Globalization, Migration and Citizenship
Introduction

The increasing ease and frequency of migration, together with the ability of migrants to sustain links and engage in circular, shuttle and serial temporary migration, and the challenge all this presents to traditional views of citizenship, is frequently cited as evidence of globalization (Castles 2000, Castles and Davidson 2000, Balibar 2004, Scholte 2005, Bisley 2007). Migration brings into sharp relief the negative and positive consequences of a world in which the borders of communities, nations, societies and states are simultaneously barriers and bridges. Historically there have always been controls on the mobility of the less well off as states have worked with capital to hold on to or move around desirable, productive slaves, subjects or citizens, and expel the unproductive or trouble-makers to colonies where they might contribute to the production of wealth (Baseler 1998, Noiriel 2007). Racialisation and racism have been important factors shaping this, largely forced, movement of people over centuries, as states have engaged in the process of constructing the state’s people and the state’s nation, selecting those who belong and rejecting those who do not (Arendt 1967), and attributing roles and functions to certain groups within the territory on the basis of certain ‘natural’ characteristics. However, since the end of the Second World War, the autonomous movement of individuals, families and groups of people has presented a particular challenge to the state’s capacity to control who enters, resides and settles in its territory. In meeting this challenge, states have developed regimes of control that are still more or less explicitly racialised, favouring the entry of some groups over others, using entry criteria that are implicitly racist or racist in terms of outcomes. It would therefore seem logical to suppose that since migration and racism are two phenomena that have been intimately linked for some considerable time, so too would be the bodies of literature that address these issues. And yet to varying degrees, they have remained discrete and separate from each other, with some scholars in each field scarcely aware of the work of those in the other. This separation can be explained to a certain extent by the genesis of these fields, which differs across the globe. These differences are explored in the first section of this chapter. The second section discusses some of the different ways/disciplines in which migration can be studied, arguing that no matter how one classifies work on migration, racism is always implicit in the study of migration (and perhaps vice versa). The 3rd section of

* All translations in the text are my own.
1 For example, the UK Highly Skilled Migrants Programme specifies recent annual income as a criteria for entry. Clearly, migrants from low income countries will find it harder meet this threshold, and low income countries are overwhelmingly African and Asian.
the chapter looks at the actual phenomena of migration and racism, and the ways in which in Europe in particular, they are linked. This section leads into an argument for a particular approach to research in the future, before ending with some reflections and questions.

States almost self-evidently discriminate between groups of people when deciding who may or may not enter, and while few would deny the discriminatory nature of migration controls, most states would argue that today these controls are not racist. In this chapter, racism is used to mean ‘any argument which suggests that the human species is composed of discrete groups in order to legitimate inequality [or unequal treatment] between those groups of people’ (Miles 1989). These ‘discrete groups’ may be distinguished (and constructed) not solely on the basis of colour, but also culture, nationality, ethnicity and/or migration status, and these differences then used to legitimate unequal treatment, for example granting multiple entry visas to people of one nationality, but refusing entry to another, or introducing selection criteria that are clearly more difficult for some groups to meet than others (e.g. income levels, language skills). In the same way that ‘race’ is socially and politically constructed, so too is racism (Solomos 2003), and the study of migration provides numerous examples of this construction process. As David Goldberg (1994, 91) and others have noted, racism is not singular, fixed and unchanging. ‘Race’ and racism both need to be located within specific historical and contemporary social and political contexts (slavery, colonialism, fascism, the end of the Cold War, 9/11, etc.); so we cannot assume what we see as racism is necessarily seen in the same way in all contexts. As Wieviorka (1992, 1993) has stressed, it is important to apprehend social change as playing a large part in reconfiguring particular forms of racism. While there are those who continue to subscribe to a crude, essentialist ‘white races superior, black races inferior’ mode of thinking, this is not usually how it is expressed today, when in Europe we are more likely to find ‘illegals’, extraCommunitari, migrants, asylum-seekers, or Sans Papiers the targets of unequal treatment, that is denied access to certain rights, benefits or privileges by virtue of their membership of one or more of these categories. To note that the majority of those who fall into these categories are also the traditional targets of racism overlooks the construction of these categories by states – more or less explicitly to exclude those who do not belong or bring some benefit with them.

Some have suggested that the hostility directed towards migrants is due not to racism but to xenophobia – an irrational fear or hatred of foreigners. While some resentment towards migrants may be linked to concerns about jobs, pressure on local services or fear of the
unknown, attributing it to xenophobia rather than racism ignores the obvious fact that hostility is not directed at all foreigners, but primarily those who appear visibly different (demonstrating the tenacity of biological racism and problems with difference). Furthermore, such attribution also naturalises and trivialises rather than challenges this fear/hatred. We will return to this theme throughout the chapter.

When discussing migration, class (Anderson 2006, Van Hear 2006) and gender (Anderson 2006, 2003, Kofman et al 2002) are as important as racism (Anderson 2006), and certainly my own research in Europe and Morocco underlines the importance of a complex approach to a complex phenomenon. One of the challenges of a recent project in Cyprus has been to try and disentangle the relative weight that should be attached to each of these factors when classifying the roots of the hostility and difficulties faced by migrants. To what extent is an individual subject to harassment because of their socio-economic vulnerability, their gender or their perceived race? How much of a state’s selective entry requirements are shaped by the impulse to control the entry of the poor and unskilled, and how much the will prevent the entry of those seen as ‘other’ or inassimilable? How can researchers attribute relative weights to these different factors? Although the focus here is on the link between racism and migration, it is important to note that this is only one of a number of factors shaping the experience of migrants, and that the experience of migrants is gendered and classed as well as racialised.

The Genesis of Race and Migration Studies

The scholarly literature on race and racism is most established and extensive in the US, where its primary concern has traditionally been with Black Americans, many of whose ancestors, though not all, were brought to what is now the US and Caribbean as slaves. Although slavery could be seen as an extreme manifestation of ‘forced’ migration, generally speaking migration, forced or otherwise, has been a relatively minor issue in the US literature on race and racism. The debt incurred by a nation built on slavery and a crude biological racism that defined particular groups as ‘naturally’ suited to slavery, coupled with the social, economic and political consequences of slavery that are still felt today by a significant section of the

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2 Policy and Practice: Racism and Discrimination in Cyprus 2005-2007
American population focussed the attention of scholars on black/white racism and on the threat to the nation represented by inequality and segregation.

The other major factor shaping studies of ‘race’ and racism was the American Civil Rights Movements, which was driven by a commitment to equality among Americans, equality under the Constitution and a need to redress a massive and damaging injustice. This was a battle fought by Americans (Black and White) for Black Americans (though of course it fed and was fed by similar movements around the world) and American society. However, not all scholars of ‘race’ and racism ignored migration. Immigration to cities such as Chicago meant that in the 1920s the population was one-third foreign born and relations between the established residents and newcomers attracted the attention of the ‘Chicago School’, including R E Park (1950) who developed a four stage theory of assimilation of migrants. Implicit within the work of Park and others was a belief in the superiority of the host society, in the threat to harmony presented by and the need to manage ‘race relations’ (Park 1950, part II).

Given that in the US, the predominant self-image is that of an egalitarian, confident nation of immigrants, where many Americans are proud to trace a migrant ancestry, and that the predominant ideology is one of meritocracy, where all that counts is individual effort and talent, it is perhaps understandable that many migration scholars were relatively slow to link racism with migration. Much of the early writing on migration approached it from a simple, economistic cost-benefit analysis, which since it concentrated on migrants as individual units of labour, could not really capture the significance of racism. On the other hand, the role of ‘race’ and racism in the development and implementation of policy should have been clear in the light of laws introduced in the late 19th century to exclude Chinese and other Asian migrants, and in the 1920s to preserve the ethnic mix of migrants through national quotas. Post-1945 the Bracero programme, initially a relatively unproblematic response to labour shortages, suffered a ‘nativist’ backlash (fuelled in part by economic recession in the early 1950s and the political paranoia of the McCarthy era) which led to ‘Operation Wetback’. The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s finally removed the racialized laws that systematically blocked the immigration of Asians, Africans and southern Europeans (and led to the end of the Bracero programme), and the minority populations in the US began to grow significantly.

The literature on post-1965 migration doesn’t really talk about race as a factor either in the development of migration policy or the reception of migrants (Portes’ important work A Portrait of Immigrant America now in its 3rd edition devotes 3 pages to racial discrimination).
However, in a recent IJCS paper, Goldberg, Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006) survey the culture of scholarship on ‘race’ in the US and note that in response to the Civil Rights Movement’s challenge to the racial and colonial formation of the US, White intellectuals refashioned the terms of reference, espousing ‘racelessness’ and embracing the terms ‘ethnic’ and migrant’ (severely critiquing Glazer and Moynihan’s *Beyond the Melting Pot* along the way). Their argument is that scholars of ‘race’ and racism in the US fall into two schools – assimilationists and cultural pluralists, both sharing a ‘stagist’ view of integration (*pace* Parke above), though different in that the latter doesn’t claim that all will submerge their identities completely, developing instead a new melted identity, but that they will recreate ethnicity in a new hyphenated form. Their problem with these two schools is that both erase ‘the timing of the migration as well as the racial discrimination suffered by immigrants of colour’ (2006: 262). They also take a swipe at the ‘new economic sociology approach’ (*e.g.* Zolberg, Portes and Sassen) alleging that the focus on social capital and social networks overlooks the structural conditions of discriminations faced by Puerto-Ricans, Haitian-Americans and African-Americans, the histories of subordination structuring the racial oppression, residential segregation and exploitation suffered by these groups, and finally the class differences of the individuals in ‘micro-networks’, which condition their access to resources and capital (2006: 265). Nonetheless, Huntington in *Who Are We? America’s Great Debate* (2004) or Brimelow’s *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster* (1995) did make the link, albeit perhaps not as thoughtfully as some would wish.

The situation in Europe, including the UK, is somewhat different, as scholars in both fields have a certain awareness of each others’ work largely because the link between the two phenomena is clearer in Europe. As Europe’s nation-states were being constructed, it became particularly important to decide who belonged to the nation and who did not. This issue was further complicated for those states who were colonial Empires, given that colonial citizenship did not coincide with any understanding of nation. In spite of this, there is a clear racialised understanding of what it means to belong to one of Europe’s nation-states. This is largely because those who look different are presumed to be ‘foreign’ in a way that is not possible in large sections/cities of the US today. Nonetheless, this academic awareness is rather cursory and tends to involve scholars from one field visiting the other to gather useful data to make a point, rather than engage in any meaningful dialogue. Having said that, it would be a mistake to generalise too much – there are important differences across Europe,
that are equally a product of particular national histories or of the processes by which European nations were constructed.

There is a link between migration and racism in every European country, but that link varies as a result of a number of factors: whether or not there is a history of immigration (e.g. Britain, France, Germany) and or a history of emigration (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain), or a history of colonisation (Britain, France, Spain and Portugal), or of being colonised (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Ireland). We could also usefully consider the impact of political history (nationalism and nation-building, federalism, fascism, Nazism, military dictatorships, liberalism and democracy) and economic developments (industrialisation, lack of industrialisation, post industrialization, a welfare state, what kind of welfare state). Each of these factors has explanatory value not solely for individual national histories of migration and racism, but also for the development of scholarship within these fields.

In the traditional emigration countries, much of the migration literature focused on the experiences of the national diaspora abroad, including their experiences of racism and discrimination: difficulties finding employment or employment commensurate with their skills and experience, problems with terms and conditions of employment, getting a fair wage etc., difficulties finding accommodation and hostility at an individual and institutional level. Scholars of immigration into these countries, however, have tended until recently to overlook the same patterns of treatment experienced by migrants into their countries, although some have noted views expressed that somehow the racism experienced by European emigrants inoculated those left behind, making it impossible for these societies to be racist (Lentin & McVeigh 2002, Schuster & Solomos 2002, Triandafyllidou 2000). However, the relatively new body of work that explores attitudes to and the treatment of migrants in these ‘new’ countries of immigration tends to give the lie to this complacent attitude. Lentin & McVeigh (2002) writing on Ireland and Anthias and Lazarides writing on Southern Europe have argued that migration regimes embody racism and thrive on the idea of an inferior ‘other’ (1999, 1-11).

If we turn to countries with a history of immigration, there is obviously a much greater body of literature available both on indigenous racism and migration, as well as on the two

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4 Although historically most of the cities around the Mediterranean had polyglot populations mixing migrants from considerable distances away (see Braudel 1972), and most of those states regarded as immigration countries sent significant sections of their populations abroad, for example, Britain and Germany.
phenomena together. Nonetheless, there are differences. In **France**, the academic debate is shaped very clearly by the weight of history, most obviously its colonial past, but equally the attachment to the **Republic**, in particular one predicated on the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. This attachment coupled with a government policy that actively recruited migrants as new citizens of that republic, as in the US, has led to the use of the ‘melting pot’ metaphor (Noiriel 1988, 1991). Because France has historically welcomed, needed migrants, few scholars have until very recently made the connection between migration and racism, this in spite of the racialised political and academic debates detailed by Noiriel in his histories of migration in France (2007, 1991, 1988). Instead, this was overshadowed by a concentration in the academy on colonialism and racism, and on colonialism and migration, not least as a result of the work of Maghrebi scholars (Fanon 1986, Memmi 2000, Sayad 2004). Given the great wound inflicted on French society by the Algerian war, this is perhaps not surprising. There are relatively few French scholars of racism (Balibar 2001, Taguieff 2001, Wieviorka 1992 & 1993), though there are a significant number of scholars who write on the (problems of) the 2nd & 3rd generation of ‘migrants’, the daily experience of young French citizens of non-French origins (Beaud & Masclet 2006), and the place of Islam in a putatively secular society (Roy 2007). Here, the issues of migration and racism are linked, although it tends to focus on these experiences rather than on policy, and this is true too for the Sans Papiers, where the concern is less with racism, than with their lack of rights and security.

In **Germany**, Klaus Bade (1986), for example, almost founded the field of migration studies with his historical studies of seasonal workers from Poland in the 19th century, a group of migrants to whom Germans remain particularly sensitive. However, the single phenomenon that has shaped the development of migration and racism studies in Germany is inevitably the Nazi period, which in much of the literature is treated separately. Here the two areas of study come together as the Nazis racial policies are intimately entwined with their policies of forced labour migration. Before the Nazis, studies on migration were completely separate – afterwards, migration studies concentrated on the success or failure of the guestworker system, and on the success or failure of integration. Racism became a taboo concept associated exclusively with the Nazis, inconceivable and unusable in post-Nazi Germany. Instead, when speaking of the negative treatment of migrants, the term

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5 In the introduction to this work, Noiriel, historian of migration describes his personal journey towards an understanding of the link between migration and racism.

6 Though of course those living in the country in which they have been born, who have not experienced migration themselves, should not be called migrants.

7 Given the breadth and depth of this literature, I won’t deal with it here.
‘Ausländerfeindlichkeit’ literally Xenophobia, is preferred even when the phenomenon being described, such as the attacks on the hostels in Rostock-Lichtenhagen or Hoyerswerda, defied such trivialisation. At the moment there are very few German scholars who are prepared to study migration in relation to racism understood as a contemporary phenomenon, rather than as a historical one (Räthzel 1990, Thränhardt 199?, Demirovic & Bojadžijev 2002), and the subject remains a sensitive one.

I have left Britain until last in this section, because although the analysis presented so far holds true here, there is some literature that does cross the field boundaries, especially work on the politics of immigration (Miles 1989 & 1993, Panayi 1996 & 1999, Schuster & Solomos 2005). However, the fields of migration and racism in the UK have been sometimes very close, at other times quite separate, and I believe that more recently, we are seeing a rapprochement once more.

As in the US, scholars of ‘race’ and racism tend to concentrate on Britain’s large and established ethnic minorities – Black-British and British-Asian (especially the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities). However, unlike the US, Britain’s Black and Asian populations before WWII were relatively small. It only after Britain actively began to recruit migrant labour from the colonies that these communities began to grow. The situation in Britain was similar to that of France, in that those migrants who came, came with British passports, so that while the individuals might suffer racism, they could not be refused entry, could not be deported, but as in France, this colonial immigration of racialised subjects tended to raise concerns about the entry of ‘inferior others’ into the body of the nation.

In the post-war years, a cadre of scholars grew up concerned with the racism suffered by Britain’s non-white population, the children of those who had come in the 50s, and the grandchildren (refs). The link between racism and migration was clear in particular when one looked at the changes to citizenship laws and migration laws, both of which were designed to exclude black and Brown migrants without mentioning ‘race’ or colour. Dummet and Nicol’s classic study *Subject, Citizen, Alien* (1990) carefully deconstructed the manner in which historically and legally the British State constructed itself and its citizenry in a racialised manner, while others have done the same from different perspectives (policy studies, political science, sociology etc).
In the UK, migration really took off as a separate field in the 1990s, as asylum in particular became a focus of academic attention not least as a response to the intense attention it received in public and political discourse. Those of us working on the new arrivals tended to focus on asylum seekers (Bloch 2002, Schuster 2003) or undocumented workers (Anderson 1999, Jordan & Düvell 2002). And for a period very few treated racism as a central issue. However, over time the logic of what we were seeing persuaded some of us at least that we needed look again at our methodology – that racism was too significant a factor to be ignored, or treated as an aside or an add-on.

So to sum up this section, for those studying these phenomena, there are important distinctions between the approaches taken towards the study of migration and racism in different parts of the world. The primary victims of racism in the US were not only citizens, they were born in the US – they were not migrants. In France and Britain, they were both citizens (up to the changes in the citizenship laws) and migrants, whereas in other European states those who came were ‘just’ migrants and frequently remained migrants through generations – without citizenship and increasingly without papers (Germany, Italy, etc.). Nonetheless, scholars from and of different regions are increasingly obliged to include racialisation and racism as factors shaping the migration experience and migration policy. This will be examined in more detail in next section.

**Different approaches to migration.**

The literature on migration can be sliced any number of ways and the analysis that follows is certainly not exhaustive, but captures I hope some of the main strands of migration scholarship, and the ways in which racism and racialisation are always implicated, regardless of which approach one takes. This is inevitable given the extent to which the racialisation of national populations and migrant populations shapes the experience of migrants at each stage of the migration process. For those contemplating the decision to move, the entry, residence and migrant labour policies of receiving countries may influence where they can apply, whether or not they are forced to use facilitators, and the ease or difficulty with which they eventually settle and find work, move on to other destinations or return home.
Economic/Labour Migration

Much early literature on migration focussed on labour migration, especially that from an historical perspective (Bade 1986, Noiriel 1984, 1988, 2007). Although the 19th – early 20th century migrations to Germany and France respectively were inter-European, both Bade and Noiriel have noted that the dominant academic and public discourse at the time was heavily inflected by racialised arguments. These historical accounts chronicle the steady employment of the concept of threat to the indigenous worker. Journalists and scholars warned of the ‘threat that immigration posed to the French race’ (Pluyette 1930, cited in Noiriel 2007: 332), a threat that was simultaneously to the body and psyche of the race/nation. Noiriel further notes that the growth of the mass press relied on and reinforced a firm line between ‘them’ and ‘us’, using not just stories of criminality and disease, but also ridiculing dangerous and child-like savages specially in relation to Black and Arab colonial subjects resident in France (Noiriel 2007: 162). For historians then the links between nation, citizenship, migration and racism are clear.

Economists on the other hand, focused on migration in terms of economic costs and benefits either to the receiving society (Borjas 1995), or as the basis of a rational calculation informing the decision whether or not to migrate (Borjas 1987). Others analysed migration as the creation of a reserve army of labour designed to depress wages (Cohen 1987). As migration studies developed, much of the scholarly work took one of these approaches. As mentioned earlier, however, this emphasis on individuals as calculating units of labour, or on migrants as tool of the bourgeois state tended to overlook racism as a factor influencing any stage of the migration process.

Two of the most thoughtful, theoretically sophisticated and empirically grounded scholars of migration and racism, Castles and Miles, are located within the latter approach, and each has engaged critically with the work of the other over time. In *Racism after ‘race relations’* (1993) a critique of Britain’s race relations paradigm, Miles notes that ‘when British academics began to take an interest in [...] domestic developments [ie racist attacks on British subjects of Caribbean origin], they drew on concepts, theories and strategies derived from the

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8 It was still usual at this time to use the words ‘race’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably – see for example Bérillon, ‘the flesh of the German is not that of a Frenchman...I have described the *bromidose fétide* of the German race, that nauseous *sui-generis* smell that that imposes itself on one’s olfactory system when one is in contact with the Germans’ (cited in Noiriel 2007:333). Noiriel in particular has tracked the manner in which the mass press of the time presented the foreigner as the enemy within, a theme common in Britain too (Porter 1979), largely because of political conflicts.
United States and South Africa’ (1993: 35). Miles noted that Castles & Kosack (1973) in their seminal study *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure* – rightly in his view - rejected the US and SA frameworks arguing instead that the British experience of post 1945 migration should be analysed in the context of capitalist reconstruction across Europe. However, operating within a conventional Marxist analysis, Castles & Kosack (see also Castles 2000) argued that the social position of migrants in the ‘under-class’ was due to the workings of the class system and the demands of the capitalist system, rather that race, since only a minority (2 or 8 million migrants) could be considered ‘racially distinct’. Miles problematises both their dismissal of race as an explanatory factor in the social position of migrants, and in their unproblematic, undefined and untheorized use of ‘race’ as a concept.

Sivanandan, of the Institute of Race Relations has built on the study by Castles & Kosack, but insists that race is as significant as class for analysis, including analysis of the migration labour system, which he argues ‘prevents the horizontal conflict of classes through the vertical integration of race – and, in the process, exploits both race and class at once’ (1982: 104, cited in Miles 1993: 37). Miles, while welcoming Sivanandan’s extra dimension, once again critiques his acceptance of the category of ‘race’…. (see his early work).

*Living with Difference*

In later work with Davidson, Castles does analyse racism as a factor in the formation of ethnic minorities arguing that such minorities may be self-defined, but are also often other-defined, ie communities of people grow up because racism and discrimination force them into close proximity and dependence on each other (Castles 2000), a position shared with Solomos (1989) and Gilroy (1987). Cohen has noted the impact racists have had on the settlement (or not) of particular groups in certain countries (1997: 109). However, there remains a lacuna in studies focused on integration, where those writing on integration and minorities still tend to focus on the failure of migrants and their children to integrate, on parallel communities and a lack of cohesion, on fundamentalism and a youth that does not fit within the ‘host’, or its ‘own’ society, rather than on the racism faced by these groups. Certainly, some of those writing on migrants and migration have discussed the discrimination experienced by migrant groups, but in a curiously ‘deracialized’ manner (e.g. Soysal 1994, 2000).
Increasingly, however, migration scholars are noting societal shifts and changes, so that in the UK for example, traditional targets of racism such as Black and Asian British people are now joined by East Europeans, Roma and Asylum-seekers, and themselves engage in racist discourses targeted at the newcomers. Vertovec has also flagged up ‘emergent forms of racism…among newcomers themselves and directed against British ethnic minorities’ (2006). That the roots of alienation, inequality and marginalisation are located in the racism of the receiving society and its state institutions is still under-researched and overlooked.

The Politics of Immigration

The politics of immigration, in terms of the role of racist politics and mainstream politics, is perhaps the field in which the link between the two phenomena is most clearly developed. Much of this work looks at the extent to which the migration agenda is shaped by the far right, by racists and racism, and by the exigencies of electoral politics. Less often, scholars explore the extent to which the state shapes racist agendas through its migration policies.

As noted earlier, the history of migration to Europe and the US is one marked by racialisation as over time different groups have been excluded on the basis of ‘race’, ethnicity or nationality. The exclusion of Chinese and other Asian migrants from the US and Australia has been well-documented. Less well known is the extent to which various modern states have excluded Jews, although historians such as Kushner and Goldberg have chronicled in particular the exclusion of Jewish refugees in the 1930s (Kushner & Knox 1999, Kushner 2006). Schönwälder has detailed the manner in which the German state ‘systematically excluded potential migrants of Asian and African migrants’ from the 1950s to 1970s (2004: 248), including putting pressure on the Portuguese government not to send candidates for employment who were ‘of African or Indian skin colour’ (2004: 250). While it may be assumed that such crass racist discrimination is no longer a feature of the migration policies of European states in the 21st century, in 2001 the British government was found to be admitting ‘white’ Czechs but refusing entry to ‘Roma’ Czechs (Kushner 2006, p.188).

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9 Although there seems to have been differences between the Ministry of the Interior, who wished to exclude darker people, and the Foreign Office who protested at this unconstitutional behaviour (Schönwälder 2004: 251).
Guiraudon suggests cautiously that ‘politicians are aware that a not negligible proportion of their electorate are hostile or neutral towards the rights of foreigners’ (2000:158). Right across Europe, this has proved a challenge to parties of the left and the right. For the right, espousing racist positions risks legitimating the far right, such that the electorate may prefer to vote for the ‘original’, rather than an opportunistic copy, while the left is torn between universal principles and a ‘natural’

Favell & Hansen have argued for a return to Borjas’ neo-liberal and Castles’ labour market based approaches, arguing that commentators on ‘Fortress Europe’s’ migration policies have missed the point, that racism is not a factor (2002) driving policy in Europe. The narrowness of this approach is revealed by recent work by Anderson et al, who note ways in which ‘nationality’ is used as a code for race (2006: 767) among employers in different sectors of the labour market, although their research also uncovered explicit references to skin colour as a factor in choosing employees.

Forced Migration

Forced migration or refugee studies as it is sometimes known really only took off as a sub-field of migration in the 1990s as the total of persons of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees rose to 20 million (it has since dropped to approximately 9 million in the last five years). These studies tended to focus on the causes of flight (conflict, human rights abuses, authoritarian regimes etc), the 3 preferred solutions to refugee flows (repatriation, resettlement, local integration), on refugee regimes and more recently on the experiences of particular groups of refugees or asylum seekers in reception states. Although racism may often be a factor impelling individuals and groups to flee, it is rarely the focus of scholars’ attention, and rarely considered when discussing local integration, resettlement or repatriation. It does become a factor, though only to a limited extent when considering particular refugees regimes, but again only in very special cases, and often only historically. British and French historians (Porter 1979, Noiriel 1991), in spite of Tony Kushner’s criticisms, though largely as a result of his own work (1999, 2006) have done a great deal to unpack the interplay between racism and government refugee policy. A special issue of the

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10 Guiraudon uses ‘foreigner’ as a synonym for ‘migrant’, but notes that hostility is directed not at the most numerous (Portuguese) or ‘geographically distant’ (Asians) foreigners [present in France], but towards North Africans, and in particular Algerians, that nationals of France’s former colonies, ie very often French citizens.
journal *Patterns of Prejudice* (2003, 37:3) brought together a number of articles exploring the links between racism and asylum in Britain (Kushner, Macklin, Back), Ireland (Lentin) and France (Lloyd), and across Europe more generally (Schuster).

What has become apparent, as I argued in that article, the hostility now directed against asylum-seekers is part of the process of racialisation. ‘Asylum-seekers’ are a group of people singled out by the state as legitimate targets for hostility. They have been constructed, not solely as a legal category—those awaiting a decision on their entirely lawful application for recognition as a refugee—but as something more. ‘Asylum-seeker’ is now a term that is used unambiguously, and immediately conjures up cheat, liar, criminal, sponger—someone deserving of hostility by virtue not of any misdemeanour, but simply because he or she is an ‘asylum-seeker’—a figure that has by now become a caricature, a stereotype, in the way that ‘Blacks’, ‘Jews’ and ‘Gypsies’ have been and still are (Schuster, 2003: 244).

**Migration and Racism in Europe Today**

Leaving the more academic reflections to one side, let us turn to the substance of those migration/racism studies and the manner in which migration and racism are interwoven in European societies now. Goldberg has argued that ‘race is integral to the emergence, development and transformation (conceptually, philosophically, materially) of the modern nation-state.’ He extends the claim, noting that race both marks and orders the process of state formation and the related apparatus and technology employed has ‘served to fashion, modify and reify the terms of racial expression as well as racist exclusions and subjugations’ (1993, p.234). For many of us, especially of us who consider ourselves [l]iberal Europeans, children of the Enlightenment, adherents of Universal values and norms, such a claim can and does provoke resistance, it doesn’t mesh with our self image as citizens of modern, liberal democratic European nation-states.

However, those who make a close study of the experiences of labour migrants, of migrant communities, of migration policies and their implementation are, I would contend, forced to accept Goldberg’s assertion. The scale of human mobility today

11 Although it is considerable, it is important to remember, however, that migration is still a minority activity – in which less than 2% of the global population engage (UN reference?)
(and other) citizens draw around themselves all attest to the significance of racism, racialisation and the idea of ‘race’. To return to the beginning, the treatment meted out to ‘migrants’, especially to those deemed undesirable, can only be legitimated by dehumanising them, by accepting that some people are less worthy of having their rights and dignity respected than others. The evidence of this dehumanisation can be seen in the bureaucratic decisions to, for example, withdraw support from families of asylum seekers in the UK so as to pressurize them to return ‘home’, or to detain indefinitely men, women and children of all ages – without having to make the case before a judge. In Germany, internal mobility controls (residenz pflicht) are imposed only on asylum seekers. In France and Italy, potential asylum seekers find it difficult make a claim. Greece and Italy have both expelled arrivals peremptorily without allowing them to make claims. Spanish and Moroccan police have been involved in the shooting dead of 12 young men attempting to enter the Spanish-Moroccan enclave of Ceuta. And for three days in the summer of 2007, 27 Africans clung to a tuna net in the Mediterranean, because Malta refused to accept them – they were eventually rescued by the Italian navy.

But less emotively – if we take as an example the experiences of the most recent cohort of arrivals into Britain – the East Europeans, especially Poles, it becomes more difficult to resist the explanatory power of ‘race’ and racism in relation to the entry and integration of migrants. Far smaller numbers of Asian and Black migrants have occasioned much fiercer resistance than the estimated 450,000 white, Christian, European migrants who have arrived in the last 3-4 years. While the latter have undoubtedly suffered some hostility and resentment due to increased competition for work, in particular in construction, this has been balanced by the welcome afforded workers constructed as pleasant, polite and hard-working. This is in stark contrast to the political and public reaction to asylum seekers outlined above (14-15), a group of people to whom a universal commitment has been given.

There is an important issue that needs consideration, and that is the attack on Universalism that is coming from liberals and the left (Dench et al 2006, Goodhart). This is manifested, unsurprisingly, differently in different contexts but there are 2 main strands to it, though they are intimately linked. Perhaps most important is the assumption that there is a threshold of tolerance, beyond which ‘the majority population [may become] intolerant about existing immigrants’ (Favell 2001: 112). This is related to a second, equally pernicious assumption, which is that the majority populations are ‘victims’ of a liberal elite that protects the interests
of minorities or migrants, at the expense of its own electorate. Such concerns often revolve around the welfare state, in particular in north European states.

The attack on Universalism gathered strength in the 1990s across Europe and in Australia and crystallized around the response to increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers. While the ‘political Right throughout the world has always and continues to milk the issue of immigration’ (Phizacklea 2003), increasingly the Left are accepting the agenda of control and retreating from principles such as internationalism and solidarity. The attack on the commitment to offer refuge to all those in need was justified through use of ‘pragmatic’ arguments about the material and psychological resources of receiving populations which obviated the need to articulate more explicit racist concerns about the impact on particular national identities, cultures and values (Schuster 2003b). This strategy could be found across the political spectrum. The colour, ethnicity, nationality or race of migrants did not have to be alluded to, since the core of these arguments was that there were simply too many in need and it would not be possible to help ‘everyone’, and that therefore choices would have to be made and universal commitments such as the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees would have to be qualified. The case for limiting the numbers was deceptively strong because ‘genuine’ refugees and asylum seekers were constructed as helpless victims, reduced only to their needs, which seemed limitless, rather than seen as potential contributors to the receiving societies. In this case, even an absolute requirement for protection would not guarantee admittance for migrants in desperate straits even from liberal democratic states. This curtailment of an absolute imperative to grant asylum to those needing it was espoused even by governments of the centre left.

Moving from the international to the national level, and from forced to migrants more generally, the left’s traditional prioritizing of need over belonging has also been challenged here. In Britain, for example, as in the study of London’s East End cited above by Dench et al (2006), it has been argued that a Labour government that housed those in priority need favoured large Bangladeshi families over smaller ‘local’ families leading to resentment and feeding racism. In this case, the authors failed to challenge the sincerely held, but ill-informed views of the white population, accepting instead that rights and claims arising out of an earlier, more directly exchange-based welfare state ethic should trump need. In this case, the rights and claims are based on historical sacrifices, especially from the Second World War and the Blitz that destroyed much of the East End. There is no acknowledgement of the
sacrifices made by the parents and grandparents of the British Bangladeshis during the same conflict. Instead, the migrants are constructed as different, not ‘part of us’, not party to the exchange-based welfare state, although most will be contributing to it directly and indirectly through labour and taxes. Though they may be British, their colour means they continue to be constructed as migrants rather than British.

The Study of Migration and Racism Tomorrow

So where do we go from here? And in particular what is the responsibility of sociologists and other researchers in the light of continuing migration, and continuing racism directed at migrants? Related to the last point, there is an imperative to keep things in perspective. Just as those cited above are panicked into siding with the ‘majority’ – especially in Britain, in Europe there has been a worrying trend to engage in extreme rhetoric, taking very real and worrying developments, some of which have been referred to above, and make untenable comparisons with the Holocaust and Nazi extermination camps. Giorgio Agemben’s Homo Sacer has become a sacred text, cited widely by academics and activists alike, and has spawned a number of theoretical and abstract articles using the ‘figure’ of the migrant to comment on the State today. Some of this work is valuable and interesting, but much of it borders on the hysterical and is terminally undermined by a lack of understanding of the legal and material realities of migration and the search for refuge12. Between the – admittedly far too numerous – individuals who are subject to individual and structural racism and human rights abuses, and the much smaller - highly mobile, highly successful - transnational elite are many hundreds of thousands of people who move from country to country, more or less successfully, negotiating relationships with state officials, employers, fellow workers and neighbours. There is an urgent need for sobriety, based on the accurate and irresistible gathering of empirical data (especially comparative data), which can illuminate the very real potential and actual dangers associated with government policy and its implementation, and the extent to which they shape and impact on the lives of migrants.

At the other end of the spectrum are those studies financed directly or indirectly by governments that are determinedly policy-relevant and concentrate almost exclusively on the

12 As a referee for a number of migration related journals, I see two or three such articles annually and find the number of empirical errors enraging.
gathering of empirical data (see Castles 2007 on this issue). In the desperate search for funding and resources, researchers are quick to compete for government research grants, themselves offered in the desperate search for a short-term policy solution (ie one that coincides with the electoral cycle). As Castles has pointed out, this makes for bad science ‘Ministers and bureaucrats still often see migration as something that can be turned on and off like a tap through laws and polices. By imposing this paradigm on researchers, the policy-makers have done both social scientists and themselves a disservice’ (2003, 363). A further difficulty with such studies are again the set of assumptions that underpin the research – that it is possible to have non-racist migration controls, that the interests of national states are justifiably privileged and that governments are not responsible for the deaths of unknown migrants who seek to evade those controls.

Conclusion

It has not my intention in this chapter to suggest that every migrant suffers as a result of prejudice, discrimination or racism. Many migrants, well-off, well-educated, well-travelled professionals, but also semi-skilled and unskilled migrants, successfully negotiate the bureaucracies, find work, learn the language, make friends, settle, marry and found families. And perhaps these are the majority though it’s hard to tell. Certainly, many find themselves enjoying, and are grateful for the indifference, if not the welcome, of receiving societies.

Migration as a phenomenon is hugely diverse, and consequently a rich field of research. In this chapter, I have tried to indicate that whatever perspective one takes, one cannot adequately consider migration without examining the role that race, racialisation and racism play in shaping the process, whether from the perspective of the individual making the journey or the structures that shape that journey at every stage. Migrants suffer hostility that is sometimes verbalised and sometimes physically manifested, but in European states is more often tacit, but still damaging. This is not only a problem for those who experience racism directly, but is also a problem for receiving societies. Unless racism and discrimination of every kind is addressed, contested and combated, they will remain a poison within receiving societies, shaping both individual perceptions and interactions, and the institutions that underpin society. Equality, like justice, cannot be graded or diluted. Racism damages all: racists, its victims and bystanders.
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