Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study

Georganas, S. & Kagel, J. H. (2011). Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Theory, 146(1), pp. 359-371. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.001

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We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Economic Theory. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 146, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 359–371,
Uncontrolled Keywords: Auctions, Resale, Experiment
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: School of Social Sciences > Department of Economics

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