1905, TNA, WO 32/8782.  
\textsuperscript{89} For reforming the militia and home army, increasing recruitment and altering terms of service, see Spiers, \textit{Army and Society}, p 256.
Fortunately, Ward’s frosty relations with his political superior improved dramatically following the fall of the Conservative government in December 1905 and Richard Burdon Haldane’s appointment to the post of Secretary of State for War in the new Liberal administration. Haldane ‘possessed the skills and personal characteristics that Arnold-Foster lacked’ and is often cited as the greatest of Britain’s peacetime holders of the post and his intended modernisation of the War Office ‘would require reforms which would amount to little short of revolutionary.’90 In achieving this aim Haldane had, from the first, much greater faith in Ward and gave him significant additional responsibilities. From May 1906, Ward chaired the weekly Directors meetings where important operational issues were discussed and actions decided. Like several other key army officers (notably Douglas Haig) Ward shared Haldane’s views on the need for significant reform and reorganisation to turn the army into a modern fighting force. He threw himself enthusiastically into these tasks, which included officer recruitment, plans for mobilisation and the re-organisation of the Army Medical Department and that of the War Office itself. Ward was responsible for the compilation of the original ‘War Book’, which set out, in detail, the actions required on mobilization. Though it was later revised it was on Ward’s basic plan that subsequent versions were based and that things eventually went so smoothly in 1914 was again testimony to Ward’s organisational skills. In 1908-09 he worked with Douglas Haig on the production of ‘a codified set of manuals dealing with administration and training’ which became Field Service Regulations Parts 1 and 2. ‘It was very largely his [Ward’s] hand which guided Mr Haldane in his efforts to create the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force between 1906 and 1908. It was he who, with Sir Douglas Haig, Adjutant-General at the time,

mapped out the new regulations.\textsuperscript{91} In 1908 Ward authored the \textit{Territorial Force Regulations} and became Honorary Colonel of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} London Territorial Division. He was also Chairman of the County of London Territorial Force Association.

Ward was a key figure in many other critical improvements bringing his organisational and managerial skills to bear. One was as Chairman of the Committee on Civil Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Sailors, a cause close to his heart and demonstrating his keen humanitarian concern. Previous Committees had reported that the Navy was well supplied from the training ships, but that the Army would get more recruitment if better prospects for civil employment were offered after a certain period of meritorious service. It was generally agreed that ex-service men were efficient workers, many employers stating that they were more satisfactory than civilians, but an over-large network of charitable organisations did the work of finding employment. There were nine voluntary societies, including the Army and Navy Pensioners and Time Expired Employment Society, the National Association for the Employment of Reserve and Discharged Soldiers, and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Help Society. In addition, there were eight societies and agencies governed mainly by commercial as distinct from philanthropic principles. The report concluded that there was much overlapping and waste of resources and effort. Ward felt it was essential that there should be one association to take the place of the existing societies, with an advisory council consisting of members from the more important societies and departments. There should be a central office in London acting as an employment agency, with branches in counties and large towns. It should be assisted by, but not under the control of, the Admiralty or the War Office. Local Authorities should be urged to reserve a number of appointments for ex-service

men. Every soldier should be required to learn some kind of technical work during his military career and recommendations were made regarding their training and provision for welfare. The report was an important precursor for both the work of the DGVO, especially in its ‘rationalisation’ of voluntary efforts, and the post-war treatment of ex-servicemen.

Another of Ward’s achievements was the creation of the Officers Training Corps. In most histories, this reform is credited to Haldane but it was quite definitely Ward’s brainchild. Haldane had little knowledge of the armed forces and relied on advice from key specialists, in this case his chosen specialist advisor was Ward. Ward had first made proposals along similar lines in 1903-04 (i.e. before Haldane’s tenure) which envisaged the creation of an entirely new class of reserve officer. Haldane recognised the OTC as Ward’s brainchild by making him the chair of the committee in August 1906. They examined the schemes in existence in Russia, Japan and Germany and adapted what they saw as the best elements to the British context, proposing that ‘for the purpose of establishing a proper system of progressive military instruction for prospective officers in all branches of the Service, existing School and University Corps should be reorganised into an Officers Training Corps.’ The new Corps would come under the auspices of the War Office and would provide a simple and effective method of counting service in the OTC as part of a candidate’s training for a

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92 Committee on the Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Sailors, 1906, Cd. 2991 and information from British Official Publications Collaborative Reader Information Service at bopcris.ac.uk, http://www.bopcris.ac.uk/cgi-bin/displayrec.pl?searchtext=ex+soldiers&record=/bopall/ref7397.html accessed on 21/09/06.
93 Ernest Teagarden’s assessment of Haldane is that his ‘greatest asset as Secretary of State was his profound ignorance on military matters. He was therefore able to form an independent judgement.’ Haldane, p 26. Higgens rather debunks this idea of Haldane’s ignorance on military matters in his outstanding MPhil thesis ‘How was Richard Haldane able to reform the British Army?’ (pp 52-56) suggesting this was a deliberate ‘cover’ in order to woo the top Generals to his way of thinking (pp 71-72).
95 Interim Report of the War Office Committee on the Provision of Officers, HMSO, 1907, Cd. 3294.
commission in either the reserve or auxiliary forces. This would also help overcome the problem that training for military service was a hindrance to a civil career. Though a disappointment to some, particularly those, like Lord Roberts, who wanted compulsory military service, the scheme was greeted with approval by most. It was enthusiastically endorsed by the Headmasters’ Conference who, only five years earlier, had been against giving boys military instruction at school and its successor, the Combined Cadet Force, is still in existence today. Even though the number of officers produced by the OTC was hugely inadequate for the demands of the First World War, Ward’s proposals had a significant and positive impact. One of its architects commented in 1915 that ‘many armchair critics who looked askance at its inception, have now been forced to recognize its value’ and Worthington has concluded that the ‘optimism surrounding the announcement of the new proposals appears to have been warranted.96 Between 1907 and 1909, Ward also created the framework of the Imperial General Staff which came into existence in November 1909.97

Though many of the reforms with which Ward was associated took place under Haldane’s tenure the principles had been established before the Liberal administration took office, despite the lack of success of Arnold-Foster politically. They transformed the War Office into ‘a form so effective that it remained substantially unchanged for seventy years... The new organisation was uncannily like that of the board of directors in a modern service company.’98 Tadman goes further than this by suggesting that ‘these advances in their appreciation of management principles paralleled the work of the great theorists [notably

96 Captain Alan R Haig-Brown, The O.T.C. and the Great War, (London, Country Life, 1915), p x (Ward wrote the introduction to this book). Worthington, ‘Socialization, Mobilization’. It is also notable that Ward’s report comments that candidates for the Army Service Corps ‘would be selected from men possessing a business training’. Interim Report of the War Office Committee on the Provision of Officers for Service with the Regular Army in War and for the Auxiliary Forces, 1907, Cd. 3294, p 17.
97 Williams, Citizen Soldiers, p 33.
Taylor and Fayol] quite closely, except for this vital difference – that they anticipated the published works by several decades.99 Tadman therefore directly links the thinking that characterised the reforms overseen by Esher and Ward as directly comparable to Fayol’s principles of good management.

In all of the above tasks, Ward utilised his previous administrative experience, putting forward practical managerial solutions to issues that had eluded others. His belief in sound management and business training was prominent in many of the areas under his auspices. However, in one scheme in particular these principles were taken a stage further, again anticipating much of the later work of management theorists. Higgens too has recognised the mechanisms of Haldane’s reforms as mirroring modern management techniques by demonstrating that what was at work was a classic ‘change management process’ predicated upon Haldane’s deep interest in Hegelian philosophy. Higgens concludes that Haldane ‘understood the intellectual complexities of institutional change’ and it is clear that in his many and varied roles Ward shared the same understanding.100

100 Higgens ‘How was Richard Haldane able to reform the British Army?’, abstract.
The LSE Army Administration Course

The final significant change which Ward controlled occurred when he was tasked with War Office re-organisation, and one of Haldane’s main aims was the creation of an administrative staff for the War Office and army separate from the General Staff but with the same ‘real and far-reaching’ strategic control as the General Staff. The subsequent London School of Economics course is again credited to Haldane, especially as he was a founder of the LSE. This is only partially correct; Ward was as much the initiator as Haldane; he had been an administrative officer himself for almost 30 years, so this was his specialist subject. Ward had espoused many of the principles behind the course as early as 1893 and he put forward the idea for the scheme in a memorandum entitled ‘The need for a trained administrative staff’ in February 1906. Clearly though, both men were of the same view on the topic and in the paper, ‘Ward propounded the then revolutionary idea that modern soldiers needed training in modern administrative techniques.’ He enclosed a draft for a three-year staff training course, of which six months were to be spent on accountancy, commercial methods, public administration and finance, production and trade, railway administration and transport and commercial and international law. The final scheme combined Haldane’s aim with Ward’s conviction that management principles needed to be inculcated throughout the administration of both the War Office and the army. Ward was one of the first to apply business methods in Whitehall, some nine years before Lloyd-George utilised similar

102 Spiers, Haldane, p 151.
103 Ward, Supply and Transport on Active Service, pp 18 and 25-26. Haldane proposed something very similar when he said ‘I have noticed in our new Universities with delight degrees established in special sciences. Why should there not be a B.Sc. degree in the science of war?’ Haldane, ‘On the Reform of the Army’ in Army Reform and Other Addresses, (London, T Fisher and Unwin, 1907), p 36. This was in a speech given in Parliament on 8 March 1906, a few days after receiving Ward’s memo.
principles in his wartime coalition, and the first to introduce management training for civil servants and the armed forces.

Ward and Haldane’s conviction that business methods were needed place them within the broader movement for national efficiency that gained credibility after the Boer War. This movement had been vindicated by the failures of the army in South Africa and the enquiries after it, which concluded that major changes were needed. During the War itself, The Times war correspondent, Leopold Amery, demanded ‘nothing less than a revolution’ in army organisation and administration. Britain needed an ‘expert army’, one in which ‘the whole caste system the whole idea of the Army as a sort of puppet show where smartness, gilt braid... must vanish and give place to something real, something business like.’ Amery’s comments gained official support in the recommendations of the Committee on the Reorganisation of the War Office in 1901, chaired by Clinton Dawkins, a partner in the American banking firm of J.P. Morgan. The committee concluded that:

A general, if not a precise analogy, can be established between the conduct of large business undertakings and that of the War Office. There are certain well-defined principles of management in all well-conducted business corporations, and the more closely the War Office can be brought into conformity with such principles, the more successful will be its administration.

Among the ideas the Committee considered to be transferable were: the division of work into well-defined sections; adequate delegation and decentralisation of powers; effective

106 Report of the Committee on War Office Organisation appointed by the Secretary of State for War, 1901, xl, Cd. 580 and 581.
systems that avoided excessive form filling and providing adequate, co-ordination between departments; all principles that remain pertinent in modern management practice.

The movement for national efficiency was led by the former Liberal Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, who had been advocating the need for Britain to be put on a business footing since the 1880s. It was supported by other prominent Liberals and left-of-centre figures including Haldane, Halford Mackinder (Director of the London School of Economics) and the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who along with Haldane had helped establish the LSE. Drawing on a wider political consensus was the dining club the ‘Co-Efficients’ formed by Leopold Amery and Beatrice Webb in November 1902 to air strategies that could be used to promote national efficiency. While it lasted (it disbanded in 1908 over disagreements around tariff reform), the grouping included those previously mentioned plus Sir Edward Grey, Clinton Dawkins, Bertrand Russell, H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw.108

Mackinder had already introduced programmes at the LSE to serve the executives of the railway, banking and insurance industries as well as the Indian Civil Service and Ward had clearly already discussed the idea of a course with Mackinder and Sidney Webb because on the day he drafted his memo he lunched with Mackinder who then wrote to Webb saying ‘it is practically certain that the scheme we blocked out together will go through.’109 This is a

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109 B.W. Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A biography, (College Station Texas, Texas A & M University Press, 1987), p 131. Watt, ‘The London University Class’, p 158. In support of the principle of a course an article had appeared in the United Service Journal the year before written by Captain H.A. Young of the Indian Ordnance Department. ‘Practical Economy in the Army’, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. L, July to December 1906, pp 1281-1285. Young compared the army to ‘a vast business organisation’ and said that what was needed were people who were ‘businessmen first, and officers last.’ The elements of the Geography syllabus for such a course had also been developed by the then Colonel H.S.G. Miles and A.J. Herbotson in the latter’s article in the Geographical Journal in 1903: ‘The Geographical Training of Army Officers in the Universities’. In a letter Sidney Webb described Ward’s
further indication that Ward was at least as involved in the scheme’s genesis as was Haldane. The scheme received the official go-ahead six months later as part of Haldane’s army reforms and immediately thereafter an advisory board was established under Ward’s chairmanship. Its senior military member was Lieutenant-General H.D. Hutchinson, Director of Staff Duties, who was replaced a year later by Douglas Haig when he took up that post. The other military members were Brigadier-General Frederick Clayton (Director of Supplies and later Inspector-General of Communications in France during the war); Major-General H.S.G. Miles (Director of Recruiting and Organization); Brigadier-General R.M. Ruck (Director of Fortifications and Works) and Colonel G.R. Townsend (Commandant of the Ordnance College at Woolwich). Civilian members in addition to Mackinder and Webb were: Sir Frederick Harrison (General Manager of the London and North Western Railway), Sir Hugh Bell (a steel manufacturer from Middlesbrough) and Sir Felix Schuster (Governor of the Union of London and Smith’s Bank). Others who later served on the advisory committee included several who featured in prominent roles during the war including Generals Henry Wilson (in his capacity as Commandant of the Staff College), Launcelot Kiggell (later Haig’s Chief of Staff) and William Robertson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the majority of the war). Bell, Mackinder, Schuster and Webb served throughout the eight years of the course, Mackinder remaining on the Committee after his resignation from the Directorship

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of the LSE. The committee members appear to have got on well and often dined together, Haig being a frequent, and perhaps unlikely, guest of the Webbs.  

Though Ward would have liked to have a period of business training that lasted a full three years it was unrealistic for officers to remove themselves from the prospects for promotion for this length of time and so the final agreement was for a six-month course. The first ran from January to July 1907, with the second following from October 1907 to March 1908. Six further courses ran annually from October to March and in total 245 officers, mainly of the rank of Captain and Major, attended the course from all branches of the army with the exception of the cavalry.

Table 23: Participants in the LSE Administrative Course 1907-1914

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Addressing the opening day of the initial course Mackinder expressed the view that:

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111 He was persuaded to resign and take up politics full time by Leo Amery and Lord Milner and subsequently became Unionist MP for Glasgow Camlachie from 1910 to 1922. Blouet, Halford Mackinder, p 138.
112 Spiers, Haldane, p 151.
113 Watt, ‘The London University Class’, p 162-163. Ward was supported by the military correspondent of The Times, Charles a Court Repington, who also thought the course should be extended to selected General Staff officers. Military Notes, The Times, 30 October 1906, p 15.
114 There were a small number of officers from the reserve list who attended at their own expense.
The Army is the greatest single business in this country... It is true, of course, that it is necessarily conducted on a different principle from ordinary city business. The Army is not conducted for profit, but to produce power. This power is used during peace time in order to maintain peace, and in war time to achieve victory.\textsuperscript{115}

He noted that it was only recently that those in business had recognised the importance of professional training but that:

What the railways, and what the city, among its more enlightened representatives, is beginning to feel is that administration requires a training similar to the professional trainings, and that experience, in the face of German and other foreign competition, is showing that the old typically British way of blundering into the position of a responsible administrator will no longer do.\textsuperscript{116}

So there was recognition both of the novelty of this approach, professional training in management being in its infancy in business let alone in the Army, and of the ‘threat’ that German efficiency posed with its highly trained specialist administrators.

Lectures were given on 14 subjects covering six broader areas: accounting and business methods, commercial law, statistics, transport, banking and economics. They were supplemented by numerous ‘observation visits’ to such enterprises as the offices of The Times, the Great Western Railway Works, the London Docks, the London Omnibus Works, the Railway Clearing House, the Houses of Parliament and Lloyds. Students were instructed by eminent experts in their fields who were drawn from business, the universities and government. Haldane was a frequent lecturer and several others were politically from the

\textsuperscript{115} Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the First Course at the London School of Economics, January to July, 1907, for the Training of Officers for the Higher Appointments on the Administrative Staff of the Army and for the charge of Departmental Services, 1907, Cd. 3696, p 11.

\textsuperscript{116} Report of the Advisory Board, 1907, p 12.
radical wing including Webb, who lectured on the organisation of trade unions, Hastings Lees-Smith, later a Labour Cabinet Minister, (on economics) and the Fabian Socialist Graham Wallas, one of the seminal figures in the development of social science, (on public administration). 117

At the outset Mackinder had told the students on the first course that the ‘syllabuses are tentative, and not yet complete.’ 118 As would be expected in a new course, the balance of topics was adjusted as time went on. There was initially rather too much theory, too much history and insufficient reference to military problems and so the second course included some significant changes with increased time given to statistics, public administration and marine transportation at the expense of accounting and economic geography. 119 By the time of the third course a good balance appears to have been struck and the only significant change to the curriculum thereafter was that Business Organisation, how to structure and organise enterprises for maximum efficiency, became increasingly important. This module included the recognition that ‘business organization is organization of the social organism.’ 120 It emphasised the importance of process and the elimination of waste and, from 1912, included study of Frederick Taylor’s ideas, which had been published in his book *The Principles of Scientific Management* only the previous year. This gave the students an introduction to theories of management that were at the forefront of contemporary thinking. Examination questions covered a range of topics that became highly relevant in the future careers of the participants. Examples include comparing the financial resources of Britain,

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118 Report of the Advisory Board, 1907, p 12.
120 Report of the Advisory Board... Seventh Course, 3rd October 1912 to 19th March 1913, 1913, Cd. 6693, p 5.
France and Germany in view of an outbreak of war involving them (1907), the impact of conscription in wartime (1908), the pros and cons of local recruiting for the army (1910) and the impact on the London market and unemployment in the event of a major war (1912 and 1913). As one graduate of the course wrote, it taught the importance of structure and process in business methods, ‘to consider ourselves as tiny cogs and parts of a vast plant of machinery, each mutually dependent, mutually working in a great common cause.’ This esprit d’armée, Airey, suggested, should supplement the already existing regimental spirit.

The course became affectionately known as ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarden’ and its immediate impact was to assist the LSE’s finances, allowing them to open a refectory serving all staff and students. It also had the significant result of widening the students perspective on the world, including the fact that women too could be intellectuals. ‘The atmosphere at Clare Market is valuable’ Major Airey confirmed, it provided ‘social intercourse with men, women and research students ... who are all so different from the average soldier.’ Lawrence Dicksee, the course’s main accountancy lecturer, was in no doubt that the course significantly improved military efficiency and that it was responsible for the ‘wonderful success of transport and supply’ in the early part of the war. Those who went through the course became senior administrative officers during the war and had a profound influence upon the supply and management of the army. One aspect of the war that gets unanimous praise is its logistical administration and part of the groundwork for this success

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124 Dicksee, Business Methods and the War, p 2. Dicksee was the first Professor of Accounting at any British University holding the post at Birmingham.
125 For a more detailed examination of the subsequent careers of the graduates of the first three LSE courses see Appendix 12.
was laid in the eight courses of 1907-14. When, after the war, the LSE tried to have it resurrected they commented that ‘its value has been testified to be very satisfactory in the War just ended’, and this was a major influence in the course’s revival in 1924 under William Beveridge, the then Director of the LSE.  

Funnell has described the course as ‘amongst the most innovative strategies to raise the commercial awareness and accounting expertise of army administrators’ and demonstrates how it had a significant impact upon the efficient operation of the Ministry of Munitions.

In his inaugural speech in 1907 Mackinder had stated that what the devisors of the course had in mind was ‘to do something more than merely teach and learn; we have to evolve a tradition.’ This view was clearly supported at the highest levels of the army as Funnell has commented: ‘the creation of an Advisory Board … on which sat some of the most senior officers of the various army departments, was a clear indication of the importance with which the army, the War Office and the government regarded the new Army Class.’ The course demonstrates that many of the senior administrative officers and several of the senior commanders of the First World War, not least Douglas Haig, were well-versed in modern business management principles, including the latest thinking from the United States on scientific management. Perhaps this information further weakens the argument that all British First World War Generals were dyed-in-the-wool reactionaries, out-of-touch with the modern world. Stoddart has summarised the courses as providing ‘a precedent for the later university training of Army and Air Force cadets in wartime… It was the beginning of the thinking soldiers army’ and Funnell has suggested that it was a ‘revolutionary

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126 Funnell, ‘National Efficiency, Military Accounting and the Business of War’, p 738. The course was finally discontinued in 1932 in the wake of economies during the Great Depression.


innovation in the education of British army officers and in the approach of the War Office to army administration. There is a good case to be made that the LSE Army Class attempted, and was partially successful, in initiating a management revolution within the administration of the army.

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Retirement

In June 1912 Haldane became Lord Chancellor and was replaced as Secretary of State for War by Jack Seely but this was a seamless transition as Ward’s cordial relations with his political superior continued. In January 1914 prior to the completion of the eighth LSE course Ward retired from the War Office intending to concentrate on his own business activities. Overall his tenure was hugely successful and set in place a more modern and robust establishment. His partnership with Haldane must stand as one of the most fruitful collaborations between a Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary in modern British history. Haldane was highly intellectual, Ward highly practical. Ward had the direct service experience Haldane needed and both men were noted for their diplomatic skills. Most crucially, the two men shared a conviction that business training was essential for a modern army and that the very latest ideas needed to be taught to officers and administrators.

Barnett’s summary of the period 1906 to 1914 is that ‘not since the days of the Commonwealth had the British Army been so generally gripped with a sense of professional purpose in peacetime’ and, through that entire time Sir Edward Ward had been the senior civil servant in charge.  

Ward’s activities did not end with his official role and his voluntary work clearly demonstrated his commitment to the welfare of both current and ex-soldiers. He helped found the Union Jack Club, providing facilities and accommodation for ‘other ranks’ when in...

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131 In a letter to Ward three days before his appointment Seeley wrote: ‘Should it come my way I rejoice to know that I shall have your invaluable help in what must always be a difficult task. However it may turn out otherwise – but even then I should retain, what I most value, your friendship.’ Letter of 9 June, 1912, Percy Noble Papers, No. 428.
London, and was its President for 22 years. In helping transform the War Office into an efficient department of state, he also raised the morale of its staff. He had a keen concern for staff welfare both inside and outside office hours. For example, he organised the War Office Sports Club, comprising officers, private soldiers and civilians and as one of them remembered on Ward’s death, ‘he set himself to infuse a new spirit of camaraderie into the staff under his control, and here, in my view, he accomplished work which will ever make his name memorable.’ He significantly improved relations between the Army and the department, in many instances by replacing civilians with little knowledge by military experts, and helped in the passing of a host of reforms and improvements. His retirement prompted the comment that ‘he has always been a popular figure with the Army. His powers of work and keen enjoyment of it, his invincible good nature, which has never failed, and his loyalty to his friends have won him golden opinions from all who have come in contact with him.’

His work made the British Army significantly more effective and able to concentrate on its key roles. In the words of one historian Ward ‘freed [soldiers] from the necessity to account in minute detail for the disbursement of regimental funds’ and gave officers ‘the opportunity to exercise their own judgement as to the method by which policy decisions were to be enforced.’ This reduction in bureaucracy might not have been as complete as it might have been but it made the Army a more efficient fighting force.

In 1907 Ward had been created KCVO and, on his retirement, a baronet after which he became Chairman and Director of a number of substantial companies. However, the

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133 The club is another institution that is still very much in existence. See http://www.ujclub.co.uk/.
135 The Times, 7 January 1914, p 6.
outbreak of war brought him back to national prominence and no one was more committed to the cause on the home front. During the war, he was an extremely active Chairman of the Council of the RSPCA; Honorary Treasurer and a member of the General Purposes Committee of the West Indian Contingent Committee (which looked after the welfare of West Indian and Bermudan troops); Assistant Inspector of Shells for the Ministry of Munitions and Commandant-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary. However, the role that was most critical prior to his recruitment as DGVO was that in relation to the ‘Camps Library’. During the war, this organisation provided an astonishing total of 16 million books of all descriptions to every theatre of war in messes and rest huts.

For his wartime work Ward was one of the first to be appointed to the highest level of the newly created Order of the British Empire, GBE, in 1919. He died, of food poisoning, in France in 1928 and is buried in Brompton cemetery. Ward’s entry in the Dictionary of National Biography concludes that he was ‘a strong but genial personality, welcoming responsibility, imperturbable, somewhat inarticulate, Ward’s forte lay in execution rather than in counsel.’ It would be hard to disagree and difficult to think of a man who was more suitable for the role he now took on.

137 As Chair of the RSPCA, he ensured liaison between them and the Royal Army Veterinary Corps contributing significantly to the welfare of horses in the army and directly involving himself in cases of animal cruelty in the UK. Arthur William Moss, Valiant Crusade: the history of the R.S.P.C.A., (London, Cassell, 1961), p 122. Ward was also instrumental in Britain adopting humane methods of animal slaughter see The Times, 10 October 1912, p 3. For the role of the Special Constabulary see Clare Leon, ‘Special Constables in the First and Second World Wars’, Police History Society Journal, No. 7, 1992, pp 1-41.
138 See Appendix 5.
139 He was succeeded by his eldest son, Edward, who died in a plane crash in 1930 and then by his younger son, Melvill who died in the USA (the country of both his second and third wives) in September 1973 when the Baronetcy became extinct.
The Operation and Organisation of the DGVO Scheme

In late September 1915, Ward got to work in his new job and it received official Army Council approval in October. The scheme’s aim was coordination to reduce waste and provide maximum support for the fighting troops.\(^{140}\) A press notice was issued on 11 October and the newspapers commented favourably on both the establishment of the scheme and Ward’s appointment in particular. In an editorial under the heading, ‘The New War Work Scheme, Business Methods Welcomed’ *The Times* concluded that:

> Its prime mission is to tell the people of England to make the things which are really wanted and to make them in such quantities as to admit of their being promptly handled by the transport authorities... In other words business methods are to be applied which have hitherto been lacking.\(^{141}\)

So from the first this was seen as another of Ward’s schemes to improve organisations through the employment of management principles. Another key point was that Ward did not want his new department to stifle existing work, just to avoid waste and coordinate it. Specifically he stated that ‘the War Office has no desire to interfere with the patriotic efforts of those who have at the request of Commanding Officers done so much to provide comforts for individual corps.’\(^{142}\) Ward identified that existing work on troop comforts and medical supplies mainly fell into five categories:

1. Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild.
2. The old Regimental Associations, working for particular Units.
3. Red Cross Work Parties.
4. Groups of workers who had worked more or less intermittently.

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\(^{140}\) *Report on the Director General of Voluntary Organisations*, p 2.
\(^{141}\) *The Times*, 12 October 1915, p 11.
\(^{142}\) *Scheme for Co-ordinating and Regulating Voluntary Work Organizations throughout the United Kingdom*, 2nd edition, HMSO, 1 December 1915.
5. Bodies of workers unaffiliated to any central organization – this class forming the
great majority.\textsuperscript{143}

It was mainly with the last two that he was concerned. With regard to the others, he
determined that he would not interfere directly with their work. This decision was also
based, no doubt, on their prestige and their desire not to have a government official telling
them what to do. Nevertheless, he was able to ensure that their activities complemented
those over which he had more direct control.

One of Ward’s first tasks was to ascertain exactly what items were required and then to
allocate responsibility for their collection to the various voluntary groups around the country
based upon their ability to provide them so that ‘no man shall be outside the reach of
comforts.’\textsuperscript{144} His office was responsible for keeping a central register of organisations and
issued certificates to those that it officially approved. They were able to continue their work
with the War Office stamp of approval and there was an official War Office badge that could
be worn to identify volunteers working for approved bodies. Equally, he could withdraw
recognition if organisations failed to meet their quotas.\textsuperscript{145} However, this was as far as the
scheme went; there was no intention of vetting charity organisers for their bona fides or of
scrutinising accounts. Another issue was that of transport and postage costs which were a
significant burden for local charities.\textsuperscript{146} Shortly before the formation of the DGVO this issue
had been taken up by the Workers National Committee. They had pressed for a reduction in
postal charges for parcels sent to men at the Front and Will Anderson had raised the matter

\textsuperscript{143} Report on the Director General of Voluntary Organisations, p 4.
\textsuperscript{144} Memorandum from the Office of Director-General of Voluntary Organizations, HMSO, June 1917.
\textsuperscript{145} The Times, 11 October 1915, p 11 and Minutes of the Croydon War Supplies Clearing House, 12
November and 3 December 1915, Croydon Local Studies Library.
\textsuperscript{146} Councillor J.E. Rayner, Lord Mayor of Liverpool, ‘Live Liverpool: The great maritime metropolis’,
in the House. The WNC therefore resolved ‘that Messers Ben Tillett, H. Gosling, and the
Secretary [Middleton] approach the military authorities with a view to discussing the matter
further.’147 By coordinating supplies at a national level, the DGVO was able to relieve local
organisations of the burden of transport costs, significantly alleviating the problem and
responding positively to the WNC’s criticism. At a local level, the Chairman of the Croydon
War Supplies Clearing House was able to give the details of the scheme to his committee and
within a week, a Borough Association was set up.148

The first requisition order put out by the DGVO accompanied the announcement of its
establishment:

It is notified that mufflers and mittens are urgently needed, and effort should be
concentrated on making these articles to War Office pattern: Mufflers – of fleeced
wool, drab shades, 58in long, 10in wide; Mittens – Of knitting wool, drab shades,
with short thumbs and no fingers, 8in long from wrist to knuckle.149

This was quickly followed by the issue of leaflets that set out the standard pattern for
sixteen items of clothing including shirts, caps, ‘helpless case’ bed jackets and even hose
tops for Highland regiments. In December, Ward sent one of his staff (probably either one of
his two assistant directors Sir John Duthie or Capt S.B. Barney or the Secretary, Alan
Hutchings) to France on a fact-finding trip to report on the best method for distributing
comforts to avoid any of the previous problems.150 As a result of this visit, and after
discussing the issue with both Sir John Cowans and the Inspector-General of

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147 WNC Executive Committee Minutes, 16 September 1915.
148 Minutes of the Croydon War Supplies Clearing House, 18 October 1915. Croydon Advertiser,
Saturday 30 October 1915.
149 The Times, 11 October 1915, p 11.
150 Ward himself made more than one visit to the Western front in his Territorial Army capacities but
must have also looked into aspects of comforts supply at the same time. Williams, Citizen Soldiers, p 33.
Communications, Lieutenant General Frederick Clayton, Ward decided to establish a
‘Comforts Pool’ in each theatre of war, in the charge of the Military Forwarding
Establishment. The basic method of operation of the Pool was that:

1. The DGVO would be advised in advance by the Military Forwarding Officer of the
general needs of the troops in his theatre. They would obtain their information from
Commanding Officers of individual units. Hence, a responsibility was placed centrally
where none existed before.

2. The DGVO would then assemble these needs through the network of voluntary
organisations under his auspices, requesting a certain supply from each according to
its capacity. This ensured that there was not an over-supply of one item and an
under-supply of another.

3. The organisations made fortnightly returns to the DGVO and notified him of any
problems. This ensured that the DGVO was kept up-to-date with the capacity of
individual bodies.

4. The DGVO then organised transport of materials to the required destination,
ensuring that supplies emanating from a particular district were earmarked for the
battalions or units the local volunteers wished them to go to. This was set out to a
considerable level of detail in order to spell out exactly who was responsible for
what and thereby overcoming any delays in supply.

5. Military Forwarding Officers made weekly returns to the DGVO regarding what they
had received and what they had sent on to units. They were also responsible for
informing all units about the ‘Comforts Pool’ and its operation in order to obviate
any more direct requests to the home front. Again, this achieved centralised control and responsibility at senior army level where none had previously existed.\footnote{Memorandum from the Office of Director-General of Voluntary Organizations, HMSO, June 1917.}

From these reports, the DGVO was able to inform local voluntary organisations that their items had reached the right destination. Ward realised that it was essential to maintain ‘the continuance of the close connection which is so valuable between the units and the localities from which they are raised’ in order not to break the bonds of mutual aid and community existing between individual organisations and ‘their’ troops.\footnote{Memorandum from the Office of Director-General of Voluntary Organizations, HMSO, June 1917.} A diagrammatic representation of the administration of the scheme is shown in Figure 18.\footnote{Memorandum from the Office of Director-General of Voluntary Organizations, HMSO, June 1917.}
The comforts pool appears to have been especially successful, speeding up delivery to units and significantly reducing shortages. This was even true as the number of units, together
with the Army, expanded dramatically.\textsuperscript{154} This efficiency led to an elimination of complaints reaching Sir John Cowans in Whitehall. Following the episode of Lt Reynolds and the 10\textsuperscript{th} West Yorks in December 1915 there is no further correspondence on file on the subject, a clear indication that in this respect Ward had done his job.

\textsuperscript{154} British Journal of Nursing, Vol. LIX, No. 1530, 28 July 1917.
'An infinity of personal sacrifice’ - summary and success of DGVO scheme

One provision of the DGVO scheme was that those in charge of county committees were expected to ensure that local organisations were of sufficient size to ensure smooth delivery of the required items and that grouping of bodies might be required in order to achieve this. Inevitably, there were some mismatches in supply and demand. In late September 1916, as winter conditions began to set in on the Somme battlefields, the DGVO issued requisition orders for mittens. Not every organisation had collected the required number and so CWSCH minutes noted that ‘Miss Colam reported a requisition from the DGVO for 2,000 pairs of mittens, and as only 1,200 were in stock, it was resolved to purchase 800 pairs at 1s per pair and debit the Flag Day money with the cost.’155 Other branches had different problems. There were a number of depots in Ireland and whilst many reported no political problems or interference (for example Limerick and Sligo) the Kilkenny (Mount Loftus) Branch account says that ‘the association kept up under great difficulties, owing to political unrest in Ireland.’156 The Lowestoft branch faced a different form of aggression, as it ‘was the only Depot in England to be bombarded by the German Fleet, 26 April, 1916. In spite of every pane of glass being smashed, the work was carried on that day as usual. Three 12-in shells fell within 100yds of Claremont House [their HQ], and many passed over the buildings.’157

In 1916, the Army Council added the task of providing comforts from Britain for the troops of Allied countries to Ward’s list of duties and this included the US troops who began to reach Europe in late 1917. He and the voluntary organisations under his department

155 Minutes of the Croydon War Supplies Clearing House, 29 September 1916, Croydon Local Studies Library.
157 Appendices III and IV, p 36.
received especial thanks from the officer commanding US forces in Britain, Major General John Biddle, on behalf of the 20-30,000 American aviators who were stationed here. The final totals of items produced under the DGVO scheme and distributed to troops, hospitals and others were prodigious.

Table 24: DGVO total items supplied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGVO Total Items Supplied</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mufflers</td>
<td>1,742,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mittens (pairs)</td>
<td>1,574,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmets (wool)</td>
<td>435,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socks (pairs)</td>
<td>3,607,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweaters</td>
<td>123,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyjamas</td>
<td>523,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed jackets and helpless case jackets</td>
<td>325,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed socks</td>
<td>351,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation stockings</td>
<td>154,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital bags</td>
<td>6,145,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandages of all kinds</td>
<td>12,258,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressings of all kinds</td>
<td>45,503,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Woodwork articles of all kinds</td>
<td>516,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books (via the ‘Camps Library’)</td>
<td>16,660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>232,599,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco (lbs)</td>
<td>256,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games</td>
<td>62,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322,840,446</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ward placed an approximate monetary value on these of £5,134,656.\textsuperscript{158} He summarised the work of his department in the following words:

The work of these organizations has done more than any other movement in connection with the war to help and strengthen the morale of our men in the severe trials and difficulties through which they have passed, and has formed a great bond of affection and regard with those left at home.

\textsuperscript{158} Report on the Director General of Voluntary Organisations, p 9. For more about the DGVO’s work with medical supplies see Appendix 6.
When the official history of the Great War is written, there will be no more illuminating page than that which records the noble self-sacrifice of the great band of workers at home whose privilege it has been to take their share and play their part in ministering to the needs of our Army, and in having fulfilled their task loyally, faithfully, and in full measure.159

They also received the grateful thanks of the Commander in Chief. In a letter to Ward Sir Douglas Haig produced an astute assessment when he commented that:

For many years, voluntary organisations of all descriptions have formed a permanent and characteristic feature of our national life. The outbreak of the war opened up a new and wide field for their endeavour, of which they were not slow to profit. Their activities have been doubled and redoubled. All classes of the community, both men and women, have vied with each other in the generous effort to ameliorate the lot of those who were fighting in their defence. Comforts of every sort and in vast quantities, running into millions have been furnished by them for the troops; at a cost of an infinity of personal sacrifice of money, time and toil. No praise can be too great for those who assisted in the task; liberal and loving recognition of the courage and devotion of our fighting men. No words can adequately assess the value of what they did, nor sufficiently express the warmth and sincerity of our appreciation.160

Ward even ensured that the DGVO’s office continued some of its work after the war by asking the various depots to assist in aiding the devastated areas of France with donations of clothing and other essential items.161

The DGVO scheme had a significant impact on reducing overlapping. When the Committee on War Charities was formed to enquire whether further legislation was required James Shaw, County Clerk of Ayrshire, wrote in evidence that overlapping had been reduced and that ‘the voluntary organisation work has been put upon a complete system in the county to a very large extent’ since the advent of the DGVO scheme. With regard to the Croydon WSCH, which was clearly one of the better organised and larger organisations, switching to semi-official status caused few problems either in organisation or in donations. In September 1916, Alice Livingstone of the Croydon War Hospital Supply Depot reported on the merger with the DGVO. She commented that ‘the result has been satisfactory, and orders are now received direct from Headquarters and the Croydon Branch at the Town Hall. By this means overlapping is avoided and the work goes where it is most needed.’

Significantly, though, it was not only the stated aims of the DGVO scheme that were welcomed by the press on its inception. The Times expected Ward’s office to do rather more and that ‘the scheme will stimulate the work of bona fide associations and will, it is hoped, check the operations of certain bodies which are conducted mainly for the benefit of the promoters.’ From the outset, it was clear that the press at least would expect more of the DGVO than he could deliver. It was therefore no surprise when, in March 1916, Truth sounded a critical note. They cited the case of the Sailors and Soldiers Tobacco Fund, which was a perfectly respectable comforts organisation. Truth’s ire was raised because of the proportion of its overheads:

162 Letter to War Charities Committee, 9 June 1916, TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.
164 The Times, 12 October 1915, p 11.
Every shilling contributed by the public only purchased eight pennyworth of tobacco... Yet this fund is recognised by the department at the War Office under Sir Edward Ward... The formation of this department was the first feeble effort to create some sort of order out of chaos, which does not appear to have had much success.¹⁶⁵

This was entirely unfair criticism as control of administrative expenses was certainly not the responsibility of the DGVO. Ward’s remit was insufficient and his powers too limited to expect him to act as a regulator or policeman. It is also important to note that the DGVO was an Army-inspired programme run from the War Office. It was specifically intended to deal with issues of concern to that department, namely the efficient supply of comforts and medical requisites to troops and the deflection of any criticism that the Army was either not doing enough or was failing to coordinate matters. The roles ascribed by The Times and Truth were not those of the War Office but of the Home Department, and Whitehall divisions and rivalries were probably even more significant in 1915 than they are today. In its primary aim of co-ordinating the collection and distribution of comforts, the DGVO scheme was successful. It continued after the enactment of the 1916 War Charities Bill, despite Ward’s concerns that the Act could undermine his own efforts. He himself was able to report in June 1917 that ‘the response to the Army Council’s Scheme for the provision of comforts for general distribution to the Troops in the Field has been highly satisfactory’ and the long delays previously reported had ceased.¹⁶⁶

Another measure of the effectiveness of Ward’s department was that it did not run into the same kinds of problems experienced by other similar projects. The success of the DGVO

¹⁶⁵ Truth, Vol. LXXIX, No. 2046, 1 March 1916
¹⁶⁶ DGVO Memorandum 45A, IWM, WWC BO1 2/26.
scheme encouraged the authorities to act with regard to co-ordinating comforts for Prisoners of War. Following earlier abortive attempts to get the state to take responsibility, in October 1916 a Central Prisoners of War Committee (CPWC) was established under the auspices of the Red Cross and Order of St John on similar lines to the DGVO. Perhaps the problems they confronted were more complex, as they had to co-ordinate activities with foreign and enemy powers, or perhaps they simply lacked the organisational genius of an Edward Ward but it is clear that the CPWC encountered far greater criticism than the DGVO scheme. There is evidence that the new centralised operation reduced the personal touch of local charities supporting local units and, what was worse, much of the criticism came from the PoWs themselves. In February 1917, Rifleman Bernard Britland, a prisoner of war in Germany, wrote to his mother that ‘I don’t know what sort of a Xmas we shall spend this time as the committee parcels are not as satisfactory as home parcels.’\(^{167}\) The CPWC was severely criticised in the June 1917 issue of the Ruhleben Magazine representing the views of men in one of the largest camps in Germany, which also housed civilians. They repeated Rifleman Britland’s reservations and contended that officers were receiving preferential treatment. The Ruhleben article received significant publicity in Britain, so much so that the CPWC Chairman, L.S. Jameson, was forced to issue an official statement to The Times refuting the allegations. His response was more than a trifle defensive, blaming several of the problems on War Office regulations.\(^{168}\) That these criticisms were not simply anecdotal or media inspired is confirmed by the fact that a Parliamentary committee of enquiry into the organisation and methods of the CPWC was appointed. Its report concluded that the CPWC was heavy-handed, bureaucratic and top-down in its approach. It noted that it

\(^{167}\) IWM, MISC 88/57/1.
\(^{168}\) See The Times, 31 August 1917, p 9, ‘Prisoners’ Parcels: Official statement to the editor of the Times’.
‘evoked great discontent throughout the country’ by prohibiting all private parcels to prisoners and the rigidity of its regulations.169 This caused local resentment and the view that the army was taking over, severing ties with local PoWs and undermining local initiatives. It also introduced regulations that privileged officers above other ranks, allowing them an unlimited number of parcels. This was the height of folly and entirely against the grain of what both the DGVO and most other official bodies were doing at the time. The report suggested the scheme had been launched prematurely and it clearly lacked the understanding of the workings of the War Office and Army that Ward enjoyed. Overall, the report is scathing in its criticism of the CPWC, questions the veracity of some its evidence and concludes that the public outcry regarding its work was fully justified.170

Comparison might also be made to the parallel scheme inaugurated in Australia. Whilst the Australian Comforts Fund operated well in many respects, it suffered from two problems. The first was that until August 1916 the supply end of the fund was organised on a state rather than a national basis, which made co-ordination more problematic. The second was that in the field the Fund was administered by civilian members rather than being integrated into the Army in the way that the DGVO scheme was. This led to clashes with the military authorities and even, on one occasion, to ACF officials being arrested as spies. The difficulty was eventually overcome by giving the officials of the Fund military rank.171

Finally, there was the example of the labour organisation put in the hands of Neville Chamberlain. Before it was designated as a ministry, Chamberlain was given the title of

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169 Report on the Joint Committee to enquire into the organisation and methods of the Central Prisoners of War Committee, 1917, Cd. 8615, p 3.
Director General of National Service. His department had the simple purpose of making the best use of all people, men or women, in any industry, occupation or service. Chamberlain was not lacking energy and assembled a large staff but his work became confused with that of the Ministry of Labour and he fell back on trying to assemble the National Service Volunteers to take civilian jobs and release more men for the forces. This too failed, and it is hard to disagree that the role ‘proved to be a poisoned chalice, a job in which he was set up for failure, in part because he lacked a seat in Parliament and experience in national government. Moreover, Lloyd George disliked Chamberlain, and the feeling was reciprocated. In the following year Chamberlain resigned.’\textsuperscript{172}

Overall, the DGVO scheme was clearly needed and it overcame many of the supply problems encountered in 1914 and 1915. At the outbreak of war a localised approach to comforts and medical supplies was all that existed but as Pedersen has noted, ‘by the end of 1915 the government had started to realise that a voluntary and localised approach to the war was not enough.’\textsuperscript{173} Such co-ordination required great skill and diplomacy if it was not to alienate the mass of charitable activity that had been generated. In this, the appointment of Sir Edward Ward was a masterstroke. He was probably the only person who combined an intimate knowledge of the armed forces, with a commitment to efficient management and a compassionate understanding of voluntary effort. The DGVO scheme was a halfway house between unregulated and uncoordinated activity and full legislation. It was designed to solve a specific problem, that of an imbalance in supply of troop comforts, rather than to control the entire voluntary effort of the country. Based as it was on co-operation rather than

\textsuperscript{172} Marwick, Deluge, p 253 and Dictionary of Unitarian and Universalist Biography, http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/nevillechamberlain.html, accessed on 05/05/10.
\textsuperscript{173} Sarah Pedersen, ‘A surfeit of socks?’, p 51.
legislation it was inevitable that it worked well when dealing with well-organised, altruistic groups. What it could not do was deal with abuses of philanthropic principles by an unscrupulous minority of individuals who saw an opportunity for personal gain in the upsurge of charitable and voluntary giving initiated by the war.
Concerns and Legislation – The 1916 Act and its aftermath

Figure 19: The Wipers Times takes a ‘dig’ at charity

DON'T FORGET WEDNESDAY, MAY 24th.
IS THE
THE "NEW CHURCH" TIMES FLAG DAY:
PROCEEDS OF SAME TO BE DEVOTED TO THE FUND FOR PROVIDING
WARM WOOLLENS FOR WAR-WORN WALLOONS.
NO ONE SHOULD BE SEEN ON WEDNESDAY, NEXT NOT WEARING A FLAG, AS
THIS IS A MOST DESERVING CAUSE. THE FOLLOWING WELL-KNOWN
LOCAL LADIES HAVE CONSENTED TO ACT AS STREET VENDORS;
Lady ETHEL FIVEAYE, Countess of Popieraghie;
Baroness BERTHA, of Berloo; Mrs. Wm. WIGGINS,
of Wulverghem ; Lady WALTER WHIZZ-BANGE, of
Whytchate, and many others too numerous and costly
to mention.

MEDALS AS A SUBSIDIARY LINE
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION SEE SMALL BILLS.

Source: The New Church Times, 22 May 1916, p 2.

‘Almost an impossible task’ - Pressure for Legislation

The creation of the DGVO dealt with the most urgent aspect of charitable support for Britain’s forces. In co-ordinating supplies of comforts, Sir Edward Ward’s department ensured there was less duplication of effort and a more equitable distribution. As such, the DGVO dealt with abuses at the supply end of charity. However, it had no influence over the collection of charitable funds, which remained open to potential mismanagement or even outright fraud:

Chapter Summary
- Public and media pressure for charity legislation
- The War Charities Committee and Act
- Evidence of fraud and operation of the Act
- Summary of post-war charitable activity
‘The professional writer of begging letters has now adapted his whine to a patriotic tune’, The Times commented. Impostors posing as wounded soldiers frequented railway stations asking for loans of money. Since charitable sentiments reached new heights, so too did the opportunities for trickery. ‘The worst class of all’ was the impostor who watched casualty lists and wrote to the relatives of a dead ‘comrade’ requesting payment of an alleged debt.¹ It was no surprise that unscrupulous individuals existed who were very eager to exploit the extraordinary generosity of the public towards war related causes and there were very few legal barriers in their way. There were laws that regulated street collections in London but there was no overall regulation or registration of charities.² The Charity Commission only oversaw those charities with a permanent endowment and the vast majority of the myriad bodies that sprang up after August 1914 had no intention of establishing an endowment; they existed for immediate financial aid.

An indefatigable opponent of charity abuse and proponent of charity control was the magazine Truth. Founded in 1877 by the radical Liberal journalist and politician Henry Labouchere Truth had made a speciality of exposing financial and charity scandals since the 1880s.³ Its assertion was that ‘Truth deals with all current topics of the day in as kindly a manner as the title permits.’⁴ This did not prevent their unrelenting pursuit of those it saw as sponging or preying on public sympathy. A contemporary press directory commented that ‘Truth has always been famous for its fearless and valuable exposures of frauds.’⁵ The magazine’s motto, taken from Cicero, was ‘Cultores Veritatis Fraudis Inimici’ – cultivator of

² Street collections in London were regulated by the Metropolitan Streets Act, 1903.
³ Edited since 1909 by Robert Augustus Bennett when Labouchere relinquished responsibility it was published every Wednesday, price 6d. Brian Harrison, Peaceable Kingdom, p 245.
truth, enemy of fraud. They also exposed professional blackmailers, girl-floggers, shady hospitals, shadier Friendly Societies, moneylenders, quack doctors, religious humbugs, fraudulent company promoters, fake mediums and inefficiency and scandal in the Army.\(^6\)

Scores of libel actions had been brought against them and:

Although in the first twenty years of the paper’s existence [Labouchere] had only defended six cases unsuccessfully, he had lost at least twenty thousand pounds during that period because of his inability to obtain costs either from those who were defeated or from those who, like Horatio Bottomley, abandoned proceedings before the cases came into court. *Truth* had also opened funds for the various needs of poor children and had compiled an annual “Who’s Who of Impostors.”\(^7\)

It did not take *Truth* long to attack some of the manifestations of charitable support that exploded in August 1914. As early as November of that year *Truth* carried a report in the ‘Scrutator’ column entitled *Charity Chaos* lamenting the disorganised nature of the charitable effort and calling for ‘some sort of order to be brought to this charity chaos.’\(^8\) This was, perhaps, a trifle harsh and their criticism that war-related appeals were diverting funds from existing causes was not borne out in reality.\(^9\) Nevertheless, the article did contain some valid criticisms of the current war charity scenario. They were probably correct in assuming that many of those who ran their own organisations preferred ‘to be generals in their own little army of one to being useful privates in a well-organised battalion.’ *Truth’s* recommendation was government action and control, ‘a charity clearing house which should

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\(^6\) They were, for example, notable supporters of Major Adam, see Appendix 4. In 1896 Winston Churchill came under their spotlight for his involvement in a possible betting scam. Mason and Riedi, *Sport and the Military*, p 54.


\(^9\) See Chapter 6.
winnow the true from the false, the needful from the unnecessary, and see that the stream of contributions is directed into channels by which it would reach those for whom it is intended.10 Truth mounted an unrelenting campaign over the next 18 months to bring about this type of intervention. It was also the main organ to expose one of the first charity scandals, the activities of the Belgian Soldiers Fund.11

Another source of pressure was the charities themselves. Recognising that fraudulent operations could have serious implications for public confidence and affect the income of legitimate appeals, many charities began to press the authorities for intervention. The mouthpiece of the COS, the Charity Organisation Review, made a call for action when it castigated ‘all the sordid trickery of the social parasites [and] swindlers who prey on the benevolent public [and who] have reaped a large harvest since the war began.’12 The COS did their best to operate a system of self-regulation whereby legitimate charities swapped information about dubious characters.13 Ultimately, though, such a system could not possibly work given the scale of wartime charitable activity.

A number of MPs also took up the cry against charity abuses around the same date. Will Anderson asked, on 16 June 1915, what was being done to avoid duplication of effort and overlapping of appeals given the ‘rapid multiplication of voluntary agencies dealing with various phases of war relief?’14 In reply the President of the LGB, Walter Long, said that he hoped the establishment of authorised bodies dealing with pensions, allowances and

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11 For details of the Belgian Soldiers Fund see Appendix 7.
12 Charity Organisation Review, No. 37, June 1915, p 284.
13 ‘The WRC energetically spread warnings against the French Relief Fund [see Appendix 9] and received warnings from the COS about the Cosmopolitan Homes for Chronic Invalids and Invalided Belgian Refugees.’ Cahalan, Belgian Refugees, p 465.
disabled soldiers would help. The War Pensions Bill passed into law the following month, but he agreed to consult with the Home Secretary regarding what else might be done ‘for investigating and controlling organisations which appeal for public subscriptions and donations.’15 Just six days later Laurence Ginnell (Irish Nationalist MP for Westmeath North) asked whether, given the number of collections, ‘organised for personal or even criminal purposes’ licensing of collections would be introduced. Sir John Simon responded that the matter was ‘receiving attention.’16 Anderson kept up the pressure the following month with a written question that queried the seriousness of some appeals and again asked for legislation in the light of two appeals supposedly by animals, ‘one issued in the name of Wendy, a chestnut mare, for sun shelters for Army horses and one by Togo, a black spaniel for kennel huts for Belgian Army dogs.’17 This exchange stimulated The Times to action which no doubt agitated the government still further. On 28 July, an article appeared under the title ‘Waste of Charity: The Evil of Overlapping Funds’. It reiterated previous criticisms and again urged concerted, official action.18 Still nothing happened and Anderson was back on the case in December, asking a question of the Prime Minister, in which he quoted the £20 million estimate of the value of funds raised to date. He said that the evidence that some of these funds were being misappropriated was clear, as a man had just received a sentence of three months in Portsmouth for collections under the bogus Patriots League.19 Again, the

17 Proceedings HoC, Vol. 73, 23 July 1915, Col. 1817. He was echoing one of the bugbears of Truth who also disliked certain irrational animal appeals despite the success of ‘Private Tom’ and his kind, see Appendix 2.
19 This was Herbert Cole and suggests the figure may have been quoted in connection with this case. Cole was sentenced to three months imprisonment under the Vagrancy Act in December 1915. Described as an ‘author and publisher’, Cole ran the bogus Patriots’ League, which claimed a connection with the League of Mercy. See The Times, 6 December 1915, p 3; Hampshire Telegraph and Post, 3 December, 1915, p 4 and 10 December, 1915, p 4.
answer was that the matter was being considered. Having had their fingers burned with the failed 1914 legislation the government was not going to rush anything.

Pressure mounted further in the New Year, initially when a number of newspapers took up the cry for legislation, in respect of the various funds for Belgian relief in the wake of the Belgian Soldiers Fund case. Two of the most vehement, as already noted, were Truth and the Daily Chronicle through its editor, Robert Donald. In February, the Chronicle summarised their criticisms: overlapping effort, extravagance and outright fraud and Donald had two main demands. Firstly, it should be made more difficult for entirely bogus charities to be established. Secondly, those whose motives were sound should be required to be registered to avoid excessive overlap and duplication. Charities should also be required to publish their accounts (which should be properly audited), have a properly constituted committee, avoid excessive administrative expenditure and have the bona fides of their promoters checked to ensure that any patrons could be certain they were putting their names to legitimate organisations. By now, the pressure on the government was reaching a critical level and it was clear that action, rather than promises, was required. The first move was that of the LGB which took steps with regard to Belgian relief funds, only sanctioning those that received the specific endorsement of the Belgian government. However, this rather feeble reaction, which had no powers of inspection or any requirement to submit accounts, was never going to answer the critics whether in the press, parliament or among the charities themselves.

In February 1916, the government was still resistant to legislation. James Rowlands (Liberal, Dartford) asked of the President of the LGB if the scope of the action the Government had
taken on Belgian Relief Funds would be extended to all war charities. Walter Long’s reply did not totally rule out action but he made it sound extremely difficult as ‘we have looked into the question very carefully, and it seems almost an impossible task’. In a classic politician’s response he said ‘I should not like to promise to do that, because my promise might be taken to indicate that there is some hope that we might be able to do it.’

It was no surprise that Truth pounced on his words and refuted them. In the same article that criticised the DGVO scheme, which it misidentified as a regulatory mechanism rather than a co-ordinator of supply, it summarised the progress to date. Truth considered that ‘the task [was not] so difficult as it appears to be.’ They cited the recent order issued under the Metropolitan Police Act forbidding street-collection unless authorised by the Commissioner of Police, which had ‘an excellent and immediate effect’. Though recognising that legislation was not ‘likely to be satisfactorily accomplished by piecemeal departmental action’ Truth bemoaned the uncoordinated nature of regulation to date, suggested some ideas that found their way into the final Act and urged cross-party parliamentary action.

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Official Delegation and the War Charities Committee

Hot on the heels of the *Truth* article the next move was taken by the charities under the leadership of the COS. A deputation of 24 UK-wide and English organisations headed by the Duke of Norfolk and including all the major ones such as the Red Cross, NRF, COS and WRC, met with the Home Secretary, Sir Herbert Samuel, on 3 March 1916. The aim of the delegation was to get Samuel to extend legislative control of charities and ‘that in future all appeals to public benevolence in connection with any War Relief Funds should only be permitted after a licence for the purpose has been granted by the Home Office.’ They hoped that such legislation would not only act as a guarantee against corrupt practice but ‘will increase public confidence in the support of those deserving organisations who are endeavouring to minimise the terrific sufferings of war.’ Sir Herbert was not encouraging and was supported by his officials, one of whose fears was, unsurprisingly, the additional work any legislation would cause. At one stage, the Home Secretary referred to the fact that the delegation had not, up to this point, mentioned any specific cases of abuse. Rather helpfully for the delegation Sir Edward Henry, Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and part of the government team at the meeting, intervened and said ‘I can think of nine or ten funds straight away’ and he described several of the cases investigated by Inspector Curry. Sir Herbert then raised a further difficulty. If the government authorised

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23 Though the subsequent committee took evidence from Scotland there appears to have been no intention of including Scotland in the legislation until after the passing of the War Charities Act. This would seem to be for a combination of technical and practical reasons. Scotland has different charity law and therefore would have required separate legislation and, with the possible exception of Dr Sarolea’s fund mentioned later, there was far less evidence of potential misuse in Scotland.

24 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.

25 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.

26 Indeed Cahalan has said of his comments to the delegation that he treated the deputation ‘to a dazzling display of pessimistic logic. Seizing on every ambiguity and uncertainty in the proposals, he emphasised the difficulties in bringing in a law.’ Cahalan, *Belgian Refugees*, p 490.

27 Transcribed from F Primrose Stevenson’s shorthand notes of the meeting TNA, HO 45/1084/308566. See Appendix 8.
charities then they could be blamed if one of these officially sanctioned organisations was found to be fraudulent.\textsuperscript{28} He got to the crux of the issue when he summarised that ‘the question is, how great the evil is, and whether it is sufficient to necessitate the creation of this new organisation [to vet and investigate charities] and the establishment of the new principle of official control of charities.’\textsuperscript{29} Sir Edward Henry then came up with a compromise solution. The delegation wanted a positive vetting of all charities thus providing the sort of official guarantee Sir Herbert was so worried about. Instead, Henry proposed requiring registration but investigation only by exception, when doubts were raised about an organisation. This would provide ‘no guarantee from the Home Office, but the public would have this much satisfaction, that if they made complaints against these Funds, they would know that their books were liable to be inspected.’\textsuperscript{30} This was eagerly seized upon as a potential solution that could be acceptable to both sides. One member of the delegation, Aneurin Williams, Liberal MP for Northwest Durham and representative of the Armenian Refugees Fund, clearly spoke for many when he said ‘I think Sir Edward’s suggestion seems to be a most excellent and practicable one.’\textsuperscript{31} It was even supported by that outspoken critic of charity abuse Robert Donald, attending the meeting in his role as a member of the National Committee for Relief in Belgium. He went even further than Williams did by stating, ‘I think it is the absolute solution... It gets over the Home Secretary’s difficulty of the State organised charity.’\textsuperscript{32} Even so, Samuel was careful not to commit himself to anything at the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{28} Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{29} Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{30} Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{31} Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{32} Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566. Sir Frederick Robertson (of the Society for Friends of Foreigners in Distress) asked the pertinent question as to how unauthorised appeals would be prevented and the Home Secretary responded that if the public supported such an appeal it would be ‘the public’s own fault’.}
end of the meeting. His concluding remarks were that ‘I am afraid I cannot do more than say that all these points will receive careful consideration.’

The matter was put in the hands of Samuel’s departmental officials and his private secretary, S.W. Harris, prepared a memo on 14 March. He summarised two possible scenarios outlined at the meeting: firstly, pre-investigation of organisations before registration; and secondly, scrutiny of activities only after registration. If abuse were to be completely prevented then both would be required. Harris concluded that this ‘would be a big piece of work. [It] would require a considerable staff and cost a great deal and I am afraid it is impossible to think of securing this maximum degree of protection.’ Having rejected the most complex solution Harris considered the difference between licensing, i.e. close scrutiny of organisations, and registration, which would be a looser control designed to root out worst case abuses and which would only investigate charities in detail when abuse was reported. Registration would ‘involve the minimum of work and expense... and would also give the minimum of protection to the public.’ Were this solution to be adopted, he listed four potential problems. Firstly, there was the possibility of the Home Office being blamed when something went wrong. Secondly, there was the potentially high level of complaints to investigate. Thirdly, there was the issue that registration would need to encompass every small local fund as well as national ones and including every level in between. Finally, there was no existing branch of the Home Office that could undertake the task. He reached the following conclusions, if the registration route was the one adopted, which combined many of the points that had been raised in debating the issue in the press, parliament and elsewhere:

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33 Stevenson’s notes TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.  
34 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.  
35 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.
• There should be a registration fee that would, partially at least, offset the cost of administering the scheme;

• Unless a charity was registered, it would be barred from making collections;

• There would be a registering authority with the power to cancel registration;

• Local funds should be registered locally (at county level), national ones through a Central Advisory Committee;

• The Central Committee would have a permanent staff (possibly seconded from the Charity Commission, Board of Education or Audit Office);

• The registering authority could also help prevent overlapping by not registering organisations that overlapped with others.

Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, agreed with most of these recommendations but added that the Central Committee should not just be advisory; it should have the power to refuse registration. If it did not and the ‘Home Secretary is responsible, it will bring refusals to register into constant discussion in the House of Commons.’

On receipt of this advice, which now favoured some form of legislation involving registration, Samuel decided to seek further evidence and reach some consensus. On 12 April, 1916, he therefore appointed an official War Charities Committee ‘to consider representations which have been made in regard to the promotion and management of charitable funds for objects connected with the war, and to advise whether any measures should be taken to secure the better control or supervision of such funds in the public interest.’

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36 Note dated 15 March 1916, TNA, HO 45/1084/308566.
Appointed to Chair the Committee was John William Wilson (Liberal MP for North Worcestershire). They held nine meetings between 4 May and the beginning of June taking evidence from charity specialists, journalists and government officials. The first meeting quickly agreed that some form of legislation was necessary. Sir Ernley Blackwell made reference to a number of key scandals: the French Relief Fund, the War Babies Fund, Heroes Poultry Farms and the Cripples Pension Society. They decided that further proof of abuses was unnecessary, but in the event still took more evidence on this point, and finally agreed upon a list of witnesses to call. The second meeting took place on 9 May and began the collection of evidence with the appearance of Mr G.S. Paternoster, assistant editor of Truth. He believed that all charities should be registered ‘because almost all charitable funds which were established before the War are now making appeals to the public in connection with the War.’ He also stated that management costs should be no more than 10%, a belief which has proved remarkably persistent to the present day.

The Committee was working with as much speed as possible and thus tended to reach conclusions as it went along, some of which it then re-adjusted in the light of further evidence. At this meeting, the Committee decided against the idea of an all-embracing system of regulation, thus immediately rejecting Mr Paternoster’s contention. It was clear they wished to do the minimum possible to allay the public’s fears rather than eliminate all possible abuses as supported by key critics like Truth and the Chronicle. To be fair to the

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38 Its other members were: Sir Ernley Blackwell (Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Home Office); Will Crooks (the Labour MP for Woolwich who had defeated Major Adam in the December 1910 election); Lady Gertrude Emmott (from the War Refugees Committee); Ewan Macpherson (Legal Member of the LGB for Scotland); James Francis Mason (Conservative MP for Windsor and a mining, iron and steel millionaire); Francis Morris (Chairman of the Children’s Country Holiday Fund and of the Administrative Committee of the COS) and F.J. Willis (Assistant Secretary of the LGB).
39 See Appendices 8 and 9.
40 Minutes of and Memoranda Submitted by Witnesses to the Committee on War Charities, TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.
Committee the regulation of all charities would have been somewhat beyond their stated brief. Instead they came to the conclusion that what was required was a simple scheme which could be put into force at once for preventing existing abuses, ‘rather than an elaborate system of supervision which would involve the setting up of a new Government Department.’\textsuperscript{41} Therefore they agreed that the chief question was not how far to extend registration but only whether to enforce registration under penalty or not.

Two days later, they heard from Mr E.C. Price, Secretary of the Inquiry Department of the COS. True to the COS’s principles he too supported the registration of all charities, one reason being the difficulty of defining in statute what was meant by a ‘war charity’. This was indeed one of the legislators’ principal difficulties but his main point was ignored. The next two witnesses, Algernon Maudslay, Hon Secretary of the WRC and his colleague Mr W.A.M. Goode, Hon Secretary of the National Committee for Relief in Belgium favoured compulsory registration enforced by penalty. Given their experience, this was hardly surprising. Several of the scandals involved assistance for Belgium; there was the issue of the Belgian Soldiers Fund and its offshoots and the WRC had been directly swindled by the multiple fraudster, Margaret Robertson.\textsuperscript{42} She had been employed in the clothing department of the fund and had forged receipts that had cost the Committee £499. She had also attempted to collect funds for the purchase of an X-ray motor ambulance for the Italian army. For a while, she had been successful enough to move from her lodging in Coram Street to the Waldorf Hotel where she posed as the Honourable Mrs Robertson. She appeared for trial at the Old Bailey in January 1916 and was sentenced to eighteen months hard labour.\textsuperscript{43} Despite the fact that

\textsuperscript{41} TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.

\textsuperscript{42} See Appendix 7.

she had previous convictions (for forgery) this appears rather harsh in the light of other sentences meted out to charity fraudsters and one suspects that it may have had something to do with her lifestyle: in handing down the sentence the Recorder referred to her ‘riotous living’, and for being so brazen in impersonating a member of the aristocracy.

The pioneering Guild of Help organiser Frederick D’Aeth, Secretary of the Liverpool Council of Voluntary Aid, who appeared before the fifth meeting again urged a compulsory system of registration. This session also took evidence from the Chronicle’s editor, Mr Donald, who presented a fat file of evidence with regard to Miss Carey and the Belgian Soldiers Fund.44 Not surprisingly he too supported the registration of all charities as did Mr C.F.A. Hoare (Principal Clerk to the National Health Insurance Commission) and Miss M.H. Mason, who in common with Lady Emmott, had bitter experience of Miss Carey’s activities with respect to the National Food Fund and who had had extensive previous correspondence with the Home Office urging detailed control.45 She also wrote an article for the English Review stating her views on the topic, recommending central organisation under the Home Office with local enforcement by the police.46 Also giving evidence at this meeting was the redoubtable Detective Inspector Curry. He carefully listed what he saw as the ‘chief evils’ that currently existed:

1. The plundering of funds;
2. Irresponsible people starting funds;
3. Funds conducted either without any committee or with bogus committees;

44 It also contained a reference to the Immediate Assistance Committee for War Victims, another Belgian Fund, whose general manager had committed suicide ‘when it was found that he had misappropriated a considerable sum of money’ TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32, Robert Donald typescript submission.
45 The Home Office were relatively unimpressed with her ideas, which were written ‘entirely from the London point of view’ and were impracticable. TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32, ‘AJE’ handwritten note.
4. Insufficient checks on the expenditure of money;
5. Obtaining secret commissions on goods purchased;
6. Exaggerated appeals;
7. Patrons lending their names to charities without proper inquiry; and
8. In the case of appeals for the Allies, ignoring the Minister or Ambassador of the
country concerned.

He handed over a dossier of evidence regarding seven specific war charity scandals.\(^ {47}\) His main point was that control of abuse was both necessary and practicable. He said that the police ‘could without any difficulty have obtained within a few days sufficient information about the promoters [of bogus charities] ‘to shew [sic] that they were not suitable persons to have control of such funds.’\(^ {48}\) One point he made was extremely pertinent. He stated that where a genuine charity had been defrauded in ‘many cases [they were] unwilling to prosecute for fear of reflections being made on their management’ and thus losing public confidence. This is still a real problem with regard to charity fraud and it also meant that Inspector Curry was not able to give the Committee details of perhaps the clearest example of fraud with which he had been involved.\(^ {49}\)

Isaac Cowie, General Secretary and Treasurer of the City of Edinburgh COS described another type of abuse at the next meeting. He claimed that many of the organisations collecting for war relief in his city had supposedly ‘honorary’ officials who were, in fact, being paid ‘substantial gratuities’, though his memorandum of evidence failed to give any specific examples. It was no surprise that he too favoured ‘strong regulation’ even if this

\(^{47}\) See Appendix 8.
\(^{48}\) TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.
\(^{49}\) That of ‘Captain’ Illingworth, see Appendix 10.
required a substantial bureaucracy. His fellow Scot, John Samuel, Official Secretary to the
Lord Provost of Glasgow, disagreed. He was ‘entirely opposed to the employment of paid
officials in connection with charities of any kind.’ Taking a devolutionary stance, he warned
against over-regulation, especially any system run by a centralised, national bureaucracy.
Citing the example of the NRF, he contended that ‘there is always a danger of private and
voluntary benevolence suffering where subscriptions are amenable to any system of official
or red tape control or centralization.’ Samuel said that in Glasgow where they had, as we
have seen, taken a very close interest in war charities, ‘I can confidently say that abuses have
been very few in number and almost negligible in their extent.’ His arguments on local
control were quite persuasive and clearly had an impact on the Committee and the eventual
system of control, which tried to avoid the kinds of problems that had dogged the NRF.
Another provincial witness, the Rev A.G. Lloyd, Chairman of the Birmingham Mutual
Registration Assistance Committee, was of the opinion that legislation, of whatever kind,
would assist legitimate charities in their work stating that ‘compulsory registration ... would
strengthen their position immensely.’

The final meeting to take evidence on 31 May heard from the Private Secretary to the Lord
Mayor of London, Sir William Sowsby, who was another to urge universal registration and
from the Chief Charity Commissioner, H.W.T. Bowyear. He remained in favour of compulsory
registration and recommended that local authorities should act as the registering authority
reporting to a central body, in which role the Commissioners were prepared to act. He was,
however, against registration of all charities as he felt that existing bodies (the Red Cross,

50 Minutes of and Memoranda Submitted by Witnesses to the Committee on War Charities, TNA, HO
51 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32, Samuel typescript submission.
52 The passage in his typescript advocating local control is marked up in the file by Home Office
officials.
53 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.
hospitals etc) would oppose the requirement of registration of pre-war charities. At this meeting, it was agreed that Sir Ernley and Mr Willis would draft the Committee’s report and this was considered and agreed at the final meeting on 1 June.
Committee Recommendations and the Passing of the Act

Probably the most important stimulus to war charity legislation was the publicity surrounding dubious or fraudulent organisations. Journalists, politicians and some prominent charities seized upon these cases to urge government action to prevent abuses of public trust; but just how much evidence of fraud was there? How many people were prosecuted? It is noteworthy that one of the key critics of fraud and waste was Truth who were continuing a long-running campaign and, it might be argued, were thus pre-disposed to find fault. Nevertheless, Truth was certainly right that charity fraud was not new; it has probably existed for as long as there have been charities in existence. As early as the fifteenth century bills of complaint came to the Lord Chancellor about the misuse of charitable legacies and Fishman has called the first quarter of the nineteenth century the ‘golden era of chicanery involving charities’ but did the war lead to an increase in fraud or turn previously respectable individuals into fraudsters? The evidence rests on a relatively small number of cases, nearly all of them London-based and investigated by the same person, the aforementioned Detective Inspector Curry. Whilst Curry, in both his evidence to the War Charities Committee and his official reports to Scotland Yard, is commendably objective, some of the use to which his cases were put were far less fair and often drew conclusions that were not supported by the evidence. In addition most of the culprits were certainly ‘up to no good’ before the war and simply used it as a new cover for their activities.

The main cases that were considered in the Committee’s report, together with details of others that were excluded can be found in Appendices 7 to 10. What can be concluded about the charity scandals of the first two years of war? Were they so conclusive that legislation was inevitable? Where the cases potentially involved large sums (the Belgian Soldiers Fund and especially the French Relief Fund) there was no clear evidence of fraud. Where there certainly was fraud (the Cripples Pension Society, the War Orphans Fund and the activities of Thomas Alroy and ‘Captain’ Illingworth), the sums were minor. However, at this distance, it is very difficult to pontificate. It is easy to say that the cases were insignificant in relation to the totality of wartime charitable effort, but this is to ignore the impact of fraudulent activity on public opinion, especially in the circumstances pertaining at the time. As a modern report has suggested, ‘the impact of fraud on individual charities and the sector as a whole can be devastating. It can damage reputations, lead to the loss of key employees, volunteers and donors, diminish financial reserves and limit the range and extent of charitable activities that can be undertaken’.

Given only the clear instances of fraud and parasitic activity it is difficult to argue against the pressure for legislative change even if some supporters of legislation suggested that fraud was far more widespread than the evidence demonstrates. For example, the COS attacked two of the largest and most effective charities, the Salvation Army and YMCA, for wasteful administration. It is true that an element in the War Office did contemplate the regulation and taxing of rest huts but the idea was quickly quashed. The COS’s complaint was simply a continuation of their campaign against what they saw as excessive administrative costs and

56 Jeffrey Reznick, Healing the Nation: Soldiers and the Culture of Caregiving in Britain during the Great War, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), p 34.
was, like so many of their other ideas, entirely misplaced. It is unfortunately still the case today that many very effective charities are criticised unfairly for high administrative costs without any reference to the nature of the work they actually do. It was difficult for critics in the COS to understand that effectiveness is not a function of low overheads and that those with the lowest were often the least effective. Nevertheless when the Committee on War Charities submitted its report to Parliament on 19 June, 1916, it was the twin concerns of the potential for fraud or misuse of funds and the reckless use of the names of prominent persons as patrons that underpinned their recommendations. They gave prominence to the witness statements, which asserted the ‘unanimous opinion that in the public interest it was desirable that public appeals for funds on behalf of war charities should be placed under some system of control.’\textsuperscript{57} The Committee pointed out that the majority of witnesses had wanted to go beyond this to regulate all charities but as this was beyond the Committee’s remit, they declined to comment on its desirability. They were careful to say how far the legislation could go and that it would not, without undue cost, ‘be practicable to attempt to stop waste arising from these causes.’ Instead the aim of the legislation should be ‘to prevent appeals being made by persons whose \textit{bona fides} are not established and to secure that the control and distribution of charitable funds shall be in the hands of a responsible committee.’\textsuperscript{58} Their key recommendations were that:

- Registration should be compulsory rather than permissive;
- Local authorities should act as the main ‘registering authority’ and that each local charity should register (i.e. not just their head office);
- The registration committee should contain people with local charity experience and women as well as men;

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Report of the Committee on War Charities}, PP 1916, Cmd. 8287, 425.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Report of the Committee on War Charities}, PP 1916, Cmd. 8287, 425.
• The Charity Commission should keep a central register compiled from throughout the country;
• The Charity Commission should also consider any appeals against refusal of registration;
• A charge of ten shillings should be made for registration (this was reduced to five shillings during drafting);
• Each charity should have a committee of no fewer than three;
• They must have a separate bank account;
• They should keep books of account, which should be audited, with an abstract published, and minutes;\(^{59}\)
• The books should be open to inspection by the registering authority and Charity Commission; and
• Any public appeal by an unregistered charity would be a finable offence.

The committee had therefore answered two of the three key questions that were open for debate. They had decided on registration rather than closer control by licensing and were proposing Local Councils as the registering authority. What the report did not cover was the crucial definition of what constituted a ‘war charity’ and exactly what organisations would be exempted from registration, which was left to the Parliamentary draftsmen.\(^{60}\) The question of exemption was included by the provision of clause one of the Bill which stated that it covered ‘any appeal to the public’. Thus if an appeal was not made ‘to the public’ (i.e.

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\(^{59}\) Regarding audited accounts, this regulation is actually tougher than today’s law on charities. In the UK, they are only required to submit accounts for external scrutiny if their income is above £25,000, which would have been the equivalent of about £500 in 1916.

\(^{60}\) One early suggestion that charity control might be subsumed efficiently under the aegis of the Defence of the Realm Act because ‘bogus War charities waste the country’s resources’ was considered both too draconian and confusing. TNA, HO 45/1084/308566. This would also, superficially at least, have plugged one of the gaps in the Committee’s recommendations.
was restricted to a defined group of people) an organisation could be exempt from registering. It was left to the registering authority to decide if the organisation was ‘appealing to the public’ or not. This only sidestepped the issue as it didn’t define ‘the public’, which was interpreted differently in different parts of the country. The definition of what was a war charity was even more complex. Clause ten eventually stated that:

The expression ‘war charity’ means any fund, institution, or association (whether established before or after the commencement of this Act) having for its object or amongst its objects the relief of suffering or distress, the supply of needs or comforts, or any other charitable purpose connected with the present war, but shall not include any fund, institution or association established before the commencement of the present war where any such object as aforesaid is subsidiary only to the principal purposes of the charity, nor shall it include the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation or the Statutory Committee or any local or district committee established under the Naval and Military War Pensions &c., Act, 1915.61

It left the ultimate decision as to whether a charity was a war charity or not to the interpretation of the Charity Commissioners. The key points were that:

- Unless an organisation had no more funds, the definition was retrospective. However, as the Act referred to ‘appeals to the public’ unless a charity was making further appeals to the public it need not register. This was something of an anomaly and was raised during the Committee stage of the Bill.

- The definition was very wide and covered virtually all organisations formed since August 1914.

- Most charities in existence before August 1914 were exempt.

61 War Charities Act 1916
Whilst drafting was underway, the Chief Charity Commissioner, H.W.T. Bowyear, threw things into some disorder by suggesting that the Commission would ‘undertake to carry out the whole scheme by central registration only.’\textsuperscript{62} Initial reaction to this suggestion appears to have been favourable. Harris noted in a memo to Troup that ‘there would I think be great advantages in this [as] local authorities are already overburdened with work.’\textsuperscript{63} Troup appeared to agree despite having previously commented that he considered the Commission’s methods ‘too legal and inelastic.’\textsuperscript{64} In the event, it was probably Sir Ernley Blackwell who decided things by saying the Committee considered ‘the Charity Commissioners were too old-fashioned a body to undertake this new work satisfactorily.’\textsuperscript{65} As the Commission was entirely unused to dealing with collecting charities and given the local nature of the majority of schemes he was probably correct, even though this would have ensured consistency in applying the Act. The next fly in the ointment was none other than Sir Edward Ward. He wrote urgently to Henry Forster (still Financial Secretary at the War Office) saying he was alarmed that the requirement for all charities to register under the proposed Act would be seen as bureaucracy gone mad as all of the organisations affiliated to the DGVO would have to go through another registration process and this might ‘result in disaster.’\textsuperscript{66} He asked if those organisations already certified by him could be exempted from registration. Forster replied that he would make representation to the Home Office and hoped that they would be able to amend the Bill. His letter to William Brace (Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and one of the Labour MPs in the government) stressed that ‘the Army Council attaches great importance to Sir Edward Ward’s work’ and that he did not want it disrupted now that ‘the supply of comforts for the troops is arranged

\textsuperscript{62} TNA HO 45/1084/308566. Letter of 13 June 1916.
\textsuperscript{63} TNA HO 45/1084/308566. Note of 20 June 1916.
\textsuperscript{64} TNA, HO 45/1084/308566. Reply of 28 June, minute of 18 March 1916.
\textsuperscript{65} TNA, HO 45/1084/308566. Minute of 26 June 1916.
\textsuperscript{66} TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32. Letter of 2 August 1916.
on a very satisfactory basis. After the complexities of reaching some kind of unity of opinion with the charities, politicians and media the Home Office were in no mood to compromise at this late stage and Brace’s reply to Forster was somewhat brusque saying, ‘I am afraid it is quite impossible to meet his wishes without destroying the whole aim of the Bill,’ a position that Forster accepted in his response to Brace two days later. Brace was probably right, it would have been wrong to exclude DGVO organisations from registration under an Act that had been framed for a different purpose. Ward was guilty of exactly the same confusion over his scheme as the newspapers had been, namely that it was emphatically not aimed at dealing with abuses and fraud. To be fair he was more worried that all his hard work might be undone if the new Act proved over-cumbersome. As it turned out his fears were unjustified. There is no evidence that organisations under his auspices found registering under the new Act to be onerous or bureaucratic. What evidence there is from the records of local DGVO charities indicates that registration was straightforward and their work continued uninterrupted.

On the day of Sir Edward’s agitated letter the Bill received its second reading in the Commons. It was certainly not guaranteed an easy passage. Firstly, some still considered that government interference in the work of charities was unjustifiable state intervention. Then there were those who regarded the Bill as too weak to prevent abuses. However, critics of over-lenience had their fears somewhat allayed by action over flag days, though this had taken nearly a year to be extended from London to cover the whole country. The Police, Factories etc (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, which gave local authorities the power to regulate street collections and so prevent the worst abuses of flag days, was something of

69 For example the minutes of CWSCH.
a universal remedy covering everything from fraud to juvenile delinquency and what we now call ‘chugging’. It was, however, a power that was widely adopted.\(^{70}\) In introducing the Charities Bill, William Brace quickly tried to deal with both issues by saying, perhaps over-optimistically, that ‘it will not only check but stop the exploitation of the public by unscrupulous people who do not hesitate to use the nation’s sympathies for their own selfish end, ‘and that ‘the Bill is confined to war charities and I would ask the House to treat it as a war measure.’\(^{71}\) Will Anderson was quick to respond. He again referred to his belief that fraud was widespread and accused the Cripples Pension Society of trying to bribe him concluding that ‘I regret that the Bill, which is so necessary and important, is too narrow in its scope, and think it ought to apply to all charities.’\(^{72}\) Aneurin Williams, who had received the same ‘flattering offer from the Cripples’ Society’, was of the opposite persuasion worrying that ‘from the point of view of the small local charities we must be careful or we may stop much good work that is being done.’\(^{73}\) In commenting on extending the provisions of the Bill and the circumstances of smaller charities J.W. Wilson, a member of the Committee, supported this view and cautioned about the impact of the legislation on smaller charities who ‘would find it very burdensome if the restrictions were made too onerous’.\(^{74}\) He also referred to similar legislation having recently been passed in France and Brace indicated that although the Bill currently excluded Ireland the government would consider extending its provision.\(^{75}\)


\(^{71}\) *Proceedings HoC*, Vol. 85, 2 August 1916, Col. 454.


\(^{73}\) *Proceedings HoC*, Vol. 85, 2 August 1916, Col. 459.


\(^{75}\) The Home Office’s attention had been drawn to the French legislation by the British Ambassador in Paris in a letter of 8 June, 1916 and some of its ideas (for example on the use of funds from dissolved charities) were adopted into the Bill. TNA, HO 45/10804/308566.
The Bill went to Committee on 7 and 10 August. Amendments proposed included asking for specific reference to flag days and requiring every single appeal to be ‘vetted’ by the registering authority. The former was excluded for being too specific, requiring legal definition, and was anyway covered by the Police Act and the latter as vastly over-complex. Sir Edwin Cornwall (Liberal, Bethnal Green North East) though he withdrew his amendment calling for annual registration, made the accurate prediction that ‘I doubt whether the war charities will end with the War. There will be many disabled men who will require attention, and these war charities will continue after the War.’ Sir Ryland Adkins (Liberal, Middleton) was perceptive in commenting that ‘the object of this Bill is to satisfy public opinion, which is naturally and properly aroused’, perhaps rather more than it was aimed at totally eradicating fraud. The tenacious Will Anderson raised the issue of funds already collected but where the organisation need not register unless they proposed further public appeals. Brace contended that ‘the Bill has been drafted to deal with war charities in the future. It is not so easy to deal with war charities of the past.’ Anderson withdrew his amendment after Brace agreed to consult his advisors on the issue but Caradoc Rees (Liberal, Carnarvon) gloomily, and totally incorrectly, predicted that ‘after the Bill is passed probably very little will be collected, because of the cumbersomeness of getting a charity together, getting it registered, and going through the necessary formalities.’ Among a number of, relatively minor, amendments accepted in Committee were the requirements to issue a certificate of registration or exemption and for prosecutions to be initiated by the Charity Commission rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions, which would have been taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. In response to the point on charities with unexpended funds a

Government amendment gave the Commission the same powers over miscreant unregistered charities ‘which are exercisable by them with respect to a charity which … has been removed from the register’ which satisfied Anderson. On the Bill’s return to the full House for report and Third Reading on 14 August the issue of extension to Ireland was tackled. Thomas Lundon (Nationalist MP for Limerick East) was highly perturbed that his intention to avoid abuse had been totally misrepresented in the press and that the Irish Daily Independent had suggested he was prompted by an intention ‘to prevent charities being raised in Ireland to relieve the distress caused by the rebellion.’ This rather sidetracked discussion into whether there was any evidence of fraud in Ireland, and if there was not if this was simply due to lack of information. Brace pointed out that there had been no Irish representation on the War Charities Committee and no evidence was taken from Ireland. As the majority seemed to swing in favour of excluding Ireland, not least because the Bill would have to be re-examined clause by clause, Basil Peto (Unionist, Devizes) warned that ‘all the people who want to have shady charities, with no supervision, will migrate to Ireland.’ The amendment proposing extension to Ireland was withdrawn and the Act finally included the provision of including Ireland by Order in Council. This provision was not greeted entirely favourably in the Lords when Lord Salisbury spoke for several with regard to the ‘unconstitutional’ nature of the provision remarking that ‘it appears to me that as the years go on Parliament is more and more divesting itself of the obligation of legislation on the details of measures, and handing it over to commissions, rules committees and orders in Council.’ The provision was a further step in potential state control but in the event the Act

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81 Proceedings HoC, Vol. 85, 14 August 1916, Col. 1603. He did have a point. Fraudsters probably did not migrate as far as Ireland but there was nothing to stop them setting up in an area where the Act was applied less scrupulously.
was never extended to Ireland. The Lords stages were most notable for the speech of Lord Hylton introducing the Bill. He asserted that the Committee had had ‘a great number of bogus war charities brought to their notice.’ Hylton then summarised the five quoted in the report namely the French Relief Fund; Dr Sarolea’s refugee fund; Counties Rest Homes; the War Orphans Fund and Heroes Poultry Farms as being ‘typical cases’. This was an exaggeration, there were no more than ten cases of actual fraud brought to the Committee’s attention and it is difficult to assert that the five quoted were ‘typical’. Where Hylton was correct was in his assertion that ‘without a Bill of this kind it is feared that genuine charities of all kinds may be involved in the cloud of suspicion that has been created owing to the exposure of these very gross and fraudulent cases.’ The Act was passed on the final day of the Parliamentary session, 23 August. In the final analysis even if the frauds were unproven or petty, public opinion and the reputation of bona fide charities, demanded some legislative action. In the circumstances the 1916 War Charities Act was about as good a piece of legislation as was possible.

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82 It was also not extended to Scotland until March 1919.
83 Proceedings House of Lords, 5th Series, Vol. 23, 16 August 1916, Col. 72.
84 See Appendix 8.
85 Proceedings Hol, Vol. 23, 16 August 1916, Col. 75.
The operation of the Act and control of scandal

On 28 August, the Charity Commission issued the new regulations to local authorities. The Commissioners set up a subsidiary body of ‘gentlemen of high business qualifications’, the Central Trustees of Controlled War Charities, to supervise the affairs of problematic organisations. Though they commented on their shortage of staff, there is no evidence that the passing of the Act swamped the Commission with work, which would certainly have been the case if Bowyear’s proposal to take on its entire administration had been adopted. There were inevitably some problems over the introduction and interpretation of the Act. A very small number of charities refused to register ‘on principle’. There was some difficulty in the definition of what a bank was and what constituted an audit. The Commission took a narrow line on the former, which led to complaints from the Trustees Savings Bank and Post Office Savings Bank and, somewhat belatedly in 1918, to their recognition as such. Another problem of interpretation was over whether local branches of national charities had to register where the Commission’s sensible line was that if the local body had control over the dispersion of their own funds then they should register.

Defining what was a war charity and what constituted an appeal to the public caused greater inconsistency. For example, the London County Council (LCC) decided that the Ruhleben Prisoners Release Committee was not a war charity as it was purely a campaigning organisation to agitate for the prisoners’ release and not for their ‘needs or comforts’ but refused exemption in virtually every other case. The latter was again the responsibility of each local registration authority and inevitably they interpreted the Act if different ways. The LCC operated on the precedent principle, deciding on a case-by-case basis. An

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87 LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/4 decision of 11 July 1917.
advertisement by the Merchant Taylor’s School Old Boys Comfort Fund in the school magazine was considered a public appeal as it was not confined to old boys of the school. Likewise an appeal to ‘officers and friends’ by the Grenadier and Scots Guards War Funds was also deemed a public appeal, it would not have been had it been solely to officers and so a very similar appeal on behalf of the Central Depot of the King’s Royal Rifles Needlework Guild to ‘officers and men’ of the regiment did not require registration. 88 Non-public appeals were often those confined to a defined workforce and thus included that to ‘post office force employees of the South East Postal District’, as it was only to those working for the Post Office. Though collections at divine service did not require registration, appeals to congregations of churches that collected money outside services, such as the case of the Christ Church Fund for Soldiers and Sailors, were deemed a public appeal. 89 The case of the church funds clearly demonstrates the inconsistency of interpretation. As we saw in Chapter 6 in Todmorden, local church funds were exempted even if they raised funds away from the church or chapel. In practice, this probably did not cause too many problems, as registration was, for most, both straightforward and cheap.

A rather different and unexpected problem was caused by the public nature of the register. Some funds registered under the names and numbers of the military units for which they were raising funds, 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment Comfort Fund or 16th Battalion Rifle Brigade (St Pancras) Fund for example. The Army Council objected to the publication of the numbers of military units as being liable to disclose information useful to the enemy. It is

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88 The LCC were quite pedantic on this point. The Waldensian Church Missions were told they would have to register as they stated that their appeal was for an orphanage in Italy that would be a war memorial, if they simply said it was an orphanage then registration would not be necessary. LMA LCC/MIN 8349 (Vol. 15), Case No. 916.
89 LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/2, War Charities Act, 1916 - Particulars of the work done, decisions of: 10, 24 and 26 October 1916 and 11 September 1917.
difficult to see exactly how this information might have assisted them but the Charity Commission removed such organisations from their published list and requested that organisations not use military titles in future. Following these difficulties, the Home Office issued further advice on organisations that could be exempted from registration adding two further categories:

1. Charities formed with the express approval of the Commanding Officer of a Military Unit or Ship for the benefit of their men.
2. Charities formed under the direction of, and personally administered by the proprietor, manager or Editor of a Newspaper for forces or prisoners of war.

The second had become an issue for newspapers who were unsure if their own appeals required registration and whether this was affected by who was to distribute the proceeds.

With regard to the reduction in fraud, in London, the centre of greatest concern, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner was quickly in touch with the LCC supplying details of those charities where there were grounds for suspicion. Some of these were ‘old friends’ brought to attention before the passing of the Act but the list also included a few new organisations. The full list was:

1. Belgian Soldiers Fund;
2. French Relief Fund;
3. Counties Rest Home for British Soldiers;
4. Our Own Boys Day Fund;
5. Le Berceau Fund;
6. Workers Circle;

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90 TNA, HO 45/18406/309078/49.
91 LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/3, letter of 21 August 1916.
7. First British Field Hospital for Servia;
8. Mrs Honnold’s Fund for Providing Artificial Limbs for Disabled Soldiers;
9. ‘I Promise’ Fund; and
10. Assistance aux Hospiteaux (sic) Allies.

To which the Albert Day Fund was quickly added. The first three have already been covered and all were quickly made the subject to administration orders by the Charity Commission as were Our Own Boys Day Fund, Le Berceau Fund and the Workers Circle. Our Own Boys Day Fund had already been closed in November 1915. Ostensibly to provide disabled soldiers with jobs, all £500 it had raised had been used up in expenses by its Secretary Mr H.C. Burke and Treasurer Sir John Taverner. Even when the more notorious funds were under administration this was not the end of the matter and the complexities of the French Relief Fund remained unresolved for some time. Its remaining funds were paid over to the British Committee of the French Red Cross and were finally completed in 1919 when the Commission reported that ‘the task of realising the assets and discharging the claims upon the charity has been one of exceptional difficulty.’

Le Berceau Fund was run solely by its Secretary and Treasurer, Mlle Germaine Olivia Colas, and again all £600 it raised had gone in expenses, the majority to support its promoter’s lifestyle as she lived at the Savoy Hotel. The Workers Circle raised a street collection on behalf of the Jewish Workers War Emergency Relief Fund and may well have been included on the list because of their political sympathies. They initially refused to provide a balance sheet ‘and are suspected of having diverted part at least of the money for the use of

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93 See below for the LCC’s ‘hard line’ on similar Jewish organisations.
socialists in Russia.\textsuperscript{94} However, after investigation, they were cleared of suspicion and the Council upheld their appeal against refusal to register. The final four were sloppily run rather than being fraudulent. Of the First British Field Hospital for Servia and its Treasurer, Alex McConnell, the police ‘suspected that there is considerable slackness of control over collectors.’ Mrs Catherine Honnold of the Hyde Park Hotel ‘collects money through appeals in the American Press, and manages the Fund without committee or other assistance.’\textsuperscript{95} Both the ‘I Promise’ Fund and Assistance aux Hospiteaux Allies were rather more up market. The former had been started by the prominent actors Ellaline Terris and Seymour Hicks to form a league against trading with Germany and assist disabled soldiers but operated with no executive committee as did the latter whose promoter and sole manageress was the Countess de Morella.

The greatest problem with the Act was that it came with very little additional funding and was open to wide interpretation by each local authority. In London, the LCC took a hard line. They scrupulously investigated every application and (with the single exception previously noted) rejected the idea of exemption, partly due to the zeal of their Chief Clerk, James (later Sir James) Bird, partly because they were better resourced and partly because they were very much in the public eye, especially that of the press. Further away from the capital local authorities were much more relaxed. In Todmorden, for example, over seventy per cent of charities were granted exemption from the Act.\textsuperscript{96} The LCC were often over-bureaucratic, smaller authorities over-lax. For example, Bird was unhappy that the 17th Lancers Prisoners of War Fund did not have a properly functioning committee that met

\textsuperscript{94} LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/3, note to LCC by Suffield Mylius, Metropolitan Police, 21 August 1916.  
\textsuperscript{95} LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/3, note to LCC by Suffield Mylius.  
\textsuperscript{96} See page 230 note 75 for an explanation of exemption.
regularly. Given that their Chairman was Sir Douglas Haig, and most of the others were on active service, the Secretary, Miss S.D. Whitton wrote that ‘the assembling of the members [is] quite impossible owing to their military duties.’ Despite this, Bird still sought their full compliance with the Act. Perhaps he thought that Sir Douglas should break off the Third Battle of Ypres for a while to chair a committee meeting in London. In the end, the Fund arranged for the Regimental Agency (which was registered) to take care of their PoWs. Some of the over-bureaucratic approach in London was class or racially based and led to error and abuse. Bird was indefatigable in investigating the bona fides of Jewish working class charities. Typical of these was the Koval, Ludmar, Lutsk and District Benevolent Society for the support of Jews in these areas of what is now the Ukraine and Bird went to great lengths to investigate them, obviously suspicious that they could be subversive. Every one of the thirty-seven members of the committee (including the Rabbi) were investigated through inquiry agents instructed by the LCC’s solicitors. Several phrases in these reports have been marked, for instance with regard to Sam Goldsmith, 30 Frostic Mansions, Whitechapel the report commented that: ‘the district is a very poor one, principally inhabited by foreigners of Jewish extraction’ and on Israel Lewis, 47 Brick Lane, the report said he ‘is not known to be a man of any financial strength, nor does he appear to be regarded with much confidence.’ These are reports on their credit-worthiness rather than character but Bird obviously thought this very important. A report from the police said that the Chairman, Marks Goldstein, was a registered Russian and ‘he is suspected of being a Receiver of stolen

97 LMA, LCC/MIN 8337 (Vol. 3).
98 Somewhat surprisingly this same issue has been raised with regard to modern service charities with trustees on active service see Kaye Wiggins, “Governance Risk” for Military Charities – organisations served mainly by trustees on front-line service might not be being properly scrutinised, experts warn’, Third Sector, 17 August 2010.
property, but there is no definite evidence on this point.’\(^{99}\) Nothing was known about any of the other Committee members (other than their being registered Aliens). In his report to the Council Bird said that though, ‘we have no reason to suppose that this charity is not established in good faith for charitable purposes’ he was not satisfied the charity would be properly administered, solely based on the fact that ‘most of the officers and members of the Committee of the charity are Russian subjects in humble circumstances, and are not regarded as being of any financial standing.... We do not think that the Committee of the charity can be regarded as a responsible one.’\(^{100}\) This was going well beyond what the Act intended and was, in effect, equivalent to the full-scale licensing so many had demanded. Unfortunately, Bird only applied the Act in this way with regard to charities organised by the working class, especially if they were Jewish as well. The Act was not meant to be a credit check and Bird’s class prejudices were being used to suppress what he thought of as ‘dodgy foreigners’. There is no more correspondence from the charity so they obviously accepted this refusal.\(^{101}\)

Bird was less scrupulous with charities not run by poor working class Jews and this double-standard quickly backfired. At first, the British-American (Overseas) Field Hospital (BAOFH) appeared a very respectable case. Established in June 1917 for the relief of sick and wounded at the front they were registered on 25 June. The Chair was Lady Rosmead of


\(^{100}\) Report by H Alker Tripp, 5 July 1917. LMA, LCC/MIN 8338 (Vol. 4), Case No. 638.

\(^{101}\) Further examples of Bird’s misplaced zeal were the Tradesmen and Stallholders of Chapel Street and White Conduit Street Fund for Wounded Soldiers, LMA, LCC/MIN 8347 (Vol. 13), Case No. 663 and the Jewish Workers War Emergency Relief Fund, LMA, LCC/MIN 8350 (Vol. 16), Case No. 7. No fewer than seventy confidential reports were obtained on the former for a charity whose income was only £156. The latter were initially refused registration due to unsubstantiated connections with the anarchist movement, though were registered on appeal.
Datchet (wife of one of Shackleton’s expedition) and their Chief Patron the Duke of Atholl.  

Just five days after registration the police report came in. This informed Bird that the Secretary, Henry Allen Ashton, had been involved with fraudulent share dealings in 1910. Ashton ran public competitions for worthless shares or sold them at inflated prices. Though civil court action had been taken, no criminal proceedings were. When war broke out he turned his attention to publishing the Recruiting Times and organised the Voluntary Recruiting League (VRL) issuing a pamphlet entitled One Clear Call, with the usual list of influential patrons. In April 1915, Ashton organised a competition advertised in the Daily Mirror for people to make as many words as possible from the letters in ‘One Clear Call’. Entries cost 1s 6d with prizes of £500 (£50 top prize). Ashton claimed to have made a loss on this enterprise. Then, in June 1915, he offered a bungalow on Hayling Island worth £700 as a competition prize in the Daily Telegraph for the person who collected the most money for the VRL. This competition ‘fell through’. Though a file was sent to the DPP, no proceedings were taken. When conscription came in, Ashton promoted the War Organisation Committee, which was ‘regarded by the Police with some suspicion’ the report noted. He was interviewed by police in March 1916 and claimed to have spent £4,000 of his own money on the VRL and recruited 70,000 men through it. Another of Ashton’s ventures, and the most extraordinary, was the Petronite Syndicate. Petronite was described as ‘a scientific practical and effective invention for the destruction of submarines, Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and floating and submerged mines.’ All of these activities had been the

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102 LMA, LCC/MIN 8338 (Vol. 4), Case No. 675.  
103 The Metropolitan Police were routinely asked if they had any observations to make about charities seeking registration but in the majority of cases expressed no view.  
104 There appears to have been a genuine Petronite Syndicate in existence in Hull in 1892. Based at 9 Marmaduke Street their manager was a Mr M Mackay. See http://www.genuki.org.uk/big/eng/YKS/Misc/Transcriptions/ERY/Hull1892StreetsM.html accessed on 09/01/2011.
subject of articles in *Truth*, which Bird obviously did not read. Having turned down a well-meaning, but Jewish, charity less than three weeks before, Bird had registered one of the most obvious fraudsters of the period. Mortified, Bird requested of the Charity Commission and police that Ashton’s charity be kept under ‘close observation’ and, somewhat belatedly, requested reports on its Committee members from agents Perry and Stubbs. Things then got worse for him. On 24 July, Bird received a letter from the Secretary of the Star and Garter Committee of the Red Cross asking if the BAOFH was bona fide. He could only reply that they were going to examine the accounts after three months. The Field Hospital itself attempted to become established in Belgium and then Italy. Acrimonious splits occurred in the committee and eventually Ashton was forced off. He made accusations against other committee members and these disputes gave the Charity Commission the opportunity to remove the charity from the register and apply a scheme for its administration. If only Bird had waited for the police report.

Some people were clearly irritated by the bureaucracy caused by the Act. The Treasurer of Lady Garvagh’s Prisoners’ Fund, Mr R.E. Enthoven, wrote to Bird in October 1916 after the Council had insisted on the full details of all their committee members, most of whom were titled. ‘I am unable to understand the difficulty in referring to recognised publications in order to obtain details of the Peerage and their relations... The auditor of the Fund is, as already stated, the Secretary of this Department [the Board of Trade, Department of Import Restrictions of which Enthoven was Controller]. I see no use in giving that gentleman’s name.’ He concluded ‘I suggest that you should send one of your assistants to the Imports Restriction Office between the hours of 11 and 5 p.m. when I shall be happy to furnish the fullest explanation; but I trust that further official correspondence may prove unnecessary.’
Clearly Enthoven thought that regulations should not apply to him and his aristocratic friends. Bird wrote back and said he did not have enough assistants, asked for the Christian names of Lady Cowans and Mrs Parker and reminded Enthoven that the books should be professionally audited. He got another irritated letter back. With regard to auditing Enthoven admitted that receipts of the fund were entirely in his possession but that ‘in view of my official position, professional audit seems both unnecessary and a waste of money which could better be devoted to charitable purposes.’

Bird reminded Enthoven that it was a matter for the registering authority whom they approved as auditor. The fact he was bothering Enthoven was his own fault as he had said he should be the recipient of all letters because ‘the Committee and Secretaries being ladies, with no official experience, it will save time and misunderstanding.’ Bird concluded that ‘in the circumstances, I propose to follow the general and more convenient practice and to address letters on the subject of the charity to the secretary’ (who was Enthoven’s daughter). Enthoven’s next letter was worse: ‘It does not seem to have occurred to you that, in the special circumstances of this particular Charity, it is unnecessary to insist on too many formalities. The Charity is conducted by well known people and the funds are practically under Government control, which is, I presume, as good as control by the London County Council.’ He saw no point in addressing letters to the Secretary, as they would be passed on to him for reply, which begs the question of what point the other officers were and if the Charity was simply a dictatorship. Enthoven concluded that he was ‘just as busy with other correspondence in my official capacity as you claim to be, and that the work in connection with this Charity is, unlike your work, purely voluntary’.

105 All references from LMA, LCC/MIN 8339 (Vol. 5), Case No. 106 – Lady Garvagh’s Prisoners’ Fund.
Bird’s report to the Council Committee pointed out that ‘the amount of money handled is large’, subscriptions were just under £3,500 for the year. Moreover, ‘it is open to objection that the position of auditor should be filled by an official subordinate to the Hon Treasurer, as the auditor proposed in this case appears to be.’ The Committee backed Bird and he informed Enthoven, no doubt with some glee, that a professional auditor must be appointed. He had to remind him again and got a fairly non-committal reply saying the Committee would be informed but it would be an unnecessary expense and regretting ‘that it has not been possible to take a more reasonable view of the circumstances’. They were finally registered some three months later with Gerard Van de Linde as auditor. There were also problems in winding up this fund in 1918. The Council had difficulty getting audited accounts and the charity wanted to give its surplus funds to organisations outside their charitable purposes, which the Charity Commission did not approve. They agreed to hand over the balance to the Central Prisoners of War Committee, but on receiving the final audited accounts in December 1918 it was found that £50 had been given to the Queen Alexandra Hospital Home for Disabled Soldiers which was not in accordance with the Commission’s decision. Lady Garvagh wrote to say the £50 had already been paid over before she got the Commission’s decision and that it had been part of £100 given to her for whatever charity she wanted. She regretted all the bureaucracy that was being caused. There is no further correspondence but one suspects that it was cases like these that ensured that the Act was never extended.

Just how successful was the Act in reducing fraud? In the House of Commons in 1930, it was claimed that 250 charities had been proceeded against or were either refused registration or
removed from the register.\textsuperscript{106} There seems little evidence for this in the published figures from the Charity Commission. The actual number of abuses remained relatively insignificant (for example the total number of organisations refused registration up to 1919 was just 41) and in 1919 the Commissioners reported that ‘proceedings were taken against 17 persons appealing to the public on behalf of unregistered War Charities’ and that this had resulted in ten convictions. In nine cases, the offenders were fined whilst one was imprisoned.\textsuperscript{107} In London, only seventeen organisations were refused registration during the war and of these six were allowed on appeal.\textsuperscript{108} There were just twenty-four cases represented by the Council to the Charity Commission under section seven of the Act i.e. where there was suspicion of fraud. These included the eleven cases cited previously of which only six proved to be fraudulent. Of the additional thirteen, two, the Red Star Society and Tubs for Tommies, were proven frauds and the police had strong suspicion against at least five others (though none appear to have been prosecuted) but the numbers were still small.\textsuperscript{109} There was also a problem over the Romanian Flag Day held in London in November 1916. Though the

\textsuperscript{106} Proceedings HoC, Vol. 234, 28 January 1930, Cols. 934-936 quoted in Elizabeth Macadam, \textit{The New Philanthropy: A study of the relations between the statutory and voluntary social services}, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1934), p37. It was none other than Herbert Samuel who ‘talked up’ the effects of the Act and it is possible that he might have been including those who were uncertain whether they required registration or not (for example whether their appeal was public) which could have pushed the total up to this kind of figure.

\textsuperscript{107} 66th Report of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, 1919, p 9. The only case of imprisonment was Raymond Cecil Reeves of the Red Star Society.

\textsuperscript{108} The six successful appeals included: the Jewish Workers War Emergency Relief Fund (Workers Circle); the Newspapers Patriotic Tobacco Fund (who caused an interesting test case as they continued to raise funds whilst their appeal was under consideration and this was deemed unlawful), the Great Britain to Poland Fund and the Purple Cross for Sick and Wounded Army Horses. The eleven refused registration outright (mainly on the grounds that they were not war charities in the definition of the Act) were: British Prisoners of War in Germany Fund; Magnetic Waves Fund; United Services Employment Council; Veterans Association; Men on the March Pipe and Tobacco League; Battersea and Clapham Junction Traders Association 23rd London Comforts Fund; War Lecturers Committee; Red and White Rose League; Koval, Ludmar, Lutsk and District Benevolent Society; National Commonwealth Colony Foundation and the Red Star Society. LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/2.

\textsuperscript{109} The five were: the Khaki Prisoners of War Fund; the Stick Crutch Fund; the International Bible Institute War Relief Fund; the British American (Overseas) Field Hospital (LMA, LCC/PC/CHA/1/2) and the Bob Siever Charity Fund (TNA, HO 45/18406/319028/17).
organiser, Mr Smetham Lee, had obtained a licence, he utilised paid collectors (one was paid as much as £50) and the monies received were paid over to him rather than the charity.\footnote{110 TNA, HO 45/18406/319028/19. LMA, LCC/MIN 8338 (Vol. 4), Case No. 591, War Lectures Committee.}

Another issue that caused concern later in the war was outside the scope of the War Charities Act and came after claims that delays and discrepancies in war pensions were causing men to resort to begging. In October 1917, Sir Edward Troup issued a letter to Chief Constables referring to cases in Rochdale, London and Maidstone where genuine veterans had been playing the organ or violin to supplement their meagre 12s 6d a week pension. He asked that officers investigate the bona fides of street musicians purporting to be disabled war veterans requesting that ‘if the claim is false the man should be charged, if true he should be referred to his local War Pensions Committee so the public don’t think the state isn’t providing for them.’\footnote{111 TNA, HO 45/10885/346885.} He did not suggest how the men could make their pension up to a living wage.

Of the post-1916 Act frauds, the most notable were probably those of Tubs for Tommies and the Red Star Fund. The former was a charity money-raising scheme that went wrong. It started as a purely commercial idea between an American engineer’s agent, G.L. Richards and a British solicitor, Crawford Ely. It involved selling puzzle-cards at 6d each with four revolving discs each with the letters A to Z. Contestants had to spell out three words of four letters by manipulating the discs and the most original would receive a prize. As it was a game of skill, the game avoided the ban on lotteries. In late 1916, Richards had the idea of utilising the game as a charity fundraiser and met with Mrs Burn of the Emergency Voluntary Aid Committee of the Empress Club (a prominent club for women) who were raising funds,
most notably for providing heated baths for soldiers close to the front line. The idea was that Mr Ely’s interest would be bought out for £1,000 and the scheme would run with fifty per cent of the proceeds devoted to prizes and expenses and fifty per cent to the charity. In all it was not a dissimilar idea from today’s Lottery Scratch cards and had it worked it would have provided the charity with a profit of about £10,000. Unfortunately, things did not run smoothly and the charity was taking a big risk that the one million tickets they had printed would sell. The intention was that the cards would be sold over a three-day period but the charity was only able to get a permit to sell them on one day, 15 January 1917. Of the million tickets a mere 87,000 were sold bringing in £2,166. After Ely had received his commission and expenses there was only £500 left for prizes, which was eventually paid out in June, leaving a balance of just £763. The prize fund was not handled with sufficient propriety (for some reason it was not deposited under the charity’s name) and the whole scheme was too complex, the financial arrangement with the promoters too loose and there were too many fingers in the pie. The poor ladies of the Empress Club were out of their depth and both the Charity Commission and police were called in to investigate. Both were already extremely ill disposed towards schemes of this kind and flag days as a whole. During the last year, £286,830 had been collected in this way in London with overall expenses of £51,432. This was considered far too high a cost by the regulators, with Sir Edward Troup commenting that the percentage was ‘utterly unjustifiable.’ Troup was also concerned that there was ‘a possibility of a question being asked in the House of Commons and, if the Secretary of State should have to reply, he would like to say that the Commissioner of Police aided by the Advisory Committee [of the LCC on War Charities] will so far as practicable, use his power to

stop any collections where the costs are likely to be excessive. Troup was also, rather
gently, admonishing Henry for not having refused a licence for Tubs for Tommies and thus
saved him a lot of bother. Henry responded by putting his best men onto the job and so the
redoubtable Inspector Curry and his superior Superintendent McCarthy looked into the case.
Their report cleared the Charity of any offence, other than naivety, but made three
recommendations:

1. When articles are sold to aid charities the proportion of commission should be clear
(or the proportion going to the charity);
2. The registration authority should approve fund raising schemes in advance;
3. The press should not accept charity advertising unless the name of the charity
appeared in the advertisement.

The first two were forwarded to the Home Office for action whilst Sir Edward Henry wrote to
newspaper editors regarding the third, his letter being published in The Times on 26 April
1918. Tightening of regulations for street collections of all kinds does appear to have
reduced their numbers later in 1917 and in 1918 but they still remained relatively popular
and effective methods of raising funds. Though Tubs for Tommies was a case of irresponsible
management the general issue of fund raising costs was poorly understood by its critics at
the time. Today as a rough guide the Charity Commission recommends that, in other than
exceptional cases, FACE (fundraising and administration costs to total expenditure) ratios
should lie somewhere within the range ten to thirty per cent, levels that would have
horrified the likes of Troup and Henry.

113 TNA, HO 45/18406/319028/42, letter from Sir Edward Troup to Sir Edward Henry.
114 TNA, MEPO 2/1732, report of 6 November 1917.
115 http://www.charityfacts.org/resources/student_and_researcher_information/face_ace_and.html,
accessed on 06/01/07.
The Red Star Society was run by one of the most brazen, or foolhardy, fraudsters active during the war. Raymond Cecil Reeves had five previous convictions (under five different names in five different towns) for false pretences and had only been released from his last prison sentence of two years in May 1914. This did not prevent him from obtaining a post in the Adjutant General’s Department at the War Office immediately on the outbreak of war. He was dismissed in August 1915, but for insubordination not because his record had been uncovered. He then worked for a ‘well-known shipping firm’ and later joined the Architectural Association Voluntary Aid Department. This connection with charity clearly suggested a new source of income for Reeves and in March 1917, he founded his own charity, Westminster Entertainments for Wounded Soldiers (WEWS), with the apparently respectable Mrs Ferdinand Hodge (whose husband was a Captain and father-in-law a General) as Secretary. The laxness of the regulations even after the 1916 Act is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that Reeves registered the fund in July, signed up the Mayor of Westminster and several other prominent patrons and held two fund raising entertainments at the Caxton Halls in April and June from which, Mrs Hodge later confirmed, ‘Reeves took all the money’. Reeves shared some of William Illingworth’s characteristics in that he used an existing, highly respectable, charity as a cover for his activities. He had joined the Red Cross as a volunteer and utilised their notepaper until they objected. If Reeves had also shared Illingworth’s humbleness he may well have escaped detection. However, he was of a very different temperament and was clearly annoyed by the Red Cross’s quite justifiable response.

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116 These were sixteen months in 1902 in Liverpool under the name of Ronald G Sutton; twenty months in 1903 in Leeds as Walter Edwards; one month hard labour in Dewsbury in 1904 as Charles Verity; twelve months hard labour in 1905 in Knutsford as David Thornton and two years at Portsmouth in 1912 as Alfred Goldman. TNA, MEPO 2/1729, Inspector Curry’s report of 25 September 1917. LMA, LCC/MIN 8347 (Vol. 13), Case No. 643 – Westminster Entertainments for Wounded Soldiers and Case No. 691 - Red Star Society.
117 The Times, 19 October 1917, p3.
118 TNA, MEPO 2/1729, signed statement by Mrs Hodge.
In August he wrote to the Lord Mayor and all the other Mayors of London stating that he had tried to persuade the Red Cross ‘to improve their air raid organization’, that they had been disparaging his work and as a consequence he was starting a rival organisation, the Red Star Society, to assist air raid victims, wounded soldiers and orphans. Though this was no more than a re-badging of the WEWS, it required a further registration and, given the Red Cross concerns, the LCC asked the Metropolitan Police to run a check on Reeves. 119 Despite the problems of criminal records already noted, Inspector Curry unearthed the truth. The Inspector had no idea, which, if any, of Reeves’s aliases were his real name but there was no doubt at all that ‘he is nothing but an arrant rogue.’ 120 While Curry was carrying out his investigations, Reeves was champing at the bit and complaining about the delay in registration. He began collecting money in September, falsely claiming the Red Star Society was registered, and planned to hold a meeting in Trafalgar Square in October, which the police said, might be difficult to prevent. Fortunately, Inspector Curry’s report reached the Charity Commission at the end of September and, on 2 October, they placed the WEWS under administration. At the time it had a declared income of £150 and expenditure of £170 but there was ‘grave suspicion’ that these accounts had been falsified. Three days later Reeves was served with a summons under the War Charities Act. He was charged with appealing to the public on behalf of an unregistered charity, of which he was clearly guilty, but the main concern of the police was whether his criminal past could be proved so that the sentence passed would be exemplary. At first Reeves denied he had any convictions for fraud at which point Mr Muskett (the Treasury Solicitor prosecuting) reminded him that ‘there is such a thing as being charged with perjury.’ The police had taken the precaution of bringing Sergeant Stuckey from Portsmouth Prison to identify the prisoner if necessary.

119 TNA, MEPO 2/1729, letter of 31 August 1917.
120 TNA, MEPO 2/1729, report of 25 September 1917.
Reeves still did not admit outright that he was the man being described stating that even supposing it was true, ‘he had wiped out his past, and had been working for the British Red Cross.’ Mr Muskett said the Court had before it a ‘rogue and a vagabond of the worst class – one of a type with which they were very familiar since the outbreak of the war, especially in charitable matters’ and the Magistrate, Mr Chester Jones agreed. He sentenced Reeves to the maximum three months imprisonment with hard labour and ‘said the very purpose of the regulation [the War Charities Act] was to stop men like the defendant.’¹²¹ At the end of the month Inspector Curry’s colleague, Sergeant Burmby, discovered letters at Reeves’s lodgings from his mother, which revealed that his true name really was Raymond Cecil Reeves and that he had been born in 1873. The Sergeant’s conclusion was that ‘there is no doubt that this conviction has put a check upon the activities of a clever and cheeky rogue.’¹²² Superintendent Cantlef recommended both Sergeant Burmby and Inspector Curry for a reward for their work on the case and this might have been the end of the matter but for Reeves. He was clearly deluded that he had been persecuted unjustly and pursued an obsessive and self-destructive campaign to clear his name. In March 1918, he wrote to the Prime Minister accusing the Commissioners of Police of ‘foul play’ and saying that he was taking proceedings against the Charity Commission and calling for the repeal of the War Charities Act.¹²³ Lloyd-George was unimpressed but this did not stop Reeves bringing an action for malicious prosecution against the Commissioner, which failed. The following year Reeves brought an action for libel against the Daily Mail for saying in 1917 that he was ‘one of the most impudent scoundrels in the country.’ This case was heard before the Kings Bench Division of the High Court at the end of October. Reeves had no chance. Ranged

¹²¹ The Times, 19 October 1917, p 3.
¹²² TNA, MEPO 2/1729, report of 31 October 1917.
¹²³ TNA, MEPO 2/1729, letter of 9 March 1918.
against him was arguably the most able criminal barrister of the age, Sir Edward Marshall Hall, representing Associated Newspapers. The key was again Reeves’s previous record, which he was unable to deny, and the jury, without even retiring, found for the defendants.\textsuperscript{124} Reeves was made an example of because of who he was, because he was vilifying a ‘pillar of the establishment’ (the Red Cross), due to the authorities’ embarrassment at such a crook being able to run events supported by such prominent individuals and because they could not prove fraud. Quite a few others did much what he did and did not get prosecuted. He should have pleaded ignorance but sealed his fate by continually pester ing the Council and openly defying them. He then sued the richest newspaper in the land confirming that either he was a fantasist of the highest order or was mentally unstable, so perhaps Herbert Muskett was right when he wrote ‘I myself think he is mad.’\textsuperscript{125}

Despite the initial failure to prevent the activities of Raymond Reeves, the legislation does appear to have reduced the number of dubious charities. Equally, there is very little evidence of the Act producing significant problems for legitimate charities or of over-regulation other than in a minority of cases in London. In 1917, the Charity Commissioners felt justified in reporting that the Act was working so well that it ought to be extended to all charities.\textsuperscript{126} In this, they continued to be supported by many of the major charities.

\textsuperscript{124} The Times, 1 November 1919, p 4. 1919 was the year of one of Marshall Hall’s greatest triumphs when ‘the great defender’ obtained an acquittal in the case of Rex v Ronald Light, known as the Green Bicycle Murder.
\textsuperscript{125} TNA, MEPO 2/1729, letter to Reginald Poole.
\textsuperscript{126} 64th Report of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, 1917, p 8.
However, there were also drawbacks to the legislation, not least of which was its uneven implementation. This was recognised in a report written in the 1920s when legislation on the supervision of charities was again being considered:

Experience has shown that it [the War Charities Act] is by no means perfect. In the first place the whole working of the Act depends primarily on the energy with which it is administered by the Registration Authorities. In some districts Registration Authorities did their best to carry out the intention of the Act and with excellent results. In others they did little or nothing.\textsuperscript{127}

In 1927, the Cunliffe Committee recognised that the Act was very unevenly administered. They noted that over the whole of the country, fifty-two charities had been refused registration and ninety-three had been removed from the register. Of these no fewer than twenty-six refusals and fifty-eight removals had occurred in London.

In other words, penal action was taken against 9 per cent of the total war charities registered in London, and against only just over 0.5 per cent in the rest of the country. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that this proportion – eighteen to one – is a true indication of the relative standard of the management of charities in and outside London respectively, and we are forced to the conclusion that the London County Council’s administration of the War Charities Act was far more vigilant than that of the majority of other authorities.\textsuperscript{128}

They did not say that this might also have been due to over-officious interpretation in London, of which we have seen some evidence, but their main point still holds true. This was always going to be a problem with a locally administered scheme, and there was neither the

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\textsuperscript{127} Memorandum dated 31 August 1925, TNA, HO 45/319028/54.
will nor the funds to run it centrally. The Charity Commission was not sufficiently well regarded and it would have required a massive increase in resources.
Conclusion – After the Armistice

Though British forces were still fighting in Russia and occupying Germany the majority of ‘temporary’ comforts and other funds closed down during 1919 and in April 1919 the office of the Director General of Voluntary Organizations closed its doors for the last time. There was a suggestion that further legislation would help the disbursal of any surplus funds but a Home Office memo concluded that ‘many charities are proceeding so rapidly that ... by the time an Act became law we should nearly have finished our work.’ The Red Cross Charities, Voluntary Aid Detachment Hospitals, War Hospital Supply Depots, Prisoners of War Funds and Comfort Funds have been showering in upon us and are urgent in their desire to close down and deal with their surplus’ but this did not mean that voluntary activities relating to the war had ended. The largest number of schemes that remained in operation were for the victims of the conflict: including help for the devastated areas of France and Belgium; for disabled war veterans and for the commemoration of the fallen. Many relief workers also remained abroad working with the enormous numbers of refugees the conflict had created. The war had also led to the founding of a number of significant organisations that are still in existence today. St Dunstan’s, founded by the blind newspaper magnate Sir Arthur Pearson, and the Women’s Institute, an import from Canada, both started in 1915; the Royal

129 Many London based charities ran into problems over the disposal of funds. They didn’t understand their obligations as charities in that they had to pass on remaining money to organisations with very similar objects. Even those run by prominent people had difficulties including the Empire Union Clubs where Lt-Gen Sir Francis Lloyd, Commander of London District, ‘illegally’ distributed no less than £25,000. See LMA LCC/MIN 8350 (Vol. 16), Case No. 21a.
130 TNA, HO 45/309028/49. This did not prevent further legislation regarding war charities being proposed, see Conclusions.
131 One response was for towns to adopt a town in France or Belgium as a twin and provide support. For example, Sheffield adopted Serre and Wolverhampton Gommecourt, both of which had been destroyed during the Somme battles. Liverpool adopted Givenchy and even individuals continued to help the areas where they had fought. J.G. Colthart Moffat ‘spent his military pension ensuring that the “aged and broken residents” of Guillemond, the village where he was wounded in 1916, never lacked food and fuel.’ McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, pp 249-50. See also William Philpott, Bloody Victory: The sacrifice on the Somme, (London, Abacus, 2009), p 551.
132 See Storr, Excluded from the Record, pp 216-220.
Star and Garter Homes were established in the following year; the PDSA in 1917 and in 1919 Philip ‘Tubby’ Clayton began the Toc H, a continuation of his work with the YMCA during the war at Talbot House near Ypres.  

Many of the issues that surrounded charity legislation in the First World War came up again in 1939 but under very different circumstances. All parties were far more comfortable with the idea of state control in wartime and welfare provision for dependants was not an issue. With immediate conscription and vastly fewer troops abroad, troop comforts were less prominent. Nevertheless similar problems of a confusion of appeals arose and, in January 1940, a new Director General of Voluntary Organizations was appointed. He was Sir Alan Hutchings (who had been Ward’s secretary) though he had a much narrower remit and a far less prominent role than his former boss. A new War Charities Act was also passed in 1940, very similar to the 1916 Act (which it repealed) though it included Scotland from the outset, which the 1916 Act had not. The 1940 Act remained in force after the 1960 Charities Act was passed. As late as 1977, there were still 2,250 War Charities registered (some of which did not qualify as charities under the 1960 Act) and it was agreed that to repeal the Act might stir up more problems than retaining it, so it was left on the statute book. It was finally

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133 The Women’s Institutes are an interesting phenomenon as they provided another outlet for women to take control as organisers (with strong elements of feminism) and were not the cosy jam-and-Jerusalem bodies they later became. See Anne Stamper, ‘Countrywomen in Action: Voluntary action in the National Federation of Women’s Institutes 1917-1965’, Paper given to the Voluntary Action History Society Conference ‘400 Years of Charity’, Liverpool, 2001 and Martin Pugh, We Danced All Night: A social history of Britain between the Wars, (London, Bodley Head, 2008), p 191. For more on charitable organisations in the immediate post-war period see Appendices 14 and 15.
134 See The Times, 30 November, 1939, p 4; 12 January, 1940, p 4 and 13 January, 1940, p 3. Hutchings organised the DGVO in exactly the same structure as Ward’s model (Figure 19).
135 TNA, HO 279/73, War Charities Act 1940, Home Office Comments on Goodman Committee Recommendations. The memorandum from 1977 concludes that ‘at the end of the day the arguments for and against repealing the War Charities Act seem evenly balanced. If the proposal to maintain the status quo seems rather a negative one, at least it can be argued that to retain the War Charities Act can do no harm.’ Memo dated 24 October 1977.

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repealed by the Charities Act of 1992, which dealt with the control of fundraising and charitable collections.

In the view of the Home Office in the 1920s, the Act was passed to do two things:

- Prevent appeals being made to the public by persons whose bona fides were not established; and
- To ensure that funds were in the hands of a responsible committee.\(^\text{136}\)

In this it was probably as successful as it was able to be. Charity fraud and scandal is impossible to eliminate, even under the far stricter conditions prevailing today. A 2008 report found that eighteen per cent of charities reported being the victim of fraud at least once in the previous two years, costing the sector an estimated £680 million a year. This is, though, significantly less than the forty-eight per cent of UK companies that had been victims of one or more significant economic crimes during the same period.\(^\text{137}\) Given these figures legislators still demand more action against charity fraudsters. In August 2000 the Public Accounts Committee ‘demanded an explanation’ from the Charity Commissioners after an investigation by the Independent into ‘a string of cases’ and in 2010 Conservative MP Tracey Crouch tabled a motion calling on the government to ensure that local police authorities tackled criminal gangs responsible for bogus charity clothing collections.\(^\text{138}\) It is also remarkable how little the nature of these crimes have changed. For example, in 2002 police investigated the Dream Foundation, a charity to make sick and dying children’s wishes come true, after an anonymous tip that up to £300,000 had gone missing. The Fund was backed by a host of celebrities from television and sport, including footballer Alan Shearer,

\(^{136}\) Memorandum dated 31 August 1925, TNA, HO 45/319028/54

\(^{137}\) ICAEW, Charity Fraud, p 2.

and was run by a retired police officer, David Foley. Foley, his wife and the founder, David Mulcahy, were given prison sentences.\textsuperscript{139} Within days of the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, scam e-mails and websites proliferated.\textsuperscript{140} In comparison, the activities of Alroy, Illingworth, Reeves et al seem relatively benign. It is simply not defendable to allow the activities of charity fraudsters to go unchecked and the legislators of 1916 realised this. As Richard Hurley from Cifas, the UK’s fraud prevention service, said in relation to the Haiti scams, charity fraudsters prey ‘on your feelings for those innocent victims and your desire to help them... It’s making use of human suffering and the best in human nature at the same time simply for commercial profit.’\textsuperscript{141} The donors of 1914-18 were just as caring, and just as vulnerable. Cahalan’s summary is therefore eminently fair when he says that:

Several old bugbears ... were stamped out, the Commissioners cracked down on flag days, and poorly-managed charities were compulsorily reorganised ... On the whole [the Act] succeeded in eliminating the worst cases of fraud and in forcing some duplicate charities to merge. The War Refugees Committee and other large organisations were satisfied and the Act silenced the volume of criticism of the eighteen months before its enactment. But small organisations continued to flourish and proliferate.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{139} Independent, 28 August 2002, ‘Five charged in charity fraud case’. Newcastle Chronicle passim.
\textsuperscript{141} BBC News, E-Mail scams exploit Haiti quake, 16 February 2010.
\textsuperscript{142} Cahalan, Belgian Refugee Relief, p 496.
Mobilizing Charity
Non-uniformed voluntary action during the First World War

Volume 2

Peter Russell Grant
A thesis presented to Cass Business School, City University, London, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Contents Volume 2

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PART IV – REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
11 The Encroachment of State Control

If there is one question on which all writers about the First World War agree it is with regard to the huge increase of state control over every aspect of life in Britain. In the words of Stevenson, ‘state intervention was to become not merely an argument in the hands of progressive thinkers, but part of the habit and assumptions of government.’¹ There were no fewer than 409 official commissions, committees and agencies set up to deal with questions arising out of the war from the ‘Abrasives and Polishing Powders Research Committee’ to the ‘Zinc and Copper Research Inquiry Committee.’² To cope with the requirements of total war some of these, such as the Ministries of Munitions, Pensions or Food employed tens of thousands (millions in the case of Munitions), others were tiny, but there is no doubt that the plethora of Quangos that exist today are not new phenomena. In many of these areas government was intervening for the first time in people’s lives. With regard to food, for example, Beveridge noted that in the first half of 1918 Britain established a system of control over ‘nearly everything eaten and drunk by 40 million. The civilian population [was] catered for like an army.’³

What is more contested is to what extent this intervention was entirely new. Though Britain was one of least centralised and regulated societies in Europe in 1914, it was by no means the laissez-faire canvas it had been in the mid-nineteenth century. Between 1870 and 1914 government employment had increased fourfold and central and local public expenditure tenfold. ‘A continuous stream of new specialist administrative departments’, including the

¹ Stevenson, British Society 1914-1945, p 58. For a contemporary summary see John A Fairlie, British War Administration (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History, Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, No. 8), (New York, Oxford University Press, 1919).
² See Fairlie, British War Administration, pp 271-295.
³ Beveridge, British Food Control, quoted in Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, p 649.
Local Government Board, Board of Trade and Board of Education had been formed.\(^4\) Though the old Poor Law remained intact the Royal Commission on its working, which ran from 1905 to 1909, caused heated controversy regarding the lengths and nature of government involvement in social welfare. The Commission produced conflicting results, with only the minority report supporting significantly greater state intervention but it initiated ‘a debate which constituted a perhaps unique episode in the history of the relationship between British society and the various administrative organs of the state.’\(^5\) The reforming Liberal administration had, from 1906, further extended state intervention and though Lloyd-George was utilising political hyperbole when he concluded his speech on the ‘People’s Budget’ in 1909 there was more than a hint of things to come in his words. ‘This is a war budget’ he proclaimed, ‘it is for raising money to wage implacable warfare against poverty and squalidness.’\(^6\) Therefore, in Britain, along with much of the rest of the Western world, state intervention was already accelerating in the years prior to 1914.\(^7\) Pope’s summary is therefore a fair one when he concluded that ‘increasing intervention in people’s lives was not a process begun by war; the introduction of collectivist social policies had been very much a feature of the quarter century or so preceding the War. The demands of war, though, enhanced sharply the state’s role in relation to the individual.’\(^8\)

When it came to real war, near universal state intervention was not the government’s planned intention. In discussing the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions, Marwick quotes their official historian as saying that the state owned factories ‘owed their inception

\(^5\) The minority report was mainly the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the majority one that of Helen Bosanquet and the ‘advanced sector of Charity Organisation thought.’ Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit*, pp 206 and 240.
\(^8\) Pope, *War and Society in Britain*, p 31.
not to any definite plan or policy of State monopoly but to the immediate stress of practical necessity’ but that ‘once any measure of control had been undertaken the forces pressing for complete control became stronger and were ultimately irresistible.’ DeGroot agrees that ‘when the government intervened, it first asked for voluntary compliance with stated goals, then gently cajoled and only regulated as a last resort.’ This is the pattern already observed in relation to voluntary action and charities.

There is perhaps a tendency by some of these writers to over-exaggerate moves towards state intervention as being inexorable in every field when there were limitations on both the pace and nature of state control, not least because the prevailing attitude of the civil service was still strongly laissez faire. Bourne has shrewdly noted that governments are rarely willing to proceed at a pace faster than they believe public opinion will tolerate and this is more critical in wartime where, in a democracy, public support is even more necessary. Therefore, even under the more interventionist Lloyd George coalition, property rights were respected and co-operation with business encouraged in the name of efficiency but, for example, neither the railways nor the mines were nationalized. At the other end of the spectrum, ‘libertarian resistance to compulsion in all its forms never died away in Britain during the war. The Labour movement fought tooth and nail against the “conscription of labour” with a great measure of success. But compulsion and interference gained ground as the war progressed and people lost faith in the ability of purely voluntary measures.’ Nevertheless, there certainly was a strong tendency for the voluntary principle to be

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9 History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol. VII, Pt. 1, quoted in Marwick, Deluge, p 166.
10 DeGroot, Blighty, p 79. Thane agrees that intervention was ‘haphazard rather than planned’ The Foundation of the Welfare State, p 136 as does Stevenson who characterises intervention as ad hoc and ‘dictated largely by expediency, with little thought for long-term consequences or social implications.’ British Society 1914-1945, p 67.
11 Marwick, Deluge, p 156.
13 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 110.
replaced by more planned, state centralisation as the war went on. Gregory has accurately characterised one crucial reason for the loss of faith in the voluntary approach as being ‘based on an ever-increasing fear that there were many who, for selfish reasons, remained uncommitted, leaving those who took voluntary action shouldering an unfair burden... Almost everyone came to feel that the state should compel support for the war effort in the name of “equity.”’14 The most obvious example of this principle in action was in the case of conscription but it was also apparent even in the moves towards state intervention in voluntary activity and charitable efforts. Despite some reservations about the over-deterministic flavour of some of the characterisations of increasing government intervention, it is nevertheless hard to argue against its reality. Robb sums up the process, astutely commenting that ‘during the war an increasingly familiar pattern developed, whereby early reliance on market forces gradually gave way to half-hearted state regulation and eventual state control. This pattern manifested itself in military recruitment, munitions production, labour supply, food distribution, and even propaganda.’15 He might have added other voluntary activities to this list.

In identifying a clear move towards greater state control during the war, many writers have also attempted to divide the conflict into different phases. The earliest phase was cemented in the public mind by the pronouncement on 4 August 1914 by Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the government would ‘enable the traders of this country to carry on business as usual.’ This famous (infamous?) phrase was more of an attempt not to panic the markets rather than set out the government’s overall intentions as the deeply interventionist Defence of the Realm Act was passed just four days later. It does though have some validity as characterising the early period of the war not least in relation to the

14 Gregory, The Last Great War, pp 110-111
15 Robb, British Culture and the First World War, p 77.
Elliot sees the summer of 1915 as being the point at which it became ‘clear that the attitude of “business as usual” ... would no longer suffice’, and this has support in the results of the shell shortage and scandal that followed the Battle of Loos in September of that year. Inevitably July 1916 and the commencement of the Battle of the Somme is often cited as a turning point and Marwick chooses this when suggesting that ‘as nearly as such things can be calendared, the summer of 1916 was the time when, as far as intelligent opinion is concerned, the tide of collectivism was definitely in flood.’ This is not surprising given his views on the military aspects of the war and his support for the disillusion thesis. In terms of social impact the introduction of conscription that March was surely a clearer and more decisive step. In The Deluge Marwick himself rather ignores this turning point and divides the war into three phases: the first eight months of ‘business as usual’; from spring 1915 to the end of 1916, which saw the beginnings of major changes (such as new freedoms for women) and ‘fumbling’ state intervention and finally 1917 and 1918 characterised by much more rigid state control. If it is always rather dangerous to generalise over such individually decisive turning points it is perhaps more defendable in discussing one specific area such as

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17 Marwick, Deluge, p 174.
18 For example, Marwick contended that ‘a divide developed between the unspeakable society of the trenches, and the still comfortable society at home. It is from poets and painters, more than from soldiers’ letters, that we understand the bitter trauma of the war for those who actually fought it.’ He then immediately quotes a letter from the painter Paul Nash to support his argument. Britain in Our Century: Images and controversies, (New York, Thames and Hudson, 1984), p 56.
19 Brian Bond in War and Society in Europe 1870-1970, (Bungay, Suffolk, Fontana, 1984) discerns four broad stages in the war: a ‘business as usual’ phase up to spring 1915; drastic measures as new belligerents joined the conflict up to the end of 1916; 1917, a period of increasing strain on the home and military fronts and 1918, characterised by war-weariness and the connection between military reverses and disintegration on the home front in Germany.
20 Marwick, Deluge, pp 11-12.
voluntary action. Here it is possible to identify three clear phases, the transition between them marked by a key event as illustrated in Figure 20:

**Figure 1: Phases of state control**

<table>
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<th>Phase 1 - August 1914 to September 1915</th>
<th>Key event: 'Comforts Scandal' of summer 1915</th>
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<td>Laissez Faire approach - traditional paternalistic philanthropy</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase 2 - September 1915 to August 1916</th>
<th>Key event: Charity fraud, media disquiet and official committee</th>
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<td>Partial control under the DGVO</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase 3 - August 1916 to end of war</th>
<th>Still elements of both previous phases in existence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater control under the War Charities Act</td>
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It will be each of these broad phases that I analyse against the model for a possible ‘management revolution’ in Chapter 15. A key element of these phases is their link with the varying involvement of capital and labour. In society as whole, it has been suggested, the war ‘widened labour’s institutional horizon. Fundamental to this was the importance of the working class to the war effort: the government needed channels through which to maintain the commitment of the working class.’

This process of inclusion operated at both local and national level. Locally trade unionists and other representatives of labour, including women, joined ‘a variety of statutory, official, semi-official and voluntary bodies: exemption tribunals under the Derby scheme, relief of Distress Fund Committees, local Pensions Committees, Food Control Committees and so on.’ ‘In most cases, industrial cooperation was secured by allowing unions representation in new managerial agencies’ and nationally many

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Committees of enquiry included significant working class representation for the first time.\(^\text{23}\) Pro-war Labour MPs joined the government and ‘individual union leaders found themselves holding high political office, including membership of the War Cabinet itself.’\(^\text{24}\) The extent to which this inclusion of labour was permanent or represented a real shift in the balance of power I leave to the next chapter but here would simply note that it was mirrored in the increasing importance of ordinary working people in the governance and operation of wartime charities as was demonstrated in Chapter 6. As the process was a reflection of wider social trends it is also reasonable to contend that unless there was some evidence of significant social change occurring during the war then it would be extremely difficult to argue that a management revolution occurred in just one area, that of voluntary action. It is therefore to that wider thesis of the extent of social change brought about by the war that I now turn.


\(^{24}\) Bourne, Britain and the Great War, p 195.
12 A Repositioning of Philanthropy, Mutual Aid and the State? - Effects on the Voluntary Sector

Before coming to conclusions about how influential the war was on the changes that took place in the voluntary sector it will first be necessary to define exactly what those changes were.

The idea of a partnership between the state and charity was certainly not an one that was new during the period of the war. Most writers are clear that the relationship between the state and philanthropy did change during the war, with the former encroaching more decisively on the territory of the latter. The question is what was the impact of this change? One approach views the changes as placing philanthropy in a far less significant role than previously. Kidd, for example, suggests that ‘the real transition to a “new philanthropy” came during and after the First World War, when charity found itself more clearly subordinated to rather than a partner of the state.’ He sees this weakening of the partnership as an encouragement for the formation of the National Council of Social Service (NCSS) in 1919, bringing together ‘the disparate parts of an emerging “voluntary sector”’, to give charity a stronger voice. There is certainly some truth in this view which is shared by Philips who sees a more compliant post-war voluntary sector prepared to acquiesce in what the state decreed. Philips’s argument is that there was also a decline of mutualist

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1 See Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit, especially Chapter 7 ‘Society and the State’ for the national picture. For a local example of this relationship, see Helen Elizabeth Meller’s study of Bristol, Leisure and the Changing City, 1870-1914, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp 74-77. Bernard Harris discusses the development of state intervention in social welfare in Origins of the British Welfare State, Chapter 2. He also discusses the historical relationship between state provision and voluntary action in ‘Voluntary action and the state in historical perspective’, Voluntary Sector Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 25-40. I would strongly agree with his view that there has been a ‘partnership’ between the state and voluntary action for at least 200 years though the nature and degree of that partnership has changed.

2 Kidd, State, Society and the Poor, p 108.

association post-war but here he is on far shakier ground as he bases his view partly on a
decline of paramilitary youth organisations, most of whom had religious links and so any
change could be due more to a lessening of religious influence. Even more dubious are the
claims of Turner who detects ‘a new sort of heavy-handedness which seems to have been
war related and which seems to have substituted the state for civil society in the control of
people’s lives.’\textsuperscript{4} Though he is perfectly correct that the role of the state grew during the war
in relation both to the market and to civil society and boundaries between these elements
shifted and became more blurred, he wrongly interprets the changes.\textsuperscript{5} He sees the rise of
state dominance as happening mainly during the war, seriously underestimating its
encroachment into the social sphere during the late Victorian and Edwardian period. Far
more seriously, he totally misrepresents charitable activity during the war and what
elements of it were most critical. Firstly, he concentrates entirely on the early, paternalistic,
period without noticing the major changes brought about by the creation of the DGVO and
smaller, mutualist, charities. Secondly, like many others, he is entirely blinkered by the
activities of the COS which he sees as being representative of voluntary action as a whole
during the war when it was totally the opposite. Though the COS was one of the dominant
charitable bodies in the pre-war years and was often given a leading role by government
during it, its approach was increasingly marginalised by the more direct, practical and
reactive stance of many smaller bodies and by those under the control of the DGVO. Turner
believes the patriarchal approach lasted throughout the war and afterwards and bases his
view on three examples: the operation of separation allowances; increases in welfare
activities designed to reduce infant mortality and the crackdown on the use of alcohol. In
choosing these areas, he notes that ‘there was often very little change in personnel and

\textsuperscript{4} John Turner, ‘Change and Inertia in Politics’ in Hartmut Berghoff, and Robert von Friedeburg, (eds.),
\textit{Change and Inertia: Britain under the impact of the First World War} (Bodenheim, Philo Cop., 1998), p 159.
\textsuperscript{5} Philips, ‘The Social Impact’, p 158.
methods’ with ‘the same middle-class women’ of the COS at the helm. These are very partial examples chosen to support his argument. If he had instead selected troop comforts, industrial tribunals and food controls then he may have been forced to different conclusions.

A much more carefully argued approach, though still supporting the ‘increased subordination’ view, is put forward by Laybourn. He sees the first ten years of the twentieth century as being the crucial period of change in the ‘balance of power’ between philanthropy and the state. His thesis is that increased state intervention in the social sphere was due to a ‘failure of philanthropy’ to deal with the rising social problems faced by the British working class. Laybourn bases many of his conclusions on his study of the Guild of Help that superseded the COS as the largest voluntary body in England during this decade. The war, in Laybourn’s view, speeded up the transition and ‘swallowed up voluntary help, which became a mere adjunct to, rather than a partner with, state social welfare.’ He gets this analysis partly right, as the state did, over the period leading up to and including the war, become by far the leading provider of social welfare. However, I do not consider that this was due to a failure of philanthropy to meet the problem. It was clear far earlier than the commencement of the twentieth century that philanthropy could not possibly deal with the problems of a modern industrial society, however it took some time, and a more sympathetic administration between 1905 and 1914, for the state to fully recognise this fact. Laybourn makes it sound as if philanthropy declined over the period in question when it actually expanded in financial terms. He bases his views too narrowly on the philosophy of the COS and Guild rather than the wider philanthropic community and on one field, the relief of poverty. These two bodies, the ‘leading lights’ of pre-war philanthropy, were clearly

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devastated by the war, both becoming redundant in the new alignment between voluntarism and the state. The Guild ceased to be an independent force, subsumed within the new National Council of Social Service, and the COS, in Humphreys’ phase, ‘became a social leper, largely shunned by other charities and by government agencies’. Philanthropy was about far more than this, and the war widened its horizons further. In some major fields, such as the provision of hospitals, the state did not assume the lead role for many years after the First World War. The motivations for increased state provision were complex and various: the recognition that philanthropy could no longer provide the answer; pressure for reform from below by trades unions, the Labour party and others as well as a broad enough consensus that pensions, secondary education, health care or other provisions should be a right and not a privilege. When Laybourn summarises the war period as ensuring ‘that the state became dominant and the voluntary sector a subsidiary force’ he is, therefore, wrong. This fact, in terms of the provision of social welfare had been determined some time before, the war simply made it clearer. Interestingly in his earlier book on the Guild of Help, Laybourn recognised that the war had a transforming effect on charitable bodies and his conclusions were far more positive. He noted that the Guild had been forced to change, work more co-operatively and that this ‘ultimately led to its absorption into the wider voluntary movement’.

Finlayson and Lowe’s views are far more accurate. Lowe agrees that ‘during the emergency of war, the relationship between government and traditional relief agencies ... permanently

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10 Laybourn, ‘Social Welfare: Public and private’, p 379. He also makes some errors of fact such as asserting that the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Family Association was a new body formed during the war when it had been in existence since 1885.
changed.’ He sees this change not just as a realignment of the boundaries of state intervention but in the outlook reflected in the nature of the main charity umbrella bodies of the pre- and post-war eras ‘the fiercely independent Charity Organisation Society and the more accommodating National Council of Social Service.’ Finlayson argues that philanthropy was not totally submerged by state intervention but remained a vibrant, though significantly different, entity:

Voluntarism in the first half of the twentieth century was not, in fact, wholly superseded, but remained of considerable importance in terms of both the ideology which it embodied and the methods of implementation on which it relied. Preoccupation with the state model can all too easily point up the defects and shortcomings of voluntarism, and obscure its strengths and continuing importance – its moving frontier, to quote the term used by Lord Beveridge in 1949. The decline of voluntarism is yet another of the myths this thesis has touched on. It has been cultivated by an over-concentration on the comments of those who decried the declining influence of philanthropy on certain welfare problems and by the fact that the dominant voices of the inter-war and immediate post-Second World War period saw a declining role for charity if not its total demise.

I would view the role played by philanthropy in society in relation to state provision as somewhat analogous to the relationship between religion and science. To some extent religion fills the gaps that science cannot explain. As science explains more and more about the laws of nature and the universe, religion has the option of two responses. At first, it may deny the validity of the discovery (such as the Catholic Church and Copernican theory) but if

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14 See Harris, ‘Political thought and the welfare state’ pp 134-135. Harris sees the 1920s as being one of ‘great vitality and innovation in the sphere of voluntary service and in co-operation between public and voluntary sectors’.
the scientific theory is valid, religion cannot easily maintain this view. Therefore, religion adapts to the extent that it accepts these new discoveries, repositioning itself with regard to scientific theory. No doubt the science accepted by the churchman of today would have made him a heretic in the middle ages. However, if it adapts, religion does not die out and remains relevant to millions of people. Likewise, philanthropy fills the gaps that the state does not provide for. With little state provision of basic welfare services prior to the later nineteenth century, philanthropy provided a good deal of support for the poor or destitute. As society accepted that people had a right to a minimum income (or it became politically unacceptable to believe they had not, for example at times of unemployment) then the state took over from charity. Equally, as access to education (late nineteenth and early twentieth century) and basic health care (mid twentieth century) were accepted as a right so the state took over from philanthropy. Where this was not accepted, for example the provision of higher education in the USA, then philanthropy continued to play a prominent role. The point at which a social provision becomes a right is where pressure for change from below (political campaigns by interest groups or their democratic representatives) coincides with agreement for change from above, for example women demanding the vote and agreement by a majority at the 1918 Speakers’ Conference to give it. This can be a very delicate balance affected by many factors, especially with regard to when those in power reach a consensus for change. It can also be affected by reactionary philanthropists trying to cling on to their dominant role or not believing in state control, such as the COS displayed in the period under study.

Such changes do not, however, mean that philanthropy has failed. Philanthropy can never provide anything like the resources of the state so once an area of social provision becomes accepted as a right; philanthropy’s role will inevitably decline in these areas. What happens
then is not a contraction of philanthropy but a re-focussing onto other areas. One example is that many people believed in the early to mid twentieth century that poverty in Britain would be eliminated. Their error was to believe that poverty was an absolute rather than a relative concept. As the affluence of society has increased so our view of what constitutes poverty has changed. The only areas where philanthropy can accurately be said to have failed is where an area of concern becomes regarded as no longer relevant. The most extreme case was probably the 1,400 City of London charities that were amalgamated into the City Parochial Foundation in 1891 but the move away from proselytising missionary work in the twentieth century is probably a more significant example.\(^{15}\) There is no doubt that in two specific areas, its response to poverty and its links to religion, that philanthropy in 1918 was very different to the pre-war period. With regard to the latter, Prochaska has commented that ‘most dramatically, the First World War offered fresh fields for voluntary social action. It contributed to a loss of faith and disrupted parish charity, but it enlarged the need for personal service and national effort.’\(^{16}\) There is no space here to debate the impact of the war on the decline of religion in Britain but Prochaska is correct in his view that the new concerns of charity moved away from many of the traditional religious causes, most notably support for overseas missions. In relation to poverty, there is some agreement that ‘after 1914 poverty meant deprivation rather than destitution’ and this inevitably meant that philanthropy had to adapt its attitude to the poor.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{15}\) There were, for example, funds for sermons celebrating the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the failure of the Gunpowder Plot, for the tolling of the bell of St Sepulchre’s before executions at Newgate (which were no longer held there), for killing ladybirds in Cornhill (which no longer bred there), for ransoming Christian captives from the Barbary pirates (who no longer existed) and, most famously, Werke’s Charity a fifteenth century endowment of 6s 8d for the provision of faggots with which to burn heretics. Others were for the benefit of parishes which no longer existed such as All-Hallows-the-Great, which was now Cannon Street Station and St Christopher-le-Stock, now covered by the Bank of England.

\(^{16}\) Prochaska, *The Voluntary Impulse*, p 76.

The war also provided a new impetus to voluntarism based upon the principle of mutual aid. There was a profusion of small, local organisations providing support for the troops of their town, village or workplace. Other examples were the significant rises in trades’ union membership and veterans’ bodies. As Finlayson has pointed out ‘contrary to expectations ... World War One did not destroy the contributory principle – nor did it deplete the finances of organisations in the mutual-aid side of the voluntary sector.’¹⁸ Eventually all of these independently formed mutual aid organisations moved into some form of closer co-operation with the state whether through the co-ordination of the DGVO, formal political partnerships or amalgamation into the British Legion. Overall, one can perhaps suggest the change in this relationship in the following way. At first, the two strands of philanthropy and mutual aid were distinct but during the First World War, they came into greater alignment, with philanthropy making the more decisive shift. Post-war, though they drew apart to some extent, they remained far more closely linked than before 1914:

Figure 2: The changing relationship between mutual aid, philanthropy and state provision
1914-1918

Mutual Aid
Integration
Philanthropy
State

Post-1918

Mutual Aid
Integration
Philanthropy
State
Overall, I would agree with Finlayson that ‘war ... provided a focus for a profusion of philanthropic giving and effort. It may have weakened traditional charitable occupations; but it provided opportunity for new ones.’¹⁹ The most important new organisation to emerge after the war was the National Council of Social Services (NCSS), now the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO). The NCSS had its roots in the 1915 Westminster Conference of major voluntary bodies at which D’Aeth had suggested the formation of such a body. The new organisation was created in 1919 with a legacy of £1,000 left by a young soldier and pre-war philanthropist, Edward Vivian Birchall. Its aims were ‘to reduce overlapping and duplication, and to work in co-operation with the developing statutory services.’²⁰ In an Annual Report, the NCSS commented that:

> Very literally the council was born out of the experience of these four years ... A huge army of voluntary workers had been enlisted and in the relief of civilian distress and the care of soldiers and their families public authorities and voluntary agencies had learnt to work as partners. It was natural that this new sense of unity should find public expression.²¹

Though unremarked in any of the histories of the NCSS it seems quite possible that it was influenced by, especially, the management structure of the DGVO.²²

Another conclusion is that the First World War contributed towards an increased professionalization of the charity sector. Only after the war were social workers regularly

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²² There is, for example, no reference to the DGVO is the standard history of the NCSS, Margaret Brasnett, *Voluntary Social Action: A history of the National Council of Social Service 1919-1969*, (London, NCSS, 1969). Some evidence of links is provided by the fact that Ward had worked closely with the Social Welfare Association for London before the war on the employment of ex-soldiers, see *The Times*, 6 December 1913, p 4.
paid and turned from amateurs into professionals. Many modern fund-raising techniques were invented or expanded including: payroll giving; direct mail; charity related gifts to purchase for friends or relatives; flag-days and charity merchandising. The War Charities Act tried to ensure that even the smallest charities were run on professional lines with elected committees, books of accounts and minutes. Whilst I have said that voluntary action was particularly effective during the war it is possible to adduce at least three key mission-related criteria being demonstrated which helped account for this effectiveness. Firstly, there was a direct feedback mechanism from the beneficiaries of most charities, especially the troops. The fact that, contrary to the myth, there was a close connection between the Western front and those at home ensured that any problems were quickly noticed, as with the ‘sock scandal’ in 1915, and could be rectified. The very close local links with troop comfort and prisoner-of-war funds ensured this feedback mechanism operated at both the macro (DGVO) and micro (local fund) levels. Secondly, there were clear performance measures that were shared and understood; were soldiers, prisoners of war, hospitals etc getting what they needed? If they were not supplies could be adjusted, especially through the DGVO mechanism. Thirdly, all of these charities had very specific aims that were, in the most part, fulfilled through links to state provision. There was no ‘mission drift’ during the war and there were support bodies created to assist their missions.

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13 Voluntary Action, Social Capital and its contribution to winning the War

Evidence of Social Capital - Patriotism and Propaganda

I now want to turn to some further evidence of the strength, or otherwise, of social capital during the war. These examples are chosen as they would be expected to provide the most obvious links to the three types of social capital depicted in Table 1, bonding, bridging and linking social capital. These are:

- The nature and strength of patriotism which provides a clear indicator of linking social capital;
- The nature, and success or failure, of wartime propaganda, an indicator of to what extent any bridging or linking social capital was manipulated;
- The nature and meaning of morale, both on the home and battle fronts which provides an indicator of both bonding and bridging social capital.

The third element, morale, is dealt with in the next chapter as it links closely to ideas on deference. The first two are highly contested areas of debate. Some writers have argued that patriotism and propaganda undermine social capital by their operation as social control mechanisms. Those who quite happily consider small group solidarity during the war as a positive influence (the comradeship of the trenches) often denigrate larger group solidarity (patriotism) as negative and destructive, a view that became increasingly prevalent, at least amongst British intellectuals.¹ The switch in Britain from viewing patriotism positively to negatively is often dated to the post-First World War period, with a revival during the Second World War and a steady decline thereafter until at least the 1980s.² It is also a

¹ This approach is taken by many of the war writers including Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and has since become extremely strong, Oh! What a Lovely War being a good example.
difficult concept to define as it is often used synonymously with other terms notably jingoism, chauvinism, nationalism and imperialism. In the early twentieth century, these terms were more distinct and it is possible to distinguish between them. Recently a leading educational body, the Institute of Education Researchers, recommended that patriotism should be avoided in school lessons because British history is ‘morally ambiguous’. This was challenged by historians who argued that, firstly, it was an important principle at times of war and secondly that patriotism should be viewed as a relatively neutral term unless it stepped over the line into jingoism or chauvinism.³ Patriotism can be a positive emotion, love of one’s county, and does not necessarily imply hatred or negative emotions about another; whereas, both the terms jingoism and chauvinism imply an element of unthinking fanaticism, ‘my country right or wrong’ and an automatic dislike of other nationalities.⁴ Nationalism is a more precise term that emerged as a political force after the French Revolution. It refers to national identity and the desire of groups that identify themselves as sharing a common history, language or ethnicity to demand their recognition as independent states. Finally, imperialism is the tendency for strong independent states to expand, in Schumpeter’s view the common tendency of a political unit to grow until it encompasses the earth.⁵ Rose argues that there was a clear distinction among the British working class between patriotism and imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century. He quotes one young woman’s view that though working class schoolchildren in the 1920s were keenly patriotic:

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⁴ John Bourne has noted the differences between patriotism and jingoism, ‘patriotism is about love, jingoism about hate. The confusion has resulted in ideological, even aesthetic suspicion. It is now commonplace to regard patriotism as nothing more than a cynical device through which the interests of the “masses” are manipulated in favour of “elites”. For the volunteers of 1914 and 1915, however, it was a very real feeling. Contemporary correspondence leaves little doubt about this.’ *Britain and the Great War*, p 218.
Patriotism in those days was an ideal of love and service to one’s country. It did not conjure up pictures on an intolerably supercilious British raj arrogantly wielding the big whip on cowering, depressed natives. Rather, it inspired courage, promoted unselfishness and a concern for others which overrode purely private considerations.6

What this is describing, if accurate, is a classic example of linking social capital, but was this typical of the war?

One manifestation that would challenge this positive view is the idea that the outbreak of war was greeted with wild and unthinking enthusiasm in Britain. Marwick, for example, contends that ‘British society in 1914 was strongly jingoistic and showed marked enthusiasm for the outbreak of war’ and as Gregory suggests ‘images of cheering crowds outside Buckingham Palace, of long lines outside recruiting offices, of soldiers marching away singing “Tipperary” dominate folk memory.’7 However, Gregory’s own research and that of other recent writers has exploded this view as yet another war myth.8 Though there were the usual bank holiday crowds in London at the outbreak of war, contemporary reports put their numbers at no more than 10,000 and the mood was described in the press as ‘quiet and orderly.’9 In the working class community of Salford, ‘the fourth of August 1914 caused no

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7 Deluge, p 309. Gregory The Last Great War, p 9. As Gregory points out some of the worst offenders in propagating the myth of war enthusiasm were intellectual pacifists. Bertrand Russell’s autobiography is a notable example and Lloyd George’s memory on this point was somewhat at fault in his memoirs.
9 The Globe, 3 August 1914, p 5.
great burst of patriotic fervour among us."¹⁰ Mass enlistment did not really begin until the end of August when it seemed possible that the war might be lost, and then the mood appears to have one of determination rather than wild enthusiasm.

Those writers who support the idea of war fever in 1914 are also those who view pre-war British society as being jingoistic and militaristic, when the evidence for this is, at best flimsy.¹¹ Middle class patriotism is usually taken for granted but its working class equivalent is often seen as another example of the exertion of social control. Like Springhall in his analysis of youth movements, some writers suggest that the working classes were somehow duped into volunteering and that both they and their middle class counterparts saw war as an heroic adventure. Silbey has laid this view to rest in his excellent analysis The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War 1914-1916.¹² His conclusion is unequivocal and contrary to the patronising suggestion that the working class were simply the stooges of jingoistic propaganda. Instead, they showed a sophisticated understanding of their place in society and ‘their society’s place in the world. They believed in a Britain that was not necessarily the state. It was a Britain in which they had a stake. It was a Britain worth defending, whatever the sins of the government.’¹³ As Alderman Arthur Taylor, a leading figure in the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and doyen of the Halifax ILP bluntly asserted, ‘at any rate, England was the best country among a blooming bad lot.’¹⁴ Silbey’s summing up is that ‘historians may or may not agree with [the working class volunteers]

¹⁰ Roberts, The Classic Slum, p 149.
¹¹ For example John Springhall, see pages 117-8, views youth organisations as militaristic. Even during the war, support for the radical right was not particularly strong. See, for example, Panikos Panayi, ‘The British Empire Union in the First World War’, Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 8 Nos. 1-2, March 1989, pp 113-128.
¹³ Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, p 68.
actions, but robbing them of responsibility for their actions is both inaccurate and demeaning. Workers realized that they had choice before them, and made their decision. It was for war.15

It is also often not appreciated that, at the time, patriotism and radicalism were not at all incompatible. The consensus on the futility of the First World War has helped to bury this fact (at least in England – though not entirely in Scotland and Wales). Many writers of labour history have pointed out this fact and yet, as Waites has commented:

The phenomenon of patriotic and popular Labourism has been neglected by posterity... Historians ... have tended to approach patriotic Labourism during the First World War as the manipulated tool of a social imperialist clique in league with a handful of corrupt trade-union bosses... This approach seriously underestimates the strength of patriotic sentiment... In 1918 even shop stewards were ... caught up in the enthusiasm for a draconian peace.16

Laybourn and Reynolds support Waites’s findings that patriotism penetrated to the most radical elements in the labour movement. Their study of Bradford showed that a majority of ILP members supported the war, with a maximum of ten per cent demonstrating dissent. A census in February 1916 (i.e. before conscription was introduced) showed that of 461 young men in the Bradford ILP, 136 were already in the forces, 118 were in training and 207 had attested under the Derby scheme. A further survey in 1918 found that of 492 members liable for service, 351 were in the forces and just forty-eight were conscientious objectors or were on national war work.17 Many of those on the left were amongst the fiercest critics of

15 Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, p 68.
pacifists and conscientious objectors and views on the latter in soldiers’ letters range from the bemused: ‘some of their excuses would make a cat laugh’ to the contemptuous: ‘they are not fit to walk in the same street as a soldier or sailor [and] even the meanest German would despise them.’

In his D.Phil thesis Waites concluded his discussion of working class patriotism with a conundrum:

Labour patriotism is a serious gap in our historical understanding, but a still larger one is the precise nature of the ties which bound the common man to his country...

To understand popular patriotism we have to enter the imaginative landscape of adolescents who read the Magnet and the Gem... We have to ask, too, ... how far popular patriotism rested on an identification with the privateness, and civil and individual freedom of English life [as opposed to ‘regimented Prussianism’]... Popular patriotism is a phenomenon to which I will refer at a number of points in the subsequent discussion without being able to offer a satisfactory explanation for it.

If you view patriotism as an example of linking social capital then you can seek its explanation in the other layers of social capital, bonding and bridging, that lie beneath it.

If patriotism was a positive aspect of linking social capital then propaganda might be seen as a malign influence upon it. If people’s views were significantly manipulated by propaganda it is difficult to argue that those views represented any significant levels of social capital.

Though British propaganda in the First World War was relatively unsophisticated by later standards ‘the basic outlines of modern propaganda techniques were clear and so were the

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19 Waites, The Effects of the First World War, p 331.
ethical questions that would be faced thereafter.’20 A number of writers have suggested that Britain’s propaganda machine was notably successful, and significantly manipulated opinion during the war. This followed a period after the war itself that depicted British propagandists as devious liars, particularly over German atrocities.21 A prominent modern expression of this view is Millman’s Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain.22 Even the title is something of a problem as it suggests that governments can successfully manage dissent. There is very little evidence that, except in extreme totalitarian states, they can, and even in dictatorships, this management can break down when external conditions get out of hand.23 Dissent in the First World War was managed far more effectively by ensuring that people had enough to eat, that inflation and rents were kept under control and that wages were fair. Millman’s thesis is that in Britain dissent was managed whereas in Russia and Germany it was not, ‘it was not that Britain was peculiarly without dissenters, just that the British government dealt with them particularly effectively.’24 Millman wants us to believe that the potential for revolutionary dissent was as prevalent in Britain as it was in Russia and Germany. This flies in the face of all the evidence, which DeGroot sums up by saying that ‘far from bringing Britain close to revolution, the Great War confirmed the unrevolutionary character of the British worker.’25 Whilst Millman makes a number of pertinent points he

22 Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain (British politics and society), (London, Frank Cass, 2000).
23 A good example was in Eastern Europe under communism when public opinion generally believed precisely the opposite of what the state told them, even when they were actually telling the truth.
24 Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent, p 5.
hugely exaggerates the dissent movements in Britain and, especially, the plans to counteract revolution in 1918, where he admits that what he presents depends ‘almost entirely on circumstantial evidence’ and that ‘we can expect to find no other kind’. This allows Millman to interpret the evidence in whatever way he wishes. For example, he tries to argue that Emergency Scheme L, one of numerous anti-invasion plans, was in reality a smoke screen for a scheme to combat revolution. To borrow one of Millman’s phrases it will be obvious that this is very poor history, especially in its use of archival sources. If you have two explanations of something, one explicitly stated and highly probable, the other not mentioned anywhere and highly improbable, the historian should conclude that the stated purpose is the more likely explanation. Millman’s entire thesis is undermined by this misuse of the material and his argument for the sophisticated effectiveness of British propaganda does not convince.

Though not going to the lengths of Millman, Buitenhuis, in his study of individual propagandists, also suggests that propaganda succeeded by strongly buttressing the government view of the war. The problem with his argument is that a number of the points he claims were myths put out by the propagandists are, at the very least, partially true. For example he says that John Buchan’s account of the Battle of the Somme ‘turned that defeat...
into a glowing victory’ and that ‘in spite of all the evidence to the contrary’ British writers ‘soon created a propaganda myth’ that the war ‘was a product of German militarism and lust for conquest’.\(^{29}\) It is clearly debateable that the Somme was a ‘glowing victory’ but it certainly was not a defeat, even historians sceptical of the policy of attrition suggest that it was, at worst, a stalemate. Equally, the prevailing view today is that German militarism was a major factor in the causes of war, and this would have been an even more acceptable view in 1914.\(^{30}\) Messinger is far more sceptical about the success or otherwise of propaganda efforts saying that ‘it is still an open question whether propaganda really affected wartime behaviour at all’.\(^{31}\) If it was successful, it was because those in charge, who included Buchan and Charles Masterman, believed in both the importance of a free press and of non-governmental sources that would be more trusted by the public.\(^{32}\) Therefore, we are back to issues of trust building social capital. DeGroot dismisses out of hand the effectiveness of British propaganda calling it ‘so chaotic [it] could not have contributed to mass mind control.’\(^{33}\)

\(^{29}\) Buitenhuis, *The Great War of Words*, p xvi.

\(^{30}\) Surely Buitenhuis should have been aware of the work of Fritz Fischer, the major German historian who argued this point? *Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918* (published in English as *Germany’s Aims in the First World War*), first published in 1961. Buitenhuis also argues that several of the propagandists grew sceptical of the conduct of the war and cites the case of Ford Maddox Hueffer / Ford who ‘gave up writing propaganda and joined the army’ (p xvii) which hardly demonstrates scepticism.


\(^{32}\) Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*, pp 90 and 23. Messinger contrasts this approach to the press with that of Germany where the state used heavy-handed tactics that ultimately failed (pp 17-19). Marquis argues that the cosy social relations between government ministers and press barons in the UK was a major advantage over the German government’s relations with the press. Alice Goldfarb Marquis, ‘Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1978, pp 467-498.

\(^{33}\) DeGroot, *Blighty*, p 196. Robert Mackay has concluded that even the far more sophisticated propaganda of World War Two had, at best, a marginal impact and that civilian morale was operating on a whole other level untouched by propaganda, *Half the Battle: Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002), p 182. In his review of the book John Baxendale notes how closely this discussion ‘mirrors the similarly inconclusive debate about the impact of jingoism in late Victorian and Edwardian popular culture: one can make all kinds of assumptions about what its effects must have been, but one can’t get inside people’s heads to find out.’ *Reviews in History* at [http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/332](http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/332), accessed on 23/05/10.
Nevertheless, there are still those that consider that propaganda did perform this function in shielding the public from the reality of war. It is a topic I have covered to some extent in Chapter 7 but is pertinent here in relation to social capital. It is also given as a reason why the British people became sceptical of official propaganda and, in the 1930s, did not believe Nazi atrocity stories. Tate, for example, suggests that:

The success of British propaganda in the First World War made people very sceptical about news of real Nazi atrocities during the 1930s and 1940s. In Britain, almost no one who was touched by the Great War had any reliable information about it. Casualty figures were misrepresented; defeats were presented as victories; atrocity stories were invented; accounts of real suffering were censored; opposition to war was suppressed.34

The First World War was not unique in this respect. In every war governments try to manipulate information to some extent, it certainly happened with regard to World War Two. For example no one could describe Dunkirk or Arnhem as victories and yet they are often depicted as such. There were many ways the public could and did find out about the war on the front line but one example of wartime propaganda is hugely instructive in this respect, the official film The Battle of the Somme.

The film opened in twenty-four London cinemas on 21 August 1916, six weeks after the opening of the battle. It was seen by twenty million people, half the population, in the first six weeks of its release.35 It was certainly seen at the time as a remarkable depiction of the

34 Trudi Tate, Modernism, History, and the First World War, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998), p 43. Pearce’s detailed study of the anti-war movement in Huddersfield paints a rather different picture, one of ineffective censorship and great tolerance towards war resistsors. See for example his account of how two anti-war teachers were supported even by Tory councillors and how the local socialist newspaper the Worker was little affected by censorship. Comrades in Conscience, pp 203-5.
35 Beckett, The Great War, p 288. It was even seen by troops on the battlefield itself. Roland Fielding in his War Letters to a Wife describes watching it with real guns providing the soundtrack. He thought
realities of war, a point that was remarked on repeatedly in the press reviews. The *Daily Mirror* saw it as ‘a visualisation of the hell that is war’, the *Morning Post* as ‘extraordinarily realistic’ and the *Manchester Guardian* thought the film included scenes ‘so gruesome in their realism as to be hardly bearable.’ The film was one of the first to show real dead bodies but it did not do so in a gratuitous manner. British soldiers are shown stacking German bodies to await burial ‘but none of this makes a chauvinistic point ... it is the horror of war, regardless of the nationality of its victims, that makes such a powerful impact on the audience.’ Reeves sums up the film by saying that ‘above all else [it is] the ordinary soldier who is at the heart of this film. The battle was being fought by hundreds of thousands of ordinary working men and this is their film... men enduring the unendurable, men who in the face of apparently impossible odds retain their dignity, their self‐respect, even their humanity.’ This is why the film still retains its power to move audiences. Reeves describes its impact on his undergraduate students ‘whose sensibilities have long been deadened by regular exposure to unprecedented levels of film and television violence.’ However, the film is viewed very differently by a modern audience to one of 1916 as Reeves points out:

Where a late‐twentieth‐century audience sees *Battle of the Somme* as powerful propaganda for the horror and futility of war, fitting the film into its own firmly established views about the special character (and special pointlessness) of this particular war, audiences of 1916 fitted the film just as successfully into their (very

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different) notion of the War. Far from undermining or weakening popular commitment, the film served only to strengthen popular resolve to carry the War through to a victorious conclusion.40

It is instructive that exactly the same artefact can carry two such different meanings. Here the concept of the signifier and the signified clearly comes into play. Saussure’s belief, refined by Roland Barthes and others, is that the signifier, even when it is a complex text such as film, carries no inherent meaning of its own. Meaning is entirely dependent upon context. Whilst I would slightly modify this to say that the range of meanings are not infinite, as some post-modernists have indeed argued, I would agree that meaning changes over time and the Battle of the Somme, as well as many other texts produced during the First World War including poems and books, are major examples. Overall then Reeves’ view is that despite its realism, indeed partly because of its realism, Battle of the Somme was a significant element in bridging social capital. His comment is that ‘it started to bridge that chasm which separated people at home from the war in France.’41 Battle of the Somme is therefore unusual in that, though it was devised with a propagandistic intent it had a strong impact on audiences precisely because they considered it depicted the reality of the war, in contrast to much contrived propaganda. With this exception, there is no strong evidence that propaganda had any significant impact either on public opinion or social capital during the war.

40 Reeves, ‘Official British Film Propaganda’, p 37. Reeves’s view of the film is opposed to that of Modris Eksteins, (Rites of Spring: The Great War and the birth of the modern Age, London, Bantam, 1989) who argues that Battle of the Somme is a truly modern film in its mixture of fact and staged scenes. Reeves’ view, which I share, is that one could edit out the staged scenes (which are brief but include the famous sequence of the men going over the top with one falling back apparently shot) and the film would retain its meaning.
41 Reeves, ‘Cinema, Spectatorship and Propaganda’, p 22.
Chapter 7 examined evidence for and against the theory that British soldiers were alienated from the home front and civilians. Here I want to examine further how close the bond was between the two. If there was a close link, reinforced by the giving of gifts in the form of troop comforts and by other charitable acts, then this would further strengthen the argument that bridging and linking social capital was being engendered by these acts.

From the late 1920s onwards a group of writers have suggested that an irrevocable split was present between soldiers and civilians. Eric Leed is prominent amongst them and goes as far as arguing that this ensured that social capital was significantly damaged in the process. He contends that ‘the war had divorced [soldiers] from civil society ... radically [severing] the soldier from his society and [producing] in him a profound sense of injustice.’ Chapter 7 has already given some evidence that this split was illusory and the contemporary evidence is strongly to the contrary. Soldiers’ letters regularly report their feelings of linkage with those back home and some went much further. Sheffield comments that ‘during the war years, there was much talk among civilians about the positive effects of war service on social cohesion. In 1916 the Bishop of London spoke of a “brotherhood” being “forged of blood and iron” in the trenches, which should be maintained into peacetime, thus ending the class war between “Hoxton” and “Belgravia”’ and the psychoanalyst Trotter was effusive in his belief that the war had created significantly greater social cohesion in Britain. Another contemporary example of social capital at work was the success of the campaigns to raise

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42 Initially these were mainly middle-class war poets including Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon. They were later supported in the academic writings of Paul Fussell and others.
war loans. In Britain, these continued to bring in huge sums in the latter part of the war and the campaigns were boosted by a number of innovatory marketing techniques. Businessman’s Week (March 1918) provided examples of what communities or business people could raise. For example the £80 required to buy a machine gun might be raised by a group of thirty-five people, whereas a tank costing £5,000 was aimed at a population of 2,000. During the week, London raised over £75 million in war bonds and war loans.\(^45\) The idea for Tanks Week came from a member of the public, William Milligan from Tynemouth, who had written to Bonar Law saying that he had seen some tanks which had been too small for active service and suggesting ‘could these not be put into use as collecting Tanks visiting the smaller Provincial towns and thus help the country in the present crisis?’\(^46\) As a result, some ‘worn-out and battered’ tanks toured the country during December 1917 acting as giant moneyboxes. The visit to Bristol was typical, ‘each investor was presented with a souvenir flag.... Boy Scouts were found to be very useful for odd jobs and messages....Military Bands enlivened the proceedings throughout the week and many speeches [were] given from the Tank.’ The speeches were often by tank officers who ‘proved excellent speakers, and achieved remarkable results in the direction of influencing investments.’\(^47\) The Feed the Guns Campaign went to even greater lengths with displays of artillery in Trafalgar Square in October 1918 followed by Liverpool, Sheffield, Birmingham and Edinburgh. The Square itself was turned into a replica of a French village complete with houses, which brought in £29 million in just eight days.\(^48\) The sums raised for war bonds were spectacular. In the six months from November 1917, forty towns in England and Wales each raised over a million pounds with the largest contributions in Liverpool (over £25 million), Manchester

\(^{45}\) TNA, NSC 7/38.  
\(^{46}\) TNA, NSC, 7/38.  
\(^{47}\) TNA, NSC 7/38. Bristol raised £1,400,181.  
\(^{48}\) MacDonagh provides a vivid description, In London During the Great War, pp 320-321. The idea was revived to help raise funds for World Refugee Day in 2008 when the square was turned into a refugee camp. See http://www.theroadtothehorizon.org/2008_06_01_archive.html accessed on 09/01/2011. 

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(over £17 million) and Birmingham (just under £15 million).\(^49\) Overall Britain raised over £1 billion in war bonds between October 1917 and September 1918.\(^50\) Though these were investments rather than gifts the continuing flow of money was an indication that the public still believed in and supported the war. All of these campaigns were promoted by the National War Savings Committee who relied on 120,000 war savings workers, yet another mighty band of volunteer labour. One can contrast this success with the failure of the later issues of German war bonds and the fact that the Germans were so worried about the success of British war loans that they produced propaganda in an, unsuccessful, attempt to dissuade the British public from contributing.\(^51\)

The idea of ‘soldier separatism’, as Englander terms it, relies on the assumption that those who fought in the war thought of their service as something entirely separate from their previous life as a civilian.\(^52\) There is now overwhelming evidence that this idea of ‘the discontinuous character of war service’ is misplaced. The outstanding contribution to this debate has been by Bourne who demonstrated that the bond between soldiers and civilians remained because the soldiers still thought of themselves primarily as civilians. This is a theme that comes through exceptionally strongly in McCartney’s detailed study of the Liverpool Territorials. She emphasises the strength of local pre-war class and social groupings that were maintained when the men donned their uniforms. ‘Each individual held a separate set of allegiances, dictated by his ethnic origin, occupation and religion, and was

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\(^49\) The Times, 18 April 1918, p 3.
\(^50\) Beckett, The Great War, p 254.
\(^51\) TNA, NSC 7/36. ‘The fourth German loan in March 1916 attracted 5.2 million savers, but the fifth in September 1916 attracted only 3.8 million and the ninth was undersubscribed by 39 per cent.’ Beckett, The Great War, p 254.
defined by membership of various institutions and organizations.\(^{53}\) Her conclusions match those of Bourne in that the men ‘arrived back in their home communities with their civilian identities intact, ready to pick up their lives where they had left off. They were by no means unscathed by their ordeal, but, collectively, they had not become the obedient, passive victims of popular myth. They had remained civilians in uniform for the duration of the war.\(^{54}\) As Bourne suggests ‘the bulk of Britain’s urban working-class army did not find the courage to stick it out by accepting and internalizing the values of the pre-war Regular Army. Their values and their inspiration remained obstinately civilian.\(^{55}\) Bourne identifies a number of challenges that life in the army threw up, each of which the British working man was, to a certain extent, already accustomed to. These included learning to cope with a new and alien authority system, learning to do a new job of work and learning to create a new form of community. This meant that ‘they were used to subordination and tedium, two of the principal features of military life. They were inured to a certain degree of physical discomfort and material deprivation.’\(^{56}\) Indeed, for many recruits from poorer working class families life in the army was probably a distinct improvement. ‘When exposed to fresh air, physical training and plentiful supplies of army food they put on weight and height and discovered a

\(^{53}\) McCartney, Citizen Soldiers, p 17. Their comments are supported by Nicolas Hiley ‘You Can’t Believe a Word You Read’, pp 95-100 and those of J.B. Priestley that the war ‘was chiefly won on the ground by a huge crowd of young Britons who never wanted to be soldiers, hooted at all the traditions of military glory, but went on and on … with courage and endurance and tenacity we should remember with pride.’ Priestley, Margin Released, p 136.


\(^{55}\) Bourne, ‘The British Working Man in Arms’, p 340. Bourne suggests that very often orders were ‘negotiated’ between officers and men. An example he quotes is of the war poet Ivor Gurney turning down an ‘order’ (p 344). One could also view the ‘live and let live’ system whereby each side tacitly colluded in local ‘cease fires’ as being an example of civilian values filtering into the army. See Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The live and let live system, (London, Macmillan, 1980). Pope also supports Bourne’s proposition, War and Social Change in Britain, p 27. For an example of how senior commanders, including Haig, came to recognise the nature of their ‘citizen army’ see S.P. Mackenzie, ‘Morale and the Cause: The campaign to shape the outlook of soldiers in the British Expeditionary Force 1914-1918’, Canadian Journal of History, No. 25, August 1990, pp 215-231.

new self-respect.\textsuperscript{57} Bourne’s conclusion, one now shared by many other writers, is that ‘the British working-class was well adapted to the challenge of war. Working-class culture provided the army with a bedrock of social cohesion and community on which its capacity for endurance rested.’\textsuperscript{58} Bourne recognises that morale was boosted by ‘the huge network of welfare facilities, including YMCA canteens, concert parties and organized sport’, with many of the activities supplied by voluntary organisations or charitable contributions.\textsuperscript{59} From his extensive examination of contemporary written sources, Liddle links voluntary support for the troops, amongst women in particular, to ‘the strong sense of national and local identity’ shared by civilians and soldiers. This ‘called for concern and care for others and it required that one did one’s best to keep cheerful because times for all were harsh.’ His conclusion is that far from there being a division between soldiers and civilians ‘there was ... a considerable unity of purpose throughout British society during the First World War.’\textsuperscript{60} He is strongly supported by Adam Seipp’s study of Manchester during the latter part of the war. Seipp concludes that the war:

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\textsuperscript{58} Bourne, ‘The British Working Man in Arms’, p 341. See also: from the period of the Second World War Frank P Chambers, The War behind the War 1914-1918: A history of the political and civilian fronts, (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1939), p 256; Stevenson, British Society 1914-1945, p 453; and, in a rather different context, Geoffrey Best, ‘The Militarization of European Society 1870-1914’, p 29. The same process can be seen at work in the Second World War. Despite recent revisionist views that the home front in World War Two was less cohesive than the accepted version of stoicism and social solidarity (e.g. by Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz, London, Cape 1991 and Harold Smith, Britain in the Second World War, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), Robert Mackay concludes that ‘overall, the traditional picture of a spirited and resilient people is a valid one.’ Half the Battle: Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002), p 134. His view is supported by Brad Beaven, Leisure, Citizenship and Working-class Men in Britain, 1850-1945, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005), pp 9, 230-231. Though Beaven stresses discontinuities between the two wars, the result of his and other work actually shows the remarkable similarity between them. In reviewing Mackay’s book Baxendale sums up the former’s argument that ‘being British and living in Britain apparently provided sufficient common ground for the great majority in a class-ridden and in many ways socially unjust society.’ (Reviews in History). He might well have been talking about the First World War.
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Created wartime communities in unlikely places like factories, hospitals, schools and families. These communities were cross-cutting, complementary, and widely varied, but they served the same function. They integrated the home front and the front lines and gave ordinary people a stake in the final victory. They catalyzed the self-mobilization of combatant societies and proved, in some cases, far more durable than anyone imagined at the time.\textsuperscript{61}

W.E. Dowding’s contemporary analysis is linked directly to philanthropy and is quite complex in its understanding of the operation of social capital. He suggests that some of the effects of wartime philanthropy were more a ‘matter for the psychologist than the statistician’ and that by its operation ‘we have saved ourselves from the sin of callousness and have wielded that innate comradeship which is the main driving force of a nation at war.’ However his main comment that ‘the voluntary making, or buying, or giving, or doing of something is one of the many ways in which the \textit{morale} of the nation is preserved’ recognises a key operation of social capital with gift-giving cementing the bridging element between civilians and troops.\textsuperscript{62} Kidd supports this view, though from a different theoretical perspective, suggesting that there are three views of philanthropy:

- Philanthropy as altruistic, broadly the view of both Harrison and Prochaska.\textsuperscript{63}
- Philanthropy as a social control mechanism.\textsuperscript{64}
- Philanthropy as social exchange, the argument Kidd puts forward.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{61} Adam R Seipp, \textit{The Ordeal of Peace: Demobilization and the urban experience in Britain and Germany 1917-1921}, Farnham, Ashgate, 2009, p 66.
\textsuperscript{63} Brian Harrison, \textit{Peaceable Kingdom}; Prochaska, \textit{The Voluntary Impulse}.
\textsuperscript{64} See Chapter 3.
Both the first and second are one-way transactions. In the first, assuming altruism in its purest form, it is only the recipient who benefits, in the second only the donor.66 Neither can therefore be producers of social capital. It is only the third interpretation that involves an exchange of benefit. There were certainly elements of all three versions of philanthropy existing before 1914 but it was the third that became overwhelmingly prominent in the war giving of the British public.

I would now like to return to the adapted model of the perspectives of Social Capital devised by Blaxter et al (2001) which comprised the following dimensions and the suggestion that social capital is maximised if each one of the perspectives is fulfilled: 67

66 There is an interesting psychological question as to whether it is possible ever to be truly altruistic (even if you are, say, Mother Theresa or St Francis). For a discussion on this point see Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, *Philanthrocapitalism*, (London, A and C Black, 2008), pp 42-43. The gifts for troops and PoWs in the war were certainly partly altruistic but also contained a strong element of mutualism. Kidd notes that one clear element of philanthropy in the nineteenth century was that ‘voluntary charity offered a morally approved vehicle for self-aggrandisement’ with ‘high status accruing to the generous giver... Hence the emphasis in the nineteenth century upon the publication of names of donors and committee members in the annual reports of charitable societies.’ Kidd, ‘Philanthropy and the “social history paradigm”’, p 189. Grant links this public manifestation of philanthropy to the Protestant Ethic and one reason why public philanthropy first developed in Britain, Peter Grant, *The Business of Giving*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave/Macmillan, 2012), p 23.

With regard to each perspective, it can now be stated that:

- With regard to participation, both the numbers engaged in wartime philanthropic activity (probably close to 2 million) and the scale of that activity (raising around £150 million) were significant enough to have had an impact at national level.

- With regard to control and self-efficacy, there is considerable evidence of local control and effectiveness of philanthropic activity both through those organisations affiliated to the DGVO and among charities controlled by working class committees, most especially in the North of England.

- With regard to the perception of community level structures, there is significant evidence that voluntary work was integrated into local structures. This comes through an analysis of which members of the community made up charity committees, how those committees were connected to their communities (for example through information included in contemporary local histories) and how many voluntary organisations were concerned with work supporting local war hospitals or locally raised battalions.
• With regard to social interaction, there is evidence through the analysis of the composition of charity committees of cross-class co-operation and engagement of all classes; however, the level of integration would appear to be stronger in the industrial north than in the suburban south of England.\(^{68}\)

• With regard to trust, reciprocity and social cohesion, the evidence in this chapter and Chapter 7 is of extremely strong support from the beneficiaries of the charitable actions (the troops).

If a final piece of evidence is required, it is worth quoting from a detailed study of an individual community in wartime. This is Aberdare in South Wales, a mining community dubbed by The Times in 1916 as ‘the industrial storm centre of Britain’ and yet Mor-O’Brien found it was ‘fundamentally patriotic and in favour of victory in the field.’\(^{69}\) However it is his comments on philanthropy that are most pertinent as they support several of the propositions in this study:

> With the First World War ... philanthropy became the responsibility of everyone, not just the social leaders, and was inextricably bound up with patriotism. A fundamental change both in the nature of philanthropy and in the role of the state seems to have taken place specifically because of the war ... For the first time in British history, philanthropy experienced an unguided change which involved the whole of society over an extended period and under the emotional stimulus of wartime, developing from the preserve of the well-to-do and religious leaders, as

\(^{68}\) What many working class people gained during the war is what Li, Savage and Pickles describe as ‘civic’ membership types (a more middle class model of association not based on trades unions and workingmen’s clubs, that they call the ‘Labour’ type). Yaojun Li, Mike Savage and Andrew Pickles, ‘Social Capital and Social Exclusion in England and Wales (1972-1999), British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, Issue 4, December 2003, pp 497-526.

had traditionally been the case, into a mass voluntary activity with patriotic connotations.\textsuperscript{70}

In all, even using a relatively sophisticated modern measurement framework for social capital, there is extremely compelling evidence that voluntary charitable activities during the war significantly contributed to the development of social capital in Britain. However, the above model refers, almost exclusively, to the bridging and linking levels of social capital. What this leaves out is the bonding element, the personal level of social capital, which brings in questions of individual morale and psychology. This is the topic of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{70} Mor-O’Brien, ‘A Community in Wartime’, p 174-175.
14 Morale and the Deference Exchange

One dictionary definition of morale is ‘the state of the spirits of a person or group as exhibited by confidence, cheerfulness, discipline, and willingness to perform assigned tasks.’ Morale can therefore be a component of both bridging and bonding social capital. One can also talk of the morale of a nation and so it can operate at all three levels of social capital. Here I want to look specifically at individual and small group morale and then at how this affected class relations as this provides an underlying argument both as to how voluntary activities assisted in this process and whether this resulted in a social revolution in class relations.

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1 Terry Deary, Horrible Histories: The Frightful First World War, (Illustration by Martin Brown), (London, Scholastic, 1998). Some of the words that have come into the language from the war include: ammo; any more for any more; Aussie; barrage; binge; blimp; blotto; chat; dead beat; dug-out; eye-wash; fair doos; hot stuff (for a woman); no man’s land; over the top; pill-box; san fairy ann; plonk; stiff (for a corpse); umpteen; wangle; got the wind up; keep your hair on and pushing up daisies.

Small group solidarity was clearly a strong component of working class life before the First World War. There was a far greater sense of localism than today which manifested itself both in the creation of the pals battalions and in the best-organised charities (such as in Croydon or Blackburn). Communities were characterised by mutual aid activities such as the sharing of possessions or helping each other out in times of hardship. ‘The household was much more of an economic unit than it is now’ and this ‘re-inforced [sic] the idea of belonging to a group rather than confronting the world as an isolated individual.’ On top of the geographical community was superimposed the network of clubs, associations, religious and charitable organisations that were significantly added to in the form of war charities.

This solidarity carried over into wartime and many contemporary writers remarked on it. Typical are the comments made in relation to Leicester by Armitage who claimed that ‘it is doubtful if people generally have recognised even yet how far the cumulative will of individual men and women was the vital factor in the prosecution of the war.’ Armitage, again in common with most of those who lived through the war, did not see any diminishing in this solidarity as the conflict dragged on. Though ‘the atmosphere of Leicester changed’ later in the war, with determination and resolve becoming more prominent than optimism, he is in no doubt that individual morale held firm and that this was greatly assisted by charitable and other voluntary activities. The strength of the morale of those at home clearly had an impact on that of the troops at the front. Soldiers’ letters are filled with comments about how those on the home front are faring, for example if they have enough

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3 See for example Grieves, *Sussex in the First World War*, McCartney, *Citizen Soldiers* and Bourne ‘The British Working Man in Arms’ p 347. The DGVO’s office also built on this localism in their organisation.  
4 Bourne ‘The British Working Man in Arms’ p 347.  
5 F.P. Armitage, *Leicester 1914-1918; the wartime story of a Midlands town*, (Leicester, Backus, 1933), p 94.  
to eat or if zeppelin raids are worrying them.\textsuperscript{7} Waites agrees that ‘there is powerful evidence that it was conditions on the Home Front as they touched working-class wives and children which most affected the temper of the men at the fighting front’ and DeGroot emphasises how critical this point was when he states that ‘a collapse of morale on the home front would have ended the war much more quickly than a German breakthrough on the Western front.’\textsuperscript{8} The closeness of relations between the home and war fronts once again contradicts those who have argued the two were irrevocably split. McCartney emphasises that this interchange of information played a vital role in maintaining morale in the trenches. ‘It provided acknowledgement of the soldiers’ sacrifice, promoted mutual understanding of the hardships and difficulties experienced both at home and at the front, and fostered a common perspective on the conflict.’\textsuperscript{9}

However, it was not solely the fate of those at home that influenced troop morale. Most writers have emphasised that the morale of the British army on the Western Front was stronger than that of either their allies the French, who suffered serious mutinies in 1917, or their adversaries, the Germans, whose morale collapsed later in 1918.\textsuperscript{10} Simkins sums up by saying that ‘British military historians are in broad agreement that the nature of British society in 1914-18 provided a bedrock of social cohesion which prevented the BEF from total

\textsuperscript{7} See for example Great Chart Letters, from W.G. Bennett, Pte 1st Buffs, 22 May, 1915 (Vol. 4) on zeppelins; from 1811 L Cpl (later Sgt) Albert E Skinner, B Coy, 5 Platoon, Kent Bt, 5th Buffs, 3rd Infantry Brigade, 1st Welsh Division, Bedford, 6 June, 1915, (Vol. 5) on conditions at home. What did not appear to affect them, however, were political developments on the home front or defeatist comments such as those of Lord Lansdowne in December 1917, see Gary Sheffield, ‘The Morale of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-18: A case study in the importance of the “human factor” in twentieth-century total war’ in Geoffrey Jensen, and Andrew Wiest, (eds.), \textit{War in the Age of Technology: Myriad faces of modern armed Conflict}, (New York and London, New York University Press, 2001), p 108.


\textsuperscript{9} McCartney, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, p 117.

collapse, even during the crisis of March and April 1918.’ He suggests that this cohesion was strongly supported by ‘the huge network of welfare facilities ... as well as the provision of concert parties and organized sports’ and that this partially explains the differences from the French and German armies who did not enjoy these provisions to such an extent.\(^{11}\) The contributory factors in keeping up troop morale were, as Ferguson has suggested, quite humdrum. He lists warm and comfortable clothing; decent accommodation; good and plentiful supplies of food, alcohol and tobacco; adequate periods of rest; leisure opportunities and adequate leave.\(^{12}\) It is surprising how many of these: clothing, food, tobacco and leisure were provided to a significant degree by philanthropic bodies.

There are some dissenting voices who contend that morale was poor and only maintained by ‘crippling obedience’ to remote authority but these are rare.\(^{13}\) This weakens one of four explanations that Strachan notes are utilised by other theorists to explain how the morale of an army is maintained, namely discipline. The others are political ideology, which is

\(^{11}\)Peter Simkins, ‘Everyman at War: Recent interpretations of the front line experience’ in Brian Bond, (ed.), The First World War and British Military History, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991), pp 301-302. For further comparisons between the British and German armies see Alexander Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, morale and collapse in the German and British armies, 1914-1918, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008). Watson argues that morale in the British army probably strengthened later in the war (pp 140-155) whereas that in the German collapsed due to exhaustion, apathy and mass surrender led by junior officers (pp 207-215 and 229-231).


\(^{13}\)An example is Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1976) pp 80-84. Dixon’s argument is not credible and relies on some unlikely theses such as the idea that the British army had many highly competent Generals, with the exception of the years 1914 to 1918, when there were none at all. Even the so-called ‘anti-war’ writers such as Sassoon and Graves comment on the strong morale of their men and their own resolve though there are a small number of memoirs that suggest the opposite. An example here is H Drummond Gould’s The Truth from the Trenches, (London, Stockwell, 1922). Gould enlisted in the ranks and his book is virulently anti-officer though doubtful in its accuracy. At one point Gould says that on the march from the Somme to Arras ‘every man was in full pack, hand bombs and grenades being carried in addition.’ In the margin of the IWM copy someone has underlined this phrase and written ‘LIAR’ in the margin.
contradicted by much evidence, training and, most prominently small group cohesion.\textsuperscript{14}

Soldiers of all nations and at all periods are motivated most by loyalty to their group of mates, their platoon or unit. As one combatant noted ‘a corporal and six men in a trench were like shipwrecked sailors on a raft, completely committed to their social grouping, so that no one could have any doubts about the moral and physical failings of his pals, since everyone’s life depended on the reliability of each.’\textsuperscript{15} Part of this small group cohesion is between social equals, man to man, which would be expected to survive in a citizen army from civilian life. However, small group cohesion in war is also dependent upon mutual respect between officers and men who, usually, came from very different social groups.

The war ensured that working class civilians, as rankers, came into much closer contact with members of the middle and upper classes, as officers, than they might have done in civilian life. Marr further suggests that ‘in many other places, at open-air gatherings in city centres, public-school men, barristers and clerks found themselves lining up with labourers and factory workers, sharing a queue and a chat with people across the class divide for the first time in their lives’.\textsuperscript{16} As the historian of the 1/6\textsuperscript{th} West Yorkshires suggested ‘the artificial distinctions of civilian life were broken down, and a man lived in intimacy with different types and classes’.\textsuperscript{17} However, Beckett cautions that though there was a fellowship between officers and men this should not be pushed too far. Sheffield agrees and has suggested that ‘British officers and rankers believed themselves to be part of a war generation, united by comradeship and the shared experience of combat’ even though it was certainly true that

\textsuperscript{15}Carrington, \textit{Soldier from the Wars Returning}, p 98.
\textsuperscript{16}Andrew Marr, \textit{The Making of Modern Britain: from Queen Victoria to VE Day}, (London, Pan, 2010), p 127.
\textsuperscript{17}Quoted by Beckett ‘The Nation in Arms’, p 21.
‘class antagonism was not eradicated by the trench experience.’18 Despite this, there are many examples of deep respect, loyalty and even friendship displayed by some men for their officers. Baynes relates the story of a young officer convalescing in hospital in England who was visited by many of his men which ‘speaks for a depth of comradeship which was a unique feature of the First World War. Good relations between officers and men have been known in other wars, but rarely with quite this degree of warmth seen in 1914-18.’19

British officers were inculcated with a sense of concern for their men typified by the example given by Carrington:

Major Lewis impressed upon me and my friends one lesson at least, that young officers have no privileges and no rights but only duties. Woe betide any subaltern who ever so much as enquired after his dinner until he had seen his men fed and made comfortable, or who kept them standing to attention when they might have been standing at ease.20

Sheffield suggests that the ‘paternalism of the British officer corps [proved] vital in the maintenance of morale.’21 Beckett hints that this paternalistic attitude was not simply a one-way transaction commenting that ‘working-class soldiers both accepted and expected the imposition of discipline because, in British society, deference, which was not regarded as subservience, was routinely extended by the working class to social superiors in return for paternalism.’22 Trotter suggests that this relationship was akin to pre-war philanthropy and that this exchange system transferred itself to the trenches with ‘the subaltern [acting] as

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18 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p 134.
19 Baynes, Morale: A Study of men and courage, p 174. Brian MacArthur’s investigation of the archives for his book For King and Country: Voices from the First World War, (London, Abacus, 2009) prompted him to note that ‘there were surprises as my research went on. I had expected the camaraderie of the trenches but not the friendship that often developed between junior officers and their men.’ p 4.
20 Carrington, Soldier from the Wars Returning, p 74.
the West End’s representative in the East. Sharing the condition of his men – mud, vermin, shell-fire, exhaustion – he looks after them, and polices them, in the name of a distant authority. Trench warfare, one might say, was Victorian philanthropy’s last hurrah (or last gasp). 23 Though correctly noting the similarities, Trotter is entirely wrong in his support of the social control version of philanthropy, the exchange between officer and man was not just one-way. 24 Firstly, there were ways in which working class men could reciprocate by actual exchanges with officers. In many cases, the men were considerably older than their officers and so could provide much needed experience of the world. Then there was their experience of comparable conditions to life in the trenches. Bourne has suggested that working class civilian life prepared recruits, to some extent, for the experience of the trenches. If you were from an East End or industrial slum then life in the trenches probably was not quite so unfamiliar. 25 In fact, the regular food, medical and other welfare services were probably better than you were accustomed to. Granted that, back home, the people over the road were not trying to kill you but the arbitrary visitation of death was not unfamiliar even if it was manifested by cholera or T.B. rather than shells and bullets. For example, Gregory points out that the death rate of children in Lambeth between 1909 and 1913 was one in four; roughly double the death rate of adult males in the armed forces during the war. 26 On the other hand these conditions were entirely unfamiliar to young middle and upper class men and so the war came as a greater shock as they suddenly had to face the same arbitrary death that the working class had endured for generations. Perhaps

25 DeGroot is another that supports this view, Blighty, p 163.
26 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 278.
therefore working class rankers were able to help their middle class officers to cope with life in the trenches.
Transformation of the Deference Exchange

In his thesis Waites makes a revealing comment that his enquiry into the effects of the war on class structure does not cover ‘the significance for class relations of battlefield promotion from the ranks’ or any other aspect of the military side, instead ‘in this thesis the First World War is the war on the Home Front.’ This is understandable for reasons of scale and scope; however, by choosing not to cover the class system in the trenches he ignores any interrelationship between the military and social aspects of class relations. Waites is not alone in this approach of downplaying or ignoring, the mechanisms for social change that were operating – most notably the ‘deference exchange dialectic’. This is an extremely important issue as it helps to explain the mechanism whereby significant changes in class relations can come about. The environment for these changes was most fertile where close interaction between the classes took place. Therefore, the most obvious environment was in the trenches but it was also extremely important in voluntary organisations that brought together individuals from different classes in close proximity.

Deference is a relatively simple term that contains a much more complex set of relationships. Usually defined as ‘respect for and obedience to a superior’ deference ‘was one of the principal bonds of Edwardian Britain’ the other side of which was paternalism. Deference was often expressed in speech with the paternalist using the deferent’s first name whilst the latter addressed the former as sir or madam. Slightly lesser degrees of deference might involve the use of the person’s title, Doctor or Mr or Mrs Blank, being substituted for

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the more familiar and subservient, first name. Bourdieu in particular has noted that language should be viewed not only as a means of communication but also as a medium of power. When individuals produce linguistic expressions they deploy accumulated resources and they implicitly adapt their expressions to the demands of the social situation they are in. Thus every linguistic interaction, however personal or insignificant, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to reproduce. So in formal (pre-war) situations both parties in the deference exchange would utilise this concept. The ‘privileged’ would maintain distance and not use slang or vulgar language. The ‘deferent’ would modify their language and ‘speak more posh’. In the trenches this power relationship often broke down under stress or friendship with, for example, upper of middle class officers ‘effing and blinding’ along with their men. So language can act both to support the power relationship but also to subvert it.

There were certainly significant regional and occupational differences in deference in pre-war Britain; deference being far more a manifestation of rural, southern English

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29 It was notable that, after the war, it was suggested that domestic servants should no longer be referred to by their first names, Pugh, We Danced All Night, p 179. For a literary depiction of deference, perhaps the most relevant example is the relationship between Frodo Baggins and Sam Gamgee in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings. Not only does the relationship go through exactly the process of transformation outlined in this section but Tolkien, himself an officer on the Western Front, had a very similar experience. Tolkien commented that ‘My “Sam Gamgee” is indeed a reflection of the English soldier, of the privates and batmen I knew in the 1914 war, and recognized as so far superior to myself.’ (Humphrey Carpenter, J.R.R. Tolkien: A biography, London, Harper Collins, 1977, p 81). The war transformed Tolkien’s view of the ordinary working man and his war experiences had a profound influence on his writing. See for example: John Garth, Tolkien and the Great War: The Threshold of Middle-earth, (London, Harper Collins, 2003); Janet Brennan Croft, War and the Works of J.R.R. Tolkien (Contributions to the Study of Science Fiction & Fantasy), (Westport Conn. and London, Praeger, 2004); Hugh Brogan, ‘Tolkien’s Great War’, in Gillian Avery and Julia Briggs, Children and their Books: A celebration of the works of Iona and Peter Opie, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989) and Barton Friedman, ‘Tolkien and David Jones: The Great War and the War of the Ring’, Clio, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1982, pp 115-136. Croft forces a comparison with Fussell but the other writers make a compelling case for Tolkien to be recognised as an ‘alternative war writer’ to the Graves / Sassoon pantheon. It is also instructive that, unlike Graves and Sassoon, Tolkien thought himself a poor officer and disliked his time in the army like his fellow fantasist / children’s writer A.A. Milne. For further examples of pre-War deference, see Paul Thompson, The Edwardians, pp 39, 42, 105-106, 126 and 147.


31 My thanks to David Stowe for drawing my attention to this connection.
communities. In highly unionised industries, especially in the North, more modern power and exchange relationships had already replaced traditional forms of deference. However, deference is very different from simple obedience as it involves an exchange of values. As Sheffield suggests ‘deference was recognised as part of an interdependent, reciprocal relationship... This meant that social superiors should keep their side of the unspoken bargain by acting in a way that merited respect... When the employer resorted to coercion, or where patronage was offensive to working-class sensibilities, or paternalism failed to live up to expectations, deference broke down.’

Defence is therefore part of the system of social capital related to gift exchange and trust. Paternalism is offered and, if genuine, is ‘rewarded’ by deference. Defence is therefore a positive alternative to the social control thesis intended to explain why the working class remained passive during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With defence there has to be a positive decision on both sides of the exchange. It is not a simple question of the paternalist initiating the exchange; it had to come from both sides, whereas the social control model is entirely one-sided.

There is general agreement that defence declined following the First World War. Waites devotes a good deal of space to this in his thesis. He gives many examples and suggests that


33 A depiction of southern pre-war deference is presented in Robert Tressell’s novel The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists. Set among painters and decorators in Hastings and completed in 1910 the novel conveys a fatalistic view of deference that marks it out as very much a pre-war book. Post-war it may well have been more confident and militant in outlook.

34 Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches, p 71.


36 See for example Marwick, Deluge, p 299; DeGroot, Blighty, pp 296-297; Jay Winter, ‘Army and Society: The demographic context’ in Ian Beckett, and Keith Simpson, (eds.), A Nation in Arms, p 208. One of Winter’s examples, Jean Renoir’s film La Grande Illusion, though from France rather than Britain, is a brilliantly expressed examination of the changes in deference and class relations brought about by the war. Philpott agrees that the First World War ‘was the beginning of the end’ for the ‘culture of deference’. Bloody Victory, p 13.
workers sloughed off some of the servile manner which had often been part of everyday exchanges with professional men or officials.\textsuperscript{37} However, both Waites and DeGroot, though outlining the decline of deference are at something of a loss to explain why this change of attitude came about. DeGroot suggests that workers became less reverential and more assertive due to the greater degree of government control of their lives through legislation outlawing strikes and the introduction of conscription and leaving certificates.\textsuperscript{38} His argument that the decline of deference was a reaction to over-control by the ruling class has three problems. Firstly the evidence, much of which he quotes himself, is entirely against the view that the majority of workers strongly resented these controls. Secondly, there is nothing inevitable about the introduction of even a highly resented social control and ‘an assertion of hostility’, there needs to be a stronger, deeper, more psychological explanation as well.\textsuperscript{39} Thirdly, it leads him, quite wrongly I think, to suggest that the decline of deference was greater in those who remained at home than in those who fought in the trenches.

Waites uses a more convincing structural explanation in arguing that the working class became more homogenised and suggests some reasons why deference might have declined but these are political and economic factors: mobility of labour; extension of political rights etc. He does not relate changes in deference to the specific circumstances only prevalent during the war, such as the huge numbers joining the forces or taking part in new forms of work, both paid and voluntary, on the home front. He thus ignores the personal nature of the relationship, which means he is unable to explain the phenomenon. He says ‘what is more difficult is to connect satisfactorily these developments [the political and economic ones] to the desuetude of deferential attitudes and behaviour.’\textsuperscript{40} However, he does realise why he cannot fully explain the change even if his explanation is somewhat over-complex.

\textsuperscript{37} Waites, Thesis, p 41. Most of the examples are on pp 389-400.
\textsuperscript{38} DeGroot, \textit{Blighty}, p 296.
\textsuperscript{39} DeGroot, \textit{Blighty}, p 297.
\textsuperscript{40} Waites, Thesis, p 390.
and jargonistic. He says ‘this is partly because deferential behaviour is both a cluster and inter-subjective, “lived” meanings that is common to a culture (and which can change as the rules of social etiquette and “language games” of that culture change) [i.e. what is considered deferential behaviour today might not be recognised as such in twenty or thirty years and vice versa] and is also a characteristic of specific social relationships.’\textsuperscript{41} Waites thus recognises that there is a socio-psychological element in transformations in individual views of class but obscures any explanation of this mechanism within what could be termed a pre-structuralist definition of language and culture.

A number of other writers have got closer to introducing the required psychological dimension to the explanation for declining deference. This was sometimes expressed by contemporary commentators attempting to support the idea that war reduced class differences. D’Aeth suggested that the war had resulted in ‘a breaking down of many social barriers, due to the special war occupations of individuals, both at the front and at home, and the consequent new relationships and spirit of comradeship.’\textsuperscript{42} More recent writers have agreed that ‘interaction between the middle- and working-classes did reconfigure the nature of their stratification’ but have tended to suggest that the effect was perhaps more towards ‘the middle-classes ... acquiring humility through broader contact with the “rougher elements” of society.’\textsuperscript{43} Though these examples come closer to providing a description of

\textsuperscript{41} Waites, Thesis, p 390.
\textsuperscript{42} D’Aeth, War Relief Agencies, p 1.
\textsuperscript{43} Helen Tripp, ‘Mr Punch and Tommy Atkins: British Soldiers' Social Identity during the First World War’, University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, No. 4, 2002 at \url{http://www.sussex.ac.uk/history/1-4-1.html}, accessed on 29/10/06, p 5. For a strong example of the impact of the war on an individual middle class officer’s outlook and attitudes see Gary Sheffield, ‘The Effect of the Great War on Class Relations in Britain: The career of Major Christopher Stone DSO MC’, War and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1, May 1989, pp 87-105. Stone’s case includes many of the examples of social capital we have already examined including continuing mutual aid networks (p 99) and gift-giving (p 98).
what happened regarding changes in deference they still do not explain the mechanism whereby this occurred at a personal level.

The one theory that covers this gap in explanation was put forward as long ago as 1975 by Howard Newby in his paper ‘The Deferential Dialectic’. Newby’s is a highly relevant theory, not least because he relates his ideas directly to notions of charity and the gift exchange.44 Newby begins by suggesting that deference was in need of redefining, not merely as a form of behaviour or a set of attitudes but because it should ‘best be viewed as describing a form of social interaction ... which occurs in situations involving the exercise of traditional authority.’45 Thus, it involves a strong relationship to paternalism. Drawing on the work of Weber, Newby notes that ‘paternalism .. . is most effective on the basis of face-to-face contact; that is, deference to traditional authority will be most marked among those groups and individuals who directly experience the social influences and judgements of traditional elite members.’46 Because the relationship between deference and paternalism (or deference exchange) occurs to its greatest extent in these face-to-face interchanges this explains why it particularly came to the fore in trenches and workplaces during the war as ‘here deference is given not just to some abstract ethic of traditionalism but to the embodiment of that ethic in a particular person.’47 The exchange also works at its strongest within relatively small, face-to-face, social structures (like the platoon or workplace team or committee) but begins to break down in less localised groups, which may explain why there was an upsurge of the exchange during the war, reinforcing bonding social capital, but a

44 Newby’s theory has not proved massively influential; a search on Google Scholar (30/05/10) produced only 454 hits, mostly in sociological publications and the majority prior to 1990, however see below for its connection to the ‘contact hypothesis’.
45 Newby, ‘Deferential Dialectic’, pp 142-146.
47 Newby, ‘Deferential Dialectic’, pp 155-156. One area of Britain where, it appears, deference was especially absent was the crofting townships of western Scotland where there was little contact between crofters and landlords. See Paul Thompson, The Edwardians, p 224.
breakdown afterwards in the less-localised, more mobile, post-war society. However, these face-to-face interactions also carry a problem for the continuation of the paternalism / deference relationship. ‘If subordinates internalize their identification with those in power over them to the extent that they believe that “they are no different from me”, then deference will dissolve.’\(^\text{48}\) This is the crucial dialectical element in Newby’s argument, in that the very face-to-face element that is necessary for the exchange to operate also has the paradoxical effect that, especially where the personal contact goes beyond formal meetings, the two individuals will begin to realise they are not so different after all. Once this occurs the entire basis of paternalism and deference is undermined. This is, for example, exactly the process that Sheffield describes as having happened to the middle-class officer, Major Christopher Stone.\(^\text{49}\) Newby’s thesis explains how deference / paternalism acted as a significant support for bonding social capital in the trenches and in voluntary organisations but, given time, how this very strength also led to a transformation of relations between the classes at a socio-psychological level.\(^\text{50}\)

Though Newby’s theory has not itself become widely adopted it is extremely close to another theory of social capital that has gained far wider credence. Putnam in his highly influential 2007 lecture, and subsequent paper on whether the ethnic diversity of localities promotes or inhibits social capital, \textit{E Pluribus Unum}, discusses two theories that deal with diversity and social connections.\(^\text{51}\) The first is ‘social conflict theory’, derived from Marxist principles, which postulates that individuals and groups in society have differing amounts of

\(^\text{48}\) Newby, ‘Deferential Dialectic’, p 159.
\(^\text{49}\) Gary Sheffield, ‘The Effect of the Great War on Class Relations in Britain’.
\(^\text{50}\) Examples of how the deference exchange came under pressure in the trenches are provided by McCartney, \textit{Citizen Soldiers}, p 161 and Martin Petter, “‘Temporary Gentlemen’ in the Aftermath of the Great War: Rank, status and the ex-officer problem’, \textit{Historical Journal}, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, pp 127-152.
material and non-material resources and that the more powerful groups will use their power in order to exploit groups with less power. Conflict theories have been adapted to a number of other perspectives, for example criminology, and they are obviously closely linked to ideas of social control. In the context of social capital and ethnic diversity conflict theories would suggest that social capital would be adversely affected in areas of high ethnic diversity as the differing power relationships between the groups would lead to significant divisions. In contrast ‘intergroup theory’ suggests that, under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. First propounded by Allport, intergroup theory has, more recently, been extended by Pettigrew and predicts prejudice to be minimal when the intergroup contact is maximal whereas conflict theory argues the opposite: that diversity fosters out-group distrust and in-group solidarity.\(^{52}\) In the former hypotheses, therefore, the more we come into contact with people unlike ourselves the more we come to trust them, the latter suggests that the more we are brought into proximity, the less we trust each other.

Putnam’s findings were that though the initial reaction to an influx of immigrants was to reduce social capital the longer-term effects were precisely the opposite. In other words social conflict theory may explain the early reactions to ethnic diversity as one of ‘threat’ but the ultimate result confirms the contact hypothesis of Allport and Pettigrew. More recently Lancee and Dronkers have repeated Putnam’s test in a European context and decisively concluded that a ‘neighborhood’s ethnic diversity has no negative effect on the level of inter-ethnic trust; the same holds for the ethnic diversity of neighbors. In contrast, having ethnically different neighbors increases inter-ethnic trust, as predicted by the “Intergroup theory”.\(^{53}\)


\(^{53}\) Bram Lancee and Jaap Dronkers, ‘Ethnic Diversity in the Neighborhood and Social Trust of Immigrants and Natives: A replication of the Putnam (2007) study in a West-European country’, in
These studies are important confirmations of Newby’s thesis and its impact in the First World War. Intergroup theory states that contact between groups is at a maximum when five conditions are met:

- Equal status, both groups are taken into an equal status relationship;
- Common goals, both groups work on a problem / task and share this as a common goal, sometimes called a superordinate goal;
- Intergroup cooperation, the task must be structured so that individual members of both groups are dependent on each other to achieve this common goal;
- Support of authorities, law or customs, some authority that both groups acknowledge and which defines the social norms that support the contact and interactions between the groups and members;
- The potential for friendship between members of the groups.

All but, arguably, the first were most definitely extremely strong between officers and men in the trenches of the First World War.

Newby recognised the relationship between deference and the gift / trust element of social capital; however, he interprets it in a somewhat one-dimensional way. Newby considered that ‘traditionally in England the gift has been formalized through the institution of charity’ and sees charity as operating as a controlling mechanism in preserving deference.54 Newby uses the examples of charity during the industrial revolution and that of the COS in the later nineteenth century concluding that:

Marc Hooghe (ed.), Social Cohesion: Contemporary theoretical perspectives on the study of social cohesion and social capital, (Brussels, Royal Academy of Belgium, 2010), pp. 77-103. As the authors demonstrate there ‘is no reason to assume that the Netherlands is an outlier in Europe with respect to immigrants’ and so their findings are equally applicable across all Western European countries (p 77).

The impact of the rise of urban-industrial society, as the history of nineteenth-century charitable organisations shows, has been increasingly to deform the gift by rendering it more bureaucratically organized and impersonally dispensed on a less localized and less discriminating basis. The gift has thus become less effective as a means of social control, and its use has become less appropriate to the exigencies of a hierarchy characterized more and more by rational-legal authority. However, in those areas where deference to traditional authority remains, the central role of the gift can still be analysed.\textsuperscript{55}

Newby’s analysis of charity is very much of its time. He is perfectly correct to discern a significant element of social control in much of nineteenth-century philanthropy, especially that of the COS, and that state welfare undermines the gift exchange and thus the deference exchange. What he does not sufficiently recognize is that during the early part of the twentieth century, and especially during the First World War, the traditional form of gift exchange charity changed and this brought charity into a different relationship with deference / paternalism after the war. In other words, two things changed. The deference dialectic ensured a decline in deference and the changing role of charity moved it away from one of social control outside direct state control towards one of greater interaction with the state. What one cannot say is that one change caused the other; they are mutually interdependent changes, affecting each other in a cyclical relationship in Figure 24.

\textsuperscript{55} Newby, ‘Deferential Dialectic’, p 163.
Figure 5: Cyclical Interaction of Deference and Charity

Utilising Newby’s dialectical interpretation of deference helps explain a number of problematic issues. For example, Waites notes that there was a breakdown of deference but that this did not lead to any greater ‘levelling out’ of class differences.\textsuperscript{56} He therefore finds something of a dichotomy between those contemporary commentators who noted the emancipatory nature of the war and the reality, that there was little improvement in social mobility. With the deferential dialectic, one can see that socio-psychological changes can occur without there being any requirement for change to have happened at an economic level. Deference and paternalism broke down not because of any levelling out of class distinction but because many people, of all classes, no longer accepted them as valid. The war had widened the political, economic and social horizons of the working class and they were not going to continue to accept deference. Conversely many more of the middle and upper classes no longer believed so extensively in their natural role as paternalists nor in the deferential role of the working class.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56} Waites, Thesis, p 41.
\textsuperscript{57} One writer who captures this difference outstandingly is Janet S.K. Watson in Fighting Different Wars. In her consideration of how men and women, most notably nurses, represented their war
In summary the First World War brought the deference exchange to a crisis point, one that was unresolved until after the Second World War. Initially its existence helped build cohesion between the classes (in the form of bonding and bridging social capital) but then the dialectic kicked in. In some societies, most notably Russia and Germany, it broke down entirely whereas in Britain it was transformed into a new class-consciousness and awareness.\(^5^8\) Nowhere was the deference exchange under more pressure than in the forces, especially the New Armies. The pre-war army with its widely separated social classes (upper class officers, lower working class other ranks) did not seriously question it. The war brought a huge influx from the middle class (mainly as officers) and upper working class (mainly in the ranks). The deference exchange in the army was between officers and other ranks, but now the class differences between the two were far less clear, it came under extreme pressure. Deference / paternalism worked to cement morale both in the army and at home, particularly early in the conflict, but paradoxically led to its breakdown. The deferential dialectic goes a long way to explaining how it was that so many people at the time thought that society had profoundly changed, as their views were shaped by their own, personal experiences. Watson demonstrates that a variety of interrelated social and cultural factors, including ideas about gender and class, influenced how people who took part in the war constructed their experiences, both during and after the conflict. She does not specifically refer to the deference dialectic but her analysis fits well with the theory. She notes how professional nurses saw their wartime experience as ‘work’ whereas more middle-class volunteer nurses described it in terms of ‘service’. The two could well be seen as reflections of the deference / paternalism attitude. Watson says the differing attitudes indicated a great deal about their professional background and their class origins, but also could serve almost as a predictor of whether their post war depiction of their war experience would or would not fall within the paradigm of disillusionment. For instance, the relatively few World War I memoirs or novels written by working class former soldiers usually portrayed their time in uniform as a job and they do not share the tone of bitterness and disenchantment expressed by the better known soldier-authors, most of whom were volunteers from the country’s social elite. She concludes that those whose war participation was framed as work, especially if they were women, could find themselves facing hostility from fellow citizens who saw them as a threat to established class and gender hierarchies and conventions. Nevertheless, they often came out of the war having won tangible social, economic, and political gains because of their contribution to the nation’s cause. At the very least, for many men and women who were employed in useful, interesting, and sometimes exciting war-related work, their ‘story’ of 1914-1918 might be one emphasising self-fulfilment, collective camaraderie, broadened horizons, and expanded possibilities.

\(^5^8\) For a comparison with what happened in Germany see Chapter 16.
experiences, whereas most modern historians argue that social and economic relations were less significantly altered.
15 A Managerial Revolution?

The links between business and military organisation were commented upon in the section on the War Office and the LSE Army administration course and one of the pioneers of scientific management following Taylor, Harrington Emerson, was strongly influenced by his observations on the Franco-Prussian War. Emerson believed that von Moltke and the Germans had won due to their superior management.\(^1\) The most notable examples of the official introduction of scientific management in Britain during the First World War were within the Ministry of Munitions, which ‘developed a highly innovative approach in such areas as managerial organisation, cost accounting, welfare provision for labour, electrification and automation.’\(^2\) However, there were distinct problems of implementation, as noted by Waites, ‘the assiduous promotion of scientific management by the Ministry of Munitions meant extensions of time-work discipline which effectively deprived many artisans of the last vestige of control over the exercise of their craft.’\(^3\) This led to attempts to go beyond Taylor, as Kreis puts it, to ‘make scientific management more scientific’. He describes how this was done in a number of government bodies of which ‘by far the most important’ was the Health of Munitions Workers’ Committee.\(^4\) Whilst not challenging Kreis’s findings it is surprising that he does not mention that the approach of the HMWC was far closer to the ideas of Fayol. Certainly, the practice of management in voluntary organisations


in wartime was not based on Taylorist principles, which were too much geared towards production rather than the actions of managers, and had encountered the issues mentioned above. Instead, it is more instructive to compare the management practice of both the Army and wartime philanthropy to the ideas of another early management theory pioneer, Henri Fayol.\footnote{Kreis does in fact suggest a great similarity with Fayol’s ideas in his earlier thesis, ‘The Diffusion of an Idea’ p 407 and Jean-Louis Peaucelle has shown that many of Fayol’s principles were developed with significant regard to wartime conditions, ‘Henri Fayol et la Guerre de 1914’, Revue Française de Gestion, Septembre-Octobre 2001,}

Jules Henri Fayol did not become a management theorist until quite late in life, his main book being written when he was seventy-five. For the majority of his career he worked as a mining engineer before becoming the highly successful managing director of the Comambault mining and iron production company in 1888.\footnote{After the war he lectured at the Ecole Nationale de Guerre as well as establishing the Centre d’Etudes Administratives.} His ideas were therefore based on direct experience as a manager. At Comambault he grouped workers into teams according to their preferences and reversed the division of labour by giving the teams responsibility for, for example, timbering the mine rather than leaving this to specialists. By doing so, he found that output and work satisfaction increased and he concluded that ‘all employees in an enterprise participate to a greater or lesser degree in the administrative function.’\footnote{Daniel A Wren, Arthur G Bedain and John D Breeze, ‘The Foundations of Henri Fayol’s Administrative Theory’, Management Decision, Vol. 40, No. 9, 2002, p 908.} One might draw parallels here with Edward Ward’s organisation of his managerial departments or his use of native labourers during the Ashanti War. Because of this more democratic outlook, early interpreters of Fayol suggested that his theories were in contrast to Taylor’s but Fayol himself insisted that the two were complementary. Taylor was interested in methods and systems as they pertained to the operational aspects of an organisation, Fayol saw management from the executive viewpoint of coordinating and
integrating the functions of the entire organisation. Fayol’s views were, therefore, more top-down and this was one reason why he put such great emphasis on management education for those in authority. He considered that the reason that management education was neglected was that it lacked an underlying theory, ‘a collection of principles, rules, methods, and procedures tried and checked by general experience’, and so he decided to develop one himself.8 The key principles Fayol developed that concern us here are:

- His six essential qualities for managers;
- His fourteen principles of management; and
- His five functions or elements of management.

Managers, according to Fayol, needed certain qualities, knowledge and experience:

1. Physical qualities: health, vigour and ‘address’ (literally their manner of behaving) to give them the necessary gravitas in issuing commands.
2. Mental qualities: the ability to understand and learn, good judgement, the ability to delegate and adapt to changing circumstances.
3. Moral qualities: energy, firmness, willingness to accept responsibility for the actions of juniors, loyalty, tact and discretion.
4. General education and acquaintance with matters pertinent, but not exclusive to, their own function.
5. Special knowledge peculiar to the function whether it be technical, commercial, financial or managerial.
6. Experience: knowledge arising from the work proper, the recollection of lessons derived from their own experience.

Most, if not all, of these qualities are ones that we would recognise today as being relevant in the function of management and they are subtly different from those required for

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leadership. Sir Edward Ward best exemplified the above qualities during the war with regard to the organisation of voluntary action. His experience gave him the gravitas; he was an excellent delegator; his moral qualities were particularly noted by contemporaries; he was immensely adaptable, as was demonstrated in his Army career in Ashanti and at Ladysmith; he had practical experience of the coordination and distribution of supplies; he had great tact and determination, as shown in his work at the War Office. Most of all he had the conviction, like Fayol, that future senior managers should receive specialist managerial training.  

Fayol noted that there was no limit on the number of management principles, stressing that they must be flexible and adapt to the situation at hand. Nevertheless, those he outlined have stood up well in the hundred years since he first propounded them. They are:

1. Division of work, the Taylorist idea of specialisation of labour to reduce waste, but Fayol noted that it was important to integrate tasks such as those he adopted in the mines. This was a principle adopted by Ward in the allocation of tasks to individual units of the DGVO.

2. Authority and responsibility, ‘the right to give orders and the power to exact obedience’. However, this must not be unthinking obedience, a good manager required the qualities to earn obedience and so respect was vital. Fayol stated that the effective use of authority required high moral character, impartiality and fairness. This worked well in the case of the

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9 See, for example, Sharlyn Lauby, The Importance of Leadership, http://www.itmgroupinc.com/importance-leadership.html.

DGVO but not so well in some other, comparable, organisations such as the Central Prisoners of War Committee (CPWC).

3. Discipline, which came from good leaders and clear agreements between management and labour regarding rules, and the judicious use of sanctions. Fayol was here getting close to recognising that good management entails many of the elements required for building social capital and the voluntary organisations of the First World War that worked best adhered closely to Fayol’s concept of discipline. This issue is most especially one of governance. A well-governed organisation is one that maintains discipline without slipping into autocracy. Here, the best run charities (such as CWSCH or the Salvation Army) as well as the DGVO operated to the principle. Where the principle broke down badly this led directly to several of the major charity scandals of the period.\textsuperscript{11}

4. Unity of command, ensuring any worker or manager received instructions from just one person; thus, there is a clear need to delineate duties and responsibilities. This again worked well in many wartime charities but, prior to the coordinating role of the DGVO, there was a problem of mixed messages from more than one source.

5. Unity of direction. Proper focus and coordination requires ‘one head and one plan for a group of activities having the same objective’.\textsuperscript{12} Again, some voluntary organisations suffered from having more than one plan but there was certainly an overall unity of purpose.

6. Subordination of individual interests to the general interest, which was a strong characteristic of wartime voluntary bodies.

\textsuperscript{11} Most notably in the case of the French Relief Fund (see Appendix 9).
\textsuperscript{12} Fayol, \textit{General and Industrial Management}, p 24.
7. Remuneration that was fair, not a significant issue for the organisations under consideration, though it was clearly important that those giving their labour did not feel they were being exploited as the early problems with Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild demonstrated.

8. Centralisation and decentralisation. Here, as Wren, has pointed out Fayol ‘showed some brilliant insights into organisations.’\(^{13}\) He did not favour one approach over the other, considering that it depended upon the circumstances, but did recognise that businesses needed to be flexible to account for the human, psychological aspects of management noting that ‘each employee, intentionally or unintentionally, puts something of himself into the transmission and execution of orders and of information received.’\(^{14}\) This was exactly what Ward built into the management of the DGVO structure, allowing different degrees of autonomy to local branches depending upon their abilities and not interfering too much in their workings, again in contrast to the CPWC.

9. The scalar chain was the ‘chain of superiors ranging from the ultimate authority to the lowest ranks’. However, to counter possible communication delays, especially in decentralised organisations, caused by the unity of command principle, Fayol developed what he called his ‘gangplank’, which allowed communications to cross lines of authority. The gangplank was an early recognition of the process of cross-functionality in hierarchical organisations, putting together multi-functional teams to tackle specific issues. See Figure 25 - the usual hierarchical chain of command goes down each column, the agreed cross-functional communication lines are indicated

by the red arrows. The organisation of the British Army later in the War into small, autonomous units might be an example of this practice.

**Figure 6: Simplified Version of the Fayol Gangplank**

![Diagram showing the Fayol Gangplank with Manager A, Manager B, Supervisor A, Supervisor B, Worker A, and Worker B connected by red arrows.]

10. Order in relation to materials meant, ‘a place for everything and everything in its place’ whereas in the case of personnel it was ‘the right man in the right place’ within the organisation.

11. Equity and equality of treatment for all personnel at all levels were seen by Fayol as a precondition for devotion and loyalty. Here he is recognising one of the principles of social capital that was at its strongest in wartime charitable organisations.

12. Stability of tenure of personnel who need time to develop the necessary job skills. Fayol was most certainly not an advocate of change for change’s sake.

13. Initiative, the power to formulate a plan and successfully implement it, is another of Fayol’s principles that has a very modern ring to it. Fayol noted that managers ‘must be able to sacrifice some personal vanity in order to
grant this sort of satisfaction to subordinates’\textsuperscript{15} Ward’s contemporaries all remarked on his abilities of effective delegation.  

14. The final principal was esprit de corps, which stressed building harmony and unity. Fayol was strongly in favour of verbal contact between managers and staff feeling that they abused written communications. This was a notable feature of Ward’s work at the War Office in his dealings with voluntary organisations and in his encouragement of sport in the Army.\textsuperscript{16}

Wren concludes that ‘so much of the present-day management literature has been built on Fayol’s ideas and terminology that it is difficult to see the uniqueness of his insights. For his time and in the context of the paucity of management literature, his ideas were fresh, illuminating, and milestones on the path of the evolving discipline of management.’\textsuperscript{17} Yet many were to be found in the way in which the best voluntary organisations operated in the First World War, most especially the office of the DGVO.

One can also assess wartime charities and the DGVO against Fayol’s third set of ideas, his elements of management, which is illustrated in Figure 26:

\textsuperscript{15} Fayol, \textit{General and Industrial Management}, p 39.
\textsuperscript{17} Wren, \textit{The History of Management Thought}, p 218.
Planning for Fayol meant looking ahead and foresight, including what today is termed contingency planning. A good plan of action required unity (one overall plan followed by specific plans for each activity); continuity (both short- and long-term plans); flexibility (the ability to adjust to unexpected events) and precision (eliminating as much guesswork as possible). It is remarkable how these principles match what occurred in First World War voluntary bodies. Despite hugely changing circumstances - industrial distress and relief for Belgian refugees rapidly turning into provision for a mass citizen army - and a war that continued far longer than most had anticipated, the system coped more than adequately.

The organisational structure had to be arranged to provide unity of direction and Fayol advocated a relatively ‘flat’ management structure with each manager normally responsible for no more than six subordinates. In working out structures, Fayol strongly favoured the use

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18 Fayol proposed the original theory in Administration Industrielle et Générale, 1916.
of organisational charts. ‘The chart itself was a managerial instrument for analysing relationships between departments, specifying individuals and their tasks, and making modifications in the organization.’\textsuperscript{19} The clearest use of this principle was by Sir Edward Ward in his management structure depicted in Figure 18.

Fayol devoted somewhat less space to the issues of command, coordination and control but emphasised the requirement for strong communication skills, including regular face-to-face meetings, both strong features of the work of Ward both prior to and including that as DGVO. Coordinating involved timing and sequencing activities; commanding was putting the plan into action, and controlling involved monitoring and adjusting to keep the plan on track. In each of these activities, Fayol emphasised that the fourteen principles should operate. Overall Fayol was essentially a managerial strategist, well before that term came to be used in this sense. He was the first to propose a general theory of management and his theory of what constitutes good management is still the basis of modern ideas. It also characterises the best managed wartime charities, most especially the work of Sir Edward Ward and the office of the DGVO.\textsuperscript{20}

One can also look at the management of wartime charities, and in particular the work of the DGVO, in relation to other more recent concepts of managerial excellence. Volberda developed his ideas to answer the question ‘what organizational forms lead to success in hypercompetitive environments?’ He discovered that ‘hypercompetition forces firms to move more quickly and boldly and to experiment in ways that do not conform to traditional

\textsuperscript{19} Wren, \textit{The History of Management Thought}, p 222.
\textsuperscript{20} A further example is Ward’s co-ordination of medical supplies, see Appendix 6.
administrative theory. Thus, Volberda was arguing that in the most extreme business conditions flexibility is critical. By flexibility he means ‘the degree to which an organisation has a variety of managerial capabilities and the speed at which they can be activated, to increase the control capacity of management and improve controllability of the organization’

To remind ourselves, Volberda’s organisational flexibility model consists of five building blocks and has provided a sound theoretical foundation of flexibility and demonstrated how managers can effectively build and sustain flexible organisations. Volberda depicted the forces at work and the required response as in Figure 27:

**Figure 8: Volberda’s Organizational Flexibility Model (repeated)**

The model is most relevant in rapidly changing environments where effective priority setting is essential to adjusting actual or potential flexibility and, whilst not wanting to press the analogy too far, one could say that the time that voluntary organisations in Britain came

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22 Volberda, ‘Toward the Flexible Form’, p 361.
under most pressure, their time of hypercompetition, was during the First World War.

Volberda goes on to define the two central dimensions of organisational flexibility as the extensiveness of the flexibility mix (the extent of the change, the four outside parameters in Figure 27) and the controllability of the organisational conditions (the inner box, or the metaflexibility of the organisation). From this, he developed a typology of flexibility ‘each type representing a particular way of addressing the flexibility paradox of change versus preservation and some are more effective than others.’

These are represented in the following diagram together with the paths than might be followed in organisations attempting to face hypercompetitive environments:

**Figure 9: Volberda’s Typology of Alternative Flexible Forms for Coping with Hypercompetition**

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The ‘natural’ trajectory is analogous to conceptions of an organisational life cycle that usually occurs over a significant period of time. In hypercompetitive environments the changes from one form to another can speed up. This occurred even more dramatically in

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the exceptional circumstances of a total war. The rigid form of organisation may well have highly sophisticated structures and mature technology but is characterised by a highly functionalised and centralised structure with many hierarchical layers. It works well in environments with little change but comes under stress in more extreme conditions where its narrow-minded, conservative culture results in a fragile and vulnerable organisation. I would suggest that the German system of welfare provision and its voluntary organisations closely managed by the state fell into this form.\(^{24}\)

The planned form also has a narrow flexibility mix but the variety of routines and the controllability are less limited than in the rigid organisation. The organisation has sophisticated, complex and detailed procedures that require an excessive information processing capacity. For every possible change, management has developed a certain response. The shared cultural beliefs and assumptions of management mean that there is little leeway for deviant interpretations of the environment. As long as there are no unexpected changes, the controllability of such an organisation is high however, if unanticipated changes occur and are threatening to the shared idea system, the result is strategic drift in which attempted managerial solutions cannot keep pace with environmental changes. I would suggest that this form was characteristic of some of the excesses of bureaucracy created by the 1916 War Charities Act. The LCC’s heavy-handed treatment of poor working class and Jewish charities is highly reminiscent of an approach with little scope for the acceptance of deviant approaches to charity.\(^{25}\)

\(^{24}\) See Chapter 16.
\(^{25}\) As the planned form is often more characteristic of mature organisations this could partly be accounted for by the LCC having a longer-standing process for monitoring and regulating charities than other local authorities.
The chaotic form, especially characteristic of young organisations, has a very extensive flexibility mix but is uncontrollable. The possibilities for variation are unlimited but the innumerable initiatives for change are impossible to implement. The range of possible procedures is so large that making a choice is very difficult and managers decision-making capacity is greatly reduced, ‘as a result, emerging administrative problems deteriorate from petty to trivial to severe and disruptive’. However, though the chaotic form has these negative aspects it can have a role in the exploration of new opportunities when firms are facing advancing hypercompetitive conditions. I would suggest that this form existed at the outbreak of the war with the plethora of uncoordinated voluntary bodies that sprang up. They were uncontrollable and significant problems arose, for example with regard to the various charity scandals reported, even though most were trivial they were exaggerated out of proportion. Nevertheless, these early efforts provided some valuable lessons for later work and many successful organisations arose.

Finally, the flexible form demonstrates both strategic and structural flexibility. ‘Disturbances are met effectively with alert adaptations without the organization losing its distinctiveness. Resistance to signals of threat to the idea system is low’, the system adapts and the organisation is able to resist being overwhelmed by its immediate environment. Volberda acknowledges that this form has close links to the social network form outlined by Liebeskind et al, which is characterised by an organic structure, but with robust ties between personnel because of a strong professional culture. Here Volberda is acknowledging the

importance of the existence of the elements of social capital in organisations, especially those facing extreme change. I would suggest that it was the office of the DGVO that most clearly demonstrated the flexible form. With the slight exception of when Ward attempted to derail the 1916 Act, the management of his department, and that of his previous enterprises, had been marked by significant degrees of organisational flexibility at times of crisis.

A final measure of the management competence of charities during the war is provided by the importance that is now placed on trust (in the social capital meaning of the word) by management experts. The growth of corporate social responsibility is one indicator of this trend demonstrating that the loss of public trust can be immensely damaging. In the nineteenth century, there is strong evidence of significant working class distrust of charities but the First World War was a turning point.\textsuperscript{30} Despite the odd scandal, trust in charities was transformed through the inclusion of entirely new groups of charity organisers, of charities that operated for the benefit of local people and, despite its limitations, public trust was even helped by the passing of the War Charities Act. The war began a process of placing charities high on the list of trusted institutions so that today the RNLI, RSPCA and Red Cross are the most trusted organisations in Britain.\textsuperscript{31} Some writers have gone further even than this by suggesting that the individual character of senior managers’ is an important factor in


\textsuperscript{31} See David Brindle ‘Charities shine in reputation chart’, \textit{Guardian}, 2 June 2010, p 3. ‘While the global average score for corporate reputation on the [Reputation] Institute’s scale is 64.2 out of 100, and the highest UK corporate score is the 87.2 achieved by high-street chemist Boots, nine of the 10 charities that were assessed have come out above 80 and three are above 90. Top of the tree is the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) on 95.1, the highest score ever recorded by the Institute.’
company performance.\textsuperscript{32} If this is the case then, again, the figure of Sir Edward Ward assumes great significance.

So does the above amount to conclusive evidence of a voluntary sector management revolution during the First World War? There have been several claims regarding managerial revolutions in the past, perhaps the most coherent propounded by Drucker.\textsuperscript{33} Drucker suggested that there had been three revolutions in the meaning of knowledge in the past 250 years. The first was a transformation of knowledge applied to tools, processes and products resulting in the industrial revolution of the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries. The second, that of knowledge applied to human work, the productivity revolution, occurred from about 1880 to the end of the Second World War. The third is what Drucker called knowledge applied to knowledge, which ‘is the third and perhaps the ultimate step in the transformation of knowledge. Supplying knowledge to find out how existing knowledge can best be applied to produce results is, in effect, what we mean by management.’ Therefore Drucker suggests that the definition of a manager has changed from the pre-1945 period when it was ‘someone responsible for the work of subordinates’, through the 1950s when a manager was someone ‘responsible for the performance of people’ to the modern view that a manager is one who ‘is responsible for the application and performance of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{34} Drucker suggests that this transformation has taken less than 50 years, roughly from 1945 to 1990. In this strict sense, it could not be argued that the innovations in the operation of voluntary organisations during the First World War brought about a transformation in the ‘knowledge of knowledge’. However, Drucker has also written extensively on the management of nonprofit organisations and has suggested that there are


\textsuperscript{34} Drucker, \textit{Post-Capitalist Society}, p 4.
a number of critical areas where business can learn from the modern voluntary sector, most especially:

- The focus that nonprofits have on missions that are focussed ‘on the outside – the community and the customer. They look outside for what are considered meaningful results.’\(^{35}\)
- A functioning board with clear duties and responsibilities and measures of both CEO and board effectiveness.
- Knowing how to manage volunteers, which requires a clear mission, high demands, accountability and training. Drucker suggests that ‘these requirements for effective volunteers are very close to the requirements for leading knowledge workers in other sectors of the economy.’\(^{36}\)

If one judges the best voluntary organisations of the war (especially the DGVO) against these standards (most notably the first and third) then it becomes possible to argue that they may well have been significantly in advance of the business and industrial sectors of the period with regard to operational management.


16 Conclusions

Before drawing final conclusions it is pertinent to reprise the major research questions posed at the outset of this thesis namely:

- What was the extent of wartime charitable activity?
- What impact did this have on Britain’s war effort?
- What role was played by statutory agencies in enabling charity to be used in the most effective way?
- What was the state reaction to charity and was this reaction effective?
- What was the legacy of charitable activity in the First World War?

These have, to some extent, been answered but there are three points that need some additional comment:

- How did what happened in Britain differ from what occurred in Germany?
- What was the course of state intervention in charity after the war?
- What was the immediate legacy of this activity?
Comparisons with Germany

If voluntary activity made a significant contribution to social capital in Britain did it also make a similar contribution in Germany? The evidence suggests that, at first, the similarities were greater than the differences but, towards the end of the war, the situation in Britain remained substantially unchanged whereas in Germany social capital had been significantly weakened.

In the pre-war period, there is strong evidence that Germany exhibited the same dense network of local voluntary associations, youth organisations and women’s groups that existed in Britain.1 Likewise the war ‘spawned an unprecedented volunteerism in support of the troops’ and ‘opened vast new challenges to women’s charitable organisations [who] began to oversee all manner of services, including hospitals, soup kitchens, child-care centres, classes in running a frugal household, and agencies for collecting old clothing and shoes.’2 However, this situation masked some significant differences between the underlying structures of the two societies. Notwithstanding Germany’s universal manhood suffrage, Thane has depicted pre-war Germany as ‘a highly autocratic and bureaucratic state with exiguous national democratic institutions and few effective parliamentary and other sources of Liberal opposition.’3 Germany thus began the war with a far greater degree of state intervention in welfare provision than Britain and this increased significantly as the war went on, reaching its climax in the ‘command economy’ under Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Many historians have suggested that Imperial Germany began with the military having a massive

2 Jeffrey Verhey, ‘War and Revolution’ in Retallack Imperial Germany, p 250; Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 116. Chickering notes that close to 30 billion Libesgaben or ‘care packages’ were exchanged between soldiers and home during the war.
influence on the working of the state and ended as a virtual military dictatorship.⁴ Though some writers have questioned this interpretation, Chickering has suggested that ‘military accents seeped into the activities of Social Democratic voluntary associations’, a very different situation from Britain where even in the Army Council inspired DGVO programme it was voluntarism that predominated.⁵ Consequent upon this militarisation was the problem that, unlike in Britain, ‘opposition groups could not be institutionalized and integrated into the political system’ as, for example, elements of the more militant trades’ union movement were in Britain, ‘but were denounced as “enemies of the Reich.”’⁶ Even the fact that there were fewer strikes in Germany than in Britain could be seen, paradoxically, as a sign of the far greater degree of control exercised over labour by the German state. Unlike Britain, trade union membership in Germany declined during the war.⁷

What happened in Germany was that trust in state institutions broke down, which loosened the bonds of social cohesion and negatively affected linking social capital. The situation was exacerbated by food shortages and ‘the failure of rationing and the growth of the black market [which] undermined the legitimacy of the German state.’⁸ Winter and Robert contrast the situation in Germany with that in France and Britain suggesting that:

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In Paris and London the entitlements of citizenship helped preserve communities at war by enforcing a balance of distribution of necessary goods and services as between civilian and military claimants. In Berlin, a different order of priorities existed. The military came first, and the economy created to service it completely distorted the delicate economic system at home.\(^9\)

This decision to prioritise the military was doubly misguided. Firstly, as Philpott has argued, ‘mass armies were vital, resilient things, able to absorb a great deal of punishment before collapse... But the societies which sustained them were more fragile.’\(^10\) Secondly, and paradoxically, favouring the military over civilians probably undermined troop morale more than that of the home front. Knowing that their families were facing severe shortages not far short of outright starvation led soldiers to react by, for example, writing home to ask their friends not to subscribe to war loans or even to what Deist has termed a ‘covert military strike’ with between 750,000 and one million men faking illness.\(^11\) Retallack’s conclusion is that ‘during the First World War, the ideal of social cohesion was tested and found wanting; Germans’ recognition that they shared a common fate could not invest the “people’s community” with meaning’ in total contrast to Britain ‘the nation was more divided than ever when peace broke out in 1918.’\(^12\) Philpott is even more revealing when he states that the situation towards the end of the war in Germany was one in which the state did not trust

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\(^9\) Winter, and Robert (eds.), *Capital Cities at War*, p 16.


\(^12\) ‘Looking Forward’ in Retallack, *Imperial Germany*, p 269.
the people. Without trust social cohesion breaks down and total war becomes impossible to sustain.

Given the rigidity with which the German state attempted to control voluntary efforts and the failure of trust within German society it followed that German voluntary organisations were inevitably straightjacketed into Volberda’s rigid organisational form in contrast to their British counterparts whose organisational flexibility both contributed to and fed off enhanced trust in voluntary organisations and increased levels of social capital. Seipp recognises this contrast in his comparison between Manchester and Munich. In the former strong ‘wartime communities’ emerged and were maintained. In the latter:

A very different dynamic emerged in which local structures were subsumed into a larger Bavarian/Imperial war effort that left far less room for responsiveness on the part of local and regional officials. The harder the state worked to assure its citizenry that it and it alone had the answers to the problems of wartime society, the more self-evidently false those claims became.

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13 Philpott, Bloody Victory, p 452.
15 Seipp, The Ordeal of Peace, p 46.
Later Attempts at Charity Legislation

We have seen how the War Charities Act was a piece of reactive legislation that was only partially successful in its purpose. Despite those who maintained its efficacy both the immediate post-war and future governments proved reluctant to intervene further in the regulation of charity until it became necessary to do so. Various activities came under scrutiny but legislation remained the last resort for another 40 years.

One form of fund raising that First World War charities were unable to adopt, legally at least, were lotteries. After their use for such diverse projects as building Westminster Bridge and the British Museum, the UK had outlawed lotteries in 1826 in response to various frauds. Despite the ban, several charities had inadvertently broken the law and generally the police had turned a blind eye but, in June 1918, in response to an original donation by Queen Mary, the Red Cross had received 3,300 top-quality pearls it wished to offer through a raffle.\(^\text{16}\) They estimated that by running a lottery they could bring in at least £1 million whereas a straightforward auction might realise no more than £100,000. The Chairman of their Finance Committee, Sir Robert Hudson, wrote to the Prime Minister asking if something could be done to make their lottery possible. To this end, a one-page bill which would allow the police to authorise lotteries on behalf of war charities was introduced in the House of Lords.\(^\text{17}\) This was again misjudging the mood of parliament and the Bill was vociferously opposed. The Archbishop of Canterbury inevitably raised the objection that parliament would have been condoning gambling should they support the Bill and that it would set ‘a great and far-reaching’ precedent.\(^\text{18}\) When it reached the Commons the following month, it stood little chance. Henry Chancellor the radical Liberal MP for Shoreditch, Haggerston, called the Bill,

\(^{16}\) Among those who had broken the law were Harrods and the Mayor of Swansea. TNA HO 45/18971.

\(^{17}\) *Bill intituled an Act to legalise in certain cases Lotteries promoted by War Charities*, 1918 (86) ii 243.

‘an offence against the moral and spiritual and statutory policy of the nation’ and Edward Hemmerde (Liberal, North West Norfolk) invoked the support of the troops by saying ‘I make bold to say there are one million men and more in the Army and Navy who would deplore this Bill.’ A sparsely attended House defeated the second reading 81 votes to 77. The Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, intended to re-introduce it three months later but the end of the war intervened. The Red Cross were forced to auction the pearls after all and though they raised £85,000 this was a disappointing result.

As early as 1917, the Charity Commission was expressing its hope that some form of regulation of charities would be continued after the war. Their 64th report commented that the operation of the War Charities Act ‘has convinced us of the great value of some such control [being extended to all] Charities supported by voluntary contributions.’ In August 1920, the Blind Persons Act was passed which extended the jurisdiction of the War Charities Act to charities for the blind and immediately after the war; the major charities and the Commission had supporters in parliament who raised the issue on a number of occasions.

No further action was taken however until the appointment of a Home Office Departmental Committee of Enquiry in 1925 under the Chairmanship of Sir Herbert Cunliffe, ‘to consider and report whether any form of supervision is desirable over collecting charities’ which took

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20 TNA HO 45/18971.
21 Melbourne Argus, 15 March 1919, p 8. In April 1920 Mrs Hilda Leyel was fined £40 for running a lottery to raise funds for disabled veterans. Called ‘The Golden Ballot’ the scheme had claimed the patronage of Earl Beatty and also involved Horatio Bottomley. TNA HO 45/18971.
23 For example by James Gilbert (Liberal, West Newington) in April 1919 and Frank Briant (Liberal, Lambeth North) in August the same year. The Blind Persons Act did extend the powers of the War Charities Act by: limiting registration authorities to counties and county boroughs (so excluding smaller urban district and borough councils); giving registering authorities the ability to refuse registration if they considered a new charity’s objects were already covered by an existing one and giving the Commission the power to remove a charity from registration without an appeal having to be made.
two years to report. Inevitably Truth contributed a file of evidence and a further 25
witnesses were questioned representing major charities, local authorities and the police.
The report admitted that the War Charities Act ‘lacked any strong central control’ and was
unevenly administered. It noted that London had been stricter in its operation of the Act
and that a recent revision of the register had not even got a response from half of the 940
authorities who were responsible for its operation. The Committee re-visited many of the
points considered by the War Charities Committee and raised many of the same problems.
They were concerned at the scale of the issue, concluding that legislation would bring well
over 80,000 charities within its remit, many of whom were not in need of it. The level of
checks required would make the task ‘very large indeed and the existing resources of local
authorities would be quite inadequate [and] the central direction of the scheme could not
be carried out effectively without the creation of a new administrative body or the
enlargement of some existing department.’ Unlike in 1916, the circumstances of the late
1920s did not lend themselves to favour action. The level of public and media pressure was
nowhere near as great. The Committee noted that the number of proven frauds was very
small and that witnesses kept mentioning the same cases, which was also true in 1916.
However, they persuaded themselves that ‘it is difficult to believe that any large number of
undesirables can, over a long period of time, entirely hide themselves both from the police
and from the Charity Organisation Society.’ The key phrase was ‘over a long period’; during
peace time there was breathing space to uncover charity frauds, in wartime there was not.
The Committee therefore did not support ‘the institution of any universal system of
supervision over collecting charities.’ They did however recommend that the Charity
Commission should be given powers to investigate any collecting charity represented to it by

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25 Culiffe Committee p 14.
26 Culiffe Committee pp 24 and 27.
27 Culiffe Committee p 31.
a local authority as not being properly administered and given powers to wind-up or remodel any, where they found the allegations proven. They also supported raising the minimum age of street collectors to 18 and the licensing of all street collections. It was this last proposal that led to the failure of the Bill that was finally introduced in 1929. The Bill proposed that each street collection would require a licence and the major charities estimated this would mean 200,000 cases a year and so opposed it. This opposition came as a surprise to the Home Office, who clearly had not done their homework, and the Bill fell before its third reading.

So Britain entered the Second World War with the War Charities Act in amended form still in place but no other regulation of collecting charities. When war was declared in 1939 things followed a very similar course to that we have seen in the First as Finlayson has related:

The Second World War witnessed a great deal of charitable activity. Once again it brought the Servicemen’s organizations, such as the Soldiers’, Sailors’, and – now – Airmen’s Family Association, and the British Legion to the relief of war-related problems. But, of course [my emphasis], the Second World War gave greater scope for service among the civilian population at home than the First World War had done. Charitable organizations were active in helping with the process of evacuation, and in finding suitable accommodation in safe areas. Many voluntary organizations were also involved in the provision of social centres, recreational clubs for war workers, and family hostels.

Whilst I do not dispute Finlayson’s assertions regarding the level of activity in World War Two there is certainly no ‘of course’ about it. From the First World War one could substitute

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28 Cunliffe Committee p 43.
29 TNA, HO 45/16220.
provision for Belgian refugees for the evacuees and match the provision of social and welfare centres. On top of this there was the huge contribution of troop comforts and medical supplies that was significantly greater in the First World War: the army was far bigger, more of them were abroad for longer and by 1939 far more of these items were supplied by the state. Though I have not investigated charitable provision during the Second World War in great detail the indications are that giving of both money and time was significantly greater in 1914-18. Finlayson is, however, correct in his conclusion that ‘the Second World War, like the First ... provided great spurs to philanthropic effort. War and want did, indeed, drive the state – but they also drove philanthropy.’ In the words of another writer ‘the experience of the Great War ... challenged the voluntary paradigm’ altering its principles and its relationship to the state, but it proved it was more than up to the challenge.

In 1948, William Beveridge published his influential book Voluntary Action: a report on methods of social advance one of whose proposals was for a Royal Commission to review the doctrine of cy près. Accepting the suggestion, the government appointed a committee of inquiry under Lord Nathan in 1950. Reporting two years later the Nathan Committee not only supported the relaxation of cy près but recommended a central register of all charities be established, despite the fact that they estimated the numbers to have now risen to about 110,000. The government again dragged its feet and it was not until 1960 that the Charities Act finally established the registration of all charities in the UK. The eventual registration of all charities thus finally came about when it was recognised that the increasing partnership

31 Finlayson, ‘Moving Frontier’ p 196.
between the state and the voluntary sector required greater government control and, not least, when the issue ceased to be politically controversial.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{33} See Hilton and McKay (eds), \textit{The Ages of Voluntarism}, notably the chapters by Nicholas Deakin and Justin Davis Smith, ‘Labour, charity and voluntary action: the myth of hostility’ and Virginia Berridge and Alex Mold, ‘Professionalisation, new social movements and voluntary action in the 1960s and 1970s’.
The Legacy of the War

In much the same way as many commentators have assumed a decline in voluntary charitable activity *during* the First World War there is also ‘something of an historiographical consensus [that holds] that the interwar period marked an era of associational decline.’34 This view is, again, mistaken. I have already noted the great similarities between the organisation of the office of the DGVO and the nascent NCVO and there is no doubt that in the post-war decades many charities and voluntary organisations took on a more ‘professional’ character. Part of the reason for this view may come from the fact that the closer working relationship between state and voluntary sectors that occurred during the war continued and intensified after it. Harris, among others, has noted that there was ‘a growing trend in the financial relationship between the state and the voluntary sector’ and that the two sectors worked increasingly more closely together in the inter-war period.35 McCarthy has elucidated the way in which ‘associational voluntarism was closely identified with the values of democratic citizenship between the wars’ and goes on to discuss whether voluntarism supported or challenged the divisions in society.36 Her conclusions are that the evidence speaks against the ‘social control’ model and that though religious divisions, gender differences and class inequalities did not disappear from associational life between the wars ‘there was a growing recognition ... of the legitimate claim of all social groups – including those previously marginalised or excluded – to democratic citizenship and to an equal share in the development of their local communities.’37

35 Bernard Harris, ‘Voluntary action and the state in historical perspective’, p 33.
Alienation, Social Control and Veterans

One telling example of this change was in the sphere of support for war veterans and it provides some contrasts with what happened in post-war Germany. After the war the same rather piecemeal intervention of the state into areas previously occupied mainly by charitable or voluntary support continued. Whereas war pensions became a state responsibility care of disabled ex-servicemen did not, ‘in Britain, the reintegration of disabled veterans proceeded primarily through voluntary and philanthropic efforts.’ This has led some writers to conclude that war veterans, especially the disabled, were alienated from post-war society, a carryover of divisions from the trenches to peacetime. Eric Leed is again prominent amongst them stating that veterans groups organised themselves out of a sense of hostility towards civil society as well as a desire to replicate the ‘comradeship of the trenches’. There were certainly some good reasons for discontent amongst veterans, not least the initial unfairness of demobilisation that favoured those with jobs to go to, over those who did not, usually because they had spent more time in khaki. There were some isolated outbreaks of violent protest but these were usually the result of specific local grievances, the Folkestone ‘mutiny’ in 1918 and Luton riots, in July 1919 for example, or occurred at demonstrations against government policy exacerbated by poor policing, such as the disturbances in Hyde Park in May 1919, rather than being expressions of more general discontent and they were often not instigated by veterans at all.40 As one writer has commented, ‘soldiers were more interested in getting into civilian clothes, returning to their jobs and even to their traditional [political] parties. They did not want to alter the face of

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38 Cohen, War Come Home, p 5. Pensions became a statutory right in late 1919. Operation of war pensions provided yet another example of massive voluntary effort as they required 1,200 local committees involving 100,000 voluntary members. Gregory, The Last Great War, p 264.
39 Leeds, No Man’s Land, pp 204-213.
England. \footnote{Stephen Ward, ‘The British Veterans’ Ticket of 1918’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 8, November 1968, p 169.} Elmsley, Engander and Pittaway conclude, from evidence based on the reports of military censors, that this attitude was actually shared by German and French as well as British veterans. The evidence ‘does not suggest that the war politicised, let alone radicalised, front-line combatants. Rather the men who were conscripted or who volunteered to fight for their countries regarded the war as an interruption to their normal lives in which politics was significant for only a few.’\footnote{‘The Russian and German Revolutions’ in Waites, et al, The Impact of World War I, p 287.} Cohen entirely rejects the idea of ex-servicemen being alienated from the British public. Hers is a more subtle argument that the failure of the state to provide for disabled veterans may have led to disillusion with regard to politicians but it actually bound them more closely to the rest of society: ‘In the face of state neglect, British philanthropists brokered a lasting peace between a public eager to prove its gratitude to soldiers and a conservative ex-service movement looking for signs that the country cared. Shoddy treatment at the hands of the state did not shake disabled veterans’ belief that the public had appreciated their sacrifices... Voluntarism shielded the British state from the consequences of its unpopular policies, binding veterans closer to their society.’\footnote{Cohen, War Come Home, pp 7-8. Charles Kimball strongly supports this view in ‘The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales’.}

The situation with regard to ex-servicemen’s organisations is more complex, but ultimately supports the same conclusions. Before the end of the war, there were already three rival associations of veterans. First in the field was the National Association of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors, which formed with Labour Party and trade union support. The National Federation of Discharged and Demobilized Sailors and Soldiers was organised by the radical Edinburgh Liberal MP James Hogge. The Conservative response was the Comrades of the Great War begun in 1917 under the patronage of Lord Derby then Secretary of State for War. By spring 1918, the Federation claimed 500 branches, the Association 130 and the
Comrades 329. The Federation leadership wanted to take a hard line on the rejection of charity as being paternalistic though this caused problems in communities where voluntary funds had been collected, especially outside the organisation’s East London heartland. Not surprisingly, the Comrades took a rather different view with a revival of many of the wartime provisions of food and clothing, refreshment and accommodation shelters for its members. Wootton suggests that the hostility of the Federation towards charity was not an attack on voluntary support at all but was disguised criticism of the approach taken by the Comrades, a clash between modern and ‘Victorian’ values in welfare provision.

Between 1918 and 1919 several, more extreme, groups were established: the Labour-affiliated National Union of Ex-Servicemen (NUX), which was a breakaway from the Federation, as was the Communist, International Union of Ex-Servicemen. Then there was the Silver Badge Party formed by the extreme right-wing aviator and MP Noel Pemberton-Billing. Finally, there was an independent Officers Association, which, not surprisingly, was able to raise significant sums, £637,000 during 1920 alone. None of these later, potentially more radical, organisations developed a significant membership and the NUX (the largest of them) dissolved itself in 1920. Overall there were, to adapt the words of Wootton, several rival groups of ex-servicemen in existence, each with their own political affiliations, ‘glaring at each other with suspicion, envy and bitterness.’ Whilst there were many who hoped

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50 Wootton, The Official History of the British Legion, p 5.
that these bodies might come together to form one unified movement the prospects did not look terribly bright.

One very good reason for the various organisations to amalgamate was the existence of the United Services Fund, formed by the government at the end of 1919 in the absence of a single representative veterans’ body. The Fund administered a portion of the accumulated profits of the expeditionary force and Army Canteen Board (later the NAAFI), to which the Army and the Royal Air Force were considered entitled. This amounted to the huge sum of £7 million, quite enough to concentrate minds.\(^{51}\) Much of the credit for the fact that they did come together lies with Douglas Haig and his combination of diplomacy and threat, another manifestation of his not inconsiderable managerial skills.\(^{52}\) Haig had helped found the Officers Association from an amalgamation of eleven Officers Help Societies and was an early life member of the Comrades. In 1920 the latter offered the Presidency to Haig but he

\(^{51}\) Wootton, *The Official History of the British Legion*, pp 12-13. As he points out United Services Fund was a misnomer as the naval share had already gone to the Royal Navy Benevolent Fund.

\(^{52}\) Haig had already refused the offer of a viscountcy until the Government settled the issue of allowances for veterans and did not accept his earldom until after the publication of the report on war pensions in summer 1919. Wootton, *The Official History of the British Legion*, p 16; Daniel Todman, “‘Sans peur et sans reproche’: The retirement, death and mourning or Sir Douglas Haig, 1918-1928”, *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 67, No. 4, October 2003, p 1095. Contrary to the myth that has grown up of Haig as a butcher and bungler there is significant evidence that Haig genuinely cared for the welfare of those who had served under him. One contemporary comment from the trade union leader Ben Tillett is quite revealing ‘Speaking of Sir Douglas Haig, Mr Tillett said, “He had an idea of teaching me social economics; I had an idea of teaching him military tactics. I think in the end we called it a draw. I found men like Sir Douglas Haig very anxious indeed for the welfare of their men.”’ *The Times*, 20 December 1915, p 10. Haig’s view on Tillett was that ‘he calls himself a “Socialist Revolutionary” but has rendered very valuable service in keeping the dockers and other operatives at work, and has inspired them with determination to beat the Germans.’ Haig diary entry for 25 October, 1916. Gary Sheffield, and John Bourne, (eds.), *Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918*, (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005) p 247. Niall Barr and Gary Sheffield argue that the Legion brought Haig to be seen as a ‘pal’ and a ‘chum’ by the veterans: Sheffield and Barr, ‘Douglas Haig, the Common Soldier and the British Legion’ in Brian Bond and Nigel Cave (eds.), *Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On* (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 1999) pp 231-235 and Todman suggests that his image by the time of his death ‘had less the status of a conquering general and more that of a sort of moustachioed military Queen Mother.’ op cit, p 110. As Todman suggests these ‘cuddly’ images may be just as much myths as the ‘butcher Haig’ representation but they go to prove that myths are no respecters of facts, stemming instead from the needs of those who construct them and the time of their elucidation.
refused, stating repeatedly that he would only head a unified body. The Comrades therefore began talking with the Association and Federation to see if they could reach agreement. A conference of the main bodies was organised in August 1920 and, following further discussions and a second conference in December, a joint committee was set up with very little opposition and the British Legion formed with Haig as its first President.

Though expediency, particularly financial, had played a significant part in the differing organisations burying the hatchet, ‘the ability of the major groups to sink their differences and form a united body once again demonstrates that the politics and ideology of the British ex-service movement were rooted not in the war experience, but in patterns of pre-war politics that the war had done little to change.’\(^{53}\) It showed that the majority of veterans, even those active in organised associations, were citizens first and ex-soldiers a distant second. One might also note that in the various ex-service organisations one had represented models of potential social control, supported by rather outdated notions of philanthropy (the Comrades); of mutual aid bodies (the Federation and Association) and finally an integrative mechanism through the British Legion, a similar pattern to the integration of voluntary bodies, stemming from both impulses, within the office of the DGVO.

Membership of the Legion was initially quite low, only 18,000 in 1921, but a year later there were over 100,000 and by the early 1930s over 300,000.\(^{54}\) Voluntary support for disabled veterans remained strong throughout the 1920s and 1930s despite the economic slump. For example ‘between 1921 and 1930, the proceeds of Poppy Day quintupled, from £106,000 to

\(^{54}\) Wootton, The Official History of the British Legion, p 317.
£524,000; although they declined slightly in 1931 and 1932 by the end of the decade, they had again surpassed the half-million mark.55

British veterans were not treated at all well by the British government ‘in comparison to their counterparts on the Continent and in the Dominions ... German and Italian veterans enjoyed secured employment and places of symbolic prominence under fascist regimes. Ex-servicemen in Australia and New Zealand could boast about their muscular politics.56

Despite this there was very little civil unrest initiated by veterans. The major confrontations with the state that occurred in the 1920s were very much a continuation of pre-war clashes between capital and labour exacerbated by worsening economic conditions. In the mediation of veterans’ discontent and their re-integration into society, Britain was conspicuously more successful than other countries despite the lack of concern shown by successive governments. There really is only one possible explanation for this apparent paradox as Cohen has pointed out:

States and powerful interest groups alone could not ensure post-war stabilization.

The attainment and maintenance of social peace depended ultimately on the institutions of civil society – on the dense layer of voluntary organizations that mediated between the individual and the state... British philanthropists [she means all philanthropists not just wealthy ones] reconciled the disabled with those for whom they had suffered. The gratitude of the public shielded the state from veterans’ anger. In Germany, by contrast, the state regulation of charity isolated the disabled from their fellow citizens.57

55 Cohen, War Come Home, p 46.
57 Cohen, War Come Home, p 189. Again Kimball supports this argument, ‘The Ex-Service Movement in England and Wales’, p 270, and Stephen Ward in his introduction to The War Generation: Veterans of the First World War, (Port Washington, New York, Kennikat Press, 1975) is another who concludes ‘that veterans reflected the social, economic, intellectual and political divisions within their individual
nations’ rather than their communality of experience as soldiers. Despite his criticisms of outdated philanthropy, Adrian Gregory is also in agreement, The Last Great War, p 266.
Modernisation, Professionalisation and Democratisation

Cohen’s view is strongly supported by Helen McCarthy who demonstrates that voluntary associations did not become dominated by ideological class-based politics but instead educated and socialised the new mass electorate into the workings of the liberal democratic system.\(^{58}\) It was therefore the very strength of British voluntary action that ensured the country re-integrated its veterans better than others. Those who seek to suggest otherwise look only at the superficial evidence and usually lack this comparison.\(^{59}\) If Cohen’s argument is credible it also suggests that not over-regulating charities during the war was a strength rather than a weakness and supported civil society in Britain.

A further post-war trend was the managerial modernisation of the sector:

This was particularly evident within the realm of organised philanthropy, which combined an increasingly professionalised ethos with a greater emphasis on encouraging self-organisation – or what today’s voluntary sector leaders might call ‘capacity-building’ – amongst local communities. This was one of the aims of the National Council of Social Service.\(^{60}\)

Which provides further evidence of the closely related missions of the NCSS and the DGVO.

There was then a greater movement towards democratisation in the post-war voluntary sector as well as moves into new areas and greater use of business principles. These changes

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\(^{58}\) McCarthy, ‘Associational voluntarism in Interwar Britain’, pp 47-68.

\(^{59}\) A recent example is Juliet Nicholson, *The Great Silence 1918-1920: Living in the shadow of the Great War*, (London, John Murray, 2009), whose evidence is highly anecdotal and whose arguments begin with a flawed view of the war years. For example she proposes that: the war made Britain more divided; disillusionment and confidence in the military leadership was widespread; the British public were ignorant of the true conditions on the Western front; medical care in the trenches was poor and the food even worse. She even says that the Battle of the Somme began with ‘incessant rain, and deep minhibiting mud’ (p 16), which suggests that rather than not having read any books on the war published in the last 30 years that she hasn’t read any books on the military aspects of the war at all.

\(^{60}\) McCarthy, ‘Associational voluntarism in Interwar Britain’, p 64.
were clearly influenced by what had happened during the war itself and continued the trends I have examined in relation to these activities. Hilton and McKay summarise this period stating that ‘the public supported certain voluntary organisations because they trusted them to better represent their own – or others’ – interests.\(^{61}\) In other words the strong elements of bonding social capital noted as being present during the war continued into the post-war period and beyond. In addition there was an increasing influence exercised by the working class continuing beyond the Second World War when, ‘the voluntary sector was ... shaped by a working-class culture, even at the height of the welfare state, with the provision of services generating engagement rather than apathy.’\(^{62}\)
Finally we can return to the original research questions that can now be answered. These were:

- What was the extent of wartime charitable activity?
- What impact did this have on Britain’s war effort?
- What role was played by statutory agencies in enabling charity to be used in the most effective way?
- What was the changing nature of the relationship between the state and voluntary action?
- What was the legacy of the war on voluntary action?

We can conclude that:

- Wartime charitable activity was extensive, far greater than most previous commentators have suggested.
- It resulted in a new peak of charitable giving by the public, involving many hundreds of thousands of people on a regular basis many of whom had never taken such responsibility before, including a large proportion of working class women, especially in Britain’s urban industrial areas. Though not decisive, voluntary and charitable activity had a hugely positive impact on Britain’s ability to wage total war and this was largely maintained even at times of greatest crisis in 1918, unlike the situation in Germany.
- In Britain charitable activity was, largely, well managed even at the point where state intervention might have led to a dissipation of impact. Most notably the, largely forgotten, figure of Sir Edward Ward, Director General of Voluntary Organizations, ensured coordination and consolidation of effort in the realm of
medical supplies and troop comforts through his expert utilisation of effective management techniques.

- The war brought the state and voluntary activity into a new, productive, partnership that endures to this day and the balance of power shifted away from old-style philanthropy with its overtones of paternalistic upper and middle class ‘do-gooding’ towards charitable activity involving a far greater degree of control by ordinary people.

- The First World War contributed towards the increasing democratisation and professionalization of the charity sector that had begun in the later nineteenth century. Many modern techniques were invented or extended and voluntary action was particularly effective due to an increasing concentration on key mission-related criteria with far greater emphasis being placed upon the needs and involvement of the beneficiaries of charity. In particular an emphasis was placed on managerial competence in the sector, a trend significantly influenced by Ward, and continued post-war by, among others, the NCSS. In these respects the development of the voluntary sector was an area in which the First World War undoubtedly accelerated changes that otherwise may have taken far longer to manifest.
Afterword

One of the results of this study has been to explore and challenge some of the enduring myths surrounding the First World War. Contrary to what most British people believe ‘the war itself was overwhelmingly popular, and the nation came together to a remarkable degree despite critical differences that reflected the nature of divisions in English society.’¹ Or as Wilson puts it ‘the war had proved a striking vindication of the British way of life... it had converted millions of untrained civilians into capable soldiers [and] its community generally had summoned forth great reserves of endurance.’² These varying social characteristics were converted into a strength of social capital that enabled both soldiers and civilians to endure over four years of terrible conflict. In this, they were immeasurably helped by the activities of a myriad of non-uniformed voluntary organisations.

Though the war did not, perhaps, usher in a deluge of social change there were some advances, especially psychological change in the consciousness of many women or the decline of deference that had significant later implications. One of the dangers of playing down the impacts of the war on social change and considering it an aberration of history (which Fussell and others have done) is to think that the same kinds of things cannot happen again. The acceptance of the disillusion and alienation myths that accompanied the idea that ‘it must never happen again’ was appeasement.

However, as the Independent recently claimed, in the eyes of the British public ‘Joan Littlewood has the best tunes still. The [First World] war is remembered as a conflict based on class, an episode in which ordinary people were sent to their death in hecatombs because

¹ Watson, Fighting Different Wars, p 2.
² Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, p 851.
this was not, in the way the Second World War was, a democratic and popular conflict. Yet, there are more similarities between the First and the Second World Wars than is generally acknowledged. Whilst it is accepted that World War Two was fought as a defensive war to prevent a takeover of Europe by a militarist dictatorship very much the same could be said about the First. As Howard suggests ‘the First World War was just as much an ideological and moral conflict as was the Second, and with just as much reason.’ Perhaps this similarity makes it easier to understand the motivations of the volunteers (in the widest sense) of the First World War but, ultimately, many of these remain extremely difficult for a person living in the early 21st century to grasp. To give one final example of the spirit of voluntarism as it existed between 1914 and 1918 this letter from a vicar’s wife to a contemporary magazine gives a deep insight and is worth quoting at length:

St Mary’s Parsonage, Long Sleddale, Kendal

I have been interested in the articles about giving, and want to tell you what our little parish has done. Long Sleddale is a very lonely dale lying to the north-east of Kendal, and quite off the track of the ordinary tourist. It is 7½ miles long, very narrow, and our parish contains 25 sheep farms; population about 100. About the middle of the dale lies the church, school and vicarage. There are no resident landowners and no people of means. Eight boys have joined the service. The best horses have been taken, and the farmers are really wondering how they can work the farms. They have sheep on the fells, a few cattle in the dale, and grow potatoes and vegetables for their own consumption. They live to a great extent on ‘poddish and haver bread’ (porridge and oat cake), are frugal and saving people. The land is good when it is workable, but you can imagine what working it means when I tell

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3 Leading Article: ‘Justice is justice, even 80 years late’, 17 March 1998, p 20. The article was supporting the campaign to pardon those ‘shot for cowardice’ during the war.

you that when we broke up a few square yards for potatoes, we were asked what we were building, such an immense pile of boulders came out of the ground.

When the first appeal came for the Belgian refugees I spoke to the women after church one evening, showed them the pictures of the burnt farms and the poor wanderers, and told them that clothes were wanted for those who had reached England. In a week I had 119 good garments sent to me, old and new, taken out of their own stock – warm long coats, good dresses. One poor farm lad sent two of his own shirts. Since then I have sent a parcel to some fund every month. They buy a tin of cocoa, or milk, or Oxo, or 1 lb of rice, etc, and leave it at the vicarage after market; they knit socks, mufflers, mitts, send sheets, pillow-cases, and I send them away. To the Belgian Army we sent 52 lbs of provisions, mufflers, mitts, and socks, and 11s in money. That was one month’s giving. We have had collections for the National Relief Fund, £4 7s; Local Relief Fund £18; Princess Mary’s Fund, £1 2s; and made £11 14s for the Red Cross Fund by a real ‘barn dance’, got up by the girls and the men, who came and danced after work was over, and went home at 5.30. Some walked twenty miles over the fells to come and go. One old lady, whose husband, over eighty, works on the road, and who both have the old age pension, has knitted eight pairs of socks, and given other things as well. At the Kendal market they give eggs and butter, and besides that we know they are keeping the eight recruits and other friends well supplied. This week we are all beginning to make sand bags. We sent 150 respirators a fortnight ago. Indeed, one only has to mention a need when someone does his or her best to supply it.

You can imagine how happy I am to be the medium through which a great part of this generosity is passed on, and I think you will be glad to hear this ‘Tale of a lonely parish.’...
I am English, Conservative, and a staunch Catholic, though not of the Roman branch; but I feel now that at the foundation of the Empire there is common to all of us, English, Scottish, Irish, and Welsh, one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, and that out of the terrible evils of War may come the great good gift of Unity of Spirit.

I am sure, dear sir, that you are doing a great and good work, and God bless you for it. Believe me, yours truly,

*Marian Dearden* 

Mrs Dearden’s letter eloquently conveys a view of ‘a civilisation which was tougher and more admirable than we tend to imagine and which did not die completely, as was once thought, when the war ended.’

Mrs Dearden’s voluntary action had transformed over four years from traditional, church-based activities to ones playing their role in supporting Britain’s commitment to total war. Millions of ordinary men and women repeated this mobilization of the voluntary sector across thousands of voluntary bodies. These organisations too had undergone a transformation. In 1914, the main coordinating force was the COS, with its outdated concepts of managerial efficiency. The sector that emerged from the war had an entirely different view. Led by the new National Council of Social Service they were far more open to both cooperation with government and the adoption of modern principles of management. In undergoing this transformation, voluntary organisations had contributed in no small part to Britain’s ultimate victory. Lloyd George recognised this when he wrote that ‘the home front ... is always underrated by the Generals in the field. And yet that is where the Great War was won and lost. The Russian, Bulgarian, Austrian and German home fronts fell to

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5 *TP’s Journal of Great Deeds*, 26 June 1915, p iii.
pieces before their armies collapsed. However, he was wrong in that Britain’s Army, from Privates to Generals, did appreciate the importance of the home front and this bond ensured victory in what was truly a people’s war.  

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8 Contrary to received opinion this term was used extensively during the First World War. Perhaps the term’s first use was, rather inaccurately, during the Crimean War in a *Times* leader of 5 May, 1854 (p 8). In the First World War its first use may have been by H.G. Wells in a letter to *The Times* supporting the raising of a citizen’s army for home defence (31 October, 1914, p 9). In 1916 Australian Prime Minister ‘Billy’ Hughes used in a speech at Queen’s Hall, London, concluded by saying ‘The people must win this war – they must crush Prussian militarism. It is their war; it means everything to them, and they alone can ensure victory. (Cheers)’. *The Times*, 11 May, 1916, p 9. Minister for National Service, Sir Auckland Geddes, used the phrase in 1917 as did populist NUR leader and Labour MP for Derby, J.H. Thomas in several speeches linking it to the idea of a ‘people’s peace’ in which everyone should have their say (*The Times*, 10 October, 6 and 13 August, 1917, pp 4, 7 and 7). *The Times* leader of 30 October that year took it up by saying ‘This a people’s war as no war we have ever fought. The British people have fought it – and will to the end fight it - with a grander courage, patience, tenacity, and confidence than they have shown in the longest and the fiercest of our great wars in the past.’ (p 7). Clearly the term was coming into common usage by 1918 as prominent anti-war Miners Union leader Robert Smillie remarked at a meeting in support of Lord Lansdowne’s letter seeking a negotiated peace: ‘a peace after further months of military effort might mean the defeat of humanity. It was said that this was a people’s war carried on on behalf of democracy. He denied that. It had not been started on behalf of democracy, and it was not being carried on on behalf of democracy.’ (*The Times*, 26 February, 1918, p 3). The phrase also seems to have been quite common in the USA at the time and was used by G.L. Berry, President of the American Press and Assistants Union in direct opposition to the views of Smillie (*The Times*, 22 April, 1918, p 5). *The Times* also utilised the term in connection with the 1918 ‘coupon’ election suggesting that ‘it would be a people’s election, just as this is a people’s war.’ (20 August, 1918, p 7).
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Newspaper and Sporting Appeals

The First World War occurred after the bulk of the population became literate and before the era of radio and television.1 Newspapers therefore played a highly significant role in communication and their influence on public opinion during the war is contested.2 In 1914 total sales for the eleven national daily newspapers were over 4.5 million; if one includes evening papers the figure reaches 5,890,000.3 If one assumes two or three readers per copy ‘most of Britain’s adult population came within Fleet Street’s orbit.’4

As in the Boer War patriotic articles and numerous press-initiated appeals stimulated philanthropic efforts. It was good for circulation, helped ‘keep in touch with readers at home and at the front, and of course show their patriotism. They were often for cigarettes and tobacco for local lads at the front, although the Daily Telegraph’s was for Belgian refugees. Sporting Life’s appeal was, naturally enough, for footballs, boxing gloves, and playing cards. And Musical News intended to send out mouth organs.5 The appeal by the London Evening Standard was typical in that it supplied no fewer than 11 million cigarettes as well as 50,000 tins of Nestlés milk, even if their published testimony from the front, under the by-line ‘A Sergeant’s Letter’, smacked a little of hyperbole:

Dear Readers of the Evening Standard, - Your very welcome present of milk has been received by the N.C.O.’s and men of the 27th Div. Supply Column. I can assure you that it will always be remembered. Twice a day, for the next few days (and long

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2 See Chapter 13 on propaganda and social capital.
after). We shall think of you when we drink our tea, sweetened and made by your generous gift.  

The Standard also raised the funds to found the St Nicholas Home for Raid Shock Children, opened in Chailey, Sussex, in 1917. Here 590 London children recuperated from the effects of the Gotha bombing raids, one of the first responses to this new form of warfare.

The Daily Graphic’s scheme was a little different with a concentration on providing greatcoats for Boy Scouts on patrol duties on the East Coast (which realised £1,880 in two weeks) and assisting sick and injured horses through the Royal Humane Society (which collected £7,300). The Daily Sketch ‘collected over 20,000,000 cigarettes, a quarter of a million pairs of socks, ten thousand “Jack Tar tins” (each worth five shillings), forty-two thousand scarves, and hosts of other articles.’ As one reads more about troop comforts or soldiers’ diaries and memoirs it sometimes seems that the First World War was fought on Woodbines. Cigarettes may not have done much for the men’s long-term health but even if this had been appreciated it would have been the last thing on a soldier’s mind and gifts of cigarettes were clearly hugely appreciated, and not only by the soldiers. So vast was the increase in cigarette consumption during the war that it had brought in more than an additional £1 million in tax to the exchequer by April 1915.

Inevitably, many of the newspaper schemes seemed to have had more than an eye on publicity or taking advantage of a commercial link-up than in discovering and meeting the real needs of servicemen. The Daily Express ‘Cheery Fund’, under the management of

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6 Evening Standard, 1 March 1915.
7 Grieves, Introduction to Sussex in the First World War, p xxix.
9 Probably the leading tobacco fund was the Smokes Soldiers and Sailors Fund which distributed a total of 492 million cigarettes and 456,000 pounds of tobacco during the war. LMA LCC/MIN 8350 (Vol. 16), case No. 15.
‘Orion’, was certainly successful. By July 1915 it had supplied (among other things): 18,000 sets of boxing gloves, footballs and mouth organs; 10,000 handkerchiefs; 2,500 games and puzzles; 600 briar pipes; 520 cricket bats and balls; 700 whistles; 66 violins; 60 banjos; 28 auto-harps; harmoniums; roller-skates; golf outfits and fishing tackle. The stated purpose of the fund was ‘to oblige everybody at the front who asks for things, and cheer up those who do not want anything.’ This hints not a little of disorganisation and you can perhaps hear the poor soldier at the front saying ‘Oh no, not another harmonium / pair of roller-skates / pair of plus fours’. As with some press appeals today the connection between what was supplied and the actual needs of the beneficiaries could be out of line. This problem was significantly addressed following the establishment of the DGVO in late 1915 who stuck much more closely to what the men really needed.11

Local newspaper appeals spread throughout the country and the social commentator and journalist W.E. Dowding noted in June 1915 that, though much smaller, their contributions were just as valuable, perhaps more valuable, in cementing a sense of involvement in the war effort in communities up and down the land:

There is not a little local paper anywhere that has not done its part in helping things along. The Times has raised over a million and a quarter pounds: the Skegness Herald over a hundred pounds. The readers of the Weekly Dispatch have sent more than eighty million cigarettes to the soldiers; the readers of the St Ives Times sent some geese and a turkey to the neighbouring troops at Christmastide.12

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10 Daily Express, July 1915, IWM, WWC, B.O. 2 51/11.
11 The list compiled by one PoW was probably fairly accurate in its priorities: boots, socks, underclothes, flannel shirts, tobacco, cigarettes, chocolate, packs of cards, Keatings Powder (a contemporary insecticide), books, Coal Tar or Carbolic soap. TNA, FO 383/19, letter from Lt A.J. Brown RAMC to his mother, 17 February, 1915.
Local papers were perhaps better able to coordinate men’s requests with actual supplies. The Croydon Advertiser, for example, ran a regular column in 1915 of ‘Tommie’s Wants’ with individual requests for items from troops. These of course relied on the requests actually reaching the paper, but it was at least rather less haphazard. Typical examples included a wristwatch for a hospital orderly or an electric torch for an artilleryman as well as the usual musical instruments and footballs. In addition, newspapers played an extremely important role in advertising, often at no charge, the activities of other wartime charities. Dowding, himself the treasurer of a war charity, recognised that ‘the editors of our British newspapers have played a fine part. Without publicity the war funds could never have been raised: and publicity has been given with more open‐handed generosity than any of the organisers of funds could ever have believed possible.’

As beffited sport’s popularity and status in society games equipment was a popular theme of many appeals, often run by sports bodies and clubs. Both Liverpool and Everton sent footballs and kit to fans in France and the MCC sent cricket equipment to seventy-six military and naval units, as well as to prisoners of war. As the issue of disabled servicemen became more prominent the Football Association established a fund for wounded or disabled footballers and the dependants of those killed. It kicked it off by transferring its existing Benevolent Fund into the scheme in February 1918 and, within a year; the Football National War Fund exceeded £13,000. There were regular collections at matches or donations of gate money, sometimes raising substantial amounts. The success of charity collections at matches was in direct contrast to the lack of response when the FA tried recruiting at matches. There was just one recruit at an Arsenal match in November 1914 and not even

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13 The charity might have been Peel House, the club for overseas Dominion Forces as they were represented at his funeral.
16 Letter from F.J. Wall, FA Secretary to Agnes Conway, 28 February 1919, IWM, WWC, BO 38/2.
that following a speech by Colonel Burn MP at a Chelsea game. Certainly the war changed the experience of spectators at games, even if they did not always have the desired effect, as MacDonagh noted in an entry that also shows how, even in 1914, going to a match developed into an experience not dissimilar to attending a game today:

Going to football matches in the old days we used to be confronted with evangelical posters greatly concerned for our eternal welfare, asking us, among other questions, ‘Are you prepared to meet your God?’ and bidding us ‘Repent, for the time is at hand.’ In these days the posters carried by a line of sandwich-men, walking up and down before the gates of the Chelsea football ground, ask the crowds such questions as: ‘Are you forgetting that there’s a war on?’ ‘Your Country Needs You.’ ‘Be Ready to Defend your Home and Women from the German Huns.’ So far as I could notice, little attention was given to these skeletons at the feast. Inside the ground there was excitement and uproar. What a picture! The rosettes of the supporters of the rival clubs [this was a local derby against Arsenal]; the rattles and horns; the frenzied cheers, and the shouts of welcome when the teams came running on to the field!

In the first post-war season the two games between Everton and Nottingham Forest realised £1,418 and in 1920 half the proceeds of the Charity Shield between West Bromwich Albion and Spurs, £1,414, were donated to the FA Fund. Annual payments to veterans were around £1,200 a year in the early 1920s but had fallen to about £800 toward the end of the Fund’s life in 1938, when it reverted to its original purpose of assisting any former footballer in need. The FA’s scheme may have come about partly to atone for what many saw as its tardy response to the outbreak of war. Unlike amateur dominated sports like cricket, professional

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18 MacDonagh, *In London During the Great War*, 16 December 1914, pp 44-45.
football was not halted in 1914 and continued to be played until the end of April the following year. Veitch comments that ‘the professional game administered by the Football Association received short shrift from an often hostile press, contributors to which were incensed by the decision to continue to play the scheduled league games despite the crisis of war.\(^{19}\) The fact that the clubs had contracts with players until the end of the season was not thought a sufficient excuse and football was compared unfavourably with other sports such as cricket, rugby and rowing.\(^{20}\) More unusual were the fund-raising efforts of women’s football teams. Women’s football blossomed during the war, especially at munitions factories, and they often utilised their matches for fund-raising purposes. Teams associated with the Armstrong Whitworth Company (of whom there were six from the Scotswood locomotive factory alone) raised in excess of £1,500 for war charities over three seasons up to the Armistice and after the war the famous women’s team, Dick Kerr’s Ladies, from Preston, was founded for the object of helping ex-POWs\(^{21}\)

\(^{19}\) Colin Veitch, ‘“Play Up! Play Up! And Win the War!” Football, the Nation and the First World War 1914-15’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 20, No. 3, pp 369-370. Michael MacDonagh’s experiences of wartime London suggest that the ‘anti-football’ lobby was mainly confined to the conservative ‘die-hard’ press, especially the Unionist Globe, MacDonagh, *In London During the Great War*, 16 December 1914, p 44.

\(^{20}\) No doubt much of this criticism was the establishment ‘getting its own back’ on professionalism but it was certainly vociferous. Opposition was most prominent from the philanthropist Frederick Carrington in the columns of *The Times* and, in a letter to the paper, the historian A.F. Pollard became almost apoplectic with rage and went so far as to say that the football clubs were ‘doing their best for the enemy’ by not shutting up shop and that ‘every spectator who pays his gate money is contributing so much towards a German victory.’ *The Times*, 7 November, 1914, p 10.

Appendix 2 - ‘Private Tom’ and other animals

Unsurprisingly the RSPCA was the main animal charity operating during the war. There were 90 RSPCA Inspectors serving with the army who ‘look after the animals they come across on the march. They tend the neglected cows. They befriend the lost dogs. They painlessly destroy starving and suffering creatures.’ There was even a home for lost dogs at the British Army Base at Boulogne. However, the RSPCA’s main task was to help care for the hundreds of thousands of horses used by the BEF. Partly because of their work the ‘wastage’ of horses was reduced from the sixty per cent of the Boer War to a tenth of that figure.

The National Canine Defence League (now the Dog’s Trust) stepped in on the home front. By May 1915 they had provided 1,650 dog licences and were supplying regular food for 155 dogs left at home by reservists who had been called up or those who had volunteered. On 14 October 1914 they received what has to be one of the most genuine and touching letters of thanks to any wartime charity:

Dear Sir

I now have pleasure in writing to thank you for your kindness to my wife in her recent trouble about the keep of the dog whilst I was serving my King and country in Belgium and France. Having the misfortune to be wounded at the Battle of the Aisne on Sept. 13th, 1914, I was sent to the 5th Northern General Hospital, Leicester, for operation, and then invalided home for a few days on Oct. 5th, 1914. My wife then showed me your letter telling me of your gift of food. The so-called City Aid had interviewed my wife and told her it was her duty to destroy the dog; even told her

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2 Messenger, Call to Arms, p 435, gives the Boer War wastage rate as an appalling ninety-three per cent.
the place and fee, 1s, for destroying same, for every penny spent on food was money wasted.

Having fought at Mons and the retreat to within a few miles of Paris, our regiment had the satisfaction of saving a large number of dogs that had been forgot by their owners that had to leave their homes in a hurry and move for safety, and some of them had forgot their dogs. We had several of them follow us all through our trying time, and it would teach some of the so-called City ‘Aid’ Society a lesson if they could see them in the firing line with us. It was a common sight to see them lick their new owners’ hands and faces and lying between our legs; they shared the same dangers as us and several of them got killed one way or another. You could not help, whilst lying there, wondering what your own dog would do, that you had brought up and taught to do your bidding. Then to receive a letter from my wife asking me what to do about destroying the dog, as the City Aid had been on to her about it. But a friend of mine had seen your advertisement in papers and told my wife about it. If you would like to show this letter to any of your subscribers you are at liberty to do so. I hope I have not took up much of your time in reading this.

I remain, yours truly

W.J. Astell

T.Company, 1st East Lancashire Regt. 3

As Private Astell suggests, animals could even provide companionship in the trenches.

Official mascots ranged from the conventional dogs or goats to the more unusual cows or even a bear (though he stayed in England and later became the model for Winnie-the-Pooh). 4 Private pets were even more numerous and their loss was even marked in poetry. It

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3 Our Soldiers’ Love for Dogs, NCDL Press Advertisement, IWM, WWC, BO 2 57/6.
4 Winnie was the mascot of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Brigade. Troops from Winnipeg were being transported to eastern Canada, on their way overseas. When the train stopped at White River, Ontario, a lieutenant called Harry Colebourn bought a small female black bear cub for $20 from a
may not have the impact of the major war poets but there is no doubting the heartfelt sentiment expressed in Major E de Stein’s *Elegy on the Death of Bingo our Trench Dog*:

Weep, weep ye dwellers in the delved earth,
Ah, weep, ye watchers by the dismal shore
Of No Man’s Land, for Bingo is no more;
He is no more, and well we knew his worth,
For whom on bully-beefless days were kept
Rare bones by each according to his means,
And, while the Quartermaster-Sergeant slept,
The elusive pork was rescued from the beans.
He is no more and, impudently brave,
The loathly rats sit grinning on his grave.

Him mourn the grimy cooks and bombers ten,
The sentinels in lonely posts forlorn,
The fierce patrols with hands and tunics torn,
The furtive band of sanitary men.
The murmuring sound of grief along the length
Of traversed trench the startled Hun could hear;
The Captain, as he struck him off the strength,
Let fall a sad and solitary tear;
’Tis even said a batman passing by
Had seen the Sergeant-Major wipe his eye.

The fearful fervour of the feline chase
He never knew, poor dog, he never knew;
Content with optimistic zeal to woo
Reluctant rodents in this murky place,
He never played with children on clean grass,
Nor dozed at ease beside the flowing embers,
Nor watched with hopeful eye the tea-cakes pass,
Nor smelt the heather-smell of Scotch Septembers,
For he was born amid a world at war
Although unrecking what we struggled for.

Yet who shall say that Bingo was unblest
Though all his Sprattless life was passed beneath
The roar of mortars and the whistling breath
Of grim nocturnal heavies going West?
Unmoved he heard the evening hymn of hate,
Unmoved would gaze into his master’s eyes,
For all the sorrows men for men create
In search of happiness wise dogs despise,
Finding ecstatic joy in every rag

hunter who had killed its mother. He named her 'Winnipeg', after his home town, or 'Winnie' for short. Winnie became the mascot of the Brigade and went to Britain with the unit. When the Brigade was posted to France, Lt. Colebourn took Winnie to London Zoo. Colebourn formally presented her to the Zoo in December 1919 where she became a popular attraction and lived until 1934.
And every smile of friendship worth a wag.

Very few anthologies include poems like *Bingo* or, when they do, they treat them with contempt, thinking animals unfit for pity or concern. One example is Hussey who notes in a chapter introduction ‘the curiosity printed on p 45 [*Goodbye Old Man* by Mackenzie Bell about a horse] represents our nadir, suggesting that the British people, always animal lovers, thought that the treatment of old horses was a matter fit for wartime verse.’ This is a repugnant comment. War would be fine for Hussey if people were treated humanely but animals were butchered and tortured, which says little for his humanity. Believing animals to be worthy of compassion was of significant practical use in the Army. As we have seen, improvements in equine husbandry significantly decreased losses on the Boer War figures.

The officer in charge of base supplies in South Africa was Sir Edward Ward and he was a highly pro-active member of the RSPCA committee responsible for court action against many animal cruelty cases. If the practical impact of caring for animals is doubted the following tale from a prisoner of war may be salutary, if somewhat unusual:

A great dog was kept by the Germans to track down prisoners who escaped, but like most other Germans at Schwarmstedt, he was open to corruption, and on discovering that the English officers could give him better and more plentiful food than his proper masters, he promptly became great friends with them. So much so that finally, when one of the officers escaped, he took the dog along with him. At the end of the war the RSPCA also stepped in to assist with the problem of soldiers who wanted to bring back dogs they had rescued. A typical plea for help ran thus, from a Private, 1/7th London Regiment:

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He has been a faithful animal to me both in holding the line and attacking. I have had him about twelve months, and he was with me all through the retirement of 1918, and with me all through the late attacks since August 1918. He has been slightly wounded twice in going over the top with me, but he has been inoculated by a friend in the RAMC each time... I think he deserves to come with me, as he has stuck to me through thick and thin, and when I was wounded and could not walk he stayed with me all through the attack under a heavy barrage for nearly three hours, so you can understand how attached I am to him.7

The Council agreed to cover the quarantine expenses of all of these animals and built 500 special kennels for the purpose.8

Most of the animal charities were already operating before the war and, like the RSPCA, Blue Cross and NCDL, continue their work to this day. Some, including probably the most remarkable of all, were a response to the patriotic fervour the war engendered in many people. The story of the Dogs and Cats of Empire Fund is best told in the words of its founder, Maud Field, in a letter of 10 July 1915:

In reply to your letter I shall be pleased to tell you all I can about ‘The Dogs and Cats of Empire Fund’. I saw in the paper one day that the Kaiser said Germany would fight to the last cat and dog – This made me think that the dogs and cats of the British Empire ought to do something for their country – I therefore issued an appeal to them through my fox terrier ‘Tom’, asking every dog and cat to give 6d. There was a

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8 Fairholme, and Pain, A Century of Work for Animals, p 218. The Society’s ‘Soldiers’ Dog Fund’ which was supported by the Evening News, ended the war with a surplus of £5,304. Adrian Gregory also comments on dogs in wartime and contrasts British and German attitudes. He also notes how the Daily Mail came under attack when they suggested food was being ‘wasted’ when used to feed dogs. Gregory, The Last Great War, p 309. Another who notes the importance of animals for fighting men is Holmes, Acts of War, pp 106-107.
great response, and in four months Tom had collected £1,000 for a Y.M.C.A. Soldiers Hut at the Front. The Hut is now in full swing, it is a large double one, and I am told it is the largest and the best equipped Hut in France – Every dog or cat who gave £5 could have his or her picture hung upon the wall of the Hut – A great many sent £5. Two gramophones were also sent by dogs!
I also made an album of subscribers photographs and letters to amuse the men who use the Hut – Tom’s master, my brother, Captain Stephen Field, died in April as a prisoner of war at Wittenburg, and since then Tom has been collecting for British prisoners of war imprisoned in Germany – Tom’s life sized picture with the inscription ‘Private Tom R.A.M.C.’ adorns the wall of the Hut.9

Subscribers to the Fund included guinea-pigs, ‘Solomon a chicken hatched in October last’, a cockatoo aged 30 from Argentina, ‘a ginger coloured cat without a tail’, a spider, 16 horses, a ‘school of teddy bears’, a ‘naturalised dachshund formerly called Herr Rufus von Pop’ and some cocks and hens who contributed ‘with much glad crowing’. It was no wonder that the Daily Chronicle said of the Dogs and Cats of Empire Fund ‘it is, in a way, the most remarkable of all the funds which have been started since the war began.’10

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9 IWM WWC, BO 3 14/9. The grave of Captain Stephen Field, RAMC, lies in Berlin South-Western CWGC Cemetery.
10 Daily Chronicle, 26 June 1915.
Appendix 3 - ‘My good lady, go home and sit still’- militant women

Alongside Irish independence, the outstanding piece of unfinished political business on the outbreak of war was the question of women’s suffrage. As Marwick has noted ‘one of the most interesting psychological phenomena of the war is the way in which the suffragettes, who for ten years had been waging war on the Government and the community, now outshone everyone in their patriotic fervour and stirring appeals for national unity and endeavour.’1 Whilst a minority of feminists formed part of the pacifist opposition throughout the war the majority of suffragists flung themselves wholeheartedly into war work. This caused a split in the more militant of the major suffragist organisations, the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) Sylvia Pankhurst voiced stringent opposition to the war but most of the rest, including her mother Emmeline and her sister Christabel, ranged with the patriots. Sylvia formed her own Workers' Suffrage Federation (WSF), which maintained a resolute opposition to the war, but despite this, she still made a significant contribution to wartime charity. On 15 August 1914 to alleviate unemployment amongst women in the East End she set up her own employment exchange in Old Ford and a week later her first milk distribution centre. 'Soon she was running four mother and baby clinics... During 1915 her restaurants served 70,000 meals, 1,000 mothers and babies were seen at her clinics [and] over £1,000 was spent on milk distribution.'2 Given the over- jingoistic nature of much of Emmeline and Christabel’s rhetoric, I think there is a strong case to be made for Sylvia’s work having had a far more positive impact on the home front than that of her mother and sister despite her vocal opposition to the war itself.

1 Marwick, Deluge, p 87.
There was greater unanimity among the members of the less radical National Union of Women’s’ Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), led by Millicent Garrett Fawcett. Though Fawcett was initially opposed to the war (she was principal speaker at an anti-war meeting at the Kingsway Hall on 2 August) Britain’s entry quickly changed her views. As Fawcett herself described, and as we saw in relation to Belgian refugees, the NUWSS had the advantage over many other bodies dedicated to war charity of having a strong existing structure:

We were a tolerably large band of organized women – over 50,000 members, and about 500 societies – scattered all over the country, accustomed to work together in a disciplined, orderly fashion for a common end; we felt, therefore, that we had a special gift, such as it was, to offer for our country’s service – namely our organizing and money-raising power.

The NUWSS organised a network of hospitals in France, five in Serbia and one in Salonika with a total of 1,800 beds as well as lending the services and paying the salaries of nearly 150 trained workers for local relief committees all over the country. ‘The NUWSS also sent the Millicent Fawcett Unit ... to Russia in 1916 to work among the Polish refugees, especially to do maternity nursing and work among the children.’ They set up a maternity unit in Petrograd, a children’s hospital at Kazan on the Volga and another hospital for both refugees and local peasants at Stara Chilnoe.

A key figure in overseas medical work was the Honorary Secretary of the Scottish Federation of the NUWSS, Dr Elsie Inglis, who has strong claims to being the greatest heroine of the

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4 Millicent Garrett Fawcett, The Women’s Victory – and After: Personal reminiscences 1911-1918, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1920), p 87. Her comments reveal that several of Fayol’s principles of management were intrinsically understood by the NUWSS (see Chapter 13). In comparison the WSPU had only 2,000 members (Marr, The Making of Modern Britain, p 58).
5 Fraser, Women and War Work, p 18.
war. Sadly, the British authorities were less than appreciative of her outstanding abilities during her lifetime. In September 1914, she went to the War Office and offered to equip and staff a fully operational hospital in France. She was told by an, unnamed, War Office official, ‘my good lady, go home and sit still.’ Undaunted by this misogynist response she repeated her offer to the French Red Cross who responded positively. The NUWSS Scottish Women’s Hospitals (SWH) were entirely run by women, from the surgeons down to the orderlies, drivers and domestic staff. Though initiated by Inglis the project was enthusiastically taken up by the whole NUWSS. The first hospital, at Royaumont, was quickly joined by one at Troyes, financed by the students of Newnham and Girton women’s colleges. Satellite committees of the SWH were formed in Canada, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and by 1919 the astonishing sum of £428,905 had been raised for the scheme. Sadly Dr Inglis herself, and many of her staff, did not see the culmination of her work as Helen Fraser explained:

Dr Elsie Inglis’s greatest work began in April, 1915, when her third unit went to Serbia, where she may truly be said to have saved the Serbian nation from despair. The typhus epidemic had at the time of her arrival carried off one-third of the Serbian Army Medical Corps, and the epidemic threatened the very existence of the Serbian Army. She organized four great Hospital Units, initiated every kind of needful sanitary precaution, looked into every detail, regardless of her own safety and comfort, hesitating at no task, however loathsome and terrible. Her constant message to the Serbian Medical Headquarters Staff was ‘tell me where your need is greatest without respect to difficulties, and we will do our best to help Serbia and her brave soldiers.’ Two nurses and one of the doctors died of typhus. Miss Margaret Neil Fraser, the famous golfer, was one of those who died there, and many

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6 Frances Balfour, *Dr Elsie Inglis*, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), p 144.
beds were endowed in the Second Unit in her memory... Later when the Germans and Austrians overran Serbia, one of the Units retreated with the Serbian Army, but the one in which Dr Inglis was, remained at Kraljivo where she refused to leave her Serbian wounded, knowing they would die without her care. She was captured with her staff and, after difficulties and indignities and discomforts, was released by the Austrians and returned through Switzerland to England. On her return she urged the War Office to send her and her Unit, to Mesopotamia [but] she was refused permission to go, though it is perfectly clear their assistance would have been invaluable and ought to have been used. Once more she returned to help the Serbians and established Units in the Balkans and South Russia. The Serbian people have shown every token of gratitude and honor which it was in their power to bestow upon her. The people in 1916 put up a fountain in her honor at Mladenovatz, and the Serbian Crown Prince conferred on her the highest honor Serbia has to give, the First Order of the White Eagle. Dr Inglis died, on November 26th, three days after bringing her Unit safely home from South Russia. Memorial services were held in her honor at St Margaret’s, Westminster, and in St Giles’s Cathedral, Edinburgh. Those who were there speak of it not as a funeral but as a triumph. The streets were thronged; all Edinburgh turned out to do her homage as she went to her last resting place. The Scottish Command was represented and lent the gun-carriage on which the coffin was borne and the Union Jack which covered it.\footnote{Fraser, \textit{Women and War Work}, pp 17-18.}

One might say too little, too late.
It was in Dr Inglis’ work in Serbia that she encountered two of the war’s most remarkable women who also ran their own fund. The Hon Evelina Haverfield and Sergeant Major Flora Sandes’ Comfort Fund for Serbian Soldiers and Prisoners might have had the longest name of any wartime voluntary organisation but its founders certainly deserved to be commemorated in its title.\(^8\) Evelina Haverfield was the daughter of the 3\(^{rd}\) Baron Abinger. She was a keen sportswoman who, during the Boer War, collected abandoned horses from the battlefield and nursed them back to good condition. She was among the first London women suffragists to be sentenced to imprisonment (for ‘storming’ the Houses of Parliament) and organised a branch of the WSPU.\(^9\) She was one of the original members of the Women’s Emergency Corps in August 1914, which ‘was soon joined by many women from the higher classes and was in the early days an unlikely mix of feminists and women who would not normally have mixed with such dangerous types.’\(^10\) She then founded and organised the Women’s Volunteer Reserve (WVR) and was President and Commandant-in-Chief of the Women’s Reserve Ambulance (Green Cross Corps). In the WVR Haverfield insisted that drill practice was essential to ‘train women for their own defence in the last extremity’ and that ‘if women made themselves really efficient they would be recognized when the time came.’\(^11\) As Gullace has pointed out this was a highly controversial viewpoint and attracted ‘scathing ridicule’ from both men and many women. Despite this ‘the marching and drilling of uniformed women and the adoption of military “rank” gained an astonishing popularity among women on the homefront.’\(^12\) The WVR became involved in several ventures, not least of which was in providing, until 1918, a uniformed group called

\(^8\) The Fund was especially focussed on the ‘cheehas’, men either too old or disabled to serve in the front line. Storr, *Excluded from the Record*, p 216.

\(^9\) One of her publicity stunts for the WSPU was parading on horseback dressed as Joan of Arc in full armour.

\(^10\) Women’s Organisations at [http://www.1914-1918.net/women.htm](http://www.1914-1918.net/women.htm) accessed on 20/09/06.


the Lady Instructors Signals Company, who trained Aldershot army recruits. The WVR was rather expensive to join - one had to pay for one’s own uniform which, at more than £2, could not be afforded by poorer women, though it was a significant influence in the establishment of the Women’s Legion, which had a more widespread appeal.

In April 1915, Evelina went to Serbia as administrator of one of the Scottish Women’s Hospital Units at Valjevo and remained, with Dr Inglis, working for the Serbs as prisoners of the enemy from November to February 1916. In August 1916, she went to Russia in charge of the transport column of Dr Inglis’ unit. It was on her return to Britain in November 1917 that she organised the Serbian Comforts Fund with Flora Sandes and became Commissioner for the Serbian Red Cross Society in Great Britain. Haverfield went back to Serbia in August 1919 and at her instigation another fund was raised, for Serbian children, with which she established an orphanage at Baiyna Sachia on the borders of Bosnia. It was there in March 1920 that she succumbed to pneumonia brought on by fatigue and exposure. She received the Order of St Sava, St George’s medal for bravery under fire and was made a member of the Serbian Order of the White Eagle after her death.13 The work of Dr Inglis’ team in Serbia was summed up by the Prefect of Constanza who remarked that ‘it is extraordinary how these women endure hardships; they refuse help, and carry the wounded themselves. They work like navvies. No wonder England is a great country if the women are like that.’14

If Evelina Haverfield was remarkable then Flora Sandes was unique. She was the only British woman to serve as a front-line fighting soldier during the First World War. Flora, the daughter of Samuel Sandes, a Scottish clergyman, was born in 1876. Even though she was

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13 Taken from Account of the Life of Hon Evelina Haverfield, written by Flora Sands, IWM, WWC, SER 11/20.
14 Marwick, Deluge, p 98.
nearly 40 years old on the outbreak of the war, she joined an ambulance unit in Serbia. She described her experiences in a newspaper interview in 1918:

‘I went to Serbia ... in August 1914 being one of the first to go to the help of that little nation. After the terrible retreat I joined the regimental ambulance, but, being cut off from the unit I asked permission to join the Serbian Army as a private, and was accepted. For two years I have taken part in all the fighting, and was badly wounded at the taking of Hill 1212. On this occasion a hand grenade exploded near me, and I sustained 24 wounds. I ordered the men to fall back, but they refused saying “We are not going unless we can take you”. One of the officers crawled through the snow, dragging me along, while the men remained behind and fought a gallant rear-guard action until I was carried into safety. The next day, when our troops attacked and occupied the Bulgarian trenches, they found a number of our men who had been taken prisoner. Every one lay dead in the trench with the throat cut from ear to ear. That is the Bulgar way of dealing with prisoners.’

Sergeant-Major Sandes has been awarded the highest decoration for which Serbian soldiers are eligible. Having been granted a few weeks’ leave of absence she is devoting her time in this country to collecting funds for the Hon. Mrs Haverfield’s Society for providing comforts for the Serbian soldiers and Serbian prisoners of war.¹⁵

Sandes wrote and published, An English Woman-Sergeant in the Serbian Army (1916) to help with the fund-raising. The book is an extraordinary narrative of physical bravery and endurance. For example, she describes having bullets extracted from her body without anaesthetic and having to act as chief surgeon for her unit after all the doctors died from typhus, performing operations such as toe amputations with a pair of blunt scissors. Despite

¹⁵ Daily News, 10 January 1918.
these gruesome episodes Smith astutely sums up An English Woman-Sergeant as being totally different from later, better-known memoirs such as those of Sassoon and Graves, calling it ‘rather jolly and romanticised, making the whole experience sound like fun’. Sales of the book realised over £5,000 of which the first £2,000 was sufficient to provide 108 tons of supplies to be shipped out. Her active service was still not over because ‘despite her success in London, she returned to the front in time to help recapture Serbia from the enemy in the great offensive of September 1918.’ After the war, Sandes remained in the Serbian Army and had reached the rank of major by the time she retired. In 1927, she married Yurie Yudenich her former sergeant and later a White Army general. She ‘lived with him very happily in Belgrade until he died [in 1941]: they ran a taxi service there. Later, she became, rather incongruously, chaperone and wardrobe mistress to the Folies Bergere in Paris.’ Flora Sandes finally returned to England and died at her Suffolk home in 1956.

Inglis, Haverfield and, most definitely, Sandes were exceptions among women but though they were exceptional it would be wrong to dismiss their importance. Their activities were given a great deal of publicity and despite criticism in some, conservative, circles they were generally treated as having made a heroic contribution to Britain’s cause. Praise for such ‘unfeminine’ activity from the mainstream British press would have been impossible before the war, indeed it is remarkable how the exploits of Sandes were reported so matter-of-factly, without any adverse comment as to their exceptional nature. Gullace is correct in her conclusion that ‘because only one British woman saw actual combat in World War I

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17 Gullace, Blood of Our Sons, p 149. Sandes military role was not, however, approved of by the officials of the Serbian Relief Fund. See Storr, Excluded from the Record, p 198.
19 British film producer Tim Hollier is currently seeking to turn her remarkable story into a feature film with Kate Winslet, perhaps a little inappropriately, in the title role.
(although several succeeded in enlisting only to be unmasked at the front), the achievements of women like Evelina Haverfield and Flora Sandes are largely symbolic – but their symbolism was significant. Lee is prepared to go further, suggesting that Sandes ‘modelled resistance to female subordination and enhanced women’s claim to personal and collective power.’

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Appendix 4 - Sir Edward Ward and the Major Adam Scandal

Not everything was entirely plain sailing for Ward during the Haldane era and, in February 1914, a legacy of the problem of Ward’s involvement in the decision making of the Army Council resurfaced in a sensational libel action against him. The circumstances of the supposed libel occurred in 1910 but the roots lay further back. At its heart was the unsatisfactory system of confidential reporting on officers which was another target of Haldane’s and Ward’s reforms and it is somewhat ironic that this led to the potential discrediting of Sir Edward in the law courts. In 1906, five officers of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers were placed on half-pay, a very serious and unusual step that suggested significant problems in the regiment. One of these officers was Major William Augustus Adam, a talented linguist and graduate of Trinity College, Dublin. Adam’s conviction was that his commanding officer, Lt Col Graham, was the source of the adverse reports on him, partly because of a personal animosity caused by Adam’s former relationship with the daughter of the painter Sir John Everett Millais. His convictions were reinforced in press comment on the case, especially in the pages of Truth. In fact, Graham was not the source of Adam’s troubles. They originated at a more senior level, from Major General Henry Scobell, commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and Sir John French, then commanding the Aldershot Army Corps. Rather than being forced to retire, and given Adam’s obvious talents, he was employed at the War Office in an intelligence capacity, where his relations with Ward were entirely congenial. In 1910, Adam decided upon a political career and fought a by-election, rather surprisingly winning the Woolwich constituency for the Unionist Party. As an MP Adam decided to raise the issue of confidential reports and the 5th Lancer officers under parliamentary privilege and in a statement in the Commons he questioned the integrity of Gen Scobell suggesting
that he knowingly submitted false reports on the officers of the 5th Lancers.¹ This was a step too far for the War Office, especially as it was not the first time Adam had embarrassed the authorities. Whilst on attachment during the Russo-Japanese War he had submitted a report to a newspaper without getting the clearance of his commanding officer. This officer was General William Nicholson who had since become Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The official response to Adam’s parliamentary revelations was to publish a refutation that was sent to all significant newspapers. In this, they stated their faith in General Scobell and revealed that Adam had been placed on half-pay and requested to retire from the army. It was this letter, which went out under Ward’s signature, which constituted the supposed libel. The case came to court in February 1914 and was, together with the Curragh mutiny, the biggest military news story of the year until the outbreak of war. It received extensive coverage in the press, especially when the jury found for the plaintiff and awarded Adam £2,000. However, this was reversed on appeal, it being held that Ward’s publication had also been covered by official privilege, and the House of Lords endorsed the Appeal Court’s judgement.²

This did not deter Adam who continued to raise the issue for the rest of his life. He petitioned the King on several occasions, involved at least three future Prime Ministers (Baldwin, Churchill and Eden), bombarded the War Office and anyone else who would listen with his grievances and published a book on the case.³ Whilst Adam and his supporters were certainly correct in their criticism of the confidential reporting system, he was entirely wrong in thinking that there was a single, prejudiced source of his own negative reports. Both

Generals Scobell and French had independently concluded that Adam, though he had other talents, was not fitted to commend a cavalry force in the field. The War Office then compounded their problem by employing Adam when they should probably have listened to Nicholson and dispensed with his services. In court, they could also have proved their case simply by producing copies of Adam’s reports, but they were shackled by their own secrecy, refusing to concede on the confidentiality of the documents.

In the end, Ward probably did not suffer any great damage from the case. Even Adam and his counsel, as well as the press reporters, conceded that he was simply the conduit for the supposed libel. The main casualty was Adam himself. He was clearly a highly talented and intelligent man and his skills, especially in languages and intelligence, would have been invaluable in the war. Instead, he became obsessed with his sense of injustice and psychosomatic illness prevented him from being anything other than a nuisance and embarrassment after 1914.

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4 TNA, WO 374/206, Major W.A. Adam personal file.
Appendix 5 - Nothing like a Book - the Camps Library

On the outbreak of war, Lord Kitchener asked Sir Edward Ward if he would look after the welfare of the many soldiers from overseas who were arriving to support Britain’s war effort. One idea Ward had was to ensure a supply of books and magazines for the camps and billets where the soldiers were stationed. At the end of 1914, he placed an appeal in the press for donations of literature and the Camps Library was born. The enterprise quickly outgrew its initial premises in Great Smith Street, which despatched 40,000 volumes to camps on Salisbury Plain and elsewhere. It eventually found larger and permanent premises at 45 Horseferry Road, provided courtesy of the Belgian Army. The warehouse had previously been occupied by Broadwood’s, the piano makers, and its reinforced floors were essential for the mountain of books that poured in from all sources, quickly reaching 75,000 a week. The Queen was an enthusiastic supporter as were many prominent authors including Rudyard Kipling, George Meredith, Arthur Conan Doyle, Marie Corelli, Hall Cain and John Galsworthy. The success of the enterprise meant that its activities were soon extended to encompass British troops, both at home and abroad, and, later still, prisoners of war in not only Germany but Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey as well as internees in Holland. Probably every camp, canteen and rest hut on the Western Front had its supply of Camps Library material. The war’s most famous cartoonist, Bruce Bairnsfather, produced advertisements for the Library and every parcel of books sent out contained postcards for the recipients to send home to friends and relatives to encourage further donations. Given his contacts, it is not surprising that Ward received support at the highest possible level. To keep distribution costs down he negotiated free postage for all donations with Herbert Samuel, at that time the Postmaster General, while the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides and Church Lads’ Brigade helped in collection and distribution.

1 Percy Noble Papers, Nos. 451-464, 481 and 1514.
The Library had strong support from senior Army commanders, though sometimes not from their subordinates. In late 1915 QMG, General Maxwell, questioned whether the expense to the Army of the Camps Library, £60 per week, was worthwhile. The C-in-C, Sir John French, replied that ‘all Commanders were unanimous and he concurred in recommending the expenditure.’ Sir Douglas Haig, shortly to succeed French, lent his personal support by writing:

> Those who have not visited our Armies in the field can scarcely realise what books have meant during two years of war to the men in the trenches, in billets, and in hospitals. So I hope that those at home will buy books very freely, and in increased numbers this autumn, and having read and enjoyed them, as freely pass them on to the Camps Library for circulation among the troops. Any movement to increase the circulation of books has my whole-hearted support.

In all, by the end of March 1919 when the Library closed, it had distributed the astounding total of sixteen million books. Some of these donations were not entirely welcome (old telephone directories or copies of Bradshaw for example) but the majority seemed to match what the troops desired. ‘What the men chiefly wanted were stories – good stories, love stories, detective stories, sentimental stories.’ One donation initially seemed misguided but eventually proved otherwise:

> Books of every language were sent in: French, German, Chinese, Japanese, Greek, Hindustani, Maori and Gaelic found their way to the Library, and once, in grave and anxious days at the beginning of the war, someone sent in a Guide to Germany. It was first suggested that this should be thrown away, but a far-seeing optimist

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2 QMG War Diary, 12 November 1915, TNA, WO 95/28.
rescued it from destruction and set it in a prominent place to be kept for the day
when it should be useful to guide our army into the land of our enemies. On the day
the Armistice was signed that book went over to France.5

The work of the Camps Library, and its sister organisations the War Library and the British
Prisoners of War Book Scheme, are perhaps easy to underestimate. We have already noted
that the Great War was uniquely literary. Books and magazines played much the same role
as MP3 players and computer games play with today’s troops and the aid to morale and
alleviating boredom must have been immense. Perhaps it was going too far when one
adjutant of a front-line battalion wrote that ‘in the trenches I think books are even more
appreciated than tobacco,’ but the views of another officer probably got close to reality
when he said ‘cramped in a crumbling dug-out, time passes slowly, and the monotony is
greatly relieved by a few “mags” from the old folks at home.’6 Another letter from France
came with the message that ‘the last parcel of your books came just as we had been relieved
after the gas attack, and there is nothing like a book for taking one’s mind off what one has
seen and gone thru.’7 If it were thought that Australian troops might be less inclined to
literary pursuits these comments from the Australian Infantry Base Depot at Havre should
dispel those illusions:

Your parcel came today, just as a crowd of our men were leaving for the front. I
wish you could have seen their faces as I was able to relieve the tedium of a 36-hour
journey, and then the books would be passed on to the men in the firing line. I do
thank you on their behalf, and like Oliver ‘ask for more.’8

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5 Report on Camps Library, p 9. The existence of the Guide to Germany was first mentioned in 1915 by
W.E. Dowding in his report ‘The Romance of Voluntary Effort III – For Our Soldiers and Sailors’, TP’s
6 Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1915. Quoted in Theodore Wesley Koch, Books in Camp, Trench and
7 Koch, Books in Camp, p 7.
8 Report on Camps Library, p 12.
Obviously as Ward’s wartime responsibilities increased, he was less able to take an active part in the running of the Library and so the key role in its success was played by its Honorary Director, Eva Anstruther. Anstruther was a most interesting person in her own right and her relationship with Ward was supposedly more than professional. She was born Eva Hanbury-Tracy, in 1869, the eldest child of the 4th Lord Sudeley:

She grew up in a vast Gothic-style mansion in Gloucestershire - Toddington Manor, the house having rooms numbered in their hundreds. Her two immediate siblings were boys and she grew up a somewhat lonely child, resorting to creative writing from a young age. She cultivated a wide circle of similar-minded friends - mainly school peers - and began writing seriously at the age of fourteen.

In adult life, she had some success with poems, newspaper columns, short stories, certainly one play and a couple of novels but remained on the outer fringe of major success. She had a special ‘Den’ in her married homes where she would sit and read or write or sometimes, in London, she would go to Clifford’s Inn where she had a small personal office. She married Henry Torrens Anstruther in 1889, recognising in him the potential of a cabinet minister - and she with designs on being the wife of one. This was not to be and she eventually left him, in 1912 and officially, in 1915.

During the First World War she was appointed by Sir Edward Ward (who also became her lover) as Director of the Camps Library and was responsible for stocking the libraries for troops on active duty in France, a service for which she later received a D.B.E. - on Ward’s recommendation.\(^9\)

Anstruther left her husband a month after the work of the Camps Library commenced and Ward was ‘shockingly’ ‘sometimes to be seen emerging from [Anstruther’s] house in the afternoons’. He also visited her regularly at her country home though ‘how long the affair

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lasted is not recorded.¹⁰ Ward had been married in 1880 to Florence Caroline, daughter of Henry Minchin Simons, a merchant with interests in the Far East and they had two sons.

¹⁰ Ysenda Maxtone Graham, *The Real Mrs Miniver: Jan Stuther’s Story*, (London, John Murray, 2001), p 20. Struther was Eva Anstruther’s daughter and Maxtone Graham is her great-granddaughter. I am also grateful to Robert Maxtone-Graham, Dame Eva’s grandson, for further information.
Appendix 6 - Moss and Medical Supplies

Ward’s department also co-ordinated the distribution of supplies to the sick and wounded in Army Hospitals. He discovered on taking office that ‘in the early days of the War… Officers Commanding Hospitals, Matrons, and other officials, were in the habit of making application to a number of War Hospital Supply Depots and other Voluntary Societies for gifts … which resulted in many Hospitals receiving far more stores than were required, where other and less fortunate Hospitals frequently were without Comforts.’ Ward was determined to end this free-for-all and put some of the blame on his partners in the Red Cross. Following discussion with the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, General Sir Arthur Sloggett, Ward wrote a fairly stiffly worded letter to Sir Arthur Stanley, Chairman of the Joint War Committee of the British Red Cross, spelling out his scheme to co-ordinate activity, including how the Red Cross would need to cooperate. ‘I hope that makes the situation perfectly clear’ Ward concluded, atypically brusquely. Stanley replied the next day to say he concurred with Ward’s plans, the key being that ‘Officers Commanding Hospital Units were instructed to forward indents to the Head Office of the D.G.V.O. setting out the requirements of their Hospitals either for an immediate supply of articles or for a periodical supply in fortnightly or monthly consignments until further notice.’ All rather bureaucratic, no doubt, but it did improve matters considerably.

Another medical innovation with which the DGVO became involved was the use of sphagnum moss in treating wounds. Ward’s final report explained this unusual project:

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1 Report on the Director General of Voluntary Organisations, p 5.
3 Report on the Director General of Voluntary Organisations, p 5.
Colonel Cathcart of Edinburgh endeavoured to bring to the notice of the medical community the great value of sphagnum moss as a surgical dressing.\textsuperscript{4} Considerable opposition to the general use of sphagnum moss existed, but... the objections were gradually overcome with the result that by 1917 the vast majority of medical officers realised the possibilities... It was at this time that the Director General, Army Medical Service, approached me with the object that my Department’s undertaking the gathering, collection, treatment, supply and distribution of sphagnum moss dressings... In 1918 it became imperative, in view of the enormous demand, to re-organise the whole system of supply, and I consequently established a committee in Scotland, known as the Sphagnum Moss Joint Committee ... to secure an output adequate to meet any demand which might be made upon us... A great work has been accomplished.\textsuperscript{5}

An entire army of volunteers was enrolled in this, with a large number of schoolchildren involved, at least in the early days:

\textsuperscript{4} A Modern Herbal, by Mrs M Grieve published in 1931 describes its use: ‘The growing plant, with its underlying layers of withered stems and leaves, is collected, picked clean from other plants, pine needles, etc., and dried. It is then lightly packed in bags of butter-muslin, which are sterilized before being placed on the wound. Sphagnum Moss has important advantages (as an absorbent) over cotton-wool. Many materials, including other kinds of moss, are equally soft and light, but none can compare with it in power of absorption, due to its sponge-like structure. Prepared Sphagnum can absorb more than twice as much moisture as cotton, a 2-oz. dressing absorbing up to 2 lb. Even the best prepared cotton wool lacks the power to retain discharges possessed by Sphagnum. A pad of Sphagnum Moss absorbs the discharge in lateral directions, as well as immediately above the wound, and holds it until fully saturated in all parts of the dressing before allowing any to escape. The even absorption of the moss is one of its chief virtues, for the patient is saved a good deal of disturbance, since the dressing does not require to be changed so frequently.’ Accessed online at \url{http://botanical.com/botanical/mgmh/m/mossph54.html} on 27/12/10. See also Natelie N. Riegler, ‘Sphagnum Moss in World War 1: The making of surgical dressings by volunteers in Toronto, Canada 1917-18’, \textit{Canadian Bulletin of Medical History}, 6, 1989, pp 27-43 and J.B. Porter, ‘Sphagnum Moss for use as a Surgical Dressing; its collection, preparation and other details’, \textit{Canadian Medical Association Journal}, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1917, pp 201-207.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Report on Director General of Voluntary Organisations}, p 7. There were also other claimants to assisting in the introduction of Sphagnum. The Rev Andrew Clark in his diaries (edited and published by James Munson, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988) describes his involvement.
The children who live near the moors are collecting sphagnum moss for the military hospital in Keighley.... Quite a nice lot was brought this morning but much more will be gathered this week-end.6

The War Supplies branch in little Ottery St Mary in Devon was heavily involved too. It had an average of eighty volunteer workers on the sphagnum moss scheme who produced a total of 240,310 dressings.7 At Crieff, in Scotland, one of the volunteer collectors, J.M. Clerk, was even inspired to compose a poem about their activities:

**The Sphagnum Moss Work Party**

I grew on the misty moorland
Where the black and the red cock crow,
All green and grey and wine-red,
There in my peaty mossbed,
All cool and damp and fragrant,
Where the wind from the mountains blow.

Unheeded, unsought for ages,
I grew where the wild things live
In far-off silent places,
In empty, lonely spaces,
Storing the hidden forces
Of the healing I can give.

Now waked from the dreaming moorland
By the clamorous voice of War,
From land of glen and shieling
I come to lay my healing
On the wounded, broken, bleeding
Who have called me from afar.8

Though we might scoff at the amateurishness of these activities they clearly made an impact on the flow of medical supplies to the front. One contemporary commentator credited Ward

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6 Diary or Log Book, Stanbury Board School Haworth, 17 November, 1916. See also van Emden and Humphries, *All Quiet on the Home Front*, pp 273-274.
with fusing the various agencies, including the Red Cross, into ‘a complete and gigantic supplementary National Organization for Aid to the Sick and Wounded.’

Appendix 7 - ‘Beyond the range of ordinary business’ - The Belgian Soldiers Fund

Instances of ‘con-artists’ promoting bogus charities occurred from the early days of the war but they were generally of a very local, small-scale nature. The first scandal to reach national prominence was that of the Belgian Soldiers Fund (BSF), the brainchild of Miss Sophie (or Sophia) de Mussenden Carey, the daughter of a Lincolnshire clergyman, though of Channel Islands extraction.¹ Though Carey was identified both at the time and by later writers as an outright crook, there is little definite evidence that she ever did more than stretch the rules to the limit of the law and take liberties with the money donated to her fund.² Carey had something of a dubious past and as recently as May 1914 a finance scheme that she ran, the Women’s Financial Information Bureau, had been the subject of an exposé in Truth. In a series of articles the magazine questioned the methods of her fund and those of her American financier partner, Ben Blanchard, who had a questionable connection with her later ventures. In the ‘Scrutator’ column they noted Miss Carey’s advertisement for the Bureau in which she stated that ‘my object is to watch the capital value of my client’s shares, and when there is a likelihood of depreciation to sell out and invest in sound, rising stocks.’³ She claimed to be ‘the first woman to step out publicly into the world of finance and organise and control a company dealing mainly with investments.’ Truth questioned her credentials for running such a scheme, ‘as this lady invites people to consult her it is necessary to consider whether she is really competent to give advice about investments.’

She had apparently gained her experience from poultry farming and ‘in connection with polo

¹ Her father was Denis Carey, Rector of Toynton All Saints, Spilsbury, Lincs. She was born on 28 July 1874 and died in 1953. Source: The History of the Carey family of Guernsey, http://www.careyroots.com, accessed on 02/11/06.
² Peter Cahalan calls her ‘the most indefatigable of wartime swindlers’, Cahalan, Belgian Refugees, p 457, which is an exaggeration.
ponies and dogs,’ skills Truth clearly thought were not easily transferable to the sphere of high finance. The magazine revealed that Carey had requested £1,000 from ‘the secretary of a charitable organisation’ and claimed she would give back £200 profit for every £1,000 invested in 10 months, an extraordinary rate of twenty-four per cent interest per annum. Truth found this very dubious. They called her ‘credulous and inexperienced’ and suggested that ‘the offer Miss Carey so innocently makes is incompatible with anything that can be legitimately regarded as an investment.’ Investigation by Scrutator had ascertained that the company in which she intended to invest was the National Securities Company Limited, registered on 3 April 1914. ‘It is a private company with a capital of £5,000 in £1 shares, of which 200 have been subscribed by Miss Sophia de Mussenden Carey and Mr Baillie Hamilton, who is described in the company’s official return as secretary of the Society for the Relief of Distress.’ Truth had not heard of the company nor the Society. The following week Carey replied, regretting her offer had been misconstrued. The National Securities Company Limited, she said, only invested ‘in sound Government and municipal bonds and industrial securities, chiefly at 4 ½ to 5 ½ per cent in America and Canada.’ So how could she guarantee twenty-four per cent? Scrutator decided to interview her. Whilst still only suggesting that Carey was naive he concluded that ‘nobody with any knowledge of business and sense of responsibility would innocently propose that the trustees of a charity should hand over its funds for someone else to invest on the promise of profits of 20 per cent in ten months.’ Carey said that the investment was done by a ‘rich American banker,’ named Ben Blanchard, who does it ‘just to help a few friends’. She was ‘unable to throw any light upon the nature of the security her banker friend gives.’

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4 The Society was, however, perfectly respectable and had been operating since 1860. See LMA A/SRD.
Blanchard sat at the centre of a network of somewhat obscure businesses. He was President of the Colonial Investment Company and the Interior Securities Company (both supposedly registered in Arizona), the major shareholder of the British-based Kaetan Syndicate and General Manager of the British International Bank Limited. Scrutator found a lady who had invested £525 with Mr Blanchard. There was no security just some ‘beautifully printed and embellished’ share certificates. The US organisations could not be traced. The rates of interest promised were between forty-five and one hundred per cent per annum. After taking further advice, the lady concerned demanded her money back (and got it). Scrutator observed that ‘stranger transactions have rarely come under my notice.’ Intrigued by the mysterious Mr Blanchard Scrutator reported a meeting with him in the following week’s edition at which ‘he did not commit himself to any definite explanation of his own particular financial feats.’7 They were no nearer an explanation of the extravagant promises of interest. ‘In spite of interviews with Mr Blanchard and his solicitor, I am still befogged,’ commented the confused journalist, ‘but one thing is quite obvious: the transactions are quite beyond the range of ordinary business or banking, and Mr Blanchard, in fact, pleaded guilty to the soft impeachment of philanthropy. [However] it is only fair to Mr Blanchard to say that both in the case of the lady referred to above and in that of another lady who had also parted with about £500 he has on demand returned the cash, with an allowance for interest.’ Blanchard’s tangled web of companies were each taking share holdings in the others and all appeared to be remarkably profitable. It was unclear if any outside investors were involved. Scrutator concluded that ‘to cynics in the City it will appear that there is something akin to financial wizardry as well as uncommon philanthropy about Mr Blanchard’s dealings.’ Truth was careful not to accuse Blanchard or Carey of fraud but the implication was clear: were

there other investors in their enterprises who had not come forward and had not got their money back?8

With this episode behind her, on the outbreak of war Carey joined the Women’s’ Emergency Corps where she demonstrated that she had a ‘remarkable flair for raising money’ and organised the collection of food for refugees. ‘She gained the cooperation of highly respected people like Sir William and Lady Chance, Lady Emmott and Miss M.H. Mason.’9 After an instance of misusing the organisation’s funds for a private party, Carey and three others were thrown out. Carey went off to found the BSF and another, Mark Judge (a failed hotel manager described by the editor of the Daily Chronicle as ‘a very shady character’) later joined the equally dubious French Relief Fund.10 On 20 December 1914, the BSF launched a press appeal for £50,000 promoting themselves as ‘the only Fund that specialises in Field Kitchen and Food Comforts and a pure water supply for the Belgian Army.’11 They boasted an impressive list of Presidents; including the Belgian Ministers of War and the Interior and the President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. In fact, they did not have any official recognition from the Belgian government and their depiction of the plight of the Belgian Army led to the condemnation of their campaign by the Belgians as being likely to ‘injure the prestige of our army.’12

By April 1915, the BSF had raised £11,500 but doubts were being raised regarding the administration of the Fund. In December, the Metropolitan Police received a letter from a

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8 Though there was no hard evidence, Blanchard and Carey look as if they might have been running a ‘Ponzi’ scheme (which depends on attracting more and more new investors to pay off those wanting to cash in their ‘gains’), just like Bernard Madoff in the 21st century.
9 Miss Mason had not long retired from her post as the second woman inspector and first senior women inspector ever appointed by the Local Government Board. Cahalan, Belgian Refugees, p 458.
10 Evidence presented to the Committee on War Charities by Robert Donald, TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.
11 TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
12 TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
Miss Gentiar Fowler saying that she had made a £5 donation that had not been acknowledged with a receipt. Sgt Jeffrey visited the offices of the Fund in January but he was clearly reassured by Miss Carey and her team. His report concluded that ‘Miss Carey is an indefatigable secretary, and of the highest character’, he was clearly unaware of the Truth article. Despite Sgt Jeffrey’s glowing testimonial doubts persisted. The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire enquired as to the Fund’s credentials in late January 1915 and a note appended to the police file states that ‘Miss Carey is known as running bogus charities and this particular charity is very suspect.’

In May, possibly in an attempt to ‘raise a smokescreen’, the Fund itself complained that they had been swindled, out of £1 worth of stamps, by a bogus collector of funds, but it was some of Carey’s acquaintances who were more suspect. The Fund was closely connected with Joseph Clarkson, promoter of the Albert Day Fund, who also ran the Belgian Canal Boat Fund which was intended to feed and clothe Belgian children and to whom the Belgian Soldiers Fund donated £17 6s 7d. Clarkson was a very shady customer, described by Manchester Police as an ‘absolute rotter,’ and both his schemes were placed under administration by the Charity Commission in September 1916. Despite having these dubious acquaintances there was never any direct evidence of wrongdoing against Carey and she stated that ‘a complete card index was kept of every subscriber and their gifts … All books were audited monthly [and] no commissions or gratuities were ever accepted by any person connected with the Fund.’ Having looked through their audited accounts (which are on file at the National Archives), it is worth pointing out that there appears to be nothing obviously improper.

Equally, the Fund did carry out some very worthwhile relief activities in Belgium and

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13 Report dated 8 January 1915, TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
14 Dated 2 October 1915. TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
15 Telegram from Chief Inspector Blackwell, Birmingham Police, to Scotland Yard, 12 October 1916, TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
16 Kelynack, Pro Patria, p 54.
payments to staff do not seem excessive, at around five per cent of income.\(^{17}\) Nevertheless the Fund was not run as transparently as it might have been and the potential for, if not actual, abuse of funds donated by the public existed. In addition to the character of Carey and her associates, there were three main concerns with the BSF. Firstly, it was run on extremely laissez faire principals. Despite dealing with substantial funds, £32,000 to August 1915, there was no formal committee, Carey being emphatic that she had a ‘no committee policy.’\(^{18}\) Secondly they were profligate with their claims as to whom they named as supporters. They did not have official recognition from the Belgian government and, after he had sent them a donation of two guineas, they named the Archbishop of Canterbury as a supporter in their literature, which he was forced to deny in a notice issued to the press. They also falsely claimed to have the support of the War Office and Admiralty. The third factor was the re-emergence of the enigmatic Ben Blanchard. When the BSF started its ‘million shilling appeal’ a journalist from Truth visited its offices and asked who was responsible for the expenditure of the funds provided by the public. ‘A gentleman present thereupon volunteered to explain the system. Asked for his name, he said it was Blanchard.’\(^{19}\) It appeared that the Vigo Trading Company ‘one of the numerous companies which Mr Blanchard directs’ made nearly all purchases for the Fund (for horses, field kitchens, boilers, water sterilisers etc). Reminding readers of Carey and Blanchard’s previous history Truth summed up the entire enterprise by saying:

> In reality, Miss Carey is merely a conduit by which the stream of gold flows through an unincorporated company of anonymous persons to the tradesmen who supply the goods, and in whose hands substantial balances are allowed to remain under the

\(^{17}\) TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
\(^{18}\) Letter to the Secretary of the London Chamber of Commerce, 15 November 1915, TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
\(^{19}\) Truth, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 2032, 1 December 1915, p 877.
surveillance of an American citizen whose methods of finance are a bewildering puzzle.20

Though there was no hard evidence of outright fraud the authorities were determined to make an example of Carey and in November 1915 they had their opportunity. Scotland Yard put one of their most energetic and resourceful officers, Detective Inspector John Curry, onto the case.21 Curry became the Yard’s expert in bogus charities over the next three years and he soon had evidence against the BSF when one of the Fund’s workers, Miss Millie Back, was arrested for unauthorised street collecting. The police and Home Office decided to take advantage of this case to make a more general statement about bogus charities and the unfortunate Miss Back found herself not only up before the Magistrates but with the press benches crowded with representatives of all of the major national newspapers.22 Treasury Solicitor Mr Muskett’s message was very clear and connected only peripherally to Back’s misdemeanour for which she was even pleading guilty. It was Back’s employers that were in the dock rather than her. Muskett drew attention to two categories of swindlers. The small-scale, uneducated, con artist who, though a menace, it was suggested could be adequately dealt with through the existing law and large-scale schemes initiated by clever professionals into which category Carey was clearly placed.23 Both Muskett and the court recognised that Miss Back had been acting in good faith and she was merely ordered to pay the cost of her summons but the statement had the desired effect as it was widely reported in The Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Morning Post and Truth. The latter commented:

21 The son a jeweller from Gosport, John Thomas Curry was born on 10 November 1871. He had joined the Metropolitan Police in February 1893, became a Detective in 1898 and was promoted to Detective Sergeant in 1902 and DI in 1911. He left the force in November 1919 on a pension of £300 a year, his record marked as ‘exemplary’. Met Collection, information by e-mail, 30/04/10. TNA MEPO 4/346 and 4/381.
22 Report dated 18 November 1915, TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
23 TNA, MEPO 2/1675.
This announcement, made on the authority of the Commissioner of Police and with
the approval of the Home Secretary, gives a warning to the public which has been
given again and again in *Truth*, and which I am therefore glad to see officially
emphasised. There can be no question of its necessity if the enormous wastage of
money on charity of doubtful utility is to be prevented and the depredations of the
charity-mongers checked.\(^{24}\)

Neither Muskett nor, in this article, *Truth* went as far as saying that there should be new
legislation but already there were many that were.

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Appendix 8 - ‘A cast iron method’ - the evidence of fraudulent charities

At the War Charities Committee hearings, Inspector Curry described seven cases. The Committee included four of these in its final written report to which they added one further case from outside London. The first, the Belgian Soldiers’ Fund, has already been described. Both the Cripples Pension Society and the War Orphans Fund were straightforward frauds, perpetrated by none-too-intelligent petty criminals. Alfred Worthington, alias Charles Swift, established the former in November 1915. He used the names of prominent MPs (including Will Anderson) to give legitimacy to his enterprise calling them his ‘Parliamentary representatives’. When they objected to their names being used he proposed to pay them a retainer of 50 guineas and three guineas for every question they asked in the House. Colonel Charles Yate (Conservative MP for Melton) responded that he considered this a gross insult but Worthington used the same tactic with his supposed chairman and vice-chairman, the Rev F.H. Gillingham, rector of Bermondsey, and the Rev A.J. Waldron, formerly vicar of Brixton. Worthington was clearly none too bright in choosing patrons with such high moral principles. He advertised for disabled soldiers and ‘smart ladies’ to act as canvassers and one person at least parted with £100 which was immediately paid into Worthington’s private account. It did not take too long for the law to catch up with him and his defence at Bow Street in August 1916 was feeble. The Magistrate passed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay £15 costs to the prosecution and the cost of his maintenance in goal out of the £29 found on him when he was arrested.¹ The War Orphans Fund was organised by a Frenchman, Jules Victor Ronnet, who was already a convicted swindler and whose first effort at dubious fund-raising was the British Belgian Association. He collected at least £235 all of which went in ‘expenses’. The ‘collectors employed were

¹ The Times, 26 August 1916, p 3.
women, generally smartly dressed, and bedecked with red, white and blue ribbons. They were thus difficult to distinguish from collectors for perfectly genuine causes. Ronnet was deported in January 1916 as an undesirable alien, as fraud was difficult to prove. Back in Paris, he was soon arrested for fraud and was, at the time of the Committee’s deliberations, serving eight months in prison.

Heroes Poultry Farms was supposed to be an employment scheme for ex-soldiers that would provide eggs and poultry free of charge to military hospitals. Its promoter Ritchie Gill (aka George Ritchie), a film renter from Twickenham, advertised the scheme in the press seeking subscribers. He was one of many to use the ‘snowball’ technique, thousands of small contributions that each individual would not miss. In his scheme, he stated that his company was raising five million shillings. It seems that he set out with no intention of ever starting a real charity but intended to pocket the proceeds; he was, however, quickly unmasked. Although the Committee report suggests that ‘he might easily have obtained a considerable sum of money’, he seems to have collected less than £20. He appeared at Bow Street Police Court charged with attempting to procure charitable contributions by fraud but after character witnesses described him as ‘hopelessly optimistic’ rather than a criminal he escaped a custodial sentence, instead being fined £25. The Counties Rest Home for British Soldiers was a slightly more ambitious project and its ‘mastermind’ seems to have been more plausible. Mr M.P. Shorrock had a history of financial irregularity. He had been bankrupted twice, and was at the time undischarged from the second. He had been

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2 Minutes of and Memoranda Submitted by Witnesses to the Committee on War Charities, TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32, evidence submitted by Det. Insp. Curry.
4 The Times, 30 December 1915, p 5 and 5 January 1916, p 5. Interestingly Heroes Poultry Farms was first registered as a company in August 1915 when its directors were Colette Olga Touzeau (of Brighton) and Arthur C Payne (from Earl’s Court). Ritchie only became a Director in January 1916. It may be that it began as a legitimate idea but that Ritchie was a ‘bad apple’. The company did not attempt to trade after the court case and was dissolved in 1918. TNA, BT 31/22964/141418.
imprisoned for failing to pay his rates and had an outstanding verdict of £6,300 against him for fraud. He nevertheless ‘succeeded in inducing three Earls and several Members of Parliament to become vice-presidents, and formed a committee of more than 80 ladies, most of whom were the wives of officers commanding regiments.'5 He had succeeded in raising about £500, which again all appeared to have been swallowed up in expenses leaving the Fund with an adverse balance of £30. The embarrassment caused to Shorrock’s patrons was a strong incentive for official action.

Some schemes were even more unlikely. The War Babies Fund was described by Inspector Curry but was not mentioned in the final Report, possibly as it had a hint of immorality or, perhaps, to avoid any confusion with the entirely legitimate War Babies and Mothers League. It was started by ‘two adventurers who, before the war, were engaged in conducting massage houses.’ They ‘led the public to believe that a large number of young unmarried women in this country had been led away by soldiers, and were about to become mothers.’6 The entire scenario was ‘a tissue of falsehood’ but Curry did not say if they had succeeded in raising any significant sums, quite possibly not. Another case was a far more blatant example of fraud but was not mentioned at the War Charities Committee. This may have been because the case was not handled by Inspector Curry but by his colleague, Divisional Detective Inspector Ashley. Ashley’s tactics in bringing his man to book were particularly imaginative. The miscreant was sixty-year-old Thomas Alroy alias Thomas alias Johnson a man who had ‘given Police much trouble in connection with his exploits in various bogus charitable associations.’7 Alroy invariably employed attractive female collectors and since 1911 had operated the Christian and Temperance Mission and impersonated the, real, Fresh

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5 TNA, BT 31/22964/141418.
6 TNA, HO 45/1084/308566/32.
7 TNA, MEPO 3/249.
Air Fund. Though several of his collectors had been prosecuted, he had always managed to steer clear of conviction. In May 1914, Margaret Ford was charged with begging for the ‘Fresh Air Fund’ and stated in court that ‘a Mr Alroy engaged me about four years ago. It was through an advertisement in a newspaper I got it. He does all the business.’\(^8\) It was further revealed that ‘four women had been convicted in the West End of obstruction and begging and all those cases were connected with the same society.’\(^9\) In an attempt to apprehend him, police had visited Alroy’s office in Princeton Street, Holborn, described as ‘a filthy shabby little place’ but failed to locate him. The war caused this source of income to decline so Alroy turned his hand to other activities. He first thought of the War Relief Fund but this proved too close a title to the National Relief Fund, eliciting many complaints, and so he moved on to found the National Patriotic Society, the War Employment Guild and the Fund for the Fatherless.

At first, he escaped the law as he operated within the jurisdiction of the City of London police who appear to have been somewhat tardy in repressing charity abuses. Alroy’s was an extensive network, operating fifty to sixty women at a time and he was also fairly well versed in the law as he claimed to be a publisher and gave each of his collectors a ‘licence’ to sell pamphlets and thus escape the Vagrancy Act. Calling himself Thomas he was ‘abusive and defiant’ when questioned by City Police. Inspector Ashley had his collectors followed hoping that they would stray into an area under the jurisdiction of the Bow Street magistrates who were known to be ‘desirous of suppressing this class of offence.’ Ashley got his chance when he managed to have Alroy declared an undesirable tenant, which forced him to leave his City office for an address in Bedford Row, within the Bow Street jurisdiction. The surveillance reports indicated that Alroy ‘occupies his time solely in visiting public

\(^8\) The Times, 5 May 1914, p 14.
\(^9\) The Times, 13 May 1914, p 3.
houses’ often in association with a woman, Miss Lucy Thornton (29), who seems to have been more of a business partner than a mistress though they had ‘shown some intimacy’ during surveillance and both ‘exist solely on the money collected by these women [collectors].’ Their income was estimated at £25 a week, which, when one considers that an average wage was not much more than £1 to £2, was a very healthy sum. Alroy was also ruthless if anyone tried to swindle him. In February one of his collectors, Margaret Caddy, was sentenced to a month’s hard labour for begging, the implication was that she had failed to give Alroy all her takings and that he had informed on her to the authorities. In April 1915, Alroy advertised in the Daily Telegraph for women collectors at a salary of 15s a week and Inspector Ashley saw his chance. He got both his own wife, Amy, and the wife of PC Saunders to reply to the ad and both were employed. Alroy clearly thought Amy Ashley was a cut above his usual applicants and quickly made her a ‘district visitor’ to supervise other collectors. The two undercover agents made several visits to Alroy and his associate with fake collections and, in addition, eight of the thirty-five others who answered the ad were followed. In receipt of the policemen and women’s reports the Director of Public Prosecutions authorised the issue of a warrant for the arrest of Alroy and Thornton. Though he was tipped off by his accountant, who police had visited, Alroy was confident that he would again escape retribution and made no attempt to abscond. When arrested his first comment was that ‘I have conducted this thing for years and we have a cast iron method.’ He was wrong. Though Thornton was discharged on 18 May 1915, Bow Street Magistrates sentenced Alroy to the maximum three months under the Vagrancy Act. Mrs Saunders was awarded 30s out of public funds for her invaluable assistance and Mr Muskett described Inspector Ashley’s report as ‘a model of its kind’ and the Inspector himself as ‘a detective
Officer of exceptional intelligence and ability.’ However, it was his wife’s that was the crucial piece of evidence and her statement is beautifully written and a model of clarity.\(^{10}\)

The other example not included by the Committee was perhaps left out as the case was going through the courts at the time. The war spawned a number of patriotic organisations that promoted the positive aspects of Britain and her empire but it also led to the creation of a smaller number that worked on the opposite principle, denigrating Germany and her culture. The Anti-German League was sprung upon the British public through a newspaper campaign in May 1915, coinciding with the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Its lengthy advertisement in *The Times*, headed ‘An Appeal to the Nation’, though clearly aimed at the ‘better classes’, resorted to the worst excesses of jingoistic hyperbole. It stated that Britain was threatened by a ‘Teutonic leprosy’ not just on the battlefield but in every sphere of activity. Its main target was German goods and, to a lesser extent, those of German origin. It left no outrage or atrocity story unturned when it proclaimed:

> When offered goods bearing the mark of the beast, I ask you to think of the vast army of phantom dead, of the poor breastless women, of the outraged girls, of the little children torn to pieces, of our brave soldiers with their faces beaten to a pulp as they lay wounded, and of the sinking of the Falaba with over a hundred innocent passengers, amid the jeers of the fiends on the pirate submarine, and the Lusitania with hundreds of helpless victims sacrificed to the blood-lust of the Butcher of Berlin.\(^{11}\)

The Founder and Director of the Anti-German league was E.J. Blasir Chatterton who, he regretted in his advertisement, was ‘debarred from Military service owing to a slight physical

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\(^{10}\) The Met did not employ its first official female detective until the appointment of Inspector Lillian Wyles to the CID in 1922 / 3. However women detectives were ‘often temporarily employed for special work’ at this date, *The Times*, 30 December, 1915, p 5.

\(^{11}\) *The Times*, 28 May 1915, p 10.
disability’ but who was, nonetheless, determined to do his bit for King and Country. He was seeking ‘a Million Members, and I shall get them ... who will preach the Anti-German doctrine all over the Country’. He included a pledge to sign and return, with a one shilling subscription, and concluded that ‘it is the duty of every Englishman and every Englishwoman in the country to sign this pledge.’ It is perhaps rather gratifying to relate that Chatterton was, in reality, no more patriotic than any of the other fraudsters and that despite some success in recruiting the ‘great and the good’ to his cause, and 5,000 ordinary subscribers, his organisation lasted less than a year. In April 1916, he was declared bankrupt with liabilities of £1,278 and the following month was charged with fraud. The charge related to converting two sums, one of £215 and another of £20, donated to the League to his own use. He was tried and found guilty at the Old Bailey in July. It was then revealed that he had previous convictions for sending indecent literature through the post, a fact he failed to point out in his appeals, and he was sentenced to six months hard labour. Though Chatterton’s exposure as a fraud and pornographer must have been something of a shock it did not prevent a number of his supporters from continuing their virulently xenophobic activities with other organisations.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^\text{12}\) DeGroot says that the Anti-German League later changed its name to the British Empire Union but he is confused because there were two Anti-German Leagues. In addition to Chatterton’s enterprise there was the British Anti-German League based in Birmingham, Secretary Mr James Knight. In many ways it looked nearly as bogus and also used the ‘shilling’ tactic. *Truth* suggested it was a ‘silly game’ and ‘the latest device for extracting money from the pockets of patriotic simpletons’ (3 Feb, 1915). A number of their supporters including Admiral Charles Beresford, Dr Ellis Powell (editor of the Financial News), Joseph Havelock Wilson (sometime Liberal MP and founder of the National Amalgamated Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union) and the future Conservative Home Secretary, William Joynson-Hicks later began the British Empire Union. This was ‘yet another privately organised propaganda body, dedicated to spreading hatred of all things German’ (DeGroot, *Blighty*, p 194). The group produced the 1918 film, *Once a Hun, Always a Hun*, which advocated a ban on trading with Germany after the war. The BEU was one of the bodies that later metamorphosed into the British Union of Fascists so it would be interesting to see how its supporters later reconciled support for Hitler with their earlier anti-Germanic pronouncements. To confuse matters still further there was also the Anti-German Union ‘driven by the well-connected Scotsman, Sir George Makgill.’ van Emden and Humphries, *All Quiet on the Home Front*, p 57.
The case from outside London that the Committee included was of a very different nature though was, again, linked with Belgian relief. Unlike Chatterton, Alroy, Shorrock, Carey and the rest Dr Charles Sarolea was a prominent, distinguished and highly respectable citizen. In 1894, he was appointed to the newly founded Lectureship in French at Edinburgh University and in 1918 became the University’s first Professor of French. He was a friend of George Bernard Shaw, Ernest Shackleton and Winston Churchill and his own authorship covered political, philosophical and literary subjects. They included books on Cardinal Newman and Robert Louis Stevenson and war-related titles such as *The Anglo-German Problem* (1912, which explained how the Prussians turned Germany in a military industrial state), *How Belgium Saved Europe* and *The Murder of Nurse Cavell* (both 1915). Between 1912 and 1917, he was editor of the popular weekly journal *Everyman*. He was also a man of considerable means. He could for example, afford to donate £500 to the fund for the relief of Belgian prisoners in Germany.¹³ He lived at one of Edinburgh’s most fashionable addresses on the Royal Terrace and his book collection of some 200,000 works was said to be the largest private library in Europe. He and his wife were office holders of the Edinburgh Belgian Refugee Committee and he was for fifty years the Belgian Consul in Scotland. Perhaps the only characteristic Sarolea shared with Chatterton was that some of his views were on the extreme side, his biographer entitled her thesis ‘A good European and sincere racist.’¹⁴ The criticism levelled at Sarolea was not of fraud but of bad management practice and hoarding of funds. He administered the *Everyman* Belgian Relief and Reconstruction Fund, which had raised around £50,000. It was claimed that though the Fund had a committee they were mainly non-British, were such eminent people that it was not likely they could ever meet and that, in reality, the entire administration of the Fund was in Sarolea’s hands. The Committee

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castigated Sarolea in its report, though was careful not to mention him by name. However, in this case, not all was what it seemed. The source of criticism against Sarolea came solely from the editor of the *Daily Chronicle*, Robert Donald. Donald gave evidence to the War Charities Committee on the lines outlined above and the *Chronicle* then repeated the claims being careful not to add that they stemmed from their own editor. Inspector Curry was asked for a report on the *Everyman* Fund and he found no irregularities, suggesting the Charity Commission should look into the matter further. He also made the point that the only evidence against Sarolea was that supplied by Donald. A report from the Commission to James Bird, of the London County Council, in May 1917 concluded that the fund had now closed, its books had been fully audited and the remaining funds transferred to the Edinburgh Consular Relief Fund. It would appear that Donald had a grudge against Sarolea. The latter had been a special war correspondent for the *Chronicle* and Donald had been a committee member of Sarolea’s fund. The Committee took Donald’s facts at face value but the circumstantial evidence rather suggests that Donald was pursuing a personal motive.

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16 LMA, LCC/MIN 8337 (Vol. 3), Case # 240. Report by Inspector John Curry, 19 September 1916; letter from Herbert Morris 30/05/17.  
17 It may be instructive to note that Donald was a strong supporter of propaganda during the war believing that fabrication was, at times, necessary. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State*, p 50.
Appendix 9 - ‘A distinctly doubtful character’ - the French Relief Fund

If Charles Sarolea was the most eminent individual to be accused of, at least, borderline fraud the most prominent fund that came under suspicion was certainly the French Relief Fund (FRF). This promoted itself as the UK branch of the Secours National (the French equivalent of the NRF) to which it had gained affiliation in December 1914. However, quite early in its existence, the French ambassador stated that he did not support contributions being channelled through the FRF, which led the Bishop of Manchester to request being removed as President. Its high profile fund raising activities included a concert by Clara Butt at Eton, a matinee at Her Majesty’s Theatre and, most prominent of all, a massive flag day held on Bastille Day, 14 July 1915. This involved 15 to 20,000 ladies selling millions of flags and it raised £60,000.¹ Even Megan Lloyd-George collected for the Fund, apparently being highly successful in gaining donations in and around Downing Street. By this time the FRF had recruited one of the most impressive patrons’ lists of any wartime charity. Despite his ambassador’s reservations the French President, Raymond Poincare and several other French Ministers, gave them their official support.² They were joined by even more distinguished British patrons including Lord Kitchener, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Winston Churchill, Austen Chamberlain and, perhaps most embarrassingly, successive Home Secretaries Reginald McKenna and Sir John Simon. In retrospect, it is somewhat surprising that they were so forthcoming with their support; Kitchener for example only joined the patrons list in June 1915, when suspicions regarding the FRF had already been aired in the press, notably in those two champions of charity probity the Morning Post and Truth.

¹ Originally, 7 million flags were ordered but this was later increased to 14 million.
² Part of the reason French Ministers were kindly disposed to the FRF was because the Fund supported the Ministers’ own charities. For example, the FRF gave 20,000 francs to Jean Aguganeur, Minister of Marine, for the wives and families of victims of ships sunk by the enemy and 10,000 francs to M Dalmier, Under-Secretary of State for Fine Arts, to assist widows of French artists. Both were Patrons of the Fund. FRF circular, The First World War: A documentary record, Part 5: The Royal Army Medical Corps, Red Cross and other Auxiliary Services, European War 1914-1919, the War Reserve Collection from Cambridge University Library, WRA 36 303.
That there was certainly confusion over the legitimacy of the FRF is demonstrated by the fact that in November 1915 the *Daily Graphic* included it on their list of those charities it considered ‘indispensable’ and the work of which ‘has been investigated and is recommended to the support of readers with confidence’. Inspector Curry’s report says that the first suspicions were raised by the editor of the *Morning Post*, H.A. Gwynne, who went to Scotland Yard after he had been advised by the French consulate to have nothing to do with the Fund. This was followed by two articles in *Truth* commenting adversely on the lack of a proper management committee. At the time, the committee comprised just four people: the General Secretary, Mr James Hargreaves Dickinson; the Joint Treasurer, Sir Thomas Brooke Hitching, and two Frenchmen, Paul Roth and Gustave Bernheim, who were later among those to withdraw their support. This criticism appeared to be partly allayed when a properly constituted committee was installed and Messers Peat and Co appointed to audit the charity’s accounts. Unusually *Truth* declared itself satisfied stating that ‘this removes satisfactorily the only faults I have pointed out in the organisation of the Fund [and that] the British public can have confidence in it.’ By June 1915, the FRF was able to state that they had raised £48,000 from 12,000 subscribers. They quoted the French Minister of the Interior, Louis Malvy, as saying ‘I do not know how to sufficiently praise the Members of your Fund for their generous initiative and for their work’, his comments were again

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3 *Daily Graphic*, 11 November 1915. This was a somewhat eccentric or, at least, eclectic list as it comprised, in addition to the FRF: the YMCA (but not, for example the Red Cross); Church Army; Queen Mary’s Needlework Guild; the National Food Fund; the Vegetable Products Committee (so an emphasis on food production); the Royal Naval Division Comforts Fund (but no other comforts fund); the Ladies Emergency Committee of the Navy League (something of a pro-Navy bias); the British Committee in Aid of the Italian Wounded and Pro-Italia, Ladies Section (perhaps an Italian bias).

4 9 December 1915. TNA, TS 18/262.


influenced by the fact that the FRF had sent donations to many legitimate French charities including M Malvy’s own orphans’ fund, the Union Amicale des Enfants de la Seine.7

However, it did not take long for a crisis to occur. In an open letter the Chair of the Fund’s General Committee, T.H. Carson said that the Secretary had placed advertisements in the press that the Committee had not approved. Shortly thereafter Carson, together with the Hon Treasurer, Sir Thomas Barclay, Professor J.H. Longford and Sir Frederick Pollock resigned from the committee. In its 1 September edition, Truth published a letter from Professor Longford giving the reasons for his resignation as being:

Extravagant and unnecessary outlay on travelling expenses; excessive powers assumed by the Executive Committee, which latterly practically consisted of two persons; allocation of substantial grants from the funds on the recommendation of a member or of two members of the General Committee resident in Paris; retention of large balances in banks in London; and the unnecessary engagement of the services of a solicitor at the charge of the fund.8

In the light of the Professor’s allegations, the magazine felt that it had to backtrack on its previous expressions of confidence and that ‘unless adequate answer is forthcoming to Professor Longford’s strictures I very much fear that the French Relief Fund will forfeit the claim it had obtained to public confidence.’9 The Secretary, Mr Dickinson, refuted the Professor’s accusations in detail in the following week’s edition of Truth and he informed the paper that a new committee was being formed. ‘Scrutator’ was not over-impressed by the evidence and re-confirmed his view that ‘the information at my disposal points to the fact that [those who had resigned] had good grounds for their dissatisfaction, and that as

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9 ‘F.R.F. Resignations’ p 342.
stewards of charitable funds they adopted the only course open to them when they found that they were unable to get their views accepted.'¹⁰

November brought about the resignation of many of the FRF’s most eminent patrons including Home Secretary Sir John Simon, Winston Churchill, Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, McKenna and Kitchener. However, the whole matter was surrounded in some mystery as The Times reported under the heading ‘The French Relief Fund – Curious Correspondence – Withdrawal of Ministers from Patronage.’¹¹ They published correspondence between Sir John and Dickinson in which the latter appealed to him to remain as ‘your withdrawal would be a serious and might be a fatal blow to the fund.’ They also published letters from the Fund’s advertising manager, Mr W.E. Spiers who was mystified as to why many newspapers were now refusing to print the Fund’s advertisements or even publish the accounts. Spiers and The Times concluded that there was ‘some organized opposition to [the] Fund which is operating ... from Scotland Yard.’¹² Indeed, there was a ‘warning off’ process going on by the police. This was despite the fact that the accounts had been independently audited and no irregularities found. Truth published them and they showed a total income of £129,376. From this, they had paid grants of £69,000 but administrative expenses of £18,139 had swallowed up twenty-nine per cent of income (£9,523 in office expenses and £8,616 on expenses connected with the Flag Day). Truth expressed themselves satisfied with the auditor’s report. They commented, quite rightly, that the Fund had ‘done big and useful work... The plain fact [is] that in the course of the year this Fund contributed £110,000 towards the relief of acute distress in France.’¹³

Scrutator went on to praise the openness of the Fund’s Secretary, Mr Dickinson, comments

¹¹ The Times, 1 December 1915, p 6.
¹² The Times, letter from Spiers to J.H. Dickinson, 24 November 1915, quoted in The Times, 1 December, 1915, p 6..
the journalist no doubt regretted later, saying ‘it is not his fault that he is young and inexperienced, or that he was when he started this Fund quite an unknown person to the public.’ It was true that Dickinson’s name was unknown to Scrutator and the public but it was not unknown to the police.

At the root of the police campaign was the fact that, despite the changes to the committee structure, the FRF was very much under the control of the two men referred to by Professor Longford and it was their backgrounds and actions that led to suspicion. They were the General Secretary, James Dickinson, and the Joint Treasurer, Sir Thomas Brooke Hitching.\(^{14}\)

The Executive Committee of the FRF which had day-to-day control comprised just Dickinson and Brooke Hitching plus, originally, Sir Thomas Barclay, who resigned and was replaced by the Fund’s bank manager, Mr Gomme. Dickinson’s history did not become known until enquiries were made in his native Lancashire. It should be remembered that in the days before computerised police records it was often extremely difficult to tie information on individuals together so the fact that Dickinson could establish himself in the way he did is not altogether surprising. He was born in Colne in 1883, later moving with his parents to Blackpool, and early on in his career established a penchant for matters military and Gallic. His first brush with the police seems to have been in 1905 when he passed himself off as an Army officer and was convicted of travelling without a ticket and giving a false name and address. In August 1908, he was made bankrupt with debts of £3,000 (he was discharged in 1912) and in 1909, he claimed to be a representative of the French Aeroplane Company. He obtained premises for a week that he did not pay for, subsequently being sued for a number of unpaid debts. The report on Dickinson by Detective Sergeant Leeson of Lancashire Police

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\(^{14}\) Another Committee member, the Duke of Manchester, was also of dubious reputation though he seems not to have been implicated in any wrongdoing over the Fund. The Duke ‘is now in the Bankruptcy Court, is mixed up in a discreditable way with a criminal case of illicit trade in munitions and is accused of obtaining jewels to the value of some 65,000 francs from a Paris jeweller.’ Note prepared for Sir John Simon, after his resignation as a patron, TNA, TS 18/262.
concluded that ‘this man is, in my opinion, a distinctly doubtful character.’\textsuperscript{15} It was not only Dickinson himself who was considered undesirable. Sergeant Leeson picked up local gossip that his sister was bragging that ‘her brother is expecting to receive a Knighthood from H.M. King George and the Legion of Honour in connection with his work in the French Relief Fund.’\textsuperscript{16} His father too was a bankrupt and had been summoned for assault in 1909 and the report concluded that ‘the local reputation of the Dickinson family is extremely bad both socially and financially. Their sharp practices and doubtful transactions have brought them into notoriety throughout this district.’\textsuperscript{17} Sir Thomas was certainly not in the same league as a fraudster as Dickinson but he still had some questionable business dealings. A former Mayor of Marylebone and unsuccessful Conservative parliamentary candidate in 1912 he was elected as a City of London Alderman but on petition he was rejected as not being a ‘fit and proper person to support the dignity and discharge the duties of the office.’\textsuperscript{18} The reason for his ignominious rejection was over two cases of conflict of interest whilst in public office; the first in relation to the awarding of the contract for electric lighting in Marylebone and the second with the purchase of a property in St James’s Street by the London County Council of which Sir Thomas was a member. In both cases Sir Thomas had financial interests he failed to declare.\textsuperscript{19}

For a while after the publication of the FRF accounts things went quiet. It was not until September 1916, and a second flag day, that the activities of the Fund again came under

\textsuperscript{15} Report to Chief Constable of Lancashire, dated 12 January 1916, TNA, TS 18/262.  
\textsuperscript{16} Report to Chief Constable of Lancashire, TNA, TS 18/262.  
\textsuperscript{17} Report to Chief Constable of Lancashire, TNA, TS 18/262.  
\textsuperscript{18} Letter from Herbert Morris, Secretary of the Charity Commission to Treasury Solicitor, 24 October 1916, TNA, TS 18/262.  
\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{The Times}, 13, 14 February, 13, 14, 16, 18 and 19 March 1912, pp 4, 6, 4, 14, 16, 3 and 4. It was suggested that the Marylebone case, where Brooke Hitching’s decision on a three-person committee awarded the contract to a company in which he had an interest, had cost the ratepayers £500,000. He had also been involved in a number of failed companies.
scrutiny.²⁰ Professor Longford wrote a further critical article in *Truth* following the withdrawal of co-operation by Secours National (SN). The Fund had claimed that the whole of the proceeds of the June 1915 Flag Day would be handed over to SN but this never happened. Dickinson wanted restrictions put on the use of the funds causing SN to withdraw its support. As the War Charities Act had now come into force, the Charity Commissioners decided to launch a full investigation of the FRF and the activities of Dickinson and Brooke Hitching. They asked Treasury Solicitor, Mr E.M. Reid, for an opinion as to whether they could take action. Reid was quickly in correspondence with more disgruntled former FRF supporters. Major Walter Rowley, a mining engineer for the Great Northern Railway and a FRF Trustee, claimed that ‘the fund has practically consisted of Sir Thomas Brooke Hitching and Mr Dickinson, with a controlling majority of his friends on the Committee... I have been practically alone in protesting against the methods pursued.’ However, he had then received support from two others, Mr Fenwick Harrison and Sir William Dupree, and had been prompted to act as ‘we have two men to deal with unequalled in artfulness and duplicity.’²¹

The accusations against the pair were threefold. Firstly that they had spent excessive sums on their own expenses, particularly on luxurious trips to France; secondly that the FRF had paid excessive commission to Sir Thomas’s son for the purchase of ambulances and thirdly there were doubts about a payment of £20,000 to an orphanage in France.²² There was also some suggestion (though no evidence) that in the early days of the Fund when Dickinson was running it as an employment agency for Frenchwomen that this was a cover for prostitution.

²⁰ There is an excellent description of the day in MacDonagh’s *In London During the Great War*, p 114.
²¹ Letter of 16 September 1916, TNA, TS 18/262.
²² Even in their exonerating article in December 1915, *Truth* had mentioned that travelling expenses of £750 were ‘quite unjustifiable.’
Letters started pouring in deprecating Sir Thomas and Dickinson’s practices. It seems that Sir Thomas was in the habit of visiting France with a certain Mrs O’Reilly, described as a beauty specialist. Hitching and Dickinson had plans to open a hospital in France with O’Reilly employed as a nurse and Dickinson’s wife as matron. They had even viewed a chateau, the Chateau Rimberlieu, with a view to purchasing it before they were thwarted by the investigations. Instead, just four days before the War Charities Act was passed (on 23 August 1916) they transferred £20,000 to the ‘Edith Cavell Orphanage’. This was to be built by a M Paris who, as far as can be ascertained, was of good reputation. He ran the Maison de Pupilles and was a member of the Paris Municipal Council. Perhaps Hitching and Dickinson decided to cut their losses.

The ambulances had been supplied by Blake Ltd of Liverpool, a company ‘practically owned by [Brooke-Hitching’s] son.’ The first consignment of 50 had been lost at sea when the Caroni was torpedoed, and had to be replaced and, overall, the commission appears to have been around £1,000. Not fraud perhaps but a useful bit of business. The Charity Commissioners were unable to deal with some of the charges, because they related to occurrences before the passing of the War Charities Act, but on 28 December 1916, they put the Fund under administration, its assets then standing at some £5,000.23 As a prosecution under the new Act was impossible, in 1917 the case papers were passed to Mr Austin Cantrell QC for an opinion as to whether a prosecution for breach of trust was possible. However, the evidence was not conclusive enough and both Hitching and Dickinson escaped justice for what were most certainly unethical and self-enriching practices.24

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23 On the same day, they also place Worthington’s, Cripples Pension Society, Joseph Clarkson’s two enterprises, the Albert Day Fund and the Belgian Canal Boat Fund, and Our Own Boys Day Fund under administration as well.
24 At the commencement of the Second World War Dickinson attempted to promote a very similar venture, the Anglo-French Ambulance Corps. See Proceedings HOC, 5th Series, Vol. 355, 7 December 186
The Corps operated but under different management with Colonel J Baldwin-Webb MP as Honorary Secretary. *Flight*, May 30 1940, p. 495.
Appendix 10 - ‘Captain’ Illingworth and Queen Alexandra

The case of the French Relief Fund was a very public scandal that was extensively quoted in the passing of the War Charities Act. However, another case was just as influential even though it was kept entirely from public gaze as it held potential embarrassment for a member of the Royal Family. Several of the charity fraudsters come through as out-and-out parasites (such as Alroy), others as clever but artful (Carey and Blanchard) and some as entirely reprehensible (Chatterton). William Henry Illingworth comes across as rather a likable, if distinctly unsuccessful, rogue. Illingworth had a long, and somewhat pathetic, history of crime though, again, he was not linked with his past for some time. He was born in 1850 and received his first prison sentence, twelve months hard labour for larceny, in 1876. This was followed by ten months for fraud in 1884; eight months in 1889, again for larceny, and six months in 1900 under the bankruptcy laws. By 1914 he was very down on his luck and living at 96 Brockley Rise, London. From 1913 to September 1915, he was in receipt of 5s a week poor relief and his local vicar, the Rev W Ritson of All Saints Church Beckenham, said he had helped out Illingworth and his wife on a number of occasions with gifts of food and money. If it had not been for his choice of fraud Illingworth would have been no match for his police opponent, Detective Inspector Curry.

It took Illingworth a little while to attempt to take advantage of the war but he was at least quite imaginative when he did. In August 1915, he made his first move. He had managed to obtain a supply of material from the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and applied for a street collection permit for the Army and Navy Recruiting Agency and Posting Office. He claimed that he wanted to collect money to establish a convalescent home at Little Tingewick, Bucks. Investigations in Tingewick revealed that he had indeed taken a house there on which he owed rent. He claimed the title of Captain from supposed service in the
English Legion during the Franco-Prussian War and said he had fought at the Battle of Sedan. He also claimed aristocratic antecedents, his business card read ‘W. Illingworth Capt (retired), Forbears, Lords of the Manor of Pudsey, Yorkshire.’ The police decided that he was not genuine and that ‘his future movements will be observed.’\(^1\) In Brockley he used youngsters to collect for his various appeals and police traced and interviewed several of them. Illingworth left Brockley in November 1915 after a suspicious fire and next popped up in Hastings seven months later. He placed advertisements (for which he failed to pay) in local papers on behalf of the White Cross Fund. He was appealing for £7,000 to restore and extend a house in the suburb of Ore to turn it into a ‘Home of Rest and Convelescent’ [sic].

Both this and his Bucks appeal came with the supposed endorsement of Queen Alexandra’s Field Force Fund and this was the root of the difficulties encountered in bringing him to justice. The Fund had been started in October 1914 by the King’s mother. It was never huge (it raised around £80,000 by the end of the war) but it was very prestigious. Viscountess French, wife of the ex-C-in-C, was its President and the wives of four other generals, Ladies Allenby, Murray, Munro and Haig, were Vice Presidents.\(^2\) In 1914, Illingworth had been allowed to collect on behalf of the Fund and though he had sent in a few articles of clothing, no money appeared, even though he had made (unauthorised) press appeals. Illingworth had been in correspondence with Colonel Streatfield, Private Secretary to Queen Alexandra, from whom he received two letters. He ‘doctored’ these letters and invented a third to impress those he attempted to defraud; he told the owners of the Tingewick house that ‘no doubt he would have Her Majesty down to see the place.’ Police searched the house in Ore in August, found several parcels from the *Evening News* campaign addressed to the ‘Lonely Soldiers Guild’ and concluded that ‘there is every reason to believe that he has received a number of parcels intended for lonely soldiers and has appropriated them for his own use.’

\(^1\) TNA, MEPO 3/252.
Though the *Evening News* fund was not very tightly controlled and kept no records of its despatches, a postcard was found in Hastings to one donor in which Illingworth claimed he had just come out of hospital having been wounded at Ypres. In another, he pretended he was still at the front. Though unaware of Illingworth’s criminal record Inspector Curry, hardly surprisingly, concluded that ‘there can be no doubt that Illingworth is an impostor and a swindler.’

In October 1916 Curry uncovered Illingworth’s past and the papers on the case were sent to Mr Travers Humphrey KC ‘who said that Illingworth had committed almost every kind of fraud possible.’ Though the case against him was cut-and-dried, it did not come to court. Instead ‘after consultation with the DPP... It was decided that as proceedings were bound to necessitate [Colonel Streatfield’s] attendance in Court against his wish, and further a great objection was offered to Her Majesty’s name being used in connection with the case, no criminal action should be taken.’ A frustrated Inspector Curry was instead despatched to Illingworth’s new residence, 45 Blanford Road, Beckenham, to ‘warn him off’. He interviewed him on 9 November 1916 and Illingworth immediately ‘admitted all the money he had collected for the QAFFF he had put into his own pocket.’ Furthermore, ‘he admitted that he had been carrying on a series of frauds’ and ‘he confessed that he had used this title [Captain] without any right whatever.’ In all he was totally cooperative; returned to Inspector Curry the two letters from Colonel Streatfield and ‘promised that he would lead an honest life in future and would not again make improper use of HM Queen Alexandra’s name.’ The letters were returned to the Colonel who was promised that ‘if Illingworth were

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3 TNA, MEPO 3/252.  
4 TNA, MEPO 3/252.  
5 TNA, MEPO 3/252.  
6 TNA, MEPO 3/252.
found to be committing any offence which did not necessitate his connection with the QAFFF ... that steps would be taken to have him punished.’7

A careful watch was put on the bogus Captain and it did not take an old lag like Illingworth long to get back to his old tricks. In February 1917, Inspector Curry ascertained that Illingworth, using the pseudonym William Henry of the Imperial Air Service, had attempted fraudulently to obtain gramophone records from the Pathé Company. Curry interviewed Columbia Records British Manager, Arthur Leidtke, who confirmed the suspicions and that Illingworth was still putting on military airs ‘just outside my door I heard him giving military commands “Attention”, “Quick March” and so on to one of my staff.’8 Papers were again sent to the DPP who agreed to proceedings for attempting to obtain charitable contributions by fraud. A month went by but then, in April 1917, it was decided ‘after full consideration’ that no action could be taken ‘as it was still feared that the name of HM Queen Alexandra would be dragged into proceedings at Court.’9 A weary Inspector Curry turned his attention to other cases, William Illingworth probably turned to more petty crime and the honour of the Royal family was preserved for another 80 years until the file was opened to the public.10

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7 TNA, MEPO 3/252.
8 TNA, MEPO 3/252.
9 TNA, MEPO 3/252.
10 The papers on this case were closed until 1993, those on the French Relief Fund until the following year.
Appendix 11 - ‘The biggest communal arts project ever attempted’ - War Memorials

The most visible example of charitable fund-raising efforts after the war came in the form of the thousands of war memorials that were constructed. Of close to 6,000 memorial unveilings that took place to commemorate the war over 5,000 had occurred by 1920. The subject of memory and the place within it of physical memorials has recently received much coverage, here I wish only to concentrate on the role of voluntary action in this process and how it was similar or different from activities during the war itself. Most war memorials in Britain, in whatever format, were an expression of local community feelings of indebtedness to the dead. Unlike the war cemeteries overseas they were not planned on a national basis and the government did not prescribe what form they took, hence the ‘traditional’ form of a physical monument was not always adopted. Many took a more utilitarian form, such as a memorial hall, hospital extension or playing field and the choice between the two could sometimes lead to heated local debate.

Makeshift shrines began appearing in the streets during the war itself but the need for some kind of physical memorial was, above all, rooted in the decision not to repatriate the

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1 Alan Borg, War Memorials from Antiquity to the Present, (London, Leo Cooper, 1991), p ix. Mark Connelly notes that war memorials are totally ignored in Paul Fussell’s analysis, firstly because they lack ironic content and secondly because they are definitely not high art. The Great War Memory and Ritual: Commemoration in the City and East London 1916-1939, (Woodbridge, Royal Historical Society and Rochester, Boydell Press, 2002), p 4.
2 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 257.
Partly this was a logistical decision, given the numbers, and was confirmed as official policy by the War Office in 1915. This led to the creation of the Imperial War Graves Commission and the hundreds of war cemeteries that dot the French and Belgian countryside (as well as many other more far-flung locations). The policy was by means popular at the time, the Commission was receiving ninety letters a week on the topic, and ‘involved standing against the explicit and expressed wishes of bereaved relatives. Even more patent was the refusal to budge on the uniformity of headstones.’

This decision has led to highly contrasting views as to its interpretation. One version has suggested that ‘when the British government used regulations to wipe the home front clean of corpses, they unwittingly wiped away something else: the British soldier’s sense of home. The fracture between combatant experience and civilian perception of the war ensured a combatant alienation so profound that the idea of homecoming became impossible.’ This interpretation confuses two separate things. The criticism of the repatriation policy came not from soldiers but from their relatives at home. I am not aware that the troops reacted strongly either way, from the number who wrote about the bodies of their dead comrades or raised temporary memorials to them on the battlefields the evidence would appear to be that they probably favoured the government line. However, the obvious fallacy of the argument is its linkage to the alienation theory. It seems to be a ‘corpse-centric’ approach, crediting the dead with having their views confirmed by the method of disposal of their bodies. It might just be feasible to suggest that non-repatriation made the relatives more alienated from the troops, but not the other way round. Though one can certainly criticise the policy, this needs to be done from the perspective of the living. The principal reasoning behind the policy was an ideological one, the ‘concept of unity of sacrifice ... and that the

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7 Booth, *Postcards from the Trenches*, p 22.
cemeteries were not for use simply in the present, but for all time.\textsuperscript{8} Given this, it is fair to apply hindsight to the decision. Would the scale of loss of the war be as clear, and its memory as deep, if the war cemeteries did not exist and the graves were instead scattered throughout the Commonwealth? I think the answer is an emphatic ‘no’. Having made many visits to them, I am also struck by how they can challenge visitors’ perceptions through the uniformity of the headstones. Many are surprised that officers and men are commemorated in the same way and their graves mingled together, it does not quite tally with some notions of the class nature of the war.\textsuperscript{9} Therefore, to that extent at least, Sir Fabian Ware first Director General of the IWGC was astute as to how posterity would view the decision.

In Britain, local memorials could also act as a unifying symbol though there were also some interesting contrasts with wartime activities. Moriarty confirms that ‘each memorial took its form and meaning by utilizing and adapting conventional patterns of communal organization, and was affected by market forces of materials and labour, as well as artistic practice. Choices were made locally rather than determined from above, yet it is important to emphasize that the memorials rarely challenged official interpretations of the war.’\textsuperscript{10} The funding and choice of most memorials usually fell to local committees intended to be representative of the community as a whole. Writers who have investigated these in some detail note, however, that ‘although public interest at a local level was usually quite strong, those who became involved in the actual decisions about commemorative forms were

\textsuperscript{8} Gregory, \textit{The Last Great War}, p 255.
\textsuperscript{9} Unlike the French war graves, they are also ‘religiously neutral’. Mark Connelly has commented that there was great controversy over the adoption of headstones rather than crosses, ‘The Biggest Single Piece of Work Since the Pharaohs: The work of the Imperial War Graves Commission 1917-39’, lecture given at the National Army Museum, 1 November 2008. This too was partly a utilitarian choice. The headstone shape deflects rainwater and allows much more space for an inscription than would a cross.
\textsuperscript{10} Moriarty, ‘Private Grief and Public Remembrance’, p 126.
usually a small minority drawn from the established social and political elites.'

Though supporting this point Moriarty is careful to note that the committee ‘was rarely free to act in complete autonomy, remaining answerable to the general public whose support ... was vital for both funding and the memorial’s meaning.’ If the public did not agree with the committee, arguments could be protracted such as in Saddleworth, in Lancashire, where the debate over whether to erect a cenotaph or a hospital went on for a decade. It is certainly true that even in those areas where ordinary working people played a major role in running charities during the war, the war memorial committee was often a return to the principles of the great and the good taking the lead, an example of, to some extent, pre-war values reasserting themselves. Nevertheless it was still important for the whole community to be seen to have contributed, no more so than when the memorial was unveiled or opened, when ‘every facet of the community was represented: schoolchildren, choirs, ex-servicemen, the bereaved and the general public were all allocated their places.’ Sometimes a widow or a child might perform the actual ceremony itself though it was more usual for this to be done by a local dignitary or a national figure with local connections. Whichever form of memorial was chosen, the names of those who had died were invariably inscribed in some way. This remains an extremely important issue even today with many individuals and organisations campaigning to ensure that any missing names are added to their local memorial.

11 Gregory, The Last Great War, p 261.
12 Moriarty, ‘Private Grief and Public Remembrance’, p 127. For a description of fund raising and construction of a typical memorial see Lee, Todmorden and the Great War, pp 201-216.
13 Mitchinson, Saddleworth, p 57. They got the cenotaph, an impressive sandstone needle erected on the moors above the town.
14 This was certainly true in Todmorden see Lee, Todmorden and the Great War, pp 201-216.
memorials as no national figures exist (again) and there is no such thing as a typical memorial. Probably the largest, in all senses, was Freemasons’ Hall in London which eventually raised over £1 million, however, the evidence from a range of funds outlined in contemporary local histories and other sources suggest that a figure of £500 each would not be an over-estimate.\(^\text{17}\) If this were multiplied up, just the physical memorials unveiled would give a figure of £3 million, if the 38,000 memorials of all types were included (at perhaps a more modest average cost of £300) this would be over £11 million.

In this country, war memorials are the most tangible artefacts of the First World War today and as Moriarty concludes, without a sense of ‘communal ownership’ the memorial would not fulfil its role in local collective memory. There is little doubt that both at the time and later war memorials achieved this effect; they effectively replaced the individual grave as a site of mourning and reflection. Indeed, over the past decade they have become more treasured and noticed by the public at large.

\(^{17}\) The Hall in the Garden: Freemasons’ Hall and its place in London, (Hersham, Ian Allen, 2006), pp 59-62. Fundraising events included the largest sit-down meal ever served, to 7,000 people at Olympia in August 1925.
Appendix 12 - Analysis of Graduates of the First Three LSE Courses 1907-1909

Of those who attended the class and did not die or retire early:

- 5 (7%) attained the rank of Major
- 19 (25%) Lieutenant Colonel
- 20 (26%) Colonel
- 22 (29%) Brigadier General
- 10 (13%) Major General

This includes temporary appointments.

Of the 10 Major Generals: five came from the 1st class; three from the second and two from the third.

In the following table (c) = commended by name in the Parliamentary report on that course.
<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Staff College Graduate</th>
<th>Rank when Attended Course</th>
<th>Class Date</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>DoB</th>
<th>Highest Rank Achieved or other info</th>
<th>Career Notes</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>02/03/1866</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Served in India for most of war, briefly in France and Italy, but was often ill having contracted meningitis when serving in Boer War where he was also a PoW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirling, Charles</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>01/03/1871</td>
<td>Died 19/11/14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bright, Reginald Arthur</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>25/06/1870</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
<td>Inspector of Territorial Artillery, Northern Group India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byron, John</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>15/10/1872</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
<td>Special appointment at Ministry of Munitions from Dec 1915. Deputy Director War Office from Sept 1916.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wade, Harry Amyas Leigh Herschel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>12/11/1873</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Editor of the <em>Army Review</em> from Jan 1913 to end of war. Served on staff of 1st Army in France 1914. Military Attaché in Copenhagen 1916.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heath, Gerard Moore</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lt-Colonel</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
<td>7/6/1863</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Had served at Siege of Ladysmith and at War Office as QMG under Ward. Chief Engineer for 2nd Corps then 1st Army 1915-16. Engineer in Chief GHQ from Nov 1917.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gwynn, Charles William</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
<td>4/2/1870</td>
<td>Maj Gen Director of Military Artillery with Australian Army during war. Commandant Staff College, Camberley 1926-31.¹</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruggles-Brise, Harold Goodeve</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Grenadier Guards</td>
<td>17/3/1864</td>
<td>Maj Gen Commandant School of Musketry. Military Secretary GHQ from March 1918.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gregson, Henry Guy Fulljames Savage</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>East Kent Regiment</td>
<td>28/10/1872</td>
<td>Colonel Commandant and Chief Instructor RAOC School of Instruction 1924-1929</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Raymond, Harry Elliott</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Yorkshire Regiment</td>
<td>28/3/1868</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marrable, Thomas James</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Lancashire Fusiliers</td>
<td>13/3/1877</td>
<td>Died 28/8/13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bridge, William Cyprian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>South Staffordshire Regiment</td>
<td>28/12/1860</td>
<td>Retired 1908</td>
<td>Translator, Military Operations Dept, War Office in war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waymouth, Charles Sydney Herbert</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Dorsetshire Regiment</td>
<td>15/6/1871</td>
<td>Retired 1912</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knaggs, Morton Herbert</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>North Staffordshire Regiment</td>
<td>6/1/1871</td>
<td>Colonel Assistant Director Army Ordnance Dept at the War Office in war</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Service Corps</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terry, Astley Herbert</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>13/5/1866 Retired 1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denny, William Alfred Charles</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>20/4/1871 Retired 1910 As Lt-Col became the first Director General of Military Intelligence of Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De La Voye, Alexander Edwin</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>16/11/1871 Temp Brig Gen DA&amp;QMG from Feb 1916</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carter, Evan Eyare</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>11/8/1866 Maj Gen Served at War Office as Dep Assistant QMG under Ward. Became Director of Supplies at GHQ 1915 for rest of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McNalty, Charles Edward Irvine</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>19/7/1872 Lt Col. Retired 1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conway-Gordon, Gwynedd</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>18/6/1868 Colonel Deputy Director of Transport from Feb 1916</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taylor, Ernest Fitzwilliam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>16/11/1867 Colonel Assistant Director Supplies and Transport (S&amp;T) from Oct 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtney, Edward Arthur Waldegrave</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>10/10/1868 Colonel Assistant Dir S&amp;T from Oct 1918</td>
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</table>

1 This appointment may also have been connected with Sir Edward Ward who had a strong link with the Canadian forces. He had been an Honorary Colonel of the Canadian Army Service Corps since 1904. Young, Army Service Corps, (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2000), p 23. He was a personal friend of Sam Hughes Canadian Minister for Militia and Defence during the war and even helped organise Sidney and Beatrice Webb's holiday to that country. Percy Noble Papers, Nos. 145, 147 and 494.

2 The Short History of the Royal Army Service Corps (Aldershot, Gale and Polden, 1939) comments that ‘it was largely due to General Carter that the British Army was better fed than any other’ during the First World War (p 59).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Rank Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fisher, Henry Francis Thorhill</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>21/10/1871</td>
<td>Retired 1912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hazelton, Percy Orr</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>2/3/1871</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Director S&amp;T East Africa from Dec 1915 to Sept 1918. Assistant Dir Military Tpt at Woolwich Arsenal from Oct 1918. Dir S&amp;T War Office 1921-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot, Fernand Gustave Eugene</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Jan-July 07 (c)</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>1/2/1873</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woodfield, Anthony Hudson</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>26/6/1867</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Director Ordnance Services, British Army on the Rhine after war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard, Joseph Francis</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>24/10/1871</td>
<td>Temp Col</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deputy Dir Ordnance Services Dec 1916 to Feb 1918</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trimmell, William Duncan Conabeare</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>9/8/1874</td>
<td>Temp Col</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lewis, Charles Henry</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Jan-July 07</td>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>22/10/1861</td>
<td>Retired 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maule, Henry Noel St John</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>26/6/1873</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PoW in Turkey during war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buzzard, Charles Norman</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08 (c)</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>29/4/1874</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Served in Dardanelles, Flanders and Italy. AA&amp;QMG from Dec 1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cunningham-Cunningham, Thomas</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
<td>7/9/1877</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henderson, Edward George</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
<td>1/8/1873</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Commander Guards Brigade 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Regt</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Regt</td>
<td>Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen, Charles Merton</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Cheshire Regiment</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>6/9/1874</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercer, Archibald Ariel</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Dorsetshire Regiment</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>24/2/1875</td>
<td>Died 17/11/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, Eustace Lindsey Haweis</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Royal West Kent Regiment</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>29/2/1872</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payn, William Arthur</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Shropshire Light Infantry</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>2/3/1871</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradbridge, Edward Usher</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Wiltshire Regiment</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>16/4/1872</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig-Brown, Ernest</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Cameron Highlanders</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>23/6/1871</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swabey, Wilfred Spedding</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>25/2/1871</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleeve, Herbert</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>15/9/1870</td>
<td>Retired 1910</td>
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<td>Norrington, Frederic Conrad Swithin</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>15/7/1871</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puckle, John</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>6/10/1869</td>
<td>Lt Col. Died 15/4/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burrard, Harry George</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>18/4/1871</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moores, Charles Frederick</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>9/9/1873</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scott, Edward William Woodward</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>4/12/1872</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Assistant Director S&amp;T from Feb to Nov 1916 when he became AQMG in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberlege, Henry Charles Faithfull</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>28/8/1875</td>
<td>Retired Jan 1914</td>
<td>Chief Instructor at the ASC Training establishment, Aldershot in 1908. On Motor Transport Committee of ASC in 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, Julian Mayne</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>6/8/1872</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>Assistant QMG Aldershot Command in 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie, Kenneth Davidson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>9/8/1873</td>
<td>Temp Lt Col</td>
<td>Deputy Dir S&amp;T from July 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jellicoe, Richard Carey</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>31/5/1875</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>Director of Labour from Aug 1918. Ass Dir S&amp;T Egypt from 1926-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbes, Arthur</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08 (c)</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>29/10/1869</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Principal Ordnance Officer from May 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keddie, Herbert William Graham</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>24/7/1873</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Synge, Mark</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>Lt Col</td>
<td>Was part of the British campaign in Tibet in 1904 under General Younghusband.⁴ ADST in Persia in 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsay-Fairfax-Lucy, Sir Henry William</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Reserve of Officers (since 1891)</td>
<td>Remained on reserve</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hyslop, William C</td>
<td>Lieut-Colonel</td>
<td>Oct 07-Mar 08</td>
<td>Lancashire Royal Field Artillery</td>
<td>Had retired 1905</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Montgomery, Hugh Maude de Fallenberg</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Field Artillery</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>DA&amp;QMG V Corps for 3rd Ypres, remaining to end of war. Elder brother of Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ollivant, John Spencer</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Field Artillery</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
<td>Was at Siege of Ladysmith. During WW1 he commanded the artillery of 35 and later 3 Brigades, part of 3 Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin, John Gardiner</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
<td>Director of Ordnance Services for Australian Army at War Office throughout war. Inspector Army Ordnance Services 1926-8 when he retired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McVittie, Robert Henry</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
<td>Acting Col</td>
<td>Served in Mesopotamia at end of war and after.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ Author of *To Lhassa at Last: An account of the Tibetan expedition of 1904* (as Powell Millington) and *Certain subjects taught to officers at the London School of Economics: Abridged and adapted for study at the Supply and Transport School of Instruction*, (Rawal Pindi, 1909). He died on active service in Persia in 1921 and was highly commended by his commanding officer, Brig Gen W.E.R. Dickson. (V.J. Moharir, *History of the (Indian) Army Service Corps Vol. 3 (1914-1938)*, New Delhi, Sterling, 1982, pp 155-160).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commissioned</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Langton, Arthur Victor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Garrison Artillery</td>
<td>26/2/1880</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Employed by War Trade Intelligence Dept from April 1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Gilbert Claude</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Grenadier Guards</td>
<td>21/4/1879</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Commanded 4th Grenadier Guards in war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready, Felix Fordati</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Berkshire Regiment</td>
<td>16/7/1872</td>
<td>Maj Gen</td>
<td>Adjutant-General in Mesopotamia. Appointed General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland District in 1926, before becoming GOC of the 1st Division at Aldershot Command in 1929 and then Quartermaster-General to the Forces in 1931; retired in 1935.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush, Harry Stebbing</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal West Kent Regiment</td>
<td>7/10/1871</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Chief Medical Storekeeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, David John Jackson</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>North Staffordshire Regiment</td>
<td>27/6/1872</td>
<td>Temp Brig Gen</td>
<td>Had risen from ranks where he'd served for just over 6 years.</td>
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<td>Thomson, Noel Arbuthnot</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Seaforth Highlanders</td>
<td>1/4/1872</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>44th Brigade Commander from April 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Commission Date</td>
<td>Corps/Unit</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grieve, Charles Christopher</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Cameron Highlanders</td>
<td>28/10/1881</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Became Aide-de-Camp to Governor of Tasmania after course. Returned 1911 as Adjutant in Territorials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gifford, Herbert Llewellyn</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Royal Irish Rifles</td>
<td>10/10/1873</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>DAAG from June 1918</td>
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<td>Gillespie, Ernest Carden Freeth</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>7/5/1871</td>
<td>Brig Gen</td>
<td>Deputy Director S&amp;T from June 1916</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standen, Robert Hargrave Fraser</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>2/7/1871</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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5 In Mesopotamia he presided over significant improvements in supply and transport. Young, Army Service Corps, p 160. |
<p>| Christopher, Charles Danby  | Major      | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 1/11/1870  | Lt Col     |                                                                                         |
| Davies, Percy Matcham       | Major      | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 13/6/1873  | Temp Brig Gen | DA&amp;QMG Jan-Nov 1917                                                                                                                                 |
| Bernard, William Kingsmill  | Major      | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 7/9/1872   | Lt Col     |                                                                                         |
| Russell, Henry John         | Major      | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 26/10/1872 | Lt Col     |                                                                                         |
| Duffus, Francis Ferguson    | Major      | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 8/10/1870  | Colonel    | Deputy Director of Supplies from Feb 1916                                                                                             |
| Parsons, Durie              | Captain    | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 29/2/1872  | Lt Col     |                                                                                         |
| Grose, Daniel Charles Evans | Captain    | Oct 08-Mar 09   | Army Service Corps         | 30/3/1874  | Lt Col     |                                                                                         |</p>
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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Airey, Robert Berkeley</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
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<td>Striedinger, Oscar</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>26/4/1875</td>
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<td>Street, Arthur</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
<td>4/2/1873</td>
<td>Retired 1912</td>
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<td>Slaughter, Reginald Joseph</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
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<td>Hamilton, Robert Sydney</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>5/3/1871</td>
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<td>McCheane, Montague William Hiley</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
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<td>Colonel</td>
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<td>Fisher, Charles Alexander</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Army Ordnance Department</td>
<td>8/8/1872</td>
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<td>Lethbridge, Thomas Charles</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Oct 08-Mar 09</td>
<td>Indian Army</td>
<td>28/9/1883</td>
<td>Died 1912</td>
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\(^7\) The unusual difficulties of supply and transport in Salonika are described by Striedinger in a letter quoted in Young, *Army Service Corps*, p 165.

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<tr>
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<td>Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO</td>
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<td>No author</td>
<td><em>Dictionary of National Biography</em></td>
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<td>No author</td>
<td><em>Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920</em></td>
<td>London, HMSO</td>
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*Extracts From the Log Books of East Anglian Schools*

MISC 82 – ITEM 1244  
*The First World War Papers of the Worshipful Company of Vintners*

MISC 177 – ITEM 2700  
*Formation of Citizen Guards*

MISC 351  
*Letters from two men on active service to schoolgirl Lucy Bateson re comforts*

MISC 930  
*Letters to Liverpool schoolgirl re comforts*

MISC 2785  
*Letter of December 1915 from Lieutenant to 7-year-old schoolgirl re comforts*

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CHAR 4/1 TO 4/21  Registers of individual charities
CHAR 4/24  Subject index of the registers
ED 10/73, 74 & 75  Contributions of school children to the war effort: Collections of fruit (73), horse chestnuts (74) and waste paper (75)
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7. Dulwich College War Memorial
8. Football National War Fund
9. Shrewsbury School War Memorial Fund
10. Russian Relief Fund
11. Pharmaceutical Societies War Auxiliary Benevolent Fund
12. Save the Children Fund
13. British Legion (Elephant and Castle Branch)
14-15. British Legion (Fulham Branch)
16. British Legion (Hampstead Branch)
17. British Red Cross War Fund (1925-35)

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Appendix No. 4 – A summary showing the nature and quantity of each class of article provided by Associations
Appendix No. 5 – A general summary of all gifts supplied through the medium of the Director-General of Voluntary Organizations

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<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aldington, Richard</td>
<td><em>Death of a Hero</em></td>
<td>Chatto and Windus</td>
<td>1929</td>
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<td>Allen, Tony</td>
<td><em>Charity Flags and Flag Days 1914-1918</em></td>
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<td>Armitage, F P</td>
<td><em>Leicester 1914-1918; the wartime story of a Midlands town</em></td>
<td>Backus</td>
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<td>Arnold Forster, Hugh Oakley</td>
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<td>Arthur, Max</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Ashworth, Tony</td>
<td><em>Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The live and let live system</em></td>
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<td>Atkinson, Capt J</td>
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<td>Gale and Polden</td>
<td>1908</td>
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<td>Bairnsfather, Bruce</td>
<td>From Mud to Mufti</td>
<td>London, Grant Richards, 1919</td>
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<td>Balfour, Frances Lady</td>
<td>Dr Elsie Inglis</td>
<td>London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1918</td>
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<td>Barnett, Correlli</td>
<td>The Collapse of British Power</td>
<td>London, Eyre Methuen, 1972</td>
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<td>Barthes, Roland</td>
<td>The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies translated by Richard Howard</td>
<td>New York: Hill and Wang, 1979</td>
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<td>Bavin, W D</td>
<td>Swindon’s War Record</td>
<td>Swindon, Drew, 1922</td>
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<td>Beaven, Brad</td>
<td>Leisure, Citizenship and Working-class Men in Britain, 1850-1945</td>
<td>Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005</td>
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<td>Beckett, Ian F.W. and Corvi, Steven</td>
<td>Haig’s Generals, Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2006</td>
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<td>Beckett, Ian F.W.</td>
<td>Home Front 1914-1918: How Britain survived the Great War, Kew, National Archives, 2006</td>
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<td>Latcham, Andrew</td>
<td>‘Journeys End: Ex Servicemen and the State During and After the Great War’, PhD, Oxford, 1997</td>
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**Sound Recordings, Plays and Films**

_The First World War: The Complete Series_
Based on the book by Hew Strachan, narrated and produced by Jonathan Lewis
Wark Clements, 2004

_Forgotten Voices of the Great War: Interviews from the Imperial War Museum Archives_
Random House Audio, 2003

_The Great War_, the full BBC Series
DD Video, 2002

Theatre Workshop, Chilton, Charles and the members of the original cast
_Oh! What a Lovely War_, London, Methuen, 1965

_Oh! What a Lovely War_
Original London Cast recording, Must Close Saturday Records, 2003

_Oh! What a Lovely War_
Directed by Richard Attenborough, Paramount Home Entertainment DVD, 2006
(including documentary on the making of the film)

_The Somme_
By Peter Hart narrated by Tim Pigott-Smith, Orion Audiobooks, 2005