17 Europe in the Middle East

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Overview

In the early 20th century, two European powers dominated the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), transforming ‘the Arab world’ into a system of separate states and facilitating the establishment of a Jewish homeland that became the state of Israel, before retreating in the face of independence movements. By the end of the century, the United States was unrivalled power-broker across the region, but the Europeans had turned old imperialist relationships into commercial ones. Bound to MENA by economic interdependence and migration
flows, the European Union formulated a series of initiatives designed to address new transnational security concerns through the deployment of ‘soft power’, in conjunction with partial involvement in increased US military engagement in the region—with mixed results. By 2011 and the eruption of popular uprisings across the Arab world, the European Union was itself in the throws of an economic crisis that forced a rethink in European policies toward the region and a reassertion of bilateralism. This chapter traces this evolution in relations between the two contiguous regions, noting the interplay between changes in both; it outlines the role of the European Union in the quest to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict; and it concludes with European responses to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and ensuing challenges to regional stability.

**Introduction**

There are four discernible phases to the story of Europe and the Middle East in the last hundred years. The first, spanning the First World War and collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the 1950s, is the era of European imperialism in the Middle East, out of which was born the contemporary state system in the region. (See Box 17.1 for a chronology.)

**<START BOX 17.1>**

**Box 17.1 European imperialism and the emergence of the state system**

**1800s** Britain establishes semi-colonial role (responsible for external relations) in Arab Gulf sheikhdoms (Kuwait, the last to join the British ‘trucial system’, is first to gain independence in 1961; others—United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain—gain independence in 1971)

Separate arrangements are made in Sultanate of Oman (replaced with treaty in 1971) and South Arabia (Yemen), with Aden a British colony (until evacuated in 1967)

**1834–1962** Algeria becomes a colony of France (independent in 1962)
1881 Tunisia becomes a French protectorate (independent in 1956)
1882 Britain takes control of Egypt (officially ends role in 1936, but retains presence until 1950s)
1899 Sudan made an ‘Anglo-Egyptian condominium’
1906 Discovery of oil in Iran; foundation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
1911 Italy takes Libya from the Ottomans (independent, with extended British involvement, in 1951)
1912 Morocco, previously under French and Spanish areas of control, is made a French protectorate, with administration in north ceded to Spain (independent in 1956)
1919 Attempted imposition of Anglo-Persian Agreement
1920–23 France acquires the League of Nations mandate for Syria (independent in 1946), from which it separates Lebanon (officially independent in 1943, French left in 1946)
Britain gains the mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq); establishes Hashemite monarchies in Transjordan (separated from Mandatory remit) and Iraq (independent in 1932; monarchy overthrown in 1958); rules Palestine effectively as a colony, within which a ‘Jewish homeland’ takes shape on the basis of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as stipulated under the mandate
1941 Allied invasion of Iran: Britain in south; Soviets in north; abdication of Reza Shah, succession of Muhammad Reza Shah
1945–46 British and Soviets withdraw from Iran
1948 Britain withdraws from the Palestine mandate—establishment of the State of Israel; West Bank incorporated in Jordan; Gaza Strip under Egyptian administration until Israel captures both in 1967 war

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1951-3
Nationalization of Iranian oil; diplomatic relations with Britain severed; Britain assists CIA-instigated coup to overthrow Mussadiq/National Front government, reinstate Shah, and reverse oil nationalization

1956
Suez crisis

The second coincides with the cold war, during which Europe was part of the Western camp, but the United States unilaterally increased its power and influence in the Middle East as Britain and France retreated. While superpower rivalry was the dominant motif during the cold war, with independent and in most cases militaristic regional states playing off one against the other, the subtext was rivalry between the Western powers for commercial gain.

The third, post-cold-war, period dates from the beginning of the 1990s to 2010, during which time the European Union came into being—briefly challenging US ‘hard power’ with its ‘soft power’ approach to regional developments. The EU member states set about devising a common foreign and security policy toward their neighbours in the Mediterranean, including a coordinated position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but such efforts fell short of turning the EU into a unified actor with decisive influence across the Middle East writ large. Crucially, EU members differed in their reactions to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ensuing conflict in Iraq, inclusive of sectarian violence, defied US and allied European efforts to restore enduring stability and in the case of the British at least, their military performance in Iraq was deemed a failure. The unravelling of Iraq, only partially contained sufficiently for US troops to withdraw in 2011, was a portent of more chaos to come, following the Arab uprisings.

The fourth phase in the story of European involvement in the Middle East dawned at the end of 2010, when the uprising in Tunisia presaged a wave of revolts across the region that took Europe and the US by
surprise, and, in conjunction with the legacy of the intervention in Iraq, obliged both to re-examine their policies and assumptions.

The analysis offered here draws on a number of theoretical approaches. The literature on imperialism, neo-imperialism, and post-colonialism is instructive for understanding: first, early 20th-century European predominance in the Middle East; second, subsequent US hegemony in the region; and third, the legacy of post-colonialism in contemporary European relations with the Arab and Muslim world.

Realism comes into its own during the cold-war period, not least in the cynical commentaries of Arab columnists as a predictor of not only superpower, but also US–European competition for clients, access to resources, and military sales, as well as the paramountcy of military force (Waltz 1979). However, the realist and neo-realist paradigms are limiting, in so far as they reinforce the perception that states are rational actors calculating and acting upon their interests in a global competition.

Issues of identity do not feature in the realist paradigm, yet they help to explain the resistance to and nature of anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism, and the Arab revolts. Critical theory (Doty 1996; Fierke 2007) is helpful in deconstructing Europe’s depiction of the Middle East and its counter-terrorism policy, and related efforts to control migration (Basaran 2008). Recent examinations of narrative construction and multiculturalism, deploying discourse analysis, offer perhaps important insights on the contemporary phenomenon of radicalization in Europe, as well as the Middle East (Roy 2004; Croft 2012). Meanwhile, theories of regionalism in world politics are instructive in identifying how regions take shape, not only internally, but also in relation to one another.

The contention here is that while imperialism was done to the Middle East by Europe, the experience has shaped Europe as well as the regions colonized, and the process is dynamic. The contemporary identity of the EU has been, and continues to be, defined in relation to neighbouring regions, as well as in juxtaposition to the US. Its culture and politics are also informed by Europe’s secular and Christian heritage, and the pres-
ence within of Muslim émigré communities alongside Jewish Europeans, with links including family ties to the Arab world and Israel, respectively.

By the same token, initiatives to develop regional institutions and consciousness in the Middle East, as discussed in Chapter 9, have met with limited results, despite a rare indication of assertiveness from the League of Arab States (LAS) in the context of the Libyan revolt, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) mediation in the Yemeni crisis and Bahrain. Meanwhile, as of 2011, it is clear that the US, even with EU support, is incapable of imposing order on a region overtaken by competing transnational and sub-national actors and forces.

In economic terms, the MENA region is the periphery and Europe the core. In the 1990s, when globalization became the fashionable paradigm, theorists puzzled over whether the Middle East region as a whole and the Arab economies in particular had somehow been left behind in a global liberalization trend. European policy initiatives, especially in the Mediterranean, promoted liberal market capitalism, yet could find no alternative when parallel economic crises overtook the EU as well as MENA from 2009, and populist voices gathered momentum.

Social theory and constructivism are of use here in explaining how depictions of the problems can vary so profoundly from region to region, across and within societies (Wendt 1999: 157–90; Fierke 2007: 75–98). It helps to alert the scholar to the coexistence of contrasting world views and ‘narratives’, which serve a purpose for their proponents, but cannot be reconciled. By 2015 the Europeans were uncertain about the future of the EU itself, yet clung onto their traditional advocacy of human rights, civil society activism and free speech, while seemingly powerless to stop a resurgence of dictatorship in the Middle East.

**Phase I: the imperial era and its legacy**

Early 20th-century European imperialism in the Middle East was almost entirely a British and French endeavour, but the legacy of this period informs contemporary thinking about Europe’s role in the region.
Imperial interests

British and French imperial policies were derivative of their global ambitions and interests. Britain initially sought access to coastal ports along the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea littorals, to protect the communication routes to its imperial possessions in India and beyond. The building of the Suez Canal, which opened a new sea route from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, was a French, and later a British, business venture. It presaged progressive British interference in Egypt and protection of the canal was cited as a reason for British designs on Palestine in the early 20th century.

Britain’s decision to convert its navy from steam to oil was made at the beginning of the 20th century, and prompted its quest to control access to the oil resources of Iran and the Ottoman-controlled province of Mosul (subsequently part of Iraq). Even before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the scene was set for a century of competition between the major oil companies, and thus the governments of Britain, France, and the US.

French ambitions in North Africa were more about extending the francophone empire than securing trade routes. French colonization of Algeria, begun in 1830, lasted until 1962—leaving the Algerians with an identity crisis post-independence. Morocco and Tunisia were made protectorates for several decades. The French interest in the Levant, meanwhile, had in part to do with proprietorial connections to the Christian (mainly Maronite) community in the Lebanon, as well as competition with the British.
The way in which the British and French manoeuvred and schemed to carve up Ottoman domains even before that empire had collapsed gave them a reputation for double-dealing. Three sets of documents, discussed in Chapter 1, bear witness to the machinations that took place, and are important because they are cited by Arabs to this day as evidence of European interference and perfidy. First, the exchange of letters between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, from July 1915 to January 1916 (the Hussein–McMahon correspondence), encouraged Hashemite leadership of an Arab revolt in return for British recognition and support for Arab independence, including in areas that eventually came under British and French mandatory rule from 1920.

Second, in January 1916, a secret agreement negotiated during the previous year between Sir Mark Sykes for the British and François Georges-Picot for the French (the Sykes–Picot Agreement) provided for British and French spheres of influence and control across whole swathes of the Ottoman Empire, including in those areas that subsequently became the League of Nations mandates of Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. In its specifics, this deal undercut the British understandings reached with Sharif Hussein.

Third, in a letter dated 2 November 1917 from the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild, the British minister stated:

Her Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The ‘Balfour Declaration’, and by extension the British, are still held responsible among Arabs for enabling the creation of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, and thus generating the Arab–Israeli con-
flict. The records suggest that the British did not foresee the difficulties that they would encounter in managing Jewish immigration to Palestine or the eventual outcome.

After 1920, Palestine and Iraq were established as separate entities, administered by the British as League of Nations mandates on the way to independent statehood. France took responsibility for what became the states of Syria and Lebanon. British acquiescence enabled the emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, at the expense of the Hashemite emirate in the Hijaz. By way of partial recompense, the British installed Hashemite monarchs in what became Transjordan and Iraq.

These arrangements meant that the Arabs of the Levant and Mesopotamia transited from subjects of the Ottoman caliphate to citizens in the client states of the European victors of the First World War. The new borders cut across pre-existing age-old lines of communication, administration, kinship, and association. Iraq had previously been three Ottoman provinces, not one entity. In the Eastern Mediterranean, economic links had grown up that tied a string of port cities to the towns in the interior rather than to each other, but the mandate system separated coastal communities from those in the interior.

Thus it was that European imperialism came to take the blame for dividing up the Arab world, and for setting up a competitive state system that undercut Arab unity and produced militarist, undemocratic and client regimes thereafter. In the popular Arab narrative, this was an imperial plot to divide and rule, which the Americans stand accused of perpetuating subsequently.

**Phase II: imperial retreat and cold war rivalries**

**Nationalist backlash**

From their inception, in the Arab states the rallying cry became Arab nationalism and independence. Post-independence governments espoused anti-imperialist credentials to bolster their legitimacy. In Algeria, for example, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) based decades of political dominance on its leadership of
the liberation from France. The republicans who murdered the Iraqi king in 1958 overthrew not only the monarchy, but also related British influence.

The British retreated from mandate Palestine in 1948 in the face of two nationalist movements, the aspirations of which they had failed to reconcile. They had repressed Arab opposition to Jewish immigration, but also fell foul of the Zionist movement by attempting to limit the inflow of Jewish migrants. The rise of Nazism and thence the Holocaust in Europe meant that British attempts to block the entry to Palestine of Jews fleeing systematic extermination was indefensible and widely criticized, not least in Washington. Various formulae were mooted for partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs, culminating in the United Nations partition plan of 1947 (UN General Assembly Resolution 181). This was accepted by the Jewish leadership, but rejected by the Arabs.

Lacking the will or the wherewithal, in the aftermath of the Second World War, to implement the UN plan by force, the British simply packed up and left. As they did so, the first Arab–Israeli war, resulting in the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, decided the issue. For the Palestinians, the majority of whom became refugees, the legacy of the British mandate was a catastrophe. For the Israelis, there was no love for the British and a fierce sense that their very survival depended on self-reliance.

The ultimate humiliation for the British and French came in 1956, when they secretly colluded with the Israelis to seize control of the Suez Canal, nationalized by Egyptian President and hero of Arab nationalism, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and to overthrow his government. Furious at their deception, the US administration ordered their immediate withdrawal. To press home the point, the US triggered a run on the pound sterling that was so serious that it forced the British to comply, leaving the French and Israelis with no choice but to follow suit.

France saw Nasser as the inspiration behind resistance to French rule in Algeria. The British encountered opposition to their colony in Aden from rebels assisted by Nasser. In both cases, the imperialists were ulti-
mately driven out. In Britain’s case, the subsequent departure from the Arab sheikhdoms of the lower Gulf was achieved relatively peacefully, by negotiation, in 1971. That finally was the last step in Europe’s imperial retreat from the Middle East.

**Oil wealth and commercial competition**

The year 1971 was also the moment at which the oil-producing states of the region nationalized their oil industries, ending half a century of predominance of the Western oil companies in the energy sector and their control over price levels. The ensuing rise in oil prices, coupled with the Arab embargo on oil sales to Western countries supporting Israel in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, delivered a profound shock to the developed economies. Meanwhile, the oil booms of the mid-1970s and early 1980s fuelled a spending spree in the oil-producing states, from which European contractors and suppliers of consumer goods and arms competed to benefit. The international banking system absorbed surplus Arab capital.

Cold-war rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union encompassed both the Persian Gulf and the Arab–Israeli confrontation zone (Reich 1987). Even though the US came to Nasser’s rescue during the Suez War, its reluctance to finance the Aswan High Dam project or to supply arms led Egypt to turn to the Soviet bloc. Thus began a period of superpower rivalry in the Arab–Israeli conflict, which saw the US take over from France as the principle arms supplier to Israel, and the Soviet Union siding with the Arab republics of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

The Shah of Iran, who owed his throne to British and US connivance in the coup of 1953 that ended both the republican government of Mohammad Mussadiq and nationalization of Iranian oil production, became the principle US ally and proxy policeman in the Gulf. After the British withdrew their forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Washington built up the Shah’s Iran as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and sold him whatever arms he asked for. Saudi Arabia was the other pillar in US Gulf policy.
In the shadow of the US

Since the Israelis were effective in lobbying against the US sale of some high-tech weaponry sought by the Saudis, Britain had Washington’s blessing to make up the difference. This arrangement was behind the British Al Yamamah defence sales contract with Saudi Arabia, which kept production lines of the British Tornado aircraft running pending the development of the Eurofighter. The British–Saudi deal was worth billions of pounds over several years and formed the bedrock of bilateral relations into the 21st century, when a follow-up deal for (Eurofighter) Typhoons was forged.

In fierce competition with the Americans and British, French arms manufacturers ranked third as suppliers to the Arab Gulf states, and alongside the Soviets they were the principle suppliers to Iraq in the 1980s. By this stage, Iraq was at war with Iran. The Iranian revolution that toppled the Shah in 1979 had brought to an end Iran’s special relationship with the US and also presaged an upset in relations with Europe, especially with the British. Even though Iraq was the instigator of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) and a number of states instituted a ban on arms sales to both countries, the Iraqis continued to receive supplies, including covert help from both the Americans and the British.

Following the fall of the Shah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Washington moved away from a policy of securing its interests in the Gulf, including protection of the free flow of oil, by relying on proxies, and became directly involved in patrolling Gulf waters. Washington also gave its backing to the mujahedin and Arab volunteers fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan—the precursors of Al Qaeda.

Meanwhile, in the Arab–Israeli sector, Washington became the principle architect of moves towards peace. The treaty between Egypt and Israel of 1979, presaged by the Camp David accords of 1978, was bankrolled and sustained by US aid to both parties. Relegated to the sidelines, the Europeans used the vehicle of the European Community to articulate a common stance on the conflict, deemed by both the US and
As the transition from the EC to EU drew nigh, Europe was overtaken by the momentous events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. This meant a complete rethink of defence and security issues, as well as a preoccupation with forging new relationships with former Soviet bloc states to the east.

Concerns about ‘failed states’, refugee flows, gun-running, the drug trade, and all aspects of international crime supplanted the old preoccupations of the cold war and the strategic nuclear threat. While the US, the sole remaining superpower, could boast the military capacity to police the new world order, the Europeans advocated, of necessity, the utility of ‘soft power’, international law, and institution-building as the means to contain conflict.

**War, sanctions, and trade**

The scene was set for a decade in which the US and the EU pursued distinct (and complementary) approaches to relations with the Middle East. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the United Nations, Europe, and the US immediately imposed sanctions on Iraq, but it was the US that took the lead in marshalling a massive military force with European backing, UN endorsement, and significant Arab support. After Kuwait’s liberation, the US-led coalition forces dispersed, but a US (and small British and French) military presence was retained in order to contain both Iraq and Iran (Gause 2010: 127–8).

For a time, the Europeans went along with the US-led containment of Iraq, including sanctions and weapons inspections. Britain and France joined the US in imposing ‘no-fly zones’ over both the Kurdish region of northern Iraq and in the south, ostensibly to protect the Shia population there, but arguably more to
defend Kuwait. The French eventually ended their involvement. Only the British stayed the course and assisted the Americans in several bombing operations, purportedly to force Iraqi compliance with weapons inspections, although these were suspended following the Allied Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

With respect to the Arab Gulf states, the Europeans pursued independent and competitive commercial agendas, although the EU instituted a dialogue with the GCC—the alliance that links Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Following the introduction of a GCC customs union, the EU–GCC dialogue was expected to deliver a free trade agreement between the two blocs, but disagreements over how this would apply to petroleum products stymied progress.

During the 1990s, the adoption of a common EU strategy toward Iran proved more productive. The European approach, which favoured dialogue over isolation, was initially dubbed ‘critical dialogue’ and, after the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997, progressed to ‘comprehensive engagement’. Having negotiated the restoration of full diplomatic relations with Tehran, Britain was a full participant in the coordinated EU approach. Khatami made official visits to a number of European capitals, although not London, cementing diplomatic, trade, and cultural links. At the end of 2002, negotiations began for an EU–Iran trade and cooperation agreement, and a dialogue on human rights was initiated. By this time, however, Washington was gearing up for the invasion of Iraq and subsequently, as discussed in the section entitled ‘Phase IV: Europe and the Arab uprisings’, EU relations with Iran became preoccupied with the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme.

9/11 and the ‘war on terror’

When terrorists attacked in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the Europeans were in the forefront of pledges of support for the Americans. The US went on to a war footing and declared a ‘war on terror’, to which allies around the world committed support—at least in terms of security and intelligence cooperation.
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) offered to assist the anticipated US reprisals against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, although the Americans initially preferred to go it alone, with some British assistance. British Prime Minister Tony Blair capitalized on Britain’s improved access in Iran to help secure Tehran’s cooperation in Afghanistan. Germany hosted an international gathering in Bonn, intended to lay the ground for a new democratic polity in Kabul following the fall of the Taliban.

In due course, most NATO members committed forces and aid to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and eventually took overall command of military operations there while US forces concentrated on pursuing Al Qaeda fighters, including Osama bin Laden, along the border with Pakistan. The US and the Europeans underestimated the challenges of reconfiguring the politics of Afghanistan in the name of democracy. Meanwhile, Washington switched its focus to Iraq; in January 2002, President Bush named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’.

As the possibility of a US invasion of Iraq gathered momentum, the Europeans split ranks. The British, along with the US State Department, did convince Bush to take his case to the United Nations in September 2002, and the Security Council agreed Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to submit to new weapons inspections. However, these proved inconclusive, and France and Germany refused to support military action in the absence of UN authorization.

Britain sought UN cover for the intervention that Washington had prepared, but eventually opted to join US forces in the invasion of March 2003 without UN endorsement. European public opinion was largely opposed to the war, although Prime Ministers Berlusconi of Italy and Aznar of Spain sided with Bush and sent troops to Iraq following the invasion. The governments of the East European states—lined up to become new EU members, yet equally keen to support the US—also committed forces to the stabilization effort, but except for the Polish forces, their numbers were comparatively small.
Ultimately, the fallout for European unity and EU expansion was damaging, but not fatal. It did, however, contribute to subsequent timidity in Europe about criticizing Washington’s policies in other parts of the Middle East.

Arab governments were generally fearful that a US success in Iraq could portend a more ambitious US agenda for regime change in the region, but when the occupation met increasing Iraqi opposition in early 2004, fears of a spill over effect in the region loomed larger. Token European support for the rebuilding effort in Iraq also began to peel away as all foreign nationals there began to fear kidnap, and some were executed by the newly emergent Al Qaeda in Iraq and other extremists. After mass attacks on Iraqi civilians triggered sectarian warfare in 2006, the US military was left virtually alone to try to restore security.

In the meantime, a terrorist bombing in Madrid in early 2004, apparently inspired by Al Qaeda, turned public opinion there decisively against involvement in Iraq. Yet even though intelligence assessments indicated US policy in Iraq and support for Israel were contributing to the radicalization of Muslim opinion everywhere, the sense dawned in Europe that the problem was more deep-rooted and at least partly domestic.

In Britain, suicide bombings on the London transport system, in July 2005, and other incidents perpetrated by British nationals prompted the government to pass new counter-terrorism legislation and to re-examine its assumptions about ‘British multiculturalism’. Social tensions in other parts of Europe erupted around areas of urban deprivation and across religious divides. The place of Muslims in Europe became the subject of heated debate and prejudice, with almost all governments introducing new measures to manage immigration, as well as to combat the possibility of terrorism within the EU.

The Mediterranean neighbourhood

The EU is the most important destination for exports from the MENA region, and the overall trade balance has long been in Europe’s favour, although Europe as a whole is heavily dependent on energy supplies from North Africa and the Gulf, and more so than the US. Israel’s primary market is Europe.
These economic ties, together with geographic proximity and inward migration from the Arab countries, Turkey and Iran, to Europe make for a relationship between the two regions that contrasts with relations between the Middle East and the more distant US. Reflecting these differences, European policies in the Middle East concentrated on socio-economic strategies toward their neighbours (Behrendt and Hanelt 2000).

Thus, in their dealings with each other, the Europeans and the Arabs manoeuvred around the imperatives of economic interdependence and attendant security issues in a way that suggests that both were as influenced by political considerations as by economic imperatives.

In the mid-1990s, the EU embarked on a new initiative for relations with its southern neighbours, which was conceived in parallel with its more ambitious arrangements for incorporating former Soviet satellite states into the EU. The central objective was the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean economic area, to come into effect by 2010. The intention was to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products between the EU and neighbouring states on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Taking into account traditional trade flows and existing agricultural policies, trade in agricultural produce was also to be progressively liberalized, as was provision of cross-border services and capital movements.

(A list of successive EU initiatives for the Mediterranean, starting in the 1990s, is provided in Box 17.2.)

<START BOX 17.2>

Box 17.2 Europe and the Middle East since the cold war

1991 Wide European support for sanctions and use of force against Iraq in the Gulf War

1995 The Barcelona Declaration

EU member states, plus Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey, embrace a three-tier agenda for economic,
political and cultural, and security cooperation intended to turn the Mediterranean into a more integrated region

The arrangement becomes known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)

1990s Initiation of EU–GCC dialogue encompassing EU members and the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates envisages the creation of an EU–GCC free trade area

1990s Development of an EU common strategy towards Iran known as ‘critical dialogue’, aims to promote political, economic, and cultural links

2001 Wide European support for the US following 9/11, including NATO support of action in Afghanistan

2002–03 EU participation in ‘the Quartet’ (the EU, US, UN, and Russia) to produce the ‘Road Map’ to promote a two-state solution to the Palestine–Israel conflict

2003 Limited European support for the Iraq invasion (initially supported by Britain, Italy, Spain, and East European states)

2004 Launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) following EU enlargement from fifteen to twenty-five members, to complement EMP; ENP applies to EU’s immediate neighbours by land or sea, with bilaterally agreed action plans for partner states

EU3: a diplomatic initiative involving Britain, France, and Germany to encourage Iran to curb its nuclear enrichment programme

2008 Mediterranean Union: a proposal by French President Sarkozy, builds on the EMP to create a new Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), including EU, North African, Balkan and Arab states, and Israel
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2011 Limited EU support for NATO intervention in Libya

<END BOX 17.2>

In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the fifteen member states of the EU and Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey embraced a three-tier agenda for economic, political and cultural, and security cooperation in the Mediterranean. The EU allocated funds to promote new communication and trade links between the Maghreb and the Levant, and by 2004 was spending about €1 billion a year on the programme.

It was counted a notable achievement of this Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that Syria and Lebanon were involved as well as Israel, notwithstanding the unresolved conflict between them. In the mid-1990s, progress in Middle Eastern peace-making through the Oslo process had been expected to deliver an end to the conflict, and the Barcelona initiative was intended both to complement and capitalize on that process, but not directly interact with it. As it transpired, the EMP survived the demise of the Oslo process, but not without some stormy encounters at ministerial meetings of the participants and the collapse of early efforts at security cooperation across the Arab–Israeli divide.

By 2003, the broad parameters and shortcomings of the EMP were apparent. Instead of an integrated region around the Mediterranean, what had emerged was a hub-and-spokes arrangement, with the EU as the hub connected to each partner state by bilateral trade links, or spokes (Xenakis and Chryssochoou 2001). A series of bilateral association agreements were concluded between the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, and Tunisia. Negotiations with Syria failed to produce a similar agreement, complicated in part by a new requirement for partner states to renounce weapons of mass destruction. Libya remained under sanctions until Qaddafi’s decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction in 2003, and then only accepted observer status in the EMP.
The failure of the EMP to transform the Mediterranean into a cohesive new economic area of shared prosperity and security cooperation stemmed from the continuation of disputes between the partner states (not least the Arab–Israeli conflict), the reluctance of the Arab regimes to adopt the political reforms advocated by Europe, and the persistence of barriers to the free movement of labour around the region, kept in place by EU measures to control immigration. In addition, none of the Arab partner states had the capacity to match the European Commission in managing the bureaucratic complexities of the relationship. This enabled the EU to set the pace, at least in terms of trade relations, while the partner states feared exposure of their fragile domestic industries to European competition.

Realization of the limited achievements of the EMP led to a rethink and the launch of a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. This reflected a decision, in the wake of EU enlargement, to develop a comprehensive formula to embrace non-candidate countries around the periphery, the better to enhance their stability and prosperity, to mutual benefit. The new policy was also a response to a US initiative to promote economic and political reform in what Washington called ‘the Wider Middle East’ (including Pakistan and Afghanistan).

The core concept of the ENP was to complement the EMP with a differentiated approach to bilateral relations with each of Europe’s neighbours, taking account of the size and relative level of development of partner economies. The EU undertook to assist with indigenously generated reform programmes, and ‘Action Plans’ were agreed accordingly with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as East European neighbours outside the EU.

By the end of 2007, however, the Europeans were professing disappointment that their efforts to help to combat corruption, to promote accountability and transparency, and to export European norms for human rights protection were still failing to meet their aspirations. For the Arab states, the ENP was even less attractive than the EMP, since it offered them only the distant promise of economic benefits as and when they
achieved greater harmonization with internal EU standards. Disparities in wealth within the Arab states, as well as between the Arab economies and Europe, intensified.

Running for the French presidency in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy floated a new initiative to complement the EMP that led to the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in Paris in 2008 (Bicci and Gillespie 2011). This proved little more than a repackaging of the concept of partnership, elevated to the intergovernmental level, with a joint presidency (initially France and Egypt) and a dedicated secretariat (in Barcelona). In substance, it prioritized various joint projects, most already mooted under the EMP, and looked to the private sector to deliver funding. In essence, the UfM represented a retreat from the aspirations for the creation of a new Mediterranean area of economic cooperation and development espoused in the 1990s.

Europe and the Middle East peace process

Individually and collectively, the Europeans have traditionally championed the view that the ‘land for peace’ formula that underpinned the Egypt–Israel peace treaty of 1979 offers the best formula for a comprehensive peace deal. The concept was adopted by the UN Security Council in the aftermath of the 1967 war in Resolution 242, and repeated in Resolution 338 after the 1973 war. All EC and EU statements on the Arab–Israeli conflict thereafter have sought implementation of all relevant UN resolutions, adherence to international law, and the exchange of land for peace.

As of 2002, the EU has formally embraced the goal of a ‘two-state solution’ to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but always with the caveat that this must be achieved by negotiation between the protagonists. In practice, also, the Europeans have generally proceeded on the assumption that only the US has the leverage necessary to bring the contending parties to agreement.

In 1980, the European Community demonstrated both unity and prescience when it issued the Venice Declaration, calling for the Palestinian people to be able ‘to exercise fully their right to self-determination’
and stating that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would have to be involved in peace negotiations.

For several years, the Venice Declaration formed the basis of the European stance on the conflict, but the US was the peace broker. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the US adopted the lead in mediation efforts, including the evacuation of the PLO leadership from Beirut to Tunis. Europe called for Israel’s unconditional withdrawal in accordance with UN Resolution 425 (of 1978). Israel did pull back its forces to southern Lebanon, but then remained there until 2000.

Meanwhile, when the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, erupted in Gaza and the West Bank in December 1987, European opinion was shocked by television coverage of Israel’s military response to stone-throwing Palestinians. The European Parliament voted to deny finalization of three protocols on Israel’s trade and financial relations with the EC. The Parliament also criticized conditions set by Israel for implementation of an EC provision for direct trade between Palestinians and Europe. The move achieved an alleviation of those conditions prior to passage of the protocols later in the year.5

The tactic of delaying approval of bureaucratic instruments affecting trade with Israel was to be used on subsequent occasions, as a way in which to convey European disapproval of Israeli policies in relation to the Palestinians. For example, ratification of Israel’s partnership agreement with the EU, reached in 1995 under the EMP, was held up the following year to signal dissatisfaction with the policy of the Netanyahu government (which took office in 1996) with respect to the peace process. However, over the years such moves have not affected the trajectory of Israel’s settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem and under the ENP Israel has attained ever closer economic relations with the EU. In effect, the EU has pursued a twin track approach of improving ties to Israel while also criticising its policies on the Palestinians.
The Europeans were given only observer status at the November 1991 Madrid Conference that launched the peace process following the Gulf War. However, the conference gave birth to both bilateral and multilateral tracks, and the EC was made convener of the working group dealing with regional economic development. For the duration of the multilaterals process—which eventually ceased because of problems on the bilateral tracks—the EU used this platform to take a number of initiatives, including commissioning a World Bank report that laid the basis for an economic aid and development plan for the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank 1993).

Under the Oslo process, initiated in 1993, the EU became the largest single donor to the Palestinian Authority. The US administration kept to itself management of actual peace negotiations, but acknowledged that the whole process was facilitated by the EU role. Nonetheless, neither the Americans nor the Europeans were able to save the peace process when the make-or-break summit at Camp David in July 2000 collapsed without agreement and the second intifada ensued. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon, from February 2001, the conflict raged anew, with Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel reaching unprecedented levels and the Israelis reoccupying Palestinian autonomous areas in spring 2002.

The EU did not support the decision of the Bush administration to boycott and sideline PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, and emergency aid from the EU kept the Palestinian Authority afloat when US assistance was suspended. Responding pragmatically to US President Bush’s endorsement of a two-state solution to the conflict, in spring 2002, the EU worked through the mechanism of ‘the Quartet’ (the EU, the US, the UN, and Russia) to produce the ‘Road Map’, formally launched in 2003, spelling out steps to reach that goal.

**Responding to Hamas**

While the EU, along with other members of the Quartet, continued to cite the Road Map as the recipe for peace, Sharon preferred a unilateralist strategy, and evacuated Israeli settlements and troops from Gaza in
2005. The EU then took the initiative of organizing new Palestinian legislative elections, held in January 2006.

Contrary to expectations in Europe and Washington, the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas won a clear victory. This presented a problem for the EU, since it had included Hamas in a list of terrorist organizations and EU law prevented Brussels from funding such groups. The Quartet called on Hamas to renounce violence, to accept agreements previously reached by the Palestinian leadership, and to recognize Israel. In the meantime, Brussels introduced a temporary mechanism to funnel aid to vital service personnel in the West Bank and Gaza.

In summer 2006, Israel launched an offensive on the Gaza Strip to counter Palestinian attacks into Israel, but the ensuing battle was soon overtaken by war on the Israeli–Lebanese front triggered by a raid across the Israeli border by Hezbollah. Most European governments pressed for an early ceasefire, while the US and Britain initially held out for the defeat of Hezbollah, which the Israeli armed forces proved unable to deliver.

Hezbollah won plaudits from around the Arab world for its readiness to take on the Israelis and survive. The links between Hezbollah, its patrons Syria and Iran, and Hamas were enhanced, and after Hamas won sole control of the Gaza Strip following a showdown with the rival Fatah organization in 2007, Hamas was able to survive the blockade imposed by Israel by means of aid from Iran, among others. The EU denounced the Israeli blockade on Gaza as ‘collective punishment’, but proved powerless to lift or circumvent it. At the end of 2008, Israel launched another offensive to curtail Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza, in which more than 1,300 Palestinians and thirteen Israelis died. This time, the Europeans were united in criticizing the Israeli use of force as ‘disproportionate’.

In the meantime, the EU focused on helping a reconstituted Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to develop the infrastructure of a state, including new police and security forces. Washington took the lead on renewed peace negotiations, excluding Hamas. However, even when President Barack Obama took office in
2009 and reinvigorated US efforts to achieve a ‘two-state’ agreement, his strategy foundered over the issue of settlement expansion in the occupied territories.

In a statement issued by the EU Council of Ministers at the end of 2009, just before the European External Action Service (EEAS) came into being and Catherine Ashton was appointed the new EU foreign policy chief, the Europeans spelled out their position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in detail (Council of the European Union 2009). The statement was explicit on the illegality of the Israeli occupation and the need for it to end. Yet little was said thereafter by the EU to articulate ways in which Europe might hold Israel, or the Palestinians, to account for their actions and transgressions. Another round of war on the Israeli-Gaza front in November 2012 left 167 Palestinians and 6 Israelis dead.

A new attempt by the US to rejuvenate negotiations during Obama’s second term, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, collapsed in April 2014. This time, the US was more inclined than ever before to hold Israel primarily responsible. The following summer the Israelis engaged Hamas in a more prolonged and devastating war in which over 2,000 Gazan Palestinians, 66 Israeli soldiers and seven Israeli civilians were killed. Various donors, including the EU and Arab states, pledged support for the rebuilding of Gaza, but by early 2015 only a fraction of what was pledged had been spent. Meanwhile, the Palestinians took their cause to the UN but, having won recognition as a ‘non-member observer state’ in November 2012, their bid for recognition as an independent state was defeated by the UN Security Council in December 2014. The EU Parliament, as too the parliaments of several EU member states, did vote for such recognition of Palestinian statehood, but still held to the position that this should come about as the result of agreement with the Israelis.

**Phase IV: Europe and the Arab uprisings**

EU relations with the Middle East entered a new phase in 2010, as a result of several factors. By then, Europe was in the grips of the financial crisis that has dominated the agenda of the EU and its member states
ever since, relegating other issues, including relations with the Middle East, to the periphery. Deferring to Washington to lead on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU had no alternatives to offer when US efforts faltered. EU initiatives for the Mediterranean, from the EMP to the ENP and then the UfM did not deliver the reforms in the Arab states that they were intended to encourage. Part of the problem was that the Europeans had used the ENP action plans to oblige Arab governments to control migration in Europe’s interests to the detriment of human rights (Basaran 2008).

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, under an increasingly hardline leadership, aligned with Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas, and on friendly terms with a Shia-dominated government in Iraq, looked poised to become the new regional hegemon, in defiance of the US and its regional allies. Simultaneously, the Europeans had come round to the US position on the Iranian nuclear issue, fearing that Tehran was developing the capability to turn its civil nuclear programme into a military one. When the various incentives offered to Iran by Britain, Germany, and France—the so-called ‘EU3’—failed to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment programme, the US became more directly involved and the issue was taken to the UN Security Council.

UN-imposed sanctions on Iran were followed up with additional sanctions by both the US and the EU. Only when an embargo on Iranian oil exports was threatened in 2011 did the Iranians agree to new talks, but the possibility of war loomed, if diplomacy and pressure failed, fuelled by Israeli warnings that it might take unilateral action. However, the Obama administration was more inclined to pursue negotiations with Iran that the previous Bush administration and when Hassan Rohani was elected President of Iran in 2013 the stage was set for more serious negotiations in which the US acted in concert with the EU (represented by Ashton), plus Russia and China.

In the meantime, the Arab world was overtaken by a series of popular uprisings that began in Tunisia in December 2010.
The Arab awakening

The Europeans were caught off guard by the Tunisian revolt not least because they thought the secular Western-aligned government of Ben Ali was the exemplar of economic and gradual political reform advocated by the EU. France initially contemplated bolstering Ben Ali, but when the Tunisian army refused to suppress mass demonstrations that combined all elements of the population, secular and Islamist, middle class and working class, France joined other Europeans in supporting the protesters. Within days of Ben Ali’s flight into exile in Saudi Arabia, on 25 January 2011, a revolution erupted in Egypt.

Faced with the dilemma of whether to stand by Mubarak, its long-time ally, Washington wavered and the Europeans demurred, but when regime security forces turned violently on the demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, broadcast live around the world, the Americans and the Europeans abandoned Mubarak. In any case, Mubarak’s fate was not in their hands. This was an Egyptian revolution and the army initially went along with the protesters, sacrificed Mubarak and set up an interim administration pending new elections that delivered a victory for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi. His administration antagonised many Egyptians but crucially the army, and Morsi was ousted in 2013 amid a more brutal crackdown on the Brotherhood than even Mubarak had countenanced. EU initiatives to give Morsi cautious support in the name of democracy were rendered irrelevant.

When the revolution spread to Libya in 2011, Qadhafi mobilized the armed forces to crush the rebels and both the UN and the LAS called for action. British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Sarkozy grasped the moment to champion intervention. Germany initially opposed proposals for NATO to mount an air and naval operation, and only some NATO members participated in the campaign that led to the fall of Qaddafi. Washington chose to ‘lead from behind’. Yet toppling the regime proved easier than building a new one and by 2015 internal conflict had rendered Libya a no-go area for EU and US nationals.
The intervention in Libya did not set a precedent for action elsewhere in the region. The Europeans and Americans deferred to GCC mediation in Yemen, and, in the case of Bahrain, while criticizing the methods used by the rulers to suppress demonstrations, the Europeans stood aside. When opponents of the Assad regime in Syria faced increasingly harsh repression by government forces, the Europeans and Americans sought UN Security Council condemnation, but were thwarted by Russia and China. An LAS and UN-initiated mediation effort subsequently foundered and civil war raged.

European and US efforts to galvanise the Syrian opposition into a coherent fighting force foundered and anti-Assad Islamist militia gained in strength. By 2014 a new configuration of such forces, self-styled the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (IS) had captured vast swathes of both northern Syria and Iraq. The US-trained and equipped Iraqi army crumbled, leaving only Kurdish and Iranian-backed Shia militia to push back. Appalled by the beheadings of kidnapped Westerners, broadcast by IS over the internet, and IS recruitment of hundreds of Muslim volunteers from Europe, several European states sent forces to join in US-led bombing raids on IS.

Describing itself as a new caliphate, the IS has declared its intention to unravel the legacy of the British-French ‘Sykes-Picot’ agreement that presaged the shape of the Arab state system in the Middle East for a century. To counter the IS and its ambitions, the Europeans have made common cause with a collection of Arab governments and Iran, none of which seek to uphold the values of human rights and democracy espoused by the Europeans since the demise of European imperialism.

Conclusion

Half a century on from the retreat of the European imperial powers from MENA, a brief interlude of US hegemony had also peaked and Europeans could only look on in consternation as the regional state system that they had devised in the 1920s looked set to unravel. The confidence with which the EU had sought to export its values and neo-liberal economic model in the 1990s had given way to anxiety in the face of Islamic-
inspired terrorism at the turn of the century, and greater preoccupation with controlling immigration and countering ‘radicalization’ within Europe.

Over the same period, the EU had become increasingly integrated into the economic fabric of the Middle East, both as aid donor and supplier of arms, infrastructure projects, and consumer goods. Europe remains the principle market for exports from the Middle East, and is dependent on energy supplies from North Africa and the Persian Gulf. Migration flows—of Jews from Europe into Israel, and of Arabs, Iranians, and Turks into Europe—bind the populations and politics of these two contiguous geographic regions. Yet this is not just a simple tale of harmonious interchange; there is ambivalence and friction with clear historical roots.

European efforts to promote Arab–Israeli peace are an expression of Europe’s own security interests and ties on both sides of the divide, but there is little to show for EU engagement in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, except the dependence of the Palestinian Authority on EU financial support. The EMP has been supplanted by the UfM and that has achieved little. The ENP and its action plans for Arab reform, intertwined with the deals done by the Europeans with Arab dictators to protect European security, did not address the problems that led to the Arab uprisings, while the forces of political Islam, which the European had hoped to contain, are resurgent.

Further reading

Al-Fattal, R. (2010) European Union Foreign Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Jerusalem: PASSIA)

An explication of how EU dealings with the Palestinians were framed by EU instruments for relations across the Mediterranean.


An examination of how laws passed in the EU and agreements forged with Arab governments were used to
Hollis, R (2016) ‘Europe in the Middle East’ Chapter in Louise Fawcett, ed., The International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford & New York: OUP)

Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version.

control migration and asylum seekers.

Bicci, F. and Gillespie, R. (eds) (2011) ‘Special Issue: The Union for the Mediterranean—Continuity or Change in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?’, Mediterranean Politics, 16 (1)

A thorough examination of the genesis, parameters, and implications of EU initiatives for the Mediterranean.


An examination of British constructions of ‘Britishness’, security and insecurity.


A very readable introduction to the politics of representation in North-South discourse.


A discussion of regionalism in theoretical and historical perspective, and its application in different contexts, including Europe and the Middle East, thereby providing a context within which to understand relations between the two.


A very useful detailed overview of critical theory approaches to specific issues in international relations.


In this work, Gause—a specialist on the politics of the Arab Gulf states—explores the idea of the Gulf as a ‘regional system’.

Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version.


Points to how the European colonial legacy in the Middle East affected state-building and politics in the region.


A report focusing on the economic aspects of the partnership, with input from Arab and European experts.


A revealing analysis of the causes and implications of radicalization among young European Muslims, and relations between the West and the Muslim world.


This article provides a critical analysis of the initiative taken by the EU to re-work the ENP to support democratisation in the wake of the Arab uprisings.


An exposition of social theory from which to derive applications to the Middle East; useful specifically for understanding competing narratives about identity, states, regions, and society in this context.


A useful survey of individual and collective EU approaches to political (and economic) reform in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite refer to published version.

**Notes**

1. For the texts of these documents, see Laqueur and Rubin (1995).

2. Barcelona Declaration, 28 November 1995, available online at


5. For sources, see Hollis (1997).


**Questions:**

1. Describe and analyse the legacy of European imperialism in the Middle East after 1971.

2. In what ways did the EU model the use of ‘soft power’ in its dealings with the Middle East after 1992?

3. Analyse the role of the EU in the ‘Middle East Peace Process’.

4. Compare and contrast the usefulness of the EMP and the ENP in pursuing EU goals for the Mediterranean neighbourhood.

5. What do European responses to the Arab uprisings reveal about Europe as a regional actor?