Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game

Christiansen, N., Georganas, S. & Kagel, J. H. (2013). Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game (Report No. 13/16). London, UK: Department of Economics, City University London.

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Abstract

We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold as policy proposals shift in the predicted direction with private goods, with the variance in policy outcomes increasing as well. Private goods increase total welfare even after accounting for their cost and help secure legislative compromise. Coalition formations are better characterized by an efficient equal split between coalition partners than the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Additional Information: © 2013 the authors.
Uncontrolled Keywords: legislative bargaining, policy decisions, private goods, experiment
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/2903

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