Introduction

Although the term ‘globalization’ has been in academic use since the 1970s, serious attempts to theorize it began only in the late 1980s. In their work, *Global Transformations*, Held et al. bring together the vast literature on globalization, laying the foundations for globalization theory (GT) and providing the tools for examining empirically the globalization of multiple activities: from politics and organized violence, to finance, trade, production and migration, through culture and environmental degradation.¹ Held et al.’s appraisal of the hyper-globalist, global-sceptic, and transformationalist theses defined the contours of the first great debate on globalization, placing the transformationalist thesis at the forefront of what emerged as GT.² Uniting the huge literature comprising GT are two broad assumptions. First, that globalization is producing a fundamental shift in the spatio-temporal constitution of human societies. Second, that this shift is so profound that, in retrospect, it has revealed a basic lacuna in the classical, territorially-grounded tradition of social theory, thereby entailing development of a new, post-classical, social theory, in which the categories of space and time assume the central, explanatory role.³

Following the publication of *Global Transformations* another great debate on globalization is underway, much of it centring on the direction that GT should take. Authors, such as Rosenberg (2005), argue that GT is fundamentally flawed,⁴ hence, the way forward is to perform a post-mortem, to expose its ‘follies’ and draw lessons from this exposure. Others, however, acknowledge that the debate on globalization has generated a useful and insightful body of literature, but are resistant to attempts to turn it into a ‘theory’.⁵ This reluctance to theorize, and Rosenberg’s dismissal of GT, are rejected by Scholte (2005), Albert (2007), Robertson (2009), and by Held and colleagues’ ongoing work. Nevertheless, they concede that GT faces a real challenge: how to develop beyond the formulations generated by the first great debate on globalization.⁶
In this vein this article will focus on what appears to be a significant lacuna in GT. Examination of what appear to be the best-known works on and forums for globalization reveals that foreign policy\(^7\)—the sum of the external relations undertaken by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations—has been virtually excluded from GT.\(^8\) Similarly, scholars of international relations (IR) theory specializing in foreign policy usually exclude GT from their matrix. For instance, Smith et al.’s and Hudson’s most recent studies of the state of the art in foreign policy analysis (FPA) completely ignore globalization and GT,\(^9\) while Hill argues that existing transnational formulations in FPA are better equipped than GT to examine issues that are of common concern to these literatures.\(^10\) And Webber and Smith, embrace the notion of globalization and explore its implications for FPA, but do not consider the reverse position.\(^11\)

The omission from GT of foreign policy—conceived as an activity that possesses a relative autonomy, which may derive from the role of the decision-makers, bureaucratic politics or the state itself\(^12\)—seems problematic. Foreign policy is usually seen as a ‘boundary’ activity, at the interface between the domestic and the external spheres. While these spheres have never been completely separate, the boundary between them seems to have become more porous as a result of globalization, which is defined here for reasons that will become clearer as the argument unfolds as follows: a multi dimensional contested process that involves an increasing embedding of political, military, economic, social and cultural activities in politically unified (quasi) global spheres of activity.

The manifestations are multiple. For example, since the end of the Second World War, states have become gradually more embedded in a plethora of global political institutions and military organizations; ‘national’ economies are increasingly implanted into global economic arenas such as trade and finance; domestic and global effects are increasingly interwoven. Does this mean that the boundary between the domestic and the external spheres is blurring to such a degree that foreign policy is being extinguished and rendered redundant in a globalizing age? Or, in a world that continues to be
divided by political borders into states and societies that need to deal with ‘foreignness’, are such developments generating a precisely opposite effect: making foreign policy ever more significant, in terms of determining the scope, nature and impact of globalization.

Arguably, then, the relationship between foreign policy and globalization might have significant implications for the subject matter of international relations. In this light, the gap in contemporary IR theory, framed by the conceptual neglect of foreign policy by GT, would seem significant. This paper does not pretend to fill this void. Rather, it aims to initiate a debate, based on what is termed here the synergistic transformationalist approach (STA), on what including foreign policy in GT might entail. To this end, the first section of the article clusters recent works on globalization within IR, that critique the leading approaches comprising GT: the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses.¹³ This critique is geared towards examining three issues: why foreign policy has hitherto been overlooked by contemporary GT; exposing the problems this omission might generate and; address these problems by exploring how STA enables GT to incorporate foreign policy. The second section of the article, which is informed by STA, examines Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO from 1973 to 1988. The aim is to use the case of Israel heuristically, to identify specific areas where incorporating foreign policy into GT may better our understanding of foreign policy, globalization, and the relationship between them.

**A note on methodology**

The methodology of one case study for theory development, is employed for two reasons. First, the new debate on globalization is exciting, fruitful and provocative, but, to date, has focused almost exclusively on meta-theory and theory. There are almost no attempts to use case studies for theory development, despite the demonstrated usefulness of this methodology for examining complex interaction effects, particularly when the phenomena being studied—such as foreign policy—are difficult to measure. Furthermore, whilst deductive methods are useful to develop new theories or fill gaps in the existing
theory, case studies can be used to test deductive theories and identify new causal variables—such as foreign policy and the causal mechanisms it generates—whose effects are well known from other research.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, Israel is used as a case study for theory development in order to complement the advances achieved by the deductive methodology behind current theoretical and meta-theoretical debates underpinning GT. Second, the somewhat underdeveloped state of theoretical reflection on foreign policy in the context of GT, does not warrant full, comparative study. The study of a so-called ‘heuristic case’, however, should ‘stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions’\textsuperscript{15}

However, why choose Israel-PLO relations as the case study? After all, the international,\textsuperscript{16} territorial-religious,\textsuperscript{17} political,\textsuperscript{18} and military\textsuperscript{19} factors underpinning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, might seem to render Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO during the Cold War as disconnected from globalization.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the conditions identified by GT as necessary for inducing and reproducing globalization—spatio-temporal compression and/or integration in the world economy—did not exist in Israel during this period.\textsuperscript{21} Hence, with one notable exception,\textsuperscript{22} the interface between globalization, the Cold War and foreign policy is absent from accounts of the globalization of Israel. Informed primarily by the neo-Marxist and transformationalist strands of GT, the majority of the literature identifies the 1980s as the key period of the interfacing between globalization and Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO. Accounting for this is the confluence of Israel’s socio-economic liberalization, its exposure to the revolution in information technologies, and the ebbing of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{23}

Seemingly, then, exhibiting extreme disconnectedness from globalization, Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO between 1973 and 1988 appears a tough case to justify for exploring the feasibility and desirability of incorporating foreign policy into GT. However, it is precisely this \textit{seeming} disconnection that renders the case of Israel a useful heuristic tool. If this study can show that foreign policy played a significant part in Israel’s globalization then, arguably, it should be expected to play an even greater
role in cases where the interlink between globalization and foreign policy is more straightforward. In addition, as current formulations of GT do not account for Israel’s during this period, arguably it is possible to ‘isolate’ foreign policy, highlighting its hitherto unexposed roles in the context of globalization.

Of course, the sceptical reader might challenge this methodological claim, asserting that, since its establishment, Israel has been affected by globalization in being a settler-colonial or settler-immigrant society whose population comes from across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa; in being established in large measure through the financial and diplomatic support of great powers; and in being shaped in part by its interaction with the Jewish Diaspora and capital flows. While readily acknowledging the impact of these external factors, I argue that they constitute not globalization, but rather international/transnational relations.

Another objection to choosing Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO might stem from the fact that Israel did not recognize the organization during the 1973-1988 period. This objection seems problematic; for it would imply that territorial transnational actors (TNA)—distinguished by their seeking for some sort of territorial base such as a state e.g., the PLO, Hizballah, Hamas, the Workers Party of Kurdistan— which are not recognized by states cannot be accounted for in terms of foreign policy. However, as Hill and others have shown, territorial TNAs are ‘well-organized politico-military organizations, which pursue de facto foreign policies in pursuit of clear goals’. This makes them formidable antagonists of states, who’s actions towards these TNAs can usefully be accounted for in terms of foreign policy.24

Set in this context, examining Israeli actions towards the PLO through the prism of foreign policy would seem useful. From 1967 onwards, although not a state, the PLO enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East’s international regional
system. The PLO pursued diplomatic activity by establishing relations with Arab states, members of the non-aligned movement, the USSR and some of its clients. In addition, particularly up to the late 1980s, the PLO’s military activity relied on cross border operations and military attacks in Israel and beyond the Middle East. Thus, the organization’s core activities towards Israel fall squarely within the realm of foreign policy.\(^{25}\)

**Bringing foreign policy into GT**

This section focuses on those authors who can be described as neo-Weberian historical sociologists of IR, but I also include the work of Ian Clark, whose study of globalization shares many neo-Weberian assumptions despite him not being associated with this group generally.\(^{26}\) Converging around a threefold critique of the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses, this literature lays the ground for what is described above as the STA approach to globalization. The first charge is that the transformationalist and hyper-globalist theses attribute ontological primacy respectively to spatio-temporal and economic elements, in the conceptualization of globalization and its causes. Correspondingly, foreign policy emerges as subordinated in some essential way to the logic prescribed by the economic and spatio-temporal processes generated by globalization. In ontological terms, this formulation seems problematic. It implies that most political action by governments, that is not aimed at harnessing globalization, is doomed to failure. It suggests also that traditional foreign policy, with its tendency to assume the primacy of the political, is barely relevant. Thus, the key theses comprising GT are fatalistic about the prospects of the political management of globalization, underestimating the degree of choice open to governments.\(^{27}\)

STA, on the other hand, in using a neo-Weberian ontology, considers globalization as a multi-centric, multidimensional and dialectical process in which political and military factors alongside other elements—economic, technological, ecological social, etc.—are constitutive of globalization. This neo-
Weberian ontology, by denying primacy to any one element, allows foreign policy to be conceived of as one among several constituents of globalization.28

A second criticism concerns the conceptualization of the relationship between globalization and the state. The hyper-globalist thesis suggests that globalization is constructing new forms of social organizations that are supplanting, or will eventually supplant, nation-states as the primary economic and political units of world society.29 The transformationalist thesis, in turn, suggests that, in reorganizing time and space, globalization is redefining the territorial basis underpinning the political order of the sovereign nation-state, and its corresponding Westphalian international order, compelling states to transform and adapt.30 Thus, the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses perceive the state as external and counter-positioned to contemporary globalization.31

This conceptualization is resisted by STA. Shaw, for instance, argues that ‘globalization does not undermine the state but includes the transformation of state forms. It is both predicated on and produces such transformations’.32 This claim encapsulates how STA would perceive globalization-state relations; globalization is both predicated on, and produces transformations within the state, in a relationship that renders the two mutually constitutive.33 This conceptualization is pertinent to our discussion, for most accounts of foreign policy recognize that it is driven centrally by the state.34 Correspondingly, in considering the relationship between globalization and the state to be mutually constitutive, STA allows for the conceptualization of foreign policy and globalization in similar terms. In contrast, by conceiving globalization-state relations in antagonistic terms, the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses render foreign policy as external and counter-positioned to globalization.

The third critique levelled by STA at the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses concerns their conceptualization of the relationship between international politics—understood as the interactions
between state actors across state boundaries that have a specific political content and character—and globalization. The hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses converge around the assumption that, at some historical junctures, most notably the late 19th century, globalization and international politics were mutually constitutive. For instance, Held et al. argue that ‘the rapidly developing empires of Britain and of other European states were the most powerful agents of globalization’. However, globalization theorists suggest that international politics and globalization after the age of empire are at odds, as the economic and spatio-temporal transformations globalization generates corrode the current territorially-based international system of states. Thus, Rosenau argues that globalization ‘allows peoples, information, norms, practices, and institutions, to move about oblivious to or despite boundaries’. Held et al. contend that contemporary ‘non-territorial’ globalization generates a transformation replacing the current Westphalian international order with a multi-layered system of global governance, in which sub-state, inter-state, supra-state and private governance bodies operate simultaneously, beyond the confines of states. In these accounts, international politics (after the age of empire), predicated on the territorially-based international system of states, is rendered an element constraining globalization—measured in terms of the expansion of global markets or the rise in the extent, intensity and velocity of transnational relations.

STA, however, conceives of international politics since the age of empire, through the Cold War, to the global war on terror (GWoT), as contributing to globalization and fragmentation. I substantiate this claim by examining how STA conceives of the relationship between globalization and the Cold War and the role in it of foreign policy. Clark, while readily accepting the fragmenting effects of the inter-systemic dimension of the Cold War, focuses on the connection between the intra-systemic dynamics of the conflict and the development of contemporary globalization. The thrust of his argument is that contemporary globalization emerged out of the internal political-military-economic design of the ‘West’. Shaw explores this further, arguing that the key dynamic is the emergence of the ‘Western bloc-state’ following the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. The Western
bloc-state consisted of a ‘massive institutionally complex and messy agglomeration’ that centred on North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia. As the Cold War intensified, the Western Bloc-State extended its writ to Latin America, parts of the Middle East, parts of Asia, and much of Africa’. In this sense it was more global than Western.

While readily acknowledging the crucial importance of the Cold War’s inter-systemic rivalry, and its violent eruptions, the significance of Shaw’s and Clark’s accounts for our discussion lies elsewhere. Both authors highlight how, after 1945, a quasi global unified political sphere replaced the military—political fracturing of the globe that characterized the age of empire. Use of the phrase ‘quasi global unified political sphere’ is not to suggest that this realm was free of political pressures. For instance, the mere fact that a plurality of states comprised this sphere, generated some frictions, e.g. differences in the ‘West’ over the US’s war with Vietnam, and its involvement in the Arab-Israeli 1973 war.

Nevertheless, this quasi global sphere is regarded as being politically unified in two senses. First, states comprising the quasi global unified political sphere depend on it as a centre of violence and, therefore, cease to be what Giddens terms ‘border power containers’. This term indicates that the borders of states are not mere administrative divisions; they are also, potentially at least, lines along which violence might erupt. In this sense, states typically are discrete autonomous centres of political-military power whose conflicts can erupt in violence. Second, the coordination of authority and the use of political force has been pooled within the raft of established international politically integrated institutions, bilateral and multi-lateral alliances within the Western complex. Jointly, these mechanisms are seen to play a crucial role in the rise of this ‘global layer of state’. In fact, Shaw and others go further to argue that what emerged was a global state/bloc state with many governments.
This claim, however, seems flawed, particularly since Shaw predicates his notion of the bloc-state on Mann’s institutional definition of the state. A central tenet of Mann’s conceptualization is that states ‘bind’ territories by exerting either despotic or infrastructural power. Shaw does not explain in terms of theory, however, how the ‘Western’ bloc or global state bounds ‘its’ territory. Thus, his account does not allow for discussion of the notion of a bloc state or a global state in terms of a single state. Therefore, I suggest that conceiving the aforementioned quasi-global space as a politically unified cluster of states (hereafter referred to as the global cluster) is more appropriate.

The emergence of the global cluster created the conditions for the shift from internationalization to globalization. But how? Internationalization, like globalization, refers to a growing interdependence between states. Yet the very idea of internationalization presumes that states remain discrete national units with clearly demarcated and mutually exclusive borders of violence. Thus, internationalization seems to capture well the effect generated by the expansion of social relations to a global scale during the consolidation of empires. This period, as noted before, witnessed this expansion of social relations to the extent that hyperglobalists and transformationalists consider it the starting point of contemporary, ‘non-territorial’, globalization. However, according to STA’s political-militarist account of globalization, the expansion of social relations to a global scale during the consolidation of empires would not amount to more than internationalization. As Mann and others observe, the process of empire consolidation was accompanied by the naturalization of civil societies into nation states, ‘caged by state sovereignty and boundaries’. Correspondingly, an inter-imperial order emerged in which each European nation-state empire was a world order in its own right, exhibiting its own authority structure, trade regime, dominant language and culture. Thus, during the consolidation of empires, social relations might have extended to a global scale. However, ‘caged’, ‘border-power-containing’ nation-state-empire forms, operating within an inter-imperial order, remained discrete national units with clearly demarcated and mutually exclusive borders of violence. Therefore, the expansion of social relations could not have amounted to more than internationalization.
Hence, for globalization to emerge, a change in the political structure of social relations was required. Such a shift would entail problematizing the national discreteness of states separated by demarcated and mutually exclusive borders of violence, which characterized the nation-state-empire form and its corresponding international order. The replacement of the nation-state-empire form by the global cluster generated that effect; it eliminated borders of violence between states and prompted the pooling and coordination of authority and the use of political force in a range of international institutions. Consequently, a politically unified global statist layer emerged, eroding the national discreteness of states and their clear demarcation through mutually exclusive borders of violence. In the process, to paraphrase Mann, states were ‘uncaged’, and driven to reducing the ‘statization’ of their economies, societies and cultures. As a result, the expansion of social relations to a global scale through the activities of private, sub-state and supra-state entities, was taking place within a politically unified social space. Under these conditions, and unlike the period of empire consolidation, the expansion of social relations to a global scale developed beyond internationalization, setting in motion contemporary globalization. Hence, my earlier definition of globalization as a multi dimensional contested process which involves the increasing embedding of political, military, economic, social, and cultural activities in politically unified (quasi)global spheres of activity.

In exploring STA’s military-political account of the rise of contemporary globalization I do not attempt to provide a historical account of the interfacing of international politics and globalization. Rather, the aim is to show how STA might conceptualize international politics as contributing to both globalization and fragmentation. This conceptualization is pertinent to theorizing foreign policy in the context of GT; as a constitutive element of international politics—identified as contributing to both globalization and fragmentation—foreign policy shapes the interfacing between globalization and international politics.
Israel's globalization and foreign policy towards the PLO 1973-1988, through the STA lens

The previous section challenged the exclusion of foreign policy from GT. It demonstrated that, in providing a political-militarist account of contemporary globalization, a space is opened for including foreign policy into GT. In so doing, foreign policy is rendered one of many factors inducing and reproducing globalization; an activity that shapes the mutually constitutive relationship between globalization and the state; and a factor shaping the interfacing between international politics and globalization. These findings will inform the second part of the article, which uses STA to examine the interfacing between globalization and foreign policy in the case of Israel. However, before our heuristic examination of the case of Israel begins, some account of Israeli-PLO relations during the 1973-1988 period, is useful. The military and political outcomes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war transformed the political landscape; among other things, it allowed the emergence of the PLO as an independent political actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the early 1970s, the PLO had established itself in Lebanon as what Sayigh terms a ‘state in exile’. The statist attributes of the PLO consisted of a non-extractive financial base comprised of contributions from the Gulf States and donations from around the world; an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus providing social services to the Palestinians;53 and a ‘state within a state’ consolidated in South Lebanon, and used by the PLO for military operations against Israel.54 The growing international recognition of the PLO was another important attribute of the state in exile: the Arab League Summit in Rabat in October 1974 recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, despite objections from Jordan. In September 1974, President Podgornyi of the USSR supported the creation of a Palestinian state and in the same year a PLO office opened in Moscow; in 1978 the USSR again endorsed the PLO’s sole representation of the Palestinians and in 1981 granted the organization full diplomatic status. Although the relationship between the PLO
and the USSR was rife with tensions and disagreements, the organization was increasingly seen as an ally of the USSR.²⁵

The 6 June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon dealt the PLO’s state in exile a heavy blow. It lost its territorial base and the bulk of its military equipment. In spring 1983, the politically enfeebled PLO leadership faced an internal revolt, which was supported by Syria and partially backed by Libya.²⁶ It was not until the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifadah, in November 1987, that the PLO was able to regain its political ground. Although initially taken by surprise, the PLO quickly ‘captured’ the Intifadah politically, establishing the political base necessary for re-engagement in the international arena as an independent actor.²⁷

Israel adopted a two-pronged foreign policy towards the PLO during this tumultuous period. It sought to politically marginalize the organization through diplomatic engagement with the Arab states, most notably Egypt and Jordan.²⁸ Concurrently, it was attempting to eliminate the PLO politically and militarily through its use of intensive military force. Employing the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) directly against the PLO and using the Lebanese Maronites as a proxy, this policy reached its peak in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.²⁹ Although scaled down after the Lebanon war, Israel’s military force remained a key tenet of its foreign policy. Israel’s attacks on the PLO’s military compound in Tunis on 1 October 1985, and the assassination of the PLO’s second in command, Abu Jihad, in his home in Tunis on 16 April 1988, are examples.³⁰

i. Foreign policy-inducing and advancing military and political globalization

The conditions that enabled the interfacing of Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO and globalization, materialized in the political and military aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Two
events during the war illustrate that in the political and military context of the Cold War, Israel no longer had the capacity, assumed after the 1967 war, to ‘go it alone’. These events were the US airlift, which enabled the Israeli counter-offensive that reversed the course of the war in its favour, and the worldwide alert issued by the US in the final two days of the war to deter the USSR from intervening on the sides of Egypt and Syria.\(^{61}\)

Subsequently, Israeli governments were keen to consolidate strategic relationships with the US. The Labour government, under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin, insisted that a ‘memorandum of agreement’ (MOA) between Israel and the US be signed as part of the Sinai II agreement with Egypt (arranging the redeployment of Israeli forces in the Sinai in 1975). Later, the Likud government, under the leadership of Menachem Begin, insisted that as part of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, this MOA should be upgraded. Another opportunity to cement strategic relationships was afforded by Ronald Reagan’s ascent to the US presidency in November 1980. Whilst the Carter administration had viewed international relations from a regional perspective, the Reagan administration’s view was global, and its foreign policy was set within the context of the dynamics of the Cold War. Within this matrix Israel was considered a ‘formidable strategic asset’,\(^{62}\) reflected in the memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation signed on 30 November 1981 by the two states. This memorandum was suspended after Israel annexed the Golan in 1981, but was reactivated in 1983.\(^{63}\)

The significance of these memoranda for this article lies not so much in the political, military and economic support they guaranteed to Israel, but in their globalizing effects. Prior to their signing, Israel could only obtain secondary and tertiary alliances, that is, bonds that ensured a continuing and adequate flow of weapons and strategic materials and that coordinated Israel’s efforts to contain Arab states through the parallel efforts of other powers. Israel’s earlier alliances with France and the Kennedy administration exemplify this.\(^{64}\) However, in terms of the STA approach suggested here, the deepening strategic relationship with the US after 1973 cannot be perceived as a mere secondary or tertiary
alliance. As mentioned earlier, a global statist layer was constituted by a raft of international institutions as well as bilateral and multilateral alliances, in which monopoly over the means of violence was pooled among the states comprising the global cluster. Also, borders of violence were collapsed. Thus, by embedding Israel into the global cluster, the strategic memoranda effectively induced Israel’s military and political globalization. Israel’s military and political incorporation into the global state layer was clearly reflected by its agreement to employ the IDF for missions unrelated to the defence of Israel, which followed the description of the USSR in Israeli official documents as a confrontation state.65 Israel, therefore, like other states within the global cluster, did not retain its monopoly over use of the means of violence. Rather, Israel pooled the state’s authority and use of legitimate political force within the global cluster, at least as far as their use in the external sphere was concerned, thereby becoming embedded politically and militarily.

ii. Foreign policy, de-statization, and the reproduction of globalization

The political and military globalization of Israel through the use of foreign policy, was predicated on and produced transformations to the Israeli state. This produced a second globalizing effect, with significant implications for the political edifice upon which the Israeli state was predicated since its establishment in 1948, namely, Mamlachtiyut. Mamlachtiyut was developed by Israel’s first prime-minister, David Ben-Gurion, and his party Mapai, to fend off social and political domestic challenges. But, also Mamlachtiyut portrayed the state as the epitome of Jewish historical revival, elevating the state to the level of a supreme symbol and rendering its institutions the focus for loyalty and identification, endowing it with an aura of supreme political universality with interests beyond politics. Hence, as long as Mamlachtiyut remained intact Israel’s political, military, economic, and cultural landscapes would remain predominantly statist, as it was difficult for competing actors and forces—external or internal—to impinge on the now venerated state.66
Following the blow dealt to the Israeli state by the 1973 war blunder, social groups, especially those that hitherto were alienated by Mamlachtiyut, such as National–Religious and Mizrachi Jews, were now forthcoming in challenging the state and the political edifice upon which it was predicated. Their protest swiftly transformed into a political force with the first ever victory of the right-wing Likud party in the 1977 national elections, unravelling Mamlachtiyut from below.67

Yet, more important for our discussion was Mamlachtiyut’s unravelling from above. In advancing Israel’s political and military embeddedness in the global cluster consecutive governments—Labour and Likud—were transmitting (perhaps unwittingly) a radical political message: embedding political and military activity in global spheres would come at the expense of organizing them around the totem of the state. In terms of the STA approach adopted in this article, this act is significant in creating the political conditions for implanting other areas of activity into these global arenas. Specifically, as noted earlier, as states became increasingly embedded in the global cluster, so they reduced the ‘statization’ of their economies, societies and cultures. Hence, the process of state clustering undermined the political barriers constraining the rise of globalization imposed by the organization of these activities around the state.

A number of trends, especially in the Israeli written media, exemplify how the de-statization of Israeli society and culture reflected and advanced political and military embedding in the global cluster, and the role of foreign policy in it.68 Early examples include opinions and editorials from journalists, such as Yonatan Gfen and Ahraon Bachar. Their ‘op-eds’, which appeared mainly in the Israeli broadsheets, encompassed the key norms of the new American left, such as liberty, sexual promiscuity and a yearning for ‘peace’ in Israeli society and culture. In addition, inspired by the ‘new journalism’, and the New Yorker magazine in particular, there was a reduction in the cumbersome statist Zionist terminology that had been common in newspapers, and a substitution by a more casual, colloquial and communicative use of Hebrew.
The embedding of ‘selected’ norms and attributes reflecting the growing impact of globalization at the expense of Mamlachtiyut, expanded dramatically with the publication of numerous new journals and metropolitan newspapers. The most influential (and typical) of these was the journal Monitin, which was published between 1978 and 1994 and drew its inspiration primarily from Esquire, the New-Yorker magazine and Rolling Stone. Although also dealing with local Israeli issues, Monitin had a clear global agenda, focusing on global economic issues (mainly stock exchange and business news), eccentric social and cultural trends, and leisure activities.

There were several messages implicit in this content. First, the Monitin reader is a man/woman of the world, concerned primarily with laissez-faire. Second, Monitin was the first significant publication in the printed media, to systematically question the socioeconomic and cultural foundations of Mamlachtiyut. It thus established a stage that presented and legitimated a very different way of conducting everyday life. Individualism, consumerism, hedonism and a connection to the global social and cultural spheres of activity surrounding the global cluster, became the vogue. These themes shifted the emphasis of Mamlachtiyut on the state and the collective, to the individual. Third, in writing about issues outside of Israel the Zionist ethos as formulated by Mamlachtiyut, was eroded. In sociocultural terms, Zionism conceived of the ‘outside’ as the ‘exile’ in which Israelis- and Jews more generally-had no place. On the other hand, the coverage given to the outside world by Monitin, made it a desirable sociocultural sphere, which Israelis were encouraged to explore. The message conveyed by Monitin and other journals was reinforced by Israeli television- and particularly the import of several American and British television series, e.g., Angle, Hawaii 5-0, Colombo, Starsky and Hutch, Love Boat, and Dallas among many others. Such programmes and the themes they represented, increasingly began to occupy everyday conversations. Their protagonists, the main actors, and the norms they encapsulated, became part of Israeli social and cultural life.
Thus, Israel’s political and military embedding in the global cluster was reflected and advanced by the de-statization of Israeli culture and society, unravelling *Mamlachtiyut* from above.

What were the implications of this for Israeli foreign policy towards the PLO? Many of the Israeli intelligentsia and most decision-makers in the Israeli media read metropolitan magazines and journals such as *Monitin*, resulting in an influential part of society increasingly eager to adopt a selected set of economic, social and cultural norms at the expense of those promoted by *Mamlachtiyut*. This social group aspired to joining the sociocultural sphere to which it was being introduced. Israel’s hard-line foreign policy towards the PLO steadily became a political impediment to these aspirations. It reinforced the militaristic aspects of *Mamlachtiyut*, at the expense of the individualistic, bourgeois, capitalist, Western way of life and also attracted critique from the ranks of Western civil society, thereby reducing the Israeli intelligentsia’s ability to become an integral part of the broader Western sociocultural milieu. Through the 1970s and 1980s this social constituency consolidated into a capitalist-liberal-globally oriented elite, promoting an ethos that challenged *Mamlachtiyut*’s social, cultural and economic foundations in favour of sociocultural globalization. This elite became a major force in creating the environment accommodating Rabin’s government argument later in the 1990s that peace with the PLO and globalization were inextricably interlinked and crucial for Israel’s future.72

**iii. Foreign policy and social relations along the globalization-international political interface**

I now examine how, in becoming intrinsic to, and formative of, the interfacing between globalization and the international politics of the Cold War, Israeli foreign policy prompted the expansion of social relations in the form of military exports. Military exports are appropriate to this discussion because, as
McGrew observes, ‘studies of globalization have given little more than passing attention to the subject of organized violence’.  

It was after the 1967 war that military exports emerged as a foreign policy tool and a source of economic revenue. Previously, Israel had obtained its key weapons systems from European countries, especially France. However, France withheld crucial weapons shipments to Israel on the eve of the 1967 war, and imposed a full weapons embargo in 1969, and Europe generally scaled down or stopped weapon deliveries to Israel. This occurred against the backdrop of renewed hostilities between Israel and Egypt—which was being re-armed by the USSR—during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. Weapons supplies and grants ear-marked for Israel’s defence requirements from the US softened the blow dealt by Europe, but had conditions attached. The US refused to deliver the most advanced weapons systems, and provisions to Israel were often linked to US policy goals in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which meant they often were intermittent. Ultimately, the US’s conditional support and the ebbing of supplies from Europe pushed Israel to seek independence in weapons production by expanding its own weapons industry. 

This expansion between 1967 and 1973 was also driven by domestic trends. A growing number of retired IDF officers assumed key positions in the military industries, and those in civilian industry positions, began to move to military production. Several retired army generals also took up positions in Israel’s political, economic, and financial elites. Their growing presence in the military and civilian industry sectors, and among Israel’s elite helped the expansion of the weapons industry through pressure on the IDF to increase purchases of indigenously produced weapons systems.

Israel’s military production expansion in 1967-1973 is reflected in several indicators: demand from local industry, especially metals and electronics, which grew by some 86%; number of defence sector
employees, which increased from less than 10% of the total labour force in 1967 to 19% in 1973; and the significant growth in Israel’s arsenal of weapons, witness the launch of the Merkava tank and Kfir fighter jet projects. The shift to producing these large-scale weapons systems increased the need for scale economies in the defence industry, in which increased military exports between 1967 and 1973 from $39 to $70 million was crucial.

Although the weapons industry developed significantly in the 1967-1973 period, this expansion was substantially smaller than occurred between 1973 and the mid 1980s, suggesting the addition of other fuelling factors. One such was the international politics of the Cold War, which provided the context for Israel to use defence exports to support governments allied to the global cluster, but threatened politically by the USSR and its allies. These included, for example, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica in Central America, and the former Zaire in Africa. Israel helped Zaire to build a security force to support its invasion of Chad to prevent a political take-over by insurgents backed by Libya and equipped with Soviet arms. Little information on these operations is publicly available; however, the evidence that can be gleaned through academic research in this field suggests that the military and political embedding of the Israeli state into the global cluster and military exports became mutually reinforcing. Ariel Sharon, while holding the defence portfolio, decreed that Israel’s strategic and security interests would be met by ‘an active effort to increase our [military] export to countries who share our strategic concerns and with whom we maintain security relationships’. An authoritative observer contends that, ‘this is as clear a statement of direction on arms policy as one finds from an authoritative Israeli source’.

The advancement of Israel’s political and military globalization through the expansion of military exports was interlinked with a second factor fuelling the expansion of the weapons industry: the economic rewards deriving from the burgeoning global market for military products. In world-wide terms, arms transfers more than doubled in 1969 to 1978, increasing from $9.4 to $19.1 billion (in
constant dollars). In the 1970s alone, demand from developing countries for weapons surged by 300%.\(^8^4\) Israel’s access to the global military products market was limited by its conflict with the Arab states. Notwithstanding, the scale of global demand allowed it to establish a niche and its military exports grew from 15% of total industrial exports in 1973, to approximately 25% in the mid 1980s. Concurrently, employment in the defence sector increased from 19% to 25% of the Israeli labour force, or half of all industry workers. The defence industry also indirectly created jobs in the form of a network of financial, legal, auditing and commercial business services.\(^8^5\) The volume of sales and the amounts of foreign direct investment from US multinational companies (GTE, CTC, McDonnell Douglas, etc.) in the Israeli defence industry rendered it the chief foreign currency generator.\(^8^6\) Thus, Israel’s first economic dividends from global trade were based on military products. As the export of military products was closely linked to Israel’s aspirations to advance its embeddedness in the global cluster, it is suggested that expanding social relations through military exports, developed across the interface between globalization and the international politics of the Cold War.\(^8^7\)

In this context, Israel’s hard-line stance towards the PLO and its defence industry expansion became mutually reinforcing. The important trend was Israel’s constant scaling-up of military force in the mid 1970s, e.g. the Litani operation in 1978, and culminating in the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon.\(^8^8\) This upsurge in the use of force helped to consolidate the defence industry in a number of ways: it was a source of revenue; it elevated the defence industry among the economic sectors that received state support based on their vital importance for national security; and successful deployment of Israeli defence industry products by the IDF on the battlefield was good advertisement and marketing. This buttressing of the defence industries, in turn, increased Israel’s ability to use its military products as a foreign policy tool to grab the political, economic and military opportunities presented by the globalization-international politics interface in the Cold War.
It is significant that from the mid 1970s negotiations with Egypt got underway and the security arrangements put in place along the borders with Jordan and Syria following the 1973 war, remained. Thus, foreign policy in relation to the PLO became Israel’s *main* arena for extensive and routine use of military force, reinforcing the synergistic relationship between strengthening its defence industry and capturing the opportunities presented by the social relations along the globalization-international politics interface. This is not to imply that the defence industry was lobbying for the predication of Israel’s strength on the intensive use of military force, but rather to demonstrate a material connection between expansion of Israel’s defence industry, foundation of Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO on the intensive use of force, and expansion of social relations on the interface between globalization and international politics.

**Conclusion**

This article has sought to engage with, and make a contribution to, the emerging second great debate on globalization by examining what including foreign policy in GT might entail. Based on an exploration of various works critiquing contemporary GT, the first section of the article suggested STA as an alternative approach to the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses of globalization. STA is grounded in a political-military account of globalization and demonstrates that it is possible for GT to incorporate foreign policy without subordinating it in terms of ontology, to global forces. Informed by STA, the second section examined the relationship between the military and political globalization of Israel and its foreign policy. It was shown that the military and political crisis during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war prompted Israeli governments to pursue a foreign policy of military and political globalization. The coincidence of these changes with the intra-systemic dynamics of the Cold War spawned the rise of globalization into a constitutive factor of Israeli foreign policy. Israel’s political and military embedding in the global cluster, and expanding social relations through foreign policy across the interface between globalization and the international politics of the Cold War, reinforced its hard-line stance towards the PLO.
The globalization and foreign policy interfacing was predicated on and produced changes in the state, setting in motion Israel’s de-statization. The sociocultural tenets of Mamlachtiyut were renegotiated: journals, such as Monitin, and Israel’s single state-run TV channel, portrayed the outside socio-cultural space as one that Israelis should explore and be exposed to, thereby undermining the Zionist notion of negating the exile, and enabling the socio-cultural forces of globalization to challenge the hitherto dominant political edifice of Mamlachtiyut. Thus, from the early 1970s Israel’s ability to operate as an organized centre of violence, the composition and performance of its economy, and the growing impact of imported social and cultural norms were imprinted with globalization.

The case of Israel was used heuristically to expose more specifically how including foreign policy in GT might better our understanding of globalization, foreign policy, and the relationship between them. The findings presented above contradict what the hyper-globalist and transformationalist theses would expect. Neither economic nor spatio-temporal elements were identified as inducing and reproducing Israel’s globalization in its early stages. Rather, Israel’s military and political globalization, and the ensuing un-caging of its society and culture, was prompted by a confluence multiple foreign policy activities: the memoranda with the US, the global export of military products, and the enduring hardline stance towards the PLO. Moreover, against the backdrop of the international politics of the Cold War, foreign policy was used as a key site of political action by the Israeli state to capture the opportunities and resist the challenges generated by globalization.

In sum, while fully recognizing the limitations of using one case study, this article underscores four themes that might prove useful for the debate on how including foreign policy in GT would benefit our understanding of globalization, foreign policy, and the relationship between them. The first concerns the forces and activities inducing globalization. We have shown how foreign policy, in being a boundary activity, can generate the dynamics of globalization even in the absence of spatio-temporal compression or economic integration into global activity. It would be useful to investigate more deeply
the contexts where foreign policy might induce globalization. The second involves how, why, and under what conditions states use foreign policy to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by globalization. The third concerns the impact of globalization on foreign policy behaviour, which, in the case of Israel was dialectical. On the one hand, embedding in the global cluster and the interfacing between globalization and the Cold War, reinforced Israel’s hard-line stance towards the PLO; on the other, the unravelling of Mamlacthiyut from above by the globalization of culture and society produced an alternative ethos challenging this hard-line stance. The fourth direction is over the mutually constitutive relationship between globalization and the state, and the role in it of foreign policy.

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7 For this definition see Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 2003), p. 3.


Mark Webber and Michael Smith (eds), *Foreign Policy in a Transformed World* (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2002).


For the division of the globalization literature into the hyper-globalist, transformationalist, and global sceptic. Held et al., *Global Transformations*, pp. 1-29.


E.g., Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labour Party Positions on National Security* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1991);


Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, *From War Profits to Peace Dividends: The Global Political Economy of Israel* (Tel-Aviv: Carmel, 2001), especially pp. 307-344. However, this account focuses on the oil-globalization-weapons export nexus whilst the current article casts the net wider to include political, military, social and cultural dimensions of the interface between Israel’s foreign policy towards the PLO, globalization and the Cold War.


11 As we will see GT does recognize that in some historical conjunctures preceding contemporary globalization, most notably the late 19th century, states played an intrinsic role advancing globalization.


13 See also Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, p. 52; Mann, ‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State’, p. 474.


36 Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, pp. 81-82.

37 See Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 43; Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, pp. 5-6 and 81-82; Scholte, Globalization: a Critical Introduction, p. 46.

38 Those subscribing to the transformationalist thesis would see the advancement of globalization in terms of flows whereas those following the hyper-globalists logic—whether from a neo-liberal or neo-Marxist persuasion—would see it in economic terms.

39 For a recent account linking empire-consolidation and globalization see Barkawi, Globalization and War, pp. 27-90.


41 Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, pp. 121-140.


43 It is significant that Shaw does not conceive of this mutually embedded Western raft of institutions as an American empire or a form of US hegemony. Rather, Shaw perceives the role of the US as that of a key component state and no more. Shaw, ‘The State of Globalization’, p. 501.

44 Shaw, Theory of the Global State, p. 201.


46 These institutions include political military organizations, such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; economic bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and a developing framework of global legal institutions and means of enforcement (such as International Criminal Tribunals). Of course, the political institutionalization of the West faced significant challenges. The US war with Vietnam, Washington’s reluctance over West Germany’s Ostpolitik, and the ‘uni-lateral withdrawal’ of the US from the exchange systems all just a few examples. In addition, states and ‘their’ own societies experienced tensions, e.g. the student mobilization in France in 1968, which challenges further the idea of a politically unified space. However, despite periodic tensions, the overall political institutionalization of the ‘West’ has prevailed.


51 There is an immense literature that accounts for the consolidation of nation-state empires and the international order they generated in the manner described above. See, for example, Mann, The Sources of Social Power, p. 504; Phillip Bobit, The Shield of Achilles (New-York: Anchor Books, 2003), pp. 144-205; Shaw, Theory of the Global State, p. 104.

52 Shaw, Theory of the Global State, pp. 220-221.

53 On the PLO’s ability to provide social services see, Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp. 496-497.

54 On the consolidation of the state within the state see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 323, 369-370, and 377-403. On the ability of the PLO to maintain its autonomy in the face of Iraqi attempts to intervene in Palestinian politics, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 434-436.


64 On Israel’s secondary and tertiary alliances see Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, pp. 71-72, 123-125, and 183-184.

65 On this latter point see Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, p. 392.


69 Almog notes that the agenda set by *Moniton* was expanded systematically by national broadsheets and metropolitan newspapers, especially the local newspaper of Tel-Aviv, *Ha’ir*, and the broadsheet *Hadashot*.

70 Almog, *Farewell to Srdnik*, p. 289.


72 For an analysis on Rabin’s thought on these issues see Efraim Inbar, *Rabin and Israel’s National Security* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1999 ), pp. 135-137, 159-163; For Peres’ opinion see Shimon Peres, The *New Middle East: Framework and Processes Towards an Era of Peace* (Bnei-Brak: Steimatzky, 1993).


76 Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 204-208


78 For Sharon’s quote and its evaluation see Klieman, Israel’s Global Reach, p. 34.

79 On the limitations and opportunities for export in the defence sector and figures on total exports for 1970 to 1984, see Klieman, Israel’s Global Reach, pp. 129-214.