The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading

Cespa, G. & Vives, X. (2015). The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading. The Journal of Finance, 70(5), pp. 2099-2154. doi: 10.1111/jofi.12279

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Abstract

Short-termism need not breed informational price inefficiency even when gen- erating Beauty Contests. We demonstrate this claim in a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk-averse, privately informed, short-term investors and find that prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning to reassess inferences (about fundamentals) made during the trading game’s early stages. This behavior introduces strategic complementarities in the use of information and can yield two stable equilibria that can be ranked in terms of liquidity, volatility, and informational efficiency. We derive implications that explain market anomalies as well as empirical regularities.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cespa, G. & Vives, X. (2015). The Beauty Contest and Short-Term Trading. The Journal of Finance, 70(5), pp. 2099-2154., which is published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12279. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Uncontrolled Keywords: price speculation, multiple equilibria, average expectations, public information, momentum and reversal, disagreement, volume, volatility
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Cass Business School > Faculty of Finance
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/7012

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