POLICING SYSTEMS

The Planning and Management of 'Policing Behaviour'

in an Urban Environment.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis develops from the viewpoint that the most important structure in any Police Organisation is the local Police Station, directly providing a service to the public.

It proposes that effective and efficient policing of this type is almost impossible without clear theories and definitions of the police service. This must be followed by a clear analysis of the method by which this policing can be achieved, leading to precisely defined systems of policing. These systems must be designed to achieve measurable objectives within the total resources available.

Existing theories of 'demand led' policing problems are then developed by the thesis into the concept of an Extended Reactive Spiral. This involves public demands, the Police System and the external environment. The analysis concludes that to counter the majority of these problems a new police system must be designed. This system must develop and utilise voluntary public assistance as a major preventive resource. Prosocial public behaviour, in the form of 'self policing' is required as a preventive community activity.

Three types of police service are described in ascending levels of effectiveness against the problems of the Extended Reactive Spiral. A new 3RD LEVEL or Geographic policing system is developed in detail and tested in a case study at Brixton Police Station between 1983 and 1986.

It is concluded that there was significant evidence supporting the effectiveness of police officers influencing public demands in hostile, high demand areas. In addition, evidence suggests that the type of police behaviour required for this effect is directly influenced by the design and processes of the police system involved.
CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

1.1. BACKGROUND

The research for the theoretical foundations of this thesis began in 1979 as undergraduate projects, which resulted in two separate yet compatible reviews of modern policing theory and methods (BECKETT 1981, HART 1981). These two projects were then combined into a joint overview of urban policing problems, together with a number of detailed proposals for the development of future policing systems in democratic societies (BECKETT and HART 1982).

In 1982 a joint Metropolitan Police and Surrey Constabulary research project was formed called 'Neighbourhood Policing'. This project was directly based on the original research of BECKETT and HART and was intended to evaluate the practical results of the proposed development for policing systems. In 1985, the basic theoretical framework and organisational police system developed by this research was adopted by the Metropolitan Police for incremental forcewide implementation over a number of years. The Surrey Constabulary began forcewide implementation in 1987 after their analysis of the research project.

This thesis deals with a small part of the total research project. It concentrates on the planning, implementation, monitoring and maintenance of everyday policing activities at individual police stations. The thesis is deliberately biased towards a bottom up approach, in the analysis, planning and research. It was considered that this type of approach and area of research had been neglected in previous work and that when combined with existing 'top down' projects a more balanced perspective would emerge.

1.2. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

There were three major objectives in the research described. Each objective was linked to the previous objectives, using the knowledge gained as a foundation for developing the next level of research;
(i) The validation of the effects on police demands caused by the REACTIVE SPIRAL (HART 1981).

(ii) To develop and obtain evidence in support of an EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL, which involved specific elements within the Environment and the Police System.

(iii) To develop and test an operational, planning and management Police System appropriate for the specific environment and public demands for policing services.

Eventually it is hoped to produce an 'Expert' system capable of substantially reducing the number of errors made in everyday policing activities. But at the present time, given the very limited amount of valid and reliable research evidence, the best that can be developed are practical guidelines and a planning framework which indicates the most appropriate type of 'Police System' suited to the particular problems of each police station.

However, it is intended by this thesis to develop a valid, if basic, operational system which assists police managers in both the short and long term to develop the efficiency and effectiveness of policing for the defined geographical area covered by their police station.

1.3. ORGANISATION OF THESIS
Chapter Two describes the problems of policing, particularly within the External Environment, the broad organisation of Police Forces and the specific delivery of police services by the local Police Station. In addition, the Reactive Spiral is developed, using these data, into the Extended Reactive Spiral. This new Spiral includes the Environment and the Police System in its analysis of the problem situation.
Chapter Three provides a theoretical overview of specific policing theories and introduces the concept of Policing Behaviour as Helping or Prosocial behaviour. Proposals are then made as to how three LEVELS of Policing Systems could be implemented and measured. It is suggested that areas with high demands for police services and the highest Potential for increasing demands, required a 3RD LEVEL or Geographical Policing Systems. Only this System, it is argued, has the potential to affect the processes of the Reactive Spiral, by involving the public in everyday policing activities.

Chapter Four is the Pre Test analysis of Brixton Police Station, chosen as the case study for the thesis. This analysis concludes that both the environment and the existing police system were in decay. Significant evidence for the effects of the Reactive Spiral is described, as is the inability of the existing police system to affect its processes. Evidence for the existence of an Extended Reactive Spiral is also described.

Chapter Five lists the structure for a Geographical or 3RD LEVEL policing system, implemented at Brixton after the Pre-Test analysis. The goals and objectives of this system are explained, together with a description of the organisational elements, functions and processes required to achieve them.

Chapter Six notes the absence of a planning strategy and evaluation framework for operational policing at the 'point of service' to the public. Linked to the Geographical Policing System, an optimal behavioural sequence for this service is proposed. Strategy and tactics of the street operations within the system are also co-ordinated within a descriptive framework. The overall process has been called Directed Patrolling.
Chapter Seven is the Post-Test analysis of Brixton Police Station after a three year implementation and development period. It proposes that a new Geographical policing system had been successfully achieved with distinct improvements to the police structure, organisation and behaviour. Unexpectedly there was also evidence of beneficial changes in the external environment, particularly public behaviour. Evidence for the Reactive and Extended Reactive Spiral being affected by these changes is also considered.

Chapter Eight discusses other evaluations of the Project and relates them to this thesis. In addition, the Extended Reactive Spiral is considered in some detail, together with possible implications. A number of options for future development are then discussed.

Chapter Nine considers the original thesis objectives and concludes that the existence of the Reactive Spiral and Extended Spiral as powerful influences on policing have been supported by the evidence described. It also suggests that the development of Policing LEVELS, together with their supporting frameworks have been validated. This particular achievement is suggested to be of major importance and of significant practical assistance to the development and effectiveness of British Policing.
CHAPTER TWO

2. THE ANALYSIS

2.1. THE PROBLEM OF 'POLICING'

'Policing' is the name given to a social system which exists in one form or another in all social groups and societies. Sometimes the system will be informal, imposed by peers and high status individuals in a group, providing a form of 'self policing'. Alternatively, it can be a formal, organised and professional activity, restricted to certain members of a society, such as police officers.

Exactly what 'policing' is and the methods by which it attains its objectives, forms a major part of this study, but for the moment it is sufficient to propose that 'policing' is a very complex and little understood social behaviour.

This complexity is illustrated by the question, what do police officers actually do? Until 'policing behaviour' can be classified or accurately described it is very difficult to decide on the best ways of doing police work, or the types of activities of which police should do more or less. Even more importantly, if the public are being required to 'self police', what exactly, in quantifiable behavioural terms, does this mean?

These types of questions and lack of understanding were one of the major reasons for the adoption of 'systems' techniques and methodologies in this particular study. A number of different sciences and disciplines all have claim to knowledge about policing. Unfortunately, due to differing methods, concepts, rules for validity and reliability etc., it is very difficult to combine their knowledge into an effective interdisciplinary approach to the problems of policing.
However, the systems approach to analysis and problem solving appeared to offer a solution to this dilemma (ACKOFF 1974). Once it is accepted that policing is an important social system which exists and interacts with numerous other social systems, then systems methodology allows a basic theoretical framework to be developed, acting as a co-ordinator and arbitrator of all the various interdisciplinary data which can be input into the framework. Once this framework has been developed, the same methodology can assist in planning the future development of a policing system.

Like all human systems, policing has to be an Open System, interacting with a number of other compatible social processes to produce a measurable output which can then be used to gauge if the goals of the police system have been achieved.

It has always been very difficult to provide measures showing the 'success' or 'failure' of a particular policing strategy, or even general, everyday policing. Classified and reported crime figures are unfortunately still used almost exclusively as police performance measures, despite their well known inadequacy and openness to misleading interpretations.

When these types of performance measures are related to the lack of evidence for direct police effects on crime and the expectations of the public, where up to 75% of operational demands on police can be of a service nature, then the severe limitations of crime performance measures become obvious.

It is suggested that a broader concept in police performance measures is required. Such a concept should include the wide range of services and tasks which the police can reasonably be expected to achieve, within their statutory and practical limitations.
However, before any such decisions can be made regarding 'success', we have to decide exactly what the goals of a 'policing system' are, and for this we have to define the problems. The difficulties of applying or finding a well supported theory of policing have already been described, but what exactly are the practical, operational problems faced by today's modern police services?

During the period 1980 to 1986 an in-depth analysis was undertaken of two police services in a joint Metropolitan and Surrey Constabulary Project. This study was intended to introduce experimental policing systems to a number of police stations and evaluate their effects. In order to achieve this type of implementation it was essential to analyse the overall police organisations and their workings at the Macro level as well as the detailed workings of police stations at the Micro level.

From this extensive study, it is now possible to define with some accuracy a 'PROBLEM SITUATION' at the Macro or total organisational level and at the Micro, day-to-day police station level.

2 2. THE PROBLEM SITUATION
The study revealed that there are at least three broad areas of problems faced by today's police.

The first is the external environment, outside the police service, but an area in which police are expected to provide certain services and exert a level of control or influence.

The second is the Macro, total police organisation, particularly the highest levels of planning, control and 'support' services provided by the Headquarters Departments, senior officers and Force Policy.
The third is the Micro, actual police station and its operational street officers who are the genuine 'front line' of the total police service.

The first problem area that will be considered is the external environment at the Macro level:

### THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

#### 2.3.1 THE REACTIVE SPIRAL

The major problem of present day policing system has been identified as the **REACTIVE SPIRAL** (HART 1981). This is where increasing demands for reactive police services on limited police resources effectively reduce resources applied to preventive services. It has been discovered that in these types of public service, reactive services in isolation have little preventive effect on demands and eventually the whole police system decays into a pure reactive (fire brigade) service.

Without the restraint of police preventive services, crime and conflict increase to unacceptable levels and the demands on police spiral out of control.

In this context, crime is defined as; "Illegal criminal acts against individuals, groups or property".

Conflict is defined as; "Degrees of alienation or hostility towards individuals or groups".

The fact that police services are perceived as 'free' (i.e. no immediate cost when used) just enhances the speed of police system decay. Interestingly, it has been found that improvements in the quality of reactive services to the public
can also increase the rate of system decay, as more people are encouraged to use the improved service without cost to themselves. These particular processes are not unique to policing and can be found in other areas, particularly the Health Service.

FIG. 2.1
This type of police system decay, which was well supported by all the Project findings, is perceived by the public to have a major detrimental effect on their quality of life. Although it has been found that other major processes and events in the environment, not under police influence, are also involved the public perceive the police as the major culprit for the decay. Effectively, this means that public satisfaction with police declines considerably as their needs and expectations are not fulfilled.

In isolation, police reactive services can never satisfy public needs and expectations. The public require problems to be anticipated and prevented wherever possible. Otherwise, their quality of life is significantly reduced and they begin to perceive themselves as helpless against the forces in their environment (i.e. Learned Helplessness). Police also become ineffective; dealing only with incidents after the damage or injury has been caused and can also be affected by a form of Learned Helplessness. i.e. unable to effect change (SELIGMAN 1976).

In the face of such obvious police helplessness, the public begin to increasingly lose confidence in their own ability to affect the environment. They see themselves as totally helpless against the destructive crime and conflict influences around them. The public tend to become 'externally directed' as opposed to 'internally directed', then the locus of control (LEFCART 1976) begins to change to the passive and accepting 'externally directed'.

This withdrawal and acceptance affects public intervention in incidents and reduces levels of pro-social behaviour (WISPE 1972) between individuals in the community (i.e. help each other).
Unfortunately, helping others who are victims of crime or conflict is now perceived as being dangerous and foolhardy. A 'seige mentality' begins to develop and there is a narrowing of neighbourhood and territory down to the actual premises or even room occupied by each individual.

2. 3.2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL
Against this background of reducing public satisfaction and withdrawal from public activities there may well be rising hostility against the police by the public, due to their inability to solve the problem of rising crime and conflict. On the streets there will now be virtually no public restraints against crime and conflict behaviour. Demands for police reactive services will spiral far above those that can be dealt with effectively by available resources. This process is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. and identified as the ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL. The diagram illustrates some of its interactions with the REACTIVE SPIRAL.

Historically, there have been three public reactions to this situation:–

(i) Apathy and acceptance of random crime and conflict.

(ii) Formation of vigilante groups to fight back.

(iii) Be taken over by organised crime groups or gangs who organise the crime and conflict for profit.

2.3.3. ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL

In addition to the Macro problems described above, there are numerous processes which require to be understood in each small geographical area serviced by a police station at Micro level. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the Environmental Potential of each distinctive area.

In essence this means, is the area being policed one which supports and encourages crime and conflict? There is increasing evidence that the physical structure of an area
and the people in it have more influence over the public's quality of life, than police can ever have. High density public housing estates and the effects of organised drug crime in symbolic locations are examples of these influences.

Each district, neighbourhood or identifiable geographical location within a police station area has to be carefully evaluated for its potential regarding the expansion or growth of crime and conflict in three major dimensions:-

1. Physical; structures in the environment which reduce or encourage crime and conflict.

2. Social and Cultural; demographic features of the population and their cultural behaviour which affect crime and conflict.

3. Psychological; the attitudes and perceptions of the people in the environment which influence changes in their behaviour towards crime and conflict such as their locus of control.

It is suggested that certain areas can be classified as HOSTILE, with a high potential for crime and conflict, when contrasted with more stable SUPPORTIVE areas.

The diagram Fig.2.3 illustrates this concept, where 'potential' rises as public hostility to police rise. In practical terms this can be calculated by a number of measures at the extremes of HOSTILE and SUPPORTIVE.

Areas classified as HOSTILE are identified by high levels of street crime and violence, particularly against police or other figures of authority. SUPPORTIVE areas are active in their liaison with police, particularly in their implementation of Neighbourhood Watch and other self help schemes. Street crimes will also be proportionately lower.
2.4. **THE MACRO: POLICE ORGANISATION**

The Police Service as a whole has to be organised to deliver services and influence these types of environment, otherwise individual successes and efforts by small parts of the organisation will be completely ineffective.
In the Project, the organisational analysis at the Macro level was divided into three areas of major importance; the organisational structure, demands and resources, both linked by the third area of information systems.

2. 4.1 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.
The Police have traditionally, since their creation, been organised as a simple bureaucratic, hierarchical and autocratic structure. They have limited, time consuming, rigid work practices and procedures, responding slowly, if at all, to external and internal feedback regarding problems and difficulties.

It would be fair to say that it usually requires a major governmental investigation or legislation (i.e. The Scarman Enquiry 1981 and The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 1986) before significant changes take place. In short, the structure is very close to a classical, rigid, Closed System.

This anomaly, when viewed against the stated requirement for an Open System structure, is probably due in part to the simplistic and almost universal view of policing, as a relatively straightforward law enforcement type task. The Project data indicated that not only was this view held outside the Police Service but was also held by a large majority of serving police officers, including those at senior rank.

It is suggested that in reality, 'policing' is a very complex and uncertain activity with no clearly agreed goals or priorities. This study considers that policing is one of the most complex and demanding tasks that exists today, particularly when viewed at the overall planning and policy levels.
With such a simple, closed, hierarchical organisational structure it is essential that all levels, particularly the first operational street level, are under strict control and behave exactly as prescribed, otherwise the whole structure becomes unstable and decays.

Unfortunately, evidence gathered by the Project clearly indicated that even immediate supervisors of patrolling Constables were unable to control, monitor or evaluate workload and work activities of individuals or large groups.

Clearly the existing Police Organisational Structure was unsuited to the reality of providing police services to a complex, changing and fast moving external environment.

The structure of an organisation has to be very closely linked into its goals and priorities. Traditionally, police forces have stated their major goal as prevention. In effect they are organised with a strong reactive bias, responding to events after they have occurred.

Eventually this type of bias has been shown to reduce the Police Service to one of fast response and recording of the incident with little, if any, other type of police service provided.

Another phenomenon of the police organisation is the rapid development of Functional teams or squads. Once again this is influenced by the simplistic perception of policing tasks. It is also true that teams with a single narrow objective (i.e. Drugs, Robberies etc.) can in the short term produce evidence of 'success'. However, it has also been found that this type of success is very questionable in the
long term and difficult to maintain; it also ignores the interrelated nature of events in the environment and may produce unintended, even more detrimental side effects in other areas of policing (e.g. Prohibition in the United States).

Inevitably, this increasing specialisation of functions strengthens the existing bias of decision making towards centralisation, taking more and more authority away from Police Stations and their operational commanders. In turn this strengthens the power of Functional Teams and their authority to create even more Functional Teams.

Unfortunately, due to the Closed Organisational Structure, the priorities of these teams and even the functions selected as priorities are internal police perceptions and not necessarily those causing most concern to the public.

In summary, the police organisational structure is simplistic, rigid, closed, reactive, functionally orientated with increasing bias towards centralisation of decision making.

2. 4.2 **DEMANDS AND RESOURCES**

Before an organisation like the police can decide exactly how to deploy and invest its resources, it must be understood that a large number of these decisions have already been made outside the police organisation.

First, changes in officers conditions of work, hours of work, recompense for overtime etc., have all effectively reduced the number of man hours available to the service, and continue to do so.
Next, legislation prescribing the employment and deployment of officers, such as Custody Sergeants in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill 1986, effectively introduce restraints on deployment. Often these impositions will be implemented without effective consultation of any kind. A basic finding was that all new legislation costs extra resources to implement and maintain, thus removing more and more decision making about resources from the public service.

In addition, the Home Office will directly impose new functional requirements on police forces in a similar manner, i.e. Royalty and Diplomatic Protection, Jury Protection, Joint Drug Squads etc.

It is also apparent that although new external resource demands will continue to be imposed, additional resources currently being provided to the police will not be sufficient even to keep pace with resource deductions caused by improvements in conditions of work.

Eventually, the police service will be left with a number of resources to deploy independently. The deployment of these resources will be significantly influenced by the structure and priorities of the organisation as previously described. It was found that, in reality, the priorities for allocation were as follows:-

(1) The centralised authority structures and administration (Headquarters Departments).

(2) Functional Teams and Squads (Central then Divisional).
(3) General Administration of Police Stations.

(4) Police Reactive services at Police Stations.

(5) Preventive Police Services.

The results of these types of resource priorities were found to effectively feed the reactive spiral and increase the decay effect on police services and organisational structure.

It is important to understand in this analysis that police are in effect at the bottom of any environmental sequence of events and are directly affected by almost every problem in the environment or a community. Any reduction of service by other bodies such as Social Services, National/Mental Health Services etc., which cause problems in the environment, will eventually involve police and subsequently increase demands on the police service.

As an example of this process, the poorer, more deprived and alienated a particular area is reduced to, the greater will be the initial demands on police. Unhappily, a reduction in demands on police by one of these types of areas may be achieved by it reaching one of the almost irreversible conditions previously described as, apathy, vigilantes or organised crime.

It is suggested however, that the cost of regaining one of these areas or policing the ensuing riot far exceeds the estimated costs of adequate initial public resources.
In summary, police resources are actually significantly less than would appear from basic assumptions on force manpower levels and even the deployment of residual manpower and resources after abstraction would appear inappropriate to reduce the effect of the Reactive Spiral on police services.

2.4.3 INFORMATION SYSTEM

In 1980 when the project first began to analyse the effectiveness of police information systems, it found that efficient information systems, of any kind, were virtually non-existent within the police system, or between the police and public.

As a result, information that was available, tended to be treated as a scarce commodity and the personal property of the individual or small group. This information would not be divulged or shared with other police officers.

Centrally, in the Headquarters Departments there was some research evidence available about policing methods and processes. This had been obtained by in-house research or by Home Office Departments. Unfortunately, this type of data existed as isolated sets of facts, not linked to other research and not stored in an easily accessible data bank, which limited its operational credibility to police officers.

Many officers, including senior officers, reacted to this overall situation by developing a strong cultural resistance to using data or information for decision or planning purposes, even when it was available. Consequently, policy decisions were being made at the highest levels with scant regard for relevant data or research findings in that area.
In summary, the police organisation was unable to analyse its own problems, identify exactly how its resources were being deployed, or if they were successful. Even if it became aware of problems, the organisation was very unlikely to use any kind of significant data to plan solutions.

The deficiency of the police information systems was considered to be a major contribution to all of the problems described in this study.

2.5. **THE MICRO: POLICE STATION**

The project considered that the individual police station was the most important, fundamental unit of organisational structure in the whole policing system. Therefore, any major faults or problems in the police station system would directly affect the police service provided to the public.

Analysis at this Micro level was again divided into the three areas of major importance; the organisational structure, demands and resources, both linked by the third area of information systems.

2.5.1 **ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE**

Police Stations are the first major level of the police system. They act as service centres for a defined geographical area. The environment they are designed to service is always biased towards instability, depending on the police as a major stabilising and regulating influence.

It was accepted that this police influence was a complex, varied requirement, with conflicting priorities and demands generated by the environment. The structure and organisation of each police station was found to be the major influence on police effectiveness.
Experience and data in other service organisations, public and commercial, have indicated that service provision in complex environments are most effectively provided by 'organic' type of organisational structures (BURNS AND STALKER 1976). The more unstable the environment, the more stable and skilled the police organisation has to be. Geographically based, stable teams with a mixture of specialists and generalists, high autonomy at low levels, clear policy objectives and agreed best operating practices, would appear to be the minimum requirements for effective service provision. In effect, an open system is required (KATZ and KAHN 1978).

The worst type of performance appear to be provided by bureaucratic systems with high levels of functional divisions, rigid operating practices allowing little autonomy, low levels of individual skills and a high turnover of staff.

However, what was actually found at police stations can perhaps best be described as 'bureaucratic anarchy'. The police stations were clearly planned and organised as traditional bureaucracies, with a large number of functional splits in almost every aspect of the police organisation. Decisions and policy were always vested to the highest rank possible, who would then lay down precise instructions and directions for every eventuality. In order to ensure these directions were followed, the highest levels of individual behaviour were prescribed, supported by a rigid discipline code, enforcing supervisors and a painstaking complaint investigation system. However, in effect, none of this structure was able to influence the actual working practices of the police station.
In addition, perhaps due to the complexity of the police task and its existing bias towards narrow functional discussions in the organisation, almost every new problem would be answered by even more functional splits and reorganisation. In effect, functional division and specialisation had become a cultural norm. Virtually the only method of responding to any problem, internal or external, was by designating a special team or 'squad' to become responsible.

An example of this procedure is the division of functions between the C.I.D. and the Uniform Branch. Both sections maintained the planned division with tenacity and then further sub-divided internally. In the C.I.D. work tended to be split into various categories such as robbery, burglary and murder squads, all tending to exist in isolation. However, these officers were not as isolated as uniform officers on different shifts or reliefs. The most extreme example of isolation was between those uniform officers providing response policing and those specialising as Home Beat or Community Officers.

Virtually the only section of the police station that was forced to retain a generalist approach, consisted of uniform street patrol officers who provided the first response to all public requests for police assistance. It was clear that this particular area of policing was the most difficult and dangerous, requiring a high level of skill and ability.

Unfortunately these officers were invariably the newest, least skilled and experienced; the most skilled and experienced having been transferred to specialist functions. Up to 35% of a police station's total personnel could be changed in a twelve month period with the majority of this change taking place amongst the uniform street patrol officers. Supervisors, from
Inspectors and above, were often subjected to even higher levels of turnover with over 50% changes being recorded in a number of years.

Up to this point, the organisation had maintained its planned bureaucratic structure, perhaps encouraging functional divisions to an unusual degree, but still recognisable as a traditional bureaucracy.

It is important that any organisational structure, particularly a bureaucracy with its internal rigidity, should clearly understand its tasks and objectives otherwise it will be impossible to deliver an effective service. An analysis of the actual work and demands on the police station, revealed that an average 75% - 85% of police work was of a non-crime service nature.

However, the majority of the functional divisions inside the police stations were crime related, these had the highest status and most skilled personnel. In addition, the organisational rewards and the training provided by the police were strongly biased towards crime and law enforcement, geared towards the provision of response service and reaction to crimes after they had occurred. There was a low priority and few resources to reduce or prevent reactive demands, or improve police services in the majority of service demands. Those types of demands were considered a burden and a nuisance; 'real police work' was law enforcement.

In effect, the police station dedicated the majority of their resources and were biased functionally and culturally towards tasks that were less than 25% of its total demands.
The next problem discovered was the planned bureaucratic and management control of the police station. On careful analysis, it was found that whilst the illusion of the organisation and management control was maintained as an outward facade by all of the people working at the police station, the day to day working practices were very different.

Although supervision and control at the various levels of all the separate functions was planned to be very tight this was, in reality, almost impossible. The very nature of policing where officers operate as virtually independent groups or individuals outside the police station, without performance measures or planned workloads, results in no effective supervision for even the most junior or inefficient officers.

Prescribed work practices were cumbersome and usually inappropriate or unnecessary in police work, where simple procedures and high levels of personal skill were required. As a result rules had to be ignored or adapted in order to cope with the peak time demands on each officer. The police station administration systems were so inefficient that once an incident required further action the work generated was out of all proportion to the original incident. Often the majority of this work and inconvenience would fall on the officer who first reported or dealt with the demand. Therefore, the majority of demands had to be dealt with and finished by the initial officer, at the scene of an incident, within a very short time period, ignoring further actions and tasks laid down as being required.
Supervisors understood this problem and accepted short cuts and lack of compliance until a problem arose. In these circumstances officers were investigated, reported and disciplined for non-compliance. These practices introduced dual standards of 'do it but don't get caught' which were accepted and even encouraged by supervisory officers. It must be emphasised that this non-compliance was in relation to instructions that were clearly inappropriate and, in practice, not possible to maintain.

These practices further reduced the effectiveness of supervisors and managers, even when they were present and able to exert direct control. Supervisors became reliant on the good will and agreement of the officers in their charge, with regard to the priorities and manner in which each functional team would work.

In reality, these conditions allowed no effective control or supervision to take place, allowing individuals or groups of officers to apply their own interpretation of control or local instructions, or even decide to ignore them completely, with little chance of detection.

Although the potential for corruption and serious misconduct was very high, little or no evidence was discovered. Despite the inappropriate organisational structure and ineffective organisational system, evidence of officers motivation and dedication to be good police officers and serve the public was overwhelming (DAVIS 1985). However, due to the narrow functional divisions and preference for law enforcement, officers at a police station inevitably changed and frustrated any concerted long term policing strategy directed at anything other than simple law enforcement.
In effect the organisational structure at a police station actually operated closer to anarchy rather than the bureaucratic system it was supposed to be. Before any alternative policing objectives or methods could be introduced, it was clear that a radically different organisational structure would have to be implemented that made policing into an open system rather than a closed, bureaucratic type structure.

2. 5.2. RESOURCES
There are three major types of resources available to a police station. The first two are tangible, relatively easy to measure and utilise, but do not have the growth potential of the third, less tangible resource.

2. 5.2.1 Physical Resources
The first tangible resources are the buildings or accommodation available at the police station and the equipment provided to the station and the individuals who deliver the police service.

Many of the police stations were found to be old, in dilapidated condition, with very limited facilities. They were totally inadequate to deal with the public coming to the police station and to service the police officers or civilians based at each station. Little investigation had been made into the facilities required and the best methods of co-ordinating these requirements. 'Improvements' were invariably added ad hoc and at the expense of some other vital facility.
Police stations constructed prior to the 1950s were always totally inadequate, too small, overcrowded and noisy leading to very stressful working conditions as they were swamped by the volume of work they were expected to carry out. Newer police stations had better facilities, but were still usually insufficient and were not designed to provide the best service to the public or sufficient resources for officers at the station.

In summary, no police station examined by the project could be considered adequate to deliver a police service, even in the best possible conditions; All were completely overwhelmed by the volume of use they were subjected to.

Other equipment, such as cars, radios etc., were a mixture of the best and the worst, but almost always in the wrong quantities and in the wrong places. Some equipment was of a very high standard, but totally inadequate for the volume of work. Other equipment although plentiful, was completely inappropriate for the type of work involved and either could not be used or spent most of its time being maintained.

Basically, the police stations were found to be low technology structures, dependent on people and manual systems in almost every aspect of their work. There had been little effective investment in suitable available technology,
which could have significantly improved working conditions and effectiveness. In support of this finding it has been established that on average over 85% of total police expenditure is on wages. The remaining 15% includes all new equipment, property and maintenance of existing equipment resources. In addition inefficient administration systems were once again responsible for inefficient distribution, uses and maintenance of all equipment. There was almost no effective resource planning and evaluation for those types of resources.

2 5.2.2. Human Resources
The next major tangible resource, as illustrated above, were the human resources of the people, police and civilian support staff, based at the police station. These type of human resources can be examined in two ways, the total number of people available and the average quality or effectiveness of each individual in that total.

At the time of the analysis there was no accepted manpower formula for estimating the total manpower required by each police station, or even the requirements for each type of individual police service. Due to the organisational bias towards functional specialisation and the cultural bias towards law
enforcement, manpower was not distributed according to actual demands. The first line of police response service was always the least important and most depleted of manpower. The result in a small proportion of uniform officers actually available for uniform street patrol duties.

In contrast, squads and teams were better resourced, but unable to deal with the reactive demand for their services. These demands were completely unhindered by a kind of preventive police resources at the operational street level and grew exactly as described by the Reactive Spiral, strongly supporting the original hypothesis.

When the total police station manpower was compared to the total station demands, a different picture emerged. Stations which could be considered to have low or medium levels of demands, often had sufficient resources. Had they deployed within a different structure, they could have met demands and invested in preventive strategies. If inefficient administration systems were improved as well, demands could have been managed by the available human resources.

However, stations which had high levels of demands, often inner city areas, were well below the minimum manpower required to deal with the demands. These calculations were based on a formula developed and verified for
this project. Unfortunately, it has long been known that inner city deprived areas are the areas that are most dependent on police services; failure of police service often contribute to the most serious consequences for that area and surrounding areas. Riots are only one of the most obvious examples of those consequences.

Although these facts were uncovered by the analyses, the perception of every police officer interviewed at every police stations, regardless of whether it was a high or low demand station, was that nothing could be achieved until more manpower was provided. Once again lack of factual information had facilitated another cultural belief that was not always correct.

It was also found that once manpower had been allocated it was deployed in relation to administrative convenience or habit. Little or no attempt was made to match the levels of resource each day to the peaks and troughs of demands. Internal working practices and culture strongly resisted variations from established shift times, or working at an earlier or later time than their team or shift colleagues. This resulted in roughly the same low number of officers being on duty at all periods of the working day, regardless of variations in demands.
Without doubt, the narrow functional structure and the cultural bias of the police personnel influenced their quality and effectiveness. Attempts to maintain a rigid, rank obsessed, bureaucracy considerably reduced the potential of the lowest ranks who could always find refuge in the rules when questioned regarding their inactivity. Analysis of these officers' working days revealed that a majority had considerable periods of time in which no useful activity or achievement could be discovered.

Many organisations rely on training to enhance and develop the potential of their workforce. However, despite an extensive and expensive commitment to training, with training abstractions sometimes as high as 20%, training was not directed at this objective. The majority of training was information based on law enforcement and internal procedures, with a small amount of skills training and almost no personal development or interpersonal training. It must be remembered at this point that policing is very much a people service, using people to provide a service to people. But no effective training supported this reality until after the Scarman Enquiry in 1982.

Eventually, all of these pressures, organisational and environmental, resulted in a reasonably predictable average police officer's profile, which was analysed as follows.
Individual officers used a small number of constructs (KELLY 1955) to evaluate a variety of situations and make decisions on their actions. Most of these constructs were based on law enforcement and control (CEMAL 1986). Situations outside these constructs were to be avoided until control was possible. There was a bias towards group consensus amongst fellow officers and group action, as opposed to individual interventions and responsibility.

The majority of officers, who worked within a time based structure of response policing or specialist functions, were significantly biased towards short term, law enforcement solutions to the majority of problems. These officer's constructs emphasised quick results and tangible outcomes rather than long term solutions. They perceived the 'ideal' state as Law Enforcement, then peace keeping in a positive sense, with providing a non crime service as the lowest priority. Most situations were evaluated in this way. Officers were also found to be rigid and resistant to change as a method of dealing with stress and conflict in their work. Their actual observed behaviour on the street supported these findings.

A minority of officers, such as Home Beat and Community Officers who worked within a geographical structure of a beat with multiple
objectives, were significantly different. Unlike their time based colleagues, they had wider construct systems, and an ability to consider long term strategies and non-law enforcement solutions. Once again these profiles were supported by their actual behaviour on the streets.

This finding helped to support the hypothesis that the organisational structure and reinforcement has one of the greatest potentials for influencing behaviour changes in operational police officers.

All the officers at the police stations were found to be experiencing high levels of stress. They attributed a major part of this stress to the organisation. This was despite the more obvious dangers and difficulties in the external street environment. It was also discovered that police officers use 'sensation seeking. (ZUCKERMAN 1979) as a method of relieving stress (GODDARD 1984). Police work by its very nature offers many opportunities for excitement and taking risks.

This type of coping mechanism is particularly dangerous in a police service. Sensation seeking can manifest itself in driving unnecessarily fast or dangerously to calls for police assistance. Other examples are where Police enjoy the physical sensation of conflict and violence, therefore manipulating situations for maximum excitement rather than calmness and conflict reduction.
However, these findings must be balanced by other evidence. Independent studies (DAVIS 1985) on the quality of police manpower, consistently recognised its high quality and wasted potential. But these resources were not exploited by the organisation due to the absence of effective resource planning within a long term preventive strategy.

2. 5.2.3. Public Resources

The third area of resources is one of the most difficult to utilise, although possibly the one with the most potential. In essence it is the resource of the public and all other agencies outside the police station.

For centuries 'policing' in Britain has remained the responsibility of each individual citizen. All citizens have an obligation to obey the laws and to take action if they discover infringements by another citizen. Members of the public even have limited powers of arrest to assist and protect them in this function. This system of policing has allowed a high level of personal freedom and a measure of group control over society's quality of life, particularly the acceptable levels of crime and conflict.

Within the past two hundred years modern Democratic Policing Systems, using professional police officers, have developed to enhance and maintain this ancient policing system (ALDERSON 1978).
In Britain, professional Police Officers are answerable to the State and its laws, not the government in power if it attempts to make directions outside the existing laws of the State. This contrasts with Continental systems of policing, where police are direct agents of the government in power. British police are only ordinary citizens with a small number of additional powers, balanced by enhanced obligations to the state. The British public retains the obligation to 'police' themselves and assist professional police in their lawful duties.

This dependency on the public can be seen in most major crises, when the police will first call on public volunteers, such as Special Constables, to assist them in preference to obtaining the support of the Armed Services. The office of Special Constable is in fact far older than that of the modern professional Constable.

Leaving aside for a moment the political and philosophical aspects of this concept of policing, it is argued that in theory it has the potential for a superior human system. Concentrating on the design of the system, it would appear that it is very economical and yet very effective if maintained at a reasonable level of efficiency.

The majority of people in this human system identify with the individual personal goals involved and accept the obligations required.
A very small number of more powerful individuals assist the majority with the more difficult and skilful tasks involved, but the major part of the routine work involved is accomplished by the majority outside this group. Even the additional powers of the minority group are under majority control in the long term. Their consent is required for the maintenance, increase or reduction in the minority's enhanced power level.

This system is an open system allowing personal development and system growth assisted by appropriate positive and negative reinforcers. The system is also economical requiring a very small number of professional individuals with moderate extra powers, but still capable of attaining a high level of achievement.

Other models of policing are more closed, using a larger minority professional group who maintain extensive restrictions on individual behaviour. This group, usually a state police, act as direct agents of the government in power and its personal interpretation of the restrictions required. The minority control group require more extensive powers over the majority and are far less responsive to majority control. Positive reinforcement and development are restricted in this model which also requires increasing amounts of negative restrictions and personnel to enforce them.
The implications of the open system of policing for a police station are clear. Resource planning must recognise and include the public as a major resource in achieving police objectives. Without this recognition and actual involvement of the public, there would never be sufficient police resources to cope with the total police task.

What was actually found was that the public, including supportive agencies and bodies were almost totally excluded from any real input into policing. Even the most obvious example of voluntary public involvement, the Special Constables, were viewed with disdain and very effectively excluded from any real involvement in work at the police station. Consequently, numbers were always low and there were consistent complaints from the police about the quality of those Special Constables who stayed.

It appeared that the police, over the years, had taken their role as professional police too literally. They had convinced themselves and the public, that anything involving crime or conflict was the sole responsibility of the police. The public were only too willing to relinquish their own responsibility and increasingly complain about police inadequacy. The potential for growth of public demands on police in these circumstances was totally beyond existing or potential police resources. It was apparent that at the inner city police stations with the highest demands, this process was well advanced.
In summary, there was no resource planning or an understanding of the requirements of resource management at any of the police stations.

2.5.3. **INFORMATION SYSTEM**

Ideally, it would be expected that each police station would have developed effective information systems, however simple, in order to plan, manage and deliver a police service. The objective of the information system should have been to provide the best possible level of service to the surrounding public.

As an example of what was required, it would have been possible to have an operational and an administration system. Both systems could be linked with short term immediate functions and long term planning and predictive facilities.

However, this was not the case. Only one significant information system was identified, and this was a Collators’ system for gathering information about criminal suspects. At some stations, this system was excellent and also provided some local crime intelligence for the use of operational officers.

Unfortunately the system existed and operated in almost total isolation from the resource deployment and management of the station, even in its reduced day to day operation.
Other than this particular system nothing else existed. There was no structure for collating information, analysing or disseminating it; no resources allocated to information systems, no technical equipment or manual methods of co-ordinated information collection. When information was required, it was usually for an urgent immediate task for which special manual collection had to be arranged. In some cases information or a 'return' was regularly provided to a single functional branch or department. However, this information would be exclusive to that specialist Branch, not shared with other functions and probably not utilised effectively, if at all, by the Branch concerned.

This failure and lack of a vital organisational structure, had already been recognised by central research branches. These branches were planning and implementing a new co-ordinated, manual data collection system on manpower and deployment at police stations, which was to be collated by central computer systems. However, due to organisational structure, norms and culture these efforts were not viewed as important by police stations and none planned to use the data produced.

The lack of co-ordinated, effective information systems was identified by the analysis as one of the fundamental problems at police stations. People working at a station had no accurate data on what was really happening. Data that was available only related to narrow functions or areas in very limited time space.
This deficiency was replaced by an over reliance on perception. The higher the rank, the more influential these perceptions were. Strategy and policy were then decided, almost completely unchallenged by facts.

Without accurate, co-ordinated information systems, strategies to combat problems were not possible. Therefore, improved theories of policing were of little practical use. The only remaining option was day to day response to whatever happened. Unfortunately, even the data to organise this type of police service was not sufficient. This situation contributed to a slow but steady decline in the police service, assisted by the occasional spectacular failure when everything went wrong simultaneously.

2.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has examined in some depth a multitude of problems which surround the provision of an effective and efficient police service. Perhaps a more concise summary can be made by developing an extended Reactive Spiral (Fig. 2.4). The new Spiral includes the additional elements identified in the analysis.

2.6.1 EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
THE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL
The original Reactive Spiral hypothesis was strongly supported by the evidence from police stations and at the higher level of the total police organisation. Crime and conflict were found to be increasing at significant rates with police reactive services having little if any effect on these increases in the longer term. There was some evidence that police preventive services could be more effective in the long term, but the resources devoted to prevention were almost negligible as a proportion of the total resources.

Police organisational structures and systems at every level were closed and inflexible, being almost completely uninfluenced by information from the environment or other parts of the organisation. Formal, effective information systems did not exist. Major, powerful influences, such as legislation, public enquiries etc., were necessary for many significant changes to police practice.

Resource management did not exist in the police organisation as a concept, structure or even as an objective. Narrow functional divisions were in the majority and favoured by the organisational culture as the most effective method of dealing with all problems. As a consequence, the highest proportion and the best quality resources were concentrated in a few of the most favoured functions, particularly crime and law enforcement, reactive services. Non crime Police Services' and prevention were discriminated against and starved of resources due to this organisational and cultural bias.

Unfortunately despite the perceived importance of response police services, the public consider such activities to be the exclusive responsibility of the police, excluding the major resource of the public's own responsibility to assist.
Inevitably, police resources were inadequate to deal with these expectations, causing significant reductions in public satisfaction.

The dissatisfaction with policing and the increase in crime and conflict then begins to decrease the public's quality of life, both their physical environment and their perception of that environment.

These processes now combine to change individual members of the public's locus of control. Instead of a bias towards controlling their own lives and events in which they are involved, they become more passive and accepting of external control over their lives. This acceptance of whatever happens reduces the willingness of people to fulfil their obligation to intervene in unlawful activities. Even prosocial helping of victims is reduced.

This type of learned helplessness gives rise to increased levels of stress and dissatisfaction which is then displaced on to police, who are viewed as responsible for the decreased quality of life.
CHAPTER THREE

3. POLICING SYSTEMS

3. 1. THE PLANNING OF A POLICE SERVICE

The analysis of the problem situation has provided clear indications that the police organisational system, its structure, objectives and methods, are a major contribution to the success or failure of a modern police service.

It is suggested that structure and methods cannot be decided until the objectives or values of a policing system are understood and agreed by both the police and the public they serve. In a previous study (BECKETT 1981) these problems were examined in depth and policing was defined as HELPING people in trouble or at risk. This type of behaviour had been identified as Prosocial (STAUB 1978) and for policing purposes has been defined as 'Behaviour that benefits other people by providing the type of help or assistance to a victim, or potential victim, of crime or other circumstances one might reasonably expect from a concerned fellow citizen'. (BECKETT 1981).

Analysis by the project, of the various types of behaviour required by the public from their police, supported this definition. Almost without exception police work or behaviour could be categorised as either VICTIM HELPING or VICTIM PREVENTION.

In this chapter, both of these aspects of police work are discussed in some depth. This is in order to understand how a police system can enhance their effectiveness. Next a description of ENVIRONMENT POTENTIAL is provided. This potential provides an analysis of the various types of environment which create demands for these types of police behaviour.
The analysis of existing and potential demand should then provide a requirement for the most efficient type of policing system, or LEVEL. These various levels of policing are then described, together with performance measures. One of the most important aspects of each level is its provision of assistance to the public.

The victim helping aspect of police work has already been identified as a major component of all Response policing. Victim Prevention has also been identified as a major requirement of any attempt to deal with the effects of the Reactive Spiral (Fig.2.1). These two objectives would appear to be major POLICE PERFORMANCE MEASURES which, together with the more usual organisational performance measures, could be used to plan and measure a policing system.

An attempt will now be made to provide more detail and analysis of these types of police behaviours;

3. 2. POLICE BEHAVIOUR

3. 2.1. VICTIM HELPING

This usually describes helping an individual member of the public who is a victim of crime, or some other incident. This type of police work includes the majority of 'Response' policing. Members of the public consider they urgently require the assistance of a police officer in dealing with a situation where they are the victim of crime or other incident. Police provide 'immediate' assistance, and in the case of arrests etc., whatever additional assistance is required to finish the matter.
Police have to react to a public demand over which they have very little direct control and perhaps as a result of this, the police objective is usually to resolve the situation/problem very soon after arrival on the scene. The emphasis is on speed, resolving the problem as soon as possible.

Examples of these are:-

(i) Arrest and process of persons responsible for crime.
(ii) Recovery of stolen property or obtaining redress for loss or damage.
(iii) Lost property.
(iv) Missing Persons.
(v) Victims Aid and First Aid to injured victims.
(vi) Civil disputes and general advice.

Some victim helping is concerned with providing help to a group of people and it may be difficult to identify a single individual or individuals who benefit from police actions. The group may be a commercial company, an organisation, a group of residents or tenants who live in a particular community, etc. It may be a very large group such as a whole ward, borough, town or even city.

This means that a group of people require the help of police officers because they are the victims of crime or other incidents which have in some way affected their rights as citizens, or the quality of life they should reasonably expect.

This type of police work is similar to individual response policing, except that the victims are more difficult to identify. In some cases the victim may be a company, organisation or a local authority. In other instances the
victim may be a whole community where incidents have the potential to affect peoples quality of life. This may occur even though an individual victim is not the result of the incident.

Examples of these are:-

(i) Robberies and thefts from private companies.
(ii) Damage to company property.
(iii) Theft or damage to Local Authority/General property.
(iv) Insulting behaviour and breaches of the peace.
(v) Drunkenness and linked offences.
(vi) Civil or individual disputes which require police advice or industrial police action, i.e. strikes.

3.2.2. VICTIM PREVENTION

This description refers to the essential preventive work of police officers, which the 'Reactive Spiral' indicates must be a large proportion of any successful police system.

In simple terms, this type of police work is directed at preventing people becoming victims, particularly those most at risk. It can be provided in addition to victim helping, where a victim is advised or directed to take actions which will prevent future victimisation.

In contrast, it can be provided with the intention of preventing people becoming victims before anything has happened to them, preferably by teaching them 'self help', (how to help themselves).
Another important area of long term victim helping is where police mount special operations against individuals or small groups of criminals making their living by crime. These activities result in a large number of individual victims.

All of these policing activities can be directed at specific individuals, or once again at groups in a community. Examples of these three areas are:-

(i) Crime prevention advice given by police after a person or group has been victimised. This advice can range from target hardening to changes in personal behaviour, all aimed at reducing the chances of future victimisation.

(ii) Work with Victims Support Groups aimed at enhancing co-ordination with police operations and increasing the service provided to victims of crime.

(iii) Work with Special Constables and other public volunteers who are willing to be trained by police and assist directly in police work. This both increases the resources available to police and teaches/encourages the public to 'self help' in a very direct way.

(iv) Assisting in Neighbourhood Watch Schemes/Property Marketing, and all other general crime prevention advice aimed at teaching the public 'self help' thereby preventing themselves becoming victims of crime.
(v) Enforcement of appropriate legislation (i.e. Road Traffic offences such as defective vehicles) directed at preventing people becoming victims of their own neglect, or being the cause of other victims (e.g. drink and drive offences).

(vi) Surveillance and targetting of active 'career criminals' (these may well be juveniles committing burglary and theft). Work directed against organised crime networks. Monitoring of legislation, proposed and existing, which appears to be working against the interests of victims of crime and reduces the effectiveness of measures aimed at recognising the importance of victims of crime.

(vii) Working with schools (School Liaison) and other agencies (Inter-agency Liaison) are also important aspects of everyday police work in the context of victim prevention.

Victim prevention is also important in the area of 'victimless' crime. This is where offences such as drugs, prostitution or pornography, where there is no obvious victim, are acted against by police. It is suggested that there is in fact a victim. It is society in general, i.e. a town or a city. Unrestricted activity in these types of offences can significantly affect the quality of life in certain areas.

If police did not contain these types of activity to within certain levels they could begin to finance organised crime networks which would then begin to create individual and identifiable group victims. In addition, a more direct effect
might well be on the children and juveniles in society whose physical and mental development could be affected as a consequence of exposure to those types of offences.

The fact that society has created legislation preventing or restricting certain activities which are apparently 'victimless' tends to indicate both concern by society and the fact that in the long term victims are created in one way or another. What is now required is a description of the various types of environments which generate demands for both victim helping or preventive behaviour.

3. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL

Using the types of 'Ideal' policing behaviour described and the most effective organisational performance measures, it should now be possible to create a suitable policing system. However, whilst these types of measures are adequate to understand and control the Reactive Spiral, they may not take account of the effects of Environmental Potential (Fig. 2. 3).

This concept can be evaluated in three dimensions as summarised below:-

3. 3.1. PHYSICAL INFLUENCES

3. 3.1.1. Design state of the community.
The structure of the buildings, estate, recreation (parks etc) the roads, walkways etc. Does it constrain people or assist them?

3. 3.1.2. Physical state of the community.
The quality of the physical structure in the environment i.e Good Condition.
3. 3.1.3. **Geographical Features**
Hills, dales rivers, canals, railway lines etc., including major through roads which act as barriers in the community.

3. 3.2. **SOCIAL/CULTURAL INFLUENCES**

3. 3.2.1 **Structure of the community**
Social, racial, sex, age, employment, school, further education, secondary employment, family construct, earners in the family 'lifestyles'.

3. 3.2.2 **Social/Cultural provision**
Leisure, cultural, sports, community, local and government facilities. Events of social/cultural significance.

3. 3.2.3 **Facilities - Welfare**
Emotional support, religious, medical, legal, employment etc.

3. 3.3. **PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES**

3. 3.3.1 **Perception**
Perceived state of community/society. Perceived 'safe' areas to commute and style of travel. Unknown areas. People perceived as being safe to meet.

3. 3.3.2 **Travel**
Travel Percentages prepared to travel and need to travel or desire to travel.
3. 3.4. POTENTIAL ANALYSIS

From these types of measures, the potential of a particular area can be calculated and a prediction made as to the effects of police strategies.

If police are to be effective in very hostile areas with a high potential for crime and conflict; then they will require very different policing systems to a simple response service, which can be quite effective in a supportive area. The Police also need to find out what type or level of service is expected by the public who pay for the service provided. These 'levels' of service are now described in more detail.

3. 4. LEVELS OF POLICING

This study now describes a framework which takes account of the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL in predicting the type of police service required. This framework will also analyse the actual police service and system which existed at that time. In addition, it would recommend systems of policing which provided various levels of VICTIM HELPING and PREVENTION as required by the POTENTIAL analysis.

Accordingly the concept of 'LEVELS OF POLICING' is described. This creates three levels of police service which can be defined, their major features described and their claimed advantages/disadvantages listed. In addition, performance measures are listed in order to judge if a system is working effectively and efficiently. These levels of policing are as follows:-

(A) RESPONSE POLICING
(B) SQUAD POLICING
(C) GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING.
Response and Squad policing already existed during the pre-test analysis. However, the performance measures indicated to what extent they provided the service they were designed for.

Geographical policing did not exist at any police station as a policing system, although a number of its elements were working in isolation from the existing policing system. Therefore Geographical policing only existed as a concept not as a practical reality at this stage.

Three levels of policing, or service, are now described. Each of the levels are very different. They provide a different type of service, have different objectives and performance measures. Once a decision is made on a level of service it is not possible to evaluate it by performance measures relating to another level.

If this were to happen, then the whole policing system will change to a different level of service. It is important to understand that the way a policing system is evaluated actually maintains the type of service originally planned.

3. 4.1. RESPONSE POLICING

The 1st level of service that can be provided has been called RESPONSE POLICING and is time based in its operation.

Responding to the public's requests for police help in dealing with various types of immediate problems, has become an important part of modern policing. On average, up to 85% of these requests can be for incidents of a non-crime, service nature, with the remainder involving victims of crime or conflict.
It has been argued that police are expected to deal with too wide a range of problems and that not all problems are immediate, so they can be graded. However, some basic level of effective police response service is obviously required and expected by the public.

This type of police service is time based, with the highest manpower levels being available at peak demand times. The officers are mobile and strategically placed to respond quickly to any call from an allocated area.

With the right technical support, this type of service can be very effective. It requires the lowest manpower of any level of service.
The manpower resources needed can be calculated for each individual police station or unit as follows (HART 1986):

\[
\text{Number of incidents} \times \text{Average time per incident} \div \text{Officers average working day.}
\]

By analysis of message or incident logs, the average number of incidents per hour and per day can be calculated. This is then multiplied by the average time taken per officer to deal with each incident, approximately 2.5 hours.

The total is then divided by the average number of hours that each individual officer is available during his tour of duty, approximately 6.2 hours.

The result of this calculation will be the number of police officers required per hour or per day with a sliding scale dependent on the time of day or day per week. Peak demand times will obviously require the highest manpower levels.

Support services at police stations are then added to provide the total manpower required for an effective response service. The number of officers required must then be at least doubled, to allow for abstraction rates.

This simple formula has been found to be accurate at a number of inner city and other urban police stations.

Response Policing of this type is considered a basic foundation of all policing activities. It is based on the concept of fast response to a public demand for police services, providing initial help and support to the public.
Evaluation of this type of policing must be concentrated on speed of response and development of manpower to meet predicted demands. Recently a number of computerised Police Command and Central Systems have developed this concept and created numerous evaluative measures of this type of policing. More details of these evaluation techniques are provided in the following summary.

3. 4.2 **1st LEVEL RESPONSE POLICING IN SUMMARY:**

**DEFINITION:**
A police system which provides a 'first aid' service, responding to victims of crime and other incidents outside the public's competence or authority.

**MAIN FEATURES:**
(i) Time based.
(ii) Lowest manpower level
(iii) Almost total response to demand after incident occurs (i.e. VICTIM HELPING).
(iv) Little preventive capacity (i.e. VICTIM PREVENTION).
(v) Allows high level of centralisation for resource deployment and policing.
(vi) Minimal structure for public involvement.
(vii) Low levels of autonomy for Inspectors, Sergeants and Constables.

**PERFORMANCE MEASURES INCLUDE:**

**Demands**
Proportions of HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW Demand areas.
Percentage of Demand in HOSTILE areas.
Ratio of 'calls for service' to levels of population.

**Resources**
Adequate accommodation and equipment.
Effective Information system.
Manpower skills and ability.
Levels of overtime per officer, per team;
(1) Planned;
(2) Without notice.

Levels of sickness;
(1) Injury on duty;
(2) Certificated
(3) Self Certificated.

RESOURCE TO DEMANDS
Balance of resources to demand.
(1) Incident level per officer.
(2) Resource deployment to demand pattern
(3) Appropriate response e.g. traffic unit to accident.
(4) Graded response system to demands.
Vehicle costs include mileage and accidents per ratio of incidents.
(1) Emergency.
(2) Non emergency.

INCIDENT HANDLING
Average speed of Response.
(1) For emergency.
(2) Non-emergency graded calls.
Average time per incident to complete number of officers per incident.

QUALITY OF SERVICE
Accurate incident recording.
(1) All information required obtained.
(2) Information correct.
Quality of police assistance.
(1) Victim helping
(2) Correct procedure and referrals.
(3) Progress reports as required.
Public satisfaction i.e. letters of thanks
Public complaints with service.
ADVANTAGES
(1) Provides a genuine and valued public service.

(2) In the short term reduces police costs to the minimum.

(3) With investment and research in technology and work study there is scope for further reduction in operating costs and lower manpower levels are possible.

(4) Greater scope for control over each individual officers behaviour and efficiency levels (actions can be clearly prescribed and enforced).

(5) Greater level of overall management control.

DISADVANTAGES
(1) Always responding to problems gives no scope for prevention in this service. (Feeds the Reactive Spiral with no Victim Prevention).

(2) Improving the quality of the response service further increases demands on it. (Speeds the Reactive Spiral).

(3) Takes no account of Environmental Potential and in hostile areas can significantly increase conflict and reduce public quality of life.

(4) Ineffective in collecting routine, good quality intelligence about problems.

(5) In many areas high levels of stress on officers providing this service. This is due to lack of control or prevention and fear of the unknown, due to limited information about the environment.
(6) Increasing levels of police powers are required to impose effective control over growing problems and the willingness to use violence against police.

(7) Increasing difficulties in providing response service to hostile areas can create problems between street officers and senior managers where conflicting cultures develop. This can cause stress and discipline problems.

3. 4.3. SQUAD POLICING

Recognising the inability of Response policing to prevent and deal with problems rather than symptoms, an additional level of service may then be provided.
This is a 2nd Level of Service, called SQUAD POLICING, which is functionally based. Added to the basic foundation of the 1st Level Response Service, special teams or squads of officers are created to deal with specific problems.

These squads are functionally based with a single task to the exclusion of all other problems. They are often created to deal with high fear crime; murder, sexual offences or street robbery and organised crime; terrorism drugs and armed robbery.

Calculating the additional manpower for this level of service is more complex and depends on the exact function of the squad. Manpower must be calculated on the number of individual suspects involved, rather than crimes in general. For example investigations into drugs or robbery gangs may require ratios of two officers per targeted suspect.

The concept of Squad Policing was developed in Britain and the United States during the 1950s and 60s, when it proved very effective against specific persistent criminal problems.

More recently repeat Offender Squads in the United States have devised workload levels and work practices which are proving very successful in the effective deployment of these squads. A summary of this concept and the evaluation developed by this work is detailed below.

3. 4.4 2nd LEVEL SQUAD POLICING IN SUMMARY:

DEFINITION
A police system which aims to reduce a priority demand on police resources, using a team which specialises in this single objective.
MAIN FEATURES:

(i) Function based.

(ii) Is supported by a Response policing system

(iii) Created to deal with high fear crime and organised/group crime.

(iv) Directed against individuals or premises/location.

(v) Limited preventive effect.

(vi) Total response to demands after incidents occur.

(vii) High levels of autonomy for all squad/team personnel.

(viii) Requires effective technical and equipment support.

(ix) Requires effective information and intelligence system.

(x) Requires effective liaison and co-ordination with other officers/squads and agencies or any public involved.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

In addition to those of 1st LEVEL (Response) Policing.

Number of calls for specialist units by first response officers.
Number of times specialist units deployed.
Average time of post incident enquiries.
Levels of demand in specialist functions and geographical areas where squads employed.
Ratio of squad manpower to response manpower.
Skills of specialist officers.
Number of tasks per squad.
Ratio of resources (officers, equipment and time) per task.
Number of additional actions generated per task.
Ratio of arrests per task.
Proportions of property recovered or seized per task.
Number of new tasks (targets) per period of time.
Ratio of convictions to persons charged.
Number of registered informants.
Number of charges per informant.
Cost per informant.
Number of outstanding arrest warrants.
Co-ordination with other squads and specialist officers.

ADVANTAGES
(1) If carefully planned and managed with good technical support, can be very successful in all the above performance measures.

(2) Can be very effective in temporarily regaining police control of a hostile area.

(3) Helps to reduce public fear of crime when successes are properly marketed.

(4) Increases public satisfaction with police when successes are properly marketed.

(5) Can improve the morale of the whole force to see the results of successful squad policing.

(6) Encourages non squad officers to perform better on other duties in order to qualify for squad work.
DISADVANTAGES

(1) Although intended as a preventive measure, really is reactive depending on a problem already existing before implementation.

(2) Limited effect on reactive spiral due to reactive bias.

(3) Although initial positive effect on hostile environment, if use continued, can be manipulated into increasing conflict in an area.

(4) Due to complex nature of policing, concentrating on one or two major problems always causes serious effects in other areas.

(5) Best quality officers are drained into narrow functional tasks wider more complex tasks left to less able officers.

(6) Can produce an internal 'end over means' culture which inevitably causes public concern and more external restraints imposed over policing.

(7) Squad can assume a life of its own and lose direction. Support services increasing in cost until costs exceed benefits.

3. 5. ANALYSIS OF POLICING LEVELS

Remembering that 1st and 2nd Levels of policing already existed, at this stage it is perhaps appropriate to evaluate them against the Extended Reactive Spiral (Fig 3. 3). A theoretical evaluation and an
THE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL

Fig. 3.3.
assessment of the factual project data, both reveal the inadequacy of these policing systems. Either in isolation or combination, both systems have been shown by the analysis in the first chapter, to be virtually ineffective against the powerful processes involved in the Extended Spiral, Fig. 3. 3.

3. 5.1. PROBLEM ANALYSIS

These difficulties, in brief are as follows:-

3. 5.1.1. The Police Spiral; indicates a requirement for an open, flexible 'organic' type organisation with extensive information systems and efficient resource management. However, whilst it is accepted that police information systems and resource management could be improved dramatically, the major difficulties are their organisational objectives.

The limited response design of 1st Level Policing and the inflexible functionalisation of 2nd Level Policing will always induce a bias towards centralisation and the rigid organisational structure which was described in the analysis of the original problem situation.

3. 5.1.2. The Reactive Spiral; shows the importance of significant VICTIM PREVENTION in any police system. Analysis of this prevention, has also suggested the importance of public 'self help' as virtually the only method of providing significant resources for this essential investment by any policing system.
1st and 2nd Level Policing are not designed for this kind of public involvement and even if such a requirement were designed it would be just another functional element and very unlikely to be accepted and integrated by the other 'professional' factions. Evidence for this process can be shown by the low priority for Crime Prevention (Victim Prevention) and its minimal resources as described by the original problem analysis.

3.5.1.3 The Environmental Spiral; supports the importance of public involvement in any police system. This is to influence the objectives and values of the system, support 'self policing' and any other attempts to improve their own quality of life.

Even though 2nd level policing makes a number of determined attempts to assist in this process, such as Neighbourhood Watch, the organisational design predicts a rapid decay in police effectiveness. 1st Level Policing is not designed to accept or accommodate any of this public involvement.

3.6 OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

It is apparent that a radically different policing system will be required in order to deal with the problems described above.

Additional objectives and performance measures will be required from any proposed policing system, particularly in the effective utilisation of the public by police.
If the public are involved in a policing system, then the required behaviour or involvement has to be clearly understood before it can be included in the design of the police system.

3. 6.1. **PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR**

A previous study (BECKETT 1981) suggests that police behaviour is not confined to modern professional police officers, but that such behaviour also exists as informal responses in non-police citizens. This means that prosocial HELPING behaviour in the public should be supported by the policing system.

The study also hypothesised that this requirement for increasing 'self-policing' in non-police individuals, could be attempted by utilising the professional police officers as prosocial models for the general community as to the appropriate behaviour in various circumstances. This aspect of the police system involves the important concept of 'social learning' via a modelling process (BANDURA 1977).

It should be noted that, although in the original theory and analysis police acting as prosocial models was examined in some depth and suggested to be an important area for experimentation, it is not the only method that will be proposed for police to increase public self-help.

3. 6.2. **POLICE PUBLIC CONTRACT**

Regardless of the method by which an increase in public prosocial behaviour is obtained, it is an important system performance measure which will require to be recognised by the police system and has been described as a Police–Public Contract as follows:-
"A policing system in which professional police and a community, establish a partnership which results in a significant proportion of policing service within that community being provided voluntarily by community members. The primary objectives of such a police system are the prevention of crime, reduction of conflict and assistance of victims. (BECKETT 1981)."

3. 6.3. COMMUNITY HELPING

Another element of the Environmental Spiral which must be influenced by a police system is the 'Locus of Control'. It is proposed that a more difficult aspect of modern urban policing strategies, is the involvement of police in assisting and supporting various groups in the community and using them as an influence on levels of helping behaviour in the general public.

In this study, such a sequence is argued to be essential in a successful urban policing system, particularly as an input to the Locus of Control in the Environmental Spiral. This process has been defined as a system performance measure of COMMUNITY HELPING (BECKETT 1981) and describes any group supporting behaviour with the eventual end result of enhancing an internal locus of control in the individuals involved. Ideally the group behaviour would be directed towards increasing prosocial VICTIM HELPING and PREVENTION.

It is clear that the existing 1st and 2nd Levels of policing are not designed to support or maintain this type of process. Therefore any new system will have to clearly understand what is being attempted and be designed accordingly. First the concept has to be defined and explained in a police system context.
The DELTA chart overleaf (Fig. 3. 4) illustrates the process of COMMUNITY HELPING in the community and its subsequent effect on the REACTIVE SPIRAL, reducing the demand for RESPONSE policing.

In summary, the chart details the required training for operational beat and specialist officers, in order to act as community role models for Pro-social Behaviour. Once trained, officers provide high quality victim helping and preventive services to the public. This 'ideal' behaviour is intended to encourage increases in public Pro-Social Behaviour, particularly the levels exhibited by juveniles in the community.

By targeting and involving specific influential public volunteers as additional role models, the process is considered more effective. This type of behaviour will include membership of Special Constables, Victim Support Groups and Neighbourhood Watch Groups. It is suggested that groups of volunteers will be more effective in this role than individuals working in isolation.

Therefore, it is essential that the police system invests a proportion of their organisational resources into developing and supporting various community groups, particularly those which will encourage increased levels of 'self policing' in their individual members. Subsequently, due to the influential nature of these individuals and groups, they will also act as prosocial models to the community and then by established group learning processes, will encourage increased levels of self policing behaviour in the general community.
In practical terms this means that the police organisation encourages all community groups who can be influential in promoting self help strategies within the general public. Individual police officers would give this support and always behave in a manner which acts as a 'model' for the 'correct' prosocial behaviour in everyday life, i.e. always help people in trouble and if possible prevent themselves and others from becoming victims.

Police officers would be trained to intervene and interact with various local groups, or even encourage their formation where none exist. The intentions of this intervention would be:-

(i) Obtain the support of influential community volunteers.

(ii) Where appropriate assist these volunteers to form effective working groups.

(iii) Encourage such individuals and groups to involve themselves in the self policing behaviours of Victim Helping and Prevention.

(iv) Involve local groups and agencies in the achievement of a practical POLICE/PUBLIC CONTRACT at an individual and a group level.

3. 6.4 QUALITY OF LIFE
A remaining element in the Environmental Spiral is the 'Quality of Life'. This must be reduced to quantifiable measurable terms before it can be utilised as a police performance measure.
Initially the police input into 'Quality of Life' is defined as:-

The quality of everyday life in a defined geographical area, where the level of crime and conflict are tolerable and in proportion to the density of population. Residents have access to information about these matters and should they be dissatisfied, can actively contribute to measures designed to influence these events. Also, where 'victims' of unlawful or unusual events receive an active priority from both the residents and all official 'helping' services.

This definition implies a mixture of factual and attitudinal measures which can be used to design an appropriate policing system.

3.6.5. POLICE SYSTEM CHANGES

The problem analysis in the first Chapter demonstrated the importance of a suitable Police System in order to achieve objectives and performance measures. It is also clear that the previously described 1st and 2nd LEVELS of policing are not designed, or easy to adapt to systems capable of achieving results in the areas described above.

The Police System required will have to be open and receptive to the environment with an organic and flexible structure. If possible the system should utilise the powerful effects recorded of geographical work design as opposed to time based influences. The cultural bias towards small teams as the ideal work units should also be exploited.
There must also be substantial investment and use of information systems linked into the performance measure of the whole Extended Spiral. These systems would have to provide a basis for predictions of trends and changes. The predictions arrived at would be very important for effective Resource Management.

Police Resources in this system must be viewed in the widest possible context and utilise the full potential of all available resources, police and public, full time and part time, professionals and volunteers.

This analysis is providing a requirement for a radically different policing system. It is apparent that such a system would require major changes in both policing methods and the behaviour of the public involved in such a service. Therefore, the 3rd and final level of service is very different from the two previous levels. Although, it does of course still have to provide 'traditional' and expected policing services.

3. 7. GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING

Third Level Geographical policing is designed as an open system, flexible, with a geographical foundation and a bias towards the preventive policing of VICTIM PREVENTION and COMMUNITY HELPING.

Small, permanent teams of officers provide response and preventive service, in addition to dealing with any special problems in their allocated area. Additional resources or assistance are only provided in unusual circumstances. The whole police system must then be designed to support these teams and the police stations they work from.
Geographical policing is not new and is based on one of the most traditional and acceptable methods of policing yet devised. In short, the local constable with his own permanent beat.

The concept of preventing victims and providing a support for the community dates back to the beginnings of modern policing in the 1830s. Beat constables were taught at that time that preventing crime and preserving peace and tranquility were their major tasks. Officers would achieve these objectives through the use of preventive patrol on their permanent beats.
This theme of preventive policing and community support has been consistent through police instructions and writings up to the present day. Even the most recent police training emphasises this traditional and hallowed concept of policing.

Unfortunately for a number of reasons geographical policing is not currently considered an effective or viable option in many urban, or even rural areas and therefore has fallen into disuse. As a result, the majority of today's operational street officers and their immediate supervisors, have developed little practical knowledge about it and are unskilled in this system of policing. In addition, police forces as a whole have developed a bias towards supporting response and squad policing.

A major problem in Geographical Policing is its complexity. It utilises a number of simple and not so simple concepts, many of which are accepted by the majority of police officers. However, when these elements are all linked into an interactive, comprehensive policing system the complexity is very daunting, (Figure 3. 6).

Once a decision is made to introduce a Geographical Policing System (A) it should be understood that although it contains elements of 1st and 2nd LEVEL Policing, it is radically different and therefore requires a qualitative change in the new systems performance measures.

The evaluation of a Geographical policing system had to be developed especially for the project. It consisted of a logical systems analysis of each element and its potential measurement. Throughout the project, on a basis of trial and error, evaluation criterion were developed and modified. In the summary that follows, a description is provided of the measures eventually adopted, with varying degrees of success.
3. 7.1. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY

(A) Geographical Policing:

Definition
A system in which all the police services within a defined geographical area, are consistently provided by a stable team of dedicated police officers; assisted by the public.

Features
1. High proportion of preventive Policing (high investment of resources).

2. Basic work units of multiple objective teams (Sector teams).


4. Majority of operational Street Officers 'geographically based'.

5. Policy of public involvement and resources allocated.

6. Within policy guidelines, majority of decisions on resource deployment made by geographic Inspectors and Sergeants.

7. High levels of autonomy for Inspectors and Sergeants.

8. High investment in information systems and prediction.

9. Police resources maintained above minimum 'Response Level', with efficient use of all available resources.
10. Maintenance of an effective 'Directed Patrolling' strategy aligned to the Environmental Potential.

As can be seen from the definition and its performance measures, the geographical system requires considerable pre-planning, policy changes, reviews on priorities and use of measures. It will also require initial approaches to THE PUBLIC (J) and AGENCIES (I) to enlist their support and resources for the system. Although it will be less effective in its first iteration, the system is in fact designed to work with minimal input from these elements, but some practical support is essential in order to produce (B):

(B) **POLICE/PUBLIC PLANNING/INFORMATION SYSTEM**

A network whereby police collect information to enable the police and public to jointly plan the provision of policing services within a defined geographical area.

**Measures**

1. A police information collection and dissemination system between police and public (organisational structure).

2. The quantity and quality of information on the net-work.

3. The quantity and quality of analysis and prediction.

5. Using the team geographical areas (Sectors) as the basic unit of all police planning.

6. Level of public involvement and influence in planning police services.

7. Level of autonomy in planning system for geographical teams.

This information and planning system will require police resources. If it is designed as a non-electronic system, using people rather than technology, it could be very expensive. However, if a major investment has to be made into information technology, then the initial investment will again be high. But this system is essential in order to achieve the next element (C):-

(C) JOINT POLICING SYSTEM

A structure by which police and the public provide assistance to victims, manage conflict and crime by the best use of the available resources.

Measures

1. Numbers/percentage of formal assistance to police (i.e. Special Constables and non-uniformed assistance to police).

2. Numbers/percentage of informal public assistance to police (i.e. Neighbourhood Watch, Business Watch etc.)

3. Effective Victim Support Scheme.
4. Effective Community Mediation/Intervention Scheme.

5. Effective Lay Visitors Scheme.

6. Changes in professional agency and policing procedures to co-ordinate joint policing system.

7. Ratio of tasks between police and professional agencies.

This element recognises the important resource of the public and the performance measures require a significant input from these types of resources. Some of the joint policing will be with professional agencies, such as the Local Authority, other policing will involve voluntary part time public involvement.

The Joint Policing element requires clear direction within a planned framework if real progress is to be made in improving the public service. This framework for (C), is provided by the element (D):

(D) (i) **RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

The efficient use of police and public resources to stabilise, reduce and deal effectively with public demands for police service.

Figure 3. 7 illustrates the method used to quantify and plan this type of management. First an analysis is made to determine what type of police service is currently being provided and decide, is it decaying or improving? For example if a majority of police
resources were found to be dealing with Demand Stabilisation and yet demands were significantly increasing, the system would be predicted to be in decay. Resources would now have to be re-deployed into Demand Reduction to prevent a rapid decline into a basic Response Service.

Police Services found to be mainly Response would have to increase or re-deploy resources into Demand Reduction in order to achieve an eventual Demand Stabilisation. The tables below provide measures for each category;

**Response Management:**
Ratio of public 'calls for service' to the levels of population.
Percentage of response calls deferred to appropriate time.
Accuracy of police resource deployment to public demand pattern.
Public complaints per 100 'calls for service'.
Average speed of response to urgent calls.
Average time to complete each 'call for service'.
Average number of incidents per officer per day.
Balance of incident type per officer per week.
Vehicle costs including mileage and accidents per 100 'calls for service'.
Average number of officers in first urgent response.
Number of times per 100 incidents additional officers deployed.
Number of calls for specialist units by first response officer.
Number of times specialist units deployed.
Number of post incident visits.
Percentage of referrals to Victim Support for 100 responses.
Percentage of other service agency referrals per 100 responses.
Error levels in police procedure and recording.
Public satisfaction, letters of thanks and consumer panels.
Levels of sickness per officer and per team.
Levels of planned overtime per officer per team.
Levels of unplanned overtime per officer, per team.

**Demand Reduction**
Levels of demand (total calls for service) in geographical areas where reduction strategies implemented.
Levels of demands in specific area of reduction strategies (service, crime and conflict).
Additional demands generated by reduction strategies.
Total cost of reduction strategies (personnel and equipment).

**Demand Stabilisation:**
Rate of increase of demands (total calls for service) in geographical areas where prevention strategies implemented.

Rate of increase of demands in specific areas of prevention strategies (service, crime and conflict).
Value (financial and time) of public and agency involvement in prevention strategies.
Additional police demands generated by prevention strategies.
Total costs of prevention strategies, police and public (personnel and equipment).

(ii) **CRIME MANAGEMENT**
The efficient use of all resources to reduce and prevent crime, whilst dealing effectively with the results of crime, particularly its victims.

This category is a specialised aspect and important sub-category of general Resource Management. Figure 3.8 illustrates a similar format where decisions and predictions can be made regarding the existing system state and direction of charge within the Crime Management process;

**Crime Response:**
Percentage of initial crime response deferred.
Average speed of response to initial crime demand in urgent and deferred categories.
Levels of police resource deployment to crime investigation demands.
Speed of police response to crime victims (victim crime classification).
Average time per initial investigation.
Number of calls for specialist crime unit by first officer at crime.
Number of times specialist crime unit deployed (SOCO Etc).
Efficient initial investigation and police procedure.
Accurate recording of initial investigation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME PREVENTION</th>
<th>CRIME REDUCTION</th>
<th>CRIME RESPONSE</th>
<th>CRIME REDUCTION</th>
<th>CRIME PREVENTION</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**CRIME MANAGEMENT**

**DECAY**

**IMPROVEMENT**
Levels of crime investigation skills in initial response officers.
Number of crimes screened out.
Type of crimes screened out, percentage in each category.
Average investigation time per screened in crime.
Number of arrests for screened in and screened out crimes.
Number of additional charges and TICs.
Percentage of interrogation per 100 prisoners.
Number of detained suspects not charged
Number of victim referrals to support agencies per 100 crimes in victim classification crimes.
Public satisfaction with initial victim helping (consumer panels).
Further reports to victim per 100 crimes.
Follow up enquiries per arrest.
Percentage of property stolen recovered.

Crime Reduction:
Levels of crime in geographical areas where reduction strategies implemented.
Levels of crime in specific crime priority categories.
Number of police specially employed in crime reduction.
Number of objectives for each team/squad.
Ratio of officers, vehicles, equipment and time per targetted location or individual.
Ratio of charges per 10 targetted individuals and locations.
Number of follow up enquiries generated by each target.
Result of officers and time to the value/quality of property recovered or seized.
Ratio of convictions to persons charged.
Number of new targets introduced each month.
Public satisfaction with crime reduction priorities.
Number of registered informants.
Number of charges per informant.
Cost per informant.
Number of outstanding arrest warrants.

**Crime Prevention:**
Rate of crime increase in geographical area where crime prevention strategy implemented.
Rate of crime increase in specific crime priority categories.
Value (financial and time) of public and agency involvement in crime prevention strategies.
Additional police demands generated by crime prevention strategies.
Total cost of crime prevention strategies, police and public (personnel and equipment).

(iii) **CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**
The prevention and reduction of harmful conflict behaviour and the effective peacekeeping of public disorder.

Conflict Management is an important sub-category of Resource Management developed by this thesis. Once again system state and direction of change can be established. However, Figure 3. 9 also illustrates a proposed link between various states of conflict which has not been utilised before. Using this concept it is suggested that the management of conflict or 'peace keeping' can be developed into a practical and effective strategy. Each state of Conflict is accurately analysed by its list of performance measures;
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT PREVENTION</th>
<th>CONFLICT REDUCTION</th>
<th>DISORDER MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>CONFLICT REDUCTION</th>
<th>CONFLICT PREVENTION</th>
</tr>
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</table>

DECAY

IMPROVEMENT
Disorder Management:
Speed of police response to disorder.
Public order skills of response officers.
Average number of officers to each disorder incident.
Average length of time disorder incident continues.
Number and nature of public casualties.
Number and nature of police casualties.
Individual or group, public involvement.
In group; organised or unorganised.
Levels of public violence.
Levels of police violence.
Number of arrests per 10 incidents.
Ratio of convictions to arrests.
Number of entries in 'Doctor at Police Station' register.

Conflict Reduction
Levels of disorder and conflict behaviour in geographical areas where reduction strategies implemented.
Levels of disorder and conflict behaviour in total.
Public use of streets and fear of disorder.
Public satisfaction with conflict reduction priorities.
Number of police referrals to other mediating agencies.
Number of police involved in strategies.

Conflict Prevention:
Rate of conflict increase in geographical area where conflict prevention strategy implemented.
Rate of increase in specific types of conflict behaviour overall.
Value (financial and time) of public and agency involvement in conflict prevention strategies.
Additional demands generated by conflict prevention strategies.
Revision and testing of current public order contingency plans.
Levels of public alienation/tension.

The interaction between the Planning and Information System (B), Joint Policing System (C) and the Management Framework (D) will then produce changes in the Elements (E), (F), (G) and (H) of the Geographical Policing System. These changes are the outputs or results of this system, indicating its level of effect.

(E) **GOALS (MACRO MEASURES)**

(i) **Quality of Life**
Where the level of crime and conflict are tolerable and in proportion to the density of population. Where both police and public actively help 'victims' and the public are able to significantly influence the provision of policing services. In addition, levels of alienation are low and do not cause isolation in the community.

**Measures**
1. Level of crime/population
2. Level of conflict/population
3. Public fear of crime and conflict
4. Level of public helping for victims (total levels)
5. Quality of police service for victims.
6. Levels of alienation (attitudes) and isolation (group behaviour).
7. Life style changes (behaviour) i.e. use of street, movement out.
8. Effectiveness of public influence on policing.

(ii) **Police/Public Contract**

A policing system in which professional police and a community establish a partnership which results in a significant proportion of policing services within that community being provided voluntarily by community members.

**Measures**
1. Percentage of public involvement in policing services.
2. Percentage of professional agency involvement in policing services.

(iii) **Demand Stabilisation**

Where the level of demand on police resources are reduced and maintained at a level which enables a high quality of service to be provided for each demand.

**Measures**
1. Total level of demand/resources.
2. Nature of demand i.e. Percentage of Response to preventive.
3. Stability of police service to demand i.e. maintaining service to the volume of demands/influencing increases/maintaining quality and public satisfaction.
If significant results are obtained by the Joint Policing System (C) and improvements are made in the System Goals (E) it is then predicted that three particular areas of feedback will be input to the wider Public (J) and Public Agencies (I) as below:

(F) **PUBLIC PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR**

(1) Increased levels of 'bystander' prosocial intervention (VICTIM HELPING).

(2) Increased levels of preventive behaviour (VICTIM PREVENTION).

(G) **LOCUS OF CONTROL**

Changes in the public 'Locus of Control' from external to internal with a lessening of perceived helplessness.

(H) **SATISFACTION WITH POLICE**

Changes in Public satisfaction with:

(1) The work of local police officers (i.e. quality of service).

(2) Police service in conflict.

(3) Police service in crime.

All of these improvements in police and public behaviour should now influence the willingness of all non-involved public and professional agencies to be involved or increase their involvement in the next sequence of Police/Public Planning (B). The expected gains and losses with a Geographical Policing System can be summarised as follows:-
ADVANTAGES
(1) Positively Influences the Response Spiral.
(2) Reduces the Environmental Potential.
(3) Increased public satisfaction with police service.
(4) Once trained and skilled, increases in morale and sense of status in operational street officers.
(5) Maximum effective use of each individual officer.

DISADVANTAGES
(1) Not immediately effective, requires time to produce significant improvements.
(2) Requires radical changes in established working practices if high manpower requirements are to be avoided.
(3) Efficient information systems must be maintained at every police station which may require additional expense.
(4) High quality of leadership and management needed at police stations.
(5) Higher levels of individual skills required from all operational street officers.
In comparison to 1st and 2nd LEVEL policing, 3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing is a major challenge to any Police Force. It identifies a number of separate elements and performance measures, all suggested to be required in a modern policing system, then integrates them into a total police system. This system then prescribes an organisational structure which may appear similar to past policing methods but in fact in both operation and theory is significantly different. Any Police Force which intended to introduce such a policing system would have to plan and implement major organisational change programmes.

3. 8. SUMMARY

In this chapter the importance of VICTIM HELPING and VICTIM PREVENTION were described. It was suggested that these concepts provide an accurate behavioural description of police work, whether performed by police or public.

The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL was seen as a major restraint and source of demands for police services at the micro level, which dictated vital requirements for any policing system devised or created. At the micro level the EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL imposed other major requirements and limitations.

Levels of Policing were then described in order to provide increasing levels of service in these environments. Unfortunately 1st Level RESPONSE POLICING and 2nd Level SQUAD POLICING which already existed, were unable to provide sufficient levels of VICTIM PREVENTION.
In addition their organisational structure prevented them from dealing with the problems identified by the EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL. Major deficiencies were; closed, bureaucratic, functional designs and in particular an inability to involve and encourage the public in self policing and more particularly in COMMUNITY HELPING.

Third Level Geographical policing was then created as a potential policing system, which did not exist as a total system at that time. This level of policing was specifically designed to deal with the problems identified in the PROBLEM analysis and to utilise effective organisational structures and methods. Many of these elements already existed inside the police or other service organisations. The major concern of the project was to implement and evaluate Geographical policing as a total policing system.

In the next Chapter, a pre-implementation analysis at Brixton Police Station will be described. The analysis of the existing situation will be provided using the concepts, definitions and measures developed in this Chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. BRIXTON THE CASE STUDY

4.1. INTRODUCTION

In November 1981, the joint Metropolitan Police and Surrey Constabulary Neighbourhood Policing Project was formed. The project team immediately began work at Brixton Police Station, in the London Borough of Lambeth and Addlestone Police Station in Surrey.

During the next two years a total of ten police stations became involved in this project. However, for the purpose of this analysis only one, BRIXTON will be used as a case study. Brixton Police Station is probably one of the most powerful examples of preplanned changes to a policing system. It also has the longest and most comprehensive data base of all the project stations, though it is not necessarily the most successful of the sites.

Although collection and analysis of data at Brixton began in November 1981, it was still possible at that time to collect some data on policing at the micro level back to 1980. Therefore the PROBLEM SITUATION at Brixton will be confined to the period 1980 - 1983, after which a new policing system was introduced. The methodology of the various surveys listed in this Chapter, are detailed in Appendix Two.

It was found that the theoretical framework of the Problem Situation, both the Environment and Police system analysis as described in the preceding Chapters, had to be modified for practical use at each police station.

In this Chapter, a detailed system of analysis and comparison at the micro level will be described. First, the Environmental Potential of Brixton will be determined and analysed against the Environment Spiral. Next, Brixton police station will be analysed to determine the LEVEL of service provided and its quality of performance. This policing system will then be evaluated against the Police Spiral.
Finally, the total analysis will be quantified against the core Reactive Spiral in order to judge the interactive effects of the Extended Reactive Spiral. It is intended to provide an insight into the complex Problem Situation at Brixton between 1980 - 83.

4. 2. BRIXTON AS A POLICING ENVIRONMENT

Brixton Police Division is 2.94 square miles in size and is located in the centre of the Borough of Lambeth, with Kennington to the North, Streatham to the South and Clapham to the West. (Fig. 4. 1). The Division is an established commercial and residential centre within the inner area of South London. It is an inner city area which shares many of the features of other decaying city areas. Examples of these features are: economic decline, a declining, transient low skilled population with high unemployment, inadequate housing stock and a significant number of cultural and ethnic minority groups.

In 1981, the area had suffered one of the worst post war riots on mainland Britain. As a result of this disorder a major enquiry had been undertaken into these riots (SCARMAN 1981). It was clear, perhaps in a most dramatic way, that whatever social processes existed in the environment of Brixton, they were inadequate for the needs of the local people. The Scarman Enquiry also suggested that the methods of policing were inappropriate and in effect that the existing police system was in decay, failing to meet the perceived needs of the community.

4. 3. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

In order to attempt some type of quantitative and predictive analysis of the interaction, between the physical structure and social aspects of the population, an analysis framework had to be developed. (Fig. 4. 2). This framework will be used to describe the Environmental Analysis of Brixton Police Division.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

GEOPHYSICAL DEMAND ANALYSIS

DEMAND PROFILE (High - Low)

CRIME & CONFLICT ANALYSIS (A-C, i-iii)

ENVIROMENTAL POTENTIAL

PHYSICAL GEOPHYSICAL ANALYSIS

ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE (+3 to -3)

GEOPHYSICAL SOCIAL ANALYSIS

PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
From the police viewpoint, the first priority of the analysis is the geographical Demand Analysis. This shows the precise time and place of all recorded service demands, which allows the volume of demands from various locations to be identified. Eventually the whole of the area policed can be graded in a Demand Profile consisting of three grades, High, Medium and Low Demands.

Next, both the physical structures in the environment and the social or cultural behaviour of the community, can be evaluated over the total area or at selected locations. If it is available this can be supported by a psychological attitude or opinion survey of the community. These types of analysis are then combined to produce an Environmental Profile, which provides a value on a scale of HOSTILE to SUPPORTIVE, regarding the policing of that area.

Both the Demand Profile and the Environmental Profile are utilised to analyse the types of offenders and the nature of crime and conflict in each area. Jointly, these three summaries of the data provided a description of the Environmental Potential. This analysis is intended to act as a predictor for any type of police service provided in each area.

4 3.1. GEOGRAPHICAL DEMAND ANALYSIS

With regard to the demands on police, it is not sufficient just to deal with the overall levels and percentage increases. The demands have to be linked into geographical areas in the environment. This is to establish exactly where the major public demands are coming from. Initially, it is immaterial exactly what the demands are and therefore must include all crime and service demands.

At Brixton all these demands were plotted on a Divisional map showing the total area covered by Brixton Police Station.
This plotting revealed clusters of demands around particular areas and geographical features on the Division. It was found that total demands on police had to be plotted in this way, otherwise subtle interactions between apparently unlinked demands were missed.

Another important finding was the effect of volume of demands within certain periods of time. In areas with few demands, it took considerable periods of time before patterns and links between demands could be analysed. Whereas in other areas within days or weeks the large column of demands quickly exposed patterns, trends and links.

4.3.2. DEMAND PROFILE

Eventually, after a sufficient time period had been analysed the geographical demand plotting enabled three levels of demands to be identified; HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW which were related to specific and identifiable locations on the Divisional map. It should be noted that this technique is not a rigorous statistical formula and requires a mixture of data and professional police knowledge. However the method was certainly robust enough for project and police operational analysis. It allowed the project to identify significantly different areas and operational police officers to understand the type of police service required for the differing needs of those area.

In November 1981, when the first demand analysis was undertaken (N.P. Report 1982) it was found that more than 50% of the demands on Brixton Police originated from within eight identified areas. In total these areas only represented a quarter of the geographic size of the Division. (Fig.4.3). At this time only HIGH and LOW demand areas could be easily identified, MEDIUM areas were difficult to categorise.
HIGH DEMAND AREAS - BRIXTON 1981

Fig. 4. 3.
The survey also revealed that the workload was evenly divided across the seven days of the week, with minor increases at the weekend. The samples taken indicated that 34% of the total workload was between 7 a.m. - 3 p.m. (early turn), 48% between 3 p.m. - 11 p.m. (late turn), and 18% between 11 p.m. - 7 a.m. (night duty). Most of the night duty workload was prior to 2 a.m.

In March 1983 a second demand analysis was carried out. (N.P. Report 1983). This time HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW areas were easier to identify and it was clear that HIGH and MEDIUM areas were increasing significantly. (Fig. 4, 4). Between them, those types of areas constituted over a third of the total geographical area and were responsible for over 75% of the total demands on police. It appeared as though the HIGH demand areas were spreading by first creating MEDIUM demand areas all around them.

As had been predicted, the disadvantaged population of Brixton created higher than average demands on their police station. The Division was consistently highest in the National Home Office Crime statistics and had the highest incidents of violent street crime and disorder in Britain. As an example of this situation the graph (Fig. 4, 5) shows a breakdown of crime allegations for 1980 - 1982. Crimes averaged 42 per day and during the three year period major crime had risen by 39%, beat crime (less serious crime) by 24% and motor vehicle crime by 43%.

As has already been argued, crime is only a small part of everyday police duty and as an example of this situation an average of 192 callers per day attended Brixton Police Station. In 1981 - 82, 58% of these callers required an officer to complete a report of some description and the remaining 44% required advice or information.
Brixton

Yearly Increase in Crime

Key

- Major Crime
- Beat Crime
- Motor Vehicle Crime
- Arrests

Fig. 4.5.
Examination of the demand data showed that between 75 - 79% of everyday police work was of a non-crime service nature.

It will be seen from this analysis, that recorded crime figures are only a small part of everyday police demands. It was found that the demands on individual officers at Brixton were higher than any other police station examined.

With regard to the times of demand, little had changed and the percentages and times were very similar to the 1981 analysis.

This Demand Profile and in particular the HIGH and MEDIUM demand areas, helped to prioritise the most important geographical areas for the Physical and Social Analysis to consider.

4.3.3. PHYSICAL STRUCTURE
Generally speaking it can be said that a majority of the HIGH and MEDIUM Demand areas corresponded with the local authority high density housing estates. (Fig. 4.6). The dwellings in these estates were mainly Local Authority flats designed for convenience and ease of access.

In reality, they had low levels of physical security, providing little restriction on burglary and theft and were surrounded by a warren of escape routes for offenders. In addition, the majority of these estates bounded, or included major roads and through routes which were used by large numbers of potential victims on their way to and from the central tube, rail, bus terminus and shopping areas.
BRIXTON DIVISION
ESTATES & DEMAND AREAS

Fig. 4. 6.
A number of methods were used to evaluate the physical environment in these areas, including COLMAN (1982). Each method conclusively showed that there were high levels of crime and conflict.

As an example one HIGH demand area with high potential was the central Brixton market and shopping area. It is a major transport terminus of rail, underground and bus for the South London area. This ensures a steady supply of potential robbery and theft victims from early morning until late at night. The shops and the open air street market also attract potential victims. In addition, the narrow surrounding streets with interconnecting passages and ample transport facilities provide easy access and escape routes for offenders.

Other HIGH demand areas, in particular RAILTON ROAD and its surrounding streets, had another unique aspect which considerably increased their environmental potential. Each of these locations had a number of premises or locations which were used for drug dealing, illegal drinking and gaming. Most importantly they had well known reputations for drug dealing and RAILTON ROAD was an internationally recognised drug market with an illegal financial income of more than a million pounds per year.

In addition, RAILTON ROAD was a symbolic location with a history of public disorder. This reputation was deliberately exploited by local criminals in order to restrict police work and maintain the illegal activities, together with their revenue.
Many different types of people were attracted to these areas in order to purchase drugs. Some were only interested in drugs and had the money to pay for them. Others required drugs but had no money so they robbed those who had and other people in the central market area; these people also committed local burglaries to obtain the money required.

An interesting phenomenon, which supported an earlier hypothesis, was that in the immediate area around the criminal premises there was virtually no reported crime. It was discovered by local officers that these areas were highly controlled by local criminals who prevented theft, robbery and burglary to ensure police could not use these types of crime as reasons for being in these areas.

It was concluded by the project that the 'Design state of the community' constrained peoples behaviour towards isolation and defensiveness, increased fear, and generally detracted from peoples Quality of Life.

In addition the 'physical state of the community' in the high and medium demand areas was very poor with typical urban decay and neglect. This decay included the roads, public open spaces and buildings. Over 12,000 dwellings were defined by the local authority as unfit with some 20% of the total housing stock being substandard and a fuller 12% in need of major renovation. Almost all of the substandard buildings were in the high demand areas. (N.P. Reports 1982, and 83).

Another important aspect of the physical environment were the influences of the actual location of Brixton in London and its 'geographical control' over the community. As has
already been noted; Brixton is a major travel terminus for rail; underground and buses with major through routes dissecting the Borough.

Brixton is a very convenient place to travel through and change from one form of transport to another in consequence it is always full of strangers passing through. Some of the strangers stay for a while especially squatters in some of the 7,000 unoccupied council properties. It was suggested by the project that Brixton's geographical location and properties had a significant influence on the communities stability and long term planning and development.

4. 3.4. SOCIAL/CULTURAL ANALYSIS

For the purpose of this study this category of analysis was confined to observable behaviour and did not attempt to understand the mental processes connected with that behaviour. It is argued that this type of analysis of Social and Cultural features is more measurable and probably more significant to this type of study. Peoples actual behaviour is usually the major concern of any policing system.

A good example of this is population movement. The population of Brixton was estimated to have dropped by 20% between the 1971 and 1981 census. The majority of those leaving had been in the 25 - 60 age range, professional and skilled workers. In addition to this decline there was a high rate of transience or population movement with approximately 20% moving into Brixton in the five years prior to 1981. (N.P. Report 1982).

The main features of the Brixton population, which were considered to be one of the worst examples in London, were:-
(a) A higher rate of population decline.
(b) A higher proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
(c) A larger proportion of low income households.
(d) Greater proportions of young and elderly.
(e) More one parent families, twice the national average, and a very high number of children in local authority care.
(f) Higher incidence of mental illness and mental and physical handicap.

There was also a higher proportion of black people, in Brixton. Overall some 30% of Brixton population were estimated to belong to non-white, ethnic groups. However, 40% of the under 18 year olds and 50% of the 10 - 21 year olds were black. Unemployment among these two groups was estimated to be between 40% and 50%.

An important point to remember is that although these statistics refer to the whole of Brixton, the majority of these conditions and groups were concentrated in the HIGH demand areas. This once again indicates that the poorer and more deprived an area is, the higher the demands on the police.

Leisure facilities in the whole of Brixton were extremely poor, with very little provision for the young unemployed in sport or any other leisure activity. The lack of this type of facility had contributed to the development of a street culture, where the young mainly black population in the HIGH demand areas used the streets for their leisure. The illegal drug, drinking and gambling premises became attractive haunts for many of these young people.
In this situation crime had become a normal, accepted occupation and in one HIGH demand area over 60% of the local residents had criminal records. In this area, crime was a successful way of life and local juvenile gangs had developed robbery and burglary into professional occupations. This point was particularly emphasised by the 1981 Public Enquiry:

"And living much of their lives on the streets, they are brought into contact with the police who appear to them as the visible symbols of the authority of a society which has failed to bring them its benefits or do them justice." (SCARMAN 1981).

The best predictor of potential for serious conflict, especially street violence and disorder, is the fact that it has happened before. It would appear that behavioural, cultural or community restraints are significantly weakened in these circumstances.

4. 3.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
An important element of the Social and Cultural analysis is the psychology of its inhabitants or communities. This concerns the attitudes and perceptions of these people to their environment.

The 'community' or the public in BRIXTON were considered by the project to be made up of a number of broad interactive groups who held significantly different attitudes and perceptions about the area they lived, frequented or worked in.
These groupings were broadly as follows:-

(i) A Street Culture group; mainly young, non white, unemployed in poor housing, squatting or homeless and involved in or surrounded by a criminal culture (SCARMAN 1981).

(ii) A Residential group; living or working in BRIXTON, older, less unemployment in better housing as tenants or owners, with some financial stability despite low income levels in many cases.

(iii) A Community Agency group; professional or voluntary, extremely client orientated, trying to provide the best possible service for a wide range of clients, usually with very restricted budgets and little or no power in the community.

(iv) Local Authority Services; organised and managed under strict Political ideology, with services to clients only provided in accordance with a rigid political framework. These services and individuals were highly active and motivated, often with considerable finance, resources and power.

4. 3.5.1. Street Culture

The Street Culture group were difficult to obtain attitudinal data from in a rigorous and reliable manner. They were suspicious of any type of authority and often refused to be involved in any type of data collection. However, the Scarman Public Enquiry (1981) did manage to obtain a fair sample of this groups attitudes and concerns.
It appeared that this group were highly suspicious of the police, avoided them whenever possible, held low expectations, negative stereotypes and very hostile attitudes towards all police actions. As a group, they viewed themselves as rejected by society and excluded from the benefits enjoyed by the majority. They considered that laws, regulations and conventions were designed to discriminate against them and therefore were not humane or just.

In these circumstances, obtaining material gains by any means, legal or illegal, is justified as necessary to gain equal rights and standards as the majority.

In summary, this psychological profile is one of extreme alienation from the majority, or even from similar but less disadvantaged people i.e. parents or successful peers. This profile is not unique to Brixton, in fact it is similar to ones found in many disadvantaged groups all over the world. It has also been identified by various terrorist and extreme groups as the ideal profile for recruits to their various causes.

4. 3.5.2. Resident Group
The Resident group in BRIXTON were easier to approach and obtain data from. Their attitudes and perceptions were obtained by personal interviews conducted among a significant proportion of residents (S.C.P.Report 1983)
This research discovered that amongst this group, feelings of community were not particularly strong in Brixton. Most people saw it as an area where people keep themselves to themselves. Less than one in three knew most of their neighbours to talk to. Asked for their feelings about leaving the area, as many said they would be pleased to leave as said they would be sorry.

Fear of crime was high, particularly among women. One person in three felt very unsafe walking alone after dark, a figure half as high again as that for London as a whole. Three people in four sometimes worried about the possibility they may be victims of crime. For one in four, it was a big worry.

The crimes feared most were burglary and mugging. More than half the people in the Brixton division thought there was a fair amount of burglary and a great deal of bag-snatching or pick pocketing in their local area. More than half thought the police in the area were not very successful in dealing with these offences.

A considerable majority thought there were too few police in the area and a considerable majority thought that too few of the police were on foot.
People who had been in contact with the police were, in general, satisfied with the way they were treated (77%). The most common criticisms were of slow response to emergency calls and of lack of interest or lack of suitable action by police approached for help. The manner or behaviour of officers was occasionally criticised, especially by people who had been stopped as possible suspects.

Asked to rate the job done by the local police generally, more than half say they did a fairly good job. (Fig. 4.7). One in five said they did a very good job. One in six said they did a rather poor job or a very poor job. The opinions of young people on this point were generally less favourable than the opinions of older people.

Most thought the people in the area could do more on their own to prevent crime and most thought the police should get the help of the community to prevent crime.

Half thought Neighbourhood Watch a very good idea and just under half said they would join if approached. But some were sceptical whether it would work and some saw it as a potential invasion of privacy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CALLS</th>
<th>CALL TO LOCAL STATION</th>
<th>VISIT TO LOCAL STATION</th>
<th>APPROACH TO OFFICER IN STREET</th>
<th>APPROACH BY OFFICER IN STREET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BASE: All making contact of that kind in past year</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATISFACTION ON LAST CONTACT</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Satisfied</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Satisfied</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Bit Dis-satisfied</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Dis-satisfied</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SATISFACTION WITH POLICE BEHAVIOUR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>WOMEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASE</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOB DONE BY LOCAL POLICE</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly Good</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Poor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPINION OF POLICE
BY SEX AND ETHNIC GROUP

Fig. 4. 7.
OPINION OF POLICE
BY AGE

OPINIONS OF POLICE (S.C.P.R.1983)

Fig. 4. 7 (Continued).

Just over one in three thought it a very good idea for people in the area to work as special constables with the police. Young people were less enthusiastic than older people about special constables. Special constables may relieve pressure on police manpower and act as a link between the police and the public. But some were doubtful about the level of training they would have and the sort of duties they could undertake and some were doubtful about the sort of people likely to enrol as special constables.
4. 3.5.3. **Community Agency**

The Community Agency group were also relatively easy to obtain attitudinal data from and personal interviews were conducted amongst a significant proportion of representatives (A.2(3) Report 1983). It was found that these types of groups were much closer to the Street Culture and therefore tended to represent some of this groups views.

Community Agencies in the Brixton Division offered a broad range of services to the public and catered for a large number of people in the area. Most agencies used voluntary workers indicating the high degree of community involvement. However, some difficulty was experienced in recruiting volunteers from the area.

Most contact with police occurred when agencies reported a crime or incident to the police. Only a small number of agencies came into contact with police informally or in situations which were not directly related to crime; for example, through meetings, police giving talks or demonstrations, etc. Interestingly, although agencies were aware of the role of the Home Beat Officer (Geographical Officer) and showed enthusiasm for establishing or developing contact with this type of officer, a substantial number of agencies had never had any contact with a Home Beat Officer.
The overwhelming majority of agencies stressed the need for more foot patrols and for police to get to know the people in the area. It is notable that, although a fair number of agencies thought that police patrolled the area on foot a great deal or a fair amount, only a few thought the police actually got to know people in the area.

Most agencies welcomed more contact with police, particularly with Home Beat Officers. Many felt that such contact should be an informal and friendly nature, established on a regular basis and constructive in its aims. Agencies were very forthcoming with their ideas on ways of working together.

The majority felt there was room for improvement in the way police work in the area. Firstly, by improving contact and information flow between police and agencies. Secondly, through quicker response to calls and improvements in the way in which police deal with callers. Of those agencies who had reported a crime or incident to police in the past six months, many expressed some dissatisfaction with the service. Thirdly, for police to become more sensitive to the needs of the community, by showing a caring and friendly attitude to people and by adopting less threatening policing strategies in the area. It was strongly felt that the use of certain police practices served to alienate police from the
community and antagonise individuals, particularly youngsters. For example, the use of the Special Patrol Group and stop and search procedures.

There appeared to be a vast potential for co-operation between police and community agencies in the Brixton Division.

The overwhelming majority thought the police should try to work more closely with other agencies and many were prepared to take part in a police-community group approach to local problems. Agencies were very favourable to the idea of setting up Neighbourhood Watch Schemes in the area although somewhat less favourable to the use of Special Constables.

However, despite positive attitudes towards a joint police and public approach to local problems, many held strong reservations. It was generally felt that, initially, only a few individuals would be willing to get involved. For most, the question of social acceptability in the community and the possibility of target attacks or reprisals against individuals were cited as reasons for non-participation.

By far one of the most significant findings of this study was that the majority of community agencies in Brixton Division recognised the need for closer co-operation and involvement with police at a informal level.
However, a common theme running throughout the interviews was that police would be faced with many difficulties which they should address before starting any initiative in the community. These difficulties included a history of poor relations between police and public in the Brixton Division, general suspicion and hostility towards police and an unwillingness to work with police due to apathy or fear of reprisals.

4. 3.5.4 Local Authority

The Local Authority service group, despite repeated requests and initial agreement, refused to co-operate with the project. This refusal resulted in a lack of reliable attitudinal data from this group at the Pre-Test stage.

The collective data from the Physical, Social and Psychological analysis can now be used to calculate the Environmental Profile of the required geographical areas.

4. 3.6. ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE

This profile refers to the ability of a particular area to react to the levels of crime or conflict. In particular, it reflects levels of suppression or support for such behaviour. As described previously this interaction could be the physical design of an area and/or the people in that location, which provides this influence.

As illustrated below a scale was devised which graded the potential between SUPPORTIVE and HOSTILE.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
  +3 & +2 & +1 & 0 & -1 & -2 & -3 \\
\end{array}
\]

SUPPORTIVE APATHETIC HOSTILE
The most supportive areas were graded as +3 and required very little policing other than an effective 1st LEVEL service and support for local residents in self policing their own area.

At the -3 grade hostility or alienation from police was at its highest, requiring much higher levels of police resources and sophistication in the policing systems utilised. The mid point of the scale at 0 tended to represented individuals who were able and capable of actively supporting police but lacked the willingness or initiative to do so and were considered APATHETIC.

In BRIXTON, approximately a third of the geographical area was classified as -2 or -3. Less than a sixth was considered +3 or +2, with the remainder being +1, 0, -1.

The total HOSTILE area was considered dangerously large when compared to the SUPPORTIVE. This type of profile was significantly different from the 'average' police station examined, with the exception of HACKNEY, which is another inner city deprived area.

All the BRIXTON HIGH demand areas were HOSTILE, with only a small proportion of the LOW demand areas being correspondingly SUPPORTIVE. Many of these LOW demand areas had significant geographical features which mitigated against high crime and conflict demands allowing the people in the area to be APATHETIC without great cost to their own QUALITY OF LIFE.

However, the majority of the SUPPORTIVE, LOW demand areas were close to HIGH demand areas which residents perceived as a threat to their QUALITY OF LIFE and were willing to be actively involved in maintaining and improving their areas.
This environmental Profile now had to be combined with the Demand Profile for a more detailed analysis of the crime and conflict which existed. This was particularly important in the HIGH Demand area and these are shown as most HOSTILE (-3).

4. 3.7 CRIME AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS

A system was devised for predictive analysis of crime and violence in a priority system which assessed the degree of contribution to the potential of an area. It also gave the priorities for police planning and strategies.

The system recognised both the TYPE of crime or conflict and who was involved. High fear events which had the most extreme effects on public 'fear of crime', such as sexual assaults, personal violence or entry to homes, had the highest priority for TYPE of crime or conflict. Organised crime or conflict such as Mafia style organisations and terrorist organisations had the highest priority for being INVOLVED. The next priority was group crime and conflict, where loose knit groups operated as supportive teams to commit robbery, burglary and disturbances. The individual, random offender was the lowest priority in this system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INVOLVED</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Organised groups</td>
<td>(i) Sexual assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry to homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Random groups</td>
<td>(ii) Incidents against People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(C) Random individual  (iii) Incidents against Property

(Note: serious public concern or a perceived 'threat to the fabric of society' must sometimes increase the priority of some incidents).

The priority level of the TYPE of incidents and to be linked to the priority of who was INVOLVED to provide a final priority. Therefore, when high fear crime was committed by 'organised' groups, this produced the highest level of concern and an urgent police priority.

By way of example, in BRIXTON, the HIGH demand areas had resident organised groups who were making large amounts of money out of illegal drugs, drinking and gaming. These groups also initiated violence and fearful street disturbances to maintain their control over these areas. In addition, random groups were continually and persistently committing high fear crimes of robbery, burglary and sexual offences, all with a high degree of personal violence towards the victim.

This type of public behaviour existing as a significant norm and the continuing high demands on police to 'do their duty' and stop it produced the highest levels of ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL in any of the police stations involved.
4. 3.8. **ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL**

Finally, this concept, as an amalgum and interaction of all the various Environmental data, proved very useful despite its simplistic approach. For example a HIGH demand area could have an Environmental profile of -2 (HOSTILE), Crime and Conflict of B(i) (Random groups committing incidents against people), expressed as:-

HIGH, -2, B(i).

This type of POTENTIAL statement and prediction was then used to plan the type of police service required and the particular strategies which may prove most effective.

It was clear that in BRIXTON police action in isolation would be ineffective. However, it should be remembered, a number of specific behaviours by the remaining population in these areas, who make up the potential victims for this type of predictory behaviour, could help to neutralise and reduce this high POTENTIAL.

One such behaviour is that potential victims make themselves less vulnerable to crime and conflict. It was found that this did in fact happen and 95% of residents took some type of special precautions by protecting their homes and businesses with locks etc., (target hardening). Significantly, people also avoided some areas completely, or at certain times i.e. after dark.

Although this behaviour reduced the potential victim population, it also increased the level of 'seige mentality'
and street avoidance as hypothesised in Chapter 3. The research also confirmed that in these circumstances, this type of environment increases demand on police and, on average, one person in five had contacted the police for assistance. This figure is almost twice the average for London as a whole at that time.

Prosocial behaviour, or helping your neighbours and associates, could also help to reduce potential. One possible measure of prosocial behaviour levels is involvement in voluntary work. The research found that 35% of the people in Brixton had been involved in voluntary helping in the previous year. This was lower than the national average of 44% at that time. In addition, three in five people interviewed considered their neighbourhood as one where neighbours did not get involved with each other. Less than one in three (31%) said they knew all or most of their neighbours to talk to, 10% said they knew none of their neighbours to talk to.

However, in support of the hypothesis in Chapter 3, it was found that there was a very large and significant difference in the behaviour of voluntary workers and the remainder. Three in five of those who were doing some form of voluntary work said they had been approached for help by neighbours in the past year. This compared to only one in five of those not involved in voluntary work. These figures appear to imply that some people have a greater propensity or ability for prosocial behaviour than others and that this is something that can be recognised.
It was also apparent that there was a significant minority of people in Brixton, who were very active and influential in demanding and achieving changes. One such group had already formed the first voluntary Police and Public Consultative Group in Brixton. This model was later to be imposed by legislation to the whole of England and Wales. The Consultative Group also carried on in very difficult circumstances, to produce a number of important initiatives. (e.g. Lay Visitors to the police station).

It would appear that despite the negative environment and decreased levels of prosocial behaviour, individual members of the public could still be very effective in these circumstances. This particular piece of evidence helped to support the proposal that police should assist and protect such groups or individuals. It is suggested that this assistance against unlawful behaviour or intimidation would encourage higher levels of such behaviour or better still, increase the numbers involved.

Despite these type of encouraging evidence, in behavioural terms, the meeting of a significant proportion of BRIXTON population and the police in the HIGH and sometimes MEDIUM demand areas, could only be considered an extremely HOSTILE situation with very high ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL for increasing the levels of crime and conflict even further.

More recently TENSION INDICATORS (LOCKE, 1985) are being developed to link into ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL. It is envisaged that TENSION INDICATORS will predict the effect of a single incident or a series of incidents in a particular area given the baseline of the POTENTIAL scale.
4.4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL

Using the analysis involved in predicting the Environmental Potential, it should now be possible to evaluate this data against the important environmental elements already identified.

4.4.1 QUALITY OF LIFE

1. It was found that the level of crime to the ratio of population (HOME OFFICE CRIME STATISTICS) was, and had been for several years the highest in Britain.

2. The levels of conflict to the ratio of population were again calculated by the project to be amongst the highest in the country. In 1981 BRIXTON suffered one of the worst riots in the post war period.

3. Attitudinal surveys and behavioural analysis of the public's fear of crime and conflict found that public life style and perceptions were severely affected, producing unacceptable restrictions on everyday life.

4. As previously reported Prosocial and helping behaviour was found to be significantly lower than the averages for London as a whole.
(5) The quality of the police service for the victim was judged by the public and local police officers, to be very poor and in some cases non-existent.

(6) The levels of public alienation were exceptionally high for significant groups in the population. This alienation was particularly evident against the police but also included deep splits between various groups and cultures in the community. As was indicated on the psychological element of the environmental measures, isolation from authority and differing groups was a norm in BRIXTON.

(7) A number of significant 'life style' changes were evident. The total percentage of residents leaving was increasing every year. In addition the percentage of transient residents in the population was much higher than the London average. As previously noted, people were also restricting their behaviour in everyday life by not going out, or avoiding areas close to their homes.

4. 4.2. LOCUS OF CONTROL

It was apparent that a significant proportion of the public in BRIXTON, perceived themselves as helpless and unable to influence the major events in their lives. These individuals expected interventions by outside bodies, police, Local Authority or Community Agency, in any important life events. Independent action to resolve difficulties was threatening and almost inconceivable, displaying the traits of 'Learned Helplessness' and 'External Locus of Control'. 
However, there was one significant group that were far from helpless in these circumstances. This was the Street Culture Group, who most definitely had an internal Locus of Control and were not helpless in many ways. They had learned that crime and conflict, initiated by them, was a means of gaining control over their surrounding environment.

4. 4.3. PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

(1) 'Bystander' intervention had become a rare and unusual behaviour in BRIXTON. It was considered dangerous, unwise and foolhardy in all but the Street Culture group. These individuals would almost always intervene to help each other on the streets in any brushes with the police or other authorities.

(2) Very high levels of victim avoidance (restricting personal freedom to avoid risk) were discovered, almost to the point of neurosis. However, it became clear that high levels of victim avoidance or prevention had to be balanced with prosocial behaviour towards neighbours. Otherwise this type of behaviour became counter productive and assisted in a seige mentality.

(3) Voluntary helping or Community helping was found to be significantly lower than for London as a whole. However, some individuals, despite their smaller numbers, seemed to be able to produce major changes and effects.

4. 4.4. POLICE SATISFACTION

Satisfaction with police was only slightly lower than average in the residents group, with 77% saying they thought police
were doing a very or fairly good job. This compares with 79 - 85% in national polls at that time. However, this group was very concerned about the methods police used and expressed some disquiet.

The Community Agency groups were quite critical of police as representatives of their various clients. They made strong criticisms of police methods, behaviour and attitudes in the BRIXTON area.

Surprisingly, complaints against police, as recorded at that time, were below average, for that type of London Police Station. However, it was apparent that many of the registered complaints had involved advice from Community agencies or the Local Authority.

In summary, it would appear that demands for police reactive service had spiraled far above what could be effectively dealt with by available police resources.

The majority of the public in BRIXTON had reacted to this situation with apathy and acceptance of random crime and conflict. In certain areas, possibly as much as a third of the total police area, organised crime groups were in control and obtaining a high return from their illegal activities.

Fortunately, no illegal vigilante groups had been formed to fight back, but a small number of powerful groups and individuals were fighting back, by all the legal means at their disposal.

The picture which emerges from the Environmental Analysis in this chapter is suggested to be one of significant urban decay. Physically the environment would appear to have been creating powerful negative effects on the residents Quality of Life. Social and cultural influences in the area
were fragmented into numerous minority interests with little cohesion or co-operation between any groups.

Virtually the only cohesive and co-operative groups were those involved in the dominant criminal sub-culture, which had become established as a 'normal' way of life in Brixton. Hostility against legal authority of any kind tended to be concentrated against the most obvious symbol of that authority, the police.

The question which now remains is what sort of Police System was attempting to cope with this problem, and why was it in decay?

**POLICE SYSTEM ANALYSIS**

In Chapter 1, an overview of the projects police station analysis was described. It summarised the total data and problem areas from all the police stations involved. The major areas of concern were; organisational structure, resources, demands and information systems.

Chapter 3 then identified two existing police systems, which although argued to be inadequate, could still be maintained with limited effectiveness for various periods of time. This effectiveness was dependent on achieving certain levels of performance on the measures laid down. In addition, a third, as yet non-existent, system of policing was created.

It was argued that, in theory, this system answered the problems identified earlier. However, a system of analysis was required which would clearly indicate which LEVEL of policing existed and its effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with the processes of the Extended Reactive Spiral.

Accordingly a method of analysis was created, which is illustrated in Fig.4. 8. This diagram lays out the process developed by the project to analyse police stations and was first used in a very early form at BRIXTON.
It was found that significant amounts of data required by the 'ideal' measures described in Chapter 3, were not collected and were almost impossible to collect with the limited project resources. The police organisation itself did not routinely collect such information. However, the available data has been described and despite the omissions, still allows considerable analysis.

In this section, the diagnostic chart (Fig. 4.8), will be followed for the analysis of Brixton Police Station. This will allow all the identified problem areas to be described. A summary will then be made against the Police Spiral to provide an overview of the 'Problem Situation' at that level.

![Diagram of Police System Analysis]

Fig. 4.8.
At Brixton Police Station, two analyses were undertaken in November 1981 and April 1983, as previously described. For this thesis, the 1981 data will be used as a base line with changes in 1983 noted at the end of each description.

In essence, the analysis first looked at the definition of the LEVEL of the problem to see if that could broadly describe the method of policing. If it appeared doubtful that the LEVEL described actually existed, then a brief check on the system Features or measures was made. An in depth analysis was only made when a LEVEL was believed to exist.

4. 6. 1st LEVEL RESPONSE POLICING

**Definition Analysis:** Without doubt, there was almost total commitment from the majority of resources at Brixton Police Station to providing 'First Aid' to victims who were rendered temporarily inadequate by events outside their control.

4. 6.1. **FEATURE ANALYSIS**

(1) The Police Station was almost totally 'time based' in strategy, operation, deployment, operational street behaviour and culture.

(2) The manpower level was inadequate in 1981, but more than adequate to provide an effective Response Service in 1983. However the police manpower actually deployed on response service was a low proportion of the total with many officers on specialist functions on 'standby' in a peacekeeping role.

(3) Resources at BRIXTON were deployed almost exclusively in response to public demands and incidents. Police were dedicated to helping victims after an incident had occurred.
(4) There was little or no effect victim prevention achieved by the Policing System. Less than 1% of police resources were involved in prevention.

(5) The structure and methods of everyday operational policing were for uniform officers to await for directions and tasks from the Police Station or Scotland Yard Information Room. Officers would habitually return to the police station for further assignments or would patrol whilst awaiting radio assignments. Decisions on deployment were made centrally in response to public demands. Police officers preferred to be directed by radio than to intervene in an incident on their own initiative whilst on patrol.

(6) Both officially at policy level and within police culture the public were not considered to have a part to play in the policing of BRIXTON.

(7) The lowest level of official autonomy or decision making was at Chief Inspector rank. Inspectors, Sergeants and Constables were expected by the system to comply with the comprehensive rules and rigid procedures laid down. In effect, these ranks had all merged into a common work group, with little evidence of management or supervision. Deployment and procedures as prescribed, were almost impossible to achieve.

At this point in the analysis it is clear that a 1st LEVEL, Response Policing System did exist. The next analysis of the Performance Measures will now assess the efficiency and effectiveness of that system.
4. 6.2. DEMAND FOR SERVICE:
In March 1983, HIGH and MEDIUM Demand areas constituted over a third of the total geographical area and were responsible for over 75% of the total demands or calls for service. Approximately one third of the geographical areas all of the HIGH demand and the majority of the MEDIUM demand, was classified as HOSTILE (-2 or -3). Less than a sixth was considered SUPPORTIVE (+3 or +2), the remainder was APATHETIC.

It was estimated that a little over 20% of Brixton public had required police assistance in the last twelve months. This ratio was one of, if not the highest in Britain at that time.

4. 6.3. POLICE RESOURCES
4. 6.3.1. Buildings
Brixton Police Station was built in 1958 and opened on 5th January 1959. Although it was less than 30 years old and therefore one of London's newest police stations, it was woefully inadequate for the policing requirements of Brixton in 1981. The major problems were as follows:-

(i) Very restricted facilities in the front office dealing with the public calling at the station for service. For example, waiting, seating and interview facilities could not cope with the public demand which sometimes led to queues in the street outside.
(ii) Totally inadequate cells and charging facilities for prisoners. This sometimes required three to four prisoners for single cell. In addition a charge room had not been included in the original design of the building and required an entrance corridor to the cells to be converted into a tiny charge room.

(iii) Lack of office space, briefing rooms, charging, refreshment, toilet and storage facilities for all police and civilian staff, leading to severe overcrowding.

(iv) The police station yard was too small to even accommodate the police vehicles allocated to the station. No 'on street' parking was available.

Remembering that the building was in use 24 hours per day and grossly overcrowded for the majority of that time, the building had become very shoddy and even squalid.

After 1981, a major re-building programme was planned to be completed by 1986. However, in the short term, the reality of the situation was that without any significant improvements, by 1983 the number of police and civilians using the existing building had increased by over a third.
In summary, despite the relative newness of the building it was totally inadequate for its purpose and overwhelmed by the volume of work and use it was subjected to.

4 6.3.2 Equipment
Apart from the police building, the only other significant equipment available to the police at Brixton were vehicles and communication/radio equipment. Very little technology, office systems or labour saving equipment was available during either survey.

Information systems, with a single exception, did not exist. Not only between the environment and the system, but also inside the system between the various functions. No investment, technical or human, had been made at the police station, nor was there an understanding or acceptance that such systems were essential to any police system.

This system was closed, responding only to the immediate powerful demands of the environment. It did not utilise feedback from the public customers of its service, or information regarding its effectiveness. This system remained static and rigid, bound in tradition and culture as a classic 'closed organised system'.
Communication equipment at Brixton was also a problem. All telephone calls from the public and between police were routed through one old, inadequate switchboard, operated by a single telephonist. In 1981 the first analysis had highlighted this problem and it was then found that up to half of the available lines were persistently defective due to the age of the equipment.

This situation and equipment still remained in 1983, but by then was the subject of increasing complaints by the general public and the local Police Consultative Group.

Brixton was supplied with 58 personal radios in 1981, by 1983 this had been increased to 83 radios. However, in both analysis it was found that over 30% of radios were always awaiting repair due to the lack of adequate repair facilities. This resulted in significant numbers of officers not having radios when patrolling. None of the radios supplied were suitable for use by plain clothes officers.

Supply, maintenance and repair of police equipment was the responsibility of different branches of the organisation. Despite the best of intentions these separate branches had little or no co-ordination or communication between them. When compared to the existing military communications at that time, police operational communications and equipment were old, inadequate and insufficient.
In 1980, prior to the riot, Brixton had three 'Panda' cars withdrawn as a result of central policy decisions to 'return more officers to the streets'. It should be noted that this decision was made without research or adequate analysis as to its effects. The results for Brixton were that the number of police vehicles was reduced to seven, five in police livery and two unmarked vehicles.

It is not possible to analyse precisely the effects of this reduction, due to lack of suitable data. However the perception of the public and the police was that service to the public and assistance to officers and trouble were seriously affected. The available data support this to some extent.

By 1983, after the riot, the number of vehicles at Brixton had increased to seventeen, perhaps supporting the earlier perception of insufficient vehicles. Five of the additional vehicles were suitable for use by plain clothes officers. One problem with these vehicles was that they quickly became known to local criminals, reducing their effectiveness. Unfortunately, rotating or exchanging these vehicles with other police stations was very difficult because of internal bureaucratic procedures for vehicles. In addition, maintenance and repair procedures for all vehicles could result in up to a third of Brixton vehicles not being available for operational use.
4. 6.3.3. **Human Resources and Attitudes**

In November 1981, a very basic attitude and opinion survey of Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors was undertaken. (N.P. Report 1982). This survey identified the following as being of major concern of these officers at that time in the following priority:

1) High risk of public disorder
2) High crime rate
3) Difficulty in identifying and arresting criminals
4) High work load
5) Disaffected minority groups
6) Lack of support in sections of the community
7) Working in a high stress situation for long periods
8) Exposure to the media which was often highly critical
9) A conflict of objectives in seeking to enforce the law whilst maintaining a fragile peace.

A major concern in the conclusion of this survey was the apparent low morale and high levels of stress exhibited by the officers interviewed.

In March 1983, a more comprehensive survey was undertaken, including significant samples of all officers at the station (A2(3) Report 1983A):-
Almost all officers (95%) thought the present buildings and facilities did not meet the demands in the station area very well. Four in five thought this of the present supply of vehicles and half thought this of radio equipment. Officers were least critical about the level of manpower. Three quarters felt that the existing number of officers met demands either very well or fairly well.

Asked about the relative merits of re-organisation and increase in resources, half the officers thought an increase in resources to be the more effective policy. Just under half thought re-organisation to be more effective.

Although four in five officers considered that present training prepared officers to a certain extent for the problems they meet, eight out of ten said they would like to see changes in the present system of training. Asked about a list of seven subjects covered in training, most officers favoured an increase in five of them.

Three in four officers said that they found it quite difficult or very difficult to get information they needed on local problems and resources. Four in five saw possible benefits in having sufficient information available on computer although quite a large proportion (almost half) saw possible snags in this.
Four in five officers expressed satisfaction with the type of advice and guidance they got from their immediate supervisors. However, many thought supervisors should spend more time giving advice of this sort. A third of officers thought sergeants and inspectors should spend more time giving advice to constables.

Over half the officers said their supervisors spent too little time or no time at all asking for their opinions and suggestions. A third said this regarding advice and encouragement.

Almost all officers thought it important for constables, sergeants and inspectors to meet regularly and exchange ideas and information. Most thought there was a fair amount of chance for this to happen.

The majority of officers considered that senior officers did understand the problems that police officers in Brixton had to deal with although only one in seven believed that they fully understood. Four in ten officers thought the present lines of communication with senior ranks were not very good or not at all good.

Roughly half of the officers thought departments communicated with difficulty. An additional fifth thought there was a total lack of communication between departments. Conversely, a third of officers felt that departments communicated without difficulty. It appeared that uniformed patrol constables had the most difficulty.
When asked about levels of morale in the station, half opted for saying it was sometimes high and sometimes low. The majority of the remainder considered morale to be always or mostly low.

Most officers saw offending, particularly offending against property, as very common in the Brixton area. Two thirds thought the police could cope with the present level of street crime in the area only with difficulty. Nearly a third thought street crime has risen beyond their capacity to cope.

Most officers thought the local public placed a fairly high importance on police performance of quite a wide range of tasks, particularly answering emergency calls and detecting offenders. Just over half the officers considered that the public were fairly satisfied with police performance and most of the remainder (a third) believed that the public were not very satisfied.

The majority of officers - three quarters - saw the public in the area as not very co-operative or not at all co-operative with the police.

Almost all officers favoured encouraging local residents to look after each other and show more concern for their area. Opinions varied regarding what effect an increased use of volunteers would have on police workload. Most officers thought the level of actual police...
involvement in schemes should stay as it is at present. Indirect involvement such as referring victims and giving advice when requested were the preferred police roles.

However, when a specific example was provided of the public actually volunteering to help police a negative reaction was discovered. There was a tendency for most officers to think somewhat poorly of specials in the station with half the officers seeing bad points about having specials and two thirds considering relations with them to be poor.

Over half the officers said they would be very or fairly willing to run a crime prevention scheme or take part in a residents' association meeting. Officers were most unwilling to help run youth clubs and to give talks on self-defence.

The majority of officers thought that the amount of time spent on school liaison work should stay as it was, which as previously shown, was very poorly resourced by Police. However, almost two thirds of officers said that they personally would be fairly willing or very willing to give talks to children in schools. Nearly all officers agreed that the police need the help of schools and parents to deal with the problem of juveniles.

A majority of officers indicated that they thought that working with social agencies was
important in dealing with common problems and an even greater majority favoured more discussion with the local public about policing problems.

The vast majority of officers thought that police in Brixton spent most of their time reacting to problems and that trying to prevent problems before they arise would be a more effective way of dealing with crime. Two thirds felt that the police could do more to prevent problems before they arise.

Once again however, when offered a practical example of how this could be achieved; most officers, especially those currently working on patrol, favoured working on relief with no continuing responsibility for a particular beat or area over working on one with such responsibility.

4. 6.3.4. Results of Surveys

The picture which emerged from this survey was one of confusion. There was a theoretical understanding by the majority of officers of the issues involved and their possible solutions. Unfortunately, despite the agreement that change was necessary, it was strongly resisted at the practical level. It was also apparent that officers did not understand 'cause and effect' in the policing methods currently employed. Being unfamiliar with information systems and feedback they did not clearly understand how systems, methods and organisational changes could improve the existing problem situation.
These deficiencies are perhaps best illustrated by the virtual ignoring of the third vital resource available to Brixton, the public themselves. Out of an establishment of 69 volunteer Special Constables, there were actually only 16. Encouragement, resources and practical steps to improve this situation were not forthcoming, perhaps not surprising in view of the police attitude towards these public volunteers.

Similarly, although considering school liaison, multi-agency co-operation and crime prevention to be vitally important areas for the public to assist police, there was a marked reluctance to increase the meagre police resources presently invested in these areas. As a result of this lack of investment, the potential of public resources was not exploited and even considered unrealistic by the police themselves.

4.6.4. RESOURCES TO DEMANDS
The major resources of Brixton Police Station were the human resources of the police officers and civilians working there. As has been previously explained, the most predictive data was the number of uniformed patrolling constables, therefore this will be dealt with first.

In the three years prior to 1981 the number of constables had fluctuated between 170 and 185, never reaching the authorised establishment of 190. For some months prior to April 1981 the number had averaged 172, which will be used as the figure for calculating the minimum Response Level for 1st Level policing.
It was established from the response message data that a minimum of 40 constables per day were required to deal with the service demands from the public. No allowance was made for direct demands to an officer on patrol because at that time those appeared almost negligible.

The number of constables required (40) then had to be doubled to allow for a 50% normal abstraction rate and duties off the police station area (e.g. aid to other stations, court, etc., = 80 officers).

Essential posts inside the police station had to be manned 24 hours per day and, using Home Office formulas, was calculated at 32 officers per day.

It was therefore calculated that the minimum response level in April 1981 was 112 uniformed constables per day.

However, on examination of the actual response deployment on the streets suggested that due to the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL and the high proportion of HOSTILE areas, from which the majority of the demands originated, additional factors had to be included. During the peak demand times, single officers could not be allowed to deal with incidents and between 2 - 6 officers were assigned to each incident wherever possible.

This type of deployment has now been included in the formula, usually requiring additional officers in the street operational calculation (approximately one third more) i.e. 30 officers, 112 + 30 = 142 Constables required.
Unfortunately this calculation depends on adequate vehicle support in order to move the additional manpower effectively and efficiently to the various demand requests. At Brixton, three street operational vehicles had been removed and analysing the data suggests that there was actually a requirement for 60 extra constables (two thirds). If this figure were accepted it would have increased the minimum response level in April 1981 to 172 uniformed constables per day.

Once again, an examination of the deployment data at that time showed that 52 uniformed constables were in fact removed from operational uniform response duties and employed on various specialist functions (squads etc). This resulted in 120 constables actually being available for response work.

The abstraction total at Brixton exceeded the suggested fifth of resources and nearly totalled a third of the resources.

This serious shortfall in manpower resources was made far worse by the inefficient deployment policies which had approximately the same number of officers on duty at all times of the day regardless of the actual demand profile. In addition, local practices had been allowed to develop which abstracted officers for training courses etc., when they were posted to the 'late turn' periods (3 p.m. - 11 p.m.) which were also the peak demand periods. This often resulted in there being less officers than normal on duty at peak demand times.
In March 1983, the situation had altered dramatically. Since December 1981, there had been approximately 265 constables attached to the station, which will be taken as the average for the minimum Response Level calculation;

It is estimated for the response data that a minimum of 44 constables per day were required to deal with the service demands from the public. Officers were now dealing with more incidents direct without waiting for station assignment, but these incidents were usually recorded on the message data so required no extra demand allowance. (Often assistance or other services were required).

Number doubled for abstraction = 88 constables
Plus 32 inside posts = 120 constables
Plus 60 for HOSTILE areas = 180 constables

Minimum response level = 180 constables
Additional 50 constables for specialist duties = 230 constables.

Due to the increased potential for spontaneous disorder in 1982 - 83, constables calculated for HOSTILE areas had to remain at 60, despite the increase in vehicles for first response. The remaining 35 constables were divided between the various duties, in particular peacekeeping duties when disorder problems were expected. Unfortunately, due to the lack of effective information and control systems, there were still a significant number of occasions when insufficient constables were on duty at peak demand times.

In addition, in support of the Reactive Spiral hypothesis and as detailed in the Demand Analysis crimes and public demands continued to rise virtually unchecked despite the massive increase in manpower resources.
With regard to the civilian resources, in 1981 these were recognised as being insufficient. There was an authorised establishment for 46 civilian support staff but the actual numbers were an average 30% below this establishment.

By 1983 this shortfall had been reduced to 20% and a staff review had recommended an additional 6 civilian staff were required due to workloads. Unfortunately due to policy restraints this increase was unable to be authorised.

In conclusion, the basic manpower requirements for a 1st LEVEL Response policing system were not fulfilled in 1981 due to the high abstraction rate from uniform patrol duties. Similarly, in 1983, more than significant resources existed, but the ability to match these resources to demand requirements and patterns, did not.

Despite the adequate manpower and vehicle resources; due to lack of resource planning, deployment of resources to meet demands, information systems and local procedures, there were still numerous occasions when there were insufficient officers to meet the peak demands. In addition there was little attempt to place officers in the areas which were known to have the highest demand.

The concept of resource management, not surprisingly in this type of information vacuum was almost alien to the running of Brixton police station. There was almost a naive helplessness regarding the existence or not of the resources required.

Consequently, despite the more than adequate manpower and some other resources, the police 1st LEVEL Response system was still unable to be effective and efficient in matching resources to demand in March 1983.
4. 6.5. INCIDENT HANDLING

The practice of grading or deferring calls was not recognised as official police policy between 1981 and 1983. Consequently all calls for service were expected to be dealt with as soon as possible. It was considered inefficient to hand calls over to another relief at the end of a tour of duty.

The majority of emergency calls would be answered in under two minutes. Officers responded very quickly to the most urgent calls, particularly when individual officers required assistance.

Unfortunately, many public emergency calls were reclassified by police as 'non-urgent' due to pressure of work at peak demand times. Many non-urgent demands were then effectively not answered, as officers were reluctant to hand over nonanswered calls to another relief.

The average number of officers required to deal with the first response to all calls, due to non-deferment, was found to be 3.5 officers.

Outside peak demand times, the average time to complete each incident was 2.5 hours. However, in peak demand times this could be reduced to below 50 minutes. Incidents were either incorrectly dealt with or ignored in order to achieve these reduced times. The incident levels per individual officer at peak demand times reflected a similar finding and were not possible to achieve.
Little attempt was made to plan and deploy an appropriate response to individual demands. Whoever was available, or willing, was expected to deal, even when it was clear a specialist unit would be preferable.

4. 6.6. QUALITY OF SERVICE
An examination of police records revealed a very low standard of incident recording with significant amounts of information not obtained or recorded properly.

Similarly when the accuracy levels were examined, mistakes were common and up to 40% of incidents recorded contained mistakes. Progress reports were invariably not provided to victims.

Examination of the police records and victim interviews, indicated that correct procedures were rarely followed. Officers when interviewed, agreed with these findings and disclosed in many cases that they did not know the required procedures or referrals.

When victims, who had received police service, were interviewed they tended to be critical of police behaviour. They considered that a majority of officers were disinterested and only concerned to obtain basic details and then leave as soon as possible. A voluntary Victim Support Group in Brixton reported similar views and experiences.

Expressions of public thanks by letter etc., were minimal and invariably referred to a small consistent group of officers.
4. 6.7. **RESULTS OF ANALYSIS**

In summary, a basic 1st LEVEL Response policing service did exist in Brixton in 1983. Unfortunately, the system had limited effectiveness and efficiency, as has been described. However, it is important to remember that the performance measures used for analysis did not exist outside the project at that time. There were in fact no local or force performance measures in existence which would have enabled this type of judgment to be made about the system. In addition, even if there had been, the information required was not collected and would have been difficult to obtain.

It is now required to establish if a 2nd LEVEL, Squad Policing System existed at Brixton. The analysis has already indicated that a very high proportion of manpower resources were allocated to specialist, functional duties. Evidence to date has indicated that maintaining an effective 2nd LEVEL system requires the foundation of an efficient 1st LEVEL policing system.

7. **2nd LEVEL SQUAD POLICING**

Definition Analysis; It was apparent that a number of police teams or squads did exist which specialised mainly in a priority demand. Their objective was to be effective in reducing this demand.

4. 7.1. **FEATURES ANALYSIS**

1. All of the squads or teams were explicitly task and function based. However it was apparent that single objectives were not always clear. There were robbery and drug squads, but there were also 'crime' squads whose objectives were apparently multiple.
2. As has been indicated the Squad system was not supported by an effective Response policing system. In fact the 2nd LEVEL system had abstracted nearly one third of the available manpower resources at Constable level.

3. Although the squads were intended to deal with high fear crime and organised or group crime, an analysis of their actual work revealed that very few results in these areas were achieved. Arrests tended to be of a random operational nature, rather than planned operations.

4. Once again, with very few exceptions, the squads were not directed effectively against individuals or premises/locations.

5. It was clear that the squads had little preventive effect when judged against the yearly increase in crime reported.

6. The squads were formed directly in response to demands that were perceived by the police to be out of control by normal policing methods.

7. In theory the squads all had high levels of autonomy and in comparison to uniformed response officers, they did have. However they were often used as a central resource for numerous tasks other than their objective. In addition, if they managed to achieved their objective, the resulting paperwork, administration and court appearance, rendered them inoperative for considerable periods of time. In fact their autonomy was an illusion and not a practical reality.
8. The squads had virtually no equipment, radios and appropriate vehicles being the most obvious deficiencies. This lack of suitable equipment appeared to be a major element in the success or failure of any 2nd LEVEL system.

9. In the area of crime, there did exist a reasonably effective information system via the Collator system. However the system was not effective at producing intelligence from the information. It was largely left to the skills of the individual officer to analyse the information available. Once again lack of manpower and suitable resources reduced effectiveness in this area.

10. It was found that each squad or team was virtually self-contained with little meaningful contact or information exchange with any other group police or public. This isolation between the functional teams or squads was diagnosed as one of the major information weaknesses in the Police Station. The CID and the uniform officers traditionally maintain different cultures and objectives which in itself was a serious barrier to effectiveness. Even worse however, within the uniform and CID groups additional functional splits created even more barriers. The most extreme example of this process was the isolation of the Home Beat Constables from virtually everybody else in the strictly divided and segregated police station.
4. 7.2. RESULT OF ANALYSIS

By 1983, as a result of the 1981 analysis manpower had been significantly increased and specialist squads manpower abstractions had decreased to approximately one fifth of the total Constables available. However, an effective Response service was still not maintained in 1983. This again was due to inefficient deployment and abstraction rates caused by lack of information systems.

In 1982, specialist crime squads working to the type of performance measures outlined in Chapter 3. were introduced to work at BRIXTON, mainly on drug related crime. Unfortunately by 1983 these small squads were expected to service over twenty police stations and became a centrally directed resource. In effect services to BRIXTON became negligible and the BRIXTON based squads did not adopt similar performance measures.

There was no doubt from the analysis that although a number of 2nd LEVEL features did exist in 1981 - 83, there were insufficient to maintain a stable system. In conclusion, a Squad Policing system did not exist.

What is now required is an analysis to determine if any elements of a 3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing system are present. Remembering that after March 1983, it was intended to implement such a policing system.

4. 8. 3rd LEVEL GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING

4. 8.1. DEFINITION ANALYSIS.

Even if the 'defined geographical area' were stretched to its limit and accepted at the total area covered by BRIXTON Police Station, then it would still not be provided with police service by a stable team of officers with low functional divisions of task.
Total staff turnover at Brixton was estimated to be in excess of one third per year, averaged at all levels. In addition, operational street officers were not effectively posted to beats, or small geographical areas for long enough periods to develop some measure of knowledge and control. In practice almost all operational officers at Brixton reacted to events from any location on the area. Policing at the station was reactive and predominantly time based.

Functional divisions were also highly developed by organisational structure and in police attitudes. Even response street policing had developed into a narrow functional task of attending the scene and leaving as soon as possible. As was illustrated in the Environmental Analysis incidents, members of the public assisting the police were so rare that it was considered abnormal by both police and public.

4. 8.2. FEATURES ANALYSIS

1. There was a very low investment in preventive policing. One, full time Crime Prevention Officer provided advice to businesses and the general public on mainly physical target hardening. In addition, there were services provided by a Community Relations Chief Inspector, who appeared effective but was shared between four police stations and therefore a limited resource. Analysis of patrolling street officers behaviour failed to observe significant levels of preventive behaviour in every day operational policing. It was estimated that less than 1% of the total resources were invested in preventive policing.
2. No multiple objective teams could be found, even the operational street teams (relief) had developed response policing into a functional task. They had little concept of the wider implications of any demand they dealt with.

3. Functional divisions were the norm and actively encouraged as a method of dealing with any new problem or an old problem that had become unmanageable.

4. Of the 170 - 185 uniformed Constables, only 14 were geographically based. These officers were Home Beat Constables posted for extended periods to a beat working to their own daily roster. It was difficult to quantify the actual work of these officers; they handled very few response demands and appeared almost totally detached from the everyday work of the Police Station. Their actual work may have been preventive, but this was ad hoc and not part of any planned local strategy. The remaining officers were all time based and function based.

5. The policy of public involvement, reflected force culture at that time, a rejection of public involvement. The public were constantly advised 'to leave it to the professional police'. This culture was particularly evident at BRIXTON. Few if any resources were allocated as can perhaps be illustrated by the reduction to sixteen Special Constables, compared to the authorised establishment of sixty nine.
6. There were no geographic supervisors and almost all the effective decisions on resource deployment were made by Chief Inspectors and above. Although, a significant proportion of these types of decisions were actually made by central policy and demands outside the Police Station.

7. In addition to their lack of authority over resources, almost all decisions on staff and policing tactics were removed from operational Sergeants and Inspectors.

8. In practical terms, information systems did not exist in an effective form. Information on criminals was 'collated' by one officer and a civilian, which if used properly could be effective in certain circumstances. Pre-planning of resource deployment was undertaken by one officer on behalf of the Chief Inspector Operations. However, this deployment virtually excluded all data on past deployment and was invariably inaccurate on the actual day. Apart from these limited exceptions, no effective information or predictive systems existed.

9. As described in this analysis, the police manpower resources were in fact above minimum 'Response Level' but, the heavy functional devolvement, high abstraction rate and inefficient match of manpower resources to demands resulted in minimum manning not being achieved at peak demand times.
10. At the time of the first analysis, Environmental Potential linked to Directed Patrolling did not exist as a practice or a concept.

4.8.3. RESULT OF ANALYSIS
In 1983, very little had changed, with the exception that instead of a maximum of 185 uniformed Constables the number of Constables had risen to 265. However, none of the other features had significantly changed. Most importantly, there were still times when minimum manning levels were not maintained at peak demand times.

This serious deficiency, despite the massive increase in resources was suggested to be partly a result of the absence of information systems. Increased resources in isolation would not appear to be the solution to the Police Spiral.

It was clear from the analysis that a 3rd LEVEL, Geographical Policing System did not exist in March 1983. In addition police policy, procedure, behaviour and culture were strongly against the implementation and maintenance of such a system of policing.

4.9. THE POLICE SPIRAL
Finally, perhaps an examination of the Police Spiral at Brixton Police Station in 1983 will help to focus on the more serious deficiencies of that policing system.

4.9.1. POLICE RESOURCE
As indicated above, the total available resources were sufficient to provide an adequate 1st and 2nd LEVEL policing system. In addition, there was a vast untapped of public resources which were not used or even considered by police.
4. 9.2. POLICE SYSTEM

The Police Station was almost totally closed to feedback from the general public or street level operational officers. Only central directions from higher levels of the police bureaucracy produced responses from the police station. The System can best be described as simplistic, rigid, closed, reactive in the short term and functionally orientated with increasing bias towards centralisation of decision making.

Working in opposition to this process, almost as a reaction against it, was a street level 'anarchy' which took advantage of the inappropriate bureaucratic structure, by redefining policy and practice.

4. 9.3. INFORMATION SYSTEM

In essence, there were no effective information system. Some attempts were made to collect and collate information, but this data was not analysed and turned into predictive intelligence.

4. 9.4. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

No structure or systems for resource management existed. It was clear that even senior police officers at the police station were unable to improve this type of management in the absence of a supporting information system.

4. 10. SUMMARY

Both the Police and the Environmental Spiral have been considered in relation to the data and analysis of Brixton Division during the period 1981 to 1983. The picture which has emerged is of an urban environment and a police system, both in various degrees of decay. Perhaps what is now required in this summary is an examination of the effects on the core Reactive Spiral, to establish if this has been significantly affected by conditions and events at Brixton.
4. 10.1 **THE REACTIVE SPIRAL**

4. 10.1.1. **Crime and Conflict (Demand):**
During 1980 - 81, the Demand on the individual police officers and the total police station at Brixton, were estimated by the project team to be amongst the highest, if not the highest in Britain.

By 1983, in theory, this workload should have reduced for the individual officer, due to increased manpower. However due to failings in the existing police system, a significant proportion of officers appeared to have little work, whilst the remainder continued to have heavy workloads.

At the macro level the levels of crime and conflict appeared to have increased in all categories between 24% and 43% between 1980 and 1982/3.

The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL for increased levels of crime and conflict was very high. It could be predicted that the preceding increases would continue at least and probably be expanded to even higher percentages.

4. 10.1.2. **Police Reactive Services:**
The nature of the service provided by Brixton Police Officers could only be described as reactive. Police were found to be almost exclusively reacting to public demands, either
at the direct request of the public or as a result of public behaviour in an officer's presence, which forced a police intervention. In support of earlier hypothesis, public demand for this type of public service appeared almost insatiable. Despite the obvious increase in police capacity to provide this reactive service after 1981, they were still unable to satisfy the spiralling public demands.

4. 10.1.3. Police Resources:
Research and experience in the project showed that the most important and predictive police resource required by any police system were the number of uniformed constables attached to a police station. At Brixton the authorised establishment of uniformed constables was 190. However in 1980 and 1981 prior to the riot in April, the actual number of constables was always below this level, sometimes as low as 170 constables.

When the manpower resources required for a 1st LEVEL Response Policing System were calculated prior to April 1981 it was found that the numbers of uniformed constables at that time as deployed, were totally inadequate for even that basic police system. Interviews with police officers revealed that during this period police were only able to respond to the most urgent demands and ignored all others at peak high demand times.
After April 1981 and the Brixton Riots the manpower levels were immediately increased to over 300 constables but by 1982 had stabilised at approximately 265 uniformed constables. These manpower resources were sufficient to provide an adequate 1st LEVEL Police System and even an additional effective 2nd LEVEL system, had it not been for equipment and organisational problems.

4. 10.1.4 Police Preventive Services;

Prior to April 1981 dedicated police preventive services were limited to one full time Crime Prevention Officer and a number of 2nd LEVEL Squad policing initiatives of the 'SWAMP' Catagory (SCARMAN 1981). At this time a 2nd LEVEL Squad Police System was being attempted without an adequate foundation of 1st LEVEL Response Policing and was considered by both police and public in subsequent interviews to be a contributor to the April riots. Police were seen as unable to provide a basic service and yet were perceived as being selective and discriminatory in their Squad operations. The preventive aspect of Squad policing appeared to be marginal in this type of environment and at these resource levels and definitely represented a public conflict risk.

After April 1981, when the police manpower resources became more realistic, a more effective 1st LEVEL and 2nd LEVEL policing system was introduced. Unfortunately, despite
the increased manpower crime and general demands continued to rise dramatically. In 1983 for example, street robbery and theft increased by 66%.

It is suggested that at the macro level of the Reactive Spiral, the lack of effective preventive police strategies, despite the increased manpower, failed to reduce demands on police. In essence the Spiral was only speeded up with more officers beginning to cope less and less adequately with more demand.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING, IMPLEMENTATION

5. 1. THE SYSTEM
The Problem Situation outlined in Chapter 4 concluded that the majority of the problems described were system based, in police structure and organisational design. It was also suggested by the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL analysis and predictions, that 1st and 2nd LEVEL policing systems would be inadequate for the effective policing of Brixton in the Autumn of 1983.

In support of this decision, Brixton was provided with a written package describing the essential elements and features of such a system. For a number of organisational and practical reasons the concepts and elements of a Geographical policing system were presented in a different manner to the outline provided in Chapter 3. However, the objectives, features and performance measures were identical to those already described.

The 'ideal' end states of the system were presented as three interlinked Goals (Fig. 5. 1). Beginning with an initial priority of achieving a contract between the public and the police system, they jointly attempted to stabilise demands for police service. This type of achievement was then suggested to assist in improving the public's Quality of Life. These improvements would then enhance the effectiveness and commitment to the original Police Public Contact, encouraging even higher levels of joint achievement.

These goals were explained to be long term and very difficult to achieve. They were ideals that were consistently being strived for and only able to be achieved in a limited way each year.
In the short term however, there were objectives that could be achieved and significant progress could be made within short periods of time. These objectives were presented in a sequence which helped to illustrate the links and interaction between each objective. (Fig. 5. 2).
Fig. 5.2.
First a Geographical Policing system had to be implemented at the police station with all the various structural and organisational changes required. This police system had to include an effective Police and Public Information and Planning network as a major priority. Once these systems were effective it would then be possible to plan and implement a Joint Policing Strategy, including both the Police and the Public.

This Strategy would have three major objectives:

1. **Resource Management**, where the total police and public resources were planned against the total demands for police service.

2. **Conflict Management**, where the specific service for victims of conflict and its prevention were planned.

3. **Crime Management**, where the specific service for victims of crime and its prevention were planned.

This type of activity would then lead to the actual Resource Deployment of the planned resources in the way decided by the Joint Policy Strategy.

The success or failure of the various deployments would be evaluated and fed back through the Police and Public Network in order that an improved Joint Policing Strategy could be devised. All of the objectives described were designed in the long term to contribute towards the long term goals in Fig.5.1).
Police officers at Brixton now required a descriptive framework of a 3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing System which was comprehensive yet sufficiently flexible to allow them substantial involvement in the planning and implementation of such a system. This was achieved by providing them with the descriptive package outlined below, which was entitled 'Neighbourhood Policing'.

5.2. THE MODEL 'NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING'

In order to establish a systematic framework for this change in police methods, a model for the implementation of Neighbourhood Police was illustrated in diagrammatic form (Fig. 5.3) as described below:

A 'Organisational function and structure' consists of elements designed to re-organise a police station in order to fully utilise resources and thus increase the quality of service to the public.

AA 'Response to immediate problems' recognises the need to continue to police an area in the best possible way, whilst planning and reorganisation is taking place.

The organisational changes described above provided the essential framework for the next stages of implementation (Boxes B and BB).

B 'Information Improvement' was directed at implementing a comprehensive police/public information system in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of local policing strategies.

BB 'Resource Management' suggested ways in which existing police resources could be used in order to introduce resource flexibility and reallocation into preventive policing.
The Information Improvement and Demand Management boxes had to be undertaken simultaneously before the emphasis on implementation changes to crime prevention and peacekeeping in Box C, the ultimate aims of Neighbourhood Policing.

'Crime Prevention and Peacekeeping' described strategies and methods whereby police officers could involve the public in 'self policing' activities designed to prevent crime and conflict in local communities.

'Planning and evaluation' was a continual process which ensured that the change process was implemented and managed in the best possible way.

It should be emphasised that the package was a TOTAL POLICING SYSTEM where each separate element is designed to fit in with other parts of the police system, thereby ensuring a co-ordinated, systematic approach to the task of policing. In addition, the continual planning and evaluation ensures that the system remains dynamic, changing and adapting to the environment.

Once a decision had been made to implement Neighbourhood Policing at a Police Station, it was estimated that it could be implemented within a minimum period of twelve months. It should however be noted that extremely high levels of motivation and management skill would be required for such an achievement.

Experience at other sites had shown that an extended implementation period was both acceptable and sometimes preferred by the police and the public. The whole process was supported by a force Project Team, established to direct and co-ordinate implementation.
ELEMENTS AND TASKS OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING SYSTEM

A ORGANISATIONAL FUNCTION & STRUCTURE

A1 Set up Training Team
A2 Set up Divisional Management Team
A3 Set up Working Party
A4 Set up Divisional Information Unit
A5 Training I
A6 Brief Profiles
A7 Geographic Responsibilities for Inspectors
A8 Develop/Write Sector/Plans
A9 Information to Public
A10 Relief Teams
A11 Permanent Duly Officers
A12 Identify/Train/Deco Dedi Communications Officers

AA RESPONSE TO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS

AA1 Directed Patrolling I
AA2 Conflict Reduction
AA3 Crime Reduction

B INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT

B1 Divisional Information & Intelligence Unit
B2 Management Information System
B3 Crime Analysis
B4 Public Launch of R.P.
B5 Public Information Network

BB RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

BB1 Geographic Responsibility for Sergeants/Constables
BB2 Police/Public Contact Points
BB3 Crime Investigation System
BB4 C.I.D. T and S Team
BB5 Resource Management
BB6 Sector Working Parties
BB7 Crime Management
BB8 Alignment of Admin
BB9 Conflict Management
BB10 Special Constabulary
BB11 Graded Response to Demands
BB12 Directed Patrolling II

C CRIME PREVENTION & PEACEKEEPING

C1 Training II
C2 Victim Support
C3 Inter Agency Co-operation
C4 Community Involvement
C5 Crime Prevention
C6 Conflict Prevention
C7 Schools Liaison
C8 Police/Public Contract

D PLANNING AND EVALUATION

12 Months (approx.)
The remainder of this section describes more fully each of the individual sections (Boxes A, AA, B. BB and C), together with a brief summary of each individual element (i.e. A1, A2) and its function within the overall Neighbourhood Policing System.

As far as possible, the descriptions are identical to those given to Brixton Police Station in March 1983 and therefore have been left in the present tense. However, a small number of elements were redesigned; i.e. Resource, Crime and Conflict Management, due to in situ development by the station itself. Sector Working Parties were unique to Brixton and introduced as a local initiative some time after the initial implementation.
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<td>Set up Training Team.</td>
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<td>A3</td>
<td>Set up Working Party.</td>
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<td>A4</td>
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<td>A5</td>
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<td>A6</td>
<td>Beat Profiles.</td>
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<td>A7</td>
<td>Geographic Responsibilities for Inspectors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Develop/Write Sector Plans.</td>
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<td>A9</td>
<td>Information to Public.</td>
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<td>A10</td>
<td>Relief Teams.</td>
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<td>A11</td>
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<tr>
<td>A12</td>
<td>Identify/Train/Employ Dedicated Communications Officers.</td>
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</table>
5.3 ORGANISATIONAL FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE (A)

The aim is to make internal changes in the running of a Police Station in order to make it more efficient, but also more responsive to a fast changing social environment. New ideas and methods are introduced by way of a training package to ensure that all officers and civilians at a station clearly understand what is required from them.

A Divisional Management Structure is introduced which is based on the objective of participation and enhanced responsibilities at constable level, particularly in relation to operational street policing and its support. An information system is established which provides adequate information and data for planning by this management structure.

Operational street officers are organised on a team basis linked to defined geographical areas. These officers are required to plan and implement effective short and long term policing strategy.

A1 Set up Training Team

The broad extent of the change caused by the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing necessitates a Divisional training team which is responsible for initially, introducing Divisional personnel to the organisational changes and subsequently to new professional skills and attitudes.

The team comprises an Inspector, Sergeant and Constable from the same division, for Neighbourhood Policing theory recommends decentralised on-site training designed to meet the individual needs of officers and their divisions.
The Inspector has a dual role, not only co-ordinating all training but also acting as a change agent. He acts as a mediator and link between the project team and the division, for the process of change itself creates difficulties that need careful and sensitive management. Unless the change is correctly managed the problems generated will obscure the direction of practical implementation of the project, resulting in local resistance.

A2 Divisional Management

A shorter, more efficient management chain operating within a framework of consultation and participation, which exchanges information through meetings between officers of different ranks organised into teams. This rests on five concepts:

1. It reduces the number of levels through which information must pass to improve communication.

2. By using an interlocking method of ensuring that at least one member of each team is represented on the level above or below, participation is widely spread.

3. Organising each level into teams has the effect of pooling differing talents and skills.

4. It introduces a control mechanism whereby delegation and co-ordination of tasks fall on named individuals.
5. The whole process has an inbuilt monitoring and evaluation mechanism so that individuals and groups can measure results achieved and make more objective assessments.

Research and experience have shown that participation by means of discussion and debate, the examination of options and proposals, and the explanation of decisions, act as a powerful unifying factor. This participation encourages the free flow of communication from the top to the bottom of the management chain, without undermining discipline or order within the force.

The teams are described below and shown in the diagram overleaf:–

(a) The District Management Team headed by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) and Commander of the Area and composed of the District Chief Superintendent, Detective Chief Superintendent, and all Divisional Chief Superintendents. Whilst the District Management team is really a tool of the Area rather than the Divisional Management, the interlocking principle ensures that it is directly connected with Divisional Management through the Divisional Chief Superintendent.

(b) The Divisional Management team headed by the Chief Superintendent and composed of the Detective Superintendent (where posted), Detective Chief Inspector, Superintendent, Chief Inspector Operations, Chief Inspector Administration, Detective Inspector and all relief (or shift) Inspectors. This team deals with all Divisional policy and planning.
Fig. 5. 4.
(c) The Relief (or Shift) team headed by the Relief (or shift) Inspector and composed of his Sergeants and Constables as well as Permanent Beat Officers. In the case of the C.I.D. it refers to the Detective Inspector, Detective Sergeant and Detective Constables.

The adoption of real rather than facade participation management is difficult to achieve. Careful monitoring and evaluation is necessary to ensure the correct transition is made.

A3 Station Working Party

Divisional Management is supplemented by a Divisional Working Party chaired by one of the divisional Chief Inspectors (usually Operations) and consisting of representatives from each function and rank (up to Inspector), i.e. reliefs, permanent beat officers, C.I.D. and Administration. Disparate ranks, levels of experience and talents, operate together in a coherent manner so that they can identify local problems, examine alternatives, and propose solutions.

However, the working party is not a decision making body. Its purpose is to consider problems, initiatives and methods of introducing organisational (or operational) change. Matters may be referred to it by reliefs or by the Management Group. It will make recommendations to the Chief Superintendent and his management group but he is not bound by the recommendation(s) made.
Initially, the working party will be primarily concerned with short term problems. It may focus on any internal police matter on the Division or on an external matter amongst the community where it is apparent that police can take action which is likely to minimise or resolve the problem. A diagram of how the working party fits into the management structure is given below:-

Fig. 5. 4.
The Divisional Information Unit (D.I.U.)

This consists of a dedicated (meaning permanent) team of one Sergeant and two P.Cs. It may be an advantage to place a Detective Constable as one of the two P.Cs. in order to improve CID/Uniform communication and to establish a provisional crime analysis system. Its purpose is to collect and analyse relevant information regarding:

(1) **Police resources** - the officer on the Division and how they are employed.

(2) **Demands on Police** - the incidence and distribution of crimes committed, accidents, arrests, complaints by the public, calls for assistance by the public, etc.

By studying the two sets of information in conjunction with each other (i.e. police resources and demands) it should be possible for the deployment of street duty police officers on the division, to be matched with peak demand periods.

Training I

Formal and informal training is given to all ranks from Chief Superintendent to Constable (Uniform and C.I.D) in order to provide necessary information and skills for the implementation of Neighbourhood Policing with particular emphasis on:

1. Participative management.
4. Community involvement.
5. Inter-agency co-operation.
6. Conflict reduction (currently under development)
7. Police skills (including communication with the public).

Training is undertaken by the local team under Project Team guidance.

A6 Beat Profiles

A comprehensive profile will be written for each beat, containing detailed information about its physical and human characteristics. The profiles will be more comprehensive than those presently kept and should be stored in the Divisional Information Unit. They will be in two parts, one containing relatively static demographic information and details of local community resources, the second containing crime analysis data, informal service demands and target intelligence requests from the C.I.D. all of which need to be constantly updated.

The information will be used by the Inspector and his Relief Team when planning strategies to deal with problems on their sector.

A7 Geographic Responsibility

Geographic responsibility is a method of giving each relief Inspector (and at a later stage, his Sergeants and Constables) a continuing and personal responsibility for a specific geographic area within a Division (a Sector). This aims to increase personal contact between police and the public and facilitate the identification of long and short term local problems and their solutions.
The Inspectors assume geographic responsibility first, in order to establish early contact with the community. Sergeants and Constables assume the responsibility later in implementation once relief teams, sector plans and directed patrolling have commenced. This allows the Working Party sufficient time to agree on the best system of Geographic Responsibility for Sergeants and Constables.

A8 Develop Sector Plans

Sector plans set out the long term problem, priorities and strategies (prevention and detection) for each sector on a division. They are developed by the relief inspector responsible for that sector, taking into account the needs of the local community as well as the problems identified by police. Permanent Beat Officers and eventually all sector officers will be expected to be involved in this process. The important part of station planning ensures that all operational officers are deeply involved in the management of their respective sectors. Their day to day work and achievements should then reflect this involvement.

Data from the Divisional Information Unit together with local knowledge (police and public) assists in the problem identification and prioritisation. The strategies include both police action through Directed Patrolling (AA1 and BB10), both well as joint police/public action, such as Neighbourhood Watch and Property Marking (AA3 and BB6). They also include particular measures designed to evaluate the success or otherwise of the strategy.
Sector Planning, its strategies and evaluation, is coordinated and monitored by the Chief Inspector (Operations). All sector plans can be aggregated to produce an overall divisional plan.

A9. **Information to the Public**

Information is provided to the community on the proposed changes in policing methods and the importance of the public's active co-operation. This contact should also increase information to police on the views of the community, their problems and priorities. The very real fears that the community may have about some crime levels should be acknowledged and steps taken to verify whether these anxieties are supported by the level of reported crime or whether they are founded on rumour. This increase in police knowledge should be utilised for sector strategies.

A10. **Relief Teams**

Relief teams consist of all relief officers, Permanent Beat Officers attached to that sector and if possible a C.I.D. officer for liaison. The aim is to work together as a team using each individual's skills and experiences to address identified problems in their geographic sector.

The team will be headed by the relief Inspector, who should ensure that regular meetings are held to elicit the views of the officers and obtain their active participation in sector planning. In addition, he should inform them of decisions made by the Working Party and the Divisional Management Team.
A11. Permanent Beat Officers (formerly known as Home Beat Officers)

Permanent Beat officers will be put back under the direction and control of the relief inspector on whose geographic sector their beat lies and will also be a member of the Inspector's relief team. Their principle task will be to act as the Inspectors spearhead, organising joint police-public crime prevention schemes.

The current Home Beat Officer will be renamed as a Permanent Beat Officer when he becomes part of the relief team. Some of the officers currently engaged as Home Beat Officers will not be suitable as P.B.Os. under Neighbourhood Policing and therefore some reselection may have to take place. This will have an added advantage of raising the status of the new style P.B.O. who will then receive extensive additional training. The most important change in the training will be a considerable emphasis on intelligence gathering which it is hoped will encourage more law enforcement activity whilst keeping their current community pride.

A12. Dedicated Communications Staff

This will be a small number of officers permanently or semi-permanently employed on communications duties. They will be specially trained in dealing with members of the public by telephone or at the Station Counter, as well as directing resources in a more structured manner, e.g. Graded Response (BB10).
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<td>AA3</td>
<td>Crime Reduction</td>
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RESPONSE TO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS (AA)

Despite the complications and demands produced by a major re-organisation of the Police Station, the level of service provided to the public should not be allowed to decline.

Immediate crime and conflict problems which are causing the public most concern must receive priority from the police. The everyday patrol work of operational street officers must start to reflect the improved flow of information resulting from reorganisation.

Where there are urgent crime and peacekeeping problems, or overwhelming public demands, some aspects of crime prevention and conflict reduction will have to be introduced immediately. However, it should be noted that such schemes will make heavy demands on police resources and therefore require careful planning.

The elements in this section will be implemented simultaneously with those in the A Box. It is expected that as officers become more familiar with the concepts, so their levels of skill and achievement will increase.

AA1 Directed Patrolling I

Random police patrolling of the past is changed into an activity specifically designed to give the officer a sense of purpose and co-ordination. The job of each relief Inspector is to direct the patrolling of his officers. The main priority will be to direct officers in response to immediate short term demands, e.g. a spate of autocrime in a particular area. Any surplus patrol time will be initially directed towards collecting the necessary information for beat profiles, and later towards the needs of sector planning. At a later stage of implementation the emphasis on directed patrolling will be towards the prevention of long
Directed Patrolling will be facilitated by the increased flow of information from both the Divisional Information Unit and the public.

At the commencement of each tour of duty, every patrolling officer should be given a clear idea of what he is expected to do and achieve when he leaves the station - not merely told which beat to patrol. The major thrust of the Directed Patrol will be concerned with Conflict and Crime Reduction as described below.

**AA2 Conflict Reduction**

At this early stage of implementation, the priority will be to sustain the level of response to immediate problems. However, it may be that conflict in the division is serious enough to warrant action immediately.

Critical locations, groups or individuals should be identified and officers with suitable skills or training (probably Permanent Beat Officers) should be tasked with conflict reduction. This reduction should be attempted by a mixture of direct intervention, negotiation and contracting.

The concept of conflict reduction can demonstrate to officers the possibility of utilising a number of strategies to reduce potentially very violent situations, other than by direct force. However, the deployment of Territorial Support Units or Police Support Units may be required on those occasions where all other forms of conflict reduction have failed.
Where possible, through the use of Directed Patrol, all street officers can be involved in these strategies. This will require the training and understanding of patrol officers before it can be effective.

**AA3 Crime Reduction**

Once again, efficient response to victims of crime will be a priority at this stage. However, early crime reduction measures may be essential. If this is so, then groups or individuals who are involved in crime should be identified and dealt with as soon as possible. Certain locations may also require a high profile police presence at certain times. At this stage, crime prevention initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch, Property Marking and Business Watch should only be introduced if either the public are highly motivated or if the area is identified as having high crime rates.

Police resources will be stretched at this stage of implementation so careful consideration should be given before starting any schemes. In the worst crime areas, which are unlikely to be receptive to such schemes, early efforts should be made to generate the necessary 'community awareness', so that Neighbourhood Watch schemes can be implemented at a later stage.

Further crime reduction may be possible through contact with other agencies. In particular the local authority could be approached to consider joint action in suitable short term initiatives.
| B1 | Divisional Information & Intelligence Unit. |
| B2 | Management Information System. |
| B3 | Crime Analysis |
| B4 | Public Launch of N.P. |
| B5 | Public Information Network. |
5. 5. INFORMATION IMPROVEMENT (B)

To ensure the successful implementation and management of Neighbourhood Policing, an efficient information system is essential. Information improvement is required in two areas: firstly, between the various levels within the police organisation; secondly, between the police and their local community.

The Divisional Information Unit, set up under 'Organisational Function and Structure' Box A, is the central point for the collation and dissemination of this information. Under this stage of implementation its role is therefore expanded.

B1 Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit (D.I.I.U.)

The original Divisional Information Unit is now expanded by the addition of the collator, the officer responsible for arranging duties and C.I.D. Officer(s), if one was not already working with the D.I.U. The expanded unit will draw together all the information facilities within the station, to provide a single, central, information and intelligence service to operational street officers, police managers and the public. This new unit is renamed the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit. Due to the intelligence aspect of the Unit it should be under the control of the senior C.I.D. officer at the station.

Different types of information will need to be provided. For example, street officers will require the distribution and types of demands, whilst police managers will also need detailed information on divisional strengths, levels of abstraction etc. members of the public will need to be provided with information on crime levels and police strategies. This information will be disseminated through the Public Information Network (B5).
The increased flow of information will normally require the use of a micro computer to facilitate collation and analysis, particularly for use in Crime Analysis (B2) and the Management Information System (B3). The information produced by these systems is vital for the evaluation of any strategies introduced under Directed Patrolling.

B.2. Management Information System

The D.I.U. will collect information on all demands made on the police station, as well as monitoring the level of police resources available. This will enable police managers to more accurately match resources to public demand.

The collection of this data will still be manual, but the collation and analysis is best undertaken by the use of a micro-computer. The collation of demand information will include the breakdown of demands into different categories, e.g. types, time and location, but will not involve the recording of any personal details.

It is important that all officers can understand and are able to apply the M.I.S. data to their work, in order to optimise the use of the D.I.U. Accordingly, the accessibility and presentation of information will be given a high priority.

B3  Crime Analysis System

Neighbourhood Policing is developing a simple crime analysis system for use on the same micro-computer already installed for the provision of management information. This entails
producing information on particular crimes, e.g. burglary, to enable high incident areas to be identified and common factors extracted. This is essential for strategies introduced under Directed Patrolling I and II in order to obtain the optimum use of police resources.

B4 Public Launch of Neighbourhood Policing

At this stage the internal police station reorganisation will have reached the stage where Neighbourhood Policing can be launched and supported successfully.

Extensive local media coverage should be sought and handouts made available containing brief details of the scheme and the identities of the sector officers involved. Short presentations should be given to community groups and statutory authorities. Wherever possible local group presentations should be given by the operational sector officers involved, as part of their normal duties.

The vital involvement of the public in the scheme should always be highlighted together with practical suggestions as to exactly what they should do, e.g. Community Involvement (C4), Crime Prevention (C5) and Conflict Prevention (C6).

B5 Public Information Network

The level of contact between police and the public developed at the first stage of implementation (A9) should by now have evolved into a Public Information Network with meetings held on a more regular basis. Direct contact between various sections of the public and different levels within the police are illustrated in the diagram below:-
The aim of the above system is to encourage a two way flow of information between police and the public. More importantly, different sectors of the public will be in contact with those officers most able to provide a solution to their particular problem (i.e. local residents with their local operational street officers).
Although existing links with the public, local agencies and the media, will probably be sufficient for the Public Launch of the new policing system, they will not be adequate for the future requirements of Neighbourhood Policing.

Effective, formal, planned links have to be established between the police and all sections of the public in the area. These links will not only gather information from the public but also, on demand, provide a far greater range of information and data from the police to the public. This type of planned network is essential if the public are expected to actively participate in the policing of their area.

It may well be decided that the Sectors and the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit could provide the main framework for this type of Information Network.
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5. 6. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (BB)

The continually high level of public demand for police resources poses serious problems for police. If police attempt to deal uncritically with all demands, resources will never be sufficient (Reactive Spiral).

An attempt has to be made to manage the demands through the appropriate deployment of resources, until police crime prevention initiatives reduce them and limit their potential for expansion (Box C).

In order to achieve this, further organisational changes in police structure and practice will have to take place. These changes will be mainly directed at reducing immediate demands thereby enabling police resources to be redeployed in long term crime and conflict prevention strategies.

The aim is to manage the demand for police services from the public at three levels. Firstly, by grading the response time and the personnel deployed to demands, according to established criteria. Secondly, by matching the number of officers on duty to the expected level of demand. Thirdly, by screening demands that require action and follow-up enquiries, so that only those which meet predetermined criteria are pursued. To ensure success, careful training of police personnel and public education is necessary.

These organisational changes will take place simultaneously with the Information Improvement objectives in Box B.

BB1 Geographic Responsibility for Sergeants and Constables.

Geographic responsibility for Sergeants and Constables will encourage their identification with a sector. Under the
sector inspector a team will develop which will have in depth knowledge of an area and will be responsible for the planning and implementation of sector strategies.

The organisation of Geographic Responsibility can be undertaken by a number of different methods. The time interval between inspectors and sergeants/constables being given geographic responsibility is necessary for the Working Party and Divisional Management Team to agree on which method to choose.

**BB2 Police/Public Contact Points**

Contact between police and the public takes place in three main areas: at the station front counter, on the telephone and on the street with patrolling officers. The aims are firstly, to increase the quality of service provided to the public in order to increase public satisfaction with police. Secondly, to filter out demands on police which are better dealt with by way of advice or referral to a more appropriate agency.

The D.I.I.U. should be tasked to undertake studies at the front counter and in the communications office to establish workloads and the distribution of demands. Decision can then be taken on the appropriate staffing levels required to provide a satisfactory service to the public. Improvements to the public waiting area and front counter can also be made, for instance, layout, seating and general appearance. Similar improvements may be made to the communications room layout.
The quality of the public's contact with officers on the street should be improved with communication training in 'Policing Skills' (A5), as well as the implementation of Directed Patrolling strategies.

Better management of limited investigative skills can be achieved by only applying them to those cases most likely to be solved, i.e. those with the best evidence. A set of weightings for evidence has been developed so that cases can be assessed more objectively. Those cases considered to have insufficient evidence will be screened out and victims given any necessary support and advice by Victim Support Schemes, and the Crime Prevention or Permanent Beat Officers. A diagram describing the Crime Investigation System is given overleaf. Serious crime will continue to be fully investigated even if they have insufficient evidence according to the weighting system. Time saved from case screening will enable officers to spend extra time on the remaining cases and therefore increase the likelihood of a crime clear-up.

The concept behind the Crime Investigation System is that all crime will be thoroughly investigated by the first officer who attends (usually uniform) who will complete a crime report sheet at the scene. This report will then be handed personally by a C.I.D. officer at a Duty Desk who will make a decision to either screen out the crime or continue with the investigation. The C.I.D. Duty Desk will normally be run by a Detective Sergeant attached to the D.I.I.U.

The Duty Desk will perform a number of functions:-

(1) Supervise initial crime investigations.
CRIME INVESTIGATION SYSTEM

LEGEND
C.P.O. - Crime Prevention Officer.
D.C.I. - Detective Chief Inspector.
D.I.I.U. - Divisional Information & Intelligence Unit.
P.B.O. - Permanent Beat Officer.
V.S.S. - Victim Support Scheme.

Details of investigations fully documented in crime book.
(2) Decide as to further action (Case Screening).
(3) Provide additional training of officers in crime investigation and recording.
(4) Collect data for information systems in the D.I.I.U.

C.I.D. Targetting and Surveillance Team (Directed Tasking).

The C.I.D. office would be split into two teams, one undertaking the traditional C.I.D. investigative role, the other a targetting and surveillance role with the aim of arresting offenders.

The C.I.D. time saving by Case Screening will allow some C.I.D. officers to be taken away from their investigation of crimes already committed in order to form the Targetting and Surveillance Team with the objective of preventing serious or persistent crime. This team will consist of specially selected officers who will concentrate on crime matters which fall into the following categories:-

1. **Priority Crimes**
   These are crimes which are given high priority either by police or public (although priorities may differ between the two).

2. **Active Criminals**
   Individuals or groups known to be responsible for a high proportion of crime in an area, not necessarily professional teams, and unlikely to be deterred by traditional routine policing.

3. **Target Areas**
   High crime areas identified by the D.I.I.U.
The team would be both receiving information and returning intelligence to the D.I.I.U., as well as being closely involved in the implementation of sector strategies. Once the T & S teams have started implementing these strategies their role would be formally termed 'Directed Tasking'. This is the equivalent of uniform officers undertaking Directed Patrolling II (BB10).

BB5 Resource Management

All supervisory ranks at the police station need to understand the concept of Resource Management. The diagram overleaf provides a framework for this understanding and subsequent planning.

First police must understand exactly which category they are in at present, and in which direction they are moving. Some stations may be striving to 'Reduce' demands on police resources but are failing and therefore decaying slowly but surely into a 'Response' category. Others will clearly be in a Response category.

It is important to remember that Resource Management includes all the resources available, police and public.

The remainder of Box BB and Box C now include both types of resources. Initially, police will have to improve their own resource management by ensuring that police manpower is deployed according to public demand.

Traditionally police manpower has been relatively evenly deployed across time and across geographic areas. However, it will probably be clear from information provided by the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit that the majority of public demand is concentrated within particular time bands and within fairly small geographic areas on each division.
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMAND STABILISATION</th>
<th>DEMAND REDUCTION</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>DEMAND REDUCTION</th>
<th>DEMAND STABILISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

DECAY

IMPROVEMENT
The aim is therefore to provide additional patrol cover during known periods of high demand at the expense of known periods of low demand. Although this may involve police officers working more unsocial hours during certain hours of duty, i.e. 4 p.m. to midnight instead of perhaps 2 p.m. - 10 p.m. it may be possible to reduce the need to work unsocial hours at other times when public demand is low, i.e. less night duty.

Aligning manpower to demands may be tackled in one of two ways - minor variations to hours of duty within the existing relief duty rota, or a more elaborate fundamental change involving new relief structures and duty rotas. It is vital to maintain and develop the notion of relief teams, notwithstanding initiatives involving split reliefs covering different hours or overlapping shifts. Whatever arrangements are made, it is important to have constant groups of officers with their own dedicated Sergeants and Inspectors. These groups must be able to meet regularly as a team to discuss problems and priorities.

It has been found that if Inspectors are given the responsibility for day to day alignments and these are directed at specific problems, then sector officers will willingly co-operate with these requirements.

Alignment of duties to demands can be achieved with the minimum of disruption, provided the widest consultation is allowed. It is a particularly suitable task for the working party to undertake, since the group involves representatives from all quarters of the station. Providing they have the necessary detailed research data and clearly understand that a change must be made, they will usually come up with sensible alternative proposals.
This objective is designed, in conjunction with 'Geographic Responsibility' (A7 and BB1) and 'Directed Patrolling' (AA1 and BB10) to redeploy manpower across time and within the geographic areas of maximum public demand.

Once an improvement can be detected and demands are being reduced, the public can become more and more involved in further reductions. Eventually, through Crime and Conflict Management, demands should become stabilised at a more acceptable level. At this stage, extensive preventive tactics and strategies can be implemented jointly by police and public.

**BB6 Sector Working Parties.**

One of the most important objectives for the Police is the involvement of the residents in joint Police-Public Crime and Conflict Prevention strategies. This type of partnership goes beyond the existing and proposed arrangements for 'Consultation'. It includes the joint planning, implementation and management of local Prevention strategies in each Neighbourhood and community.

Consultation between the public and the police has increasingly been recognised as a major requirement in any successful policing strategy. Therefore, police are now required to place greater emphasis on the involvement of local residents and local police for the policing of specific neighbourhoods within each police station area. It is suggested that special arrangements will be required to make this co-operation effective.
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of local policing, it is suggested that 'Sector Working Parties', are required in each Sector.

The Division will be divided into Sectors, each the responsibility of an Operational Inspector and his men. These officers are responsible for planning and policing of these Sectors. It is considered essential that the residents of these Sectors should have an input into the early stages of this process and are themselves a part of these plans.

'Sector Working Parties' are envisaged as voluntary, non-statutory bodies, consisting of the elected Ward Councillors, representatives of local residents groups, including commercial and business 'residents' and three or four Sector police officers, including the Sector Inspector. Police would provide facilities for the meetings including a secretariat, but ideally would not wish to hold elected positions on the Working Parties. The meetings could be held bi-monthly or quarterly as desired.

It is hoped that each Working Party would establish terms of reference which would identify two main objectives:-

(1) **A Consumer Panel**, which would report back at a general level, local problems which might benefit from a joint Police-Public Crime Prevention strategy. It is envisaged, that this facility would be provided by the elected Ward Councillors on behalf of the residents.

(2) **An Action Group**, which would jointly plan, implement and manage Police-Public Crime and Conflict Prevention initiatives in the Sector area,
with the Sector Police officers. This facility would involve local group representatives, who would eventually include their groups in the various initiatives and strategies.

It must be emphasized that these are non-statutory, voluntary bodies. There is no intention to replace existing statutory consultation procedures. It is hoped that the Working Parties will be 'action orientated', concentrating on local neighbourhood problems, producing visible changes within days or weeks. When this is not possible they should be planning and implementing local long term joint strategies aimed at the root of their crime problems.

The description of Sector Working Parties provided in this outline can only be a broad proposal, meetings of those who wish to be involved will have to be held and precise terms of reference agreed. Due to the operational nature of the intended groups the Working Parties should be co-ordinated by the Chief Inspector Operations at Police Station in order to ensure that scarce police operational resources are fully distributed between the different Sectors.

**BB7 Crime Management**

One of the problems for police in dealing with crime, is the lack of an overview which provides a link between the various states of crime and the strategies for each stage.

*Crime Management* provides three categories of police response to crime problems. Once a decision is made as to the existing problems, effective changes in police strategies can be planned within the *Crime Management* framework.
Crime Prevention;
Preventing crime has been a police ideal since the beginning of modern policing. A large number of tactics options and strategies have been researched and implemented by most police stations. However, the majority of these programmes are effective in the longer term and do not produce immediate reduction in crime. High levels of crime may therefore be unaffected in the short term, especially if the public are too frightened or apathetic to be involved.

Crime Reduction;
When crime levels are unacceptably high, direct action against the groups, individuals or locations must be instigated by police. This can be achieved through Directed Patrolling or Directed Tasking for specialist officers. The objective of these tactics is to significantly reduce the levels of crime in the high crime areas.

Crime Response;
When both Prevention and Reduction have been unsuccessful, or police resources are insufficient, police are reduced to responding to crime as it occurs. Police must provide the best possible VICTIM HELPING in these circumstances in order to maintain public satisfaction with the police service. Unfortunately, response alone cannot affect the rising crime levels.

It is unrealistic to expect effective Crime Prevention when the public are experiencing high fear of crime. Therefore Crime Reduction will usually be required as the next police initiative in a planned Crime Management Strategy.
BB8 Alignment of Administration

The introduction of geographic responsibility and sector planning will make heavy demands on all relief officers, particularly inspectors. It is therefore important to both reduce the amount of unnecessary routine administrative tasks and to reallocate tasks that may be undertaken by civilian staff, to the administrative and crime support units. Pressure on limited civilian resources may require ruthless pruning of non-essential work.

The administration and support units must also ensure that their primary function as a support service for operational street officers is fulfilled in practice as well as theory. Analysis has shown that internal police administrative demands on operational street officers are often greater than those imposed by public demands.

BB9 Conflict Management

In Britain, police officers or 'peace' officers, are recognised as 'keepers of the peace' and 'peacekeeping' has always been a major objective of the professional police service since its introduction in 1829.

However, unlike Crime Prevention, Conflict Prevention has been almost totally ignored as a practical strategy or theoretical concept. Usually, police react to existing conflict by trying to reduce it and if this fails then by managing the ensuing disorder to minimise injury and damage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT PREVENTION</th>
<th>CONFLICT REDUCTION</th>
<th>DISORDER MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>CONFLICT REDUCTION</th>
<th>CONFLICT PREVENTION</th>
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**DECAY**  \(\rightarrow\)  **IMPROVEMENT**
Unfortunately, the concept of Conflict Management as a total strategy for dealing with conflict, is almost unknown in police planning and tactics. In the past police have managed to cope by relying on simple, high profile uniform policing as a method of peacekeeping.

With today's increasing conflict and actual public disorder this is no longer appropriate or even effective. However, it is very difficult to apply theories and concepts, despite their appeal, to actual fast moving street environments as an effective police strategy.

The diagram provides a simplistic yet useful overview of Conflict Management. This practical framework can be used for operational planning and day to day police work.

The concept behind the diagram is that tension and conflict are not inevitable and therefore can be reduced and even avoided. Each police station can make a realistic assessment of their present environment and own operational practices. Once this has been decided then decisions can be made about the effectiveness of existing strategies and whether or not to move into a preferred category, through police supported initiatives.

Conflict Prevention
This is considered the 'ideal' category, where the majority of potential conflict is detected and prevented at an early stage. Such prevention is achieved by normal everyday policing activities involving professional police officers, local community, volunteers and public agencies.
For example, it should be normal practice for domestic and neighbourhood disputes to be referred to effective Conflict Mediation Service, staffed and supported by volunteers and public agencies.

However, if these types of processes fail to work, or do not exist, then tension and conflict may rise leading to the next category.

**Conflict Reduction**

In this type of environment the majority of scarce police resources tend to be directed at reactive attempts to reduce and control the existing high levels of tension and conflict.

Unless police strategies and resource deployment, including the resources of volunteers and agencies, are carefully planned, with a significant investment made in long term prevention measures, then the slide into the next category is almost inevitable.

**Disorder Management**

Where there are existing high levels of violence and public disorder, police may be reduced to managing this disorder. Containing it to defined areas, preventing escalation and generally 'keeping the lid on'.

This type of policing strategy, however effective and well supported by equipment and technology it may appear, will not by itself reverse the upward trend of rising disorder.

It is essential that joint police and public Conflict Reduction strategies are implemented, with the eventual aim of Conflict Prevention processes being effectively introduced and maintained.
The framework described allows events in the environment to be graded by police to decide which of the three categories they are actually in, decide in which direction they appear to be moving and where they would actually like to be.

Conflict Management covers all policing situations from normality to riot. Strategies, tactics and even styles of policing which are appropriate to the actual situation can be selected. Maintaining the 'Queens Peace' will not happen by chance, it has to be planned and carefully maintained.

**BB10 Special Constabulary**

The Special Constabulary have the potential to significantly boost available police resources and are an existing example of the public's willingness to voluntarily help the police. They should be considered as a vital part of everyday police operational resources, and in theory could represent up to a third of the total manpower.

People living on the division should be encouraged to join the Specials to both increase the commitment of the public to the objective of self-policing and to create a bridge between police and the local community. Their role should emphasise the crime prevention aspects of Directed Patrolling where their local knowledge can be fully utilised.

If police are unable to usefully deploy and motivate the type of people willing to volunteer for Special Constable work, it is very unlikely they will be competent to usefully employ far less motivated public volunteers for the range of tasks required in Box C.
Graded Response to Demands

Graded Response is designed to control the occurrence of immediate, indiscriminate response to public demands for police action. Instead, all demands are categorised to give an appropriate level and type of response as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Time Scale</th>
<th>Resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Urgent</td>
<td>Usually R/T (Area) Car</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>As soon as possible</td>
<td>Patrolling Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>By appointment</td>
<td>Designated Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referred</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Non-police agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experience has shown that trained officers can schedule or refer a small but significant proportion of demands.

The three main aims of Graded Response are:

1. where possible, to avoid committing resources during times of peak demand by delaying response deployment until a period of predicted lower demands;

2. where possible, to avoid committing resources during times of low resource availability by delaying response deployment until a period of predicted higher resource availability;

3. to enhance the service provided to the public by arranging a time when a more appropriate resource is available to respond (e.g. when a permanent beat officer is available to deal with a non urgent and long term problem with which he is familiar).
Research shows that the public will accept delays in response to calls for assistance providing:

1. their perception of the demand is that it does not require immediate response

2. the delay is with their co-operation and consent

3. they know when police will arrive

4. the police arrive either just before or at the expected time

5. the police agree that their complaint is worthy of police attention.

6. the complainant receives sympathetic and courteous treatment.

An essential ingredient for the introduction of Graded Response is thorough training. This will involve not only the Dedicated Communications Officer (A13) but also all operational officers.

Communications officers will inevitably spend more time speaking to callers, eliciting details of the demands, referring them to other agencies and making appointments for officers to visit them. This may necessitate an increase in staffing levels if the quality of service is to be maintained. Communications officers must have an understanding of peak demand times in order to delay or schedule calls accurately, as well as information on the availability of particular officers.
The emphasis in 'Directed Patrolling I' (AA1) of responding to short term demands now shifts to targeting long term problems requiring crime and conflict prevention. Whereas Directed Patrolling I concentrated on the detection of offenders, this stage requires officers to take action to correct the root causes of problems. For instance, a particular housing estate may be identified as having a long term problem of burglary. Analysis of the burglary patterns and the common factors involved will enable officers to build a strategy specially tailored for the estate.

At this stage of implementation divisions will be preparing their second round of sector (and divisional) plans which are an essential component in the development of strategies using Directed Patrolling II. These strategies will be complemented by the C.I.D. equivalent of Directed Patrolling, Directed Tasking (see BB4).

The effectiveness of any directed patrolling strategy will need to be monitored using information from the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit (B1) to ensure that the objectives given in Sector Plans (A8) are achieved.

Directed Patrolling II is a very important part of Neighbourhood Policing for operational street officers. It provides, in a very practical way, the opportunity for them to become deeply involved with the system and also significantly contribute to its eventual success.
CRIME PREVENTION & PEACEKEEPING

C1 Training II.
C2 Victim Support.
C3 Inter Agency Co-operation.
C4 Community Involvement.
C5 Crime Prevention.
C6 Conflict Prevention.
C7 Schools Liaison.
C8 Police/Public Contract.
CRIME PREVENTION AND PEACEKEEPING (C)

Boxes A, AA, B and BB will have created and maintained the changes necessary to embark on the third phase of Neighbourhood Policing implementation.

The objective of this section is to mobilise the public in joint police/public initiatives using the widest possible liaison between police and members of the community. These initiatives should be designed to affect the 'root causes' of crime and conflict in the area, concentrating on methods of prevention rather than detection.

The Police/Public Contact will be achieved when the public take on their full role as a resource for the policing of an area.

Training II

The training given at the outset of implementation (A5) is intended to be a basic package of information and skills to bring officers up to the level required to commence Neighbourhood Policing. When Box C is reached, selected officers will require additional skills training in order for them to start planning and evaluating initiatives to redress some of the problems each relief team is tackling. The requirement for specialist skills on any relief should reflect local problems. As far as possible training should take place on division.

Examples of the type of skills that could be provided would include the following areas:-

1. Sexual offences and related matters.
2. Drugs.
3. Licencing.
5. Traffic.
7. School visits.

It is not intended that these additional skills would in any way replace the appropriate Force departments staffed by specialists, e.g. Obscene Publications, Crime Prevention, Juvenile Bureau, Accident Prevention Units. It must be realised that these branches have extremely limited resources which at best can only provide specialist advice, support and co-ordination to divisional street officers.

An officer would be selected and trained to specialise in a skill identified as being needed on the sector by the relief inspector. This officer will then assume responsibility within his relief team as the Inspector’s representative for that particular problem and would train a deputy, and a small number of officers from his relief to assist in dealing with that problem. In the ‘ideal’ system every sector officer would have basic policing street skills and in addition one primary special skill plus two secondary skills. The secondary skills would assist him to deputise for other officers.

_C2 Victim Support_

Neighbourhood Policing places great importance on increasing public satisfaction with police. As a significant amount of contact between police and the public occurs after a crime has been committed, victim support is given a high priority.

Training 1 (A5) will already have equipped officers with extra skills in dealing with victims, though this will probably be limited to the initial visits by police.
In order to reduce demands on police, any subsequent counselling and support should be undertaken by voluntary Victim Support Schemes. For these reasons police support and assistance must be given to all such local voluntary bodies who represent a valuable resource to the community. Victim Support Schemes could also assist in providing crime prevention advice to the public.

C3 Inter-agency co-operation

Neighbourhood Policing seeks to establish and maintain active communication and co-operation between police and statutory agencies on the division. For instance, local council departments (dealing with education, social services, housing, transport, recreation, the environment the elderly), the Probation Service and the Manpower Services Commission.

Initially police would liaise with each department on specific issues, with the eventual aim of bringing all agencies together to form a panel for the joint discussion and solution of community problems.

Examples of the type of problems involved would include:-

- the closure of roads on housing estates to through traffic,
- the utilisation of existing school facilities for children during the summer holidays,
- the use of offenders under community service orders to assist the elderly,
- liaison between planners and police over new housing security.
In ideal circumstances, once all statutory agencies have been brought together as a panel, the police should attempt to expand it to form a 'Neighbourhood Committee'. This would comprise of not only the statutory agencies but all voluntary and community groups providing a service in the area.

In addition, a significant proportion of this committee should be representatives of local residents. This committee (or committees, covering small areas on a division) could then comment and advise on the best way of dealing with a whole range of local problems. Police should remember that although initially many problems appear to have little to do with them, all too often problems which are un-resolved do become a demand on police.

C4 Community Involvement

Nearly all the crime prevention and conflict reducing initiatives require the community to work and act as a group. However, in some areas, through apathy and/or fear, residents have no concept of 'community' and are not involved in any group self-help schemes. Unfortunately, these types of areas almost always have high crime rates as well as high levels of urban deprivation.

In these circumstances, Inspectors must plan ways of encouraging and supporting local residents to become involved in any type of community activity, e.g. youth club, tenants group/residents association, etc. Permanent Beat and Special Constabulary officers aided by other sector officers will play a prominent role in encouraging these activities. It will also enable these officers to obtain
feedback from the community on local problems for incorporation into sector plans. Once confidence and interest has been raised these groups can then form the basis for local crime prevention initiatives.

At a more formal level of community involvement the establishment of Sector Working Parties and Consultative Committees will provide police and the community with the opportunity to discuss and solve joint local issues.

C5 Crime Prevention

At this stage all the prevention schemes put forward for implementation under Crime Management II (BB7) - Neighbourhood Watch, Property Marking, cycle post-code stamping and environmental crime prevention - should be running. The aim is to consolidate these earlier schemes and to expand into the areas where the community was previously either unwilling or unable to give support.

If Neighbourhood Watch schemes are perceived to be successful by the public there is a possibility that their commitment will decrease and crime will edge back to its former level. To avoid this, Neighbourhood Watch schemes should be encouraged to broaden their base to include further community involvement, for example, play groups, youth clubs, environmental improvements and community care for the elderly.

C6 Conflict Prevention

Although to some extent, police can anticipate and intervene in events which have serious conflict potential, they can only deal with a small proportion. In a number of areas, Community Mediation schemes have been introduced by public volunteers.
These schemes provide a referral agency for police in various domestic and neighbour disputes. In addition, trained voluntary mediation are available to intervene in conflict situations, particularly those with serious public disorder potential.

If these types of services could be supported by a Multi Agency approach it should exist to implement and maintain an effective Conflict Prevention Service.

C7 School Liaison

The high level of juvenile involvement in crime necessitates a preventive programme of education as well as the more traditional reactive approach.

The current practice for schools liaison is for Permanent Beat Officers to visit their local primary schools and for district based Juvenile Bureau officers to visit secondary schools. Neighbourhood Policing proposes to also use trained relief officers to visit schools on their sectors. The careful selection and training of officers who display the skills required (see Training II, C1) will be crucial to the success of these visits.

The aim of promoting greater involvement of local officers in schools is to engender in the children a sense of responsibility for their area and to present the police officers as a central figure in the community. It will therefore be increasingly important for all officers to realise that their own attitudes and behaviour must be exemplary if the community and particularly children are to be set an example to follow.
The philosophy of Neighbourhood Policing rejects, outright, that crime and conflict control is purely a police responsibility and, without apology, accepts that the police, on their own, cannot significantly affect the rate of increase of crime and social disorder.

Following naturally from this statement is the idea of regeneration and a police-public contract in which police would seek to shift the burden of large scale crime prevention, assistance to victims, and some non-essential police tasks to the community.

If some of this burden can be taken up by the public, the police can then be freed to concentrate their efforts in those areas where they are particularly skilled. This is not an abrogation of police involvement in such tasks: it is a recognition that police should act as motivators and facilitators by providing skilled assistance to the community in a joint effort to prevent crime and maintain order.

Consultation is absolutely crucial to the police-public contact. Since the contract is a dynamic entity which will need continual re-definition, the consultation must also be continuous. The purpose of consultation are: firstly that consultation is vital to improve information-flow between police and public. This will, in the main, consist of an explanation of police policies to the public and, in return, an accurate perception by police of the public's problems and its need.

The second purpose is to make the public aware of the serious limitations on police and so reduce what are often unrealistic public expectations of police. The third is to
mobilise public response to the public side of the contract. This response must be specifically geared to a significant contribution to crime prevention and victim support within a victim-orientated philosophy.

It is argued that the police-public contract cannot afford to be merely a public relations exercise, designed only to increase public satisfaction, since one of the unintended consequences of increasing public satisfaction may well be a corresponding increase in public demand. Thus the whole thrust must be towards getting the public more involved in active crime and conflict prevention, additionally, providing support for their own victims.

Neighbourhood Policing philosophy suggests that: "The 'ideal' is a system in which professional police and a community establish a partnership which results in a significant proportion of policing services within that community being provided voluntarily by community members. The primary goals of such a police system are the prevention of crime, reduction of conflict and assistance to victims".

This definition emphasises the extent to which such a philosophy would depend on a significant contribution by community members. Since, initially, a systematic redirection of police effort would involve committing additional resources to securing the contract, the pay off would only come if community responsibility for large scale crime prevention and victim support initiatives enabled police to redirect their own efforts towards those areas in which they are especially skilled.
It should be noted that in this definition 'victims' is used in its widest sense - not only the victims of crime but also members of the public who suffer as a consequence of noise, nuisance or indeed any social problems. In addition the victim could be an individual, group of individuals or the community at large. The term 'voluntarily' is used to disguise between 'public purchase' services such as the statutory agencies (which in the present economic climate are a relatively fixed resource) and voluntary groups (which with a change in community values, could be capable of expansion).

The next point concerning the contract is a need (without apology or defensiveness) to inform the public that it is impossible for police to significantly affect levels of most crimes on their own. This is not the same thing as stating that the Force cannot police without the consent of the public. It is to forcibly and consistently reject the argument that crime control is exclusively a police responsibility.

PLANNING AND EVALUATION

Sector planning and Working Parties provide the largest proportion of the police stations planning. Priorities of strategies and resource allocation in the long term are recommended by the Station Working Party and Divisional Management Team. Decisions on all these matters are made at the appropriate time by the Chief Superintendent of the Division.

However there is also a requirement within Neighbourhood Policing for each police station to develop its own evaluation unit. This is particularly important because without evaluation successful planning cannot be undertaken.
The Evaluation Unit at the police station is the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit and the Planning units are the Working Party, the Relief and Management Teams. Eventually the decisions as to police methods and strategies will be taken at the Management meetings.

The Neighbourhood Policing system has to be dynamic and this is ensured by investing significant police resources in planning and evaluation; without the facility the system would eventually decay.

5.9. **Summary**

This chapter has described in some detail the package developed for implementation at Brixton in 1983. Although, as has been stressed, it was a total system the exact form of each element was very much dependent on the local policing environment. This degree of flexibility is reflected in the description of the package which includes special features exclusive to the Brixton model. At other police stations there were variations in priorities and allocation of resources.

In many ways the 'Neighbourhood Policing' package acted as a check list to ensure that every aspect of the Geographical Policing System had been considered and planned. It was not intended that the system should be constructed in a mechanistic manner, using the package guidelines as rigid specification.

The majority of the model described in this chapter is concerned with internal organisational change to the micro organisation of the police station. This emphasis on organisational change was in response to the analysis of need for radical structure and process changes. However, once these organisational changes were achieved, it became clear that by itself, the original 'Neighbourhood Policing' model was insufficient.
Great difficulty was experienced by the operational managers at Brixton in linking the analysis of the environment into policing options. It was apparent that yet another planning framework was required. This framework would have to deal with the problem of linking the Environmental Potential into practical policing solutions for operational street officers.

Although, 'Directed Patrolling' was given prominence in the package and explained to the essential, it was not made explicit exactly how to do it. Many of the strategies required were new or had previously only been used by specialist officers. It was also found that there was no common reservoir of professional police knowledge regarding; best options, good practices, successes and failures.

The next Chapter describes a Directed Patrolling framework which was developed at Brixton in an attempt to answer these problems.
CHAPTER SIX

6. DIRECTED PATROLLING

6.1. POLICE BEHAVIOUR

The description of a Geographical Policing system provided by the Neighbourhood Policing package, its lists of elements and tasks, is very comprehensive. It provides an outline and virtually a component or function list of such a THIRD LEVEL system. This list was intended to cover all the requirements of this system, including the implementation and maintenance of a Joint Police and Public Information/Planning network. Eventually a Joint Policing Strategy would be created by this network.

However, there are a number of problems with the implementation of such a system, particularly in relation to the actual behaviour required from operational police officers. The ideal behaviour required has been described as that of a pro-social role model. Exactly how this behaviour fitted into Response and Enforcement, required in all policing systems, had not been made clear.

In addition, how did police contact the public and encourage them to be involved in self-policing or self-policing? Did this fit into normal patrolling or was it a separate activity? It was preferable that all such police behaviour should be linked together in a comprehensive framework which provided the optimum response or tactic available to police officers.

6.2. POLICE TACTICS

As a result of these questions and problems, a number of operational tactics were developed at Brixton for the use of all officers in contact with the public. These tactics were simplified into two basic response schedules which were then integrated as a simplified tactic for all police public encounters.
6. 2.1. **FIRST CONTACT TACTIC**

The first response by any police officer to a member of the public must be that of providing assistance or help in a pro-social manner. This initial and consistent police behaviour is illustrated in the diagram Fig. 6. 1 which describes the behavioural sequence involved.

![Diagram of First Contact Tactic](image-url)
As shown in the behaviour sequence, police were required to maintain consistent behaviour as a Pro Social model. This behaviour would require high levels of Victim Helping and Prevention.

On First Contact with the public, whether police or public initiated, police would continue this behaviour model. The police officer would endeavour to be helpful and provide the best possible service. Often, this tactic would be effective and the contact would end successfully.

However, if the public failed to co-operate reasonably or committed offences, then police would respond with appropriate restraint or enforcement. This would continue until public co-operation returned, when police would co-operate. In essence, police always co-operate on the first contact. After initiating pro-social behaviour, police responded by doing whatever the public did previously, i.e. co-operation or enforcement. This particular part of the tactic was named 'TIT for TAT'.

THE FIRST CONTACT TACTIC was based on behavioural analysis and computer game theories (CHERFAS 1987). These theories had used 'Prisoners Dilemma' psychology research, 'Tit for Tat' computer game research and 'Animal Co-operation' in evolutionary biology research. It was predicted that this type of behavioural response was extremely robust and effective in evolutionary survival and dealing with complex social situations.

6.2.2. CONTRACTING TACTIC

In addition to an initial response tactic of 'first contact', a framework for police encouragement of public self help by
Victim and Community Helping was also required. It was essential that such behavioural guidance was simple yet effective in the complex environment of policing. Eventually, after a number of attempts and failures, a CONTRACTING TACTIC was adopted. (Fig. 6. 2).
This tactic was similar to the First Contact sequence and utilised the first two stages of policing response i.e. Pro-social model and First Contact behaviour. However, when it became clear that the public required, or would benefit from self help, then this was suggested by the Police Officer. In order to encourage and reinforce such behaviour then a very practical, operational version of the Police/Public Contract was introduced, as described below.

In essence, this entailed the police officer listing the help he had already provided, explaining the limits of future police assistance and then encouraging the individual or group to help themselves. This continued in a negotiating sequence, with 'contract' made as to future public behaviour and objectives. At a very simple level this resulted in the police officer saying "this is what I have done, what are you going to do?" Several options would then be provided or elicited and agreement on one or more reached. If the public declined, or were unable to help themselves Police would still provide the best possible service.

6.3 PUBLIC CONTACT STRATEGY
What was now required was a linking of both tactics into a comprehensive strategy for police contact with the public. It was essential that such a behaviour guidance framework was simple and yet effective in the complex environment of policing. The diagram at Fig. 6.3 illustrates the strategy adopted:

This strategy was quickly adapted for contact with the public in virtually all situations. It was in fact very simple to teach and practice. The above diagram appears far more complex than the practical use of this strategy and police officers were trained in the strategy by simple examples and practical demonstrations by supervisory officers.
Fig. 6.3.
6.4. **POLICE/PUBLIC CONTACT POINTS**

The major output of any police system is the service it provides to the public. This service can be measured and directed at three main Police/Public Contact points as described in Chapter Four:-

(i) The Front or Station Office in the Police Station.
(ii) Telephone or written communication to the Police Station.
(iii) The patrolling officer on the streets.

It was considered that the Public Contact strategy could be effectively used at all three contact points in order to improve police service to the public and to increase public self-help. Supervision and direction of the first two locations are more easily achieved by managers inside the police station. Initially it was expected that the improved organisational system and effective introduction of the Contact Strategy inside the station would quickly produce results.

However, a large proportion of public contact takes place on the streets, a location which is far more difficult to supervise. In addition, a Police Contact strategy had to be integrated into other police strategies which were essential for an effective police presence on the streets. In response to these requirements the strategy was then integrated into a larger and more comprehensive DIRECTED PATROLLING strategy, which will now be described.

6.5. **DIRECTED PATROLLING**

What was required at this stage was a clear plan of RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT on the streets outside the Police Station. This deployment would have to reflect the following:-

(i) The Environmental Potential
(ii) Victim and Community Helping
In essence, Directed patrolling was a major output from all the various inputs into the Geographical Policing System. The relationship of these inputs to Directed Patrolling can be summarised as follows:-

(i) The Environmental Potential provided an analysis of the 'problem situation' and a prediction of future trends. It also identified the major features requiring police attention. For directed patrolling it was found, for example, that RESIDENTIAL or NON-RESIDENTIAL areas required two different types of police response.

These two categories became the major classification required for the planning of police strategy. In addition, HOSTILE areas, could also require a specific strategy.

(ii) The levels and quality of Victim and Community Helping required from police by the public were also suggested by the Environmental Potential.

(iii) Once a Geographical Policing System had been successfully implemented, then the information on resources and the structure for deployment would be available.

(iv) The concepts of Crime and Conflict Management would provide an implementation and analysis framework for these two specialised areas of Resource Deployment.
Public Contact Strategy provided a behavioural and decision framework for each individual officer involved in this type of patrolling.

An important part of this element was its 'self directed' nature. Direct supervision of street officers is recognised as being ineffective, if not impossible. Therefore officers had to plan their own day to day activities, within the specific objectives laid down.

Once an officer had planned his day or days, contracts were made with super-vising officers and subject to response demands, officers were then left to achieve their planned activities.

In the description that follows, directed patrolling strategies are primarily decided by whether an area is RESIDENTIAL or NON-RESIDENTIAL and the level of demands; HIGH, MEDIUM or LOW.

6.6. **RESIDENTIAL DIRECTED PATROL**

Once a geographical area has been analysed as mainly residential then a specific type of patrolling strategy can be planned.

In broad terms this strategy involved:-

1. The implementation of self-directed patrol by operational street officers.
2. The development of environmental and community crime prevention initiatives (self policing contract).
(3) The development of community conflict resolution/reduction initiatives (self policing contract).

In order to ensure effective resource deployment the residential area must now be further sub-divided into HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW demand areas. Each designation has a planned strategy (Fig. 6.4).

The three strategies were named;
(i) HIGH INTENSITY for HIGH Demand
(ii) PROBLEM DIRECTED for MEDIUM Demand
(iii) SUPPORTED for LOW Demand.

Fig. 6.4
Initially each strategy sought to respond to the existing situation effectively, then reduce demands and potential to enable the area to be re-classified as a lower demand area. The LOW demand area strategies were particularly biased towards preventive tactics. Each Directed Patrolling Strategy will now be described in some detail.

6. 6.1. **HIGH INTENSITY STRATEGY**

*Description:* This strategy is directed at maintaining police control over street crime and disorder in a residential area. The aims are to reduce both the levels of public conflict and the opportunities for street crime and disorder. It is almost exclusively dependent upon police to implement and maintain.

The strategy can only be implemented after consultation and with the support of local residents. High level of continuous disorder may force police to implement this strategy immediately, but consultation should also begin immediately.

Opportunities for crime and conflict are reduced by:

1. *Fast police response to demands (difficult for offenders to escape).*
2. *High numbers of officers on patrol in specific problem areas at the appropriate times.*
3. *Early intervention by police in conflict situations.*
This strategy can only be maintained for short intense periods, after which time it may become an excessive drain on police resources. It may also lose its impetus/psychological effect upon potential offenders in an area.

6. 6.1.1. Primary Objective:-
To reduce the demands on police to a pre-determined level where it is considered a joint police/public approach to crime and conflict problems can be implemented and not overwhelmed by the volume and type of demands.

6. 6.1.2. Control:-
Chief Superintendent:-
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter-station/inter-agency policy co-ordination and Management Objectives.

Superintendent:- (Uniform)
Overall Implementation and management of station strategy and Operational Objectives.

Superintendent/Chief Inspector (CID):-

Chief Inspector:-
Week by week management of station uniform strategy and operational objectives.
Inspector (relief officers):-
Geographical responsibility and planning proposals for defined sectors. Management and Implementation of agreed policy for that sector.

Time based duty officers function for whole station.

Inspectors (others):-
Support of Relief Inspectors both administration and operational as decided under station policy.

Under this particular strategy it may be necessary for a special structure to be created in the short term (i.e. special C.I.D./Uniform Squad, but this should be absorbed into the normal station structure as soon as possible.

6. 6.1.3. Management Objectives:--
(1) Define the problem situation.

(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to implement and maintain the strategy.

(3) Ensure that the total police station structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.

(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the resources required.
(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/familiarisation for all officers involved or affected.

(6) Plan and implement an appropriate intelligence, monitoring and criminal target system. (D.I.I.U)

(7) Identify problems suitable for multi-agency approach (concentrating on those possible to implement very quickly).

(8) Plan or implement an appropriate Public Information Network.

(9) Begin negotiations with outside agency policy makers, re: environmental crime prevention and conflict reduction.

(10) Decide the appropriate measure to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Problem Directed Strategy.

6. 6.1.4. **Operational Objectives:**

(1) Contain street crime to existing levels.

(2) Obtain a decrease in selected street crime, particularly those causing most public fear.
(3) Reduce the levels of public conflict wherever possible in day to day policing.

(4) Obtain a decrease in any other incidents which are perceived by local residents as important.

(5) Increase the number of patrolling officers to the required levels, whilst maintaining the support of residents.

(6) Increase significantly levels of victim helping by all patrol officers to residents.

(7) Collect and feed back the intelligence information required.

(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of targetted individuals.

(9) Implement the operational aspect of public information network.

(10) Establish links with all significant group representatives in the area and provide community helping.

(11) Identify suitable targets for short term crime prevention measures.

(12) Maintain police response times to agreed levels.
When a residential area is analysed as a medium demand area, or has been reduced to this level by the above strategy, then the following strategy will be required:-

6.6.2. **PROBLEM DIRECTED**

*Description:* This strategy is directed at implementing and developing a joint police/public approach to the crime and conflict problems of a residential area.

Police patrol and response times are maintained at levels sufficient to prevent large increases in public demands.

Other police resources are invested in discovering the 'root causes' (i.e. the problems not the symptoms) of crime and conflict in the area.

Once these are identified, attempts are made to involve residents in crime prevention through self policing and local agencies in environmental crime prevention and conflict reducing initiatives.

6.6.2.1. **Primary Objective**

To reduce the short term response demands on police by developing a joint police/public strategy against the crime and conflict problems of an area.

6.6.2.2. **Management Objectives**

(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to implement and maintain the strategy (Geographical Responsibility?).

(3) Ensure that the total police station structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.

(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the resources required.

(5) Plan and implement an appropriate intelligence monitoring and criminal target system (D.I.I.U.)

(6) Plan and implement or develop an existing Public Information Network.

(7) Begin, or intensify negotiations with outside agencies providing services to the area, re: environmental crime prevention and conflict reduction.

(8) Collate, analyse and interpret, re: the 'root' problems of the area to plan three strategies:

1. Priorities for multi-agency environmental crime prevention.

2. Priorities for community crime prevention.

(9) Implement the agreed strategies incrementally (do not attempt too much too soon!).

(10) Decide the appropriate measure to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Supported Policing Strategy.

6. 6.2.3. Operational Objectives

(1) Contain and where possible reduce levels of street crime.

(2) Expand the street crimes selected for increased police attention.

(3) Expand areas of conflict resolution for operational officers.

(4) Reduce all short term response demands from the area to acceptable levels.

(5) Decrease the number of patrolling officers without affecting the other objectives.

(6) Increase police resources in multi-agency activities.

(7) Increase police resources providing crime prevention and victim helping.
(8) Implement agreed crime prevention strategies.

(9) Maintain high levels of victim helping by remaining patrolling officers.

(10) Collect and feedback intelligence information required.

(11) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of targetted individuals.

(12) Enhance the operational aspects of the Public Information network.

In residential areas of low demand, reduced police resources will be available, therefore a different strategy is required.

6. 6.3. SUPPORTED STRATEGY

Description:
This strategy is directed at:

(1) Maintaining an existing, successful joint police/public strategy of crime prevention and conflict reduction, or

(2) Introducing this type of strategy into an existing low demand area within existing beat resources.

These objectives will be possible because of the success of, or potential for, a high level of involvement by local agencies and residents. This will have contributed to comparatively low levels of street crime and in particular low demands for Response and Peace-keeping services.
The opportunity for committing crime in the residential area will have been significantly reduced.

Police resources will not be increased in this strategy, any improvements or requirements for additional services must be provided from other agencies' resources, or by voluntary public involvement.

It may well be essential to introduce this strategy into existing low demand areas which adjoin medium or high demand areas, as successful police action in these areas may display demands, particularly crime, into what were previously low demand areas.

6. 6.3.1. Primary Objective
To reduce police resources in the area to the lowest possible level, whilst maintaining the existing low levels of demands on police by a successful joint police/public crime prevention and conflict reducing strategies.

6. 6.3.2. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.

(2) Introduce/Improve/retain an appropriate police structure to maintain this strategy. (Geographical responsibility?)

(3) Ensure that the total police structure and operations are, and remain at, maximum efficiency/effectiveness levels.

(4) Reduce the police resources to the minimum levels possible.
(5) Re-allocate resources to other higher demand areas.

(6) Maintain an appropriate intelligence, monitoring and criminal target system. (D.I.I. Unit).

(7) Update officers training/familiarisation of strategy objectives as required.

(8) Maintain an appropriate Public Information Network.

(9) Maintain/improve liaison with all outside agencies providing services to the area, re: environmental crime prevention.

(10) Where possible expand involvement of agencies in environmental crime prevention.

(11) Where possible expand range of community crime prevention involvement.

(12) Where possible expand range of community conflict resolution.

(13) Decide the appropriate critical measures and their acceptable levels. (Violation of these levels may indicate new strategy required).
6. 6.3.3. **Operational Objectives**

(1) Contain and where possible reduce the overall levels of street crime.

(2) Contain and where possible reduce the overall short term response demands on police.

(3) Identify and reduce future potential sources of community conflict.

(4) Decrease the total number of police resources in the area to minimum levels.

(5) Maintain some of these resources in multi-agency activities (crime prevention).

(6) Maintain some resources in long term group helping (victim and crime prevention).

(7) Encourage individuals and groups in the community to expand their 'self policing' activities where possible.

(8) Maintain agreed crime prevention strategies.

(9) Maintain the intelligence system operational input.
6. 7. HOSTILE AREAS
Unfortunately, some areas of high demand, particularly residential areas, may have a history of public disorder and very HIGH ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL. These 'symbolic locations' require special police strategies. Implementing a High Intensity strategy may precipitate violent street disorder. In addition, police resources may be inadequate to deal with this disorder for prolonged periods. The following strategy is designed as an alternative to a High Intensity Strategy in order to reduce an area to a Medium Demand classification where a Problem Directed strategy can then be utilised.

6. 8. LOW INTENSITY STRATEGY
Despite the name of this strategy, it still requires similar police resources to a HIGH INTENSITY strategy. It is only the public's perception that large numbers of police are not involved. Considerable police resources will still have to be invested in mobile reserves for public disorder and in extensive intelligence networks.

However, the strategy should only be required in the following circumstances.

(1) There is a history of and/or a strong possibility of violent confrontation with Police in the near future.

(2) There is a significant influx of visitors to the area for criminal purposes.

The area where the strategy requires implementation will in reality be HIGH demand area, although criminal activity may have suppressed reports to police of public needs. Due to the volatile nature of such areas, it was found that the strategy had to be divided into three stages; PACIFICATION, STABILISATION and eventually NORMALISATION, Figure. 6. 5.
Fig. 6.5.
6. 8.1. PACIFICATION STRATEGY

Description:
This strategy is directed at maintaining police control over street crime and disorder in a residential area. The aims are to reduce both the levels of public conflict and the opportunities for street crime and disorder. The area may well be considered to have a 'symbolic' significance.
The strategy is almost exclusively dependent upon police to implement and maintain. Unfortunately it will often have to be implemented in the face of hostility from local residents.

Despite these problems, the support and confidence of residents in police must be enhanced and maintained.

Opportunities for crime and conflict would be reduced by:

1) Introducing, at the times disorder is anticipated, the highest levels of uniform patrol officers that can be maintained without themselves provoking serious disorder.

2) Ensuring, fast and effective response to quell public disorder. This will include the detention of those responsible. Reserve manpower resources on standby (mobile) may well be required.

3) Targetting and neutralising of individuals who are persistent/career criminals or involved in organised crime in the area.

4) Early intervention by police in conflict situations.
In addition, genuine attempts must be made by police to provide a good service to local residents, and to deal with their perceived grievances.

6. 8.1.1. **Primary Objective**

To reduce the levels of short term response and peacekeeping demands on police, in particular for serious disorder, to levels that can be dealt with by reasonable police station resources. In addition to gain the confidence and support of local law abiding residents for police actions.

6. 8.1.2. **Control**

**Chief Superintendent:**
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter-station/inter-agency, policy co-ordination and Management Objectives.

**Superintendent (Uniform):**
Overall Implementation/Management of Pacification strategy and Operational objectives.

**Superintendent/Chief Inspector (C.I.D):**
Overall implementation/Management of crime objectives with Pacification strategy, management of Intelligence system (Surveillance/Targetting).

**Chief Inspector/Inspector (Uniform):**
Management of Operational objectives, day by day.
6. 8.1.3. Management Objectives

(1) Define the problem situation.

(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to implement and maintain.

(3) Ensure that the total police station structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.

(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the resources required.

(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/familiarisation for all officers involved or affected.

(6) Plan and implement an appropriate intelligence, monitoring and criminal target system (D.I.I.Unit and I and S Unit as required?).

(7) Identify problems suitable for multi-agency approach (concentrating on those possible to implement very quickly).

(8) Plan and implement an appropriate Police Information Network, concentrating on the parts linked to local residents and their representatives.

(9) Initiate, where possible, multi-agency approach to urgent problems.
(10) Decide the appropriate measures to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Stabilisation strategy.

6. 8.1.4. **Operational Objectives.**

(1) Increase the number of uniformed patrolling officers to required levels without provoking serious disorder.

(2) Deal effectively with all outbreaks of street disorder.

(3) Significantly reduce levels of street crime within a four week period.

(4) Hold, and if possible, reduce this level of street crime, after the initial four week period.

(5) Reduce the levels of public conflict whenever possible in day to day policing.

(6) Collect and feed back the intelligence information required.

(7) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of targetted individuals.

(8) Increase significantly levels of victim helping (short term) by all uniform patrol officers to residents.
(9) Implement the operational aspects of public information network.

(10) Establish links with all significant group representatives in the area and provide group helping (short term).

At a pre-planned time, or when a reduced level of crime and conflict is reached the following will be required:-

6. 8.2. STABILISATION STRATEGY

Description: -
This strategy is directed at 'stabilising' an unpredictable high demand area where, although street crime and disorder are largely under police control (i.e. not allowed to rise above certain levels), there is still a potential for escalation and conflict which requires a longer term police strategy.

The strategy is largely dependent upon police who will have to contain street crime and disorder to 'acceptable' levels, whilst increasing public confidence to the point where residents demonstrate their positive support for police. This will be particularly important at the group level.

Criminal influences in the area must be reduced to the lowest possible levels, especially elements of organised crime.

Attention must also be given to the possibility of a multi-agency approach to the crime and conflict problems of the area. Where considered desirable/possible physical changes to the environment should be initiated.
There should already be a measure of local residents support for police actions and acceptance in the area of the same regular uniformed patrol officers exercising their police powers.

A large proportion of police resources may still be required to deal with response and peacekeeping demands. However, a significant proportion of the total police resources should be directed at supporting and encouraging residents, particularly at the group level, to themselves support crime prevention and conflict reducing initiatives in the area.

6. 8.2.1. **Primary Objectives**

To reduce the short term response and peacekeeping demands (and the potential for sudden escalation) on police to a level comparable with the surrounding medium demand areas. In addition, to gain the support of residents for initial crime prevention and conflict reducing strategies.

6. 8.2.2. **Control**

**Chief Superintendent:**—

Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter-station/inter-agency, *policy* co-ordination and Management Objectives.

**Superintendent (Uniform):**—

Overall implementation/Management of Stabilisation strategy and Operational objectives.
Superintendent/Chief Inspector (C.I.D):-
Overall Implementation/Management of crime objectives with Stabilisation strategy, management of Intelligence system (Surveillance/Targetting).

Chief Inspector/Inspector (Uniform):-
Management of Operational objectives, day by day.

6. 8.2.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.

(2) Decide if an existing police structure is appropriate to implement the strategy or if change is required.

(3) Ensure that the total police station structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.

(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the resources required.

(5) Plan and Implement appropriate training/ familiarisation for all officers involved or affected.

(6) If not established, plan and implement an appropriate intelligence, monitoring and criminal target system (D.I.I. Unit and I and S Unit as required?)
(7) Identify problems suitable for multi-agency approach (including physical environmental changes where required).

(8) Expand or implement an appropriate Police Information Network, concentrating on local residents and their representatives.

(9) Initiate or intensify a multi-agency approach to urgent and long term problems.

(10) Estimate the resources that can be re-deployed in group helping (long term) and multi-agency development.

(11) Decide the appropriate measures to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Normalisation strategy.

6. 8.2.4. Operational Objectives

(1) Deal effectively with all outbreaks of street disorder with the minimum number of officers.

(2) Decrease the number of uniformed patrolling officers required to provide response and peacekeeping services.
(3) Increase the amount of crime prevention services provided by uniform officers.

(4) Maintain high levels of victim helping by individual officers, particularly to residents.

(5) Significantly reduce levels of street crime and disorder within a specified period.

(6) Expand areas of conflict resolution for operational officers.

(7) Collect and feed back the intelligence information required.

(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of targetting individuals.

(9) Implement or enhance the operational aspect of the Public Information network.

(10) Establish or increase links with all significant group representatives in the area and provide community helping.

Once again at a pre-planned time or demand level a change to the following will be required:-
6. 8.3. NORMALISATION STRATEGY

Description:
This strategy is directed at removing any remnants of 'special' or 'symbolic' significance from a geographical area, thereby enabling it to be included in the normal policing arrangements for the police station.

Police resources should be incrementally removed from the area down to a predetermined level. If a special team of officers has been set up in one of the earlier strategies, it should now be dissolved and absorbed into the broader policing strategies for the whole police station.

This strategy is dependent on the development of a joint police/public involvement in policing, particularly crime prevention and conflict reduction. Local groups and individual residents in the area should become actively involved in the self-policing of their neighbourhood.

All agencies which provide a service of any kind to the area should be encouraged to develop a joint approach to the problems of the area. If necessary police should initiate this type of development and strategy.

A proportion of police resources should be devoted to encouraging various neighbourhoods in the area to develop into 'communities' (i.e. forming residents or tenants associations) in order that they may become involved with community crime prevention initiative (i.e. Neighbourhood Watch).

A proportion of police resources should also be invested in identifying and developing strategies against the major crime problems of the area, and its sources of public conflict, as a long term objective.
Police must make vigorous efforts to prevent the area retaining a special status, both in the minds of the public and street police officers. This will require prompt replies and the production of accurate data discounting views to the contrary.

At the same time senior police managers must be aware that it is always possible for an area to decay and regain its original status. Therefore monitoring of selected indicators must always continue and prompt action taken when required.

6. 8.3.1. **Primary Objectives**
To maintain short term response and peacekeeping demands at acceptable levels. To increase long term victim helping, peacekeeping and crime prevention activities by police. By these means to actively involve local groups and individuals in crime prevention and conflict reducing strategies.

6. 8.3.2 **Control**

*Chief Superintendent:* -
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter-station/inter-agency policy co-ordination and Management Objectives.

*Superintendent (Uniform):*- 
Overall implementation and management of station strategy and operational objectives.
Superintendent/Chief Inspector (C.I.D):-
Implementation and management of station
crime strategy, management of D.I.I. Unit and
C.I.D. operational objectives.

Chief Inspector:-
Week by week management of station uniform
strategy and operational objectives.

Inspectors (relief officers):-
Geographical responsibility and planning
proposals for defined sectors. Management and
implementation of agreed policy for that
sector.

Time based duty officer function for whole
station.

Inspectors (other):-
Support of Relief Inspectors both administration
and operational as decided under station policy.

6. 8.3.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.

(2) Decide if the existing police structure is
appropriate or if change is required (i.e.
absorption of special structure into
normal policing arrangements).

(3) Ensure that the total police station
structure and operations are at maximum
efficiency and effectiveness levels (N.P.
Basic Package).
(4) Estimate reduced levels of resources required for strategy and time scale for achieving reductions.

(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/familiarisation for all officers involved or affected.

(6) Review the intelligence, monitoring and criminal target system (D.I.I. Unit).

(7) Initiate a strategy to identify the sources of the major crime problems of the area.

(8) Intensify a multi-agency approach to the identified sources of major crime problems.

(9) Review the existing Police Information Network.

(10) decide the appropriate measures to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Problem Directed policing strategy.

(11) Estimate the various levels of remaining resources required for the specific areas of the strategy.
Plan a strategy to discount 'special' or 'symbolic' significance in police/public beliefs and decide on monitoring of core indicators in case decay begins.

6. 8.3.4. **Operational Objectives**

1. **Deal effectively with all outbreaks of street disorder with the minimum number of officers.**

2. **Decrease the number of uniformed patrolling officers required to provide response and peacekeeping services.**

3. **Increase the amount of crime prevention services provided by each individual uniform officer (long term victim and group helping).**

4. **Maintain high quality of victim helping by individual officers, but encourage voluntary groups (Victim Support) to expand the actual levels of help to victims of crime.**

5. **Maintain low levels of street crime and disorder.**

6. **Continue to expand areas of conflict resolution for operational officers.**
(7) Collect and feed back the intelligence information required.

(8) Effect the arrest and/or neutralisation of targetted individuals.

(9) Enhance the operational aspect of the Public Information Network.

(10) Increase contact with significant groups in the area and provide community helping.

If the Normalisation strategy is successful a change can now be made to the Residential Problem Directed strategy.

6. 9. NON-RESIDENTIAL STRATEGY

As previously indicated, areas with no residents i.e. Industrial Estates, Shopping Centres, Airports, Stations etc., may require different strategies. If there are no residents who can be motivated to assist police voluntarily in their spare time, police tactics will have to reflect the professional business nature of any such area.

This strategy involves the development of environmental crime prevention and commercial crime prevention (self strategy; HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW demand areas are identified and linked to; CONTAINMENT, PROBLEM DIRECTED and MAINTENANCE police strategy. (Fig. 6.6).
6.9.1. **CONTAINMENT STRATEGY**

**Description**

A strategy directed at:-

(A) Containing high levels of demands on police within a defined non-residential geographical area and preventing them from 'overspilling' into surrounding areas, particularly residential areas.
(B) **Maintaining police control over street crime and public disorder in all public places within the defined non-residential area.**

(C) **Reducing the demands on police, particularly response and peace-keeping, to pre-determined levels.**

These objectives will be achieved by:-

(1) **Fast police response to demands (difficult for offenders to escape).**

(2) **High numbers of officers on patrol in specific problem areas at the appropriate times.**

These strategies will have the effect of reducing the opportunity for crime, but they are expensive in terms of police resources. However, it is possible that police will have no alternative and have to accept these costs (i.e. Airports, Football grounds, etc.) until radical changes in the environment can be implemented.

The overall strategy will usually be very dependent upon police to implement and maintain, but wherever possible, there should be extensive involvement by other non-police security services (e.g. guards, watchmen, stewards, etc).

Normally there will be little resentment from the public using the non-residential area about the high levels of police activity. However, if organised attacks are made on police, 'swarming' begins, or media complaints begin to be made, then the whole strategy may become inappropriate.
6. 9.1.1. **Primary Objectives**

To reduce the short term response and peacekeeping demands on police from a defined non-residential area to a pre-determined level. This level will be considered appropriate for a joint long term police/commercial security strategy to be implemented without being overwhelmed by the volume and type of demands.

6. 9.1.2. **Control**

**Chief Superintendents:**
Overall policy direction/forward planning, inter-station/inter-agency policy co-ordination and Management Objectives.

**Superintendent:**
Overall Implementation and management of station strategy and Operational Objectives.

**Superintendent/Chief Inspector (C.I.D):**

**Chief Inspector:**
Week by week management of station uniform strategy and operational objectives.

**Inspector (relief officers):**
Geographical responsibility and planning proposals for defined sectors. Management and Implementation of agreed policy for that sector.
Time based duty officer function for whole station.

Inspectors (other):-
Support of Relief Inspectors both administration and operational as decided under station policy.

Under this particular strategy it may be necessary for a special structure to be created in the short term (i.e. special C.I.D./Uniform Squad), but this should be absorbed into the normal station structure as soon as possible.

6. 9.1.3. Management Objectives
(1) Define the problem situation.
(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to implement and maintain the strategy.
(3) Ensure that the total police station structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.
(4) Estimate, acquire and allocate the resources required.
(5) Plan and implement appropriate training/familiarisation for all officers involved or affected.
(6) Plan and implement an appropriate intelligence, monitoring and, if required, a criminal target system (D.I.I.U).
(7) Identify problems suitable for a joint short term police/commercial security approach (concentrating on those possible to implement very quickly).

(8) Identify problems suitable for multi-agency approach (concentrating on those possible to implement very quickly).

(9) Plan or implement an appropriate Public Information Network designed to reach all concerned non-residents.

(10) Begin negotiations with outside agency policy makers, re: environmental crime prevention.

(11) Decide the appropriate measure to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Problem Directed strategy.

6. 9.1.4. Operational Objectives

(1) Contain the high level of street crime and/or public disorder to the defined non-residential geographical area.

(2) Reduce these levels of street crime and disorder, particularly those types causing most public fear to pre-defined levels.
(3) Obtain a decrease in any other offences or incidents which are perceived as important by the public in the area.

(4) Increase the levels of police resources available for short term response and peace-keeping demands.

(5) Maintain police response times to agreed levels.

(6) Increase the levels of police resources available for crime prevention services.

(7) Increase, where appropriate, the levels of victim helping to the public in the area.

(8) Collect and feed back the intelligence information required.

(9) Implement the operational aspect of the Public Information Network (commercial version).

(10) Identify suitable targets for short term crime prevention measures.

(11) Establish links with all significant group representatives and provide short group helping.

After a suitable reduction in demands, a change will be made to:-
6. 9.2. **PROBLEM DIRECTED STRATEGY**

Description:-

This strategy is directed at implementing and developing a joint police/public (non-resident) approach to the demand problems of a non-residential area.

Police patrols and response times are maintained at levels sufficient to prevent large increases in public demands.

A significant proportion of police resources are invested in jointly (with the non-residents concerned) discovering the 'root causes' of the crime problems in the area.

Once these are identified, attempts are made to involve the same individuals or organisations in preparing crime prevention solutions to these problems. These solutions should contain a suitable fixture of self policing (i.e. commercial security systems, alarms, watchmen, bolts and bars, etc.) and environmental crime prevention (i.e. changing the total environment in a way so as to reduce the opportunity for committing crime).

The responsibility for introduction, maintenance and cost of all these systems remains with the individuals or organisations concerned. Police should act as motivators, advisors and co-ordinators of the various systems in order to ensure that they are both a cost effective benefit to the organisation or business concerned and are co-ordinated into the total 'Problem Directed' police strategy.
6. 9.2.1. **Primary Objectives**
To reduce the short term response and peace-keeping demands on police from a defined non-residential area by developing a joint police/public (non-resident) strategy against the crime problems of business/organisations in the area.

6. 9.2.2. **Management Objectives**
(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.

(2) Decide the appropriate police structure to implement and maintain the strategy (Geographical Responsibility?)

(3) Ensure that the total police structure and operations are at maximum efficiency and effectiveness levels.

(4) Estimate and acquire or allocate the resources required.

(5) Plan and implement or develop an existing Public Information Network, designed to include essential non-residents.

(7) Begin, or intensify negotiations with outside agencies providing services to the area, re: environmental crime prevention.

(8) Collate, analyse and interpret, re: the 'root' problems of the area to plan two strategies:-
(i) Priorities for multi-agency environmental crime prevention.

(ii) Priorities for commercial crime prevention.

(9) Implement the two agreed strategies incrementally (do not attempt too much too soon!).

(10) Decide the appropriate measure to indicate 'success', and the various levels of achievement required before a decision can be made to implement a Maintenance Policing strategy.

6. 9.2.3. Operational Objectives

(1) Contain and where possible reduce the levels of crime and disorder, particularly in streets and public places.

(2) Reduce the levels of short term response and peace-keeping demands on police.

(3) Reduce police resources held on 'standby' for response and peace-keeping services.

(4) Increase police resources allocated to crime prevention services.

(5) Increase operational levels of long term victim and group helping behaviour by 'front line' police officers.
6. Select a small number of multi-agency and commercial crime prevention tasks.

7. Implement the agreed crime prevention strategies.

8. Develop the joint police/commercial crime prevention strategies at the operational level.

9. Develop the multi-agency crime prevention at the operational level.

10. Educate individuals, businesses and organisations in the area to understand the necessity for them to self police, then to participate in this.

11. Develop the information and intelligence operational input.

12. Develop the operational (day-to-day) contacts in the Commercial Public Information Network.

The successful implementation of this strategy will then allow for change to:

6. 9.3. MAINTENANCE STRATEGY

Description
This strategy is directed at:

(1) Maintaining an existing successful blend of environmental structure/professional crime prevention services in a non-residential low demand area.
(2) Introducing this type of strategy into an existing low demand non-residential area within existing beat resources.

These strategies will be initiated or maintained by a low level of policy response, peace-keeping and crime prevention services. They will be considered possible because of the success of, or potential for, a high level of involvement and co-operation between police and the various non-resident clients who require police services for premises, property and employers in the area. This will have contributed to comparatively low levels of crime and in particular low demands for Response and Peace-keeping services.

The opportunity for committing crime in the non-residential area will have been significantly reduced.

Police resources for committing crime in the non-residential area will have been significantly reduced.

Police resources will not be increased in this strategy, any improvement or requirements for additional services must be provided by the private or public bodies who have interests in the area.

It may well be essential to introduce this strategy into existing non-residential low demand areas (residential or non-residential). Successful police action in these areas may displace demands, particularly crime, into what were previously low demand areas.
6. 9.3.1. **Primary Objectives**

To reduce police resources in the area to the lowest possible level whilst maintaining the existing low levels of demands on police by a successful joint police/public (non-resident) development of a crime reducing environment and commercial crime prevention strategies.

6. 9.3.2. **Management Objectives**

(1) Define or re-define the problem situation.

(2) Introduce/Improve/retain an appropriate police structure to maintain this strategy. (Geographical responsibility?)

(3) Ensure that the total police structure and operations are, and remain at, maximum efficiency/effectiveness levels.

(4) Reduce the police resources to the minimum levels possible.

(5) Re-allocate resources to other higher demand areas.

(6) Maintain an intelligence, monitoring and where appropriate, a criminal target system. (D.I.I. Unit).

(7) Update officers training/familiarisation of strategy objectives as required.
(8) Maintain an appropriate Public Information Network with particular emphasis on business/organisational contacts.

(9) Maintain/Improve liaison with all outside agencies providing services to the area, re: environmental crime prevention.

(10) Where possible expand involvement of agencies in environmental crime prevention.

(11) Where possible expand range of commercial crime prevention involvement.

(12) Decide the appropriate critical measures and their acceptable levels. (Violation of these levels may indicate new strategy required).

6. 9.3.3. Operational Objectives
(1) Maintain low levels of crime and disorder, particularly in streets and public places.

(2) Maintain low levels of short term response and peace-keeping demands on police.

(3) Decrease the total quantity of all police resources in the defined non-residential area to minimum levels.
(4) Ensure that a proportion of the remaining police resources continue to provide short and long term crime prevention services.

(5) Maintain the development of the joint police/commercial crime prevention at the operational level.

(6) Maintain the development of multi-agency crime prevention at the operational level.

(7) Encourage individuals, business and organisations in the area to expand their everyday 'self policing' activities wherever possible.

(8) Maintain agreed crime prevention strategies.

(9) Maintain the information and intelligence operational input.

(10) Maintain and where possible develop the operational (day to day) aspects of the Commercial Public Information Network.

6.10. **SUMMARY**

In this chapter, the concept of Directed Patrolling has been described in some depth. Initially, the development of a police PUBLIC CONTACT STRATEGY was analysed and discussed. This development was then linked into operational street policing by the planning and implementation of DIRECTED PATROLLING.

This patrolling was specifically linked to the geographical demand profile and the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL to produce a number of options for improving police services and reducing public demand.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7. BRIXTON - THE EVALUATION

7. 1. IMPLEMENTATION

By 1986, a 3rd Level Geographical Policing system called 'Neighbourhood Policing' had been implemented at Brixton Police Station. The experimental project had by this time been running for two and a half years.

One of the first considerations of the evaluation concerned the effectiveness of the implementation. It was clear from a number of other experimental sites that implementation had not been achieved at all these sites. However, at Brixton sufficient elements of a Geographical Policing system existed to indicate that implementation had been successful. What now had to be evaluated was the effectiveness of the system.

7. 2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

In the Pre-Test evaluation in Chapter 3, it was concluded that a Geographical Policing System did not exist prior to 1983. In this chapter, a summary will be made of the various evaluations made by the project at Brixton in the Post-test. This evaluation was conducted during 1986 using data from that year and, where appropriate, data from the preceding three years.

The evaluation will be collated within an evaluation framework which utilises the plan and description of a 3rd LEVEL Policing System (Fig.7. 1). Each structure or sub-system will be examined to establish its existence and effects. The methodology of the various surveys listed in this Chapter are detailed in Appendix Two.
GEOGRAPHICAL POLICING SYSTEM

POLICE
Geographical Policing System

PUBLIC
Voluntary Helping (Pro-Social)

AGENCY
Professional Helping (Pro-Social)

Police/Public Planning/Information System

Joint Policing System

Resource Management
Conflict Management
Crime Management

Satisfaction with Police

Public Locus of Control

Public Pro-Social Behaviour

GOALS
Quality of Life
Police/Public Contract
Demand Stabilisation
It was predicted that the greatest changes would be to the internal organisation of the police station with significantly reduced effects on operational police systems outside the station. In addition, as the evaluation progressed through the framework, reduced effects were predicted in each subsequent structure or sub-system. Changes in the environment or public behaviour were considered to be the most difficult to achieve within the system.

With regards to people, it was expected that the first indications of change would be in behaviour, with possible changes in attitude if the behaviour had become established.

There were low expectations of behaviour change by police outside the station and the public in the areas being policed. Due to the relatively short duration of the project, significant attitude changes among the police or public were not expected.

7.3 POLICE SYSTEM ANALYSIS (A)
Initially, police have a major responsibility to reorganise themselves and implement specific structures and systems. Unless this objective is achieved, further evaluation is pointless. In this analysis it was necessary to establish that a system as defined had been implemented, and was effective in achieving its objectives. The major question is, did an effective Geographical Policing System exist?

7.3.1 DEFINITION ANALYSIS
In April 1984, geographical responsibility was introduced for the majority of uniformed Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors. This responsibility was achieved by dividing Brixton Division into four proportionate areas called 'Sectors'. Each of the four reliefs was allocated one of these Sectors as an ongoing geographical responsibility. (Fig. 7. 2).
Existing Home Beat officers within these new Sectors were re-selected and renamed 'Permanent Beat Officers'. These officers were attached to the reliefs for supervision and planning. This combination of officers were known as a Relief Team. By 1984 an increasing number of relief officers were being used as Sector Officers, working in a similar manner to Permanent Beat Officers for periods of six months.

These Sector and Permanent Beat Officers were by 1985 responsible for all preventive policing on each Sector and by the end of 1985 were also dealing with the majority of the immediate response demands. The reduced number of officers on the remaining relief shift duties acted as a support service and dealt with demands during low demand periods. Sector and Permanent Beat Officers adjusted their work patterns to cover the high demand periods. Changes to these relief teams were reduced as far as possible.

By 1986, the majority of police services within a defined geographical area were consistently provided by a stabilised team of dedicated police officers. In addition, there was considerable pressure from the majority of Sergeants and Inspectors, and approximately half the Constables, to remove the reliefs completely and change to a total geographic model, as developed by the Surrey Constabulary.

The existing Relief Teams were, by this time, identified to significant numbers of residents, organisations and businesses on each Sector; many of whom were greatly increasing their involvement with police by supporting and assisting these Relief Teams.
7. 3.2. FEATURES ANALYSIS.
Ten main features of a 3rd LEVEL system were identified in Chapter 2. It was suggested that a sufficient level of resources must be allocated to each and that a significant effect must be detected. Each of the ten features is analysed in some depth and the major element of Directed Patrolling has been illustrated with a case study.

7. 3.2.1 Proportion of Preventive Policing
The available evidence suggests that the proportion of resources invested in preventive activity had increased significantly. As an example of this change, in 1983, it had been estimated that less than 10% of police/public contact was initiated by police, with little of this interaction able to be classified as preventive. (N.P. PROJECT 1983) The overwhelming majority of contact was public initiated, immediate response demands.

By 1986, police initiated contact (Brixton Report 1986) was estimated to have increased to 38% of all police/public contact, broken down as follows:

1. Assistance to Public 48%
2. Crime Prevention 32%
3. Victim Helping 10%
4. Offender Detention 8%
5. Peacekeeping (prevention) 2%
Operational, Geographical uniformed constables were found to have significantly (1% LEVEL) increased their time working on their sector and involved in proactive activities for up to 45% of each 8 hour tour of duty. (BRIXTON REPORT 1986).

It was found (N.P. PROJECT 1986) that at least 1 in 3 officers claimed they spent more time (1% LEVEL) on:-

- Giving information to the public
- Working with community groups
- Crime Prevention.

Police attitudes towards community involvement were much more positive compared with pre-test levels. Willingness for police to get involved significantly increased (5% LEVEL) for:-

- Giving talks to children in schools
- Helping to run youth clubs
- Spending a weeks attachment with probation officers
- Giving talks on self defence
- Giving talks to trainee social workers.

There was also a significant increase (1% LEVEL) in the belief that police should spend more time on pro-active activity including:
- Giving crime prevention talks to residents
- Talking to local people
- Giving advice and support to victims
- Liaising with schools
- Discussions with leaders of ethnic groups
- Keeping an eye on likely offenders.

As can be seen, police behaviour on the streets had significantly changed towards Preventive Policing and those changes were reflected in police attitudes.

Prevention had now become a significant proportion of everyday uniform Constables patrol activity.

In addition, it was estimated that over a third of uniformed Sergeants spent up to 12 hours each per week in preventive activity. Over half the uniform Inspectors were also found to average 26 hours per week in preventive work. Chief Inspectors and above averaged ten hours per week in crime and conflict prevention.

Estimates of the total police station resources involved in prevention were difficult but calculated to be not less than 36% of the total resources. This included two full time Crime Prevention Officers and a Licensing Officer, tasked to prevent alcohol related crime and conflict.
7. 3.2.2. Sector Teams

By 1986, five large Sector Teams had been established. Four were in symbolic high demand locations and a fifth was in the central market and shopping area of Brixton. These teams were by this time dealing with over two thirds of the total response and preventive demands of all the Sectors.

As they were based in the high demand areas of each Sector and adjusted their times of work to peak demand times, they dealt with the majority of operational street policy. The teams had slightly less manpower than the remaining relief shift based teams. However, the workload of Sector Teams was a third higher than relief officers.

It was concluded that Sector Teams were the most productive basic work units with a range of multiple objectives being achieved.

7. 3.2.3. Functional Division

Unfortunately, due to the complex nature of the new policing system, functional divisions had actually increased. Inside the police station, new elements in the policing system, such as the Crime Desk and the Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit, had been responsible for increasing the number of specialist tasks.
On the streets, outside the station, large Sector Teams had been established. A large number of officers, however, remained on the narrow functional response based reliefs. Whilst these officers were responding to demands from the whole of Brixton, they were increasingly accepting the geographical responsibility of the whole Relief Team. But at the time of evaluation the functional splits between the reliefs and Sector Teams were causing increasing difficulties. It was clear that the actual system of geographical responsibility devised by Brixton was increasing the functional splits in operational street policing. Recognising these problems, both the Senior Managers and the Operational uniform officers were pressing for changes and more radical systems of geographical responsibility.

7. 3.2.4. Geographical Operations

In theory, all operational uniformed street officers were geographically based in 1985. Analysis showed that under 10% of these officers had not been involved in some geographical activity. The remainder had operated geographically for significant periods of their duties.

Police attitudes towards geographical responsibility had changed dramatically. In 1983 less than a third (28%) of officers preferred geographical to time based operations. By
1986 70% of these officers now preferred geographical responsibility (N.P. PROJECT 1986). Officers now considered local knowledge and local contact with both residents and agencies as higher priorities than at pre-test (significant at 1% level). They also considered benefits to be, work variety, team work and good supervision.

A majority of officers (58%) agreed that geographical responsibility had led to improvements in the policing of the area and wanted to see it continue either in its present form or with changes. Few wanted it abolished (10%). Around 1 in 2 officers felt they spent more time on their sectors in:-

- Getting to know local people
- Patrolling on foot
- Receiving information from the public
- Identifying crime spots and trends
- Working as part of a team
- Looking at long term problems.

7. 3.2.5. Public Involvement Policy

There was an explicit policy of public involvement in Brixton policing. This involvement began between senior officers and the Lambeth Consultative Committee and continued down to Constable level.

Public involvement at the lower levels can be illustrated by the unique innovation at Brixton of the Sector Working Party concept in 1985.
This joint public and police working party was the basic foundation of local police planning and priorities.

There were also considerable resources invested in the policy of public involvement. Approximately 200 police man hours per month were dedicated to this work. The majority of this work was in providing a secretariat for the Working Parties, preparing data and statistics and attending other public or agency meetings on police policy.

7. 3.2.6. **Resource Deployment**

By 1985, almost all uniformed resource deployment was the responsibility of Sergeants and Inspectors. The only exceptions were in the urgent requirements for aid to other police stations. Invariably, even these decisions would be authorised by the supervising officers involved, if there was sufficient time for consultation.

A central duties office under the Chief Inspector Operations acted as a support and co-ordinating function in the resource management process. Even large operations, such as Festivals, raids and anti-robbery strategies, were pre-planned and resourced by Sector Inspectors and Sergeants.
7. 3.2.7 First Level Autonomy
Inspectors and Sergeants had increased autonomy in a number of areas. Staff selection, training and development operational priorities, planning, strategies and management of routine and special operations were devolved down to these officers.

7. 3.2.8 Information System Resources
Each Sector and specialist function at the police station had designated officers who collected and processed information as part of their operational duties. These officers were supported by the D.I.I.U. staffed by four police officers with some computer assistance. The Crime Desk and the Collator were linked into this central system. When the new extension to Brixton Police Station was opened in 1986 all these functions were located in adjoining offices, supported by increased computer systems.

However, despite these improvements, the resources were still inadequate, leaving the information system erratic and sometimes unreliable. Insufficient electronic data collection and processing made the system manpower-intensive and unable to cope with the new demands for service. Before the information system could show its true potential, high levels of investment in equipment and skills were needed.
7. 3.2.9. *Response Level*

The minimum Response Level for Brixton was calculated to be 200 Constables in 1986. When an addition for high potential of 65 Constables was added it rose to 265. The actual manpower at that time was 217 Constables. However it had been estimated that, due to better resource deployment and the advantages of Geographic Policing, the extra for high potential could be reduced to 35 Constables for a full 3rd LEVEL Policing System.

It had been found that since 1983, Constable manpower had steadily decreased. This was due to a failure to replace normal manpower losses each year. The average manpower level for Constables, each year, are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In support of the concept of an accurate 'Response Policing Level' a small research project was undertaken at Brixton and the surrounding stations of Clapham, Kennington and Streatham. (BECKETT 1985).

It was found that the three significant influences on street crime levels were; the Environment, levels of uniformed Constables and the patrol behaviour of these Constables. Once the powerful effects of the Environment, such as good or bad weather, had been identified and excluded from all the samples, then correlations as high as .85 were obtained between levels of street crime and police manpower.
The important aspect of the manpower levels was the existence of a Directed Patrolling or Tasking strategy. These findings contradicted other research evidence (KELLING ET AL 1974) about the effects of police on crime. Whilst the findings can in no way be considered conclusive, due to the small samples and short time scales, they did provide some support and highlight the implications.

It would appear that, unlike other studies which just assessed numbers of police officers against changes in crime statistics, it is important to include the actual amount of time spent in the High Demand areas and exactly what they do. Once this has been done, it is suggested that police can have a significant affect on levels of street crime. These research findings reinforced the importance of an effective Directed Patrolling strategy whatever the numbers of patrol officers available. It was also suggested that the higher the levels of street crime, the quicker police can influence these levels. Low levels of street crime appeared to be far more difficult to influence despite increased manpower and a Directed Patrolling strategy.

7. 3.2.10 Directed Patrolling

Despite reducing manpower levels, Directed Patrolling linked to the Environmental Potential, was the major framework used by Sectors to plan their policing strategies.
The evaluation of the Environmental Potential in Chapter 3 and the descriptions of Directed Patrolling in Chapter 5 were both developed by Brixton officers from concepts and frameworks provided by the project team during 1984-85. An overview and example of this development can be provided by a summary of the strategy to reduce high crime demands and implement Sector Teams as follows:-

CASE STUDY: The Anti-Crime Operation: Brixton 1985

In 1984 the allegations of 'street crime' on Brixton Division began to increase at a tremendous rate. In the peak months of May, August, and November 1984 total allegations for robbery, theft person, burglary and auto-crime were between 950 and 1,000 per month, with robbery and theft from the person showing the highest percentage increase.

It has been calculated that over the years 1983/4 the trend increase in street robbery and theft allegations was 66%. The steepest rise in these allegations took place in the last six months of 1984.

Although allegations of crime are considered more informative at local level for police strategy planning, they do not allow comparisons with other British crime statistics.
However, when classified Home Office crime statistics for 1984 were examined, a similar dismal picture emerged.

In 1984 there were an average of 16,400 crime offences per 100,000 of the population in the whole of Lambeth. This was 1,000 greater per 100,000 than the next worst crime area in England and Wales - Hackney. The National average is 7,000 crimes per 100,000 of the population.

Up to 21st January 1985 street crime allegations in Brixton had already reached 724; the predicted total for January was calculated as being well above 1,000 allegations.

The project team concluded that reductions in street manpower at Brixton in 1984 for a variety of reasons (Miner's Strike etc) influenced the rapid upward trend of street crime. In addition, the senior officers at Brixton were aware that concentrated anti-crime operations could only have a short-term reducing effect on crime. It quickly rises above the original level (Sea-Saw Effect BECKETT 1985).

Although such short-term police measures can affect street crime in these areas, unless long-term police strategies are directed at changing the physical environment (multi-agency approach) and the social culture (police/public contact), eventually crime will rise and once again overwhelm police short-term strategies.
Unfortunately, once police street manpower has been allowed to fall below a certain level, the fragile restraint police exercise on street crime levels in these types of areas will be completely overwhelmed and an explosion of crime will follow.

It was clear that, in very simple terms, this is what happened in Brixton during 1984 and that ordinary police patrol tactics were insufficient to regain the situation. In addition, any increase in police resources would have to be concentrated on the problem if it were to be dealt with successfully.

Once crime has escalated out of control a mixture of short and long-term police strategies are required in order to regain control. During 1984 a number of small, short-term anti-crime operations had been carried out in Brixton but with limited success. Although each operation had produced a number of directly attributable arrests, there had been very little effect on the overall crime rate or trend.

This operation had to be directed at two important functions. First, it had to act as a 'first aid' or emergency measure to immediately reduce the escalating crime. Second, and more importantly, to be the first stage of an extensive long-term police strategy for Brixton Division, based on a foundation of Geographical Policing and Directed Patrolling.
The anti-crime operation began on Monday 21st January 1985 with the major focus being directed on Brixton Division, as this Division accounts for the majority of street crime in Lambeth. Four major geographical locations in Brixton had been identified as 'high demand' areas where street crime was most heavily concentrated. These were as follows:

(1) The Stockwell Park Estate and the surrounding roads leading up to Stockwell Tube Station, including the Overton Estate to the east of Brixton Road.

(2) The central market and shopping area in Brixton Road, Atlantic Road and Coldharbour Lane.

(3) Moorland Road Estate, including the surrounding Somerleyton Road and Coldharbour Lane.

(4) The area between Railton Road, Dulwich Road and Brixton Water Lane.

The Operation was designed to control all of these locations and thereby substantially reduce the allegations of street crime. To achieve this control, two distinct police strategies were adopted:

(i) high-profile uniformed patrols to prevent and displace street crime;
(ii) covert, plain-clothes operations using fixed observation posts and mobile surveillance teams, to identify and arrest those actively engaged in street crime.

It was emphasised to all officers, plain clothes and uniform, that the overall strategy was a Target Operation and not a 'stop and search' exercise.

Three 'high demand' areas were then selected as suitable for covert surveillance operations.

'Alpha' Sector (the Stockwell Park Estate area)
'Bravo' Sector (the Moorlands Estate area)
'Charlie' Sector (the Railton Road area).

High profile uniformed patrols were maintained on all surrounding Divisions, particularly on the periphery of Brixton Division. In addition, a permanent Neighbourhood Unit of uniformed Brixton officers was started in the market and central shopping areas.

These uniformed patrols were designed to displace crime into the controlled surveillance sectors where the offenders could be identified, targeted and eventually arrested.

The D.I.I.U. analysis of the environmental potential in each 'high demand' area was utilised to develop the specific strategies used in the 1985 Anti-Crime Operation.
The strategy adopted for the three surveillance areas, 'Alpha', 'Bravo' and 'Charlie', was however basically the same. Local criminals, or those frequenting the areas, were identified, targetted and in many instances arrested for various offences.

Most importantly, great efforts were made by police to keep these offenders in custody once arrested. This removed the increased potential for offences committed whilst on bail by offenders who have very little to lose in these circumstances.

In the central market area a permanent uniformed Neighbourhood Unit was formed. This Unit, with its high-profile uniformed patrols, began to simultaneously displace crime, arrest offenders and develop a long-term policing strategy with the local residents and traders. The strategy required was implemented by means of directed patrolling, planned by the officers involved.

Prior to the Operations the number of Permanent Beat Officers in the Moorlands Estate had been increased to two. These officers were now assisted by a uniformed Sergeant in order to give greater emphasis to long-term strategies with the Estate, once the crime had been brought under control. Once again, these officers planned their own directed patrolling within the overall strategy.
It was known that a permanent Neighbourhood Unit would eventually be required in the Stockwell Park Estate area, but this could not be provided within existing resources.

A slightly different strategy was planned for the Railton Road area. First, the street crime in the area would be reduced. Then a specific drugs operation would be directed against the drug dealers in the area. This operation would utilise men from the Anti-Crime Operation and the local Brixton uniformed officers who would eventually man the permanent Railton Road Neighbourhood Unit. The Unit itself would be implemented once the number of drug dealers and their customers had been reduced to a level which could be maintained by normal uniformed patrols. A copy of the original 'Action Plan' for this strategy and unit is shown at Figure 7.3.

RESULTS
There is little doubt that the Operation and its surrounding publicity was responsible for massive decreases in allegations of street crime in the months of January, February, March and April 1985. The decrease was calculated to be 80% less than a similar period in 1984. (Four Area REPORT 1985). This significant percentage decrease was not repeated in surrounding Divisions.
**OBJECTIVE** Normalisation of Railton Road

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>MEANS OF MEASUREMENT</th>
<th>FREQUENCY OF MEASUREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Targetting and Surveillance of Street Drug Dealers.</td>
<td>15.2.85</td>
<td>Crime books</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Create a dedicated team of officers to form a Neighbourhood Unit consisting of 1 PS and 6 PC's to patrol Railton Road.</td>
<td>18.3.85</td>
<td>Crime books</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) (i) Contain street crime and reduce street drug dealings.</td>
<td>18.3.85</td>
<td>Crime books</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Create an atmosphere of confidence with local residents thus reducing likelihood of conflict.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Reduce the number of incidents involving public disorder.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consider small postal survey.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) After consultation and support of local residents, establish police office in Railton Road.</td>
<td>Consider Meetings with local residents</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Establish contact with existing agencies, eg Community Youth Workers, Neighbourhood Housing Office, local churches.</td>
<td>APRIL 1985</td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) With other agencies promote Tenants Associations in relation to Marcus, Garvie Way and Railton Road.</td>
<td>MAY 1985</td>
<td>Establishment May 1986</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Training of officers on 'C' Sector in Surveillance techniques for necessary operations in Railton Rd. Also to provide additional training for uniform officers to compliment the dedicated officers patrolling Railton Rd.</td>
<td>JUNE 1985</td>
<td>Training Courses arranged</td>
<td>3 Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Dedicated Patrol to promote Crime Prevention Initiative eg, Neighbourhood Watch leafleting.</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>Requests for Crime Prevention Information</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Review of policing strategy and manpower for RAILTON ROAD.</td>
<td>18.3.85</td>
<td>DIIU</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 7 3.
It should be noted that the dramatic decrease in street crime began suddenly, just before the Operation began. The crime allegations for January failed to rise above the expected 1,000 and were frozen at 843 by the end of January. This sudden decrease in January is believed to have been influenced by the extensive pre-Operation media attention.

The Operation resulted in 125 people being arrested. Most importantly, 18 arrests were made for robbery and all of these offenders were known and targetted because of their active involvement in robbery and burglary.

The targetting strategy was maintained during the Operation. In 1984, between 1st January and 30th April there were 2,314 'stops' by police on 'L' District, resulting in 252 arrests. However, in 1985, during the same period there were only 2,047 'stops' but arrests increased to 575.

There appeared to have been two successes in this Operation; first, as previously detailed, allegations of street crime were substantially reduced. A considerable proportion of the local criminals responsible were arrested and convicted. However, most importantly local public satisfaction with the Operation was obviously very high, as measured by letters to the local press, letters to police and reactions from the Consultative Group and Sector Working Parties.
The second success was the implementation and maintenance of a planned strategy which continued to be effective after the initial operation had been withdrawn. There was no 'inevitable' Sea-Saw Effect in the high-demand areas, with the possible exception of Stockwell Park where a follow-up strategy was not possible for some months.

**DISCUSSION**

With regard to the development of Directed Patrolling, this operation was the foundation of this policy and strategy at Brixton. Due to the undoubted success of the initial tactics, Directed Patrolling became an accepted part of everyday police operations. In addition, when linked to Geographical policing, it was found by uniform patrol officers to be far more effective.

Neighbourhood Units, or Sector Teams, were quickly established in the four main high demand areas in order to maximise the effects of Directed Patrolling. This particular operation was undoubtedly a breakthrough with regards to police methods and effectiveness which proved to local police officers that major improvements were possible through changes in street policing.

7. 4. **PLANNING AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (B)**

As it has been established that the structure of a Geographical police system did exist at Brixton in 1985, the next sub-system must now be examined. A major initial task of the police is to establish a planning and information system between the police and the public. This is in order to plan and implement a joint policing system with the public.
7. 4.1. FEATURES ANALYSIS

7. 4.1.1. Information System:-

The D.I.I.U. was set up as the centre and co-ordinator of the police information system in 1983. It continued to develop and by 1986 had established several data collection routines and sub systems. Dissemination of information to senior managers, reliefs, and sector officers was also established as a service.

Officers in the C.I.D. did not make great use of this information system until late 1985 when a Detective Inspector was given the post of Crime Co-ordinator and linked into the D.I.I.U.

Uniformed officers made extensive use of the information system and the majority (82%) had come across information produced by the D.I.I.U. In addition, 77% had visited the D.I.I.U. for a special request or for information already available during the 12 months prior to being surveyed.

A majority (76%) claimed to be satisfied with the service provided by the D.I.I.U. including the quantity and quality of information produced. Around a fifth (21%) were dissatisfied and put forward suggestions for improvement.
However the D.I.I.U. found that the routine data collection systems employed almost completely absorbed their available resources. Analysis and intelligence from the information placed an added burden which they found very difficult to cope with.

It would appear that the major success of the D.I.I.U. was to educate police officers as to the value of an information system but then found it difficult to provide them with their newly understood needs.

In 1985 the Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinators and the public involved in Sector Working Parties were allowed to contact the D.I.I.U. direct for certain types of information. Although the public were delighted with this service it had to be at the expense of other D.I.I.U. tasks and the system as a whole was inadequate for the demands being placed upon it.

Inside the police station the major structure of information processing and dissemination was the cascade of meetings. Of these meetings the most important was the relief meetings of operational street officers and their supervisors.

Prior to the Neighbourhood Policing System, meetings were sporadic with low expectations from their participants. In the Post-Test, uniformed Constables attitudes towards relief meetings were very positive. The majority of officers (over two thirds) felt:-
the lines of communication had improved as a result
the meetings had achieved what they were set up to do
they were worthwhile
they should be continued, either in their present form on with some changes.

A large majority (96%) had attended a relief meeting in the past twelve months with over half (54%) having attended within the previous two months.

high attendance levels were the norm
high participation levels were evident - most had raised a matter for discussion and were satisfied with the outcome.

Another structure introduced was the Working Party, which was a police version of a Quality Control Circle. This structure was less effective with 53% claiming they understood how it worked and 44% considered it performed very or fairly well.

Once the need for a public and police information system was understood and incorporated into the essentials of all planning and evaluation, then the deficiencies of the existing system became more apparent. It was clear that the information system required careful and skilful replanning as soon as possible.
Despite these structural, equipment and skills problems, it was clear that major improvements had been achieved since the pre-test. A significant majority had noticed the following achievements during the past 12 months.

- more information passed on to public
- more information received from public
- getting to know the public
- improved information exchange between officers

Many officers felt that the lines of communication between senior management and officers had improved. They considered that senior officers were more understanding of the day to day problems faced by reliefs and the system of judging police officers performance was less likely to be based on arrests and summonses only.

Compared to pre-test levels, constables were significantly less likely to claim there was now a need for change in the following:

- recognition for a job well done
- suggestions passed up the rank structure
- a say in how the area was policed
- chance to see a job through to the end
- support and trust from supervisors.

It was clear from these findings that, despite the numerous problems with the police and public information system, it was very successful as an initial attempt to implement such a structure.
7. 4.1.2. **Information quantity and quality**

As has been already described, the quantity of information required by the users totally overwhelmed the existing system. The collection and dissemination of the information alone was well above the capacity of the existing system. As a result, analysis and evaluation was difficult and the quality of the information varied from outstanding to useless and was sporadic. Unfortunately the majority of the information was of too low a standard to support the most effective operational results.

Despite these criticisms there was no doubt that the requirement for quality of information had been established and both police and public were beginning to prioritise their needs in a much more effective manner.

7. 4.1.3. **Analysis and Prediction**

Until 1985, analysis and prediction using the data collected was rarely attempted. But in January 1985 this was required to support the Sector initiatives described earlier. By 1986, specific crime initiatives under the Crime Coordinator also required analysis and prediction. Although considerable effort and time was required to achieve this type of analysis, it was very successful and supported all the operational achievements.
The major problems with this service were poor data collection and inadequate analysis systems and skills. It became clear that the ad hoc skills obtained were insufficient and specialist skills were required in this role. These skills will have to be recruited and trained in by the organisation. Routine analysis of the data into various categories of importance was also lacking in the system used.

7. 4.1.4. Police and Public Planning

Brixton was unique as being the only Neighbourhood Policing site which innovated and established both Sector Working Parties (consumer panels and action groups) and internal police Sector Planning Teams (Quality Circles), all working in parallel with the Lambeth Consultative Group.

By 1986, the system had become so dynamic that Sector Working Parties demanded and obtained special representative places on the established Consultative Group. This was despite resistance from a number of existing Consultative Group members.

In effect, Sector Working Parties Meetings were better attended than Consultative Group Meetings. These were averaging around 18 - 20 public spectators for meetings, whilst Sector Working Parties were all averaging between 45 - 48 per meeting.
Project analysis established beyond doubt that the Brixton Police and Public Planning System was the most powerful and effective of any project site.

7. 4.1.5. Sector Planning
Responsibility for virtually all operational planning was devolved down to Sectors, (reversing the Force practices at that time). Once the police and public in a Sector had submitted their proposals, then the rest of the police station planned how to support these objectives. Figure 7. 3 shows an example of this process.

7. 4.1.6. Public Involvement
One of the reasons that Sector Planning was considered successful at Brixton, was that the police on Sectors and reliefs were not allowed to become insular or continue with inadequate police working practices. Due to the extensive public consultation and involvement at Sector Working Parties, police plans had to reflect public priorities in balance with police legislative priorities. This joint planning committed police and public to realistic objectives which both were responsible for achieving.

Analysis showed that public involvement was a major influence in Sector Planning on Brixton Division.
This success was recognised by surrounding police Divisions who also began to introduce similar structures and systems.

7. 4.1.7. **Level of Autonomy**

It was recognised by the Senior Managers at Brixton Police Station that, with a system of operational Sector Planning and Public Involvement, high levels of autonomy for the geographical teams were essential.

Therefore, broad objectives and policies for the whole Division were planned at Chief Superintendent level. These co-ordinated with Force goals and requirements. However, everything else was devolved to the Sectors. On some occasions it was found that Sector requirements were contrary to Force goals and priorities. Provided these alternative priorities were supported by evidence they would usually be authorised.

7. 5. **JOINT POLICING SYSTEM (C)**

This part of the system was an important measure of the public support and assistance towards policing objectives. The majority of the features involve the public input to operational policing.

7. 5.1. **FEATURES ANALYSIS**

7. 5.1.1. **Formal Public Assistance**

No significant increases emerged in formally organised public assistance to police. Virtually the only area for such involvement at the
The present time is that of Special Constables. The table below shows the total number of Special Constables at Brixton each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main barrier to this type of development appeared to be the police themselves. Although they maintained an organisation and support for Special Constables, it did not appear to be very effective in recruiting and supporting existing officers.

No great efforts were ever made to discourage Special Constables, but more importantly neither were they specifically encouraged by the majority of uniform patrolling officers or their supervisors. There were exceptions at Brixton when some Sector Officers began to involve selected Special Constables in Sector work.

However, there were significant attitude changes (1% LEVEL) among the majority of officers. Increasing from 42% to 76% in 1986 those willing to work with Specials and from 22% to 70% those considering that relations between Regulars and Specials were good at Brixton.

In areas outside the police organisation there were other significant developments. The local
Consultative Group had, on their own initiative, established a formal system of volunteers, who had some standing in the community, to assist police in operational matters.

A rota was established and volunteers were available on call to police. If a sensitive operation was planned or implemented these community representatives would be informed that the operation was taking place and provided with all details. On numerous occasions, they were actually taken on the operation to witness police action.

Although viewed with initial suspicion by many operational officers, this formal assistance became established as a vital part of all sensitive policing operations. In a very short time after its inception such public assistance was incorporated into police instructions and formal procedures. This aspect of formal public involvement in policing was considered very successful by both police and public. It had the effect of preventing speculative rumours and disinformation among the alienated groups in the community.

7. 5.1.2. Informal Public Assistance

In contrast to police unease and suspicion with formal public assistance, Neighbourhood Watches and Business Watches were actively encouraged and supported. In fact, the major problem for police was limiting the enthusiasm of both public and police for implementing such schemes.
It was recognised at Brixton at an early stage that such informal structures required significant police support and resources. Therefore a policy decision was made, contrary to general Force policy, to severely limit the number of Neighbourhood Watches and concentrate on getting a small number of successful schemes in the most problematic areas.

Consequently, as a result of this policy, although the number of watches were amongst the smallest at any Metropolitan Police Division they were established in the high demand areas or vulnerable displacement areas. This policy resulted in Watches where no other Division had succeeded. The majority were in high density, council Estates and a significant number had a majority of black residents. In the Railton Road area two such Neighbourhood Watches were the foundation of a re-emergence of residents' influence over a symbolic location with drug related crime.

By 1985 these informal organisations had become the main source of public participants in the Sector Working Parties. They also provided some of their most active individuals who represented Sectors at the local Consultative Group.
However, one of the most important contributors of the informal Watch Groups was their establishment in the most HOSTILE High Demand areas. As has already been illustrated, they provided a catalyst for pockets of supportive residents in these areas. The establishment of these self help groups in problem areas became one of the major objectives of the Sectors Directed Patrolling strategies, as indicated in item 8 of Fig. 7. 3.

7. 5.1.3 Victim Support

A voluntary Victim Support scheme had been established in Brixton since 1982. However, at the pre-test stage in 1983 police co-operation and support had been criticised at Brixton. The initiative for the scheme had not come from the Police, but from the nationally organised victim support organisation.

It was clear in 1983 - 84 that the existing police reporting and investigation procedures had difficulty in accommodating the support of crime victims. In fact, the classification system for crime, with its high priority on property, frustrated some of these efforts. Attempts to change locally to a more victim orientated system of classification were complicated by the national classification requirements.

However, by 1985, initiatives had been taken independently by Brixton Police Station to provide better victim support by police in the initial investigation and to refer more cases to
the Victim Support scheme. In addition, a service of further reports to victims of crime was introduced by police. Crimes which were 'screened out' by the Crime Desk as being incapable of further investigation, all received letters acknowledging their crime and giving details of the Victim Support Scheme.

7. 5.1.4 Community Mediation
Attempts were made in 1985 and 1986 to set up a group of trained voluntary Community Mediators, to be available for intervention and referrals in local matters of conflict. This time the initiative came from the local police at Brixton, but unfortunately there was insufficient corresponding enthusiasm from voluntary organisations.

Public awareness of this type of service did not appear to be very high in Brixton, despite the urgent need for support in this area. Outside Brixton however, a number of successful schemes were initiated in other parts of London.

The failure to implement such a community mediation service in Brixton resulted in police having to almost totally accept responsibility for conflict prevention and reduction. This requirement was very demanding on police resources and therefore a serious deficiency in the implementation of an effective geographical policing system.
7. 5.1.5. Lay Visitors

In contrast, an effective Lay Visitors Scheme to visit prisoners in police cells was pioneered by the Lambeth Consultative Group. This initiative was supported at top policy level in the police, with existing procedures being changed to accommodate this process.

After a trial period, the Brixton pilot Lay Visitors System was considered very successful and adapted by Home Office for implementation nationwide. The system appeared to fulfil several functions:

(i) Monitor prisoners' welfare and treatment in police custody.

(ii) Inform and educate the public about police procedures and powers, dispelling alarmist propaganda.

(iii) Function as a rumour control service regarding individual prisoners, by giving factual information to a concerned community very quickly.

In many ways accredited Lay Visitors found themselves acting as Community Mediators in conflict situations. By 1987 senior Lay Visitors were attempting to include a full Community Mediation Service as a separate service linked to local religious groups.
7. 5.1.6. **Procedural Changes.**

Numerous police procedures were forced to change as have already been described. The Neighbourhood Policing System initiated and anticipated many of these changes. But, outside the experimental sites there were still obligatory Force and National procedures which effectively obstructed improvements in policing.

However, these obstructions were quickly recognised by the police organisations and using the feedback from all the experimental police sites, including Brixton, the years of 1983 - 1986 saw some most radical changes to policing in both the Surrey Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police. For the police, changes and improvements to procedures and techniques have now become the norm. In recognition of this 'new state' of normality, planning and managing change are now included on all supervisor and management training.

Professional agencies outside the police had similar problems with political policies. Many local authority procedures were genuine attempts to provide and improve services to the public. However in Lambeth and particularly Brixton, the dominant political ideology at the time, sought to exclude police from these procedures in a very bureaucratic and formal manner.
It was quickly recognised by the front line agency workers that this was impossible, as close effective liaison with the police was essential for their work.

This situation led to unauthorised and unofficial local authority links between police and front line agency workers. Whilst these arrangements worked adequately for the majority of the time, they also caused some serious problems. In addition it was a very inefficient method of providing the best quality of service to the public.

Fortunately, the Lambeth Consultative Group, whilst not recognised by the political party in power, were still able to act as a beneficial third party influence between the police and the local authority. This influence had the effect of reducing some of the worst aspects of this unco-ordinated situation.

In contrast to these types of local problems, at national level, increasing legislative requirements for statutory joint agency approaches were being introduced.

7. 5.1.7 Environmental Changes
Paradoxically, one of the best examples of the effectiveness of a police and local authority partnership was in the HIGH Demand area of Railton Road and the Central Market. After
the riots of 1981, there was an extremely effective partnership between the local authority public works, housing and the police, regarding the development of this area.

Extensive physical and environmental changes were planned and implemented by 1985. The major thrust of these changes was to improve the residential and community facilities to reduce the tension ridden, crime supporting environment. Simultaneously with the beginning of these changes, the Sector teams in the Market and Railton Road improved and concentrated the policing services to local residents and businesses.

There was no doubt that the physical environmental changes contributed to substantial increases in residents' and visitors' Quality of Life in these areas. It was also significant that during the 1985 riots, local residents forcibly prevented rioters from damaging properties in the Railton Road area; unlike 1981, when this area was a deliberate target for property destruction by local residents.

A number of other environmental improvements were also initiated, i.e. removal of walkways in the Stockwell Park estate and other crime prevention initiatives, but none were as effective or co-ordinated. It appeared that high levels of liaison and co-operation were essential for the maximum benefit to be obtained from environmental improvements.
7.6. **POLICE MANAGEMENT (D)**

The elements in this section of the Geographical Policing System outlined in this section are intended to be practical and valid performance measures of everyday operational policing. In particular, these measures proved to be the most difficult to create and validate.

The lists of measures for Box D, in Chapter 3 were not available at the time of evaluation in 1986. In fact, the tests were formulated as a product of that evaluation. At the present time the measures are still under development and are slowly being introduced into everyday use as operational performance measures.

Therefore, for the purposes of this report, exact figures, percentages and ratios were not collated in many cases. Only qualitative, and in some cases subjective, measures were available. However, even at this level of evaluation, significant changes were apparent. These were mainly due to dramatic improvements over previous achievements. In the following evaluations for Box D only major changes or failures will be included as evidence.

7.6.1. **RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

7.6.1.1. **Response Management**

Brixton retained its position as generating one of the highest levels of public 'calls for service' per head of the population, when compared to the rest of Britain. In addition, there was some evidence of additional demand increases being stimulated by improved and increased police services. Unfortunately, due to internal police reluctance and a lack of effective systems, grading or differing of less urgent demands was almost totally absent.
Far greater success was achieved in matching the resource deployment profile to the demand profile. It was not unusual to find that between 80% and 90% of street resources were correctly deployed in time and location. This success helped the police response to urgent calls and approximately 85% of these demands resulted in a police officer attending within 90 seconds. However, in reflection of the turbulent environment and the potential for violence, an average of three officers would always attend the first urgent response, in fact additional officers were deployed to all demands in approximately 78% of all public 'calls for service'.

Due to increased co-operation and interaction between uniform patrol officers specialists such as Traffic officers and C.I.D. personnel, civilian and uniform, up to 38% of all demands resulted in the deployment of these specialist officers in response to uniform requests. This compares with pre 1983 figures as low as 12%.

The number of post-incident visits fluctuated depending on geographical location. In high demand areas with Sector Teams providing the policing service, two or three post visits were the average. Outside these areas post incident visits remained unusual.

Despite improvements in internal police administration procedures, each incident demand was
still averaging 2½ hours to complete. On investigation it was found that this was due to increased victim care by police officers and in cases where persons had been arrested, increased interrogation and investigation for additional offences.

It also became clear that despite the failure to reduce time for each incident, more demands were being dealt with by the same, or often a reduced number of officers. This was found to be due to almost every patrol officer working to their capacity of approximately three significant incidents per tour of duty. In many cases officers were working overtime to increase this to four or five incidents per continuous tour of duty. In effect the workload had become equally distributed amongst the available officers with fewer examples of excessive or insufficient individual workloads.

Officers on relief, still dealing with response demands, continued a heavy bias towards these types of demands (90%). But, all sector officers and permanent beat officers had developed a 60% reactive, 40% proactive balance of incident demand type.

Prior to 1983, referrals to Victim Support or other service agencies initiated by police, were less than 5%. However, by 1986 this had risen to 16% of all public calls for service. A large
percentage of the increase was due to improved administration and co-ordination between the Crime Desk and the local Victim Support Group.

Unfortunately these types of successes were not reflected in the levels of police procedure and recording errors. Sample checks on various records and incidents revealed unacceptably high error rates and it was clear that supervision at sergeant level and self checking by each individual were deficient and inadequate.

During 1985, strict financial restraints had been imposed on Brixton Police Station in common with all Metropolitan Police Stations. In particular this required overtime to be planned and maintained within budget. Due to the high levels of autonomy and control over their resources achieved by the Inspectors, they were able to reduce unplanned overtime to less than 10% of all incurred overtime. Remembering the uncertain and hostile environment of Brixton, even in 1986, this was a considerable achievement. Unfortunately this overtime reduction was imposed at a time of significant reduction in street manpower at Brixton. This reduction had been caused by the failure to replace Constables transferring from Brixton in the normal wastage procedures.
Once again, the links between street manpower and crime became clear. A number of street crimes began to rise in correlation with decreases in street manpower. The only way in which the Senior Managers at Brixton Police Station could counteract these increases was by authorising additional overtime, thereby increasing the levels of street manpower. This additional overtime was recognised as being in defiance of central instructions and many requests were made, together with the evidence, for understanding and action in these circumstances. Unfortunately in an atmosphere reminiscent of pre-1982, data and facts were ignored in preference for perception and opinion.

The previously described 'see-saw' effect of adequate policing followed by inadequacy now became the norm at Brixton in 1986 as authority for additional overtime resources was obtained or refused depending on the levels of public concern at the time. However, there was once again clear supporting evidence for the effects of patrolling officers on levels of street demands.

By 1986, it had been established by a number of research projects that there was a correlation between levels of self certificated sickness and morale in police officers. At Brixton it was found that there had been a reduction in the overall levels of such sickness.
However, amongst relief officers the levels had not decreased and even risen slightly. The decreases were amongst the Sector Officers, who by now formed a significant percentage of the total patrol strength. It would appear some evidence for a decrease in sickness levels for officers with a geographical responsibility compared to officers with a time based responsibility.

7. 6.1.2. Demand Reduction:

The major demand reduction strategies were specialist crime squads, traffic operations and Sector Teams in the HIGH DEMAND areas. All of these strategies were considered successful and illustrated the powerful effects of careful planning, concentrated directed police activity and sufficient resources to obtain an objective.

Sector Teams were one of the most successful strategies, in the areas that they operated, demand reductions of up to 55% were recorded within the first three months. Initially resources were directed at reducing crime demands but this inevitably increased local conflict and faced police to concentrate the majority of Sector resources on conflict reduction. There was no significant success at reducing the proportion of service demands in these areas. In fact, it was found that service demands began to increase as people gained confidence in their local police officers.
Although these service demands began to increase it was found that essential information about local crime and conflict, began to be provided as a result of these new service demands. This information now enabled police to reduce crime and conflict demands even further, but most importantly provided data for effective prevention strategies to be implemented. This type of interaction helps to illustrate the complexity of dealing with public 'calls for service' and the knock on effect of changes in police strategy.

The effects of specialist crime and traffic squads were less complex. Without doubt they caused significant decreases in demands for their particular objective, sometimes up to 80%. However, once they had finished or moved on, the effect was not permanent nor were there as significant additional benefits in other areas unlike the multiple objective Sector Teams.

It was considered that where any particular demand had increased above certain levels then specialist reduction strategies were the most cost effective solution. But in LOW DEMAND areas, or where the levels of a particular demand were moderate, then intensive demand reduction strategies were less effective and certainly not cost effective. Longer term prevention strategies were considered more appropriate in these circumstances.
7. 6.1.3. Demand Stabilisation

Initially, when the theories and concepts of a Geographical Policing System were being created, it was thought that demands on police would be significantly reduced by police strategies. The Reactive Spiral predicted that police resources invested in preventive strategies and tactics would eventually reduce public calls for service and then stabilise at a publically acceptable level. Increases in demand on police each year would be very small, easily capable of being dealt with by an increase of public participation and volunteers to help police.

This was not in fact what happened at Brixton in the period 1983 - 86. First, there was an increase in general demands for service in the geographical areas where prevention strategies were implemented. This demand increased as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, this was contrary to the predictions of the Reactive Spiral. Even more disturbing were the increases in demand for police services and resources in the specific prevention strategies. As has been previously noted, prior to 1982 police investment in these types of areas was negligible, possibly less than a 1% of any police station.
After 1982, the increase was forced by public demand up to 10 - 11% of total resources, and still the demands continued to increase. This increase in demand was in addition to the previous increase in general demands for service.

An analysis of the situation showed that police had in fact, fallen into the trap of just providing another service which demanded insufficient return from the public who wished to participate. Police were attempting to maintain and manage large crime and conflict prevention strategies which were not supported by a reciprocal manpower and resource commitment from the general public or public agencies. It was also apparent that the public involved in these schemes were not self motivated to maximise the effects or benefits of such strategies. In effect many of the schemes were ineffectual with an outward facade of meetings, signs and paperwork but produced few tangible results.

This general finding was highlighted by what police considered were the few successful strategies in the specific HIGH DEMAND areas. Here the public were encouraged and motivated to become self-reliant, using police only as a support service. These schemes were qualitatively different and almost without exception evolved into Residents and Tenants Associations. Once they had reached this level of development the requirements for police resource reduced considerably.
There is little doubt that Demand Stabilisation, as originally conceived did not work. What appeared to happen was that the nature of the demands initially increased then changed into a different type of demand, from response to preventive support. Perhaps in the future this increase and qualitative change can be anticipated and linked to a more effective strategy of increasing public self help and responsibility in their own preventive strategies. Then perhaps Demand reduction and stabilisation will become a possibility.

7.6.2. CRIME MANAGEMENT

In the early stages of the Neighbourhood Policing project, the CID officers at Brixton found it difficult to come to terms with the concept of Crime Management. They accepted the traditional view of their work that they were skilled investigators of crime that had already occurred. Virtually all CID officers, regardless of rank, considered themselves as investigators. The higher the rank, the more important the cases investigated. Management of Police crime resources, planning and implementation of police crime strategies etc., were not seen as central to any CID managers function.

Eventually the Detective Chief Inspectors role was nominated as being the 'Crime Manager' and changes began to take place.
7. 6.2.1. **Crime Response:**
The initial response to virtually all crime demands was a uniformed patrol officer, consequently in all but the most minor cases, an officer would be on scene within twenty minutes.

Obviously, serious or urgent crimes were dealt with as emergencies, obtaining a response within approximately 90 seconds in the control or HIGH DEMAND areas. Due to the lack of graded uniform response procedures, very few crime responses were graded or deferred.

By 1986, the quality of the initial investigation had improved considerably. Uniformed officers were achieving good levels of investigation, providing sufficient care and support for the victims of crime, and exercising good judgement about calling in specialist officers or forensic investigation at an early stage. Unfortunately their levels of recording these actions were well below what was required.

Once the initial crime response and investigation had been completed it was reported back to a central 'Crime Desk' inside the police station. This desk was a project initiative originally developed at the Notting Hill project site and rapidly adopted by Brixton in September 1984. The purpose of the Crime Desk was to examine the allegation of crime, the evidence obtained by the investigation so far and then make a decision as to whether any further investigation was warranted.
A decision on the 'solvability' of any crime was assisted by a matrix system which awarded points if certain types of evidence, such as a description of a suspect, were available. Allegations of crime which scored above a certain number were then screened in and allocated to a public officer for further investigation. In addition certain types of crimes, or those considered of a serious nature also had a priority which allocated additional points. Approximately 27% of all crimes were screened in for further investigation.

One of the major concerns of this Desk was the support given to victims of crime and every victim was sent a letter with standard details of the police action, information on victim support services and with appropriate crime prevention advice. In addition, police made direct referral to the local Victim Support in approximately 18% of crimes when they were particularly concerned about the victim involved.

Although this concern regarding victims was working well in the areas described above, it was being affected by the priority crimes classifications. Originally, these had reflected the Home Office national classification system which tended to discriminate in favour of property crime. This counter bias tended to neutralise the other areas of excellent victim
support work undertaken by the Desk. As a result a new Victim Orientated priority crime system was introduced. This gave a higher priority to crimes against people as opposed to crimes against property.

Attempts were also made to improve CID involvement in interrogation of suspects already in detention, investigation of their involvement in other offences and the recovery of stolen property.

Due to the high individual workload of each CID officer these attempts mostly failed. Officers were continually removed from such work in order to deal with serious major crimes, leaving such work to less experienced uniform officers.

7. 6.2.2. Crime Reduction
It was important for police to understand their limitations in the areas of crime reduction. A large proportion of crimes are committed out of sight of police and certainly cannot be detected by a patrolling street Police Officer. Because Neighbourhood Policing was mainly concerned with local policing it had to concentrate on those crimes which could be affected by local officers, the majority of whom patrol the streets. Therefore priorities were given to 'Street Crimes'.
Remembering the importance of organised crime in the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL one of the highest priorities had to be given to street crimes linked to organised crime and also which caused injury to high fear to people. The most obvious crime in this category was the sale and possession of illegal drugs. However, as drug crime is initially victimless and little if any allegations are made by the public regarding drug crimes, police success can only be gauged by the numbers of types of arrests they make. Local police officers are unlikely to seize large quantities of drugs due to the distribution network utilised by drug dealers. This ensures that only the minimum quantity of drugs required for sale are available on the streets to avoid expensive drug seizures by patrolling officers.

The arrests for drug offences were as follows:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>504</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to 1984 the emphasis on drug arrests was by stop and search, with the majority of arrests being for small qualities of drugs carried for personal use. In 1984 this policy was changed, and the priority became drug dealers. As a result over 85% of arrests were for possession of drugs with intent to supply others. Initially, police had to develop new
methods and techniques to obtain arrests and convictions. This change accounts for the initial low number of arrests in 1984 compared to the 1983 figures. However, by 1986 street drug dealers were an endangered species and the huge financial rewards for this particular type of drug market had been significantly reduced in the Brixton area.

The next important area of street crime for Brixton was considered to be street robbery. This crime was committed by groups of criminals against people and generated high public fear. The major emphasis in this category was to reduce the number of robberies committed and the figures per year were as follows:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>2073</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduction</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increase</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is proposed that these increases and decreases are not just random fluctuations of the figures, but are related to changes and deficiencies in the number of officers patrolling the streets and exactly what they were doing.

In 1983, as has already been explained, significant numbers of extra officers were provided to Brixton and began to patrol the
streets. Despite the fact that their patrols were undirected, their presence was sufficient to deter street robbery. In 1984 officers were being lost through natural wastage and not being replaced. Additionally, Brixton was being required to provide considerable assistance to other police stations and forces particularly during the miners strike. By 1985, this aid had been stopped and despite the reduced number of officers, by use of the Directed Patrolling strategy described earlier (the 1985 anti-crime operation), police were once again able to make a significant impact on robbery offences. In 1986, Brixton was unable to maintain this strategy due to totally inadequate manpower and drastic overtime restrictions. The station was once again reduced to sporadic special operations without the maintenance of a continual Directed Patrolling policing. Evidence in support of the sea-saw effect is provided by these figures.

It is also important to note that the 1985 reduction was contrary to a general Metropolitan Police increase or 11% that year. Ironically, this smaller than usual force increase was directly a result of the Brixton reduction.

Another important street crime is residential burglary particularly those committed by small groups. There is no doubt that the public continue to find such crime fearful and expect
police to regard them as a priority. The figures for burglary are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3353</td>
<td>4209</td>
<td>3274</td>
<td>3622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again the figures are related to police activity. A minor increase in 1983 is followed by a significant increase in 1984. This is followed by the 1985 reduction in the face of a full geographical policing strategy. By 1986 only the public self help Neighbourhood Watches remained consistent to the 1985 police strategies. Their limitations have already been discussed, but perhaps they helped to moderate the percentage increase that year.

The number of police specially employed in crime reduction remained almost identical to the levels in 1983, less than \( \frac{1}{5} \)th of the total constable strength. In particular the Robbery Squad developed successful targeting operations but were only able to be effective when supported by Sector Officers and linked directed patrols.

In general the CID remained totally overloaded. Added to their difficulty in coming to terms with efficient crime management systems, their individual caseload and responsibilities were excessive. This can be illustrated by the fact
that at one time in 1985 there were over 70 outstanding arrest warrants with nobody in the CID able to execute them. Annual estimates of CID workloads calculated that some officers were supposed to be dealing with in excess of 400 investigations per year. The recommended minimum per officer is 100 per year.

7. 6.2.3. Crime Prevention:
As has been previously intimated, Crime Prevention was a growth endeavour at Brixton with an almost insatiable public demand. Even with the careful planning and restricted policy of Neighbourhood Watch, police were still finding it difficult to cope. The observations in the section on Demand Prevention are particularly appropriate to this area of Crime Management and do not require expansion.

One area which has not yet been considered for Prevention strategies is the involvement of youth in crimes. It was estimated in Brixton that approximately 75% of all crime and up to 90% of robbery and burglary were committed by young people under the age of 21. This finding is not peculiar to Brixton as similar estimates have been made for a number of other areas all over Britain.

Unfortunately, this is one area that police have very limited positive effects whereby they can
influence youth to engage in more social behaviour. Police experience would indicate that by the time such individuals and groups come to their notice for crime, a significant proportion refuse to change their behaviour and continue into a criminal 'career'.

In Lambeth, the use of a multi agency approach to this problem was ineffectual. Local Authority policing obstructed an effective partnership with police and local schools were even more obstructive to police involvement. Unfortunately this attitude rebounded directly on both bodies. The major problem of the local authority was juvenile crime and damage, with local schools facing increasing crime and violence inside their premises.

Realistically, police are a minor element in these type of crime prevention measures and can only try to persuade more influential groups and bodies of their responsibilities in these areas. For example, there was no evidence that police had any influence as pro-social models on local juveniles they were regularly in contact with. Perhaps the only effective influence they had was in reducing their opportunity to commit crime due to improved police intelligence on their behaviour and criminal activities.
7. 6.3. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Although 'peacekeeping' has always been a primary function of police, only at Brixton in 1985 did the concepts of conflict research and its management begin to be applied to operational police work. Perhaps due to the intense and continuous nature of conflict in Brixton new, improved methods of policing had to be developed. The remainder of this particular section give an overview of these developments, which are gradually being adopted and implemented throughout the Metropolitan Police and in other police forces.

First, these developments recognise the importance of geographical location. Some locations are supportive of disorder, due to their easy access and escape, or opportunity for anonymity. Many even have a culture and history of disorder. In all instances police must control the location before the conflict or disorder occurs.

In order to deal with this requirement, the strategy of Defenders and Enforcers was developed. The Defenders are local officers who know the area well and as their title implies, defend the area tenaciously against disorder. Officers employed in this capacity are trained and equipped to deal with minor to major disorder including full riots. Ideally they should never leave their area, always occupying and controlling the public streets and spaces. At Brixton these officers were mainly Sector Officers.

Enforcers are mobile, riot equipped officers who act as support and reinforcement for Defenders as required. They move quickly from location to location dispersing large crowds so that they can be controlled by Defenders. All
the officers involved use the Contact Strategy as a guide to their behaviour and tactics. The Contact Strategy was found particularly effective in the majority of conflict situations.

Secondly, the importance of various stages in conflict and disorder was recognised. Once an area was no longer considered normal and increasing levels of disorder were imminent, then immediately different types of policing i.e. LOW INTENSITY, HIGH INTENSITY, PRE RIOT and RIOT, could be utilised. Once a riot had been quelled then POST RIOT back to LOW INTENSITY and normality could be implemented. Lined to the contact strategy this was just a conflict version of directed patrolling. Each specific stage of this sequence in time required recognition and the implementation of the appropriate police strategy. Obviously, unsuspected spontaneous disorder had to be dealt with immediately and effectively but was unlikely to escalate into full and widespread rioting without developing through the stages described. However, effective Disorder Management in response to spontaneous disorder was still a major police priority.

Another important development in Conflict Management, was the realisation that a large proportion of what had been previously considered 'Service Demands' were in fact aspects of conflict. Culturally, police downgraded service demands as being 'not real police work', crime was considered the most important and desirable task. This was despite the fact that service demands could total as much as 85% of total police demands.
When these types of demands were closely examined, it was found that over 60% were in fact related to Conflict Reduction and Prevention. Domestic and neighbourhood disputes, insulting and disorderly behaviour, particularly by children and juveniles all featured strongly in service demands.

Once the importance of these demands, as being the early stages of a descent into criminality, were understood, police began to view them more positively. With this understanding came performance measures and then higher levels of effectiveness.

7. 6.3.1. Disorder management

By 1986, Police in Brixton had developed considerable expertise in the area of Disorder Management. They had adopted Force policy of 'early intervention' as a basic foundation for their strategy. Particularly in the HIGH DEMAND and symbolic areas, police would usually respond within 90 seconds, as for other emergencies. But within 4 to 5 minutes, 15 to 20 local officers could be available at the location and the average length of such incidents was 14 minutes.

Local police officers, particularly the Sector Teams, had become very skilled in public disorder situations. They knew the local people usually involved and could isolate them from outside agitators intent on causing disorder. If the participants could not be
persuaded to desist very quickly (contact strategy) they would immediately intervene and arrest the offenders. Any attempts to release the prisoners or continue the disturbances would meet a similar police response.

The major strength of these officers was that they were known and knew the majority of people likely to be involved. Over a period of time the Sector Teams had built up 'contacts' with individuals and groups regarding the tolerable levels of street behaviour and were able to cite these agreements when breached by disorder. Outside agitators were often surprised to find a lack of local support for their disorder, an element which had been essential for escalating disorder. In addition, it was local policy to ensure the arrest of all participants at a later more convenient time if they could not be detained immediately. One of the major strengths of these tactics was that they had been developed by the Sector Teams themselves and were strongly supported by senior managers at Brixton.

When major disorder erupted in September 1985 these tactics were quickly expanded to evolve into the Defender and Enforcer tactics previously described. In this particular disorder the officers devised fast moving, vehicle supported riot tactics, as opposed to the defensive almost static tactics, used by the majority of the force at that time.
A good indication of Brixton's effectiveness at Disorder Management was the progress and outcome of the riot in September 1985. The riot began on Saturday 28th September at approximately 4.30 p.m. For the rest of that day the riot was dealt with according to existing public order strategies and tactics, with large numbers of police officers from other areas assisting Brixton.

During the lull on the morning of Sunday 29th September a conference was called of all Sector Inspectors and Sector Teams. As a result the Defenders and Enforcers concept was created. By 12 noon of that day only Brixton officers were on the streets. Sector Inspectors took full operational control of their Sectors with Defender teams. Once this control had been established non Brixton Police Officers were introduced as required but worked under Sector control. Mobile Enforcer teams, guided by a local officer, were deployed as required.

By Sunday evening, the expected prolonged sequence of violent disorder had been neutralised by the effectiveness of the new tactics. By Tuesday of that week all external assistance was withdrawn and no further disorder occurred.

It was clear from analysis after the riot that the new tactics had stopped the riot sequence and prevented further riot. These successes
were in contrast to previous riots in Brixton where sporadic rioting had continued for days. In addition, Brixton quickly ceased to be a manpower drain on other police stations by not requiring prolonged assistance. This is in contrast to Tottenham's riot for example, where up to 80 extra officers per day were still being required six months later. Some of the extra officers required were in fact from Brixton on a number of occasions.

In 1986 it was noticeable that up to a third less officers were being injured by the public in street disorder and 60% more prisoners were being arrested as the result of public disorder.

7. 6.3.2. Conflict Reduction:

This aspect of conflict was mainly the responsibility of uniform patrol officers, particularly Sector Officers. They anticipated the locations and times that conflict or disorder was likely to occur and by their very presence and known effectiveness, reduced such incidents. In addition, Sector officers targeted known troublemakers ensuring that they were arrested for any offences committed.

It was found that once the initial high levels of crime in a HIGH DEMAND area had been reduced, there still remained almost endemic conflict behaviour, particularly from juveniles.
In some areas this conflict increased, perhaps as a result of police restricting the opportunity for criminal acts. Firm action by police over an extended period reduced overt conflict and incidents of disorder in the HIGH DEMAND area by 85% or over, indicating the potential for police success in these circumstances.

One indication of police success in conflict reduction was the increase of public street use in the vicinity of existing symbolic locations. Officers involved in these types of conflict reduction initiatives, conducted short sample surveys of public street use as a performance indicator of operational success.

It was found that between six and eight weeks after an initiative began the nature of street use would change. There would be a reduction in the number of juveniles frequenting the location and an increase in adults of various ages. This increased broadening of public use, further reduced the number of 'resident' juveniles. Another important indicator of public confidence was the increase in cars parked in the area to the extent that for the first time in years, police officers in these areas had to involve themselves in traffic regulation and restrictions.

Police success was to the extent that even the organised criminal drug gangs found it difficult
to recruit people to cause disorder in those areas and were increasingly having to confront police themselves, often with the support of illegal firearms.

On a number of occasions it was clear that for various reasons, tension in a particular area would begin to rise and there was a strong possibility of escalation towards a riot. As a result Brixton police developed different police strategies linked to discrete sequences in time as previously described.

The strategy was considered so successful that together with Defenders and Enforcers, was adopted as the basis for public disorder strategies and contingency plans for all police stations in the Police AREA to which Brixton belonged. These strategies were published in some depth in the national Police Magazine (JUDGE 1985). This article also provides some insight into street level Conflict Management and Directed Patrolling (APPENDIX ONE).

As police increased their skills in conflict reduction, they began to establish major links between juveniles and alcohol as being major elements in conflict escalation. Juveniles often began to cause increasing problems in a particular area, starting with minor hooliganism, graffiti and vandalism escalating to serious public disorder and crimes such as
robbery and burglary. If this pattern of behaviour was linked with alcohol abuse the problems increased significantly. In addition alcohol abuse by other, apparently respectable individuals and groups often led to similar violent disorder and assaults.

In the short term, police began similar conflict reduction strategies where these types of problems were regularly taking place. However, it was recognised that such initiatives could only be maintained for short periods outside the HIGH DEMAND areas and better preventive measures were required.

7. 6.3.3. Conflict Prevention

Initially it was unclear to the public at Brixton as to exactly how conflict could be prevented. Attempts had been made and failed, to develop a voluntary conflict mediation service. However, the Local Consultative Group were acting as community interveners in the most serious cases, but there was still no consistent operational conflict prevention strategy.

The first conflict prevention strategy developed by police was in the area of alcohol abuse. Initially the major locations for this type of disorder were located and the source of supply identified. These usually fell into three categories.
(i) Pubs and Clubs
(ii) Off Licence Premises
(iii) Illegal drinking establishments.

The full time police licensing officer then began to liaise with Sector officers in order to deal with abuses by all these sources. In the case of illegal drinking establishments, they often catered for groups who were unwilling to use existing licenced premises. As a result a small number were encouraged by police to obtain licences' and operate within the law. Others were closed by police action.

With regard to the legal licenced premises they were involved in schemes to prevent alcohol sales to juveniles. The majority of licence holders and the companies they worked for were very supportive in these strategies.

The next prevention initiative was in regard to juveniles. An example of this strategy can be provided by a description of police action on the Moorlands Estate. This council estate was notorious locally for juvenile problems, but the local residents had already shown considerable initiative and self help by organising a club for local youths. Two local Permanent Beat Officers became involved with this club and assisted the organisers with various activities. For the period that they were involved there was a significant reduction in the incidence of conflict and disorder on that estate.
It was the intention of this project to expose juveniles to influences other than negative and anti-social peer groups. Although there was a measure of success with this and a number of other similar projects, there was no conclusive evidence that police officers in isolation acted as pro-social role models for exposed juveniles. However there was anecdotal evidence from juveniles that perceived instances of incorrect or excessive behaviour by police officers, legitimised in the youths view, their own anti-social behaviour. Perhaps this is another reason for police to act as though they were effective role models. These findings are supported by other evidence that exclusive youth cultures, devolved of adult influence, increase anti-social behaviour.

It may be that conflict prevention strategies directed at these two particular areas may be effective and worthwhile for police development. Particularly in the case of juveniles, conflict types of behaviour may be a precursor to criminal behaviour in many instances. If this is so, it may be more effective for police to seek to influence this type of street behaviour, rather than the ineffective juvenile crime prevention strategies already discussed.

Officers involved in these types of prevention strategies were confident that levels of tension
and public alienation from police and each other were significantly reduced. Indeed at the Sector Working Party meetings this viewpoint was supported by residents in these particular areas. However the effects were very localised and by 1986 still not extensive enough to have a significant effect on residents in Brixton as a whole.

A final area of Conflict Prevention in which the police at Brixton became proficient was the planning of major or important police or public events such as raids, music festivals etc. Every event was carefully evaluated for its disorder potential and plans made accordingly. Police made it quite clear to all interested parties that should disorder occur it would be dealt with firmly and effectively. On a number of operations in 1985 and 1986 this resolve was demonstrated. In addition police made very effort to inform the community of its actions and reasons for police tactics. This was supported by links with local consultative group members and late in 1986, even by local elected representatives.

7.7. **GOALS (E)**

It should be remembered that the Goals of the Geographical System were 'ideal' end states, unlikely to be achieved or contributed to for a considerable time. Initially predictions were made that within the first four to five years only changes within the police system would be achieved.
Unexpectedly, there were some indications that police could influence Quality of Life measures far more quickly than anticipated. There were a number of significant changes recorded which correlated with policing changes.

7. 7.1. QUALITY OF LIFE

7. 7.1.1. Crime

By 1986 the ratio of crime per head of the population was the highest in Britain with an average of 19,842 per 100,000 of the population in the whole of Lambeth. The National average was 8469 per 100,000 of the population. By way of example, more than 1 in 10 of all street robberies committed in the Metropolitan Police District occurred in Brixton which accounted for more than 10% of the total robberies recorded by the Metropolitan Police. Brixton suffered more than twice the number of robberies than any of the other 74 Metropolitan Divisions. The only year this depressing trend had been interrupted was in 1985 when the reduction in street robberies in Brixton had actually improved the total Metropolitan Police figures in this categories.

However, as previously described, for the fifteen month period from December 1984 to April 1986, there were significant decreases in crime particularly street crime. This decrease correlated with the effective implementation of Geographic Street policing and Directed Patrolling.
7. 7.1.2. Conflict
Conflict and tension remained at high levels in Brixton throughout the period from 1983 to 1986. In 1985 a major riot took place, as previously described. During 1986 almost double the number of serious public order incidents occurred than on any other Metropolitan Division. One of the reasons that extended riots did not develop was almost directly due to the expertise of local officers and the superior tactics they had developed.

In many ways Brixton became a focal point for conflict and debate in many areas. Activists and organisations which had nothing whatsoever to do with Brixton would use the Central Market area as a focal point for demonstrations and protests. It was apparent that Brixton was destined to remain a focal point for conflict and disturbance. However, it appeared that because of police skill in handling this conflict it was becoming accepted as normal and caused less stress to both police and public.

7. 7.1.3. Fear of Crime
Surprisingly, despite the increase in crime, which a public attitude survey in 1986 showed that the public were aware of, there was a slight drop (5%) in the public's fear of crime, when compared to a similar survey in 1984. It would have been predicted that an increase in crime would have increased public fear of crime over this period of time and, therefore,
a stabilisation of the public's fear of crime must be a significant positive result. This is particularly important when viewed against the large increase in the rate of crime.

7. 7.1.4. Community

Another success in the public's Quality of Life were the strong indications of an increase in the sense of community.

A 22% increase in people who claimed to know all/most of their neighbours to talk to (significant at the 1% Level).

An 8% increase in people who had provided VICTIM HELPING to neighbours (significant at the 5% level)

A 7% decrease in the belief that people 'keep themselves to themselves' in the Area (significant at the 5% level).

These findings indicated a significant increase in members of the public in Brixton having been involved in VICTIM HELPING within the previous 12 months. There was no evidence from other Police Stations of similar increases in pro-social behaviour.

7. 7.1.5. Public Satisfaction

There was also a significant increase in the public's satisfaction with the police service provided to victims, with over 50% of those
victims interviewed being satisfied or very satisfied with police VICTIM HELPING. (BRIXTON REPORT 1986). The majority also considered that their case had been investigated thoroughly and competently.

7. 7.1.6. Desire to Move

Despite the increased crime and continuing high levels of general conflict, there was a slight increase from the pre-test situation in the public's satisfaction with the area and no change in the desire to move to another area.

7. 7.1.7. Public Behaviour

With regard to the public's behaviour on the streets, it was difficult to quantify any general changes in Brixton. However, as has been previously mentioned, in the specific HIGH DEMAND areas, particularly during the high-risk periods, a considerable increase in general public use of the streets had been noted.

Finally, perhaps a fitting comment and observation on one particular HIGH DEMAND area and symbolic location, RAILTON ROAD, was made in a recent newspaper investigation on 'BRITAIN'S TOUGHEST STREETS', (SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 1988). This article proposed that from the public's point of view RAILTON ROAD was the only location examined which had lost its symbolic nature and been normalised as planned by the Directed Patrolling Strategy.
However, the credit for this achievement, unaware of the huge effort and police resources invested in this success, is given to the local residents who have 'unwittingly succeeded where the Metropolitan Police had failed, and have made the Brixton end of Railton Road a safe place in which to walk at night'. However, some of the local residents were more aware of the joint police and public investments and its effects, and said, "Money has been poured into the district ever since, the small criminal and prostitution area has been pulled down, and we've got a lovely set of bobbies on the beat".

7. 7.2. **POLICE PUBLIC CONTRACT**

7. 7.2.1 **Public Involvement**
By 1986 there was a massive increase in public involvement in policing. There were over 61 Neighbourhood Watch Schemes involving 7,000 active participants. This contrasts with the complete absence of such public activity prior to 1983.

7. 7.2.2 **Multi-Agency Involvement**
In addition there had been a slight increase in professional agency, including the Local Authority involvement in policing services. Approximately 6% of such individuals had significant contact and involvement in policing services. (BRIXTON REPORT 1986). Of course, political ideology and preventive restrictions were mainly responsible for this low figure.
7. 7.3. **DEMAND STABILISATION**

7. 7.3.1. **Demand Increase**

With the decrease of manpower resources and the increase in public reactive calls for service, demands began to outstrip resources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Constable Manpower</th>
<th>Response Demands (per week)</th>
<th>% Increase in Demands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demands for police preventive services escalated in 1984 and were a major area of investment in 1985, to support the enhanced geographical policing. In 1986, when geographical policing declined, the public continued to demand more of a desired police service, without the required reduction in response demands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Increase in Preventive Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. 7.3.2. **Ratios**

The ratios of Response demands to Preventive demands were estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Preventive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. 7.3.3. **Stabilisation**

It was considered that Demand had not stabilised, a reduced number of officers were faced with ever expanding demands for both reactive 'calls for service' and servicing of preventive policing strategies. Added to the removal of the geographical bias in 1986 and perhaps a lack of public initiative in self policing all demands spiralled as predicted by the Reactive Spiral.

7. 8. **PUBLIC PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (F)**

The major concern of this element is the level of 'bystander intervention' or willingness to help neighbours in aspects of crime and conflict. This aspect of the evaluation was very difficult to measure. However, police officers considered that there was a significant improvement (5% LEVEL) in the public's willingness to assist police. Members of the public were more likely to assist police at the scene of a problem, telephone police in serious cases and act as witnesses at court. In one particular incident (Appendix One) the public intervened in a violent riot to protect their own area and community.

There was also an improvement in levels of co-operation and support between neighbours where over 1 in 2 (57%) looked after each others house or flat whilst vacant. This improvement reflects the increase in community spirit which has been previously reported. The proportion of the public claiming they would like to spend more time in voluntary work had more than doubled from the pre-test (16% to 38%) as an indication of changes in public attitudes in this area.
7. 9. **LOCUS OF CONTROL (G)**

There were considerable changes in the public's attitudes and beliefs which contribute towards a belief that they can influence their own environment. In particular, there were changes (5% LEVEL) in the proportion of those who claimed:

- Police should get the help of the local public in preventing crime.

- People in the area could do more to prevent crime on their own.

- Neighbourhood Watch Schemes are a good idea.

- They would be willing to get involved in such schemes.

In many ways this result was unexpected, particularly as it was an element of the system over which police had minimal influence.

7. 10. **SATISFACTION WITH POLICE (H)**

7. 10.1 **Contact with Police**

In contrast to the pre-test survey, a higher proportion of the public approached officers in the street. Ninety percent of these street encounters were to the public satisfaction. A lower proportion of the public were calling at the police station.

Community Groups considered that police worked more closely with them in the post-test and had also noticed increases in the friendliness of police. They also thought that policing had improved significantly over the past 12 months noticing more police foot patrols than before.
It was found that proactive contacts with police had increased in a number of categories.

- More claimed they were given a talk or meeting with police in the past six months (13% increasing to 26%).

- More claimed they had attended a joint police - community meeting (22% increasing to 33%).

- More claimed they would take part in joint police - community group initiative (12% increase).

A much higher proportion of Community Groups (73%) knew who their Permanent Beat Officer was and considered that police were now working much more closely with them than before; but, as predicted by the Reaction Spiral, still considered they required more contact and service.

7. 10.2 Police Service
With regard to the police service in matters of conflict one of the most significant indicators was in the number of letters of appreciation that were sent by local residents to the police after a number of public order incidents in various HIGH DEMAND areas in 1986. This type of positive response was very unusual and the first time such a volume of public comment had been made.

7. 10.3 Victim Helping
A majority of victims of crime were impressed by the way both uniform and plain clothes officers dealt with their case. They were also satisfied with the way police dealt with their case. (N.P. PROJECT 1986). This finding contrasts with information in 1983 from the Victim Support Scheme, who considered that nearly three quarters of victims were less than happy with police action. (BRIXTON REPORT 1983).
7. 11. **AGENCY; PROFESSIONAL HELPING (T)**

There can be no doubt of the dedication and determination of the Local Authority to help their local residents. Many of their policies, strategies and schemes were focused on this priority. But, the majority of these plans deliberately excluded police which is directly the opposite of the requirements within the Geographical Policing System.

The major example of where this policy was ignored and a partnership with the police was forged are the outstanding achievements of the Railton Road area. Perhaps when viewed against the failure of other independent schemes, such a partnership can be viewed as successful.

7. 12. **PUBLIC; VOLUNTARY HELPING (J)**

In contrast, police/public partnerships with voluntary agencies in many other areas were very successful. It appeared that those volunteering for such work were satisfied with police liaison and viewed it as effective. An important finding was that the individuals involved were willing to work for significantly longer periods of time in their voluntary capacity. In addition there was a 22% increase in people who stated that they would like to be involved in COMMUNITY HELPING (significant at the 1% level).

However, a surprising result in the post-test public attitude survey was an 8% drop in those who were involved in the work of community groups as were pre-trial. But as stated, those who were, worked more frequently.
7.13. **SUMMARY**

Once again the processes of the Extended Reactive Spiral (Fig. 7.4) will be reviewed in order to summarise the Brixton evaluation in this Chapter.

The evidence in the analysis clearly showed significant changes in police organisational structures, systems and practices. There was now a distinct bias towards an open system, responsive to environmental feedback. This was in contrast to the previous closed, fixed response structure. Although police were still reactive in the short term, they were also responsive in the medium and long term to changes in policy, strategy and day to day operational procedures.

One of the best examples of these changes was the information system. Clear changes in police behaviour and attitudes had occurred during the new policing systems operation. The system also recognised the public as customers of the police service and made great effort to include them. Planning and tactics were becoming increasingly dependent on the information system as a basis for decision making. Unfortunately these successes highlighted a serious resource and skills deficiency within this sub-system.

Resource management was found to be both an accepted managerial policy and a practical everyday operational tool. Perhaps this change was the major success within the police system at Brixton. Effective and efficient use of existing resources was such, that significant improvements in police service were possible, despite reductions in resources. Directed Patrolling was a major feature in this effectiveness.
THE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL

Fig. 7.4
Most importantly, the quality of the police human resources, significantly, improved. The difference in behaviour between 'time base' and 'geographical' officers became a decisive measure of improved quality. Without doubt, geographical officers provided the best value and quality of work.

However, there were considerable problems with heightened conflict between sector and relief officers. There were also increases in functional and structural specialisation, which was contrary to the original concepts and strategies. Although considerable planning and design had been invested in the application of the geographical system to operational policing, there were numerous structural and system defects in the system devised.

Surprisingly, despite the large increases in crime and conflict during the three year evaluation period, public satisfaction with police at the macro level, had remained constant. In addition, there were several indications that identifiable groups within the community had actually increased their satisfaction with police. The findings at this micro level were as yet not large enough to be reflected in the general trend.

It had been recognised at the outset that significant improvements in such an ambitious concept as the public's 'Quality of Life' would be very difficult, both to effect and measure. Nevertheless there were trends towards a number of improvements, some of them significant. In particular, crime prevention awareness was high, increases in contact/helping neighbours and willingness to volunteer were very important trends.

Continuing these improvements, measures of the Locus of Control produced significant development. It was clear that particularly in
attitude and belief, the public were changing towards being 'inner directed'. No longer were they willing to accept the environmental effects on their lives as unchangeable. Particularly in the area of crime prevention, the public accepted their own role in self-help.

The police themselves had invested considerable proportions of their resources in Preventive Services. But it would appear that despite improvements in public self-help, they were insufficient and this service was itself feeding the core Reactive Spiral.

Increased contact with police, expanding public expectations, despite significant reductions in crime at one period, continued to increase 'calls for service' or demands on police. In addition to increased reactive demands, increased preventive demands were added to the publics needs. A major failing of the preventive strategy was not to obtain sufficient reciprocal self-help input from the public receiving the service. In future this requirement will have to be obtained as a major priority.

Despite the large increase in demands police were now able to maximise the efficient use of their resources with a Geographical Policing system. It would also appear to be possible to calculate and plan the precise manpower requirement needed for each LEVEL of policing. Perhaps this will help to destroy the myth that police have no effect on the publics Quality of Life. The available evidence in this study suggests that police effectively assist to influence the social environment in a number of limited but important areas.
CHAPTER EIGHT

8. DISCUSSION

8.1. THE PROBLEM SITUATION

In Chapter 2 it was suggested that there are at least three broad areas of problems faced by today's police.

The first is the external environment, outside the police service, but an area in which police are expected to provide certain services and exert a level of control or influence. An analysis of this problem in that Chapter, describes the importance of the Reactive Spiral and created the concept of a linked Environmental Spiral. Both Spirals were linked by a process described as Environmental Potential which increased or decreased the speed of decay in the Reactive Spiral.

The second area of problems was described as the Macro, total police organisation. This particularly included the highest level of planning, control and 'support' services provided by the Headquarters Departments, senior officers and Force Policy.

The third was the Micro, actual police station and its operational street officers who are the genuine 'front line' of the total police service.

Both of these problems areas were developed into the concept of a Police Spiral, whose rate of decay could be significantly influenced by the Environmental Potential and more directly by the Reactive Spiral.

In the previous Chapter it was proposed that as a direct result of the Neighbourhood policing experiment at Brixton between 1983 and 1986, a number of changes took place. The majority of these changes were to the Police Organisation within the Police Spiral.
Outside the police station and more specifically within the processes of the Environmental and Reactive Spirals, it was suggested that a number of changes and improvements within these systems correlated with policing changes designed to affect them.

Beginning with the Police Spiral, discussion and comments will now be developed regarding the linked Spirals. It is also considered important to follow this with details of other published attempts to evaluate aspects of the Neighbourhood Policing Project which would dispute some of the proposals made.

8. 1.1. THE POLICE SPIRAL
The first major cluster in the total system is the physical structure and organisation of the police system. This framework creates a physical environment particularly for police officers just as buildings and roads do for the public. The evidence from the project suggests a very strong influence on operational street officers who are exposed to geographical responsibility, both on their behaviour and their attitudes.

Alternatively, a time based environment also has a major effect on officers. It should be possible to utilise this finding as a method of shaping police behaviour. Geographical behaviour is multi objective and contains higher quantities of pro-active activities. Time based behaviour is narrower, often with single objectives and almost always reactive.

It would also appear that the two behaviours are inevitably in conflict with each other. Split level policing systems, including both behaviours, have inevitably decayed into the more powerful time based, reactive behaviour. Remembering, however, that time based actions tend to increase the Environmental Potential and Reactive Spiral, the Brixton system was deliberately biased heavily in favour of geographic behaviour.
Although the system had many successful aspects, high levels of internal conflict were created between the remaining numbers of time based officers and the vastly expanded geographical teams. This conflict became so dysfunctional, that plans for a total geographical system were evolved 'bottom up' by the majority of operational officers.

Total geographical policing is a unique system devised by the Surrey Constabulary at Camberley where reliefs were completely removed.

The Surrey geographical model is simple and yet radical to the existing cultural norms of street, time based policing concepts. It was developed as a result of experience in the Surrey and Metropolitan experimental sites. The unique aspect of the model is that it removes the operational conflict of time based and geographical behaviour by making all street officers geographical.

Existing response time based shifts or reliefs are developed into Area or Sector Teams, which have total twenty four hour policing responsibility for ALL the policing needs of a geographical area.

Officers no longer work as a rotating eight hour, time based relief, but are spread through the twenty four hour period. An innovation of the system is the creation of a Headquarters Sector. These officers work under an Inspector and have time based responsibility for all the central services at the police station.

Initially the model was unique to Camberley in Surrey. Early evidence and evaluation indicated minimum conflict between operational and headquarters officers. In addition, due to a careful, planned and participative implementation, the resistance of street operational officers was significantly reduced. In June 1988 the Chief Constable of Surrey announced that the experiment had been evaluated internally and accepted as Force policy for all police stations in Surrey.
To date, no Metropolitan police stations have converted to this model. However, given the evidence of success from both Brixton and Surrey, it would appear that the adoption of the Surrey geographical system and the successful aspects of the Brixton system could produce a vastly superior model of 3rd LEVEL policing. It is interesting to note that in 1988, both Brixton Police Station and the Lambeth Consultative Group produced independent public reports indicating their preference for an adoption of this style of policing. The police failure to implement was based solely on their inadequate manpower levels.

With the adoption of a geographical policing system, there is a requirement for substantial organisational changes to the existing bureaucratic methods and policing structure. Planning, decision making and organisational links or networks, have to be invested in street level operational Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors. Of course this type of organic system inevitably produces conflict with existing bureaucratic structures and methods but, if police stations are ever to become the true foundation and most important part of any police system, this type of change is suggested to be essential.

There was clear evidence from the Brixton Project that if the majority of strategic and day to day operational decisions were made by geographical street officers, a far higher quality of policing service was provided. One effect of this type of organic system is the requirement for effective and skilled management and considerable investment has to be made into suitable management training and development.

The remaining significant element of the policing system is the change from a closed, short term reactive structure to an open, proactive system. It was suggested in the first chapter of this project that such a change was essential and the post test evaluation supported the benefits of an open police system. At Brixton, this openness was considered a major element in the total 3rd LEVEL system.
At the systems level, the speed of reaction to events, general ability to deal with the unexpected and plan for the expected, was greatly enhanced. Psychologically, both police and the public had more confidence and trust in the new open police policing system.

Unfortunately and in contrast to this success, the Information Network in the police system had numerous defects. The lack of police skill and knowledge in this area became a major problem. After years of surviving in a virtual information vacuum the transition to an effective information and knowledge based system was very difficult.

Years of neglect and failure to invest in technical and human skill training could not be overcome within the short life of the project. However, the awareness of the need for these types of resources and facilities was quickly highlighted. By 1988 both the Metropolitan Police and the Surrey Constabulary had invested substantial amounts in information research, development and equipment.

Some questions still remain however regarding the design of the most appropriate information systems. In a traditional bureaucracy such as the police, it is always very tempting to replicate this structure with large, centralised information systems. In fact, this trend has already begun with Command and Control operation systems, centralised crime reporting system etc. But evidence from the project suggested that decentralised, organic, networking system would be more appropriate to public needs. Fortunately, the Neighbourhood Policing Project introduced the concept of police station computer systems (HART 1983), resulting in their introduction to all police stations in the Metropolitan Police.
As a result of this implementation, decentralised small local computer networks and large centralised computer system co-exist at the present time in the Metropolitan Police. Both systems have their supporters and it would appear that a synthesis of the best aspects of both systems could well result.

In many respects, the separate police structure and its supporting information system, interact and blend into almost a physical structure which then becomes a system for delivering services and 'getting things done'. Exactly what is done and how the service is delivered now becomes a separate element, cluster or node, which has been called Resource Management.

Prior to this project in 1981, strategies and tactics were very much at the individual level, with no central recognised body of data and evidence as to the best and most effective police practices. Part of the project was the collection and testing of such existing knowledge, its integration into compatible techniques and the creation of new knowledge.

Initially, these activities were combined under a general heading of Resource Management. Unfortunately, this concept was extremely difficult for many police officers to accept. They strongly resisted data and analysis in favour of perception and opinion. Gradually and in response to increasing Home Office and Local Authority pressure, police officers began to accept and implement this concept. Within the Neighbourhood Policing Project, resource management had by now increased in scope and included two important sub-categories,

Crime Management was slightly novel, in that for the first time it linked together all the various police and public responses to crime in a unified and planned system. Within this framework it was now
possible to analyse the existing problem situation with some accuracy and then plan appropriate interventions and strategies. Police activities connected with crime have a high status within police culture and consequently this type of resource management was quickly accepted.

In time, police managers from Sergeant upwards, also began to accept the wider issues of equipment and manpower planning and deployment. They understood that the overview provided by the Resource Management framework reinforced their responsibilities in these matters and began to utilise its guidelines.

However, there still remains a majority of police activity (up to 85%) which was not specifically addressed by either framework. This police work was traditionally categorised as 'service' demands and had a very low status in police officers' opinions. Analysis of this type of activity revealed that over 65% of such public demands could be classified as peace-keeping, where individuals or groups were in conflict with each other. In a blinding glimpse of the obvious, it was realised that if this traditional peace-keeping element was re-identified as a police priority and properly planned, a significant proportion of everyday police service could be enhanced.

As a result of this research and by utilising the latest research into conflict, public order, negotiation and mediation, the Conflict Management framework was created. This collation had a number of advantages:

1. It enabled a previously low grade activity to be reintroduced as a proper activity for police officers.
2. It increased the range of high status police activity to over 80% of the total police demands and services.

3. It illustrated the urgent requirement for the growing concept of Conflict Prevention and facilitated its development.

4. It gathered together a data base of theory, strategies, tactics and practice within a logical planned framework.

5. It was also found that conflict prevention with juveniles, before they progressed into crime, could be effective in diverting them away from such activities. In effect, this type of prevention began to link into Crime Prevention.

Resource Management, with its two sub-categories of Crime and Conflict, has now provided an opportunity for considerable research and development at the actual police station. It provides an action research framework which can be utilised by operational street officers and their managers in everyday police work.

8. 1.2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPIRAL

Describing police behaviour, whether by public or professional police, as pro-social or helping behaviour was a radical concept in this research. But it is argued that it is essential as a concept and allows a paradigm change for the whole of policing theory and methods.

Once it was considered that helping and preventing victims was not just a police activity, but also an obligation on every citizen, policing became a community activity and responsibility. This allowed the formation of a Police/Public Contract and as noted by the Police Foundation (1987) this contracting, when used by police officers as an everyday operational tool with individuals and groups, was very successful.
In addition, a clear definition of professional policing behaviour and its various categories of victim helping, preventing and community helping enabled resource deployment to be planned and evaluated. Individual police officers behaviour could also be prescribed and developed away from unnecessary enforcement behaviour. However, it also enabled the development of the First Contract strategy which ensured that police action was appropriate and always utilising a superior behavioural strategy, able to impose enforcement when required.

It was also found that by using these concepts within the police system that beneficial changes could be made. Once changes were made to crime priorities and victims classified as more important than property, increases were obtained in public satisfaction and quality of police service. The imposition of a geographical police system also reinforced and rewarded the adoption of the pro-social behaviour paradigm by individual police officers.

Changes and improvements of this nature could not have been introduced and co-ordinated without the adoption of policing as pro-social behaviour. The paradigm also allows appropriate changes of public behaviour to be explained, justified and encouraged. Often, appeals to the public to help their police are too wide, non specific or even beyond their capabilities. In the pro-social paradigm the required behaviours are specific, explicit and easily within the ability of almost every member of the public.

Public satisfaction with the police is often a moving target, with public expectations matching or overtaking improvements in policing. This is particularly true when public expectations are out of touch or not kept informed of police realities. Without doubt, the open 3rd LEVEL policing system and in particular its geographical structure, counterbalance and restrain excessive public expectations. Public satisfaction with policing then includes satisfaction with their own input into the local policing services.
The ultimate measure of public satisfaction and a most important performance measure of any police system is considered to be its successful input and enhancement of the public's Quality of Life.

It was strongly argued in Chapter Two, that the traditional crime performance measures used to judge policing were totally inappropriate. In many ways, adherence to these types of measures could actually decrease the overall quality of police service to the public. For these reasons, in this project the ultimate goal and performance measure was considered the public's Quality of Life.

In a number of ways this was yet another paradigm change. By thinking differently about the end result and designing a police system to achieve the appropriate performance measure, a superior policing system could be created. Remembering that the design of the 3rd LEVEL policing system and its various performance measures in this project, is still very experimental. Future research in these areas, particularly the police support for the public's Quality of Life, should improve considerably on these early attempts.

A major output of the public's Quality of Life, back into the Environmental Spiral, is its influence on the Public's Locus of Control. In essence this means that the public are influenced to increase their own levels of self-help and take more control of their own lives. The project suggested that there are two major ways in which the police can directly support this process.

The first way is by police resources being invested in Community Helping activities. Obviously, this support has to be carefully planned and evaluated but this project gives a number of examples of where police support for Community organisations and initiatives were successful. In many ways the major impact of such initiatives as Neighbourhood Watch is mainly an increase in Community Helping behaviour. Nevertheless, such longer term achievements may be more important than the stated short term objectives with regard to Crime Management.
A second police success was the Directed Patrolling strategy of 'Contracting'. It was independently noted by the Police Foundation that Contracting as a method of obtaining public participation and self-help was found to be significant (IRVING 1986). Hopefully, this finding can now be utilised in an improved future design of Directed Patrolling strategies.

Increases in the publics control of their immediate environment and community may now feed back into levels of pro-social behaviour, particularly bystander intervention. There was some evidence of this type of increase in Brixton but only within the safety of assisting police. Spontaneous, independent public bystander intervention will probably be more difficult to influence.

The sum total of the Environmental Spiral is a decrease in crime and conflict in the surrounding environment, which now influences the inner Reactive Spiral.

8 1.3. THE REACTIVE SPIRAL

Within the original core Reactive Spiral the rate of increase of crime and conflict would appear to be the most dependent variable in the spiraling sequence.

It is interesting to note the change of emphasis in crime and priorities away from property into victims. These changes have important implications for police both in their priorities and strategies of Crime Management. In addition, increasing legislation and the new criminal offences it creates, are a potential increase in levels of crime. All of these factors are beginning to combine and place totally unrealistic demands on limited police resources.
Increasingly, conflict demands are becoming a new priority. Conflict now has a much higher profile, perhaps because of changes in public expectations and tolerance. This means that the potential for increased reactive demands on police has at least doubled if public expectations of police continue as they have in the recent past.

Both the police and the public must understand the strictly limited resources and effectiveness of police reactive services. This response is a very limited public service, provided to help people temporarily incapacitated, not able bodied adults; too lazy, careless or irresponsible to look after themselves. Nor is it available for those evading their responsibilities as citizens and neighbours.

Increasing public violence against the police officers who are attempting to provide this service illustrates another aspect of public irresponsibility which cannot be allowed to continue. If the psychological fear of detection and punishment or cultural norms are unable to influence these increasing trends, then technology must be developed as a cost effective deterrent. Research into non-lethal force for police officers may provide the means for individual officers to subdue large numbers of offenders. As alien as this may appear to British policing, this development is almost inevitable if the present violent trends continue.

In addition, technology could assist response services by independently recording the scene when police arrive. Lengthy and expensive disputes as to what officers saw and heard could be significantly reduced. Unfortunately, the development of this type of police technology and professionalism is very slow and spasmodic.

Outside the police, competition to provide services in the private sector ensures that services are efficient and cost effective. However the police have no competitors to ensure that high standards
are maintained and developed. There are no alternatives to the police and there are no formal mechanisms at street level to allow the customer to make effective choices regarding the type and quality of service they require.

One method of exposing these services to market forces and of increasing their value in the public's perception, is to allow licenced private companies to provide similar services. Another solution is to redesign existing police services within a geographical system, exposed to the market forces of consumer panels in the form of Sector Working Parties.

Regardless of the option which is eventually adopted, there will have to be radical changes in policies and practices regarding police resources. As with all other employers, the available pool of recruitable manpower is rapidly shrinking and the competition for this pool will inevitably increase.

There are a number of options, all of which will perhaps have to be adopted to some degree. First, police will have to invest heavily in new technology. To the extent that the abilities of each individual are more than quadrupled by the supporting technology.

Second, restrictive standards will have to be re-examined. Both physical requirements and levels of achievement before joining the police. Human resource development will have to be adopted by the police in order to raise the abilities of new recruits and to maximise the achievements of every individual employed.

Third, existing police cultural restrictions on the effective involvement of the public will have to be dealt with. There appears to be two aspects to this concern. One, which is exclusive to the police is a version of the professional versus the volunteer syndrome. The
other is a joint police and public almost irrational fear of vigilantes. Often police use the emotion and illogical fear of the vigilante argument in order to enhance the less powerful case of exclusive police professionalism.

An example of this process in the case of the volunteer Guardian Angel subway patrols in New York. Here impressionable juveniles under the direction of adults join gangs, train to be effective fighters in order to protect the weak and endangered people on the subway. For the first time, the youth and gang culture has been exploited to provide an exciting pro-social alternative to the existing anti-social criminal gangs. Predictably, the New York police are totally opposed to this initiative.

This study leaves little doubt that police preventive services must receive one of the highest priorities if the Reactive Spiral is to be effected. It also concludes that the public are the only effective and economic resource for the majority of this prevention. But most importantly the bulk of this prevention must be directed at juveniles who are responsible for the majority of all Crime and Conflict demands on police. As a result of these logical conclusions, emotional or self interested police objections to initiatives such as the Guardian Angels must be reconsidered. If police trained and supervised such initiatives it is very unlikely that the spector of vigilante would ever become a reality.

At a more mundane level of juvenile crime prevention, this cannot be a major initiative of the police. It is essential that they are a junior partner in the types of multi agency programmes now under consideration (NACRO 1985).

To reinforce the importance of the processes described it should be remembered that when the simple reactive spiral is extended to include other important processes within the police organisation it is suggested that the problem situation becomes more complex.
An increasing reactive bias in police resource deployment and the ineffectiveness of these resources against the rising demands, affects the openness of the existing police system. The inability to cope encourages a narrowing of objectives and selective attention to the major reactive demands.

This narrowing of objectivity and reduction in available resources reduces investment and maintenance of police information systems, particularly the more subtle feedback systems regarding long term problems and the environmental effects of the reactive spiral.

Without adequate information systems, effective resource planning becomes almost impossible, further reducing the effectiveness of the existing police resources and enhancing the decay effects of the reactive spiral.

Historically, and understandably in this situation, the operational urgency of dealing with immediate demands drastically reduces the resources and the perception of need for longer term preventive strategies. In addition, the reduction and ineffectiveness of resource planning fails to influence this bias. As resource planning reduces so do preventive strategies.

On the streets, if the public have been effectively excluded by police, or allowed to opt out, then there are virtually no public restraints against crime and conflict behaviour. Isolated, the police may be reduced to their own group seige mentality 'the thin blue line'. Individual police officers begin to adopt the defensive over control of their emotions to deal with high stress levels often called 'John Wayne Syndrome', others may adopt the deviant ends over means mentality of the 'Blue Knight Syndrome'.
However, it should be noted that in addition to the evaluation proposed by this study there were other evaluations of this large policing research project. Two such evaluations will now be discussed in order to illustrate alternative views to the results of the Neighbourhood Policing Project.

8.2 POLICE FOUNDATION REPORT
The first evaluation was restricted to Notting Hill Division (POLICE FOUNDATION 1987). This report admitted that evaluation was difficult as the required 3rd LEVEL Policing System was not implemented successfully. Other than a small number of isolated organisational changes, Notting Hill remained at best a 2nd LEVEL SQUAD Policing System.

However, the Police Foundation Report did make a number of important proposals and conclusions. A major recommendation was that 'All notions of pro-social education of the public by role modelling and social engineering should be abandoned.' The report suggested that the underlying theories of pro-social modelling (Chapter 3) are largely impracticable and attempts at increasing public self help are based on dubious interpretation of the relevant research literature.

With regard to the police acting as role models, the Brixton experiment produced no evidence to counter the Police Foundation's opinion. But there were some qualitative data to suggest that if police did not behave as though they were role models for pro-social behaviour or behaved inappropriately, this could be taken as justification for anti-social behaviour by significant sections of the public, particularly juveniles.
Concerning 'social engineering', the Police Foundation's distaste for such objectives seems a little emotional and illogical. Almost every known definition of policing in the research literature describes policing as some sort of influence or shaping of public behaviour. In short, changing or maintaining public behaviour in certain ways, which can only be considered 'social engineering'.

It is also important to remember that in the described 3rd LEVEL Policing System, the police have to be totally open and honest about their motives. The formation of a police/public contract will accept nothing less as a basis for the contract. In addition, the desired or 'shaped' behaviour from the public is pro-social, to help each other when they are in difficulties. With these intentions and in the type of open environment described, the public can make their own decisions to become involved, or to opt out.

The Police Foundation Report continues to suggest that 'Even if greatly increased resources were available the strategies - would be very unlikely to produce the effects claimed for them.'

Evidence from the Brixton Project however begins to dispute this claim. There was evidence of significant changes in public attitudes and behaviour which correlated with changes in policing, as predicted by the theories under examination. A major example of these changes were the increases in public VICTIM HELPING behaviour and willingness to be involved in COMMUNITY HELPING. All of these changes were happening at the same time that police were making strenuous efforts to persuade the public to increase these behaviours.

Another 'social engineering' concern of the Foundation Report was the control of minority groups by police. This did not appear to be a problem in the Brixton experiment. The majority of minority groups had very similar views to police and the public majority, as
to what was acceptable or permissible and what was not. It was the methods used by police to enforce this consensus which caused the major differences. However, because the police had been forced to operate an open system, negotiation, discussion and contracting between police and public began to overcome these differences.

The remaining deviant minority, as was described in the Environment Profile in Chapter 4, were criminals, obtaining their living by crime. These values were not imposed by police but by the laws and statutes of this country. Great care has to be taken in identifying unscrupulous and clever individuals who manipulate popular ideologies for criminal gains. Virtually, every symbolic location in London has by now had alleged 'community leaders' accused and charged with such criminal behaviour.

Despite these differences, both the Foundation and this project are in agreement regarding the need for an open, responsive policing system. Many of the organisational proposals made in their report, were in fact able to be implemented at Brixton.

Additionally, both reports have recognised the urgent requirement for consultation and contracting skills in every-day operational policing. Conflict Management is jointly recognised as an important new area for police research and development.

Overall the Police Foundation Report was optimistic on the future of more advanced policing systems such as Neighbourhood Policing and concludes:

"The Neighbourhood Policing project, without reaching a single one of its main objectives may still prove to have altered significantly the agenda for urban policing, both in London and beyond."
8.3. TURNER REPORT

In contrast to this eventual optimism, the TURNER Report (1987) was almost totally negative and pessimistic. This report covered all of the project sites and concluded that Neighbourhood Policing was a total failure:

"The evidence from the trial shows no clear advantages from Neighbourhood Policing and overall it cannot be said to be a success. Placed against estimated development and implementation costs for the experiment of over £5.5m, annual running costs at the sites of £1.8m and the disruption caused by the process of change, this must count as a failure."

This rather narrow and simplistic view has in fact omitted a number of facts. Leaving aside for one moment the question of success, the element of expenditure has suddenly been introduced as a major part of the evaluation. What is not stated is that, over 90% of changes and innovations at all Metropolitan Police Stations between 1982 and 1986 emanated from the Neighbourhood Policing Project.

For an organisation with a yearly expenditure of over 1 billion pounds to have this type of major research, development and implementation system as an internal change agent for such a small proportion of the total expenditure (less than .005%), must be considered a major organisational success. Many organisations of a compatible size, outside the police, would be very pleased with such value for money.

With regard to the 'disruption caused by the process of change', the project pioneered the understanding inside the Metropolitan Police that change was normal and constant. It also played a major part
in creating systems and concepts for the Management of Change (TOFFLER 1970). There would also appear to be an unfortunate linking by TURNER between no-change as being positive and change negative.

The next point made by TURNER is:-

"The evidence available gives no grounds for believing that this poor result is due to lack of time, site selection or incomplete implementation."

There is in fact ample evidence in TURNER's own reports and data, that almost all of the failures at sites other than Brixton are directly due to failed or incomplete implementation. This of course is an important finding when compared with these sites demonstrating successful implementation which did produce results.

This type of evidence creates the opportunity for a multiple level evaluation, starting with implementation, through to system design, ending with strategy and tactics evaluation. Unfortunately, these types of assessments had not been attempted.

On the positive side it was considered:-

"Neighbourhood Policing has worked moderately well at Brixton" and "Of the Metropolitan sites, only Brixton offered any signs of external effects from Neighbourhood Policing but even they are questionable."

The report then begins to cite a number of other casual instances and events, which apparently are not considered part of the 3rd LEVEL policing system i.e. The 1985 Anti-crime Operation, Crime Management strategies, level and effectiveness of street manpower
deployment and growing community involvement! It would appear that TURNER is unaware that these 'external effects' are in fact planned aspects of a 3rd LEVEL system.

In addition, the significant reduction in street crime in 1985 is minutely analysed and then dismissed casually, arguing that none of these factors can be conclusively proved as responsible, and therefore, the reduction did not really happen!

At this stage it is becoming clear that the type of conflict described in Chapter 2, regarding differing methods, concepts, views of validity and reliability, is emerging.

TURNER was appointed as an independent evaluator of the project in February 1985 and by June 1986 had replaced the original systems based approach to evaluation (ACKOFF 1974) based on psychology and management with one based on Econometric Modelling and individual element evaluation. Essentially this was a reductionist approach based on economic theories.

Unfortunately, this was exactly the type of evaluation which had been rejected as unsuitable prior to the beginning of the project. Therefore, the pre-test data did not include evidence for this type of evaluation, particularly the financial evidence.

DAVIES (1987) had commented on this type of reductionist evaluation and its validity to complex open systems. He notes how traditionally scientists have tended to treat complex open systems as annoying aberrations, perhaps because non-linear systems are harder to study than linear ones. By focusing attention on simple linear systems science developed a strongly reductionist flavour. Scientists argued that they could always explain complex systems in terms of
their components, even though they are often interactable in practice. Davies then argues that this purely methodological restriction has become so ingrained that many scientists believe that the primary phenomena of nature are those relating to individual irreducible objects or elements alone.

It is clear that Turner is this type of evaluator as demonstrated by his recommendations for future work:

"Descriptive packages should be assembled on methods of community contact, geographical responsibility and directed patrol. These should be limited to a description and criteria for assessing their suitability for a given situation."

"Station Commanders should be encouraged to apply such packages only one at a time and for limited areas."

"Experiments should be limited to changing only one aspect at any one place and at one time."

Davies would argue, as was the original intention of the evaluation (Hart 1984), that the network of the 3rd LEVEL system is holistic. It is the pattern of the system with its ability to 'self-organise' that is important, not the state of any specific node. Therefore, it is not possible to reduce the net-work, or a pattern of activity therein, to the activity of individual nodes. It is the collective behaviour of the whole system that defines the end state of the phenomena under investigation.

Perhaps an example of this type of invalid reductionism is Turner's dismissal of the significant reduction in street crime for a fifteen month period. Because it cannot be reduced to an individual causal element, it does not really exist! However, the
inappropriateness of the evaluation still does not explain the apparent negative bias throughout the whole evaluation. Positive results at the highest levels of significance are either ignored or devalued wherever possible.

Elements which are considered to have some type of positive effect in TURNER'S evaluation were:

- Participative Management
- Community Contact (qualified success)
- Geographical Responsibility (qualified success)
- Directed Patrolling (qualified success).

8.4 EVALUATION SUMMARY

Unfortunately both of the evaluations described seemed to have failed to understand that there are at least two separate clusters within the police system which require different types of evaluation. Essentially, a 3rd LEVEL Geographical System is a physical structure or system, supported by technology which uses strategies and tactics, in order to achieve objectives.

HOPE (1986) has noted that some confusion surrounds police orientated research and what is really needed is a system 'for getting things done', where a framework is provided for police and public to work efficiently together in whatever is effective. Even if some of the strategies and tactics do not work they can then be changed within the system provided.

It is suggested that this type of evaluation is required for Geographical Policing, which asks the question, did the system improve the ability to achieve desired results? Therefore, initially, the total system is under evaluation, not various strategies and tactics such as Neighbourhood Watch, Environmental Crime Prevention etc. In addition, individual element 'failures' in the total system cannot cause the whole system to be rejected. Within these concepts a number of conclusions will now be made.
8.5. **CHAPTER SUMMARY**

Perhaps the major achievement of the project at Brixton Police Station was to demonstrate that major changes to the police organisation could be successfully implemented. In addition, these particular changes, introduced by the 3rd LEVEL Geographical Policing System, began to influence significant police behavioural and attitudional changes. These changes then began to influence the problem situation described in this project and summarised above.

The evidence that preventive policing systems can be implemented allows some proposals to be made for future police planning. The diagram 8.1. illustrates a simple overview of the major elements involved in this process.

![Diagram 8.1: Police System Planning](image-url)
Retaining the concept that the police station is the most important organisational structure, it is developed as two separate yet interactive systems. The first is the LEVEL of policing which has to be decided in conjunction with the other elements in the planning system. If for example a 3rd LEVEL system were decided, then the interacting strategy and tactics would have to be planned in accordance with the ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL and the effects of the REACTIVE SPIRAL calculated.

In the project, descriptions of the three LEVELS of policing, together with their performance measures have been provided. The most effective of these LEVELS is considered to be the preventive and geographical 3rd LEVEL. This system has indicated some potential for achieving objectives in an effective manner.

A number of strategies and tactics for use with this system have been described together with some evidence of success. However, many other research projects provide additional and improved preventive strategies (HOME OFFICE 1988).

The ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL has been described in some detail in this project and research into improvements continue. It would appear that with the advances in social survey techniques this concept could soon achieve a high degree of validity and reliability.

At the heart of the whole system sits the relentless REACTIVE SPIRAL which impartially decides on the effectiveness of any police system. This project has provided significant evidence for the existence of this spiral and perhaps some insight into its associated processes.
Recently a number of public services particularly the Health Service have suffered from similar problems and processes. They have found their greatest difficulty to be changing and implementing new organisational systems and procedures. This project has shown that police can successfully implement more complex systems which opens the door for major improvements and innovations in policing the future.
9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1. THE OBJECTIVES

This Chapter reviews the original objectives laid down in Chapter One and summarises the positive effects and changes achieved by the project in each objective. As previously stated it was envisaged that each proceeding objective would include and build on the evidence and knowledge provided by the previous findings, and this will also be considered. Conclusions are also made regarding possible contributions to British Policing in general, which are producing significant changes resulting from this thesis.

9.1.1. THE REACTIVE SPIRAL

The existence and effect of the core Reactive Spiral (HART 1981), where increasing public demands will always outpace police reactive resources, was clearly validated in the Brixton Case Study. In the Pre-Test analysis it was shown that even effective 1ST and 2ND LEVEL police response systems will not influence the decay effects of the Spiral.

However, the Post-Test analysis also indicated that a simplistic increase in police resources dealing with pro-active or preventive strategies will not by itself influence the decay effects. It was clear that demand prevention must include a significant proportion of voluntary public resources. There are two reasons for this requirement; first it provides an opportunity for a real and significant increase in available resources and second, it has a regulatory effect on excessive public expectations of police reactive and pro-active services.
Therefore, except in areas where demands on police are increasing very slowly, an efficient and effective police service which stabilises public demand, can only be provided by a 3RD LEVEL, Geographical Police System.

In addition, it would appear that the greatest proportion of resources invested in demand prevention and stabilisation will have to be voluntary public assistance. It is also suggested that this, public assistance should be some form of 'self-policing'.

These findings are suggested to be of major importance to the planning, implementation and maintenance of any policing system and its attempts to utilise a joint police and public preventive strategy.

9. 1.2. THE EXTENDED REACTIVE SPIRAL

Outside the core Spiral, two other important and linked spirals are suggested to have been validated in this Case Study. The Police Spiral and the Environmental Spiral are considered to increase the understanding of links and interactions between major elements, or perhaps more accurately compounds, in each area.

Once police resources are understood to be very limited in their quality and their ability to directly affect change, then the concept of Police Systems or LEVELS, becomes important. The description of three LEVELS developed by this thesis become an important practical instrument in defining what actually existed in any police station requiring analysis. Once this had been completed, using the same concept, decisions and planning could then take place regarding preferred changes.
The vital importance of police investment in Information Systems was also highlighted by this Spiral, as were the serious police deficiencies in this area. Without doubt the project identified and clarified the need for total, integrated information systems as a priority for any police system.

The Police Spiral also introduced the unfamiliar concept of Resource Management to police stations. This particular area was most important in any successful attempt to develop the efficiency and effectiveness of any police service. In addition, developments within the project which consolidated Crime Management and introduced Conflict Management were considered major advances in police Resource Management theories and practice. This thesis has continued this development into the creation and validation of performance measures, which is still continuing as an important area of research.

Police Resource Management also included the utilisation of voluntary public resources which prior to the concepts developed in this thesis was an extremely difficult and controversial proposal. However, with the paradigm change of Police Behaviour being described as Pro-social or Helping Behaviour, the compounds of the Environmental Spiral now became strongly linked into the Extended Spiral.

Pro-social Behaviour as a concept, allowed the practical and realistic development of a public input into policing. Victim Helping and Prevention, together with Community Helping became quantifiable outputs from the public's voluntary resources which could be channelled into demand prevention and stabilisation.
Public Satisfaction has always been recognised as an important aspect and performance measure of any public service, particularly the police. If police are to achieve the required levels of voluntary public behaviour, their satisfaction is a major part of the Environmental Spiral. This project indicated some success in this area, but perhaps more importantly identified areas for development, particularly, the areas of public involvement and information in everyday policing matters. These types of links would appear to have the important effect of limiting public expectations, hence satisfaction, to realistic levels of satisfaction with police and their own achievements.

Existing police performance measures were recognised by this thesis as being counter productive to police performance. By encouraging undue emphasis on crime measures, it could be seen that police were forced to concentrate on a reactive, crime dominated police service. Unfortunately, as the thesis has explained, reactive police service and obsession with crime, where police alone can never be effective, are detrimental to a police service.

By developing police performance measures around the concept of a defined Quality of Life, significant advances in police performance are now possible. It was clear in this thesis, that even in the relatively short period of the Case Study, significant trends improving the public's Quality of Life were already apparent. By adopting a more realistic and holistic network for the development of police performance measure, genuine and realist improvements in the service provided by police can now be achieved.
Previous attempts at encouraging public involvement in solving their own problems are numerous. Very few, if any, have been consistently successful in poorer, deprived areas of the urban environment. Perhaps one of the reasons is the almost total neglect of important psychological concepts, such as 'Locus of Control,' which would predict such failure if certain conditions were not achieved by those desiring change.

This thesis considers that 'Locus of Control' is possibly only one important example of the type of problems and requirements which must be accounted for by any process of change in difficult urban environments. Only by attempting to understand individual and group needs in a particular environment can a particular beneficial behaviour by the public be supported and reinforced. There was some evidence in this thesis that by careful planning and support, increases in behaviour such as Pro-social can be achieved.

The Extended Reactive Spiral has to some extent provided solutions, or directions for change regarding the findings of the core Reactive Spiral. However, what is still required is the specific development of a police system designed to achieve an effective and efficient police service by utilising the evidence from both objectives.

9. 1.3. **POLICE SYSTEM AND STRATEGY**

A major objective of the thesis was to provide a design for a superior policing system, able to provide an effective and efficient police service in the most difficult urban areas. Chapter Five provides such a description with a detailed list of elements, functions, and processes. This description is unique in that it introduces for the first time in police
administration the concept of a TOTAL System based on a systems design. Also, the essential systemic nature of such an approach, involving the public and public agencies is an integral part of the overall design.

Chapter Six recognises the difference between a system 'for getting things done' as provided by Chapter Five and the requirement for 'how things are achieved'. In Chapter Six strategies and tactics are described down to the level of proposed behaviour sequences for optimum effectiveness. It is important to remember that both chapters reflect the action nature of the research and were developed and refined by actual experiences at the test site.

At the very least a basic framework for a 3RD LEVEL Geographical System and its strategies has been provided. Every aspect of this system has also survived a very practical test in a hostile urban environment.

9.2. OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

It is suggested that a major expansion in public knowledge is now possible utilising the findings of the Brixton test site. Using a defined theory, system and police strategy, significant new findings and evidence have been obtained by this project.

One of the most important conclusions is: Using this system in a hostile environment, with high demands for police service, a calculated number of police officers, mainly uniformed Constables, can significantly effect rising public demands for reactive police services.
From this finding it is now possible to develop an accurate police manpower formula for a specific geographical area. When this type of calculation is linked to the newly developed performance measures, as at Brixton, policing is beginning to develop into quantifiable, planned service.

In the wider police environment, outside the test site in this thesis, changes are taking place. Due to the Systems nature of this project few if any new ideas or concepts currently under development or research in policing, are not included in the Geographical model of policing.

Of course, the majority of these ideas and concepts were not conceived or invented by this thesis. It merely recognised their potential and included them in a logical, and systemic method to exploit their maximum potential. But this co-ordination and maximisation is argued to be one of the major achievements of this thesis. Existing and future developments in policing theory and practice should be absorbed into improved versions of its System and Strategy. As has already been indicated, a number of Police Forces have already adopted the approach resulting from this thesis.

Within the thesis itself, a number of new concepts and theories have been created and developed. It is argued that this combination of theory and practical achievement has provided the opportunity for an important paradigm change in British Policing.

Perhaps most importantly for the central concern of this thesis, is evidence that the actual Police System or organisational design can be a major influence on police and public behaviour.
THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS AND PAGES ARE REDACTED AT THE REQUEST ON THE UNIVERSITY, SEE ORIGINAL COPY.

ALL PAGES OF APPENDICES FROM PG 407 TO THE END OF THE BOOK.
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