
This is the unspecified version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.

Permanent repository link: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/2890/

Link to published version:

Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Estimating Event Lifetimes for Distributed Runtime Verification

Christos Kloukinas, George Spanoudakis, Khaled Mahbub
Department of Computing, The City University, London, EC1V 0HB, UK
{C.Kloukinas, G.Spanoudakis, K.Mahbub}@soi.city.ac.uk

Abstract
Runtime system verification has been proposed as a form of dynamic verification of software systems which can be applied in settings where complete static verification or exhaustive system testing is not practical. Runtime verification checks properties against runtime events generated during the operation of a system. Current approaches to runtime verification assume that runtime events are time-stamped by a single clock and, thus, can be totally ordered. They also assume that events are received by the reasoning engine in the same order as they have been produced. These assumptions are apparently true only in systems with a single clock. In this paper, we present the extension of a framework for runtime verification which can monitor distributed systems, in which events are produced by different components, each having its own clock.

1. INTRODUCTION
Runtime (or dynamic) system verification has been proposed as a complementary approach to static system verification and testing, which can enhance confidence in the correctness of system operations by monitoring and identifying violations of required system properties during the normal system operation [3][6][10]. Runtime verification is needed due to the inability to guarantee the completeness of system models that have been used for static analysis and the preservation of these models by system implementations. It is also useful as it is difficult to foresee all the different circumstances that may arise during the operation of a system and therefore guarantee that the assumptions, under which its correctness can be statically proved, hold at runtime.

Typically, platforms for runtime verification (e.g. [6][9][11][20]) provide support for specifying formally the properties of a system that should be verified at runtime, identifying the events that should be available in order to assess if certain properties are satisfied, capturing these events at runtime, and checking for violations of the required properties.

The main limitation of existing runtime verification platforms is that they assume that the systems to be monitored consist of components running on a single machine. In such cases, the events of the system that is being monitored are: (i) time stamped by a single clock, (ii) totally ordered, and (iii) received by the monitor in the same order as they are generated by the system that is being monitored.

Whilst valid in the case of centralised systems, these assumptions do not necessarily hold in cases of distributed systems with components running on different platforms. In such systems, runtime events may come from distributed components operating with different time clocks. Furthermore, distributed system components may have different types of connections with the monitor and, therefore, generate events which arrive at the monitor with different communication delays and possibly in an order that is not the same as the order of their generation.

Thus, in order to check properties involving events from distributed components, a monitor would have to overcome two problems: (i) to synchronise the clocks of the various event sources, so that the timestamps of the different events can be ordered and compared to each other, and (ii) to establish until when a particular event needs to be stored, so that it can reason about the system properties in a sound way or, equivalently, to compute the required monitoring lifetime of each event.

Consider, for instance, the case of monitoring the availability of the communication channel between two components C1 and C2 of a system by ensuring that the dispatch of a request R from C1 (Event-1) will always be followed by the receipt of R by C2 (Event-2) within a specific time period. In this case, Event-2 may arrive at the monitor before Event-1 due to different communication delays in the relevant channels. Thus, when the monitor receives Event-2 it will have to decide for how long it should wait for Event-1 and wait for this event before dropping Event-2 or otherwise it may report a false violation of the availability of the communication channel between C1 and C2. This would happen in cases where, after dropping Event-2, the monitor receives an Event-1 corresponding to it.

In this paper, we present an extension of a dynamic verification framework described in [20] which addresses these problems. The original framework monitors systems against properties expressed in Event Calculus (EC) [19] and was initially developed to support monitoring based on events which are generated by a single source. The extension of the framework that we present in this paper enables it to monitor systems in which events are generated by distributed sources having different clocks and communication channels to the monitor.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of our monitoring framework and the language that it uses to specify monitoring properties. In Section 3, we propose a solution for
computing the lifetime of events that the framework
receives from distributed sources and show how these
lifetimes are used during monitoring. In Section 4, we
give an overview of related work and, finally, in Section 5
we summarise our work and outline directions for further
research.

2. MONITORING FRAMEWORK

2.1. Overview

As shown in Figure 1, the dynamic verification
framework that we have extended consists of a monitoring
manager, a monitor, a Network Time Protocol (NTP)
server, and communicates with different event collectors
attached to the components of the system that is being
monitored.

The monitoring manager has responsibility for
initiating, coordinating and reporting the results of the
monitoring process. Once it receives a request for
monitoring a specific set of properties, the manager
checks whether it is possible to monitor them and, if it is,
it sends the properties to be checked to the monitor, and
starts listening to events which are generated by different
types of external event collectors. These events are
received via TCP/IP sockets and sent to the monitor.

After receiving events from the manager, the monitor
checks whether they violate any of the properties given to
it. The monitor is a generic engine for checking violations
of EC formulas against a given set of runtime events.
During monitoring, it also takes into account information
about the state of a system that it derives from runtime
events using a special type of EC formulas called
assumptions (see Section 2.2). When a violation of a
property is detected, the monitor records it in a deviation
database which is polled regularly by the monitoring
manager to retrieve detected deviations.

2.2. Specification of Properties

As indicated in Section 1, in our runtime monitoring
framework the properties to be monitored are expressed in
a language based on Event Calculus (EC) [19]. EC is a
first-order temporal logic language which can be used for
representing and reasoning about events and their effects
over time. An event in EC is an occurrence that takes
place at a specific instance of time (e.g., invocation of a
system operation, receipt or dispatch of a message) and
may have an effect. The effects of events are represented
by fluents. Fluents are conditions which may change over
time (e.g. a condition indicating that a system has received
a message) and are initiated and/or terminated by events.

The occurrence of an event in EC is represented by the
predicate Happens(e, t, lb, ub). This predicate denotes that
an instantaneous event e occurs at some time t within
the time range lb, ub (i.e., lb ≤ t ≤ ub). The boundaries
lb and ub that define time ranges are specified as linear
expressions over time variables of Happens predicates in
an EC formula of the form:

\[
\begin{align*}
lb &= l_0 + l_1 t_1 + l_2 t_2 + \ldots + l_n t_n \\
ub &= u_0 + u_1 t_1 + u_2 t_2 + \ldots + u_n t_n
\end{align*}
\]

Given our focus on runtime system monitoring, the
events we consider represent invocations of system
operations, responses from such operations, or exchanges
of messages between different system components. Thus,
events have the following structure which captures the
information required for monitoring such system
interactions without affecting the overall expressiveness of
the framework with respect to standard EC:

\[
event(_id, _sender, _receiver, _status, _sig, _source)
\]
In this structure:

- `_id` is a unique identifier of the event
- `_sender` is the identifier of the system component that sends the message represented by the event
- `_receiver` is the identifier of the system component that receives the message represented by the event
- `_status` is the processing status of an event (i.e. whether or not its processing has started when the monitor receives it)
- `_sig` is the signature of the dispatched message or the operation invocation/response represented by the event, comprising the operation name and its arguments/result.
- `_source` is the identifier of the component where the event was captured.

Fluents are defined as relations between objects of the form `rel(O_1, ..., O_n)` where `rel` is the name of a relation which associates the `n` objects `O_1, ..., O_n`. The initiation or termination of a fluent `f` due to the occurrence of an event `e` at time `t` is denoted in EC by the predicates `Initiates(e,f,t)` and `Terminates(e,f,t)`, respectively. An EC formula may also use the predicates `Initially(f)` and `HoldsAt(f,t)` to denote that a fluent `f` holds at the start of the execution of a system and at time `t`, respectively.

The rules to be monitored at runtime are specified in terms of the above predicates and have the general form

\[ body \Rightarrow \text{head.} \]

The meaning of a rule is that if its body evaluates to true, its head must also evaluate to true. The `Happens` predicates in a rule which have no constraints for their lower and upper time boundaries are what we call “unconstrained” predicates. During the monitoring process, rules are activated by events that can be unified with the unconstrained `Happens` predicates in them. When this unification is possible, the monitor generates a rule instance to represent the partially unified rule and keeps this instance active until all the other predicates in it have been successfully unified with events and fluents of appropriate types or it is deduced that no further unifications are possible. In the latter case, the rule instance is deleted. When a rule instance is fully unified, the monitor checks if the particular instantiation that it expresses is satisfied.

An example of a rule that can be expressed in the EC language of our framework is given by the formula below:

**Rule 1:**

\[
\forall _e\text{id}1, _C1, _C3:\text{String}; t1:\text{Time} \\
\text{Happens}(e(_e\text{id}1, _C3, _C1, REQ, authorise(), _C3), t1, \text{\texttt{R}(t1,t1)}) \Rightarrow \exists _e\text{id}2:\text{String}; t2:\text{Time} \\
\text{Happens}(e(_e\text{id}2, _C3, _C1, REQ, authorise(), _C1), t2, \text{\texttt{R}(t1+1,t1+10)})
\]

This rule states that when an event \(e(_e\text{id}1, _C3, _C1, REQ, authorise(), _C3), t1, \text{\texttt{R}(t1,t1)})\) representing a call of the operation `authorise()` in a component \(_C1\) by a component \(_C3\) is dispatched, it must be followed by an event \(e(_e\text{id}2, _C3, _C1, RES, authorise(), _C1)\) representing the receipt of the call by \(_C1\) in no more than 10 time units after the dispatch of call. Thus, **Rule 1** expresses a bounded availability property for the communication channel between the component \(_C3\) and other components of the system \(_C1\) since it requires that the requests generated by \(_C3\) are transmitted within a bounded time period.

The unconstrained predicate in this rule is the predicate `Happens(e_{_C3}, t1, \text{\texttt{R}(t1,t1)})\)\(^1\), since the lower and upper bounds of its time variable are defined without any references to other time variables in the rule. Thus, at runtime, new instances of **Rule 1** will be generated as soon as an event that can be unified with this predicate is received. Each of these rule instances will remain alive until it is fully unified or until no further unification of an event representing the receipt of a response of the call dispatched by \(_C3\) in the rule instance is possible.

Note that, as in the above example, our framework requires all the constrained predicates in a rule to have time variables with constrained upper bounds. This is to ensure that rules can be verified. For example, if the `Happens` predicate for \(e_{_C1}\) in the head of **Rule 1** did not have an upper bound, then its absence would never cause the monitor to flag the rule as violated, since the monitor would always wait for some \(e_{_C1}\) event at some point in the future.

### 3. Computing Lifetime of Events

As we discussed in Section 1, the problem that arises with the use of events which are generated by distributed sources is two-fold: firstly we need to synchronise the clocks of the different event sources so that the timestamps of the events that they generate can be comparable to each other and secondly we need to know until when we need to store a particular event in order to be able to reason about the system state and check rules.

The clock synchronisation that is performed through the use of the Network Time Protocol (NTP) by our framework solves the first problem but not the second.

To appreciate the second problem, consider **Rule 1**, assuming without loss of generality that \(_C3\) and \(_C1\) denote both the source of the event and the clock of the source component where the event was captured. As the occurrence of events of type \(e_{_C1}\) in **Rule 1** is unconstrained, events of this type can instantiate the rule during monitoring. Unlike them, events of type \(e_{_C1}\) are temporally constrained by \(e_{_C1}\) events in the rule and cannot, therefore, create new instances of the rule; they can only be unified with existing rule instances.

---

\(^1\) \(e_{_C1}\) is an abbreviated reference to the event \(e(_e\text{id}1, _C3, _C1, REQ, authorise(), _C3)\), in which the subscript denotes to the event ID and the superscript to the event source. Such abbreviated references are used in the rest of the paper in all cases where other event variables are not important.
Thus, if the monitor receives an event of type $e_2^{C_1}$, in addition to unifying it with all the current instances of Rule 1, it must keep it until there is no possibility to receive an $e_1^{C_1}$ event that could be correlated with $e_2^{C_1}$ through Rule 1. This is necessary since if $e_2^{C_1}$ is dropped and later the monitor receives an $e_1^{C_1}$ event with an earlier timestamp than $e_2^{C_1}$, it would report a false violation of Rule 1. The possibility of $e_1^{C_3}$ and $e_2^{C_1}$ events arriving at the monitor in the opposite order of their occurrence arises due to different (and dynamically changing) communication delays in the channels that connect $C_1$ and $C_3$ with the monitor or even attacks in these channels that can cause the loss of events. Whilst keeping events of type $e_2^{C_1}$ in this case is necessary for the soundness of the monitoring results, the monitor must also ensure that it keeps these events only for the maximum time that is necessary for the soundness of the results. This is because if the monitor keeps them longer the size of its event store will increase monotonically with a deteriorating effect on both the space and time required for monitoring. The maximum time point until when events $e_2^{C_1}$ would need to be kept by the monitor, in this example, can be established by finding the maximum value of the time variable $t_1$ of $e_1^{C_3}$ events that satisfies the constraints: (1) $t_1 \leq t_2-1$ and (2) $t_2 \leq t_1+10$.

In general, for a rule with $n+1$ Happens predicates, there will be $2n+1$ such inequalities to solve. This is because one of the rule predicates is unconstrained (the one firing the rule), the remaining Happens predicates contribute two inequalities each, and we need an extra equality to establish the exact value for the time variable of the event in question ($t_2$ in our previous example with the $e_2^{C_1}$ events). Figure 2 shows the algorithm for computing the lifetimes of an event. According to this algorithm, when an event $e$ occurs, the set $R(e)$ of rules which have predicates that can be unified with the event $e$ is determined (this set includes rules that have event types which are the same as the type of $e$ or supertypes of it). The set $R(e)$ will include rules that may specify time constraints for the event that cannot be fully evaluated yet. Subsequently, the constraints of each rule in $R(e)$ are identified and expanded with an equality expressing that the time variable of the predicate of the rule that has been unified with $e$ is equal to the timestamp of $e$ (step 2.a). Given the time constraint set that results from this process, the algorithm computes the maximum possible value for each of the time variables of the rule using the Simplex method [8] (step 2.b.i). Subsequently, it groups the different time variables according to the clock of the event source they are related to (step 3), and generates a set of all the conditions $(\text{Lifetime}(e))$ for computing the upper bound of the lifetime of $e$ (step 4). A condition in $\text{Lifetime}(e)$ states that $e$ won’t be needed after the last event that is seen from a channel which is relevant to $e$ has a timestamp $(\text{last_observed}(c))$ that is greater than the maximum possible value of the time variables grouped in this channel’s group (see condition $\text{last_observed}(c) \geq \max_{i, j} (\text{max}(l_i))$). The reason for using the timestamp of the last event that has been observed from a clock in the evaluation of the $\text{Lifetime}(e)$ conditions is because events are communicated to the monitor through TCP/IP sockets which guarantee a FIFO transmission within the same component (clock)-monitor channel. The conditions in $\text{Lifetime}(e)$ determine the lifetime of $e$ since when their conjunction becomes true, the lifetime of $e$ will expire.

**Figure 2: Computing the lifetime of an event – I**

In our previous example, if Rule 1 is the only rule that is being monitored and an event of type $e_2^{C_1}$ is observed at $t_2=10$, step 1 will produce the set $R(e_2^{C_1}) = \{\text{Rule-1}\}$, step 2.a will produce $CN = \{t_1 \leq t_2-1, t_2 \leq t_1+10, t_2 = 10\}$, step 2.b.i will produce the solutions $\text{max}(t_1)=9$ and $\text{max}(t_2)=10$ by finding the maximum value of $t_1$ for which the constraints in $CN$ are satisfied, and step 3 will produce two groups of time variables $\{t_1\}$ and $\{t_2\}$, for the two clocks $C_1$ and $C_3$, respectively. Finally, in step 4, the lifetime constraint set for $e_2^{C_1}$ will be established as: $\text{Lifetime}(e_2^{C_1}) = \{(\text{last_observed}(C_1) > 10), (\text{last_observed}(C_3) > 9)\}$.

It should be noted that our algorithm uses the Simplex method, which has exponential complexity $O(2^n)$ (for a problem with $n$ variables [8]), to find the maximum time of a time variable in step 2.b.i., although there are algorithms with polynomial complexity (the worst case complexity of Karmarkar’s algorithm [1], for example, is $O(n^{3.5})$). This is because for small numbers of variables, as the ones normally appearing in monitoring rules ($n \leq 10$), Simplex has better performance. Furthermore, the algorithm of Figure 2 computes the maximum value of a time variable for each rule separately, rather than combining them into a single larger problem. This is because the individual rule problems can be solved independently and a larger set of rules would take more time to solve due to the additional time variables (in general $2^n + 2^m < 2^{n+m}$ for $n,m \geq 2$). Due to this approach, once the individual rule systems have been solved, the different time variables that are associated with events...
Note that at this step, the algorithm of Figure 2 assumes that the clocks/sources of the events in the rules are fully specified when a rule is matched with an incoming event. In the example of Rule 1 this is the case, since the sender of an event \(e_2^{C1}\) (i.e. \(C3\)) is also the source of events \(e_1^{C3}\). Thus, when Rule 1 is matched with an \(e_2^{C1}\) event, the identity of \(C3\) becomes known. However, there might be cases where the exact source of events that could potentially be matched with a rule is not known after the rule is matched with arrived events. Consider, for instance, the following rule:

\[
\text{Rule 2:} \quad \forall \_eID1, \_eID2, \_U: \text{String; } \_C1, \_C3: \text{Terminal; } \_C2: \text{Component; } t1, t2: \text{Time}
\]

\[
\text{Happens}((\_eID1, \_C1, \_C2, \text{REQ}, \text{login}(\_U, \_C1)), t1) \land \text{Happens}((\_eID2, \_C3, \_C2, \text{REQ}, \text{login}(\_U, \_C3)), t2) \land \_C1 = \_C3 \Rightarrow \exists \_eID3: \text{String; } t3: \text{Time}
\]

This rule requires that if a user \(\_U\) logs in to a system \(_C2\) from a terminal \(_C1\) and later he/she logs in again from a different terminal \(_C3\), he/she must have logged out from the former terminal before the second login. The rule effectively monitors cases where users are monitored in from different terminals at the same time. When an event \(e((\_eID2, \_C3, \_C2, \text{REQ}, \text{login}(\_U, \_C3)), \_C3))\) (or \(e_2^{C1}\) in our abbreviated form) arrives at the monitor, its lifetime will need to be estimated in reference to the maximum possible values of time variables \(t1\) and \(t3\). In this case, however, the algorithm of Figure 2 does not work, since at step 3 it is not known which other terminals the user of \(e_2^{C1}\) may be using or, equivalently, which source clocks should be associated with the time variables \(t1\) and \(t3\).

\[
\text{Compute_Lifetime}(e) = \{ t | t \text{ has a predicate } p \text{ that unifies with } e \}
\]

1. \(R(e) = \{ t | t \text{ has a predicate } p \text{ that matches } e \} \)
2. For all \(r \in R(e)\) do
   a. \(CN = \{ \text{time constraints of } r \} \cup \{ \text{time variable of } p \text{ that matches } e = \text{timestamp of } e \} \)
   b. For all \(t \in CN\) do
      i. Find \(\text{max}(t)\) given \(CN\)
3. Group the time variables \(t\) into as many group types \(TG_r\) as the different types of event sources \(c_o\) in \(R(e)\)
4. For all group types \(g \in TG_r\) do
   a. For all the known sources \(j\) of type \(g\) do
      i. Create a group \(G_j\) and assign copies of the time variables of \(g\) to it
5. \(\text{Lifetime}(e) = \{ t | \text{last observed}(c_o) > \text{max}G_j(\text{max}(t)) \} \)

To deal with such cases, we use an extension of the algorithm, shown in Figure 3. The extended algorithm initially groups time variables into groups corresponding to the types of the event sources that are associated with them in the rules. Then, for each of the source type groups, it finds all the sources of the particular type that are known to the system, creates different groups for them and assigns copies of the time variables of each source type to each of the source groups that were generated from the type. Thus, if it is known that the system that is being monitored with Rule 2 has 3 terminals, the algorithm of Figure 3 will create different variable groups for each of these terminals and assign copies of the time variables \(t1\) and \(t2\) to each of these groups.

Having computed the \(\text{Lifetime}(e)\) constraint set, upon the arrival of an event \(e\) at runtime we use it to compute a vector with the maximum time values for \(e\) with respect to the different clocks related to it. For the ongoing example of Rule 1, the vector of \(e_2^{C1}\) would be \(\langle 10, 9 \rangle\). The event and its vector are then stored in the database of the monitor. Also, when a new event arrives at it, the monitor checks if the lifetime of some other events which depend on the clock of the new event has expired. The above process is shown in Figure 4.

4. RELATED WORK

Forms of dynamic verification have been developed and investigated in the context of program verification, safety critical, and service centric systems.

In program verification, research has focused on the development of programming platforms with generic monitoring capabilities, including support for generating program events at runtime (e.g. jMonitor [11]), embedding specifications of monitorable properties into programs and producing code that can verify these properties during program execution (e.g. monitoring-oriented programming [4] and [6]). There is also work focusing on runtime verification of requirements specifications [7]. However, metric time is not considered in [4], [6], [7] or [11]. Runtime monitoring methods have also been applied to autonomous safety critical systems [16], as the testing of such systems is difficult and resource consuming. In service-centric systems, dynamic verification has focused on monitoring service level agreements (SLAs) [2][20]. In safety critical systems, early monitoring methods focused on detecting timing failures and guaranteeing system responsiveness [9][15]. Though [15] supports timing constraints, it does not support distributed monitoring. The distributed
monitoring of [9] on the other hand does not support fluents or general expressions for time and does not clarify how the bound of the size of the event histories is decided. Event correlation has also been considered in [18] where event observers are produced as transducer automata recognizing and rewriting the input events. Compared to our framework, the approach in [18] does not support fluents or metric time.

The extension of the framework in [20] with the capabilities described in this paper makes it possible to verify complex properties, based on events captured from distributed sources, thus, exceeding the capabilities of other approaches.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have presented extensions of the monitoring framework described in [20] that render it applicable to multi-clock distributed systems. Our extensions address two of the problems of distributed systems monitoring: (1) the need for synchronizing the clocks of different event sources so that the events they emit can be correlated, and (2) the estimation of the lifetime of events within the monitor in order to ensure that unknown transmission delays of other events that may need to be correlated with them will not affect the monitoring process. To address the first of these problems, we have incorporated an implementation of the NTP protocol in our framework. To address the second problem, we compute the maximum lifetime of an event by identifying, the constraints between the time variable of the event and time variables of other events that coexist with it in rules and solving these constraints to find the maximum possible lifetime for the event using the Simplex method (see [12] for full details).

One possible optimisation of our solution is to statically solve all the linear constraint systems at initialisation, so as to only need to instantiate the specific values of the different timestamps associated with a new event and its related rules when the event arrives, instead of solving the corresponding linear system each time. This would require a symbolic solution of the linear constraints system instead of the more straightforward numerical solution which we currently employ. For this reason we have decided against the symbolic solution in the current implementation, and intend to examine this option once we have gained more experience with the behaviour of the current implementation in a distributed setting.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has been funded by the European integrated research project Serenity (FP6-IST-2006-27587).

7. REFERENCES


[16] Nelson, S., Pecheur, C. “V&V for advanced systems at NASA”, TASK NO: 10 TA-5.3.3 (WBS 1.4.4.5.3), prepared for Northrop Grumman Corp, 2002


