Media and democracy in Brazil

1. Introduction

The Latin American media environment currently faces serious challenges which range from historical factors to regional political problems and gradual shifts in cultural attitudes. As Fox and Waisbord (2002, ix) have claimed, both local politics and media globalization have significantly shaped the development of the Latin American media in the 1990’s. Argentina for instance has seen a situation of limited competition and TV networks controlled by the state slowly give way to an internationalized market environment. In Brazil, as my last work (Matos, 2008) has shown, market expansionism from the 1990’s onwards occurred in parallel with the growth of political liberalization and with a widening of public debate in the mediated public sphere. In such a scenario, calls for the strengthening of the public media grounded on public interest purposes have became fever pitched.

A key question investigated here is how media democratization can assist in the deepening of the political democratization project in Brazil. In an increasing globalized world, it can be affirmed that the public media can stand as a space for the fortification of national culture, but not in opposition to globalization, being further a vehicle which can be capable of reinforcing both local and national identities and cultures in negotiation with the global sphere. This paper, taken from one of the chapters of the forthcoming book, *Media and Politics in Latin America: globalization, democracy and identity* (IB Tauris, 2012), attempts to give an overview of the development of media systems in Latin America in a comparative perspective, emphasizing the specific situation of Brazil and the relationship that has been established between public communications and the public interest. It focuses particularly on examining the ways in which private interests have shaped the evolution of commercial broadcasting in opposition to the lack of a tradition of media regulation. It thus examines current debates put forward by governments which strive to reverse the historical deficiency of public communication structures and their misuse in favor of personal and/or political interests.
2. The media system in Latin America: a history of neglect of public communications

Latin America is a site of multiple cultures and hybrid identities that are deeply and historically tied with European culture and the colonization process. In spite of the cultural diversity of the countries in the region and their historical, political and economic differences, Latin America is currently seeking wider integration and formation of a common public sphere at the same time that it is attempting to tackle poverty, improve educational levels and boost economic growth. Political liberalisation and the growth of multiple public spheres has been followed by the ascent of the market forces, the implementation of neo-liberal reform programmes and the reinforcement of privatization and deregulation policies, thus paving the way for media globalization in the region.

In countries like Brazil, public television has had a historical record of failures. Various efforts have been made to strengthen the public media system since the return to democracy. The media environment in Brazil and Chile has been transformed since the 1990’s, with the entrance and competition from foreign companies, the expansion of cable and satellite services and the introduction of new technologies. As Fox and Waisbord (2002, xxii) assert, the whole Latin American region has had a weak anti-trust tradition of legislation as well as a culture of promiscuous relationships between government officials and media owners, all of which have undermined aspirations for democratic change in the media sector.

Thus the broadcasting model that developed in Latin America has been similar somewhat to the commercial-inspired, entertainment US style (Sinclair, 1999; Straubhaar, 2001). This has consisted of privately owned television and radio stations and private newspapers financed by both private and public (state) advertising. Few companies have controlled wider shares of the market, with few under-funded public (state) television channels dedicated to educational interests mainly owned by sectors of the Church and oligarchic politicians. This has characterised very much the Brazilian broadcasting system (Matos, 2008,2009), one which has been largely built on a combination of political control and limited regulation.

From the 1990’s onwards, Latin American media systems were influenced by international trends which included increasing media commercialization and the formation of multimedia giant global corporations. The globalization of communications has thus imposed competitive threats to media owners in the continent. The second generation of the Marinho’s, owners of Globo Organisations in Brazil, have had to adapt for instance to the competition from international media
in the cable market (Fox and Waisbord, 2002) by forging alliances with Murdoch’s News Corporation for satellite television and deals with AT&T for cellular phones. The 1995 Cable Law also created the means for the start of the internationalization process, initiating a break with Brazil’s tradition of media protectionism and accelerating the entry of global media companies.

Media globalization has however produced inequalities within the continent. Certain countries in Latin America have been more affected than others, with Brazil and Mexico, which have stronger national production markets and audiences, registering lower levels of media concentration and higher media diversity compared to other weaker countries in the region. Liberalisation policies have also facilitated the emergence of giant media conglomerates in Latin America, seeing the rise of duopolies in Argentina, the Grupo Clarin and Telefonica, Grupo Santo Domingo and Grupo Ardilla in Colombia and Grupo Phillips and Cisneros in Venezuela. As Fox and Waisbord (2002, 18) have summarised, globalization in the region has “...contributed to the consolidation of a three tier structure formed by large producers and exporters of audiovisual content in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela; medium-size producers and exporters in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru and modest-size producers with virtually no exports in Bolivia, Central America, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay.”

Media systems in the region have also seen a transition away from family-owned or partisan media to more internationalised corporations. In the case of Argentina, in 1989 a reform law demanded the privatization of state-owned commercial television stations, eliminating further cross-media ownership limitations (Fox and Waisbord, 2002). As Sinclair (1999, 84) has stated in regards to Argentina, the history of military intervention and populism had previously “prevented the development of a supportive relationship between the state and private TV owners”, something which has characterised countries like Mexico and Brazil (1999, 84). Only after the 1980’s did Argentine TV become free from direct government control, with the governments of Alfonsin in 1983 and Menem in 1989 turning TV over to private ownership. This paved the way for the expansion of cable TV in the country.

The current progressive centre-left and left governments that have been in power in most Latin American nations since the last years, including in countries like Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile¹, have adopted a new approach to media policy, seeing communications as having a role in social and economic development (Moraes, 2009) and examining and applying democratic strategies capable of advancing further media democratization. It can be said that the debates of the 1990’s are somewhat a revival of the Unesco discussions which took place at the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) during the 1960’s and 1970’s in favour of a more just global media order, with balanced flows between countries, less biased
international coverage done by the news agencies of developing countries and the strengthening of public and community media in Third World countries.

As Fox (1997, 7) reminds us, it was Latin America that emerged as the first Third World region that identified problems in its communication system, proposing policies and attempting to carry out broadcasting and press reforms. Critics in the San Jose meetings, which were sponsored by Unesco and held in Costa Rica to discuss national communication policies, attacked the huge US imports, the lack of regional exchange and the absence of public services and channels of popular participation. Concerns here were with both the reform of national media as well as with the changes in international flows, with suggestions to establish National Communication Policy Councils composed of representatives of different groups. The Unesco meetings were eventually abandoned a decade later after the withdrawal of US and UK representatives in 1984 and 1985, and afterwards again in 1994 and 2003 at the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva. The meetings of the 1970’s nonetheless occurred in a very specific historical context, mainly in a situation of military oppression, destruction of forms of democratic participation in government and suspicion towards forms of regulation for the public interest (Fox, 1997, 8).

In particular countries of the region however there was already clear pressures towards the construction of a public service broadcasting grounded on educational imperatives, a history which has nonetheless had a troubled life. In most Latin American countries however, the regulation of broadcasting clashed with national and international forces standing behind commercial broadcasting. Politicians also traditionally maintained an interest in using the state (public) media to reach out to voters and to gain political support, something which started during the Vargas period in Brazil in the 1940’s as well as during the Peron years in Argentina (Fox, 1997, 13).

Countries like Peru, Chile, Venezuela and Mexico at the time shared a common concern in applying public service ideals to their media, but this was met with opposition from Latin American media owners, which saw this as an attempt of limiting free expression. Thus from the late 1970’s onwards, governmental attempts at media reform were largely abandoned or shifted to other avenues, such as the United Nations. Evidently, concerns regarding media reform and channels of media participation still persist today, although what needs updating is the political, economic, cultural and social context into which these debates are immersed. The timing is also a much better one. In Latin America undoubtedly political liberalisation has opened an avenue in the continent to revisit these debates in a very changed atmosphere.

In Argentina the Law of Audio-visual Communication Services, presented by the president Cristina Kirchner and approved on the 17th of September 2009 by the Chamber of Deputies, could limit the power of private media conglomerates. The law impedes that any private television has
more than 35% of the media, demands official publicity to be regulated and licenses to be renewed every ten years and not 20, allocating a third of the electronic radio spectrum to non-profit organisations. It also prohibits horizontal and vertical concentration, establishing minimum quotas for national productions. The law is being seen by experts in the continent as ground-breaking, and as a sign that the whole region might follow this example soon afterwards (i.e. Moraes, 2009). This has angered the *Clarin* group, which detains around 80% of the cable TV concessions in Buenos Aires.

In Brazil, from civil society players to journalists, politicians and some media entrepreneurs, pressures have been placed in regards to the formulation of a media regulatory framework, set to be implemented by the government from the end of 2010 and which is the result of the more than 600 proposals approved during the *Confecom* (National Conference of Communications) debates of 2009. Following the launch of *TV Brasil*, a council for the *Empresa Brasileira de Comunicacao* (EBC) was established with representatives of civil society, which is responsible for the former television, the NBR channel and another eight radio broadcasting stations. It is to the relationship between the state and Brazil’s broadcasting tradition that I turn to next.

3. Broadcasting in Brazil and media regulation policy

*a) The state in communication policy*

The expansion of global media as a consequence of increasing cultural, political and economic globalization is seen to have transformed the very nature of the previous strong relationship that existed between the media and the state (i.e. Sparks, 2007; Hardy, 2009; Thussu, 2000, Curran, 2000). The fact that media systems are transcending the barriers of the nation-state have raised concerns that media globalisation is actually contributing to diminish the power of countries to regulate and/or use their media for educational and cultural purposes. As various authors have noted (i.e. Morris and Waisbord, 2001; Straubhaar, 2001), the state continues to matter because it can still play a role in shaping (national) media policy. As academics like Garnham (1986 in Morris and Waisbord, 2001) have stated, globalization has not eliminated the relevance of the state, and many critical globalization theorists (i.e. Petras, 1999) claim that it has been the state which has permitted international trade agreements and the free flow of capital, thus having sanctioned many of the practices of current neo-liberalism.
The arguments in regards to the decline of the state stress that it has become weakened in a reality where the market forces have posed their dominance and have dictated current developments, including the expansion of cable and satellite technologies across borders, of telecommunication companies and the increase in the power of multinational media conglomerates, facilitated by the liberalisation of media systems. This includes also the state’s capacity to rule within a certain territory without the interference from other states (Morris and Waisbord, 2001, i). The state’s participation in the ownership or regulation of the broadcast media in liberal democracies is largely based upon the need to guarantee standards of “neutrality” and minimise political bias. According to Baldwin and Cave (1999, 9-13), many of the rationales for regulating can be described as “market failure”, mainly when the market fails to produce results in accordance with the public interest. The state can also have a role in assisting in the extension of the public sphere through regulation and subsidy (Hardy, 2008). Thus it is clear that states do remain important in shaping the structure of media markets.

As Dunleavy (1987) has argued, public service broadcasting regulation in the UK has managed to act as a counter-weight to the press, neutralising or balancing the biases of the partisan British newspapers and tabloids by offering more “trustworthy” information. Thus its role in broadcasting is seen as one which is tightly connected to the public interest and to the use of public media for educational purposes, securing political coverage that is impartial between parties. As Dunleavy (1987, 47) further notes, the state is designed to act as a balance of interests between competing groups in society. This role of the state as a mediator of diverse and competing interests is associated with the pluralist conception of the state as being politically “neutral”.

In the Latin American case, it is clear that the state is still very politicized, more than three decades after the fall of the dictatorships in the region. The more contemporary context nonetheless is assigning a new role for the state. As Moraes (2009) has further stated, the debates taking place in Brazil in the last years concerning the communication field can actually contribute to revitalise the public sphere and the regulation capacity of the state in socioeconomic and cultural life, reinforcing the social-democratic function of the state and slowly paving the way towards a more publicly-oriented media platform committed to the collective good.

b) The public media in Brazil

Since its origins in the 1920’s, Latin American broadcasting has not had a role in social and economic development and has not privileged public service ideals (Waisbord, 1995). Due to
largely state sponsorship, Mexico and Brazil developed the largest broadcasting industries in the region. The state traditionally was assigned a role of political control and censorship as well as having been the main advertiser or sponsor in many Latin American countries during the dictatorship years. The state performed an arbitrary authoritarian role, having served as an investor in the construction of the telecommunication infra-structure and a supporter of the private media.\textsuperscript{ii}

The relationship between the public media and the state has always been an uneasy one in the history of broadcasting in Brazil, with the latter having been constructed more as a state model media than a proper public communication platform. The public media sector in Brazil as it stands suffers from various historical deficiencies. Brazil has thus always had a weak public media sector which has been composed mainly of the respected but funded-starved TV Cultura in SP and its counter-part TVE in Rio, as well as other regional outlets controlled by local politicians and by sectors of the evangelical Church.\textsuperscript{iii}

National broadcasting policies in Brazil have traditionally been closely aligned with political interests and state control. Broadcasting regulation has been under control of the Ministry of Communication, with presidents using the distribution of radio and television licenses as a form of political patronage. The Brazilian state was a prime contributor to the development of the newspaper market and the modernization of television (Matos, 2008; Abreu, 2002; Lins da Silva, 1990). As Fox (1997, 61) notes, the Brazilian Telecommunications Code of 1962 combined authoritarianism of the former Getulio Vargas regime, such as the power of the president to distribute broadcasting licenses. According to Caparelli (1986 in Fox, 1997), between 1965 and 1978, the code enabled the military government to distribute almost 60% of the television channels in Brazil to its friends.

State intervention in South America has had the main aim of reinforcing governmental powers rather than promoting democratic forms of communication (Waisbord, 2000; Matos, 2008). The 1988 Brazilian Constitution stipulates that the Executive body has the power over television and radio concessions, with Congress having to ratify or not the decision. Thus state interventionism in Brazil has been characterized by a mixture of clientelistic practices, political patronage, censorship control and less by concerns with the public interest. In many other Latin American countries also, PSB sectors have established a relationship of political clientelism with local, regional and national governments.

The rights to communications were established in the Federal Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (see appendix for full version), mainly in the article 220 that states against prohibitions towards restrictions on the freedom of expression. Although the Brazilian Constitution has contained some advancement in the field, critics have argued that not much has been done to actually make these
rights effective (Saravia, 2008, 75). The constitutional articles that deal with social communications for instance have not been regulated. The Brazilian broadcasting media have also had to comply with public interest commitments defined by the 1988 Federal Constitution. The articles included in the constitution that deal with regional programming, and which suggest a preference for cultural and educational television outputs, are being defended by civil society groups. According to Lima (2008), a project that requires the regulation of the article on the regionalization of cultural and artistic production has circulated in the National Congress for 17 years and has not been approved. However, the article 222 was altered by constitutional amendment in 2002 to permit the entry of foreign capital in the sector.

Civil society players and officials linked to the government and organised groups have underscored the necessity of building a solid regulation framework for the country to replace outdated laws such as the Codigo Brasileiro de Telecomunicacoes (1962), and to follow from some initiatives of the 1990’s, including the Cable Law (1995) and the Lei Geral de Telecomunicacoes (LGT, 1997), which are seen as having benefitted mainly commercial groups. According to Bolanoiv (2010), the public policy laws for the communication sector mainly consist of the Codigo de Telecomunicacoes and of the 1997 LGT, with broadcasting being still controlled by the old law and cable TV and other forms of paid TV are linked to the telecommunications sector. As Bolano states, the political debate in the communication sector is divided into three big groups: Conservatives (which defends the interests of broadcasters); Progressives (the movements in favour of media democratization) and Liberals (who support the interests of the telecommunication sector), with the social movement groups being the least contemplated whilst the corporate media sectors prevailed.

Thus in many emerging democracies like Brazil nonetheless, public service media and broadcasting does not have a history of having contributed to strengthen democracy, and it has not served to boost educational and cultural levels. Rather, the market media and commercial broadcasting have largely taken on this role, and have also traditionally been allowed to develop somewhat unregulated in most countries of the region. Further, as Saravia (2008, 72) reminds us, the whole notion of communication rights by itself is a relatively new phenomena, with the first discussions on this taking place in the decade of the 1960’s.

The 1st National Conference on Communications (Confecom) to discuss some of these issues was held in the first week of December 2009 in Brasília uniting members of opposite sides, such as civil society players, journalists, representatives of media outlets and a small group of media entrepreneurs who have been debating media policy reform at least for the last seven years. It was
also seen as a direct development of the launch by the Brazilian government of the first public television station, *TV Brasil* in December 2007.¹

Other distortions of public communication systems are the misuse of state structures for political purposes. Oligarchic politicians and Church interests control many “public” radio and television stations throughout Brazil, and especially in the Northeast (Matos, 2008). In Brazil’s Northeast the family of Collor de Mello dominate the media in Alagoas, the Sarney’s in Maranhão and the recently deceased famous conservative politician Antonio Carlos Magalhães (ACM), in the State of Bahia. Chaos and irregularities mark the process of radio and TV concessions. Currently, many public TV and radio stations are in the hands of politicians. Statistics from the Deputy Chamber in the Legislative year of 2006-2009 indicated that 30% of Brazilian senators and various MPs have concessions of radio channels and TV stations (Lopes, 2008). As Table 1 reveals, in the mid-1990’s politicians controlled from 30 to 40% of the total number of radio and television stations in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channels</th>
<th>Total Brazil</th>
<th>Current politicians and past</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>31.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>1169</td>
<td>40.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1 – Radio and TV stations controlled by politicians in Brazil (1994)


A more recent research launched by academic Venicio de Lima (2007) stressed how at least 50% of the more than 2,000 community stations permitted to operate by the Ministry of Communications belonged to people linked to politicians. These numbers indicate a rise in the radio and television stations owned by politicians and point out the fact that, in spite of political democratisation, the state is still politicised and subject to the pressures of particular groups in opposition to the less privileged sectors of society. The ties with the state were weakened from the 1990’s onwards but still maintained. Certain legislations that were of interest for the media market were approved in the last few years by federal governments, including the privatization of the
telecommunications system and the permission for the participation of foreign capital in the national market (Matos, 2008) after the revision of articles in the Brazilian Constitution.

Thus in their fear of a stronger public media sector posing as a threat to the commercial media, market liberals in Brazil have pointed to the bad state of the structures of the public media in the country, including the promiscuous relationships shared between the weak and partisan state media with politicians from the Northeast and the dominance of the sector by the evangelical church, as the main reason to condemn the restructuring of the new PSB platform, and to argue in favour of the hegemony of the market.

4. Brazilian government’s policies for the communication sector: a debate

Similarly to the ways in which many Americans oppose an active regulatory role for the state because of their fear that state intervention will encourage partisan manipulation, in Brazil similar worries were expressed at the time of the emergence of the Empresa Brasileira de Comunicacao (EBC). The close links between the government and the revitalization of the public media have thus been subject to heated debate. Controversies have been raised by the opposition questioning the intentions of the government of using the channel for its own political purposes. The government of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva is seen by critics as having done little to change the media scenario in Brazil (i.e. Moraes, 2009; Lugo-Occando, 2008) beyond the realization of the Confecom debates, although the Ministry of Culture has been actively involved in the attempts to strengthen the public media platform. The programme for the sector of social communications that the Lula candidature presented in 2006 for his re-election bid stressed the democratization of communications as necessary for the deepening of democracy, underscoring knowledge as an important tool in national development.

Critics have nonetheless pointed out that the main governmental actions on this front have been the creation of TV Brasil and the realization of the Confecom debates in the end of 2009. The latter saw the approval of 672 proposals by representatives of the government, social movements and groups such as the National Forum for the Democratization of Communications (FNDC) and some businessmen that would be submitted to Congress and the Executive powers for ratification in 2010 and 2011. Confecom (Federal Communication Conference) emerged as an important milestone in its recognition of the urgency of discussing public policies on communications in the country, approving 672 proposals in defence of a system of regulation that includes wider societal participation, the formation of a journalism council as well as the definite regulation of
constitutional articles that deal with the production of regional, educational and cultural programming. Considering the highly politicized nature of Brazilian institutions and the media, many of the proposals are seen by market liberals as opening a loophole for media censorship.

Various scholars (i.e. Saraiva, 2008) have defended among others the strengthening of community media as a means of democratization further social relations in Brazil and the registration of all the concessions in order to evaluate if those given to particular entities are not operating against the law. In the interview given to the National Forum for the Democratization of Communications (FNDC), the first president of the Latin Union of Political Economy of Information, Communication and Culture (ULEPICC) and professor of the Federal Sergipe University and UnB, Cesar Bolano, emphasised how the public media continues to have the same space as it had before: “What happened was a restructuring of the public television, but the public TV in Brazil still has the same space as before, in terms of audience share and of effective production.”

The federal government has also committed itself to taking broadband into the poorest regions of the country, with one of the proposals envisioning an equal distribution of concessions for digital technology between the public, private and state systems. The government also wants to create digital television channels for the ministries of Culture, Education and of Communications as well as distribute channels for unions and social movements, introduce legislation to restrict cross media ownership and enforce television stations to transmit programs produced by independent production companies. There are also proposals defending the regulation of articles of the Constitution, including article 220 which prohibits the existence of monopolies, and number 221, which foresees the regionalization of radio and television production.

The ideological tensions that existed in the 1970’s during the NWICO debates have not altogether diminished: the Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasting (Abert), which is closely connected with TV Globo for instance, considered the results a “regression” and the newspapers Estado de Sao Paulo affirmed that if the results were transformed into law this could restrict press liberty. Soon after the realization of the Confecom debates, the National Cultural Conference was held in March 2010, defending also further commitment to the regionalisation of programmes and criticising the concentration of media groups. These initiatives were met with hostility from the main media players, with newspapers like O Globo and Estado de Sao Paulo classifying the measures of both conferences as an attempt to control the press by radical sectors of the government and as a way of inhibiting the action of the private sector.

In regards to the current project of strengthening PSB, concerns have been raised further in relation to the political links that it has maintained with the Federal State, mainly the role that the
government is having in implementing the public media platform, something which began to slowly
decline following the one year anniversary of TV Brasil but which has altogether disappeared.
These concerns are still embedded in the core critiques made by the sectors of the market media to
TV Brasil and to other media policy initiatives. Most certainly, the difference between a democratic
public service model from one of direct government control and interference, more associated to
authoritarian regimes, is mainly the placement of regulatory structures that among other things
institutionally guarantee partisan fairness and quality in programming.

Thus the issue is much more complex than some of the claims made by sectors of the opposition.
For the project of strengthening the public media platform is the natural consequence of the re-
democratisation of Brazilian society since the end of the dictatorship in 1985, and which has
included a gradual democratisation of the country’s social and political institutions, the increase in
democratic demands being made by the middle and lower sectors of Brazilian society and the
pressures for wider social inclusion.

One need only look at the history of broadcasting in the country to see that the pendulum has
been largely balanced towards the market, which has encountered a series of difficulties in
permitting the construction of a journalism vulnerable to political and economic pressures, much in
the same way as the current public and commercial media are. As Santos and Silveira (2007, 76)
note, the reasons why the state should still have a role include its capacity to organize the use of
limited resources, stimulate technical advancements, guarantee fair competition and favor national
development. Thus the debate should goes beyond the more straightforward issue of “to regulate”
or “not to regulate”, but rather how to design a model of regulation that is in favour of the public
interest.

5. Conclusion

Where then are Latin American media systems heading towards in a context of increasing
economic globalization, expanding political liberalism and demands of civil society players for a
diverse communication platform that can attend to the needs of the country’s multiple identities? As
Fox (1997, 30) notes in her discussion of the reasons that media reforms were largely abandoned in
the 1970’s in Latin America, many of the countries in the region had more serious problems to
discuss during the first years of re-democratization, ranging from trials on human rights abuses to
re-structuring economic growth programmes.
Furthermore, similarly to the case of other Eastern European countries, nations such as Brazil are now in the aftermath of the dictatorship encountering difficulties in implementing PSB, from designing a public media platform that can be fully separated from both political and economic interests to raising citizen’s awareness of who the public media audience is, what they want and expect from these services and the ways in which they can pose positive competition to the commercial media, improving quality programming and providing wider in depth debate.

The media landscape in Brazil today is undoubtedly different than it was back in the 1970’s. Media conglomerates have expanded in the whole of Latin America and are interconnected both nationally and internationally as a result of the growth of cable and satellite and new technologies. This has made these media industries become more complex, difficult to regulate and with more blurred ownership patterns. Multiple audiences and publics have also emerged, cutting across nation-stations and with diverse tastes. It is in such a precisely rapidly changing digital environment that the fortification of a public media committed to citizenship remains all the more necessary.

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1 This includes the governments of Lula in Brazil, Nestor and then Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.

2 The state is still the biggest advertiser, participating in around 7.13% of all advertising investment, which is approximately US$ 493.136 million (Lima, 1996, 99 in Matos, 2008).

3 The other public television channels in Brazil are: TVE-RS, Parana Educativa, TV Cultura SC, TVE-ES, TVE Bahia, TV Ceara, Rede Minas, TV Brasil Central, TV Rio Grande do Norte, TV Cultura PH and TV Palmas. The public sector platform and decision-making organ is composed also by the radio state station, Radiobras, Radio MEC, the Cabinet of the Presidency and the Rio state television, TVE Brasil.

IV See “Sem dar consequencia, vamos perder o legado da Confecom” (Without giving continuity, we are going to loss the legacy of Confecom, in Ana Rita Marini, FNDC, 13/08/2010).

VI See FNDC interview.


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