What the analysis of empathy in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* reveals for psychotherapy

Volume 2, Appendices

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Declaration

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Appendix 1
Interpreting intersubjectivity and Husserl

Aim: The point of Appendices is to add material that is necessary but is not of the utmost importance so as to place it in the main body. The Appendices position the thesis and appraise some of the relevant literature. Unfortunately, due to the very intricate topics that surround the work of Freud and Husserl, there is a very great deal that could be written at this late stage and not everything can be discussed but still some comments are necessary. It does not help to bore the reader and add material that does not argue. This Appendix provides an account of the supporting literature in phenomenology and psychotherapy. To achieve the interpretation of this thesis, it has been necessary to explore a number of themes that are not recognised as being central within the English language secondary literature. Some readings need to be affirmed as being close to the text whilst others need denounced because of their inaccuracy with respect to the pertinent issues. There are many writers who would claim to be phenomenological. But once Husserl and Heidegger are understood (Moran, 2000a), it is possible to identify key themes that define this area. There are no other doctoral theses on Freud and Husserl in Dissertation Abstracts International. The specific reading made in this work owes a debt to the expositions of Fink (1933/1970, 1934/1972, 1939/1981), Sokolowski (1964, 1968, 1981), Kern (1977, 1988), Biemel (1970, 1977), Embree (1996) and the work of Marbach and Ströker, listed in the references. The thesis contends that Husserl’s work on the intentionality of consciousness has never been fully presented despite the agreeable contributions made by Marbach such as Mental Representation and Consciousness (1993), which is argued as the leading idealist reading of Husserl. There is a genre of Freud studies and this work is a critical and appreciative contribution that sees deep positive worth in free association and free floating attention, yet it is important to think how meaning exists. Specific works consulted on transference include Carotenuto (1991) and Prokoris (1995) and
Gardner on the interrelation of thought and emotion by the unconscious (1993).

1.1 Interpretative problems

There are numerous interpretative problems for the thesis and its allied areas. Commentary is required concerning how they are treated. There is no consensus concerning Husserl and Freud, nor are there agreed accounts of relations between Kant, Husserl and Heidegger or scholarship concerning Freud, psychodynamics or therapy. Consequently, the interpretative problems in Husserl studies and therapy are addressed in the following ways.

Firstly, a dilemma appears because when I think of the field of relevant literature I have read in compiling this thesis, mostly it appears incoherent. Generally, strongly felt, negative comments are not expressed in academic work. Such comments would win no new friends and do not serve the purpose of scholarly work. Therefore, the comments expressed below are with respect to the content of the work, not its author. The imperative is to create an independent critical position and make argument, where some stance is championed and others challenged. Some comments are made in positioning Freud and Husserl to other writers. Freud and Husserl are claimed to be central to the topic of interpreting mental processes.

In overview, there are five 'axes' or 'directions' within philosophy, psychotherapy and psychology that need to be related to Freud and Husserl. 'Axis one' is to understand the relation of Husserl to his phenomenological philosophy peers of Scheler, the early Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Axis one comprises the core phenomenological writers. This group would also include Sartre to some extent. It is obvious that Husserl had an oblique and elliptical style of writing. Half a sentence can be very significant when understood in the proper context. He also employed irony and rhetorical devices, so that what might appear to be stated directly on one page was actually overturned on the next. To further complicate matters, he could use the same term on the same page in two entirely different senses. Therefore, Husserl's terms can only be defined by great care and attention to the small details of the work. Reading Husserl is similar to practising phenomenology. Both require an attention to the letter and spirit of the text, in order to find invariant aspects and interrelations between aspects of the whole. Close reading is a version of reflecting on a textual object and requires thinking and reconsidering the text and the experiences to which it points.
**Logical Investigations, Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic and Cartesian Meditations** were the only books over which Husserl had full editorial control and these do not present the full set of essences of Husserlian phenomenology (Embree, 1993, p xiii). Overall, it is decided that Sartre cannot be included in this grouping because he shared too much in common with the broader contingent of continental philosophers.

A second axis would compare Freud to phenomenological therapies of the sort initiated by Boss, Atwood and Stolorow. Lacan could also be placed in this grouping because he was influenced by Merleau-Ponty on the importance of language. But he did not follow phenomenology despite having been influenced by Heidegger. Lacan is noteworthy for his “schema L” which could be read as bearing a parallel to the work of Husserl. But it is enormously difficult to get sense out of his writing after about the year 1953.

A third axis moves from Husserl’s influence as it has been adopted by American ‘phenomenological’ psychology that is argued to be a mistaken rush headlong into non-a-priori experimentalism entirely against the instructions of the phenomenological philosophers. This is dubbed pseudo-phenomenology and briefly mentioned in Appendix 3.4.

A fourth axis of interpretative problems lies in the direction towards hermeneutics. This path includes the contributions of Ricoeur, Derrida and Gadamer, for instance. The latter is important as it is the stance of the thesis. Received wisdom says that Heidegger is relevant for the purposes of psychology and therapy. The thesis disagrees because Heidegger’s stance is not intentional (nor meta-representational). But it should follow the hermeneutic circle. This is why Husserl is more relevant when the connection to hermeneutics is made.

There is a fifth axis towards ethics and the work of Levinas (1986, 1987, Gans, 1997). (Assoun (1998) is one who has written on Lacan and Levinas but it is not possible to discuss his paper because it contributes nothing relevant).

There could be a more philosophical approach that would follow the trends from the Ancients, through Descartes to Kant, and towards the developments by Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Foucault - or towards Levinas and Buber. The philosophy of science and the relation towards natural science could also be explored in more detail but it is not. It would be possible to take phenomenology to make broad comments on psychology and therapy and not just psychoanalysis. Comments
specifically on the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* are placed in Appendix 2. However, because of the need to make a focus, the main exploration occurs in a critique of Freud from the position of Husserl, in order to better understand the relation between Heidegger and Boss with respect to the phenomena of others, meaning and intersubjectivity. All other considerations are set aside. All of these axes entail major interpretative problems. In summing up so far, it can be seen that the literature is diverse and much comment on the *Fifth Meditation* has been misguided. Detailed discussions follow below.

First, let us consider the axis of phenomenological and continental philosophy. There is an outstanding lack of consensus in Husserl scholarship. Several of the important concepts in Husserl's writings are interrelated and defined contextually in an abstract terminology. Rare are the passages where clear examples of the method and its results are stated. Occasionally, concrete passages supply examples of what Husserl exhorted his readers to achieve. For instance, there are only a few pages on what it means to vary an essence of a visual object-sense (Id II, §18b, p 67/62). There is little or no consensus among Husserl scholars on the stance, central concepts and full practice of phenomenology. Even Directors of the *Husserl Archives* emphasise different aspects of the noema\(^1\). Among English language publications by philosophers who are familiar with the German language texts, there is little or no agreement on Husserl's methodology. Indeed, Husserl defined his approach as a method to be practised and that others might come to replicate what he had experienced and concluded on:

> If the right attitude has been won, and made secure by practice... if one has acquired the courage to obey the clear eidetic data with a radical lack of prejudice so as to be unencumbered by all current and learned theories, then firm results are directly produced, and the same thing occurs for everyone having the same attitude; there accrue firm possibilities of communicating to others what one has himself seen, of

\(^1\) Bernet has it that the noema is an object of belief (BKM, p 50, p 176) and Kern writes that it can be used in a very general sense (pp 95-101). Marbach writes that the noema is real (1982, p 223, fn). Ströker writes that only the transcendental approach entails the noema and that it has no connection to the natural attitude (1987, pp 57-60). In 1993 she wrote that many noematic moments comprise a noema of identity, despite differences that appear (p 100).
testing descriptions, of making salient the unnoticed intrusions of empty
verbal meanings, of making known and weeding out error by measuring
them again against intuition - errors which are also possible here just as
in any sphere of validity.
Id I, §87, p 212/180.

Part of what Husserl claimed in the above is that elucidations arise from the
phenomena themselves, considered as conditions of imagined possibility, essence, in
both pure psychology or the transcendental contemplation of conditions for any world:
a modal logic. What Husserl claimed above is that this elucidation is not logical
imposition or argument, but a direct revelation gained from appreciating the
similarities and differences in what appears. It would be possible to write a good deal
about the close relation between Kant and Husserl and interesting to compare Kant and
Freud and Kant and Heidegger. To do these things well would require a great deal of
space. The proximity between an idealist reading of the Critique of Pure Reason
(version A) and an idealist reading of Husserl is juxtaposed with a possible
hermeneutics of lived experience. Since the publication of Gardner's Kant and the
Critique of Pure Reason, (1999), there is a text that makes plain a reading of Kant.
These works support the reasoning of the thesis and sit well with Marbach's Mental
Representation and Consciousness (1993). Husserl's The Idea of Phenomenology,
some sections of Ideas I and Ideas II and the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, are texts that
make the consideration of the conditions of possibility for intentionality to reach the
transcendent world, most clear. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that Husserl
is the intellectual heir of Kant. Husserl did not duck the problem of intentionality nor
turn to an analytic reading of Kant, as did Heidegger in his turn to Being without
intentionality or co-intentionality. Specifically, most of Husserl's philosophy is a reply
to Kant by radicalising the Copernican turn to epistemology and transcendental
philosophy concerning an ideal sociality of intersubjective consciousness (Id III, Supp
I, §5, p 116/128). But it is argued that Husserl is not entirely without hermeneutics and
early claims about presuppositionlessness amount to nothing. (Work by Meinong
(1972) and Pfander (1967) have been read as alternative approaches to phenomenology
and a means of further understanding the whole).

The second axis of phenomenological developments of Freud includes the
contributions of Boss, Atwood and Stolorow, and could make reference to Lacan
(Appendix 3.3 for details). There are a number of interpretative problems in assessing the current conceptual basis of therapy.

In the third axis of phenomenological therapy and psychology, is an alleged corruption of phenomenology. The work of Wertz and Giorgio is singled out as being faulty in Appendix 3.4. (Axis four, towards hermeneutics, and the fifth axis towards ethics are omitted from detailed inquiry. It would have been possible to explore criticisms of psychopathology and psychiatry but this was not pertinent either (Grob, 1991, Gaines, 1992, Parker et al, 1995)). There was no point in providing analyses the literatures on empathy in therapy and child development, as this would merely show how non-phenomenological they are. Therefore, no use has been made of Berger (1987), Guy on the trails and tribulations of practice (1987), nor Marris (1996) who has done much to relate attachment and child rearing to economics, in a neo-Marxian way.

The answer to interpretative difficulties is to employ the hermeneutics of Rickman (1997, 1998) who is accepted because he is a senior figure in the UK who has pioneered hermeneutics for over three decades. He holds that there are such things as identifiable criteria for a better or worse interpretations of an author’s work. He maintains that such criteria are rationally identifiable. “Interpretation is not a guessing game. There is something to be interpreted that also limits the range of reasonable interpretations. Even if final, incontrovertible interpretations elude us we need to look constantly for better interpretations and, therefore, for criteria to judge their superiority”, (Ibid, p 302). Obeying the hermeneutic circle means reiteratively recontextualising the part and the whole. The part informs the whole and the whole informs the part. Because of Norris (2000), it is decided to give Derrida (1973, 1974a, 1974b, 1978, 1991) the benefit of the doubt despite his failure to attend to the genuine details of what Husserl was trying to do as seen in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations and The Crisis. Palmer has provided extra tips on hermeneutics (1969). A similar introduction by Phillips (1996) and Maddox (1983).

The thesis is not against empirical research but shows how a priori reasoning is potentially useful in deciding between theoretical positions. The manners of drawing conclusions, justifying guiding concepts and inferring clinical reasoning are important. It is an a priori hermeneutic and epistemological concern. Psychological reasoning is a fundamental activity for clients and therapists. This thesis begins thinking about the other, and relating with them, in an overall context of understanding psychological meaningfulness.
1.2 Existential phenomenology and the other

The writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty need some detailed discussion, as these two thinkers have been some of the most influential in existentialism or existential phenomenology. It is asserted that a central difference between Husserl, Binswanger, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Boss is the acceptance or rejection of Kant's transcendental philosophical approach of considering the conditions of possibility. Despite their differences, Husserl, Binswanger and Heidegger focused on ascertaining the conditions of possibility for concepts, by finding universal and necessary a priori, through a rational analysis of how Objectivity appears and makes sense in various contexts. The classifications of existential phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology and ontological-hermeneutic a priori phenomenology are difficult and would take the thesis too far afield from its task of appraising the understanding of intersubjectivity as Husserl defined it. The stance of existential phenomenology, or existentialism, is held by this thesis to be the commonalities between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in their work during the 1940s where they reinterpreted Husserl and Heidegger (Owen, 2004). Briefly, existential phenomenology did not make an a priori analysis and neither does the work of Boss, which, although heavily influenced by Heidegger, omitted all mention of the consideration of conditions of possibility in Boss and Heidegger's two most influential works. It is argued that Husserl's attention to empathy, and co-intentionality with respect to being, is more relevant than the approach of Heidegger and Boss in the English language translations. It is judged that where Husserl fails is the omission of hermeneutics and this is not acceptable for the thesis.

Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism* of 1947 makes it clear that Sartre is incorrect in claiming that existence precedes essence, which has the sense that actuality precedes possibility. "But the basic tenet of "existentialism" has nothing at all in common with the statement from *Being and Time* - apart from the fact that in *Being and Time* no statement about the relation of *essentia* and *existentia* can yet be expressed, since there is still a question of preparing something precursory", (1993, p 232). Heidegger distances himself from Sartre's "humanism" because it still does "not realize the proper dignity of man. To that extent the thinking in *Being and Time* is against humanism", (p 233).
The writing of Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* is without details and references. Because he indiscriminately commented on Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Freud, Heidegger and others, the reader has to know the work of these writers in order to understand what is being stated. Accordingly, it becomes possible to mistake when Sartre is voicing his own beliefs, criticising others, agreeing with a point and so forth. Two things are clear. First, Sartre refuted some of the beliefs of the Kantians because they were “preoccupied with establishing the universal laws of subjectivity which are the same for all, [and] never dealt with the question of persons”, (1958, p 225). Second, *Being and Nothingness* is not an acceptable critique or development concerning the *Cartesian Meditations* because Sartre failed to understand some of the basic points of Husserl’s stance. So Sartre criticised beliefs that Husserl never held. The comments on the other as self-reifying and self-deceiving can be gleaned from the account of the young girl and the waiter (pp 50-64) and the culmination of the existential psychoanalysis (pp 557-616) that reaches a peak in trying to understand humanity as a “totality”, (pp 567-9).

Yet there are some novel elements to *Being and Nothingness* and these are similar in spirit to the hermeneutic difficulties mentioned by Jaspers. For instance, intersubjectivity cannot provide “universal knowledge” because of the “ontological separation” between self and other. For Sartre, any two persons are free to act and do not influence each other, nor bear any relation to the other in any way of being able to control, stand against or for, or in other ways communicate or share meaning: “between the Other-as-object and Me-as-subject there is no common measure, no more than between self-consciousness and consciousness of the Other... No universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of consciousnesses. This is what we call ontological separation”, (p 243). The other is other. Their perspective is never given to me as it is to them.

For Sartre, for-itself inanimate being cannot have intentional relations. (It cannot be open to the world in Heidegger’s terms). “The Other is first the permanent flight of things toward a goal which I apprehend as an object at a certain distance from me but which escapes me inasmuch as it unfolds about itself its own distances”, (p 255). In making these comments, he was arguing that the other ‘takes’ the self ‘outside itself’. The other de-centres the self and takes it towards that which is not. Sartre made three initial basic claims:
The realist who believes that he apprehends the Other through his body considers therefore that he is separated from the Other as one body from another body, which means that the ontological meaning of the negation contained in the judgement, "I am not Paul," is of the same type as that of the negation contained in the judgement, "the table is not the chair"...

The knowing subject can neither limit another subject nor cause itself to be limited by another subject...

Only a witness external both to myself and to the Other could compare the image with the model and decide whether it is a true one.

Let us take these points one at a time. Firstly, to understand the other through their body is classed as a realist position and that ordinary logic applies. This was not the case for Husserl. Secondly, freedom and the inability to constrain human being are assumed. This is clearly not the case from the cases of slavery, inculcating fear, manipulation and the sexual abuse of children. Thirdly, Sartre precluded the possibility that it is possible to adopt a new perspective or the perspective of another. Again, this is clearly untrue. If clients could not grasp their freedom to understand and act differently, there would be no possibility of maturing or therapy.

The hermeneutic of the sense of the other in Sartre begins with the idea that a human totality or world never appears (p 225). He has a point here in that the human totality is a difficult set of positions to grasp and that the human sciences are based on subtle evidence. Sartre also agreed with Heidegger: Arguments concerning empathy "do not put the debate on its true ground: that is the Other is first perceived or he appears in experience as a particular form before all habitude; and in the absence of any analogous inference the fact remains that the object, signifying and perceived, the expressive form refer purely and simply to a human totality whose existence remains purely and simply conjectural", (p 225). Sartre did not like inquiry into the conditions of possibility.

For Sartre, the ether frustrates and defeats the desire to know: "I apprehend the relation of the green to the Other as an objective relation, but I can not apprehend the green as it appears to the Other. Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me... the Other in the world corresponds ...to a decentralization
of the world which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting", (p 255). The otherness of any specific other person is a whole, a gestalt: My "apprehension of a look turned toward me appears on the ground of the destruction of the eyes which "look at me". If I apprehend the look, I cease to perceive the eyes", (p 258). In conclusion, Sartre keeps readers guessing what he was arguing for and against.

The writing of Merleau-Ponty lacks references but replied in more detail to Husserl and Heidegger mainly, and the reader has to know their work in order to understand if he is agreeing or disagreeing, recapping or developing. Generally, the writing style is less bombastic and more to the point than Sartre. Although introductory, the comments are often more accurate. The general tendency to think that Merleau-Ponty is a better phenomenologist than Husserl is created by the fact that Merleau-Ponty is a better writer who recapped portions of Ideas II, Cartesian Meditations, Crisis and Being and Time in a relevant and accessible way. But two points need to be observed. First, Merleau-Ponty refuted Kant because the criticisms of intellectualism and "objective thought" that he deemed unacceptable for an attention to being in the world, the being of others and consciousness. Second, Phenomenology of Perception (1962, pp 348-364) is in broad agreement with the Fifth Cartesian Meditation and accepts hermeneutic openness or re-interpretability. As shown below, Merleau-Ponty differed in the view of the other with respect to Sartre.

The place to start with Merleau-Ponty is his treatment of meaning as a self-sufficient whole, which follows on from Ideas I, section 49, where Husserl argued that meaning and being exist for consciousness as cognised being. The starting place is to attend to the manifold of ways in which consciousness intends the world and being with other consciousness. Merleau-Ponty quite rightly asserted that "it is clear that no causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society", (1962, p 434): in the sense of there being natural cause-proper occurring within the sphere of meaning. He correctly recognised that 'causal,' motivational, associations of sense occur. Merleau-Ponty agreed with Kant and Husserl that considering the world is an absolute perspective: "the whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced", (p viii). "To return to the things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography to the country-side", (p ix): Meaning that one should not mistake the map for the territory - or a moment (language) for the whole of senses
that it can be about.

Merleau-Ponty believed that phenomenology involves indeterminacy and openness of perspective. As a consequence, descriptions potentially defy rational thought and are connected to ambiguity: "Thus there is in human existence a principle of indeterminacy... Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure, and in so far as it is the very process whereby the hitherto meaningless takes on meaning... chance is transformed into reason", (p 169). But if we agree with Kant that description without argument is not philosophy. The philosophy begins with transcendentalism.

There is a treatment of the hermeneutic problem concerning how to catch experience before egoic reflection can turn to it. It concerns how human experience can be caught in a pristine way. This possibility is investigated in “finding out how to steal a march on myself and experience the unreflective as such”, (p 360). Merleau-Ponty showed his scholarship in understanding the close relation of perception, bodiliness and temporality - as portrayed in *Ideas II* and *Cartesian Meditations*. Consequently, he explained Husserl’s position by stating that the human body is a third type of being, neither wholly natural nor of-consciousness. The “body withdraws from the objective world, and forms between the pure subject and the object a third genus of being...”, (p 350). Human bodiliness is lived and material. *Leib-Körper* is a part of a new whole, an intercorporeal one, just as in *Ideas II* and *Cartesian Meditations*: “Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. All of which makes another living being, but not yet another man”, (1962, p 354). The word “comprise” makes better sense in the last excerpt although “compromise” is what appears in the book. Therefore, “compromise” must be a typesetting or translation error.

For instance, an interesting part of the stance of Merleau-Ponty for this thesis is to agree that, to a great extent, the region of meaning for consciousness is governed by association of meaning, which is the nature of ‘cause’ or motivation of sense between people - and that such a region does contain within it ambiguity and a multiplicity of perspectives on the self same (1964, p 169). Meaning is co-extensive with culture and history. To a degree, all understandings for Husserl are historical ones (BKM, p 265).
Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, there are demands which arise in the intentional form of indeterminate generality, the demands of morality, of custom, of tradition, of the spiritual milieu: "one" judges this way, "one" has to hold his fork like this, and so on - i.e., demands of the social group, of the class, etc. They can be followed quite passively, or one can also actively take a position with regard to them and make a free decision in favor of them.

Id II, §60c, p 281-2/269.

It is a weakness of phenomenology that Husserl did not go further into the details of specific psychological analyses of tradition, affect, child development, context, history, class and culture. This shortfall is set right by Chapter 12 in a preliminary way.

Finally, as concerns the other in relation to self, to be embodied is not a form of intellectual knowledge but a mode of fundamental existence: "Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge... My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my 'symbolic' or 'objectifying function'", (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp 140-1). "Solipsism would be strictly true only of someone who managed to be tacitly aware of his existence without being or doing anything, which is impossible, since existing is being and doing in the world", (p 361). Human beings cannot escape one another. Meaning is social and historical. The region of meaning and being for consciousness is governed by association of meaning, which is the nature of 'cause' or motivation of sense between people - and that such a region does contain ambiguity and a multiplicity of perspectives on the same object.

1.3 British continental philosophy's mis-understanding of phenomenology

The following roll call of writers are claimed to have done harm to Husserl studies by spreading misinformation. Alweiss (2003) is challenged for being unclear and unjustified in the World Unclaimed. She is right that bodiliness is one way in which Husserl surpassed Heidegger in Being and Time. A. Smith (2003) is off target in his book on the Cartesian Meditations, but that will be dealt with in Appendix 2. Finally the comments of Mays are an example of authoritative statements on Husserl that are not shared in this work.
Mays in an interview expressed as series of wrong claims and it is because of his seniority that time is spent challenging his views. Mays said that “Husserl took over Brentano’s concept of intentionality”, (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 24). The most charitable reading of this remark is that it could be approximately correct if he meant that Husserl developed Brentano’s work a great deal. But as it stands, it is untrue. Husserl criticised Brentano’s concept of intentionality from 1905 (Time, §§3-6). By 1913 Husserl had developed phenomenology a great deal in attempting to work out how mental processes are involuted - in his concept of “intentional explication,” or sometimes “implication,” (which is a play of logical implication) but these remarks are brief and can be misunderstood (Id I, §§105, 114, 117). Closely connected to “intentional modification” is the belief that all forms of conceptual intentionality and presentation are referred back to original experiences of fulfilled perception.

When Mays stated that Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein succeeds “in a way that Husserl’s notion of empathy did not”, (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 25), he made a contentious remark that is not justified for either transcendental or psychological phenomenology. It is not justified because within the transcendental phenomenological perspective, Husserl made it clear how the process of empathic presentation constitutes at once, a mutual interrelation between self, other, cultural object and meaningful world. In a pure psychological perspective, Husserl did account for the possibility of actual affect, and ease of understanding of specific other persons, on the basis of empathic presentation.

The next bone of contention is that it was Husserl in 1919 who gave a lecture on the understanding of a hammer as a cultural object, a meaningful object in the world. There is no mention by Mays of Heidegger who borrowed a copy of Ideas II for six years between 1925 and 1931 and who obviously took heavily from its ideas on pre-reflective presence and contextuality, a debt which Mays does not explain.

Temporality is most fundamental for Husserl, as anyone who has read Ideas I, The Idea of Phenomenology and Time will know. Heidegger broke Husserl’s copyright in his writing on temporality in Being and Time.

Furthermore, all remarks by Husserl about his method being “descriptive” are misleading. Husserl misrepresented his own stance with introductory remarks harking back to Brentano’s position that Husserl had surpassed. The imaginative variation of essences was at work from at least 1907 and Husserl had worked with variation in mathematics since 1890. It is incorrect to state that intentionality is a “conscious
attitude”, (Mays and Hamrick, 2001, p 25). A conscious attitude is only one type of intentionality. This is wrong.

With respect to the remainder of the interview, the thesis agrees that the natural science, which Husserl criticised, has evolved. Since the advent of quantum physics, finite element analysis and the digital computer, the nineteenth century natural science mould has been broken and science has been challenged by the strange material phenomena is it has interpreted. Therefore, to state that: “One ought ... not hold a priori views which conflict with such findings”, (p 28), is to disrupt philosophy’s domain of rational thought that prepares for contact with the real. Given that Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions are greatly influenced by Kant, it is not at all clear how phenomenology should evolve from its original critique of psychologism, biologism, anthropologism, etcetera that clearly make it an exploration of a priori concepts that might underpin future empirical work. It is this movement from the theoretical to the empirical, and reflection on any new empiricism that has not transpired in fulfilling what Husserl planned.

The way to read Husserl is with eyes like a hawk and a memory like an elephant. The interpretative problems in reading Husserl involve having to surmise his true intentions. This is because it is not possible to infer them from texts without understanding how he is addressing his reader. There are few asides to let the reader know what problem is being tackled, how the current comments are to be taken and precisely what analysis of lived experience is being attempted. Husserl left behind a patchwork quilt of research papers that have been edited and translated, yet still do not provide an adequate account of the terminological and methodological changes that occurred over an output that spanned five decades. Some major concepts and practices are hard to define because there are no clear definitions or worked examples of the whole process of reflection and variation that was often referred to, but never included as full workings. The fragmented writing style in Ideas I, for instance, produces different readings from those who have been interested in what Husserlian phenomenology promised: a revolutionary account and justification from the very contours and dimensions of lived experience itself. Passages within Ideas I could be read as a call to arms, to storm the universities and destroy all corrupt concepts and conceptualising practices. The problem is that the influence of the past is corrupting and this spreads into the present and the future - that a historical process of hearsay and intellectual misdirection prefers the received wisdom of remarks that do not get close
to the meaningful world, as discussed by Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and company. In terms of overviews of the whole of phenomenological philosophy, Moran (2000b) is quite sound although his paper on Husserl and Heidegger (2000a) is more pertinent and makes a number of points that are accurate.

1.4 Intersubjectivity in the therapy literature

Among some psychodynamic writers (Modell, 1984, Mayer, 1996, Stolorow, Renik, 2004) and attachment researchers (Aitken and Trevarthen, 1997), intersubjectivity is a watchword for representing the immediate inter-responsiveness of communication of all kinds. Psychodynamic therapy contains several portrayals of intersubjectivity and has taken it up as watchword for thinking about therapy and the human situation. Therapy “is pictured here as a science of the intersubjective, focused on the interplay between the differently organized subjective worlds of the observer and the observed. The observational stance is always one within, rather than outside, the intersubjective field... the observer is also the observed”, (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984, p 41-2). Stolorow has made an agreeable statement but did not provide the details: “transference and countertransference together form an intersubjective system of reciprocal mutual influence”, (1994, p 10). Similarly, “each participant’s reaction is a product of his/her construal of the cues communicated by the other”, (Eagle, 1993, p 102, fn). These are prior attempts to get away from individual, non-relational thinking and may even try to take into account the effects of changes in empathic ability. Often empathy is merely understanding emotion or being influenced by the emotions of others (Shapiro, 1974).

Therapy has many pictures of the other. Overall there is no consensus. Two therapists from the same school may use the same concepts. But what they refer to, and their interpersonal style with clients, may be quite different. There have been estimated to be 400 therapy theories (Karasu, 1986). But whether there are 400 styles of practising and theorising or more likely, an infinite variation of practice and thought, the therapeutic relation has long been noted as central:

The key to the influence of psychotherapy on the patient is in his relationship with the therapist. Wherever psychotherapy is accepted as a significant enterprise, this statement is so widely subscribed to as to
become trite. Virtually all efforts to theorize about psychotherapy are intended to describe and explain what attributes of the interactions between the therapist and the patient will account for whatever behavior change results.

Bordin, 1959, p 235.

The quotation clearly indicates that the therapeutic relationship is the medium for improvement or deterioration. It is agreed that any relationship is an empathic, or better, a co-empathic one. The quotation means that in individual therapy, the relationship between two persons is the medium of communication. Any lack of focus on it as a conscious relation is a concern. Most stances feature a personality theory concerning the nature of the self or ego but few have a theory of the relationship with the other or of the overall meaningfulness of the cultural world. It is strange that the phenomena of the other and social life are taken for granted in therapy. Sometimes, the immediate experience of the other is taken as a 'fact,' a 'reality,' yet it falls within the hermeneutic circle. For everyday psychological experience, the other person is known or not known. Liked or not liked. And may appear as immediately understood or not. Often, the lack of reflection that occurs for the everyday includes taking for granted that the other is unambiguous in appearing the way they do. No other possibilities are considered.

There have been previous attempts within therapy to create a stance that views the therapeutic relationship as intersubjective as well as empathic. Early attempts can be subsumed under the heading 'object relations' but these often miss the phenomenon of the intentional relation. Some are inspired by a study of infant development where the infant is understood as "interiorized interaction: not simply the environment's response, but the mutual influence between the two", (Beebe and Lachmann, 1988, p 8). The beginnings of a contextual understanding are found in comments such as the human "field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer", (Kohut, 1984, p 41). In an overview of these developments...

...this vision of the basic unit of study is not the individual as a separate entity whose desires clash with external reality, about an interactional field within which the individual arises and struggles to make contact and to articulate himself. Desire is experienced always in the context of
relatedness, and it is that context of relatedness, which defines meaning. Mind is composed of relational configurations ... Experience is understood as structured through interactions. Mitchell, 1988, p 3-4.

What Mitchell means is that individualism is a wrong turn. Contextualisation of the individual and their intentional relations is preferable. Fairbairn is often cited as the first post-Freudian to set psychodynamics on the path to understanding human nature in a worthy fashion. For him it was “impossible to gain any adequate conception of the nature of an individual organism if it is considered apart from its relationship to its natural object, for it is only in its relationship to these objects that its true nature is displayed”, (Fairbairn, 1946/1954, p 139). Where the use of the word “natural” means genuine rather than material. What Fairbairn warned is not to decontextualise clients or their thoughts, feelings and relationships with others, for risk of misrepresenting the fact that human beings live in a socio-historical habitat of other people. Such writers try to revise psychodynamic theory in terms of stressing a developmental perspective. Development is agreed by the thesis as being important. For instance: “The origin... of individual psychic life... is a transindividual field, represented by the mother/infant matrix, not an individual unconscious and instincts residing in an individual”, (Loewald, 1988, p 50-51). These relational perspectives are argued as being accurate descriptions of the lived meaningful and relational situation.

Empirical researchers and therapists alike use “intersubjectivity” to capture the inter-responsive interconnection between people (Diamond and Marrone, 2003, Bott-Spilius, 2004, Reník, 2004a, 2004b). But intersubjectivity could be misconstrued. For instance, Aitken and Trevarthen (1997, p 669) note that “joint awareness” and “joint referencing” exist as part of affective and non-verbal communication. Joint awareness and joint referencing occur in the type of conceptual intentionality inherent in speech and non-verbal communication. Aitken and Trevarthen note that psychological theory generally “does not adequately address... both cognitive (individualist) and intersubjective (communitarian) aspects” despite both being “necessary in the formulation of an adequate theory of the emergence of human mental functions”, (1997, p 655). This entails an account concerning how such phenomena can be recognised within observable interactions themselves. For Husserl, the intersubjective situation is familiar and his portrayal of it is in broad agreement with parts of Aitken
and Trevarthen's view.

1.5 Intentionality, reduction, noema

There are many intricate parts to the Husserlian whole and to omit any of the central elements is to misrepresent its Gothic twists and turns of plot and argument. Consciousness is intersubjective, pre-reflexive, and concerns the universal absolute rationalisations of necessity of there being Here and There perspectives that are given through the empathic, Objective and cultural-historical conditions for meaning, as defined in the Cartesian Meditations. Phenomenology is fundamentalist and has a coordinating purpose of finding the types of intentional relation for a community of thinkers who address themselves to regions of being. Great care is required to stick to the letter and spirit of the texts. This thesis claims that the proper reading of Meditations is to understand that what resides in all intersubjective experience (TS, §40) is something that can be called "inter-perspectivity". The new word emphasises that intersubjectivity co-exists with the possibility of gaining another perspective on the self-same cultural object.

The term intentionality refers to all types of intentional relation between consciousness and object and to the object of other consciousness. An introductory contribution has been made on intentionality by Hall (1982), which rather misses the point that all meaning is an achievement and that there are many types of intentionality. Pre-reflexive 'intentionality' works together with egoic intentionality-proper to create all types of object and meaning. De Murault is fairly accurate in overview (1974). There are other texts in the bibliography which have been read and found to be of assistance including a two-part paper from Husserl in 1939 (1975) which helps to set the scene, as well as making comparisons to Ideas III and what is printed in English as the "Epilogue" to Ideas II, which was first published as the "Author's Preface" to the 1931 Gibson translation of the 1913 version of Ideas I.

Something needs to be made of the abundance of papers on the transcendental reduction. "Reduction" means taking back to an original trustworthy type of givenness. It is argued that only Fink (1970), De Boer (1978) and Ströker (1993, p 60, fn 34) get it right. The transcendental reduction produces an attitude of withholding judgements concerning the existence of any object of attention. The transcendental reduction suspends both belief and disbelief to produce neutrality and disinterestedness towards
what appears, a state that Freud called "free floating attention". Papers on the transcendental reduction generally sketch aspects of the full stance. Schmitt (1971) is quite accurate but sketchy. Ricoeur (1978) is introductory. Hartmann (1971) stresses links to Kant, as the reduction aims to prevent jumping between false *metabases* (CPR, p 338/A 458), false foundations, but otherwise he is not accurate on method. There are contributions from Ballard (1972), Bossert (1974), Küng (1975) and Mirvish (1995) where the latter is only introductory in scope. The transcendental phenomenological stance is given a brief characterisation in Landgrebe (1970). Philipse (1995) and Kates (1979) discuss transcendental idealism and the presence of ideals and the empirical in Husserl’s thinking, as does Marbach (1982, 1984, 1994). A full attention to Husserl’s stance between idealism and realism would prevent any confusion on this account (cf IP, Id I, CM). Spiegelberg’s 1974 paper is noteworthy for its lack of understanding of basic issues. Notable additions to these most trustworthy pieces are those comments on the reduction by Boehm (1965), van Breda (1977), Drummond (1975), Elveton (1970), Keirby (1997), Scanlon (1972, 1981), Seebohm (1989) and the brief characterisation given by Ricoeur (1967).

There are other works specifically on the noema such as the edited collection by Drummond and Embree (1992). Atwell (1969) clarifies the differences between ideal objects and moments of the whole of signification in-line with *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Sokolowski (1984), Tharakan (1998) and Holmes (1975) contribute readings that lend themselves to my interpretation of the noema as membership of a set of variants about a core of constant identity. All these papers are insightful and paint a picture of the noema as a polythetic concept and a basis for an "eidetic science" with colleagues. The thesis takes the objective side of the noema as a focus on the object, similarly to Boolean algebra, where multiple views of the noema ‘overlap’ to indicate an area of commonality and agreement across time. Worthwhile interpretative help comes from some early writers such as Salmon (1929) who provided details of the basic aims of Husserl’s work and Fink’s papers from 1934 and 1939 are helpful. There is an area of debate concerning whether a noema is an ideal concept of higher intentionality or whether it is the givenness of imagination, recollection or an exemplary occurrence of any object or synthesis of consciousness. Because this thesis follows the leadership of Marbach (1992) on the noema, whilst taking into account comments by Bernet, on noema as belief (BKM, p 50, p 176) and Ströker (1993, p 95-111) on the identity and difference of noema as constancy. The writings of Langsdorf
(1984), Larabee (1986), Sokolowski (1984) and Drummond (1990) appear to be the most reliable. These all portray the noema as both a given or a conceptually given object, according to the type of object and the manner of interpretations that are being carried out.

1.6 Eidetic method and worked examples

Mohanty's (2003) paper on Husserl is decisive in that it argues that Heidegger's critique of Husserl was "never convincing". But his (1991) chapter on the imaginative variation is noteworthy for being inaccurate and misleading. Generally, there are so few detailed accounts of eidetic variation that they can be concluded a very short space.

It also has to be noted that Husserl used "seeing a priori essences" as a form of research rather than a means of hypothesis creation or testing, or as a means of drawing final conclusions. In his unpublished work he explored different eidetic possibilities that become expressed in the conceptual changes within the published work. In this effort, he continually developed his conclusions on the essences of consciousness and objects-for-consciousness. This exploration of essences is understood as a parallel to the concept of mathematical determinacy in the natural sciences of physical nature.

The character of eidetic phenomenology is generalising what is the case and what must be, as a series of thought experiments (PP, §§9, 10). The literature on eidetic variation is most deficient. Spader (1995) makes a barely adequate contribution that is at least preferable to Kasely (1997) who has not appeared to have read the definitive texts of Ideas I, Phenomenological Psychology and Meditations where the process of variation is made abundantly clear. Despite the details given on essences in Ideas III and Ideas I, this topic reaches maturity in Phenomenological Psychology. It is the case that the text of Ideas III also provides many clear details of the nature of eidetic exploration and variation. Of the leading texts on Husserlian phenomenology, none give overall details of the full set of procedures and reasons for each of the fine twists and turns, according to the first principles by which Husserl sought to establish his eidetic approaches. Although many English language works in psychology and psychotherapy claim to introduce Husserl from the perspective of professional philosophy, they are seen by this thesis to be introductory or inaccurate. Despite the many unreliable partial introductions to the whole, a search of the literature has
produced only one short replication of Husserl's actual practice of reflection (Smith, 1977), and one description of what appears to the transcendental attitude (Salmon, 1929). The thesis is an attempt at a conclusion on Husserl's reflection and the seeing and variation of essences.

Furthermore, the books and papers I have read on Husserl have not one accurate worked example of a step by step definition of Husserl's method of seeing, eidetic explication and variation or any significant execution of seeing, in-line with Husserl's instructions. No authoritative manual of Husserlian practice is in existence with the exception of Marbach's conclusions on noetic analysis (1992, 1993, 1999) and other notes on method (1982, 1988a, 1994). As far as I can ascertain, no detailed replication of the full process of seeing and concluding has been achieved. Sokolowski provides a largely accurate introductory sketch but he provides no workings to guide readers nor any references to originals texts (2000).

Levin (1968) is the only person to have commented on induction in the method of variation and therefore is a person who supports the 'empiricism of essence' view I have made clear (section 5.3). Others have made contributions to the major focus on method and have shown Husserl to be proposing methods as answers to the conceptual grounding of any empirical praxis (Kersten, 1989). One claim is that there is no phenomenological method that is entirely against the letter of Husserl (van de Pitte, 1977). Strasser (1977) provides an excessive focus on phenomenology at the time of Logical Investigations.

1.7 The Idea of Phenomenology

There are few English language works on The Idea of Phenomenology that provide an intimation of the complexities in this important statement. One paper by Taminiaux (1988) covers the issues reasonably well and there are other reliable commentaries by Kern (1977), Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993) and Ströker (1983, 1988b, 1993, 1997) that are helpful in clarifying terminology and its various developments in an authoritative manner. The most helpful overview of phenomenology in relation to the acts of consciousness and intentionality is Marbach (1993) and the preparatory overview on essence by Null (1989). Other background comments on the term "absolute" are given by Boehm (1970): Welton (1983, p 123) is accurate in his brief introduction of the terminology of real (natural and worldly) and reell, concrete parts
of an act or synthesis, and the irreell eidetic sphere. There are brief comments by Trân (1954/1986) on this text and Ideas I that are accurate.

The type of phenomenology that is being proposed in The Idea of Phenomenology is an early version of transcendental phenomenology (cf Husserl, 1974). A transcendental reduction is in use and is implied as being statutory for transcendental phenomenology before the eidetic reduction ("eidetic abstraction") can begin. What this means is that these lectures begin the work of comparing and contrasting the objective manners of givenness, thereby ascertaining the implications between different types of cognitive processes that occur in different ways, and the nature of those processes. The direct seeing of the constitution in an all-embracing immanence of worldly meaning, reveals that it has various moments. Meaning includes the introjection, maintenance and projection onto the world, of its objects, ideas and persons.

Phenomenology in 1907 can be classified as that which concerns the accumulations of sense. It becomes a basis in the 1920s for properly "genetic" seeing of the sedimentations of sense for a transcendental ego. Although the method of reflection focuses on what appears for self. Meaning is always intersubjective, cultural, societal and historical. These communal aspects are constituted by an intersubjective community (Langsdorf, Watson and Bower, 1996) in connection with processes common to each transcendental ego and consciousness. The term "transcendental ego" or "transcendental I-pole" has to be approached with caution because it includes absolute consciousness which is a form of self-presence that produces the natural I that is felt and described as oneself (Salmon, 1929, BKM, p 216). Contrary to many readings of Husserl, particularly those influenced by Heidegger, it is clear that consciousness is considered as immanent and transcendent, private and public. There is no gap between mind and matter, subject and object, for Husserl.

As regards the development of the method, Sokolowski (1964, p 144) renders phenomenology in 1907 to be an example of the static phenomenology of static constitution. This is true insomuch that Husserl did not consider the whole process of

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2 Eventually, the overall perspective on this constitutive source relates to a community within the overall history of civilization. Although it is not stated in The Idea of Phenomenology, the overall picture of consciousness in 1907 is an intersubjective and temporal one (Bernet, 1994a) as can be seen from the comments on layers of sense in Time.
the accumulation of sense. But it is not true that phenomenology is not concerned with
temporal accrual of the object (IP, p 67/11) or not concerned with history in the early
years (PRS). Generally, the genetic phenomenology of genetic constitution did not
begin until 1917 to 1920 and can be seen in a more developed form in the papers of
Experience and Judgement, Formal and Transcendental Logic and in Analyses on
Passive Synthesis.

1.8 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time

For English readers who have no access to the Nachlaß, or the Husserliana volumes
on passive synthesis and the finer points of Husserl’s analyses (Hua VIII), the Time
book is not a good source for analysing what he actually did, or how he classified and
reasoned according to what he saw, because its words hint at what is being commented
on and this gives the text an inexplicit quality. All dates of specific papers within the
main text are accepted according to Bernet (1985, cited in Brough, 1991, p xvii) and
not according to those given by Boehm, the editor of Husserliana X in 1966. The only
dependable overview of Husserl’s conclusions on temporality in English is provided
by Kern (BKM, pp 101-114). However, even this account is brief and possibly badly
translated, so it does not provide sufficient details of the full picture of consciousness
that can only be gained by a focus on Kern (1988). When the latter paper is read with
the account in Bernet, Kern and Marbach, only then does the temporal picture fall into
place.

There are other notable papers on parts of the temporal whole by Bernet (1982,
1987, 1993a) and Sokolowski (1964). Both of whom have studied the original
manuscripts in the Husserl Archives. Other noteworthy papers on Freud and Husserl
are those by Seebohm (1992) and Mishara (1990). Some of the papers from the period
before 1910 keep the image of linearity of the absolute “flow”. This image is
misleading and should have been fully edited away because the “flow” is immediately
in contact with all aspects of consciousness. Papers from Part B are writerly comments
and show the presence of his argument by eidetic necessity (cf Id III, §9). Something
unusual occurs in consciousness because there is a complete simultaneity of cognitive
interaction between all aspects of absolute consciousness, in connection and
organisation with retentional consciousness, and the constituted present awareness.
This finding is contrary to the natural attitude assumption that there is only a linear
flow from the future into the present, and from the present into the past. For the natural attitude, material from the past is assumed to be out of awareness and has no influence on the present. Such a linearity of temporality, a ‘time line,’ is a wrong understanding because it does not pay attention to the phenomena that appear and must be interpreted. The equi-primordiality of absolute consciousness is important because it co-occurs with the constitution of the senses, self and other.

1.9 Ideas I

The Kersten translation has been altered after a paper on the translation by A. Smith (1997). Ideas I was the first part of an intended trilogy that was never published in Husserl’s lifetime. In some ways it extends and clarifies the project of the intentional analysis of the processes of affect and cognition, via the focus on objects-for-consciousness in the world. In other ways, it gives a purposefully false impression, as Husserl refused to discuss temporal constitution, bodiliness, and the analysis of cognition and made no clear argument concerning how he had appropriated Kant’s project. The influences in Ideas I include those of the part and whole ontology, from the second of the Logical Investigations, which are reapplied in the eidetic investigation of the many manners of constitution of any object (LI II, §§36-39; Id I, §§2-17, §§70-75). The point being that the whole, of the manners of constitution, shines light on a specific manner of constitution.

Although Ideas I was intended as a basic manual of phenomenology, because it introduces so many fine distinctions, often by synonyms, it is hard to distinguish the main points and emphases that Husserl intended without the help of expert commentators. Consequently, Marbach’s work has been consulted to define the method of comparison of the objective manners of givenness. Also, it needs to be noted that the method is still not yet fully mature at the time of writing and the marginal revisions and annotations do not improve its clarity. The task of defining the transcendental reduction is not sufficiently complete until Cartesian Meditations.

The noteworthy literature on Ideas I includes all those perspectives that agree with Marbach’s leadership in pointing out the role of the noematic character of objects. Other helpful explanations come from Bernet, Kern and Marbach (1993) although their presentation omits some points and is-condensed. The most insightful comments are those from Ströker (1987, 1988a, 1993), which help set the context alongside other

1.10 Ideas II, Phenomenological Psychology and pure psychology

There is little written on pure psychology as Husserl intended it to be. Embree (1994) makes only general comments between a phenomenological and a natural approach. Davidson makes sound comments on the constancies within Husserl's writing but does not go as far as interpreting noeses, using eidetic variation or arguing in terms of a priori propositions or for that type of interpretation (1988). D. Smith (1995) uses the idea of parts and wholes to investigate the differences between consciousness, *Leib* and *Körper* adequately in-line with Husserl's comments (Id II, §62, p 294-5/281-2, PP, §15, p 83/109, CM, §58, p 135/162).

There is a small literature on Philosophy as Rigorous Science including a chapter by McCormick (1981) but the lack of commentaries on it is a serious shortfall, considering its parallel relation to the introduction of *Being and Time*. For instance, there are comments in Philosophy as Rigorous Science that have been adopted by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Among the reinterpretations of Husserl by later writers, including Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the frequent omissions of the 1911 manifesto mean that misguided accusations are made against Husserl. Husserl is accused of reifying consciousness or ignoring the other and history. Such accusations are clearly not the case. The comments towards the end of the manifesto concern the implications of eidetic science for the praxis of the everyday. Therefore, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, Ideas III and Ideas II are close to ontology and existential-phenomenology, but are not classifiable as such because they do not focus on the themes as laid down by Jaspers (1963) and developed by the French writers including Sartre (1958, 1960, 1970) and Merleau-Ponty (1962).

Sound overviews of existential-phenomenology are provided by Howarth (1991) and Keat (1991). But for Husserl, existential-phenomenology, Heidegger's phenomenology, pure psychology, and all other sciences and philosophy, remain in the natural attitude. Allegedly, nothing of the natural attitude is acceptable for the project of transcendental phenomenology that must have rid itself of all such contamination.

*Ideas II* is another major text that is not covered sufficiently well, except for notable exceptions by Elliston (1977); Montes (1990), Scanlon (1989, 1993, 1996), Smillie (1971) and Hall (1979). The literature has some papers on empathy and
consciousness (Drummond, 1996, Makkreel, 1996, Nenon, 1996). The comments by Merleau-Ponty on bodiliness are accurate in portraying Husserl’s notion of empathy and bodiliness (1968). Steinbock discusses the role of the world at this time (1996). *Ideas II* represents a loose collection of research papers on the constitution of the sense of the regions of nature, and individual and intersubjective objectivity, written during the years 1913 to 1920 mainly. My reading of *Ideas II* is one that stresses the facets of the phenomenological understanding of contextuality and bodiliness.

Gurwitsch (1964, 1965, 1974) is one of the few writers to focus briefly on the core theme of appresentation. Gurwitsch commented that *Phenomenological Psychology* is concordant with respect to the content of *Ideas II* and *Crisis*. He also wrote that *Phenomenology* and the *Amsterdam Lectures* are both “addenda” to the lectures of 1925. This is largely correct. A commentary on *Phenomenology* is omitted in favour of some clearer points on the two perspectives of pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology in the *Amsterdam Lectures*. In comparison to later comments in *Cartesian Meditations* (§43), the approach in 1929 to empathy is a static phenomenology (§7, p 43/59) although there is much discussion of seeing the “originary sources of sense” within a whole concrete surrounding world (§6, p 39/53). It is not mentioned until section 43, that both static and genetic approaches to constitution can occur, but there is insufficient detail in the *Meditations* by itself, to define phenomenology.

There is a shortage of papers that explicate the stance of pure psychology. Buylendijk (1987a, 1987b) provides two general overviews. Armstrong (1977) is one of the few people that realises the importance of intersubjective implication across the years from *Ideas II, Paris Lectures, Meditations* and *Crisis*. He also focuses on the early constitution of the object in *Time*. All these remarks are pertinent to pure psychology. Scanlon (1989) sketches out a portion of the research attitude of pure psychology but does not spell out the stance or method. Therefore, there is a lack of interest in pure psychology amongst human scientists, social scientists, philosophers, psychologists and psychotherapists, which is lamentable. It is worth putting together some of the key ideas from Husserl’s definitions. In 1927, Husserl lectured that:

(4) The term “I” [or “ego”] designates a new direction for investigation (still in abstraction from the social sense of this word) in reference to the essence-forms of “habituality”; in other words, the “I” [or “ego”] as
subject of lasting beliefs or thought-tendencies—"persuasions"—(convictions about being, value-convictions, volitional decisions, and so on), as the personal subject of habits, of trained knowing, of certain character qualities.

P, §5, p 166-7/286.

The earlier text makes comments in a similar vein:

1) The title Apriority means: this psychology aims first of all at all those essential universalities and necessities, without which psychological being and living are simply inconceivable. Only subsequently does it proceed to the explanation of psychological facts, to theory, precisely their eidetic explanation, which is for us the first interest.

PP, §4, p 33/46.

The following is a general definition.

(2) The exploration of single forms of intentional psychic processes which in essential necessity generally must or can present themselves in the mind; in unity with this, also the exploration of the syntheses they are members of for a typology of their essences: both those that are discrete and those continuous with others, both the finitely closed and those continuing into open infinity.

P, §5, p 166/286.

The above is a comment concerning interpreting mental processes. Frequently, Husserl made misleading statements that are not at all representative of what is method fully entailed: "2) The title of intuition or description designates for us then the source of this a priori...", (PP, §4, p 33/46). What the method really entails is the following: "(3) The showing and eidetic description [Wesendesksription] of the total structure [Gesamgestalt] of psychic life as such; in other words, a description of the essential character [Wesensart] of a universal "stream of consciousness", (P, §5, p 166/286). But even this statement is not clear in how the aims can be achieved.
3) ...intentionality... consciousness... personality as such, and 
objectivity as objectivity of consciousness... this twofold centering of 
conscious life... furnishes every inner psychology... the task ...of 
descriptively pursuing... Every category of possible objectivities 
designates an index for a methodic regularity of possible psychic life; 
every possible real world, a regularity of possible intersubjective life. 
PP, §4, p 34/47.

4) ...as psychologists we do not want to be philosophers... Each can 
begin only as a natural, unphilosophical human being.

...We want to remain in the natural attitude; we want actually to 
be nothing else but psychologists, directed in a natural, human manner 
toward the objective world as actuality, and endeavoring to investigate 
it insofar as it is a world of mind.
Op cit.

One comment is that: "(1) The description of the peculiarities universally belonging to 
the essence of an intentional psychic process, which includes the most general law of 
synthesis: every connection of consciousness with consciousness gives rise to a 
consciousness", (P, §5, p 166/286). The same sense occurs in: "5) ...the pure essential 
theory of the mental, of the individually psychic as well as of the socially psychic, and 
of the productions of society, is eo ipso simultaneously a knowledge of the world, with 
regard to the mentality which factually permeates it", (PP, §4, p 35/48). The object of 
pure psychology is...

6) ...The psychic province ... has a multiplicity of immediate essential 
insights which continually grows with analysis and is never to be 
limited. Here, mere immediate intuition delivers already a quite endless 
science, an intuitive and descriptive a priori ...The mediate, concluding 
and deducing procedure is not lacking at higher stages, and it leads to 
higher level a priori; but by no means is the entire science of the type of 
a mathematics.
What the above makes clear is the development of Kant in Husserl.

Finally, it would be possible to take phenomenology into a more semiotic direction that would be in-line with many of Husserl’s constant themes of signs and expressiveness of the living body (EW, p 20-31/340-373). This direction would have to consider moments of the whole and stay true to the full picture of the moments of synthesis, egoic intentionality and cultural intentional implication that together comprise the meaningful world.

1.11 On meta-representation

The distinctions Husserl made in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation can be further embellished in the following way with respect to retrieving some of the core themes that show a meta-representational hermeneutics is relevant to psychotherapy. Meta-representation is the “ability to represent the representational relation itself,” a representation about representations and specifically to represent how others are representing a cultural object (Pylyshyn, 1978, p 593). Husserl’s distinctions among the different forms of intentionality in relation to different senses of the same object is a meta-representational theory of mind. The aim of the section is to show the value of a meta-representational theory of consciousness that discerns specific sorts of relations to objects of different kinds. Meta-representation is: “Explicit understanding ... that one and the same representation can have different interpretations” or perspectives and this is compatible with hermeneutics (Perner, 1991, p 102).

Meta-representation in this context means being able to account for the overall empathic phenomenon of appreciating that another person is turned towards specific objects in specific ways. Others have their views of a cultural object that are quasi-given to selves. Selves have their view of the cultural object that is given first-hand to selves and quasi-given to others, when they empathise selves. Intersubjectivity needs to be teased apart so that action and reaction can be interpreted. It is claimed that Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation has provided a suitable template to discern the givenness of the other and meaning, that will support a useful understanding of the quasi-givenness of the meanings of others, the communal or public meanings that individuals can make their own.
Husserl's work is interpreting the human intentional situation as a *meta-representational theory of mind* (LI I, §15, p 293/60) of the sort that has made its mark in developmental psychology (Perner, 1991). In empathy meta-representation is representing that another person is representing. What quasi-appears is their perspective on an object in some way. The outcome of empathy is admitting and organising the totality of the cosmos of shared meaning to consciousness. Husserl's perspective on intentionality and co-intentionality shows such distinctions in the experiencing of others. Any failure to acknowledge or portray the other's perspective can be understood as a less than adequate understanding of human being in relation to the world (and does not involve meta-representation). Transcendental philosophy begins with the discussion of conditions of possibility and the *Fifth Meditation* is a statement of the conditions of possibility for meaningfulness of any situation. The stance is to consider noesis-noema correlations where different forms of intentionality pertain with respect to the givenness of specific types of appearance. From 1912, Husserl's pure psychology considered how mental processes "as such" could represent cognised being (Id III, §§8, 9). The question is how to establish differences among the forms of intentionality.

The topic under discussion is the difference between appearance and being as intentional forms. Perner writes that representations that "serve that function" of "close causal contact with the world" are "primary representations", (1991, p 6). The same sense of intentional distinctions and similarities occurred in Husserl. Perner continues:

Misrepresentation occurs when the system is not functioning properly ... *secondary representations* are purposely detached or "decoupled" from reality and are at the root of our ability to think of the past, the possible future, and even the nonexisting and to reason hypothetically ... metarepresentation [is] ... the ability to represent that something (another organism) is representing something. Since the distinction between what is represented (referent) and as what is represented (sense) is central to the concept of representation, metarepresentation requires understanding of this distinction ... Primary representation has to occur before secondary representation becomes possible, and secondary representation has to develop before the concept of representation can be represented (metarepresentation).
What the above means is that there are differences in mental process, and between different intentional relations that contribute to different perspectives on the same referent. This needs a clear example to make the assertion more tangible. Relating with others most often happens without reflection. But that can be rectified through proper clarification. In the everyday life, most often, to accept the psychological reality of clients means taking them at face value and not thinking about how they have taken up a position, with respect to their position in life and their problem. Only further reflection, reasoning and contemplation can reveal how a person has adopted a perspective. Only further interpretation can begin to understand what that perspective is, with respect to psychological knowledge and understanding in general. So, there are further ramifications of Husserl’s position as expressed in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*.

There are many simple and compound types of being aware. Husserl’s work is to distinguish the forms of being aware of objects in their basic types. Some of the types of intentionality can be listed as follows: (1) perceptual presence without identity and temporality are most basic; followed by (2), perception with identity as the next higher; then (3), the pure presentiations, such as imagination, recollection and anticipation; then (4) picturing presentiation, as the next most complex; and leading to (5), empathic presentiation of the perpetually quasi-given sense of the other and their perspective; and then the move into (6) the conceptual forms of intentionality which are not given perceptually. As Chapter 7 showed, the point about empathy is to elucidate the mental activities that are hidden, in an intellectually legitimate way. Empathy works through the perceptual intentionality of the other’s body carrying a number of associations of sense that signify the givenness of the other’s perspective. These senses also adhere to cultural objects that can be understood in a manifold of perspectives.

Instead of stating that there are oxymoronical ‘unconscious senses,’ that are the obscure products of unconscious processes. It is here asserted that the psychotherapeutic attitude of providing psychological help is attending to intentional implications between self and other in a social microcosm. Theory for practice can follow a tradition that attends to the difference between consciousness and co-consciousness; rather than referring meaning and cause to inanimate being. Husserl’s
ability to distinguish the forms of intentional relation, the manners of reference, is more adequate than Freud’s. The function of theory is to link between instances and provide direction, to point to what is important. Theoretical statements serve the purpose of commenting on any specific instance within their region of applicability.

Marbach explains the sense of ‘psychological reality’ that occurs in the mental processes of his own remembering of having been of sitting in a café in Venice, as follows:

There is no second Caffè. Ontologically speaking, there cannot be an image without a vehicle of it, carrying its appearing, and since I am in no way conscious of such a carrier when I rememberingly refer to the Caffè, but am conscious only of the Caffè itself, it would seem clear that recourse to a mental image of the Caffè supposedly in the mind, cannot be accepted as an account of the phenomenon of re-presenting the event to be preferred to the descriptive account in terms of I-displacement.

Marbach, 2000, p 86.

The point is that for empathy, it follows that there is no other current empathic or perspectival psychological reality than the one that appears for consciousness, according to the hermeneutic beliefs and attitude taken. But this does not mean that people can only gain one view of a person or object. This ontological position needs careful thought. For instance, the reality given by physics is a relevant perspective on material being. But when it comes to the world-for-consciousness, there are no pictures or schema neither in the mind nor in the unconscious.

What is required is a stance that enables the discussion of types of intentionality in relation to the enmeshment that is the shared life. It is a necessity in theorising people in general, in the human sciences or therapy. Kern and Marbach make it clear that “in a Husserlian perspective... it is a question of understanding that a person represents the world in a certain way, namely, that she mentally figures to herself ...the world ... it is a matter of understanding the motivational connections among intentional experiences taking their course through time ...and [how a person] posits them as real (‘believes’ in them) or abandons them as merely apparent, or unreal”, (2001, p 78).
Through meta-representation it is possible to understand the empathised mental states of others, so as to detect and comment on their potentially incongruous, deceitful or truthful intentions, claims, affects, portrayals of affect and thinking. Incongruity can appear currently as it happens or retrospectively, after the fact. There are different manners of signification, expressiveness and responses. It is further possible to distinguish single and complex forms of incoherent and inadequate types of communication, by taking up new perspectives in order to consider a cultural object.

Meta-representation concerning the difference between that which is attainable perceptually and what is unattainable currently, temporarily or permanently, are key distinctions in knowing what are one's own limitations, and hence, what forms part of oneself and the capabilities of others. Meta-representation appears in judging the following differences:

- Self and other can both tell the truth about their perspective on the same object and such perspectives can be true and different. It is a further step for the two people to be able to agree each other's perspectives as valid. Disagreement is the case where the other's perspective is not valued but dismissed or in other ways argued as being faulty or incorrect.
- Imagination is not the same as perception. Both fearful anticipation and psychosis seem to begin, for instance, sometimes as an inability to limit imagination to that which is perceptually based. Imagination can express wish, desire and possibility. Anticipation concerns future possibility. For instance, some wishes, thoughts, desires and imaginations can only remain unfulfilled whilst others are fulfilled eventually perceptually in experience.
- It is possible to distinguish the intersubjective function of an intentional form in various ways. For instance, with respect to affect as a cultural object, it could be defensive, maintain an existing power balance in a relationship, prevent change or make security of attachment increase or decrease. The same object could have many teleological functions among beliefs, emotions, relationships and associated experiences.
- Conceptual intentionality expressed in speech or writing, could be attempts at lying, cheating, manipulation or examples of fearful or depressive rationalisation. In other cases, thought can be about inaccurate beliefs concerning the creation of assumptions that are incorrect or about beings and states of affairs that are argued to be false. Such hindering beliefs might need to be teased out and disputed in order to provide help.
Belief means that some experiences are sponsored by an adherence to an intellectual position: they occur through adherence to an intellectual stance, rather than an actual attention to phenomena.

The consequence of not adopting meta-representation is that others' perspectives cannot be accounted for. To have an inadequate account is as bad as not accepting that others have a conscious perspective at all. If it is agreed that the major phenomenon of Objective understanding is that all persons have perspectives on an Object, then theory should follow suit. If theory cannot or will not follow suit on this phenomenon, then the interrelation of perspectives will not occur. Because the perspective of the other is important, therapy should attend to meaningfulness of conscious experience as a priority. Only then will it be able to pick out the salient details in clients' lives and in their current interactions.

The phenomena mentioned above do appear in the writings of therapists but they are not brought together into any overall cognitive-affective theory of the constitution of meaning, and are not related to the interrelation of self and other. If nothing else the Fifth Meditation is a first sketch of intersubjectivity in a way that does not involve natural causality. The following psychological propositions are stated as being some theoretical guidelines requiring further development. The perspective of therapists and clients are conjoined by Husserl's inter-perspectivity.

The importance of hermeneutic beliefs in therapy is that clients can be interpreted as holding beliefs that determine their behaviour, emotion and relationships with others. Furthermore, through believing one way or another, people come to hold beliefs about themselves which are related to their connection with others. Hermeneutic beliefs play a major role in the psychological life. In the professional sphere, beliefs are theoretical and justificatory with respect to the different fields of therapy. Theoretical beliefs tie together disparate aspects of practice, supervision, empirical research, the understanding of psychopathology and its cure. For instance, beliefs define cause and effect, identify specific behaviours as more problematic than others, and consequently outline the direction in which clients should move in order to decrease their problems. In short, beliefs indicate the area of movement and future progress.

A guiding thought in this analysis is the assumption that beliefs guide actions. Indeed, by observing actions, it may be possible to discern what beliefs are manifest. The content of belief is that they can vary in their accuracy with respect to the same
referent. This can be demonstrated when the nature of the experience of clients is put back to them as a form of statement that is easily accessible to them, concerning the pushes and pulls of what they have experienced. For instance, pointing out that a bullying boss is similar to a tyrannical stepfather, and linking that to the anger and fear felt in the presence of the current boss. Furthermore, rationality or fearful emotion, for instance, can govern the link between belief and action. However, in conclusion a rationality of some sort is assumed to be discernible among intersubjective events. There is not chaos but a regular structure.

Rather than no link between past and present, the thesis accepts that there is an influence but that it is impossible to verify “transference interpretations” because the referent can never be re-observed. However, current relationship events, and this form of evidence, is argued as being more certain ground because it attends to recent perceptual intentionality for client and therapist. Husserl and Perner share compatible versions of the same theory. For pure psychology mental processes produce mental objects. Whilst not all mental processes are conscious. They do occur in varying amount of proximity to the ego and can be understood. The upshot is that to think psychologically is in part to differentiate intentional forms.

Belief is an important topic because it is interpretable in the experiences of clients. For instance, a business man and expert in his field is fearful of meetings. No one has ever challenged him or criticised him. Yet he is anxious for three hours prior to a meeting and he becomes claustrophobic whilst in a meeting room. It can be interpreted that he believes that his social performance is poor. This belief is not explicit prior to its interpretation by his therapist. Yet once mentioned it can be accepted or rejected as an explanation of why he is anxious. The course of therapy includes helping him re-evaluate his beliefs about himself and his relations to others. Eventually, he comes to accept that his social performance is good and that his belief is more coherent with evidence of the totality of his experiences in business meetings.

Beliefs occupy a hermeneutic role in that they explicitly (or implicitly) can be interpreted as providing ontological answers to the nature of the communal life. To believe and interpret what exists is to believe and represent a cultural object as understood in some way. the manner in which the beliefs accrue can be seen by experienced therapists of any sort as having occurred at a specific time. Although these explicit or implicit beliefs are accurate or inaccurate concerning the psychological cultural object as a referent in some context, they can be interpreted as responsible,
of the problematic experiences, relationships, emotions and other aspects of clients. This means that the problematic beliefs of clients become manifest in their problematic emotions, thoughts and relationships. Therapy adopts an interpretative stance and can know that it does this in order to help alter the relation between parts and wholes, and between senses of a referent. Beliefs can be partial representations as opposed to the whole possible set of beliefs about a referent. Beliefs interpret a referent in some way. Beliefs are senses of a referent. These beliefs are socially learned through experiences in the family, abuse and in other ways.

The function of theory is to point at what is important. In this case, it is important to distinguish through universal consideration about what is co-occurring with all meaning and intersubjectivity. In Husserl’s language, doxic acts of belief refer to all potentially existent referents. In other words, what is of concern is how doxic acts refer to existent or believed but non-existent psychological objects.

This distinction is redolent of a passage in the Logical Investigations where the image of a map as a representation for a territory is used and belief is connected to its possible fulfilment.

The real basis of fulfilment does not lie in ... [a word] at all, but in a plainly signitive intention intertwined with it... an intention pointing beyond the apparent object, and thereby characterizing it as a sign. The analogy of what appears and what is meant, which may be present... The outline of England as drawn in the map, may indeed represent the form of the land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes when England is mentioned, does not mean England itself in pictorial fashion... it is not the object imagined in the latter (the map), which counts as the very thing meant by the name, but the original object which the name represents.

LI VI, §20, p 727-8/XIX/2, p 74-5.

The map-territory distinction is a vivid metaphor to describe the difference between linguistic knowledge as it refers to its referent. The map-territory distinction is a fruitful one insomuch that the map is always simpler than the territory it represents yet
has to be of sufficient complexity for it to function. For instance, if all specific instances of the territory of consciousness were put onto the map of phenomenological knowledge, then the map would not function to guide other travellers because it would show too many details. Husserl’s method of cartography for psychology is a universal one that should show the invariants of consciousness for all persons who can then ‘read’ in the manner he defined. The map-making process of seeing a priori essences of real conditions requires phenomenologists to see their own intentional relations ‘on behalf of others’.

In terms of the ‘maps of the world’ that distressed persons have, it is possible to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate versions with respect to the territory of intersubjective world: This is Husserl’s intentionality which is equivalent to the topic of meta-representation. In another wording, the situation of suffering is motivated by having inaccurate maps of belief about Objectivity and intersubjectivity. It is the quality of understanding, empathising, that lead to intersubjective distress. Poor reasoning and implicit or explicit beliefs contribute to unsatisfying relating to self and others, and towards poor ego- and other-constancy and affect-regulation. Bad maps and poor map reading contribute towards the inability to satisfy one’s basic needs.

In the domain of understanding consciousness in its intersubjective matrix, if one phenomenologist were to follow precisely what Husserl had defined and the map produced did not show invariant features for another phenomenologist who had done the same, then the method and the map would not be sufficiently defined or generalized. Therefore, one criterion for a good phenomenological map is that it should be sufficient to enable persons to move around the same territory with ease. Accordingly, some aspects of the territory are omitted, for the reason of creating a useful representation with respect to the actual territory. The map itself is a generalised form, showing the interrelations of key features.

However, in trying to ascertain the accuracy of the Husserlian map, the knowledge born of an accurate relation to the referent, there is the question of how we use any other knowledge to relate, criticize or develop Husserl’s approach to a territory. How can we judge that one map is better than another? There are many

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1 This same idea occurs in another writer: “important characteristics of maps should be noted. A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness”, (Korzybski, 1933, p 58). Terms such as “mapping” and “modelling” could also be used.
potential interpretative perspectives.

It is argued that a meta-representational picture of consciousness has advantages over other types of theorising in that it distinguishes between a manifold of senses and their referent. The advantage of a meta-representational understanding of consciousness and intersubjectivity is that there are marked differences between:

- Perception or primary representation in the five senses of what is current.
- Presentation or secondary representation occurs in empathy, recollection, anticipation, depiction or imagination, for instance.
- Mis-representation of the differences accuracy and inaccuracy, true or false, occur with respect to what is held to be the case, as opposed to what self or others might mistakenly believe to be the case.

These distinctions were explicit in Husserl’s theorising about intentionality: For instance, picturing presentation involved in visual works of art occurs through a “difference between “picture” and “depictured””, (Id I, §99, p 245/210): Meaning that in the case of visual art, the canvass is perceived; whereas the scene that it is about is presentiated, depicted in the canvass. Husserl’s work is a legacy of taking consciousness seriously and being able to create a theoretical discourse about how people are aware of meaning and relate to the same meaningful objects in different ways. Examples include distinguishing an instance from the generally truthful case; not mistaking the model for its actuality. Or distinguishing between perception, imagination, speech, delusion and hallucination, and involuted cases such as imagination of perception, imagination of empathy, etcetera. Meta-representation is understood as crucial to psychological mindedness, contextualising the awareness of one’s own relationship to others, and the Objectivity of cultural objects in the cultural world. Meta-representation, the representation of representations, is at stake in Freud but in an inexplicit manner because he classed dreams and transference feelings (mis-empathy) as hallucination. The proposed solution to this is that Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation is meta-representational in nature. This stance is argued to be a criterion for the success or failure of therapy concepts and practices.

One developmental psychologist in particular has promulgated empirical work on the basis of a meta-representational theory of mind. Such a stance is acceptable to Husserl’s phenomenology. Perner has done the most to establish an experimental position with respect to the referents—of different types of mental process and the cognition of reality. The work of Perner and colleagues is a genuine example of
applied pure psychology in developmental psychology. Perner concludes that "metarepresentation is in fact indispensable for modelling the information-gathering process and thereby understanding how it works and how one can improve it so that the model of reality reflects as accurately as possible", (1991, p 40).

One empirical finding is that three-year-old children “cannot answer explicit questions about why a person knows or doesn’t know something”, (p 151). Perner and colleagues also show that the adult experimenters’ requirement for a verbal response from a four year old is what inhibits the ability of children to communicate their understanding. When children are permitted to point, or can answer by merely looking in the right direction, or are permitted to respond with physical activity, they point at the right answer in meta-representational experiments when they are three. The main finding was that children greater than three years old are able to make “a distinction between representing a fact and making a judgment about a fact”, (Clements and Perner, 1994, p 377).

Wimmer and Perner (1983, p 103) noted that five to six year olds could tell the difference between a lie and a mistaken assumption 94% of the time as opposed to 28% of the time for four to five year old children. Peskin (1992, p 84) concluded that: the “success of the older children in concealing information indicated their new representational understanding that to influence another’s behavior, one must influence that person’s mental state”. Botterill and Carruthers conclude on behalf of Perner that “theory of mind development cannot be explained in terms of quasi-scientific theorising, because scientific theorising would be entirely impossible without mind-reading ability”, (1999, p 94): a reinvention of Husserl’s wheel.

‘Mind reading’ in an approximate sense, or better “empathy” in Husserl’s sense, is empathising within the intersubjective world about common referents and different perspectives on them. It is a condition for rationality and experimentation. For instance, it has been shown empirically that children who have more siblings are likely to pass the false belief test earlier than those who have less siblings. One interpretation of this is to conclude that empathic ability, that employs imaginative transposal, is move adequately developed through early socialisation (Perner, Ruffman and Leekam, 1994).

The meta-representational theory of consciousness could play a wider role in therapy and the human sciences in structuring empirical work and research. Meta-representational theory enables consciousness to be understood in its intersubjective
habitat. Some developmental psychologists have found a focus on the differences in perspective between self and other to be an inspiration for further theoretical and experimental work in deciding how children, during the first four years of life, gain a representational theory of mind (Wimmer and Perner, 1983, Clements and Perner, 1994, Peskin, 1992, Perner, Ruffman and Leekam, 1994). This model has been commented on and found of potential use. It is close to Husserl’s position of transcendental intersubjectivity and has been presented as an explanation of psychological reality. This thesis holds a meta-representational theory of mind. Clients understand themselves and others, in relation to the whole of humanity. Therapists understand themselves and clients, with respect to the same whole, but seen differently.

1.12 Maintaining ontological dualism for psychology

People and meanings appear in their own way but interpretative stances appear linguistically. It is difficult to work out what Husserl meant by the attitudes towards the lifeworld, when the Lebenswelt is the ground of Geistes and Natur, and there are two other attitudes towards spirit and nature. The ground of the lifeworld would seem to overlap with the spiritual-psychological or intentional attitude, (Kern and Marbach, 2001, p 76, p 80), and it is sharply demarcated from the natural attitude of psychophysics. The stance of the thesis concurs that mental processes are never observable in themselves because they co-occur with observable bodily and spoken communication.

The topic of the Lebenswelt or lifeworld in Husserl arose as a potential answer to overcoming the ontological duality of Geistes and Natur. The “pre-given world” of psychology as a theme appeared in Phenomenology as a Foundation of the Sciences (Id III, §17, p 79/92) and in Ideas I, it was clear that consciousness and the world are co-apriori: Sense-bestowing “consciousness ... exists absolutely and not by virtue of another sense-bestowal ... the world itself has its whole being as a certain “sense” which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field where sense is bestowed”, (Id I, §55, p 129/107). What comes across during the 1920s is that the lifeworld is the genuine ground of all meaning and that it provides a specific shape to human knowledge and understanding.

From Logical Investigations, Philosophy as Rigorous Science and other works, it is clear that natural psychological science cannot occupy the role of epistemological
foundation. Husserl wanted to overcome the ontological dualism of Geistes and Natur by attending to the lifeworld as the genuine ground: Because “every differentiation of the sciences which is clear about its origin must be carried out by a return to the experiential world”, (PP, §7, p 47/64). The Fifth Cartesian Meditation is the best example of the universal a priori structure of the lifeworld that relates self to other consciousness and to the mutual cultural object, as Chapter 7 has shown. The demonstration of a concrete universal structure would bring with it “the corresponding form ... for all possible sciences... We survey all its exemplary forms which are familiar to us from our experiencing life and inquire after what is typically universal, and even so universal that we find it in every world-experience”, (PP, §7, p 47-8/64-5).

As Ideas II and the Meditations make clear, pairing by association is the linchpin in creating habituated senses and constituting all kinds of composite meaning. Understanding speaking or silent other persons (and the case of any cultural object) occurs through pairing by association in the lifeworld and that cannot be taken away even by the most severe of all reductive abstractions, the reduction to the own world. This is Husserl’s challenge to Freud. Husserl’s pedigree is that he is the true heir of Kant. Husserl’s advantage is that he has paid attention to the conscious givenness of the other in determining transcendental propositions about the conditions of possibility for communal intentionality to create Objective sense.

In Crisis, the lifeworld was given a polythetic definition and was no longer ‘silent’ as it was in Phenomenological Psychology and Meditations. Bernet, Kern and Marbach assure readers that the experience of the lifeworld “is thus no longer a mute, preconceptual intuition, but rather the experience of the actually present [aktuell], concrete, historical world, together with its cultural products... a living participation in the cultural world”, (BKM, p 222). Also, it is interesting to note the method that Husserl advocated for transcendental phenomenology in the Crisis. Husserl requested phenomenologists to become disinterested in everything except for consciousness, so it becomes possible to find oneself caught up in the lifeworld in order to understand the aims of others. An “absence from every attitude interested in this respect in truth or falsehood” enables such a revelation (BKM, p 227). Although Husserl did not use the word “free floating attention,” the attitude is recognisable as non-participant observation on concrete human existence, to enable the lifeworld to manifest itself in its particular form of givenness.
Where non-phenomenological, natural forms of science go wrong in their involvement with transcendental realism, is that they mistake the part for the whole. What appears for natural science is dislocated from the domain of conscious meaning. For Husserl and phenomenology, meaning in the intersubjective lifeworld, in the context of history, is the proper ground. The human habitat is primarily a meaningful one. It is a perversion of thought to consider natural science as the proper representation of this fundamental situation. Natural science can only ever be derivative with respect to the qualitative ground of the lifeworld.

Let us take these topics a little further. This thesis does not believe that it is any simple concern to make assertions about how consciousness works. Accordingly, to state that there is equivalence between meaning-for-consciousness and material events within the neurology, chemistry or the physicality of the body, is to state a contradiction. On the one hand, meaning and meaning-for-consciousness - and, on the other hand, material events in the living human being - are two very different domains. For Freud or psychodynamics to claim there is a dualism is to collapse the distinction between consciousness, self-consciousness and meaning for it - and the physical substrate which cannot be conscious. Despite Husserl's efforts to overcome dualism, Ströker maintains that he was unable to do so. If she is correct, his dualism is one that takes "without question the difference between body and soul as it had been historically prefigured in a dualism of the two sides of the human subject" and attends to "different modes of givenness, which he could make transcendentally perspicuous in detail only through a number of abstract divisions", (1993, p 131). Husserl's dualism is not the same of Descartes and both identify a genuine distinction. To proclaim that all of what Descartes wrote on dualism of the body and mind is a problem that has been overcome is to deny the differences that the *Meditations on First Philosophy* commented on. Descartes' analysis of the being of consciousness, as different to material being, is a useful counter-assertion against natural psychology which would have therapy believe that the genuine way forward is only to focus on inferable mentation (the "computational level" in Smith, 1994, p 149) or such a level in relation to the neuroscientific perspective. Naturalism means that the true ground for therapy as a natural science is to prefer natural being in order to understand meaning (sic) and so prefer natural science over hermeneutic inquiry.

What is acceptable for this thesis is the stance of ontological dualism as it applies to the two types of givenness of consciousness and the living body in
psychological context, as they appear to consciousness. Descartes wrote: “It is true that I may have ... a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing”, (MFP, p 54). To an extent this is similar to the Husserlian account of noematic givenness of two facets of human being, the living body, Leib, and consciousness embodied in it. Descartes developed an account of the relation between consciousness and body:

In fact I have never seen or perceived that human bodies think; all I have seen is that there are human beings, who possess both thought and a body. This happens as a result of a thinking thing’s being combined with a corporeal thing... Also, the fact that we often see two things joined together does not license the inference that they are one and the same; but the fact that we sometimes observe one of them apart from the other entirely justifies the inference that they are different.

p 115.

The quotation above argues that consciousness and the body are two different forms of givenness despite their interpenetration. This is a conclusion that Husserl supported for pure psychology, a perspective that works within the nexus of realism to an extent. In comparison, Freud’s philosophical and psychological stance is incoherent. He is clearly against a dualism that attends to conscious meaning; and for a natural science approach of psychological energy, unconscious mentation and neurology that has somehow reconciled the difference between meaning-for-consciousness - and the material nature of the living body. Therefore, a philosophical and psychological question is ducked rather than answered by Freud.

The point of the mass of background material presented above is to show some of the details of the relevant debates that exist within the areas of Freud and Husserl studies.
Appendix 2
Interpreting the *Cartesian Meditations*

Aim: The first section reinforces the conclusions provided by Chapters 6, 7 and 8. The remainder of the comments are on the *Cartesian Meditations* literature.

2.1 The analysis of phenomena and elucidation

This section further considers the detail of the argument and distinctions Husserl made.

Phenomenon P1: Perceptual givenness is the type that appears to the perceptual senses in the current moment, the original temporal field. It is a mixed representation overall.

Phenomena P2a, b, c, d: There are of several different types of presentiated givenness. They occur with forms of adding sense to a perceptual object. Empathic presentation is one of these types that occur in the specific generation of the sense of other people, their perspective on the cultural object and world and have cultural senses.

Phenomenon P2a: The givenness of the other concerns understanding other persons as *Leiben* fellow human beings who are physically separate to self yet persons who participate in the shared meaningful world with self.

Phenomena P2a, b, c, d: Empathic presentation extends to the ability to transpose oneself imaginatively into the perspective of the other, in order to imagine their view on the same cultural object that appears to self. But for the other, the object appears from a different perspective. It is assumed that self is able to do this successfully by Husserl.

Phenomenon P2b: The phenomenon of specific expressive nonverbal meanings of the other is constituted according to specific gestures of their body. The nonverbal expressiveness of the other's body acts as a carrier or signifier for a basic sense of meaningfulness of its movements and potential movements.
Figure 2 repeated - Phenomena for elucidation, P1 to P8.
The presence of knowledge and understanding of any sort, when attended to in the attitude of analysing its genesis, show two related phenomena, P3 and P4. Instances of understanding one object may change across time but its referent does not: Husserl’s empirico-idealism. All understanding has a primal institution.

Phenomenon P3: In the case of the other, there is a first-ever occurrence of otherness. This is the result of a genetic eidetic variation and is only experienced as an imagined possibility: It can never be seen and is not remembered.

Phenomenon P4: There is a first-ever sense of self co-occurring with the first-ever sense of other.

Then there are a series of phenomena that refer to intersubjective life.

Phenomenon P5 includes all phenomena concerning the senses self, other and human reality: Intersubjective life is the whole that verifies and nullifies all senses of self, other, world and objects in the world. Specific parts of the overall intersubjective experience can be identified as Identically self and other. Therefore, P3, the Identical other in self, is modified when it applies to other persons.

Phenomenon P6: The usual sense of the transcendental ego excludes all otherness from itself even though it is the source of such sense. The transcendental ego, like the other, is empathic or co-intentional; Identical; has a paired sense to intersubjectivity through understanding itself as a Leibkörper; it is leibliche and perceptual.

Phenomenon P7: The transcendental ego has a bodily absolute givenness Here with potential verifiability. As regards its body, the transcendental ego is comprised of three elements. There is the on-going sense of Leib; the understanding of oneself as a Korper in space that is visible to others; and the amalgamated sense of oneself as Leibkörper. There is a transcendentally reduced sense of self that includes intersubjective senses in itself and appears to others as a cultural object.

Phenomenon P8: There is a forced reduction to ownness where only the correlates of self appears, the own world or Lebenswelt, and the consideration of intersubjective phenomena that remain, includes empathising other selves and their constitutive processes as inferences.

The following links occur between the phenomena and the transcendental distinctions that can be gained from considering their possibility.

The difference between phenomena P1 and P2a, P2b, provides the distinction that perceptual givenness and presentiated givenness are not the same. In connection
with the cognitive assumption, which assumes it is permissible to assume cognitive activity, all senses are assumed to have been constituted by consciousness.

Phenomena concerning presentation and development of understanding over time, provide the distinction that the primal institution is the first-ever achievement of the sense of an object of any sort. This also applies for the primal institution of the sense of the other, P3. Not seen but drawn from eidetic necessity.

Phenomenon P5 provides the distinction that the observably Identical referent means that specific noeses can refer to it in different ways yet still recognise the Identical. Husserl concluded that Identical senses of self, other and their difference are maintained. (In the case of the sense of the Identical senses of self and other, both these and their Identical difference, are constituted by consciousness, because of the cognitive assumption).

Phenomenon P1 provides the distinction that the transcendental aesthetics of thing-constitution, of the perceptual object, is the lowest form of the recognition of any Identical perceptual object. Once that has been intentionally achieved, empathic presentation is assumed to follow a similar course: that it too is a specific type of addition to human beings but at a higher level that requires there to be further additions of sense.

The remaining distinctions concern intersubjectivity and how empathic presentation 'is with the other' that show the Objectivity of cultural objects for self and other.

The differences between various aspects of self provide the distinction that there is a first pairing between the three aspects of self and the possibility of similar perspectives on the visual object of the other's Körper.

Because of phenomena P1 and P2, there arises the distinction that people are spacially separate. The sense of first-hand otherness remains other to self.

Because of comparison of reflections on phenomena P2a, P2b and P2c, the distinction arises that the sense of the other is a complex modification of the sense of self, including leibliche and körperlich aspects, plus further pairings of sense still to be identified.

Phenomenon P2b provides further understanding of the nature of a second pairing that occurs between self and other, such that the other's Körper comes to be understood as a meaningful object that has its own living body, Leib.
Because of phenomenon P5, vice versa, there is reciprocity and universality between self and other.

Because of phenomenon P2c, there is an imaginative transposal of self in to the position of the other, with respect to what appears for the other, as self imagines it to be for the other there.

Because of phenomenon P2d, a third pairing occurs between the senses of self and other that are constituted by imaginative transposal. How the self empathically imagines the other to understand the cultural object, is added to the self's sense of the world for the other and the Objectivity of the object.

Phenomenon P5, the verification and nullification afforded by everyday intersubjectivity provide the distinction that what is verified are the imaginatively transposed senses of presentation constituted by self. P2d is sustained through further comparison and through a fourth pairing of senses. And so for the Objectivity of the object and understanding.

Because of the prior phenomena, the everyday intersubjective life is intelligible because of the regular elucidations of possibility for the concrete lifeworld and its Objectivity identified above. Non-verbal interrelation of consciousness for the other, and the shared understanding of the human body, is the bedrock of transcendental intersubjectivity, the conditions for intersubjective-Objective meaning.

Finally, each individual consciousness and person has a common understanding of the same cultural objects, Objectivity and world. It is claimed that the phenomena of intersubjectively understandable Objectivity, verbal communication and the socio-cultural and historically developing whole are understandable according to the conditions of possibility above.

There are problems with the interpretation (section 8.1). The remainder of this section comments on the cohesiveness of the distinctions made in the Fifth Meditation with respect to the overall stance of transcendental phenomenology and its intersubjective idealism. The following remarks appraise the overall cohesiveness of Husserl's stance as it might be contradictory or between the distinctions he drew. The cohesiveness between distinctions is cross-referred according to numbering. As a first criticism here, it should be noted that Husserl is positing that he has been able to identify non-self-sufficient moments of a whole that is self-sufficient. The manner of assessing the Fifth Meditation is to ask how well the phenomena and distinctions have
be shown in the text; and if the manner of interpretation is sufficient to catch the nature of the phenomenon of consciousness. The question of the success of this account is answered in the negative for reasons of a lack of adequate detail in the text. Supporting details may well be in the Husserliana volumes or the Nachlaß. The distinctions that Husserl made are now listed and questioned in turn.

D1: Perceptual givenness and presentiated givenness are not the same. In connection with the ‘cognitive assumption’ that consciousness constitutes all objects, both types of senses have been constituted by consciousness. But, it is not immediately apparent that presentation is an appresentation or that presentiation is not the same as presentation, perception. When Husserl concluded that presentiation is “not inference, not a thinking act”, (CM, §50, p 111/141), he argued for inherent reasoning to occur from out of the distinctions themselves and played down his own emphasis on the workings of the higher conscious processes that occur in interpreting such forms of meaning. Distinction D1 needs to be rethought.

D2: Primal institution is the first-ever achievement of any sense of an object of any sort. But if the urstift is not experienced but forgotten and unobtainable, there is no account of how this type of distinction of the presence of the past in the present comes to be plausible within the Cartesian Meditations. Nor is there any account concerning how the first-ever achievement of the other gets up-dated throughout the lifespan in the text. The details of these important conclusions are simply omitted. Distinction D2 needs further showing of its basis for it to pass.

D3: The observably Identical referent means that specific noeses can be Identical also. In the case of the sense of the Identical senses of self and other (P5b), both these and their Identical difference are constituted by consciousness, following the ‘cognitive assumption’. It is assumed that there is constancy of self and other, and there is an intersubjective relation between them, of a particular type. This makes a paradoxical finding. Self and other are clearly not the same, but their intentional interrelatedness is such that they ‘face’ each other. Distinction D3 implies that the whole already exists and has been at work prior to any turn to reflect on what appears for the ego. This is because if there is an Urstift of the other (D2), there has been an on-going whole of prior self-other experiences that has accrued over time.

Another way of summarising this distinction is to state that all monads are intertwined and co-dependent on their empathic interconnectedness. This is backed up by: “Yet every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs
in the former sphere. Whatever he constitutes as non-other... is inseparable from his concrete being. The transcendental ego constitutes... the "Objective" world, as a universe of being that is other than himself - and ... the other in the mode: alter ego", (§45, p 100/131). Yet the mode of givenness of the other person is achieved "in a manner that excludes an actually direct... showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism... a showing of them in perception proper", (§50, p 110-1/140). For their consciousness never appears to self. Therefore, the private ego co-exists with the public merger. The major finding is "what is mine in my world-experience ... my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other", (§44, p 98/129). Husserl is making a paradoxical conclusion. "The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world", (Crisis, §53, p 178/182). Like so many theories, idealisation takes place in order to explain what appears. For D3 to stand, it would be necessary to check with psychological reality in some way: Hence empirical psychology is required to respond to the conceptual claims of pure psychology.

D4: The transcendental aesthetics of thing-constitution, of the perceptual object, is the lowest form of the correlation in the recognition of the Identical perceptual object. On the contrary, it can be argued that the empathising of a human being is a much more complex sort that does not rely on the identification of an Identical thing or begin with the recognition of the other's body as a perceptual Korper. A human being appears as one instance of a highly variegated set of human beings, nothing like inanimate things. It might be better to argue that there are types of human expressiveness and that one person is acting like one of those types or employing one of a number of cultural forms. As it is presented in Meditations, D4 cannot stand as it fails to attend to the pre-reflexive presence of meaning of the other and its contexts.

D5: There is a first pairing between the three aspects of self. The self is reflected on from different perspectives. There is a question concerning the extent of pairing by association generally. In "the case of experiencing a physical thing ... what is there perceptually motivates <belief in> something else being there too", (CM, §50, p 109-110/139). Readers are told that specific noeses correlate with specific types of objects. But there might be all manner of non-specifiable pairings occurring. Because of the overlapping nature of meanings, it is difficult to distinguish shades and nuances of non-verbal behaviour from its meaning. If we accept that the non-verbal meaning of
behaviour is posited as being the root of meaningfulness, it is the case that specific gestures, body positions and facial grimaces, taken as a whole, may mean something specific yet such meanings are not without ambiguity. There is scope for miscommunication in non-verbal behaviour as the type of signification is less precise than spoken language. D5 Cannot stand without further showing of its basis.

D6: Self and other remain separate to each other, never having each other’s consciousness first-hand. It is clear that the other is an intentional modification of self, and vice versa, the other’s sense of their other, is a modification of their sense of self. Both are mutual and, simultaneously, ownness is comprised of my accumulated self, but linked to, and in contradistinction to the other, the current perceptual Körper and their actuality in a real context. It is unclear where these nested processes begin and end. The consequence is that there is difficulty in proving by showing, in Husserl’s phenomenology. D6 can stand because the intersubjective connection does not include telepathy, which would take further careful work to delineate as a phenomenon.

D7a: The sense of the other, constituted by empathic presentation, is an intentional modification of the sense of self. A second pairing occurs between self and other. Husserl claimed that the first and second pairings must involve an urstift. But no sufficient account of its occurrence is given. It is entirely opaque to argue that it must happen, because nothing of the original object appears and it must be inferred or elucidated. One of the major principles Husserl held was that theoretical attention must be given to what appears. Yet presented senses quasi-appear and the meaning of the body of the other is immediately apparent. But to elucidate presented senses, that are no longer present, cannot be recollected and cannot be felt first-hand, is most difficult as they belong first-hand to the other, their motives and intentionality. Examples can be imagined and do not particularly help to set phenomenology on firm ground. Rather, such a procedure may help it stay within the limitations of the experience of one theoretician. This is perhaps why Marbach argues that pure psychology must turn to empirical psychology in order to look at exemplary cases there. Something similar could be done in the case of psychotherapy. D7a cannot stand as it is worded because it does not include the sense of intersubjective responsiveness sufficiently.

D7b: Vice versa, there is reciprocity and universality between self and other. When the elucidation of reciprocity and mutuality is further considered, it becomes difficult to know where to draw the line between the ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ between two instances of consciousness. Stated in another way, human intersubjectivity requires the
contributions of two or more persons and is not about the predictable effect of one person on the other. Indeed, human interaction cannot be viewed as the natural causation of one thing on another thing, without the possibility of it being otherwise. In intersubjectivity, in the phenomenological view, events could be otherwise as free will obtains. D7b can stand as an accurate account of intersubjectivity.

D8a: There is an empathic imaginative transposal of self in to the perspective of the other, with respect to what appears for the other, as self imagines it to be over there. Empathic presentation of the other is when “I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is”, (§54, p 117/146). Husserl asserted there is a potential interchangeability of perspectives in empathy, so much so that it could be referred to as a theory of ‘co-empathy’ in that mutuality and reciprocity are included. There is not just a ‘one way’ attention towards the other, or only one view of the world and its cultural objects. Therefore, Husserl’s account warrants serious contemplation of the plurality of senses and perspectives that can arise about the same referent. The account ‘contains’ relativism, so to speak, because it refers all possible perspectives to the absolutes of what appears for intersubjectively related instances of consciousness. This is born out by the treatment of relativism in The Crisis where this thesis concurs with the account provided by Soffer: “Husserl explicitly embraces a limited version of relativism... at the level of the concrete lifeworld”. He did not abandon “the absolute, or the idea of philosophy as a foundational discipline capable of attaining this absolute (...as universal intersubjectivity)”, (1991, p 143). Indeed, this thesis wholly agrees with Soffer that relativity and non-relativity exist in The Crisis: “Every people has its “logic” and, accordingly, if this logic is explicated in propositions, “its” a priori”, (App VI, p 373/382). Husserl meant that common sense is relative to the specific intersubjective group that shows some constant, universal and ubiquitous parameters.

As noted in Chapter 7, one moment of Husserl’s argument rests on the truth of mutual reciprocity and mutual natures. The sense Leib, that one person adds to the other, is linked to prior empathising of what it would be like for oneself to be like the other, but ‘over There’. Thus, in transposal a regular set of empathically imagined senses is potentially created, based on the categories of Leib-Here and presentiated-Leib-There. On this basis, it is deemed possible that one can appreciate the points of view of others. Therefore, for Husserl, there is the eidetic possibility that the recognition of the other’s perspective is possible through the capability of
interchanging ""from here"" with "corresponding to the change of position that puts me "there"", (CM, §53, p 116-7/146). If this were not true or faulty, then mutuality and reciprocity would fail. It would be more sobering perhaps, to consider those cases where mutual understanding fails and conflict arises rather than to only consider the optimistic view that agreement can occur. D8a can stand if it also includes the phenomena where there is failure or lack of clarity to understand the other.

D8b: A third pairing occurs between the senses of self and other concerning what has been empathically imagined for the other. Husserl alleged that it is possible to verify the Identical self, other and their difference. What is referred to in this statement is the great mass of social reality and its action of verification or nullification in so supporting or disconfirming true belief. Given that there is so little concordance and agreement in history, between cultures, the genders and the races, there is doubt about how to include these aspects. But Husserl was focused on a most fundamental situation, deeper than mere agreement or disagreement. So D8b may pass as a possibility but would better to be rethought in relation to a wider account of intersubjective reality.

D9: What is verified is the imaginatively transposed sense of the presentation constituted by self. Everyday intersubjective life is intelligible because of the regular conditions of possibility identified above. This fourth pairing seals all the moments into a cohesive whole. But there is a significant problem with Husserl's wholistic stance. Husserl wrote that it is the universe of self, other, their difference, temporality and world-time form that together comprise the meaningfulness of world (§55, §56). The problem is that causation is implied: all the moments are necessary for the whole to be as it is. If one of the moments were absent or different, the explanation of its conditions would not be the same. Also circularity is present: The One World stance both plays a role in forming the solution and is proven as a result. D9 can stand as a possibility. Life is the teacher, if only we know how to learn from it.

Husserl's concept of verification of otherness is related wholly to the constancy of identity and non-identity. Identities as sameness, and non-identity as difference, refer to judgements that obey some inferable rule about their degree of sufficient similarity or difference. From the point of view of one observer, difference might be present whilst another might see similarity. For there to be constancy of self and other, one that overcomes any temporary confluence or identification, in the context of lifelong social experience, verification has to overcome temporary mistakes. In order to
maintain the verification between self and other in society, requires there be a self-reflecting and self-correcting capacity, concerning how individuals maintain their own ego, over the lifespan, in relation to specific and general others. Without such abilities, Husserl's ideas about verification of otherness do not work.

Consciousness and the intersubjective intentional implication between instances of consciousness are the fundament through which intersubjective Nature enables intersubjective Objectivity to occur in an intersubjective world. In other words, identity and difference of meaning, self and other are maintained whilst all moments of the whole contribute to the overall effect. Or in a different but equivalent language, the conditions for the intersubjective Objectivity of the world are the proclaimed result.

It is quite comprehensible that, as a further consequence, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "higher psychic sphere" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world - for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. Higher psychic occurrences, diverse as they are and familiar as they have become, have furthermore their style of synthetic interconnexions and take their course in forms of their own, which I can understand associatively on the basis of my empirical familiarity with the style of my own life, as exemplifying roughly differentiated typical forms. In this sphere, moreover, every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations.

§54, p 120/149.

The case above specifically mentions the ability to understand another who is "angry or cheerful" and that specificity is the end product that occurs when all the moments (essences, a priori) conditions are in place. Husserl is concluding that the Objectivity of cultural objects, other persons and the world, is the result of these necessary moments
of the whole. This conclusion is vulnerable because of all the criticisms listed so far. The passage above could be read in many ways that would take phenomenology in other directions.

D10: Through the nine prior distinctions of possibility, cultural objects have an intersubjectively understandable Objectivity. Empathic presentation extends 'through the other', not just providing their sense, but to providing the sense of the cultural object that others have. For Husserl and his structuralism, there is concordance between the immanent and transcendent correlations between consciousness and world, in forming a basis for higher, intersubjective intellectual and cultural structures. It is assumed that the Identical in the noema appears which indicates the eidetic structure of consciousness and the Identical form of the noeses involved. A good deal of idealisation and simplification has occurred in Husserl's account and major topics like naturalising, assuming cause and effect, not attending to correlation, not attending to the signifying practices of culture and society - etcetera - have occurred thus jeopardising the credibility of Husserl's analysis in Cartesian Meditations. However, as an account of the phenomena of the other, there is the 'positive' or 'optimistic' occurrence when we do accurately grasp what the other feels, thinks and experiences. Objects do exhibit cultural senses, as do persons. The accuracy of understanding though, is not guaranteed by a transcendental a priori account alone. Its function is to sketch out what might be possible through thought alone.

2.2 Expert readings

Since the publication of An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Bernet, Kern and Marbach in 1993, it would be impossible to ignore the interpretative help that Kern provides in clarifying the ambiguities in Cartesian Meditations. Kern explains that Husserl's original text contained a confused terminology, something that Husserl did not realise until shortly after completing the work (BKM, p 159). Kern notes that Husserl questioned the statements in Cartesian Meditations in several texts that are not yet published in English (p 261). Empathy is the constitutive synthesis involved in gaining everyday senses of others and One World, as it was in 1912 (Id III, Supp I). The analysis of presentation is built on the model of perception (BKM, pp 141-154). The presentation corrects Husserl’s own inaccuracy and thereby produces a reading of
the text more in line with the later writings of *Husserliana XV* that do not contain such confusions.

There are only two really insightful discussions of the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* by Kern (BKM, pp 154-165) and Ströker (1993). But even these are overly condensed and omit some of the steps and the overall significance of the work. Kern, writing in *An Introduction* points out the confusion concerns not sufficiently distinguishing that the reduction focuses on absolute consciousness (CM, §47, p 104/135) and the best form of evidence (p 105/135). Kern points out that the equivalence between the own world, *Eigenheitssphäre* and the *ursprüngliche welt* or *sphäre*, is that they refer to absolute consciousness and pre-reflexive processes. However, there was a subtle difference for Husserl also discussed the role that *Originalität* or *ursprünglichst* evidence played. Absolute consciousness is that which has immediate pre-reflexive contact with the other. The ambiguity arises because the givenness of the other is by definition not that same type of givenness of self to self. Therefore, it is contradictory to claim that a pure ego contains within itself the source of all otherness. The further connection with the Leibnizian term “monad” is intended to mean that Husserl is considering general occurrences¹. Kern points out that for Husserl, the monad, reduced absolute consciousness, is interdependent with the totality of all human beings, all consciousness. A single consciousness is not a self-sufficient whole (BKM, p 157-8). This is what is meant to be shown by the full reduction to the wholly genuine sphere of ownness, the pure own world of original givenness.

Ströker makes it clear that the full transcendental reduction to absolute consciousness shows strongly that consciousness is intersubjective, reciprocal and mutual (1993, p 136). She also emphasizes that in absolute consciousness, otherness is always already present (p 135). This is something of a paradoxical conclusion at the heart of transcendental phenomenology. She clarifies Husserl’s analysis by pointing out that the role of the living body is a necessary constitutive condition in that it is engraved on absolute consciousness and the connection to retentional consciousness, through prior learning and association (p 137). The outcome for Husserl’s analysis of

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¹ Leibniz defined the interrelationship between monads in the following way in section 59 of the *Monadology*: “Now this connection or adaptation of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe”, (1714/1991).
public meaning is that the cultural world of the apperentation, of the cultural sense to the cultural object, is not achieved through the constitution of any one consciousness (p 138). The meaning of this perspective is that all intersubjective meanings, be they empathic, cultural, scientific or philosophical, are enveloped in this one viewpoint and method of analysis. The tenor of the reduction to the pure own world is a temporary thought experiment that finds that there is an intersubjective source of mutual consciousness in oneself, as there must be, for all other consciousness (p 139).

Ströker points out a shortcoming in Husserl’s theorising (p 131). Namely, that he should have stayed with an attention to the expressiveness of the other’s body. Thus, the semiotic remarks noted particularly in Ideas II (Supp VIII) and elsewhere, might be sufficient to portray more accurately the givenness of the other and then link self to other in a way that perhaps focuses on the links between gesture, speech and the empathic meaning of the other. Ströker notes that this would entail an exploration of bodily hermeneutics and the constitutive conditions for understanding mutuality, empathy, bodily-meaning and public meaning. Such an approach would pick up the lead made by Ideas III (§2) to begin a somatology of the living body as it indicates sense.

Ströker does not like Husserl’s attempt to consider the semiotic expressiveness of the body but wonders what he would have achieved if he had “proceeded otherwise than on the basis of a traditional, dualistic point of view”, (1993, p 131). Husserl is further hampered by his acceptance of the Cartesian mind-body difference because it should “become clear that every synthesis of fulfillment that aims at the clarification of the sense of my transcendental ego leads back... to my bodiliness”, (p 132). Ströker is correct to point out that Husserl held two opposing views: “he now sought on the one hand to dispel the illusion of solipsism... and on the other hand to broaden the absolute basis of judgement for my ego, so that this basis could become capable of supporting all those sense-bestowing achievements that are not in my power alone to perform”, (p 138). Ströker remarks that Husserl held two views. Namely, (1) that the ego is identically itself, and (2), that the ego is intersubjective, mutually and intentionally implicated with the other. “It is clear then that my empathy... is not sufficient... If I am to constitute others not merely as other subjects in the world but also as a transcendental egos like mine, then I can never attribute the constitution of myself to myself alone”, (p 139-140). Husserl argued by the necessities of parts and wholes. Because it follows that real community is presupposed, there is a paradoxical finding,
“it can be posited and exhibited only in diverse theses that harmonize with each other, but that originate from different singular subjects, presupposes such an intersubjectivity”, (p 142). “Thus there are greater and smaller, more specific and more general communities of subjects, together with their objective correlates, interwoven with each other in various ways,” a cultural or group intentional analysis discerning the intentional relations between specific people and their senses (p 143). Ströker remarks that the transcendental phenomenological picture of meaning constitution is more complex that the tripartite definition of it as ego, noesis and noema. The “very thought of an objectivity that could be constituted from the solipsistic standpoint would be absurd... What is objective...refers to other subjects outside of me”, (p 142).

Marbach provides some detailed background comments on the nature of the implication, or overlapping of cognitive processes, the one with the other (1993, p 85). He also focuses clearly on the One World thesis (p 91). He explains that Husserl believed that each consciousness is ‘split,’ in a non-pathological sense, because of pairing, the ego and empathy towards others. Marbach’s clarification for reading the Meditations is not so much to discuss the givenness of the other, or the empathic presentational synthesis, but to point out that sections 34 to 36 refer to the “parallelism” between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Something which is not apparent in the text by itself (1994, p 197-8). In brief, Marbach emphasises that pure psychology is a natural attitude use of reflection and eidetics; whilst transcendental phenomenology is the full non-worldly procedure. But paradoxically, although transcendental phenomenology is the utmost primordial grounding, it is guided by pure psychology that comes first in exploring that ground.

Three papers by Bernet provide some background information on Husserl’s perspective in comparison to others writers. For instance, Bernet (1998a) compares peripheral topics to the Fifth Meditation mainly in comparison to Levinas. He also discusses empathy and transference by a comparison of Husserl, Freud and Derrida on the sense of the other (Bernet, 1993b). This latter paper is helpful in terms of showing some pertinent distinctions. It has to be noted that even in 1906 Husserl was busied with the nature of empathy and its connection to the ego, for all human beings (Bernet, 1994a). From 1910 onwards, Husserl worked on “extending the transcendental reduction to intersubjectivity”, (Hua XIII, No. 6, cited in BKM, p 154). In 1914, Husserl believed that empathy is only possible by way of presentiating the other’s “point of view”, (Hua XIII, p 329, cited in BKM, p 155).
Of the work of writers who are not Directors of the *Husserl Archives*, those whose comments are most agreeable in their accuracy to the texts include the following. Armstrong is one of the few writers to have understood the place of intersubjective intentional implication in Husserl’s thought (1977, p 6). Armstrong is also correct in noting that perception, even of a simple object, involves and implies the empathic presence of others and their understandings (p 7). He agrees with Natanson (1973, p 32) and Gurwitsch on this central perspective (1974, p 231).

Cairns (1976, p 102) is important in that he provided details of the reduction to the own world and spelled out its difference to the other types of reduction. The same set of interviews with Husserl and Fink provide details on what it means to analyze the transcendental ego (p 82-3). His criticisms of Husserl need careful consideration (1972, p 21, pp. 27-29). Embree (1992, pp 196-208) is one who follows Cairns in wanting to develop Husserlian reflection and focus more on the givenness of objects than on interpreting the intentional forms. In fact his 1997 paper demands criticism (p 289) to develop the work. Kersten (1973, p 135-143) makes critical comments which need attention and he seems to be a relevant player as he was an undergraduate student of Husserl.

Generally, a sufficient background necessary to understand the *Fifth Meditation* has been supplied by the comments in the previous chapters on intentional implication, modification and explication. The *Fifth Meditation* also stands as part of an uneasy transition from *Amsterdam Lectures* (inaccurately recapped by Kocklemans, 1967, pp 429-446) to Fink’s *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (CM VI, completed in 1932). The text of the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* does not compare to the commentary given on the latter by Bernet (1994b) or by Fink in 1933 (1970) and later. It appears that the *Sixth Meditation* is a rough draft that was abandoned and represented Fink’s own work. The marginalia by Husserl and his appendices frequently criticise Fink’s approach. So, the *Sixth Meditation* cannot be used as a study to enhance understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology.

### 2.3 Faulty readings

The rogues gallery of failing to attend to the text includes the following: Schütz (1966), Kocklemans (1994), Alweiss (1996, 2003) and A. Smith (1997). However, it is not possible to enter further detailed criticism of the last two writers at this late stage.
First for censure is Schütz who, although in many ways a supporter and developer of Husserl's work, provided a seriously mistaken critical reading of the *Fifth Meditation* that has unfortunately upheld for many years (1966). Schütz was correct in noting that there is a two-step reduction (p 57). But shortly after this, he stated that it is impossible to perform the procedure (p 59). Schütz is incorrect to think that there are three egos in Husserlian phenomenology (Op cit) for there is only one sense of self, the natural attitude one that has different functions according to the perspective taken towards it. The on-looking part of consciousness, and the absolute consciousness, is not egos in the same sense at all. However, Schütz only provided general comments, that there are two appresentations of sense to the other. Firstly, the addition of a sense of lived bodiliness to the other. Then the other is seen as a co-existing ego in the mode of having the givenness 'There' (p 64). This much is correct.

Schütz then moved into a series of critical remarks concerning circularities that are presupposed in judging the senses of ownness and otherness in self. Such remarks are in direct contradiction to Husserl's principle of reduction, that it is not permissible to prejudge what is self and what is other, in the transcendental reduction (p 65-6). The comments are correct in so much that the manner in which such a judgement is made is intersubjective in origin, and that it is meant to be removed by the reduction. Insomuch that he is questioning the sense of intersubjectivity for Husserl, it seems that Schütz has got a sufficient grasp on the subject and is stating that Husserl should have addressed communication between persons as well, rather than moving to consider some 'wordless' and 'culture-less' perspective (p 75-77).

Unfortunately, Schütz concluded that solipsism arises when the natural attitude intersubjective set of meanings is rejected as a ground for phenomenology. This is obviously a fault for it at once ignores the sense of the transcendental reduction and secondly fails to address the main perspective of Husserl, that meaning is a public affair (p 91). Schütz claimed this final situation is due to the ontological mistakes of Husserl (p 87). Such a comment is entirely contradictory to his own initial opening statement that empathy makes possible reciprocal understanding within a human community (p 52). Therefore, the comments of Schütz are garbled although he made pertinent criticisms on circularity in the method and reasoning of Husserl. Schütz did not understand that there are two absolutes in Husserl's thought (p 167).

Gorner supports the reading of the *Fifth Meditation* as the work of Husserl-the-solipsist but provides some condensed and useful points in terms of emphasizing how
there is a double action of the transcendental reduction (1976, p 61, citing Hua XIII, p 189). He clarifies the processes that are involved in creating the understanding of the other as a person, 'like me', with a personal perspective of their own. Gorner also confirms that the reduction produces an understanding of objects for consciousness, as appearing with a reference to other persons (p 60). Similarly, work by Crossley (1996) is part of social psychology and reads the *Fifth Meditation* as a confused failure to attend to intersubjectivity in an adequate way. This is part of the mis-information effect that abounds in understanding empathy and intersubjectivity in the secondary literature.

Elliston provides good details of the peculiar reduction (1977, p 217) and he notes that objectivity is there for all (p 213). Elliston remarks correctly that at the time of writing, Husserl believed that all phenomenological answers were to be found in the *Eigenheitssphäre* and he provides plenty of details about what appears after the full reduction (p 219, cf CM, §44, §45). Elliston is also correct in naming sections 52 to 54 as the foundation for the analysis of all intersubjective experience and knowledge, and that it involves "intentional overreaching", (1977, p 223-4). Elliston also sides with Schütz in wondering what happens to natural language and meaning, for transcendental phenomenologists. Elliston has difficulty in accepting the tenet that the natural attitude can still be analyzed, by or within, the transcendental one (p 227). So Elliston's paper is of good quality in mentioning these major themes. Cunningham (1976) misses the point generally about the tensions and inadequacies of Husserl's approach. Costelloe (1998) does not achieve much insight in understanding Schütz's picture of Husserl.

Ricoeur provides general introductory comments on the *Meditations* as a whole (1967). His comments are insufficient and do not take the reader to a deep level of understanding similar to that which is provided by Ströker and Kern. Ricoeur is quite correct to note that simultaneously, the other is constituted in me and that the other is constituted as other, different to self (p 116). He is correct in stating that both self and the other belong to each other's world of experience, and that this one world is accessible to all persons (p 117). He is helpful in pointing out that several of the sections of the *Fifth Meditation* can be read together, and that Husserl was providing a progression which ascends from the most fundamental to the highest, cultural senses. Although many details of the alleged cognitive process are mentioned, the amount of detail provided is not sufficient in comparison to Kern's presentation (BKM, p 156). Merleau-Ponty remarked that reflection is necessary, despite his other comments on its
inability to be one that wholly displays everything that the thinker wants to know. We should not be drawn away from reflection but need to focus on “the basic operation which infuses meaning (sens) into the sensible, and which is taken for granted by any logical mediation or any psychological causality”, (1964, p 34).

As regards the remainder of the English language literature on the Fifth Meditation, comments are required on work from the following persons. Welton provides useful snippets from the Husserliana series on Husserl’s own immediate disappointment with Cartesian Meditations and provides a sketch of how Husserl worked to further clarify his position (2000, pp 129, 133-8, 148, 150, 155, 222). The general tenor of these remarks is to further stress intersubjectivity. Strasser agrees that immediately after sending the typescript of the Meditations to the translators, Husserl no longer liked his work (1976, p 15).

Kocklemans is correct to understand the reduction to the own world as a reduction to non-verbal experience (1994, p 283) although the overall standard of his work is poor. Steinbock is correct to quote Husserliana XIII that shows the primacy of empathy (1995, p 53) and he correctly notes that speech has been omitted in the particular case of the Fifth Meditation (p 74). Some insightful comments on association in Ideas II and the Meditations are found in Lauer (1967, p 173). He is correct to note the central role of association between one’s own Seele and Leib and to note the appresentation of this sense of unity to the other. Husserl believed that the presentiated or mediated sense of the other is supported by the first-ever achievement of the pair, self and other. Lauer spots that the Kulturwelt is the basis of the intersubjective a priori conditions for the existence of the shared world (CM, §61, §62). His comments (1967, p 169) are very much like those of Ricoeur (1967, p 117) and Elliston (1977, p 217). Elliston is correct to note layers of constitution of the sense other in the Fifth Meditation but he does not go as far as working out the universal essence of empathic presentation.

Downes makes an introductory comparison to treatments of the problem of other minds (1965, p 253). Downes is noteworthy in that he also realises the centrality of the One World thesis (p 258) and he is able to realise that there is something of a contradiction between alleging that the on-looking part of consciousness is able to generalise its perspective to such a degree that it is able to take up a position of looking with ‘anybody-ness’ and not ‘somebody-ness’ (p 257). The Fifth Meditation could be
read as an answer to the problem of other minds but its form of analysis circumvents 'the problem' as did Heidegger.

Lambert correctly ascertains that the full reduction is meant to remove all senses of intersubjectivity (1975, p 45). Yet Husserl's argument rests on the ability to judge the sense of one's ownness as being different from the sense of the other's givenness (p 47). Lambert makes a number of objections to Husserl's approach on the grounds that assumptions without evidence, let alone phenomenological evidence, are being made. For instance, Husserl assumed that one's own experience of Leib is like that of all other persons. This is particularly strange when the first hand, living, bodily senses of other persons are unavailable to self (p 49).

Smillie provides an interesting perspective insomuch that his comments lend themselves to a semiotic reading of the expressiveness of the connection between the Körper and Leib (1971, p 65). However, there is an over-strong emphasis on the role of the motivating understanding of the other, as having a living body like mine. This does not account for the first-ever occurrence of empathy that happens in infancy. But, Smillie is quite correct to note the shortcoming that whilst infants are turned towards the other, there is no way of being able to see their own face (p 67). However, the emphasis on argument by analogy is misplaced (Ströker, 1993, pp 130-131). Husserl's argument is much greater than just focusing on the nature of the feedback and connection between two types of expressive sign, between the unity of self and that of the other.

Further French writers need to be mentioned for their comments on the other have relevance for understanding the different readings of the same situation. The phenomenological movement as a whole influenced continental thinking about the nature of the other. Notable contributions have been made by Heidegger (Chapter 9), Sartre (1943/1958, Appendix 1.2), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962, Appendix 1.2), Levinas (1947/1986, 1963/1987) and Lacan (1954/1978, Appendix 3.3). But a full discussion of these developments would take us far away from what the function of this account should be for the thesis. Please allow the following remarks to suffice.

Merleau-Ponty's position on empathy and intersubjectivity followed the comments of Ideas II (§21, p 101/95) and discussed "co-functioning" and "intercorporeality". Merleau-Ponty wrote: "We function as one unique body", (1968, p 215). "There is not the For Itself and the For the Other. They are each the other side of the Other. This is why they incorporate one another: projection-introjection", (p 263).
Merleau-Ponty accepted Husserl's position on presentiation and the givenness of the other. To accept this position means to agree with the claim that the sense of the other in the natural level is the production of a connection between self, other and the totality of social life. The sense of the other is a mirage because each consciousness puts it there, in the place of the other, and does so in a regular way. Projections, retentions and anticipations are in an interplay that continues to attain a sense of others as the basis for all public meaning.

Of the remainder of English language works on the Fifth Meditation, background comments have been provided by Hall (1979) who makes generally correct comments without making any piercing insight. Embree remarks on Husserl's paradoxical findings (1997). Spiegelberg has a paper that suggests the possibility of a generally phenomenological-subjective type of analysis, in imagining what it is like to be another person (1980). This transpositional approach is distinguished from empathy proper. What Spiegelberg is discussing is what it is like to move about in another person's world. Not much help can be gained from Stein's doctoral thesis that is not precise in laying out the method or the problem at hand (1989). Other background material is provided by Owens (1970) in a general piece on intersubjectivity.

Some further contributions on Meditations are made by Attig and Spiegelberg (1976) who discuss apodicticity incorrectly. It was not achieved at the time of writing but was an aim. Tripathy (1992) is generally inaccurate about the Meditations. Embree (1997) notes that the reduction to the sphere of ownness is also contradictory in that it is not possible to remove the natural attitude. He notes that the Fifth Meditation is an argument by logic. There are indeed confusions between the constituted and the constituting (p 289). Hall (1979) notes the tension between reducing to a sphere of ownness that correctly knows the whole world (p 15) but he does not note the 'contradiction' of having empathy within a sphere of ownness (cf CM, §44, p 99/129-130). Williams (1989) is an acceptable introductory work. Husserl's image of human beings is discussed by Stack (1974). There is a general discussion of empathy by Bello (1977) and other introductory remarks by Arp (1993). Lacklustre contributions to the literature have also been provided by Boehm (1970), Cobb-Stevens (1983), K. Hartmann (1985), Maloney (1986), Bostar (1987), Mishara (1994), Tharakan (1998) and Carr (1973, p 32-5, 1999).

Some poor papers and books have been contributed by the following persons and are mentioned here for the sake of completion rather than edification. The work of
Kocklemans (1967) is lacklustre in comparison to those contributions noted above. Kocklemans fails to provide an analysis that goes into sufficient detail (1987). A paper by Marsh is noteworthy for being published at all because of its gross inaccuracy in asserting that one’s own Leib is removed by the reduction (1979, p 463, cf CM, §44, p 98/129). Such a mistake indicates the poor state of play in the general knowledge of Husserl’s work. A paper by Zahavi entitled “Husserl’s intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy” is misleading because the body of the work is very far from the stated aim (1996). The paper jumps around a number of subjects without making any specific points or showing Husserl’s development of Kant or response to Hegel.

Haney’s book on the Cartesian Meditations is inaccurate (1994). She interprets the transcendental reduction as removing all conceptualising ability from the onlooker part of consciousness. She writes that a “pre-linguistic, pre-empathetic ego cannot” describe itself. “The primordial ego cannot speak; the solipsistic ego does not cognize the phenomenon of the other; the mundane ego labels the natural, everyday ego which constitutes itself and others as mutual reciprocal subjects/objects in the shared, intersubjective world”, (p 31). Such notions are completely foreign to the text that states quite clearly that there is no such thing as a pure ego without a sense of the other. A further problem arises later, where Haney believes that argument by analogy is taking place (p 119-120). Obviously, this is not the case as Ströker points out (1993, p 130). Consequently, when Haney states it again, the same point needs to be ignored (1986, p 146, 1997).

As a closing comment on The Fifth Meditation, it has to be noted with respect to Levinas, that Husserl took an epistemological and not an ethical approach to intersubjectivity on the occasion of writing the Meditations and in some other texts, but the Kaizo papers are evidence to show how ethics were included during the years of writing and teaching (cited in Welton, 2000, p 260, pp 306-327).

2.4 The difference between adequate and inadequate readings

To focus on the nature of the conditions of intersubjectivity, as Husserl did, is to compare and contrast manners of givenness that comprise the whole of meaning as publicly situated and open to be understood by any person in anyway. But there are rational limits of specific, necessary conditions of thought. The accessibility of the
human world to the meanings of others and the real physicality of material and bodily being is constrained by prior understanding. An approach that focused on the manner of relatedness, could move toward ethics and epistemology or any inclusion of important topics and still remain a phenomenology, as long as it keeps the myriad of worthwhile distinctions actually made by Husserl over the years of writing.

Ultimately, the state of pure psychology in relation to transcendental phenomenology in the Crisis is that pure psychology is abandoned as a mistaken but useful, introductory phase in the development of transcendental phenomenology. Empathy and intersubjectivity are the most central topics, rather than a focus solely on the lifeworld that is multifaceted. There is a large body of works on Crisis that include noteworthy items from Ströker (1980) and Scanlon (1992). One way of considering the Crisis is to think of it as a defence against not being able to admit the mistake of ignoring Heidegger's ontological and hermeneutic themes.

Both Husserl and Heidegger are guilty of hubris in claiming that their positions are absolute ones. Husserl seemed unable to bring himself to give any concessions concerning hermeneutics to Heidegger and dug himself further into an entrenched position as regards transcendental phenomenology. Any possibility of a rapprochement with Heidegger is omitted to save his own project of transcendental phenomenology. The lines toward the other opened up by section 45 of Phenomenological Psychology, or the analysis of the expressive body in Ideas II, are not followed through by Husserl. If Husserl had accepted Heidegger's criticisms gracefully or re-opened the semiotic path that was so clear in 1914 (Bernet, 1988, Ströker, 1993, p 131), this direction might have opened up new avenues of thought that could have showed the reliance of Heidegger's work on Husserl's. Instead, it seems that Husserl chose to ignore Heidegger's position except for the 1931 critique (1997b) and for those remarks that insist that transcendental phenomenology of history is the only true path for all philosophy and the sciences, the dream was not over (Crisis, App IX, p 391/510).
Appendix 3
Heidegger's challenge and the other in psychotherapy

Aim: This Appendix provides material related to the psychotherapy literature and practice. Further affirmation of the genuine matter and style of phenomenology need to be opposed to inaccurate study and commentary. Heidegger’s work and manner of writing must come for critique in comparison to the Kern and Marbach school of interpretation. A number of themes are covered below and should be understood as the discussion of matters that are parallel concerns of the main text. Some brief comments are made about Daseinsanalysis, the only explicitly Heidegger-influenced therapy. But a sustained emphasis on Daseinsanalysis would detract from the aim of the thesis that is to focus on the other as a whole, comprised of developmental and social understanding that enables therapists to meet with clients in an adequate manner.

3.1 Heidegger’s mistreatment of phenomenology in History of the Concept of Time

Heidegger is generally understood as the most serious opponent of the Husserlian attention the ‘superficiality’ of consciousness. The thesis has opposed Heidegger’s influence, in to re-writing Freud’s psycho-analysis by Boss and has showed how there is a richer vein of critique and development by way of Husserl. But something needs to be shown about how at fault Heidegger was in his critique of Husserl. Two specific shortcomings of Heidegger’s stance can be traced back to the 1924 lecture course published as the History of the Concept of Time.

- Firstly, Heidegger did not treat intentionality as intentionality but obscured Husserl’s clear comments in Ideas I on intentional implication and modification and turned away from the phenomena to Greek philosophy. Specifically, he turned away from the phenomena of the different types of givenness and abandoned a possible critique and
development of the investigation of noesis-noema correlates and Husserl’s hermeneutic stance with respect to how different types of objects appear.

- Secondly, in *History of the Concept of Time* Husserl’s phenomenology is defined without mentioning the major focus on the intentional analysis of noeses and what that means (for instance Id I, §99, §111). It is not clear whether this is a purposeful misrepresentation of Husserl’s case or not. However, Heidegger’s critique of Husserl made Heidegger’s phenomenology into an object-related study in the context of ancient Greek philosophy rather than the relation of the being of Da-sein to the being of what exists and how it exists, for Da-sein.

Heidegger’s critique of Husserl in *History of the Concept of Time* can be summed up as follows:

- Nature and consciousness are two ontic occurrences; whereas Being is the first phenomenon, following Aristotle. Being is the ground to be understood phenomenologically with the Being of the intentional, consciousness or Da-sein, as the first port of call: The monumental accusation put to Husserl is that he entirely evaded the call to understand the question of the Being of consciousness: “Husserl’s primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness”, (HCT, §11d, p 107/146-8). And further, “the question of the being of the intentional is left undisussed”, (§12, p 113/157). Leading to the conclusion: “Not only is the being of the intentional...left undetermined, but categorically primal separations in the entity (consciousness and reality) are presented without clarifying or even questioning the guiding regard”, (§13f, p 128-9/178). The phenomena of the Being of self and other is described as even “Da-sein’s being-alone is a being-with in the world. Being-alone is only a deficiency of being with - the other is absent - which points directly to the positive character of being-with”, (§26a, p 238/328). Da-sein should be understood in a double sense: “first, that of the entity which is to give the sense of being originally and authentically; and the other is the determination of the right sort of access to the entity in order to bring out the sense of being”, (§16, p 146/195-6).

- Heidegger claimed that Husserl naturalised intentionality because he kept the separation between subject and object rather than overcoming it: It is claimed that Husserl’s approach is no improvement over the natural attitude. The accusation is that the initial assumption, that meaning and being exist for consciousness, is named as a presupposition and so stated as being-out of court: For “absolute being - ...does not determine the entity itself in its being but rather sets the region of consciousness within
the order of constitution and assigns to it in this order a formal role of being earlier than anything objective... Thus this determination of being is also not an original one”, (HCT, §11c, p 105-6/145). The point is that Husserl is meant to be idealising consciousness rather than attending to it as a phenomenon in the world: “The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy”, (§11d, p 107/147). For this criticism to stand it would have to be the case that Heidegger had circumvented the whole influence of the history of philosophy and gone further toward the nature of intentionality in the world prior any hermeneutic bias distorting his view. Clearly, he preferred argument according to the pre-Socratics.

Heidegger's hermeneutic strategy can be summed up as follows:

- There is a move to hermeneutics as referentiality¹ in the more all-encompassing horizon of historically-inspired retrievals of meaning: “When we ask about the sense of being, then being, which is to be determined, is in a certain way already understood... a wholly indeterminate preunderstanding... whose character can however be phenomenologically understood”, (§15, p 143/193).

- Reductions of a different type show horizons for understanding of the sense of the being who understands beings of different sorts. For instance, Da-sein is the only being who understands self and non-self being and beings. Da-sein has a world. Animals have a sort-of world. Primitive Da-sein has an animistic world. Non-Da-sein being does not have a world.

- Kant's a priori is taken to the horizon of Da-sein's temporality as a finite mortality and comparative history. What is required is a return as a "genuine repetition," a "return ...that goes back prior to the questions which were posed in history, and the questions raised by the past are once again originally appropriated... the repetition ... must bring us to understand that the Greek formulation of the question was conditioned and provisional and... had to be so”, (§14a, p 138/188). On the one hand, Heidegger clearly preferred the Greek conception and yet he also held that: “The more originally and the less prejudicially the elaboration of what is put into pre-view is brought about, the less one uses fortuitous, seemingly self-evident and worn-out concepts which are

¹ More about hermeneutics in Chapter 9 (cf BT, §§16, 17, 31-3, 76).
clear in their origin, then all the more surely will concrete research into being attain its
ground and stay rooted in its native soil”, (§32, p 306-7/423). The point is that this
passage does not make it clear that the majority of Heidegger’s philosophical work
exists as historical comparison where the earliest Greek philosophers are valued time
and again over contemporary ideas.

The argument between Husserl and Heidegger is about what is valued as the
genuine manner of attending to the pristine phenomena of intentionality in its genuine
contexts of others, culture, philosophy natural science and history. From Husserl’s
perspective, Heidegger was wrong to prefer empty philosophising over an attention to
the phenomena. Despite his pertinent hermeneutic criticisms, Heidegger did not do
intentional analysis but made historical comparisons in works like Being and Time and
the Zollikon Seminars. Heidegger’s criticisms fall flat because he cuts out
intentionality from his analysis. Of course consciousness does not appear directly but it
does appear through the givenness of any object through one’s own actions. The
phenomenology of the intentionality of noesis-noema correlations and implications
beats the phenomenology of being-in-the-world and Da-sein devoid of intentionality.

To summarise, a discourse about being does not help because it is an analytic
reading of human being that ignores intentionality and shared meaning in favour of
history. Although history is important it is not as important as understanding
psychological meaningfulness and meta-representing the shared relationship with
others. History of the Concept of Time is a particular case where Heidegger refused to
attend to intentionality and possibly purposefully misrepresented Husserl’s turn to
consciousness, whilst turning his work to non-sensible Being. When taken to
psychology or therapy, the basic stuff of affect, the presence of the past as personal
history, suffering, cause and ‘causes,’ habits of all kinds - are the basic material that
needs to be understood.

Similarly, the influence from 1924 is taken forward into Being and Time. Many
interpretations of Being and Time are simply inappropriate because they do not
understand Husserl’s phenomenology and therefore cannot see how Heidegger placed
his work with respect to the Logical Investigations, Time, Philosophy as Rigorous
Science and Ideas II. Like Husserl, Heidegger worked to replace ‘bad naturalism’ with
‘good phenomenology’. Heidegger provided a hurried sketch in Division One that is a
blur of concepts that do not begin to make a focus until section 69 and Division Two.
However, Division Two is more unclear than the first.

Unfortunately, some of the major commentators on Heidegger who have the greatest familiarity with his work are not translated into English. There are some notable exceptions including a short paper from Dastur (1996), Gadamer (1975) and Bernet (1994a, 1994b). The reading of Being and Time here is influenced by seeing the work as a response to Husserl (among many others) and a critique and development of his position. Lambert (1975) makes a correct comparison to Being and Time where Heidegger wrote that the other is encountered "from out of the world", (BT, §26, p 112/119, where the world is the basis of the understanding of the phenomenologically "secured problematic", §43a, p 192/207). Other sound contributions that have accurately sketched the major themes of Being and Time. A deficient interpretation of Heidegger is provided in the doctoral dissertation by Willbourn (1997).

The core image of Being and Time (§§17, 18), which is that of the semiotics of immediate understanding in relation to temporality (§69). The referentiality and semiosis through which things, persons and the gestures and speech of persons, make sense within the horizon of the world, is a temporal occurrence.

Heidegger was capable of clear writing and presentations of his thought (1997). However, in Being and Time, he chose not to be clear and provides readers with an exercise in style. It becomes necessary to read in between the lines, as well as along them, in order to work out what he had to say, such is the multiplicity of meanings that he called forth. With reference to Heidegger’s disconsolate remarks at the end of Being and Time (§83), it seems that he is unhappy with his analysis, although it is not clear why. Possibly, this is because there is no balancing up of the clear emphasis for the influence of the past in Division One and the less clear emphasis on the future in Division Two, for instance. The major figure of the hermeneutic circle in Division One refers to the influence of past knowledge, or better, pre-reflexive understanding in Da-sein’s being. It is the influence of the presence of the past, in the present, for the future.

Heidegger’s writing in Being and Time is polythetic. It traverses a number of introductory distinctions, before heading off on a new tack. Thus, it provides a movement of continuing clarification. It establishes a distinction early on, and then abandons it for a new term. The experience of reading Being and Time is similar for the struggle clarity itself. Being and Time is as though Heidegger purposefully wished to defy clarity for the sake of making the reader work at making the text meaningful. Reading Being and Time is a lesson in artful hesitation and delayed gratification.

In comparison, it can be seen that for Heidegger, the method of phenomenology is developed through a preparatory procedure of finding the horizon of Da-sein's temporal being (BT, §5, p 15/17). The same investigation is repeated through increasingly more concrete and intricate analyses, by the 'description' of a selection of primordial existentials of the ontological horizon of the world, meaning and temporality (§§69b-83). Some themes within the introductory sections of *Being and Time* provide clues to the most constitutive of Da-sein's being-structures. One clue is the heading of Part One. The heading states the overall aim of *Being and Time*: "The Interpretation of Da-sein in Terms of Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being", (p viii). From this remark we would expect to see Heidegger developing Husserl's eidetic analysis of the temporal structure of consciousness. During the Introduction (§§1-6) we read that Da-sein's being is Sorge and that this is related to temporality in some way (§5, p 15/17, §8, p 35/39). Again, readers are given a glimpse of something of the overall project. Section eight warns, for instance, that the whole of Division Two is only an initial starting point, sufficient to sketch out a basis from which to ask questions about being overall or make explicit the relation of the Temporalität des Seins to the Zeitlichkeit of Da-sein. A clue to this Zeitlichkeit is gained from the nature of its being-in-the-world, a form of being who transcends (§7c, p 34/38), reaches out and beyond itself, in such a manner as to incorporate the Being of other beings and being overall itself. But when so much of *Being and Time* is vague with respect to a formulation of the precise details of how temporality and the transcendence of the world fit together, it can be concluded that there is a fair amount of inconclusiveness for any interpretation.

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2 It would go beyond the current scope of this work to compare and contrast Husserl and Heidegger's positions on temporality. To undertake such a task would mean working through all of Heidegger's output from about 1919 to 1934 and comparing it to Husserl's writing on temporality during the same period. In short, the two perspectives are quite similar, although both writers are neither clear nor coherent in the statements they make, even within the same text (Dastur, 1996). Heidegger's position on original Zeit is almost the same as Husserl's.
Heidegger's claims are only the understandings derived by a single author. However, in terms of discussing pre-reflexive understanding in the passive voice, then this would be acceptable if it were explained (cf §32, p 140-141/150). The question of consciousness, and active and passive process, are ignored in favour of a discourse concerning the temporal openness or clearing of Da-sein's being. There is no rapprochement from Heidegger towards Husserl's stance which is criticized, misrepresented and ignored. Consequently, the position of Being and Time is that all understanding of being appears in the clearing of Da-sein's temporal being, yet the manner in which Da-sein becomes aware is relegated to a mere superficiality in comparison to the fundamentality of the manner of its being.

3.2 Criticisms of the stance towards the other in section 26 of Being and Time

Something like a reply to Hegel is found in Being and Time, section 26. Heidegger claimed that all forms of surface relating are caused by being-with and are identifiable as types between two extreme modes, of either inauthentic leaping in for the other; or authentic leaping ahead for them. The first sort, leaping in, is patronising, disempowering, dominating and controlling the other. Even if such attempts are subtle and unobtrusive or tacit and unnoticed. In this case, Da-sein forces itself on the other and dictates to them what they will concern themselves with: "In this concern, the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him", (§26, p 114/122). It is a deficient mode of being particularly occurring in the attitude of everyday, fallen Da-sein. Heidegger listed some of its shortcomings as ambiguity and jealousy, chattering and fraternising and satisfying the requirements of the they. The opposite direction is to become resolute and to leap head in comradeship: "Resolute Da-sein can become the "conscience" of others. It is from the authentic being a self of resoluteness that authentic being-with-one-another first arises, not from ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the they and in what they wants to undertake", (§60, p 274/298).

The other end of the continuum is a positive and restorative mode of being-with of leaping ahead, where the other is given back their care, Sorge, returning them for the burden and exercise of choosing their own individual possibilities. Leaping ahead is an empowering form of concern that helps other Da-sein because it "pertains to authentic
care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it” as self-possessed (§26, p 115/122). This freeing of the other occurs within “authentic being a self of resoluteness”, (§60, p 274/298). Indeed, an “authentic alliance” is co-operative work on the same project (§26, p 115/122). In terms of the possibility of co-operation between two or more Da-sein, there is the possibility that persons can work towards the same goal according to the way each participant has ‘taken hold’ of their own being, in how they concern themselves in their possibilities towards others: in their attitudes towards others.

For instance, Fürsorge includes sharing food, the style of clothing and nursing (p 114/121). But all such mentions only show Da-sein’s Being and must not be read as psychology. Such an analysis of codes of clothing, forms of caring for others and the types of sharing food are not entered into but would indicate a more semiotic style of analysis of actual instances of Da-sein of the type following what is begun by the remarks on leaping in and leaping ahead (p 114/122). Such an analysis would be focused on the power dynamic between cases of dominance, robbing the other of their burdens and responsibilities; versus freeing the other, being tolerant and considerate. But the brief sketch provided raises the question of the many themes that could be included in an analysis of the ontological structures of intersubjective praxis. From section 26, four sets of themes need to be acknowledged and noted as the full context for such an analysis of being-with, yet they cannot possibly be explored here in a full account of what they might entail. These are the themes of (1) power and self-responsibility; (2) the individual and the collective; (3) authentic and inauthentic; and (4) the associated analysis of Da-sein’s being-with as alienated; fallen, thrown and so forth (§27).

It is possible that Heidegger is suggesting that a politics or an ethics would be forthcoming. Heidegger stated a case for establishing a social history of oppression and liberation, slavery and freedom or formulating a ‘group analysis’ of such current power dynamics in a more applied style. This type of analysis can be found in feminism, Foucault and social history. Another possibility for understanding how Heidegger’s thoughts can be applied ontically is that the type of Being of others can be seen in their

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* Psychotherapy has adopted the same term “alliance” to characterise the type of therapeutic relationships it would like to make with clients.
actions and mistakes, and it is revealed in its assumptions when they project their
world and their preconceptions. But the situations addressed by the terms leaping in
and leaping ahead are only a small choice among many intersubjective possibilities.

3.3 On psychotherapy from a phenomenological standpoint

Although many psychotherapists have taken the word “phenomenology” to try and
explore or inspire how they work and think, the vast majority of these enterprises in
thought fall far short of what Husserl and Heidegger actually discussed. The attempts
at explanations by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Levinas have not helped in
delineating the original concerns.

Jaspers created his own phenomenological descriptions of the experiences of
people with psychiatric disorders and this is a potentially fruitful and necessary line for
phenomenology to pursue. Consequently, his approach is not Husserlian interpretation
of mental processes but it is interesting. Jaspers’ comments on the hermeneutic circle
in the General Psychopathology emphasised the continual possibility of the re-
contextualisation of any interpretation. It is worth noting his hermeneutic stance
because it was a precursor to Heidegger. Jaspers asserted six principles that are
interlocking, if not repetitive.

a) Understanding “meaning demands other methods than those of the natural sciences”,
(1963, p 355). All “empirical understanding is an interpretation;” Therefore,
hermeneutics is ubiquitous (p 357).

b) The whole contextualises each of its non-self-sufficient moments: “Understanding
therefore will push on from the isolated particular to the whole and it is only in the
light of the whole that the isolated particular reveals its wealth of concrete
implications”, (p 356-7).

c) The hermeneut should not decide on any specific understanding too hastily.
Ambiguity is a phenomenon that needs addressing. Human being contains such
ambiguities and contradictions. “We should always look out for possible ambiguities”,
(Op cit).

d) Hermeneutic re-interpretability is forever open and not capable of being closed: “all
phenomena are open to unlimited interpretation and reinterpretation”, (p 356).
Therefore, understanding is inconclusive because of hermeneutic re-interpretability.
Predictions and hypothesis testing lie outside of the sphere of psychology and
psychiatry. "If understanding is inconclusive, then our predictions of what someone will do or how he will behave are equally so", (p 358).

e) Although hermeneutic re-interpretability occurs, and all topics are open to it, it is possible to become more certain concerning specific understandings. "Multiplicity" of "unlimited possibilities of interpretation... does not necessarily imply haphazard uncertainty but can mean a flexible movement within the range of possibility that leads to an increasing certainty of vision", (Op cit). It follows that rationality exists and that some interpretations can be shown to be better or worse than others. Although there is re-interpretability, there is not chaos or a loss of distinguishable criteria for making distinctions.

f) Jaspers believed that it is possible to distinguish between truth and falsity (p 359). For him, phenomenology is about "understanding which illuminates" and "makes us positively conscious of what is". The representation of the nature of the relationship is also borne out by being able to judge between different types of relations.

Phenomenology for Jaspers meant "purely an empirical method of enquiry maintained solely by the fact of patients' communications... The object of study is non-existent for the senses and we can experience only a representation of it... Description demands the creation of systematic categories, as well as demonstration of relationships and orderly sequences on the one hand and of sporadic appearances, unheralded and unforeseen, on the other", (p 55, fn). What he meant was that he wanted phenomenology to be an empirical investigation of the full range of human experiences understood as intentional and meaningful, rather than chaotic. He acknowledged that the consciousness of the other does not appear, so that only conscious communication can be studied. For Jaspers, the scope of the approach for psychotherapy practice should be sufficient to spot regular, definitive patterns and be capable of including and accounting for novel, unique and idiosyncratic occurrences. The consequence for those who accept these tenets is to agree with Jaspers in concluding that personality is inconclusive in a hermeneutic sense. "Personality is always inconclusive and points on to something else", (p 431). "The quality of a man can never be stated with absolute certainty as to the future and, so far as the actual manifestation has gone, can only be fixed in retrospect by ignoring the play of chance and free decision. Personalities are never whole and conclusive. If they were, they would be without life and potentiality, one-sided and stultified, grown into an automaton", (p 434). "We cannot say whether the theoretical concepts of what may
underlie everything do approximate to what ‘really is’ or to what ‘is properly there’. There is no valid theory of psyche, only a philosophy of existence”, (p 551). This latter sentence seems to support the idea that the force of non-empirical stance is sufficient to be correct. Self-reflexively, to accept hermeneutics is to be aware of what interpretative strategy or preferences are being taken towards a specific situation in terms of making sense of it.

The point of this presentation of the early work of Jaspers is to illustrate that the influence of Dilthey was at large in the German-speaking world of mental health before Heidegger. The work of Jaspers has a contemporary hermeneutic quality to it.

Further comments below are based on the reading and an extensive literature search of the leading databases of psychological and psychotherapy literature including Ovid, Medline, SilverPlatter and PsycLIT™. The comments are drawn from an analysis of the available books and papers given in abstract on the databases. It is not feasible to give a detailed analysis with respect to this literature due to a lack of space at this late stage. The following comments concern how phenomenological topics or their equivalents are broached in the natural therapy literature that is theoretical and empirical.

The specific topic of a primordial lifeworld does not arise in the databases of the literature of course. The closest equivalents to this might be worldview, cultural consciousness or the social learning of assumptions about the cultural world. There are writers and researchers who use the natural science mindset and techniques to discuss social learning from an intersubjective and cognitive-behavioural perspective. And there are those writers who discuss themes similar to intersubjectivity under the heading of ‘systems theory’ but the latter writers are using an electronic and mechanical metaphor as the basis of their approach.

Another literature search using the word “empathy,” produced many items of quantitative and qualitative empirical research, but no comprehensive discussions of the theories concerning how empathy occurs. It can be concluded that just about all therapies have ignored hermeneutics with a handful of exceptions (Tuckett, 1994). The constitution of the sense of the other is completely ignored within mainstream psychology. The only places where it does arise are in theorising about object constitution and in ubiquitous but nebulous remarks that the therapeutic relationship and empathy are central topics.
There is the beginning of a philosophy of psychotherapy in the work of Grünbaum (1984), Edelson (1984) and Erwin (1997). Erwin has no account of the psychological world and writes in support of logic.

In some quarters of the UK there is a rumour that Lacan was a phenomenologist, which is entirely untrue. Lacan knew Heidegger personally and translated his work. But what he took from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty was an interest in language, which he developed in his own way (Roudinesco, 1990, p 299). Roudinesco comments that Lacan accepted a turn to language and so he was critical of phenomenology because he sided with structuralism at the time (p 300). Lacan (1977, p 193) comments on “schema L” which is stated as being about how speech unfurls four positions. The schema is given as a Z shape in one paper and as a figure of eight in another work by Lacan and Wilden (1981, p 107, p 267). Lacan seems to be saying that what therapists receive is the unconscious. Little is explained in the presentation of the schema and because it has directional arrows in Lacan and Wilden, it makes more sense to read it as a series of ‘causative’ interactions.

Other→unconscious Subject (das Es) ~ an original trauma occurs
unconscious Subject→object ~ the trauma is held in the infant in its unconscious
object→ego ~ a paranoid and alienated sense of self arises for clients
ego→Other ~ transference in the therapeutic relationship is shown in speech, affect and behaviour.

What Lacan, Boss and Atwood and Stolorow have in common is that they work to criticise the Freudian influence that reifies and decontextualises by focusing on ‘the individual’. Binswanger and Ellenberger could be mentioned but they have not added a great deal.

The work of Owen has been towards establishing the genuine relation between Husserl’s phenomenology (1992, 1993, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) and Heidegger’s (2000a, 2000b), and between Husserl and scientific psychology (Owen and Morris, 1999). Plomin (et al 2000) is a useful work that shows natural science at its full extent but meaning is not wholly determined by the material substrate of “heritability”.

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3.4 Against pseudo-phenomenology

The contributions of Husserl and Heidegger can be compared as alternative versions of phenomenology. To do so is to set a limit on the core concerns of the discipline. But the work of some 'phenomenological' psychologists and psychotherapists is far outside of the core to deserve the name phenomenological because it has too little in common with the original themes. Although Giorgio, Wertz, Ihde and Strauss have appropriated the word "phenomenology" it does not mean that any of them make a priori analyses of noesis-noema correlations or any such activity. This gives rise to "phenomenology" in the vulgar sense of it being a mere subjectivism or description of what exists. Humanistic psychology, existential-humanistic therapy, existential psychiatry and other schools have perpetrated this fault. It is a new psychologism that never understood the old a priori pure psychology.

The size of the problem is much greater than there being some psychologists who have felt that they wanted to develop some of Husserl's ideas into an empirical practice. The fact is that because so few people know what Husserl wanted his readers to do that a whole school of faulty scholarship has arisen that uses the original name but does nothing that the term stands for. Clearly, these writers have not considered the original works in any serious way. Since The Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl argued that concepts should become more valid by attending to conscious experience and mental processes should be related to sensual and intellectual meanings. For Husserl, the unrefined data are conscious, and the refined data are a priori essences, ideas. Giorgio and colleagues have only focused on lived experience as represented descriptively and understood as a focus on object-senses. Accordingly, this pseudo-phenomenology omits entirely the requisite focus on attending to the manners in which consciousness attends to its objects and does nothing to further apriori theoretical research. Marbach (1988a) is probably the best short introduction to what Husserl thought theorising in psychology should be. Giorgi and company are quite happy for phenomenology to be a science and for philosophy to be removed from psychology. The position is a new psychologism and the opposite of what Husserl and Heidegger wanted. Heidegger showed how well he understood Husserl's desire to reform psychology in his first part of Draft B, in response to Husserl's first draft of the Encyclopaedia Britannica paper. Contra Wertz and Giorgio, their reading is not a matter of a new interpretation of Husserl or Merleau-Ponty but a refusal to use his
procedures of a priori, noetic and eidetic research before any empirical work. Phenomenology is not about description without understanding what attitude oneself is in when turning to the objects, in order to understand the relation to the objects and the work that consciousness does.
Appendix 4

The natural psychological science evidence-base for individual therapy

Aim: The type of natural psychological science that is explored below is the standard empirical sort that applies statistics and falsificationism in making its conclusions. Such a type of thinking is close to what Freud wanted psycho-analysis to become. The purpose of this Appendix is to take stock of what has been achieved in creating a consensually agreed natural evidence base about all kinds of individual psychotherapy. The aim is to ascertain if, and in what way, this evidence-base for individual psychotherapy is converging. The potential outcome would be defining in what way there is convergence about 'effective' therapy. The outcome raises questions about a wholly quantitative means for clinical reasoning and evidence-based practice. No specific comments are made concerning the use of statistics and the reliability of the means of generating the findings in the five sources that are analysed. Rather, the aim is to promote discussion and reflection on issues concerning the focus of empirical research as a whole. A guiding assumption is that there is a role for client-centred, need-oriented, useable research which would help with in-session effectiveness and other practical concerns.

The focus of the natural scientific approach is on randomised control trials and meta-analyses for justifying and providing psychological services and therapy. Generally, psychotherapy research considers quantitative evidence that show what sorts of therapy are curative. But this is only one example of what empirical research could be. Currently, psychotherapy research answers one major research question:

Research question 1. How should therapists practice effectively with specific disorders?

The analysis below is proposed as a self-reflexive step in finding out how far randomised control trial (RCT) research has got in answering research question 1. The paper compares the references for specific disorders for individual therapy, to find out how much commonality there is among the recommendations made.
The easiest form of comparison is to display the recommendations of the evidence bases in tables. Five major evidence bases are surveyed. The sources for the comparison are taken from Gabbard (1995), Roth and Fonagy (1996), Division XII of the American Psychological Association (Chambless et al. 1998), Nathan and Gorman (1998) and the UK Department of Health (2001). Four of these five works are interrelated. The Nathan and Gorman book follows the Chambless et al work. The Department of Health recommendations are a development of the study by Roth and Fonagy on behalf of the National Health Service (NHS) Executive.

Table 1 displays the recommendations of Gabbard and his team (1995) from the American Psychiatric Association’s Task Force on effectiveness. The strength of this huge collaborative effort is that psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapies are given room. The Task Force was the first to publish and set down recommendations on what is recommended practice for psychological and psychopharmacological mental health treatments. The work has its worth in including details on good practice and it makes recommendations on how to provide services for eating disorders, for instance. Some details of the size of the research group are provided and RCT findings are listed alongside research that has had group sizes as small as n = 5 with no control group. In criticism, it is not clear which studies are of the preferred RCT format.

Table 2 portrays a seemingly authoritative work (Roth and Fonagy, 1996). But after scrutiny, some of the recommendations in the closing pages of the work are made without substantive evidence. Specific omissions of the evidence exist with respect to two claims. First, the authors claim that psychological education, motivational interviewing and interventions that focus on self-control and behaviour couples therapy were “proven” interventions for overcoming alcohol abuse (p 366). No references are made to this literature and a search of PsycLIT by this writer could find no references in the database. Secondly, the authors claim that cognitive therapy is proven to help schizophrenia but again references are not quoted. A search of PsycLIT by this writer revealed two Chinese language publications that do support this claim but they are not referenced in Roth and Fonagy’s book. Therefore, it is not clear what evidence is being cited to support these recommendations made in the closing pages. Accordingly, it is not clear what evidence has been employed in making the concluding statements on effectiveness.

Chambless provides a set of recommendations that almost entirely support the provision of cognitive behavioural therapy (et al, 1998, Table 3). Chambless and her...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>CBT</th>
<th>Psychodynamic</th>
<th>Other modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>Social skills Benton &amp; Schroeder 1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agoraphobia</td>
<td>Exposure Jansson &amp; Ost 1982, Trull et al 1988</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific phobia</td>
<td>CBT Ledwidge 1978, Exposure Crowe et al 1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised anxiety disorder</td>
<td>CBT Borkovec et al 1987, Butler et al 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual aversion disorder</td>
<td>CBT Kaplan 1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anorexia</td>
<td>Social skills training Pillay &amp; Crisp 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Histrionic personality disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidant personality disorder</td>
<td>Social skills training Stravynski et al 1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal Cashdan 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive compulsive personality disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brief dynamic Winston et al 1994</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - Recommendations on the empirically validated therapies from Gabbard (1995).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>CBT</th>
<th>Other modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol abuse disorder</td>
<td>Social skills McGrady et al 1986, Mattick &amp; Jarvis 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major depressive disorder</td>
<td>CBT Thase et al 1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dysthmic disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal Elkin et al 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panic disorder</td>
<td>CBT Klosko et al 1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social phobia</td>
<td>Cognitive Hope et al 1990, Chambless &amp; Gillis 1993, CBT Scholing &amp; Emmelkamp 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised anxiety disorder</td>
<td>CBT &amp; relaxation skills Durham &amp; Turvey 1987, Power et al 1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline personality disorder</td>
<td>Dialectical therapy Linehan 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidant personality disorder</td>
<td>Social skills Stravynski et al 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - Recommendations on the empirically validated therapies from Roth & Fonagy (1996).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Well-established treatments</th>
<th>Probably efficacious</th>
<th>Probably efficacious other modalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>Social skills Marder et al 1996</td>
<td>Social skills Marder et al 1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agoraphobia</td>
<td>Exposure Trull et al 1988</td>
<td>Relaxation skills Ost 1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulimia</td>
<td>CBT Agras et al 1989, Thackwray et al 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline personality disorder</td>
<td>Dialectical Linehan et al 1991</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - Recommendations on the empirically validated therapies from Chambless et al (1998).
team, on behalf of the American Psychological Association, apportion the findings into gradations of the amount of proven and possible efficacy. But they do not make clear which papers are RCT findings. Furthermore, in presenting guiding conclusions, it is necessary to make critical remarks about the quality and suitability of research but this is not done to any great extent. This aim would have take up more space than has been allocated by Chambless and company.

Nathan and Gorman's recommendations (1998, Table 4) are particularly interesting because they set a chapter on medication against a chapter on the psychological therapies for a specific disorder or type of disorders. Table 4 shows what these editors recommend and a particular focus is made on RCT research. Throughout the book, however, it is not immediately clear which papers follow the RCT standard as opposed to other 'lesser' types of evidence. This book also provides some details of the group sizes but this attention to detail is not present for all the papers cited in it.

Table 5 shows the recommendations for practising psychological therapies within the British National Health Service (Department of Health, 2001). The immediate drawback of this work is that although it does clearly show its preferences for RCT and meta-analyses of RCT work. It also makes clear the very low sample sizes that have been accepted. Given the influential nature of this document in the provision of individual psychotherapy in the UK, it seems odd to be guided by research with particularly small group sizes. Methodological evaluation could play a much greater role in psychotherapy research, but that topic falls outside of the scope of this Appendix.

Comparison of the five tables shows there is little consensus about specific papers that indicate what is effective for a specific disorder. But of the 186 papers cited by the five evidence bases, 164 (88%) are either cognitive or behavioural, eight (4%) are psychodynamic and six (3%) are interpersonal. The remaining eight papers suggest relaxation skills, social skills, brief therapy and educative approaches. The most obvious conclusion is that the preferred modality of the scientist-practitioner model, natural science cognitive-behavioural therapy is the most researched type of practice. But other conclusions can be drawn from a perusal of the first five tables of findings. But the profession as a whole has no consensus and a telling rift appears between those who think there is no evidence to suggest the uptake of cognitive-behavioural treatment (Bolsover, 2002) and those who portray cognitive-behavioural therapy and its RCT format as the winner (Chambless and Ollendick, 2001).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Other modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol abuse disorder</td>
<td>CBT Finney &amp; Moos 1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipolar disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medication compliance &amp; Lithium Cochran 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific phobia</td>
<td>Exposure Marks 1987, Barlow 1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulimia</td>
<td>CBT Fairburn et al 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borderline personality disorder</td>
<td>Dialectical Linehan et al 1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidant personality disorder</td>
<td>Exposure &amp; social skills Alden 1989</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Recommendations on the empirically validated therapies from Nathan & Gorman (1998).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>8 rated reviews</th>
<th>6/7 rated reviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major depressive disorder</td>
<td>Psychotherapy &amp; pharmacotherapy</td>
<td>Thase et al 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agoraphobia</td>
<td>Cognitive Hoffart 1993</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exposure van Balkom 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Stress inoculation &amp; EMDR Shalev et al 1996, Solomon et al 1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised anxiety disorder</td>
<td>CBT Gould et al 1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Hartmann et al 1992</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Recommendations on the empirically validated therapies from the Department of Health (2001).
A second conclusion can be drawn as follows. If each agreed conclusion is permitted to count as one entry in a catalogue that totals all contributions from tables one to five, then each ‘vote’ that accrues indicates replicated support. Further totting up for each type of therapy for a disorder gives rise to Tables 6 and 7 below. The point is to gauge how the evidence base is converging and how a consensus is appearing concerning what are or are not acceptable forms of treatment for specific disorders. Table 6 includes some disorders that have no evidence base to suggest any form of treatment. The allocation of votes for entry into Table 6 was made in the following manner. If there are no results mentioned in the five sets of recommendations, a dash is entered in the table. If there is only one finding for therapies of different sorts, then “no consensus” is entered as a dash. If there are more than two different papers agreed by separate recommendations, then the amount of times the same paper is mentioned counts as a vote for entry into the table. Where the evidence base converges is where more than one recommendation has concluded that the same type of therapy for the same disorder is suitable. This gives rise to the following conclusions across the board.

Psychological science by itself is insufficient in that its manner of conceptualising therapy as some form of effectiveness competition, entirely focus on what type of therapy is better than another one. It is a matter of interpretation as to what the votes of Table 6 mean. Perhaps, the cognitive-behavioural therapies contain within them principles that define good practice for all forms of individual therapy. It is possible to think about tendencies that appear between the lines of what has been shown effective. For instance, encouraging clients to be self-caring, to be informed about the principles of their therapy and to be active outside of the session are general principles that might make all forms of therapy more effective. Another possibility, within the results of Table 6, is that clients may need to test themselves and their beliefs in their problematic situations. If this were accepted as a core theoretical principle for any therapy, it would mean that all forms of therapy might include some behavioural task-setting (exposure therapy) as part of the work.

One question that comes to mind is to think about reasons why there has not been any clear convergence on specific papers among the five sets of recommendations above. If it were generally the case that a specific type of therapeutic approach was suitable for a specific disorder, then more than one researcher would replicate such a finding. But this is not the case. The only cases where there is agreement on what is effective, with respect to the type of disorder, are those in Table 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Consensually-agreed forms of therapy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Substance abuse          | Behaviour - Higgins et al 1993, Drummond & Glaudier 1994  
CBT & relapse prevention - Carroll et al 1994  
CBT & relapse prevention - Carroll et al 1994  
Supportive - Hogarty et al 1974, Gunderson et al 1984,                                                                 |
CBT - Robinson et al 1990, Makowitz 1996,  
Interpersonal - Elkin et al 1989, 1995  
Supportive - Hogarty et al 1974, Gunderson et al 1984,                                                                 |
| Paranoid schizophrenia   | -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
Cognitive - Hope 1990, Chambless & Gillis 1993,  
CBT - Scholing & Emmelkamp 1993, Taylor 1996  
Stress inoculation & EMDR - Shalev et al 1996, Solomon et al 1992  
Generalised anxiety       | Behaviour - Butler et al 1991  
Dissociative identity     | -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Sexual aversion          | -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
Interpersonal - Fairburn et al 1993, Wilfley et al 1993  

Table 6 - The consensually agreed results for axis I disorders between Tables 1 to 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personality Disorder</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paranoid</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schizoid</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schizotypal</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antisocial</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Borderline          | Dialectical - Linehan et al 1991, 1993  
| Histrionic          | -                      |
| Narcissistic        | -                      |
| Avoidant            | Social skills - Stravinski et al 1982, 1994 |
| Obsessive compulsive| -                      |

Table 7 - The consensually agreed results for axis II, the personality disorders.
A second question that comes to mind is the difference between the quantitative research model and the other types of research that are not given preference. The measurable and the meaningful are not mutually exclusive but there is a great deal of difference between the contingency of any set of research clients and the population as a whole. Accordingly, a note must be made of the approved types of methodology and evidence that are currently acceptable and should inform the drive towards clinical governance, evidence-based practice and clinical reasoning. Although the wording differs among Nathan and Gorman (1998) and the UK Department of Health (2001), there is agreement that there are a small number of types of evidence that occur in decreasing importance:

**Type I evidence** - at least one good systematic review, including at least one randomised controlled trial

**II** - at least one good randomised controlled trial

**III** - at least one well designed intervention study without randomisation

**IV** - at least one well designed observational study

**V** - expert opinion, including the opinion of service users and carers.

Department of Health 1999b, p 6.

The way to deliver services that meet clients' needs is more complex than finding out what the outcome results are on average. For natural psychological science, the evidence base is the major means for designing the overall delivery of a service according to the guidance of clinical governance, a new form of management by objectives (Department of Health, 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, Parry and Richardson, 1996). One previous findings in this area was that all therapies were equally effective in providing help (Beutler, 1991).

In consideration of the type of research that is given preference throughout, it should not go without comment that there is an obvious preference for quantificatory approaches over qualitative ones. Clearly, the RCT model is narrowly focused on making comparisons of effectiveness gained under controlled circumstances. In practice, therapists are much more able to be flexible, motivate and meet clients' specific needs as they arise in sessions. Accordingly, there is a difference between **effectiveness** (what happens in real sessions) and **efficacy** (what happens in RCT research). The real situation is further influenced in an uncontrolled manner because clients have different
motivations to work and different abilities to be psychologically minded. Plus there is the factor of understanding co-morbidity of multiple disorders and personality factors, rather than the 'pure' presentations of a disorder in the RCT case. The crucial point is then to assess and differentiate between false and genuine solutions to problems concerning effectiveness. The interpretation of RCT findings as indicating what has efficacy does not account for the skilfulness and the ad hoc ability to create a therapeutic outcome with a client. Accordingly, if there were more of a focus on relationship factors, for instance, it would be possible to differentiate between helpful and hindering types of relating to clients. But this could only be achieved through qualitative means. Indeed, as effectiveness is the aim of empirical research, it would seem necessary at some point to temper the zeal to know outcome effect size, in preference for knowing more about relationship and motivational factors whereby clients can be enabled to participate in their therapy more easily. But it is still the case that clinical governance, clinical reasoning and assessment can be furthered by reading in-between the lines of standardised quantitative findings and by adding useful qualitative data concerning how well clients can differently use what opportunities are offered them.

Substantial criticisms of the natural psychological model have been asserted by some of its own practitioners who have become dissatisfied with what it studies and how it studies it (Shapiro and Elliott, 1986, Stiles and Shapiro, 1989, Stiles et al, 1995).

Another reading of the five tables presented above is to consider that other uncontrolled variables are at play. Standardisation is missing within the appliance of science in the creation of an evidence base for practice, funding and research. A future aim might be to standardise further the use of statistics, randomised control trials and meta-analyses.

Furthermore, there are substantial differences in the quality of the natural science of statistics and methodology in psychotherapy. There are fundamental differences in the quality of evidence that is used for justification and important decision-making in clinical reasoning and service delivery. The types of evidence mentioned above are used in ascertaining the reliability of any recommendations in quantitative thinking. But just because in RCT research, a number of therapeutic approaches to a specific disorder may not have been researched, it does not mean that those approaches should be discontinued. Just because a single RCT study has occurred it does not mean that a specific form of therapeutic orientation is a treatment of choice. Several writers have warned that just because a specific brand name of therapy has been researched, it should not be concluded
that it is the only suitable form of therapy for a specific disorder. What this shows is the interrelation of problems and the belief system adopted in regarding the data. The hermeneutic problems of the natural approach can further teased out:

Initial observation: The excellent organisation of cognitive behavioural therapists and empirical researchers is worthy of applause. The best-organised social systems win as they can create acceptable evidence and perform well according to their own standards. But RCT research is only focused on finding what are effective therapies from the standpoint of what is most effective of change on an averaged-out basis, where large numbers of participants and persons in the control group are required. In reality, there are no pure disorders and no pure therapies (Owen, 1999b).

Problem 1: There is poor science at large amongst natural researchers into therapy (Cohen, Sargent and Sechrest, 1986, Morrow-Bradley and Elliott, 1986, Dar, Serlin and Omer, 1994). Time and again, these researchers break their own rules.

Problem 2: There is no place for hermeneutics within natural research currently. For instance, is there chaos or order within the results? A natural researcher is not qualified to answer to this question. On the contrary to natural science, it is the place of hermeneutics to interpret results and weigh up meanings and emphases. There are no standard forms of meta-analysis, providing systematic reviews and no standardisation in creating RCTs.

Problem 3: Natural research questions and answers do not fit the nature of human being nor psychotherapy. Their approach is not acceptable. There is a further distance between RCT research and research into therapeutic process where the latter can only be investigated through a different type of question and answer. Accordingly, RCT findings are not focused on meaning and process, so cannot answer the more detailed questions that practitioners would like to know.

Problem 4: There is no consensus on what constitutes the appraisal of statistics and interpreting the findings of natural research (Holmes, 2002, Williams, 2002).
Therefore, what is ‘proven’ to natural researchers is that there is an evidence-producing capability.

The meaning-oriented and qualitative-research methods are not valued, and because they are not well organised, they are not able to argue their case.

One solution is to pose answerable research questions and use methods that temper the non-meaning and non-process emphasis, to pose questions that are worth knowing.

It could become possible to be rigorous about therapeutic process, relating and meaning, and so meet clients’ needs.

At this stage in the quality control of research, without scrutinising each paper’s methodology it is not possible to find out if the specific studies cited in the tables above have any genuine claim to statistical or methodological validity. For instance, the minimum sample size varies with the type of analysis being carried out. If the study uses an analysis of variants, the minimum meaningful sample size is 20. If a correlation study is carried out, the minimum is 30. If a factor analytic study of 10 questions were the tool, then more than 100 persons would be required in the therapy group. If there were 30 questions, then at least a thousand participants would be required. Furthermore, the protocol of meta-analysis has been heavily criticised by Erwin who finds it unacceptable to dilute the worth of methodologically sound experiments with those that are less sound.

“There is no argument, or at least none that I am aware of, that demonstrates that any one of these methods is correct and that the others are all incorrect,” Erwin concludes in assaying the logical consistency involved in meta-analysis (1984, p 435). What the references mentioned above do not include is any adherence to standardised forms of statistical testing. The upshot is that like is not being compared to like. Hence, the recommendations of the quantitative evidence base remain disparate attempts that do not support the aims of psychotherapy research. Following Tables 6 and 7, it is here argued that the quantitative enterprise does not comprise an authoritative set of findings. Accordingly, as the quality of the science used is dubious and not standardised, the recommendations cannot be accepted as justification for practice or service provision.

The question that appears for this Appendix is to ask why quantitative research has such a dominance in an area that is notoriously personal, subjective and is potentially resistant to clarity of thought. Again, it is argued that an attention to the perceptions and misperceptions their clients may have about how they are being helped, for instance, that may tend toward them dropping out of therapy, rather than seeing it through to a positive
conclusion. There is a question raised concerning the suitability of Paul's early formulation of outcome research as: "What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this individual, with that specific problem, and under which set of circumstances," (1967b, p 111). Rather than accept this scientist-practitioner model of thought, it is perhaps up to researchers to be more precise about what goes into the search prior to any re-search: that if it is assumed that quantitative questions are the most apt type of question then it is no wonder that there is an omission of details concerning the process of therapy of different sorts. Stated in a different way, perhaps it is the role of RCT research to make one type of contribution that needs to be aided by contributions from qualitative, theoretical and service-provision perspectives.

There are pertinent questions concerning clients' abilities to use what is offered them, for instance. The purpose of research is to inform therapy practice and structure the services provided. One way of making demarcations is to separate services, perhaps in the following way. There can be:

a) Long-term therapists who only deal with the most severe forms of disability. Even these services may need to exclude persons who cannot use or benefit from psychological therapy. It would be interesting to know what factors make people unsuitable for any type of psychological help.

b) Medium-term therapists who specialise in working with medium disability. Some people will have to be referred to long-term or short-term work, so it is necessary to estimate how well they will be able to use what is offered them. Some will have to be re-referred when a new episode of distress ensues, so it is useful to know how to manage their therapies across the lifespan.

c) Short-term therapists in primary care who specialise in sets of techniques that help minor disability. Yet this type of help has limits and so it is necessary to know how it fits with a and b.

Qualitative research could orient itself more to the factors concerning how to place clients with widely different needs into different parts of the mental health services.

What the discussion above shows is that there is a need for research about the pragmatic concerns that face therapists. Specifically, it is not just a question of research question 1, "how should therapists practice effectively with specific disorders?" But it is necessary to consider how clients appear with novel patterns of need, ability and personal history. There is a 'research question'-posed in assessment and answered by referral. Justifications of the assessment protocol and the clinical reasoning that accompanies are
required.

The quantitative research whole, of all relevant RCT and meta-analytic findings, would take a great deal of diligent comparison to scrutinise their methodological quality. Yet, it is most necessary to standardise rules for RCT and meta-analytic formats. At some point in the future, it may be possible to evaluate the types of statistics used along with the sample sizes. The agreement of standards for statistics and methodology would formalize quantitative work and render it more cohesive. It is time for the creation of some guidelines for the future quality control of psychotherapy research and an appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of research methodologies of various sorts.

In addition to the research question at the head of the section, there are self-reflexive and self-regulatory components of research, its self-understanding. With the preference on quantitative methodology, it is not clear to what extent qualitative research can contribute to the aims of answering research question 1. Secondly, at the time of assessment, findings concerning effectiveness are used to answer a second practical question about where clients should be placed between primary, secondary and tertiary services. These questions concern where to place potential clients according to the amount of previous help they have received and estimates of their severity of disability and ability to use what is offered them. The questions are:

Research Question 2 How should the services and access to them be structured? This question could be answered according to some estimate of the severity of disability, distress and co-morbidity of the occurrence of axis I and II disorders.

RQ3 How qualitative research into therapeutic processes and relapse prevention are given a clear remit with respect to quantitative effectiveness research.

RQ4 How can clients best use which types of therapy? In addition, for what optimum length of time? The question concerns how best to place a client within a range of different services that are on offer.

RQ5 How can research findings be used to inform the therapy profession concerning how the troubled mind works and be interpreted to show how therapy helps in different forms of distress.

But this short list is not the full quota of possibilities. What practitioners want to know are general strategies from research findings of all sorts and this type of question is an interpretative and value-oriented question. There are degrees of disability, suffering, complexity of co-morbidity, attachment history and different abilities to use therapies of
different sorts. Further consensus on the qualities of clients who might benefit most from specific theoretical orientations and individual, group, couples or family forms of therapy, would be helpful. A sole emphasis on effectiveness has not produced a sufficient amount of evidence for approaches other than cognitive and behavioural treatments. Perhaps the guiding research question of Paul needs to be recast. It could become: "What principles of treatment, for which client needs is most effective for this individual's ability to participate in what type of therapy in which set of circumstances?"


1 At least another 300 books, papers and chapters have been read throughout the course of writing the dissertation. These texts are not listed in the reference section or the bibliography below because their standard of scholarship was too poor to deserve mention or they were not fully relevant to the topics discussed. The listing includes only those texts that meeting the required standard for deserving comment.


(1921c/1955) Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud,


Chicago: Quadrangle Books.


(1988a) How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 19, 252-268.


