THE SECURITIZATION AND POLICING OF ART THEFT IN LONDON
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OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 introduces the thesis by giving the background to the research, analyses what is already known about art theft and the criminals involved, and then considers the gaps in our knowledge. It finishes by examining the challenge of theorizing and researching art security. The methodology follows in chapter 2, before chapter 3 analyses the co-production of risk in the security sites and situates the threat. The subsequent four chapters examine the co-production of security. Chapter 4 analyses the public police and security, and chapter 5 private sector security, investigation and loss adjustment. Chapters 6 and 7 examine insurance as enabling risk and security, and governmental nodes enabling security beyond insurance. Chapters 8 and 9 consider the future, with chapter 8 focusing on the co-production and chapter 9 presenting final conclusions.
CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMATIC OF ART THEFT

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The *Guardian* reported on 21 April 2007 that the public police were cutting back their involvement in art crime and warned of the calamitous consequences “...of organised criminals free to plunder the nation’s heritage...” However, although art continues to be stolen in London, and there is evidence of the involvement of criminals who are organised, this ‘crime-wave’ has not occurred. As a criminologist and former art transporter and installer, I wanted to investigate why it had not happened, and in doing so to examine how the securitization and policing of art theft in London is undertaken, and, crucially, by whom and why.

This thesis examines the securitization and policing of art theft in London within the broader theoretical framework of security governance in a globalized risk society characterised by opportunities and insecurities (Beck 1992, Beck 2009, Giddens 1999, Lupton 1999). The securitization and policing of art can be viewed as a four way amalgam; private security, the insurance industry, the public sector and self- policing by the art world itself. Within these areas are a large number of security nodes (defined on page 11) of differing sizes and influence. Art security in London is an example of the complicated configuration of modern security in which ‘hybridity’ (Johnston 1992) is better replaced by ‘networked’ or ‘nodal governance’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003:18). It can also be described as a co-production of preventative security. At the heart of my research is an examination of a new policing matrix and the question: who performs, manages, governs and controls the securitization and policing? In line with Wood’s (2006:230) proposed methodology, it empirically maps existing nodes and networks, assesses their operations and, lastly, proposes innovations. This has never been done before.
The main focus of this investigation is on the configuration of the security network in London and how the different security and location nodes work in practice, their relationships, the position of the public sector, the role of the insurance industry, and how this all affects the co-production of risk management strategies and security of art in the capital. Situated within the domain of environmental criminology, this thesis is primarily concerned with two main perspectives; first, nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), and, second, the influence of insurance on security governance (Baker and Simon 2002, Ericson 2007, Ericson et al 2000, Ewald 1991).

At first glance, it may appear incongruous that research empirically examining nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), especially with its lack of a locus of power, and the insurance industry should focus so much on the state. However, this is no state fetishism (Shearing 2006). It is, first, a reflection on the amount of public sector owned art in London, and, second, also an attempt to focus the lens on how the public sector can exist and work within a nodal governance framework.

London is an ideal research site because of its position as a centre of the art world and global art market, the growth of its cultural economy and the significance of its cultural institutions (considered in more detail on pages 17-19). It is also home to the largest insurance market in the world.

My main question is

• Who performs, manages, governs and controls the securitization and policing of art theft in London?

The following aims and objectives frame the research:

• To provide a map of the policing and securitization of one of the world’s largest centres of art.
• To investigate how secure permanently and temporarily situated art is in the capital and consider new threats.
• To analyse how and why the numerous policing and securitization nodes (with their wide range of resources, capabilities, motivations) function in the art security terrain.
• To research how this policing and securitization actually works within art sites with varying locations, levels of resources and security.
• To examine how criminologists’ theories on nodal governance work in an actual security arena.
• To research why the securitization of art in London is relatively successful, identify what lessons might be learned and possible new innovations, and consider whether other urban spaces or security arenas could learn from the co-production of art security in London.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
Art crime covers many areas: art theft (including looting), damage (including iconoclasm), deception (fakes, forgeries, fraud, and ransom), trafficking, and graffiti. Although these cross over in many ways, while examining art security in London, and in particular those involved in its securitization and policing, I chose to focus on art theft which, with damage, is one of the two main threats. I felt it more important to focus on one specific area to enable me to go into the type of detail required. For example, looting and the entrance of art objects into museums, galleries, churches, auction houses, dealers and private residences has some different characteristics from what this thesis is focussing on-the illegal exit of art in situ from these locations or in transit between them.

Art crime is characterised by its shades of grey and the interface between licit and illicit activities. Arguably, this is even more the case for crimes such as the trade in illicit antiquities between ‘source’
and ‘demand’ locations than for thefts of art from locations in ‘demand’ countries such as the UK. However, with art theft, this interface is also a huge issue, especially the recovery of stolen objects. The effects of criminal law are negligible for many art crimes, especially the trade in illicit antiquities (Mackenzie 2007, 2011). With art theft, this is exemplified by the low risk of punishment (Conklin 1994, Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006, Dolnick 2006).

While very aware that there is no clear definition over what constitutes either art or an art world (Becker 1982, Thornton 2008), as demonstrated by the artist Jeff Koons and Cicciolina, a porn star and ex-member of the Italian parliament, calling their son a work of art (Uvod u Studije Performansa 2009), this thesis uses Becker’s (1982:350) term ‘art world’ throughout and deals specifically with culturally and/or financially valuable objects that have been painted, sculpted or made, such as installations, and reside in locations in London.

The thesis uses Ericson’s (2007) definition of security, that it:

“is safety, something that guarantees and guards a secure condition and thus provides freedom from danger. Security contributes to certainty: freedom from doubt, fear, and anxiety about danger. Certainty is a question of knowledge, of knowing for sure. Certainty as knowledge combines with security as safety to provide reliability- something that can be relied upon to happen- and thus confidence in taking action” (Ericson 2007:216).

The thesis also borrows Reiner’s definition of ‘policing’ as a ‘set of social processes’ (Reiner 1997, Reiner 2000, Reiner 2000b). Many criminologists now use the term ‘security governance’ because they believe that the term ‘policing’ and ‘police’ have connotations with the ‘state’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Wood and Shearing 2007, Wood and Dupont 2006). However, as the debate has moved on and modern life continues to be dominated by all forms of security, and criminological
discourse continues to propose that the public sector is only one part of the whole, the term ‘policing’ can be used without assuming it has a clear link to the public sector. This thesis uses ‘security governance’ and ‘policing’ interchangeably. In addition, it uses the term ‘public police’, and, although aware of the difficulty in defining private policing due to its wide diversity (Johnston 2000, Button 2002, Percy 2006, Shearing et al 1980), it also employs the label ‘private police’.

Wood and Shearing (2007) provide a clear definition of ‘nodes’ and their governance:

“Governing nodes are organizational sites (institutional settings that bring together and harness ways of thinking and acting) where attempts are made to intentionally shape the flow of events. Nodes govern under a variety of circumstances, operate in a variety of ways, are subject to a variety of objectives and concerns, and engage in a variety of different actions to shape the flow of events. Nodes relate to one another, and attempt to mobilize and resist one another, in a variety of ways so as to shape matters in ways that promote their objectives and concerns. Nodal governance is diverse and complex” (Wood and Shearing 2007:149).

The term ‘node’ is used throughout the thesis as it provides the most useful analytical language.

Although aware of the problems in defining organised crime (Martin and Romano 1992, Ryan and Rush 1997, Sheptycki 2002, Woodiwiss 2001, Wright 2006), this thesis does not have the space to discuss the debates over the social construction of organised crime in this country. While preferring the looser term ‘criminal gangs’, the argument proposed by Chappell and Polk (2011), in their work on the illicit antiquities trade, that the term ‘organised crime’ is useful in the sense of the crime being organised through a network of actors is very relevant for art theft.
The thesis uses the International Council of Museums’ definition of a museum as:

“a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment” (International Council of Museums 2010),

and Encarta Dictionary’s of an art gallery that it can be both a museum of art and a location that displays and sells art (Encarta Dictionary).

Concerning risk, O’Malley (2003) writes that, “risk refers to the probability of harm, the role of its calculation or assessment in making decisions about whether to perform criminal actions, and its role in criminal justice decision-making” (O’Malley 2003:363). This thesis aims to help the shift in criminology from risk being viewed negatively to, instead, having more neutral, and at times positive, connotations in line with arguments proposed by Baker and Simon (2002) and Ewald (1991).

ORIGINALLITY OF THESIS

Providing the first clear single account of the London art security terrain, this thesis’ originality can be considered in three areas.

1. *Empirical* The art security terrain in London has never been mapped and examined in this way.

2. *Theoretical* It advances present knowledge of ‘new’ policing theses (McLaughlin 2007) and, in particular, Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal governance in an actual policing arena. By doing so, it adds to the growing body of academic work on nodal governance in different settings. It also adds to the large body of academic work on environmental criminology (Felson and Clarke 1998, Felson, 2002, 2003) and the under researched sphere of insurance (Baker and

3. Methodological Although grounded theory was the approach taken at the start of the research, Wood’s (2006:230) proposed methodology for research on networked policing emerged as the most appropriate, and the thesis took it into a new area. It also added to the research into the traditionally restricted worlds of the art world, private policing and public policing.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

What do we know about art crime?

Data sources
Existing Research Literature: There is little chance of a researcher being “terrorized by the literature” (Becker 1986:135) as a lack of prior research has forced the few previous criminological researchers into foraging around a range of sources. While researching Art Crime in 1994, John Conklin found very little social scientific research to help him and relied largely on media sources. Art crime had “so far escaped the attention of criminologists” (Conklin 1994:1). Ten years later, Mackenzie (2005) found the situation had hardly changed. There were exceptions such as his own work, and that of Polk (1999 and 1999b) and James (2000) in Australia. Despite the dominant understanding continuing to come from fiction, promisingly, there is a growing amount of research being undertaken and articles appearing in journals (for example, the Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice November 2011).

Academic researchers, including Mackenzie and Polk, are often drawn to the area of looting and entrance, including further sale, of objects into the art/antiquity market. This is the dimension of art crime in which most research has been undertaken and is currently being carried out, exemplified by the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research’s (University of Glasgow) project on the global

There are a number of reasons why academics are attracted to this area; first, there is more prior knowledge to build on, especially through links with archaeologists; second, the fact that, arguably, it is a bigger problem due to the quantity of antiquities and the lack of site security; third, research access is easier; and, fourth, although the trade is illicit, arguably it is easier for looted antiquities to materialise in the licit art market and in museums than art stolen from within ‘demand’ locations. This licit/illicit interface is the focus of much research.

Art theft from locations in city spaces is one of many other dimensions of art crime which remain under researched, or non-researched, and in need of academic empirical investigation. The fact that there is no criminological research that has focused specifically on the securitization and policing of art theft in London highlights the original contribution of this thesis.

Research from the legal point of view (Barden 1996, Campbell 1996, Kelly 1995, Massy 2008, Merryman 2007, Palmer 1996, Ward 1993) provides a valuable source of information, particularly as different legal systems affect policing and security measures. For example, the different legal systems in France and Italy compared to the UK and USA pose challenges over good faith purchases and who actually owns art after it has been stolen. This varies from country to country. For instance, under Dutch law, if stolen art works are not discovered within thirty years of the theft, the thieves have the right to keep them (Howard 2007).
In the last few years, works by Houpt (2006), Dolnick (2006), McShane and Matera (2006), Boser (2008), Nairne (2011) have been published, including useful information from first hand sources who have played large roles in the world of art theft. However, while offering many insights into art theft, they are written with an eye on the bestseller list as well as the academic library. So, although very useful, it can be argued that they should be treated with an element of caution due to the potential for sensationalism.

**Art Magazines and News Media Reports:** Within this under researched area of crime, media reports provide much information. Castells (2004) has observed, “The media, local and global, are the means of communication through which the public mind is formed” (Castells 2004:139). The media also help form the potentially more critical ‘academic mind’, especially in the absence of a large body of empirical research. It is important to consider how the media shape, or help to reinforce, the public’s perspective on art theft. Neuendorf (2002), similar to Cohen (2001), writes of the power of the media to set the agenda. With art theft often appearing in their entertainment sections, the media have tended to concentrate on the larger crimes and sometimes not reported the severity and scale. This has shaped the public’s perception of art theft as entertainment and led the art critic Robert Hughes, writing in *Time* magazine about the coverage of the estimated $200 million heist from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston, to lambast the media as, “ignorant troglodytes” (McShane 2006:305).

However, while far from extensive, the British broadsheets do provide coverage and have reported important issues such as thefts, recoveries, and damage (e.g. *Guardian* 20/01/2011, 20/12/2011, 11/08/2009; *Scotsman* 29/08/2003, 23/02/2011). The *Guardian*, in particular, attempts to cover art theft, not only when the big crimes have happened in the UK or abroad, but also relevant issues. Importantly, the articles reach a far larger public than newspapers or magazines specific to art (such as the *Art Newspaper*).
While there are clear problems with using media sources, they nonetheless do provide knowledge in an area of little information.

**Internet Resources:** The internet is a good source of information as it is used by both public and private policing organizations to disseminate communication about their role. Private companies involved in the policing of art theft such as the Art Loss Register\(^1\) and the Art Management Group\(^2\) use the internet to address the public, as well as to advertise their different activities. National, international and transnational policing agencies, such as Interpol, Europol, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), and the FBI, also have websites which they use to explain their role and provide information.

Non policing organisations such as the International Foundation for Art Research and the Association for Research into Crimes against Art use the internet as a principal source for their activities in the art world (www.artcrime.info), as does the Museum Security Network (www.museum-security.org) and Art Theft Central (artheftcentral.org) which have relied on the work of committed volunteers like Mark Durney. Artdaily.org, self-styled as, “The First Art Newspaper on the Net”, has many articles on art thefts. Blogs such as the Illicit Cultural Property (www.illicit-cultural-property.blogspot.com) provide forums for debate. Trade websites are also full of discussions and the source for much industry literature (Cultural Security Magazine 2010).

\(^{1}\) The Art Loss Register describes itself as “the world’s largest private database of lost and stolen art, antiques and collectables. Its range of services includes item registration, search and recovery services to collectors, the art trade, insurers and worldwide law enforcement agencies”(www.artloss.com) Discussed in detail in chapter 5.

\(^{2}\) The Art Management Group’s services include, “Due diligence, Collection care and management, Preventative conservation, Security and risk assessments, Security marking, Disaster recovery, Theft and loss recovery, Dispute resolution and legal issues, Tax and inheritance advice, Collection disposal, Storage, transportation and shipping”. (www.artmanagementgroup.com)
‘Trade’ organizations also use their websites to report on events that are occurring. For example, the International Council of Museums (ICOM) posts its press releases on its website (http://icom.museum/), as does the Association of Art Museum Directors (www.aamd.org) which represents 184 directors of art museums in the United States, Mexico and Canada.

**The cultural and economic significance of art crime**
The uniqueness of art makes it more important than the many items which are stolen or damaged. Art works cannot be replaced. As McShane (2006) argues, “An art thief’s greatest offence is severing the public’s critical link to its vividly portrayed cultural heritage, and preventing future generations from enjoying the vision of those who came before” (McShane 2006:332).

The ‘mixed economy’ of leisure and cultural activities also generates a huge amount of money (Cinti 2008). In the 1980s, the Greater London Council (GLC) was a pioneer in seeing the massive potential of culture for the local economy (Cinti 2008). Culture became a ‘separate sector’, an ‘industry’ (Cinti 2008:70). The GLC developed infrastructures and locations for culture and art in particular.

In the UK, as well as the 48,500 people directly employed in the art and antiques market (British Art Market Federation 2013), there are many more employees and businesses, such as people who work for the cultural institutions that display art and those involved in the tourist trade, who in addition to relying on the sector for their employment and income, play a part in generating and maintaining the cultural economy. For example, 30,000 people in the UK are employed directly or in connection to historic houses (Historic Houses Association 2011).
Though contentious owing to the difficulties in calculating such a figure, the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA)\(^3\) claimed in 2010 that every £1 invested in the cultural economy by the Arts Council produced £2. It stated that, “The UK has the largest and fastest growing cultural economy in the world – the creative industries contribute 6.2% to the UK economy, with nearly 2 million people in creative employment” (MLA Cultural Capital Manifesto 25/03/2010). The Historic Houses Association (2011) claims the houses it represents, “contribute £1.6 billion to the economy”.

Besides the income it generates for the British economy, tax alone from sales of art and antiques in 1998 made at least £426 million for the government (House of Commons Select Committee 2005). So, while the government funds art (Arts Council England 2012) and provides some cover through the Government Indemnity Scheme\(^4\) (Department of Culture, Media and Sport 2004), government money is being generated by the art market itself.

Tens of millions of people visit galleries, museums, churches and houses every year to appreciate works that have been handed down from generation to generation (Houpt 2006). Historic houses have nearly 40 million visitors a year (Historic Houses Association, English Heritage, National Trust). The over 40 million visitors to national museums in 2008/9 (MLA Cultural Manifesto 25/03/2010) helps make London one of the main capitals of art in the world. In 2009/10, 46.7% of adults and 66.8% of 11-15 year olds in England visited a museum, gallery or archive (DCMS, Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport Adult and Child Report 2009/10 in www.publications.parliament.uk)

\(^3\) Closed down in 2012, the Museum, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA), a non-departmental public body, ran lots of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s cultural functions. Many of them were transferred to Arts Council England.

\(^4\) The Museums, Libraries and Archive Council described The Government Indemnity Scheme as, “The GIS allows the public access to objects within the UK which might not otherwise be available, by providing borrowers with an alternative to the considerable cost of commercial insurance. It means that a museum, gallery or library can arrange to borrow objects from non-national institutions and, in the event of loss or damage, compensation will be paid to the owner by the government. Therefore the government, rather than an insurance company, carries the risk” (MLA 2009).
In 2010, attendances for museums and galleries in London were:

- 5,842,138 British Museum
- 5,061,172 Tate Modern
- 4,954,914 National Gallery
- 2,629,065 Victoria and Albert Museum
- 1,819,442 National Portrait Gallery
- 1,665,291 Tate Britain
- 1,271,301 Saatchi Gallery
- 1,007,306 Royal Academy of Arts

(The Art Newspaper, No223, April 2011)

In contrast to most cities in the world, many of the museums and galleries are free, and since this policy was reintroduced, the number of visits by children under 16 to national museums has increased by 80% (MLA Cultural Capital Manifesto 25/03/2010).

The criminological significance of art crime: the extent, nature and patterns of art theft

In 2009, the Art Loss Register had 210,533 works on its database, of which 200,839 were currently unaccounted for (Art Market Monitor 2010). Dolnick (2006) explains that:

“A Museum of the Missing would fill endless galleries; the collections of paintings and drawings would include 551 Picassos, 43 Van Goghs, 174 Rembrandts, and 209 Renoirs. Vermeer would be there, and Caravaggio and Van Eyck and Cezanne and Titian and El Greco” (Dolnick 2006:13).

According to the Art Loss Register, the top ten stolen artists are Pablo Picasso with 699 stolen works, Salvador Dali with 396, Joan Miro 390, Marc Chagall 361, Albrecht Durer 212, Pierre-Auguste Renoir 192, Andy Warhol 183, Rembrandt van Rijn 181, Peter Paul Rubens 147, and Henri Matisse with 138...
The audacious theft on 16 October 2012 of paintings by Picasso, Gauguin, Matisse, Freud and Monet from the Kunsthall museum in Rotterdam highlights the level of threat at present (Guardian 16/10/2012).

Though this thesis focuses on pictures, sculptures and installations, the theft of cultural items is diverse, as DIAGRAM 1 illustrates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pictures</td>
<td>89,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sculpture</td>
<td>21,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>12,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamps and Seals</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>3,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timepieces</td>
<td>25,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms and Armour</td>
<td>1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and Manuscripts</td>
<td>4,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramics</td>
<td>10,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coins</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enamels</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>8,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass</td>
<td>1,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>1,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelry</td>
<td>10,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighting appliances</td>
<td>2,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medals</td>
<td>984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorabilia, Toys, Models</td>
<td>1,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects of Art</td>
<td>7,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(arttheftcentral 2009) DIAGRAM 1
The figures in DIAGRAM 2 are from the Art Loss Register and show from which locations art is stolen. Although these should be viewed as a guide rather than as evidence, owing to the statistical problem concerning whether they are based on the whole database or the annual amount (estimated at about 10,000) (arttheftcentral 2009), they provide a useful insight.

**Thefts by location as reported to the Art Loss Register**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallery</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In transit</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Art security not only represents a huge challenge but has different characteristics to other areas of protection of goods of value or money (Resource 2003). For example, by being open to the public, many museums, galleries, churches and residences place themselves at a security disadvantage compared to commercial property or private houses. Thieves can visit the institutions and analyse the security systems, potential entrances/exits, and staff attitudes and routines (Howard 2007). Institutions also make themselves vulnerable by publicising the displays (Resource 2003). Galleries have even started to display their collections online (www.nationalgallery.org.uk, www.southlondongallery.org). In line with the rational choice perspective and Felson and Clarke’s work on “Opportunity makes the thief” (Felson and Clarke 1998:1), being able to do this kind of research could affect the potential offender’s crime calculus and, ultimately, their crime choice.
Not only are thefts a threat, but damage is also a major concern. Allowing the public, especially groups of children, to be close to art works increases risk (CSO Online 01/09/2004). This was demonstrated by the Russian woman who threw a cup of tea at the Mona Lisa on 2 August 2009 (Guardian 11/08/2009). From urinating in Duchamp’s urinal or stealing pencils from a Hirst installation, to causing more severe damage, iconoclasm is also a current risk (Scott 2010). This was evidenced by the man who wrote on Rothko’s Black on Maroon at Tate Modern on 7 October 2012 (Guardian 07/10/2012).

The limited amount of literature has considered a number of theoretical perspectives in dealing with different aspects of the crime. Polk (1999) writes about the importance of restricting opportunity for potential art thieves. This corresponds with Smith et al’s (2002) work on anticipatory benefits in crime prevention and changing a potential offender’s, “construction of a presenting opportunity” (Smith et al 2002:2). Polk (1999:3) is an advocate of increasing security or “target hardening”. The way works of art are displayed and stored is extremely important. The use of prevention techniques, such as CCTV, alarms, and locking systems on paintings (Resource 2003), can play a role in restricting opportunity for theft (Felson 2002).

Routine Activity Theory (RAT) has been used by Conklin (1994), Mackenzie (2005), Polk (1999) and Lane et al (2008) in their work on art crime. While often used to analyse street crime, the basic factors in the theory exist in art theft. The theory works on three basic precepts: the existence of a suitable target, a motivated offender and the lack of capable guardian, or, supply, demand and regulation (Felson 2003, Lane et al 2008). RAT deals with prevention of the theft from the location.

Although they have used it, Lane et al (2008:245) argue that one problem when considering RAT is that it is a ‘micro-level’ theory and not applicable to a “structural analysis of a transnational market”.

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However, the logic behind the theory is relevant for the area that Lane et al (2008) cover, the looting of antiquities and art, and also for art theft. While the fact that it can be used to consider every crime could minimise the usefulness in focusing on it in detail when specifically analysing art theft, the crime science aspects of designing against crime and situational crime prevention are very relevant (Felson 2002, Secured by Design 2012, Reynald and Elffers 2009). In relation to staff stealing from locations, Cognitive Mapping theory also fits this insider theft (Mackenzie 2005).

Another perspective, which deals with the disposal of stolen goods is Market Reduction Approach. This crime reduction strategy formed the basis for two Home Office Reports. Based on research on burglaries by Sutton (1998) and Sutton et al (2001), it works on the premise that by making it harder for thieves to sell on their stolen goods, the number of burglaries would drop because there would be less motivation to steal. In their work on reducing the looted antiquities market by targeting the purchasing locations in demand countries through shaming and then reintegrating them, Chappell and Polk (2011) have linked the Approach to Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming.

If insured, the insurance company will force a certain level of risk assessment to occur. These are advised for insured and uninsured locations. The problem for small institutions, in an example of the risk society, is that these institutions which are the most at risk and in need of security, in theory, have much less chance of acquiring it compared to larger institutions. However, with art, increased security does not offer a complete answer. It can actually make thefts more violent (Mackenzie 2005, Tijhuis 2006). Many thefts since 2000 have been ‘smash and grab’ raids rather than sophisticated art heists. The theft of two paintings from the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam in 2000 took less than seven minutes (Howard 2007). In February 2008, three thieves armed with guns stole paintings by Cezanne, Degas, Monet and Van Gogh worth $163.2 million from the EG Buehrle collection Museum in Zurich (NBC News 02/19/2008).
A large security problem is that many thefts go undetected (McShane 2006). For instance, in 2008, fifty paintings were reported to have gone missing over a number of years from the British Government Art Collection (*Times* 26/12/2008). This is not a new phenomenon. A security report in 1954 for the Victoria and Albert (V & A) Museum claimed that an attendant called John Nevin had stolen 2,544 items over twenty years (artdaily.org 2005, V & A 2009).

There are many examples of very high profile art thefts in which security personnel made large errors, such as allowing the perpetrators to enter or by ignoring alarms (Dolnick 2006, Houpt 2006, Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006). Smaller institutions have the problem that they often cannot even afford security personnel (Resource 2003). Many security personnel often lack motivation, are poorly trained and badly paid (Dolnick 2006, Houpt 2006, Mackenzie 2005). Polk (1999) believes that staff at galleries should receive more training. Mackenzie (2005) argues that low wages and the predictable high turnover of employees must affect both the dedication and experience of security personnel. The Resource: The Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries’ report *(2003)* states that, “No system has yet been found that will completely replace a loyal and well-trained team of attendants” (Resource 2003:2.6).

Large organisations such as the V & A Museum in London can make significant staff changes. After three thefts in January 2005, the museum turned to the security consultancy branch of the private company Arup. Major changes were implemented and well trained staff, many with military experience, were brought in on long term contracts (Arup 2009).

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5 Based on experience and best practice from museums, libraries and archives, this report was a manual that was intended to be used as a general security guide by security managers.
Institutions which have been victims of theft must be alert to the fact that they might be seen as soft targets. Although it may seem obvious, this issue of repeat victimisation (Farrell and Polk 1993) needs to be highlighted because it appears to be particularly an issue with art theft, especially in relation to the expectation of another success and what might have been missed the previous time (Farrell and Polk 1993). For instance, the Dulwich Picture Gallery in London has had the same Rembrandt portrait stolen four times (Mackenzie 2005). Another example is Russborough House in Ireland which in 2002 was the victim of stolen art for the fourth time (Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006). Likewise, places with valuable art must be aware of thefts from other premises that might have security similarities (Mackenzie 2005). Mackenzie (2005) uses ‘flag effect’ and ‘known quantity effect’ in relation to broken windows theory and argues that, “once a flag has been placed, one must work hard to remove it” (Mackenzie 2005:8). Once it has been removed, the existence of a capable guardian makes the potential theft less attractive for a motivated offender (Mackenzie 2005). Dulwich Picture Gallery and Russborough House are classic examples of the flag effect and help to illustrate why thefts occur more often from private houses than museums or galleries (McShane 2006).

A lack of resources makes this difficult for smaller institutions, and they remain, or can become even more attractive targets, particularly if larger institutions improve their security, generating displacement (Ekblom 2006:385). In France, in 2004, the Office Central de lutte contre le traffic des Biens Culturels, reported that 450 chateaus and 225 religious buildings had been targeted and more than 20,000 art works and artefacts had been stolen (Houpt 2006). In the UK, an example is the theft of Da Vinci’s Madonna with the Yarnwinder (valued at $65 million) owned by the Duke of Buccleuch which was pulled off the wall by thieves at Drumlanrig Castle in Scotland in 2003. There was no heavy security and though an alarm was triggered the thieves escaped with the painting (Houpt 2006, Scotsman 29/08/2003).
Churches are also targeted. There are many examples, such as the theft in 2009 of a Renaissance painting by Lucas Cranach the Elder from a Norwegian church (CBC News 2009), and, in 1969, of the Nativity with St. Francis and St. Lawrence by Caravaggio, now estimated to be worth $20 million. Believed to be stolen by the Sicilian Mafia, it is still missing (Houpt 2006, Mackenzie 2005). In Belgium, Van Eyck’s The Last Judges was stolen from the cathedral in Ghent (Houpt 2006). Tijhuis (2006) believes that Italy has a huge problem and that countries such as France and Belgium also suffer, albeit on a lesser scale. Houpt (2006) writes that the number is at a record high in France. In Russia, there is a similar problem with icons (Interpol 2005, Tijhuis 2006). In 1992, there was a warning that if this type of theft continued in the Czech Republic, there would soon, “be nothing left to steal” (Ward 1993:206).

**Links to other crimes**

Bowman (2008) warns that, “In an age where terrorism and transnational trafficking in people, drugs, and arms are at the forefront of criminological concerns, transnational crimes against culture are easily forgotten” (Bowman 2008:236). While this conclusion is correct, and while Bowman’s (2008) statement that criminological study of this type of crime could help us to understand transnational crimes such as trafficking and illicit markets is true, she does not focus enough on the argument that transnational crimes involving art and antiquities do not only represent windows through which to study transnational crime and help us investigate these crimes, but that they should be investigated because they could be part of crimes such as money laundering (Independent 30/11/1996) and drug trafficking (Scotsman 29/08/2003, Bailey 2004, Houpt 2006). For example, the alleged use of stolen art as currency in drug deals means that it could be directly involved in the crime. Dolnick (2006) writes:

“For the Police it becomes a game of Follow the Bouncing Ball: a Picasso stolen from a weekend house in the Dordogne passes through the hands of a French gang, which sells it to...
one based in Amsterdam, which in turn sells it to drug dealers in Turkey, where it serves as a
donw payment for a shipment of heroin that ends up on the streets of London” (Dolnick
2006:31).

DIAGRAM 3 maps the complex movements involved with the first Russborough House robbery in 1986

(Bailey 1997, artheftcentral 2009) Diagram 3

**Changing nature of art theft within the globalized risk society**

The global crime that exists today is a new phenomenon and art theft is particularly demanding for
governments and public and private policing agencies. The adaptability and lack of accountability of
networks of criminal organisations, other than to themselves or other networks, gives them an
advantage over the governments and agencies who try to stop them.
This is particularly the case in Europe and covers a huge range of different crimes (Johnston 2000). Glenny (2008) writes that:

“Combating organised crime is very difficult, in part because in areas such as banking or licit commodity trading, actors, motives, processes and objects of commercial exchange move back and forth between the light and shadow so fast that it renders moral or legal definition impossible” (Glenny 2008:236).

This legal/illegal interface is a common thread in much of the literature (Fijnaut et al 1998, Tijhuis 2006) and is very applicable to art theft.

Glenny (2008) highlights the transnationality of crime through various examples, such as a Moldovan girl trafficked into prostitution. He writes that Moldovan, Ukrainian Russian, Egyptian, Bedouin, Russian Jewish and indigenous people all played a role, often with violence, in this girl being trafficked to Tel Aviv. It has been claimed that stolen art is moved in similar ways (Bailey 2004, Dolnick 2006, Ward 1993).

Glenny (2008) underlines the link between the growth of organised crime in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the speed of economic development. However, it is important to remember that just because there was a lack of research in these countries, it does not mean organised crime did not exist; it was just not recognised (Ryan and Rush 1997, Carter 1997). For example, organised crime in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet block is not a recent development (FBI 2009), what is new is the research into it by western criminologists and journalists. These criminals had great difficulty operating outside of specific areas because they lived in police states and, at a time when researchers were examining American and European organised crime, research from within or outside these states was difficult to do (Carter 1997). For example, China is still an authoritarian country.
Organised crime in these countries is extremely important when considering art theft as they are places where the art market, legal and illegal, is booming, and large crimes are happening (Interpol 2009, oglobo.com 2007). Though this thesis concentrates on London, thefts that occur abroad are relevant because of the capital’s position as an international art centre and the transnationality of art theft. In 1999, 25% of art recoveries by the Art Loss Register happened in another country than the original theft (Kenwood 1999). By 2006, this figure was 50% (Radcliffe 2006 in Houpt 2006).

Demonstrated by the huge increase in recoveries occurring in other countries than where the theft occurred (Kenwood 1999, Radcliffe 2006 in Houpt 2006), as a transnational crime, art theft poses immense challenges to cross border policing, particularly with its links to other crimes (Mackenzie 2005, Dolnick 2006). However, with a few exceptions, it is still largely ignored in the literature on transnational policing (Mueller 2001, Sheptycki 2002, Williams 2001). What little coverage it does receive is extremely useful for our understanding. For example, Passas (2001) writes of the similarities between money laundering and art theft, in the sense that art can be ‘cleaned’.

Williams (2001) examines the complex mix of different people and groups involved in crime. On prostitution, he compares different, separate groups who facilitate the sex industry; the collusion of villagers who sell their children, and also some areas of the tourist industry. He uses art theft as another example, with buyers not checking the legality of their purchase, and also dealers and auction houses not paying enough attention to issues surrounding provenance (Williams 2001). Both crimes are examples of separate actors supplying a market.

**Why is art stolen?**

Lane et al (2008) argue that the economic power of people in rich countries in the second half of the twentieth century, coupled with their desire to display their status through art objects, resulted in
collectors and museums fuelling the international market in art and antiquities. Houpt (2006) writes that the Sotheby’s sale on 15 October 1958 marked the beginning of this trend. Cezanne’s *Le garçon au gilet rouge* sold for $610,000, five times more than a painting had ever sold for at auction. The event was a huge success for Sotheby’s head, Peter Cecil Wilson. Auctions had previously been seen as a dislikeable necessity until he assembled a room in which Winston Churchill rubbed shoulders with Kirk Douglas, Margot Fonteyn and Somerset Maugham. Not only did it help to change the reputation of auctions, but sellers were attracted by the potential higher prices in public auctions compared to dealing directly with dealers. From less than $25 million worth of sales in 1958, auction house sales were at almost $5 billion by 1989 (Houpt 2006). In London, the number of million dollar auctions was 176, and in 2010 it reached 271 (Art Market Trends 2010).

In 2001, the UK art and antique market accounted for 25.3% of the global market with sales of £4.2 billion. The market was second only to the United States in size of global trade (House of Commons Select Committee 2005, British Art Market Federation 2007) and there were claims that, volume wise, it was the largest marketplace in the world (House of Commons Select Committee 2005), with its annual import-export trade 50% of the EU total and 40% of the global market (*The Art Newspaper* 12/08/2009). The massive rise of China in auction house art markets, which in a decade has gone from ninth to first in sales, has now seen both the United States and United Kingdom overtaken by the Asian powerhouse (Art Market Trends 2010).

While the global recession in 2008/2009 had a massive effect on the art market, with the price index of Impressionist art falling by 39.3% from January 2008 to January 2010, optimism quickly returned (*Art Price* January 2010, *BusinessWeek* 04/02/2010), exemplified by the sale of Giacometti’s *Walking Man* 1, 1961, for $104.3 million to the London based collector Lily Safra (*ARTINFO* 04/03/2010). In June
2011, a sale of post war German art made £108,803,550 ($174,129,201), a then record for a contemporary art sale in London (The Art Newspaper 29/06/2011).

This enormous market has also attracted criminals drawn by the opportunity to make money in a highly unregulated field. The attraction to criminals was, and still is, the low risk of punishment for substantial potential profit (Boser 2009, Conklin 1994, Dolnick 2006, Mackenzie 2005, Passas 2001, Tijhuis 2006). This has presented a large security problem for the art world. As McShane (2006) explains, “Whatever art is, whatever it looks like, whoever created it…if it has a monetary value, a thief will try and steal it” (McShane 2006:xvi).

**Who commits the crimes and how art is stolen**

Ironically, considering criminology’s usual focus on everything but the actual criminal (Maguire 2000), examinations of art theft often concentrate on the people who commit the crimes. Although research on the security and policing activity, before, during and after the thefts, is more important for this thesis with its focus on those performing, managing, governing and controlling the securitization, analysis on the perpetrators can also help. For instance, if the greatest threat comes from insiders, then an institution might be able to adapt accordingly.

Many of the sources of information state that it is wrong to assume that art theft is a ‘gentleman’s crime’ in which a rich collector either steals or orders a theft (Bailey 2004, Charney 2008, Kenwood (in New York Times 03/02/2000), Kisluk 1999, Tijhuis 2006). McShane (2006:177) argues the opposite; they exist but are just hard to catch. He believes that many in the art world are in denial about these orchestrated ‘made-to-order’ thefts. Though he has little empirical evidence, Conklin (1994) agrees with McShane. Mackenzie (2005) argues that while the collector is motivated by the art, the hired thief is motivated by profit. Howard (2007) writes that there is evidence that the theft of two
paintings from the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam in 2000 was for a collector. However, she does not provide a source to back up the claim.

It is claimed that conmen can use stolen and fake paintings to directly defraud banks and financial organisations, or, indirectly, by persuading the banks’ customers into investing or buying the art. They are used to secure loans which can fund other criminal activity (Sparks 2002, McShane 2006). The literature also mentions cases where, as plea bargains, criminals have used stolen art to avoid jail (McShane 2006) or to gain a reduced sentence for an unrelated crime (Mackenzie 2005). Houpt (2006) writes that there is also evidence of people stealing their own art in insurance fraud.

Besides these, there is a history of art being stolen for political reasons. ETA (McShane 2006) and the IRA (Boser 2009, Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006) have both been involved. The IRA stole a Vermeer in London and used it in an attempt to have imprisoned members transferred to Northern Ireland (Bailey 2004, Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006). Dr Bridget Rose Dugdale, who orchestrated the thefts, even lent the paintings out to other terrorist organisations (McShane 2006).

In addition, there is also a long history of inside jobs, possibly the most famous of which is the theft of the Mona Lisa from the Louvre by an employee in 1911 (Mackenzie 2005). In London, perhaps the largest case was the Nevin one at the V & A (V & A 2009). McShane (2006) claims that, “Sad to say, no amount of high-tech security in the world, then or now, can stand up against an inside job” (McShane 2006:124). Although this assertion is hard to substantiate and he does not explain in detail why this could be the case, the literature points to inside jobs being very difficult to stop. Houpt (2006) highlights FBI figures that showed that more than 80% of art thefts are inside jobs. Tijhuis (2006:151) describes the 1998 FBI internal study which found that 83% of known thefts from museums could be “classified as ‘internal thefts’”. He argues that this means the thefts were performed by staff or other
people who had access to collections. However, the 83% figure should be treated with care as it might relate to any involvement, direct or indirect, as opposed to actually performing the theft. Also, it is very important to make it clear that this relates to art thefts that have been solved (Museum Security Network 2008). So, while it might be correct to state that 80% of known failed art thefts involve insiders, it is not possible to claim that 80% of all art thefts were ‘internal thefts’.

While contemporary criminological theory argues that thieves are opportunists and engage in a number of criminal activities (Felson 2002), there are instances of art thieves, such as Stephen Breitwieser and Etoh Mvondo, whose desire is to acquire particular art forms (Bailey 2004, Houpt 2006, Mackenzie 2005).

According to some of the literature, modern art theft is dominated by organised criminal networks (Charney 2008, James 2000, McShane 2006, Mueller 2001). These networks are involved in global crimes that exist through networks of criminal organisations that are flexible, sophisticated and use the globalisation of economies, societies and politics for their illegal gains (Bowman 2008, Castells 2003, Vlassis 2001). This links with Vlassis’s (2001) argument about organised crime in general being conducted by small, adaptable, increasingly more sophisticated groups:

“They, too, are shifting from country to country, region to region and activity to activity, depending on opportunity, profitability and the lack of capacity on the part of national authorities to place their operations at risk” (Vlassis 2001:358).

However, despite the claims about the involvement of organised criminals within art theft, it is important to highlight the lack of evidence presented.

The basic factors of Routine Activity Theory in art crime provide the framework for why profit driven criminals and criminal gangs are drawn to art theft (Conklin 1994, Mackenzie 2005, Lane et al 2008).
However, despite the ‘cost benefit analysis’ (McManus 1995:57), other criminal activities might often be easier. McShane (2006), writing about the Dublin gangster Martin Cahill, believes that the ‘General’s’ other activities, such as jewellery and extortion, were less difficult because they could be easily converted to cash. He argues that the art Cahill stole only caused him problems. Mackenzie (2005) and Polk (1999b) also comment about the difficulty profit-driven criminals have in disposing the art.

However, this has not stopped criminal gangs being drawn to it. Tijhuis (2006) writes about a ‘tradition of serial thieves’ in France. Conklin (1994) believes that while groups of organised criminals are sometimes put together for a specific crime, there are also gangs that systematically steal art, particularly in countries such as France and Italy.

In spite of the difficulties, stolen art can be useful; for example, there are claims in the literature that it has been employed as collateral in deals (Dolnick 2006, Bailey 2004, Times 26/01/2003) with stolen paintings usually worth 10% of their value on the black market (Dolnick 2006, McShane 2006).

Criminal gangs are not always specific to art theft. McShane (2006) believes that sometimes they are as likely to rob a bank the following week. Kisluk (1999:2) argues, “They just happen to steal art rather than a car”. For criminal gangs, art can show others that you have a certain level of eminence (Bailey 2004, Mackenzie 2005). Bailey (2004:3) calls it “trophy crime”. There are even stories of stolen art being used as gifts between organised crime groups (Mackenzie 2005).

Extortion could be a very common motive for art theft (Bailey 2004, Merryman 2007, Tijhuis 2006). The grey area that exists between rewards and ransoms is an attraction for criminals. For example, in 2002, two Turner paintings, stolen while on loan in Frankfurt, were returned to the Tate after lengthy

There are even claims of criminal gangs hiring thieves to steal art as a diversionary tactic to allow them to commit robberies. Mackenzie (2005) believes that two versions of the Scream have been stolen in Norway for this reason.

Tijhuis (2006) is sceptical about the claims of links between art theft and drug trafficking, and argues that many common claims for why art is stolen cannot be backed up by empirical evidence. While the available evidence from different sources- including research in this thesis- does point to the fact that art theft has links to drugs, Tijhuis (2006) provides a salient reminder that in this under researched area, assumptions based on a small amount of empirical research should be treated with caution.

**PROTECTING ART IN A GLOBALIZED RISK ENVIRONMENT**

**What we need to know about art crime and art criminals**

*The public-private nature of the art world*

In 1994, Conklin estimated that art theft was worth $1 billion annually. By 2006, this figure was estimated to be as much as $5 billion annually (James 2000, McShane 2006, Mueller 2001). However, many figures on art theft lack specificity and rely on very little sound evidence. While they serve to highlight the crime, they also confuse attempts to understand it, as too often figures from disparate types of art crime are put together. Interpol states that it is extremely hard to estimate the actual scale of art theft (Interpol 2009).
Even if more statistics did exist, it is worth remembering that, “Crime statistics are an organizational construction” (McLaughlin 2007:58) and that there is always the ‘dark figure’ of unreported crime (Reiner 2007:46). Charley Hill, an art detective and former MPS Art and Antiques Unit officer, explains:

“It’s all bullshit. People talk about these incredible figures, but all the figures you see are completely made up. Police statistics do not distinguish between something of artistic quality and a sodding ornament somebody won shooting in a fairground” (Cited in Dolnick 2006:37).

However, even if the figures lack empirical evidence, enough is known to make it clear that art theft is a crime that occurs on a huge scale, is worth massive sums of money and is a daily occurrence. While the media publicise the big thefts, day to day criminal acts are endemic (Kisluk 1999) and pose a more common and larger threat (Resource 2003, Tijhuis 2006).

An example of the private nature of the art world is the fact that many art crimes are never reported due to ransoms or rewards being paid (Conklin 1994). There is the argument that by paying a ransom you are avoiding the ‘flag effect’ because the robbery will not be highlighted. Also, for fear of ‘flagging’ their security problems and of harming future loans, stolen art is often not even reported to the public police (Conklin 1994, Houpt 2006, Mackenzie 2005). However, this can actually have the opposite effect. By paying a reward or ransom, the victim is actually flagging to criminals that they are a source of money if their property is stolen, and becomes more vulnerable (Bailey 2004). This occurred after a ransom was paid to recover 28 paintings stolen from the Milan Gallery of Modern Art in 1975. Only three months after the payment, 38 pictures were taken from the same gallery (Mackenzie 2005, Tijhuis 2006). Furthermore, by not reporting the crime, the victim is making it easier for the art to be sold on (McShane 2006).
A further example is the auction houses. Similar to Mackenzie’s (2005b:258) difficulties in engaging with them during his research into the market in illicit antiquities, they also politely refused to speak to me. The art world could be the largest unregulated business in the world (McShane 2006) and there are questions over how much some in the art community want their world to be policed.

Art theft is still a thriving enterprise and presents the type of modern challenge that characterises securitization and policing in the globalized risk society. The artist Banksy sums up the challenge, “I’ve come into contact with a lot more villains since I moved from vandalism into selling paintings. The art world is full of shady people peddling bright colours” (Sunday Times Magazine 28/02/2010:19). The private nature of the art world and the dark figure (Reiner 2007:46) of art theft statistics therefore increase the challenge of protecting and securing art.

The risk environment of the art world

Globalized risk

Beck (2009:8) argues that, “We live in a world that has to make decisions concerning its future under the conditions of manufactured, self-inflicted insecurity”.

The new challenges faced by western societies are such that “governmental institutions” and even “discourses” cannot respond, nor even understand them (McLaughlin 2007:194). This incomprehension leads to imagined fears based on the invention of risk surrounding the unknown (Ericson 2007). Ewald (1991) argues that, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Ewald 1991:199).
The fact that risk is about anticipation and future events (Beck 2009) helps to explain why it has become dominant. The fear of crime now appears to be as important, if not more so, than the actual facts on crime (Lupton 1999, Wood and Shearing 2007). This ‘fear’, and impossible goal of freedom from it, results in everyday decisions being governed by ‘risk’ (Ericson 2007, Johnston 2006), and the knowledge of risk, while being able to allay people’s fears, can actually create uncertainty and insecurity (Beck 2009, Davis 1990). O’Neill (2002:16) argues that the ‘risk society’ can be characterised more by “perceptions of and attitudes to risk” rather than by the actual risks. Johnston (2000:23) writes, “the more security we consume, the less secure we may feel”.

Ericson and Haggerty (1997:71) believe that, “Late modern society is characterised by institutions organised around fear, risk assessment, and the provision of security”. “Precautionary logic” (Ericson 2007:155) pervades society, and while people can do little about global uncertainty, they can assess their local area for potential crime and disorder. The perceived threat leads to fear and intolerance, whether or not an actual event happens. While many in society become excluded, those who are included are also often under intense scrutiny and surveillance. Ericson (2007:215) argues that, “Life is lived in webs of surveillance in which everyone is simultaneously a suspect and a police agent”. The level of distrust that emanates is such that even the public police are under surveillance from the public police (Ericson and Haggerty 1997).

This ‘fear’ is not a new phenomenon (O’Neill 2002, Simon 2007). However, in an age when political references to insecurity nearly always concern crime or disorder (Wood and Shearing 2006), this link between actual risk and perceived risk means that security issues become even more prevalent and a large number of agencies are involved in trying to control the ‘risky’, or, “to minimize the riskiness of the most risky”, as Rose (2000:333) puts it.
While criminologists address the issue of ‘risk’ from different angles and in varied ways; for example, Garland (2001) from the welfare state angle, and Ericson (2007) from surveillance and insurance, have sociologists overstated the ‘risk society’? Beck (1992), in particular, has been criticised for being contradictory (Lupton 1999) and for also overstating risk (Denney 2005). However, whether there are a greater number of risks (Beck 1992) or whether the risks are thought to be greater (Giddens 1999), it is important to consider the strategies used to try to control risk and uncertainty.

**Strategic risk management**

The Foucauldian position on risk is that the knowledge gained by networks of ‘experts’ in calculating ‘risk’ can be, and is, used to govern society (Burchell *et al* 1991). Lupton (1999) writes, “The technologies of mass surveillance, monitoring, observation and measurement are central to this disciplinary power, helping to construct understandings of bodies in space and time and to use these understandings to regulate them” (Lupton 1999:89). This leads to the paradoxical notion of uncertainty being removed, or at least lessened, through the technology of risk. Risk becomes calculated and given value by insurance through compensation (Ewald 1991). Risk can be embraced (Baker and Simon 2002). If the fear of crime has become as important as crime itself (Castells 2002, Ericson 2007, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Garland 2001), then, is it not inevitable that society will turn to the insurance industry to try and remove or provide guarantees from the uncertainty? If this is the case, where does this leave the public sector and its key policing agency, the public police?

Even though politicians, in an effort to appear tough on crime and the perpetrators, sometimes place themselves in a central role or reactivate, in Garland’s (2001:140) words, “the myth of the old sovereign state”, the reality is that the globalized risk society has exposed the limits to not only the level of control the public sector can hope to have in crime control, but also its ability to provide effective security (Garland 2001, Johnston and Shearing 2003).
Insurance and risk management in the art world

It is the private insurance companies who become the leaders in security as they drive risk reduction through their risk assessments and by insisting on greater security (Davis 1990, Ericson et al. 2000, Lupton 1999). As chapters 3 and 6 will show, it is the private insurance companies that choose, decide and insist on the type and level of security required by people and organisations. This fuels both the private insurance industry and those industries involved in the sale of technology such as locks, CCTV, alarms and private security personnel (Ericson et al. 2000). While offering an alternative to the public sector (Ericson et al. 2000), according to Ericson (2007:197) they turn people “into agents of surveillance and self-policing”.

Furthermore, it is not actually the loss which is insured but the financial value (Lupton 1999). By this line of reasoning, everything has a price and insurance companies are assuming more control by setting this price and by having the power to decide if the financial guarantee should be given after an event. With art, though, this argument is clouded as many high value pieces cannot be replaced and so while financial compensation is helpful, its significance lessens to an extent. To what degree this actually happens will be examined at the end of chapter 6.

Controlling risk is complicated by the inclusive nature, whether driven by financial or philanthropic motives, of parts of the art world, as well as the potential security weaknesses manufactured by the art world itself from loans and sales. In managing their risk, institutions look to ‘insure’ themselves. The crucial question is whether they also embrace this risk and, if so, how and why? (Baker and Simon 2002)
Moreover, while the insurance industry not only relies but thrives on ‘risk’, and society may be increasingly governed through crime (Ericson 2007, Simon 2007), who is leading this governance in the smaller sphere of the art world?

**Responsibility of institutions and the influence of insurance and the public sector**

Art institutions, worldwide, depend on the creation of risk through national and international loans and flows of art between each other, and private collectors, for their commercial survival. While this creation of risk can be seen negatively as it makes art more vulnerable, it can also be seen as a ‘good risk’ because of the potential profit (Lupton 1999:13). In line with Ewald’s (1991:208) view that “insurance allows enterprise” and Baker and Simon’s (2002) embracing of risk, insurance could be seen to be the driving force behind institutions taking ‘risks’ such as putting on blockbuster exhibitions with loans of art works moving around the world, even after previous thefts during loans.

As many institutions in London only charge for these temporary shows and do not charge for normal visits, they are very important. The money made can be used to pay for security for both permanent and temporary exhibitions, and can also enable galleries to show lots of different art that they would otherwise not be able to, including works of high cultural and financial value. It also encourages more regular return visits by the public, both paying visits and free ones.

Ironically, as insurance companies replace the public sector in providing a safety net for society, the public sector itself, which owns a lot of art in London, cannot afford commercial insurance, or at least cannot justify its expense, and is forced to exclude itself and art owned by the Crown. Its provision of its own safety net, through public sector funds, for its art and through the Government Indemnity Scheme for those works that are loaned to it, and also, importantly, the financial cover for non-public
sector owned art loaned in the ‘public interest’ to institutions (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2004), has parallels with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) ideas about those in society who have the ability to help assisting those with the least resources. As will be seen in chapters 3 and 7, by covering potential financial loss, the Scheme allows lenders and institutions to take ‘risk’ and, similar to the insurance industry, encourages the lending and displaying of art. One crucial aspect, and very relevant to Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) work, is that to qualify, the institution must be able to show that the art is being displayed in the public’s interest (Department of Culture, Media and Sport 2004). However, an important question arises: in offering a security guarantee done in the public interest and by encouraging the creation of flows of art, is public sector support in effect greasing the wheels for the neo-liberal nature of displaying art which involves both the minimising of risk (Denney 2005, Ewald 1991, Ericson 2000) as well as the necessary embracing of risks (Baker and Simon 2002) in the forms of temporary exhibitions and loans?

Also, while helping with insurance and offering guidelines and advice, the public sector does not actually fund the security, which still has to be proved to be at a sufficient level for the government to cover the insurance. Nevertheless, a crucial point is that the public sector does provide cover for a huge amount of art held and displayed in the ‘public interest’ and does so following an insurance model. The challenge is then to effectively situate the security in the spaces in which this art is kept, or into or out of which it is moved.

_Securitizing art and cultural spaces in the globalized city_

Tokyo and New York are not only leading centres of finance, and linked in many ways because this, but they act as ‘gateways’ for the entrance and exit of capital. The same cities perform a very similar role with art. While Castells (1996) argues that the global city is a network and not a place, Sassen (2001:349) points out that the global city is a “function of a network” and “also a place”.

With risk assessment of potential threats leading to inclusion and exclusion (Castells 2002, Garland 2001), Lupton (1999:145, 147) argues that the ‘fear of crime’ is now located in public spaces and the ‘excluded’ are managed, often ‘explicitly’, so they do not ‘pollute’ these areas. Rose (2000:329) also comments on the new ‘conceptions’ and ‘strategies’ as security takes over ‘space’. Many criminologists refer to Mike Davis’s study of Los Angeles. Written in 1990, his work is not only important because of how it shows the ways security can reconfigure a city in drastic ways, but also because much of what he describes, particularly the “proliferation of new repressions in space and movement” (Davis 1990:223), has now become the norm in cities throughout the world. Summing up this inclusive/exclusive character to the security of space, Castells (2002:348) uses the label, “sociospatial fragmentation”.

This strikes a chord with Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) ideas of inclusion/exclusion and segregation, and Soja’s (1989:150) “bounded enclosures” built on risk within society. In effect, what are created are “privately guarded fortified enclaves” or, as McLaughlin (2007:116) describes them, returning to Shearing’s work in the early 1980s, “security bubbles” and “security corridors” (Shearing et al 1980).

Existing globally and responding to the international fear of crime (Loader and Walker 2007, McLaughlin 2007), by managing risk with the creation of these bubbles and corridors, the insecurity in society as a whole increases because those spaces outside of these specific areas, whether they were perceived to be ‘risky’ before or not, now appear to be so. Rose (2000:329) calls it, “a spiral of
amplification of risk”. Cities are full of these “security bubbles”; examples including shopping centres, theme parks, holiday resorts (Reiner 2000, Johnston and Shearing 2006, Loader and Walker 2007, Shearing et al 1980, Wakefield 2003), universities, and locations with art.

Ericson (2007) takes Shearing’s (1980) ideas of “bubbles of governance” a step further and describes “streams of governance effectively managed by a multinational private security company” (Ericson 2007:184). In his example in Florida, the public are not only going from “bubble” to “bubble” but potentially do not actually leave the “stream” for any length of time.

How these bubbles and streams exist and are created within the cultural sector is particularly interesting. McLaughlin (2007:116) discusses the ideas put forward by Soja (1989) about cities having the status as nodes of the “globalized market economy”, and the civilising process of culture through the promotion of the “cultural city”. Cinti (2008:78,79) writes about “cultural clusters” within cities and the importance not only of culture to generate money for the local economy, but also local authorities’ use of culture for “territorial exploitation” in relation to regeneration projects. Costa (2008) concentrates on the idea of “creative cities” in which economic success and employment are created through “creative” industries and, similar to Cinti (2008), the use of culture in regional development and urban regeneration. London epitomises these concepts.

Some cultural institutions, themselves, follow the other areas of city life, at least for the middle and upper class citizens (Castells 2002), in being heavily securitized. Loader and Walker (2007) argue that as well as order, security nodes generate culture by creating or forming individual and collective identities. These are based on risk and pre-crime strategies to manage space.
A major role of policing becomes the ability to pinpoint potential security risks and then trying to eliminate them, or, as Ericson (2007:181) puts it, “The objective is to prevent crime and disorder from festering by monitoring every imaginable sore point”. Indeed, for Ericson (2007) criminology originated in the consideration of risks before they occurred. However, the level of surveillance in our society, particularly in Britain, is unprecedented. Where once it was discreet, it is now obvious. Haggerty and Ericson (2000:606) write of an “emerging surveillance assemblage” and argue that while Orwell (1949) wrote of surveillance being used for social control and Foucault (1977) of the panoptic surveillance controlling the ‘soul’, modern surveillance is carried out by both public sector and non-public sector actors and encompasses the whole of society.

In contrast to intrusive and controversial aspects of surveillance in society (Haggerty and Ericson 2000), with art, as chapter 3 will illustrate, surveillance in locations such as galleries, museums, churches and residences, does not appear to be controversial in the same way. This is probably due to the fact that it entails the observation of locations into which people do not have to enter but instead have chosen to, rather than the more intrusive surveillance of their lives and personal details. Furthermore, although surveillance ideas such as computer chips can be seen in a negative light in connection to human movement, it is possible that these surveillance methods can and should be seen in a positive light when used with art, for example, microchips on art works. Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ (1977), and Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000:606) “surveillant assemblage devoted to the disappearance of the disappearance” with its ending of human anonymity in society, can provoke controversy and fears over loss of privacy and social rights. However, with those trying to secure art from theft and damage also trying to achieve the ‘disappearance of the disappearance’, is it a contested issue in the same way? To analyse this properly, it is important to consider the security providers who are policing these spaces, as well as the wider configuration of the nodes undertaking the protection and security of art.
Security framework of art on display in London

For a number of reasons, the security framework which best describes the securitization and policing of art theft in London is one of nodal governance. The first reason is due to institutions creating “security bubbles” (Shearing et al 1980) and the forming of security corridors when art is transported or loaned. This aspect of nodal governance is not dissimilar to Crime Pattern Theory’s ‘nodes’, ‘paths’ and ‘edges’ and its consideration of the way items move along the ‘paths’ between locations or ‘nodes’ (Felson and Clarke 1998:6). London’s role as an international centre for buying and selling art also generates many temporary security bubbles and security corridors (or security paths). However, ideas of inclusion and exclusion are not as straightforward as with other areas of society because many locations are not only open to the public and often free to enter in contrast to most cities in the world, but they actively try to encourage the public to walk through their doors. In fact, they are a rarity in modern society in the way they welcome groups of children. What has needed further investigation is how this level of access into the security bubbles, permanent and temporary, affects security. Chapter 3 addresses this key issue when examining the impact of increased access on page 112.

Second, the policing matrix for art in London consists of many security nodes of varying size and shifting influence and impact. Often dependent on each other, they form a complex, pluralised securitization terrain that has no locus of power. Although a map or matrix can be constructed, the terrain cannot be simply defined because of, in line with Zedner’s (2006) arguments on liquid security, the fluidity of art theft and the often changing nodal response. However, it is worth mapping them to help in the examinations of their operations and potential innovations.

Pluralisation of security and nodal governance

The pluralisation of security has made much of the pre 2000 literature on ‘policing’ or ‘security governance’ now appear dated or even redundant (Ericson and Haggerty 1997:3). For example,
Johnston (Johnston and Shearing 2003) himself writes that his ideas of ‘hybridity’ (Johnston 1992) now fail to sufficiently describe modern security. More modern definitions are therefore necessary. With Clifford Shearing at the forefront of this literature, perhaps the clearest definition is Wood and Shearing’s (2007) definition of ‘nodes’ and their governance (on page 11).

Johnston and Shearing (2003) consider that there are eight general dimensions which provide the framework for security governance:

1. Who makes the rules?
2. What is the nature of the rules?
3. What is the focus of the governance?
4. Who implements/executes governance?
5. Modes of governance.
6. Processes of governance.
7. Technologies of governance.
8. Mentalities of governance.

(Johnston and Shearing 2003:22-30)

These are theoretical not ‘normative’. Johnston (2006), responding to criticism from Loader and Walker (2006), writes, “Nodal governance is a theoretical concept describing an ‘is’, not a normative one promulgating an ‘ought’. It is ‘normatively neutral’” (Johnston 2006:47). A key aspect to the theoretical framework is that it is not narrow; it can be used in a wide range of different normative ways (Johnston 2006). The eight dimensions, and the framework they provide, are crucial to this thesis’ examination and understanding of the art security terrain in London as nodal governance provides the most appropriate conceptual language for the security terrain.
McLaughlin (2007) makes the point that Shearing and colleagues do not seek to approve or disapprove of modern forms of ‘security governance’, nor do they call for either a return to public sector based governance or seek ‘radical socialist alternatives’, but argue that as public sector led security governance is not viable, the important thing, instead of looking back, is to formulate a strategy, “The aim must be to maximise the benefits of neo-liberal ‘nodal governance’ arrangements and minimise the ‘security deficits’” (McLaughlin 2007:94). With art in London, the public sector can, and does, take an important role in its own security. However, as will be shown in chapter 7, this is not happening through the role of the public police, but rather through the insurance guarantees that it provides both for its own art and art it indemnifies. This thesis considers whether this shift in governance has been intentional, if it really is a significant repositioning and whether, intentional or not, this might be the most effective way or the most effective position for the public sector within the nodal system.

The ‘fragmentation’ or ‘pluralisation’ of policing now receives attention both academically and in policy discourses (Button 2002, Jones and Newburn 1998, 2006, Johnston and Shearing 2003, McLaughlin 2007, Loader and Walker 2007), and it is widely accepted that the public sector is now one part of a network of security providers that, due to conditions rather than characteristics, exist today (Garland 2001, Johnston 2006, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Loader and Walker 2007). Loader and Walker (2007:120) consider it a “shift from the police towards policing, and more broadly, from government to governance”. Shearing et al (1980) go further and believe that the security challenges of late modernity, whether imagined or very real, have led to “a quiet revolution” in “private security” (Shearing et al 1980:1) or “security governance” as Johnston and Shearing (2003) call it, such has been the dramatic nature of change. In the UK, significantly more people are now employed in private than public policing (Button 2002, Ericson 2007, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Loader and Walker

With Johnston and Shearing (2003) proposing that this form of security has no locus of power, nodal governance works within a “complex terrain of regulatory space” (Johnston and Shearing 2003:148). Loader and Walker (2007) believe this replacement of the public sector is not driven by market forces or the individual, but by community and local democracy. Rose (2000) writes that community becomes a “means of government”. However, hierarchies do exist, and coexist, in this terrain of governance (Wood and Shearing 2007), so while governance may be described as ‘bottom up’ (Loader and Walker 2007), the diversity and complexity of, and the relationships between, the nodes make this description too clear in the unclear sphere of security. Wood and Shearing (2007:149) write, “There are multiple ‘tops’ and many ‘downs’ and they overlap”. Furthermore, while inequalities still clearly exist among the security nodes, power rests between them, not one over another. Brodeur (in Wood and Dupont 2006) argues that notions of nodal governance free up ideas on power and its effects, and break through ideas of centralisation or decentralisation. Brodeur writes that the pluralisation of security “does away with the single stuff mythology” (Wood and Dupont 2006:ix). In the securitization of art, this is illustrated by the adaptable, shifting position, influence and involvement of the security nodes.

**The public sector as a site of governance**

An important aspect of nodal governance is that the public sector can still be a very important site of governance (Johnston 2006). Similar to ideas of ‘collective good’ within security governance proposed by Loader and Walker (2007), Johnston (2006) writes:

“Proponents of the nodal model merely argue that with demonstrable evidence of nodal governance becoming more and more apparent, alternative opportunities may arise to
transform networked relations in ways that could, under the right conditions, advance just and
democratic outcomes” (Johnston 2006:34).

However, while they share the ideas of ‘collective good’ with proponents of nodal governance, Loader
and Walker (2007) believe the public sector should still be a controlling force rather than one node
among others. They call this type of security governance “anchored pluralism” in which the public
police acts as an anchor in a pluralised terrain of policing (Loader and Walker 2006:194).

Importantly for this thesis and its focus on art theft, much of the policing literature debates the issue on
the assumption that the public police either have the operational ability or wish to be an important
node or site of governance. An abdication of their role, if, or when it occurs, whether voluntary or
forced, leaves a gap that the fluid nature of pluralised security should quickly fill, and might be better
suited to fill. A crucial issue is how this plurality is managed and whether, in fact, it needs to be.

**Negative logic and managing plurality**

Discussing the loosening of the public sector’s primacy over security and the fragmentation in risk
management, Ericson and Haggerty (1997:86) characterise the collective and individual fear within
risk society as, “negative logic”. Johnston and Shearing (2003:141) counter this by arguing that, a
“Risk mentality can be compatible with just outcomes”. Loader and Walker (2007) also believe that
this need not be the case and that collectively, whether out of self-interest or altruism, security does
not have to be individual and negative. They believe that ideas of security are too binary (“us/them,
friends/enemies, inside/outside”) and result in a constant fear, or “institutionalized anxiety” (Loader
and Walker 2007:12).

Johnston (2000) poses the question of how can, “plurality be managed so as to ensure effective and
efficient administration while also maintaining desired standards of democratic accountability and
equity?” Johnston (2000:162). Loader and Walker (2007) argue that in neo-liberal societies the people with the least resources, and at greatest risk and need for security, are those who have the least chance of acquiring security. According to Johnston and Shearing (2003:143) the danger is that, “the poor get justice and the rich get security”. Shearing (2006:30) believes that, “What is required is the promotion of conditions that promote and support the construction of nodes, including super-structural nodes, that recognise and mobilise the resources of the weak in ways which strengthen their bargaining positions.” Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Shearing (2006) are writing about security in general and argue that this can be addressed through donor funds and tax resources being directed to those in society with fewer resources and by giving the poorer members of society access to security through means such as grants. This would help to narrow inequalities, which in turn would benefit everyone, from the rich to the poor. The better off would save more by reducing the security inequalities than by stretching them further (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Johnston and Shearing (2003) understand that for the rich to consider ‘accountability’ and ‘equity’ as important factors in security they need the personal incentive of attaining more security for themselves.

**Individual responsibility and insurance**

This incentive results in Garland’s (2001:203) call for more “collective regulation and moral restraint”, with its echoes back to the pre 1980s welfare state and ideas of provision for all, seem out of tune with the rush for exclusivity and personal security provision that characterise society today. Each of us is now our own risk assessor, responsible for our own security choices. Rose (2000:328) argues, “Each of us is to be our own rock”. When people in society need a safety net, many now turn to insurance, not the public sector (Ewald 1991, Lupton 1999).

In neo-liberal terms, risk taking can be viewed as central to both neo-liberal society and insurance, and essential to a vibrant economy and progressive society (Baker and Simon 2002, Denney 2005, Ewald
Beck (2009:138) makes the claim that, “For a whole era, the space of expansion of risk seemed to coincide with the space of insurability”. Ericson et al (2000:553) write, “Neo-liberalism fits comfortably with the economic individualism of private insurance, and they constitute each other in discourse and practice”. Ewald (1991) goes further and argues that insurance provides an antidote to fear from insecurity. Insurance “liberates man from fear” and encourages “enterprise” (Ewald 1991:208). He compares this feeling of security with religious faith (Ewald 1991). In contrast, Ericson et al (2000:550) are negative about public sector intervention being reduced generally and warn that, “Insurance becomes the institution of governance”. The insurance companies will continue to provide a safety net for those who can afford it. However, the danger is that the poor miss out, or as Ericson et al (2000:555) put it, “the rich can afford to self-insure, the poor can gamble in desperation”.

Doyle et al (2010:226) argue that, despite being the largest industry in the world, insurance “remains all but invisible to us sociologists and other academics, as well as to the public”. Doyle and his co-authors are convinced by the importance of insurance, and while criminological discourse is now recognising the huge role of the industry in modern policing and security matrices, there are very different perspectives. For example, while Ericson et al (2000) are mostly negative towards the growth of the role of insurance from their research into North American insurers, Baker and Simon (2002) and Ewald (1991) view the industry as potentially positive. Examined in detail in chapter 6, and indeed throughout the thesis, a major issue concerns how the art insurance industry in London operates in relation to these, at times, opposing views. Does insurance offer opportunities for locations with art? Does it provide, manage, control or govern security? If it is shown to control or govern security, then interesting questions arise over many of the predominant criminological theories of security governance, and, more specifically, concerning the securitization and policing of art and art spaces in London.
Considering security at the general level, while the role of the insurance companies is increasing, the public sector’s partnerships with citizens, companies and communities characterise public policing. These “preventative partnerships” encourage people and communities to police themselves (Garland 2001:17). This is in line with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) and Shearing and Wood’s (2007) ideas within nodal governance that, while still very much based on risk, the “problem solvers” in security are from within a particular community not from outside (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Johnston 2006, Shearing and Wood 2007).

The issue is how the ‘local’ community deals with this obligation (Rose 2000). And, if every individual is encouraged to take an active role in their own personal security (Lupton 1999), how are conflicting interests, due to the possible existence of many publics, married into effective local policing? Are these ‘communities’ built on competing risks or collective interests? (Johnston and Shearing 2003:141) Do the majority have the best interests of everyone in that community? Why do those who choose to assume the responsibility, do so? Do the ‘communities’ want to assume responsibility? Do they have the desire and/or resources? In analysing policing theses, Loader and Walker (2007:136) criticise Johnston and Shearing (2003) about their use of the term ‘public interest’ without being more specific about what and how it is ‘constituted’. Shearing (2006), aware of this, wrote that he accepted, “albeit reluctantly” that the usefulness of the concept of “public interest” had passed.

Concerning art security, Kisluk (1999), from the Art Loss Register, agrees that self-policing within the art world, with dealers and buyers checking databases, would increase the risk for thieves and decrease profitability by reducing avenues for sale. She argues, “It will become riskier and less profitable to steal art so why steal it” (Kisluk 1999:4). Regarding Australia, Polk (1999) believes in the potential of
prevention methods and called for an Art Loss Register style database to be introduced. In line with Felson’s (2002) ideas that crime opportunities are engendered by stolen goods markets, Sutton (1998, 2001) argues that middlemen, in this case art dealers, are ‘crime facilitators’ and should be targeted. Polk (1999) believes that dealers and auction houses have a great responsibility, and argues, “An art market well mobilised to respond quickly to both thefts and questions of faking and authenticity will be difficult to penetrate by any but the most sophisticated and knowledgeable criminal scheme” (Polk 1999:3). The level of reporting of stolen art has increased in the US and Europe. This is due in part to the number of databases that now exist, many of which are open to the public (Kisluk 1999). However, at present, as well as being ‘facilitators’, some dealers and auction houses could be labelled as ‘crime generators’ (Felson 2002:24) where they change from being settings of legal activities to become ‘crime attractors’ which are settings that attract offenders (Brantingham and Brantingham 1998, 1999 in Felson 2002:24).

However, although the level of reporting and use of databases may have increased, the reality is that art continues not only to be stolen, but to pass through legitimate auction houses and dealers (Tijhuis 2006). Also, while the public’s role is important in making sure they are informed customers and by being able to judge the adequacy of provenances, this is not always easy due to the lack of regulation with issues concerning provenances, such as illicit art being laundered onto the licit market (Massy 2008). Much of the policing still needs to be undertaken by agencies which have specific expertise and formal policing and investigative powers.

**Reconceptualising the role of the Public Police**

The globalisation of art crimes means that transnational policing is crucial. However, security governance at national level is the paramount concern. Undertaken by both public and private sectors, there are numerous issues surrounding art in which a huge array of situations exist; for example, public
sector owned art privately policed or policed by guards who are public sector employees in a public building; privately owned art in a public sector owned building policed by public sector employees or private security; privately owned art in a private building policed privately; and security corridors appearing and disappearing due to loans and sales. These concerns with art match general issues in modern security governance and include conflicts of interests within private/public, public/public, private/private relationships in the security terrain (Jones and Newburn 1998, Johnston and Shearing 2003); regulatory divergences between private and public sectors (Ericson 2007, Ericson 2007b, McShane 2006, Shearing and Stenning 1981); prioritisation, usually due to resources, within the policing nodes (Button 2002, Reiner 2000b, Wright 2002); and there are issues over loss prevention versus crime prevention (Jones and Newburn 1998, Johnston 2000, Shearing et al 1980).

In policing generally, and art theft specifically, on different occasions the public and other nodes in the security terrain still need to rely on the public police due to the formal policing powers and capacities the node retains. However, the complexity and adaptability of modern crime poses ever greater challenges to the public police (Bowman 2008, O’Connor 2005). This is highlighted by crime in which financial transactions occur without the perpetrator having to touch the money or be in the country where the crime occurs (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). With art theft, the crucial question over the role of the modern public police service arises again: What is the level of public police interest in and understanding of art theft and do they have the resources to deal with the crime appropriately?

While the public police have, to some extent, adapted to modern challenges by, for example, creating the Serious and Organised Crime Agency and Special Crime Directorates, it is in the ‘social imaginary’ that they still exist (Loader and Walker 2007). Reiner (2000b) argues that they “monopolized the concept of policing” in both the academic and the popular mind (Reiner 2000b:208). Most people learn about the public police from the media rather than from direct personal experience.
(Skogan 1994 in Mawby 2002, Leishman and Mason 2003) and fictional television programmes have a big impact and can greatly distort the public’s reality (Reiner 2000, McLaughlin 2007). While this can lower expectations by damaging the cultural construction about who the public police actually are (McLaughlin 2007), this can raise people’s expectations about what the public police do, what they can achieve, and can present them as necessary (Reiner 2000). It can also increase the expectations of the public police themselves (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). If expectations are indeed raised, while this can legitimise the role of the public police in the public’s view, it can also make the job of the public police more difficult. They can either accept this or view it as a threat (Leishman and Mason 2003). This is very important in regards to the media portrayal of art theft, and even more so for the public’s expectations of the public police when art is stolen.

Examining how this node works operationally is important to this thesis because of the formal policing powers the public police retains within the pluralised art security terrain. The fact that it is only one part of a complex system of social control (Johnston and Shearing 2003, McLaughlin 2007), an idea which in the UK goes back to the research of Banton in 1964 (see page 67), is very significant for this thesis and an important reason why more research is needed into this security arena.

CONCLUSION

The global risk society which characterises modern life relies on securitization. The governance of this security or “policing”, internationally and nationally, is a complex knit of agencies, public and private, with different motivations. It is clear that the security landscape has undergone dramatic changes and is now more complex than ever. The limits of the level of control the public sector can hope to have in crime control and its ability to provide effective security have been exposed (Garland 2001, Johnston 2006, Johnston and Shearing 2003). The discourse has moved on and, not only can public and private now not be defined by ‘loss’ and ‘crime’ labels, but also ‘public’ and ‘private’ are labels that are
losing their relevance as security governance is now made up of complex relationships between varied security providers. McLaughlin (2007:94) writes, “emergent post-state modes of governance are relational, contingent, overlapping and multi-sited”. The securitization and policing of art theft in London exemplifies this with its complex matrix of security providers, involving private and public sector, and ‘community’ policing, which coexist and produce a security and response network. It has many of the characteristics present in theories on policing in the globalized risk society and also has facets and conditions which test these theories.

The securitization and policing of art provides an example of how security nodes form a matrix, and, very importantly, this matrix adapts as the stratification of the nodes changes. For example, due to its encouragement of cultural spaces, the flows of art it helps to create, and its own large amount of art, the public sector still has a position in the network. So, while in one area, public policing, the public sector has taken a smaller role, it still retains a large amount of influence. This, in line with the overlapping of nodes and the fluidity of nodal governance, appears to have had a limiting impact, to an extent, on the escalating influence of the insurance industry.

Much of what we know about art theft through the limited existing material is useful: Why it matters; the risks to art; the extent, nature and patterns of the thefts; the perpetrators and their motivations; and the securitization and policing issues and responses. However, there remains a lack of criminological research and a shortage of empirical evidence. The few criminologists to have researched this specific area have addressed the subject using criminological theories such as Routine Activity Theory (Conklin 1994, Mackenzie 2005, Polk 1999) and Market Reduction Approach (Mackenzie 2005). They have managed to give an overview of art theft, whether global or national, and, to an extent, its securitization, but they have not situated the subject on a specific location such as a capital city.
Rather than being viewed as a handicap, a lack of previous research on art security, the insurance industry, and nodal governance in practice should be seen as even more reason for conducting empirical research in an area brimming with theoretical discourse. It is important because there is a need for more examinations of how policing theories, particularly nodal governance, work in actual settings; and, also, due to the appeals from many of the nodes within art security for more academic research to be undertaken. An art detective who has worked for both public and private policing agencies argues that academia can have a key role by putting:

“before government and law enforcement accurate measurements of the scale of the problem and a well-educated argument to persuade them that there are benefits to be had by investigating and treating cultural property crime as a serious issue, recovering it and closing the door to criminals using art and antiques at an international level to fund crime internationally” (Art Detective 2).

In contrast to the lack of research on art security, art crime and, specifically, art theft in London, there is significant research literature on policing. However, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argued fifteen years ago that, “While research literature on policing is proliferating, it is also increasingly redundant and stagnant”. They believed there was a need to, “undertake more thorough analyses of the purposes and consequences of [contemporary] policing” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997:3).

By focusing on one city’s complex security terrain, this thesis sheds more light on the securitization and policing of art theft in London and also art theft in general because it can go into more detail into the securitization within locations, the nodes that make up the policing matrix, how the security terrain works in practice, the position and role of the public sector and insurance industry (including their driving of the self-policing of art with the ‘community’), and the eight general dimensions that Johnson and Shearing (2003) believe form the framework for security governance.
This chapter has examined the available data sources, from theory to the empirical problematic that exists in London concerning the securitization and policing of art. Building on this existing knowledge, the thesis uses research conducted in the field to examine how risk can be co-produced and security situated; how a policing thesis, nodal governance, can work in an actual policing arena; how the private sector, particularly insurance, can drive security and create conditions for a vibrant art world; and, overall, to examine how the securitization and policing is co-produced.

Becker (1982) wrote that:

“I think it is generally true that sociology does not discover what no one ever knew before, in this differing from the natural sciences. Rather, good social science produces a deeper understanding of things that many people are already pretty much aware of” (Becker 1982:x).

This thesis has kept this very much in mind as it is bringing together a large amount of existing knowledge, or different ‘awarenesses’, from many sources in the aim of constructing and spreading a deeper and wider comprehension about how art security, particularly concerning art theft, is presently being produced in London.
CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

While research on insurance (Baker and Simon 2002, Ericson 2007, Ewald 1991), environmental criminology (Felson and Clarke 1998, Felson, 2002, 2003, Lane et al 2008) and the work of criminologists (such as Johnston 1992, 2000, 2006; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing 2006; Shearing and Stenning 1981, 1985, 1987; Wood and Shearing 2007) on policing- especially nodal governance- provides the theoretical framework for this thesis, an effective methodological framework was also needed. This chapter examines the methodological approach, the research experience, and research dilemmas.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Due to the limited amount of empirical evidence and lack of previous research on the securitization and policing of art theft in London, a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) was initially at the heart of this thesis.

There is debate among its proponents over how it should be conducted and whether some approaches have become too proscriptive (Bottoms 2000, Charmaz 2006, Glaser 1992, Strauss and Corbin 1990). However, in line with Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) ideas on starting research from a general subject and sociological view, and not with a preconceived theory, the research began with the broad subject of art theft. Borrowing Charmaz’s (2006:14) analogy, “Like a camera with many lenses, first you view a broad sweep of the landscape. Subsequently, you change your lens several times to bring scenes closer and closer into view”, I chose to focus in on one location, London. I also decided to concentrate the research from the angle of securitization and policing rather than the perpetrators of the crimes or specific case studies of locations. Though it is fascinating to focus on who is stealing the art, it is an
approach that can lead to the research being outdated before it is even written up. As Bowman (2008) writes, “Transnational crime is a moving target- where it is today is not where it may be tomorrow. It does not hold still for its scholarly portrait to be painted” (Bowman 2008:227).

Following ideas of the researcher as ‘Bricoleur’ (Denzin and Lincoln 1993), mixed qualitative methods were employed, comprising of interviews, complete observation, and complete participant and participant as observer research. Collins (2008:32) on researching violence believes that, “we need as many angles of vision as possible to bear on the phenomenon”. This is also the case in the under researched area of art theft, and the reason why I entered the field and took this multi-angled methodological approach. Whether this was ethnographic in the most anthropological sense is open to debate, but I took Hobbs’s (2006) idea of ethnography as, "the product of a cocktail of methodologies that share the assumption that the personal engagement with the subject is the key in understanding a particular culture or social setting" (Hobbs 2006: 101). I wanted to avoid wrapping up warm in the “criminologist’s new clothes” (Ferrell et al 2008:172) and “abstract empiricism” (Young 2011:viii). To borrow the much quoted line from Park (Park 1950 in Bulmer 1984: 97), I needed to, “get the seats of my pants dirty in real research”.

The analytical framework (Hughes 1994) was constructed around the nodes involved in the policing and securitization terrain within London. Though it emerged slowly, this proved to be the most effective way of researching, collecting and analysing data within categories. A lack of rigidity allowed for these categories to change, link up, be removed altogether, or to emerge as key issues. This flexibility was crucial as significant changes occurred during the research. This approach was stimulating, especially as a number of important categories and themes emerged and developed into crucial issues having initially not appeared to be so, and vice versa.
At the beginning of the research, the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1990) allowed theory to emerge and shaped my research into investigating, first, the co-production of risks, in which I examined the situating of the risk and the situating of the security, and, second, the co-production of security. Bryman and Burgess (1994:220) argue that, “it is questionable whether it (grounded theory) is employed by researchers in its entirety”. This was certainly true of this thesis as the aims listed in chapter one emerged after a year of research and it was at this point that both the theoretical and analytical framework were given much more solid foundations.

While this thesis initially used a grounded theory approach, it did not jettison data (Richards and Richards 1994); the data was highly important and was not just useful for the creation of ideas. While it may be counter to classic grounded theory to keep all the data and return to it (Richards and Richards 1994), this proved very beneficial. As the researcher, I not only regularly considered the methods, theory and analysis that I was undertaking, but I also had to use them for self-analysis, and it was through turning them back on myself that I gained a far greater awareness of the research. Writing about art, Barthes (2000:73) argues that, “Depth is born only at the moment the spectacle itself slowly turns its shadow toward man and begins to look at him”. In effect, the essential reflexivity within grounded theory allows for this shadow to be recorded.

When Wood’s (2006:230) proposed methodology for research and innovation within a nodal governance framework emerged as the most appropriate, my methods shifted from grounded theory. Wood’s methodology consists of three main phases: first, empirically map existing nodes and networks; second, assess their operations; and third, design and tailor innovations.
Research field

Academics often do not have the chance to conduct research in their desired, or most suitable, location (De Walt and De Walt 2002). However, the opposite has been the case for this thesis. London is one of the best sites in the world to address research questions on art security as it is a global centre with thousands of locations with art, especially art on display. The city’s emergence as being central to the research question was directly linked to this fact.

As far as the location nodes in the field were concerned, theoretical saturation (Charmaz 2006, Strauss and Corbin 1990) was extremely hard to achieve. So important in grounded theory, this difficulty, or impossibility, was due to the huge number of nodes. This was a reason for the lens (Charmaz 2006) primarily focusing on the securitization and policing stakeholders instead of case studies of individual locations.

Sample

With the sample, my aim was to be as representative of the London art security terrain as I could. Theoretical sampling, sorting and theoretical saturation (Bottoms 2000, Charmaz 2006, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1990, Seale 1999), involving data collection being, “controlled by emerging theory” (Glaser and Strauss 1967:32) and “comparative analysis” (Glaser and Strauss 1967:52), led to the research focusing on a sample of types of nodes:

1. The public and private sector policing and securitization nodes involved with art theft in London.
2. Locations in London in which art resides.
Interviews

33 interviews were conducted.

- **Insurance Companies** - Interviews were conducted with four of the leading London insurance companies involved with art insurance. Owing to choosing universal anonymity in the thesis, more details cannot be given.

- **Art Detectives (private sector)** - Interviews were conducted with four art detectives. All worked for the public police (three in the MPS Art and Antiques Unit and one for another police force) before joining the private sector. Their work includes prevention, detection, recovery, and consultancy.

- **Locations** - Seven interviews with employees (three Heads of Security, a Collection Security co-ordinator, a curator, an employee, and a volunteer). Their employment locations were two national galleries, a large national museum, a large public library, a commercial gallery, a midsized museum and a historic house.

- **Loss Adjusters** - Two interviews with two leading art loss adjusters. Loss adjusters have a varied role which includes assessing and managing risk; investigations; recoveries; resolving claims; providing the link within insurance, and with policy holders, before and after thefts; and also using other public and private nodes when it is appropriate and beneficial.

- **Public Police** - One interview with the (now ex) Head of the MPS Arts and Antiques Unit.
  - One interview with the Head of the Heritage Crime Initiative. The initiative is led by English Heritage, ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).
  - One interview with an MPS officer who does not work with art or cultural policing issues.

- **Private Companies/ Databases** - Two interviews with the two main databases in the UK and one interview with a private company that set up an art investigation division.

- **Installation Company** - Four interviews with an art installation company with whom I also conducted Complete participant and Participant as observer research. The company has two
full-time installers, but it frequently uses more for larger installation jobs. For example, it is not unusual to have six people working at one location.

- **Government Agencies** - One interview with the National Security Adviser. According to him, now based in the Arts Council England his role involves policing the Government Indemnity Scheme and making sure the items that belong to the nation, loaned to the nation from abroad, also loaned out from national museums, are held in safe and secure environments. He also makes sure that national institutions receiving items under Acceptance in Lieu (see page 216) have adequate safety and security for the items. Moreover, his role is to spread and share information on behalf of all national institutions and the wider community (National Security Adviser).

  - One interview with the Head of the Acquisitions, Exports and Loans Unit (AELU). The Unit manages the issuing of export licences for art and antiques.

  - One interview with HMRC Trusts and Estates who administer the Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive (see page 223).

- **INTERPOL** - One interview (by email) with the Co-ordinator of INTERPOL’s Works of Art (WOA) Department.

- **Artists** – Two interviews with well-known artists.

  - One interview (by email) with a convicted forger who has worked with the public police.

Some of the interviewees work for a number of different agencies/ companies. I have listed them under their primary role. I have allocated a number to all of them. For example, **Art Detective 1, 2, 3, 4; Insurer 1, 2, 3, 4; Loss Adjuster 1, 2; Head of Security 1, 2, 3** and so forth. In the data chapters, unless I need to be more specific, they are referred to by their role and a number. The interviews are referenced either **Art Detective 1** or ((Art Detective 1)).
Observation

Locations- 50 sites were visited. Owing to the importance of spatial and temporal factors on crime opportunities (Felson and Clarke 1998), many included repeat visits.

- 7 National galleries/museums
- 8 Art museum/galleries (including galleries run by the commercial sector where the art is open to public with the primary aim of displaying the art for public consumption not sale)
- 4 Commercial galleries
- 6 Foreign galleries in Holland, Spain, and France
- 3 Churches
- 3 Cathedrals
- 5 Members’ clubs/societies
- 1 Art Fair
- 8 Private residences (including 2 outside of London)
- 1 Historic house
- 1 National library
- 2 areas in which there is a cluster of art locations
- 1 area in which there is a cluster of jewellery locations

For referencing, the National galleries/museums category is Nationals 1, 2, 3, 4 and so forth, the Art museum/galleries category is Art Gallery 1, 2, 3, 4 etc.

Observational research (Complete participant and Participant as observer)

This was undertaken in the art installation company (formerly a transportation and installation company) for which I had previously worked on a part-time basis prior to the research (see list of interviewees on page 64). The research occurred at sporadic intervals, reflecting the amount of work
offered to me and, also, my own availability. I have changed their name to ACE when presenting my findings.

**Direction of approach**

The thesis examined the securitization and policing of art theft in London from the viewpoint that while parts of the network are not working well, some art security is proving to be effective. Instead of taking the common sociological approach of researching primarily why something is failing, the thesis also analyses what is working. It can be argued that Banton (1964) pioneered this approach as he saw the value in potentially learning from what works well in successful institutions.

**Previous knowledge of the field**

Many researchers have previous experience of their social worlds; for example, Burgess (2000) as a teacher and Becker’s jazz experience for Outsiders (1963). Prior to undertaking this research, my personal experience of working in the art world, transporting and installing art, gave me an insight available to few. Previous professional experience meant I had a larger “knowledge base and insight” (Strauss and Corbin 1990:42). However, being on the ‘inside’ is also a physical and mental space from which you can fail to see the obvious. For example, Maupassant’s immense dislike of the Eiffel Tower was apparently such that in spite of not liking the food he often ate lunch in its restaurant because it was the only place in Paris from where he could not see the tower (Barthes 2000). I was aware that being ‘inside’ could also block me from seeing something, however large or small, that had become ‘routine’ or obvious (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

It was for this reason that, using grounded theorists’ argument that the approach should be used flexibly (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Charmaz 2006), I decided to begin the formal research with the literature review. This was despite some researchers arguing that the literature review should be
delayed (Charmaz 2006). I believe that much of my thesis would not have emerged or developed in
the manner it did if I had not conducted a thorough analysis of the literature. So, while Strauss and
Corbin (1990:50) argue that there is, “no need to review all the literature beforehand”, I tried to
analyse all the available academic literature on art theft given that its quantity is limited. However,
mindful of the reasons why grounded theorists often delay the literature, I followed Becker’s
(1986:148) advice to, “use the literature, don’t let it use you”.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Conducting the Interviews

In the social sciences, there is a lot of discourse around interviews. There are strengths and weaknesses
to the different methods, especially concerning interpretation. An important aspect is that in my role as
researcher, I was aware and understood this (May 2001) and realised that involvement in the
methodological and philosophical debates can improve the quality of the research (Seale 1999).

Interviews provided a great opportunity in this thesis to not only attain information, but to construct
knowledge (Fontana and Frey 2000, Holstein and Gubrium 2002, Kvale 1996). Rather than more
restrictive standardized questioning (Hopf 2004, May 2001), in-depth semi-structured interviews were
used as they allowed me to probe for more information (Charmaz 2006, May 2001). Bourdieu (1993)
argues that by asking the same questions to everyone, the researcher is assuming that a consensus
exists on what the problems are. In attempting to encourage unexpected data to emerge, broad, open
ended questions were used and then followed by more focused questions (Charmaz 2006). This meant
the “field of inquiry” was not limited (Fontana and Frey 2000:653) and categories emerged and were
developed. This reflexivity was shared by many within the process and the interviews were often
“active interactions” (Fontana and Frey 2000:653).
Relationship with Interviewees

During the interviews, it was important to try and remain neutral (McLaughlin 2007:48, Holstein and Gubrium 2002). However, with research of this type relying on a level of rapport both in the interviews (May 2001) and to attain them in the first place, I was conscious that this neutrality could not become disengagement. With interviews being interpersonal situations (Kvale 1996), establishing decent relationships with the interviewees was very important (Maguire 2000) and I felt that on most occasions I achieved this fairly successfully by appearing interested, knowledgeable and professional in my approach. How I presented myself (Fontana and Frey 2000), and was perceived, was very important, especially as the field has very few academic researchers. While not trying ‘to be’ like them - I remained very much an “outside outsider” (Reiner 2000b:222) - I was aware of the importance of small factors that could create a favourable or poor impression from the start. For example, aware of the problems in researching up, showing my gratitude for their taking the time to speak to me was important, especially as many of them were not only extremely busy but also acted as gatekeepers (King and Wincup 2000). I was also conscious that I would be contacting many of them again in the future and that, as a researcher, I had a responsibility to other academics not to close future research opportunities by my actions.

Observational research

Anderson (2009:372) quotes Becker from a sociology seminar, “when the people we study cannot recognise themselves in our representations of them, we need to rethink our approaches, and pay close attention to what they say and what they do”. In order to try and gain the most accurate representation of the art security world, I chose to conduct observational research as well as the interviews.
Very aware of the problematic issues with the terms “ethnography” and “participant observation” being used interchangeably or as cognate terms (Forsey 2010:559), I used three differing observation approaches: “complete observer”, “complete participant” and “participant as observer” (Burgess 2000:81, 82; Junker 2004:224). The different types of observation improved both the quality and the interpretation of the data (De Walt and De Walt 2002). While it might seem contradictory to the visual nature of the term, one valuable aspect of the “observational” research was the importance of listening, or “seeing voices” (Forsey 2010:562), as well as observing visually.

**Complete observer**

Going into the field as a “complete observer” (Burgess 2000:81, 82; Junker 2004:224) gave me the opportunity to collect a large amount of data first hand. In line with participant observation, it was critical that as a researcher I was “seeing” as much as possible (De Walt and De Walt 2002). Tools such as maps and floor plans in institutions were helpful (De Walt and De Walt 2002). Very aware of the importance of locality on the cultural space of the city (Cinti 2008, McLaughlin 2007, Soja 1989), and, more generally, time and space in crime opportunities (Felson and Clarke 1998), I visited a large sample of locations. Despite my choices in the complete observation research being unavoidably shaped to some extent by my own subjectivity, it provided more triangulation concerning important aspects; for example, the size, ownership, geographical location (for example, proximity to the centre of the city), the ‘importance’ of the location, the quality and ‘value’ of the art, the kinds of works of art on display, the different levels and methods of security, and the type of access allowed.

Repeat visits were undertaken so that observation was carried out in similar and under different conditions. This gave more depth to the already emerged categories and allowed new ones to develop. This temporal dimension in my data collection was important, as was a more historical consideration
of time (Katz 2010). The V & A is a good example with its changes in security after thefts in 2006 and its insider thefts from 1930 to 1954 (Arup 2009, V & A 2009).

In relation to ideas on inclusion/exclusion, restrictive access (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Soja 1989) and “security bubbles” and “security corridors” (Shearing et al 1980:1, McLaughlin 2007), observing and being in these spaces was valuable for the purpose of investigating and analysing the policing and securitization within; and, also, with it being easier to put your nose to a £50 million Titian or Picasso painting than to step on the grass on a visit to Mickey Mouse (Shearing and Stenning 1985, 1987), to observe and note the flows and movements of people in the locations.

Burgess (2000) and De Walt and De Walt (2002) argue that participant observation complements interviews and vice versa. In this thesis, the various types of observation were valuable in this way, especially as interviews were conducted from information attained from observation, and vice versa; for example, I would go to locations at the time and day they were, according to a number of interviewees, apparently most at threat.

Complete participant and Participant as observer

My role as an art installer gave me the opportunity to collect data in natural settings (Burgess 2000, De Walt and De Walt 2002) in which members of the public do not have access. It also allowed me to conduct participant observation in a multi-site field (Hannerz 2003).

I was a “complete participant” in regards to the people who worked in the locations. They were unaware that as well as being an art installer I was also a researcher. While in some research areas this might have made it very difficult to ask them questions (Burgess 2000), I was fortunate that the nature
of my role meant that not only was I occasionally able to ask them specific security questions, but sometimes I was actually required to ask these questions as part of my job.

I took the role of “Participant as observer” with my colleagues (Bryman 2008). I had known them for many years prior to my research and they were aware of my identity as a criminologist and my research plans, so being covert with them was not an option. While my identity was primarily that of art installer colleague, and they were more concerned that the job I was doing with them was being done professionally, occasionally they also took on the role of researcher and pointed out details to me. This would have happened, though, even if I were not a researcher, because the job of installing art entails good practice and it is normal to watch out for inadequate procedure.

Overt with my colleagues but covert with the locations, the concept of ‘going native’ was not a large problem because while I remained ‘one of the lads’ with my co-workers, socialising with them out of work hours, they and their actions were not the primary focus within this part of the research and, therefore, I avoided some of the problems entailed in researching friends (Ward 2008). Furthermore, as it was unusual for our company to work more than one or two days at each location, I could not go ‘native’ in these settings.

Recording data

*Interviews:* The interviews were conducted in museums, offices, cafes, bars, a park, someone’s house, over the telephone and by sending questions via email on two occasions. There were advantages and disadvantages to many of the settings. For example, while cafes and bars could be noisy and affect the quality of the sound recording, the interviewees tended to feel at ease in these settings. Museums and offices were convenient for the interviewees, and even in these locations, the interviews were often held in the on-site cafe. This convenience for interviewees was very important, especially in line with
interviewing up and the ‘giving’ of their time. The option of not recording the interview was offered to all. Those who did not wish to be recorded were happy for me to take notes. I emphasised the fact that it was academic research and that they could notify me if they did not wish for something they were saying to be recorded or noted. Occasionally, I was told opinions or ‘facts’, “off the record”. A number of times I was told, ‘Don’t write this down...but…”, and asked, pointing at the voice recorder, “is that turned off?” before information was divulged. While these conversations provided insight, they were not included in the data. Some interviewees asked for their names to be withheld and I agreed to this. During the writing up process, I opted for universal anonymity, even for those people who had not specifically requested it. I felt that this was important so as not to give the impression that some people and their information were more important. There were a few cases, such as with the National Security Adviser, where it was impossible not to be obvious with the identity of the interviewee.

I was very conscious of the power of the voice recorder to influence and frame the interview. Maguire (2000:138) believes people are “instinctively resistant” to its use. How I handled this potential ‘resistance’ was important and I tried hard to immediately put the interviewees at ease. Reiner (2000b) discusses the initial alarm a recorder can provoke and how this can be addressed by being prepared to turn it off when asked. Like Reiner, I found that this was rarely necessary, but followed his tips in making it very clear to the interviewees that I was happy to turn it off at any point and by noting the points that caused the “concern” (Reiner 2000b:224). At the end of the interviews, I purposefully made it very obvious that I was turning off the recorder and putting it away. This then led to a number of very interesting conversations which, though they could not be used for data, gave me very useful insight.

I found that although voice recordings did appear to make many of my interviewees more mindful of what they were saying (Maguire 2000), the opposite occurred with a few people. They appeared
encouraged by the voice recorder and wanted to make certain that I had recorded everything they said. While this produced rich data, I had to be aware about why they might be keen to express their opinions. This is considered on page 79 when considering validity and reliability.

**Observation:** Notes were taken throughout the visits to locations. In museums and galleries, I made no attempt to hide my note taking but I did try to avoid drawing attention to myself in the way I was observing security aspects. In smaller settings, I would make mental notes and wait until I left the premises before writing them down.

Though framed by emerging categories, the notes were varied and I attempted to record even those things which at first appeared not wholly relevant. Methodological and theoretical notes were included alongside the observations.

**Complete participant and Participant as observer research:** In line with Lofland and Lofland (1995), I would take down simple notes or key phrases. I made certain that people who worked for the locations did not witness any obvious note taking. This was easy as during a standard day there might only be a couple of noteworthy instances and these could be scribbled down in the toilet (Reiner 2000b) or on the back of the Post-It notes used in my work as an art installer to note measurements, numbers, locations of pictures, and as markers during the actual hanging of pictures. These would then trigger my memory when I was able to make more detailed notes. These notes were very important for Hagan’s (2010:186) succinct reason that, “The palest ink is clearer than the best memory”.

**Analysing the data**

The analysis of the data was critical to both the development and findings of the thesis. Collected from interview notes, transcriptions and the observation field notes, the rich data allowed for detailed
analysis which involved the coding, re-coding and indexing of categories, sub categories and themes. Open sampling and open coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990) were the most appropriate methods with which to begin the analysis. This allowed codes to emerge and for the descriptive to lead to the interpretative. Similar to the importance of personally transcribing the interviews, it was imperative for the generation of the theory that it was me doing the sampling and coding (Glaser 1978).

In the open coding stage, 78 codes were ultimately developed through a process during which I kept returning to decode and encode the data. This involved creating codes from initial tags and then, through comparison across the data, combining data within wider codes. In the axial coding stage, 17 categories and subcategories emerged which then formed 9 major themes. After initially appearing to be very important, a number of categories which could have been major themes were side lined. For example, although organised crime appears in the literature and was spoken about in many interviews, the lack of evidence (except for the involvement of the Johnson family and the head of the Adams family apparently having stolen art on his walls) meant that it did not emerge as a key theme in the research. With 9 themes formed, this was the stage that would usually have led to the development and emergence of theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2008); however, in my research this was when nodal governance emerged as the theoretical framework that fitted the co-production of art security, and it was at this point that my methods shifted from grounded theory to using a pre-ordained theory and Wood’s (2006:230) methodology.

I was aware that within the coding of the interview data, as in the whole process, there would always be a “residue of ambiguity” (Fontana and Frey 2000:645 in Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Moreover, I was mindful that my personality would also affect the process and, ultimately, my coding would be subjective (Saldana 2009). Memos (Glaser 1978) were also important in both theory generation and reflection. Though aware of the benefits of programmes such as NVivo and NUD*IST, the coding of
the data was done manually on hard copies along with a codebook. This was because it could be conducted without having to negotiate access issues to specific computers. Tags and initial codes were generated with words in the margins which were then recoded on new hard copies. Categories and subcategories were later noted in the margins with the use of words, and then themes with highlighter pens. This process might appear old fashioned; however, it was accessible, practical and effective.

**RESEARCH DILEMMAS**

**Access**

This thesis deals with research ‘up’ and the obvious question arises: why would people talk and share their knowledge? A key issue was entering into three closed areas - the art world, the public police and private security - into which, historically, it has been difficult to gain access. The use of gatekeepers was very important (King and Wincup 2000) and it was only through building up an element of trust about my research and my role as researcher before, during and after interviews that certain interviewees passed me other people’s contact details or agreed to contact them on my behalf. This is emblematic of the nature of research up, in which the researcher is reliant on the interviewee and not vice versa, and relationships are needed to gain interviews. Persistence paid off in a number of cases in which the person was either difficult to track down or too busy to meet. Flexibility and patience were needed; for example, although interviewing via email is far from an ideal method, it did mean that access was gained in two cases.

While being inconvenient, issues involving access and my role as researcher were not only very important to the thesis, but to some extent actually helped the research (May 2001). The complexity of power relations (Foucault 1982) was apparent before, during and after the interview process. For example, in one sense I was researching ‘up’ when conducting an interview with someone who had, or
previously had, ‘power’; however, for certain interviewees, my role in academia and the potential publishing of findings gave me some ‘power’ as well. My dependence on them for information meant they retained their ‘status’, but it created an interesting dynamic, one which, perhaps naively, I was not expecting.

The unpredictable nature of researching and gaining access to powerful institutions was evident in this thesis. A polite refusal was common, for example, from the auction houses and some galleries. However, often a direct approach resulted in crucial nodes agreeing to be interviewed. Overall, the thesis was characterised by an unexpectedly positive response to interview requests. Many of the main nodes involved in the policing and securitization agreed to talk to me. Though this direct approach was often successful, in the similar way that the use of a snowball approach (Maguire 2000) with gatekeepers (King and Wincup 2000) was so pivotal to the research, the different approaches did not always run smoothly and on one occasion the ‘snowball’ and ‘direct’ clashed. In this case, I had made a direct approach by email to the Head of Security of a national gallery. He had responded and agreed to be interviewed. However, unbeknown to me, the PCS union, with whom I had previously been in touch, had contacted the same gallery on my behalf to try and organise an interview for me with security personnel. On my arrival, the Head of Security asked if it was actually him who I wanted to interview and not one of his security personnel. Fortunately, he saw the funny side of what could have been an awkward situation and was happy to be interviewed. This showed the pitfalls and the difficulty of managing and controlling snowballs when they pick up pace.

With the dominant understanding of art theft being framed by fictional literature and films, and news articles often appearing in the entertainment section of newspapers and websites, a crucial factor for many interviewees was the fact that the research was academic. In light of the lack of previous research, some hoped that the thesis could have an impact on professional practice and policy. Others
were pleased the social world in which they operated was receiving academic attention. The chance to explain their concerns and/or frustrations with the current policing was a motivation in some cases. Some other reasons included: to highlight good security, to discuss the challenges, to establish a direct link with City University, and a desire to assist other people as the person had, on a previous occasion, not been helped. The significance of the reasons for granting access will be considered more critically when examining validity and reliability on page 79.

Access could also be withdrawn. My relationship with the public police was reminiscent of a revolving door. For example, I was sporadically in touch with the MPS Art and Antiques Unit through emails and an interview with the then head of the Unit from January 2009 until Autumn 2010, when, after his departure to be Head of Security at the V & A Museum, and a number of helpful emails over the summer from one of his former colleagues, I was very politely informed that due to, “budgetary constraints” they could no longer assist me. However, shortly afterwards, I gained access into another area of the public police, through the Chief Inspector who was leading the newly set up Heritage Crime Initiative.

**Sensitive information**

It would have been understandable if the policing and securitization nodes’ personnel had chosen to not speak to me and I was grateful that many did. It also made sense why the location nodes’ personnel, in particular, would decide to not discuss certain sensitive aspects of their security. Suspicion of the motives behind my research was understandable. It was important that they did not see me as a spy (Forsey 2004). This was particularly an issue with the interviews. Confidentiality was very important and a reason for adopting universal anonymity. Occasionally, at the beginning of the interview they would say information was, “in general terms”. Though this did not always prove to be case, it was a prerequisite for a number of people agreeing to be interviewed. Added to this, the
recorded and transcribed interviews as well as notes from interviews, observation, and complete participant and participant as observer research are kept locked away.

Concerning my complete observer research, while there is a potential ethical issue with the data collected as it is covert, I was observing what any member of the public can see on a visit, and in the thesis I largely avoid using the names of locations. With the complete participant and participant as observer research, concerns over ethical problems owing to the covert research in the locations in which I was installing art were balanced by the fact I was sensitive to, and with, the material collected (De Walt and De Walt 2002).

Validity and Reliability

When people did grant access, it was necessary to be aware of two key aspects. First, why were they speaking to me? Second, might they be recycling ideas about art theft that lacked empirical evidence (Tijhuis 2006) or using “familiar narrative constructs” (Miller and Glassner 2004:127)?

Concerning the first, I was very conscious that as well as the reasons they gave me (see pages 77/78), the interviewees could have agreed to speak to me for a range of specific agenda such as self-promotion, promotion of their employer, and an opportunity to criticise other nodes. With the second, Silverman (2001) and Miller and Glassner (2004) warn about the “romantic” impulse that equates experience with “authenticity”, especially in regards to “open-ended” interviews. Even if the information is first hand, was it a memory of a memory lacking corroboration from another source, an act of self-promotion, or an assertion that lacked empirical evidence?

Owing to these two aspects, triangulation of the research data using a suitable sample of interviewees and locations was extremely important and also a key reason for choosing a range of qualitative
methods. For example, instead of relying on data from one art detective who had previously worked for the public police, I interviewed four. Though their accounts were inevitably subjective, interviewing this number gave my data more reliability than if I had interviewed one or two.

Although I interviewed a former forger, this thesis examined the London art security terrain from the perspective of the securers. The implications of this were that while I strived for triangulation of interview and observation data, however ‘valid’ or ‘reliable’ my findings were, they would ultimately provide a one-sided perspective. While undeniably a limitation, owing to the main question of the thesis being, “Who performs, manages, governs and controls the securitization and policing of art theft in London?”, relying on triangulated data from the interviews with the securers and from my observation research was less of a limiting factor than potentially it could have been because it was they who were the focus of the thesis.

Debate exists over whether triangulation is a method to justify knowledge (Flick 2004) or a validation strategy (Gomm 2004, Quinn Patton 2002). Kirk and Miller (1986) highlight the paradox that, “perfect validity entails perfect reliability but not the converse; perfect validity is theoretically impossible” (Kirk and Miller 1986:71). While the modernist headings of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ do not sufficiently cover the extent of the issues (Seale 1999), Seale’s (1999) belief that, “conventional approaches to validity and reliability, such as avoidance of anecdotalism, attention to sampling issues and searching for data that challenge an emerging theory” (Seale 1999:12) can be appropriate, was particularly important to this research due to the tendency for art crime literature to repeat information based on little evidence. This is the reason why, owing to the lack of previous empirical research, I tried within the interviews to elicit examples to back up assertions from the interviewees and, as I became more adept at the interviewing process and acquired more knowledge, I was able to shape the interviews through prompts. Overall, my attempts at triangulation followed the pragmatic approach
taken by Hammersley (1991) and advocated by Seale (1999:48) who believes in research that is, “value relevant, but not research that is value laden”.

With the role and identity of the speaker being pivotal in the construction of knowledge (May 2001), it was necessary for me to be aware that in attempting to produce an overall representation of the art security terrain, a lot of my data would comprise of subjectivist accounts. It was important to look for a balance between accepting what was said and being too sceptical. Reiner (2000b) discusses this in relation to his research on the public police, “Ultimately, there is no way of knowing for certain whether what police do in front of observers, or what they say to interviewers, is intended to present an acceptable face to outsiders” (Reiner 2000b:220). He reassures himself by the fact that he has built up a level of trust with those he is researching so they are more likely to tell him how it actually is (Reiner 2000b). Similarly, Miller and Glassner (2004) highlight that although it is important to be sceptical it is too much to deny that any truth exists at all. Therefore, as well as trying to be trusted, it was important for me to have a certain amount of faith in what I was seeing or hearing.

While some believed their information to be of great significance and I needed to be careful with their data because of this, others such as volunteers had to be motivated by me to feel their information was significant. Furthermore, accessibility of the interviewee to information was extremely important (May 2001). It seems an obvious point but some interviewees who appeared to have access, in reality did not have as much knowledge as expected and I needed to be cautious with data collected from their interviews. In contrast, and what occurred more often, was that some who appeared to have limited information, in fact had much more.
Replicable study and model

Owing to the difficulties of qualitative work, instead of trying to produce a replicable study, this thesis makes it clear how conclusions were reached through the lines of inquiry with a reflexive account of the procedures and methods (Seale 1999). This does not mean, however, that a very similar study could not be undertaken.

The thesis provides an example of policing and securitization that, in theory, might be useful for other cities. However, while it gives a level of knowledge and insight not previously established, and can offer a representation and innovations for London, it does not provide a model that is replicable in other locations. This is because of differing conditions and factors, such as the involvement of the public sector, the types of policing, and the role of insurance. Also, the danger in attempting to make a replicable model is that generalisations can be sought, rather than information specific to the capital.

While serving as a useful comparison for other urban centres with cultural spaces, comparisons with other capital cities might be more useful than with other British cities because of the enormous amount of national museums and the size of the art world in London.

One area in which the research could also prove useful is in considering the policing and securitization of other locations characterised by security bubbles and corridors in London, and a public and private policing matrix with the insurance industry playing a prominent role; for example, locations that display or sell jewellery in the capital.
CONCLUSION

During the research, I kept in mind Ericson’s (2005) view of sociology:

“It refuses to accept the social structures, institutions, organizations, processes and relations in
the terms in which they are conventionally presented. This refusal is grounded in fine-grained
empirical and creative abstractions of data that reveal the unexpected, violate common sense,
and educate through irony” (Ericson 2005:367).

Aware of the fluidity of the social world being researched and the too many unknown unknowns in the
under researched field of art theft, I wanted to avoid some methods that would not have been
appropriate to this specific research, such as set question surveys and quantitative explanations, due to
a potential danger highlighted by Ferrell et al (2008:173) that, “they simply create that which they
claim to capture”.

Through conducting extensive research using mixed qualitative methods, and collecting and
interpreting how people make sense of this world, knowledge has been constructed that sheds more
light on the under researched area of the securitization and policing of art theft in London. The
research conducted in this thesis cannot give the perfect, complete picture of the policing and
securitization of art in London (Charmaz 2006) or a “mirror reflection” (Miller and Glassner
2004:126). To believe this would be both arrogant and delusional. What it does provide is rare access
to the locations and the policing and securitization nodes involved, and the meanings ascribed by the
people within this social world. Undoubtedly, there were going to be different realities, and to the
benefit of the research this proved to be the case. The methodologies employed meant I avoided
creating a “Datasoraus” (Ferrell et al 2008:169). Instead, rich ethnographic data was collected from the
field in which the many nodes involved in the policing and securitization of art in London operate. The
methodology enabled, rather than engulfed, the research.
CO-PRODUCTION OF RISK

CHAPTER 3 SITUATING RISK AND SITUATING SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

“Artistic work lasts when it has an organizational basis that preserves and protects it” (Becker 1982:350).

The insecurities and risks faced by the huge amount of art in London are very real, amplified by the many flows of art objects within, and into and out of, the capital. However, the fear of crime that permeates the risk society (Lupton 1999, O’Neill 2002, Wood and Shearing 2007) does not outweigh the reality of the threat with art. Indeed, perhaps due to the media construction of art crime, arguably the converse is true, and the often violent reality commonly encounters a lack of fear from those outside of, and sometimes even from some within, the security terrain.

The art world depends on movement. Its organisational basis not only ‘preserves and protects’ art, but creates the flows that help amplify its value; in terms of heritage, identity and economics. While, according to Art Detective 2, the market that operates with this world is “dangerously lax”, the many manufactured flows of art, and resulting insecurities, are matched by a fluid threat. The securitization and policing of art in the capital is not only crucial to each piece of art and their owners, but it is critical to the whole London art world functioning successfully.

There are major risks to art in the capital. Damage is the largest, with iconoclasm a very real current risk (Head of Security 2). Terrorism is also a major concern (Head of Security 2, Art Detective 4). Another threat, not examined in this thesis, comes from forgeries and fakes (Art Detective 4, Loss Adjuster 1). Focusing on the second largest risk, theft, this chapter uses empirical research to situate
the risk within the security of art in situ and on the move in London, and then analyses how the risk is managed through situating security. In providing a comprehensive overview of the multiple art sites, this chapter is necessarily descriptive as it is the first time that this mapping has been undertaken and because it sets up the analysis in this chapter and the chapters that follow.

Art Sites in London DIAGRAM 4
SITUATING RISK

Risk of theft to art in situ

According to the National Security Adviser and Loss Adjusters 1 and 2, the risk to art in situ is very real and thefts happen in London from local authority, independent, commercial and private locations. Commercial venues suffer more losses than government ones (National Security Adviser). The nationals offer examples of good practice, as the National Security Adviser pointed out, “Theft in national institutions, the actual risk of threat because of the measures implemented is extremely low, extremely low”. The Head of Security of a national gallery (Head of Security 2) explained that they are more likely to be victims of iconoclasm. The iconoclastic daubing on Rothko's *Black on Maroon* on 7 October 2012 (*Guardian* 07/10/2012) highlights the problems in managing this risk. In contrast, while elements from art works have gone missing, Head of Security 2 said that his galleries have never lost a single art work from their premises.

According to insurance companies, thefts make up between 10% and 30% of claims (Insurers 1, 3, 4). While at the top end, these incidents are very rare in London and the UK (Art Detective 4, Insurer 1, Head of Security 2), they happen much more at the lower level, particularly the £10,000 - £50,000 price range. This is due to the objects being easier for a fence to deal with than masterpieces which are highly recognisable and almost impossible to move onto the legal art market (DS Rapley Presentation at V&A 28/01/2010, Art Detectives 2, 4). In addition, as Art Detective 2 explained, it is very hard to know the extent of art theft due to it being recorded as property crime in the UK, and, in line with flag effect (Mackenzie 2005), locations having different policies over whether to be open about a theft. While there are statistics for many countries, there are none available for either the United States or the UK (Interpol Co-ordinator). This clearly makes understanding the threat more difficult.
While other crimes such as bank and cash in transit robberies have become harder, and more dangerous, art is a soft target in comparison (Art Detective 2). Loss Adjuster 2 expressed, “Why art? Because they can”. The type of art at threat also changes, as illustrated by the spate of porcelain thefts from stately houses between 2007 and 2010, with twenty one major cases and fifteen failed attempts (Art Detective 2, The Art Newspaper June 2010), and art objects made from jade being stolen in April 2012 from museums in Durham and Cambridge and an attempted robbery at the Museum of East Asian Art in Bath (Museums Association 2012).

As turning metal art objects into money is presently easier than selling on stolen paintings (Art Detective 4), the current huge problem of metal theft threatens a lot of art. The risk ranges from the tangible value of Damien Hirst’s Skull (Head of Security 2) to the price of melted down bronze from sculptures (Art Detective 4, Loss Adjuster 2) and the non-art theft of church roofs (Public Police Officer 2). Some of the cases have been audacious in the UK; for example, the theft of a 2.1 tonne Henry Moore sculpture from his Foundation in Hertfordshire in 2005 (Art Detective 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2, Artist 2).

Furthermore, whilst thefts of jewellery and other high value items are common in London and the stolen objects easier to sell on, Loss Adjuster 2 said that art theft is arguably less difficult as there is unlikely to be a guard positioned right next to the art object in many locations. With thieves ready to risk their lives by stealing from railway lines (Network Rail 05/10/2011) and councils even looking to move away from using metal road signs, art is particularly vulnerable, especially outside art in locations such as cemeteries and parks. It is no surprise that a Barbara Hepworth statue was stolen from Dulwich park in December 2011 (Guardian 20/12/2011), a Lynn Chadwick sculpture taken from the grounds of Roehampton University in January 2006 (Guardian 24/01/2006) and Artist 2, a renowned sculptor, has had break-ins at his studio near London.
Risk of theft to art on the move

“We get dealers who don’t think twice about sending works by Fedex” (Insurer 1).

In London, the public and commercial sectors move huge amounts of art around the city. Within the capital, art is bought and sold, loaned out and borrowed in. It is also being sent to and returned from restorers. Added to these internal flows are the massive amounts of art entering and leaving the capital. While lots of this art is moving to and from galleries and museums, it is also a regular occurrence for installers to handle extremely valuable art in locations such as private homes, societies and private members clubs. For example, ACE hung over £80 million worth of art over two days in one house in April 2010.

With the art market and art world creating and encouraging these flows, ACE and Loss Adjuster 1 highlighted that the time when the painting is between ‘nails’ and security bubbles (Shearing et al 1980) is vital as the risk of theft and damage rise massively. Many of the large claims faced by insurers, particularly for damage, but also for theft, have occurred during transit (Insurers 3, 4). The key drivers in securitization, such as the insurance companies, loss adjusters, the MLA/ Arts Council England, and the National Security Adviser, are very aware of the benefits and potential dangers of art being within these flows.

Different security concerns are raised when art is on the move. Some of the transporters and installers are extremely careful and are aware of the risks (ACE, Insurer 3). The art is often crated up, which makes damage less likely and makes it harder to identify the object for an opportunistic theft (Loss Adjuster 1). Interpol have found that most of the thefts of art in transit have occurred due to carelessness, such as art being left in a lorry unattended, rather than a targeted operation. For example,
in December 2010 a lorry with 28 artworks worth $6.5 million was stolen from a warehouse in Getafe, on the outskirts of Madrid. The keys had been left in the glove compartment (ARTINFO 6/12/2010). According to Loss Adjuster 2 and ACE, valuable art has been stolen from lorries in west and central London.

ACE now focuses solely on installing art, due to the entrance into the transportation market of companies that charge less. The decision of locations to use cheaper companies makes art more vulnerable because, though these transporters handle and move other items around London and the UK, they often lack the specific knowledge required to look after the art and do not always follow the appropriate handling requirements (ACE fieldwork, Loss Adjuster 1). Loss Adjuster 1 dealt with a claim for a painting worth millions which had marks on the canvas made by a handler’s knuckles.

While an ex MPS officer (Art Detective 3) claimed that the security of art flows is extremely good because art is well protected and security guards are used when it is transported, this is actually often not the case for a lot of valuable art (Insurer 1). When I was with ACE, the art that arrived for us to install was handled extremely carefully; however, even for art of high value (for example, art with a financial value of millions of pounds) there were no security guards.

Risk is increased further when large quantities of art are brought together temporarily, either for exhibitions or for sales. In this example of risk being embraced (Baker and Simon 2002), it is not unusual for hundreds of millions of pounds worth of art to be at art fairs and temporary exhibitions. Those involved are often very aware of the potential risk. For example, the National Security Adviser spoke of the level of security assessments at some exhibitions as, “The same and possibly more than for permanent exhibitions. Details of loans, values etc. are provided to me and these are measures and form part of the assessment” (National Security Adviser).
There is a lot of good practice for some art on the move in London. Driven by a risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), loans of public sector owned art and art that is covered by the Government Indemnity Scheme are strictly controlled and stick to consistent guidelines with rigorous expectations (Insurer 4). The National Security Adviser explained that he and his staff, “manage and maintain records of venues” and also “the movement of items”. This is crucial because the threat of damage and theft to public sector owned art is clear; with examples including two Turner paintings loaned by the Tate stolen in Germany in 1994 (Head of Security 2, Nairne 2011), the portrait of Francis Bacon by Lucien Freud stolen in Berlin in 1988 whilst on loan from Tate Britain (Tate Galleries 2011), and in France when the Musee d’Orsay in Paris loaned out Degas’ Les Choristes to the Musée Cantini de Marseille from where it was stolen in 2009 (ARTINFO 31/12/2009).

Similar to the National Security Adviser’s mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) leading to many checks, the insurance companies will use a surveyor or loss adjuster to do a risk assessment before valuable art objects travel, including checking security arrangements, photographing and documenting the objects (Loss Adjuster 1). However, flows of art again highlight the often large disparities in security between the public sector and some within the private sector. For instance, although an employee at a national would be dismissed for sending valuable art by a courier service, according to Insurer 1 some dealers will not think twice about doing so.

The National Security Adviser explained that although much art can become vulnerable by entering the flows, strict controls in the Government Indemnity Scheme drive some venues into improving their security and facilities in order to receive loans. So, in these cases of embracing risk (Baker and Simon 2002), art on the move is actually increasing security not compromising it. In this way, the Government Indemnity Scheme enables both the flows of art and its security, an idea that might seem
contradictory in theory. The UK government have further helped the flows of art by introducing the controversial Immunity from Seizure Law in 2007 (part 6 of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007) for art loaned into the UK (Department for Culture, Media and Sport 2007).

In contrast to Ericson’s (2007:184) warnings over the emergence of private security “streams of governance”, the strict controls for some publicly owned art have resulted in public sector led “streams of governance”. For example, when a national sent a collection of one of Britain’s leading artist’s paintings to China they sent a team to escort and install them (Head of Security 2), and when the Government Art Collection sends art to be installed at a location, an employee monitors the process from nail to nail (ACE fieldwork 29/07/2011).

Who poses the risk according to the security terrain in London?

Criminals who are organised

In London, the methods used to steal art are sometimes far from intricate, and have included victims being violently beaten (Art Detective 1, Loss Adjusters 1, 2, Private Company 2). This correlates to an apparent rise in violence with high end property crime in general. Insurer 1 suggests that this could be linked to the fact that access into some private locations has been made so difficult that criminals will wait for the person to enter and then go into the property with force. Head of Security 2 explained that there is an awareness that it could also happen to galleries and museums in the UK.

Despite some claims in the literature about organised criminals’ involvement lacking substantiation, Art Detectives 1, 2, 4 and Loss Adjuster 1 are clear that the stolen art, whatever the initial motivation for the theft, can end up in the hands of criminal gangs, be moved abroad and does reappear through certain channels that appear in legally grey areas and involve rewards. Many in the field also share the opinion that the majority of thefts are committed by, or linked to, “professional criminals” and are
often undertaken by thieves involved in other criminal activities; among these are Irish travellers (Art
Detectives 2, 4, Loss Adjuster 2).

Despite the lack of evidence to substantiate some claims about organised crime’s involvement, there is
evidence that leading criminal families in the UK have been involved; for example, the Johnsons for
whom art theft was one of many criminal activities. Another example was the discovery, on his arrest,
that Terry Adams, the head of the notorious Adams family, apparently had a range of art stolen from
museums, dealers and different burglaries in his north London house (Art Detectives 2, 4). Although
there is disagreement about whether displacement (Ekblom 2006:385) occurs when security is
improved in one location (Head of Security 2), the changing threat to cultural locations, exemplified
by the spate of rhino horn thefts from museums by, according to Europol, an internally active “Irish
and ethnically-Irish organised criminal group” (Europol 07/07/2011), highlights both criminal gangs’
involvement and also their fluidity.

Reinforcing the literature’s argument, money is the driving factor behind their participation in London.
Whether the art enters a stream of criminality, is stolen opportunistically or to order, re-enters the
legal market or not, the motivation for the actual thief remains money, and, as Loss Adjuster 2
explained, the piece can be handed over to a handler very soon after the theft, even within an hour.
Loss adjuster 1 said that if thieves have a drug problem they might steal anything they can, and even
accept £1,000 for a £1,000,000 painting. Put simply, as Mackenzie (2005) highlighted, criminals will
steal art if they are paid enough or they believe they can gain financially (Art Detectives 2, 4, Loss
Adjusters 1, 2, Insurers 2, 3). According to the National Security Adviser, a theft also creates other
financial opportunities through ransoms, blackmail or extortion, and, as explained by Art Detective 2,
art can be used as a currency to assist other criminal acts. Well-known art can be ransomed/rewarded
back or remain in criminals hands and be used as trading bonds or collateral (Head of Security 2).
Added to this, is the lack of public police targeting of the professional receivers, the existence of numerous points of sale, including the ability to sell on eBay, and open borders within Europe (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1).

**Insiders**

The 2003 Resource report\(^6\) warns that art might be stolen by a member of staff at an institution such as a museum or gallery. In line with Ekblom’s (2006:384) idea of staff as “promoters”, Mackenzie (2005:3) argues, “In suspicious disappearances of art works, those with the opportunity should be the first subjects of investigation”. The risk from staff in London is very real (Art Detective 4, ACE). This can be from negligence; for instance, however good technologies such as alarms are within a location, they need to be maintained and reacted to. The Paris Museum of Modern Art theft in 2010 was a case in point as the thefts were recorded on CCTV but the on-site security personnel apparently missed them (ARTOBSERVED 21/05/2010). Also, issues such as leaving doors open during hot weather in London can increase the threat to the art (Commercial Galleries 2, 4).

In private residences, staff have stolen art and antiques from their employers (ACE). There has also been suspicion of insider knowledge in other cases, an example being the theft of art from Kate Moss’s house in London (ARTINFO 24/05/2010). Insurer 3 pointed out that while private homes have security alarms, they are usually not turned on if staff are present.

Linked with Mackenzie’s (2005) use of cognitive mapping theory with this ‘insider’ theft, according to Routine Activity Theory, “specialized access permits crime” (Felson 2002:98). Though aspects of Routine Activity Theory can seem obvious, it is how locations actually address and manage the

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\(^6\) See footnote 5 page 24
‘obvious’ that is important. For example, in one of the largest national galleries (National 5), while the public can walk in through the front door without having their bags examined or being checked, the staff entrance is much more stringent. Arriving at this entrance, a visitor must report to reception, have their picture taken for security, have an ID made up, and be met by a member of staff. Similarly, at another national, staff must show ID even when they are in the back offices (Employee 5).

Insurer 4 is clear that there must be sufficient checks before employing personnel. The National Security Adviser is very aware of the issue and in 2011 was investigating whether the government could get exemptions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 for checking potential staff. Some locations are very stringent about the people to whom they give security clearance. Even to be a volunteer at one particular national entails a phone interview, two face-to-face interviews, two application forms, and a police/CRB check. In contrast, there is no police check to be a volunteer for National Trust and English Heritage (Employee 5).

While incidents are rare at nationals, they do occur and the personnel are dealt with stringently. The National Security Adviser said, “I’m aware of in the last year of two members of staff actually being dismissed….they were negligent in the way they dealt with incidents, follow up procedures”. Relating to good practice, he explained that the focus is now more on technology than guards:

“It is…it is and based on what happened in Paris we have changed the practice that is used across Europe now and it is a condition for art loaned from this country that once a gallery is sealed when it contains British items, if a gallery is sealed then we will not allow security patrols to walk through, switch the alarm systems off, switch the lights on and then walk through only to switch the lights off and seal it at the other end. Technology is much cheaper and more effective method so we are insisting that they are sealed, witnessed to be sealed and then the guard will stand outside the doors and never open those doors, and we are much more
happy using the technology, trusting the technology than the people. And that is a direct change that has been implemented over the past six months following the incident in Paris” (National Security Adviser).

In some galleries, CCTV in the gift shop covers the tills (National 7, Art Gallery 2), and in locations such as Private Members Club 1, cameras are predominantly on the staff areas rather than the main rooms. The level of threat from people working at a location is heightened when there is building, renovation or decorating work. Art Detective 2 and Loss Adjuster 1 were clear that with avenues such as professional receivers, markets and the internet to move on stolen art and antiques quickly, temporary access can give opportunities to contractors. Though locations do show an awareness of potential insider threats and adapt with surveillance of the people carrying out the work (Private Residence 1, Art Gallery 5), there are still lapses, especially with different contractors entering and leaving, some of whom will not appreciate the level of care required. For instance, during renovation work at Art Gallery 5, on arrival at the location, an employee of ACE noticed that a painting by a leading pre-Raphaelite painter, Edward Burne-Jones, had been left on the floor, propped up against a wall. He immediately placed it in a more secure place. At this location, apart from this one slip, the full-time staff were monitoring the contractors on camera and requiring them to sign in and out at the entrance and being buzzed in when leaving or entering the location.

Houses are very vulnerable, an example being six valuable paintings stolen by painter/decorators from a west London house. Though one was worth £40,000, they were up for sale at auction with estimates of £500-800 (Loss Adjuster 1). While art installers have the closest access to the art, and though opportunities present themselves frequently, they do not pose the most significant threat. Their business is dependent on reputation. Furthermore, the amount they would receive from a fence for
even extremely high priced art makes stealing it even more unattractive (ACE). Temporary contractors, with less knowledge of art, appear to pose a greater threat.

**Flag effect in London**

Whether large or small, all institutions must be aware of potential threats. However, in line with repeat victimisation (Farrell and Polk 1993) institutions that have had a robbery or burglary must be even more alert (Resource 2003). To counter this threat, Mackenzie (2005) argues that, “Museums, galleries and private residences that suffer from the flag effect - that are perceived as soft targets - can react by beefing up visible security systems, to remove the ‘flag’” (Mackenzie 2005:7). Those galleries with sufficient resources, such as the V & A Museum after thefts in 2005, did just that by employing a security consultancy. The security strategy changed with new, more proficient security staff, technology and ‘risk’ strategies (Arup 2009).

There is a difference of opinion over whether locations should be open or closed about a theft that has occurred. Although Head of Security 1 at a national library stated that they would always go public, Head of Security 2 at a national gallery said they would not. The Interpol Co-ordinator argues, “I think they have nothing to gain in keeping it secret. They should disseminate photos of the stolen cultural property including to the public and thus increase chances to get hints and to recover the items” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

However, while fear of advertising vulnerability to criminals is a large issue, perhaps the bigger concern, according to Head of Security 2, is the potential adverse effect on the location’s reputation. When reputation equals loans which in turn generate money, highlighting potential ‘risk’ can be hugely detrimental. This can even be felt as a city and country; for example, Paris and France as a whole after the Museum of Modern Art Paris thefts in 2010 (National Security Adviser). This is why
the theft of art whilst on loan to another location abroad has less impact for the loaning institution (Head of Security 2).

If a location does choose to go public, how it manages the coverage is important. For example, aware of this, Head of Security 1 believes that, arguably, they did a very good job after one theft, “We thought some coverage was inevitable….we deliberately took a decision to try and manage it, and actually worked very successfully with the Metropolitan Police and their press office….collaborative on that” (Head of Security 1). Although the fact that Head of Security 1 chose to highlight this case might be a case of promoting the location’s security operations, the crucial aspect here is that they did go public. Smaller locations with fewer resources do not have the same capability, but they can advertise the object as missing without stating from where it was stolen, although it might be clear to some people. Insurers are obviously keen to recover the object and want their money back, so adverts are usual; for example, in trade gazettes (Insurer 4, Loss Adjuster 1). According to Insurers 3 and 4, this is also in part due to art being harder to dispose of than items such as jewellery.

SITUATING SECURITY

In light of the risks of art being stolen in London, the most extreme preventative method is to prohibit access to the public and many of the staff. However, this is impossible for many locations who must display art to the public for commercial reasons, per their remit or for tax purposes. This can even be difficult for private residences as they too have people entering and leaving their premises. It also runs counter to the manufactured flows so important in maintaining the status and value of the art. Speaking about nationals, Head of Security 2 said that the aim was not to, “avoid risk”; it was to, “manage risk”.

This section examines how locations manage this risk by situating security, and the disparities in the way art is handled and risk managed, which can be stark according to Insurers 1, 2, 3 and ACE
installers. For example, the level of security in many nationals is extremely high, with the standard of risk assessment and success in minimising risks very good (Head of Security 2, Insurer 1, Loss Adjuster 1, National Security Adviser). In contrast, views on risk, and managing it, can be very different in the commercial sector, with less money spent on security (Insurers 1, 2, 3, Loss Adjuster 1). As Insurer 1 explained, “a commercial art dealer...their views on risk and how to minimise it are completely different to the national galleries” and “the insurance market views them as chalk and cheese.”

**Importance of resources in risk management**

Funding is a key issue. Many locations, such as nationals and high end properties, have access to significant funds to spend on managing risk (Insurers 1, 2). In line with the potential for the design of a location to have a huge impact on crime (Newman 1972, Felson 2002, Shearing and Stenning 1981), this extends to the structural designs. For example, the National Security Adviser described how he works and liaises with architects, and Loss Adjuster 1 and ACE were clear that security risks can be minimized through environmental design, such as a museum or gallery’s loading bay for deliveries being ideally situated within the actual building or at least in closed surroundings.

In contrast, locations such as local authority museums and historic houses have budget constraints that can affect security, make them more vulnerable and adversely affect the implementation and execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) within their settings (Insurer 4, Loss Adjuster 2). For example, in Art Gallery 8 (a central London mid-sized museum), some display cases are so old that they, themselves, are objects of interests (Head of Security 3).

The presence in London of so many national museums and large galleries gives the capital a distinctive characteristic to other urban spaces in the UK which, while they might have a vibrant
cultural sector, have very different levels of public and private funding. An important question, in line with nodal governance and the prevention of the rich getting security and the poor justice (Johnston and Shearing 2003), is whether the galleries with, or access to, high level funds end up with expensive art, while those without the financial capability miss out on both security and art. There are many examples which prove that this is not the case. For example, the Dulwich Picture Gallery continues to display a Rembrandt portrait (Jacob de Gheyn III) even though it has been stolen four times (Visit 26/05/09, Mackenzie 2005).

While every location must utilize their resources as effectively as possible, they face differing challenges. For example, Art Gallery 8 has problems securing funds for security upkeep and upgrades. As a heritage asset, gaining the initial funds for security systems has not been its main problem (Head of Security 3). The difficulty lies in maintaining a running budget and making later upgrades because the funding tends to be one injection of money. Also, donors are keener to assist with paintings than other areas, such as security systems. This can be because funding an art object leads to the donor’s name being listed on the piece’s conservation log.

The applying of resources appropriately is critical, and, within this, the risk of damage must also be considered. For example, Head of Security 2 highlighted that a Rodin sculpture might be robust compared to one by Cy Tembley. Small measures can save resources. For instance, after somebody stole a lens from a projector on a contemporary art piece at a national, there were calls to have a guard and a thermal imaging device positioned by the piece. By simply attaching the lens more firmly, there was no need for either measure (Head of Security 2).

The cost versus risk ratio is faced by every location with art, and awareness of the threat is important. It is too easy to analyse a gallery and surmise that a lack of extremely valuable art means there is no
need for high level security, because this neglects the appeal to criminals of art objects in the £10,000-
£50,000 range. Insurer 1, Art Detective 2, and Loss Adjuster 1 believe that all locations should record
their art properly, particularly unique characteristics of a piece such as blemishes, and keep detailed
digital inventories. Though some, especially private owners, need pushing to take them, cost effective
measures can often be highly effective. The Interpol Co-ordinator argues, “Good prevention including
human surveillance and technical protection (not only high tech). Sometimes quite reasonable
decisions (place of items not reachable by visitors, lighting instead of display in a dark corner, etc.)
contribute effectively to theft prevention” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

Awareness that art is different from other items at risk of theft; for example, jewellery and money,
and, therefore, sometimes has distinct security requirements, is also important (Loss Adjuster 1). This
is significant in respect of the “tools” used in the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing
2003:28) and also affects other threats such as damage. Moreover, the unintended consequences of
certain security measures must be considered (Marx 2007). For example, while sprinklers are essential
in many non-art locations, Loss Adjuster 1 and the National Security Adviser spoke of their strong
opposition to their use in spaces with art.

**Managing the location’s environment**

In line with “target hardening” (Polk 1999:3), restricting the opportunity for potential art thieves is
crucial. With my empirical research showing differences in the implementation of governance as well
as a wide disparity among locations concerning the other seven dimensions of governance (Johnston
and Shearing 2003), the key aspects are now considered.
**Wider environment**

The wider environment in which the locations exist is an important consideration, particularly the greater security field encompassing the area. For example, the National Gallery and National Portrait Gallery can passively benefit from the extra layer of securitization and policing situated around Trafalgar Square. Another example is if they are located in certain areas such as St. James’s Place, where they can benefit from the CCTV of nearby locations. For instance, the cameras from Christie’s auction house cover much of the surrounding area (Loss Adjuster 1).

Conversely, another national’s security personnel patrol in ‘public’ space outside their gallery and this can actively benefit the security of the surrounding vicinity (Head of Security 2). Other galleries are situated in areas where the wider security field is less extensive. Numerous examples include the Whitechapel Gallery, the South London Gallery and the Dulwich Picture Gallery. However, due to the level of surveillance in London, they still exist within a security field, albeit not as extensive as galleries within the centre of London.

**Technology**

**Alarms**

According to Insurer 3, alarm companies are a key market within the “tool kit” of technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003:28). Alarms are used for buildings and rooms, as well as on art objects. Locations with large resources can, and do, invest in state of the art devices (Insurer 2, National Security Adviser, ACE). These can track any movement of the piece through sensors, and can be linked to other security measures such as CCTV and to software that will do thousands of collection audits a day (ISIS 2011). However, while upgrading an alarm and security system is financially viable for rich private collectors and some locations, many places such as small and midsized museums, and less wealthy collectors or locations like churches (Insurer 2, Head of Security...
3), must often decide which art objects should be alarmed. For example, at Art Gallery 8 the most valuable paintings are alarmed and have motion detectors. Although in theory this policy of basing it on value makes sense, especially for damage, the reality is that due to its size and where it is hung, some of the most valuable art on the site is extremely hard to steal while some of the less valuable objects are smaller and more vulnerable to theft, but they are not alarmed (Head of Security 3). When the Johnson crime family were targeting art and antiques, they stole less unique, smaller value pieces which were easier to sell on and attracted less attention (Insurer 4).

Insurer 1 explained that commercial galleries sometimes choose to have no security alarms. In some locations, the room itself is a piece of art. This can limit how security is done as measures such as alarms, CCTV, humidity and smoke detectors must be incorporated without changing the space (Art Galleries 3, 8, Members Club 5).

**CCTV**

Although some commercial galleries and dealers do not have it (Insurer 1), CCTV is a very common tool in many locations. Though it does not offer a panacea and there are questions over its general effectiveness (Gill and Spriggs 2005), CCTV can be extremely useful for locations that display art, especially if it is being monitored. It allows more effective deployment of staff, which can save costs, as well as offering a good, if not better, form of invigilation as it can enable quick, coordinated responses to perceived active threats within a location (Resource 2003, National Security Adviser, National 4). At locations with resources, such as some private residences and large museums and galleries, there are often a large number of cameras with someone monitoring them in real time (Private Residence 2, Nationals 1, 2, 3).
However, if cameras are not being monitored in locations with fewer resources, such as small churches (Churches 1, 2, 3), then CCTV only offers a potential deterrent and a record of a crime, albeit a useful one. Captured on CCTV, the smash and grab theft during the night of 1 May 2010 from Commercial Gallery 1, a small central London gallery, is an example (Commercial Gallery 1).

**How art is displayed**

How paintings are hung, and objects displayed, is crucial to decent security. The MLA recommends having secure locking systems on the paintings and the use of display cases (Resource 2003). This is an area of situating security where nationals differ greatly from many commercial spaces. Nationals often have locking systems which make taking paintings from the walls difficult, sometimes requiring two people to unlock and remove the painting, or even frames secured onto the wall (ACE, Nationals 3, 7). However, it is not uncommon in commercial galleries or temporary locations for art to be simply hung on hooks and easy to remove (ACE, Insurers 1, 3, Commercial Gallery 1, Art Fair 1). This can also be the case in non-commercial private locations where the art does not need to be taken from the wall (Art Gallery 6) and in the public sector (Art Gallery 7). In other locations, though art may be displayed securely in the public spaces, this is not the case in the staff areas (Art Gallery 5).

There can be differences within locations in the way some pictures are hung. Galleries might hang large paintings on hooks but screw smaller ones into the wall (Art Galleries 2, 3). For instance, in Art Gallery 2 a temporary exhibition’s (26/05/09) paintings were screwed into the wall and a painting that has been stolen a number of times had different fixings to other pictures in the permanent collection. At a blockbuster exhibition (11/10/2011) at National 7, one specific picture had its own display case with a shutter that was pulled down and locked daily at 6pm.
Similar to small paintings being particularly vulnerable (Loss Adjuster 1), insurance companies and the National Security Adviser are also very aware that smaller objects are easier to steal, and locations have been expected to adapt accordingly to the increased risk. This relates to Routine Activity Theory’s VIVA acronym (Felson and Clarke 1998). Value, Inertia (weight of the object), Visibility, and Access are all relevant when considering crime opportunities with smaller objects. For example, considering Inertia, a lighter smaller object is easier to steal than a heavier, larger one. Owing to this, measures such as display cases are often required and these are regularly alarmed (Insurers 1, 2, Head of Security 3, National Security Adviser, Nationals 1, 6, 7, Art Galleries 3, 4). While this can create a problem for historic houses and their quest to appear ‘real’, the majority of locations, even smaller ones, have acted accordingly. With fewer visitors and less security, they must be especially aware of this threat even if it affects their resources (Head of Security 3). For example, Art Gallery 5 spent a considerable amount of money on glass display cases for exhibit. Similarly, after suffering thefts, Private Members Club 1 placed all its miniatures behind glass.

With the problem of metal theft threatening many art objects, decisions not only have to be made about display cases being used, but also whether certain objects can still be displayed outside, and if replicas, though far from ideal, should be used for these works.

**Physical barriers**

The use of physical barriers is far from the type of controlling methods highlighted by Shearing and Stenning in 1987. Barriers such as metal wire do not prevent risk but are a tool in helping to manage it. For example, Head of Security 2 explained that one of his galleries can have 46,000 visitors on a busy day. A balance has to be found between its remit to allow the public to interact with the art, and the security and protection of the pieces. More extreme measures such as the security barrier in front of the Mona Lisa in the Louvre in Paris (Visit 06/02/2009) can change the visitor experience. Head of
Security 2 described using this type of casing as akin to, “showering with your coat on”. He added that some of the artists themselves do not want lots of security on the actual art piece, as even glazing can distract from the experience of looking at the art.

In London, in publicly and privately owned galleries, it is very common for there to be very few physical barriers. For example, in 2010, two of London’s largest privately owned, open to the public, galleries used no barriers (wire, rope or otherwise). In Art Gallery 6, there were signs advising people about the lack of barriers, the use of surveillance cameras in all the rooms and asking people to respect the art and requesting them not to touch it. At an exhibition in Art Gallery 4, although the public could move very close to paintings, in line with the controlling of space and the ‘disciplinary society’ (Foucault 1977), they appeared very conscious of being constantly watched by a large number of security personnel. While the majority of visitors appeared extremely happy, there were some complaints about the style of security. However, this was far from the “repressions” concerning space and movement about which Davis (1990:223) highlighted and warned. Perhaps, any visitor dissatisfaction should have been tempered by, first, having such excellent access to the extremely valuable art, and, second, being aware that the owner was a private individual and was not charging for the experience. Furthermore, I was later informed that the lack of glazing on the paintings was the reason for more security personnel (National Security Adviser). This was the only example during my empirical research that I encountered complaints about the method in which space was being controlled or managed.

It is common for some galleries to have barriers in front of only some of their art (Nationals 5, 7, Art Gallery 3). At nationals, this can be the case during temporary exhibitions where paintings have been brought together from different owners or if a painting has been loaned to a permanent exhibition. The security requirements from the owners, and their insurance, can differ and galleries will respond
accordingly in order to loan in the painting (Insurer 4, National Security Adviser). This highlights how the flows of art can result in different nodes making varying rules of governance for the node whose responsibility it is to implement and execute the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). It is also an example of why nodal governance is the most appropriate framework to use to analyse the security terrain. Policing theories such as preventative partnerships (Garland 2001), hybrid policing (Johnston 1992), anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker 2006, 2007) and the nexus policing model (Shearing and Marks 2011) do not have the capacity to explain this fluidity of governance as they are too fixed.

**People/Staff**

The artist Anish Kapoor is quoted as saying, “What we need is lots of nasty guards out there” (Sunday Times supplement, 13/9/2009 p 42). Whether he said this jokingly or not, the importance of staff in the locations cannot be understated. In contrast to the employees who are involved in insider thefts as “promoters”, clearly staff can also be “preventers” (Ekblom 2006:384) through ensuring that risks are successfully managed.

Some large locations still have a ‘guard’ sitting or standing in a room with all sight lines covered (National 2, Art Gallery 4), while others have personnel who move around a lot (National 1, 5, 6, Art Gallery 4). In some cases, they will have technology such as headpieces (National 6).

There are disparities in personnel numbers. For instance, Art Gallery 4 has one of the finest collections of art in the world but only two security staff per floor – and while one floor has six rooms, the other floor has nine. In contrast, National 1 has two fully trained employee guides per room, as well as other security personnel walking around main areas and the entrances and the exterior of the building (Observation, Gallery Employee 5).
In many locations, these personnel are dressed informally and are there to assist rather than to ‘police’ visitors (Head of Security 2, National 5, Art Gallery 6). Despite the threat of damage still being very much present, in the large busy museums and galleries, according to Head of Security 2, the risk of theft is lessened by the huge numbers of visitors who help the location self-police, and by doing so become part of the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003).

The nationals have a good level of security personnel. The National Security Adviser believes this is directly linked with decent management structure and supervisory roles making people more effective. However, in many locations, expectations of staff must be more limited due to a reliance on volunteers. Their role is often fairly varied, acting as both a layer of security and a guide to enhance the visitor experience (Head of Security 3, Gallery Employee 5). Their presence can affect the level of implementation of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) that can be expected. Head of Security 3 is clear that full time staff must remember that these volunteers receive no money for their time and will not always be available to work. Furthermore, as Volunteer 1 explained, if an incident happens the potential sanction of dismissal is diminished greatly. A reliance on volunteers also means that, even for a small museum, a large number are required to cover contingencies. This poses organisational challenges. For instance, Head of Security 3 described how at his mid-sized, independent museum, they do not employ full time room stewards because of the expense. Instead, there are 140 volunteers, and this can make it a struggle to convey security messages to them.

The vulnerability and threat to locations that depend on volunteers, and do not have the same security teams as other locations, was highlighted by the theft from Drumlanrig Castle, Scotland, of Da Vinci’s the Madonna of Yarnwinder in 2003. At Historic House 1 in London, although volunteers do have call buttons with different combinations of buttons linked to the office and the public police, all the personnel, with the exception of one person on duty, are volunteers and most of them are aged over
sixty (Volunteer 1). Some full time staff and volunteers are aware things could be greatly improved, but Volunteer 1 accepts that it comes down to resources.

In contrast, access to funds means that Art Fair 1 in central London can have extensive numbers of security personnel performing numerous roles. To an extent, this highlights how and why, in line with the three main precepts of RAT Theory (Felson 2003), certain criminals focus on specific locations; for example, the targeting of historic houses by Irish travellers (Art Detectives 2, 4, Loss Adjuster 2). How these more vulnerable locations deal with the risk can differ. For example, owing to the threat of burglaries, one large National Trust property chose to change the way they implemented and executed governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) by having people live on site (Volunteer 1). However, the National Security Adviser advises against this as these people can be victims of “tiger kidnap”. He believes that good physical security, including decent technology, are far more efficient.

Present financial constraints could have a detrimental effect on staffing and the security of art, especially in the public sector. Mackenzie’s (2005) argument about low wages affecting security personnel is evident in London where issues over pay have resulted in a strike at the National Gallery (PCS Union 12/02/2010). There are fears over the levels of cuts in funding and that personnel at all levels will lose their jobs and specific knowledge will go with them. Written evidence submitted by Museums Association (arts 126) to Parliament in September 2010 was clear, “This latter point is particularly troubling. It takes years, often decades, to build up knowledge of a collection and museums and galleries now face the prospect of highly knowledgeable staff rapidly losing their jobs, without a clear successor” (House of Commons 2010).

There could be a shift to using more private security in nationals. According to the National Security Adviser, this is already happening for reasons that include, “cost, training and resources”, but the
number is still limited to only about 5%. Some locations believe that they get more commitment and motivation from directly employed security personnel and by paying them more than contracted private security (Head of Security 1).

Overall, a wide range of people who work at, or with, the locations believe that personnel in London’s diverse range of art spaces perform a crucial role in the protection of art and many do a very good job (Head of Security 2, National Security Adviser, Volunteer 1). Many of the security measures rely on some human involvement. Often these can be very simple such as where keys are kept and being aware of the increased threat of thefts at certain times of the day; for example, when staff are at lunch (Loss Adjuster 1) or holiday times (arttheftcentral 2010). Many locations are aware of this, and where possible will encourage the staff over these issues (Gallery Employee 5). For example, CCTV depends on those doing the monitoring; the Paris Museum of Modern Art 2010 thefts (see page 93) being an example of a failure by personnel (ARTOBSERVED 21/05/2010). In contrast, the attentiveness at National 5 in London is illustrated by security personnel not allowing balloons into the gallery because they “cover the cameras”.

Additional alertness can even result in finding previously stolen art, as was the case when a curator at the Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum in Glasgow noticed art listed on an auctioneer’s catalogue which had been stolen fifteen years earlier (Guardian 20/01/2011).

**Access**

**Entrance/exits**

Entrance/exits are vital parts of the location’s management of security and in restricting opportunities for potential thieves (Resource 2003). Some locations adapt to the potential threats they face; for example, some private residences and members clubs have CCTV on entrances and monitor gates
which will only open from the inside to allow someone to enter or exit if a security code or thumb recognition is used (Private Residences 1, 2, Private Members Club 1). The number of entrances to a location is a factor and many of the locations, even temporary ones, only have one public entrance/exit. While staff or contractors might need to access locations through other entrances, these are often tightly controlled (National 5, Private members club 1, ACE). In contrast, some small galleries in busy areas of London (Commercial Galleries 2, 4) leave their doors open with no security personnel near the exits, especially on hot days.

In some of the high end residences, access points into the actual residences are protected with extensive alarms and CCTV systems and lights. Doors and windows are locked and monitored (Private Residence 2). If the owners leave the property for any length of time, the art is sometimes placed in storage (ACE). In contrast, Art Detective 1 explained that at residences with less security, reconnaissance can be easy and involve people knocking on doors using the pretext of selling things. This creates the opportunity to look inside and then let other people know what kind of items are at the location. Considered through Routine Activity Theory, an assessment of the capable guardian and suitable target can be undertaken as well as a quick investigation into whether items are concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, disposable (CRAVED) (Clarke 1999 in Felson 2002).

To provide more security, some locations have a guarded entrance to a security bubble (Shearing et al 1980) within the larger security bubble of the location. This type of target insulation (Marx 2007) within the wider security field is often the case for temporary exhibitions where art has been loaned in, such as at Nationals 1, 5, and 7. This is also present in an out-of-London private house I visited with ACE, where most of the expensive art, including a Rembrandt, is kept in an inner security bubble which has increased security measures and restricted access (Private Residence 1).
Auxiliary exits such as fire exits are also extremely important, as are windows, especially for locations that do not have air conditioning. In hot weather, a simple measure such as blocks placed on how far windows can open is a cost effective security precaution (Head of Security 3).

Visible security personnel at entrances are also vital. While some locations with valuable art have them outside or by every door (Art Galleries 4, 6, Cathedral 2, National 6), other locations only have personnel positioned behind a desk and they might not be monitoring the actual entrance (Art Gallery 7). Although levels of resources affect the type of monitoring of entrances and exits at many locations, simple measures close to the entrances can also put off thieves. For instance, they do not like bright external lighting, gravel (owing to the noise), flower beds (due to shoe imprints in the soil), or dogs (Stately Home Hotline 2011).

**Bag checks**

While it is noticeable that in cities such as Amsterdam and Barcelona visitors are sometimes required to leave bags in a cloakroom, this is not the case in London. Unusually for the capital, some locations, such as the V & A Museum and Art Fair 1, have bag checks. At the V & A, the checks are only when visitors enter the building, but at Art Fair 1 they also occur when people leave.

For preventing thefts, bag checks when people exit are much more useful; however, for the risk of damage or terrorism, checks on entering make clear sense. For example, the attack on a Poussin painting by a man with spray paint at the National Gallery in 2011 (*The Observer* 17/07/2011) might have been averted if there were bag checks at the gallery’s entrance.

However, these checks are a logistical challenge for a gallery with five million visitors annually. The huge visitor numbers mean the staff are already extremely busy dealing with the crowds. For example,
on 4 August 2011 a national had to close because it was full (Gallery Employee 5). This is one reason why in some locations there are bag checks when entering the smaller security bubble (Shearing et al 1980) at special exhibitions, but not the larger bubble at the main entrance (National 1). Highlighting its adaptability within its execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), this level of security can change according to perceived threats. For example, in 2010 a terrorist threat and a student protest prompted bag checks at a national’s main entrance (Gallery Employee 5).

Impact of increased access on security

Owing to the often free entrance, London, arguably, provides more access to its art than any other major city. While Paris and New York also have huge visitor numbers, admission charges are usual. Other cities famous for their art have substantially fewer visitor numbers and their locations charge. For example, Madrid’s most popular museum, the Museo del Prado, has 2,222,914 fewer visitors a year than the National Gallery, and its leading modern art museum, the Museo Reina Sofia, has 2,747,640 fewer than Tate Modern (Art Newspaper April 2011, P24). The enormous visitor numbers and the free entrance into many publicly and privately owned locations makes London’s art spaces a fascinating example of an inclusive cultural hub. Many art locations encourage children, and have comfortable seats and clean toilets which the public can access. Although their gift shops are often strategically situated, in this age of privatization of space (Davis 1990, Ferrell et al 2008, Reiner 2000) art spaces represent an oasis of inclusion. For example, in 2009/10, 66.8% of 11-15 year olds visited museums and galleries in the UK (DCMS, Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport Adult and Child Report 2009/10).

Issues surrounding the balance between access and security are ever present and vary depending on the type of location; an example being that while small objects are now usually in display cases, other, often larger, objects can be touched by the public whether they are meant to be or not. Whilst a recent
encouragement to touch designated objects in some art locations can confuse the public (National 1, Volunteer 1), other cultural locations such as libraries face greater challenges because touching objects is key to their purpose (Collection Security Co-ordinator 1). However, while libraries can have graduated measures, including an audit trail of those granted access to a particular book, this is harder for other types of locations. For example, although in National Trust properties visitors should not touch objects, the policy of wanting the space to appear lived in makes objects more vulnerable. Small pieces are stolen despite wire sometimes being used (National Trust 2011). Similarly, with outside art, while insurance companies might force the locations to bring in the objects (Insurer 2), this might run counter to the purpose of the art.

The type of location will clearly affect the level of access. For instance, a private residence might only be entered by those who live there, or know or work for those who do. Locations such as societies and members clubs have some restricted areas and other spaces which are more open. Owing to their purpose, places of worship will usually be more open, and even the larger locations such as Westminster Abbey and St. Paul’s Cathedral become less restrictive on Sundays when they allow free entry.

Head of Security 3’s museum has entrance fees. He said that charging visitors can affect the numbers that access a location and that having fewer people makes managing the space easier and lessens risk. This contrasts with Head of Security 2’s argument that a high volume of visitors in free spaces can help self-policing the location. However, it is important to note that Head of Security 2 has a large security team.
Electronic Access

Online directories of art such as www.bbc.uk/yourpaintings, HMRC’S databases of tax-exempt heritage assets (HMRC 2011), and the National Trust’s (National Trust 2011), clearly help the public and make art accessible to people all over the world, as do dealers’ and auction houses’ catalogues (albeit with the aim to aid sales). However, across the security terrain it is accepted that the internet is also a great source for criminals, both for researching thefts and for selling on the stolen art works, especially on eBay (Loss Adjuster 2, Art Detectives 1, 2).

Access due to other uses of locations

Security issues can be caused by many locations permitting access and allowing the use of their facilities for a wide range of non-art specific activities. Head of Security 3 explained that the success of the events is usually the key factor for those working at them and the security of art can become less of a concern. For example, doors that should be shut are left open in education sessions, and at functions, windows might be opened to make the guests more comfortable. Food and drink which may usually be prohibited, will be very close to the art (Scott 2010, Commercial Gallery 3), and, even if there are security measures for the event, these may be far from perfect. In venues such as members clubs, where the art is rarely the reason for the visit, the often close proximity between food, drink and art has resulted in small art objects at Private Members Club 1 going missing and paintings being sent to restorers after dinners.

Other locations are used for shooting television programmes and films. The volunteers or employees working there can find it difficult to keep track of everybody entering and exiting the locations, and to monitor them when they are on the premises (Volunteer 1, Historic House 1, Society 2).
SELF-POLICING

Mackenzie (2005) is correct to argue that, “what emerges from a criminological analysis of art theft is that the best protection the trade has against art theft is the trade itself” (Mackenzie 2005:12). My research shows this to be the case; however, it also highlights that while many security providers are working effectively, not everyone, particularly within the London market, is so keen (Art Detectives 2, 4).

The London art world can do more to protect itself. Art Detective 3 argues that it is down to costs, but this does not tell the whole story. Although the motivations to self-police should be evident, and despite many public and private locations having excellent security and being examples of good practice, the art world is full of grey areas in which some people’s desire for self-policing can be questioned. In relation to the issue about the effectiveness being increased if the “problem solvers” in security are from within a particular community not from outside (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Johnston 2006, Shearing and Wood 2007), a problem for art security in London is that the art world is one of the few remaining unregulated fields and it has problems dealing with thieves within it (Art Detectives 2, 3).

Art Detective 2 states:

“the market of art and antiques can be dangerously lax” and he continues, “so it’s a completely unregulated market...so to ask it to police itself....when every time there is a suggestion that policing of the art market will take place, the resistance from within the market is such that you can see any attempts to self-regulate are not going to succeed” (Art Detective 2).

Insurer 1 believes that due diligence has improved in the UK in the last ten years but people still need to be pushed into greater security, including even simple measures such as keeping photographic/digital records of their art. Insurer 2 thinks that thousands of private collectors look after
their art excellently but other owners do not necessarily regard it as a large issue. For example, they might have bought a painting many years before and its value could have risen dramatically. If they are insured, then the insurance company, in its role of making the rules of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), will make them consider it important (Insurer 3). However, if the owners are uninsured, it is solely up to them.

Self-policing can help recoveries. When a set of paintings stolen in Oslo surfaced in Amsterdam, the dealer in Holland noticed a label for an Oslo dealer on the back of one of the paintings. By calling him, he found out the paintings were stolen, notified the public police and arrests were made (Insurer 4). Information sharing can also have a huge impact in preventing thefts occurring. This has been shown by the London Museum and Archive Security Group in 2006 (Head of MPS Unit Interview for ARCA, Public Police Officer 1) and also the Stately Home Hotline (Stately Home Hotline, National Security Adviser). This shows the potential for self-policing, but there must be a desire for it to occur.

Databases, both those open and closed, can be extremely useful for the self-policing of all locations. As the Interpol Co-ordinator explained about the Interpol database:

“I am convinced it is an effective tool. We granted public access in August 2009 and have already granted over 1,100 access rights. If we want to tackle illicit trafficking effectively, we must provide the means to a potential purchaser to check whether or not an object is recorded as stolen. On the other hand, the possessor has no longer an excuse in saying he did not know, or he had no means to check. This shifts the responsibility to the sellers and buyers including the professional art trade. Effectiveness will further increase by a more systematic data supply to Interpol and the further development of search facilities, such as the image comparison. We have initiated a working group focusing on these objectives” (Interpol Co-ordinator).
Although unsurprising that the Interpol Co-ordinator was promoting the effectiveness of the Interpol database, his argument that potential purchasers must be able to check whether art objects are stolen and, critically, that this database should have public access, are very valid. However, as Loss Adjuster 1 pointed out, this still relies on people checking the databases. This is why reward notices are placed in trade gazettes to notify the art world.

In spite of the roles of the insurance industry and the public sector in making the rules of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), responsibility ultimately rests with the locations. While overall their role in the security of art can be seen as “adequate” according to a former forger (Artist 3), and some locations are doing excellently, art pieces are still getting stolen and some places are not self-policing adequately. Loss Adjuster 1 highlighted instances such as a dealer leaving keys in doors, and a clock being stolen from a location in the St. James’s area by a thief dressed as a workman. Doors were even held open for him.

While simple documenting measures are crucial to self-policing (Insurer 1, Loss Adjuster 1, Art Detective 2), knowledge of other security measures is also important. The DCMS has used its non-departmental agencies, most recently the MLA and now Arts Council England, to provide advice and information for locations. For instance, Resource (2003) advised reporting a crime to the police as soon as possible, to warn other similar institutions, to assist the police by reporting approaches offering the return of stolen art for money, and to use help from the National Security Adviser.

Crucial to self-policing is the need for locations to have a good awareness of the type of threat. For example, the fact that thieves in the UK appear to have an aversion to modern art must be considered (Loss Adjuster 2, Insurer 3). There are some exceptions such as Picasso’s work (Insurer 3). Ho (1992), who researched 229 art thefts from dealers in the United States, also found that art thieves hate
abstract art. Loss Adjuster 2 described how in one theft from a house in London, thieves stole a low value seascape but left a painting by a leading abstract artist whose work can sell for millions. He believes that this could be because they know little about art and therefore cannot judge the value, but also because the kudos within the criminal world gained from stealing art (Bailey 2004, Mackenzie 2005) could be undermined by the nature of much contemporary art. This is one reason why it is better for dealers not to have price tags on paintings or objects.

Insurer 4, Loss Adjuster 1 and Art Detective 2 all warned that when locations are keen to self-policing and use popular security measures they must be careful about how all of this is undertaken; for example, they must be very aware that marking or using special liquids on the art objects might actually cause irreversible harm. For instance, Smartwater is useful for many locations such as churches, especially with the present high risk of metal theft from parts of their buildings such as the lead from their roofs, but there is much uncertainty over its use with cultural objects and whether it damages them. Some technology allows for less, or even non-invasive, documentation, as Art Detective 2 explained:

“which again is something we do. We photograph several positions of the object multiplied by thousands of times and we end up with like a fingerprint or DNA of object that can’t be replicated. It’s 100% fool proof and it’s non-invasive…the only way to do it…and we can now do it using a high resolution scanner which also incorporates infra-red and x-ray so we can see through, we can see behind and we can tell you beyond a shadow of a doubt and create a record of that object that cannot be replicated and is 100% yours” (Art Detective 2).

Nonetheless, there are limits to self-policing, however motivated the locations might be, especially after a theft has occurred. If locations attempt to recover the art themselves, they face large hurdles.
Art Detective 2 highlighted this:

“I had an instance only two weeks ago. A client whose property…they had spotted their own stolen property on eBay. They contacted the investigating officer and, this is going back to where I was saying about the poor quality that goes into the police, and they said, ‘can we buy our own stolen property back on eBay?’ and they were told, ‘no you can’t because we may have to investigate you for handling stolen property’. The result was that these people watched their own property being sold on eBay because they had…they felt they had to abide by the police. They then found some more of their property on eBay and went to the police and said, ‘you are going to have to do something about it’ and the police recovered a quarter of all that had been stolen because the person had been dealing on eBay” (Art Detective 2).

MEASURING SUCCESS

In the UK, the fact that a small number of crime families commit many of the thefts can make it easier to map than in European countries where there appear to be more criminal gangs involved (Loss Adjuster 1, Art Detective 2). However, success cannot be calculated because there are too many known unknowns and unknown unknowns due to art not being recorded separately from other property theft and some locations choosing not to report a theft. An apparent reduction of museum thefts by 65% from 2005 to 2009 does show success (Head of MPS Unit Interview for ARCA). However, it is debateable whether this was due to increased and more effective security or displacement (Ekblom 2006:385) leading to other locations such as historic houses being targeted.

All locations must be aware of the shifting trends and fluidity of the risk. On the subject of policing and technology in general, Marx (2007:54) warns about complacency and the risk of not taking other precautions due to faith in a “tactic’s fail-safe nature”. This warning is highly appropriate for locations with art in London. For example, by 2010 a shift in the UK had appeared towards museums
being targeted during the day and thieves using an increased level of threatened violence (Art Detective 2). This is in line with ‘smash and grab’ thefts that have happened at stately homes and also for other private residences where more violence was present in the incidents (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1).

Although understandable due to the response that the public sometimes receive, a concerning trend is if people are not going to the public police (Art Detective 1). If they are insured, they need to report a theft to the public police to avoid putting their claim at risk; but if they are not, then it is tempting for them to try and recover the objects themselves. If the public police are seen to not be involved there is the danger that the criminals will view it as a less risky criminal enterprise (Art Detectives 1, 2, Insurer 2). So, even if they are not confident or are unhappy with the public police’s response, the onus is on the locations both to report the crime and also to play a leading role in the security network.

Measuring success is also very hard because of many locations being open to the public in one form or another, and their focus being on managing risk rather than avoiding risk (Head of Security 2). This is the case for many types of cultural location, as highlighted by the British Library (Interview 15/10/2009):

“How do you actually measure the success? You know, there’s no such thing as 100% security. There’s no such thing as 100% success. We’ve had one thief who stole four items and we have 640,000 readers through our doors every year out of god knows how many million of us...and you’ve got 100,000,000 items in the collections...some people would see that as a success”.

(Interview 15/10/2009)

Using measures to mitigate all risk of theft would change the whole ethos of many of the locations or even mean they could not operate (Heads of Security 1, 2).
CONCLUSION

While the insurance companies and the government, particularly through loss adjusters and the National Security Adviser, drive a lot of art security in the capital, much of the onus lies with and between the locations in which art is kept, displayed, stored, and transported.

Many of the arguments about the significance of space in security, and anxiety and restrictions over space and movement (Soja 1989, Davis 1990), relate directly to locations with art. However, though they still very much have to be their “own rock” (Rose 2000:328), many of these security bubbles (Shearing et al 1980) are far more open to the public than other places in London, and offer an example of how space can be effectively securitized whilst remaining inclusive; no ‘other’ is being excluded, either implicitly or overtly.

Art security has many facets that might initially appear paradoxical. For example, while wealthy private residences can ‘fortify’ themselves, the many popular locations open to the public are helped in their self-policing through the sheer number of visitors; and, in contrast to ideas of “target removal” concerning other areas of security (Marx 2007:47), one of the safest places for art is on a wall being displayed. This, though, is linked to the environment of many of the actual locations, where the implementation, execution and technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) can be extremely extensive.

Due to the difficulties in recovering the objects, prevention of thefts is crucial. However, the level and type of control depends on resources and staff, and this is where vulnerabilities lie or security deficits are caused. Many locations depend on technology, and have high and low technology methods, from basic situational crime prevention to costly environmental design. Yet, all locations must also have an actual desire for, or awareness about, good security. This is not always the case.
Moreover, crucially, they must work with other nodes involved in the co-production of security. Art security in the capital is a good example of the threats and opportunities in the global risk society. Minimising the ‘security deficits’, some of which can be self-inflicted due to the manufactured flows of art, whilst maximising the advantages of nodal governance arrangements (McLaughlin 2007:94), combined with the benefits from indemnification and insurance (Ewald 1991), have led to the vibrant art world continuing to flourish in spite of a recession. The bringing together of perhaps the finest exhibition of Da Vinci’s work at the National Gallery in 2011 (National Gallery 2011) exemplifies this, as do the huge sales in the auction houses and the massive visitor numbers throughout art spaces in London.

This chapter has shown that the locations in which art is kept have a wide range of issues concerning situating risk and situating security. Many locations, particularly the nationals, are currently successful, but others, such as some commercial galleries, churches and private residences, are much more vulnerable. With the risk to art being fluid and currently becoming more violent, all locations must be constantly aware of the changing risks, especially as they, themselves, are actively involved in the manufacturing of risk.

While a lot of the security responsibility rests with the locations and on how they situate their security within the co-production of risk, the leading securitization and policing nodes concerned in the co-production of security play crucial roles. The following chapters examine how this co-production of security works in practice.
CO-PRODUCTION OF SECURITY

In line with Wood’s (2006:230) proposed methodology for conducting research and innovation in security fields, this section of the thesis begins with Diagram 5 showing the existing nodes involved in the securitization and policing of art theft in London.

Following Johnston and Shearing’s (2003:30) use of their eight general dimensions of governance (first considered in Chapter 1 p 47) to inform their analysis, the subsequent chapters follow a similar approach.

DIAGRAM 5- SECURITIZATION AND POLICING NODES
CHAPTER 4 PUBLIC POLICE AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

As society undergoes significant changes in the way it undertakes its security, this is a critical time in the UK for the public police and policing in general. Considering Shearing et al’s (1980) argument - that state led governance is not viable and that instead of looking into the past, the important thing is to devise a strategy which minimises insufficiencies in security - with the security and policing of art in London, the public sector exists in the network as a number of nodes, one of these being the public police. The private sector is doing much of the securitization and policing within a matrix made up of nodes of divergent sizes and influence, which at times cooperate among themselves, and at other times compete with each other. Dealing with the “is” (Johnston 2006:47), nodal governance can be complicated (Wood and Shearing 2007) and has the capability to best reflect the reality of this actual security terrain in which security is co-produced and, also, to enable the terrain to be examined.

As the only force in England and Wales with an Arts and Antiques Unit, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) still takes a role. This chapter uses empirical findings to examine how the MPS Unit and the public police in general operate, or do not operate, within the co-production of art security; how they collaborate with other public and private nodes, locally, nationally and internationally; and the limitations they face due to factors such as legal constraints, accountability and distribution of resources. It considers prioritization and attitudes within the police service towards art, and the influence of the private sector nodes. Moreover, it identifies opportunities for change and looks for potential connections and nodes that could improve the network.

In contrast to the high level of scepticism among criminologists about the effectiveness of the public police (Brodeur and Shearing 2005, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Morgan and Newburn 1997, Reiner 2000, Waddington 1999), the Unit has been successful in the past (Art Detectives 2, 3, 4) and can
justifiably claim to still be so within its contracted sphere. However, in the modern policing terrain, there are questions over the potential for the Unit and the public police in general to be effective in the future. In the shadow of the larger question of “who should the police be?” (Shearing and Marks 2011:210) and aiming to analyse the effectiveness of the policing matrix and how the co-production of art security works in practice, this chapter examines the role of the public police in this specific co-production and argues that while nodal governance offers the most effective policing approach to understand the security terrain as a whole, it is especially the case for the public police.

**BACKGROUND: PUBLIC POLICE AND ART**

The public police’s response to art theft generally begins with the local police force where the crime occurs, or, within London, the local borough police or the City of London Police. These officers can turn to the MPS Art and Antiques Unit, limited in its operational potential by its small size and jurisdiction over only London, for advice and help in disseminating information on stolen property (Public Police Officer 1, Art Detective 2) and, while the Unit is involved in operations that require specialist knowledge of art crime (Public Police Officer 1, MPS 2010), it is the police forces and borough police themselves who are often involved in investigations. That is, if they choose to investigate (Art Detective 1). For example, many items stolen from museums, “are recovered by officers on the street” (Head of MPS Unit Interview in *The Job* April 2010:14).

Ex-public police officers who now work in the private sector explained that investigating might not be an attractive option for local police forces because of thefts of art and antiques being recorded as property crime (and not being differentiated from other stolen objects), and one art theft probably involving more complex, costly, time consuming investigation than lower value property crimes (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4). This also makes it hard to know the true scale of the problem and difficult to form
a concerted public police response, if one was sought by senior officers. The public police node is split between one section that is partly effective and another larger section that is largely ineffective.

**MPS Arts and Antiques Unit (The Unit)**

An ex-Head of the Unit (Interview 29/03/2010) explained, “We never recovered less than £14 million of stolen property a year when I was there”. He also told me that during this time the limited number of detectives (on average, about four) were recovering more than the rest of the entire MPS. This large assertion of operational success is evidenced by the Unit’s involvement in high level recoveries such as Vermeer’s *Lady Writing a Letter with her Maid* and one of Munch’s *Scream* paintings (Art Detectives 2, 4).

The Unit is now part of the Economic and Specialist Crime command (formerly the Fraud Squad) within the Specialist Crime Directorate (MPS 2010). While many in the art security terrain argued that its capacity to be effective is reduced by its size and lack of staff (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4; Interpol Coordinator; Loss Adjusters 1, 2), in 2009 the Head of the Unit explained that it consisted of four detectives, two support staff, thirteen special constables, two volunteers, and one work experience person, with the specialist support staff having both police and art knowledge. The Unit uses special constables from non-profit organisations and the private sector (Head of the Unit, Private Company 2). According to the Head of the Unit, this is in line with Specialist Crime Directorate Units. The limited size of the Unit is not new as even at its ‘peak’ in the 1990s when it was a squad, it was often undermanned (Art Detectives 2, 4). While articles in the press have claimed otherwise\(^7\), the Head of the Unit stated in 2009 that the “Budget remained largely the same for the last ten years - use of special constables is newer.” However, as shown by its history in which it has been closed and reopened due to cuts in resources and prioritisation of other policing areas (Art Detectives 2, 3), its

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\(^7\) Such as an article in the *Guardian* on 21 April 2007 which wrote about the Art and Antique Unit’s use of special constables as, “it's volunteer or die”.

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existence is vulnerable. It was disbanded in the 1970s on account of the number of armed robberies (Art Detective 3) and also in the 1980s when specialist operations saved the required 10% by axing the Unit (Art Detective 2).

Its role is not a residual one. For example, the Head of the Unit detailed how they work as a “focus team desk”, and can have many more officers available if needed; for example, in 2009 he spoke of using 240 officers in a recent investigation. However, this is not normal and there are instances where the Unit has not been able to deal with a case. Whilst very successful with one case at a large cultural institution in London, the Unit was unable to deal with another (Head of Security 1).

Although the Unit is at threat and limited in its capacity, other international public policing approaches are also not above criticism, even the Italian Carabinieri unit (CCTPC) which is viewed as one of the most effective and has 300 officers (Interpol Co-ordinator, Houpt 2006). Art detective 4 stated that it is important to remember that the Carabinieri are military police and the Head of the Unit emphasised to me that they use many conscripts without art knowledge (over 250). Art Detective 4 asked, “Would you want a Military Policeman running art theft in the UK? Best suited to traffic control....” However, this overlooks the fact that with a central office, an operational department and 12 units across Italy, many in the Carabinieri unit (CCTPC) have skills specific to art crimes (Carabinieri 2009).

If the extra officers in the UK are made available, and have the skills to act in the circumstances of crimes involving art, then arguments over whether having a focus desk team is a more effective means of policing than having one large unit, can be properly assessed. However, if the officers are not made available to a focus desk team, then having 300 officers in a unit like the CCTPC appears evidently more effective. Comparisons are also made more difficult due to the British way of using private individuals to do public police work, as with the Art Beat scheme, which makes the policing matrix in
London and the UK distinct from other countries. The Interpol Co-ordinator explained that, “A construction, such as the Art Beat teams, where private individuals contribute to carrying out police duties is only conceivable in the UK”.

The Unit still has successes, such as its involvement in setting up the London Museum and Archive Security Group in 2006 (Head of the Unit Interview for ARCA, Head of Security 3). The Security Group came about after Shaun Greenhalgh’s trial in 2007. His sixteen year forgery career might have been stopped far earlier if there had been better information sharing between museums about his attempts that failed. The Group has made a difference, as the Head of the Unit explained:

“Now, there are 240 museums in London communicating about matters of mutual concern, so if an individual brings in a fake or a forgery, the museum lets us know. We then record it for intelligence purposes, so that means we can stop forgers much earlier in their career” (The Job April 2010:14).

They can point to an apparent reduction of museum thefts of 65% and recovery rate of stolen objects at 82% from 2005 to 2009 (Head of the Unit Interview for ARCA). While due to the different dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and nodal make-up of the policing and security matrix, it can be argued that it is difficult to ascertain exactly how much the Unit is responsible for this, seen through a nodal governance framework, this working together and link up of many nodes responsible for implementing the governance of security (Johnston and Shearing 2003) has clearly been beneficial and is an example of the ‘community’ taking a keen role. However, rather than being ‘bottom up’ (Loader and Walker 2007), the ‘tops’ are overlapping with the ‘downs’ (Wood and Shearing 2007:149). The Unit has understood how to operate within this shifting governance and they are seen to do a very professional job by many in different areas of the security terrain (Head of Security 2, Insurer 1, Interpol Co-ordinator).
THE PUBLIC POLICE DOING NODAL GOVERNANCE

The Unit’s work with the private sector

In line with Johnston’s (Johnston and Shearing 2003) belief that ‘hybridity’ (Johnston 1992) now fails to describe modern security, the way the public police and the private sector work with each other is more complex than binary relationships because a variety of nodes and differences of approach among and within them are involved. For example, while at senior public police managerial level art crime appears to be overlooked, collaboration does occur between the public police and different private sector nodes. This mainly happens through the Unit and involves relationships with loss adjusters, cooperation with museums through the London Museum Security Group, and with private policing agencies. With the latter, this is often through art detectives, many of whom previously worked for the Unit. While acknowledging that some private detectives cause problems, the Head of the Unit asserted that the MPS Art and Antiques Unit works well with many in the field. The forming of the Security Group in 2006 with the support of the V&A is a good example of the nodes sharing information and working effectively together, with different nodes, especially smaller museums, benefiting greatly, according to Head of Security 3.

Key to the operational success of the co-production of art security in London is the sharing of information between, and among, different nodes, private and public. While handicapped by other areas within the public police, the Unit’s risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) is in line with other nodes in the security arena and it takes a leading role in this transfer of information. The interconnection of knowledge bubbles can make a significant difference through information such as specific times and days when criminals are currently targeting locations, their methods, and the type of piece (for example, Old Masters, porcelain, jade and different metals).
It is important to highlight that a very important relationship within the co-production of art security exists between two public sector nodes: the Unit and the National Security Adviser. They both demonstrate how public sector nodes can play a key role within a nodal governance framework. Their relationship also underlines how, if the conditions exist for this connection to occur, it can be advantageous to the security network. However, their relationship has little to do with situating power in a public sector setting; rather it is about situating risk and security. The National Security Adviser explains:

“I have regular dialogue with the Metropolitan Arts and Antiques Unit, specific contact in relation to temporary exhibitions which are high risk. Liaison in relation to police response to venues and I also invite the Designing out Crime officer to attend meetings with architects. I also attend and present details of the GI requirement to police staff as part of their formal training” (National Security Adviser).

This sharing of information between security nodes must also cross borders. While, as evidenced by the London Museum Security Group, cooperation within London is not as poor as in the rest of the UK, it could still be improved and, as stolen art moves into and out of the capital, the policing of art in London cannot be seen in isolation. According to Art Detectives 1, 2 and 4, and Loss Adjuster 1, the flows of stolen art across different areas nationally and over open and closed international borders, and the level of art knowledge required, pose a massive test to the public police. Bowman (2008) believes that recent increased policing efforts with some crimes have pushed organised criminal networks into broadening their activities into new areas such as the trade in organs and art theft. By 2000, criminologists were aware of art being used in money laundering for example (James 2000). This could be in part because the normal processes such as laundering through currency exchanges have become more difficult (Sheptycki 2000). Also, concerning a stolen painting or object, the art market as, “the last, great unpoliced financial market” (Art Detective 2) can bypass the 15,000 Euro ceiling
for money transactions by layering the amounts, so that large quantities of money can be moved across borders without being flagged up. There are many routes throughout Europe for stolen art and antiquities (Interpol Co-ordinator); including, across or under the Channel (Art Detective 1, Sheptycki 2002), the Irish Sea (Art Detective 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2), Switzerland (Loss Adjuster 1), through tunnels at the Italian border (Loss Adjuster 1), and across the Slovenian border out of the EU (Slovenian police and Croatian police, Art Crime and Investigation Conference, Slovenia 2010).

Art theft is one example where the public police have been able to achieve good results through successful international cooperation, and it is the Unit that is most involved in this international collaboration. For instance, according to Art Detective 4 the recovery of the *Scream* in 1994, in which he had a central role, relied on cooperation between the British, Norwegian and American police. Another example is the successful tracking down, arrest and extradition of Octave Durham, who was later found guilty of stealing two paintings from the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam in 2000. This relied on cooperation between the Dutch and Spanish police (Howard 2007).

While problems do exist in the British public police’s cooperation with some countries such as Italy and France, mainly due to different legal systems, the Head of the Unit was clear that there are many good relationships, especially with countries such as Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Though this could be due to the fact that it largely involves the return of their property, it corresponds with the international picture where there is a lot of cooperation, usually bi-lateral and often involving Interpol, among national police forces (Interpol Co-ordinator).


**Database**

The Unit already has a database, the London Stolen Arts Database (LSAD) with 54,000 items of stolen property (MPS 2012a). However, it does not appear to have been updated since 2008 (MPS 2012b) and while the Unit still has a strategic role, their database appears to have a residual one.

Since August 2009, the Interpol database has granted access to the public. Interpol believes that this is necessary in the fight against illicit trafficking. However, while useful, the Interpol Co-ordinator is cautious about their use,

> “Clearly, the figures should be interpreted with utmost care. They show more the capacity of countries to measure and record data, rather than providing the exact information on the number of thefts/items” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

**Art Beat Scheme**

While, arguably, the Unit is effective within the parameters it has placed on it, it now also uses the knowledge and skills of civilians who work in the art world, some of whom are employed in security and knowledge bubbles, through the Art Beat Scheme (MPS 2011).

Whether described in terms of hybrid policing (Johnston 1992) or nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Johnston 2006, Shearing 2006), using special constables employed by private policing companies introduces the dichotomy where the public police benefit from using those within the community with specific skills and knowledge, but can be damaged by questions about conflicts of interests. While the Head of the Unit maintained that there is no conflict of interests, he did state that they try and use volunteers from non-profit organisations such as the British Museum and the V&A. However, they do employ special constables from private companies such as the Art Loss Register.
While ArtBeat is about cooperation between public and private sector nodes, is it “policing on the cheap” as the Guardian newspaper asked in 2007? (Guardian 01/11/2007)

There is plenty of scepticism over the scheme from those who work in the field. Is the use of special constables, as ArtDetective 2 asked me rhetorically, “window dressing” or, as ArtDetective 4 speculated in his interview, maybe a public relations exercise for the public/private sector relationship? ArtDetective 4’s concern is that they could end up as Police Community Support Officers, not using their specific art and antiques knowledge and skills. While another ex-Unit officer believes that the relationship between public/private sectors is a decent idea, he does not think it is good for the public police to use art world private individuals as special constables because they have no knowledge of investigating (ArtDetective 3). Functionally, apart from their lack of criminality and “evidence gathering” knowledge, according to ArtDetective 2 the fact they would not be suitable as expert witnesses further negates their usefulness.

Despite these reservations, the Unit’s use of special constables is in line with other areas of policing, public and private. Head of Security 2 called it a good use of resources as it utilizes very well trained people with a high level of specific knowledge which cannot be expected of most police constables. He highlighted the use of ‘specials’ in the IT world to reinforce his point. In line with Johnston and Shearing’s use of Stenning’s (in Johnston and Shearing 2003:28) security ‘tool kit’ within the technologies of governance, the ‘specials’ do bring different tools which enable the Unit more capacity in how they implement and execute governance. An ArtBeat special constable (Private Company 2) and Head of Security 2 both explained that when these private individuals are in their special constable role, even though they are being paid by their employer, their allegiance is to the position of constable. They argue that they can be a valuable asset to the public police, especially as the Head of Security 2 said, “The average bobby doesn’t know a Canaletto from a can of beans”. Whilst benefitting the public
police, the Art Beat Scheme can also help the employers of the special constables, whether they are location nodes or private policing nodes.

In 2009, the Head of the Unit believed that the UK system is more effective due to its “focus team desk” than those in other countries. Although this is hard to substantiate, particularly if compared to Italy, he also said that the use of special constables, which he highlighted dates back to the 1820s, is a form of community policing. This chimes with Johnston and Shearing (2003) and Jones and Newburn’s (1998) work, and it can be argued that these people, with their role in this community, are best suited to policing it, and the ‘sphere of decision making’ is best located in this local democracy. However, with the Art Beat scheme, it is still the public police who are making the decisions albeit with the assistance of the special constables and their knowledge.

**Public police in general**

It is when looking at how the public police at the general level deal with art theft that criminologists’ criticisms of the public police are more applicable (Brodeur and Shearing 2005, Morgan and Newburn 1997, Reiner 2000, Waddington 1999). Any examination into the effectiveness of the public police must consider the everyday reality that thefts of art, particularly from private houses, are investigated inadequately by inexperienced officers. Most public police officers dealing with art in the UK will have little or no knowledge of art (Art Detectives 2, 3, 4, Loss Adjuster 1, Head of Security 2).

In a case of nodes connecting, with one node working to make another more effective, a large national cultural institution in North London has taken it upon itself to educate their local public police (Head of Security 1). This policy has also had another beneficial effect, that of the cultural institution learning more about public police procedures and the criminal justice system (Collection Security Coordinator 1). So, the flow of knowledge was not one way, and, in theory, the policing network for
cultural locations might have improved in the borough. This illustrates the importance of the ‘community’ and their ‘knowledge’ in nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). However, the fact that the same borough police lost a disc given to them by another museum on which there was CCTV footage of a burglary (Head of Security 3) shows how errors can occur.

While locations can educate the public police to an extent, it is largely up to the public police themselves. Among officers there is a lack of awareness about the Unit and its database (Head of the Unit in The Job April 2010:14). The Head of the Unit was clear that the Unit needs officers to report the thefts to them (The Job April 2010:14). This is crucial to the Unit’s ability to implement governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Art Detectives 1 and 2 were adamant that the public policing node would be more effective within itself and the co-production of security would benefit greatly if, when a property crime occurred, art and antiques theft was recorded separately as a matter of procedure, and not just out of choice by an officer. This is crucial to the Unit maintaining a strategic role. Indeed, it is critical to its survival because at times of cost cutting, as one of the most vulnerable units within the MPS Special Crime Directorate, it cannot afford to be residual.

**Risk assessments**

The public police do not ‘police’ inside the security bubbles in which art is held (Art Detective 3), the exception being perhaps a site visit from a Crime Prevention Officer (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1). Even then, as Loss Adjuster 1 explained, usually the person who actually does a detailed risk assessment will be paid by an insurance company. Similar to many other areas of space in modern society (Davis 1990, Ericson 2007, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Soja 1989, Wakefield 2003), inside the ‘bubble’ it is private security - whether in house or contracted - technical staff who ‘do’ the security. With art, they might be better suited for the role due to their art knowledge. Indeed, private security might feel the public police are encroaching on their area and should remain outside the
‘bubble’ to avoid a conflict of interests (Button 2007, Hoogenboom 1991). However, while this could be the case for decently paid, full time security staff at a location such as the V & A (ARUP 2009), at other locations such as National Trust properties and smaller museums which depend on volunteers, many of whom are over sixty years old, my research shows that this is not the case (Head of Security 3, Volunteer 1).

In addition, in line with the limits to what the public police can actually do (Manning 1997), the involvement of insiders in art thefts makes their role even harder (Art Detective 4, Mackenzie 2005, Tijhuis 2006) and curtails their potential capacity in this type of policing.

Knowledge transference

While other art policing nodes, public and private, might work well with the Unit, Art Detectives 1, 2 and 4 highlight that it is a struggle to have a similar relationship with local public police forces who, whether because of a lack of specialised knowledge, deficiency of resources, lack of desire within the force, or indifference at management level, are keener to focus on other areas of policing.

The insurance industry has similar problems, especially with the need to involve the public police straight away by either contacting the police officer leading the investigation or through their loss adjuster (Insurer 4). Insurer 2 believes the public police are now more open with the insurance industry than in the past. This is also shown by the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with guidelines on exchanging information between the police, insurance companies and Loss Adjusters (ACPO ABU MOU 2005). However, while some successful joint operations occur (Insurer 4, Loss Adjuster 1), this cooperation is not always the norm. Insurance companies are often frustrated by the public police. Similar to other nodes, they hand the public police information which is then not acted upon (Loss Adjuster 2) or face delays in receiving police authorisation to pay a reward (Insurer 4). Some within
the industry believe it is in the public police’s interests to use the insurance companies more as they would both benefit if they worked closer together (Insurer 3). Insurer 3 even suggested that the insurance industry could pay some of the costs.

This highlights the difference in how the public police operate compared with the private sector and other parts of the public sector where there is the drive to utilise the abilities of those best suited to implement and execute the governance of security (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Although the Unit shares the same drive for this to occur, the fact that it does not exist in the public police at the general level creates a gap in the security.

While there are some cases of knowledge sharing about stolen cultural items in London (Heads of Security 1, 3, Loss Adjuster 1), the lack of it within the public police, at borough, force and national level, and also with the private sector (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1, Artist 3) exposes a serious weakness in policing. Stolen art crosses police force boundaries and if forces or borough police do not want to get involved because the art was stolen in another force’s or borough’s area, then the policing is severely handicapped (Public Police Officer 1, Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1). This is not unique to art as Inspector O’Connor (2005) explains, “Under current policing structures collaboration does not offer an effective or efficient model for gaps in Level 2 services, the local territorial imperatives are simply too strong” (O’Connor 2005:72). Loss Adjuster 1 added that the dislocation is highlighted when information that should and could be supplied by local or borough forces is provided by private sector nodes. These knowledge gaps are a clear example of the “missing links” in security governance about which Burris writes, highlighted by Wood (Burris 2004 in Wood 2006:235).

The potential is clearly there for new, or at least improved, connections to be formed within the public police and with the private sector nodes such as loss adjusters and art detectives. In London, the Unit
plays a strategic role in promoting these connections through finding and using nodes with capacity and knowledge; for example, the Art Loss Register and setting up the London Museum Security Group. Another example is the City of London Police (26/10/2010) who explained that their, “Major Investigations Team would oversee an investigation, but the specialist expertise would be provided by the Met's unit”. However, the frequent failure of the public police forces nationally, and also the boroughs in London, to provide or see the potential for these connections weakens the security terrain and reduces potential success.

**Unique role of the public police in the nodal governance framework**

Reiner’s (2000:7) description of the police as a “specialized body of people given the primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security” is particularly appropriate, as the ‘formal’ is important here because, while the public police with art theft might be simply one node in the security framework, the powers which they have and the private sector do not, give them a particular role, whether they are best suited to it or not, or indeed whether they want it or not.

According to Art Detectives 1 and 2, and Insurer 2, if the public police are seen to not be involved at all, there is the danger that the criminals will view art theft as a less risky criminal enterprise. While private police fill the gaps left by the public police, their lack of criminal investigative powers means that while the thief, or those connected with the thief, might still lose the art work they have stolen, the risk of criminal justice sanction lessens dramatically. This is a concern with the often low level punishment already making involvement in art theft a more attractive proposition than other more dangerous thefts.

In spite of constraints, the fact that the Unit has had past and recent success shows its potential to be effective in the future. The combination of investigative skill and art knowledge of the Unit’s
detectives makes them very suitable people to investigate art crime. This is illustrated by the fact that on leaving the MPS many work in the private sector of art investigation. The Head of the Unit’s move from the Unit to the V&A Museum in June 2010 is a recent example. However, outside of the Unit, the reality is very different in the public police, as Art Detective 4 argues, “By and large police can’t cope and deal with it as it needs expertise, energy and time that they don’t have”. Owing to this, in line with Johnson and Shearing’s (2003) belief that Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997:86) “negative logic” need not be the case and the fact that we are now all our own risk assessors (Rose 2000), if the public find the local police force and borough police response ineffectual, they will turn to the private sector and hire the services of art recovery companies directly or through their insurance companies (Art Detectives 2, 3).

However, even though private companies, at present, offer many services and arguably provide a more effective service to the public, the public police are needed. The Museum, Archives and Libraries Council believed that for collections to be adequately protected then an effective public police response is also essential (Resource 2003). Many insurers, on account of their large role in the policing matrix, would like the public police more involved. As Insurer 4 explained:

“we don’t police the art world. We have information about the art world, and about art theft, art damage, all those kinds of things....we’re not going around arresting people or anything like that. We don’t want to have that power…we are an insurance company” (Insurer 4).

Insurer 2 argued, “it is important that the police maintain an active, proactive role in seeking...seeking out the criminals responsible for art theft...because without them you know you could see it proliferate as a crime” (Insurer 2). Similarly, the frustrations of Art Detectives 1 and 2 are that the public police fail to get more involved, do not act when given the information needed to do so, and fail to connect enough with other nodes, aside from the Art Loss Register. No one is calling for the public police to be a central node, or even an anchoring node, but that they act when it is necessary for them to do so. The
fact that the nodal governance framework already exists and art security is presently being co-produced in London means the conditions are currently in place for the public police to work more effectively within this framework. While the Unit has understood this, the public police in general have not.

The influence of the private sector in the protection and recovery of stolen art in London is very large and, as it continues to grow, there is the distinct possibility that there will be no public police involvement in the future. Policing history warns us about, and indeed the public police’s existence is arguably built on, the dangers of a private sector takeover (Zedner 2006). Furthermore, it should be a concern that this is all happening in one of the few remaining unregulated fields (Art Detective 2), within a world that has problems dealing with thieves in it (Art Detective 4), and in a pluralised policing terrain in which many private sector nodes are calling for more public police involvement not less.

This is directly related to Art Detective 1’s warning that if people lose faith with the public police then they may not report thefts, and the fact that this is already happening. This is linked to the contentious issue over being arrested for buying back your own stolen property (Art Detective 2). The reasons for not being able to do so are clear, but if a theft is not investigated properly and people see their stolen art up for sale on eBay, they will try to recover their art in this way. If they are penalised for doing so, then it will become more appealing to simply not report thefts. A knock on effect is that information about the theft will then not be shared and knowledge about potential threats will diminish further. Much depends on the attitudes of senior public police, and also within the public police more generally. However, while this is about the mentalities of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), the starting point is whether mentalities even exist for much of the public police in respect to art security.
MENTALITIES OF THE PUBLIC POLICE WITH ART

“They’ve got enough to do, they don’t want to know. And that’s it” (Art Detective 1).

The success of the London Museum Security Group is an example of how the security terrain can bring together knowledge in order to help the security and policing of art in the capital, and highlights the Unit’s risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). However, highlighting the differing governmentalities which can exist within nodes, conversely a lack of interest from managerial level of public sector nodes has hampered other initiatives in the UK. An example is the Council for the Prevention of Art Theft (CoPAT), which was a collaboration between cultural heritage organisations (including museums, national inventories and archaeological organisations), law-enforcement agencies, customs agencies, the art trade, appraisers, and the insurance industry (House of Commons 2000). CoPAT had significant successes such as the abolition of Market Overt \(^8\) in 1995 and the Code of Due Diligence \(^9\) for antique dealers and auctioneers introduced in 1999, but according to Loss Adjuster 2, a lack of interest from high level police officers and ministers curtailed its effectiveness.

How the public police “problematize” (Foucault in Wood 2006:231) art theft is linked to it often being a low priority. Dolnick (2006) argues that there is public pressure on them to focus on ‘real crime’ not art theft. However, a lack of evidence makes this assertion hard to substantiate. Instead, in line with the “problematics” of government and the ‘mentalities’ or ‘rationalities’ of government (Foucault

\(^8\) Appendix 60 of the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (2000) explained Market Overt as, “a medieval law that enabled a buyer to obtain good title to a stolen object by purchasing it in certain street markets, such as the one at Bermondsey. A Private Members' Bill was introduced in the 1994 Parliamentary Session and resulted in the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994, which abolished market overt from 3 January 1995”.

\(^9\) Appendix 60 of the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (2000) explained, “The codes of “due diligence” have been developed by the Council in partnership with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Norfolk Constabulary, and the Metropolitan Police Service, with the wider co-operation of dealers, auctioneers, private collectors, lawyers, police officers, Customs and Excise and other government departments”.

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decisions are not led by public pressure but by choices taken from within the public police and government to problematize other policing areas about which they have knowledge and can exercise more power. For instance, Inspector O’Connor (2005:25) reports that many police forces prefer to focus on areas of crime like drugs because they are more accustomed to dealing with them. However, while it might appear as though those involved in art are left by the public police to, “govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1996:45), Foucault’s (1980 [1976]:98) ‘net like organisation’ through which power is employed is a more appropriate description due to the existence of the Unit and the public police still having some unique powers such as the letters of authorisation for rewards from insurance companies (see page 196).

Although it might be inevitable that private art detectives who previously worked for the Unit would feel that art theft should be more of a priority (especially if they are still operating in the security terrain and their work would benefit from more public police involvement), it is interesting to note why they believe senior police appear to disagree. For example, Art Detective 4 believes that senior officers have made decisions to marginalise art theft in line with Home Office guidelines and blames it on art theft being “highbrow” and the public police not liking art. Art Detective 2 states, “It isn’t taken seriously”. Art Detective 3, who is now retired, disagrees that public police attitudes to art are a reason for the lack of prioritisation. While he sees less public police being involved as a backward step he argues that, “it’s due to lack of resources”.

Other types of art crime receive a similar attitude. Research on art vandalism provides this example:

“It is noteworthy that one respondent who did remark on the matter complained that museums were under supported by the authorities. She illustrated her point with an example in which a vandal was identified with CCTV footage, but was never reprimanded because police failed to take the episode seriously” (Scott 2010:16).
A major reason, or justification, for the lack of prioritisation within the public police is the assumption that lots of art is insured (Loss Adjuster 2, Art Detective 2). There is the argument that with their risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), insurance companies are better equipped than the public police and should take the lead. In relation to the techniques and tactics of government continually being redefined in relation to, “what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on” (Foucault 2002, [1978]:221), Art Detectives 1 and 2 and Public Police Officer 2 are clear that theft is an offence that must be investigated and the fact that some people have insurance should not make art theft less of a priority for the public police. As Art Detective 1 pointed out, stolen cars are far more likely to be investigated than paintings even though vehicles are usually insured.

Though many within the security terrain agree that other crimes should be higher priorities (Heads of Security 1, 2, Insurers 1, 4), those who deal with lots of the thefts, such as Art Detectives 1, 2 and 4, argue for greater prioritisation, especially because of art theft’s links with other crimes and its part in the funding of other criminal activities. Art detective 4 uses as an example the Johnson crime family, whose activities included drugs, armed robberies, thefts, and violent crimes. Their Achilles heel was art theft and he believes the public police should have realised this long before they did. A crucial point is that it does not need to be an uppermost priority, but nor should it be marginalised because it inhabits the Level 2 policing gap (O’Connor 2005).10

Since there is a lack of separation of the art crime statistics from property crime statistics, the problem, in effect, does not ‘exist’. This is a case of Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) dimension 8, mentalities of

10 O’Connor, D Inspector (2005) “Level 2: These are cross-border issues; usually the actions of organised criminality, major incidents and events affecting more than one BCU and potentially across boundaries into neighbouring forces.”
goverance, being linked to dimensions 1-3 (making and the nature of rules, and the focus of the governance), and unless this separation occurs, which some within the security network (Loss Adjuster 2, Art Detectives 1, 2) are calling for, the status quo looks set to remain, irrespective of past successes. Johnston and Shearing (2003:29) argue that, “Mentalities are often more implicit than explicit”. Arguably, this is a case of them not even existing and, in contrast to Johnston and Shearing’s (2003:29) point, the senior public police’s indifference is clear. In line with governmental ‘technologies’ (Foucault 2002, [1975]:250), their lack of desire to shape a mentality regarding art theft means that the public police have very little impact on dimensions 1-3. This contrasts greatly with the governmental ‘technologies’ of other public sector nodes that, at least for their art and that for which they have responsibility, play a significant role in the first three dimensions and do so through their risk management mentality.

Constructed by the public police themselves to not be a problem, and with no clamour from the public, aided by the media treatment of art crime as entertainment, senior management can explain the lack of priority for policing art. Their attitude is exemplified by a proposed national stolen art database in 2003 being hampered in part by the lack of interest shown by local police forces (Home Office Letter 13/09/2004), and the failure of the MPS to publish the Unit’s level of recovery success in the past (Art Detective 2).

FINANCIAL PRIORITISATION IN PUBLIC POLICING AND THE EFFECT ON ART SECURITY

Art is one area of policing that is particularly vulnerable when financial prioritisation issues arise. In 2007, the Guardian gave a dramatic warning about apparent budget cuts to the Unit (Guardian 21/04/2007). This is where private policing fills the gaps (Wakefield 2003) through “loadshedding” (Button 2002:35), and “cost effective” (Jones and Newburn 1998:101) business like policing (Reiner
The Unit survived in 2007, and its turning to the private sector in the form of using special constables is an example of modern police managerialism (Garland 2001) and could be viewed as a case of microhybrid policing in which two nodes, private and public, work together within the larger nodal governance framework. This alleged budget cut threat in 2007 happened after public police funding had increased 26% in real terms between 1996/7 and 2005 (O’Connor 2005). This is particularly relevant with the present cuts. As Art Detectives 1, 2, 3 and 4 made clear, financial reductions to the MPS Unit have happened in the past and will happen in the future.

PRIVATE SECTOR NODES INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICING

Though arguments over whether public and private policing have different priorities (Johnston 2000, Jones and Newburn 1998, Rigakos 2002, Shearing et al 1980) are still very relevant, in line with McLaughlin’s (2007) assertion that the distinctions between private and public have been undermined by the public sector’s use of “essentially private values” in organizational and managerial thinking, the public police now use many techniques and technologies associated with private security (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Garland 2001, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Rose 2000).

According to the Head of the Unit and Art Detective 2, when it comes to art theft, while the public police place their emphasis more on the criminal and the private sector more on the recovery of the item, both engage in specialized investigative activities. However, while this can be the case, the large emphasis on risk management and the prevention of crime by some of the private companies (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1), particularly insurance companies, shows that the preventative measures are more important than either the recovery or the criminal. This is also highlighted by the crucial role of the National Security Adviser in art security risk assessments for the government. The public police also try to focus on prevention, with crime prevention officers, situational crime prevention (Felson 2002) and initiatives such as Secured by Design (Secured by Design 2012), as well as proactive
measures by the Unit (Head of the Unit). The problem for the public police’s crime control with art, as in their investigations, is the operational gap created by their lack of art skilled officers.

**Preventative policing with nodal governance**

Public policing in general has changed dramatically since Shearing and Stenning argued in 1985 that the focus on opportunities, rather than potential offenders, would need mass surveillance (Shearing and Stenning 1985). This has happened and the widespread use of CCTV is an example of the shift, with the use of mass surveillance and the focus on opportunities being central to both public and private policing. Indeed, this apparent shift of focus by the public police could be seen to be an attempt to be more competitive with private security (Mastrofski 1998). Furthermore, in theory, when public and private operate together then motivations become mixed. With art security, the public police’s work with private policing agencies in London is a case in point. The question arises: if order is maintained, do the motivations behind this maintenance matter? If the answer is yes, the discussion is further complicated if the public police sell their services for profit (Johnston 1992). What happens if a conflict of interests (Button 2002) arises between working for the public ‘good’ and the individual interests of their customers? Are they then working to maintain order for moral reasons or profit? This question is central to the legitimacy of the public police. The public police’s use of the Art Loss Register to identify stolen art objects, and, crucially, allow them to charge everyone for this service is controversial. Insurer 4 raised the question that if the public police are using the Art Loss Register to undertake services on their behalf then why should insurance companies pay the Art Loss Register for these services?

The public police might be saving costs by allowing the Art Loss Register to charge companies and the public to pay the bill instead of them; however, it has a marked effect on how the public police and the Art Loss Register are viewed by many other nodes within the co-production, such as insurers,
private art detectives and loss adjusters (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1, Insurer 4). Furthermore, when considered in relation to nodal governance, creating this kind of monopoly, as with a closed database, runs counter to ideas of maximising “the benefits of neo-liberal ‘nodal governance’ arrangements” (McLaughlin 2007:94). Many in the insurance industry are not particularly comfortable or happy about this as they are undertaking lots of the securitization and policing of art but are then billed for a ‘police’ service which they could do themselves. Although these extra costs can make the insurance industry’s concerns about the Art Loss Register appear predictable, this friction amongst the nodes can further increase depending on how the Art Loss Register deals with the information to which it has special access. The Interpol Co-ordinator sums up this concern:

“The fact that a private company like the ALR conducts searches has already led to a number of identifications and subsequent recoveries. Sometimes, the flow of information to police was not always as it should have been, and this is to be improved” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

It is a strange policing situation if the public police do not know what is in their ‘own’ knowledge bubble due to their use of another node and when that node is profiting from the knowledge.

REGULATORY CONCERNS

Whilst having to work and ‘compete’ in a growing policing terrain, the public police are also under ever-increasing financial and managerial accountability pressures (Reiner 2000:209). In addition, they are faced by the risk management mentalities of governance and the technologies, such as surveillance techniques from private security, being used on them, themselves (Ericson 2007b, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Johnston and Shearing 2003). Regulation is more stringent and has curtailed some policing methods. For example, Insurer 3 believes that increased public police regulation or ‘red tape’, considered further in chapter 6, has made it more difficult for them to work with each other.
Perhaps the key example, and a feature of the modern public police service, is the move away from using police informants after the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIPA) Act 2000. Art Detective 2 describes the consequences of the Act:

“they (the police) lost round about 80% of all informants when the RIPA act was introduced, so it would be very doubtful if the Art and Antiques Unit had a single criminal informant working for them, so they miss out on a huge amount of information as to who is committing crime and where stolen property is going” (Art Detective 2).

This is an area in which the dissimilarities between the private and public policing agencies are highlighted; the public police’s capacity is lessened while the private agencies can, and do, continue to use informants.

While the private agencies use informants, they are limited in what they can do with the information; for example, they cannot go and search premises (Art Detective 2). This reliance on the public police to act is especially frustrating for those former officers now working in private policing, especially when they give information to the public police which is then not acted on and creates a gap in the operational effectiveness of the security arena (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4).

CONCLUSION

“New Policing” theses (McLaughlin 2007) help to describe modern policing matrices. While society may view the public police as indispensable (Brodeur and Shearing 2005), empirical research shows that with art theft - though it can be argued that in aspects of the policing they have the potential to be more effective than the private sector (Art Detective 1, Artist 3) - the public police’s functions are limited, hamstrung by resources and management antipathy.
Public police involvement is split in London between the partly effective Unit and the borough police (and outside of London, the county police) which lack the specialised skill and desire to implement and execute the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and, therefore, tackle art crime effectively. With their capacity to act further curtailed by regulations on informants and rewards, the public police remain in the security terrain because of the Unit’s work and also owing to their formal policing powers; first, if a reward is offered (Insurer 2, 3, 4, Loss Adjuster 1), and, second, because of their powers to arrest and to conduct a criminal investigation (Art Detectives 1, 2, Insurer 4).

Considering the role of the public police and whether they are focusing on public order at the expense of investigating crime, when budget cuts occur it is the specialized units which are most at threat and within the MPS’s Specialist Crime Directorate it is the Unit which is one of the most vulnerable. This is in spite of its history of success and its future potential. The irony is that viewed in line with “acting as market players” (Loader and Walker 2007:23), in spite of the often lengthy investigations, level of specialization required, and regulatory restrictions after the RIPA Act 2000, the Unit has offered, and continues to offer, far more than ‘value for money’. This was also the case with former Unit officers in other police services in England and Wales. The public police are not only missing a chance to investigate other crimes through the links to art (Art Detectives 2, 4), they are losing out on the opportunity to be involved in tackling a crime by using other nodes to do much of the policing and securitization. Attempts such as the Council for the Prevention of Art Theft (CoPAT) have been hindered by the very node, the public police, which would benefit from it and a more organised security terrain (House of Commons 2000).

Essentially, CoPAT was attempting to form an effective co-production framework, explained best through nodal governance. If the coordination were better, benefiting from the work of other nodes, particularly those in the private sector, the public police could be more effective at not a huge, or even
at no, increase in cost. The Unit has understood this and their use of the Art Loss Register in identifying stolen pieces and collaboration with locations are examples. The previously mentioned controversy is not about the Art Loss Register or other private nodes being used, but in the operational process.

It is important to note that the policy at the senior management level of the public police to not take the lead role in certain crimes is not explicit to art (Johnston and Shearing 2003:120). If the public police, though still a significant node (Johnston and Shearing 2003), are not actually playing a crucial role, as is the case with art, then in policing arenas with no locus of power (Johnston and Shearing 2003), the crucial issue concerns whether there is an awareness within the public police of their ability to perform specific roles within the network.

Indeed, a proportion of the public sector’s policing function does not need to be carried out by the public police. While policing debates often focus solely on the public/private partnership, in many aspects of policing, especially in areas requiring specialized policing, other public sector nodes are better equipped in some areas. For example, with art, the preventative policing functions undertaken through the government funded DCMS, MLA/Arts Council England, and in particular the National Security Advisor, have been successful and are a reason for the low incidence of known thefts from public sector run museums and art loaned in the public interest. However, while this covers a lot of art in London, many private owners potentially miss out on public sector policing and have to self-police themselves by turning to the insurance industry.

Despite some areas of the co-production of art security in London working well, art remains vulnerable as shown by the continued thefts of art in the capital, as well as nationally and internationally. The fact that the public police have powers no other node has means that they cannot operationally retreat completely, even if art is viewed as low priority policing. The public sector has
the ability to look after its own art and art that it indemnifies, but the security terrain needs public police involvement. The public police could view the co-production using a nodal governance network as advantageous to their role within the terrain, and not as an excuse to leave it.
CHAPTER 5 THE PRIVATE SECTOR: SECURITY, INVESTIGATION AND LOSS ADJUSTMENT

INTRODUCTION

“The way the police service is being run with fine arts, it’s going to have to be done by private companies” (Art detective 1).

Following on from the previous chapter’s assertion that the public police need to be involved and that a co-production best explained by a nodal governance framework provides the most suitable approach for this to occur, the evidence indicates that if the public police choose to have a peripheral role then the influence of the already heavily involved private security nodes will increase further. As another ex-police service art detective (Art Detective 3) said, “More people will turn to private sector and the art world will police itself”. This chapter argues that increased involvement of private sector security, investigation and loss adjustment is beneficial and should be welcomed within the securitization and policing of art theft in London. However, it should not be seen as replacing the public police or the public sector more generally, nor be used as an excuse by the public police to take a lesser role. Art security is at its most effective, and mutually beneficial, when it is being co-produced and making use of the specific powers and capabilities of different public and private nodes.

The next chapter examines the role of the largest type of private stakeholders, the insurance companies, and their part in driving the use of private security. This chapter considers the array of private nodes which are implementing and executing much of the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) through carrying out the operational securitization and policing. It begins by looking at why they are involved and analysing how they undertake security and the mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) they employ. It then considers their role within the co-production of
security and how they work with other public and private nodes in ‘doing’ nodal governance, before considering regulatory issues which are so important to private policing. Art security in London provides a very useful case study for why and how private sector nodes can, and do, work in a modern policing matrix in which there is no locus of power.

BACKGROUND: PRIVATE SECURITY SOCIETY AND ART SECURITY

Before examining this case study, it is worth highlighting Cohen’s argument in 1983 that:

“…although in areas like mental illness the private sector might genuinely displace the state, this would be an impossible outcome in crime control. For the state to give up here would be to undercut its very claim to legitimacy” (Cohen 1983:117 in South 1988:1).

However, the fact that private security is working in areas that might formerly have been policed by the public police has not been controversial for some time (Johnston 2000, Wright 2002). Only nine years after Cohen’s statement, Johnston wrote in 1992 that:

“Private security carries out virtually all the tasks undertaken by the police, plus rather more besides; guarding and protection, surveillance, intelligence and undercover work, preventative activities, investigation and detection, custodial function” (Johnston 1992:18).

Too often the focus when analysing policing has been on the public police (Johnston 1994, Jones and Newburn 1998, Wakefield 2003), and when criminologists have analysed private security they have found it difficult to define what is ‘private policing’ or ‘private security’ (Button 2002, Johnston 1992, Johnston 2006, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Percy 2006, Shearing et al 1980, Shearing and Stenning 1981, South 1998).

When considering policing at a general level, the move to the private has primarily occurred for two reasons; first, because of the lack of effectiveness of the public police (McManus 1995, Wright 2002),
and, second, due to the proliferation of private areas in which the public spend time. It is private security that control the risk management of these spaces and choose who to include and exclude from the “security bubbles” (Ericson 2007, Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Loader and Walker 2007, McLaughlin 2007, Reiner 2000, Shearing and Stenning 1981, Wakefield 2003).

While these reasons are accurate with art in London, they do not give the whole picture because of the massive amount of public sector owned art, and the public sector’s involvement in the security and policing of it. However, in spite of this, much of the securitization and policing of non-public sector owned art in London, and some public sector owned art, is carried out by private stakeholders. In line with being a “many-sided phenomenon” (Shearing and Stenning 1981:195), wide-ranging and encompassing an array and range of companies and operators, private sector nodes are heavily involved in much of the co-production of art security in London. Wood and Shearing (2007:7) argue that, “governance of security exclusively by state governments is no more than a hiccup in history”. However, for lots of privately owned art in London, there was not even a hiccup. Indeed, while the “quiet revolution” in policing (Shearing et al 1980:1) occurred in many security arenas, the private sector has always played a key role with art. With private security involvement occurring from start to finish of the policing process, the security terrain for art in London is best described by the argument that governance of security is far from the exclusive domain of the public sector, and that nowadays it is neither public sector led, nor does it need to be; rather governance is, “the property of shifting alliances” (Johnston and Shearing 2003:148).

**Private sector nodes involved in art security**

In their seminal article on private security, Shearing and Stenning (1981:209) ask the very clear questions, “What do they do? And how does what they do relate to what the public police do?” Thirty
years later, these questions are still crucial to any examination of private security. This section considers the key nodes, before the next one analyses how they ‘do’ nodal governance.

**Private art detectives/ Loss adjusters**

Despite the world of private investigation being enormous and although there are many security consultants, often ex-public police or military, who work with art locations, few people have both the investigative skills and art knowledge required for investigating art crime. Investigation specific to art is small and predominantly made up of a key group of private art detectives and loss adjusters who are used by a range of different companies and often have a central role within the security and policing network. Among these detectives are ex-public police officers, including former Unit officers. Due to their activities, knowledge, expertise and contacts, they often provide the link between the different nodes, and sometimes even within the nodes. Loss adjusters have similarly varied links, with their role (see page 64) encompassing crucial functions from risk assessments to recoveries. However, they work on behalf of the insurance companies. Loss adjusters and risk surveyors working for insurance companies will have the expert knowledge key to risk assessments, and if they themselves do not have the particular information, then they will know someone who does (Loss Adjuster 1).

**Private companies involved in art security**

The private companies that are involved in the securitization and policing include those whose functions are specific to art and others for whom art is just one, sometimes very minor, part of their operations. Some do not actively play a role in the wider security terrain in the capital, but their operations can have an impact.

First, companies provide assistance in situating security at a location with their expertise in providing physical presence or manned security. Second, in line with Brodeur and Shearing’s (2005:392)
argument that nearly all technology comes from the private sector; with art, the preventative nature of securitization and the focus on designing out opportunities for crime have provided an opportunity for private companies, especially through the importance of technology. Third, companies such as Art Loss Register and Art Management Group employ experts with knowledge of art or art security and are involved in a wide range of art security activities.

MENTALITIES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR NODES

Risk management

The type of risk management approach behind the methods employed by many private nodes relates to Shearing and Stenning’s argument in 1985 that while criminal justice and order is maintained in society for moral reasons, private policing agencies (or “private control”) try to maintain order to achieve the objectives of the community they are policing. Therefore, for a business corporation using “private control”, moral connotations connected to order are irrelevant; order is the condition most conducive to profit. This creates a shift in attention as it is directed away from those who might commit the crime to those whose action might create the opportunity. The authors use bank tellers as an example (Shearing and Stenning 1985 in McLaughlin et al 2003:428). Ericson (2007) also writes about this surveillance of employees who, though included in the security network, are under constant surveillance and suspicion. This links with the pre-crime focus in art security and how locations in London are very aware of the threat posed by employees in creating opportunities for theft or by being directly involved. Johnston and Shearing (2003:78) returned in 2003 to this idea of risk management within the mentalities of governance, and it is even more valid today than in 1985 or 2003.

Although linked to profits, it is relevant to both public and private sectors, and is a crucial part of managing risk at any art location and key to the preventative policing and risk management security methods that are central to the securitization and policing of art theft in London. Furthermore, it would
be naïve to believe that financial concerns do not also play a major part in situating security and the risk management and responses within the public sector. My research shows that they are highly important.

**Motivation**

Mirroring the motivation for the thefts and for many of the responses, money is the simple answer to the question of why the private sector gets involved in art security. Art security represents a huge range of financial opportunities (Loss Adjuster 2), from supplying guarding personnel (page164) and providing specific technology (pages 101, 165), to insurance companies’ array of activities (chapter 6).

The financial worth of the objects and their own potential profits are highly significant and it would be wrong to argue that market forces do not drive their work. However, my empirical research found that for many in the private sector, as was also the case in the governmental nodes, the actual art is a hugely motivating factor for their work and their company’s day to day activities, with the uniqueness and cultural value being very important aspects. Although, in stating this, the interviewees could have been engaging in acts of self-promotion or to promote their employers, it was interesting how many of them clearly had a wide knowledge of art. In some cases, this was due to a long held appreciation of art, but for others it occurred whilst actually working on the job. For example, a number of former public police detectives who now operate in the private sector, Art Detectives 1 and 4, learnt about art and antiques having worked in different areas of the public police. They expressed that their passion for protecting the art and helping victims of theft and other art crimes continues to this day.

The fact that it is an area with specific challenges draws in companies as well as individuals. The risk management mentality of many private nodes is a good fit with art security as they can use already existing technology, such as CCTV, or develop specific equipment; for example, alarms for display
cases. Companies can use expertise and knowledge drawn from those who work in specific fields such as law, art history, investigation, and electrical engineering.

For some companies, art is just one of their activities. For example, one London based company which had successful investigative experience in other fields chose to start an art and antiques investigation division. The co-founder of the company (Private Company 3) explained that they entered the market because of their previous investigative experience in other areas and by the exciting challenge of unsolved art thefts. With ten or eleven open files at the time of the interview, Private Company 3 felt the financial gain was potentially huge, especially as three of them were “large”. By employing one of the well-known private art detectives on a retainer, the company gained his expertise, knowledge and contacts, and in return he could benefit from their corporate experience and their staff who had investigation expertise, albeit in other fields. The company itself did not need to have art knowledge. Whilst happy to learn on the job, they believed it very important to employ a leading, high profile detective as they felt the market was too small to start up without a well-known successful expert (Private Company 3).

The company closed down because of non-art related reasons and with it the art and antiques section. However, its co-founder felt that their art investigation could have been successful. The fact that this company entered the art security terrain highlights that as long as there remain cases of unsolved thefts and unrecovered art, some of which involve considerable amounts of money, people will be drawn to this area. A prime example is the art from the 1990 Isabella Gardner theft in Boston in which twelve masterpieces, including five Degas, a Vermeer, a Manet, and three Rembrandts, were stolen. In spite of a $5million reward and potential leads in numerous countries, they have never been recovered and the case represents the Holy Grail for art detectives (Boser 2008).
Private Company 3 emphasised the competitive nature of art recoveries. The recovery of a significant piece of stolen art comes with the type of cachet on which reputations are gained and careers remembered. For example, ex-Unit detectives’ recoveries still carry much kudos, especially their involvement in the return of one of Munch’s *Scream* paintings.

With competition also existing in other areas of private sector operations with art, such as the technology companies and the private security companies who provide personnel, it is important to consider how this competitiveness fits with notions of co-producing art security and nodal governance in an actual security terrain. First, competitiveness can lead to private nodes working together and making the terrain more efficient, as evidenced in London by loss adjusters employing art detectives on behalf of insurance companies; second, nodal governance allows for complications, complexity, and nodes relating to but also resisting each other in a manner that other policing theories do not (Wood and Shearing 2007:149). This is the case whether it is tension between differing private sector interests, differing public sector interests or between private and public sector interests. Being an “is”, rather than an “ought” (Johnston 2006:47), it allows for competition to occur to the benefit, rather than to the detriment, of art security. In contrast to senior public police officers, private sector nodes appear to understand this and are more willing to work within this fluid arena.

**PRIVATE SECTOR NODES DOING NODAL GOVERNANCE**

Zedner (2007) argues that, “A coincidental facet of the temporal shift to pre-crime is that responsibility for security against risk falls not only to the State but extends to a large panoply of individual, communal and private agents” (Zedner 2007:262). She is right for many areas, even those, “only remotely related to crime”. However, with art security, the shift is not coincidental nor is it new. Although they use the public police after a theft, private owners and their insurance companies intentionally turn to private agents before and after. The owners and/or insurers will decide the focus
of the governance, and these private nodes will implement the governance through the ‘tools’ or ‘technologies’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003:28) at their disposal, in line with their expertise, knowledge, time and skills. However, within the London art security world and its lack of a locus of power, the public sector is also involved because, similar to the private owners, it is taking responsibility for its art as well and the art it is indemnifying. Nodal governance allows for the type of fluid arrangements that not only consider “security against risk” (Zedner 2007:262) but also situate risk and security within the co-production of risk. For the London art world to function as it presently does, pre-crime logic must also allow for conditions that facilitate private and public agencies to enable private and public art owners to embrace risk.

Crucial to this in the private sector are the leading private art detectives and loss adjusters. In their varied roles, from risk management assessments to recovery, they are the ones with the best picture of what is happening and how to preclude or react to a problem such as theft or damage occurring. Over thirty years ago, Shearing and Stenning (1981:221) highlighted the opinion of a British detective inspector who believed that investigation work by private security was, “fraught with dangers”. However, with art security, detectives in the private sector are the ‘go to’ people for the security and policing nodes, as well as the location nodes. With their capacity, expertise and understanding of art and investigation, they are also the links in knowledge and actions between nodes. For example, Art Detective 2’s work involves diverse nodes; insurance companies, loss adjusters, databases, the public police, private sector companies and other private detectives. The focus is on using the strengths of each node and, while they are involved in many of the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), it is through the implementation of the processes of governance that their role is the largest. There are some similarities with the Unit, but the differences with the public police in general are stark.
In contrast, some private detectives appear to be more like bounty hunters and inhabit grey areas of legality. The Buccleuch Da Vinci case is a prime example. Now hanging in the National Gallery of Scotland, the painting’s recovery was clouded in controversy with three lawyers and two private detectives being charged with, and cleared of, extortion, after £350,000 was paid to recover the painting. Allegedly, they had requested £4.2 million from the owner, the Duke of Buccleuch, for the painting’s return (Scotsman 21/04/2010).

Although some private detectives can cause the public police problems (Head of Unit), this is rarely the case for the leading private art detectives who believe that if their capacities and those of the public police could be combined more often, then the security terrain would benefit. This is particularly due to the limits placed on the public police by the RIPA Act 2000 resulting in private art detectives having greater capacity to investigate stolen art (Art Detective 2). Despite this, if the public police do not act on information given to them by the private art detectives, then the best result the private detectives can hope for is the recovery of the art because they do not have law enforcement powers. It is for this reason that Art Detective 2, one of the leading private art detectives, sees himself and others as a “mere inconvenience” for criminals. The fact that he is an ex-public police officer could increase his frustration because, from his perspective, not only is art theft important, but from his former work in the public police he understands how valuable his information could be in arresting the criminals involved as well as the recovery of the object.

Obviously, it is up to a node to choose whether to, and how to, use these detectives. However, as Art Detectives 1 and 2 explained to me, if a node chooses not to engage with them, as has happened in the case of the public police, then potentially that node stands to miss out on their capacity and expertise. While the established names in art crime investigation might go to the Balkans trying to recover a stolen painting, they are also in demand for their wide expertise and are involved in different
consultative activities. Although some self-promotion from these detectives was perhaps inevitable in my interviews, it is evident that they have been influential. For example, one of the art detectives has acted as an advisor to the government on international loans to museums in England and Wales, worked with UNESCO, and works for a number of different companies involved in recoveries, resolution disputes, and security and risk management. Though Johnston and Shearing’s (2003:25) assertion that those making the rules are frequently different from those who implement them is often the case, this shows that there are instances when those who implement and execute governance are involved in at least shaping the rules.

Loss adjusters play an even more crucial part within the nodal matrix owing to their diverse roles and relationships and connections with the other, mainly private, securitization and policing nodes, and also because, similar to the brokers, they are a link with the policy holders for the insurance companies (Loss Adjusters 1, 2, Insurer 4). They are used by the leading insurers when liaising with the public police and perform much of the ‘policing’ function for the insurers (Insurers 2, 3, 4). They, too, shape the rules as well as implement them. And, together with their art knowledge, they have links with public and private policing, as well as investigative skills and an ability to find out information from the criminal world (Loss Adjuster 2, Insurer 1).

They often use other professionals to directly assist them (Insurers 2, 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2). This usually occurs when a recovery is being attempted. The insurance company for which the loss adjuster works will be aware of the arrangement and happy for the extra expertise to be used (Insurers 2, 4). For instance, a leading art insurance company often uses Loss adjuster 2 who frequently works with a leading art detective (Insurer 4, Art detective 2). Within London and the UK, there are well known, established relationships between loss adjusters and detectives. They also provide the connection within insurance, acting as a third party between the brokers and the insurance companies, the
importance of which is made clear by Insurer 1, “I don’t know where we [the brokers] would be without them…we couldn’t adjust a claim because our only allegiance really is to the clients and the insurers are trying to protect their interests”. This is why, while some private art detectives have a key role within the nodal network and operate with many nodes, the loss adjusters have a more crucial role as regards the ‘doing’ of nodal governance as it is they who influence the rules and initiate much of the pre-crime security logic and also the post-crime response. Their decisions shape the network and they are involved in all eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), from the making and the nature of the rules, the focus, the implementing of governance, through to the modes, processes, technologies and mentalities of governance. For example, Loss Adjuster 1 has worked with private sector nodes such as the same art detective and an equally prominent one, with experts in certain types of art, the Art Loss Register, the Unit and many other police services, as well as the insurance companies and the customers.

In spite of the policing capacity of loss adjusters and private art detectives, the public police cannot be bypassed. For example, leading loss adjusters are members of the Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters and have to act within the framework of law. While recoveries might be hastened, Loss Adjuster 1 was clear in his interview that doing any sort of deal without including the public police would make him an accessory to the crime. In a world characterised by its shades of grey, this is very important. The main loss adjusters who work for the leading art insurers (Loss Adjusters 1, 2) see the benefits of working with the public police and working within a network. Indeed, they support it and try to establish links within the security terrain both as part of their role in working for art owners and insurers, and also due to their understanding of pre-crime and post-crime logic.

Very relevant when considering the public and private policing relationship in art security and the different focuses in relation to recoveries and apprehending and punishing the perpetrator, is the fact
that recoveries can highlight different motivations between public and private policing. The Unit is clear that even if the public police are involved and investigate the crime successfully, their prime objective is to arrest the criminal (Head of the Unit). Recovering the stolen art is therefore a secondary objective. This leads to people turning to the private sector due to its focusing more on the recovery (Head of the Unit and Art Detective 2):

“Victims and insurers come to the private sector because they will say the police have concluded their investigation, they have arrested somebody for the burglary, we are still missing all this property and we want these guys to find it for us” (Art Detective 2).

Nevertheless, this is far from a case of private policing versus public policing, as evidenced by the leading art detectives’ calls for more public police involvement, not only to avoid legal problems in their recoveries, but because they want the criminals involved to be arrested and receive a stronger sanction than losing the piece, and their belief that the public police should be more involved in this area of policing (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2). Their attempts to utilise the capacities and strengths of different nodes involved in the security terrain, similar to the work of loss adjusters, is nodal governance in practice. Art Detective 2’s collating of information from insurance companies is an example, as is the passing of information to the public police, even if this information is not acted on (Art Detective 1).

Other important nodes are also heavily involved. For example, as regards a guarding presence, although lots of locations will use their own in house security for manned security and there is still only a small number (5%) of privately employed guards working in national museums and galleries (National Security Adviser), it is also common for many venues, especially commercial locations, to use private security companies who are heavily involved in the policing (Insurer 3). This is an area in which the cost benefits and capacities of private security is attractive to locations.
Technology companies also have an important part in doing nodal governance owing to their expertise and capacities. They are heavily involved in the modes and technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). For instance, the electrical engineer responsible for the state of the art alarm system at a given location has a crucial role (Art Detective 2). Companies offer all round security covering every aspect of technology, and provide the types of systems expected by insurance companies/loss adjusters and the National Security Adviser for public and private locations with expensive art. An example of the technology is the use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags and sensors which can be linked to a portable computer to connect easily with an existing system and be integrated with CCTV (ISIS 2011). In line with Routine Activity Theory and CRAVED (see page 110) (Clarke 1999 in Felson 2002), this can make art unappealing to steal as it becomes harder to remove and conceal, less available and harder to dispose. The fact that technology companies cover the preventative policing aspects, such as alarm/detector systems, locks and surveillance, as well as being the first line of response to an incident before the public police, adds importance to their role in the security terrain.

Although the public sector locations’ use of security systems from private companies can be seen as the private influencing the public sector, with art in London, the public sector also greatly influences the private. This is not through advising them what company to use, but by recommendations or requirements to those situating security in locations which require private providers such as alarm companies. The National Security Adviser believes that his recommendations, as well as those of his predecessors, help set the industry standard. In this example of different nodes within the security framework using each other’s strengths, he is a knowledge connector in a world of security bubbles.

Nodal governance has the fluidity to reflect how the focus of many within the co-production on capacity rather than ‘power’ makes the art security terrain more effective, and, as the art world
continues to grow and flourish, so do opportunities for those who can play a role in co-producing the risk that drives it by providing the most effective tools for the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). With services and products being potentially very profitable, it is no coincidence that the leading security companies are involved in situating risk and security at art locations and for art on the move. The fact that some of the more general situational crime prevention methods involving the marking of property or objects might not be appropriate due to the particular characteristics and composition of much art and even some of the locations (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1) can lead to more tailored solutions and other expertise being used instead; for example, more specific technology such as x-rays of the art (Art Detective 2). In an example of market forces driving better security, Art Detective 2 is clear that private companies, whether they are specific to art or operate in many sectors, can combine the expertise, skills and knowledge of specialists, which clearly aids the security terrain. However, despite their expertise, it is important to note that there are still issues over how these companies operate; for example, slow reaction times when alarms are set off (ACE).

The public and private locations with resources can afford both the initial high tech security and also the upgrades (Insurer 1). While other locations cannot pay for the same levels of security, it does not mean that security should be, “viewed as a commodity that only a minority can afford” (Brodeur and Shearing 2005:396). This would be too simplistic due to the flows of art, the large public sector influence, and the fact that many locations can afford decent security. However, there are still those, especially some private residences, who due to not being able to afford good security for their valuable art object(s), either miss out on having the piece by loaning it or take the risk of having weak security. When the public sector does assist owners of nationally important art by exempting tax, the security is the responsibility of the owners of the artworks if they choose to keep the art on their premises.
(HMRC Trusts and Estates). If they insure, then it will be an insurance company that requires a minimum level of security.

Certain art specific companies are involved in a wide range of art activities and work with many nodes. For example, the Art Management Group’s areas of expertise come under the headings of Conservation and Management, Research, Dispute resolution and Legal Issues, Advisory and Valuation, Security and Risk management. They have brought together experts in all of these areas (Art Management Group 2012, Art Detective 2). While the Art Loss Register’s core business is stolen art, it is also heavily involved in other areas such as mediation issues (Private Company 2), and lists its different services as:

“Registration of the legitimate ownership of works of art and other valuable possessions, Registration of the loss of works of art and other valuable possessions, Registration of fake and forged works of art and other valuable possessions, Due diligence services, Expert provenance research of works of art and other valuable possessions, Specialist World War II provenance research, Investigative and recovery work” (Art Loss Register 2011).

**How a private node does security: the Art Loss Register**

It is worthwhile narrowing the lens of investigation even further by focusing on a case study within the case study. The Art Loss Register is an excellent example to analyse because the company encapsulates the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the benefits and tensions, within and between private sector nodes and with the public sector nodes within the nodal governance security terrain.

The work of organisations such as the Art Loss Register is an example of Market Reduction Approach (Sutton 1998, Sutton *et al* 2001). With the disposal of art often being the most problematic part of the whole enterprise for thieves (Mackenzie 2005, McShane 2006, Polk 1999b), and in line with Kisluk’s
(1999:4) and Polk’s (1999) arguments that if dealers and buyers checked databases, the risk for thieves would go up and resale opportunities would decrease, databases are important in both aiding recoveries and preventing thefts. Though it is hard to prove statistically the effectiveness of databases, they do appear to greatly assist the security terrain in lowering the amount of art theft (Private Company 2, Loss Adjuster 1). Technology facilitates this process with digital images being easy for anyone to record and the internet enabling the possibility for them to be viewed anywhere in the world (Loss Adjuster 1). If the art is to be sold on the licit market, professional thieves need to have connections with fences or collectors to buy the works of art (Conklin 1994). Mackenzie (2005) quotes the judge in the trial of the French art dealer Paul Petrides, “specialist art thieves only act because they are assured of getting rid of their booty with the complicity of go betweens and receivers of stolen property” (Mackenzie 2005:6). In London, according to Loss Adjuster 2, stolen art can be handed over to a fence within an hour.

Market Reduction Approach actually deals with targeting and cutting out the dealing in local stolen goods markets, not the type of international markets in which much of stolen art is moved. Despite this, Mackenzie (2005, 2007) believes that this approach is an effective way to combat art theft. The general precepts of the approach have value, and his work on using the approach for the illicit antiquities trade (Mackenzie 2005b, 2011) is also very relevant for the trade in stolen art, as is Chappell and Polk’s (2011) use of Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming with Market Reduction Approach in relation to the same trade.

In London, apart from the Art Loss Register database, there is the MPS’s London Stolen Arts Database (LSAD), and Salvo for garden and architectural items (Salvo 2011). Due to the transnationality of the licit and illicit art world, databases such as those of European countries, and Interpol, the FBI, and the LAPD are also extremely relevant.
The world’s largest private database with more than 300,000 objects registered, the Art Loss Register has had success with pieces being identified (Private Company 2, Loss Adjuster 1, Art Loss Register 2011), sometimes years later during catalogue searches (Historic Houses Association 2011b). This has happened cross border, even with art stolen from a country house in the UK being identified in Australia (Loss Adjuster 1). Art Detective 4 explained that if a well-known painting were stolen, it is likely to be flagged up at some point in future sales by the Art Loss Register. While venues such as nationals have their own due diligence acquisition teams and do not require the Art Loss Register (Head of Security 2), the database is useful for many locations, especially smaller ones, and is a crucial tool in the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Also, as the database is heavily involved in dispute resolution as well as recoveries, the art expertise of its staff is extremely important (Private Company 2). It helps the victims of art theft and fulfils the role it sets out to do in providing a very useful service and making the selling on of stolen art more difficult nationally and internationally (Private Company 2, Loss Adjuster 1).

However, the Art Loss Register encapsulates the problems that can occur with private sector involvement in a policing arena. In this case, there is both an operational and strategic problematic. First, although the Art Loss Register has the largest database in the UK, it does the searches for the customer and is not ‘open’ to all, even for people who have paid; and, if a victim recovers their own property they still pay the Art Loss Register. Art Detectives 1 and 2 believe that this charging again for the recovery as well as for the registering of the object is not a fair system.
Second, their apparent attempts to create a monopoly are unpopular. The Art Loss Register has publicly opposed moves for an open, free database, and its purchase of the Trace database in 2009 is an example of its efforts to corner the market. The Chairman of the Art Loss Register argues:

"The Art Trade cannot be expected to search a multitude of databases with different content which do not provide an authoritative check on whether the item is stolen, missing or has some other defect to its title. Likewise victims of theft need to register in one location providing support to the police to assist them and increasing the chances of recovery." (Art Daily July 2009).

He said this after the Art Loss Register had acquired the Trace database. Though he is right that, in theory, having one database makes the whole process easier, what he does not go into detail about is how Trace operated differently from the Art Loss Register. By not dealing with recoveries, Trace remained impartial. It was also a free to use, open database (Private Company 1). A former Public Police Officer (Interview 17/09/2010) who worked with Trace believed it was the most effective, “I got so hyped up on it because this computer I used to work with was the answer for it….”

Though it was the insurance institutions that originally helped to set up the Art Loss Register, it is from them that a lot of the reservations come. These include the Art Loss Register’s charging methods (Insurer 4), and scepticism about whether it is always actually the Art Loss Register that is finding the stolen art or whether it is via third parties who see the art on the list and contact them (Insurer 3). Also, when it works internationally it is handicapped by the fact that publicly funded foreign databases such as the French Treima cannot share information with it because the French receive their information for free and cannot then go and pass it to a commercial company (Art Detective 2, Durney 2010). So, while the Executive Director and General Counsel for the Art Loss Register, is correct to argue that, “to solve art crimes and stem the flow of stolen art” it is important to have cooperation and that it is

11 Trace was a subsidiary of MyThings. It was an open, impartial database that did not do recoveries. A large range of people had accounts; from UK police forces, the FBI to auctions houses. It was bought by the Art Loss Register in 2009 (Interview 28/01/2009)
worldwide (Art Market Monitor 22/04/2009), this inability of the Art Loss Register to share with foreign national databases is a hindrance to collaboration. Loss Adjuster 1 emphasised that a public database not being able to communicate with a commercial one is a problem. This is an example of market force driven securitization causing an operational clash and is why, while the Art Loss Register does work internationally and has had transnational successes, at the moment their current model cannot work as effectively across borders as a more open database situated in the public sector potentially could (Art Detective 2).

The Chairman of the Art Loss Register argues against this with the contention that a more open database would help criminals (Interpol 2012). However, similar to the HMRC tax exemption, if people used an agent then this could be avoided. Also, Trace was an example of an open database that was effective (Private Company 1, Art Detective 1).

This important debate about whether databases are better situated in the public sector and, also, if they should be open to the public, is continued in more detail when proposing recommendations for the future in chapter 8.

The Art Loss Register’s role here is an example of nodes contesting and mobilising in their own interests (Wood and Shearing 2007). This is in line with neo-liberal securitization and policing. There clearly is room for neo-liberalism within the co-production and for competing forces, but not for this kind of monopolisation. It can be argued that, as a private node profiting from the public, especially the public police, and by monopolising databases, the Art Loss Register is receiving an unfair advantage which goes against the competitive, free market private sector approach to security and policing. The paradox is that having a monopoly facilitates the Art Loss Register in its work and at the micro level often helps the art world, but at the macro level its operations, though often helping, can
also actually obstruct the transnational security of art. This is clearly a weakness in the implementation of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and how nodal governance can and does operate in this security arena.

However, this critique of some of the Art Loss Register’s operations should be considered in relation to the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) and senior government figures’ previous lack of desire for the introduction of an open, public database. The Art Loss Register is currently providing a key service that might not be undertaken otherwise.

As well as controversies surrounding the monopolisation of databases, the involvement in different activities can benefit the art world but also leaves the Art Loss Register open to accusations of conflicts of interests; for instance, if the Art Loss Register has a potential financial gain from a recovery but is also involved in mediation/ownership disputes. Moreover, the Art Loss Register’s working relationship with the MPS might help legitimize the company, but the concerns of a number of other nodes over the operational process means that this relationship causes friction.

With art security, this highlights that the public sector working with the private and vice versa is not controversial, it is, in fact, necessary. However, the crucial issue is how the process functions operationally.

**REGULATORY CONCERNS**

Private sector nodes might offer more effective policing but the question arises; is it being carried out for the public ‘good’? While ideas of risk, economics and technology play a major part in their development (Ericson 2007, McManus 1995), political issues surrounding the legitimisation of private policing agencies are clearly important (Wright 2002). Johnston (2000) contends that this
legitimisation occurs if the private police are employed by a democratic body. Shearing et al (1980) argue that what differentiates public and private police are not what they do, but their legal status and who controls them. Compared to public police officers, who swear an oath of office, private policing agents are often under no other obligation than to work in their employers’ interests (Shearing and Stenning 1981). For instance, in the United States, loss adjusters can pay a lot of money for information about art without having to go through the layers of institutional approval needed in public policing agencies (McShane 2006). Similarly, private policing in the UK can also avoid the constraints placed on the public police (Art Detective 2). In the art world, where the line between licit and illicit can be very fine, the private sector nodes have to be careful to make sure their actions, particularly in recovering art, are not illegal even if, for example, a private detective knows the location and identity of a stolen piece and the public police are not acting. According to Art Detectives 2 and 4, the problem they have is negotiating its recovery without breaking any laws.

Legitimisation issues arise within the security terrain for art in London in some examples of the private sector working directly with the public sector, such as the already examined use of special constables and the Art Loss Register working on behalf of the Unit.

Ericson (2007:212) argues that, “Private police operate efficiently at the margins of the law or beyond the law”. This is a reason, according to Ericson (2007b), why people, particularly the insurance companies, will turn to private security rather than the public police, who are often not involved at any level. However, with art in the UK, the private sector does turn to the public police. Indeed, as Art Detectives 1 and 2 make clear, it is the lack of public police involvement that means people sometimes do not even have this choice. In London, the existence of the Unit means the situation is less stark but still, although they do, and indeed have to, involve the public police, loss adjusters working for
insurance companies use private art detectives to recover their art rather than rely solely on the Unit or borough police.

In the UK the Private Security Industry Act was passed in 2001 after thirty years of campaigning (Button 2002). While regulation was welcome, the Act was a dilution of proposals set out in a government paper in March 1999 (Button 2002). Private security is regulated by the Security Industry Authority (Percy 2006) which has assessing bodies such as the National Security Inspectorate to approve and certify security companies (NSI 2011), and, as the next chapter considers in more detail, it is the insurance industry that regulates much private security. Some private security is keen to show professionalism and high standards, with the British Security Industry Association being an example of how they try to convey this message (BSIA 2009).

Nonetheless, potential issues arise when a transnational business is regulated domestically. Also, Garland (2001) makes the point that while the public sector is obliged to work with the private sector, “they are not obliged to stand back and allow its unregulated consequences to fall where they may”. However, although some private detectives can cause difficulties, key nodes in the private sector, such as the leading private art detectives, loss adjusters and insurance companies, are heavily involved in driving better diligence (Loss Adjuster 1, Art Detective 2). This is important because while this is similar to some public sector nodes, such as the National Security Adviser in particular, it contrasts with the senior public police officers’ lack of interest.

Criticism directed at private security over its use of ‘counter-law’ is that it allows for ‘summary justice’ and is based on exclusion (Ericson 2007b). The lack of due process and the use of anticipatory justice are contentious in both private and public policing, as security can come before justice. In this kind of system, security and justice no longer work together. The result of this separation is that
although security may increase, justice may suffer (Ericson 2007b, Johnston and Shearing 2003). While in many urban spaces the type of policing based on anticipatory justice raises difficult questions, particularly concerning the protection of human rights and over access (Brodeur 2000, Wood and Shearing 2007), the inclusive nature of many spaces that display art in London runs counter to the direction that policing, especially performed by the public police, appears to be taking in large swathes of the capital.

Although these issues at first appear to be less relevant because of this, in fact due to this access and the private and public policing of art being essentially consensual, it is important that this specific case is highlighted. Furthermore, within many art locations, in relation to the question raised on page 45 about the governance and surveillance of cultural space and concepts such as Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000:606) ‘surveillant assemblage’ or Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ (1977) being controversial, this does not appear to be the case. This could be due to the acknowledged exchange that is occurring, with everyone being granted access to often unique, highly valuable, culturally important art, and the shared goal of protecting this art and the access to it. That the market force driven private sector is heavily involved in the implementing of the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) through its staffing, the technology, the risk prevention and recovery of art, is an accepted fact and seen by public and private sector nodes, as well as the public, as bringing many benefits to the security of art.

CONCLUSION

Private stakeholders within the securitization and policing terrain carry out a sizeable proportion of the operational functions. Their array of activities, most shaped by specific expertise, gives them a leading role in the co-production of security. While some private stakeholders, such as loss adjusters, are involved at almost every stage, others such as alarm companies have a more limited specialised function.
It is too simplistic to conclude that the public sector role in art security is based on ‘public good’ while the private sector is simply profit driven. Indeed, the whole co-production of art security depends on economic considerations. This is highlighted by examples such as some public sector nodes being abolished or downsized for money saving reasons in spite of being successful and profitable, and a private company entering but then leaving the security terrain for financial reasons.

Furthermore, though there is criticism of how some private nodes undertake their operations; for instance, focusing on the recovery of the item more than on the perpetrator of the crime, or running a ‘closed’ database, the private sector nodes are the ones that have the knowledge, expertise and time to assist private and public sector art owners. This can be in managing the risk through preventative measures, but also in trying to recover a stolen object.

Private sector nodes have a part to play with each of the eight general dimensions that provide the framework for security governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003:22-30). Brodeur and Shearing (2005) argue that, “In addition to the public policing organizations, there have been, for over half a century, an ever-growing number of private police agencies and agents that perform duties analogous to the public police” (Brodeur and Shearing 2005:382). The securitization and policing of art is an example. With the ever increasing flows of art, locations in which art is situated, and financial values that have risen dramatically in the last fifty years, it is not surprising that the private sector is being used by the private and public sectors. Even if the public police were more involved, private companies would still have a crucial role. This is demonstrated with public sector owned art locations using private sector technology.

Both the private and public sectors share mentalities of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and focus on prevention. However, the public sector’s preventative measures, using private security
technology, are largely, though not solely, for its own art and that considered to be of public interest. Considering privately owned art, the MPS Unit does offer advice on prevention as well (MPS 2011b). However, the lack of public police involvement more widely leads to the public turning to the private sector in both pre-crime and post-crime areas of art theft. It can be argued that if sections of the public police do not want to, or cannot, give art owners adequate policing, then a private sector takeover is inevitable to fill the gap. This would not be an appropriation of a security arena. It might be benign and necessary for the security of art. However, the crucial point here is that it does not have to occur because the securitization and policing nodes, both public and private, can work together to benefit themselves and the co-production. The security terrain works better, and would be improved further, when this happens. Furthermore, the public benefit, as do private and public nodes, and the conditions exist for everyone to potentially profit.

In line with the theoretical focus and empirical analysis on nodal governance and security governance, this chapter has systematically set out why and how a private sector market exists with art security in the capital and the benefits it brings to art security. It has also proposed that there is an opportunity for private security nodes to work even closer within a nodal governance framework. This is even when they have competing interests or different motives. Although private sector nodes, such as art detectives and the Art Loss Register, place emphasis more on the recovery and public police on the criminal (Head of the Unit and Art Detective 2), if art has been stolen then the different motivations can work together; they do not have to oppose each other.
Importantly, in the arena of art security in London, private sector nodes are not resistant or slow to the benefits of this co-production, as Loss Adjuster 1 made clear:

“I try to work with police. I always say we’re there, or insurers’ money is there to back up and help you with anything if it is needed....if for instance a reward will help and it’s done through the correct sources, the correct route, we’re quite happy to..” (Loss Adjuster 1).

The fact that they are keen highlights further the potential that exists for there to be even more effective co-production with art security in London.

The role of the private sector in preventing thefts and trying to recover stolen art helps the art world to embrace the risks which facilitate the thriving London art sector, but it is the insurance industry that drives and enables the facilitation of the embracing of risk. While the government agencies’ use of an insurance model for public sector owned art is examined in chapter 7, the crucial role of insurance companies is analysed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6 INSURANCE AS ENABLING RISK AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

“In a pre-crime society, there is calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all of these, there is the pursuit of security” (Zedner 2007:262).

The London art world is an example of risk being essential to a vibrant economy and progressive society. Risk is the motor, enabling the flows of art that fuel the vibrant market and fill the museums and galleries with people eager to visit culturally significant displays. If risk were not embraced, the capital’s art world would come to a stuttering halt.

While the private sector, with its pre-crime security focus, conducts much of the actual policing and securitization of art in London, it is also heavily involved in driving it. The previous two chapters have examined the nodes that are mainly involved in implementing and executing governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). This chapter and the next one focus on who is driving and setting the conditions in the pursuit of art security, which is related directly to the first three dimensions of governance (making and the nature of the rules, and the focus of governance) as well as dimensions five, six and eight (the modes, processes and mentalities of governances) (Johnston and Shearing 2003).

This chapter examines the insurance industry’s role; the part it plays, the level of its power and influence, and how it works within the security terrain. It shows that the insurance industry, directly and indirectly, drives much of the security and policing of art in London. In their largely negative analysis of the North American insurance industry, Ericson et al (2000) are extremely pessimistic about its level of operational involvement. However, this chapter demonstrates that in London the role
of insurance within the co-production of art security can be seen positively. Though the issue is still very much about the insurance industry providing security, what also needs consideration is; first, their role as the leaders in the securitization and policing through their driving of risk reduction (Davis 1990, Ericson et al 2000), and, second, their enabling of risk through setting the conditions for people to embrace it (Baker and Simon 2002).

Embracing risk has enabled London to be a crucial global hub of art. This is an example in the global risk society of risk being positive and providing opportunity (Baker and Simon 2002). With its risk assessments, imposition of security measures, recovery of stolen art, and financial guarantees, the part played by the insurance industry is crucial to both the security terrain and the art world itself. Added to this is the crucial influence of insurance itself, whether through the insurance companies or beyond them (Baker and Simon 2002). This chapter builds on previous discussion and analysis to examine how security is realised through insurance and how insurance institutions ‘do’ insurance.

BACKGROUND: THE LONDON ART INSURANCE MARKET

The significance of people turning to London based insurance institutions for security is far from new, as evidenced in the seventeenth century by the importance of Edward Lloyd’s Coffee House for maritime cargo. Well-known as the place to purchase marine insurance, his business was thriving by the end of that century (Lloyds of London 2011).

The power and influence of the insurance industry cannot be overstated (Burchell et al 1991, Ericson et al 2000). In the UK, with 8% of the total worldwide premium income, employing around 275,000 people and handling investments worth £1.6 trillion (24% of the UK’s total net worth) (ABI 2011a), it has a crucial role in British life and, more specifically, in how people manage security. As the largest insurance market in the world and main insurer of museum collections (Graham and Prideaux (for the
MLA) 2004:1), London is an excellent case study of how insurance markets operate within modern securitization and policing arenas.

Both the empirical and theoretical research undertaken for the thesis has led to the conclusion borrowed from Kimball (1992:xxv in Baker and Simon 2002:7) that, “There is no good definition of ‘insurance’, for any purpose”. Following his lead, instead of attempting to provide one, the chapter focuses on the importance of highlighting the varied aspects of insurance (Ewald 1991).

The London insurance industry is a market comprising of many companies and Lloyds syndicates (Graham and Prideaux (for the MLA) 2004:3). It is operationally active through the numerous people involved at different stages. Insurer 4 explained that from the brokers and their contact with the public, to the insurance companies with their many functions and job roles, and the loss adjusters who work for them, the insurance market’s reach and influence is extensive and spreads far further afield than the capital, with some insurers underwriting business all over the world. This increases still further when the products that they can propose are considered.

It is very important that due to the many different companies involved in insurance, and the competition that exists between them, that the art insurance industry in London is not seen, whether negatively or positively, as one entity. While providing and driving the security of others, risk is spread with companies reinsuring their insurance (Loss Adjuster 2, Insurer 1), and, while smaller risks are insured by companies individually, larger risks are sometimes shared among insurers to the extent that in extremely high value art exhibitions dozens of syndicates and companies might be involved (Insurer 4, Graham and Prideaux (for the MLA) 2004).

In interviews with leading insurance companies, I was told that art is seen to be either “good” or “very good” to insure (Insurers 1, 2, 3). According to Insurer 3, claims are relatively small, and thefts of
other items are more common. The companies have a range of clients. For instance, Insurer 4 stated that 60% of her company’s clients are private collectors, 20% museums and 20% dealers.

**INSURANCE AS A DRIVING NODE IN THE CO-PRODUCTION OF ART SECURITY**

Considering security in general, insurance companies have become the driving force on account of their risk assessment requirements, and their choosing, deciding and insisting on the type and level of security required by people and organisations (Davis 1990). This reflects other areas such as health, fire and life insurance in which companies have been heavily involved in research and testing in order to cut their potential losses. For example, the first fire departments in the United States were set up by the fire insurance industry (Baker and Simon 2002).

Insurance is full of ironies, a central one being that within the global risk society the insured can be encouraged to be involved in ‘risky’ behaviour due to insurance (Doyle and Ericson 2010). In line with embracing risk (Baker and Simon 2002), it is Ewald’s (1991:208) belief that the ‘insurance’ offered by the insurance industry creates security that encourages “enterprise” and that the safety net it provides is positive, which best suits the fluid art world in London. The ‘risky behaviour’ encouraged by insurance can be seen as behaviour that utilises risk which benefits the entire international art world.

A crucial aspect is the fact that owing to it being the financial value of the object which is insured and not the actual object, and it is the insurance companies who set this price (Lupton 1999), the impression can be created of a dominance of security by the insurance industry.
‘Institutions of governance’- Governing through risk

Concerning the concept of strategies to control risk, and the Foucauldian position that ‘risk’ can be used to govern society (Burchell et al 1991), Clark et al (2010:4) argue that, “Insurers directly or indirectly govern people, products, and markets”. This is the case for much of the privately owned art in London as the insurance companies are not only heavily involved in many of the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) but, crucially, they are making the rules through the requirements they place on their customers, deciding on the nature of the rules, and choosing the focus of governance.

If we are all now our own risk assessors (Rose 2000), it should not be a surprise that people choose the insurance industry with its risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), its history of risk assessments and provision of a safety net, and its allowing risk to be viewed positively (Baker and Simon 2002, Ewald 1991, Lupton 1999). Ericson et al’s (2000:550) work on the North American insurance industry becoming “the institution of governance” is meant to serve as a warning. However, it contrasts greatly with the attitude of many in the security terrain for art in London and how they view the insurance industry. With the public police having a limited role, commercial insurance increasingly offers people what the public sector cannot; investigation and potential recovery of the stolen item. This is alongside the guarantee of financial recompense. The industry’s part in recovering art, primarily through loss adjusters, means it has a prominent position in this area of art crime. However, operationally, its most significant role in the co-production of art security occurs through a focus on pre-crime policing in its risk assessments and security requirements. This is mirrored in the public sector by the National Security Adviser.

In general, insurance institutions are becoming more involved in policing and preventative crime risk management (Ericson et al 2000:533). With art, this is certainly true in London. Insurers 1, 2 and 4
explained that the assessments, usually done by a surveyor or a loss adjuster, are thorough and cover all aspects; such as the people in the institutions, the alarms, general security, the handling of artworks, storage, flooding, terrorism. These risk assessments are necessary for the insurance companies to cut down on losses from damage and theft. As Art Detective 2 explained:

“Insurers now are far more exact in their requirement to protect and they feel there are more, not exactly savings to be had, but much better to make sure the object is safe rather than stolen…rather than saying yeah, well, we’ll pay for it if it goes” (Art Detective 2).

In line with Routine Activity Theory’s VIVA acronym (Felson and Clarke 1998), people entering locations to check and make assessments (concerning value, weight of the object, visibility and access) of security weaknesses and opportunities to steal art pose a very real threat (Loss Adjuster 1). With museums, galleries and dealers, art is usually the primary target in a robbery. However, there are exceptions, such as the midsized museum in central London where Head of Security 3 explained that stealing art had not been the aim in two burglaries. Items stolen included cash and wine. Similarly, for clients who display art within their private houses, other high value property might be the primary target (Insurer 3).

Insurance companies force private clients to have good security (Insurer 3), and it is due to these assessments that the insurance industry makes the rules and drives security for a lot of art in London. Loss Adjuster 1 is clear about who polices art, “Certainly insurers do. They will of course require in the wording in their policy that all appropriate security measures have been taken”. Art Detective 2 sees “the insurance market as a positive” and “they are the main driver in crime prevention today”. He added, “So who is driving it all? The insurance industry by calling in either an outside security advisor or using their own internal assessments…and they are the people dictating terms and conditions for security on art and antiques” (Art Detective 2).
Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997:127) description of governance “as the art and activity of risk management” and the lack of central governance as “agnostic liberalism” comes with the warning that the largest threat to the risk society is that, “it risks leaving too much to dispersed institutional sites of governance connected only by the circuitry of risk communication” (Ericson and Haggerty 1997:452). In contrast, for Johnston and Shearing (2003) the lack of central governance, particularly regarding the public sector, is a positive and is central to nodal governance. As this thesis illustrates, there are key nodes in both the public and private sector, but no fixed centre for the London art security matrix. According to Loss Adjuster 2, the fact that it was from the insurance industry that CoPAT originated, shows that within the industry, while obvious individual motivations remain, there was enthusiasm to organise the securitization and policing nodes into working together more effectively and encouraging better security, especially in respect of people self-policing and closing avenues to move on stolen art, such as Bermondsey market. This was exemplified by the voluntary codes of due diligence for the art trade promoted by CoPAT (ABI 1999).

Insurance institutions might be governing through risk, even if indirectly, but they, themselves, have also benefited from improvements that originated from within the art world. In the last decade, the level of due diligence has risen dramatically in the commercial art market, particularly with provenances. The art world, especially the art market, benefits from having strong guidelines as the extremely high value market can be undermined by the sale of stolen, forged or faked art (Insurer 1). Whilst still highly unregulated (Art Detective 2), greater confidence in the market helps to achieve higher prices and generate more sales.

Though clearly a profit driven enterprise, many involved in art insurance do care about art. Insurer 4 explained that, “we obviously want to protect our loss ratio and our figures, but also bearing in mind

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12 A Market Overt site (see Footnote 8 p141)
there’s quite a few of us with art history background...we actually want to make sure the art works are ok as well.” Insurers 3 and 4 spoke of large insurers also having projects which benefit the art world, such as grants and scholarships. When asked whether public relations were the primary motive, they argued that any related good public relations were a by-product rather than the prime motivation. Though their answer might have been foreseeable, this stated attitude towards the art world contrasts with that of ministers in recent governments, with the possible exception of Paul Boateng MP who at the CoPAT Codes of Due Diligence launch (02/03/1999) stated that the codes represented, "a significant new initiative to tackle this area of crime and, as such, deserve our support." (Appendix 60 of the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (2000).

**Enabling risk**

With art, the risks covered, such as theft and damage, are very real. This is not a case of vagaries of fate being ‘risk’ managed and the influence of insurance companies growing as a result (Lupton 1999). Rather than seeing the insurance companies for art in London as ‘producing’ risk by offering a safety net through guarantees (Ericson et al 2000), it is better to view the private and public art world as embracing the risk (Baker and Simon 2002) that is being enabled by the insurance companies. There is a difference between insurance institutions enabling and producing risk. By enabling risk, they help increase the value of the art and the amount of money that can be generated from art on display.

The dangers of placing art into the flows for sale or for public display have existed since humans first made art. While the public have produced this risk for millennia, the modern extent of this enabling of produced risk is newer. Ewald’s (1991:208) ideas of insurance allowing ‘enterprise’ can be seen through the ‘risks’ taken by galleries with their changing exhibitions, particularly the blockbuster shows; the art fairs that assemble hundreds of millions of pounds of art in a temporary location
(Curator 1); owners and institutions agreeing to loan their works nationally and internationally, sometimes even after previous thefts during loans (Head of Security 2); and the constant moving of art into and out of London for sales. This enabling of risk is crucial to the staggering prices of art and, also, the popularity and continued upkeep of many cultural institutions. For instance, allowing the public to enter the privately owned Gagosian gallery in King’s Cross, London (Fieldwork 16/6/2010, 25/08/2010) and stand six inches away from a Picasso work, benefits the art world. The Picasso ‘brand’ is promoted, as is the Gagosian name and the gallery. This is far from specific to the private sector. Indeed, it is mirrored in the public sector.

While public sector owned institutions depend on these flows of art, created with their own and privately loaned pieces, more for generating visitor ticket sales to popular blockbuster exhibitions than for actual sales, their enabled risk through indemnity also follows an insurance model. For the private sector, specific art exhibition insurance (Hiscox Art Collection 2009) additionally helps these flows which are amplified further through expansion of air travel routes and the rise of new elites in areas such as the transitional ex-Soviet countries (Dobovsek, Art Crime Conference, Slovenia, 2010) and China.

These flows of art, and the ensuing insurance in situ and insurance in flow, mean that consideration of Routine Activity Theory (Felson and Clarke 1998, Felson 2002) in relation to art security becomes more complicated. Analysis in relation to art theft must recognise that with both art in temporary situ and art on the move, the target is a moving one, the motivated offender might differ from location to location, and the guardian might often change. It is important that those nodes involved in pre-crime assessments appreciate and react to this reality.
Power of insurance

While the National Security Adviser was clear that his risk assessments for public sector owned art and art loaned to government institutions are very strict, and are arguably more so than those undertaken by commercial insurance, risk assessments by the private sector insurance market are often also stringent and drive people to have a good level of security (Insurers 2, 4). For example, Insurer 4 said that her company surveys every risk they choose to cover and will send out their internal surveyor or ask a loss adjuster to do risk assessments for substantial clients, while smaller ones will use a proposal form. According to Loss Adjuster 1 and Insurer 4, all aspects are covered and insurers analyse where the threats are; for instance, storage facilities and travel of art for exhibitions.

In the UK, according to Insurer 1, most museums have contracts with alarm companies and security companies. Insurer 1 believes that, “there is a very good process in place that insures that the right security companies provide the right security”. Ericson et al (2000) warn about the power of insurance companies to choose, decide and insist on the type and level of security required by people and organisations. This fuels both the insurance industry and those companies involved in the sale of technology, such as locks, cameras, alarms and private security personnel. Furthermore, while the public police offer advice, commercial insurance companies have more leverage to force people to take security measures. As a result, there is an opportunity to misgovern through risk.

However, the fact that insurance companies can take advantage of their position does not necessarily mean they will. This ‘forcing’ people to have good security can be positive. While some security measures are very expensive, and for private galleries or museums acquiring funding for security products can be difficult because of the problem that donating money towards a particular painting is more attractive than paying towards a security upgrade (Head of Security 3), it should not be forgotten that many measures such as photographing and documenting the art are unsophisticated and low cost.
It is difficult to view negatively the insurance companies’ forcing of people to follow these simple measures. The Interpol Co-ordinator, while reiterating the significance of the role of the insurance industry, affirms this:

“They do indeed play an increasingly important role, e.g. by imposing a reliable documentation including description and photographs, certificates of authenticity prior to insuring high valuable art. Some decades ago, they insisted less on such documentation, which is, however, the basis for any research following a loss” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

An example is when a certain threat arises or increases, such as the theft of bronzes, insurance companies will expect locations to improve security in line with the increased risk (Insurers 1, 2). Concerning damage, implementing basic measures such as placing thicker card between paintings in transit or temporary storage, and using special gloves when handling art, can make a huge difference (ACE, Loss Adjuster 1).

The ultimate sanction of not insuring the location exists. However, due to the very competitive market and a desire to keep customers while not suffering losses, Insurers 1 and 2 explained that an insurance company would make proposals such as keeping bronzes inside where the piece is less at risk or behind a showcase inside a gallery. This connects with an awareness of the potential criminals, their target locations and mindfulness of trends such as the level of violence in the crime (Insurer 1, Loss Adjuster 1).

Loss Adjuster 1 described how he gives recommendations and the details of security companies to clients but does not promote security for the sake of a product, “They will pay someone like myself to go in and do an actual report with recommendations. I don’t make a recommendation just to justify my having gone there. If it’s ok, it’s ok” (Loss Adjuster 1). Indeed, when he has assessed that security is excessive, he has informed the people involved. Insurer 1 said that his company does not recommend
particular security companies. The clients can choose and then surveyors or loss adjusters will check the adequacy afterwards and ensure the security is at a specific level. The National Security Adviser was clear that this requirement for certain levels of security is the same in the public sector. This highlights the existence of layers of responsibility within the implementation and execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003).

It is right to maintain a healthy level of scepticism over the insurance industry’s potential links to products. However, concerns should not turn to cynicism, and any apprehension must not be limited to this industry. For instance, in relation to issues concerning securitization being carried out for private profit motives, the public police promote the use of certain products. One example is their giving SelectaDNA, a forensic gel that gives a unique security marking that can be used on objects to help in target hardening and potential recoveries, the ‘Secured By Design’ validation (SelectaDNA 2010) and a public police officer appearing on the company’s promotional video.

Furthermore, a pertinent question arises about whether within the modern securitization and policing terrain, would links to products be so different from the public police allowing the Art Loss Register to charge insurance companies and the public for services done while working for the public sector, or the public police charging football clubs for their policing services (Johnston 1992) or shopping centres in London for uniformed patrols? (Retail Security Oct 2011:6)

If in the future they were to promote or select certain products, the competitive nature of the art insurance industry in London would mean that the consumer still has a choice of other insurance packages if they were not prepared to agree to certain conditions. Indeed, it could be argued that within the art security terrain, the insurance industry offers more choice than other areas; for example, the public police. Moreover, the insurance companies have the knowledge and expertise that other
nodes do not, and where rates may have been cyclical in the past, they have actually progressively gone down in recent times. More investors have been attracted to insurance as a good investment, leading to greater competition, which brings down the costs for the consumers (Insurer 2).

Though the power of insurance companies enables them to govern through risk and insist on risk technologies, the fact that with art insurance in London this allows customers to embrace risk is significant. In line with this mutual benefit, in a competitive market in which art insurance is often less expensive than non-specialist insurance (Insurer 1), relationships with customers are very important and insurers talk about keeping or engendering confidence among customers and avoiding an unconsidered reaction to a certain type of theft occurring, such as metal (Insurer 2). Also, people access art insurers through specialist brokers. Insurer 1 explained that this helps create a balance of power within the insurance matrix because the brokers try to get the most suitable deal for the customer and their loyalty lies with them and not with an insurance company. They help the customer choose the most appropriate insurer for the best price and also help those purchasing the cover to understand the risks.

The insurance companies and the government agencies are the leading institutions of governance in the art world. However, in governing art security through risk, their objective is not to obtain power through this governance for other reasons. Albeit for differing reasons, both want to minimise losses as much as possible. Furthermore, owing to the competition between insurance companies, the importance of brokers and the inability of the government to purchase commercial insurance, no one has too much power. Indeed, the owners of art, including the public sector itself, have more choice and self-responsibility compared to other areas such as motor insurance in which car owners are legally required to purchase insurance. This highlights that while Clark et al’s (2010:4) argument about the
insurers governing, directly or indirectly, is true overall for a lot of privately owned art in London, the potential customer has a choice about whether they actually want to be ‘governed’ and also by whom.

**INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY**

It is each individual’s decision whether they wish to embrace the risk (Baker and Simon 2002) and if so, how and to what degree. From keeping a painting in a safe or on a wall, to choosing to loan it to an exhibition on the other side of the world, these decisions can encompass a wide range of motivations; from altruistic and philanthropic, to prestige and for financial reasons. Is the loan meant to maintain the high value of the piece, circumvent the responsibility of security for the piece, allow the public to see a unique art work, or, even, possibly all three?

Highlighted throughout this thesis, the emphasis on individual responsibility that characterises society, or as Baumann (2000:8) describes it, “an individualized, privatized version of modernity”, corresponds with the insurance model for security. In line with Rose’s (2000) and Ewald’s (1991) focus on the individual, insurance companies are keen to underline this aspect. For example, AXA Art advertises on its website that, “We pride ourselves on an individual approach to each risk” (AXA Art 2009).

Many private collectors look after their art very well. Insurer 2 made it clear that the wealthiest can afford to regularly update their security systems and will often do so. Unfortunately, others who bought a painting many years ago and have seen the price of the piece rise dramatically, for example, a Lowry work (Art Fair 1, Insurer 3), may not be able to do so. However, these people can, whether insured or not, have digital records of their art and some security measures to prevent crime.
Due to the many potential problems, the importance of insurance to locations that display art cannot be understated (Insurer 1, Graham and Prideaux 2004:8). The MLA’s Insurance for Museums: Guidelines for Good Practice (2004:1) asserts that:

Insurance is a “vital consideration of risk management for museums and galleries (as it is for all other businesses, charities, trusts and government bodies) and appropriate cover can be arranged for almost every area of a museum’s operation”.

This is true even if only Third-party insurance is purchased, in case of claims made against them. Insurer 1 described how smaller, independent museums will usually have insurance for building and liabilities but not necessarily for their collection.

Whilst through its risk assessments first-party insurance provides more protection financially and physically from the potential threats, many considerations are needed to be taken into account in choosing; first, whether to have it, and, second, the type. According to Graham and Prideaux (2004:8), they include, “legal and moral obligations, fiscal, historical and emotional reasons”. Theft is only one consideration, albeit an important one, as it can constitute, depending on the insurance company, from about 10% (Insurer 4) to 30% of claims (Insurer 3). The majority of the rest of the claims are for damage (Insurers 1, 2, 3, 4), many occurring in transit (Insurer 3).

INSURANCE DOING NODAL GOVERNANCE

Flows of knowledge

My empirical research has highlighted the importance within the co-production of nodes connecting and working with each other. In competition, the insurance companies do not regularly share information or communicate with each other, except with a big market claim or over a spate of thefts (Insurer 4). Insurer 4 revealed that there are exceptional cases, such as a meeting about the Johnson
criminal family in which most of the loss adjusters were present. Another example is a 2010 information collating project sponsored by an insurance company (Art Detective 2, Insurer 4).

However, these companies facilitate the flows of knowledge throughout the security terrain to prevent losses and to aid recoveries, and also to enable risk to be embraced. In this small world where people know each other, or, at least are aware of one another, it is in the nodes’ advantage to work together. For instance, concerning recoveries, a policing network characterised by knowledge bubbles could not function. Information must be shared, even if people have competing interests. This is why insurance companies use a range of nodes, public and private, many of whom receive their payments directly or indirectly from the insurers. In contrast to other approaches that have more fixed conditions such as partnerships, nodal governance frameworks encourage and have the flexibility to allow for these often temporary exchanges and link ups to occur. Despite this, disagreements have occurred; for example, two of the leading figures in the policing terrain (one a private art detective, the other a loss adjuster) no longer communicate. Though they work for different concerns, this type of breakdown is particularly unfortunate owing to so few people having the combined specialised investigation skills and art knowledge.

**Loss adjusters: nodal governance facilitators**

In spite of the competition between the insurance companies, and although some knowledge cannot be shared, flows of knowledge concerning operational security do exist due to loss adjusters and their role in the interconnectedness of nodes, and the opening and closing of these flows. The leading loss adjusters specialising in art, of which there are only a small number, are widely deemed to do an excellent job in assessing risks and resolving claims (Insurers 1, 4, Art Detective 2). Through their role of doing and facilitating nodal governance within the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), mirrored to an extent in the public sector by the National Security Advisor, they are
crucial to the insurance companies enabling people to embrace risk and for the whole art security terrain. This again highlights how the nodal governance framework is fluid and based on capacities rather than power, and why it is a more effective approach for this co-production than other more ‘fixed’ policing theses.

With stolen art often leaving the country from where it was stolen (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1, Radcliffe in Houpt 2006), international cooperation is vital in investigating a theft. Loss Adjusters 1 and 2 explained that in their often international work, they are under less pressure to be transparent and it is easier for them to operate with their array of contacts than transnational public policing, which not only relies on collaboration between different police in varying countries but is also under pressure to be transparent (Brodeur 2000, Sheptycki 2002). According to Insurer 3, when insurance companies try to work with foreign police forces it can be very difficult.

From the public’s perspective, considering the constraints on the public police and the potential cost of paying for private investigation, buying insurance not only provides financial cover but, importantly, provides a loss adjuster who will conduct risk assessments and investigate a theft as well. Loss adjusters’ ability and capacity to ‘do’ nodal governance is the reason why they can carry out pre-crime and post-crime policing effectively. Though they have wide expertise and knowledge, it is their effectual use of other nodes’ capacities that is crucial to their success. They understand, arguably more than anyone else, how to benefit from the nodal governance framework. The fact that they encourage the conditions for it to exist is, therefore, no surprise.

The public police: a nodal governance obstacle

With loss adjusters having such a crucial role, knowledge must flow between insurers and the public police, and this is where a current weakness exists in the nodal governance framework for art security.
While insurance companies and art owners often have the choice of which private sector nodes they choose to implement and execute governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), legally, they must sometimes use the public police due to the node’s formal policing powers.

Despite cooperation in certain operations, including stings, in which loss adjusters, insurance companies and the public police have been involved (Insurer 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2), this can often be a frustrating relationship, exemplified by the Chief Constables’ attitude towards CoPAT highlighted on page 141, and characterised by a sluggish, at times indifferent, public police response (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4). According to Loss Adjuster 2, as well as the delay in authorising letters for rewards, information given by insurance companies to the public police is also not acted on. Insurance companies are aware that their level of involvement with public policing is the decision of the public police services themselves (Insurer 3). Insurer 3 argues that coordination is very loose and could be improved. While fifteen or twenty years ago there might have been more contact between the insurance companies and public police due to money being offered for sting operations, this is less likely due to regulations. This is in line with Art Detective 2’s view that it is now easier to dispose of stolen property, at least at the lower level, “It’s increased because there is very little police activity in targeting professional receivers” (Art Detective 2).

Although the Unit offers good crime prevention advice (MPS 2011b), the person to whom the public have access through their borough police in London, or local force at national level, will be a Crime Prevention Officer. Loss Adjuster 1 and Art Detective 2 explained that the likelihood is that this officer will not have the specialist art skills for effective risk management of art, and they might even propose taking measures such as marking the art object, which could cause damage. As these officers are dealing with all sorts of criminal threat, this is no great surprise. However, as proposal 3C on page
argues, they could receive some art specific training which could help them in their recommendations and, also, in knowing who has useful expert knowledge.

This is not about who is governing through risk or exercising ‘power’ (Burchell et al 1991, Foucault 2002 [1978]), but effectiveness. According to Insurer 4, instead of going to the Art Loss Register, the public police could avoid the controversy examined in chapter 4 and be more efficient if they went directly to the loss adjusters. Insurer 3 believes that the public police themselves would benefit if they worked closer with the insurance industry and argued that more communication between the public police and insurance could improve the security terrain. However, Insurer 3 understood that the public police are sometimes not allowed to communicate with insurance. While the public police, in particular the Unit, argue that they focus on the criminal more than the recovery (Head of the Unit), Insurer 3 believes that the identity of the person purchasing the insurance can be significant in whether the public police are actually more interested in the stolen item than convicting the perpetrator of the crime.

This is particularly important because of victims’ frustrations with the public police and their feeling of being “short changed”, especially when they often encounter the attitude that it is not a priority due to the assumption the stolen art is probably insured (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 2). Returning to the unique role of the public police in the co-production, this is an example of a node trying to abdicate some its responsibility for the implementation and execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Insurers are aware of this and make it clear that the insurance companies are not the ‘police’ (Insurers 2, 4). Insurer 3 explained that, first, they do not have the power of the public police, and, second, it is the public police’s remit to investigate a criminal act. Moreover, Insurer 2 highlighted the belief that without public police involvement the crime could proliferate because criminals are encouraged when they know that the public police are not paying attention to certain
crimes. If it were to increase, people would in effect be punished twice because insurance premiums could rise due to increased ‘risk’. Furthermore, the premiums of other non-art insurance clients could also go up due to the spreading of insurance costs.

NODAL GOVERNANCE IN POST-CRIME SECURITY

![Picture 1 2001 Poster Campaign in Germany offering a £100,000 reward for the portrait of Francis Bacon by Lucien Freud (stolen in Berlin in 1988 whilst on loan from Tate Britain)](image)

After a theft has occurred, rewards play an important role in the recovery of stolen art and are viewed as a necessary incentive, as Insurer 4 explains, “you know you would get some good citizens who would call up and say I think I have information… but I think sometimes you maybe have to give that slight carrot”.

While nodes do work together, whether out of necessity or a genuine appreciation of the benefits, the post-crime aspect of the insurance industry and nodal governance shows weaknesses in both the methods used to recover stolen art and the actual undertaking of nodal governance. It is important to analyse how and why.
There is the argument that if insurance stops paying rewards, a huge motivation to steal is removed. While a famous stolen art piece might be very hard to sell on and so the resale value drops significantly, the reward value remains (Insurer 1). It is important to restate that for insurers, recovery of the asset is the primary motive. Insurer 2 was clear that, though the public police would not want him to be admitting it, in contrast to the public police’s aim, conviction is not the primary goal.

Insurers 1, 3, 4 and Loss Adjuster 1 were adamant that the public police have to be, and are, involved straightaway and a letter is required from a Chief Constable or Assistant Chief Constable before a reward can be paid. The rules are very strict and payment only occurs if the specific information results in the recovery (Loss Adjuster 1). It is the public police who assess whether the person receiving the reward has or has not been criminally involved (Insurer 4). While the issue of whether they have the capacity to do this will be examined shortly, significantly this is an example of a node that makes and shapes the nature of the rules of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) having its ‘power’ checked. In light of Ericson et al’s (2000:550) warnings about the growing power of insurance industry in North America (on page 52), this is an important aspect of the art security terrain in London as it highlights how the insurance industry is an important ‘institution of governance’ but not the ‘institution of governance’. With its lack of a locus of power (Johnston and Shearing 2003), nodal governance has the capacity to help us understand how, within the same security arena, the ‘power’ of the insurance industry can be very significant at times but can also diminish greatly.

The issue of offering rewards for stolen art is potentially extremely contentious (Insurer 1). When is a reward a ransom? This grey area was highlighted in 2010 with the controversial case of the return of the Buccleuch Da Vinci Madonna, stolen in 2003 (Scotsman 21/04/2010). The return of Turner
paintings stolen in 1994 when on loan in Frankfurt from the Tate in London also has many shades of grey (BBC 2011, Nairne 2011).

Clearly, there is the potential for ‘rewards’ in these types of cases actually being ransoms. A leading art insurance company is very aware of this problem and Insurer 4 was very direct in speaking about this issue:

“We never do these things without police involvement. I think we’ve got very strong views on... because rewards are always bandied around and things but there are such strict rules. You’ve got to make sure that you’re not actually paying the person who stole it” (Insurer 4).

Moreover, if it really is the case that criminals will move stolen art around and take turns to try and profit from the ‘recovery’ (Loss Adjuster 1, Boser 2009), this has the potential to be even more problematic.

Although potential rewards can encourage criminals to take the risk, they also play a part in encouraging art owners to embrace risk (Baker and Simon 2002) due to the possibility of getting the art back if it is stolen. If this possibility were removed, then perhaps people would be less keen to lend, which could have a detrimental effect on the art world. Also, the motivation for private detectives would also be lessened as they, too, would stand to profit less. This highlights the tension in nodal governance and post-crime art policing with nodes’ different priorities. Nodes appreciating that this tension exists and understanding how to work with it is crucial to art security working effectively.

If there are few, or no, art specialist public police officers or civilians working for them, how can the public police fully understand what is happening? It can be argued that they do not need to as they can take advice from private sector nodes which do have the knowledge. However, this is worrying for operational reasons because, as Insurer 4 explained, receiving a letter of authorisation from the public
police even now, while easier outside of London, can be very difficult in the capital. This concern is shared by Art Detectives 1, 2 and 4. They argue that if art becomes even less of a priority for the public police, officers could handicap and delay the potential recovery of art, especially as the senior officers who authorise the letters are the people who have a history of hindering measures against art theft. It was unsurprising that this was a key issue for these interviewees as it directly affects their work. Even nodal governance, with its adaptability, is hindered when a node with a specific function slows the policing process. This highlights a weakness in this particular framework because while making the rules of governance can be, “almost always a matter of contestation and variability” and public sector legislation might no longer be the definitive form of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003:22), in this particular case, public sector legislation does make the rules. The problem occurs when the public police, who must then efficiently implement it through authorisations, fail to do so effectively.

It is difficult to judge the scale of rewards being paid out. For while insurers must obtain the public police letter, in an example of how ‘local’ communities deal with the risk responsibility obligation highlighted by Rose (2000), uninsured victims of theft may decide not to notify anyone and, instead, decide to pay for information. This can happen for fear of the flag effect (Mackenzie 2005) and, also, for reasons such as not wanting to notify the tax office. In such an unregulated area, it is impossible to find out the size of the known unknown that is uninsured art, as Insurer 1 stated, “that is the other side...because there is a lot of art that is not insured. And what happens to that we are never going to get to hear about it”.

**REGULATORY CONCERNS**

In line with Ericson et al’s (2000:547) warning against the dangers of, and the entrenched problems within, unregulated insurance, the insurance industry’s level of influence could potentially be viewed
negatively when considering who makes the decisions and the motivations behind them. However, my research shows that while the driving role of the insurance industry is seen, unsurprisingly, in a positive light by the industry itself, this view is also shared by many in the security terrain in London. The industry brings governance and regulation to art security and also to an unregulated art world in which the insurance market has driven better diligence. The required risk assessments are crucial to the physical security of art. They also have a large role in issues such as fraudulent sales. For example, by offering Title Insurance, they themselves need to check the provenance of a piece. Steven Spielberg’s discovery that his Norman Rockwell painting, the *Russian Schoolroom*, had been stolen from a gallery in Missouri, USA, is a case in point (Art Law Gallery 2009).

In the UK, the insurance companies do not want to take on precarious risks with art in London. There is no need for them to do so, nor is there the necessity for the customer to take the kind of risks that Ericson *et al* (2000) warn against. Insurer 1 explained, “so much of what we do is straightforward because we ask this question “who is it that we are insuring?”. If the ‘moral risk’ is good then it’s seen as a ‘good risk’”. When risks grow for the companies, then reinsurance and pooling of risk with other companies or syndicates mitigates against the danger of losing too much money from a large claim (Insurers 1, 4). For the customer, the risk assessments, as well as the competition between the insurance firms, and the role of the brokers in gaining a good price for the client and making sure they understand the risks, lowers the level of risk they might have in purchasing, or being required to, insurance.

UK insurance companies must be authorised by the Financial Services Authority (FSA 2011a) through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the FSMA) (National Archives 2001). The Association of British Insurers produces Codes of Practice and, while some were no longer used after the introduction of statutory regulation on 14 January 2005, it still supplies Codes, Statements of Best
Practice and Guidance Notes (ABI SORP 2005). Regulation for the general insurance industry is set to become more stringent; first, due to new European regulation in January 2013, Solvency II; second, the setting up of three UK bodies, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Policy Committee, the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority; and third, a new European Supervisory Authority, the European insurance and occupational pensions, EIOPA (FSA 2011b). There are also regulations such as the EU Insurance Accounts Directive which was put into effect in the UK by the Companies Act 1985 (Insurance Companies Accounts) Regulations 1993 and the Insurance Accounts Directive (Miscellaneous Insurance Undertakings) Regulations 19930 (ABI SORP 2005:53).

People who purchase insurance can also be covered by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (UTCCR) (OFT 2011), though these do not apply for commercial customers and in some individually negotiated cases with art; for instance, properties with high value works if purchasing contents insurance (FSA 2007). Loss adjusters are also bound by FSA regulations and are members of the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters which maintains professional standards (Loss Adjuster 1, CILA 2011).

Even though it is accountable to the Treasury (FSA 2011a), the FSA is an independent body which receives all of its funding from the companies it regulates. Due to this, it could be argued that in the UK the insurance companies are effectively left to govern each other, as they are in North America (Ericson et al 2000:546). However, pertinent questions are; first, who should regulate the industry? Second, is the government best positioned? If in areas such as the private security industry the public sector is more concerned with “soft selling” security and acting as a “pander to a billion pound industry” rather than creating a fair system (Zedner 2006:283), then is it fit to act as a regulator for the insurance industry?
Indeed, in the UK, due to its unwillingness to provide cover without certain standards being met (Ericson 2003 in Zedner 2006), it is the insurance industry that regulates the private security business, not the public sector, and it is the insurance industry that forces individuals and institutions to undertake decent security. While this allows insurers more ‘power’, it also provides added regulation in an often unregulated sector. This follows Baker and Simon’s (2002:16) argument that, “Insurance is a form of regulation”. Does it matter that the impetus for this regulation is based on financial gain? Is this just in line with neo-liberal modern forms of governance? If the public sector has relied on the private security sector to self-regulate and the sector has been reluctant to do so, then there is a strong argument that, even if it is driven by market forces, regulation from another direction should be welcomed in this area, albeit with caution.

The largely unregulated art world is in need of more controls. If the government provides this for art that it is responsible for, then why should the commercial insurance industry not do likewise? The competitiveness of the commercial market and the government’s indemnity and tax policies, as well as the existence of risk technologies driven by insurance companies, mean that the ‘weak’ have more chance of protecting their art, while the insurance industry and the government can drive for better security at the same time as enabling the flows of art between security bubbles.

LIMITATIONS OF INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS

While much art is secured well from threats of theft and damage, the London art world is still full of examples of terrible security; among these, a dealer leaving keys in his door (Loss Adjuster 1), unattended expensive art left propped up against a wall (ACE fieldwork 17/08/2010), a cup of tea sitting on a Rembrandt painting at a restorers (ACE), art stolen from outside a leading auction house (ACE), and unique and valuable art being sent by courier service (Insurer 1). Taken from among many, these few examples highlight the limits of what insurance institutions can actually do with art
security. Even if insured, individual locations have the ultimate day to day responsibility. Furthermore, if they do not purchase insurance then, apart from influencing locations, the insurance institutions have no contact, yet alone ‘power’.

**Uninsured art**

With it being difficult to judge and impossible to know how much art is uninsured in London, according to Insurer 1 it is often a false assumption that people have insurance. Many locations do not purchase it, and collections that have been victims of thefts, such as the Beit Collection in Ireland and the Isabella Gardner Collection in Boston, were uninsured (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1, Boser 2009).

Despite rates not rising (Insurer 2), when calculating their risk, for some, the safety net provided by insurance through compensation (Ewald 1991, Lupton 1999) is not sufficient recompense for them because of the uniqueness of their art (Insurers 1, 4). In this case, the risk management technologies from insurance are more important than the actual insurance institution and the concept of “addressing risk(s) beyond insurance” can become practice (Baker and Simon 2002:10). According to Art Detective 2 and Insurer 1, the price of insurance premiums can also lead to some believing that their money is better spent on their security than on the potential compensation. Insurer 1 believes that smaller locations might judge that, in theory, this increased security makes the theft of art more difficult, so they do not need insurance. Also, security driven by insurance companies can be so good that people might feel that having previously bought insurance, there is no longer the need for it as they feel that they can now implement and execute governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) without the assistance from insurance companies. However, despite improvements in due diligence and stolen art being difficult to sell (Insurer 1), the fact that art is still being stolen and sold on, especially pieces
in the £10,000 range (Loss Adjuster 2), makes this a difficult decision, particularly as they might have other high value non-art items at the same location.

In contrast, many dealers buy insurance (Insurers 2, 4, Loss Adjuster 1) and do so for the very reason that it provides the financial recompense for loss of potential earnings (Insurer 4, Loss Adjuster 1). This chimes with Ewald’s (1991:208) argument that insurance produces conditions for “enterprise” and Lupton’s (1999:13) “good risk”, and Baker and Simon’s (2002:1) “embracing risk”.

Although the insurance industry is a driver and enabler for the flows of art in London and has a direct influence on art in the capital, uninsured art does not necessarily miss out on security. In line with risk beyond insurance (Baker and Simon 2002), the influence of the insurance industry on the protection of art has benefits that also help those without insurance. For example, AXA Art set up Artprotect, the Global Risk Assessment Platform (GRASP), and Quick Security Check in response to events such as the 2004 Momart warehouse fire in London, which destroyed irreplaceable art valued at about $100 million, and thefts such as the 2008 robbery of the Buhrlle Collection in Switzerland. Those without insurance can also benefit from these security re-assessments due to the continual upgrade of security products. Furthermore, a high level of security or learning about the need for simple, but crucial, measures, such as photographing their art, often comes from the insurance companies. Therefore, although the industry’s role in the eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) diminishes for uninsured art, it does not disappear.

The insurance industry’s requirements can lead to exclusion for those that cannot pay the premiums or for institutions which do not ‘fit’ the insurance companies’ designs. The fact that they risk being excluded can be seen negatively or positively. Can victims of crimes be blamed for their failure to protect themselves; is their vulnerability their fault? (O’Malley 2003). This is unsympathetic when
viewed in relation to a market in which prices have risen dramatically for some art. However, financially, the uninsured can still benefit from insurance by loaning art out and having other locations insure or indemnify the piece. By allowing the piece to travel to exhibitions, whether organised by the private or public sector, the value of the art can also rise. The obvious negative of temporarily being without the art is offset by retaining ownership and having someone else manage its risk. This could be viewed as the strong helping the weak in line with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) proposal, or, conversely, the strong taking advantage of the ‘weak’. However, to analyse it in this dichotomous manner would be to fail to appreciate the fluidity and often surprising nature of an art world that manages to adapt and generate both exposure and profit even in times of recession.

It is too big an assumption to consider that either of these extremes could be the case. Shearing (2006) argues that, what is required, “is the promotion of conditions that promote and support the construction of nodes, including super-structural nodes, that recognise and mobilise the resources of the weak in ways which strengthen their bargaining positions” (Shearing 2006:30). Whether you define the government’s agencies or insurance industry as ‘super-structural’ or as ‘strong’ nodes within the co-production of art in the capital, to an extent they do support those without the financial ability to provide sufficient security. In line with neo-liberalism, low premiums from a competitive insurance market, or the loaning out of art and allowing someone else to cover insurance cost, are two ways. Another two are, first, the tax exemptions in the Cultural Heritage Assets Scheme for those who allow the public access to their art of national interest on a set number of days, and, second, the government’s indemnifying art in the ‘public interest’ (MLA 2009). While insurance can offer an alternative to the public sector (Ericson et al 2000), and is the case with the securitization and policing of art theft in London, in this context the public sector can offer an alternative to insurance through indemnity, at least for art of public interest.
Public sector owned art embracing risk beyond insurance

The direct influence of the insurance industry on the security terrain for art in London is reduced by the large number of public sector owned locations and the government indemnification of loans in the public interest.

While local authority museums often have varying degrees of insurance cover; for example, Third-Party Insurance (Insurer 1), the fact that nationals cannot purchase commercial insurance (Insurer 1, National Security Adviser, MLA 2009) results in vast amounts of art being out of the reach of the commercial insurance industry. Three of the main insurance companies dealing with art (Insurers 2, 3, 4) explained that any contact with central government, the MLA (now Arts Council England) or the nationals is rare. The exceptions are if they work with nationals in providing ‘top up’ to some indemnity (Insurer 4), if the indemnity is not judged to be of a high enough value for an individual work (Insurer 1), or if government owned or indemnified art is being loaned to a commercial venue whereupon the National Security Adviser will visit and advise the location. According to Insurer 1, insurers are keen to be involved due to the very high level of risk assessments conducted by nationals, and in these cases they usually work directly with the locations.

In addition to the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) (MLA 2009, AELU Manager), a lot of art is further removed from the private insurance industry’s scope through the Acceptance in Lieu (AIL) Scheme (MLA 2011a), the Private Treaty Scheme (2011b), and the Cultural Heritage Assets Scheme (HMRC 2011a, AELU Manager). While some local authorities will turn to commercial insurance instead of the GIS because it can be faster to organise, the MLA estimates that by indemnifying non-government art loaned to public institutions, museums save £ 5 million a year (MLA 2009).
While the public sector’s role reduces the direct level of influence that the insurance industry can have on the security terrain, the influence of the insurance industry on the public sector is massive. Examined in more detail in the next chapter, while the power of the public sector to control crime and offer effectual security has been exposed in relation to the public police (Garland 2001, Johnston and Shearing 2003), the public sector’s use of an insurance model, exemplified by its own risk assessments through the National Security Adviser and risk technologies from the private sector, to provide layers of security for its own art and its numerous locations that display this art, and that deemed to be in the public interest, offers the sector an alternative way of providing an amount of security and, potentially, avoiding the need to use the public police for public sector owned art, and art loaned in the public interest, through the pre-crime focus of preventing its theft or damage.

Baker and Simon (2002) highlight the difference between having no insurance at all and self-insuring, and the government’s self-insuring is another example of addressing risk(s) beyond insurance (Baker and Simon 2002) with risk management technologies being used without the insurance companies. However, the difference between ‘risks within insurance’ and ‘risks beyond insurance’ is that with the latter, risks are not spread in the same way, which leaves people, in this case the government and taxpayers, more exposed. This inability to spread and reinsure their risks coupled with the uniqueness of much art means that while they embrace risk, they have more to lose than the insurance industry. If a privately insured Titian were stolen in London, though the loss of the painting would be terrible, at least the owner would receive many millions of pounds and the insurance company would also not be liable for all the loss. In contrast, if the same painting were public sector owned, not only would the painting be gone but the public funds would be sitting on a huge loss and the risk could not be spread anywhere else but to the taxpayer. The National Security Adviser’s tough security requirements reflect this severity of potential losses.
CONCLUSION

Bentham wrote in 1843 that man:

“is susceptible of pleasure and pain by anticipation, and that is not enough to guard him against actual loss, but also to guarantee to him, as much as possible, his possessions against future losses. The idea of his security must be prolonged throughout the whole vista that his imagination can measure” (Bentham 1843:1, 302 cited in Brodeur and Shearing 2005:387).

Ideas of risk have moved on since 1843 and though much has been written about the risk society (Beck 1992, 2009, Giddens 1999), a surprisingly small amount has focused on insurance, despite the obvious connection, and the huge direct and indirect role of insurance institutions in our everyday lives.

Although risk is socially constructed in our modern world and much is done in its name, with areas like art in London it is important to focus on both what is a risk and what is done in its name. Insurance is a type of government (Ewald 1991, Baker and Simon 2002), and in London the insurance industry drives the securitization and policing of much privately owned art. This echoes with Davis’s (1990) argument that insurance companies become the leaders in security through their risk assessments and by insisting on greater security. The industry’s enabling role is crucial and it is clearly a leader, but this thesis shows that to label it as ‘the leader’ would be to fail to understand the nature of the co-production of art security network in the capital. In many ways it is the predominant node, but, in a city whose cultural landscape is characterised by an abundance of public sector owned locations that display art, it cannot be the leader as it has no direct role in these spaces or in other places that do not purchase insurance. In other urban settings which have fewer public sector owned art works and locations, conditions could exist for the insurance industry to be the sole leader, but not in London.
In light of Ewald’s (2002) suggestion that the logic of government could be changing its focus more to precaution than insurance; with art security, the government and the insurance institutions are focusing on both. The nature of art security is that even if pre-crime measures of precaution and prevention were so good, risk would still not be completely removed. Risk is not only needed due to its leading to more care (Baker and Simon 2002) but because even before risk is embraced, or even if it were not embraced at all, risk is produced by art owners due to the very existence of the art pieces and their uniqueness.

The fact is that risk is embraced and the insurance institutions play a huge role in enabling this risk that creates the flows of art. Baker and Simon (2002) add a pessimistic note to their positive view of insurance, “Ideas like embracing risk or spreading risk inevitably promise more than they can deliver, and they can never capture more than a partial vision of a cultural moment” (Baker and Simon 2002:2). However, with London’s art world, this ‘inevitability’ is not the case. Though only a partial vision can realistically be captured, the embracing or spreading of risk arguably delivers more than they ‘promise’.

Ericson et al’s (2000:534) research on private insurance companies in North America resulted in their assertion that, “the private insurance institution is shot through with immoral risky behaviour”. In London, the art insurance market does not take huge risks, at least not without reinsuring or spreading the risks, and potential customers benefit from the competitive nature of the industry. Though limits exist as to what the insurance industry can actually do, in the sense that they guarantee financial recompense and not the return of the object (Lupton 1999), they do try and recover the art. Also, it is in the prevention and management of risk in which insurers have a key role. While at times they drive the security terrain directly, at other times they do so indirectly through their methods of crime prevention being adopted by both the public sector and some of the uninsured public. Indeed, even
though the argument exists that insurance can drive security to such a good level that there is no point in having insurance except for restoration or Third Party insurance (Insurer 1); first, individuals will still take out insurance due to the safety net it provides from the many threats, for example, the inclusion of terrorism cover; and, second, to enable individuals to embrace the risk of the ever increasing flows of art entering and exiting, and the journey between, security bubbles. The appeal of a guarantee is amplified as risk is embraced and art values continue to rise.

The fact that overall the UK insurance industry handles £1.6 trillion of investments (ABI 2011a) highlights the obvious fact that it is a business first and foremost. In purely commercial terms, where a loss damages profit, there is strong motivation enough to prevent the losses in the first place. However, in my research the people working in, with, or alongside the insurance companies dealing with art were keen to make the point that they do care about the art itself (Insurers 1, 2, 3, 4, Loss Adjusters 1, 2).

Although art thefts are happening, the number of known thefts in London is relatively low. My research shows the insurance industry is doing a largely effective job. However, what this research also highlights is the key concern that when this is the case, other nodes, such as the public police, can make art less of a priority. In the co-production of art security, the insurance industry, despite its important role, relies on working with a range of nodes to successfully protect or recover stolen art. In line with nodal governance, other nodes cannot see the work of the insurance industry as an opportunity to do less, but instead as a chance to cooperate and work together to form a more effective security network in which there is mutual benefit for all those involved. As threats change, demonstrated by the spate of thefts of art made out of metals, the insurers and those they employ must also balance their ability to enable their clients to embrace risk while also driving security.
CHAPTER 7 GOVERNMENTAL NODES ENABLING SECURITY BEYOND INSURANCE

INTRODUCTION
Taking as a starting point the government’s embracing of risk beyond insurance (Baker and Simon 2002:10) and the need for even greater security due to an inability to spread risk or reinsure, this chapter examines the public sector’s retention of influence through the governmental nodes that securitize and police art in London, and, also proposes that these nodes encourage flows of art through embracing risk beyond insurance. It analyses how through their work with other public and private nodes they enable this risk to be embraced. Rather than build fortresses of culture characterised by restricted access because of the inability to spread or share risks, government nodes led by MLA/Arts Council England have taken a counter approach and, using an insurance model built on risk management as their mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), have helped to enable and drive their own locations’ security and other places’ through their loans of art. Owing to this, government agencies are heavily involved in both enhancing the vibrant art world and also driving its security. While this chapter analyses how this is done, it also examines whether present changes are hindering the effectiveness of the governmental nodes’ approach and, also, very importantly, whether private owners are missing out on security.

Despite some people within its apparatus not wanting, or feeling the need for, the public sector to play a prominent role (Art Detectives 2, 4, Loss Adjuster 2), the fact that there has not been a complete private takeover of art security in London is evidenced by the public sector still being very much involved in the security terrain. My empirical evidence shows that preventative policing functions undertaken by the government through the DCMS, MLA (now Arts Council England), and in
particular the National Security Adviser, appear to be largely successful and are a reason for the low incidence of known thefts from public sector run museums and art loaned in the public interest.

The position of the public sector is a key issue in the pluralisation of securitization and policing arenas, with criminologists such as Shearing, Loader and Johnston forthright about its role. Summed up by McLaughlin (2007), their argument is that there was an, “urgent need to replace state-centred with pluralized, multi-lateral or nodal conceptions of ‘police governance’ that were appropriate to the unfolding network of policing and security arrangements” (McLaughlin 2007:187). Johnston and Shearing (2003) underline the public sector’s own acceptance that public sector rule was not “definitive” by quoting the Crime and Disorder Act 1999:

“There should be no automatic assumption that the police/or local authority will ‘lead’ every aspect of the partnership at local level. Decisions should be approached on the basis that leadership will fall to whoever is best placed to provide it in the light of local circumstances and the nature of a specific issue” (Johnston and Shearing 2003:120).

What role can the public sector perform in art security? Owing to the role of the state and its agencies within theories such as anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker 2006, 2007) and the nexus policing model (Shearing and Marks 2011), these approaches do not fit with art security in London. This chapter shows that nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) provides the most effective framework to consider the role of the governmental nodes in the co-production of art security because it allows for their large involvement in certain areas but lack of participation or influence in others.

In contrast to other areas of security in which the public sector has become less “solid” and more adaptable (Zedner 2006:268), with art security in London this “liquid security” (Zedner 2006:267) or “fragmentation in risk management” (Ericson and Haggerty’s 1997:52) across public and private
sector institutions is not new. Furthermore, as the previous chapters have illustrated, it did not occur in response to the public sector’s methods being challenged by private stakeholders in a competitive sense. It was, and still is, primarily due to the many challenges it faces in the security of its own art. In fact, the public sector is being asked by some in the private sector to do more in the security network, not less.

BACKGROUND: THE GOVERNMENTAL POLICING AND SECURITIZATION MATRIX FOR ART

A number of nodes under the government’s control play important roles in the securitization and policing of art theft in London, and provide security for the public sector’s art and that which it indemnifies. While the National Security Adviser explained that items do get stolen from museums, he was clear that security in the nationals is very good with high level risk assessments. Insurer 1, Head of Security 2, and the Acquisitions, Exports and Loans Unit (AELU) Manager were among many in the art security terrain who confirmed this. According to Insurer 1 and the National Security Adviser, this is also the case when art is being transported and the flows of public governance occur.

Until 2012, the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA) was the main government node involved in the securitization and policing of art theft in London. After the Goodison Review’s 2003 Consultation and 2004 Report, Securing the Best for our Museums. Private Giving and Government Support¹³, a lot of the functions of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) International and Cultural Property Unit were transferred to the MLA. With the DCMS responsible for policy, the MLA ran the functions. A non-departmental public body sponsored by the DCMS, the MLA was a victim of the “bonfire of the quangos” (Public Administration Select Committee 07/01/2011), and, having moved to Birmingham in April 2010 after previously being based in London.
(House of Lords 29/03/2011), many of the MLA’s functions began to be transferred to Arts Council England on 1 October 2011 and it was closed down in April 2012.

The MLA saw its function as, “Leading strategically, the MLA promotes best practice in museums, libraries and archives, to inspire innovative, integrated and sustainable services for all” (MLA 2011b). As the government’s arm dealing with art in the UK, it was a key node, especially because of its role with the Government Indemnity Scheme (MLA 2009); Acceptance in Lieu, where a taxpayer can avoid paying Inheritance Tax by ‘transferring’, in effect selling, art works to the government (MLA 2011a); Immunity from seizure after the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcements Act 2007 (MLA 2011e); and advising HMRC over the Private Treaty Sales (MLA 2011f) and the Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive (HMRC 2011b). Arts Council England has now taken over these functions.

In line with Rose’s (2000) ideas of self-responsibility, the MLA helped locations self-securitize by also being a source for a huge amount of information for the cultural sector. The amount of resources it made available was impressive. Following on from its predecessor Resource’s (2003) advice, it provided guidance such as the Collections Link (Museums and Galleries Commission 2000), the handbook Security in Museums, Archives and Libraries: A Practical Guide, the manual Guidance Collections: Increasing access, limiting risk, and self-assessment aids such as checklists for museums Benchmarks in Collection Care for Museums, Archives and Libraries. The MLA also ran the Museum Accreditation Scheme which aimed to set and encourage standards (MLA 2011c). And, in 2005, the MLA commissioned the Cultural Property Advice online advisory service (MLA 2011d). Funded by the DCMS, it advises private and public collectors as well as the art market.

The MLA was an important hub for the public sector nodes as it also operated with the Department for Communities and Local Government; the Department for Children, Schools and Families; the
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (MLA 2011b); the UK Border Agency and HMRC. Added to this, it worked with 150 local authorities, 3000 public libraries, 300 archives and 1200 museums (MLA 2011h).

The Acquisitions, Exports and Loans Unit (AELU) was taken over by Arts Council England as well. The AELU Manager was clear to me about the importance of the export controls. The AELU is an example of how a body, albeit a non-government one, contracted by the DCMS, can have a large influence on the flows of art into and out of the capital.

**GOVERNMENTAL NODES DOING NODAL GOVERNANCE: SECURITY BEYOND INSURANCE**

There are two good examples of different governmental nodes doing nodal governance; first, the MLA (now Arts Council England) in its managing of the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS); and second, HMRC running the Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive. It is important to analyse them as they are examples of good practice and because they demonstrate how nodes can operate successfully within the co-production to their own benefit and that of the wider security terrain.

**Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS)**

The MLA administered the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS), which in 2010/2011 provided certificates for loans to UK museums and galleries worth £10,485 million. This free cover saved borrowers £25million (MLA 2011h). By indemnifying art loaned from non-national institutions which is on display in the public interest (MLA 2009), the GIS plays an important role in the flows of art through London. It encourages these loans by covering the financial value and enabling risk to be embraced. The National Security Adviser highlighted the fact that, importantly, the GIS covers the loans from “nail to nail” and indemnifies loans from abroad as well.
Another factor is that in line with Ewald’s (1991) view that insurance encourages enterprise being true for art in London; the government’s assistance performs a similar role. London’s public sector run cultural sector would not exist without it because a lot of the privately owned art would simply not be in the cultural spaces. As Art Detective 2, who was involved in advising the government on it, explained:

“The Government indemnity is hugely important because if you were to insure the National Gallery alone on the open insurance market it would just about bankrupt the Exchequer on the premiums alone and that’s before you get to the Victoria and Albert Museum, National History, Tate Gallery and so on” (Art Detective 2).

The borrowing locations benefit, and, by loaning the art, the owner has the work of art protected. The responsibility for who carries out the implementation and execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) shifts from the owner to the institution receiving the art on loan. Also, the value of the work is usually not only sustained but actually rises by being placed into the flows of art. Many locations are assisted greatly by the indemnification of these flows of art. For example, non-nationals can put on important exhibitions and show art that they do not own. This benefits the art world, including the visitors, and provides a safety net. It is, to a degree, Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) ideas of those with more resources helping those with fewer resources in security. However, the safety net is not wide due to it only being a minority of art owners that can directly benefit. The danger remains that art which is not looked after by the public sector or by commercial insurance does not receive sufficient levels of protection or an adequate response from the public police if it is stolen. Despite insurance rates being competitive and not rising sharply (Insurer 2), left to self-securitize and self-police, there is clearly the potential for the ‘weak’ to miss out on security and justice.
While the GIS indemnifies these loans, the public sector owned art is not indemnified (Graham and Prideaux MLA 2004). This is because if a claim were to arise then the Treasury would in effect be paying itself. There is also no indemnity cover for loans from national museums due to government accountancy rules. However, while the government does not guarantee compensation, the GIS guidelines do outline the financial liability a non-national museum takes on when it borrows art from a national one and the “discretionary arrangements” for compensation (DCMS 2011a).

Analysing the difference between how the commercial insurance industry enables the flows of art that fuel the art market and what the GIS does for art deemed to be in the public interest, it is clear that the private sector focuses more on selling the art while the public sector can use the art for ticket sales to exhibitions and to encourage people to pay to enter locations that are otherwise free to access. Reciprocal loans of art are also enabled (Head of Security 2). Facilitating larger and better exhibitions, GIS enabled loans can directly generate money for the locations if they charge the public to see exhibitions, and, also indirectly, even if they do not, through people visiting the location and spending money in the cafe or the shop and being encouraged to return for a paying exhibition. The National Security Adviser, who polices the GIS, argues, “Many exhibitions are actually now being enabled as a result of the Government Indemnity Scheme and they couldn’t take place without it”. The indemnity allows others to embrace risk and, similar to insurance companies, the government is enabling this process. However, in this risk beyond insurance (Baker and Simon 2002), especially because the public sector has to potentially pay out significant amounts of money and its inability to spread or share this financial loss, the prevention of losses must be avoided as much as possible.

**Effectiveness of GIS**

Following a preventative policing model based on risk assessments and strict controls similar to the commercial insurance industry, according to a number of key people who either work closely with it
or have experience with it, the GIS is operationally extremely effective: The strict rules and their implementation through the stringent risk assessments, processes and technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) have led to the GIS security and care standards acting as a kite mark for the industry (Insurer 1, Head of Security 1, AELU Manager, National Security Adviser). The National Security Adviser says that, “I glean that we are the envy of many of European nations in the way that we actually manage our indemnity scheme”. During my empirical research, I did not encounter criticisms of it. Even insurance companies, who are losing potential clients because of the scheme, recognise its effectiveness (Insurer 2). Insurer 1, who has a lot of experience of it, argues that, “the Government indemnity is phenomenal”.

While this enabling of locations to put on shows is a key part of the art world, the government has to be careful in how it is used. As a person employed by a governmental node who works closely with it explained:

“We wouldn’t give government indemnity to items at local commercial galleries. And then we also question...because government indemnity has to be for the public benefit...you cannot profit from it. And a lot of commercial galleries that have things up for sale will try and pull a fast one and put them on loan with a museum which will obviously up the value and then apply for government indemnity” (Interview 27, 16/12/2010).

The GIS shares a similar crime prevention and risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) with the insurance companies. Insurer 1 stated, “The indemnity scheme says that we are going to get the risk management so good that we don’t need insurance”. It is a clear example of the public sector conducting pre-crime policing. This is why the National Security Adviser’s role is so important within the co-production and is the reason why; first, he conducts so many risk assessments of venues; second, manages independent security consultants who assist in assessing
locations; third, adapts the type of security for British art loaned overseas in line with changing threats and risks (for example, after the Paris thefts in 2010); fourth, is involved with architects on renovation and new building projects; and fifth, works with other government departments and promotes the GIS to visiting delegations. The focus on preventative policing means assessing all potential risks, from the staff to any event that could occur. Art Detective 2 argues that, “it is administered pretty rigorously and they have issues with security which they are on top of”. Similar to Head of Security 2’s assertion about dealing with risk at the nationals in which he works, the National Security Adviser also explained that risk cannot be completely avoided as the importance of accessibility is one of the drivers of the scheme. The more important aspect is managing the risk. In doing so, the GIS, and in particular the National Security Adviser’s role involving all eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), relies on the capacity of many different nodes in the private and public sector.

A crucial part for the reputation of the GIS, and it being effective, is that valid claims must be paid out. The Manager of the AELU explained, “When claims are made, the DCMS do pay out. They need to otherwise the whole scheme collapses”. According to her, even though only a very low number have been paid out since 2005, the small number is a reflection on the good security.

An important effect of the scheme is its incentive for locations to improve their security in order to get loans they would otherwise not be able to stage. The consequence of this is that their permanent works are more secure. This effect of creating more secure spaces due to embracing risk is crucial to governmental nodes and insurance companies. The National Security Adviser explained:

“In some cases venues are improving their security, their facilities to enable loans under the Government Indemnity and once it’s installed for one exhibition they remain and have that status for years to come, which is actually increasing their liability for the future” (National Security Adviser).
This is also the case for non UK locations as the National Security Adviser conducts risk assessments for UK art loaned abroad. He assesses the implementation, execution and the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and makes certain security requirements are being met. If art worth over £30 million is loaned, he visits the location personally, with the costs paid for by the overseas borrower.

The National Security Adviser takes a very active approach and personally conducts checks. For example, non-national museums need to apply three months before they can obtain government indemnity for a loan. If they have not been security approved within the previous three years, then he will visit and conduct a security check. If extra security measures are required, he will propose them and these must be met before indemnity can be granted (National Security Adviser, AELU Manager).

In the past, his role has been situated within a range of agencies: the MPS, the Learning and Skills Council, the National Gallery, the Galleries Commission, the Museums and Galleries commission, Resource, the MLA, and now Arts Council England. He argues that operationally, “It doesn’t matter where that function fits”. This idea of the focus being on the capacity of a node rather than from where the node’s capacity functions from is central to nodal governance. What is important is what works, not from where it works.

The use of an insurance model by the government through the National Security Adviser and the MLA (now Arts Council England) in the security of its art, the locations in which it is displayed and the other art shown in the public interest, demonstrates that although the public sector has difficulty in providing effective art security through the public police, it clearly retains the ability to self-police and to provide good security for its own art, and that in the public interest, by using this type of security model. These governmental nodes have not only acknowledged this, but have driven it.
The Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive

The Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive, administered by HMRC, aims to help those with art of national interest through tax exemptions on the items. As the majority cannot access this ‘subsidy’ because their art is not of national interest, this incentive may be quite far from what Johnston and Shearing (2003) were considering when they wrote about those with more assisting those with less. However, this scheme does help people. It enables them to keep the art, as well as acting as a barrier to a loss of heritage from the potential sale of the art abroad.

In exchange for the conditional exemption from paying the tax, access must be granted to the public on a set number of days (HMRC Trusts and Estates Interview, HMRC 2011a, HMRC 2011b). According to HMRC Trusts and Estates, the number can vary from a minimum twenty eight days to over a hundred a year. Since the Finance Act 1998, the scheme has become stricter and the criteria for objects more stringent. Aside from the annual report that the location must submit to HMRC, there are checks to make sure that access is being given to the public (HMRC Trusts and Estates Interview, Private Members Club 1). Though larger locations are often commercial and open to the public, smaller places might be private residences which do not wish to advertise their art. HMRC Trusts and Estates explained that these places can choose to have, “view by appointment” arrangements.

Effectiveness of the Conditional Exemption Tax Incentive

In line with granting public access, places benefiting from the tax exemption must list details on the HMRC website (HMRC 2011c). Art Detective 2 argues that this can compromise security because criminals can do research to find out in which properties art is held, and the type of art. However, HMRC Trusts and Estates, as well as the AELU Manager, believe that some of the potential security issues on the question of having addresses and names on the internet are negated by the fact that, as
long as access is still granted, HMRC permits agents to be used and their details listed instead of those of the location. The effectiveness of the Incentive is not necessarily linked to the security because the focus of the rules (Johnston and Shearing 2003), and the overall aim, is to allow public access to art of national interest. The responsibility of HMRC Trusts and Estates is to the taxpayer and making sure that the art owner is displaying the art. They do check this, sometimes using ‘mystery shopper’ style checks according to HMRC Trusts and Estates. The curator at Private Members Club 1 revealed that the club had an unannounced covert inspection (ACE fieldwork 03/09/2010).

HMRC Trusts and Estates explained that they also offer guidance about how to display the art. However, the people who choose to use the incentive are the ones responsible for the art’s security. This assessing of the risk by owners is a good example of security choices in art security, and the opportunities and dangers within them. On the one hand, they can keep a valuable work of art and save a lot of money by avoiding large amounts of tax; but on the other, they are opening their location up to extra potential security risks by allowing the public access to the art. Calculating in finance, security, and emotional attachment, their decision must be made in light of the other choices which include: selling the work to a private buyer or the public sector, loaning it to the public sector, paying the tax and keeping the art ‘private’.

HMRC Trusts and Estates works with advisory bodies such as English Heritage, Natural England and Arts Council England. For instance, Arts Council England advises over what items should qualify. This is a clear example of one public sector node using the capacities of another, or others, for the benefit of the security terrain, as well as helping art of national interest.
**Government nodes as nodal governance facilitators**

The most crucial public sector facilitator within the nodal governance framework is the National Security Adviser. Another key node is the Acquisitions, Exports and Loans Unit (AELU) due to its involvement in the flows of art into and out of the UK. They are both now considered.

**National Security Adviser**

As well as his work with the securitization and policing nodes which enable him to play this leading role in the co-production, the National Security Adviser spoke of how he relies on the locations in which security is situated. Those who work for them play key roles; from the initial stages such as architects and security technicians, to the people who provide security for the art on a daily basis. He must also deal with a wide range of issues affecting some of these people; from the low pay of the public sector guarding personnel and the move to using more private sector staff, to the problems encountered by directors of the locations.

With his role (see page 65) being crucial in the safety and security of art displayed in this country as well as UK owned art that goes abroad, potentially this could be an example of Ewald’s (2002) argument that the logic of government could be moving more to precaution from insurance. However, in line with other governmental nodes and the insurance companies, the National Security Adviser also uses the logic of both. They are intertwined. Losses must be avoided, but forms of indemnity or insurance must be available or the public sector institutions that display art, and the art world in general, would not exist in the present vibrant form.

Similar to the commercial insurance industry’s risk surveyors and loss adjusters, he sets the conditions that enable the government to allow locations to embrace risk. Based on a risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), he is the person in the public sector who links the nodes,
and forms and maintains flows of information from bubbles of knowledge. For example, in regards the public police, he speaks regularly with the Unit, has specific contact with them for high risk temporary exhibitions, invites ‘Designing out Crime’ officers to meetings with architects, and presents details about the GIS to public police staff. Within the wider security terrain, he is a key facilitator and driver for the interconnectedness and cross nodal activities which are so important to the co-production of art security; such as the public sector art collections, MLA (Arts Council England), UK Border Agency, HMRC, the public police, the public guarding sector, private policing nodes, technology companies, independent security consultants, and architects.

Comparable to loss adjusters, his role does not have a fixed position looking outwards horizontally or vertically at other fixed nodes. Rather, in line with nodal governance, it is fluid and adaptable. Importantly, it needs to be for the role to function strategically. Although he did not use the term nodal governance, the conditions and framework he spoke about are best conceptualised by it rather than other more rigid policing theories. Whether you describe it as responsibility or power, his job comes with obvious authority throughout the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). For some art, he has an important role in governing through indemnity. More generally, for public sector owned art his part is very significant as it enables the governing through an insurance model.

**Acquisitions, Exports and Loans Unit (AELU)**

Due to its hugely important work, it is crucial that the AELU is effective. According to its Manager, operating well in 2011, the AELU carried out a huge amount of work despite the difficulties imposed on it, such as the move to Birmingham, the MLA’s closure and being transferred to Arts Council England. In the year 2010-2011, it issued 11,966 export licences with an overall value of £9,799m. In 99.7% of cases, licences were issued within five working days (MLA 2011h).
In regards cultural export, the use of high level, independent assessors in the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art and Objects of Cultural Interest (MLA Annual report 08-09) shows both the importance placed on checking the flows of art out of the UK, and the benefits of using expert knowledge from within the art community in facilitating the flows of knowledge.

The AELU, itself, combines expertise and knowledge in its active role, as the Manager explained, “....we have this hub so all museums know that they can call us up, they can alert us to look out for something, we have a most wanted list up on our wall.” According to the Manager, as well as locations that display art, the AELU also work well with other nodes such as the UK Border Agency, with whom they have frequent meetings, and also across Europe (EU 2011).

The art market supports what the AELU Manager says. It recognises the AELU’s highly important role and believes that it does a good job. The Chairman of the British Art Market Federation argued in 2009 that, “the AELU has a good record in answering the needs of the art market” (The Art Newspaper 12/08/2009). Its expertise benefits the UK art world, both public and private; as the Manager described, “We are supposed to provide a hub of expertise on tax on art and give disinterested advice to everybody, both private and public”. She highlighted the pressure on the experts in the public sector as they need to stay ahead of what is happening. They must manage to do this despite the handicaps placed on them by the node that ultimately employs them, the government. A fear is that by, first, transferring the AELU’s operations to Birmingham, and then, second, from the MLA to Arts Council England, crucial expertise is lost and the process will become simply an administrative process, which goes against the Goodison Review (2004). This could harm the art market, result in art of national interest leaving the country, and weaken art security in the UK.
GOVERNMENTAL NODES UNDOING NODAL GOVERNANCE

Closure of the MLA

Printed in July 2011, the MLA’s Annual Review was produced while the closing down and transfer of some of its functions to Arts Council England was happening. In the introduction, Paul Lander, the Accounting Officer and Acting Chief Executive, and Andrew Motion, the Chair of the Board of Trustees, wrote that:

“we were heartened when the Secretary of State wrote to us explaining that whilst it hard been a hard decision to make, it was an important part of the government’s drive to cut costs and increase transparency, accountability and efficiency and that it was ‘………no reflection on the professionalism and ability of your staff and management who have been outstanding’ ” (MLA 2011h).

This may have been of little comfort to two thirds of the MLA’s employees who were made redundant and not transferred to Arts Council England; however, it does reinforce that the MLA was successful and it was abolished primarily for cost saving reasons. Though this happened during a recession and a time of drastic government cuts across almost all public sector functions, this has similarities with the other public sector producers of art security, such as the public police with their history of being vulnerable to cost saving (Art Detective 2), and the response to other proposals such as the CoPAT’s national database for stolen art. The Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) model proposed by CoPAT, as well as an idea to extend the Metropolitan Police’s art database, were rejected by Estelle Morris, then Minister of State for Culture, Media and Sport, and Caroline Flint, at the time Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, on the grounds that a database, “would not be good value for money” (Home Office Letter 13/09/2004).

While continuing to decently fund many of the locations, such as the nationals, this handicapping of the security network by abolishing and downsizing effective nodes, and abolishing potentially very
useful measures or schemes, characterises much of the senior level government approach to art security. This contrasts unfavourably with the insurance companies who understand that in art security, specific skills and experience are required throughout the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). It is frustrating for many in both the public and private sectors of the security arena because the public sector contains extremely capable people who provide a very good service which could be even better with more backing. However, according to them, they and their agencies are constrained by decisions made higher up in government that impede their work and make producing art security more difficult. For example, while key people in the MLA had a good understanding of many of the dimensions of governance in the cultural sector, from the making and the nature of rules to the mentalities and processes of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), key politicians in the cultural sector did not. The shame is that the money saved is negligible when compared with other areas of government, but the damage of the cuts to the securitization and policing of art in the UK could be significant. In short, some of those with a key understanding of the cultural sector will no longer be shaping or implementing the government’s approach to culture and, more specifically, art. This tension between the public sector nodes within art security appears set to grow.

Whether this reflects a deeper, more negative attitude in the UK towards art and its security is debateable because the substantial cuts are affecting whole swathes of the public sector. However, while recent governments have often enjoyed the reflected glow of a thriving cultural sector, the 2010 Coalition government appear to see the cultural sector as an easy area where cuts can be made without too many consequences. If it were a loss making sector, then this attitude could be perhaps slightly more understandable, but it is a sector that is profitable. The UK, the AELU Manager argued, “is not embracing the cultural sector even though it is profitable” whereas “In France they use art as the answer to the economic problems.” The artist Anish Kapoor is much more forthright in expressing his
view about the Coalition government’s cuts to the culture sector, accusing the Conservatives of having a "castration complex" (Guardian 03/03/2011).

The abolishing of the MLA could also have an impact on museums in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland because while it was UK wide in its operations, Arts Council England, as its name implies, only covers one country in the Union. This issue was raised by the Museums Association to a Commons Select Committee in September 2010 (House of Commons 2010).

Another example of the public sector nodes’ work being made harder was the decision taken in 2008 to transfer much of the MLA’s personnel to Birmingham. This was particularly the case for the AELU.

**The move to Birmingham**

Considering the MLA and its UK operations, the fact that these covered the whole of the UK gave some credence to the move to Birmingham. However, concerning the art functions of the MLA, it makes less sense as the majority of the art expertise is in London, and, although there are very significant locations that contain important and valuable art throughout the UK, the capital is a global art market and unquestionably the hub of art on display nationally. The move resulted in those responsible for making the rules and implementing governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) being moved away from where they needed to be.

A prime example was the work of the AELU being made much more difficult by the move. Considering the £9,799 million worth of export licences issued last year (MLA 2011h), and with London being overwhelmingly the location for the flows into and out of the UK, moving a crucial node over 100 miles away from this hub is clearly counterproductive to its work. Added to this, there is the problem that the people with the expertise do not want to relocate to Birmingham and so their
knowledge of how to check licences and the relevant information can be lost. The transference to Arts Council England might have similar consequences. It could be argued that this is a case of Wood and Shearing’s (2007:149) nodes shaping, “matters in ways that promote their objectives and concerns”, with the government’s financial policy winning over the objectives and concerns of the MLA and the AELU. This is an example of Wood and Shearing’s (2007:149) nodes resisting one another. The aspect that must be underlined is the fact that this was again a clash among public sector nodes.

With about 40% of the global trade of imports-exports of arts and antiques, part of the UK’s success is the fast processing of the 11,966 licences. “I am told that licences are routinely produced within two or three days…It is inconceivable that this level of services can be maintained if the AELU is located over 100 miles away from the centre of the art market” (Chairman of the British Art Market Federation in The Art Newspaper 12/08/2009). The Manager of the AELU said that even though the AELU was still effective, it would be even more so if it were based in London with the model that it used. The fact that after the move to the Midlands much personnel time was still spent in the MLA’s London office shows the importance of the location. While money is saved administratively through the short term cost savings, handicapping its operations could damage the UK art market. The future success of the AELU impacts on the UK art market and also art security because of their work with the public police, in particular the Unit, with those within the art community, and with other agencies such as UK Border Agency whose drastic cuts could also adversely affect their operations. In contrast, it is hard to imagine the private sector, particularly the insurance industry, handicapping their operations in a similar way.

**OVERCOMING TENSIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC SECTOR NODES**

The tensions that exist between nodes within the public sector, with primarily politicians and senior police officers on one side and the rest of the nodes on the other, do not need to exist. My research
shows that many public sector nodes are already working well and using each other’s capacities for the benefit of the security terrain. Despite the recent obstacles, the AELU is an example.

Regarding cultural heritage crime, the Heritage Crime Initiative led by the Alliance to Reduce Crime against Heritage (ARCH) is more explicit about public sector nodal networking. English Heritage, ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) signed a Heritage Crime Memorandum of Understanding at their first conference on 11 February 2011. They also brought in local authorities to be closely involved (Public Police Officer 2, English Heritage 2011a). The Heritage Crime Initiative is new, and Public Police Officer 2, its policing adviser, was clear in 2011 that its approach was already proving successful. While it was to be expected that he would promote the Initiative as it was in its infancy and he was driving it, a key aspect he spoke about was the importance of ACPO’s involvement. The Heritage Crime Initiative already has an ACPO portfolio and this was driven by Lincolnshire Chief Constable Richard Crompton and now by Hertfordshire Chief Constable Andrew Bliss, both of whom are keen archaeologists.

Although the theft of art from London’s locations often has different aspects from many heritage crimes, and also taking into account the Policing Adviser’s subjectivity, the Heritage Crime Initiative does appear to be a good example for nodes, especially from the public sector, and points to how the co-production of art security, from the public sector’s side, could be even better coordinated to be more effective. Examples in other sectors include the Serious Fraud Office (Serious Fraud Office 2011).

Other public sector nodes that could be more involved are the CPS and the Judiciary of England and Wales. This is due to their position in the criminal justice system, especially in regards sentencing and deciding whether a case is in the public interest. In light of low sentences for art theft potentially making the crime more attractive to criminals than other activities (Conklin 1994, McShane 2006), the
CPS’ role within the Heritage Crime Initiative is an example of how it can be more involved in cultural property crimes (Public Police Officer 2).

However, while more coordination and the involvement of other public sector nodes could be beneficial, my research highlights that for many of those in the public sector nodes of art security the current challenge is more about keeping the present arrangements between public sector nodes functioning in light of each node’s financial cutbacks. An example, according to the AELU Manager, is trying to maintain the AELU and UK Border Agency’s successful relationship.

**PUBLIC SECTOR ENGAGING MORE WITH THE PRIVATE IN THE NODAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK**

With the present Coalition government’s budget cuts having a large effect on its own nodes, public sector relationships with the private are even more important. Currently, nodal partnerships between public and private nodes are often characterised by micro hybrid relationships, many of which are successful. However, these could also be at the macro level. Nodal governance provides the framework that enables this to happen without the crucial fluidity of the security network being lost. An example is the fact that the insurance companies are keen to work closer with the public police (Insurers 3, 4).

Shared mentalities of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), with their pre-crime focus and importance of preventative measures in the security of art, is a reason for the private and public working together. This is underlined by the reliance on private sector technology in the public sector. The huge amount of public sector owned art is another reason. The public sector has many knowledgeable people with expertise, and, as described, they are not only willing to share this know-how across the security terrain, but actively try to do so. While the public locations use the private sector, similarly, the other public sector nodes also use experts from the private sector. Art security in
London benefits from this sharing of mentalities and technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). So, despite the friction between public sector nodes, there is not the type of tension between the public sector and private interests that can exist in other policing arenas. For instance, the AELU works with both public and private with its expert advisors and reviewing committee on the Export of Works of Art (MLA Annual report 08-09). Another example is the appointment of one of the art detectives I interviewed as Expert Advisor to the Government on International Loans to Museums in England and Wales in 2008.

According to many in the security terrain, the way that the public sector uses the private and vice versa could be more coordinated to make the most of the capacities and capabilities of the nodes in the security network (Art Detective 1, 2, 4, Insurer 3, Loss Adjuster 1, 2). An example of this, and a future improvement that could improve the co-production of art security, is a national database. Examined in more detail in the next chapter, the rejection by the government of CoPAT’s proposed national public/private national database in 2004 (Home Office Letter 13/09/2004) does not need to be the end of the proposal.

**CONCLUSION**

In line with Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997:119) belief that governance in the risk society is pluralised and spread by an array of “public and private institutions and spaces”, this is the case with the securitization and policing of art theft in London. However, in contrast to many security areas in which the public sector has some control and important questions over whether it is ‘pimping’ out security are raised (Zedner 2006:279), these do not arise in the same way with art in London due to the dichotomous manner of art ownership in the capital. The public sector has a considerable role through the huge amount of its own art and that it indemnifies, but it is not involved in the security of large amounts of non-public sector owned art. In the first area, it maintains almost full control through
its own agencies and is involved in all eight dimensions of the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003); from choosing the mentalities of governance, to making the rules and implementing much of the governance. In the second, it has neither the influence nor control to act as a ‘pimp’. Ericson’s (2007:174) argument that security has become a “private commodity more than a public good” is highly relevant for privately owned art, but security and policing of public sector owned art and art loaned in the public interest remains very much “a public good”.

Also, there is not the same sense of public versus private that can exist in other security and policing arenas. In art security, the areas where private stakeholders are involved in producing security are not especially contentious: insurance matters, risk assessments, preventative advice and measures (including technology), recoveries, design, and transportation. There is potentially a challenge in the guarding sector but it is one of the few areas where there is ‘competition’. Usually, where they have entered areas previously the domain of the public sector, private providers have done so to fill gaps and not as a direct challenge. Even in activities where public and private might be involved, such as recoveries, the insurance companies, loss adjusters and leading private art detectives are keen to see the public sector agencies more involved, not less (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjusters 1, 2).

This chapter has examined the public sector’s role in the co-production of art security and its wide ranging involvement in the securitization and policing of its own art, and art of public and national interest. Key factors that have led to the public sector’s important position in the security configuration of art in London include: its need to protect and self-police its own huge amounts of art; its inability to purchase commercial security; its inability to spread the costs of potential risk; and the indemnifying of non-public sector art. Its place in the London art world has further increased through its encouragement of cultural spaces and the flows of art it helps to create. So, while in one area - the
public police - the public sector has arguably taken a smaller role, it still retains a large amount of influence and has key nodes in the security matrix due to risk beyond insurance.

My research shows that governmental nodes currently appear to provide effective security for public sector owned art and art it indemnifies. This even includes the created flows of art. For example, the GIS scheme is so ‘stringent’ that it greatly reduces the chance of thefts occurring, and it could be argued that, in effect, it reduces the need for the public police with public sector owned art (Insurer 1). Maintaining the already successful governmental nodes, and potentially making them even more effective, depends on not handicapping them through drastic budget cuts, loss of expertise and measures that adversely affect their operational capabilities (as well as the security network’s). A current fear within the security arena is that the present reduction in resources and expertise will hamper the public sector’s nodes’ capacities for securitizing and policing public sector owned and GIS indemnified art, which has such a beneficial effect on the art world in London. Art security needs specialist knowledge and expertise, and the most successful public sector functions with art are based on these, as demonstrated by the former MLA, the work of the AELU, the National Security Adviser and other governmental nodes that help secure and encourage the art and its flows around and into and out of the capital. The people responsible are currently providing a high level service under difficult circumstances. Nodes such as the AELU and the National Security Adviser are already working in a nodal governance framework, albeit a loose one, and so is the MPS Unit, even if, in general, the public police are often not.

However, despite the current challenges, although the government agencies are still currently self-policing the public sector’s art and art deemed to be in the public interest effectively, are they also providing sufficiently for the majority of art owners, and helping to deliver a more effective security matrix for all art in London? Empirical evidence shows that government nodes are working with
private sector nodes and at times this is effective, for example, with private security technology. They also offer wide ranging, decent advice for all locations with art. However, the danger is that while public sector nodes make use of the private sector to enable the security of public sector owned art and art loaned in the public interest to be very good, and insurance companies do the same for some private owners, it brings us back to the fact that the general policing arena is hindered by the lack of another public sector node’s involvement, the public police.

The chances of thefts happening are very real and the public expect an adequate response. The governmental nodes’ present successful securitizing of public sector owned art, their role in the flows of art, and their useful preventative advice, should not lead to less public police involvement with art even if insurance companies through loss adjusters are doing much of the investigating.

It is difficult to know how the recent government budget cuts and the resulting changes will affect the public sector’s role in the securitization and policing of its own art, and art of national interest, and also the co-production of art security as a whole. Within the governmental nodes, a common belief is that the public sector must be careful not to undo the success that it presently has in producing art security through the GIS, the AELU, the many other operations of the MLA (some of which have been transferred to the Arts Council England), and the locations such as the nationals which are producing high level security in a very professional manner. Weaker security could result in not only the loss of unique, culturally important art, but the repercussions from a theft happening at a leading gallery would have severe effects on London as a cultural hub because once a reputation is tarnished, art loans into and out of these flows become more difficult (Head of Security 2).

It would be wrong to view the co-production of security for non-public sector owned art as the public sector losing its position to insurance and private security providers. The role of private stakeholders
in art security is far from new and it will increase with the on-going development of technology and the challenges of modern policing. While the public sector is securitizing its own art decently; to do this, governmental nodes are enabling security beyond insurance. Similar to the insurance companies, they are setting the conditions that enable risk to be embraced. The issue is how the public sector maintains this security of its own art, and that which it indemnifies, whilst also, when appropriate, making use of its capacities to enable the co-production of art security across the whole of the public and private London art world to be as effective as possible, and, also maintaining the flows of art that help make London a global capital of art and from which the public sector benefits greatly.
CHAPTER 8 THE CO-PRODUCTION OF LONDON ART SECURITY USING NODAL GOVERNANCE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempted to answer the question: Who performs, manages, governs and controls the securitization and policing of art theft in London? It found that a co-production of art security exists in the capital, and that this co-production is an example of a nodal governance framework in an actual setting. Reiner (2010) highlights that the idea of the public police being one node among many is far from new; indeed, it has existed since the 1820s. The importance is not about arguing whether it is a whole new type of policing or not, it is about how to make the most suitable conditions in which it can function as effectively as possible to maximise the advantages of this type of networked governance.

My research shows that in this security arena with no locus of power, the security terrain is more effective when and where co-production exists, whether among a number of nodes or within a larger network. However, there are gaps and limitations, with examples in the security terrain of nodes not working together effectively or not coordinating themselves well, and problems with flows of knowledge between many nodes.

In line with Wood’s (2006) methodology, this chapter summarises the co-production. First, it considers how it exists; second, operational gaps and limitations; and third, innovations for future development. It does so using the eight general dimensions of governance to inform its analysis (Johnston and Shearing 2003).
THE EXISTING CO-PRODUCTION

The concept of a co-production of security shares similarities with other areas such as health and social care. However, compared to healthcare where co-production has referred, “to the contribution of service users to the provision of services” (Realpe and Wallace 2010:8), in this thesis, co-production refers to the wider interconnection of networks, collaboration and cooperation of the many nodes involved throughout the eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) in art security in London.

The theoretical framework provided by nodal governance helps to demonstrate that this security terrain is not actually best described by partnerships and team work, but, rather, it is a more complicated, adaptable matrix. In line with Burris’s (2004: 341) argument that nodal governance brings more clarity “to the internal characteristics of nodes”, though appearing to make our understanding of the co-production of security more complicated, nodal governance actually makes it clearer.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 analysed the public police and security; private security, investigation and loss adjustment; insurance as enabling risk and security; and governmental nodes enabling security beyond insurance. All the nodes involved have a part in the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). However, the ways they do this differ according to their roles in art security. For example, an engineer working for an alarm company is tasked with one aspect of implementing governance; in contrast, the insurance industry has an enormous wide ranging part to play in the co-production. One way is through forcing the art world, at least those who purchase insurance, to securitize and police themselves effectively. This must also be done while embracing the risk (Baker and Simon 2002) that helps to create the hugely successful art world. The insurance industry enables this to occur and greatly influences the mentalities of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) in art security. Their
risk management mentality shapes the rules, the focus, the modes, the processes and the technologies of governance, as well as by whom it is implemented. However, the industry, itself, relies on many nodes to not only execute and implement governance but also to help shape the other dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), such as the focus and nature of the rules.

Nodes’ understanding the value and use of the co-production is further highlighted by certain governmental nodes, such as the MLA (Arts Council England) and the National Security Adviser. Through their work, the public sector is involved in all eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) for the art for which it has responsibility. However, this is not through approaches such as ‘rowing’ or ‘steering’ governance (Crawford 2006) or anchored pluralism (Loader and Walker 2006). Johnston and Shearing’s (2003:33) argument that, “the exact demarcation between the respective responsibilities of partners may be difficult, or even impossible, to establish” is true for many of the relationships within the security arena. However, an exception, arguably, are the public police because of their role in post-crime areas such as authorising rewards and their investigative powers. Johnston and Shearing (2003:33) contend that, “Indeed, the key issue for the future will not be demarcation of functions, but effective co-ordination of networks”. This is crucial to the co-production working effectively. For example, the adaptability of a nodal governance framework allows the public police to remain an important part of the policing matrix when it is suited to being so, which it is in some areas, but also allows them to withdraw or play a lesser role in other areas. In effect, the framework allows the public police to use other nodes to do much of the policing for them, but, crucially, still be involved when it is appropriate even if other public or private nodes are producing, directing or executing certain aspects of the securitization and policing. A key aspect is to make them understand that this opportunity exists, and, also, how to actually make the most of it. The Unit already appears to understand, as do other public sector nodes such as the National Security Adviser.
To an extent, the public police acknowledge this in other areas of policing. For example, the National Intelligence Model\(^{14}\) recognises this opportunity and, in the words of Superintendent Martin Very of the Kent Police, “removes police dominance in partnerships- learning between partners” (Securing the Landscape Conference 20/07/2011). Nodal governance also enables the use of networks rather than partnerships. The problems occur when nodes with specific powers, such as public police forces, use the co-production as an excuse to leave the terrain rather than an opportunity for their role within it.

**Relationship between nodes**

A key aspect of nodal governance is the relationship between the different nodes. Johnson and Shearing (2003:148) define governance as, “the property of networks rather than as the product of any single centre of action”. They highlight the fact that the nodes making the rules are “typically” not those with the responsibility for implementing them (Johnson and Shearing 2003:25). The co-production of art security highlights how this leads to networks rather than binary partnerships. These form from the node making the rules (whether it is the insurance company, the owner of the art or the National Security Adviser), through to the location in which security is situated.

Considering pre-crime measures for situating security in the private and public sector, the use by loss adjusters, surveyors and the National Security Adviser of a range of nodes for their risk management, especially in respect of the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and the specialists who can provide the tools for the managing of risk, creates links among these nodes which can be long or short term.

In post-crime situations, short-term networks are formed when the recovery of a stolen art object is being undertaken. Depending on the owner of art and whether or not they are insured, this co-

\(^{14}\) The Code of Practice for the National Intelligence Model (http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/National_Intelligence_Model_C_of_P.pdf)
production can happen through the governmental nodes or insurance companies, and might involve many nodes. For instance, if the art is insured, a loss adjuster will lead the recovery process on behalf of the insurance company, and will try and use the capabilities of certain nodes such as art detectives, the public police, foreign police forces, the Art Loss Register, as well as the owner of the art and other members of the art world (licit and illicit). Within these nodes, prior relationships might have already been formed; for example, between a loss adjuster and the public police.

The work of the AELU, the National Security Adviser, loss adjusters, art detectives and insurance companies are examples of nodes using other nodes with specific capabilities. It is important for their own interests that they do so and it also helps the security terrain. Although this approach might seem an obvious one to take, it contrasts with areas of policing, such as some parts of the public police, which can be inward looking and create “missing links” (Burris 2004 in Wood 2006:235). Highlighting the potential benefits, a prime example is loss adjusters operating with a wide range of nodes in their preventative measures and checks, as well as when trying to recover a stolen piece. Their use of a node is based on the expertise and capacity of that person, agency or location. It is this awareness, and linking of nodes and flows of knowledge that can make the terrain so much more effective. The National Security Adviser’s role is similar. His sharing of advice with private locations and the MLA’s guidelines help the wider community. For instance, he has on-going contact with the Head of Security at the National Trust. When the Johnson family were involved in crimes involving art, he was conscious of loans to National Trust properties and this dialogue was important. While not usual, insurance companies also held a similar meeting about this threat (Insurer 4).

In line with Crawford’s (2006:458) description of nodal governance that, “any understanding of the role of the state and its relationship or otherwise to other nodes should be an empirical question”, the changing relationships between the nodes mean that experientially in the securitization and policing of
art theft in London, the public sector, through its nodes, has a floating role which, depending on space and time, shifts from being highly influential to inconsequential. Identifying five policing models, Crawford (2006:466) describes the “networked or nodal model whereby plural policing providers link together in horizontal partnerships” with a presupposed “element of co-ordination”. However, Wood and Shearing’s (2007:149) ideas concerning the mobilisation and resistance of and among nodes, Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) proposal that there is no locus of power, Wood and Shearing’s (2007:149), “multiple ‘tops’” and many “downs” which “overlap”, and Brodeur’s views (in Wood and Dupont 2006) on the release from notions on power, provide better descriptions in the context of art security in London as they are all evident within the nodal governance framework. The collaborations that occur are changeable within the security matrix. They are not ‘horizontal partnerships’, nor are they fixed.

Although this changeability and fluidity characterises the security terrain, there are elements of structure within the co-production. For example, loss adjusters tend to use the same art detectives. There are also a number of cases where the co-production has become more structured, as shown by the following four cases.

**Examples of co-production**

There are four good examples of how the co-production has worked or is already working. The first is the London Museum and Archive Security Group (now the National Museum Security Group) whose meetings and sharing of information, explained in more detail in chapter 4, greatly help art locations in London (and now nationally), especially those with fewer resources (Head of the Unit, Head of Security 3).
The second is Cultural Property Advice, an online advice service developed by the MLA with DCMS funding, which offers advice for trade, private and public collections. Its creation involved many in the art world and art security terrain: MLA, DCMS, ALR, HMRC, Museums Association, MPS, Swift Find (Dick Ellis), the Portable Antiquities Scheme (Roger Bland), the National Museums Directors' Conference, the Spoliation Working Group, The Association of Art & Antiques Dealers (LAPADA), The British Antique Dealers' Association (BADA), Society of London Art Dealers (SLAD), and Charles Ede Ltd (MLA 2011d).

The third is Object-ID. Based with CoPAT from 1999-2004, initiated by the Getty Information Institute in 1993 and introduced in 1997, its aim was to create a standard for describing art works and cultural objects, and to promote the use of this standard to help with the security and policing of these objects. Its development involved an array of nodes: museums, UNESCO, cultural heritage organisations, policing agencies and organisations (such as MPS, FBI and Interpol), customs agencies, the art trade, the insurance industry, and art appraisal organisations (AXA Art Object-Id Booklet, Loss Adjuster 2). Once developed, nodes have continued to promote it, and it remains not only an example of the type of collaboration that can exist but also shows the positive effect the involvement of those within the ‘community’ can have if they work together and take an active part in the policing and securitization of art. The fact that the Object-Id standard has been translated into a large number and wide range of languages (House of Commons 2000) illustrates the worldwide influence this collaboration has had and can continue to have.

The fourth, and the one that was previously an example of a co-production working, is the Council for the Prevention of Art Theft (CoPAT). Set up in 1992 as a non-profit organisation to prevent art crime, it is an excellent illustration of how co-production can work. The Council worked through five committees whose members included the public police, lawyers, insurance, heritage organisations,
museums, and historic house owners. As well as its involvement with Object-Id and its publishing of the Crime and Intelligence Digest (CCID) which disseminated information about thefts (House of Commons 2000), CoPAT’s significant successes in pushing for and achieving the end of Market Overt (see footnote 8 p141) and establishing a Code of Due Diligence for the UK art and antiques trade (see footnote 9 p141) illustrated what could be achieved through bringing together a large number of differing types of nodes with a range of capacities.

**OPERATIONAL GAPS AND LIMITATIONS**

How each node is involved in art security defines how they view the network or networks in which they operate. For example, a private art owner might not see the public sector as part of their security network, although this might change if a theft occurred. In contrast, a national’s network will consist of a range of public sector nodes as well as the private sector. The fluidity of the art world means that if the private owner were to lend to a public location then they, or at least their art, would also enter this network for a temporary period. With overlapping governance and no locus of power within art security, this form of “liquid security” (Zedner 2006:269) is pragmatic. Perhaps, because art security, at least for privately owned art, has not undergone the “quiet revolution” or “hiccup” (Shearing et al 1980:1, Wood and Shearing 2007:7) in policing, it has not had to adjust to the same extent of changes that have arguably occurred in other security arenas. This means that many of those involved have experience of what works and, of equal importance, what does not.

Within these networks, and overall in the co-production, there are gaps, limitations and ethical problems. Unfortunately, CoPAT is a prime example of how networked collaboration within the co-production can fail and leave gaps. While the insurance industry tried to drive CoPAT, according to Loss adjuster 2 the lack of interest from senior police and politicians adversely affected its capability
and potential. A frustrating aspect is that CoPAT had previously received Home Office and ACPO support in 1999 with its Code of Due Diligence. Although not referred to as nodal governance, CoPAT was in effect using a nodal governance framework to improve the securitization and policing of art.

This shows how the motivations of nodes, or lack of motivation, can limit the co-production. Financial concerns can also cause ethical issues which limit networks’ capabilities. For instance, as well as the example of the Art Loss Register not being able to share information with some publicly funded databases abroad, such as the French TREIMA (Art Detective 2), concerns over how profits are generated from information arise elsewhere. For example, Head of Security 2 is keen to share information with non-profit organisations, nationally and internationally, but not with private security consultants who use the information for profit.

Similarly, nodes involved in situating security must be wary of not being used or taken advantage of by art owners. This applies to commercial galleries and art owners trying to use the Government Indemnity Scheme to increase values of their art (AELU Manager), and private lenders using loans and curators to get their art insured for higher values. There is the potential for locations, themselves, to be complicit in this and accept a higher insurance valuation to get the loan in.

Recoveries of stolen art also raise ethical issues within the co-production. With as much as 50% of stolen art leaving the country from where it was stolen (Radcliffe 2006 in Houpt 2006), competition arises among those trying to recover stolen art objects which can have very large rewards. The use of informants is a potentially contentious issue and there are some instances, such as the Buccleuch Da Vinci case, which illustrate that this part of the co-production can sometimes inhabit a very grey area between the licit and illicit. However, as Art Detective 2 explained, the private sector’s use of informants in the UK can also be viewed as filling gaps created by the RIPA Act 2000 which
prevented this practice by the public police. He argues that the fact that detectives such as him hand information to the public police is helping the co-production.

Although, overall, the main drivers of security share the same risk management mentality of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), tension and differences can exist within the aims for security and among those who implement and execute the governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). This, though, does not have to equate to gaps or limitations within the security arena because of nodal governance’s allowance for the conflicting interests of the nodes to exist and for the most effective nodes to act when they are best suited, and to take a lesser role when not. However, while in other settings explained by the theory, the ‘community’ might be best placed to make decisions about its own securitization and policing, the unregulated London art world is characterised by differing local concerns. The fact that some within the ‘community’ are slow to situate their security adequately or engage with security nodes can create gaps in the effectiveness of the co-production. This highlights how this security tension is actually greater within the art world than among the security providers.

Many aspects of art security require expertise or, at least, the ability to recognise a knowledge gap and understand how to act to address it by turning to another node with the specialist capacity. This is a central tenet to the co-production working. While the private sector can continue to fill these gaps, especially in implementing and executing governance and the tools within the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003), potentially this will become more difficult for the public sector due to budget cuts which will result in fewer people with the expertise, or at least the knowledge of where to turn, within the security terrain.
Although gaps, limitations and ethical issues will always exist in the co-production of art security in London, there is a drive among many nodes for the art security terrain to be improved. The next section proposes innovations for how the security arena could develop the present co-production.

PROPOSALS: INNOVATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

1. The nodal governance theoretical framework could be more recognised and made more explicit.

Nodes could be made explicitly aware of the theory of nodal governance and how it represents the most effective framework to consider art security in London. It needs not be viewed as an ‘ought’, but rather as an adaptable framework that presents an opportunity (or, more specifically, differing opportunities depending on the nodes) for analysing, understanding and improving the co-production of art security.

2. The co-production would benefit from CoPAT having a significant role once again.

In line with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003:33) argument about the crucial importance of the “effective co-ordination of networks”, CoPAT has the potential to make the co-ordination of the existing networks within the co-production more effective. The fact that it was previously successful (see pages 141, 245) indicates that if it received backing and support from other nodes, especially ACPO and senior government, it could once again have a significant impact on art security in London and the UK.
3. The public police could play a more intelligent role in the co-production.

A. The Unit must remain and its work highlighted so that there is a greater awareness in the public police service of the Unit and knowledge to use it.

This recommendation emerged because failure in communication between public police forces is too common (Loss Adjuster 1, Art Detective 1). Also, at present, the fact that many officers are unaware of the Unit and its work makes its strategic role more difficult and handicaps the co-production of art security. This needs to be addressed. Officers in specialist units, borough police and national police forces must know to use the Unit (even if its jurisdiction is limited to London) because it represents an opportunity for the MPS and other forces to make use of certain officers’ specific expertise and knowledge. Some forces are already alert to this; for example, the City of London police (City of London Police email 26/10/2010).

A well-resourced, highly skilled public policing approach working within the co-production would benefit the securitization and policing of art in the capital and in the UK. However, even if there were ACPO support, due to budget constraints it is highly unlikely that either a well-staffed Unit made up of officers or one that could include civilians working directly for the public police (and not paid for by private employers) are realistic proposals. Although not an ideal solution according to some in the security terrain (Art Detectives 2, 4), at present, if used properly, special constables can and do benefit the public police with art theft (Head of the Unit, Head of Security 2).

The MPS Unit’s existence is always vulnerable to budgetary constraints. The Unit must remain in the public police sphere due to the expertise it brings to the co-production (alongside the formal policing powers) and the ability to take a wider approach in regards the cross over with other crimes compared to the narrower art and antiques specific approach of private art policing agencies in their pre-crime and post-crime policing.
A critical question is: if other areas of policing in London are receiving a lot of funding from the private sector or other public sector sources, why not art security? The fact that the Art Beat special constables are paid by non-MPS sources shows that, in effect, the Unit is already being partly funded by other public and private sector nodes. It could receive more direct funding from the private sector. This would be far from unique, as there are already other examples of this in practice in London. For instance, as well as its own private security, Westfield Shopping Centre in Shepherd’s Bush, London, pays £250,000 annually to have an onsite public police presence that patrols in its privately owned space (Retail Security Oct 2011:6).

The challenge is that the Unit must remain operational and that its “focus team desk” function (Head of the Unit), with its ability to bring in other officers for certain operations, continues to exist. It does not need to ‘steer’ (Crawford 2006) the security terrain or act as an ‘anchor’ (Loader and Walker 2006); however, nor can its role become residual, because if this were to occur, then its usefulness would lessen significantly for the public police and the co-production in general. To be operational, it cannot only rely solely on the private sector. It already works well with public sector nodes such as many of the locations that display art, the National Security Adviser and the AELU; however, its work also relies on borough police within London and other police forces nationally.

B. Police officers should record stolen art and antiques separately as a matter of course.

The lack of knowledge about reported art thefts highlights the need for more art theft statistics. Currently, it is a struggle for those involved in art security - from the security nodes to academics - to get a realistic picture of known thefts and attempted thefts. To enable this, thefts of art and antiques should be recorded separately from other property crimes by the public police (Art Detectives 1, 2). Added to this, in line with Inspector O’Connor’s (2005) recommendation that qualitative issues as well
as quantitative could be built into a performance framework, collecting qualitative data would also be very useful. However, Levi (1993:71) highlights how the art theft dockets that the public police provided twenty years ago were four pages in length and were rarely filled out by officers. Therefore, for practical reasons, a simpler method could be introduced, even if it were only a single box to tick to show that art and antiques had been stolen.

C. There need to be changes in the public police’s approach to art theft.

Level 2 policing challenges such as art theft must not be forgotten in light of the present coalition government’s, “vision for policing and how it will cut crime and protect the public, be more directly accountable to the public, offer value for money” (Home Office 2012). First, the fact that investigation of art thefts might involve more complicated, expensive investigations, which take more time than lower value property crimes, should not be an excuse for not dealing with them adequately (Art Detectives 1, 2, 4). Second, the public must feel that they will receive a decent service. If they do not believe they will, and if art owners are uninsured, the danger is that they will not go to the public police, but, instead, try and recover the art themselves which would result in them illegally purchasing stolen goods. This could have the effect of encouraging criminals to engage in more art theft.

In relation to Brodeur and Shearing’s (2005:395) argument that the public police have more constraints placed on them and Castells’ (1996:62) that the public sector structure within which public policing operates can conflict with the flexibility of networks, paradoxically, with art security, the co-production actually offers a way to circumvent these. Senior police officers need to be made aware of this. Art security in London would benefit greatly from recognition by ACPO that art theft, and crimes involving art generally, are important in their own right, and, also, that their links with other crimes present investigation opportunities. The involvement with stolen art of two major UK criminal families, the Johnsons and Adams, could be used as examples, especially in light of the fact that
ACPO’s police reform steering group found that annually less than 6% of over 1500 active organised crime groups were being targeted by the public police (O’Connor 2005).

Although it is too early to judge, art security could benefit from the Waste and Metal Theft Taskforce set up at the end of 2011. The current problem of metal thefts could be a way to push for art theft to be taken more seriously by ACPO. In relation to this, the forming of The Alliance to Reduce Crime against Heritage (ARCH) and the Heritage Crime Initiative are very interesting developments. First, they demonstrate that if there is senior police motivation then ACPO will take a leading role and, also, highlights how the link with other crimes makes acting on heritage crime more attractive to the public police. The Policing Adviser to English Heritage was clear that you have to make senior people interested, and key people must drive this. For instance, he spoke about how heritage crime has benefited greatly from Chief Constable Crompton’s keen interest.

In light of budget constraints, a proposal is for officers who work with other policing areas to receive some art and cultural sector crime training. This recommendation emerged from Crime Prevention officers (see page 196) not having art specific knowledge and from interviewing the Policing Adviser to English Heritage who explained that, though the Heritage Crime Initiative was very new, he had already given heritage crime training to 42 Kent officers. He said that the key is less about officers having specific expertise in dealing with the crime, but rather the ability to recognise the crime and knowing which specialist officers they should contact. This appreciation of how a co-production works echoes with how loss adjusters make use of the capacities of a wide range of nodes throughout the security terrain.

In relation to Brodeur and Shearing’s (2005:395) argument that, “justice is mostly provided by the public sector and security is increasingly provided by private enterprise”, according to private art
detectives and loss adjusters, many of the public feel that with art theft they are receiving neither security nor justice from the public police (Art Detectives 1, 2, Loss Adjuster 1). This contrasts with the ‘help’ people might be receiving from governmental nodes through schemes such as GIS and the Conditional Tax Exemption if their art is of public or national interest. While these schemes do make a difference as far as art owners are concerned, they benefit the few not the many. Although the insurance companies and the range of private sector nodes involved in the technologies and the implementation and execution of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) do offer financial recompense and an array of security services for the public who purchase insurance, they cannot offer justice, nor is it their aim. The uniqueness of much art increases the loss, and while at present the governmental nodes, the insurance companies and many of the private sector nodes are providing decent levels of security for the art (either for which they are responsible or of which they are trying to maintain the security), for ‘justice’ to be provided the public police need to act when their unique powers are needed. As stated at the end of 3A, the co-production allows for this to happen without the public police having to take an ‘anchoring’ or ‘steering’ or fixed partnership role overall.

4. There needs to be a further reduction of avenues for sale of stolen art.

Opportunities for the sale of stolen art must continue to be targeted. Market Reduction Approach (Sutton 1998, Sutton et al 2001, Mackenzie 2005, 2007, 2011) has a key role to play in making the sale of stolen art more difficult and in removing some of the incentive for thefts. The most useful tool is databases.

5. An open database based in the public sector would benefit the co-production.

In line with Loss Adjuster 1’s claim that there were strong arguments for having a public sector funded database, a key conclusion of the 2001 Ministerial Advisory Panel on the Illicit Trade in Cultural Objects was, “that as instruments for the suppression of crime and the enforcement of public laws the
databases should, at least in the initial phases, be publicly funded” (DCMS 2001 p10). However, with the current budgetary restraints this is highly unlikely, especially as CoPAT’s proposal for a national database for stolen art never came to fruition because of financial reasons15 (Home Office Letter 13/09/2004). Therefore, alternatives must be considered.

The MPS Unit already has a database, but, while it can be argued that it is better for the public police to have the predominant one in the UK (Insurer 3), the fact that its extension was rejected in 2004 during a time of government spending makes its further development extremely unlikely in the present austerity era, unless the Unit were to receive funds from the private sector.

This is an area of the co-production in which prominent nodes could work together more effectively if the government, through the DCMS or Arts Council England, and the insurance industry collaborated with a database. Despite the Chairman of the Art Loss Register publicly arguing against an open, free database, a range of nodes in the security terrain would prefer it rather than the current monopoly being formed by the Art Loss Register (Insurer 3, 4, Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1). This is even more relevant since the Art Loss Register bought the Trace database. Insurer 4 said:

“I think it would be great if there was a public body or something who did the same kind of thing”......“ I think you could also have dealers check it. You could have auctioneers check it because this is another thing with the Art Loss Register…you’ve got to go to them and say can you check out this item for me? It would be far more user friendly because there have been quite a lot of other people who have tried to go into the market and do it. But, it’d be really good if you could perhaps pay a one off fee at the beginning or something and then you can just check...you know, your own items and then it’s up to you what you do with that

15 Another reason was that, while the MPS Art and Antiques Unit were keen, a lack of interest from other police forces, and the art trade lessened the usefulness of the proposed database (Home Office Letter 13/09/2004).
information. I think if there was an open searchable facility rather than having to go to another party to check it would be…and it's also limited by search criteria” (Insurer 4).

With the transnationality of art theft making it more necessary for databases to be able to connect or contact other databases nationally and internationally in one form or another (Art Detective 2, Loss Adjuster 1), a public sector based database could overcome the present situation of foreign databases being unwilling to share information due to their present clash with private profit interests.

At present, there is a lack of a truly international open database, or connection between databases. Interpol’s growing database has the potential but it will depend on the national public police services to make it a success. This is problematic, as shown by the 36 countries, including the UK, which reported to Interpol that for 2008 they had, “either no statistics or no cultural property thefts” (Interpol Co-ordinator).

If insurance companies contributed to the cost of an open database it could save them money as they would not be charged twice as they currently are by the Art Loss Register. It might also help address the current feeling that the victim is punished by being charged even if they recover their own property, and potential conflicts of interests due to the Art Loss Register’s many activities (Art Detectives 1, 2). Some of the running costs could come from recoveries and it could include insured and non-insured art. The potential is there for the public sector to use a model from the private sector to at least cover costs, instead of the current situation whereby they are using a semi-private model but not benefitting financially, or investigation wise, in the way they could. A key aspect is for the database to not be a commercial enterprise.
Also, it would be better if the database were to solely serve that function and not divert into other activities, such as conflict dispute or recoveries, because it then retains its impartiality. This was the case with Trace database and why, before being taken over by the Art Loss Register, it was seen as highly effective (Private Company 1) and, for Art Detective 1, as the ‘answer’.

6. People should be educated and encouraged to self-police more effectively.

Johnston and Shearing (2003), Wood and Shearing (2007) and Johnston (2006) are clear about the importance of local concerns within nodal governance. This thesis has highlighted that art security does, to an extent, test the idea that the ‘problem solvers’ in security are from the community and not from outside, as the challenge presented by the art world is that within it there are lots of concerns which can differ greatly and many have to be pushed to situate security and engage with certain security nodes appropriately.

The fact that the market has difficulty dealing with thieves inside it hinders attempts at self-regulation (Art Detectives 2, 4). In what is an extremely lax and unregulated world (Art Detective 2), how much do some in the ‘community’ want to self-police? The answer lies largely in potential profit. With art being seen as an attractive investment and values increasing, due diligence is improving. Government agencies and insurance companies are forcing this to occur, as are some art buyers. However, although improvements have been made, in line with Object-Id, many art owners could and should document their art better (Insurer 1). The art world and art market, specifically, should also focus more on the importance of provenances. Databases play a large role in this, and potential customers must conduct as sufficient checks as possible before purchasing. Although issues concerning provenances can be extremely complicated, customers must take more responsibility in this respect. A ‘buyer beware’ campaign highlighting the potential losses of buying stolen property could drive this awareness. This could be funded by the market itself or by insurance companies alongside their advertisements.
Chappell and Polk’s (2011) use of Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming within Market Reduction Approach in relation to the market in illicit antiquities could be useful with art theft, especially in relation to those who have purchased stolen art.

While insurance companies and governmental nodes are driving security, when art is stolen it is debatable, even if the owners do have insurance or indemnity, whether the replacement of the unique piece with its financial value is a form of justice or particularly satisfactory for many owners. This should drive their self-security. Moreover, whether they purchase insurance or not, as their own risk assessor (Rose 2000) they can also potentially minimize risk by loaning the art.

The gap in the network potentially remains with the uninsured, whose risk management is wholly their concern. Obviously, these people cannot be forced to improve their security. However, in line with Routine Activity Theory (Felson and Clarke 1998, Felson 2002), they can make their own security changes to help close off opportunities. My observation research highlighted many instances where simple measures and practices could help this be achieved. For example, a gallery that has been a victim of a theft, such as Commercial Gallery 1, could have a front door that only opens from the inside, similar to many jewellery shops in Hatton Garden, London.

The market could give all buyers specific information about different ways they might produce the security of their art object. The potentially reluctant market could be encouraged by, first, being persuaded that this is a show of good practice, and, second, through financial links with the security providers or the insurance companies. This could be done in a similar way to how computer shops offer a range of security products and insurance to their customers.
7. **More regulation is needed within the art world.**

Although the co-production itself does not need more regulation as this would run counter to the fluidity that aids its effectiveness, it could benefit from more regulation within the art world, especially the art market. Potentially driven by ACPO and the Home Office, this would not be top down controls of the actual co-production but, rather, it could be specific regulatory changes to make it harder for those involved in the crime. The drive in 2012 for an amendment to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, which would, first, add a new criminal offence to The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 1964 (SMDA 1964) in prohibiting cash payments for scrap, and, second, increase penalties for each existing offence in the Act (Home Office Impact Assessment 22/02/2012), show how, even if slowly, more regulation can be introduced. Owners of art objects made of metal may directly benefit from this new regulation. All art objects could benefit from similar measures such as increases in penalties. The CPS and Judiciary could be more involved, and their involvement in the Heritage Crime Initiative show it is possible.

8. **The work of governmental nodes should be funded appropriately.**

During my research, government agencies such as MLA, Arts Council England, HMRC, UK Border Agency, and AELU were undergoing major changes, including being operationally and financially handicapped or closed down. This could potentially have a devastating effect on the art world in London and the UK overall. Their art functions need to be funded sufficiently to operate effectively and for the co-production overall to work well.

9. **On-going development of technology must aid the co-production.**

The continuing impressive development of the tools in the technologies of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) offers opportunities for co-producing security. An example are recognition systems that can be linked to CCTV and the internet so that known or suspected art thieves can be recognised
as they arrive at an art location. In an example of global co-production, galleries around the world can view the image (BSIA 2009). As the risks within art security change, technology must continue to be reviewed and adapted. This relies on information about risks being shared through the art security networks nationally and internationally.

CONCLUSION

Nodal governance is the most appropriate policing thesis with which to analyse and understand the co-production of art security in London. This chapter has addressed gaps and limitations and made proposals for this specific area of security, which is, perhaps, an extreme example of public/private relationships in a security arena in the globalized risk society. For instance, the insurance industry and the public sector are heavily involved in some areas but, while their influence remains strong, their direct involvement disappears completely in others.

In analysing art security in London, it is necessary to avoid state fetishism (Shearing 2006), but it is also important to eschew private fetishism because of the huge amount of art in London for which the public sector takes responsibility for and the manner in which public and private nodes work together (even if only temporarily). There is no node whose ‘rule’ is ‘definitive’, not even the insurance companies despite their involvement in all eight dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Art security must be co-produced. ‘Local’ concerns shape this co-production, whether they are the public sector’s or private owners’ concerns for the art they own or for which they are taking responsibility. The fact that private art owners have the choice over whether to turn to insurance, in contrast to other areas such as motor insurance, gives them an element of ‘self-rule’. The mentality of risk predominates, and the roles of many of the nodes, public and private sector, within the co-production are linked to the managing of risk and also the embracing of risk. Although there are some exceptions, such as problems with the Art Loss Register (pages 146, 169, 170) and some private
detectives (pages 129, 161), overall the fact that this is driven by market forces does not mean that it is done to the detriment of local concerns. Indeed, many of the local concerns are themselves driven by market forces and, although they can lead to corners being cut in some examples, in many instances these forces can, and do, make the security nodes push the ‘community’ into more effective securitization and policing. Rather than being a divisive factor, market forces are often a unifying factor and can be viewed as positive rather than as a threat to local democracy or local concerns. However, although the involvement of private sector nodes is widely acknowledged to benefit art security, this current situation of market forces being unifying could change as nodes enter and exit the co-production; for example, while the exceptions mentioned above could potentially be resolved (e.g. see recommendation 5, page 254) to the benefit of the security terrain, in contrast there could also be more of these cases to the detriment of the co-production of security.

The most effective security terrain is one in which nodes co-produce security by using their own strengths and those of others when it is most appropriate, and conditions exist for them to do so. In practice, the way this functions with art security is not so clear cut because of different motivations and issues such as financial constraints. Clearly, improvements are needed in relation to the existing gaps and limitations. However, this should not cloud the fact that areas of the co-production are working very well. This is evidenced by the low incidence of known thefts from some types of locations, such as nationals. The advantages this co-production has is that, first, in contrast to many other areas of policing, its risk mentality is often based on opportunity rather than fear. Second, unlike other security arenas in which public/private co-productions are newer and can be characterised by tension over roles, nodes already have experience in co-producing art security and private involvement is not encroaching on public policing. The challenge is to make the co-production more effective whilst maintaining a vibrant cultural sector and being able to adapt to a fluid threat. Linked to policy
and practice, this chapter’s proposals for the future development of the co-production of security are directed towards this challenge.
CHAPTER 9 FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

Between 29 January and 14 March 2010 the artist Michael Landy created ‘a monument to creative failure’ at the South London Gallery in which he invited artists to climb up high steps and throw their works into an enormous Perspex skip measuring 600m³. The art was then sent to a landfill site. Among the many artists who discarded their works were Damien Hirst and Tracey Emin. When asked how he felt about the fact that the art being thrown away was protected more in this exhibition than most art is in galleries, Landy replied that, “two girls had said they would follow it to the landfill and try to nick some”. His art installation sums up the captivating and often contradictory London art world in which the notion of both cultural and financial value can be very arbitrary. Artists and art owners want their works to be seen and at the same time be secure, and contemporary art can be
derided but emerges stronger through a recession. London’s art world is a cultural hub that manages to be vibrant and inclusive in an age of fear and austerity. It embraces risk (Baker and Simon 2002) at a time when other spaces in the city are becoming more exclusive and risk-averse. Risk can be managed and not only can different worlds benefit in neo-liberal terms, but security is also often increased.

Aiming to avoid the accusation levelled at policing research by Ericson and Haggerty (1997:3 quoted on page 58), this thesis intended to be relevant through being useful for policy and professional practice, and also for wider academic research. Through its detailed research into the security terrain and by taking theory to an empirical problematic, it has focused on an area of securitization and policing that encapsulates many of the challenges faced by modern security governance in the globalized risk society. It is well established that securitization and policing in general are undertaken by an array of public and private agencies and locations (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, Loader and Walker 2007). What is less known, especially in the under researched field of art security, is how it actually works in practice. In particular, the research provides another addition to the increasing, but still insufficient, amount of empirical research that currently exists internationally on nodal governance. Advocates of the approach are calling out for more “mapping” of security fields to be undertaken (Wood 2006:221). In London, only the ‘night time economy’ (Hadfield 2008) has been researched using nodal governance in a ‘real’ setting.

Art security in London is characterised by its huge range of differing types of locations in which risk and security are situated and the varied types of public and private stakeholders involved. Chapter 8 highlighted how nodal governance best describes the present co-production of risk and security, and provides the most suitable theoretical framework. In line with the theory not providing normative “oughts” for modern security terrains (Johnston 2006:47), this thesis does not attempt to provide a model of ‘how to do’ securitization and policing. The proposals in the previous chapter are aimed only
at this specific security terrain at the present time. A ‘one size fits all’ model is not appropriate due to the uniqueness of each city space, nationally and internationally. This, however, does not mean that this thesis’ proposals cannot be of use for innovations in art security in other urban spaces, or for other non-art security arenas.

REFLECTION ON RESEARCH

My initial use of a grounded theory approach led to the research question emerging and both Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal governance theoretical perspective and Wood’s (2006:230) methodology being central to this thesis. If I were to do the research again, I would use both from the outset. I would also propose to another researcher to take a similar approach because the methodology lends itself to systematic and clear analysis. In this under researched area, it was not obvious at the start of my research that the conditions of the security arena corresponded more with nodal governance than other policing theses. Although it took some time for this to become apparent, and even though the process to viewing art security in this way was at times messy and lacked clarity, the essential reflexivity of the grounded theory approach did give my research more understanding of policing theses and the illicit and licit worlds involved with art and art security than would have, perhaps, a narrower, preordained approach.

Researchers in other cities and countries must be careful, though, about assuming that nodal governance is the most suitable policing thesis for their research field. For instance, in a country such as Italy, with the Carabinieri’s large Division for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, another theoretical perspective may be more appropriate.

Art theft and other art crimes need much more quantitative research, especially in areas such as sales catalogues. However, this thesis has unapologetically taken a qualitative approach. With the lack of
available statistics on art theft in London, including none from the public police, the dangers that Ferrell et al (2008) and Young (2011) warn about in conducting quantitative research were arguably even larger for me than for researchers in other areas. Even if more statistics did exist, with art theft, they have the potential to be misleading because of locations not wanting it known that they have been victims of a theft (Mackenzie 2005, Head of Security 2).

**RESEARCH AGENDA POST 2012**

Internationally, there is now more criminological research being undertaken on art theft and other art crimes. In the UK, as well as the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research’s current four year project on the global illicit trade in antiquities, Loughborough and Newcastle universities have recently been involved in research on crime and anti-social behaviour facing heritage assets (Bradley et al 2012). However, the need for more research on art theft and art security in London and the UK is overwhelming as many types of art objects continue to be stolen; from paintings, sculptures, to a wide range of objects (even a brick signed by the artist Gavin Turk). The apparent low number of known incidents from locations such as nationals can be linked to their awareness of threats and changing security challenges (Head of Security 2), and, crucially, having the resources to adapt to them (Insurer 1, Head of Security 3). Many other locations, although not all, do share the same mentality of governance and desire to implement and execute governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) adequately, but they find it harder to situate security and to adapt to changing threats and the shifting levels of vulnerability that result; for instance, the potential of increased violence in thefts (Loss Adjuster 1, Insurer 1, Art Detective 1) and the present problem of metal theft, in particular the thefts of sculptures from outside spaces in London. For example, the sculpture *Two Forms (Divided Circle)* by Barbara Hepworth had been in Dulwich Park for 40 years before being stolen in December 2011 (Guardian 20/12/2011). The recent thefts from the Kunsthal museum in Rotterdam (Guardian
16/10/2012) serve as a warning to all of London’s locations, even those with well-funded, excellent security.

Added to this, despite target hardening (Polk 1999:3) and the reintroduction of illicitly acquired art objects into legal arenas now being more difficult (Private Company 2, Loss Adjuster 1), there are still avenues which encourage the criminals. For example, potential rewards or ransoms are incentives for art to be stolen, as is the value of the object’s materials. These incentives are exemplified by spates of thefts by criminal gangs; for example, the thefts of jade objects in April 2012, apparently for the Chinese market (The Museums Association 2012). This highlights the licit and illicit opportunities arising from the rapidly expanding markets (such as the BRIC countries) with cravings for certain types of art.

Other large threats to the effective securitization and policing of art in London (and cities throughout the world), such as iconoclasm and fakes and forgeries, also require much more academic investigation. Research into fakes and forgeries is especially interesting because, in contrast to this thesis that has largely dealt with the illegal removal of art from locations, it deals with the illegal entrance of art into these locations. Art Detective 4 and Loss Adjuster 1 are particularly keen for research to be done in this area as it poses a huge present and future threat. Art Detective 4 predicts that, “Forgeries is where the money is going to be made”.

Leading people within the art security terrain, as well as in other similar arenas, are pushing for more academic research as they believe it can impact policy and practice (Art Detectives 2, 4, Public Police Officer 2, Loss Adjuster 1). It is very important because this is a critical time for art security in London, nationally and internationally. In the UK, public sector nodes are experiencing restructuring and huge budget constraints at a time when private and public sector nodes involved in the
securitization and policing are facing an ever more adaptive, fluid threat, characterised by opportunistic criminals.

More art security research needs to be undertaken in other urban spaces, especially cities with large cultural sectors. A comparison study in another major city would be very useful for our understanding of art theft, art crime more generally, environmental criminology, and the relation of policing theses to practice (in that city and more generally), and also for our understanding of the co-production of art security in London. It could benefit the securitization and policing of art in other cities as well; for example, in countries where there is more public police involvement than in the UK, such as Italy, and also for cities in countries where, conversely, there is less public sector involvement in the cultural sector.

Three future projects represent my research agenda for 2013 and beyond:


2. Research on the Heritage Crime Initiative’s attempts to stop thefts from heritage sites in the UK.

3. Research on the securitization and policing of art from locations in an urban space with differing security dynamics from London. Brazilian cities such as Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, both of which have problems with art crimes and divergent security topographies and characteristics from London, would be excellent case studies.
FINAL CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to shed light on the under researched configuration of the securitization and policing of art theft in London. Building on existing knowledge, my research found that the security terrain is made up of a co-production that works with, and is part of, a vibrant art world that embraces risk. This risk that fuels both the art market and art on display is enabled by the public sector and insurance companies. However, the security terrain is characterised by not having a locus of power. There is no “solid state technology” (Zedner 2006:269) nor has there been. “Liquid security” (Zedner 2006:269) is not new for art security as there was no revolution in its policing, whether quiet or otherwise. In contrast to many policing arenas, it is possible to argue that it was the public police’s, and not the private police’s, involvement in art policing that was the hiccup. However, this would view the art security terrain through too narrow a lens. My research shows that in one area, the public police, the public sector has more recently taken arguably a smaller role. The public police do need to be involved due to their formal policing powers and the fact that art theft cannot be seen as an island in a sea of crimes; however, focusing solely on this node would fail to understand the nature of the security terrain.

The co-production, conceptualised through the nodal governance framework, does make a significant difference. Both public and private sector nodes benefit, an example being the public sector which, due to its encouragement of cultural spaces and its own large amount of art and the flows of art it helps to create, still has a key position in part of the network and retains a large amount of influence due to risk beyond insurance. However, in other areas it has very little, if any, influence because private sector nodes, whether they are insurance companies, loss adjusters, private policing and security agencies, or technology companies, are the ones best suited to many of the dimensions of governance (Johnston and Shearing 2003) involved in the co-production of risk and the co-production of security. Although there is not a consensus within the security terrain over how secure art is in London
generally, in contrast to Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997:452) warning about the risks of connections through “the circuitry of risk communication”, it is clear from empirical research that rather than being a danger, in London this risk communication and the embracing of risk not only help art security, but, through a nodal governance framework, actually drive it, and are crucial to the current relatively low rate of known thefts from publicly and privately owned locations with art, especially the nationals.

Johnston and Shearing (2003) conclude Governing Security by writing:

“Our point is merely that with demonstrable evidence of nodal governance becoming more and more apparent, opportunities may arise to transform networked relations in ways that could, under the right conditions, advance just and democratic outcomes; and do so in a way that uses as little force as possible. Since that possibility becomes more thinkable under the nodal model than under alternative ones, we could argue that it merits both serious consideration and further development” (Johnston and Shearing 2003:160).

In art security in London, opportunities emerge within the nodal governance framework which can transform networked relations. However, while at times ‘just’ and ‘democratic’ outcomes are clear (such as helping many locations protect and recover art if stolen), they can become extremely clouded within the unregulated art world in London and its grey interface between the licit and illicit. This is partly due to market forces. Nevertheless, it is very important not to be myopic, but instead recognise that, in line with the globalized risk society, it is these market forces that allow risk to be embraced, fuel the vibrant art market, make London a city bursting with flows of significant art, and often encourage security rather than expose it.
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