Introduction: The TV format industry as a transnational trading system

The first TV formats - programmes that are licensed for adaptation to local audiences - began to cross borders in the early 1950s. In the ensuing decades, the trade developed but at a slow pace. Most formats were US game shows such as *The Price is Right* and *The Wheel of Fortune*, which travelled across the developed world. No more than a handful of companies distributed these formats and the trade, confined as it was to a minor daytime genre, was largely unknown within the TV industry itself (Chalaby, 2012a; Moran, 1998).

It all changed in the late 1990s when the TV format trade suddenly exploded and became a multi-billion dollar industry. The number of formats in circulation grew exponentially, as did the number of countries they travelled to, and the number of companies distributing and producing them. This revolution had multiple determinants. In developed TV markets competition was becoming intense, with a rash of cable and satellite channels on pay-TV platforms. TV executives opened up to the idea of buying into a concept with a proven track record that allowed them to offer local and original programming while managing risk. In the emerging markets, fledgling broadcasters were seeking local content but lacked the expertise to produce it. Formats offered solutions with a tried and tested recipe to follow.

By the turn of the century, the vitality of the new market was confirmed and enhanced by four exceptional shows that finally convinced TV executives worldwide of the power of formats: *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?*, *Survivor*, *Big Brother* and *Idols*. These programmes were adapted in more territories and generated more revenue for broadcasters than any other TV format before. Their global success prompted more acquisitions and commissioning teams to look for
adaptable content, in turn encouraging producers to develop concepts capable of crossing borders. Within a few years, an old licensing right that had sat on the margins of the TV industry became a global commodity. From modest origins, the TV format trading system grew to an estimated €2.1 billion per year between 2002 and 2004, and €3.1 billion between 2006 and 2008. The 2004/06 study counted 259 formats leading to 1,310 adaptations and 31,397 hours of formatted programming, while in 2006/08 445 formats led to 1,262 adaptations and a total of 54,383 hours (Bisson et al., 2005: 11; Chalaby, 2011; Esser, 2013; FRAPA, 2009: 8-13; Moran, 2006).

Drawing from world-system theory and global commodity chain analysis, this article argues that the TV format business became a transnational trading system in the 2000s. A trading system can be defined as a singular transnational space that brings together interdependent economic agents, institutions, places, networks and commodities. At its core lies a commodity chain that determines economic agents’ positions and strategies, organizes networks of production and distribution and shapes trade flows within that space.

This article analyzes the TV format business as a transnational trading system organized around a global commodity chain. Focusing on the global TV format commodity chain, this paper first examines how economic agents strategize along the chain’s four distinct segments; it then scrutinizes the chain’s governance, studying the relationships between buyers (essentially broadcasters) and their suppliers. It also examines the chain’s geographical configuration, identifying three tiers of format exporters and specific trade routes along which most formats travel. Finally, considering the chain’s institutional framework, it shows that the transnational TV format trading system has begun to be protected by a fledgling
international regulatory regime and that it stands on firmer legal grounds than ever before. The viability of this trade rests almost entirely on the recognition of intellectual property (IP) rights, which are increasingly acknowledged by courts of law around the world.

**World-system theory and global commodity chain (GCC) analysis**

Approaching trade as a system was instigated by the scholars studying the multi-secular history of the Atlantic as a singular maritime space. The ‘Atlantic system’ designates the networks of trade and culture, the civilization and values, which have developed across the Atlantic throughout the centuries. Fashioned by a succession of seaborne empires, this system expanded through successive phases between the mid-13th and mid-19th century. In its last phase, it was marked by the ‘Atlantic triangle’, which saw manufactured goods leaving Europe for Africa to be exchanged for slaves, who in turn were shipped to work on plantations in the West Indies and the Americas, wherefrom plantation products were exported to Europe (Pietschmann, 2002).

This approach enabled historians to comprehend long-term changes in the structure and patterns of trade flows, identify sets of interdependent relationships and understand the intertwined roles of economic agents, institutions, governments and places within that system. It eventually helped them uncover a singular trans-empire maritime space whose visibility was partially obscured by national and imperial histories (Pietschmann, 2002: 23). It also allowed them to understand the place - and ultimately the modernizing influence - of the Atlantic system within the world economy (Emmer, 2002).
This approach developed organically but was influenced by Fernand Braudel who first conceived the Mediterranean as a singular space of commerce and civilization (Braudel, 1949). Immanuel Wallerstein, a Braudellian scholar, is also cited, as his world-system study is relevant both substantially and methodologically (Canny, 2002; Pietschmann, 2002: 11-18). It is within this perspective that the author of The Modern World-System introduced the concept of global commodity chain (GCC), defining it as a ‘network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986: 159). This led to the development of a body of literature, initially labelled GCC analysis, later evolving into global value chain (GVC) theory (Bair, 2009; Gereffi, 1994).

This article examines each dimension of Gereffi’s commodity chain: its input-output structure (the shape of its connecting production and distribution processes), territoriality (spatial dispersion), governance structure (issues of control and power relations among economic agents that determine chain co-ordination), and institutional framework, which refers to the impact that policy institutions and regulatory systems have on commodity chains (Bair, 2009: 9; Gereffi, 1994: 96-7; Gereffi, 1995: 113; Sturgeon, 2009: 130-1).

GCC/GVC analysis brings many benefits, not least the ability to comprehend how the transnational TV format trading system is organized and determines economic agents’ roles and behaviour, and how it evolves as it is continuously reshaped by the interplay and corporate strategies of these same agents. It enables us to assess the role of places and institutions, and identify production patterns and trade routes. It gives us a better understanding of the power distribution within the chain, and of the impact of regulation, national or otherwise, on the TV format trade.
The global TV format commodity chain

The *input-output structure* of the global TV format commodity chain is composed of four distinct segments (or boxes): a format is, in turn, created, distributed, produced and finally acquired (Fig. 1). This sequence can be played out in many different combinations, depending on economic agents’ strategies and resources (Table 1).

Fig. 1 The TV Format Commodity Chain: input-output structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINATION</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTION</th>
<th>PRODUCTION</th>
<th>ACQUISITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV PRODUCTION</td>
<td>BROADCASTING</td>
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</table>

Table 1: most common combinations within TV format chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originator</th>
<th>Distributor</th>
<th>Producer</th>
<th>Buyer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until recently the most common business model was licensing, i.e. format owners selling the international rights of their formats to a distribution company. In turn,
the distributor sells a licence to either a local production company or directly to a broadcaster that decides to produce the format in-house. The process involves four economic agents in the first case (A/B/C/D), and three in the second (A/B/C/C).

This combination remains common as most formats are still produced under licence. However, leading format owners increasingly favour a new model: international production. Whenever feasible, they opt to produce their shows in order to prolong their stay in the commodity chain. This strategy has led to the international expansion of TV production companies, and today about 14 super-groups have production capabilities in up to 30 territories (Chalaby, 2012b). Once a concept shows potential, these groups keep the format rights and produce it in territories where they have facilities (A/A/A/B). They also have international distribution divisions which acquire third party content, creating an A/B/B/C route through the chain.

For reasons that will be specified below, several broadcasters and media conglomerates have decided to invest in the global TV format commodity chain. BBC Worldwide, RTL (FremantleMedia), ITV (ITV Studios), ProSiebenSat.1 (Red Arrow Entertainment), Modern Times Group (Nice Entertainment Group), Sony Pictures Television and Warner Bros. Television Group are among those that have developed their international TV production capabilities over recent years (Chalaby, 2012b). These groups have three options: they can sell the licence locally (A/A/B/B or A/A/B/C), they can (preferably) produce the format for (or co-produce with) a local broadcaster (A/A/A/B), or in the few countries where they own a TV channel that matches the format’s requirements, they can air their own show and achieve full vertical integration in the TV format commodity chain (A/A/A/A).
Governance structure

Governance structure highlights power and co-ordination within chains; it is where the distinction between a buyer- and producer-driven commodity chain is made. The latter type includes those chains in which large manufacturers remain in control of production and distribution networks and processes, which is ‘characteristic of capital- and technology-intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, computers’ (Gereffi, 1999: 41). By way of contrast, buyer-driven commodity chains prevail in industries that are labour-intensive and in such cases ‘large retailers, branded marketers, and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries’; the classic example being the fashion industry, which is controlled by a few global marketers in command of large networks of subcontractors across the developing world (ibid.: 41-2).

The issue of power has attracted considerable attention in the GCC literature and attempts have been made to both expand and soften the terms of the dichotomy. For instance, Philip Raikes and colleagues suggest the existence of ‘multi-polar driving’ chains with a possible ‘diffusion of power between producers and buyers’ (Raikes et al., 2000: 397). The more recent GVC framework has highlighted other forms of chain coordination and integration (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 2008; Sturgeon, 2009). This article analyzes the relationship between broadcasters and suppliers within the GCC approach, while integrating a few elements from GVC analysis.

The distribution of power in the global TV format commodity chain hinges on the answer to these two questions: who is most in control and who benefits most from the chain? It is undeniable that the independent TV production sector has
profited from the rise of TV formats. Although this sector is not universally
established, in recent years it has witnessed a sharp growth in countries such as
Britain and the USA, not least thanks to booming TV format sales. In the UK, the
150 leading TV production companies have reached a total turnover of £2.1 billion
in 2013 (Broadcast Indie Survey, 21 March 2014: 5). Arguably, TV formats only
represent a portion of their revenue as the international trade in audiovisual
products remains dominated by finished programming. Nonetheless, TV formats
have acquired a strategic importance for TV production houses who constantly
strive to develop new ones. A recognised entertainment format will raise a
company’s profile and, as it develops international scale, will boost the company’s
profit margins. Many global TV formats have played a key role in the growth of TV
production groups, such as Endemol’s Big Brother, RDF’s Wife Swap, Shed’s
Supernanny, FremantleMedia’s and Syco TV’s Got Talent and Idols, and Shine’s
MasterChef.

While TV formats have played a key role in the development of the
independent TV production sector, on balance, the global TV format commodity
chain is buyer-driven. Control, and the lion’s share of profit, rest in the hands of
broadcasters, the chain’s large ‘retailers’. The range of benefits TV formats bring
them is so vast that they accept - sometimes only after harsh negotiations - licence
fees between 7 and 8 per cent of production costs. In an age of intense competition,
formats enable them to offer local programming and improve ratings while
lowering risks to the schedule, safe in the knowledge that the same concept has a
proven track record in other markets. Any new TV format is expected to
outperform the show that it is replacing, to be scalable (adaptable to various
budgets) and versatile (being able to fit in different slots or stretched to various
lengths). Formats also enable broadcasters to drive down costs by taking out the
development expenses normally associated with a new show. All TV formats
involve a transfer of expertise and are accompanied by production bibles and
consultant producers; by the time a format has reached a broadcaster, the
production model has been fully refined: all possible short-cuts have been identified
and previous mistakes ironed out from the production process.

Above all, broadcasters derive substantial income from TV formats. Well-
known franchises never fail to generate a considerable amount of advertising
revenue because, notwithstanding their ratings, they are easier to sell to advertisers
than generic shows. On many occasions broadcasters get to share extra revenues
from voting and licensed products. In recent history formatted shows such as Who
Wants to Be a Millionaire?, Survivor, Big Brother, Idols and Dancing With the
Stars have made a key contribution to the balance sheets of TV networks around
the world (Bazalgette, 2005). In 2012, the top 100 formats generated US$2.7 billion
for 84 channels across 16 European territories, with Money Drop alone generating
US$213 million (Clarke, 2013). In addition, such shows not only become returning
brands for channels, but become part of their identity and help them to build their
profile.

Examining the issue of power, the relationship between broadcasters and their
suppliers is determined by three factors: quality of the IP, which is broadly set by a
format’s ratings record, its originality and complexity; broadcasters’ purchasing
power, and the supplier-broadcaster ratio.

The importance of IP in contemporary broadcasting means that the suppliers
who pass the quality threshold do hold a certain amount of leverage over their
clients. Broadcasters are desperate to acquire distinctive shows that help them stand
out from the competition and compete for the best formats. Those production companies that control valuable IP, such as a well-known global TV franchise, are arguably in a good negotiating position. It is the uniqueness and originality of a concept that makes a TV format difficult to replace and gives bargaining power to its rights holders. Furthermore, the complexity of certain formats, in terms of multi-media integration for instance, gives a certain amount of ‘competence power’ to TV producers (Sturgeon, 2009: 129). Access to good IP being vital, broadcasters are increasingly mindful of their reputation in the TV production community and try to maintain a good relationship with their suppliers.

Even though supplier power cannot be entirely discounted - especially for those few TV producers fortunate enough to hold desirable IP - ultimately the balance of power is firmly in favour of broadcasters. Their significant purchasing power gives them natural leverage over suppliers, a position that is reinforced by the particularly high supplier-broadcaster ratio (there are many more companies selling IP than acquiring it). As such, the position of broadcasters is not dissimilar to that of supermarkets whose size alone gives them control over large transnational food chains and thousands of small farmers.

The British market, home to some of the world’s most popular TV formats and production companies, provides a case in point. Although the number of broadcasters with a commissioning budget has recently expanded to cable and satellite operators such as Sky, Discovery and MTV, most of the commissioning purse remains in the hands of four terrestrial broadcasters: BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5. Hundreds of independent TV production companies vie for the attention of these four volume buyers, which all acquire shows for multiple channels. In turn, each of these broadcasters deals with a large number of
producers: in 2013, the BBC worked with 296 independent suppliers (up from 290 in 2012), ITV worked with 89 (up from 81), Channel 5 with 59 (up from 57), and Channel 4 with more than 300 (2012 figure) (Broadcast Indie Survey, 22 March 2013: 18-23; Broadcast Indie Survey, 21 March 2014: 23-7). These broadcasters also dwarf the suppliers they are dealing with. ITV’s revenues touched £2.7 billion in 2013 and those of the BBC (2012/13) reached £5.1 billion (BBC, 2013: 106; ITV, 2014: 4). By way of contrast, the average revenue of the UK’s leading 153 independent production companies stood at £13.1 million in 2013 (Broadcast Indie Survey, 21 March 2014: 7-14).

Until the early 2000s, broadcasters’ position in the chain was so dominant that PACT, Britain’s independent producers’ and distributors’ trade body, convinced the British Government to introduce legislation in order to safeguard producers. The Communications Act 2003 duly introduced a code of practice that was inspired by similar regulation preventing supermarket groups’ exploitation of their dominant position in the agriculture chain. The Act regulates the terms of trade between broadcasters and producers preventing the former from getting hold of all the IP rights when acquiring a programme or format (Doyle and Paterson, 2008).

The Act has undoubtedly put a brake on the abusive practices broadcasters used to indulge in, including price fixing, strong-arming and blackmailing (McVay, interview 2009). By creating a market for IP rights, it has also transformed IP catalogues into bankable assets, vastly improving the financial prospects of the independent production sector in Britain (Chalaby, 2010).

Nonetheless, broadcasters’ purchasing power combined with the high supplier-broadcaster ratio means that regulation alone cannot fully redress the balance of power. Indeed, industry surveys regularly paint a picture of a fractious and difficult
relationship between suppliers and broadcasters, who seem to be in command of this commodity chain. A recent survey among PACT’s 500 members highlighted once again the difficulties producers face when dealing with their clients. It brought to light a wide range of issues, including broadcasters’ non-respect of the terms of trade (regarding rights particularly), late payments, lack of concern about producers’ cashflow issues, and pressure on financial margins (Khalsa, 2013). Other oft-voiced complaints include unwillingness to pay production costs up front, slow decision process, contradictory feedback, complex commissioning structure, etc. (Broadcast Indie Survey, 21 March 2014: 23-9). All these complaints are voiced anonymously because the stakes are significant for producers who are willing to jump through hoops to gain a network commission.

A clear picture emerges: the importance of quality IP and the complexity of production processes in contemporary broadcasting create a certain degree of interdependence among economic agents and there is evidence of supplier power in the global TV format commodity chain. However, not only is this power unequally shared among suppliers, but ultimate control resides with a small number of volume buyers who more often than not are in the position to dictate their conditions and who always benefit most from their transaction with producers.

Both broadcasters and producers have developed strategies in order to upgrade their position along the TV format chain. As seen above, several production companies have expanded internationally in order to exploit their IP across markets. Broadcasters, and even Hollywood studios, have become aware of the benefits of extending their involvement in the commodity chain and have moved upstream by taking control of TV production companies. This strategy began more than a decade ago (Chalaby, 2012b: 28) but the rhythm has accelerated recently: since
2012, Warner Bros. acquired Eyeworks (an Amsterdam-based company with facilities in 17 countries), Discovery and Liberty Global took over All3Media (UK’s largest independent production group with a large international footprint), and ITV has made nine acquisitions (Kanter, 2014a, 2014b).

There are several advantages of pursuing a strategy of vertical integration. Being involved in TV production enables broadcasters to develop their own IP pipeline, sell TV formats and finished programmes to third parties, and diversify their revenues away from advertising. It is a strategy that offers them the best of both worlds: broadcasters can still access producers’ IP, and can either use or sell elsewhere the shows they develop. These acquisitions may confirm the strategic importance of IP ownership, but they also confirm the ascendancy of broadcasters over the suppliers they purchase.

The global TV format commodity chain is a key engine of change that is contributing to the globalization of the world TV industry. Not only do the dynamics within this chain stimulate media firms to expand internationally, they also increase their transnational – albeit asymmetrical - interdependence. This industry is increasingly organized on the basis of transnational networks of companies whose strategic decisions are informed by an international trading system, which they also contribute to re-shape and transform.

Geographical scope: Trade flows and patterns

The GCC perspective enables us to offer a better account of trade flows in the transnational TV format trading system than existing theoretical frameworks. The volume of cross-border media flows has increased sharply since the late 1990s. These flows consist of finished programmes, TV formats, transnational TV
channels and all manner of distribution platforms from pay-TV operators to Subscription Video on Demand (SVoD) providers such as Netflix, Amazon’s Lovefilm and Microsoft’s Xbox. This has led international communication scholars to lay emphasis on the cosmopolitan nature of the new media order.

Sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Arjun Appadurai became influential and contributed to our understanding of contemporary media systems. According to Beck, only a ‘boundary-transcending and boundary-effacing’ cosmopolitan outlook can investigate a social reality whose inner quality is being transformed by intense cross-border flows and ever-increasing interdependence among states (Beck, 2006: 82). Such theoretical narratives have helped place the stress on the cosmopolitan nature of contemporary media systems prompting academics to investigate, for instance, the articulation of the local and the global in the media that straddle borders (e.g. Chalaby, 2005; McCabe, 2013). Concepts such as hybridization, syncretism and métissage came to the fore as they grappled with the consequences of interpenetrating cultures (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004: 53).

The cosmopolitan outlook is full of insights but tends to ignore the influence of capitalist power structures on the world TV industry and in particular its embeddedness in international trade. It is a view according to which weightless media float above capitalistic logic and media products flow seamlessly in all directions. However, from spices to silk and from coffee to IP products, commodities have always travelled along specific routes (Bernstein, 2008). Under the capitalist world-economy some routes have disappeared, some have flourished and many new ones have emerged, but on the whole capitalism has intensified trade by encouraging a world-scale division of labour (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986; Feenstra, 1998). The GCC approach, which takes the magic out of media studies
and replaces it with history, enables us to bring to light the structure and patterns of trade flows in the world TV format trading system.

An examination of the geographical scope of the global TV format commodity chain reveals tightly structured trade flows. On the basis of data collected in the late 2000s, three tiers of TV format exporters can be distinguished. Britain and the USA precede a group of seven mid-sized exporters (Australia, Argentina, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden), themselves followed by a third tier of smaller exporters (Denmark, Canada, Italy, Norway and Spain) (Table 2). Between 2006 and 2008, Britain and the USA exported more formats (431) than all the other exporters put together (386). Their formats generated almost as much revenue (in terms of production costs) than the rest of the exporters (€3.0 billion versus €3.1 billion). Table 2 also shows a clear trade leader as the UK beats its nearest rival by a margin of 2:1 both in terms of number of exported formats and revenue generated from local production costs. Chart 1 reveals a division between countries that are primarily IP generators versus those that are IP consumers, as four territories only (Argentina, Britain, Japan and the USA) have a positive balance in the TV format trade.
Table 2: Format exports, in terms of number formats, number of hours, number of episodes and revenue, 2006 to 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nb. of exported formats</th>
<th>Nb. of exported hours</th>
<th>Nb. of exported episodes</th>
<th>Production costs of format adaptations</th>
<th>Country ranking by number of formats/revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7,203</td>
<td>6,877</td>
<td>€482 million</td>
<td>4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>3,472</td>
<td>€491 million</td>
<td>8/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>€40 million</td>
<td>13/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>€42 million</td>
<td>11/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,252</td>
<td>4,966</td>
<td>€245 million</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,242</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>€136 million</td>
<td>6/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>€48 million</td>
<td>12/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>€147 million</td>
<td>10/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9,677</td>
<td>9,364</td>
<td>€1.1 billion</td>
<td>3/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>€13 million</td>
<td>14/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>€78 million</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>€233 million</td>
<td>5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>13,781</td>
<td>15,981</td>
<td>€2.0 billion</td>
<td>1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>10,783</td>
<td>13,485</td>
<td>€980 million</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from FRAPA, 2009: 11, 13-15.

Chart 1: exported versus imported formats, by country

Source: FRAPA, 2009: 11.
The key to these figures is history: the trade remains dominated by the two nations that initiated it in the 1950s, and several countries of the second ring, most notably Australia and the Netherlands, were industry pioneers in the 1990s. The TV format business rapidly internationalized in the 2000s when the number of formats in circulation grew exponentially, as did the number of companies that produced them and the number of countries they travelled to (see Introduction).

New territories are constantly opening up to the format trade. In recent years the Middle East, Asia and Latin America have all become fast-growing markets. In Latin America, Brazilian broadcasters have become avid format consumers, and those in smaller markets such as Chile, Panama or Peru have also begun to adapt international franchises in high numbers (Waller, 2013). Asian markets used to be blighted by a ‘blatant disrespect for intellectual property’ with local broadcasters simply cloning Western shows (Keane, 2004: 9-10). Chinese firms were particularly adept at borrowing ideas, from Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? to Super Girl (a clone of American Idol). All this changed with China’s Got Talent, the show that finally convinced Chinese broadcasters to pay for a licence fee and help this market move away from rampant copycatting. They witnessed how the transfer of expertise that comes with a legal format contract enabled Shanghai Dragon TV, the broadcaster of China’s Got Talent, to completely overhaul its production processes and air China’s most successful show ever (Yin, email correspondence 2013; see also Fry, 2013).

Once acquainted with formats, many territories begin to look at their position in the global TV format commodity chain, seeking to move from stage one - (re)produce foreign IP, to stage two - create local IP for local consumption, to stage three - export local IP. Gereffi defines industrial upgrading as a ‘process of
improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable and/technologically sophisticated capital- and skill-intensive economic niches’ (1999: 51-2). Several governments and industry leaders have initiated this process and have identified TV formats as a way of exporting more TV entertainment-related IP. Belgium, Colombia, Israel, South Korea and Turkey are among those countries that have recently emerged as format exporters.

The question is: which attributes does a country need to possess in order to be successful in the global TV format trade? Further research is necessary but, at first sight, several features stand out in the four territories that perform particularly well: Britain, the USA, Holland and Israel. The first attribute is a broadcasting ecology that cultivates both competition and diversity. In the USA, the cut-throat environment is double-edged as tough competition makes IP investment a necessity but can make broadcasters risk-averse. The British eco-system is sufficiently competitive to force innovation but that also includes public service broadcasters - predominantly Channel 4 – which can afford to take risks in trying new formats. Both the Dutch and Israeli broadcasting systems present similar conditions.

All have strong cultural links with the USA and are (or were) heavy importers of American television fare. The UK was the world’s main importer of US game shows in the 1970s and 1980s, Holland also imported its fair share, as did Israel. All of them import(ed) US series in great numbers. Even Japan (one of four countries with a positive trade balance in the format business, see above) owes its prowess in the game show genre to a strong US cultural influence in the aftermath of the Second World War (Ishita, 2000: 29-30). Proximity and familiarity with the birthplace of commercial TV creates producers, commissioners and audiences who understand the grammar and semiotics of television.
Finally, an export-oriented media policy is a necessity. The American government has helped Hollywood studios sell their films since the 1920s (Miller et al., 2005; Trumbbour, 2002), and Britain’s broadcasting policy has begun to support UK exports since the turn of the century. Its Communications Act 2003 enables producers to keep all the TV rights that are not specifically purchased by broadcasters, among those are format rights which TV production companies are free to exploit on the international market. It is in their interests to exploit their IP as much as possible and unsurprisingly UK format exports have soared ever since (Chalaby, 2010).

The geographical configuration of the global TV format commodity chain helps us understand why the format trade works as a system: the trade is dominated by a few IP-exporting countries, formats follow routes and trade routes follow patterns. An industry motto claims that a good idea can come from anywhere, and while it is true that formats are exchanged among a growing number of countries, not all countries are equal in the transnational TV format trading system.

The systemic aspect of the trade is further underlined by new organizations that oil the ‘global wheels’ of the industry. These include a trade association (see below), a trade press (e.g. C21Media, World Screen) and trade fairs. Since 2009, a two-day event, MIPFormats, precedes MIPTV in Cannes; the 2013 edition attracted 570 participants from 55 countries.¹

**Institutional framework**

The fourth dimension of commodity chains ‘identifies how local, national, and international conditions and policies shape the globalization process at each stage in the chain’ (Gereffi, 2005: 113). This section argues that the TV format trading
system has begun to be protected by an emerging international regulatory regime and that it stands on firmer legal grounds than ever before. The viability of this trade rests almost entirely on the recognition of IP rights and these are increasingly acknowledged, in the context of TV formats, by courts of law around the world.

From a legal perspective, a TV format is a right to remake a programme for a given territory. This right exists alongside other rights (such as ancillary rights, television rights, video rights, etc.) that are attached to a piece of IP. For a format to exist, a broadcaster must accept to pay for a show’s intangible elements, such as its concept and package (as opposed to something concrete such as a script), and for format rights to be traded, buyers must recognise them as IP rights. This has been a long battle and it has taken more than a half-century for this right to gain international recognition.

A few industry pioneers, being aware that the entire business rests on the premise of IP protection, founded FRAPA in April 2000. FRAPA’s foremost objective is to act as an industry pressure group to campaign for the legal recognition of TV formats and protection of the IP they contain. It also aims to combat plagiarism within the TV industry by means of education and the creation of guidelines for fair competition (Lyle, interview 2009; Rodrigue, interview 2012).

Almost by nature, TV formats are difficult to protect, and the history of the trade is littered with lawsuits between parties fighting over IP. Some periods have been more acrimonious than others, and the first half of the 2000s was particularly so. The height of reality TV brought a flurry of lawsuits involving many of the world’s best-known formats. However, despite persistent obstacles, the recognition of TV format rights has progressed by leaps and bounds since the turn of the century. The importance of respecting IP rights has slowly spread around the globe.
and is now an increasingly accepted industry norm in regions such as Latin America and Asia. In addition, evidence shows that rights owners are gradually more successful in protecting their formats. Courts are not only more favourable to format owners than in the past, they have a wider choice of options open to them.

Five legal routes presently exist (FRAPA, 2011: 6):

- Copyright law can protect against copycat formats.
- Laws of unfair competition (or passing off in certain jurisdictions) can provide help against formats that confuse the public.
- Laws of unfair competition can also guard against unfair business practices that are deemed ‘parasitic’.
- The law of confidential information can help safeguard the expertise behind a format.
- The law of registered trademarks can help protect format titles and logos.

**TV formats and the law**

The industry’s favourite line of defence has traditionally been copyright laws but many difficulties reside in their application and the outcome of such cases has been uncertain at best. First, for a TV format to be a ‘work’ susceptible of copyright protection, it ‘requires that the format (1) has found expression in a certain perceptible form and (2) that originality is expressed’ (European Broadcasting Union, 2005: 69). Thus a court must ascertain a format’s degree of originality, knowing that ‘inspiration is allowed’ and weighing ‘the competing benefits of protecting IP rights against the right of free access to information’ (ibid: 70).

Second, a TV show is made of several *copyright works* (literary, artistic, musical, etc.), and when ‘these elements or other features are combined’ they form a
‘dramatic work’ (FRAPA, 2011: 10-11). It follows that not all formats are equal before the law: scripted formats that come with characters and storylines are easier to protect than quiz shows, themselves easier to protect than variety and reality programmes (ibid.). To compound the difficulties, concepts, legal practices and interpretations vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The international copyright regime that is underpinned by various treaties such as the Bern Convention and the Budapest Treaty fixes certain general principles, but legislation and its application are still determined by sovereign states (Tingay, interview 2012). For instance, the ‘level of inventiveness’ or originality that a format must possess to be granted copyright protection varies considerably from one jurisdiction to another (ibid.).

However, despite these obstacles, evidence shows that TV formats are increasingly granted legal protection against copyright infringement. After years of fruitless attempts, it was a Spanish court that agreed for the first time that a TV format could be subject to copyright protection. In 1994, Endemol sued Antenna 3 in Spain over a local version of Love Letters. The court not only found that Love Letters ‘was protected by copyright’, but that the “‘key elements” of the format had been copied by Antenna 3’ (FRAPA, 2011: 16). Since 1994, there were 13 instances of a court finding that in principle a TV format can be protected by copyright, irrespective of whether or not the court upheld the claim of copyright infringement (Table 3).³
Table 3: Courts that held that TV formats can be protected by copyright laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Formats</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994, Spain</td>
<td>Endemol v Antenna</td>
<td>Love Letters/unknown</td>
<td>Claimant (Endemol) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2004, Netherlands</td>
<td>Castaway Television Productions v Endemol</td>
<td>Survive!/Big Brother</td>
<td>Claimant (Castaway) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002, Belgium</td>
<td>BVBA Habrasaje en Martin De Jonghe v VRT</td>
<td>Golfbreker/Golfbreker</td>
<td>Claimant (Martin De Jonghe) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003, USA</td>
<td>Survivor Productions LLC &amp; CBS v Granada &amp; others</td>
<td>Survivor/I’m a Celebrity… Ge Me Out of Here!</td>
<td>Claimant (Survivor Productions) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004, Brazil</td>
<td>TV Globo &amp; Endemol v TV SBT</td>
<td>Big Brother/Casa dos Artistas</td>
<td>Claimant (Endemol) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005, USA</td>
<td>RDF Media v Fox Broadcasting</td>
<td>Wife Swap US/Trading Spouses</td>
<td>RDF’s claim of copyright infringement upheld but case did not go to trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005, Belgium</td>
<td>Tailor-Made Films v VRT</td>
<td>Don’t Get Mad… Get Even/De Thuisploeg</td>
<td>Claimant (Tailor-Made Films) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007, Malta</td>
<td>Endemol v TVM Malta &amp; others</td>
<td>Big Brother/L-ispjun</td>
<td>Claimant (Endemol) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009, Spain</td>
<td>Maradentro Producciones v Soceable</td>
<td>Epitafios/Epilogo</td>
<td>Claimant (Maradentro Producciones) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010, Spain</td>
<td>Atomis Media v Televisión de Galicia</td>
<td>No Em Rattlis, No Te Enrolles and Ya Te Vale (all Spanish versions of What Kids Really Think/O País Dos Ananos)</td>
<td>Claimant (Atomis Media) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, Spain</td>
<td>Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión v Radio Popular</td>
<td>Carrusel Deportivo/Tiempo de Juego</td>
<td>Claimant (Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, Spain</td>
<td>Corporación Radiotelevisión Española v Gestevisión Telecinco</td>
<td>Tengo Una Pregunta Para Usted/España Pregunta, Belén Responde</td>
<td>Claimant (Corporación Radiotelevisión Española) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, Canada</td>
<td>Robinson &amp; Les Productions Nilem v France Animation &amp; others</td>
<td>Robinson Curiosité/Robinson Surcroë</td>
<td>Claimants (Robinson &amp; Les Productions Nilem) successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: FRAPA 2011: 10-29; EBU 2005: 142-5.

In several instances, courts have deemed that TV formats merit protection but have ruled against copyright infringement in a particular case. For example, although the Dutch Supreme Court agreed that ‘the combination of 12 elements within Survive! when taken together was sufficiently unique and specific to be original’, and hence
that the whole formed a ‘copyright work’, it decided that ‘Big Brother was not an infringing copy’ (FRAPA, 2011: 17-18).

Other legal options

The laws of unfair competition in civil law jurisdictions (or passing off in common law systems that prevail in the Anglo-Saxon world) offer a line of defence that is growing in popularity among format owners. The focal point of such an action is not the act of copying, but that ‘the imitation, deliberately or inadvertently, has misappropriated the goodwill such that members of the relevant public would be confused or deceived into thinking that the copy was created by the format owner, causing the format owner loss and damage’ (FRAPA, 2011: 30). In such an action, the claimant must prove that his or her format has gained a reputation in the country - ‘local goodwill’ - where the case is brought (Bridge and Lane, 1990).

The first such dispute occurred in France in 1993 (Table 4). Once Antenne 2 had licensed CBS’s Rescue 911 (La Nuit des Heros), TF1 poached the production team to make Les Marches de la Gloire and Le Defi. Antenne 2 sued ‘for unfair competition on the counts of passing off, disruption of business, acquisition under false pretences and parasitical business practices’ and was successful (EBU, 2005: 133). Although the trend is not as marked as for copyright claims, Table 4 shows that several cases reached courts in recent years.
Table 4: Courts that held that a TV format can in principle be protected by unfair competition laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Formats</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993, France</td>
<td>Antenne 2/TF1</td>
<td>La Nuit des Héros/Les Marches de la Gloire</td>
<td>Plaintiff (Antenne 2) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995, Germany</td>
<td>Developer v ZDF</td>
<td>Labyrinth/Goldmillion</td>
<td>Plaintiff (developer) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005, France</td>
<td>Saranga Productions v Canal Plus</td>
<td>Crise-en-direct/C’est déjà demain</td>
<td>Plaintiff (Saranga) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007, Spain</td>
<td>Televisión Autonomía de Madrid v Televisión Española</td>
<td>Madrid Directo/España Directo</td>
<td>Plaintiff (Televisión Autonomía de Madrid) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, Spain</td>
<td>Corporación Radiotelevisión Española v Gestesión Telecinco</td>
<td>Tengo Una Pregunta Para Usted/España Pregunta, Belén Responde</td>
<td>Plaintiff (Corporación Radiotelevisión Española) successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013, France</td>
<td>Endemol France v Banijay</td>
<td>Dilemma/Loft Story</td>
<td>Plaintiff (Endemol France) unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Confidential information about a TV format and the expertise surrounding it can be safeguarded by law. A breach of confidence can be brought against a party that misuses information received as such. This covers paper formats that are pitched to broadcasters, communications by flying producers and the production bible, which can only be seen by licensees. An important case was won on these grounds by a media consultant against Sony Entertainment Television in India in 2001 (FRAPA, 2011: 42-3).

Finally, the law of registered trademarks can protect format titles and logos. This legal provision is particularly useful when called upon to protect formats with a strong brand element and identity. Several global TV formats, including Big
Brother, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? and Popstars won injunctions to prevent trademark infringements (ibid: 45; Pickard, 2012).

The legal protection of IP remains an industry issue. Perhaps reflecting once more their disadvantageous position in the TV industry, format creators and producers remain adamant that it remains difficult to protect ideas and that format theft is a constant threat. In addition, discrepancies exist in the legal protection of TV formats from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, Spain saw five copyright cases, three of them successful, against none in the UK.

However, despite these pending issues, TV rights owners’ legal position is stronger than ever. As seen above, all successful copyright cases, bar two, and most successful unfair competition cases occurred since 2002. The viability of this trade rests entirely on the recognition of IP rights and these are increasingly recognized by courts of law around the world.

**Television, trade, and historical capitalism**

This article’s central argument is that the TV format business developed as a singular transnational space at the onset of the 21st century. This space is singular because of the economic interdependence of economic agents, the multiple connections and transactions among them, and the knowledge they have of each other and of the industry as a whole. Common spaces have developed, digital or otherwise, in which industry members can exchange views and develop relationships. These members also increasingly share common values, notably with regard to IP.
This space is transnational in scope because it brings together economic agents, organizations, commodities and commercial networks across borders. Furthermore, the chain that is the core of this system not only increases media firms’ transnational interdependence, it stimulates them to expand internationally.

This trade is systemic in character because it is structured by the global TV format commodity chain, which ascribes roles and relationships but also informs economic agents’ commercial and industrial strategies. In addition, commodities follow trade routes and these routes follow patterns.

At theoretical level, this article asserts the need to comprehend global television within the context of historical capitalism. The discourse of cosmopolitanism fails to establish the connection between culture and economy, and more fundamentally between culture and history, and thus misunderstands the globalization of television. The intensification of cross-border TV trade and the formation of a singular transnational space do not automatically confer this trading system a cosmopolitan character. The patterns and structures of the TV format trade clearly show that, unlike Beck claims, borders have not all become ‘transparent’, and the inequalities among territories, including the division between IP generators and IP consumers, demonstrate that nation-states are more than just ‘historical fetishes’ (Beck, 2006: 8).

Commodity chains have been transnational ‘from the very beginning of historical capitalism’, Wallerstein rightly argues (Wallerstein, 1983: 31; see also Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986). Thus it cannot be inferred from the emergence of a TV format commodity chain that distances, differences and borders have all vanished in the TV industry. The globalization of television has less to do with an alleged cosmopolitization of the world than with the expansion of the capitalist
world-system into IP trading. This explains why the new transnational TV format trade and its commodity chain replicate the features of former trading systems.

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Theory Building in an Age of Globalization’, in J. Bair (ed.) *Frontiers of 


2 Henceforth EBU.

3 This figure includes the RDF Media v Fox Broadcasting case over *Wife Swap US/Trading Spouses*, although it was stopped after the first hearing, probably due to an out-of-court settlement (EBU, 2005: 142-5).