Policy formation in the European Community – the case of culture

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Declaration

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the origin and development of EC cultural policy through four case studies of policy formation. The four cases selected occurred in the pre-Maastricht period, 1955-1988. The first two policy experiences correspond to a pre-history of the EC’s cultural policy, the latter two resulted in authoritative policy decisions by EC institutions. The research objectives include historical understanding of this policy experience and an examination of the process of European policy formation. It draws upon archive material from the Historical Archives of the European Union. This material is organised and analytically narrated around the events that make up each episode. The approach is theoretically oriented case research – each experience studied corresponds to a policy episode. These policy episodes are analysed through a combined theoretical framework based on Kingdon’s multiple streams model (1995), which explains the pre-decisional and decision-making stages of the policy-making process, and on institutional processualism which seeks to attain a causal understanding of these processes that is sensitive to institutional context. This thesis represents one of the first applications of this model in the field of cultural policy. The comparative approach deployed identifies similarities and differences among the four episodes studied and compares the dynamics of the policy process between them with a view to generating theoretical generalisations about the formation of cultural policy in the EC in the period of interest. The application of Kingdon’s model to European public-policy to an extent tested the model, though ultimately it demonstrates its flexibility and relevance to a variety of agenda situations and analysis. The model was less successful in explaining policy formulation, in this instance, which is explained by the pervading institutional reach of the EC Treaties. A specific interest of Kingdon’s is policy entrepreneurship and how it affects the policy process and this is also a main interest of this research. The model worked well here but proved limited in that it generated only a partial explanation for the agency of cultural policy entrepreneurs whose motivations, we found, are intrinsic and specific to cultural policy.
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Council for Cultural Cooperation (Council of Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General (European Commission); for example, DG Culture is the Directorate-General for Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>European Atomic and Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECs</td>
<td>European Communities (ECSC, EEC, EAEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Committee (Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic and Energy Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office, also FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAEU</td>
<td>Historical Archives of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>European Movement (Mouvement Européen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-level Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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PART ONE

Part One comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study; Chapters 2 and 3 respectively reflect on its location in the cultural policy researchscape and discuss its theoretical architecture, and methodological ‘scaffolding’; Chapter 4 contextualises the concept of culture as a European policy domain.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis addresses the formation and development of cultural policy in the European Community¹ (EC) at supranational level. Culture is now an established policy area at European Union level, having been legally recognised in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. But just as the 1957 Treaty of Rome did not make any provision for culture in any shape or form, cultural matters fell outside of the European Economic Community’s (EEC) formal agenda. Its goal, as the title of the Treaty – Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community – indicates, was to establish an economic community with a mandate to create a common market and implement the relevant measures. It is not surprising, therefore, that culture, like education or health, was not an explicit field of EEC concern at the time.

The Treaty of Rome contains, in fact, references to culture but these are either oblique² or relate to specific socio-economic cultural matters that are affected by or affect the implementation of the common market. Yet, as this thesis will argue, the culture issue was present on the EC’s agenda from the earliest stages of the European Community. For the following forty five years the culture issue would move up and down the European

¹ This thesis uses the term European Community (EC) since the events it covers occurred in the period before 1 November 1993, when the European Union came into existence (although the EU subsumed but did not replace the European Community). Where a historical distinction is required the terms EEC, or EU are used specifically. The term European – e.g. European policy – is also used.
² Oblique or implicit references are the object of interpretation both in terms of the meaning of these references and in terms of the meaning of culture and are, arguably, subjective. In the preamble of the Treaty of Rome the member states declare that they are ‘determined to create the foundations for an ever closer union between the European peoples’ and beyond this ‘to create the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflict’ – both statements have often been interpreted in the literature as adding an implicit cultural dimension to the European Community. Other examples are Art 7, Art 131 which touch on nationality discrimination. Other, more direct references to culture allude to cultural assets directly affected by the implementation of the common market, for example Art 36; cooperation with third countries, Art 131; and Annex of Article 106 on invisible transactions, from musical publications subscriptions to international artists’ salaries or authors’ royalties.
agenda gradually progressing in from the margins of European policy making. The institutional sensitivities and the tensions that characterise the evolution of this European policy sector over this period of time reveal how intensely valued it was by both the Community and the member states. This journey culminated with the insertion of an article on culture (Article 128) in the 1992 Treaty on European Union (hereinafter Maastricht Treaty).

The trajectory of the culture issue in the pre-Maastricht period (1955-91) was not linear or even the result of an incremental development process; rather, it seems to have consisted of ‘fits and starts’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Indeed, there were a number of attempts to set a European agenda for culture and develop policy. These initiatives had different origins, aspirations, articulated different visions and had different outcomes. This research is interested in understanding these experiences – it (1) explores the critical junctures in the European integration journey at which processes of agenda setting and policy formation were initiated in the culture domain; (2) explains why and how they happened when they did and what motivated political actors to mobilise in order to promote a cultural policy in the European Economic Community; (3) charts and explains the dynamics of the political processes surrounding these events; and (4) explains their outcomes.

The research identified four episodes in which cultural policy proposals were initiated and reached the decision agenda (albeit with different outcomes) – these are the units of analysis in this investigation. They illuminate why and how new policy issues –

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3 Tilly (2001) defines episodes as bounded streams of social life; which acquire social significance because participants or observers construct names, boundaries and stories corresponding to them.

4 According to Princen (2009), the decision agenda is the ‘set of issues that are considered for active decision-making’ by government (or an institution), in this case, the European Commission. It will be a narrow subset of the wider, governmental agenda, the issues being discussed by policy-makers in a given period of time (Princen 2009), see also Kingdon (1995).
particularly in sensitive policy areas such as culture or areas not covered by the treaties – are incorporated in the EC’s agenda, how they progress to policy decisions, and the dynamics and strategies of these processes. They explain why and how cultural policy formed and ultimately add to our knowledge and understanding of the EC as a political system.

The first episode – the proposal of a cultural policy for the EEC (1955-57) – marks the first historical attempt to place culture on the European Economic Community’s agenda and took place during the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome in 1955-57. However, what started as a cultural agenda for the EEC ended up as a legal provision for education in one of the Rome treaties, the Euratom Treaty.

The second episode follows the attempt to institutionalise a European policy for cultural cooperation in the Treaty Establishing a Union of States (also known as the Fouchet Plan) (1961-62) which also occurred in the context of treaty negotiations but emanated from the EC Heads of State. Their 1961 Declaration on Cultural Cooperation sought to extend the European integration process to three new key policy domains, cultural policy among them. However, the treaty negotiations eventually collapsed, cancelling the cultural cooperation initiative, the only policy that had been agreed.

The third episode accounts for the creation of a new policy domain for culture in the European Commission (1972-77) which culminated with the first Commission policy paper ‘Community action in the cultural sector’ in 1977. The six year-long policy process evolved in the context of the European Commission’s effort to extend the scope of its policy competences and the resistance of the member states and the Council.
The fourth episode follows the process leading up to the Commission’s policy communication ‘A fresh boost for culture in the European Community’ in 1987. Similarly to 1977 paper this was a long (5 years) policy process but, in contrast with it, the Commission’s 1987 paper can be characterised as a relatively speedy, last ditch attempt to produce a Commission policy, following a long (1983-86) episode of agenda-setting at the highest political level in which culture successfully careered to the treaty reform negotiations but ultimately failed to be included in the Single European Act.5

‘A fresh boost’ was the last Commission paper before the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which conferred treaty basis to and institutionalised6 culture, enabling the EU to (legally) take action in the field. This is significant (also as a cut off point for the sample of episodes) because this thesis analyses and explains the formation of cultural policy in the European Community in the pre-Maastricht period, when culture was not a legal competence of the EC and equally lacked the support of EC member states. Legal basis, or the lack of one, has obvious implications for agenda and policy formation and decision making in these circumstances for the research is not looking at authoritative measures or legislative initiatives to create a cultural policy; rather, it looks at the ‘larger puzzle’ (Kingdon 1995) of why, to paraphrase Kingdon (1995: 1), the time for this idea (culture) had come at those particular junctures in these four instances.

The reference discipline for this research is the field of public policy – the research is concerned in particular with the process of European policy-making. To research these

5 The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) revised the Treaties of Rome in order to add new momentum to European integration and to complete the internal market. It amended the rules governing the operation of the European institutions and expanded Community powers in a number of fields, notably the environment and common foreign policy, opening the way to political integration and economic and monetary union to be enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht.

6 Tilly and Tarrow (2007) define institutionalisation as the incorporation of performances and political actors into the routines of organised politics.
episodes of policy formation the study developed a theoretical model combining Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework and institutional-processual (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Gallego, 2006) theories. Kingdon’s framework provides a model of the policy process that explains agenda change, why/how some issues move onto and up the agenda and others don’t, and how an issue gains traction on the policy agenda when three independent but simultaneous streams of problem, policy and politics couple with a choice opportunity, which is effected by a policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995).

Institutional processualism is interested ‘in how situated interaction (and, in this way, human agency) can feed back upon context’ (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006: 538) and combines two theoretical perspectives – from the neo-institutionalist approach it relates situated interaction to the influence of context; from the processualist approach is focused on the interplay between belief and action as experience unfolds in time. Social mechanisms are also added as analytical devices to examine the link between institutional or process contexts and outcomes.

With a focus on process, thus, this theoretical model analyses the dynamics of the culture issue through its inclusion on the European policy and decision agendas, the issue’s definition, the formulation of policy and the relevant decision processes in an institutional context/s. This approach has not been deployed to research cultural policy before.

This model is deployed to study the four episodes (introduced above) and their findings will then be compared\(^8\) in order (1) to generate a comprehensive, in-depth understanding of the formation of cultural policy in the EC and relevant processes, and (2) to produce limited (necessarily) generalisations about the variables (including theoretically defined

\(^7\) Cf. Chapter 2 for a full account and more elaborate explanation of this model.
\(^8\) Cf. Chapter 3 for a full account of the research strategy and methodology followed.
variables) – for example, agenda initiation, the impact of institutions or policy entrepreneurial action – that have a causal role in the formation of cultural policy and are common across the baseline of policy experiences. Ultimately, this will enable the research to fully explain why and how, and the conditions under which cultural policy formed in the EC (pre-Maastricht).

Thus, while this thesis focuses on a policy sector that is little known, discussed or, for that matter, understood and is yet to be fully studied,\(^9\) it also fills a gap in the literature, particularly academic literature – existing literature on the EC’s cultural policy is, in any case, predominantly descriptive. By revealing how cultural policy formed in the EC in the pre-Maastricht period, this study adds not only to the historical understanding of European cultural policy but, most importantly, moves research to a more advanced and theoretically informed understanding of the emergence and development of cultural policy in the EC.

The historical approach contributes to a more nuanced understanding of European cultural policy, not least today, explaining, for example, why the fundamental assumptions which structure the EC’s current ‘Creative Europe programme (2014-2018)’ (European Commission 2013) are what they are.

Conversely, the theoretical framework elected here has not been deployed to research cultural policy before,\(^10\) and in this sense this thesis also tests these theories in European cultural policy, revealing some of their strengths and weaknesses. But one of the main claims of this research is that it identifies a number of factors to consider in the formation

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\(^9\) See Chapter 2 for a review of both cultural policy research and European cultural policy.

\(^{10}\) We refer to the full model here. For example, Ahearne (2010) and Littoz-Monnet (2007) have utilised Kingdon’s framework to analyse cultural policy.
of (new) cultural policy, particularly in a European or international context (although some of the findings may also apply to national contexts).

Despite the recurrent nature of the several attempts to launch a cultural policy at European level these were all very separate events which had a specific origin, evolution and ‘story’. But what the research was able to theorise (or at least hypothesise, given the limited sample) was how the culture issue tended to emerge at key junctures of institutional change and of the integration process in the European Community and what its initiation on the European political agenda (pre-Maastricht) owed to a combination of factors which were observed consistently across the episodes: the tendency of the cultural agenda to initiate in major political events, its attachment to the issue of union and/or the fact that the European agenda was seen (and used) as an instrumental means to address national cultural policy issues.

The research also found that European cultural policy formulation tends to be guided by the treaty under which it develops; and that, in turn, institutional and process frameworks shape the alternatives search and policy development activities.

The thesis also argues that policy entrepreneurship was a key explanatory variable in policy formation though it also sheds some interesting light on the action and profile of policy entrepreneurs in the cultural policy arena which may be of interest not only to students of international but also national cultural policy. Policy entrepreneurs were found to play a key role in all aspects of European cultural policy formation but this thesis goes further to suggest that in a policy sector such as cultural policy, which normally has a low status on governments’ agendas, the action of policy entrepreneurs may not only be
a fact of political life but may actually be a necessary condition to its progress in the policy or political agendas.

Ultimately, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of the EC policy process and how it works as a whole.

This chapter is divided into the following sections: following this introductory section, Section 2 reviews the motivations for undertaking the research whilst Section 3 discusses the research questions. Section 4 establishes the boundaries of the research topic, followed by section 5 outlining this thesis’ structure.

1.2 Reasons for undertaking this study

One of the reasons for undertaking a study on policy formation in the culture domain in the EC is that despite the wealth of literature covering the subject of cultural policy in the EC little attention has been devoted to exploring the political processes that led to its development (cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of this). Subject literature tends to focus on specific policy outputs or particular experiences or on descriptive overviews of the Community’s involvement in cultural projects/actions or policy (cf. Chapter 2). These contributions, however, ignore the political processes which generated such outcomes.

Also, accounts, both academic and grey literature, tend to start from the 1977 first Commission paper (though, as pointed out above, ignoring the process that shaped or led to it) failing to identify or connect the 1955 and 1961 events with the development (or even pre-history) of this European policy sector. And some accounts will support that community action, not cultural policy, existed before Maastricht (though see Chapter 4 for a discussion on this). In contrast with those narratives this thesis seeks to render a
historically grounded account of cultural policy formation in the EC. In this sense this thesis fills a gap in the knowledge about cultural policy in the European Community in both the fields of European policy-making and cultural policy.

In addition, the study of a policy over a long period of time provides insight into policy dynamics and how they relate to the evolution of the policy-making system (Jones and Baumgartner 2002; 1993)\textsuperscript{11} potentially enhancing the understanding of contemporary policy developments (Ragin 1987). Baumgartner and Jones (2002) showed how a long time perspective on policy areas is necessary to reveal the fundamental dynamics of stability and punctuations. A short time perspective would only have captured one of these aspects, most likely stasis and incrementalism, the typical policy mode. The sensitivities and tensions that accompanied the development of the EC’s cultural policy over time reveal how valued this policy was by the Community and the member states; which makes it an interesting experience to study in its own right.

It is a fact that public policies, including cultural, are increasingly shaped by the European/international context and what was, before, a prerogative of national governments is now increasingly done in cooperation with or shaped by international institutions and international (or global) organisations; that is, cultural policy is more internationalised; although Chapter 4 demonstrates this may not be that novel as an idea. However, whilst EU supranational cultural policy is non-binding, it is also true that the EU has become an important actor in its own right on the international stage (Rhinard 2010), not least because of globalisation and growing interdependence.

\textsuperscript{11} See Baumgartner and Jones (2002; 1993) on the importance of studying policy over a long term in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how public policies are formulated and change.
On a different note, the processual institutional (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Gallego 2006) perspective adopted by this study\textsuperscript{12} adds to a body of research which utilises the institutional dimension of policy-making as a conceptual lens (Allison 1971; Cram 1999) to explain policy formation in the European Community;\textsuperscript{13} and allows us to explain how the European Commission succeeded in expanding its policy competences (in this case to what is a sensitive area of national policy) despite there being no basis in the founding treaties or tenuous claims to legal justifications and amidst national opposition (Cram 1999). And although the four episodes investigated in this research had different origins, orientations and outcomes their analysis contributes to an understanding of why and how the EC cultural policy evolved in the way it did, and the dynamics of this policy sector today – both historically, as it will help understand the direction and image of current EU cultural policy; and theoretically, in terms of understanding the factors that affect EU cultural policy making.

The experience of the EC’s cultural policy here is therefore of potential interest to cultural policy in the international arena, especially in regional settings similar to the EU and possibly also to federal type structures, where tensions between national and supranational levels over cultural policy making may exist.

Another feature of interest in this policy experience is the role played by individuals in the development of EC cultural policy. This is a European policy sector to which the extension of EC competence was strongly opposed by national governments. Would a cultural policy have developed in the European Community had policy entrepreneurs not

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Chapter 2 for the theoretical model developed by this research to examine the policy episodes.
\textsuperscript{13} See for example: Rhinard (2010) on policy framing in the European Commission; Princen (2009) on agenda-setting in a number of policies; Guignier (2004) on public health policy; Cram (1999) on the development of social policy and of information and communication technology policy in the EC; Corbett (2005) on the development of the EC Higher Education policy; Mazey and Richardson (1996) on social policy; and many others.
intervened when they did and in the way that they did? And what motivated policy entrepreneurs to act? To the best of this author’s knowledge no other research on cultural policy has taken this angle in their investigation. Moreover, in linking agency with the institutional framework in which it operates, policy entrepreneurship only supplements and deepens the institutional-processual approach.

This perspective is in contrast with most research on cultural policy which normally focuses on policy analysis and causal explanations that are concerned with the doctrinal, ideological or rhetorical aspects of cultural policy rather than with the policy making process, in particular in its pre-decision phase. The consequence is that there is little, if any, insight into or causal understanding of policy formation in this domain. This is a gap – empirical and conceptual – that this thesis begins to bridge. It hopes to draw attention to an alternative perspective in cultural policy research, one that seeks to explain policy from a ‘making’ perspective, the political process that leads to and shapes policy in the first place. This research has therefore also relevance to cultural policy research, method and theory.

To conclude, this thesis claims that there is scope for research that seeks to explain the development of a cultural policy in the EC and why and how it occurred. As pointed out above, the value of this investigation lies not only in the ‘case’ study, which is historically and politically significant in its own right and therefore demanding of social scientific interpretation (Ragin 1987) but also, more broadly, on what it can add to our knowledge about the policy making process in the institutional context of the EC.

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14 See, for example, McGuigan (2005: 97) who accepts that very little work in cultural policy locates itself within a theory of the formation of public policy; and also Volkerling (2005).
1.3 **Questions addressed by this research**

The main research question that this thesis addresses is: RQ0 How did cultural policy form and evolve in the European Community in the period of 1955-1987? As mentioned above in order to explain how policy for culture emerged and evolved in the EC the strategy for the research was (1) to focus on the period which preceded the formal, legal recognition of a EC role in relation to culture, which occurred with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; and, within this period, (2) to investigate episodes of cultural policy in its pre-decision, formation phase.

The research identified four episodes which were deemed analytically significant in terms of investigating and answering the main research question. By analytically significant we mean both historically and in terms of the policy process. Historically, because the experiences selected provide not only historically grounded causal explanations for how policy formed in these instances but also understanding of ‘why this idea’s time came’ (Kingdon 1995) at these particular historical junctures. The significance in terms of the policy process comes from the fact that the episodes allow the study of the full career of such efforts, providing insight into the rationale and processes of policy formation, not least European. The research task is to examine the four episodes and study them comparatively in order to develop limited historical analytic generalisations (Ragin 1987; Barzelay 2001) about the processes which led to the creation of a cultural policy domain in the EC.

Each episode has its own specific ‘story’ and outcomes, and this opens up second level research questions – these concern:

RQ1 why each of these episodes occurred and how their initiation can be explained;
RQ2 how did the culture issue progress in the four episodes and how can this be explained;
RQ3 what explains the outcome of each episode; and
RQ4 what was the role played by individuals (policy entrepreneurs) in these processes and what motivated them to intervene.

RQ1 contributes to an understanding of the historical and critical junctures that created the conditions for cultural policy to access the European agenda in the absence of any treaty competence for it. The research will look at each episode as a unique constellation of problems, solutions, ideas and politics drawing on concepts from agenda setting and policy making models.

RQ2 is a critical question in a research that is process focused. It looks at the career of the culture issue and how it moved through agenda and policy processes and institutional frameworks, also taking into account the relevant political contexts;

RQ3 seeks to explain the policy choices that were made as a result of the policy processes observed in each episode. The outcomes selected as the phenomena that this study must explain refer to policy choices of EC institutional rules and routines connected with the development of a cultural policy domain. These include:
- The proposal for a cultural policy in the EEC at the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome in 1955-57
- The creation of a policy and venue for cultural cooperation: the negotiations for the draft Treaty on Political Union by the EC Heads of State in 1961-62
- The policy paper ‘Communication to the Council on Community action in the Cultural sector’ (COM 1977 ) adopted by the European Commission in 1977

RQ4 investigates the contribution of actors who played a policy entrepreneurial role in these experiences. The research examines the contribution of such actors to the agenda and policy development processes in the four episodes.

The nature of the research questions, the case orientation and analytical approach chosen are already indicative of the emphasis of this research on process\textsuperscript{15} and of its location in the meso-level of policy-making and day to day politics – which influenced the choice of theoretical framework deployed to analyse the episodes and organise the data for the study (Cf. Chapter 2).

1.4 Topic boundaries – what this research does not address

Similarly to other empirical studies in public policy some of this thesis choices will inevitably structure or condition the reading and understanding (and results) of the research – these are discussed below.

Although, as argued above, the policy experiences studied in this thesis are of historical significance in the development of a cultural policy in the EC it does not aim to produce a history of this policy sector in the pre-Maastricht period – this research is firmly grounded on the formation of European public policy. The objective of this thesis is to investigate why and how cultural policy developed in the EC and it does this by isolating specific policy experiences that are deemed relevant to this development and studying the processes leading to and shaping such outcomes. The analysis is historically grounded

\textsuperscript{15} This research follows McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s definition of processes as frequently recurring causal chains, sequences and combinations of mechanisms (2001).
and in this sense it does (or hopes to) make a contribution to the history of the sector in terms of identifying events and explain their occurrence. But writing a history of this policy sector is not the aim and also not the outcome of this research.

Also, despite the focus on culture as an object of European public policy this research does not address debates which might be in the immediate periphery of this topic and that some literature associates with cultural policy in the EC (pre-Maastricht); for example the place of culture in the process of European integration, or particular sectors of cultural policy such as the audiovisual.

The first debate relates to the instrumentalisation of culture at EC level to promote or further European integration and is often examined (or interpreted) in terms of the politicisation and utilisation of culture by the EC as an instrument of state building on a European (EC) scale. This debate has permeated the literature on EC cultural policy to a greater or lesser extent (see for example, Shore 2002; Shore 2000; Barnet 2001) drawing on ideas and literature on the use of culture and symbols in nation building. This thesis acknowledges that it is probably more than a coincidence that the culture issue tended to gain momentum at times when political union was on the EC’s political agenda and this issue is addressed if or as appropriate and within the confines of the research framework.

A related issue is the agenda of specific EC institutions (for example, the European Council) which was at the origin of high profile reports such as, for example, the 1976 Tindeman’s Report on European Union. The cultural rhetoric of the European Council was by no means unimportant – it provided much needed political leverage for the progression of the culture issue in the European Commission. However, these ideas tended to be just that (rhetoric) or they tended to materialise in initiatives such as ‘A
People’s Europe’ (CEC 1984), which much like branding exercises were more concerned with the symbolic aspects of EC Europe. These were typically the domain of the information and communications machine of the European Commission.\(^{16}\)

Lastly, the research is designed to explain the dynamics of the culture issue and of policy formation, where the term culture is used in a broad, general sense to refer to this policy sector. But it does not address specific areas of cultural policy, for example, heritage, copyrights, audiovisual.\(^{17}\) The audiovisual is an example of an industry which concerned a number of Directorate Generals in the European Commission throughout the 1980s – ‘Internal Market’, ‘Technology’, ‘Competition’ and ‘Information, Communication and Culture’ – as the field touched on a number of issues – economic, market, technological and cultural in its broadest sense. Although early interest in the sector (early 1980s) was located in the Commission’s cultural sector division, which is manifest in one of its policy papers, the field quickly developed an independent ‘life’/profile, strategy, action programme and policy machinery and will not be specifically dealt with in this thesis.

The clear definition and delimitation of the object of research is necessary because the boundaries and relationship between the subjects above and this investigation are or can be sensitive – although they do not warrant the particular attention of this thesis they do surface in the study and will be dealt with as relevant. In a similar vein but on a more methodological note, the case oriented comparative research, in particular its focus on case outcome and the theoretically grounded character of casing, involve certain methodological requirements which per se define the scope of the episodes’ analyses and

\(^{16}\) At best such programmes might have been delivered in cooperation with the Commission’s cultural sector division.

\(^{17}\) Examples of research that has addressed specific areas of cultural policy are: Ward (2008) on the European Union and the culture industries; Littoz-Monet (2007) on audiovisual, books and copyrights policies; Collins (1993) on broadcasting and audiovisual policy; Sarikakis (2007) on media and cultural policy in the European Union.
delimit their boundaries. To conclude, thus, any event that is analytically significant to the research is dealt with as core to this investigation; peripheral or secondary phenomena or events are dealt with as exactly that.

1.5 Thesis structure

This study investigates the formation of culture policy in the EC. The research strategy is to investigate in-depth four relevant initiatives and to study them comparatively in order to formulate analytic generalisations about how policy develops. The aim is to attain a sound process understanding of European public policy making. The choice of a multiple-case (Yin 2002: 46) research design in a way determined the basic structure of this thesis at its most general level – it is divided into three parts and structured as follows:

PART ONE introduces the study, its theoretical and methodological scaffolding and reflects on its contexts. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to this research. It presents the object and objectives of this research, the reasons for undertaking it and defines the project’s boundaries, what it does and does not do. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the context for this thesis’ analysis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on cultural policy research as well as the literature on the EC’s cultural policy. The chapter shows the specificity of cultural policy research, on one hand, and, on the other, how most of the European cultural policy literature presents descriptive and critical appraisals of its policy outputs though overlooking why or how they emerged in the first place. It then develops a theoretical framework that will guide the exploration of the dynamics of cultural policy formation in the episodes. Chapter 3 turns to the methodological aspects of conducting an institutional-process based analysis performed in historical policy experiences and context. It explains and justifies the combination of process-based and historical methods used in this research, and assesses how they fit together and how they align with the
theoretical framework elected. **Chapter 4** contextualises culture as a domain of European public policy in the period of interest (1955-87).

**PART TWO** focuses on the four policy experiences and the empirical analysis of policy formation processes in the EC in **Chapters 5 to 8**. The research design used in the episodes studied is broadly modelled on Kingdon’s (1995) work, which also structures the narratives – historical and analytical – which are deployed to report the four episodes. The same theoretical strategy is replicated in all the episodes in order to structure their comparison and the generalisation of analytical findings. The episode analyses thus follow a similar format in terms of their organisation: an introduction to the episode in question, a mapping of the event narrative structure (to help the reader map and make sense of the episode and the events in it), a historical narrative, and the concluding analytical narrative which presents a theoretically informed interpretation of and findings from the episode.

**PART THREE** includes the comparative study of the four episodes and the thesis conclusions. **Chapter 9** compares the four episodes. The comparison is guided by the analytical framework elected and derives limited (to this sample) theoretical generalisations about the formation of cultural policy in the ECs in the period pre-Maastricht and these are structured by the thesis research questions outlined in the introduction. Finally, **Chapter 10** draws general conclusions from the study. An outline of the thesis is presented in schematic in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1.1: Thesis outline
CHAPTER 2

Literature review and analytic framework to explain the formation of cultural policy in the European Community

2.1 Introduction

The previous, introductory chapter argued that cultural policy in the EU remains unexplored, as national policy has so far been the main focus of cultural policy researchers. This focus on national cultural policy is all the more remarkable given that over the last twenty or so years not only has the European Union progressively encroached on national policies but its own cultural policy has become established. This lack of interest in the European Union’s cultural policy and its evolution is even more intriguing since other regional (international) organisations have and are, in the meantime, emerging, following on the footsteps of the EU. European and international cultural policies clearly represent a significant development in/for cultural policy but have been overlooked by cultural policy researchers.

This chapter builds on these reflections. It introduces the reader to current literature and details the model developed to investigate European cultural policy formation. It surveys the current cultural policy researchscape, outlining key work and theoretical assumptions behind it\textsuperscript{18} as well as the factors that have shaped this research, and also assesses the existing literature on the EC’s cultural policy. In contrast with the dearth of academic research on European cultural policy, literature on the European Community’s involvement in culture is in fact vast, though it is mostly secondary literature.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} The focus, in this instance, is on British or English speaking cultural policy research as this is the research tradition in which this research project is based.

\textsuperscript{19} Academic, institutionalised, research into cultural policy was emerging at this time (1991) and postdates our episodes. Institutionalisation developed with: dedicated university departments e.g. Warwick University’s Centre for Cultural Policy Studies (1990s); conferences e.g. International Conference on
The two reviews show that the EC’s cultural policy remains under-researched. But they also demonstrate how existing academic research into cultural policy tends to emphasise particular models of policy and policy analysis that is mainly concerned with policy outcomes and/or its doctrinal or ideological aspects and with primarily national focus.

Such approaches would not help the study of European cultural policy, given the aim of this research to understand the process that shapes policy in the first place, how cultural agendas emerged and policy formed, particularly in the specific pre-Maastricht period. To address these demands the research develops an analytical model to guide its investigation into policy formation. Combining Kingdon’s multiple streams framework (1995) with institutional-processualism (Barzelay 2003) the model is introduced and explained in detail following the appraisal of cultural policy literature/s.

The next Section 2 of this chapter therefore reviews the cultural policy research literature and its main schools of thought (focusing on English speaking cultural policy research). Section 3 proceeds to examine the existing literature on the EC’s cultural policy and its segments and is then followed by Section 4 which develops a model to capture the dynamics at work in the formation of cultural policy which will be deployed to examine the four policy experiences.

2.2 The many halves of cultural policy research

While it may be argued that cultural policy has a long history in public policy (or public administration\textsuperscript{20}), intellectual interest and scholarship in the field is recent, motivated and

\textsuperscript{20} Flew (2005) places the historical origin of cultural policy in the 1789 French Revolution, in particular the idea that art treasures and monuments belonged to the nation and were the responsibility of the state, the aim of cultural administration then being that of binding people and nation through culture.
activated by a mix of academic and policy related events occurring around the 1990s (and perhaps most decisively or visibly in Britain and Australia). Interest and research interest in the field of cultural policy was, according to Tony Bennett (2001), stimulated by

´…the increased economic importance of [the creative] industries; a closer inter-penetration of questions of cultural policy with social policy; and the increasing significance of questions of culture in the humanities and social sciences, and public and intellectual debates more generally (around issues of cultural diversity, multiculturalism, culture and identity) (2001: 51)

Bennett’s account is specific to the Australian cultural-political context but it resonates with developments in Britain at around the same time, not least the public administrative reform initiated by Thatcher and followed by Labour’s ´Modernising government´ agenda that intersected them. The emphasis on efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the management of public policy (and the gradual predominance of the problem-solving approach over ideology), for example, can be related to developments such as preventive, outcome oriented holistic government (Six 1996) (reflected in Bennett’s interpenetration of cultural with socio-economic policies above) and the advent of instrumental cultural policy; in turn supported by the ‘what works is what matters’ mantra and the utilisation of evidence-based policy, for which the contribution of social science (academic) research was explicitly called for (see for example, Blunkett 2000; Fischer 1999; Clarence 2002).

Thus, whether its role is seen as to form or establish a common culture and identity among its citizens, to support the arts and culture, or to help progress society or the economy,
most authors will agree that cultural policy research has evolved along two major fault
lines, what Oliver Bennett, paraphrasing Adorno,25 termed ‘the torn halves of cultural
policy research’ (Bennett 2004; Scullion and Garcia 2005; Selwood 2006). In fact, these
two research strands are consistent with two main approaches to policy analysis: research
for and of26 policy (Thissen and Walker 2013; Gordon, Lewis and Young 1977); and as
we shall see below, the two strands, respectively labelled ‘cultural policy research’
(Scullion and Garcia 2005; O’Brien 2014) and ‘cultural policy studies,’ (Bennett 1996;
Lewis and Miller; O’Brien 2014) reflect distinctive assumptions about the ‘cultural’ in
cultural policy and the ‘policy’ in cultural policy, conferring distinct ontological and
epistemological bases to the two strands which then has implications for policy analysis
and its outcomes (Thissen and Walker 2013).

According to O’Brien (2014) most cultural policy research will align with one half or the
other, although we will argue that other ‘halves’ do exist (cf. 2.2.2 below). But it is the
two ‘torn halves’ that this chapter now explores.

2.2.1 The ‘torn halves’

As indicated, one ‘torn half’ reflects the tendency of cultural policy research to focus on
policy making and its impact; the other looks into cultural policy from a critical
perspective, the two strands reflecting two contrasting ideas about what cultural policy is
and does. It is ‘within the construct of culture that the parameters of cultural policy are
forged’ (Stevenson, Rowe and McKay 2010) and although they share the same interest in
the production, reproduction and reception or experience of culture, the two approaches’
conceptions of culture are also different. This is discernible in two oft-cited, contrasting publications from the early 2000s (see Bennett 2004; Scullion and Garcia 2005; Selwood 2006): while Mark Schuster’s (2002) *Informing cultural policy* focuses on culture as creative-aesthetic and intellectual output, Lewis and Miller’s (2003) *Critical cultural policy studies* reader conceives of culture in its anthropological sense, ‘how we live our lives’ (Lewis and Miller 2003: 3), which also frames the aesthetic register (Yúdice and Miller 2002).

Concurringly, Schuster (2002) takes cultural policy to be ‘the sum of government’s activities with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage’ (Schuster 2003); whereas Lewis and Miller (2003) define cultural policy as a ‘means of formatting public collective subjectivity’ (Lewis and Miller 2003: 2), as they explain, as ‘a site for the production of cultural citizens’ where cultural activity provides ‘not only a ream of representations about oneself and others, but a series of rationales for particular types of conduct’ (Lewis and Miller 2003: 1; but see also Yúdice and Miller 2002: 1-3).

These distinctions are important because the object of study has a bearing on its research, on the assumptions and (research) questions asked and therefore what research is to account for – they send research in different conceptual directions; which are explored next.

2.2.1.1 Cultural policy research

Thus, research in the policy making, ’applied’ (Bennett 2004; Scullion and Garcia 2005) variant tends to focus on policy development: priorities, trends, policy effectiveness and
the outcomes and impacts of public cultural policy. It has generated a variety of policy research themes.

Since the 1980s, and reflecting the view held by both the political right and left at the time (Selwood 2010) that the arts could be articulated with socio-economic realities, an important segment of this literature has focused on the economic impacts of cultural activity (for example, Mulgan and Worpole 1986; Bianchini, Fisher, Montgomery and Worpole 1988; Myerscough 1988; Bianchini and Parkinson 1993; Bianchini 1989a; Bianchini 1989b; Hewison 1995; Belfiore 2002; Garnham 2005).

Connected to economic impact and at a time (1990s) when urban regeneration spending was a key source of government funding for the cultural sector (Selwood 2001), is also work on the role of culture in urban renewal and in local development strategy (for example Landry and Bianchini 1995; Hughson 2004; DCMS 2004). The regeneration theme, in turn, unravelled a range of issues and literature such as the concept of a creative city (Landry and Bianchini 1995) and a creative class (Griffiths 1993; Florida 2002), city image (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993; Hughson 2004; Murray 2001) and identity (Ghilardi 2006; Bernstein and Blain 2003) or the role of culture in place promotion (Richard and Wilson 2004; Murray 2001; Booth and Boyle 1993). More recently, emphasis is placed on longitudinal studies to understand the impacts of specific cultural activity and policies on urban regeneration – the work of Garcia is significant here (for example, Garcia 2013; 2012; 2007; Garcia et al 2010).

The instrumental use of culture and its economic impact were equally manifest in the creative industries, as New Labour’s policy innovation signalled its ambition to ‘harness cultural production to a renewed economic agenda’ (Banks and O’Connor 2009). It both
redrew the boundaries of cultural policy, from the arts to creative industries, and redefined its ‘grounds, purposes and instruments’ (Garnham 2005) and discourse (Banks and O’Connor 2009). The creative industries became a fertile segment of cultural policy research (for example, DCMS 1998, 2001; Caves 2000; Howkins 2001; Garnham 2005; Pratt 2005; Banks and O’Connor 2009).

The belief, moreover, that culture or creativity could also address social issues intensified the integration of ‘useful’ cultural forms (and industries) with both economic and social policy, and explains policy agendas focusing, for example, on participation in the arts, believed to contribute to neighbourhood renewal, social inclusion or to affect health, crime or employment (PAT 10 1999). Matarasso’s report Use or ornament? The social impact of participation in the arts (1997) established this conviction, inaugurating a vast research output on the social impacts of culture. In 2004, a literature review (Ruiz 2004) on the social impacts of arts/culture identified over 80 such studies. Like economic impact, though, social impact research also attracted scrutiny (Belfiore and Bennett 2007; Belfiore 2002; Merli 2002; Selwood 1999).

The instrumentalism that dominated the first New Labour mandate precipitated a wave of critique: of instrumentalism per se and of the flawed methods and data used to document the (claimed) instrumental benefits of cultural policies (Belfiore 2002; Selwood 2002, 1999). Cultural commentators and academics called instead for greater consideration of the intrinsic value of culture (Holden 2006, 2004; Hewison 2006; Hewison and Holden 2004; Selwood 2002) ultimately influencing government policy (Jowell 2004; Burnham 2009). The cultural value issue unlocked another segment of

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27 This author could never do justice to research on the creative industries in this short and necessarily general paragraph.
cultural policy research – see O’Brien’s (2010) and Donovan’s (2013) comprehensive reviews of the literature on cultural value and its assessment.

The above shows how, consistently with (policy) analysis for policy (Thissen and Walker 2013), the applied variant of cultural policy research is mainly concerned with the outcomes, impacts and effectiveness of cultural policy; although this is probably a condition of instrumentalism, which is inherently outcomes/impacts oriented. The other attribute of cultural policy research that is apparent above is its assumption of policy making as a rational, politico-technical decision process, neatly progressing from problem recognition to policy solution and decision, and supported by science-based analysis, methods and evidence (which cultural policy researchers produce). It also has an eminently national focus, whether policies are of national, regional or local scope.

2.2.1.2 Cultural policy studies

By contrast, research in the critical of policy (Thissen and Walker 2013) ‘other half’ is concerned with the critical interrogation of the nature, agenda and direction of cultural policy and, reflecting its cultural studies roots, the ways in which power operates through (cultural) policy (Allan, Iverson and Roper-Huilmsn 2010). Research engages conceptually with issues of ‘governance, cultural identity and representation that cultural policy might be seen to generate’ (Scullion and Garcia 2005: 118) to explain policy choice, its intended (or otherwise) effects or its success.

Cultural policy studies evolved from the (r)evolutionary turns of cultural studies in the early 1990s, more specifically the so-called policy turn, influenced by cultural studies scholars’ interest (particularly in Australia, at that time) in engaging more directly with

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28 These were reports to DCMS and were part of the AHRC/ESRC ‘Measuring cultural value’ work programme.
The two main approaches to (or in) cultural policy studies reflect two conceptual directions: one inspired by Gramsci’s Marxist-derived notions of class struggle and cultural hegemony; the other drawing on Foucault’s work on governmentality.

The Gramscian approach looks at culture as a site of ideological struggle, social action and intervention; as a site of resistance, against the culture of the powerful, where hegemony arises and is secured (Hall 1981: 239). Research follows a hegemonic perspective, critically interrogating cultural policy emanating from government and power structures to explore the ‘insidious and often hidden connections between culture and power’ (McGuigan 2003: 24). The focus is on behaviours and expression and the meanings that participants ascribe to them (Gray 2010) – McGuigan’s analyses of New Labour’s Millennium Dome initiative are an example (McGuigan 2004, 2005, 2007; McGuigan and Gilmore 2000, 2002).

The Foucault-informed strand, theoretically grounded on the governmentality (1991) concept, looks at ‘the cultural’ as a field of social management (Bennett 1996) and policy as part of the process of governmentality and citizen formation (Bennett 1996). Here, culture is constructed through institutional contexts, where cultural struggle emerges (Bennett 1996) and is directed at the transformation of populations through cultural technologies – artistic, intellectual forms, programmes, practices – disseminated through the social body (see also Miller 1993, 1998; Cunningham 1992, 1991; Ross 1999). Lewis and Miller’s (2003) definition of cultural policy above is predicated on this approach (also Yúdice and Miller 2001).

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29 The governmental mechanisms and processes which involve people actively in their subjectification, the government, management and development of themselves (Bennett 2007: 77)
What follows is that the study of policies can help understand how culture is pushed in certain directions (Lewis and Miller 2003: 3). Thus, whilst taking culture as its object but also recognising its intrinsically governmental origin, the governmentality school adopted an interventionist role: to tackle governmentality. The aim was to identify and transform institutional, governmental logics (Bennett 1996: 32) by engaging with government and agendas to change the game rules (Sterne 2002) from within.

Ultimately, given the critical, and textual, perspective, cultural policy becomes a series of texts that analysts will interpret (Gray 2010) according to one or the other conception of power, trying to find and understand the rationalities of governance and how the distribution of power determines (cultural) policy: governmentality explaining what those rationalities are and how they operate, hegemony explaining how/why they are dominant (Joseph 2012).

The approaches and research outputs are, obviously, different in the two ‘halves’ of cultural policy research, though they both share, unequivocally, an embeddedness in the sovereign, nation-state model; and, hence, an exclusive concern with the national ‘cultural’ whether this refers to creative/cultural activity, way of life or identity.

The two strands share, moreover, particular assumptions about policy – what it is, how it comes about – and a tendency to focus on the outcomes of policy, all of which have implications for policy analysis and its results (Thissen and Walker 2013). Applied cultural policy research typically presupposes a rational model of policy making and politics, where policy choice is based on rational decisions informed by the evidence produced by cultural policy research. In cultural policy studies cultural policy is
conceived as a methodological (hegemonic) tool to (instrumentally) achieve particular outcomes through culture.

The notion of policy in both strands is thus predicated on rationality, albeit in different ways; a rationality that neglects the constitutive role of conflict (Barnett 2001), contention and mobilisation in policy making; disregards the heterogeneity and messiness of political processes; ignores the role played by process; and their interaction. The focus on outcomes also means that both traditions have elided the formation (pre-decision) element of the policy process to explain policy; a gap that this thesis addresses.

2.2.2 The other halves

Of course, cultural policy has also been analysed through other lenses\(^{30}\) and whilst these are located in and use models from other disciplines (these will not be reviewed here), the subject of investigation is cultural policy and the questions raised by these researches are important, not least in relation to the methodologies used to examine/understand cultural policy. However, it is essential, also, to recognise a segment of research into cultural policy in practice, which is not easily classified as part of the ‘torn halves’, but is nonetheless an ‘other half’ in which researchers have creatively deployed a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to analyse cultural policy (Gray 2010).

Ahearne (2010), for example, has used a model combining Kingdon’s multiple streams and Lindblom’s ‘probing’ (1990) concept to investigate French intellectuals’ ‘implication’ (Ahearne 2010) in culture related policies during France’s Fifth Republic. Other research has also identified models and concepts that are or seem to be specific to cultural policy (or maybe come with the ‘cultural’ of this policy) – examples of which are

\(^{30}\) See Gray (2010) for a very useful survey of analytical approaches to cultural policy, including economics, sociological and political science perspectives.
the notion of policy attachment (Gray 2002), ritual cultural policy (Royseng (2008) and explicit/implicit policies (Ahearne 2008; 2004) (cited in Gray 2010). These represent a variety of theories and methods that contribute to the theoretical understanding (and practice) of cultural policy though, at this point in time, remain solo contributions.

In terms of the cultural policy researchscape mapped above, therefore, this thesis probably sits more comfortably with Gray’s (2010) category of research using other models and disciplines and perhaps also with the ‘other half’ discussed above – this research, too, identifies patterns that seem to be specific to cultural policy (or that come with the cultural of cultural policy), albeit in the European context.31 But the above review will act as a useful frame of reference to locate this thesis in relation to conventional cultural policy research and identify its contribution to the field (cf. Chapter 10).

2.3 Research on EC cultural policy

Existing research on the formation of public policy at European supranational level does not focus specifically on cultural policy.32 There is, however, a vast amount of what is mostly secondary literature on the European Community’s involvement in culture. Much of this literature is descriptive and largely tends to fall into one of four categories. It approaches EC cultural policy from either the perspective of the history of the Commission’s involvement in culture and its policy outputs, the instrumental role of cultural policy in European integration, policy-making in practice, and the Community’s cultural legal acquis and its connection to the development of cultural competence. A good part of these sources date from the period around the Maastricht Treaty when interest in the new ‘Article 128’ on culture was at its peak.

31 Cf. Chapter 9 for findings, comparison and theoretical generalisations.
32 The exception might be Littoz-Monnet (2007) but it focuses on specific broadcasting, book pricing and copyrights policies to investigate the ‘communitarisation’ of policy (cf. 2.3.4 below).
2.3.1 Narratives of the EC’s cultural policy

In terms of volume, a good part of the literature on the EC’s cultural policy comprises what are in essence narratives of the Community’s action on culture. These are often chapters or sections of publications introducing the EC, its policies and institutions and mainly provide a chronological overview of the EC’s involvement in cultural policy, identifying (what are perceived as) some of the key events in this chronology.


Some of these accounts tend to emphasise the tensions between the supranational and national levels of competence in the field often offering a view (implicit) of supranational involvement in culture as encroaching upon the sovereignty of the member states (Shore 2002, 2001a, 2001b, 1993; Sandell 1997; Duelund 1990; Mohr 1990; Westgeest 1990).

But however informative they may be, the emphasis of these accounts is on the description and critique of policy outputs, rather than policy-making. They provide little
if any insight into the reasons for European level policy activity, still leaving the reader with the puzzle as to why and how it started. Indeed, there seems to have been no interest or attempt to delve any deeper into the origins or causal processes of policy activity at European level, or, put simply, what led to the publication of the Commission’s papers in the first place.

2.3.2 European integration and instrumental cultural policy

The role of culture in European integration is a second and strongly argued strand of the literature which became more important as the Maastricht Treaty included a policy statement on culture (Article 128). Approaches to this relationship vary, from reflections on the different boundaries – cultural, artistic, geographical, politico-economic, regional – of Europe (Braudel 1995; Fisher 1992); to how common ground between them could be found and differences bridged through cultural co-operation (Fisher 1992; Mourik 1991; Ryngaert 1987) and views on the role of culture in European integration.

On this last point, and in order to underline the importance of transnational cultural interaction and flows (formal and informal) in the process (Magiera 1991; Romero 1990; De Witte 1990), some of the literature argues that,

‘[the] freedom of movement does not cover individuals only as actors on the economic stage, but in their complete – economic as well as social, political and cultural – personality’ (Magiera 1991: 156).

For De Witte, moreover,

‘the exchange of ideas and possibly also of artistic and literary productions is one of the methods of fostering the development of world understanding and a sense of morals and cultural community among peoples’ (1990: 46).

Interest in the instrumental use of cultural activity by the EC for the promotion of a European ‘we feeling’ generated some scholarly literature exploring the link between the
process of integration, EC cultural policy and European identity (Sassatelli 2002; Schlesinger 2002; Smith 1997). This line of argument was influenced by Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) and Anderson’s (1983) work on the instrumental use of traditions, culture and symbolism as techniques for nation- and state-building. Cris Shore’s (2000) anthropological study of the Commission and its policy-making and political activities, for example,

‘alerted [him] to the panoply of cultural devices and techniques being deployed by EU policy professionals to turn the so-called ‘European idea’ into a reality’ (Shore 2000).

Narrow interpretations of this instrumentalism, however, inspired apocalyptic visions of ‘Brussels’ wanting to thwart national cultural autonomy and identity to create a European nation-state (Shore 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 1993; Mulder 1991; Oddermatt 1991).

Again, the focus here is on the instrumental use of European cultural policy and its role (potentially) in European nation-building. But this only speculates about the possible (rational) motivations for the EC’s involvement in culture, it does not tell us anything about why or how this policy/ies emerged.

2.3.3 The European civil servants’ tales: the day to day of policy making

It was not unusual for European Commission and Council officials to publicly present or even publish papers on their policy sectors. Most officials spent relatively long periods of time in the same post which more often than not meant that they were the key actors and agents in their policy processes, and who, over time, built up the arguments and support for Community intervention in their fields. They were deeply knowledgeable about their policies, their initiation and development, and the politics surrounding them – Robert Grégoire, a Commission civil servant responsible for the Culture Division between 1973 and 1985, is one such case.
Their papers provide well informed empirical narratives of the business of policy making in culture in the context of the Commission and the broader EC system, key events, often containing useful commentary on the principles and action in the field as it unfolded and evolved (see, for example, Grégoire (2000, 1984, 1978, 1976), former head of the European Commission’s Culture Division; but see also, among others, Missir (1987; 1984) former chef de division for culture in the Secretariat General of the European Commission; Forrest (1994, 1987), a former head of the Council Secretariat; and Frediani (2007a, 2007b, 2003) a former Council official working in culture and education).

But although EC officials’ accounts are not the result of systematic research or informed by theory, their narratives are useful for a number of reasons. They are well informed, insider perspectives which offer first hand empirical accounts of the day-to-day work of policy makers, the politics as they unfolded inside the European Commission (in the 1970s and 80s), and other actors/events impacting the policy process. More broadly, they offer insight into the workings of the European Commission as an organisation, the European institutions and how policy makers/officials navigated the European institutional system and negotiated the opportunities for and threats to the creation and development of a new policy sector. However non-academic or not linked to European public policy research, these accounts are congruent with and supplement the body of organisational and policy analysis on the Commission in numerous other policy sectors.

Most importantly, where this study is concerned, these accounts show the dynamic processes involving not just the institutions but also some of the ‘flesh and blood people’ (Dyson and Featherstone 1999) within them, and how they interacted and impacted on the development of European cultural policy. Their emphasis on process lends relevance to this thesis’ choice of a process based research design to investigate European policy
formation. But, whereas the civil servants recount their experiences of ‘what’ happened, this thesis favours the linkages between context, processes and outcomes to explain why and how ‘what’ happened.

2.3.4 The legal perspective: from ‘competence creep’ to policy

The more analytical accounts of EC involvement in culture focus on the implications and effects of European legislation on culture – nationally and at European level – namely the establishment of the common market and the removal of barriers to trade and movement between the member-states (Craufurd Smith 2004; Flamand-Levy 2004; Lester 1993; López 1993 focussing specifically on museums; Fisher 1992; Mulder 1991; Bekemans 1990; Mohr 1990; Westgeest 1990; De Witte 1988, 1987a; Ricigliano 1976). Mulder’s (1991) anxiety about the fact that, ‘[in] the light of these developments, the degree to which national governments are able to ‘steer’ and develop art and culture will steadily decline’ (Mulder 1991: 4), is a good example of the apprehension of European cultural commentators at the time.

Thus, it is not surprising that governance and the question of competence and the division of powers over culture – who regulates what – between the Community and the member-states was a legal theme that got some research attention (Craufurd Smith 2004; Flamand-Levy 2004; Pollack 2000; and Sanjose and Roseñada 2000, Cornu 1993 – both from the perspective of subsidiarity; De Witte 1988, 1987a; Rasmussen 1988; Dewost 1987). The amount of literature peaking around the years leading up to and immediately post 1992 (Single Market) is perhaps indicative of the expectation of cultural writers and commentators across Community Europe about the EC’s impact on culture as the Maastricht ‘moment of truth’ materialised (Scott and Freeman 1994; Fisher 1992; Loman et al 1991; Bekemans 1990; De Witte 1987a).
A not unrelated, if more specific, third theme in the legal literature is the importance of cultural legislation (soft and hard, direct and indirect legislation) and in particularly soft law, in gradually securing a legal basis for Community action on – and policy for – culture (Flamand-Levy 2004; McMahon 1995; Scott and Freeman 1994; Lomans et al 1991; Dewost 1987). According to Dewost

‘forms of proceeding have developed in practice (in particular, decisions on the various forms they may take) which, without being legal acts of the Community, make it possible to take tentative steps in areas for which no express Community power exists […] and which later serve as the basis or further Community acts’ (1987:342).

This literature evidentiates one of the methods which allowed the institutionalisation of existing policy activity on the part of the Commission from a relatively early stage, a phenomenon labelled ‘creeping competence’ by Mark Pollack (1994: 1) in his seminal article on the expansion of the Community policy agenda into areas that were not anticipated in the 1957 EEC Treaty through law and regulation.

A scholarly account of the formation of EC policy/ies on culture, provided by Anabelle Littoz-Monet (2007), looks into ‘competence creep’ from a perspective of politics. Analysing the development of three policies at supranational level in the late 1980s-90s – broadcasting, book pricing and copyrights – Littoz-Monet argues that, from the 1970s onwards, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Commission’s DG Competition, making use of their judicial and regulatory powers, initiated a negative type of

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33 Soft law can be defined as non-binding legal instruments such as resolutions, recommendations, declarations or communications, all mostly of symbolic character but which nevertheless create a precedent or a basis for further initiative.

34 Tilly and Tarrow (2007) define institutionalisation as the incorporation of performances and political actors into the routines of organised politics.
integration\textsuperscript{35} which induced the gradual transfer (‘Communitarisation’) of national policies in those sectors to the supranational level.

Littoz-Monnet looks at this (induced) policy transfer from three combined theoretical perspectives – policy images and institutional venues\textsuperscript{36} (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), multilevel governance\textsuperscript{37} (Marks 1993) (MLG) and an actor-based approach (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 1993) – to investigate how the policy images\textsuperscript{38} of actors in multiple governance levels interacted, and how they in turn interacted with the dynamics of European integration to generate the development of supranational policy.

The ‘image and venue’ approach focuses on the tensions between venues (different jurisdictions) and conflicting policy images – its principal mechanism is conflict expansion. In this thesis, for example, the policy episodes follow a typical ‘inside access’ model of agenda building (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976)\textsuperscript{39} in which issues arise from within the system and do not involve the expansion of conflict (or only to a limited extent).

MLG is not relevant to this thesis’ research problematic (or its policy experiences). On

\textsuperscript{35} Negative integration consists of the elimination of trade barriers; positive integration, by contrast, corresponds to an active, purposeful action to promote European integration such as a policy or a specific activity; see for example Wallace (1991).

\textsuperscript{36} According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 1991; also Rochefort and Cobb 1994) a policy image refers to ‘how a policy is understood and discussed’ (1993: 25), and policy stakeholders will control the perception of a particular policy problem through the use of symbols, rhetoric and policy analysis (in UK politics this is visible e.g. Labour and Conservatives). The theory also recognises the link between policy images and institutional venues and how the latter carry a decisional bias – for example, when the UK’s DCMS was created in 1997 the image of public cultural policy clearly shifted from subsidised arts (the Arts Council’s image) to creative industries with an instrumental, socio-economic emphasis.

\textsuperscript{37} The concept of multi-level governance emerged in the 1990s in the context of European regionalisation and as a theoretical perspective giving expression to the involvement of a multiplicity of authority structures in European policy-making and potentially preventing any single level from dominating governance structures. It represents the ‘intimate entanglement between the domestic and international levels of authority and the changing relationships between actors situated at different territorial levels, both from the public and the private sectors’ (Marks 1993). See for example Marks (1993) and Marks and Hooghes (2004)

\textsuperscript{38} The two policy images under investigation were dirigiste and liberal. According to Littoz-Monnet (2007) the term dirigiste refers to regulatory and legislative developments an interventionist nature, in contrast with liberal legislative solutions which aim to liberalise markets.

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. Footnote 54
one hand, the policy agenda typically builds internally; on the other, the EC politics surrounding the development of the culture policy in all four episodes can be theorised as a one dimensional (intergovernmental-supranational) political space in which actors are assumed to have preferences for new policies but press for such outcomes within the limits of their powers (see also Pollack 2008: 204).

An analytic interest of Littoz-Monnet’s study (which this research shares) is the role of actors in the policy process. Littoz-Monnet explores the ways in which policy actors designed and implemented interventions (policy ‘sequencing’) in order to achieve their goal of liberalisation of the European media market. Actors are conceptualised as capable of strategic action within given institutional structures (2007) – preferences get activated by how individuals interpret context, and it is this combination that yields choice (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The assumption is that intentional (rational) human action/decision making causes social processes, and explanation (therefore) consists of showing how (or that) these decisions arise, that is, their motivations and contexts.

An obvious limitation of Littoz-Monnet’s theoretical framework is that it is relevant to the sample of policies selected and the specific politico-economic context of the late 1980s in which they emerged: the three policies are primarily economic and market oriented policies; they are regulatory policies in terms of their mode; and their stakeholders are located in multiple policy venues across domestic and international levels. The explanatory or theoretical value of this approach is possibly relevant to similar policy experiences, though less pertinent to any generalisations beyond ‘convenient cases’ (Ragin 1999).

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40 Regulatory policies are inherently market oriented policies; their aim is to intervene in the market whether it is to control or to liberalise it. For conceptualisations and categorisations of policy, see, for example: Sbragia and Stolfi’s (2008) policy types, and also Wallace’s (2000) policy modes.
In contrast with Littoz-Monnet (2007), this research seeks to explain policy trajectories and outcomes (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) – the emergence of culture issues and their journey in the policy cycle – in the context in which actors make their choices and interact i.e. the black-box of process. A major aim here is to uncover the interplay between situation, context and agency and its consequences, which calls for a ‘causal reconstruction’ (Mayntz 2004) of the policy process in each episode.

A suitable candidate as an explanatory method to explore and understand how action, institutional and context aspects interact and influence each other is a process-based approach. Pettigrew defines process as ‘a sequence of events, actions and activities unfolding over time in context’ (1997)\(^{41}\) though McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s definition of processes as ‘frequently recurring causal chains, sequences and combinations of mechanisms’ (2001) adds a further level of (within process) detail to Pettigrew.

**2.4 Toward a dynamic process model**

**2.4.1 Institutional processualism: processes and institutions matter**

A framework that is particularly relevant to the study of the process of policy making and its dynamics is institutional processualism (Abbot 2001; Barzelay 2003). This approach is rooted in two theoretical perspectives: processualism and neo-institutionalism. The processualist approach views social reality as stories where human effort, interaction and structural and temporal context matter (Abbott 2001) and it especially interested in how actions drive process.

In comparative politics, processual theories of processes, including policy making, typically analyse how events are influenced by a nation’s governmental system or other

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\(^{41}\) The interaction between agents and contexts occurs over time and policy trajectories are commonly explained as the result of the temporal intersection of disparate factors (Barzelay 2007).
institutional characteristics of the site (Barzelay and Jacobsen 2009: 319). But actions are embedded in contexts, which shape/limit their information, insight and influence (Pettigrew 1997: 338). The neo-institutionalist perspective is particularly interested in how situated interaction is influenced by institutional context. Institutional rules and norms matter because they prescribe roles for, and set limits on, the behaviours of individual actors (Smith 2004). The premise is that, rather than mere passive vessels within which politics occur, institutions act as intervening variables between actor preferences and policy outputs.

This dialectic between structure and agency also means that actors are strategic, as they seek to realise what are complex, contingent and often changing goals, and are so in contexts that favour some strategies over others although at the same time relying on what are perceptions or interpretations of context (see Hay and Wincott 1998). Zahariadis (2007) also points to the importance of human cognition and emotion as the bases of political manipulation and how this impacts on the interaction of individuals with institutions. However, whilst institutions make things possible, people make things happen; so, ‘institutions matter’ (Rockman and Weaver 1993) but their importance is tempered by real, ‘flesh and blood’ individuals, their emotions and cognition.

In institutional processualism, thus, the emphasis is on structure and action but whilst there is a concern with the impact of institutions this is moderated by (or reconciled with) the interest in other influences on the dependent variable; which is a condition of a process-oriented approach. The action being analysed is always action by individuals that is oriented to the behaviour of others (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 13) and there

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42 All three main neo-institutionalist schools of rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism ‘matter’, in the sense that they structure behaviours. They also inform processual institutionalism.

43 Zahariadis’ analysis refers specifically to policy entrepreneurs but this is relevant to any ‘actor’.
is, therefore, also a quest to find the underlying social mechanisms which shape the observed processes (Pettigrew 1997).

2.4.2 Social mechanisms

A conceptual tool that has a central role in this causal, processual explanation and which is used in this research design to model the connection between contextual conditions (actors) and outcomes (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 13) is that of social mechanisms. Mechanisms are events (or sequences of events) that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances (Tilly and Tarrow 2006: 214). Social mechanisms represent the interactions between individuals or between individuals and some social aggregate (Schelling 1998). They are activated by process and context factors and state how, by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions⁴⁴ (Mayntz 2004: 241; Hedström and Swedberg 1998) – this relationship is represented in Figure 2.1 below,

![Diagram: The causal role of a social mechanism (own elaboration)](image)

**Figure 2.1: The causal role of a social mechanism (own elaboration)**

As the micro-level ‘cogs and wheels’ (Elster 1993) that bring the relationship between input and outcome into existence, they establish how macro-level events or conditions

⁴⁴ In Bunge’s model (cited in Hedström and Swedberg 1998), two sets of events – input I and outcome O – are linked to one another by mechanism M, so that: $I \rightarrow M \rightarrow O$
affect the individual, how the individual assimilates the impact of these events and how, conversely, individuals, through their actions and interaction, generate macro-level outcomes (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). The activation of one or more mechanisms in combination thus creates event trajectories.

As an example, policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon 1995), a common social mechanism in this sample, is activated by the interaction between actors’ choices and the context/s in which they operate. Another social mechanism common to studies of policy formation or change is ‘attribution of opportunity’45 (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) and is often combined with or activates the mechanism of policy entrepreneurship. This sequence is central to Kingdon’s model of the policy process, as policy entrepreneurs apply their efforts to what they anticipate is the opening of a policy window.

This was also a key combination in this research, although cultural policy entrepreneurship was also found to often operate in association with the mechanism of ‘actor certification’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) (cf. Chapters 5 – 8). Both social mechanisms consistently operated with policy entrepreneurship in the sample. Table 2.1 below defines these mechanisms,

45 According to McAdam et al (2001: 46) the ‘attribution of opportunity’ (2001: 46) mechanism is activated when an actor interprets the situation, comes to a view that the situation provides an opportunity for realising its goals and seizes this opportunity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social mechanism</th>
<th>What it is about</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy entrepreneurship</td>
<td>The activity of advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the hope of future return; which might materialise in the form of policies of which they approve, satisfaction from participating or career promotion (Kingdon 1995: 122–123) (see also 2.4.5 below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribution of opportunity</td>
<td>An actor interprets the situation, comes to a view that the situation provides an opportunity for realising its goals and seizes this opportunity (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor certification</td>
<td>An external authority’s signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor i.e. an actor interprets the performance/claims of another actor, assesses to what extent it meets certain standards for claim-making and validates these (Tilly and Tarrow 2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, the framework discussed above seeks to capture the dynamics of process and the diverse variables or factors that interact to influence issue/policy trajectories and outcomes. Such interactions and influences, however, are not one-time (frozen in time), isolated events, they occur over time. This is a characteristic of institutional processualism. In order to account for longer processes, it focuses on final but also intermediate outcomes, as smaller component events/outcomes help shed light on the issue/episode trajectory. Time is thus an explanatory factor in this framework. A model of the policy process that takes temporal context, process and institutional frameworks into consideration is Kingdon’s multiple streams – and it is to this that this chapter now turns.

2.4.3 Kingdon’s model of policy making

Kingdon’s model (1995) focuses on the pre-decision stages of the policymaking process and provides a framework to explain the initiation and generation of public policies. The choice of Kingdon’s model is particularly apposite for two reasons. Firstly, the model
assumes that these processes occur in dynamic institutional environments, as formal or informal rules and procedural requirements make some outcomes possible and others unlikely (Kingdon 1995). Secondly, it seeks to capture agency – which is primarily manifested in its interest in policy entrepreneurship – and its interaction with situation, structural and temporal contexts and the relationship between them. This is a strongly processual feature. The model combines the systemic and the situational and complements or even integrates the institutional-processualist framework elected.\footnote{Barzelay and Gallego (2006) in fact argue that Kingdon’s framework is institutional-processualist.}

But why is Kingdon’s the most appropriate model?

A model that has been used in European policy studies is advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Weible 2007). The model assumes that policy making occurs within a policy subsystem but that its behaviour is affected by its broader contexts, it assumes a micro-level model of the individual and that the way to deal with multiple actors (sharing beliefs) in a subsystem is to aggregate them into ‘advocacy coalitions’. Advocacy coalitions could be identified in our 1960s, 1970s and 1980s episodes and ACF can explain policy change; but in ACF the key actor is the coalition, not the individual. Conversely, ACF does not account for causal processes intra-coalition nor the institutional factors that affect them, whereas our episodes show the importance of both institutional environments and entrepreneurial individuals on policy formation.

Also, a paradigm that has been widely used in European policy studies is policy networks/communities (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Richardson 2004), favoured because of its actor focus and the scope to account for the variety of actors populating EU policy-making (Richardson 2004: 5). In our policy sample, communities could be identified who
shared interest and resources to push the cultural issue on the agenda, for example, the Commission-EP alliance in the 1977 episode. But network models are better at describing network interactions than explaining policy-making dynamics (Adam and Kriesi 2007; John 1998), they do not explain policy change. Precisely, Kingdon’s primary aim is to understand how issues ‘came to be issues in the first place’ (1995: 2), why some issues capture attention, rise to and move on the agenda eventually becoming policy while others do not.

Kingdon’s model makes distinctions between people and processes or activities and postulates that policy forms/changes when three streams of participants – who recognise a particular problem, who develop a policy proposal, and those who push/campaign for its adoption – converge, opening a window of opportunity, due to intentional action by actors Kingdon describes as policy entrepreneurs. In Kingdon’s own narrative:

‘First, various problems come to capture the attention of people in and around government. […] Second, there is a policy community – [civil servants], academics, interest groups – which concentrates on generating proposals. […] Third, the political stream is composed of things like […] public opinion, election results, shifts in partisan or ideological distribution […] and interest group, […] processes [which] can operate as an impetus or a constraint’ (Kingdon 1995: 87).

Kingdon, moreover, conceptualises the process of policy making as involving four analytically distinct phases (1) agenda setting, (2) formulation of policy alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among those options, and (4) implementation of the decision (Kingdon 1995: 2-3). His study focuses on the first two processes – specifically, who affects agendas and alternatives, why and how. But how do the three streams of participants interact with the policy making activities of agenda setting and policy formulation?
2.4.3.1 Agenda setting: problems and politics

Agendas are about the attention given to problems or issues and agenda setting can be defined as the process by which an organisation comes to pay attention to some issues rather than others (Jones and Baumgarter 2005: 38). Two key process questions here are: why do some problems attract policy makers’ attention, rather than others; and why do they rise or fall on the agenda. In other words, how are agendas set? According to Kingdon’s model, agendas are mainly set by problems and political processes (or streams).

2.4.3.1.1 Problems

The problems stream consists of various conditions or problems that policy makers and citizens want addressed.\(^\text{47}\) It refers to where attention is allocated, in the first place, and focuses on the factors affecting the perception of what constitutes a problem by governments, politicians, and other participants.

For a condition to be defined as a problem, people must first recognise it as such and become convinced that something should be done about it. But there is a multitude of problems vying for government attention at any one time and participants pay attention to some problems at the expense of others. A given problem can have many implications and can potentially be defined in different ways\(^\text{48}\) and therefore how conditions come to be defined as problems makes a difference. Problem definition is the process of characterising problems in the political arena (Rochefort and Cobb 1994: 3) and is effected through the strategic portrayal of causal stories (Stone 1989). An issue’s definition, thus, influences not only its chances of reaching a political agenda, but also

\(^{47}\) Kingdon (1995) differentiates between a condition and a problem, which arises when a condition is deemed to be appropriate for governmental action.

\(^{48}\) For example, transportation for disabled people could be considered as a transportation issue and as a human rights issue (see Kingdon 1995).
the stakeholders it mobilises, the type of ‘politicking’ that it activates, and the probability of a successful policy outcome for the issue’s advocates (Petracca 1992: 1) – it is a purposive process and is closely related to agenda processes.

In the European context, the EC’s own remit and tasks directly affect the definition or framing49 of problems. As issues come on the European agenda, framing involves not only the nature of problems and solutions, as it normally would in any government, but also the appropriateness of the European level of intervention. Thus, the argument surrounding an issue will typically involve a substantive element (why something needs to be done about it) and a European dimension element (why the need for European action to address it).

But research has also shown that, perhaps by its very nature the EC may (in practice) favour certain issue frames over others (see, for example, Princen 2009; Guigner 2004; Scharpf 1999). In the 1970s and 80s, the European Commission was mostly receptive to issues and arguments that could be linked to the common market and its implementation, and framing an issue in economic terms or emphasising its relevance to the common market significantly enhanced its prospects of rising to the European agenda.50 This research also found evidence of ‘strategic framing’ (Princen 2009). For example, the 1970s episode shows how the European Commission actively sought to frame the culture issue, a nationally sensitive issue for most member states at the time, in a way that justified European (supranational) level action.

49 In Schön and Rein (1994) the framing of a problem or situation determines the features to which inquirers will attend, the order they will attempt to impose on the situation, the directions in which they will try to change it. In this process, they identify both the ends to be sought and the means to be employed. Similarly, policy frames convey a particular image of a policy problem, implying certain definitions and solutions, different frames leading to the engagement or activation of different constituencies (Rhinard 2010).

50 As Lenschow and Zito point up (1998) such institutional choices bias the policy discourse in the direction of certain policy frames and constrain the range of options decision makers perceive as available.
Moreover, as problems come to the attention of policy makers through a variety of mechanisms – indicators, focusing events, policy evaluations (Kingdon 1995) – one tactic deployed by the Commission was the commissioning of European level research studies on culture to (provide data to) guide (and legitimise) this intervention. In the 1950s episode, on the other hand, the culture issue was strategically framed in educational terms, as European political leaders were sensitive to the cultural role of education in the European project in the immediate post-war decades.

2.4.3.1.2 Politics

The second line of explanation for why issues get ‘on’ or ‘off’ and ‘high’ or ‘low’ on the agenda has to do with politics, according to Kingdon (1995). Independent of problem definition and policy formulation, political events proceed, at their own pace and according to their own dynamics. They can be powerful agenda setters. A change in government, political pressure or events can move an issue on the government agenda, although, at the same time, agenda decisions involve a significant degree of calculation of the political costs and benefits of addressing a particular issue rather than the importance of the issue itself.

This was also the case in this research. In all episodes, attempts to develop a cultural policy in the EC occurred at times of political change and invariably the culture issue emerged when political union was at the top of the European high level political agenda. According to former EC officials interviewed for this research, Commission officials would painstakingly pore over every European Council’s final Communiqué in the hope of finding clues and therefore opportunities for new proposals in their policy sectors (see COM2 2009; COM3 2010; COM5 2010; CON1 2009; also Grégoire 2000).
Commission’s agenda followed the appointment of new Commission colleges; in fact, all four episodes occurred in circumstances of institutional change of one kind or another.

The political institutional framework within which agenda setting occurs also has a decisive influence over agenda processes (Peters 2001) as it determines the extent to which issues enter the agenda and the kind of issues or arguments that might be considered. In the EC, an important institutional aspect that influences agenda setting is the highly fragmented decision-making system, which creates multiple avenues for influence. In this research, this is illustrated by the (stage-managed) expansion of the culture issue’s politics to the European Parliament in the 1970s episode, and the Commission’s arm’s length appropriation of the 1986 Florence Capital of Culture’s practitioners’ conference (cf. 1980s episode) in order to legitimise its new cultural policy agenda from the grass roots.

2.4.3.1.3 European routes for agenda setting

A typical issue will begin life as an issue of public concern in the systemic or public agenda (Kingdon 1995; Cobb and Elder 1977) and progresses to the governmental agenda when it becomes an issue of concern – a problem – for policy makers. A key difference between the EC and other polities, however, is that there is not (nor ever was) any such thing as a European ‘demos’ and direct public involvement in the European political system has always been extremely limited (certainly if compared to the various national systems). The media do not operate on a European scale and the political

52 There are different types of agenda depending on who within government is paying attention to issues. The governmental agenda is the set of issues to which governmental officials are paying attention (Kingdon 1995: 3; Cobb and Elder 1977: 86). In the EC, for example, each of the European institution (Council, Commission, European Parliament) will have their own agenda; but within the Commission itself different Directorate Generals (e.g. DG Competition, DG Culture) have agendas for their respective policy areas.
parties\textsuperscript{53} and interest groups with the power to mobilise public interest do not have much impact beyond their national borders and do not have a European presence. The national, member state level was (and remains) the focal point for citizens’ political interests and loyalties.

Despite the relative isolation of European policy making from public opinion, however, Princen and Rhinard (2006) identify two routes for agenda setting\textsuperscript{54} in the European political system. Issues can emerge or ‘creep’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1119) on the European agenda from below, through experts and officials identifying policy problems or formulating new policy directions at a lower institutional level. Or they can arrive or ‘crash’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006: 1119) from above, driven, for example, by heads of state meeting in the European Council (or summits, pre-1974) urging specific European action.

The two metaphors provide good images for the two dynamics of agenda initiation – issues ‘creeping’ from lower level politics often create a self-sustaining dynamic and are able to engender the gradual expansion and institutionalisation of European level activity on a particular issue whilst issues ‘crashing’ from high level politics inherently carry an impetus for change which can help them overcome political or institutional inertia. In the former case issues arrive through the problems stream; in the latter, they are initiated

\textsuperscript{53} The European Parliament’s political ‘parties’ are party groups, that is, aggregations of national political parties – for example, the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) or the Party of European Socialists (PES) – and lack the unity required to produce a sustained, coherent pattern of European level agenda setting. They facilitate parliamentary institutional functioning but do not have a public expression as political parties.

\textsuperscript{54} Princen and Rhinard’s classification follows from the models of agenda building identified by Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) which account for an issue’s trajectory through agendas: in the outside initiative model issues arise in the systemic agenda and move to the governmental agenda. In the inside access model issues or proposals arise within government and are only expanded to attention groups in order to create enough pressure on decision makers to place the issue on the formal agenda. A third model, mobilisation, posits that issues are initiated by political leaders but then require the support of the mass public for its implementation.
through the politics stream. The four episodes in this research all show these two dynamics in operation. They also demonstrate how the two dynamics and streams can interact.

2.4.3.2 Alternative formulation

Apart from his interest in how some issues climb to the agenda and others do not, Kingdon is also concerned with why, out of the set of all conceivable alternatives for governmental action, officials actually consider some more seriously than others (Kingdon 1995: 4).

Kingdon (1995) likens the generation of policy proposals to a process of biological natural selection. As ideas ‘boil’ in the policy ‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon 1995: 116) and are rehearsed and tested they must meet several criteria that determine how some proposals survive and others do not, for example, technical feasibility, value fit with the policy community, resource feasibility, or the potential support or receptiveness of politicians. If a proposal does not meet the criteria it might be revised or combined with other ideas and float again.

But the merit of a proposal is also assessed in terms of the political support for (or opposition to) it and may entail a process of cultivation or softening up the system, in which policy entrepreneurs broker ideas and people and push their proposal in different fora. The generation of alternatives is thus (certainly by comparison to agenda setting) a relatively managed process (Barzelay 2003) and the pace of development of a policy can vary, from the gradual to the fast-paced, as the policy episodes in this research illustrate.

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55 In Kingdon’s terminology, alternatives refer to policy solutions or proposals.
However, making the short list of possible alternatives is only one side of the question. A policy alternative does not necessarily follow (consequentially) from the emergence or definition of a problem. Available solutions seek problems as much as problems chase solutions. Preferences are often uncertain and the decision that something needs to be done often creates the preferences rather than vice versa (Peters 2001). In this case, the solution shapes the problem and issues may ‘land’ on the agenda because they are convenient and satisfy a strategic need rather than because they are emergent problems.

In the European context research suggests the existence of (structural) biases in European public policy, namely the tendency to focus on issues of cross-border trade. This research found a bias in all the policy formulation events – also a cross-border or market bias in the two Commission policies – but what explains it is the fact that the treaty is an institutional framework that pretty much shapes policy formulation and that fitness with the Treaty (and its goals) is a sine qua non condition for an issue’s progression on the Community’s agenda and policy-making process.

An alternative explanation to Kingdon’s for this, however, is that the search for a (policy) solution is purposeful; in which case policy generation may be best characterised as problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963: 121). According to Cyert and March (1963) researching organisational contexts, problemistic search presupposes that search is stimulated by a specific problem and is directed toward finding a solution that can satisfy organisational goals – it is a motivated and biased search. Our sample presented evidence of such behaviour.

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56 Scharpf (and others) finds that the EC’s commitment to removing barriers to trade makes that European public policy tends to deal with a relatively limited range of (trade related) problems (1999: 23).
2.4.4 Opening windows and coupling the streams

As seen above, in Kingdon’s model the three streams of problems, policies and politics flow independently of each other and are driven by disparate forces – problems are recognised irrespective of existing policy options to address them or contemporaneous political events; proposals develop on their own irrespective of whether they present solutions to problems and independently of political considerations; and political events unfold autonomously irrespective of problems or proposals. A policy window opens in either the problem or political stream providing the opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions or alternatives (the opportunity consists of the fact that all three streams concur when the window opens). In Kingdon’s (1995) terms this action is taken by policy entrepreneurs, individuals who are willing to invest their resources to promote their issue and are able to attach solutions to problems, overcome challenges by rethinking proposals, and find political support for their ideas.

Like opportunities in a conventional sense, however, coupling opportunities and policy windows are unpredictable, seldom happen and are only open for very limited periods of time; that is, ‘an idea’s time comes’ (Kingdon 1995) but is also goes. Any intervention must therefore be quick and effective. The outcome is either that policy changes or nothing happens. Kingdon (1995) suggests that windows close for various reasons, because participants either feel that they have solved the problem and the matter is closed or they fail to act and political attention turns to other issues, closing the opportunity window. The events that prompted the window to open, on the other hand, may simply

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57 The proposals are constantly in the policy stream but become elevated on the governmental agenda because they can be seen as solutions to a pressing problem, because politicians find their sponsorship expedient or even because a new administration or a shift in the political stream opens a window that makes its timing propitious (Kingdon 1995: 172-173).

58 Kingdon (1995) assumes that policy entrepreneurs are individuals but policy entrepreneurial action could be taken by a collective, institutional entrepreneur – the European Commission is a relevant example.

59 This is because, as Downs’ issue-attention cycle (1972) theorises, prominent issues remain so for only a short time, gradually fading from the centre of attention.
lose their significance just as the political momentum also fades just as turnover and key players moving on to other positions may also affect policy or political developments potentially contributing to the closure of a policy window. A final rationale for policy window closure is that no feasible or adequate policy proposals are available.

But although windows are in or by principle unpredictable there are instances where their opening can be anticipated as regular cycles of various kinds open and close windows on a schedule. They can structure agendas although the issues arising from these are not always predictable. Examples are budget cycles, the European Commission’s four yearly term of office, the regular European Council or summit meetings.

Also, the advent of a successful window for a given issue area can prompt spillover into an adjacent area. Spillovers occur because politicians sense that ‘riding the same wave’ again can still bring benefits, because support in the political stream can be extended to new issues, or because success in a first case provides an argument by analogy for success in the second. In the European Commission in 1971, for example, after successfully initiating the education policy domain onto the Commission’s agenda Commissioner Spinelli immediately turned to the development of a cultural policy – the ‘wave’ was still rolling, the political mood seemed to be receptive and some of the arguments just needed to be reframed.

But a window missed for some reason might well mean that the chance to push the issue is lost and an entrepreneur must wait for another window to open. Without a policy window, by contrast, issue advocates will not waste time and resources promoting it because they know that the conditions are not suitable. The ability to discern an
opportunity – when an idea’s time has come (Kingdon 1995) – to manage it, and seize it, are therefore essential attributes of policy entrepreneurs.

2.4.5 Policy entrepreneurs

According to Kingdon’s model the dynamics of the policy process and agenda-setting can only be fully captured if the role of policy entrepreneurs is taken into account. Many actors and organisations take part in policy making or try to influence decision making, as Kingdon (1995) notes, but it is normally possible to identify an individual or a small group of people that appear to have been instrumental in moving an issue up on the agenda and into a decisional position. Kingdon categorises such actors as policy entrepreneurs.  

The concept of entrepreneurship originates in economic theory (see for example Schumpeter 1934). Schumpeter sees entrepreneurs as actors who recognise and achieve new economic possibilities which lead to economic change. In Kingdon’s conception, entrepreneurial action leads to policy change. In this view any action that enhances the possibility of a change in policy is by definition an act of policy entrepreneurship; the author of such actions is a policy entrepreneur (Barzelay 2001: 59).

60 Entrepreneurial behaviour has been the subject of studies across a range of disciplines and in a variety of contexts with contributions coming especially from economics, business, sociology and psychology. See for example Schneider and Teske (1992); Roberts and King (1991) and Mintrom (2000) for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature.

61 Schumpeter (1934) conceptualises entrepreneurship in terms of innovation – in an economic context the entrepreneurial function brings about economic development, that is, change. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950) Schumpeter claims that ‘political entrepreneurs spark revolutionary change, much like technological innovations reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention’. Schumpeter places the emphasis on the effects of entrepreneurship. Hayek (1972), conversely, underlines the importance of ‘concrete ordinary knowledge’ in the process of discovery (i.e. practical understanding of the system in which an entrepreneur operates) placing the emphasis on the entrepreneur and its environment. These conceptions complement each other and our understanding and application of the concept of policy entrepreneurship owes to both.
The role played by policy entrepreneurs in the policy episodes in this research was found to be analytically significant. There is evidence of policy entrepreneurial activity in all four episodes and of the intervention of policy entrepreneurs as critical to the unfolding of the dynamics of policy processes and their eventual outcomes; many different forms of entrepreneurial input were found.\textsuperscript{62} It could be counterfactually argued that this research’s policy episodes would not have existed had the policy entrepreneurs not been there and did what they did when they did it: they played a central role in changing institutional frameworks and capacities. Their activities range from problem definition and redefinition to agenda setting; from issue advocacy to venue shopping, or cultivating political support.

Cohen, March and Olsen’s garbage can model (1972) in fact identifies a ‘stream’ (not a role as such) for participants but these are depicted rather casually as ‘decision makers looking for work’ (1972: 80), if not reactively, i.e. as acting ‘on the basis of different definitions of the situation’ (1972: 81). Kingdon, by contrast, singles out a role, a functional role (that of coupling the streams) for entrepreneurial participants – they act rationally and purposefully, they are ‘power brokers who manipulate problematic preferences and unclear technology’ (Zahariadis 2007: 74).

2.4.5.1 The qualities of policy entrepreneurs

Much like a business entrepreneur, a key characteristic of policy entrepreneurs is their willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, political capital, reputation, sometimes money – in the hope of a future return (Kingdon 1995: 122). The ‘return’ on investment may materialise in the form of a policy that reflects the entrepreneur’s values, the protection of ‘turf’ or career advancement, although this thesis will challenge this as

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. Appendix 1 for an overview of policy entrepreneurs, their roles and functions in the four episodes.
a limited assessment of policy entrepreneurs’ motivations, or at least of those operating in the cultural policy arena. Location-wise, policy entrepreneurs are found in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research institutions. In our sample entrepreneurs ranged from very high profile political players to less high profile politicians to policy-making civil servants in the executive.

More generally Mintrom and Norman (2009)\textsuperscript{63} suggest that there are four key features in policy entrepreneurship. First, a displaying of social acuity in that policy entrepreneurs who are well connected in the local policy context and get on with others tend to achieve greater success in securing policy change. Second, effective problem definition, for how an entrepreneur defines and frames a problem in policy discussions can determine what kinds of policy stakeholders will pay attention to them. A third attribute is team building ability as entrepreneurs work their networks of contacts to build political support or craft strategic coalitions of supporters (Rabe 2004) to promote their political initiatives. They look at supporters as repositories of skills, knowledge and political capital which can be drawn upon to ‘scaffold’ those initiatives. Fourth, in leading by example entrepreneurs seek to minimise the perception of risk among decision-makers, which might involve engaging with others to clearly demonstrate the workability of a policy proposal, what Kingdon calls ‘softening up’ (1995).

In his study Kingdon also identified a number of personal qualities in policy entrepreneurs, such as persistence, claim to a hearing or authority, and negotiation skills that contribute to their success.

\textsuperscript{63} But see also contributions from Kingdon (1995), Mintrom (2000) and Roberts and King (1996)
All the policy entrepreneurs in this sample show these qualities. Research has argued that European Commission officials ‘usually display the qualities of a successful policy entrepreneur to a degree unmatched by national civil servants’ (Majone 1993: 26; but see also Cram 1994; Laffan 1997); although this might be explained by the bias of the European Commission toward policy innovation, since the Commission’s culture seems to value more the initiation of new policies than the development of the capacity to implement them (Metcalfe 1996; Peters 2001; Laffan 1997).

2.4.5.2 The process of policy entrepreneurship

But what are the processes by which policy entrepreneurs attain their objectives? A critical process for policy entrepreneurs is, of course, the coupling of the problems, policy and politics streams as described by Kingdon (1995: 181-183). Coupling by policy entrepreneurs refers to their ability to recognise an opportunity, couple a solution with a problem and take advantage of favourable political conditions to push their policy proposal through the policy window. As they couple the streams, a common tactic deployed by policy entrepreneurs is the ‘softening up’ (Kingdon 1995) of policy communities, by which means they present or test ideas, involve stakeholders and build acceptance for their proposals. Cultivation is necessary to draw the attention of (often inertia-bound) policy communities and prepare the ground for when a window opens.

Both the social mechanism of policy entrepreneurship and the efforts of policy entrepreneurs are conditioned by the process and institutional frameworks in which they operate, which represent opportunities and/or constraints for entrepreneurial action (and also explains the articulation of policy entrepreneurship with other mechanisms, cf. 2.4.2 above). The complex (if fragmented) decision making process of the EC, involving different institutional and decision layers, normally features a wide range of venues where
change agents may place their issues on the agenda or seek support for their ideas (Meijerink and Huitema 2010), so-called ‘venue-shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Knowing the institutional system and the rules of the game, and the local norms that define appropriate behaviour can enhance the ability of actors to instigate change. This was critical to policy entrepreneurs in the episodes.

But however contingent policy entrepreneurship is on process and/or institutional contexts, contextual factors lay outside the mechanics of social mechanisms and only account for how they are affected by the context in which they occur; they do not and cannot fully explain policy entrepreneurship. Mechanistic literature distinguishes between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ variables, belief formation or political learning from past experience being examples of individual (inside, intrinsic) causal variables that may activate a social mechanism such as policy entrepreneurship. In mechanismic theory, both outside (contextual) and inside variables are constituent parts of causation and it is their mix that creates the unique outcomes that arise from the intersection of contextual factors with the social mechanism.

In this research sample political learning from past experience was consistently associated with policy entrepreneurship. The research uses policy entrepreneurs’ personal history and experience to show this association. We note that for methodological reasons this research will only be able to show or establish but not scientifically

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64 Research on the motivations of (business) entrepreneurs also found that people have a biographically developed understanding of the projects available to them and that motivation is subject to change in light of experimentation and learning (see Jaywarna et al 2013).

65 A causal mechanism according to which actors act in accordance with lessons drawn from relevant, often past, political experience (Falleti and Lynch 2009).
demonstrate the causal effect of personal history or experience;\textsuperscript{66} but this was a consistent finding, it is significant and is (needs to be) therefore reported here.

This thesis will claim, in addition, that the low status of the culture issue, generally, in government agendas, is a (another) condition (contextual) that is specific to cultural policy; and that it not only heightens the bearing of entrepreneurial action in this policy domain but calls for certain must-have attributes in cultural policy entrepreneurs (cf. Chapter 9).

\textbf{2.4.6 Limits to Kingdon’s model}

This is the first time that Kingdon’s model is fully deployed to study a cultural policy experience but the above indicates that it is indeed useful to explain the formation of cultural policy in the EC – all the model’s components can be identified in the episodes and the model performed well in this policy case. But we would want to be careful about generalising the model’s applicability to the European institutional context.\textsuperscript{67} This research found, for example, that whilst in Kingdon issues start in the public agenda and move to the government agenda, in the European case this does not happen – there isn’t

\textsuperscript{66} This would entail specific methodology, not least interviews (which were not available in this case) or similarly qualitative, in-depth data collection methods. The data that we can offer to substantiate this line of enquiry are insights from personal histories and experiences obtained from biographies, and texts – speeches and other writings – authored by the policy entrepreneurs or others.

\textsuperscript{67} Kingdon’s account of the policy process has courted controversy (Bendor, Moe and Shotts 2001; Sabatier 2007; Zahariadis 2007; Durant and Diehl 1989; King 1985; Mucciaroni 1992) and critics have raised a number of issues and concerns although there is limited scope in this chapter to discuss these. Bu a common critique to the multiple streams refers to the descriptive nature of garbage can models and their lack of explanatory power (see for example Bendor et al 2001; King 1985). Kingdon does not in fact claim predictive power, the model clearly sets out to uncover the dynamics of processes and their specific causal drivers as opposed to the testing of pre-set variables – this is a strength (and an opportunity) rather than a weakness. The model has also been criticised for the fact that it focuses on temporal sorting and situational factors at the expense of structural factors such as institutions (Mucciaroni 1992); also Van Gestel 1999; Schlager 2007). This is an issue that this thesis has addressed by adding an institutional-processual dimension to Kingdon’s model. Critics have moreover questioned the extent to which the three streams (problems, policy and politics) are independent (Zahariadis 2007; Bendor et al 2001; Mucciaroni 1992) and whether the items that reach the agenda are possibly those that display stronger linkages (actual or potential) between the streams, increasing the probability of coupling (Mucciaroni 1992). This could be possibly found in our 1960s, 1970s and maybe 1980s episodes, but was not at all the case in 1955 where potential linkages de facto existed but this potential was not effected.
a European demos, public opinion or media, and thus no public agenda. The episodes ahead will show how culture was invariably initiated to the European agenda from within the system.

Conversely, in Kingdon, policy formulation originates in a ‘primeval soup’ (1995) of ideas from which a policy is chosen. Indeed, although in our sample, the institutional Treaty framework was a constraint pervading policy formulation and related tasks which allowed only certain ‘ingredients’ in the soup and shaped policy choices accordingly.

This research also found that whilst Kingdon’s policy entrepreneur function is extremely useful, Kingdon’s conception of it has limitations in terms of fully explaining what makes individuals tick and/or act; Kingdon’s is a simplistic, rational portrayal. This resonates with Sabatier’s (1998) own observations about Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs whom he agrees are key players in the model but whose ‘intervention in the coupling process is a ‘black box’’ (Sabatier 1998: 272).

Finally, the uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity charged contexts (especially present in the pre-Maastricht period) in which our sample of episodes occurred played well to the multiple streams model – accounting for randomness to explain policy outcomes is one of the model’s strengths. But were the circumstances different, maybe even the Commission’s cultural policy today where shared competence between the Commission and member states and operational routines are established, the application of Kingdon’s model might not be as productive.
This chapter started with a review of cultural policy research (national policy focused) and on existing literature on EC cultural policy. This mapping enabled this thesis/research to understand where it is located in relation to current debates in the field and therefore identify its contribution, which, we believe, lies in the perspective taken – policy formation rather than policy outputs – and in the research design developed to examine cultural policy. Having established that the conventional cultural policy research is more suited to policy ‘snapshots’ and does not provide the tools to answer the question of policy change/formation (and would not apply easily in an international policy context), the chapter then proceeded to develop a theoretical framework, a bi-dimensional combination of models that is able to capture the dynamics of the policy making process. It started by explaining and assessing the utility of institutional-processualism (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Gallego 2006), particularly useful to capture situated interaction and the influence of political and institutional contexts; of social mechanisms, and their role in modelling the connection between contexts, actors and outcomes; and Kingdon’s multiple streams model, which offers not only a structure of the policy-making process but also the concept of policy entrepreneurship to capture agency and its interaction with situation and context/s. This combined framework provides a toolbox containing the necessary tools to meaningfully organise and make sense of the evidence and, on this basis, to explain the formation of cultural policy in the EC.

But if this chapter provides the research architecture, the next chapter provides its engineering, its ‘mechanics,’ that is, the research strategy and methodologies deployed to implement the theoretical concepts rehearsed above and the strategy followed to conduct the investigation to answer the research questions.
CHAPTER 3
Aligning explanation and method: research strategy and design

3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter appraised the state of the research literature and discussed the theoretical framework adopted to analyse the four policy episodes and explain how cultural policy formed in the EC. This chapter now considers the research design and methodological principles that support that analysis. The/a theoretical framework implicitly brings with it particular ontological assumptions about the nature of social and political world and this has implications for any methodological choices. This chapter therefore opens (Section 2) with a brief reflection on the ontological assumptions of this study and how, in this context, explanation and method are aligned. The following Section 3 presents and discusses the sources of data – archival and interviews – that the research draws on and considers the relevant ethical aspects. This is followed in Section 4 by the research strategy deployed and the techniques used to organise and analyse the data, whilst Section 5 at the end explains the comparative analysis of the four episodes, its aim and function in the research strategy.

3.2 Aligning explanation and method
As pointed out in Chapter 1, this research started from the recognition of an empirical reality – that European public policies for culture had formed at European supranational level before legal competence to act in the field was recognised in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 – and insofar as the aim of this project is to formulate theoretical generalisations (from the comparison of cases studies) about why and how it happened, the research strategy deployed here is inductive – although, in the event, the need to locate the research, that is, to connect evidence and ideas (Ragin 1994) and identify its contribution
(Pole and Lampard 2002) requires an assessment of the theoretical literature. This research design thus conceptualises the entry point as an empirical observation, leading to a proposition and data collection – the latter in dialogue with a conceptual framework, research question/s development – and so on and so forth. This is presented in Figure 3.1 below,

![Diagram](https://example.com/diagram.png)

**Figure 3.1:** The inductive model (adapted from Rudestam and Newton 2014: 5)

The explanatory framework elected was discussed in detail in Chapter 2 but it is indeed part and parcel of the research design. The assumptions that it makes about the nature of the social and political world (Mahoney and Rueschmeyer 2003: 374) and the causal relationships within it – in other words, its ontology – condition the methodological choices that the researcher can make. The focus on context, process and situation and the causal relationships/patterns that produce specific outcomes (a policy choice, in this case) favours a case-oriented research strategy – the emphasis is on whole cases and on the

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68 Whilst Hoonard (2004) stresses the qualitative research goals of discovery and to have data shape the theory rather than theory shape data, Rudestam and Newton (2014; also Pole and Lampard 2002) point out the role of a theoretical perspective in making sense of empirical observations and in lending meaning – ‘the so what? quality’ (Rudestam and Newton 2014: 6) – to a study. Hoonaard accets that by habit, qualitative researchers tend to review the literature toward the end of the data collection phase (2004).

69 Institutional processualism, Kingdon and social mechanisms.

70 According to Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003: 374), in comparative politics ontology refers to especially fundamental assumptions about the causal structures of the social or political world.
comparison of ‘complex wholes’ (Ragin 1987) (as opposed to separate variables across cases). The temporal (historical) component of cases (policy episodes), in turn, implies the use of historiography.

For research to be effective, thus, there needs to be fit between method and the theoretical approach and its ‘ontological premises’ (Hall 2003). The design of an effective research methodology therefore involves a cogent system in which the design issues are organised in a cohesive and consistent manner: from the overall research goal, to the selection of a case oriented research strategy and the cases to study and their outcomes, to the theoretical framework to explain why/how policy forms, the research questions to be answered, method, and the data and the evidence\(^{71}\) that answer those questions; for whilst theoretical notions affect our interpretation of information they also affect the information we select to interpret (Vaughn in Ragin and Becker 1989). There is no point in selecting, for instance, a qualitative research approach to investigate why and how things happened and utilise (solely) quantitative data and methods to answer those questions; their fundamental assumptions simply do not square.

3.3 The empirical research: sources of historical data

Empirical data\(^{72}\) for the case studies in this thesis originates in multiple sources including primary and secondary sources. Data collection was qualitative, purposive, theory-driven and guided by the research questions formulated (Miles and Huberman 1994: 27). The

\(^{71}\) I like to differentiate between data and evidence and define data as the information that is collectable and relevant to the investigation/research problem; it becomes evidence (that something happened) when it achieves a particular significance or evinces a particular relationship – for example, causal – between variables.

\(^{72}\) By data we mean information or text (Hoornaard and Hoornaard 2008) gathered from documents (cf. footnote 73 and 3.3.1 below), including archival documents, archival oral interviews/transcripts and interview transcripts. According to Schreiber (2008) ‘many definitions of data include the word fact, or facts, but this implies an inference about the data and not the data themselves’ (2008).
approach to data in this thesis is slightly atypical in that historical documents (and documentary analysis) are the main source of data and evidence. Normally, they are used to fill in the gaps from interviews, a data collection method privileged by traditional political science as, typically, events occurred at or near the time of the research and data is collected from the participants themselves. But this thesis has a significant historical element to it and although the ‘road less travelled’ in political research, the archives came to be a/the key source of case evidence.

3.3.1 Documents

The historical character of this research thus means that it draws on extensive documentary research and analysis. For historical data relating to the European Community institutions the author consulted a number of archives and documentation centres, as follows:

Archival documents for the period of 1955-89:

- Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (HAEU)
- Historical Archives of the European Commission, Brussels (HAEU)
- Central Archives of the Council of the European Union, Brussels (HAEU)
- Institute of Historical Research, University of London, London
- Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères de France (Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France), Paris (MAEF)
- The National Archives, London (NA)

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73 We follow the American Historical Association’s (2011) definition of documents (in a historical perspective, which is also this study’s) as ‘all forms of evidence – not just written texts, but artefacts, images, statistics, oral recollections, the built and natural environment, and many other things – that have survived as records of former times.’ Written texts (and also oral recollections) are the forms of document mainly used in this research. For practical reasons, however, given the predominance of evidence from (primary and secondary) written documents, in this research the term ‘documents’ refers to this (written) type.
- Archives of the Arts Council of Great Britain, Victoria and Albert Museum Art & Design Archive, London (AACGB)

The online archives of the national Parliaments of Denmark, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom were also accessed.

Other European documentation:

- European Documentation Centre, European University Institute, Florence
- European Documentation Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, London
- Library of the European Commission, Brussels
- Library of the European Council, Brussels

Primary data\textsuperscript{74} from the above sources were generated\textsuperscript{75} from documents including internal memos, correspondence, records of meetings, official minutes of meetings and decisions, notes, position and strategy papers, mission reports, speeches and official documents. The Florence HAEU also holds personal documentation funds and these were an important source of personal data: letters, personal documents, notes and other and often provided personal viewpoints on political issues.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74} In this research primary sources refer to first person accounts of events in original documents e.g. meeting notes or correspondence and are usually the product of the person involved in the event or an eyewitness to it. A secondary source is an item created after the events it describes or is related to or is created by someone who was not directly involved in or was not an eyewitness to the events (Lundy 2008) or is created from primary sources. Likewise, primary data are information collected by the researcher; secondary data is defined as information collected and archived or published by others. But this research understands that drawing the boundary between primary and secondary sources or data might be more complicated than first thought, since determining whether a document is primary or secondary depends, to an extent, on the questions asked of it.

\textsuperscript{75} We note the contrast between data collection and data generation (Garnham 2008) in that the data obtained from these documents is shaped by the theoretical framework that informs this study and the research question/s addressed.

\textsuperscript{76} A list of all the archival sources utilised in this research is found in the bibliography.
Overall, archival material provided detailed evidence of the day to day ‘business’ of policy making in the European Community and on the workings of the policy bureaucracy, deliberations and decision-making, behind-the-scenes negotiations, institutional and individual behaviours and politics which are not always observable – after all, these documents are the product of politics in action. This material was also instrumental in connecting institutional actors to one another and to other relevant actors outside of the European Commission, for example, as well as in uncovering networks and relationships some of which proved to be analytically significant:

‘Wading through the archival material makes one more aware of the context within which politics happen. Decisions are not made in a vacuum and decision makers are not singular actors. […] Archival research makes one sensitive to variables that may be useful in explaining what produced a particular outcome’ (Frisch et al 2012: 11).

Ultimately, the use of unobtrusive measures, specifically documentary data, allowed the interrogation of experience, attitude and belief in other, less direct, ways (Webb cited in Lee 2000) and enabled the detailed (or even forensic) tracing and reconstruction of institutional and policy processes and the roles of actors in them. It proved to be a particularly useful type of data to address this research problematic, relevant, rich and accurate which fitted well with the ontology of institutional processualism – interviews (more on which below) would not have been able to yield such an array of specific evidence or adequate level of detail.

3.3.1.1 Secondary sources

Another critical documentary source that was essential to the chronological study of the

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77 According to Lee (2000) ‘Unobtrusive measures’ refer to data gathered by means that do not involve direct elicitation of information from research subjects. Unobtrusive measures are ‘non-reactive’ in the sense that they are presumed to avoid the problems caused by the researcher’s presence. Lee argues that questions about experience, attitude and belief might be addressed just as effectively by watching what people do, looking at physical evidence of various kinds, and drawing on the written as well as the spoken voice, as they are by interviews and questionnaires.
career of the culture issue throughout the EC history and events was the EC Bulletin, published monthly since 1958, and the Annual Review of the Council’s work. Other key sources were documents from the European Commission: COM (Commission) official documents and SEC (General Secretariat) internal (unpublished) documents; selected debates of the European Parliament and reports from its Committees; and press reports mainly from Agence-Europe, French, Italian and British newspapers.

Given the focus on process and on the actions of individuals in specific historical contexts, historical and biographical accounts were also consulted. These were autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, recollections, reminiscences and the many histories of European integration. These sources contained precious data, often first hand narratives, even anecdotal evidence, which contributed to the interpretation and reconstruction of many of the events that make up the policy episodes analysed in this thesis. Secondary literature provided additional opportunities to triangulate evidence.

3.3.1.2 Limitations of documentary data

But historical and archival information are not used uncritically in this research. One issue is that historical data is limited and indirect; and, probably to an extent that will be unknown to the researcher. For instance, one of the reasons to discard an initial sample candidate policy experience (the European Commission’s 1992 paper) was the imbalance between archival data (or those accessible) and interviews which was different from the other sample episodes and would generate a different evidence base.

Also, documents are produced for purposes other than the research’s own questions as well as for other audiences (than the research’s) (Pole and Lampard 2002: 159) and therefore ‘data capture’ (Danto 2008) and reconstructions using this evidence result,
necessarily, from interpretation (Lundy 2008; Pole and Lampard 2002; Scott et al 2012; Danto 2008), not least theoretically guided – a different researcher, with a different aim or theoretical interest, might ‘come up’ with a different ‘story.’ And, indeed, there are instances, in this research, where interpretation is speculative, consciously so, but this is acknowledged and explained.

A further issue that needs flagging up is that although the archival data used in the research are mostly sourced from the European Union historical archives, UK and French government archival sources were also accessed, albeit to a limited extent. The research could not secure access to the archival collections of other EC member states and instead national positions are gleaned from secondary sources. This explains the confines of the study in terms of the national data used and why British or French national perspectives are more salient in this thesis, at the risk of potential bias, however useful these data were as a form of triangulating European archival data.

3.3.2 Interviews

Given the primacy of written documentary – primary and secondary – sources as discussed above, why then do interviews? The first reason was the expectation that informants would help deepen the research’s understanding of the connections between, for example, context, process and action uncovered at the archival data mining stage (see for example, Scott et al 2012; Danto 2008); in other words, that they would help contextualise and provide further insight into political events, behaviours and shifting contexts. Precisely, in qualitative interviewing

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78 This is particular relevant to historical documentary data as often the research’s challenge is to represent (and map) particular data and context in a meaningful way. Holloway and Galvin (2015) acknowledge that when interpreting qualitative data researchers make inferences and discuss the possible meanings of the data but that interpretation, although linked to the analysis, can be speculative.
‘the goal is the understanding of specific circumstances, how and why things actually happen in a complex world. Knowledge in qualitative interviewing is situational and conditional’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 38).

The second reason was to expand on the historical documentary material collected and possibly uncover new facts, participants and connections. The third and no less important reason was to triangulate the data obtained from the other (primary and secondary documentary) sources. To clarify, the form deployed here is methodological triangulation (Denzin 1970) – the use of more than one (qualitative) method for gathering and analysing data – and it is utilised not as verification but as a strategy to understand different dimensions of the units of analysis and enrich interpretation; which ultimately enhances the persuasiveness of the research account (Rothbauer 2008).

Qualitative interviews were therefore conducted albeit with a small sample of eleven informants: European Commission and European Council (former) senior officials all of whom were involved in the events analysed in this thesis (these are especially relevant to the 1970s and 1980s episodes). This is a very small interview sample in comparison with similar kinds of research and this is for two reasons. Firstly, it has to do with the way in which this policy sector evolved, a minor policy issue (in terms of European public policy-making), and a low profile operation involving a very small number of staff who were also, inevitably, its main actors. Secondly, the 1970s episode occurred well over thirty years ago and the 1980s (and most recent) episode, a quarter of a century ago and, naturally, as time passes, informants become increasingly difficult to find.

79 The list of people interviewed for this research can be found in the Bibliography.
80 Similar studies will easily involve 60 to 200 and more interviewees.
81 Robert Grégoire (head of the European Commission’s Culture Division for almost 15 years) makes this point in his memoirs (2000).
82 The Commission’s office dealing with culture was always minimally staffed. In the period of 1973-1987 the size of the Cultural Sector Division comprised the official who headed it and an assistant (and also one or two stagiaires). The small size of this operation and the slow turnover of civil servant jobs in the Commission (1970s-85) means that the same small number of officials populating the immediate decision structures – DG, Commissioner office – were involved in this policy for a very long time and were in fact the only (key) actors in it.
This interview process was supplemented with a selection of interviews and/or transcripts from virtual video and sound archival resources: the HAEU’s Oral History Programme Interview Collection and the Oral History of European Integration archive of the Centre Virtuel pour la Connaissance de l'Europe’s (Virtual Resource Centre for Information about Europe) (CVCE)\(^3\) (see 3.3.4 below on ethical considerations on the use of these data).

The interviews were conducted face-to-face in Brussels and in London and lasted around one to two hours each (see 3.2.4 below on ethical considerations for the interviews). Interviews were semi structured but more like guided conversations than structured queries (Yin 2003: 89). The interview tactics were targeted to individual informants, which allowed the research to effectively explore or benefit from their individual characteristics.

Informants were encouraged to offer their own narrative – not only chronological – accounts of the policy events/episodes they participated in. This approach bore in mind the twin interview goals of eliciting in-depth, quality information at the same time as collecting empirical data that fitted the case-oriented and narrative explanatory methods adopted in this thesis (more on narrative methods below). This approach is not without its problems, however. The individuality and the uniqueness of the interview means that as interviewees talk about their experience they might take a number of directions, meaning not only that the process is time consuming but that empirical results can be dispersed and consequently difficult to make sense of and compare with other interviews.

\(^3\) The HAEU’s Oral History Programme Interview Collection (based in Florence) brings together the transcripts of 325 interviews with politicians, diplomats and executive officials from eight Member States, engaged in the European integration process. The CVCE (based in Luxembourg) includes audio-visual archives, consisting of exclusive interviews and accounts of the important episodes and participants in the history of European integration.
in the sample (Alvesson 2011); which also makes the representativeness of these data (and their reliability) more difficult to establish.

In the following ‘research wave’ (Firmin 2008) of follow-up (mostly) email correspondence more specific questions were asked; which was in order to expand on previous interview material and to clarify information such as dates, names or sources. The interviews and correspondence were recorded and transcribed and analysed using standard qualitative data analysis techniques.

A well documented methodological issue with conducting interviews as a source of data is potential bias (George and Bennett 2005; Yin 2003), for example, the tendency to present the official line or the risk of informants forgetting the details of events, dates and so on, as in this case a long time has elapsed since the events took place. This author was also sensitised to the fact that informants were often unaware of what had been happening in the broader policy process context in which they had been operating. The use of multiple sources of data – archival documents, interviews, memoirs, biographical material, and secondary material – all allowed triangulation\(^{84}\) of the data obtained from them (Patton 1990: 267). Conversely, it was refreshing to see how the narratives of informants revealed the sometimes random (and uncomplicated) nature of events where some secondary literature might offer more elaborated accounts.\(^{85}\)

### 3.3.3 A note on translation

Many (perhaps most) of the primary and secondary sources for this research were not available in English. This is certainly the case for archival documents in the period

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\(^{84}\) In the ‘data triangulation’ (Denzin 1970) verification sense.
\(^{85}\) See, for example, Shore (2001) who offers a dramatic, conspiracy inspired account of the EC’s involvement in culture.
preceding the British membership of the EEC (1973) where documentation is in French or German. To an extent this is also the case with many of the documents from the 1970s (post-1973) and 1980s periods, one reason possibly being that the culture division and relevant DG and Cabinets were always staffed by French, German or Belgian civil servants. The interviews were also conducted in English, French and Italian. In addition, many of the relevant secondary sources, from memoirs to theoretical writings, were in different languages including English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. In this thesis all the sources are translated by the author.

3.3.4 Research ethics considerations

Proper consideration was given to the ethical issues raised by this research project and this concerns mainly three areas of research practice – historical documents, interviews, and legal (national and international) requirements. These are addressed below.

3.3.4.1 Historical documents

Ethical issues are often said to be less problematic with unobtrusive data (of the kind used in this research) than in other social research; simply because there is no direct contact with the informants being studied. But however less conspicuous, which parallels the unobtrusive nature, ethical issues do emerge in the collection, handling and processing of this kind of data that need to be considered; not least the application of key research concepts such as reliability and validity to historical data, for example. These concerns are discussed below.

One is the concern with the integrity or reliability of the historical record (Corti and Thompson 2004; Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011). The approach used in historical research to demonstrate that the integrity of the data/evidence is kept, even through the processing
stages, is to leave a clear trail of evidence that subsequent researchers can follow (American Historical Association 2011; Frisch et al 2012). In this research this includes: the accurate documentation of the sources (or the evidence) used – in particular, all primary (archival) sources cited or quoted from are cited in the text and fully referenced in footnote; annotations or evaluative comments on these sources, regarding their quality, limitations, gaps, or other relevant issues; and any other information that might have a bearing on the research or its results.

Part of this integrity implies the recognition that the historical nature of this research (at least in part) means that knowledge is situated in time and place (Back 2004). This was the case namely with the concept of ‘community action’ (specific to the EC) and the concept of ‘culture’ as the domain of European public policy (which varied across time) – cf. Chapter 4 for definitional issues. Put simply, demonstrating the reliability of the sources enables other researchers to review the arguments presented and re-examine their links to the sources and, obviously, to assess the validity of the research.

All the archival data used in this research were approved by the provider organisations, were collected or processed after their permission was obtained and according to their access policies and legal requirements (for which see 3.3.4.3 below). These data were only used for the purposes they were originally intended for – this project – and are securely stored. The helpful assistance of archive repositories and librarians was duly acknowledged in the Acknowledgements pages of this thesis.

3.3.4.2 Access and legal requirements

All relevant legislative and data requirements – regarding data protection and intellectual
property – as well as the requirements and access policies of specific data providers (national and international) were complied with.

All European Union archives make their documents available to the public under the rules laid down in their access policy and legislation addressing the availability of and public access to EC documents and the processing and use of these data. In practice these rules and exceptions mean that although this research was still able to access European Union archive documents from the late-1980s (chronologically the latest case but still under the 30 year rule that protects EC documents), there will also have been documentation which was simply not made available for reasons of confidentiality or security.

Similar procedures were followed with regards to the UK’s, French and other national archives where primary data was obtained from, not least the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (where this research is based). Any data from the European oral history programmes noted above – HAEU and CVCE – were processed and documented in accordance with their requirements.

3.3.4.3 Interviews

The interview process followed standard ethical guidance in the use of interviews as research methods (see for example Faden et al 1986) and City University London’s ethical guidelines (City University London n.d.; ESRC n.d.). The relevant ethical issues considered are discussed below.

Informant selection can be in some way characterised as a following a snowballing approach, through personal or institutional contacts leading to other contacts (some informants, in fact, made the initial move to contact the researcher having been prompted to do so by a contact) (Bryman 2008; Singer 2003). All participants were sent an initial email letter fully identifying the researcher, briefing them about the research, its rationale and its purpose, and the reasons for the invitation to the individual in question i.e. what I ‘wanted’ from them. Participants were also fully informed about the uses of the data they contributed, their rights, and were also made aware of the arrangements made with regards to the data processing, management and security and confidentiality. Their permission was sought/obtained through the appropriate documentation and accordingly informants’ names are coded in the thesis in order to protect their anonymity.

3.4 Research strategy

From a methodological standpoint, the comparative case-oriented research strategy (Ragin 1987) is appropriate for the investigation into the four episodes of formation of policy in the EC. Case-oriented research uses a small sample of multiple case studies to explore the causal effects of particular variables on specific outcomes, by comparing the relationships between them both within and between cases (6 and Bellamy 2012). The objective is to develop within-case analysis but also to compare the behaviour of variables, or specific patterns, between cases.  

Thus, each policy episode is a case – an experience involving a policy making process

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87 According to Swanborn (2010) the label generally used now is ‘comparative politics’ (2010: 15).
88 In conventional case study, the researcher focuses on the description and explanation of social processes that unfold between entities participating in the process, following the behaviour, relationships of particular variables, and the research will examine one-moment snapshots of such behaviours/effects. Case oriented research also factors in the impact of context and analysis of behaviours relate to a particular case (end) outcome.
leading up to a policy choice\textsuperscript{89} – but a case in the sense used by Ragin (1987), a single historical experience examined as a whole,\textsuperscript{90} that is, ‘a total situation resulting from combinations or conjunctures of causal conditions’ (Ragin 1987: 49-51). Ragin’s argument to study experiences as wholes is that the only way to understand multiple conjunctural causation is to examine similarities and differences in context,\textsuperscript{91} as this shows how different combinations of conditions have the same causal effect (or how similar causal factors could operate in different directions) (Ragin 1987: 49). This way, our four policy experiences are taken as wholes representing different configurations of the policy making process, that is, different combinations of features, causes or conditions that explain the outcome (a policy choice) of that episode and its trajectory (i.e. cultural policy formation).

In line with Ragin (1987: 31), a first step in this strategy is to look for underlying similarities in the items of a set displaying some common outcome or a characteristic of interest (Ragin 1987) (more on sample selection below). In our case, the common outcome is a cultural policy choice at four different historical junctures. One common characteristic of interest is contextual and is the pre-Maastricht period.

\textsuperscript{89} In the framework of this research a case refers to a network of events (or episode) within a limited period of time. In this thesis we will use the term ‘episode’ or ‘experience’ to emphasise the contrast between case study and case-oriented research. But also see Footnote 94 which proposes that there is a theoretical dimension to a case.

\textsuperscript{90} It may be useful, at this point, to contrast Ragin’s ‘case-orientation’ (as a whole) with the concept of ‘case study’ (see for example Yin 2003). According to Yin (2003) case study inquiry ‘benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis and copes with the situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points (2003: 13-14). This is more theory-centred and akin to variable-oriented research design (for example, Goldthorpe 1997; Ragin 1999; Ragin 1997) – case-orientation is an evidence-oriented strategy – and is often concerned with pinning down the specific mechanisms and pathways between causes and effects rather than revealing the strength of a factor that causes an effect (Blatter 2008) which the case-oriented approach tests.

\textsuperscript{91} Because the research takes place in the natural context of the phenomenon, we may be able to explore – in repeated case studies – the significance of different contexts e.g. political, social, time and their impact on the social process studied (Swanborn 2010). The research is inductive and these conditions and how they (might) affect the phenomenon are not known \textit{ex ante}. 
In the second step, the similarities identified are shown to be causally relevant to the outcome – policy choice – of all the episodes. The case-oriented method is primarily interested in identifying invariant relationships and patterns of constant association (rather than variation), and the comparison of episodes thus helps to understand the conditions and factors that are associated with specific outcomes or processes that are shared by the cases. Our task, in this instance, is to identify and analyse theoretically important similarities and differences among the four episodes (Ragin 1987: 31) which are deemed to constitute ‘necessary or sufficient conditions’ (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) for cultural policy to form and generate a choice. As we shall see, and lifting the veil on our findings, one such variable (and necessary condition) is the action of policy entrepreneurs, as without their intervention the episodes would not have happened.

In the third and last step, on the basis of the similarities identified within and between episodes (such as the example above), the researcher formulates an empirical generalisation/s concerning such conditions and is in a position to theorise about policy formation.

As explained above, case-oriented research explains the causal effects of specific variables on particular outcomes and the comparison assesses these effects between cases. The selection of experiences to research was therefore based on case outcome – a policy choice – and four policy experiences were then selected from an initial list of six candidate cases all in the pre-Maastricht period. The two episodes discarded were the

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92 In the selection of conventional case study (in contrast with case oriented research), given that both case study analysis and cross-case analysis aim to identify cases that reproduce the relevant causal features of a larger universe (representativeness) and provide variations along the dimensions/variables of theoretical interest (Gerring 2007), selection starts with an analysis of a larger population of potential cases and the actual selection rests upon certain assumptions about them i.e. it starts by asking what is this a case of?
Commission’s 1982 and 1992 papers.\(^{93}\) The 1982 paper was discarded because no commonalities of interest with the other experiences were found, this paper was possibly just an update on the Commission’s 1977 paper (part of the final sample). The 1992 paper was issued in April 1992 before the Maastricht Treaty came into force (1 November 1993) but after it was signed (7 February 1992) and is, for all intents and purposes, an action plan for the Treaty’s Article 128 ‘Culture’; and thus, it no longer satisfies the sample’s pre-Maastricht common characteristic of interest.

The selected episodes presented commonalities but also showed variations and in this context the analytic rationale for the selection of episodes was to consider two kinds of variation:

(1) variation in terms of the institutional context of the agenda and policy processes – two episodes (1950s and 1960s) occurred in the context of treaty negotiations, the other two (1970s and 1980s) in the context of the European Commission. As a matter of fact, the theoretical framework applied successfully to both contexts, and the findings about the policy process are remarkably consistent across episodes; which has to do with the fact that the EC institutional system is fluid, EC institutions sharing, to some extent, in the policy process, be this agenda setting, policy formulation or decision making.

(2) variation in terms of the outcome – two episodes (1950s and 1960s) did reach an authoritative policy decision but in unusual circumstances (one spilled over into a boundary policy area, the other reached an intermediate decision); the other two episodes (1970s and 1980s) resulted in policy decisions by the European Commission.

The display of commonalities and variations is not unwelcome, on the contrary, it tests the strength of the theoretical generalisations. On one hand, the case oriented comparative

\(^{93}\)Respectively ‘Stronger Community action in the cultural sector’ and ‘New prospects for Community cultural action’.
method focuses on configurations of conditions, making their association with specific processes or outcomes explicit. On the other, it seeks to account for every instance of a certain phenomenon, highlighting any irregularities and explaining them (Ragin 1987: 13-16). The comparative study of the four episodes will illuminate the configurations of conditions in which the culture issue progressed (or stumbled) through the policy process.

3.4.1 Casing and modelling of the empirical data

The casing and modelling of the empirical data are analytically (and theoretically) guided by the explanatory framework introduced above. An institutional processual analysis accounts for the what, why and how of the relationships among context, processes and outcomes (Pettigrew 1997: 340) and as such provides a framework to investigate the behaviour of actors interacting with problems, resources, ideas and solutions and responding to contextual – political and institutional – events; they all make up the process of policy making and move it forward.

Barzelay (2003) developed a codified framework for the systematic comparative analysis of the process dynamics of policy making. It integrates the institutional processual approach with Kingdon’s multiple streams model in order to account for the policy process, its components, causal mechanisms and their temporal context in detail. This framework is applied to the episode analyses. It not only helped sorting the relevant case data but guided the identification, mapping and analysis of the policy making activities, political processes, social mechanisms, the contextual factors and ‘configurations of

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94 Casing (Ragin and Becker 1992: 218) means making something into a case (in a theoretical sense). Cases (including in Ragin’s sense, discussed above, and having noted above that the terminology preferred/used in this research is episodes or experiences) are ‘made’ by invoking theories, implicitly or explicitly, for justification or illumination in advance of the research process or as its result (Walton in Ragin and Becker 1992: 121) – these theoretical choices are instrumental in identifying the aspects that are analytically significant and need explanation.
conditions’ (Ragin 1987: 14) at play in the policy making process as they relate to agenda setting, policy formulation and decision making – that is, it helped casing.

3.4.1.1 Data analysis

Narrative\textsuperscript{95} methods are used in the research to report the episodes studied and analyse the processes investigated in the four episodes; and to build explanations\textsuperscript{96} (Yin 2003) about them. Research does not happen in a conceptual vacuum and as both an interpretative and explanatory method narrative connects evidence with theoretical ideas. In this case it sequences events and groups them together to create a larger picture and theoretically informed coherent whole.

Each researched episode will be presented as an integrated historical and analytic (interpretive) narrative. Historical narrative involves the creative process of reconstructing what happened in a manner that is faithful to the historical record. It provides the ‘plot’ (Benson 1972: 81-82), that is, a narrative of events with an emphasis on cause and effect\textsuperscript{97} and in which time is included as a factor in the causal explanation. A property of narrative that is critical here is its ability to contextualise the constituent parts into a meaningful, relational whole, making ‘conjunctural causation’ (Ragin 1987) explicit.

Analytic narratives combine theoretical tools with the narrative method providing a model of action for ‘what took place and why’ (Levi 2003: 5) and account for outcomes

\textsuperscript{95} Griffin (1993: 1097) defines narratives as analytic constructs (or ‘colligations’) that unify a number of past or contemporaneous actions and happenings, which might otherwise have been viewed as discrete or disparate, into a coherent relational whole that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them.

\textsuperscript{96} See, for example, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 87) for whom explanation involves singling out the problematic features of the phenomenon at hand and identifying the recurrent mechanisms that produce those features.

\textsuperscript{97} See also Fischer’s (1970) argument that history-writing is not story-telling but problem solving, and that historical narration is a form of explanation.
by identifying and exploring the processes and mechanisms that generate them (Bates et al 1998: 12). They convert or interpret a historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design (Ruback 2006). In this thesis the theoretical ‘scaffolding’ for the analytic narrative is provided by institutional processualism (Abbot 2001; Barzelay 2003), multiple streams (Kingdon 1995) and elements of analytical sociology, and episodes will be reconstructed and interpreted within this framework.

Policy processes are composed of parallel and serial events (Barzelay 2002: 24) and the narrative of each episode is structured around these (cf. narrative event structure below and Figures 5.1, 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1 for completed episode narrative structures). The empirical data collected provided the raw data for identifying or constructing the component events of each episode. The criterion for the selection of events in each episode was analytical significance in relation to the ‘plot’, bearing in mind other research design issues, namely the research questions and the analytic framework. Events are then mapped in a way to provide structure to the narrative – these event narrative structures are presented in diagrammatic form at the beginning of each chapter to guide the reader. Barzelay’s narrative structure (2003), shown in Figure 3.2 below, is particularly helpful as a framework for episode/event mapping and temporal sequencing.

![Event Narrative Structure](image)

**Figure 3.2:** Event narrative structure (based on Barzelay 2003)
Events are classified according to their positioning in the episode under investigation both temporally and in relation to each other: events that are core to the unfolding episode, contemporaneous, related, previous and later events. Prior and contemporaneous events are normally contextual (often also causal) events from which the core episode’s events or processes originate or are connected to; later events can also be causal when their anticipation shapes events in the episode, in which case they become horizon events (for example, anticipation of the 1992 Single Market influenced policy events in the EC in the late 1980s). Further, each event is broken down into sub-events so as to show their dynamics in greater detail.

3.5 Comparative analysis of the episodes

One of the advantages of using identically structured narratives is to facilitate the systematic comparative analysis of the four policy experiences; the aim is to provide a process understanding of cultural policy formation. As mentioned above, the emphasis of case oriented research is on cases/episodes as ‘complex wholes’, that is, as an ‘interpretable combination of parts’ (Ragin 1987: 6) and its goals are therefore both historically interpretive and causally analytic (Ragin 1987: 35).

The systematic comparative analysis of the policy episodes will thus seek: to understand the outcomes or processes of individual episodes (as ‘wholes’ made up of a ‘combination of parts’); to identify and explain analytically significant similarities and differences between the episodes; and to formulate limited generalisations about the causes of theoretically defined phenomena (e.g. agenda initiation, policy entrepreneurship) that are common to the baseline of episodes. These findings (generalisations) will be theory-like
statements\textsuperscript{98} about the configurations of factors that affect the formation of cultural policy in the EC. The research found that the main factors consistently impacting the dynamics of policy formation are: contextual factors, political and institutional, process design features\textsuperscript{99} (Barzelay and Shvets 2004), the issue property of agenda status and the role of policy entrepreneurs.

This Chapter 3 rehearsed and discussed the methodological ‘scaffolding’ that supports this research project and the methods that will enable it to answer the research questions. After discussing the ontological foundations of the study and its assumptions, the chapter described the study’s research strategy to use ‘cases’ (or rather ‘casing’) and a particular narrative structure to ‘process-trace’ the policy formation process in the episodes. The end game was to deploy similar analytical structures that would then facilitate episode comparison. It also discussed the data collection techniques deployed and how the empirical data were ‘cased’ in the study.

The chapter also showed how the research operationalised this methodology in the context of the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter and therefore how, for example, the casing exercise and the structured narratives are transformed into causal, analytical devices in this study. The ultimate aim is to formulate limited generalisations about and learn from these processes. In doing this, having also considered all the relevant ethical implications, the research claims to have achieved an acceptable standard of research quality and produced research that is relevant and credible.

\textsuperscript{98} Although, as Ragin argues, social phenomena are characterised by ‘causal complexity’, in which the same outcome is often produced by different combinations and levels of causes; which means that a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions for specific outcomes does not exist (1997).

\textsuperscript{99} According to Barzelay and Shvets (2004), process design is a system of interacting parts of which he identifies four categories: guiding ideas (e.g. priorities, results orientation), governance arrangements (e.g. roles, decision rights), structured events and cognitive techniques (e.g. negotiation tactics).
Next, Chapter 4 discusses the ideational and historical contexts that have framed (at European/international level) the concept of culture as a European policy domain.
CHAPTER 4

Culture as a European policy domain: ideational and historical contexts

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explained the research strategy and design followed by this research to conduct its empirical investigation of the selected four policy episodes. This chapter complements or extends it in that it defines and contextualises concepts that are key in this research. It first, in Section 2, explores the historical and ideational contexts surrounding culture as a European policy domain assessing how the concept evolved through the period covered in this research (1955-88) to clarify the different ‘definitions’ (as it were) of the ‘cultural’ of cultural policy found in the episodes. Section 3 then explores the Commission’s own concept of community action (on culture) and its origins and contrasts it with that of (cultural) policy to test the extent to which they are one and the same (not least because the methodologies deployed in this research apply to public policy). Finally, in Section 4, the EC’s trajectory from Rome to Maastricht provides a historical framework to the period in question and to the following empirical research of the four policy episodes.

4.2 Culture as a European domain of policy

An important definitional issue in this research is the different conceptualisation of culture in the episodes. The concept changed over time, in European (or international) policy making in this domain, and we are not talking about definitions of culture per se but about defining culture as a policy domain. All policy domains naturally change, either organically, because the issue evolves – for example, the environment was not a

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100 A policy domain refers to a social space in which actors gather to participate in policy deliberation with the goal of affecting the content of legislation; domains, process all the policies associated with a general issue or sector e.g. education, culture, transport etc. See for example Rhinard (2010).
policy concern in the 1950s but an issue-specific domain emerged in the 1970s and this was different from what it would be in the 1980s or today – or for political reasons, for example, as a result of framing (or re-framing).

This thesis’ four policy experiences fall into two, broadly speaking, distinct conceptions of culture as the domain of policy: the two early episodes are clearly concerned with education as culture; the latter two, although different between each other, can be more readily associated with what we recognise today as public cultural policy. The next paragraphs appraise these conceptions in detail.

As policy scholars have argued, policy making takes place not only within an institutional framework, a central argument in this thesis, but also within an ‘ideational’ framework (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Campbell 1998; Rhinard 2010). The argument is that general values and dominant ideologies – political, cultural, social – influence more domain-specific policy ideas and that, therefore, actors’ policy ideas/preferences reflect (intentionally or not) broader, societal values and a prevailing ideological climate (see for example Rhinard 2010). Sabatier (1998), alluding to a more endogenous process, also argues that policy ideas can reflect individuals’ perceptions of the world through the lens of their pre-existing beliefs (1998). Indeed, literature focusing on the cultural basis of policy domains defines them as cultural constructs around which organisation and individuals orient their actions (see for example Cobb and Elder 1983; Burstein 1991).

The so-called ideational turn in policy analysis looks at politics from the point of view of ideas, culture, and other cognitive factors and offers an apt starting point for the exploration, according to these arguments, of the concept of culture as the domain of policy in the four episodes. Of particular interest is Campbell’s (1998) distinction
between levels of ideas and their effects on policy making. According to this view, ‘paradigms’ are background assumptions that constrain action by limiting the range of alternatives that policy-making elites are likely to perceive as worth considering.\textsuperscript{101} For example, when individuals/organisations define particular conditions as problems, develop policy options and decide which other organisations to deal with, they are strongly influenced by cultural theories about how society works (Cobb and Elder 1983).

‘Programmatic ideas,’ for example, policy programmes, debates, are cognitive concepts and theories (in the foreground) that specify how to solve specific policy problems. ‘Worldviews’ (Goldstein and Keohane 1993), at a higher level of abstraction, are broadly held values, attitudes and normative assumptions which preside over the other two levels. In a nutshell, thus, paradigms are the underlying ideas upon which the foreground concepts, or programmes, rest, nest, and they must resonate with broader worldviews in order to be considered politically and culturally acceptable.

In the first two episodes examined in this thesis – 1955-57 and 1960-62 – it will be immediately apparent that the cultural domain of policy is mainly concerned with the cultural dimension of education, specifically in the field of higher education. This has to do with contemporaneous worldviews,\textsuperscript{102} immediately after the Second World War, which were dominated by the concern with avoiding war and the conviction that preserving the peace would mean engaging the minds of citizens, that is, that the

\textsuperscript{101} In this context, Dobbin (quoted in Campbell 1998) defines culture as the shared conceptions of reality, institutionalized meaning systems, and collective understandings that guide policy making: that is, cognitive structures that are rationalized in the sense that policy makers take them for granted as part of the nature of reality.

\textsuperscript{102} Although it needs to be noted that the concept of cultural policy as a public policy was a novel idea at the time and therefore no model, history or tradition existed, at both national- and international level, which is the focus here. The first (national) public, government cultural policy, minister and ministry emerged in 1958 in France. The Arts Council of Great Britain (created in 1948) claimed to be an arms-length agency with no (direct) government policy responsibility (although this is itself now considered as an institutional model of cultural governance).
‘solution’ was cultural.

A key target in this undertaking were the young generations. Thus, at European regional level, in 1948, the Western European Union, although a military institution, set up a Cultural Committee for intellectual cooperation with student exchanges as a central element. The Hague Congress in 1948 recommended not only the creation of the Council of Europe but also action in the field of culture/education. The idea of inter-national mobility was expected not only to spread educational and professional achievement but also to further universal and cosmopolitan values and enhance intercultural understanding between European countries and cultures.103

European universities of the 1950s thus began to debate the role of university in European society and the ‘balance between general culture and specialised training’ in academic curricula (Annuaire Européen 1957: 187). Culture is a functional aspect of education and this historical juncture was particularly favourable for this perspective to bed in.

Thus, in the 1950s, cooperation in education in Western Europe operated under the paradigm (Campbell 1998) of education as a privileged means to promote intercultural understanding and dialogue and overcome mistrust. This paradigm had been institutionalised (at international level) by both the Council of Europe (CoE) and UNESCO in a number of conventions and resolutions104 signed during the 1950s. Higher

103 In October 1949, the European Cultural Conference held in Lausanne advocated the creation of the College of Europe at Bruges and the European Cultural Centre in Geneva (to work with the young).

104 The Council of Europe, for example, signed 6 conventions/resolutions around student mobility and related issues between 1950 and 1959. Its prominent European Cultural Convention (1955) established, in its Article 2, that each signatory would: ‘(a) encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages, history and civilisation of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to those Parties to promote such studies in its territory; and (b) endeavour to promote the study of its language or languages, history and civilisation in the territory of the other Contracting Parties and grant facilities to the nationals of those Parties to pursue such studies in its territory.’ In 1950, Chapter D. Cultural Activities of UNESCO’s Conference Resolution encouraged ‘the efforts of Member States to strengthen their cultural development, especially through the training of Youth and through Adult Education’; in section D.3. Dissemination of culture, it saw ‘itself
education (HE) or, more specifically, HE institutions were seen as a programmatic idea (Campbell 1998), a policy solution to help materialise those ideas.

This was the ideational framework that shaped the concept of culture as a domain of policy as it appeared in the German proposal to include a cultural dimension in the European Community (our 1955-57 episode) and the proposal for a cultural cooperation policy in the Fouchet Plans (the 1961-62 episode).

But if the concern for cultural understanding in the climate of ideas explains the approach to culture (or education as culture) as a domain of policy in the European (international) context in the immediate post-war, where the first two policy experiences are chronologically located, in the 1970s and 1980s episodes the approach to cultural policy reflected different preoccupations and paradigms.

Although in the late 1960s still only a handful of European countries could claim to have a public cultural policy and dedicated structure, it was, again, UNESCO and the Council of Europe who took a (direct) lead in terms of conceptualising cultural policy, advocating its enactment in European nation states and diffusing cultural policy ideas. UNESCO, in particular, initiated a cultural policies research and development programme in the mid-1960s\(^{105}\) which culminated with two influential intergovernmental conferences in 1970 (Venice) and 1972 (‘Eurocult’ in Helsinki). The conferences advocated ‘the need for systematic planning and long term policies’ for culture, and the duty of governments to

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\(^{105}\) Most of these were research and fact finding expert meetings in the run up to the first ever meeting dedicated to cultural policy in 1970, the Venice Conference. A first report on ‘Cultural policy: a preliminary study’ had been published in 1969.
engage in it; the logic being that, since the individual was acknowledged to have ‘the right to freely participate in culture’ (Article 27 of the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights), ‘public authorities had to provide the means for exercising it’ (UNESCO 1970; 1972).

The Conferences institutionalised the paradigm of cultural development, seen as ‘an integral part of the general development of nations’ (social, economic and so forth), and identified issues that governments should consider as part of cultural development action: ‘the right to culture,’ the need ‘to increase general access to and public participation in culture,’ what was deemed ‘its democratisation,’ and the need for ‘international cultural relations and co-operation as a prerequisite to international peace and understanding’ (UNESCO 1970; 1972).

Thus, from 1945 and immediate post-war years to 1972 the worldview had changed into the idea of culture as a factor of development (on a par and intertwined with social, economic, international development and peace keeping); the new paradigm was now cultural development, a holistic and pluri-dimensional approach (in contrast with the previous essentially one-dimensional educational perspective); and the programmatic instruments were public cultural policies and the cultural developmental issues they were supposed to address.

This ideational framework (in fact, some of the issues above) is reflected in the notion of culture adopted by the Commission in the 1970s as it developed its community action/policy on culture (although this was, necessarily, also framed by EC institutions and objectives) (cf. Chapter 7). Not least, it is ultimately reflected in the fact that the Commission switched from the term ‘culture’ to that of ‘cultural sector.’ But European
Commission officials participated in these fora (UNESCO, Council of Europe, OECD) as observers and this ideational convergence may not be surprising\textsuperscript{106} (Council of the European Communities 1957; Council of Europe 2001; Haigh 1974; UNESCO 1970, 1972).

In the 1980s, it was the time for the Council of Europe to take the lead (in Europe) in the sense of acting as the focal point of the debate on and diffusion of cultural policy ideas, research and (good) practice. By this stage, national participation in international cultural policy debates had ‘grown up,’ in that, most countries now had a culture minister, an own cultural agenda, cultural politics, and some were influential; and the European cultural policy community which had gradually formed, was also becoming ‘Europeanised’ – debates/issues to an extent reflected the cross-fertilisation between national cultural policy practice/ideas and the agendas and policy diffusion role of these international institutions/fora.

The Commission’s cultural policy of 1987 also reflected the Europeanisation of policy

\textsuperscript{106} The establishment of ‘all forms of useful co-operation with the Council of Europe’ (CEC 1957) was ruled in Article 230 of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The EC and Council of Europe (CoE) agreed on the forms of cooperation in 1959 and in 1974 further consultations led to the creation of a CoE ‘liaison office’ in Brussels to ‘facilitate contact and exchange of information’ (CoE 2001: 24) with the EC. Cooperation (further enhanced and formalised in 1987) consisted of: mutual reporting on relevant information or decisions e.g. Council of Europe annual reports/publications regularly featured a digest of relevant EC events, decisions; the invitation of EC officials to the Council of Cultural Cooperation meetings, conferences; informal consultations, etc. Similar practices were adopted by UNESCO and other international organisations e.g. OECD at the time. In the Commission, Dharendorf’s 1973 DG’s programme of work in the field of culture, for example, included the development of interactions with the CoE, Unesco and OECD, see HAEU BDT144/87 folder 65 Programme de travail dans le domaine de la culture, 9 juillet 1973, p. 19. Also, EC archival documents provide details of those conference invitations and EC officials’ rapports de mission on these, visits and similar – Robert Grégoire (cf. Chapter 7) and colleagues would report back to the Commission on these events with detailed accounts and strategic commentary, see for example, HAEU BDT144/1987 folder 55 Rapport de mission, Strasbourg, Conseil de L’Europe, 26 octobre 1976 and also HAEU BDT 144/1987 folder 55 Note, Relations avec le Conseil de l’Europe dans le domaine culturel, 5 novembre 1976 for further Commission internal correspondence on ideas debated at this event.
ideas. However, although programmatic ideas now chimed with European policy ideas and realities more closely, the worldviews and paradigms remained broadly similar to those of the 1970s.

4.3 EC cultural policy and Community action

In the European Commission of the 1970s the problem was slightly more fundamental; not so much what a European cultural policy would do but the fact that it existed. Most European Community member states simply rejected the idea of an EC cultural policy; still, the Commission’s cultural policy lived on.

What became a longstanding squabble between the Commission and the EC member states was fought with words; which is perhaps most obviously reflected in the ambiguity about and the different designations used in parallel in the literature to refer to this area of Community intervention (post-1970s): (EC) cultural policy and Community action. Some literature also uses the term cultural competence (perhaps to stress the lack of one) but stric to sensu this refers to the legal capacity to act in the field. Political sensitivities about what is the appropriate term persist to day in what is still a somewhat contentious issue among European cultural policy observers.

In terms of this research, its aim and research tasks, clarifying the terminology here

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107 Chapter 8 does not address this particular aspect but some of the cultural policy issues/themes embraced by the European Commission and the Culture Council at the time were in fact also addressed by the Council of Europe (not least because delegates were the same national Culture Ministers).

108 The term ‘Community action’ was in use specifically in the two 1970s and 1980s policy episodes in the institutional context of the European Commission.

109 This was also the case with some of the former Brussels officials interviewed for this research. Evidence of this tension was also found in archival documents: for example, European Commission officials refer to ‘cultural policy’, ‘the Community’s cultural policy’, ‘the Commission’s cultural policy’ internally (for example in memos, policy think-papers) and on occasions also externally – of which the communication of Commissioner Brunner to the European Parliament in March 1976 is a notable example (European Parliament 1976a) – whilst other internal documents remind the reader that such intervention is not a European policy but ‘Community action’. Both stances are found in archival material throughout the 1970s and 1980s which suggests that the denomination of this policy was a perennial and contentious issue in the European Commission.
matters because the research aims to apply established theories of the policy process to a phenomenon – ‘Community action’ – which is, in essence, an empirical observation. To this author’s knowledge this term has not been examined: is it comparable to policy? Is it a case of something else? The next paragraphs therefore explore the notion of ‘Community action’ and its origins further, if briefly.

The term was first coined in 1972 when the European Commission’s ambition to develop a policy for culture was frustrated by the absence of legal Treaty basis in this policy area. The Commission, however, possessed functional powers to implement European Community objectives which enabled it to design and implement action necessary for the realisation of the common market – a Community objective – with no need for a decision from the Council. Using this functional authority and framing its intervention on culture as necessary to the achievement of Community objectives¹¹⁰ the Commission was able to develop and institutionalise a legitimate (Community) action in this domain. The term was formally used by the European Commission from 1972 onwards.¹¹¹

It is clear that in avoiding any reference to the term policy in relation to culture and trying to justify intervention/action with the common market, the Commission’s choice of terminology was calculated, strategic, and that it had more to do with the legal and political expediency of the term than with the nature of the intervention. Concurrently, the issue itself, originally defined as ‘culture’, was also redefined in socio-economic terms, as the ‘cultural sector’. This ‘purposeful opportunism’ (Cram 1999) of the Commission has been documented elsewhere.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Grégoire (2000) but see also chapter 7 below for a more detailed narrative.
¹¹¹ Cultural policy is currently (and has been since the 1990s) the term officially used by the European Union.
¹¹² See for example Cram (1999). In her study of the development of social and ICT policies Cram conceptualises the behaviour of the European Commission as purposeful opportunism. The term is borrowed from Klein and O’Higgins (1985) who define purposeful opportunism as the activities of an
Technically, in fact, the Commission’s ‘Community action’ proposals studied in this thesis fit well with Heywood’s definition of public policy as,

‘a plan for action adopted by […] a government [based on] a formal decision giving official sanction to a particular course of action’ (Heywood 2002: 400).

Another test, if one was needed, is the fact that the models of the policy process used to structure the analysis of the two ‘Community action’ episodes in this research showed to be fully ‘fit for purpose’ and were validated.

Therefore, for the purposes of this research the terms policy, public policy and Community action are all used, and used interchangeably, to analyse and refer to this Commission activity.

More specifically, the research is concerned with the policy process, that is, acts of (policy) initiation and implementation, the making of decisions (Heywood 2002: 400), although the focus is on the formation, pre-decision phase of the policy process. Thus, in this thesis, the term policy making will refer primarily to the process leading to and including decisions on policy (or Community action) proposals.

4.4 The historical context: the EC’s journey from Rome to Maastricht

The four episodes investigated in this thesis are situated in different phases of the EC as it evolved not only institutionally but also in terms of its human, cultural and territorial geography. The section below plots the key points of the EC’s journey from Rome to Maastricht to help situate the episodes in the EC’s historical context.
Following Dinan (1994) the period of 1945-57 was a period of reconstruction, reconciliation and integration. A key event in this period was the American Marshall Plan for economic recovery. The Americans hoped it would encourage European integration. Indeed, the early 1950s witnessed the development of the European community idea (Cini 2005) and in 1951 the Treaty of Paris created the first European community – the European Coal and Steel Community. Other initiatives to integrate Europe followed but were unsuccessful. The relaunch of the community concept, an economic community, started at Messina in 1955, the first of a series of high level meetings to discuss European integration. The outcome of these meetings was two treaties signed in Rome in March 1957 – one establishing the European Economic Community, the other establishing Euratom, the European Atomic Energy Community. At its inception the Community was comprised of six\textsuperscript{113} member states who spoke four languages\textsuperscript{114} between them.

The 1960s were also a period of establishment and consolidation of the economic community and the implementation of the first common policies. But they became known as the decade of De Gaulle (Dinan 1994). The French President proposed (1961) the creation of an intergovernmental political union to the Community member states. The plan folded but motivated the rapprochement between France and Germany, an alliance that would drive the European Community for decades to come. The 1965 ‘empty chair crisis’, prompted by De Gaulle’s boycotting of decision making in the EC for six months produced a shift in the Community’s governance ethos: from the initial vision of a supranational authority of the EEC to a states-led intergovernmental approach. The two British bids to join EC membership in 1961 and 1967 were blocked by France.

\textsuperscript{113} Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{114} This number refers to official languages and excludes national and lesser-used languages.
The 1969-79 decade witnessed a Community in flux (Dinan 1994) starting with the 1969 Hague Council’s resolve to relaunch European integration through completion, deepening and widening. Further, in the European Council of 1972 there was talk of a European union by 1980. This did not happen but initiated the path to union which would materialise twenty years later. The 1970s were also an era of (world-wide) economic crisis prompted by the rise in oil prices and the impact of the first EC enlargement (1973) which added three new member states – Britain, Denmark and Ireland – to the EC and two new languages.

The years of 1979-84 showed the Community turning the corner (Dinan 1994) as the early 1980s presaged the Community’s revival. These years saw the second enlargement to Greece, the first direct elections for the European Parliament, the launch of the European Monetary System, the settling of the British budgetary dispute, and a renewed interest in the creation of a single market and industrial renovation through high technologies. On a more political note the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union voted by the European Parliament (1984) was one in a number of initiatives which reinforced ideas of revival and reform that would materialise from the mid-1980s onwards.

The 1985-88 period thus brought with it the extraordinary transformation of the European Community (Dinan 1994). These years, the first Delors’ era in the European Commission, saw the conclusion of the Single European Act, a major revision of the Treaty of Rome that underpinned the development of the single market programme, and the third enlargement to Spain and Portugal bringing the EC’s membership to twelve, 338 million population and nine different languages. The 1989-93 period brought the ‘acceleration of European history’ (Delors cited in Dinan 1994: 128) – on the one hand the collapse of communism in 1989, on the other the progression from European community to European
union which culminated with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union in 1993.

One of the characteristics of the evolution of the EC is the ‘fits and starts’ nature of the integration process and the tensions and moves to advance it or stall it. One of the key arguments of this thesis is that institutions, interests and the agency of purposive actors have an important influence in the day-to-day politics of the policy process (Cram 1999). But the daily politics need to be seen in the high-level context of the European integration process; for it was contrasting conceptions of what integration was about (or how much national sovereignty should be surrendered) that ultimately shaped the path of the (nationally sensitive) culture issue throughout the development of the Community (up to the late 1980s).

This chapter examined the conceptualisation of culture as a policy domain in the European context as it evolved through the period covered in this research (1955-88) and reflected on the changing climate of ideas, which EC cultural policy agendas in turn mirrored – from the education-as-culture approach of the immediate post-war to the notion, promoted by cultural intergovernmental (Europe-based) organisations in the 1980s, of culture as a factor in development. It has also drawn attention to a definitional issue of policy which is mainly relevant to the Commission episodes, Chapter 7 in particular, i.e. the Commission’s instrumental framing of cultural policy as Community action so as to give it a legal basis and deflect unsupportive member states. Finally, the EC’s trajectory from Rome to Maastricht provides a historical context to the period in question and to Part II of this thesis which follows next.
Part Two is comprised of four chapters, Chapters 5–8, focusing on the empirical analysis of the four policy formation episodes.
CHAPTER 5

The European relaunch of 1955-57: proposing a cultural project for the EC

5.1 Introduction

The first episode examining the development of cultural policy in this thesis concerns a proposal to include a cultural dimension in what was to become the new European Community. The issue of culture\textsuperscript{115} entered the European agenda at the negotiations in Messina in 1955 and ended up in the Euratom Treaty in 1957. The proposal, from the German government, was for the new community to set up a European university as a vehicle to cultivate the European idea and values in the minds of young Europeans. Having been split recently between East and West and with the looming Cold War in its own backyard, the Federal Republic of Germany saw the unification of Western Europe and its integration into it as its lifeline to internal stability and international recognition – a cultural dimension would help cement integration. The German idea had a mixed reception. The subject of culture was not on the preliminary agenda of the conference and was not seen as a priority. In fact, it was considered by many as a non-issue and it did not have political support. Yet, over two years, the issue managed to progress through the several stages of the negotiations and eventually found its way into the treaty that set up the European Atomic and Energy Community.

This outcome is explained if we look into the process dynamics of the issue’s career through the two year negotiations. This chapter narrates this episode and explains the dynamics and career of the culture issue/German proposal, its inception, progression, events and outcomes through the policy cycle. It shows how the issue’s low status interacted with actors’ choices, the institutional context of the negotiations, resources and

\textsuperscript{115} Cf. Chapter 4 for a discussion on the concept of culture as a policy domain in the immediate post-war.
how opportunities for progression were created inter-process, almost organically. In line with a processual approach institutional change is assumed to result both from dynamic and ongoing processes – time was a key process factor in this episode. In the later stages, the intervention of a strategic policy entrepreneur combined with process to help move the issue forward to its final formulation in the Euratom Treaty.

This chapter is structured into four sections (including this introduction). The event narrative map next page charts the events and political process in this episode – the episode under investigation occurred in the period of 1955-57. The next Section 2 provides an overview of the context of European political integration in the early 1950s and assesses the ‘previous events’ and the climate of ideas which, this thesis argues, led to and explain the origins of the Messina proposal. Section 3 focuses on the negotiations for the new community following the career of the culture issue from its initiation at Messina through progression in the negotiations to legislative form in the Euratom Treaty in 1957. Following that, the conclusion in Section 4 draws together the episode evidence. It demonstrates how the interaction of events with elements of process, institutions, resources and issue status shaped the issue’s career throughout the episode and ultimately determined its inclusion in the Euratom Treaty.
Figure 5.1: Event narrative mapping of the policy episode 1955-57

Previous events

PE1 Cold War 1946-

PE1 Building a Europe of culture (I), 1948-50
PE1.1 Brussels Treaty
PE1.2 Hague & Lausanne Conferences
PE1.3 Council of Europe

PE2 Building a Europe of culture (II), 1950 -
PE2.1 European Cultural Centre, College of Europe, etc
PE2.2 Ideas about youth mobilisation and European university

PE3 Creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 1951

PE4 The ‘German Question’, 1945-55

PE5 Failed integration plans in early 1950s: EPC, EDC, other initiatives

Contemporaneous events

CE1 Cold War
CE1.1 Youth campaigns/propaganda

CE2 European reconstruction, reconciliation and integration

CE3 Fed Rep Germany politics
CE3.1 Adenauer’s external policy priority: integration into W Europe

Episode

Agenda setting, 1955-56

E1 (I) The Messina Conference
E1.1 Initiating the issue on the agenda: the German proposal
E1.2 Formulating the European university issue
E1.3 Non-decision

E1 (II) Brussels & Venice Intergovernmental Conferences
E1.1 The Euratom agenda and the nuclear HE training facility
E1.2 Reframing the European university issue
E1.3 The Spaak Report
E1.4 Approving the Spaak Report

E2 Val Duchesse Intergovernmental Conference, 1956-57
E2.1 Keeping the options open
E2.2 Settling for an ambiguous formulation
E2.3 Deciding to include a legal provision in the Euratom Treaty

E3 Decision making, 1957
E3.1 Rome Treaties signature – EEC and Euratom

Related events

RE1 Negotiations for the Treaties of Rome, 1955-57

Later events

LE1 Entry into force of EEC Treaty and EAEC (Euratom) Treaty, 1958

LE2 European university implementation, 1958-76

LE3 Hallstein’s advocacy of EEC cultural policy, 1958-
5.2 Western Europe at a historical and critical juncture

The first post-war decade can probably be considered as one of the, if not the most prolific decade of the twentieth century in terms of the number and variety of initiatives designed to unite Europe\textsuperscript{116} and avoid another war – from treaties to international organisations, communities, conferences, programmes, and in a range of fields, cultural, educational, economic, industrial, defense, political. The early 1950s can reasonably be considered as the foundation period of EC Europe. By 1950, pioneering institutions such as the Council of Europe and NATO were in place. By the end of the decade the three European communities, the ECSC, the EEC and the Euratom had been established.

In one way or another, successes, failures and the lessons from all of these led to the idea (and attempt) in 1955 to form an economic community, possibly the only untested form of community at that point in time. At the negotiations in Messina, in 1955, West Germany (hereinafter Germany\textsuperscript{117}) proposed the incorporation of a cultural project in the new European economic community. The next section explores and discusses the factors – events and ideas – which contributed to and help to explain the emergence of this episode at this point in time.

As the event narrative mapping in Figure 5.1 above indicates, there were three such events. One was Germany’s geopolitical situation, which was compounded by the question around German unification. A background but major political event was the Cold War, not least the cultural warfare unleashed by it (for example Scott-Smith and Krabbendam 2003). Another event was the climate of ideas (cf. Chapter 4 for an appraisal

\textsuperscript{116} In this chapter Europe means Western Europe and excludes central and eastern European countries which were part of the Communist Soviet dominated block. Other (Western) European states, for example, the UK, Sweden or Spain did not play a role in the events investigated in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{117} In this thesis the term Germany refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (or West Germany). Reference to East Germany will be explicit.
of worldviews, paradigms, initiatives regarding culture at this historical juncture) and initiatives to spread the European idea and the focus on the young generations in this endeavour. From this there followed debates around the role or function of universities in enhancing intercultural understanding and disseminating a European spirit.

5.2.1 The ‘German Question’ and the German quests

The first historical variable to understand is the question of German unification and its impact on the German government’s policy toward Europe and its quest for the political unity of Western Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany had only recently (1949) regained sovereign status and incorporation into Western Europe. The eastern side of what was formerly Germany remained occupied by the Soviet Union later becoming the Democratic Republic of Germany but under the Soviet sphere of influence. The western side had re-emerged as a democratic federal state in 1949 as the East-West division deepened and the Cold War heated up.

Germany found itself in a complex position, politically, geopolitically, and also socio-geographically. Whilst nationalist resurgence called for German East/West reunification at all costs (Schwarz 1991a: 598), pushing Germany toward the Soviet dominated east, the political élites, who wanted to integrate with Western Europe, pulled the country in the opposite direction, toward the west.

5.2.1.1 The quest for European unity

Thus, following four years of occupation, demilitarisation and denazification German

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118 Germany had been divided into East (dominated by the Soviet Block) and West following the war.
119 The Allies had in fact considered the total dismemberment of Germany but the international political situation and the increasing Cold War tensions, then in the early stages, determined its fortunes.
120 In 1945 Germany had been demilitarized and divided into 4 zones which were occupied by the allies (US, Britain, France in the western side, Soviet Union in the east). Whilst the allies had actually considered the total dismemberment of Germany, the strategic imperatives of the Cold War determined a different fate.
Chancellor Adenauer’s strategy was to embed Germany in the West; and he did so to the extent of prioritising European integration over national unification. In the early 1950s the regaining of sovereign status prompted German efforts to rebuild the trust of the international community (in particular, or most immediately, the European community). This was vital especially given that suspicion of the German military strength and fear of its fast developing economic and industrial capacity still persisted in Europe into the 1950s, particularly in France. Integrating with (Western) Europe was seen as a way to achieve this:

‘a vital springboard for us to get back into foreign affairs’ (Adenauer quoted in Schwarz 1991b: 233).

Another significant political incentive was the American economic support that came with integration;121 ‘there is safety in numbers’ and the opportunity was that ‘integration is also for Europe’s sake and therefore essential for us’122 (Adenauer quoted in Schwarz 1991b: 233).

Other than the geopolitical aspect, however, there were significant internal/national reasons driving the political quest for integration with Western Europe. Adenauer’s remark at a cabinet meeting in 1952 that ‘the people must be given a new ideology, it can only be a European one’ (Lenz quoted in Schwarz 1991a: 612) reflects his interest in European integration

‘as the most effective, and perhaps the sole means of protecting Germany from itself. A Germany, integrated into European institutions […] can defend itself not only against […] nationalism, but also against the temptation to turn directly to the Russians to solve controversial problems [i.e. East Germany

121 In fact, closer European integration was a condition for American economic aid as the US government saw the common market project as vital for the survival of Western Europe.
122 Indeed the return of Germany to the European table was both in its own interest and in the security interests of the West – which was also ‘pragmatic’ in its approach. A good illustration of this is presented by Luce (cited in Reuther 2004) in an article in Time magazine in December 1949, ‘Giving German industry increasingly free reign involved risk; giving the West Germans more sovereignty involved risk; backing Konrad Adenauer was a gamble; arming the Germans would be a gamble. But the only alternative […] would be to let the country stagnate and, eventually, fall to Communism. That would not be a gamble, it would be a disaster’ (Ruther 2004).
and the question of unification] with them without taking into account the general interests of the West’ (Spaak 1971: 311).

The German investment in the European enterprise was therefore more than a defensive ‘ticket to Europe’; it was also about Europe as a catalyst for change in Germany, and what Adenauer saw as a necessary cultural change. Integration into Europe would be instrumental in the reframing of the German psyche, particularly (though not only) where nationalist predispositions were concerned. For Germany, thus, the quest for Europe was not only a political but also a cultural crusade.

European unity (or integration) therefore became a significant aspect of German policy and foreign policy, and external relations a very dynamic area of government activity.123 The concept of ‘European unity’ so strongly advocated by Adenauer was a comprehensive, progressive one, in which he recognised

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\text{‘that purely national-political advantages, which have no bearing on the larger interdependency in which we all live, will do us no good whatsoever. It is not only a question of political problems. In the economic and cultural sphere as well we are no longer alone. In the long run, nobody can exist relying only on himself. […] Only by such associations [unity] will European nations be enabled to defend peace, to re-build Europe, to save European culture and to make Europe once more a significant component in world politics and in the world economy’} \text{(Adenauer 1955).}
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Culture clearly had a place in the Chancellor’s vision of European unity and may explain the creation by Adenauer’s Foreign Affairs Secretary, Walter Hallstein, of a new Directorate-General for Cultural Relations in the Office for Foreign Affairs (Loth et al 1998: 18) in the early 1950s. Hallstein had a similar notion of the political significance of a united Europe and of what were its fundamentals,

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123 To the extent that until 1955 Adenauer himself accumulated the job of chancellor with that of Foreign Affairs Minister.
‘Indeed, the creation of Europe as an organised unit and therefore capable of acting in concert with a powerful global political voice is a matter of political, economic and cultural self-assertion of Europe’ (Hallstein 1955).

5.2.1.2 Reaching out to the young generations

Part of this endeavour, and especially at a time of transition from the period of reconstruction and stabilisation, following the war, to a new period of transformation and democratisation, an issue that was particularly pressing for the German government was the situation of young people. Not only were the young German generations of the 1950s still the outcome of the Hitler Youth and Nazi education policies and of a war which had, too, offered powerful common experiences that had cemented their identity (Buddrus 1995: 248) but there was also a younger generation of kriegskinder (war children) born between 1938 and 1948. None of these had a reason to hold any particular European sentiment. For Adenauer and Hallstein reaching the hearts and minds of young Germans was (ultimately) of paramount importance in Germany’s geopolitical struggle.

Hallstein, a former university professor, was particularly concerned with the disenchantment of the European peoples’ with the European situation, ‘especially amongst young people’ (Küsters 1990:58), and that,

‘If we do not succeed in breathing new life into the European movement at an early date, the present spirit of willingness will evaporate or may turn into bitterness and invest in other ideals. That applies particularly to young people. Throughout Europe youth has been and remains fired with enthusiasm; but enthusiasm is not some kind of herring to be salted and put away for a few years (Goethe). If young people are disappointed, they will look for other outlets for their enthusiasm. […] If Europe fails to offer them a supranational ideal, the Soviet doctrine will do so. That doctrine offers a reprehensible, destructive world view, but it is one which for many appears to rise above the bickering of individual nations and interest groups, thereby offering an

124 This author’s Italics
125 Opinion polls on attitudes toward European unification conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Britain in the period of 1952-55 reveal that initial enthusiasm for unification was waning in every country in 1955 (except in Britain where there was an increase). In France, for example, pro-unification opinion declined from 60 to 45 percent between 1952 and 1955. Pro-European popular sentiment started to grow again from 1956 onwards (Rabier 1989).
appealing option. [...] Rapid political integration is thus vitally necessary’
(Hallstein quoted in Lappenküper et al 1999).

The very real, sensitive German youth problem was, in fact, part of a bigger, European, condition (in Kingdon’s terms (1995)) which was only exacerbated by the emerging Cold War.

5.2.2 Of Cold War and cultural warfare: battling for the young

Chapter 4 has already elaborated on the view that prevailed in the immediate post-war that overcoming mistrust and keeping the peace entailed the promotion of intercultural understanding and dialogue; and how the involvement of young people in the European (re)construction was seen as critical to the ‘new’ Europe. Subsumed in this understanding was the conviction that the big barrier to the union of Europe lay not in political circumstances (or not only) but in minds shaped by the nationalist discourse of schools and education (Palayret 1996). This was at the origin of the theory or paradigm that education, especially the cultural dimension of education, was a privileged means to achieve those aims.

The 1950s, thus, saw the development of international cultural projects/campaigns designed to mobilise the young, focusing primarily on European cultural values, human rights and anti-isolationist attitudes. In the early 1950s, for example, the Union of International Associations identified some 150 international associations actively engaged in European (mobility or inter-) cultural activities126 primarily aimed at the young (Cornides 1957: 97).

126 This excludes the very active work of American (private) foundations and networks in cultural and educational exchanges between the US and western Europe, and the pro-Western youth and student movements and programmes some of which were (indirectly) financed by the CIA; see for example, Geppert (2003, especially Part III), Rawnsley (1999), Scott-Smith and Krabbendam (2003, especially Parts III and V).
With the growing Cold War tensions, however, international youth/student organization became a strategic site of struggle in the Cold War. This meant that the dissemination of the European ideal in Western Europe became not only urgent but also gradually complementary with anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union invested heavily in youth events and propaganda\textsuperscript{127} since the early 1950s but the West’s response, with investment (European and mainly American) in similar initiatives, had only modest results. Youth mobilisation and organisation thus became one of the battlefields of the Cold War (Kotek 2003) and cultural and intellectual activity one of its weapons.

5.2.3 A European role for universities?

As alluded to in Chapter 4, in the campaign to mobilise the young in the 1950s, (higher) education was viewed as a critical instrument; and the idea behind the internationalisation of education was that it could not only spread educational and professional achievement but also cultivate universal and cosmopolitan values and enhance mutual cultural understanding across countries (Teichler 2004). The Council of Europe, for example, was active in the area of higher education and signed a number of multilateral European conventions to facilitate mobility and exchange that spanned the 1950s.

The idea of systematic intervention through education (rather than exchanges), in particular through higher education, started to take shape in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{128} European university models ranged from the simple introduction of a European dimension to curricula – European studies or research on integration were not uncommon – to a

\textsuperscript{127} The Soviet Union had a monopoly in international youth and student affairs (Kotek 2003: 169) and spent an estimated $2.5 billion a year on youth front organisations in the 1950s (Kotek 2003: 181). Their third Youth and Student Festival in Berlin in 1951 attracted two million participants from all over the world (Aldrich 1999: 187).

\textsuperscript{128} In the Soviet block for example, the active cooperation between universities was a vehicle for the promotion of political integration.
centralised European university to promote European values which required the harmonization of national systems (Palayret 1996).

Although such projects aroused a measure of interest in some academic circles, by and large the idea of a European university was a political initiative which grew outside the academic world. The few projects that came into being normally consisted of student exchanges and the introduction of a European dimension in academic curricula but the idea of a centralised European university institution was openly rejected by western European universities. The only established European education institution, the College of Europe in Bruges (created in 1950 and still fully operational) was meant to train young people for careers in European or national administration.

Therefore, if on one hand there was generally recognition of the role that higher education could or should play in the development of cultural Europe and the ‘European spirit,’ the potential role of university as a channel for their systematic cultivation found much less support (if any). These two sides of the question were to be brought together at the negotiations for a new European community.

Thus, by the mid-1950s, the European high level processes of cultural ‘Problems’ (overcoming mistrust and keeping the peace, uniting (Western) Europe, connecting with disaffected young people, the Cold cultural War), ‘Policy solutions’ (of international education/cultural initiatives, youth mobility, higher education/university projects) and ‘Political’ events (national élites’ political will to unite, the creation of a new European community and of a new agenda, the Cold War, American assistance or insistence) and

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129 Although mobility in post-war Europe was not easy, considering the lack of appropriate facilities, the insufficiencies in transport infrastructures, and the border and exchange controls in operation everywhere. Moreover, many of the academic links usual in traditional university life had been disrupted by the war. (Re)creating a European academic community was not a simple task.
the climate of ideas seemed to converge at the time when the Messina/EC negotiations ‘window’ was about to open.

But, had this idea’s time come?

5.3 Negotiating the new European community: from Messina to Rome

In 1955, under pressure to give a new impetus to European integration the Six ECSC members turned to a bold initiative to politically unite Europe. The new model for integration proposed to start with incremental economic integration (Franks 1964:98) through which political cooperation and, ultimately, unification would gradually materialise. The first step would be a customs union which would then evolve into a European common market. For this to happen the economies of the participating states would need to be increasingly coordinated in the future, a path that would lead to closer political cooperation further down the line. The Six also saw themselves as a (initial) core of states which, as they envisaged, could later be joined by other West European states.

5.3.1 Proposing a cultural project for the new community’s agenda

The Sicilian town of Messina was the place chosen to host the conference of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six that opened the two years of negotiations for the new European community. On the agenda there were two items: the election of a successor for Jean Monnet in the presidency of the ECSC (Monnet was stepping down from the ECSC in order to create a platform to campaign for integration) and consideration of a

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130 In fact this became two communities: the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the treaties for which were signed in Rome in March 1957.
131 Monnet was resigning from his post of President of the ECSC in order to campaign for European unity with the benefit of complete freedom of action and speech. His mission was to achieve a United States of Europe, for which he set up a committee (with the same name) including international political personalities. In his words ‘our countries are too small for the current world, in the scale of the modern
plan for action regarding the development of European integration.

At Messina the delegations of the Six were headed by their respective Foreign Affairs ministers. The Benelux, Italy and Germany submitted memoranda to the Conference – the Benelux working paper was a technical document focusing mainly on customs and economic issues; the same for the Italian government’s proposals which proposed monetary and currency union further along the line. The German government, however, had a comprehensive approach to European integration – an ‘all round integration’ (Küsters quoted in Serra 1989: 235).

The German proposal included not only a broad conception of economic integration (though based on the ECSC model the idea of a European common market was essentially a German creation) but also an institutional framework for the future community, and included a cultural project. The view was that ‘integration should be realised not only in the economic but also in the cultural field’132 (HAEU CM2 951/aC1133). For reasons explained above, the German government saw the new Community primarily as a political project (Müller Armack 1971) and German officials had been instructed to negotiate a deal on ‘European unity’ as far as possible. The holistic approach to integration had been strongly advocated by Adenauer and by Walter Hallstein, the technical means that the America and Russia of today have at their disposal and that the China and India of tomorrow will also dispose of. The unity of the European peoples in the United States of Europe provides the means to bring up their standards of living and to keep the peace. It is the great hope and opportunity of our times’ (Serra 1989: 67).

132 The term ‘cultural’ was used in its broadest sense in international affairs in the 1940s-1950s (note also that the concept of a government cultural policy – and its typical areas of concern – as we know it today was uncommon), cf. Chapter 4.

133 HAEU CM2 951/aC1 Extrait du proces verbal de la session restreinte des Conseils de la CEE et de la CEEA, tenue a Bruxelles le 20 mai 1958 (510f/58). Premier échange de vues au sujet de la creation d’une institution universitaire europeenne et d’un centre commun de recherches nucleaires [sic] (Point 11 de l’ordre du jour).
German Foreign Affairs Secretary, Head of European policy and German chief negotiator at Messina.\textsuperscript{134}

In his introduction to the German government’s Memorandum Hallstein stressed the importance that his government attached to matters concerning young people (HAEU CM3/NEGO/006\textsuperscript{135}) – Section C of the German Memorandum read,

‘The federal government wishes to show to young people tangible testimony of the desire for European union through the foundation of a European university to be created by the six ECSC member states’ (HAEU CM2 0951\textsuperscript{136}).

As Haedrich, a German government official put it,

‘the project was not a purely university one, but one born of political and psychological necessities, a new starting point for European integration’ (Haedrich quoted in Palayret 1996: 47).

The university was possibly also Hallstein’s ‘pet idea,’\textsuperscript{137} as Kingdon (1995) would have it. A former professor and Vice-Chancellor of Frankfurt University, Hallstein had developed his concept of a European university operating in concentric circles (Palayret 1996) to promote European values and educate the European élites (Hallstein was of European federal persuasion which may help explain this idea). As Chairman, in the late 1940s, of the Standing Committee of the Southern German Higher Education Congress,

\textsuperscript{134} In its drive to cooperate and integrate Germany had signed a cooperation pact with France months before (October 1954), a comprehensive and ‘unprecedented cooperation programme’, which involved economic and extensive cultural cooperation (Serra 1989).

\textsuperscript{135} HAEU CM3/NEGO/006 Négociations des traités instituant la CEE et la CEEA (1955-57). Réunion des ministers des affaires étrangères, Messine, 01-03.06.1955

\textsuperscript{136} HAEU CM2 0951 Extrait du process verbal de la reunion des ministers des affaires étrangeres, tenue a Messine, les 1 et 2 Juin 1955, Mémorandum allemand, paragraphe C

\textsuperscript{137} Hallstein had in fact floated the university idea in the Association of the European Community Institutes for University Studies created by Jean Monnet (Palayret 1996) which he was a member of and which included key European political figures. Monnet was also interested in developing a European dimension to education and had created the association to promote and investigate its feasibility. Both the association and Hallstein’s idea were political initiatives and completely outside of the university world (which rejected the idea). We should note that in his memoirs, Müller-Armack claims that the European university was his and Ophüls’ idea (cf. Footnote 138 below) and that it was agreed at Erchenscheld (cf. footnote 140 below). Of course, there is no easy way to verify whose idea it was (and does it matter?); what it does is that it recognises that the German government was fully behind the European university idea.
(responsible for, amongst other things, the restructuring and de-nazification of higher education), Hallstein had played a role in the reorganization of the higher education system in the Western occupied German zone. He had also been president of the South German Rectors' Conference, which he founded. He was therefore personally as well as politically sensitive to the problems and need for reform of German universities.

Thus, it is not surprising that the German government insisted that the issues of the youth and the creation of a European university were discussed at Messina (Serra 1989: 177). All the leading negotiators in the German delegation to Messina – Hallstein, Müller-Armack, Ophüls, Erhard – were former academics138 and supported the proposal (Müller-Armack 1971; Hallstein 1962: 200). German universities were in a crisis of transition at the time and they possibly saw it as a way to breathe new life into the university system, for example, that it ‘could encourage exchanges between young people’ (Küsters 1990: 64).

The German integration perspective was comprehensive and in a way innovative, and the German government, and certainly Hallstein, an expert in institutional law, anticipated

‘the involvement of institutions that are instrumental to the achievement of integration in the intellectual, cultural and economic dimensions…’ (HAEU CM2 0951139).140

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138 Walter Hallstein (head of the German delegation to Messina and Adenauer’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs) had had a full and successful academic career becoming Vice Chancellor of Frankfurt University in 1946, then Visiting Professor at Georgetown University in Washington DC in 1949 – he entered politics in 1950; he had also supported the founding of UNESCO in Germany. Alfred Müller-Armack, (Head of the Economic Policy division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs) was an eminent Professor of Economics and of Cultural Sociology at the Universities of Münster and (later) Cologne and the creator of the concept of ‘social market economy’ – he entered politics in 1952. Carl Friederich Ophüls, Head of the European Affairs division of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bonn’s Chief Negotiator in Brussels (was second in command at Messina), was also a former law professor.

139 HAEU CM2 0951 Extrait du process verbal de la reunion des ministers des affaires étrangères, tenue a Messine, les 1 et 2 Juin 1955, Mémorandum allemand, paragraphe C

140 In its pre-Messina meeting at Eicherscheld in May 1995, the German government had agreed that integration should ‘be complemented by an institutional structure’ and that it should be ‘appropriate to have integration in the sphere of science and education, something along the lines of a European university’ (Müller-Armack 1971: 91-103).
But when Hallstein finished his presentation, the Belgian conference chair, Paul-Henri Spaak, remarked that ‘such issues do not fit with our present work’ (Calmès in Serra 1989: 177). The Dutch, whose focus was on economic integration, concurred, and France, a player of weight, suggested that the issue should be dealt with by Education Ministers. Only Italy backed the German proposal. But although Spaak did not rule out the issue (Spaak was a key promoter of the European idea), core agenda issues were prioritised (more on the significance of this process factor below) which meant that the European university and the cultural perspective on integration were not discussed.

A last ditch attempt by Hallstein, at the final session of Messina, to see the issue included was unsuccessful. Spaak found the German perspective interesting (Müller-Armack 1971) and one which he and some of his colleagues could associate with (HAEU CM3/NEGO-006\textsuperscript{141}) – he actually declared that he was personally open to the idea\textsuperscript{142} (HAEU CM3/NEGO-006\textsuperscript{143}) – but said that the German concerns with the cultural dimension, young people and the European university fell outside of the objectives of Messina. Its agenda was to discuss economic integration. Thus, the resolution issued at the end of the meeting – which set the agenda for the next stage of the EC negotiations – did not mention the European University.

\textsuperscript{141} HAEU CM3/NEGO/006 Négociations des traités instituant la CEE et la CEEA (1955-57). Réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères, Messine, 01-03.06.1955
\textsuperscript{142} Paul-Henri Spaak was in a good position to understand the German proposal. He was a veteran figure of the European unification movement in the post war and was one of the key political figures in the Hague Congress (1948) where the idea of a European university and of the importance of culture to a future European community was aired for the first time. He had negotiated the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence (1948), which came to develop an important cultural programme, and had also presided over the European Culture Conference of Lausanne (1949). Now Foreign Minister of Belgium, Spaak had been the first Chairman of the Council of Europe (1950) and President of the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, later becoming President of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, capacity in which he was now chairing the Messina meeting.
\textsuperscript{143} HAEU CM3/NEGO/006 Négociations des traités instituant la CEE et la CEEA (1955-57). Réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères, Messine, 01-03.06.1955
But this is exactly where the interaction of process, institutions and actors may have surprising consequences.

In fact, in the framework of the negotiations, Messina was only an initial scoping meeting, an agenda structuring\textsuperscript{144} (Tallberg 2003) meeting to select issues for active consideration in the following stages. More broadly, its function was to put integration, and in particular, economic integration back on the European political agenda and agree on the procedures for the negotiations that would follow (Serra 1989). There were only two days to go through an extensive range of issues and come up with a concept for the new Community. With a full agenda, differing interests and conflicting positions to reconcile, in order to ensure the smooth (and productive) running of the negotiations, Spaak imposed a strict regime. His goal was to ‘only examine what might be technically feasible’ (Serra 1989: 217) and to seek agreement on the next steps of the negotiations (Küsters 1990: 65).

Negotiation tactics\textsuperscript{145} were adopted accordingly which mainly aimed to circumvent peripheral issues and potential controversy and achieve agreement as much and as quickly as possible. The agenda was also managed as a structural aspect of the negotiations whereby straightforward issues were dealt with first, leaving the more problematic questions (and minor or perceived non-issues) for the last sessions. Another tactic was to limit the time delegates could spend on any one item so proceedings could move forward and Spaak could press on to the next phase (Uri 1986: 67). Strong-arm tactics were also used to dramatic effect…

\textsuperscript{144} Tallberg (2003) defines agenda structuring as the capacity to structure decision-making by emphasising or de-emphasising items on a political agenda – according to Tallberg, the true ‘power of the chair,’ since it is firmly anchored in the discretion enjoyed by any chairman managing the agenda of a decision-making organ.

\textsuperscript{145} For example, agenda control, phasing, the cultivation of a compromise style.
‘Occasional emotional outbursts when he [Spaak] would fling his pencil onto the table and leave the negotiating room for a time with a ‘it cannot go on like this, gentlemen’ were well orchestrated and effectively staged intermezzi which did not fail to have the desired effect’ (Müller-Armack 1971: 106).

But, importantly,

‘It made it possible to stay on course without being sidetracked by demands that, however important, remained secondary in terms of the real objective.’ (Gazzo 1967)

This way, due in part to the modus operandi and, in part, to agenda exclusion (by convenient oblivion), there were a number of non- or low status issues which, like culture, came up during the sessions but were not dealt with – they were not discussed, were not formally accepted but were not rejected either. But given the lack of time to deal with all these issues in the closing sessions of Messina, as planned, Ministers decided that all residual issues were bundled together and moved to the next phase of the negotiations to be dealt with later (HAEU CM3/NEGO-006146; also Calmès quoted in Serra 1989: 177) – the university proposal was carried forward.

Thus, although the German proposal to involve a cultural element in the new European community had failed to garner meaningful support or to (formally) secure a place on the agenda for the following round of the negotiations, a mix of resource and process features – namely lack of time, the issue’s low status, the negotiation tactics deployed and agenda congestion – interacted with procedural (institutional) factors determining that the issue was carried forward (informally formally!) to the next stage.

5.3.2 Alternative formulations in the IGC negotiations

To keep the integration momentum going, the Messina conference was immediately

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146 HAEU CM3/NEGO/006 Négociations des traités instituant la CEE et la CEEA (1955-57). Réunion des ministers des affaires étrangères, Messine, 01-03.06.1955
followed by a number of meetings of ministers and experts punctuated by two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC). In the first phase (July 1955-October 1955) committees of experts and officials developed the recommendations of the Messina Resolution and identified the measures to be taken building up a picture of what integration would look like (Küsters 1990).

In November 1955–April 1956 a small group of experts was brought together to write a report which set the agenda for the final leg of the negotiations for the treaties establishing two new European communities: the European Atomic and Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community. The report (known as the Spaak Report) was a report to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (political) who should meet in Venice in May 1956 to approve it. Concluding the first phase of treaty negotiations, thus, the Venice IGC and the Spaak Report provided a broad outline of the two new Communities.

Phase two’s meetings took place in June 1956-March 1957 in Brussels (Val Duchesse) and involved the negotiations for the design, specification and drafting of the two treaties.\(^\text{147}\) The purpose of these meetings was to convert the principles set out and developed in the Spaak Report into treaty articles, paragraphs, and explicit and precise rules (Gazzo 1967). For a low (almost non-) status issue such as culture each leg of the negotiations was a new agenda challenge to overcome; and as treaty and issue priorities surfaced and successively congested negotiation agendas, it was not guaranteed that culture would be given serious consideration.

\(^{147}\) This research only had fragmented access to the minutes of the IGCs’ negotiations but a range of historical documents and secondary literature can help shed light on these events, the choices made and the trajectory of the issue.
5.3.2.1 The Spaak report: any deal rather than no deal

The issue of the European university resurfaced at the Venice IGC in the Spaak Report in May 1956. Part 2 of the Euratom section of the Spaak Report recommended the creation of a European nuclear research centre to provide, amongst other things, research development and specialist training. The report also suggested in passing that this centre could provide the basis for the development of a European university – it stated:

‘The school and research centre might constitute the basis for a European university where scientists from various countries would teach together; like any university it would have to have recognised autonomy’ (HAEU CM3/NEGO-87\(^{148}\)).

The European university now not only appeared in the negotiations for a treaty dealing with the energy/atomic community, but its formulation had changed. It was now articulated as a spin-off of a European nuclear centre of excellence for international scientists rather than the primarily young-focused facility to promote the European idea and values that Hallstein had originally proposed.

In fact, Hallstein had raised the issue of the university several times in the common market committee but no logical link to economic integration could be found in these negotiations (HAEU CM2 951 aC1\(^{149}\)). The (only) alternative decision venue that offered a prospect to include the university on a (legislative) treaty’s agenda was the Euratom committee, where the nuclear training and research issue and the creation of a facility were being discussed.

The nuclear centre was a French proposal. At the time the undisputed leader in Europe in energy and atomic research, production and training facilities, France, which

\(^{148}\) HAEU CM3/NEGO-87 Comité Intergouvernemental créé par la Conférence de Messine (1956) Rapport des chefs de délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, Parte 2, Section 1

\(^{149}\) HAEU CM2 951 aC1, Extrait du projet de procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte du 20.05.1958 des Conseils de la CEE et la CEEA
represented about 70% of the existing [atomic/energy] capability in the Community [of Six]’ (Mercereau 1986: 30), was keen to keep its leadership of the European atomic race and boost nuclear research. As a civil and military nuclear programme on its own was impossible the French wanted to create a European organisation to share the costs. The fact that the first chapter of the Euratom treaty was dedicated to the ‘Development of Research’ (nuclear/energy) gives an idea of the significance of this project in European terms. The nuclear centre would have no problem in securing a place on the Euratom treaty’s agenda.

For Hallstein, on the other hand, moving the university issue to Euratom meant toning down the initial European mission and adopting a more neutral issue image\(^ {150} \) – any deal was better than no deal. According to Schwarz, in fact, the German support for Euratom was ‘a quid pro quo for French agreement to a common market’ (1997). It could be speculated that the university figured somewhere in this deal although the university was a very small issue and will have played a minimal, if any, role in any grand political calculations.

A factor that was analytically significant in the successful coupling of the European university project with the French nuclear centre was the negotiation method employed, that is, process. The aim of these negotiations was to convert the Messina ‘general’ (Gazzo 1967) conclusions into the agenda for the treaties and, once again, Spaak’s method

\(^ {150} \) Although the Germans had (apparently, at least) little interest in Euratom, German energy/nuclear realpolitik at the time allows us to speculate about other reasons why Germany went along with the French proposal. Whilst the restoration of German sovereignty (1954) had forced Germany to formally renounce the production of nuclear weapons, when it joined NATO shortly afterwards the issue of the nuclear armament of Federal defense units became part of the security (and political) Western European agenda. Adenauer advocated the need for Germany to produce its own nuclear weapons and in the winter of 1956 he negotiated a secret agreement with France on military (potentially including nuclear) cooperation (the French had first approached the German government for nuclear cooperation in 1951) (see for example, Carson 2004). Germany was developing its industrial energy capability but German scientists actively rejected the idea of engaging in research or training for military purposes. Might the French centre play a part in German-French collaboration in nuclear military research/training?
of working sought to maximise political consensus – ‘the Spaak procedure [as it was known] produced miracles’ (Gazzo 1967). This way, according to Küsters (1990), technical reports from phase one expert committees were reworked and articulated as political statements and, to avoid conflict, different opinions and national interests were accommodated or subsumed wherever possible. In the words of one observer,

‘It is a fact that […] a balance between different concepts and different demands, between legitimate and, at times, conflicting interests, had to be sought and restored day after day’ (Gazzo 1967).

Attitude, the pro-European ‘real team spirit’ (Gazzo 1967), also contributed to the culture of consensus – in the words of one delegate,

‘As Mansholt used to say: «I want Europe, but Lücker wants Europe too, and if our opinions differ, we have to find a way to reconcile them». There was no other way’ (Lücker 2006).

But if the outcome was, indeed, agreement, it was also agreement based on the lowest common denominator; which meant lumping issues together and the (consequent) generalising of ideas. Nonetheless, in the scale of things, the university was a very low status issue which Hallstein was trying to include in a treaty at all costs and this process feature only helped his cause in this instance.

But even at the final report drafting stage which followed, there were forces, of the unplanned, real-life type of events, at play in the process – Pierre Uri, the Euratom rapporteur, recounts that,

‘…in the final evening [of a two week EEC and Euratom report writing session in a hotel in Cap Ferrat, outside Nice] nothing had been done on Euratom. We had to leave by noon the following day, because it was Easter weekend and the hotel was fully booked. I started dictating Euratom that evening at 7.30 pm; at midnight I had a whisky; by two in the morning I was done (Uri 1986; Uri quoted in Serra 1989: see 306).
There was no time for questions on this draft (Uri 1986) and once again, lack of time and the need to speed up things were factors shaping the (specification and policy formulation) process.

Thus, in many ways similarly to Messina, the university issue careered – or rather, survived – to the next phase of the negotiations thanks to the institutional and procedural features of the negotiating process (what Barzelay (2003) terms process context and design features). First of all, the difficulty in matching the university with a common market issue led Hallstein to ‘shop’ for an alternative decision venue,\(^{151}\) in the event, the Euratom negotiations committee. The European university was a minor, low status (almost non-) issue floating in what was a congested negotiation process and in which the pressing search for consensus was amenable to broad brush, general statements and the bundling of issues rather than details and specifics.

This framework provided a structure for Hallstein to entrepreneurially adapt the university issue image from an institution with something of a European/cultural mission to one of very general character and this way attach the university to the nuclear training centre, a specific institution – and solution to a defined problem – with which there was an (Higher Education) interconnection\(^{152}\) (Rochfort and Cobb 1994) and which had been agreed. This way, however minor or boundary the issue or vague its formulation, the university got on the Spaak report and, crucially, on the agenda of a new Treaty – this time, formally.

\(^{151}\) The notion of venue shopping (Baumgartner and Jones 1989; 1993) recognises that policy-makers intent in changing policy will ‘shop’ around for a favourable venue that is receptive to their claims about the nature of a policy problem and their solution. According to Baumgartner ‘Policymakers behave like the navigator of a hot-air balloon. They seek to steer their policies to those areas in the political and administrative system where the winds are most favourable to them’ (1989: 3).

\(^{152}\) According to Rochfort and Cobb (1994) political issues and public policy debates are constantly redefined and changed through the operation of two related processes: boundary effects, where events in one area of politics affect related areas, and the rise and fall of component parts of a complex issue. No issue exists in a vacuum and there is always the potential of spillover into or from related areas.
5.3.2.2 The Val Duchesse negotiations: keeping policy options open

In the final round of treaty negotiations at the Val Duchesse castle in Brussels the agenda/principles set out and developed in the Spaak Report were translated into a Treaty and policy specifications: detailed articles, paragraphs, rules and protocols.

The first meetings of the Euratom committee focused on the first chapter of the Spaak Report ‘Development of research’.

The German delegation submitted a note on the European University project (Palayret 1996). The Germans had revised the proposal, still modeled on the Spaak Report’s design, but the terms were now inverted – it included a European institute of advanced (nuclear) studies and ‘a university of gigantic proportions’ (Mercereau 1988: 27) focusing on both teaching and research. Paul Mercereau, a French official and government representative to the Euratom negotiations, remembers that the Germans’ ‘obsession’ with the European university tended to dominate the discussions on research (Mercereau 1988) in the Euratom committee.

Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands were interested in the university project but were also concerned that a treaty which provided for an energy and atomic community was not the appropriate framework for a (general) university. The Germans, however, wanted to secure the inclusion of the/a European university in the treaties and the only treaty window open was the ‘nuclear.’ Debate on the issue was inconclusive and was postponed to a later stage (Palayret 1996). But the issue figured in the Spaak Report (the agenda for the treaties) and it would have to be dealt with at some point.

It was (once again) at the closing stages of the Euratom Committee of the IGC of Val Duchesse that Hallstein insisted that a decision was made on the European university (like

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153 The establishment of Euratom concentrated on eight key activities around which the Treaty was structured – the first aim was ‘Promoting research’.
he had done at Messina). It could be speculated that Hallstein also used his own positional power and time (last minute) tactics; that is, to request a decision on a new issue at the very end of the proceedings to push a decision with little or no consideration. Archival documents suggest that, in fact, Hallstein did not have any specific or clear conception for the university at this point in time. Yet, despite the lack of a clear image, the other delegates were persuaded enough to back – and therefore institutionalize – the university in the new treaty. Hallstein’s successful claim indicates that this can be explained by the fact that he received certification from other delegates (political actors). He had been championing the university since Messina, he was the German chief negotiator, who had Adenauer’s endorsement and also had a personal cachet of credibility (as a well-known legal expert and former academic figure, politician, a busy speaker at high profile international events, and so forth).

Provision for a nuclear research and training facility on the Euratom Treaty had already been made on the basis of the original French proposal – Articles 8 and 9(1) – and ministers agreed to add a second paragraph to Euratom’s Article 9 to provide for ‘a’ university:

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154 In fact, it was only in May 1958 (the Treaties came into force in January 1958) that a joint meeting of the six EEC/Euratom members was convened to discuss what to do with it and how to proceed. See, for example, HAEU CM2 951/aC1 Extrait du proces verbal de la session restreinte des Conseils de la CEE et de la CEEA, tenue a Bruxelles le 20 mai 1958 (510f/58). Premier echange de vues au sujet de la creation d’une institution universitaire europeenne et d’un centre commun de recherches nucleaires [sic] (Point 11 de l’ordre du jour).

155 Articles 8 and 9(1) of the Euratom Treaty state that:

8(1) The Commission shall, after consulting the Scientific and Technical Committee, set up a Joint Nuclear Research Centre. The Centre shall ensure the implementation of the research programmes and of any other tasks entrusted to it by the Commission. The Centre shall also ensure the establishment of uniform nuclear terminology and of a standard system of measurements. It shall organise a central bureau of nuclear measurements.

8(2) The work of the Centre may, for geographical or operational reasons, be carried on in separate establishments.

9(1) After requesting the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, the Commission may, within the framework of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, set up schools for training specialists, particularly in prospecting for ores, producing nuclear materials of a high degree of purity, processing irradiated fuels, in atomic engineering, health protection and the production and use of radioactive isotopes. The Commission shall settle the particulars of instruction.
Article 9(2): An institution at university level shall be set up; the particulars of its operation shall be settled by the Council acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission (EURATOM 1957).

This is obviously a different kind of institution from the joint nuclear centre of articles 8-9(1) and the different discourses of the two sets of texts – articles 8-9(1) and 9(2) – show that they were not part of the same ‘script’. But Hallstein had got what he wanted – being in the Treaty

‘marked the politicians’ intention to see the issue dealt with, even with an open formula’ (HAEU CM2 951 aC1156);

and most importantly,

‘with a legislative Treaty basis, however ambiguous, the university project could always be elaborated at a later stage’ (HAEU CM/1958, 951 aB13157).

With four states already backing the university – Germany itself, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium – the ‘qualified majority’158 of votes required by the Euratom rules to pass a decision were (for now, at least) in place.

In addition, a new article – Article 216 – setting a deadline for the university’s implementation was also inserted in the Treaty:

Article 216: The Commission’s proposals concerning the particulars of operation of the institution at university level referred to in Article 9 shall be submitted to the Council within a period of one year after the date of the entry into force of this Treaty (EURATOM 1957).

The deadline further ensured that the university was (would be) treated as a priority as soon as the Treaty came into force. Hallstein was to become the first EEC Commission

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156 HAEU CM2 951 aC1, Extrait du projet de procès-verbal de la réunion restreinte du 20.05.1958 des Conseils de la CEE et la CEEA
158 The EURATOM Treaty established that qualified majority voting required 12 votes from a possible 17. Germany, France and Italy weighed 4 votes each, Holland and Belgium, 2 votes each, and Luxembourg 1 vote. As things stood in the final stages of Treaty negotiations in 1957, the university could already expect (at least) the 12 votes necessary.
President from April 1957 and for someone in his position the fact that the university was included in the Euratom (rather than EEC) Treaty ‘was merely fortuitous’ (Hallstein cited in Palayret 1996); this was an issue that he could easily follow up in the future.

Clearly, Hallstein’s objective in this last leg of the negotiations was to institutionalise the university issue in the Euratom treaty. This was the only window of opportunity to put it firmly on the implementation agenda of the European Communities – from an institutional perspective, if it was there it would be implemented.

Much like the preceding negotiation stages, the issue progressed through Val Duchesse to the decision agenda – to adopt the Treaty – primarily influenced by process and institutional features. Hallstein’s attempts to discuss the university at Val Duchesse were always inconclusive; but overall, a combination of lack of time, agenda congestion, the negotiation tactics employed interacted with the issue’s low status meaning that the case was always left open – not accepted but not rejected – and that it was left to be dealt with in the final session.

But Hallstein also played his own time/last minute tactics and successfully. By putting the issue back on the table at the last minute and asking for a decision to be made, he put pressure on the meeting to concede (with no time for consideration). This tactic paid off in the end; for despite the high level of uncertainty and the vagueness of the issue image, Ministers agreed to include the university in the treaty. This is explained by the activation of the social mechanism of actor certification – Hallstein’s certified status validated his bid to get the issue through.
5.4 Conclusion

The first episode narrated and analysed the episode in which a proposal to include a cultural dimension in the new European community’s agenda was made at the Messina conference in 1955, and followed the career of the culture issue through the policy cycle until its eventual inclusion in the Euratom Treaty in 1957.

First, the analysis highlights the causal influence of contextual political processes in particular on agenda initiation. If the German political situation and the need to anchor Germany in the West created beliefs in German élites about European unification and the need to mobilise the young in this endeavour, the emerging cultural Cold War reinforced these beliefs, both converging with (Western) debates about youth mobilisation and the role of universities in the European construction.

Second, the episode shows how during the two year negotiations, a mix of resources and process features\textsuperscript{159} – lack of time, agenda congestion, negotiation tactics and consensus – interacted with the issue, pushing it through subsequent negotiations stages. At Venice, the lack of opportunity in the Common Market committee led Hallstein to entrepreneurially ‘shop’ for the Euratom treaty venue to place the issue on this agenda although this meant changing the issue image.

The issue’s low status and its interaction with process design is also significant, analytically. As the negotiations increasingly focused on economic and nuclear-energy, so the cultural/university project lost agenda status and almost a non-issue. But if low status and no political support all but excluded the university from major decision

\textsuperscript{159} Cf. Footnote 99
agendas, the interaction with process and institutional rules, however, created opportunities to roll through successive decision stages.

The narrative also confirms, third, the causal importance of social mechanisms in transforming process events into outcomes. Hallstein’s entrepreneurial efforts were critical at key points in the process: in championing the (a low status) issue, in moving and adapting it to an alternative decision venue and keeping it ‘alive’, and in using personal resources to keep the issue on the decision table. But the activation of the mechanism of actor certification, which operated in tandem with entrepreneurship, was key in the final negotiating session when, under pressure, actors that were previously unresponsive to the university issue, endorsed Hallstein’s bid to include the university in the Euratom Treaty.
CHAPTER 6

The 1960-62 plan for the political union of Europe: proposing cultural cooperation

6.1 Introduction

Although the need for the political development of the European Community project was felt from a very early stage, economic integration and the implementation of the common market were an immediate priority and the most visible aspects of the EC. Political unification and the attainment of a ‘closer union between the European peoples’ (Preamble, EEC Treaty 1957) were in fact explicit aims of the treaties. The first serious attempt of the six signatories of the Treaty of Rome to create a political union (Mayer 1996: 39) began in 1959 when the Foreign Ministers of the Six agreed to hold regular meetings for consultations on developing an international policy. The issue of political union was formally initiated on the Community’s agenda at the Paris Summit of February 1961, which was followed by two years of negotiations for the ‘Draft treaty for the establishment of a political union’ (what became known as the Fouchet Plan).

In contrast with the existing supranational approach of the European Communities the Fouchet Plan aimed to extend the integration process to the domains of foreign, defence and cultural policy in an intergovernmental framework. It marks the first significant attempt to institutionalise cultural policy making de facto in the framework of the European Community, albeit in the framework of intergovernmental cooperation between the Six member states of the European Communities.

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160 The ‘Six’ are the six states that founded the EEC and the other two Communities. The ‘six’ became an alternative term and was frequently (until the first enlargement in 1973) to refer to the EEC member states – France, West Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

161 Named after it first commissioner, the French diplomat Christian Fouchet.
The Fouchet Plan was eventually rejected (in 1962) but only after the policy for cultural cooperation had been agreed. The matter, like the Fouchet Plan itself, was left open at the end of the failed Fouchet negotiations (Bloes 1970).

This chapter provides an account of the Fouchet episode and the events that preceded it but with a focus on the cultural cooperation issue/proposal and its trajectory through the negotiation process. Similar to the preceding episode, it shows how the culture issue was mobilised by the convergence of a variety of events occurring at the same time in the broader political stream and how these also created opportunities for the French government’s entrepreneurial effort to include culture on the new treaty agenda. Although the unsettled political environment that dominated the Fouchet negotiations was a constant, a policy specification for cultural cooperation was in fact the only policy to be completed and agreed. This outcome is explained in process institutional terms by the interplay between the institutional setting in which the culture negotiations took place and the wider negotiation context. Policy entrepreneurs were instrumental in transforming initial conditions into outcomes at every step of this episode.

This chapter presents evidence to support these arguments and proceeds as follows. The event narrative mapping presented next page charts the events and political processes in this episode – the episode occurred in the period 1960-62. Section 2 reviews the previous and contemporaneous events and ideas, from the political union initiative to De Gaulle’s European vision and ideas and explores the emergence of the cultural cooperation issue. Section 3 focuses on France’s cultural politics under De Gaulle and how the French government mobilized institutional resources to place culture on the new union agenda. Section 4 accounts for the cultural cooperation agenda-setting, while Section 5 explains how the culture negotiations eventually generated and agreed a policy specification in the
context of the failing political Fouchet negotiations. Section 6 details a competing attempt by the Council of Europe to ‘hijack’ the institutional ownership of European cultural cooperation, and Section 7 explains how the collapse of Fouchet sealed the fate of cultural cooperation. The concluding Section 8 reflects on the episode, events, process and outcomes in the light of the processual institutional framework.
6.2 The political union initiative

When General De Gaulle returned to power in 1958 he saw as his mission to bring France back to the international political big decisions scene. After his bid for a Franco-Anglo-American global directorate over NATO and Western cooperation failed (Parsons 2001), De Gaulle turned to the establishment of a permanent and closer Union of the European peoples that could parallel the superpowers (Mélandri 1985: 96), based on which he could orchestrate his European diplomacy (Parsons 2001) and achieve French ambitions. A closer Europe provided France with the means to achieve other interests and to retain a role of international leadership (Guyomarch 1998: 41).

Although critical of the supranational method, De Gaulle believed in European unity, and was quick to realise the implications of the recently established EEC as a precedent to leverage French power through leadership of Europe (Vanke 2000: 90; Guyomarch 1998) – as he put it,

‘the essential point is the Common Market […] and especially the political and cultural organisation of Europe’ (De Gaulle quoted in Vanke 2000: 90)

De Gaulle’s idea was to limit European integration to the technical and economic (common market) aspects of the Treaty of Rome and to create a political union of intergovernmental character; put simply, a structure of political cooperation outside of the European Community framework (Werts 1992: 19). De Gaulle thus set about to reorganise the political relations of the Six to balance the idea of European Community Europe – consolidated by supranational institutions – with that of a concert of European states (une Europe de patries), primarily based on intergovernmental cooperation.

On 5 September 1960, at a press conference, he articulated his ideas for the political organisation of Europe (of the Six):
The building of Europe, that is, uniting it, is for us a primary objective. [...] France considers that regular co-operation between the states of western Europe in the political, economic, cultural and defence fields is not only desirable, but both possible and practical. [...] If this path is chosen [...] links will be forged, habits will be created and, in the course of time, it might be possible to take bigger strides towards European unity’ (De Gaulle quoted in Nelsen and Stubb 2003: 44).

The concept was well received by France’s five EEC partners who agreed with the need for stronger political ties among the Six to safeguard and support the progress that the European Community had already made on the economic front. After all, the Treaties established political union as the ultimate goal of the European process; De Gaulle’s proposed closer political cooperation would further facilitate integration in the future. The changing international political situation – the Berlin crisis, the emerging issues about the relations between the EEC and former European colonies, and the proposals from Greece and Turkey for accession to the EEC – only encouraged the development of solid European political cooperation links.

In fact, De Gaulle’s conceptualisation of a European political union as the framework for the political organisation of Europe was not a new idea; nor was the shape that such a union might take or who might lead it.

6.2.1 De Gaulle’s European vision: Europe des patries or France primus inter ‘patries’?

De Gaulle had publicly articulated his vision of post-war Europe organised as a world power even before the end of the Second World War. But in a speech in August 1950 he specifically laid out his ambition to lead a European political order; which would take the shape of

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162 This author’s emphasis
‘a joint system whose planning and leadership should normally be the responsibility of France, just as America assumes responsibility in the Pacific and England in the Orient’ (Bromberger and Bromberger 1969: 110)

Recognising that France like any state acting in the international scene alone was no longer viable, De Gaulle had turned to the idea of intergovernmental cooperation, a deep, organic cooperation leading to common policies in European and international affairs independent from the United States (Soutou 1997). A Europe of the states offered a modern, progressive model for French independence; for whilst the method of intergovernmental cooperation avoided any kind of supranational power over France (such as the European integration of the EEC), it afforded France the necessary European leverage to exert international influence and leadership.

De Gaulle’s assertion that ‘Europe is the means for France to recover what it ceased to be after Waterloo: first in the world’ (De Gaulle quoted in Vanke 2001: 96) shows his intentions. At its most conceited De Gaulle’s rationalisation for France’s bid to be leader of ‘little Europe’ (la petite europe163 as he called it) was that,

‘It appears that France is alone in wanting a united Europe, in wanting it badly enough… The trouble with Europe is that, apart from us, no one else seems to have the desire to be truly European’ (De Gaulle 1970).

However obsolete it is in today’s Europe, De Gaulle conception of ‘European’ was fundamentally cultural, as

’all sharing the same white race, the same Christian origin, the same way of life, bound between themselves since immemorial times by relations of thought, art, science, politics, commerce, it is only natural that they form a whole which has its own character and its own setup’ (De Gaulle 1970).

163 ‘Little Europe’ (from the French la petite europe) was a nickname for EC Europe (comprising the six EEC member states). The term was frequently used by De Gaulle (who possibly initiated it) and became popular in political circles and the media.
De Gaulle’s policy toward Europe was therefore double-edged, and genuinely so: it emphasised national independence and identity, whilst at the same time contributing to the construction européenne. The national independence aspect was motivated by the desire to have the voice of France heard by the international community and rejection of any integration into an Atlantic bloc dominated militarily and culturally by the US. The construction of Europe was both an ideal in its own right and an instrument for achieving other objectives (Guyomarch 1998: 40): on one hand, to build a prosperous, liberal and democratic Europe based on peaceful co-existence and cooperation; on the other, to create a united Europe, an instrument that could serve French policy and from where its global power role would be deployed (Soutou 2010). De Gaulle’s strategy was therefore to ensure that European policy and institutional developments were in accordance with French priorities.

The precondition was, as Gildea writes, ‘that France should preserve its hegemony in Europe and that Europe should be constructed in the image of France’ (2002: 257). It should be noted that, for a politician with the historical and cultural sensitivities of General De Gaulle, French leadership of Europe carried a moral dimension,164 the belief in France’s special civilising role in the world. French language, literature and culture had a contribution to make to European unification (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; see also Gildea 2002). This both reflected and was reflected in French diplomacy, in which traditionally culture and cultural relations are closely linked with and play an important role in French foreign policy and interests.

De Gaulle had long recognised a place for culture in his European vision, an idea on

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164 The ‘duty to intervene in the great problems of humanity’ (Debré 1978: 23, 39, 71). Like De Gaulle, Michel Debré, his prime-minister and one of his closest allies, also shared a political vision of France becoming a top-rank global power, a conviction or aim which remains observable to date.
which he had expanded in many public broadcasts and speeches over the years – for example, in a speech in February 1953 his view on European organisation was that,

‘it is necessary to build a confederation […] to which the states […] delegate part of their sovereignty in strategic, economic, cultural\textsuperscript{165} matters’ (De Gaulle 1970).

The rationale being that,

‘a powerful [European] Confederation [will materialise] when the peoples will have got used to living together’ (De Gaulle quoted in Silj 1967: 119).

In 1958 following his election De Gaulle had actually told his diplomatic affairs adviser, Jean Marc Boegner, that

‘Europe must almost literally become a reality in political, economic and cultural terms’ (De Gaulle cited in Soutou 1992).

Still, whilst from a French perspective, and in the context of the French diplomatic repertoire, culture’s part in De Gaulle’s European political vision may not be totally surprising, what is remarkable, nevertheless, is the extent to which culture became a key element in his European strategy. It was under De Gaulle’s tenure as President that the external cultural policy\textsuperscript{166} of France was greatly reinvigorated (Pendergast 1974: 353; Roche and Pigneau 1995; Raymond 2000). The importance of cultural expansion as an element within the French repertoire of diplomatic strategies, and especially in the framework of De Gaulle’s presidency, invites further exploration.

\textsuperscript{165} Author’s emphasis. There are numerous examples of De Gaulle’s idea of a European political order where the cultural element has a central role before, during and after the Second World War. In 1950 he talked of ‘continuing the enterprise started by Charlemagne but using modern political instruments – economic, social, strategic, cultural’ (1970). In a speech in 1951 he also referred to bringing European states together in a positive way and ‘on positive matters, in particular, economy, defense, and education.’ See, for example, De Gaulle (1970) but also Jouve (1967) and Soutou (1992).

\textsuperscript{166} The external cultural service created as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1911 and the (new) Ministry of Culture set up by De Gaulle in 1959 are two different government departments. The 1959 Culture Ministry headed by André Malraux was exclusively concerned with (national) French cultural policy whereas the very busy Cultural Relations Department based in the Quai d’Orsay Foreign Affairs Ministry focused on international cultural relations and diplomacy and the French commonwealth (although the French cultural diplomacy tradition dates back to the eighteenth century).
6.3 French external cultural policy agenda under De Gaulle

Cultural cooperation had a relatively high status on the European agenda of the French government when De Gaulle launched his political union initiative in 1960. The strategic objectives of De Gaulle’s external cultural policy were laid out in the two French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ five year cultural plans. The 1958 first ‘Draft five year expansion plan’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1958) identified France’s main priority as being, ‘to preserve her original personality in a Europe on the road to integration where she no longer represents a predominant material force and to exercise a kind of intellectual primacy over it’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1958).

The 1964 ‘Second five year cultural expansion plan’ (MAE 1964), six years into De Gaulle presidency, recognised cultural activity as an integral part of French foreign policy. It stated that, ‘Cultural activity is closely tied to the political and economic action which it precedes, supports and completes. Cultural activities contribute directly to the power of our country at international level’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1964).

Cultural cooperation and the rayonnement (diffusion) of the French language (Roche and Pigneau 1995: 80), carried out by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Directorate General for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, were two major instruments of expansion and promotion of ‘brand’ France internationally – the 1958 and 1964 plans are clear about this, ‘Our culture often precedes our exports. Where French is spoken, French goods are purchased’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1958).

167 De Gaulle’s new external cultural policy was accompanied by investment and reform of the policy machinery – in the ten years of his presidency the Cultural Relations Directorate General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ two five year plans (1958 and 1964) for cultural expansion saw a fivefold increase in the budget for (external) cultural activity – from 168 million francs in 1958 to 894 million in 1968, a substantial forty two percent of the total Quay d’Orsay’s budget (Pendergast 1974). France signed over seventy cultural agreements in the post-war period to 1968 including the two comprehensive Franco-German treaties of 1954 and 1964. The European trend continued into the new millennium: by 2003 40% of the French 151 cultural institutes abroad were based in Europe. See, for example Interarts and EFAH (2003); Raymond (2000); Roche and Pigneau (1995); Pendergast (1974).
‘The expansion of the French language must be the dominant preoccupation of all our cultural action’ (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 1964).

A highly developed aspect of French cultural diplomacy was educational and scientific cooperation¹⁶⁸ carried out on a bilateral basis, in particular in higher education and in subjects the French academe were renowned for: politics, economics, administration, industrial studies and humanities. Methods of cooperation included university and higher education exchanges, joint research projects and degree equivalences. Cooperation enabled France to project an image of French civilisation and instil French values in future élites which might in the future lead to prosperous relationships.

Language, in particular, became a sensitive cultural policy issue for the French government. Not least because driven by the fast growing American influence in post-war Europe, English was rapidly overtaking French as the international, business and scientific language par excellence. French had prevailed as the international élite language for centuries, to the extent that the international use of French language was one of the benchmarks used by the French government to judge France’s diplomatic influence and international status. Stemming the expansion of English as the international linguistic currency thus became a political issue in De Gaulle’s – or the French government’s – cultural agenda.¹⁶⁹

Much like the dual-purposed European policy, De Gaulle’s external cultural policy also had a dual agenda: on the one hand it asserted (through rayonnement) French identity and

¹⁶⁸ Education as formation rather than instruction was prized as a value per se and not as a vocational contribution to economic development which was more in line with the American approach (Pendergast 1974). Although at this time, in Europe and elsewhere, cultural cooperation was normally framed in broad cultural, that is, civilisational and educational terms.

¹⁶⁹ De Gaulle, himself a vigorous defender of the use of French language internationally (Haigh 1974), made significant political efforts to promote the use of French as the official language of international organisations.
autonomy so as to make France’s voice heard by the international community; on the other, it engaged robustly in the (cultural) construction of Europe (though as a channel for the promotion of French interests). De Gaulle’s defence of the French language was an attempt to defend the political influence that undoubtedly went with linguistic supremacy (Gildea 2002). Language and intellectual supremacy were powerful driving forces of the French external cultural policy agenda, especially in its orientation towards Europe. They were also important factors shaping the political events that were about to take place.

One of the construction européenne European projects that France was involved in at the time, which touched on education, European values and, at least from the French government’s perspective, language, was the European University. This was on the European agenda and becoming a pressing issue for the attention of the Six.

6.3.1 Trying to hijack the European agenda

After the treaties entered into force, in 1958, the German government and the Euratom and EEC Commissions revisited the idea of creating a real European university (originated at Messina, cf. Chapter 5) to be created and operated within the framework of the European Communities. Agreement on its definition and shape however eluded the several committees appointed to look into the project and by 1960 the University was a relatively ‘old’ project reaching stalemate.

170 For example, the need of the European Community (as a new polity and international organisation) for a common linguistic currency (Pendergast 1974) offered a further incentive – French language as a European common linguistic currency would contribute to keep the ‘intellectual primacy’ of France in Europe. The outcome of the French effort is still visible today: French has been and still is (informally at least) the principal language of the EC’s institutions, especially the European Commission and the European Parliament. It might also account for the Commission’s (still) dominant French administrative culture.
There were different interests at play and although there was generally support for the university as a European project, it became a highly politicised issue. Italy wanted the university to be based in Florence, for which the Italian government had acquired land, but Belgium, who had their own kind of European university in the College of Bruges, feared potential competition (Palayret 1996). Luxembourg also had an interest in being the seat of the European university but, like the Netherlands, was out-priced by the million dollar budget estimates for the project (Palayret 1996).

For France, the European University project was of potentially significant national interest, as it provided the opportunity for France to both reenergize its university system and (ultimately) help it restore its cultural and intellectual leadership in Europe. Although France had an established bilateral education cooperation programme, the government believed that French universities could only aspire to world class status if they could successfully attract high profile academics (Haigh 1970), something which France could not afford on its own. A European framework clearly had more weight than France acting on its own (Bariéty 2005) and enabled it to achieve these objectives. In terms of the rayonnement policy, the project could be instrumental in sustaining French as an erudite language and its standing among the other languages of the European Community.171

The French strategy in the University negotiations was therefore to shape the project to suit its own objectives. So, whilst France’s five EEC partners were happy for the European University to be a (supranational) Community project, the French government insisted on an intergovernmental institutional framework and actively sought to include (broader) cultural cooperation and the creation of a cultural cooperation agency (a European Council of Higher Education) to oversee the project. In an intergovernmental

171 The involvement of both the ministries of Affaires Étrangères and Éducation Nationale is an indicator of the significance the French government attributed to the project at the time.
setup a major player like France could easily dominate agendas and votes whereas supranational governance offered equal status to all six members, potentially weakening France’s influence; although this in part reflected French concern that a supranational cultural mandate might supersede its national prerogatives over curricula and qualifications.\textsuperscript{172}

But in the bigger European political and institutional scheme of things De Gaulle feared that allowing Community jurisdiction in what was a (new) field of competence – culture and education – not recognised in the treaties could create a precedent (Palayret 1996), opening the way to the emergence of other policy fields at European level. The European University issue therefore became, for De Gaulle, a symbol of the undesirable extension of Community powers (Corbett 2009; Amaral et al 2009). It became primarily a political question for France.

At the last Council meeting to discuss the European University project in October 1960 the French delegate, Paul de Gorce, made fundamental objections to the university project (Palayret 1996), suggesting that the issue should be tackled ‘in the framework of a European cultural cooperation agency if one was set up’ (Gorce quoted in Palayret 1996). The Council negotiations collapsed. French tactics had changed – France was now trying to abort the University negotiations in the framework of the Community, buying time in order to add the University to its own cultural cooperation agenda as part of the union project.

Indeed, the wider political context had shifted. De Gaulle was now in the final stages of his (European) bid for a political union based on regular intergovernmental cooperation.

\textsuperscript{172} In France awards were conferred by the state rather than the universities.
between the Six in the fields of culture, foreign policy and defence; and the approaching Paris summit (planned for December 1960 but eventually held in February 1961) to discuss cooperation provided a new institutional venue to place the European University and cultural cooperation issue and to make it work in a way that suited French objectives. By then, the University was a high status, still (following two years of negotiations) unresolved problem looking for a solution, which only added pressure for a decision to be made. As the summit’s host (and mastermind), conversely, it fell to the French government to set the summit’s agenda. France was ideally positioned to strategically repackage the European University issue.

In terms of process, then, frustrated with their failure to influence the Council’s University negotiations, the French targeted the window opened by the looming Paris summit and the opportunities that the French EC presidency and summit offer to structure agendas (Tallberg 2006), to refashion and mobilise the issue in a favourable decision venue.

6.4 Setting political cooperation in motion: placing cultural cooperation on the agenda

6.4.1 The 1961 Paris summit

When the Heads of State of the Six met in Paris in 10-11 February 1961 their goal was to find the means to organise close political cooperation and to provide a basis for a progressively developing union (European Council 1961a). The Paris agenda therefore aimed specifically to examine ways in which close political cooperation might be effected (Jouve 1967: 282). The Summit, the first ever political-strategic meeting of Heads of State or Government in the history or context of the EEC, had been mostly the work of
General De Gaulle, and the goal was essentially to give shape to ‘his’ ideas for political union;¹⁷³ as Couve de Murville (French Foreign minister) put it,

‘With no alternatives around, why not embrace projects that would at least kick-start political Europe. We would see then; plus, De Gaulle was not eternal!’ (Couve de Murville 1971: 361).

The mood in the Paris summit was therefore one of expectation and of conviction that this could be the beginning of something (Couve de Murville 1971). On the morning of the summit’s first day (10 February 1961) De Gaulle was the first to speak and heads of government heard the details of his plans for cooperation in foreign affairs, defence, science and culture. The French government was the only state to submit a proposal on political cooperation (which is possibly because it was De Gaulle who had driven the process thus far). The French paper included a section on cultural cooperation, which, in fact, mostly replicated the proposals that the French delegation had submitted to the European University negotiations in the previous months. The European University was also included but was now one of a number of projects.

Cultural cooperation was defined essentially in terms of intergovernmental cooperation in higher education in the European Community and in line with France’s (external cultural) European policy objectives, aiming specifically,

‘to foster the development of European culture, to encourage a feeling of belonging to a common civilisation in young European intellectual élites and promote a greater harmonisation of effort and coordination of the different areas of research. […] a true common market of ideas […]’ (MAE Europe 1961-65¹⁷⁴).

The French cultural cooperation plans were, broadly speaking, welcomed by the other five states; at least in principle. But cultural cooperation was by no means a central issue

¹⁷³ De Gaulle had met each head of government at Rambouillet over the summer of 1960 to discuss his ideas for political Europe.
¹⁷⁴ MAE Europe 1961-65, carton 1960, Questions internationales européennes, Note, no date (possibly March 1961)
and was at the mercy of the wider politics of the negotiations, the mood of which became increasingly dominated by national interest. Couve de Murville (1971: 350-351) recalls in his memoirs, how De Gaulle’s personality was at the centre of attention and how his political weight – ‘his charisma was extraordinary’ (Russo 1998: 12) – enabled him to assert his views unambiguously and with little concern for diplomatic grace. Baron Rothschild, a Belgian diplomat, found De Gaulle ‘unbearable. […] He didn’t want to bind to anything or anyone. […] Unpleasantness was certainly an element there’ (Rothschild 1986: 87-88)

De Gaulle’s stance generated a suspicion of French (hegemonic) goals, which polarised national positions and ultimately affected the negotiations. The Benelux small states feared De Gaulle’s intentions over Europe. The Netherlands, in particular, was concerned that cultural cooperation just between the Six would generate further division in Europe, adding to the economic segregation that resulted from the EEC.\textsuperscript{175} Dutch foreign minister Joseph Luns’ view was that,

‘Cultural cooperation seems innocent enough but not when proposed by the French’ (Luns quoted in Vanke 2001: 99).

The Italian government insisted on the European University project and on its location in Florence. Germany, according to an observer,

‘was more cautious. At this point in time the Germans were still weak [in international politics] and tried not to create problems’ (Russo 1998).

A major issue, however, institutional, was the fact that in an intergovernmental framework the German government had no national jurisdiction over cultural matters (since culture and education were exclusive competences of the länder), which meant that it was not mandated to make any decisions on cultural cooperation.

\textsuperscript{175} In 1959, one year after the EEC was established, the non-EEC Western European countries had created their own trade block, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Some of the members of the EEC and EFTA were also members of NATO.
But Paris was a petit sommet (little summit) meant to be more of an agenda-setting exercise. Cultural cooperation was not a priority in what was a full and contentious agenda and not enough time was allocated to a proper discussion on cultural cooperation. In any case, consensus on broad political cooperation between the Six failed, the only agreement being about the need to continue to explore the political development of the EEC and ways to effect it. The Heads of State therefore decided to create a committee to study and submit proposals to their next summit meeting.

Thus, if, on one hand, the political conflict that dominated the negotiating process affected the summit’s talks and its outcome, in that what was expected to be a short and possibly uneventful European agenda-setting summit was (formally, at least) inconclusive, on the other, by virtue of its inclusion in the French government’s political cooperation proposal, the only proposal on the table, the cultural cooperation issue was firmly (or as much as it could be) on the political union agenda and would be carried with it to the next stage of the negotiations.

6.5 Negotiating the cultural cooperation agenda

The new committee (hereinafter Fouchet\textsuperscript{176} Committee) was tasked with the study of the issues relating to the organisation and methods of cooperation (including cultural cooperation) between the Six and the development of the Communities (Battista 1964). But in its first session on 16 March 1961 the Fouchet committee could not break the deadlock of the Paris summit. Distrust of De Gaulle’s intentions behind cooperation persisted, with the Dutch delegation making British participation\textsuperscript{177} in the political union negotiations a condition for Dutch approval (Harryvan 2009; Vanke 2001), and Italy

\textsuperscript{176} Named after its head, Christian Fouchet, at the time French ambassador to Denmark, former Gaullist député and close political ally of De Gaulle

\textsuperscript{177} At this point in time the UK was in the final stage of its bid to accede to the EEC – its application was submitted on 9\textsuperscript{th} August 1961.
seized the moment to exercise its veto player brinkmanship – it would review its support to the political cooperation initiative ‘if the outcome regarding the University did not meet its expectations’ (Schweizer 1997: 233), that is, if a decision on its location in Florence was not taken.

Faced with the possibility of negotiation failure, once again, the Six created two working groups: one to develop the agenda for cultural cooperation, the other to look into political cooperation, both to report to the following (formal agenda-setting) summit, months later. The culture working group (hereinafter Pescatore or culture Group) was chaired by Pierre Pescatore, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Luxembourg’s chief negotiator. By virtue of its small size and modest influence in international politics, Luxembourg was perceived as a minor player (see for example Roziers 1999; Tallberg 2006; Blavoukos et al 2006), a state with weak preferences, but also seen (possibly for these same reasons) as a mediator.

This was also true in the Fouchet context, but, traditionally, Luxembourg went along with French positions (Bodenheimer 1964) which might explain France’s support for Pescatore’s appointment – though Pescatore’s reputation as a jurist and legal scholar and experienced diplomat, made him the ideal candidate to chair the culture working group. Pescatore had also been actively involved in the European University’s Committee in 1958-60 and knew the issue/s well, a track record that came on hand for the policy entrepreneurial role he was to play.

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178 According to Tallberg (2006) negotiation failure refers to deadlocks and breakdowns in bargaining that are caused by the parties’ inability to identify the underlying zone of agreement.

179 Luxembourg was aware of its limitations in international affairs and was alert to the need to cultivate its connection with, and plug into the diplomatic networks of its neighbour, France; with whom, in any case, it had language, cultural and other affinities. In the context of the union negotiations Luxembourg was seen by an observer as too insignificant to be able to make a difference.
6.5.1 Unsettled agenda setting

The Pescatore group met for the first time on 7 April 1961. To avoid continued conflict, rather than using the French proposal from Paris, Pescatore decided to go back to the European University’s last Council Interim Committee’s report (October 1960) as the basis for discussion. But this was the proposal that the French government had vetoed and which had effectively brought the European University project to a halt. Faced with the reopening of an old plan that they had gone to lengths to dismiss five months before, French Foreign Affairs Ministry officials decided that

‘some sort of counter proposal from France might make it easier to reject the Interim Committee’s report as the only basis for discussion’ (MAE Europe 1961-65180).

France hoped that putting an alternative proposal on the table could help it regain control over the cultural cooperation agenda. Like the Paris and previous French plans, the French paper (MAE Europe 1961-65181) supported an intergovernmental solution to cooperation (the creation of a Council of Ministers and so on). The plan was now for the Council of Ministers overseeing cooperation to only make decisions by unanimity of vote meaning that a French veto would be enough to kill an unwelcome proposal (the shaping of deliberative procedures was a tactic commonly used by the French to enable control over events, agendas).

But the French move in fact exposed the underlying fault line in the negotiations; for although national views on the methods of cooperation were broadly compatible between the Six, it was the question of jurisdiction over cooperation and the European University that proved divisive. France rejected any involvement of the Community in cultural

180 MAE, Europe 1961-65, Questions internationales, carton 1960, Note, undated, Sous-direction d’Europe occidentale
cooperation while the other five delegations supported an ‘organic relationship’ with the Community, supranational level\textsuperscript{182} – the Community framework provided not only protection from France’s hegemonic ambitions but also potentially a financial contribution. In the case of Germany, moreover, the constitutional problem of national representation meant that it could only fully participate within a supranational framework and a treaty mandate.

France found itself (again) isolated and opposed by the other five delegations, another point of contention being the extension of the Six’s cultural cooperation to third countries. For reasons explained above, the Dutch delegation was particularly keen to involve third countries in cultural cooperation, especially the UK (MAE Europe 1961-65\textsuperscript{183}). But British involvement in cultural cooperation was a threat to French rayonnement, not least to De Gaulle’s plans (cf. 6.3 above) to make French the official language of the future Union’s institutions (Fouchet 1972). In fact, at the same time as the Dutch battled for its inclusion, De Gaulle was vigorously fighting to stop British accession to the EEC (see for example Vanke (2001)). French views on how the participation of Britain affected the cultural cooperation enterprise were unequivocal,

‘Within the framework of the Six, the primacy of the French language is unchallenged. However, British membership of a possible [cultural cooperation] institution would immediately relegate French to second place and would profoundly change the character of the institution’ (MAE Europe 1961-65\textsuperscript{184}).

But France was about to expand its bilateral cultural/educational agreements with other


\textsuperscript{184} MAE, Europe 1961-65, Questions internationales, carton 1960, Note pour le secrétaire général, Sous-direction d’Europe occidentale. Undated (possibly March 1961)
states, trying to benefit from the new European cultural cooperation framework (MAE Europe 1961-65\textsuperscript{185}), and eventually agreed to cooperation with third countries, despite its misgivings about British involvement.

Finally, the Italian delegation threatened to use its veto right, warning that

\begin{quote}
\textquote{without University there will be no cultural cooperation, nor political cooperation} (MAE Europe 1961-65\textsuperscript{186}).
\end{quote}

Moving forward depended on (near-unanimous) consensus on the various issues and this was therefore an effective weapon for the Italians to wield. Still, fearing that this could open the door to new European supranational policies, France rejected the project.

Thus, by mid-April 1961, close to the report’s deadline, progress in the Pescatore Group was slow, dominated by conflict and polarised positions (which in part functioned as a surrogate for disagreements in the broader political negotiation process), and with no discernible zone of agreement between the intergovernmental and uncompromisingly anti-Community stance of France and the functional approach of the Five.

### 6.5.2 Engineering agreement

With time now pressing for the Pescatore Group to submit the cultural cooperation agenda for incorporation into the Fouchet Committee’s report, the chair, Pescatore, adopted a more proactive chairmanship. In a process dominated by preference divergence and the risk of failure, the consensus decision making norm (in effect in the negotiations) which implied that the interests of all parties needed to be taken into consideration, was a process condition that called for formal leadership (Tallberg 2010) by the chair.

\textsuperscript{185} MAE, Europe 1961-65, Questions internationales, carton 1960, internal document, Sous-direction d’Europe occidentale, Mars 1961

\textsuperscript{186} MAE, Europe 1961-65, Questions internationales, carton 1960, Note, 8 Avril 1961, Sous-direction d’Europe Occidentale
Negotiations chairs typically have the responsibility to not only manage the agenda but to broker agreements and decisions and represent their decision body in relevant decision fora; which means that they can control and shape the outcomes of the negotiations. Pescatore fully mobilised his chairmanship’s resources – informational and procedural. He had privileged access to information on national preferences and resistance points; he had procedural control over agendas and outcomes; and he spoke for cultural cooperation in the Fouchet Committee. As the jurist responsible for drafting the new political union treaty, moreover, he knew how cultural cooperation could fit with it. These are the sorts of resources that can activate policy entrepreneurship.

The legitimacy of the chair’s office and personal authority – his status as an experienced European diplomat who had had advisory roles in treaty and other European negotiations for a number of years (including the European University negotiations in the EEC’s Council in 1958-60), and his technical-legal expertise – were additional reputational resources that certified Pescatore and sanctioned his formal leadership/ intervention.

Pescatore resorted to the procedural instruments available to chairs to broker agreement, that is, the possibility to ‘plant or develop’ (Tallberg 2010) texts or proposals. His solution – international conventions187 – allowed intergovernmental and supranational jurisdictions to operate concurrently in cooperation projects. Thus, cultural cooperation would be overseen by an intergovernmental European Council of Ministers of Education or Culture; but the ‘convention’ institutional formula would,

‘give, in principle, an intergovernmental character to cultural cooperation, but allowing the Community to participate in the running and funding of the

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187 A convention is a formal treaty which is binding but is also flexible in terms of its membership. In international law no court can penalise a state that fails to comply with its obligations under an international convention. Under Community law, however, non-compliance would be penalised. See for example, MAE, Europe 1961-1965, Questions Internationales, carton 1960, Letter from Pierre Pescatore to Christian Fouchet, Luxembourg, 14 avril 1961; and also MAE, Europe 1961-1965, Questions Internationales, carton 1960, Débats du groupe de travail des 7 et 8 avril 1961, sous-direction d’Europe occidentale, 11 avril 1961.
European university as well as other European projects to be developed in the future’ (MAE 1961-65).  

This technical (legal) formula engineered, rather than brokered, political agreement, but it was an inclusive solution which provided for the varied jurisdictional geometries that satisfied (or at least satisficed) the demands of France as well as the Five’s.

In fact, the aims of cultural cooperation as stated in the Pescatore Report – which formally set the Six’s proposed agenda for cultural cooperation in the future Union – were remarkably similar to the French proposal’s at Paris (cf. 6.5.1), that is,

‘to reinforce the spreading of a European culture, to give young intellectuals from participating countries the feeling of belonging to a community of civilisation and to promote a harmonisation of efforts and coordination of means in the different domains of research. Such a result could only be obtained in a framework of respect for national cultures and universities. Which can only develop from the intensification of reciprocal exchanges and mutual development’ (EG-104: 1).

The cooperation measures were also similar – among others, mobility and exchanges between universities; the attribution of a European mission (vocation) to academic institutions in participating states; the creation of a European higher education institution (HAEU EG104).  

Following Tallberg’s (2006) theory of formal leadership, which sees ‘chairmanship’ (as a political decision-making institution) as a functional response to negotiation failure, we explain the eventual outcome of the negotiations in the Pescatore working group by the chair’s, Pescatore, intervention. Pescatore changed his leadership role – from facilitating a political compromise from what were conflicting positions to a process that called for

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190 Ibid.
the chair’s proactive, formal leadership to find a solution. In this sense, the process resembled a problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963), a search motivated by a local problem (bypassing negotiation conflict), rather than or as much as trying to reach consensus on the optimum cultural cooperation agenda.

It could be said that the process followed and, ultimately, the agenda outcome were determined by the interaction of two institutional design features of the Fouchet negotiations: the consensus norm of decision making (with majority voting France could have been simply outvoted) and the chair’s prerogatives. The causal relationship between the context (a context of conflict) and the agenda outcome can be explained by the social mechanisms of the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) – Pescatore’s decision to intervene – at one end, and of actor certification (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001), at the other.

The logic of appropriateness links context to actions and explains why actors behave in a way that matches their identity/role to a given situation – in this case, Pescatore acted in the belief that he was doing his job. The mechanism of actor certification explains the endorsement of Pescatore’s proposal by all parties in the negotiation. The social mechanism of certification was activated by Pescatore’s nomination as chair of the cultural cooperation group, the group’s representative on the Fouchet Committee, the jurist responsible for designing the political union draft treaty and in no small measure by his personal reputation.

Cultural cooperation had now formally entered the Fouchet Report which set the political cooperation agenda for the following Bonn summit.
6.5.3 Setting the agenda for cultural cooperation: the Bonn Summit of July 1961

The second summit of 1961 took place near Bonn on 18 July. The cultural section of the Fouchet report (the Pescatore report) was approved by the Heads of State with the exception of item 4 on the creation of a European University (Palayret 1996; Gerbet 1962: 502). Germany could not commit to the University project because of the Federal government’s constitutional problems – the German Foreign Affairs Minister, von Brentano, would go as far as making a declaration of intentions in relation to cultural cooperation but could not go any further without the eleven (länder) Cult Ministers (MAE 1998: 118). Even Pescatore’s conventions could not help.

Although not a high priority issue, cultural cooperation was now a real as well as a symbolic agenda issue, for, having built expectations about it as part of intergovernmental cooperation, the Heads of State needed to do or at least to be seen to do something about it. In particular, negotiations for the European university (whether within the Community or the union initiative) were now into their fourth year, a delay which had brought an enhanced visibility to the project.

The summit’s final communiqué already emphasised the role of culture in the political union project, namely

‘to strengthen the political, economic, social and cultural ties that exist between their peoples […] and to advance towards the union of Europe. […] The cooperation of the Six must go beyond the political field as such, and will in particular be extended to the sphere of education, of culture, and of research where it will be ensured by the periodic meetings of the Ministers concerned’ (European Council 1961b).

Thus, close to another failure (following Paris) to make a decision on cultural cooperation European leaders were under pressure to show results. Luxembourg Minister Werner remarked that
‘it would be unacceptable not to mention cultural cooperation in our final summit declarations’ (MAE 1998: 118).

Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister suggested that they could

‘at least make a declaration of intentions to give the impression that the problem is solved’ (MAE 1998: 119).

The solution proposed by Adenauer (MAE 1998) was to remove the European university issue from European cooperation plans and let the Italian government take the university forward as a national project. This was agreed, although for Italy, left with the burden of creating a new university, ‘the Bonn decision was not a bonne [good] decision’ (Cattani quoted in Palayret 1996: 121).

The Heads of State then adopted a Declaration on Cultural Cooperation (European Council 1961b) (which on the whole followed the Pescatore report) which launched the Six’s intergovernmental agenda for cultural cooperation:

‘the creation of a Council of ministers of education or ministers responsible for international cultural relations […] and for the negotiation of one or more conventions on the following matters;
- cooperation and exchanges between the universities of the Member States of the European Communities;
- the European status that can be conferred on university establishments and national research institutions;
- the creation in Florence of a European university by Italy to which the six governments will contribute;
- the possible creation of other European institutes devoted to university education or research’ (European Council 1961b: 36).

They also instructed the Pescatore Committee to draft the necessary conventions191 ‘as quickly as possible […] to put the plan for cultural cooperation into effect’ (European Council 1961b: 36), when in fact the Fouchet negotiations for political cooperation and the political union treaty were some way away and certainly far from a conclusion. Were

191 The three conventions were for the European Culture Council, university exchanges and the European institutes.
the Six feeling the pressure from emerging competition to lead on cultural cooperation in Europe? This event is analysed next.

6.6 Turf war in the international cultural cooperation arena

The Six’s new cultural cooperation agenda, not least the creation of a Council of Ministers to implement it, introduced a new European level jurisdiction in an arena claimed by another international organisation – the Council of Europe. While the Six’s cultural cooperation plans were led by Heads of State and Foreign Ministers and had a political accent to it, the Council of Europe was the (international) venue of choice of the Conference of European Ministers of Education192 (Haigh 1970) (including those from the Six) and had a genuine focus on cultural/educational concerns; in which it was supported by a significant European policy community of (culture/education) government officials, university rectors and educationalists and policy makers.

The Council of Europe claimed problem ownership193 (Gusfield 1981) of – and consequently institutional authority over – European inter-national cultural cooperation and mobilised to defend its turf.195 Hilgartner and Bosk explain issue extension in terms of ‘positive feedback’ (1988) between different arenas; according to which the patterned institutional relations or social networks that link public arenas mean that issues rising in

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192 Following the Western European Union’s (WEU) decision to concentrate on European security and defence matters, the Council of Europe had (January 1960) absorbed the WEU’s cultural and educational cooperation activities, taking over responsibility for the work of its (former) Universities Committee and all the educational and cultural activities. The WEU’s significant international cultural programme had been active since 1948 (at this time under the auspices of the WEU’s predecessor the Brussels Treaty Organisation). See for example Haigh (1970; 1974).

193 From an institutional perspective, problem ownership (Gusfield 1981) refers to jurisdictional control over policy and decisions and appropriations for a problem area.

194 Cultural/educational cf. Chapter 4 for a discussion on this.

195 Evidence suggests that there may have (also) been a political motivation to this. The report of the 28th session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 24th April 1961 reveals the nervousness of some EFTA members about the emerging political union of the Six, pointing the benefits of agreement between the two economic blocs. The belief was that the Council of Europe could play a role in the ‘rapprochement of the two EEC and EFTA’ blocs. Was the cultural cooperation challenge designed to have a role in this?
one arena have a strong tendency to spread into others. In this case the two institutions 
operated intergovernmentally in the same European 'turf', involving the Six member 
states (and in cases the same ministers).

The Council of Europe now planned to revive its activity; which involved the expansion 
of intergovernmental cultural cooperation within the framework of its Western European 
membership (at the time sixteen European states, including the Six), the association of 
non-members and the rationalisation of the European (cultural cooperation) institutions 
(Council of Europe 1961). In practice, this meant making the Council of Europe ‘the 
principal organ of cultural cooperation in Europe’ (Council of Europe 1961a).

Naturally, the Council of Europe followed the cultural cooperation developments of the 
‘restricted communities’ (Council of Europe 1961d) with anxiety. As the Fouchet 
negotiations for political union progressed and Pescatore’s conventions were drafted in 
the late summer of 1961, the Council of Europe mobilised to set up a Cultural Cooperation 
Council (Council of Europe 1961b) (CCC). On 27th September 1961 the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly advocated that,

‘the CCC should […] serve as the one agency of European cultural co-
operation whatever the new organisational structure of European political and 
economic co-operation may be’ (Council of Europe 1961a),

at the same time considering

‘whether the future CCC would not be the appropriate organ for carrying out, 
in the widest possible framework, the scheme to set up a European University 
as well as the other [Six’s Cultural Cooperation Declaration] 
recommendations’ (Council of Europe 1961a).

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196 This is how the Secretary General of the Council of Europe referred to the Six during the 29th session of 
the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers held in Paris on 16th December 1961 to discuss the role of 
the Council of Europe.
But the Council of Europe Assembly went further. Arguing that under the Six participation was largely limited to the (six) EEC members, whereas the Council of Europe’s cooperation would be carried out ‘in the framework of greater Europe’ (Council of Europe 1961c), it proceeded to bid to take over the Six’s cultural cooperation project – it invited

‘the member Governments of the European Communities to entrust the future Council for Cultural Cooperation of the Council of Europe with the implementation of the [Six’s cultural cooperation] plans’ (Council of Europe 1961c).

For the Six, however, cultural cooperation was an aggregate aspect (with political and economic cooperation) of intergovernmental cooperation leading to European political unity. Their cultural cooperation agenda was therefore fundamentally political – the Six responded that:

‘the methods of cooperation utilised in the Six’s community differ from those followed by the Council of Europe and, therefore, allow us to expect more concrete results. [...] This is demonstrated by the experience in other sectors [e.g. economic integration] which is a paradigm and an inspiration in the international arena. The Council of Europe [...] cultural exchange may cover the geographic extent of free Europe, [...] however, the Six’s [...] [cultural] cooperation has a specific objective’ (MAE Europe 1961-65197).

The political wind was to shift in a different direction, however. What happened next, the collapse a few months later of the political union/Fouchet negotiations (more on which below), determined that the Council of Europe’s endeavour to take responsibility for European cultural cooperation was, eventually, successful.

In terms of process, thus, if, on one hand, and following Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), the mechanism of ‘positive feedback’ explains the spread (or at least the rising) of the cultural cooperation issue in/to the Council of Europe domain, on the other, the mechanism of

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‘attribution of threat’\textsuperscript{198} (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001) – that is, the threat attributed by the Council of Europe to the Six’s political union and its cultural cooperation – explains the Council of Europe’s mobilisation and its subsequent claim to ‘ownership of the problem’ (Gusfield 1981) of European cultural cooperation and bid to appropriate it.

6.7 Closing the window on the Six’s cultural cooperation

The self-assured response of the Six to the Council of Europe’s bid reflected the positive mood of the Fouchet talks at the time. Indeed, on 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 1961 the Fouchet Committee received from President De Gaulle France’s proposal for a ‘Draft Treaty for the establishment of a political union’ (Battista 1964) (hereinafter Fouchet Plan) which stated in its Article 2 that one of the Union’s aims was

\begin{quote}
‘to ensure, through close cooperation between Member States in the scientific and cultural field, the continued development of their common heritage and the protection of the values on which their civilisation rests’ (Battista 1964: 12).
\end{quote}

As the political cooperation talks proceeded, the cultural cooperation conventions were in the meantime completed by Pescatore and were on the agenda of the Fouchet Committee meeting of 15 March 1962. The Committee did not have any problems (Bloes 1970: 318) with the cultural conventions and the plan was to ‘add the three cultural conventions to the future Union Treaty and to have them officially signed at the same time’ (MAE Europe 1961-65\textsuperscript{199}); which shows the high status that cultural cooperation enjoyed in the framework of the new political union.

But, in fact, the political Fouchet negotiations were not going well. The issue of British involvement reached an impasse and matters of security and the operation of the new

\textsuperscript{198} McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) define attribution of threat or opportunity as an activating mechanism responsible for the mobilisation of previously inert populations.

\textsuperscript{199} MAE, Europe 1961-1965, Questions internationales, Carton 1960, Observations de la délégation française sur les projets de conventions établies par la sous-commission des questions culturelles, (undated)
Union within NATO divided the Six. Cultural cooperation was but an aspect of the broader political cooperation framework and, as an integral element of the cooperation architecture, any decision on it rested on decisions about political cooperation in general.

On 17 April 1962 the talks broke down and the Fouchet Committee decided to adjourn the meeting to a later time; though not before urging Pescatore’s working group to continue its work on cultural cooperation (Bloes 1970: 364). But this was too little, too late. No new date or mandate was set for the Fouchet Committee to return to the negotiating table and it never met again; and neither did the Pescatore Committee. The Fouchet negotiations had collapsed and with them the cultural cooperation project of the Six.

Thus, although there was clear agreement on and support for cultural cooperation, political contextual factors and institutional (structural) features (Barzelay 2003) at work in the process interacted, closing the window of opportunity and therefore determining the fate of the cultural cooperation issue. On one hand, the collapse of the wider political negotiation process meant that decision stage was not reached and that an authoritative decision on the culture issue was never made. On the other, from an institutional perspective, the fact that cultural cooperation was an integral part of the broad union institutional framework meant that its fate was inexorably tied with the fate of political union; and, therefore, if the union project failed, so did cultural cooperation.

However, although at this specific point in time it could be said, following Kingdon (1995), that the culture idea’s time came and went, as it followed the opening and closure of a political window, it is important to note that the political union venture of 1961 was the critical juncture at which the coupling of political union and culture was
institutionalised, influencing subsequent ideas and choices about political union. This legacy would eventually materialise in the Maastricht Treaty on Political Union some thirty years later and endures still.

6.8 Conclusion

The study presented in this chapter confirms the benefit of examining the formation of (European) policy, in this case a policy for cultural cooperation, using a processual-institutional framework of analysis. The episode reflects the importance of process contexts, macro and micro, as well as the role of structural and institutional features and social mechanisms in the trajectory of the culture issue and formation of policy.

The analysis highlights the role played by contextual factors in mobilising the cultural cooperation issue and shaping opportunities for actors to place the issue on the European (Six’s) agenda. Issue initiation resulted from the confluence of events flowing in the problems, policies and politics streams at this juncture: the European political union initiative, the university problem, French policy aims to regain global power status, French expansionist external cultural policy. France’s unsuccessful attempt to hijack the EEC’s European University project led France to entrepreneurially move the issue to the forthcoming Paris summit agenda, a favourable decision venue. Conversely, at the end of the episode, contextual political factors – the collapse of the political union negotiations – closed the policy window on cultural cooperation.

This chapter also demonstrates how institutional context shaped the process and outcomes of the negotiations in the Pescatore Group. The mix of the contentious environment of the Pescatore Group’s initial sessions and the consensus feature pressed Pescatore to entrepreneurially use the chairmanship’s institutional powers to obtain results.
Pescatore’s search for a solution is best characterised as a problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963), a procedural, rational search for a resolution of the stand-off as much as a search for a best cultural cooperation agenda – it shows how an organisational process influenced a policy outcome.

As with the previous episode, the social mechanisms of policy entrepreneurship and actor certification played a role in driving processes and were responsible for converting (contextual) political events into outcomes. Policy entrepreneurship enabled the French government (collectively) to couple the political, policy and problem streams and successfully place cultural cooperation on the European political cooperation agenda at Paris but actor certification explains its acceptance – De Gaulle had an almost mythical status, this was his idea... Likewise, while Pescatore’s performance had only a modest entrepreneurial element to it, it is the activation of the mechanism of actor certification that ultimately explains the successful outcome of the Pescatore Group’s negotiations.
CHAPTER 7

Creating an EC policy domain of culture, 1972-77

7.1 Introduction

At the dawn of the 1970s the EC seemed set to turn the page on the troubled process of European integration of the 1960s period and to move towards a revitalising new stage of its development. The excesses of intergovernmentalism of the 1960s were now to give way to a new phase of Community completion, deepening and enlargement, three goals to which the member states committed themselves to in the Hague Summit of 1969. Implicit in the new conceptual ‘triptych’ was the idea that the European integration process should reach beyond an economic community.

The Hague opened the door to a number of new EC policies in the early 1970s – education, environment, social policy among others. Culture emerged as a European policy issue at around the same time but it would take six years for it to be recognised as a policy domain in which the Community had a role. There was no legal Treaty basis for a cultural competence and political support from most EC member states was limited if not hostile – there was no apparent logic motivating the development of a Community cultural policy. Still, the European Commission eventually issued its first policy paper, a Communication on Community action in the cultural sector, in 1977.

As the third episode analysis of the thesis, this chapter explores why and how the Commission became involved in this policy domain, why at this particular juncture, how

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200 For example, De Gaulle’s veto of British accession to the EEC in 1963, his refusal to cooperate with the European Commission, among other events. When de Gaulle was not granted a more intergovernmental Commission or voting and veto rights, the French representative left the Council of Ministers leading to the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965-66. France’s aggressive stance over the Common Agricultural Policy also also reaped rewards, in contrast with the substantial contributions imposed on other member states.
it emerged and came to be. The conclusion that it reaches is that this was the outcome of a long political process, which resulted from a combination of factors: policy entrepreneurial action, institutional dynamics, a coalition between the European Commission and the European Parliament (hereinafter EP), and favourable ‘tidal currents’ from the political stream.

This chapter is divided into eight sections including this introduction. The event map next page provides a structured mapping of the process narrative – the policy episode under investigation occurred in the period of 1972-1977. The following Section 2 contextualizes the European Community at the turn of the seventies and identifies the events that led or opened the way to the central episode. Section 3 accounts for the first policy cycle from the initiation of the culture issue on the Commission’s agenda to the deferred decision while Section 4 investigates the second policy cycle and the institutional developments that were triggered by this process, not least the expansion of the culture issue to the EP. Section 5 examines the third and final policy cycle and Section 6 explores the Council’s non-decision. Finally, the concluding Section 7 demonstrates how the interaction of process events with political and institutional contexts and resources shaped the issue’s career throughout the episode.
Figure 7.1: Event narrative mapping of the policy episode 1972-77
7.2 The European Community at a crossroads – beyond an economic community

The development of EC action on culture in the early 1970s was the result of a number of influences flowing together at the same time. The research identified two drivers of change – political and institutional – both occurring in the late 1960s which impacted the political context at the turn of the decade and which in the short term triggered/stimulated the development of new European (supranational level) policies in the 1970s. These were of particular consequence for the emergence of cultural policy. One is the shift in the European political mood toward the late 1960s and, more specifically, the change in the direction of EC politics that followed (from) the 1969’s Hague Summit. The other, which possibly reflected and influenced the above, is the change in the ethos of the European Commission itself at around the same time.

7.2.1 The 1969 Hague summit: moving forward

One of the watershed moments in the history of the EC was the summit of European leaders at The Hague in 1-2 December 1969. The Hague summit marked the end of the transitional period (during which, according to the EEC Treaty, the Common Market had to be established) and also the end of a politically turbulent decade for the Community. The economic Community had been envisaged as only a stage on the road to a politically more integrated Europe, but by the end of the 1960s ‘political Europe had made no advance whatever’ (Spaak 1965). Political disagreements between member states over key issues such as enlargement, the Community’s own resources and the strengthening of the institutions persisted which brought the integration process to a virtual standstill.

The call for a European summit in 1969 brought fresh hopes and the opportunity to relaunch the process of European integration and open the way to the next phase of the European project. With no formal agenda set the leaders agreed to discuss the three
themes proposed by French President Pompidou: ‘completing’ the Community’s initial agenda, ‘deepening’ cooperation into new areas, and ‘enlargement’ of the EEC’s membership. The three themes were interconnected and their implications were vast; particularly in terms of the (new) policy priorities that the EC needed to focus upon for the following decade. The Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister’s admission at the time that, ‘the summit had to take decisions in areas where the founding fathers could not reach agreement before’ (Financial Times cited in Werts 1992: 34).

gives an idea of the expectation and, indeed, the sense of history that surrounded the Hague summit of 1969.

At the Hague, the relevance of cultural policy to the next phase of the European project was emphasised by two Prime Ministers, of Luxembourg and Italy. Luxembourg’s Pierre Werner said that,

‘in the long term we could not even think of expanding the economic union without a minimal coordination of our foreign policies, cultural policies and also defense’ (HAEU EM 237201).

For Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor, equally, the imperatives facing the Community were both economic, political, historical and cultural. He argued for the reinvigoration of the process of integration even if that meant engaging in ‘action […] not covered by the Treaties of Rome’, because

‘At this point we confront the particularly important problems in the development of a Community which is intent on becoming a new event in history: problems of culture, science and technology. If we do not make the decisions, events will take over’ (HAEU BAC 79/1982-221202).

201 HAEU EM 237 Conférence des Chefs d’Etat ou de Gouvernement, La Haye, les 1er et 2eme décembre 1969. Déclaration de M. Pierre Werner, Président du Gouvernement Luxembourgeois
The cultural argument, however, did not attract much attention. Only Italy and Luxembourg advocated the idea and the prospective new entrants to the EEC, especially the UK and Denmark, were unlikely to support it. Nevertheless, the summit’s final communiqué showed that European leaders recognised the

‘need to safeguard in Europe an exceptional source of development, progress and culture’ (European Council 1969).

But this general statement is in contrast with the significant commitments made at the Hague to areas such as economic policy, political cooperation and Higher Education all of which ‘crashed’ (Princen 2006) on the EC’s agenda at the summit.

Similarly, successive drafts of a report of the six’s Foreign Affairs Ministers on how the issue of political cooperation could progress, which they were tasked to examine at the Hague, show that culture – together with foreign affairs, education and defence – was on the table as a possible field for cooperation. In the event, the delegations could not agree on which were the most critical areas to political unification and the ‘search for new [cooperation] fields’ (Foreign Ministers 1970) was deferred to a later stage.

The Foreign Ministers’ (or Davignon) final report was adopted by the Council of the EC but the EP, namely its influential Political Affairs Committee, was disappointed with the limited scope of the report’s plans for political cooperation, in particular with the fact that plans did not include cultural policy (European Parliament 1970). The culture issue had surfaced in the EP’s debates (November 1969) in preparation for the Hague summit in which MEPs called on European leaders to create ‘guiding principles for cooperation in

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203 Denmark, Ireland (who started their membership bid in 1967) and the UK (now waiting to re-open the negotiations since 1961). Norway was still a candidate at this stage.
204 HAEU CSM 42 Rapport a Messieurs les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres [sic], Bruxelles 17 Juin 1970 ; HAEU CSM 42 Draft of the final report adopted by the Foreign Ministers, Luxembourg, 27 October 1970
205 HAEU CSM 42 Draft of the final report adopted by the Foreign Ministers, Luxembourg, 27 October 1970
the domains of culture and education’ (HAEU UEF 185; HAEU BAC 79/1982-221).

In the European Commission, too, officials meeting to discuss the report (HAEU FMM 37) concluded that there was scope for cooperation between Ministers and for Commission activity in the areas of culture and education (HAEU FMM 37).

7.2.1.1 Also moving forward but faster: the wider European political mood

The political mood of European civil society also moved in a similar direction. Evidence shows how in the weeks leading up to the Hague summit, European interest groups campaigned for the recognition, at the Hague summit, of the place of culture in the changing political priorities of the European Community. A pamphlet of the Council of European Local Communities, for example, called for the creation of a ‘Common cultural policy’ (HAEU BAC 79/1982-221). The Brussels Staff Committee suggested that political unification should also involve artistic creation, education and information (HAEU UEF 183: 4) whilst the EC Council’s Economic and Social Committee recognized that ‘Europe is the only dimension which allows the peoples to fully develop the foundations of their material, cultural and spiritual existence’ (Bitsch 2001: 566).

206 HAEU UEF 185 Intervention de Monsieur H. A. Lücker au nom du groupe démocrate-chrétien du Parlement européen faite le 3 novembre 1969 sur le rapport de M. Scarascia-Mugnozza relatif à la Conférence au sommet de La Haye; see also European Parliament (1969). The European Parliament had had a long standing interest in cultural cooperation within the Community with a regular and frequent debates on culture/cooperation. The first significant manifestation of such interest the 1962 Report on Cultural Cooperation (European Parliament 1962; 1963a; 1963b). The report which was voted by unanimity, was followed by a number of resolutions throughout the 1960s namely with proposals for cultural cooperation initiatives and the creation of a Culture Council (see for example, European Parliament 1963a; 1963b; 1963c; 1963d; 1965a; 1965b; 1965c; 1966; 1967a; 1967b; 1969. The European Parliament had even proposed, ahead of the ratification of the Merger Treaty at the Rome Summit (1967), the expansion of the new (merged) Commission’s competences to culture (European Parliament 1967a; 1967b).

207 HAEU FMM 37 Letter from Achille Albonetti to Franco Maria Malfatti (European Commission President), 23 November 1970.

208 HAEU FMM 37 Appunto. Elementi per un documento sulla costruzione progressiva di una Comunità politica europea.


Thus, it is clear that toward the late 1960s the need for a reinvigorated European Community and the anticipation about the Hague summit built a belief ‘in and around (European) government’ (Kingdon 1995) that a window would open for the assimilation of the softer aspects of integration, namely cultural, into the Community’s future vision. However, despite strong advocacy across the political spectrum for a European cultural competence, support was fragmented and was, therefore, ineffective. Thus, although the culture idea was floating around in the political ‘soup’ (Kingdon 1995) and at the highest level, it is also obvious that, to paraphrase Kingdon (1995), its time had not come yet.

It was another soft policy area – education – that garnered the support of European leaders, ‘crashing’ (Princen 2006) on the European agenda ‘from above’. At the time education was strongly framed in cultural terms, which, according to Kingdon (1995), is the sort of precedent that can impact on boundary policy issues.

7.2.2 The European Commission: in search of a new agenda

A new vision and the desire to expand into new fields of Community activity was also a theme in the European Commission, and one that can be found consistently in the Commission’s internal deliberations and public pronouncements in the late 1960s. This was not a new ambition, by any means. In the early 1960s, Commission president Walter Hallstein (1958-67) was already a firm advocate of greater political cooperation between the EC member states and of the ‘necessary’ extension of the Community’s jurisdiction to the new policy areas of cultural affairs, defence and foreign policy.211

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211 See, for example: Hallstein (1964: 16; 1965: 25) and his many speeches in the 1960s. Also, in its response to a European Parliament’s request for an update on the issue of cultural cooperation, the Commission unambiguously concurs that a cultural policy that respects the values of member states and the responsibilities of (other) international organisations could be developed (European Commission 1963).
The idea of a Europe of the peoples, for example, was present in the Commission’s agenda since the early 1960s but is explicitly problematised as a Community issue in the Commission’s 1968 Declaration on the achievement of the customs union (CEC 1968) which states that,

‘Europe is not only customs tariffs. Europe does not belong only to the manufacturers, the farmers or the technocrats. [...] is not only the Europe of the Governments, of the Parliaments or of the administrations. It must be also the Europe of the peoples, of the workers, of youth, of man himself. All – or nearly all – still remains to be done’ (European Commission 1968: 5).

The document also recognises that the tasks facing Europeans in the future include not only economic union but also political union and the human/societal issues arising from their implementation, arguing that,

‘none of [the] fundamental political, economic, social and human problems [the transformation of society] can be solved by our old States imprisoned within their narrow frontiers. It is just as impossible to solve them without breaking through the old structures inherited from the past and without creating the European structures which are vital to the work of renewal as it is necessary to retain the old cultures, traditions, languages, originality, everything that gives the States their personalities’ (European Commission 1968: 6-7).

Was the European Commission claiming a future role in the soft aspects of the European integration process? The Commission’s choice of the 1968 declaration on its customs union achievement to acknowledge the safeguarding of cultures and traditions as an issue, a European issue and, importantly, one that could only be addressed by supranational

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212 This was probably driven by Commission president Walter Hallstein but was also connected with the Press and Information Office’s European information policy in early 1960s to establish a direct relationship between the Commission and the European people. The aspiration to forge more direct links with the wider European public since the early 1960s also had to do with the Commission’s goal to assume a more independent and active political role as a European institution, rather than acting as an ‘agent’ of the member states (the Council). See, for example, European Commission (1962a: 7; 1962b: 10; 1963; 1965) and Seymour (1968). Ludlow’s (1998) aptly titled article ‘Frustrated ambitions. The European Commission and the formation of a European identity, 1958-1967’ provides for a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of this question (but see also Bitsch, Loth and Poidevin 1998: 507).
structures\textsuperscript{213} was not accidental. The Merger Treaty’s\textsuperscript{214} implementation in 1967 had prompted new debates in the Commission about the role it would play in the future,\textsuperscript{215} initiating a new ‘institutional phase in the Commission which would parallel the political changes that were taking place at the same time’ (Cini 1996: 50). The Hague Summit’s priorities of enlargement and, in particular, deepening, added real scope for the Commission to expand into new policy areas.\textsuperscript{216}

Thus, although in the late 1960s the time for the idea of culture had not come yet, in terms of process and the narrative structure followed in this thesis, there were two contextual ‘events prior’ to the main episode that changed beliefs about the European project and influenced the cultural policy making process context in the Commission in the early 1970s. One, the Hague summit, was a major political event which established a new direction for the Community and the integration process, paving the way for the emergence of new (including soft) policy agendas. The other is a process context factor that has to do with latent institutional change and the ambition of the European executive to grow and expand into new areas of policy (Grégoire 2000: 184). Majone’s observation that ‘The European Commission’s goal is to expand its powers and to maximise its influence as measured by the scope of its competence’ (Majone 1992), embodies the institutional ethos that would characterise the Commission of the 1970s.

\textsuperscript{213} As a piece of anecdotal evidence, according to one of this thesis’ interviewees, who worked in the European Cultural Foundation from the mid-1960s to 1998, his first official contact/meeting with the European Commission in 1969 was to discuss cultural projects (NGO1 2 009). The Foundation would go on to work closely with the Commission in European education projects.

\textsuperscript{214} The Merger Treaty combined the executive bodies of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC into a single institutional structure. Signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965 the Merger Treaty came into force on 1 July 1967 and established that a new Commission would take up office in 1970.

\textsuperscript{215} This is clear, for example, in the European Commission’s 7\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} General reports on the activity of the Community. Hallstein’s respective introductions explicitly refer to cultural policy as a possible new policy sector for the Community; but see also European Parliament (1967a; 1967b).

\textsuperscript{216} A Commission internal document written by European Commissioner Hans von der Groeben in 1969 referred to the definition of Community competence in ‘cultural affairs’ as part of the development of European political cooperation. See HAEU BAC 03/1974 folder 29 Un programme pour l’Europe (De Hans von der Groeben, Membre de la Commission des Communautés Européennes, en collaboration avec Ernst Albrecht, Directeur Général).
Precisely – the fact that culture had failed to enter the European agenda through the ‘high politics route’ (Princen 2006) at the Hague, would not prevent it from hatching from ‘low-level’ (Princen 2006) policy-making processes in the Commission.

7.3 Placing culture on the Commission’s agenda

7.3.1 Initiating the issue: spillover from education policy

One of the preoccupations of European leaders at the Hague was that their decisions and subsequent Community action could only fully succeed if young people were involved in it. They therefore responded favourably to proposals for initiatives in education cooperation.217

The EC Education Ministers met in November 1971 and their first text, a Resolution on cooperation in education (HAEU BAC28/1980-784218), reflected the political-cultural rhetoric of the Hague’s leaders two years before. It called for education cooperation to ‘take account of the historical similarities of civilisation and culture’ of the member states and stressed the aim ‘to define a European model of culture which [correlated] with European integration’ (HAEU BAC28/1980-784) – ultimately, cooperation in education would help foster a European cultural identity.

The Commission was asked to generate proposals for education cooperation and it was Altiero Spinelli,219 the Commissioner responsible for the Industry, Technology and

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217 Thus far the only education issue in which governments had been involved was the European University project although the negotiations were intergovernmental and not at Community level.
218 HAEU BAC28/1980-784 Resolution of the ministers for education meeting within the Council of 16 November 1971 on cooperation in the field of education.
219 Altiero Spinelli (1907-86) was a prominent figure of European federalism and had led the European Federalist Movement, which he founded in 1943 while in political exile. He was appointed to the European Commission in 1970 where he was responsible for the industrial policy and research portfolio. In the Commission, he played a key role in the initiation of a number of Community policies – industrial policy, research, environment, education and culture – none of which existed when he joined the Commission in 1970 (Corbett 1996). After leaving the Commission in 1976 he became a Member of the European...
Research portfolio, who mobilised the Commission to engage systematically with education policy. He was, in fact, the first Commissioner whose portfolio included education, a task that he claimed for himself. Spinelli believed that education was ‘of the greatest importance for integration and economic union’ (Spinelli 1972: 118) and that it should be one of the major aims of a Community policy for European society for the following two or three decades (Spinelli 1972).

At a meeting of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (hereinafter COREPER) education experts (March 1972) to implement the Education Ministers Resolution, Spinelli, who attended as the Commission’s delegate, rationalised Community (supranational) action in education using the same politico-cultural rhetoric as the Resolution but argued that

‘the construction of the European Community also [raises] cultural issues’ (HAEU BAC28/1980 78/1).

Spinelli was concerned with the maintenance and promotion of the diversity of European cultures, claiming that,

‘although the historical heritage of Europe carries within it common cultural features it must not turn into a uniform culture and must allow all to access the cultural richness and diversity of the member states (HAEU BAC28/1980 78/1).

\[\text{Parliament. He was the initiator of the Draft European Union Treaty, which was endorsed by the EP in 1984 but not by the member state governments.}\]

\[\text{220 This idea relates to Spinelli’s radical federalist vision of a European (transnational) society in which the conduct of common interests and affairs would be transferred from states to a European government, as distinct from national governments, and controlled by an elected (European) Parliament. He believed that the European Commission had a central part to play in this (see for example HAEU EG B.A.-04 Lettre d’Altiero Spinelli, membre de la Commission des Communautés européennes, à ses collègues les commissaires, Bruxelles, le 16 décembre 1974; and also SEC(72) 4250 especially paragraphs 12-15).}\]

\[\text{221 COREPER is the Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives responsible for preparing the work of the Council of the EC. It functions as an intergovernmental body and occupies a pivotal position in the Community decision-making system – it is both a forum for dialogue (among the Permanent Representatives and between them and their respective national capitals) and a means of political control, carrying out preliminary scrutiny of the dossiers on the Council agenda (eg proposals and drafts for acts tabled by the Commission). It seeks to reach agreement on each dossier, failing which it may suggest guidelines, options or solutions to the Council.}\]

\[\text{222 HAEU BAC28/1980 78/1, Note. Coopération dans le domaine de l’éducation, Annex II Declaration du représentant de la Commission, Bruxelles, le 28 mars 1972.}\]
He went on to argue for the application of the four freedoms of the common market to cultural activity and workers:

‘the Commission believes that the provisions of the Treaties apply to cultural activities and activities related to them in the same way as they apply to other domains and other undertakings. There are still important gaps to fill in relation to the functioning of the common market for cultural and educational products. […] People who make a living from culture and who enable culture to flourish do not benefit in the same way as other salaried workers do from the Treaties’ provisions on social policy, freedom to supply services, freedom of establishment, professional development, gender equality in pay, social security and relocation measures. This would be an area for further investigation and community action’ (BAC28/1980-78223).

Spinelli was clearly trying to push a new Community policy in the area of culture. A strong advocate of the expansion of the Community’s policy competencies (HAEU EN 110224) Spinelli was a formidable policy entrepreneur. His strategy was to construct a (cultural) ‘problem’ (in Kingdon’s terms) that fitted the Commission’s preferred (common market) policy solution (Cram 1997). There were ‘interconnections’ (Rochefort and Cobb 1994) between the new European education policy being discussed and culture and Spinelli only needed to provide an argument to activate a spillover to the culture policy area. COREPER was a crucial policy scrutiny point in the Council and Spinelli seized the opportunity to float a ‘trial balloon’ (Kingdon 1995) for the new policy idea.

In fact, Spinelli had already started an investigation into a Community policy for culture. He had asked the Commission’s ‘Education and Teaching Group’ to reflect on what the Community might be able to do in the field of society or civilisation or culture (Grégoire

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223 Ibid.
224 See for example HAEU EN 110 Réunion de travail spéciale consacrée a l’examen de la situation générale de la politique européenne. And Spinelli’s input to this meeting: Quelques idées concernant les politiques communes industrielles, de la recherche scientifique et technologique, de l’environnement, régionale, qui devraient être inscrites dans les propositions de la commission pour la préparation du sommet.
2000: 181; HAEU EN-664\textsuperscript{225}). He did not have a particular preference for any of the three areas and Robert Grégoire, the Group’s cultural expert, was given the freedom to choose – he opted for culture (Grégoire 2000).

Grégoire was to play a critical role in the development of Commission policy on culture. A Frenchman, Grégoire had worked in the ECSC since 1956 and in the (EEC) Commission from 1967. His experience as a civil servant in a variety of departments and functions gave him an in-depth knowledge of the inner workings of the policy machinery and of the European institutional system which he would use to great effect. But he had started his working career in theatre and had a personal interest in culture.

7.3.2 The 1972 Memorandum ‘For Community action in the field of culture’

Grégoire responded to Spinelli’s request with a sixty-six-page document entitled ‘For Community action in the field of culture’ (HAEU EN-664\textsuperscript{226}). The document took the form of a ‘Memorandum from the Commission to the Council of the European Communities.’ As a memorandum it was a policy think-paper. As a memorandum from the Commission to the Council it was a policy proposal aiming to set the EC agenda for culture.\textsuperscript{227}

Grégoire had in fact considered a different title – ‘For a European cultural policy’ – which he thought was more appropriate but which would have been, in his words, ‘suicidal’ (Grégoire 2000: 182).

\textsuperscript{225} HAEU EN-664 Letter from F. P. Mercereau to E. Noel of 16 October 1972, Annexe ‘Communication de M. Spinelli a MM. Les membres de la Commission’

\textsuperscript{226} HAEU EN-664 Memorandum de la Commission au Conseil des Ministres des Communautés Européennes. Pour une action communautaire dans le domaine de la culture (doc. Ref. 45/GEE/72-F)

\textsuperscript{227} According to Cini (1996) non-binding non-legislative policy tools at the Commission’s disposal (for example, a memorandum) can compel change within a particular policy environment as much as any legally-enforceable instrument can.
‘in a domain like culture, community action had a chance of being accepted; a European policy was at risk of going down in flames almost immediately’ (Grégoire 2000: 182).

He knew that most member states would not agree to a Community cultural ‘policy’ (only Italy and Luxembourg supported the idea) and would immediately oppose what they would deem to be Community interference in national affairs. He used his knowledge of the legal and institutional system rationally. The ‘Community action’ label (rather than ‘policy’) met the provisions of EEC Treaty’s Article 235 under which Community institutions were empowered to act where this was necessary in order to achieve Community objectives – framing a problem in terms of, for example, the common market, would justify and legitimise intervention.

Thus, not surprisingly, one of the strands of the Memorandum ‘for Community action in the field of culture’ was the systematic application of the EEC Treaty to the cultural sector. This was justified on the grounds that the Treaty affected every area of the national economies (including culture) and that the impact of other common policies on culture needed to be monitored (HAEU EN-664: 63).

‘At a time dominated by an economic way of thinking and disregard for things cultural I could not say head on that culture also matters. [...] I had to be careful so as to make sure that the memorandum was not rejected. On reflection, however, the most pressing problems of culture are economic and social. The provisions of the EEC Treaty are also economic and social. It follows that the Treaty provides the Community with the means to assist the cultural domain with solutions to problems that are beyond the reach of each state individually’ (Grégoire 2000: 184).

228 The Italics are in the original text.
229 Article 235 of the EEC Treaty (EEC 1958) states that ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament], take the appropriate measures’. Art. 235 can be invoked to legally create a new area of Community competence.
The other action strand was cooperation between the member states – the Memorandum argued that despite the pooling of resources between the member states and the free circulation across national borders people were not yet ready to live together. Proposals therefore included the creation of an EC cultural association to disseminate European culture and promote cultural activities; and the creation of a European fund for monuments and sites to finance the protection and conservation of European heritage.

Although the issues were cultural Grégorie carefully framed them in a way that made them amenable to EC supranational level action: on one hand, in the form of the liberalisation of the cultural market and economy; on the other, in the form of member state cooperation, an innocent word, as Fogg and Jones (1985) point out, designed to reassure member states that they could come together to consider common concerns without fear of legal intervention from Community involvement that might be justified on the basis of the Treaty of Rome (1985: 293).

In September 1972 the Memorandum was approved by the Commission’s inter-services committee\(^{230}\) (including the eight DGs already dealing with cultural issues\(^{231}\)) and sent to

\(^{230}\) The inter-service consultation is a (horizontal) committee consisting of Commission officials drawn from across the Commission’s General Directorates and other relevant units (e.g. legal, Commission’s Secretariat General) that are concerned with particular policy matters. The procedure aims to ensure consistency and consensus among the Commission’s services on a given draft proposal and that any technical problems, reservations or differences in interest or approach are addressed in the early stages of the policy formulation process. See for example Cini (1996) for a detailed account of the European Commission’s internal processes and procedures.

\(^{231}\) Commission Directorates General: DG I External Affairs; DG III Industrial, Technological and Scientific Affairs; DG V Social Affairs; DG VI Agriculture; DG VIII Development; DG X Press and Information; DG XIII Dissemination of Knowledge; DG XIV Internal Market and Approximation of Legislation; and also the Secretariat General, Legal Service, Statistical Service, and Customs Union Executive. (DG titles are not consistent in different sources. The reference for the above is Dumoulin (2007).
the College of Commissioners\textsuperscript{232} for decision ‘as to how the issue should be followed up with the Council’ (HAEU SEC(72) 4250\textsuperscript{233}). The next decision phase was more political.

7.3.3 Deferring decision-taking

When the Commissioners met in December 1972 to consider the Memorandum, the political-institutional conditions had changed. In less than a month (January 1973), following enlargement,\textsuperscript{234} a new (enlarged) Commission would take up office. The Commissioners knew that the culture Memorandum was likely to be politically sensitive to at least two of the new member states, Denmark and the United Kingdom (HAEU BDT 144/87\textsuperscript{235}). Brussels officials even believed that the new Commission might rethink the Memorandum or simply desist from sending it to the Council (HAEU BDT 144/87\textsuperscript{236}); not least because the political conditions in the Council were also unpredictable (at best).

All things considered, approving the Memorandum to send to the Council in these conditions could leave the incoming Commission in a difficult position, one way or another. The Commissioners therefore ‘[took] note’\textsuperscript{237} (COM(72) PV 230: 8-9\textsuperscript{238}) of the Memorandum, they endorsed the proposal – they issued a ‘positive opinion’ (HAEU BDT 144/87\textsuperscript{239}) – but did not take a decision, shifting instead the responsibility to rule on the way forward for culture to the 1973 Commission.

\textsuperscript{232} The college of commissioners is the Commission’s highest decision-taking (Cini 1996) level and is also characterised by its political perspective (as opposed to the essentially technical nature of the work and decisions at DG level). Cini (1996) compares the college of commissioners to a sort of cabinet (in the British sense) performing tasks that are usually attributable (in a national context) to ministers.

\textsuperscript{233} HAEU SEC(72) 4250 Bilan et perspectives de l’activité du Groupe «Enseignement et Education», 24 Novembre 1972; HAEU EN664 Communication de M. Spinelli a MM. les Membres de la Commission

\textsuperscript{234} On 1 January 1973 three new members joined the EEC – Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom – bringing the number of member states from six to nine.

\textsuperscript{235} HAEU BDT 144/87, Folder 65 Note à l’attention de Monsieur Hammer, Bruxelles, 18 janvier 1973, Annex: L’état de la procedure, from G. Livi

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{237} This formula – ‘taking note’ – enables Commissioners to debate a situation or a document without coming to any positive decision.

\textsuperscript{238} COM(72) PV 230 final (séance du 6 décembre 1972)

\textsuperscript{239} HAEU BDT 144/87, Folder 65 Note à l’attention de Monsieur Hammer, Bruxelles, 18 janvier 1973, Annex: L’état de la procedure
Nonetheless, the deferred decision created, in a sense, an irreversible position; for once the institutional machinery was in motion it would be extremely difficult to reverse, for example, to remove the issue. In process terms, thus, the way was forward – which leads us to the second cultural policy cycle.

7.4 Establishing a new cultural policy domain in the European Commission

7.4.1 Creating a new policy venue

The Commission that took over in 1973 was ‘larger’ not only in terms of member states but in terms of the number of Commissioners and portfolios – from eight in 1972 to thirteen in January 1973. One of the new portfolios was an action domain specifically for Research, Science and Education, now headed by Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf.240 A new Directorate-General DG XII Research, Science and Education was also created.

Unlike Spinelli, his predecessor, Dahrendorf was not fully convinced that the Community had a role to play in education or culture as ‘not everything is improved by being on a European scale’ (Dahrendorf quoted in Corbett 2005: 80). Still, recognising that the treaty assigned only very limited tasks in these fields, Dahrendorf’s approach was to regard the treaty framework as defining the limits of (rather than the opportunities for) the possible role of the EC (Corbett 2005: 80) in these areas.

Dahrendorf launched his working programme for the Research, Science and Education (SEC(73) 2000/2241) portfolio in May 1973. This included a section on ‘cultural affairs’ which meant that, although formally a non-portfolio issue,242 culture was on a

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240 Dahrendorf was an eminent sociologist and a German university professor before embarking on a political career in the 1960s. He was previously the Commissioner for External Relations.
241 SEC(73) 2000/2, Programme de travail dans le domaine ‘Recherche, Science et Education’ (Communication personnelle de M. Dahrendorf). Bruxelles, le 23 mai 1973
242 Non-portfolio issues are issues that do not directly concern a particular portfolio (Joana and Smith 2004). According to the EC Bulletin (the official EC information monthly digest) of January 1974 Dahrendorf’s
Commissioner’s agenda. Grégoire had personally briefed (Grégoire 2000) (if not lobbied) Dahrendorf on his 1972 Memorandum, and the availability of viable, ready made ‘solutions’ probably appealed to the Commissioner (as would the then 1980 union deadline, cf. 7.4.3 paragraph 4 and 7.4.4 paragraph 5). Not surprisingly, the cultural affairs programme broadly followed the lines of the 1972 Memorandum. Measures included the dissemination of information about national cultural identities, cultural exchanges and the ‘complete freedom of circulation of cultural goods, services and persons’ (SEC(73) 2000/2: 6). Importantly, the need for the Council to engage with the culture issue was also emphasised. By and large, Dahrendorf had engaged with the new policy.

The realisation of these plans, however, required a bureaucratic structure to implement them and European cultural data to inform policy action. This opened a new phase in the establishment (and institutionalisation) of the culture policy domain.

7.4.1.1 Assembling a dedicated policy bureaucracy

Thus, just days after he launched his working programme Dahrendorf set up a ‘specialised service’ (HAEU EN-664) in the Commission: a Division in DG XII’s Directorate A ‘Teaching and education, external relations in the fields of research, science and education’ to deal with his cultural affairs programme.

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portfolio included Research, science and education, the common research centre, statistical office, scientific and technical information and information management – it did not mention culture.


244 DGXII was the Directorate General for Education, Research and Science.
The new office enabled the Commission to intervene on culture related matters more strategically (HAEU BDT 144/87) which had, until now, been done by a number of DGs. The tasks of the new division included the application of the treaty to the cultural sector; the development of cultural cooperation between the member states; joined-up collaboration with all the DGs concerned with cultural sector issues; the monitoring of other DGs’ activities and impact on culture; and the development of European level research and data (HAEU EN-664).

Although six months earlier the 1972 Memorandum included the word ‘culture’ in its title, the Commission’s legal office now objected to calling the new division ‘culture’ (Grégoire 2000: 189-190) because of the lack of Treaty basis. But given that the Division was concerned with its socio-economic aspects – the cultural sector – and the application of the Treaty principles to it, it was named ‘Cultural Sector Questions’ (Problèmes du secteur culturel) (hereinafter Cultural Sector Division). Grégoire already had oversight for the culture issue and the new division would now operate under his authority.

245 Op. cit. footnote 243
246 For example, DG Common Market e.g. export of works of art, author’s rights, freedom of circulation; DG Competition e.g. state aids, competitive practices; DG External Relations and Development Aid e.g. cultural cooperation with third countries; DG Industrial Affairs and Research e.g. application of nuclear R&D to conservation (I note that DG titles and remits evolved, changed or merged over the years – the titles above were current in the early 1970s).
247 Op. cit. Footnote 243; see also SEC(73) 2117, 29 mai 1973
248 The EEC Treaty is a framework treaty: it articulates the basic principles and general rules for establishing an EEC; these rules apply to any sector to which it has relevance (the treaty does not designate specific industries or areas of application e.g. construction industry, fishing, etc).
249 The unglamorous term Problèmes (French for issues, questions) was not uncommon in the Commission and several administrative units started with this title (they are also found in international organisations e.g. Council of Europe). It is indicative of the origins of these administrative structures, as the (unanticipated) outcome of negative integration or ‘creeping competence’ (Pollack 1996).
250 The Commission’s own papers suggest that the creation of the Cultural Sector Division was made easier by the fact that it was set up within an existing department of DG XII’s and used Grégoire’s existing post, the budget entry for which was simply transferred to the new division. See HAEU SEC(73)2117 O.J.254, Point 8, Note a Messieurs les Membres de la Commission [sic], 29 Mai 1973. See also COM(73) PV 254 (séance du 30 mai 1973) for the minutes of the actual Commission decision.
The Cultural Sector Division’s own working programme (HAEU BDT 144/87\textsuperscript{251}) (July 1973) reiterated the plans set out in previous texts but added measures to draw in external policy actors into the cultural policy process – consultation with cultural sector professional associations and sections of European public opinion; and cooperation with other international cultural organisations (e.g. the Council of Europe).

Thus, eight months after the Commission’s decision on its first Memorandum on ‘Community action on culture’ was held back by the difficulty of predicting political conditions, culture had managed to slip into Dahrendorf’s programme as a non-portfolio issue and become part of a Commissioner’s agenda, it had a dedicated policy bureaucracy in a DG with a director in post, and had also a dedicated development programme.

This (micro-level process), however, needs to be seen in the broader context of the Commission’s expansion and the (macro-level) processes in place to enable it. Its routine to capture new policy issues, once a new (non-treaty) policy idea emerged, involved research and development and the elaboration of an action programme (Cram 2007). As some sort of institutional\textsuperscript{252} foundation (Cini 1996: 31) was established and (soft) legislation (for example, EP texts) built up (more on this below), the Commission could claim legitimacy in the area and get ready to advance its proposal should a policy window open.

7.4.2 Mobilising the European Parliament

Momentum for the culture issue had also been building in the EP, following the Liberal and Allies’ submission in June 1973 of a draft resolution on the protection of cultural

\textsuperscript{251} HAEU BDT 144/87 folder 65, Programme de travail dans le domaine de la culture, Bruxelles, le 9 juillet 1973

\textsuperscript{252} Tilly and Tarrow (2006) define institutionalisation as the incorporation of performances and political actors into the routines of organised politics.
Cultural heritage had come to prominence following UNESCO’s Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1972 and the EP’s Youth and Cultural Affairs Committee (hereinafter Culture Committee) asked British MEP Lady Elles to review the resolution.

Elles not only reviewed but substantially expanded it. Her report (European Parliament 1974b) supported Community action to protect cultural heritage but advocated much broader European level intervention in culture. It welcomed the new Cultural Sector Division in the European Commission and called on the Commission to develop proposals to the Council on the application of the Treaty to the cultural sector and on the creation of a Council of Culture Ministers. Other measures mostly echoed the Commission’s recent documents on culture.

This was no coincidence. Elles’ report and resolution had been written in close collaboration with the director of the Cultural Sector Division, Robert Grégoire, who had ‘secretly’ (Grégoire 2000: 206) offered to help with the review. The EP’s committee meetings were normally attended by a Commission representative who coordinated relations between the EP and their DG and policy area, and informal meetings with the EP’s rapporteur for a proposal were routine:

Especially in fields such as education or culture, with an ambiguous legal basis, collaboration or partnership with the European Parliament was particularly important and actively sought by Commission officials as this and any ensuing legislation (for example, resolutions) helped build legitimacy for the issue or policy in question (COM2 2009).

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253 The Council of Europe was also organising a European Year of Architectural Heritage for 1975. The Commission’s DG Environment and Consumer Protection Service was in fact closely involved in the work of conservation of architectural heritage promoted by UNESCO, Council of Europe and Europa Nostra. The EC’s first environmental policy which touched on both cultural and architectural heritage was also adopted by the Council in November 1973.
Grégoire more than helped – he ‘dropped the entire memorandum package in [Elles’ resolution]’ (Grégoire 2000: 206). The resolution was approved by the EP plenary by unanimity on 13 May 1974.

Elles had framed her resolution (European Parliament 1974b) in terms of European identity, very popular since EC leaders had issued a Declaration on European Identity (European Council 1973) at their Copenhagen summit in December 1973. European Identity in fact referred to the external identity of Europe in world affairs (not to cultural identity), but drawing on the political commitments of the EC leaders enabled Elles to rationalise and legitimise the EP’s call for the Commission to act on culture. Citing (interpreting) European Council conclusions or the rhetoric of the member states was a common tactic of European institutions to rationalise and legitimise action, especially in the promotion of new policy areas (see for example, Cram 1997). The Declaration’s rhetorical references to European civilisation and common heritage only encouraged Elles’ cultural reinterpretation of ‘European identity.’

The EP’s (collaborative) resolution marked the beginning of a close working relationship, or, as Grégoire called it, of the ‘complicity’ (2000: 207) between the Commission (Grégoire himself) and the EP. The Commission looked to the EP to add legitimacy to its own actions. In process and institutional terms, complying with an EP’s request for

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254 Italics in the original.
255 The Declaration came in the wake of the much debated lack of a European unified response to the Middle East war in 1973. The war was at the origin of the massive hike in oil prices and the ensuing oil embargo which derailed the international economy in the 1970s.
256 That is, in terms of articulating a coherent European foreign policy and a harmonious approach to world affairs and security.
257 The Declaration on European Identity was a central reference for Elles in the Parliamentary debate that preceded the vote on the resolution, see European Parliament (1974a).
258 It is curious that the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity is widely cited in the European cultural policy literature in connection (narrowly) with the development of cultural policy, when, in fact, the document is clearly framed in terms of security and defense and the European geopolitical situation (see also Calligaro 2010).
action (the Commission was legally bound to respond to e.g. calls for action/questions from the EP) established a precedent, which enabled the Commission to strengthen the institutional basis of the culture policy domain. In legislative terms the EP’s texts added to culture’s own acquis (albeit soft-law). Politically, the EP was an ally within the Community system which helped balance the dominant position of the member state governments in the Council (Cini 1996).

7.4.3 Generating a policy proposal

The EP’s involvement gave the Commission the impetus to move the culture issue to a new phase (HAEU BDT 64/84, 102: 2; BDT 144/87, 67: 1). Recognition of the importance of culture for the European project had also been growing in the European Commission since European leaders decided, at their Paris summit (October 1972), to establish a European union ‘by the end of the decade’ (European Council 1972: 16). A study to inform the Commission’s report to the Council on European Union had concluded that any debate on the Union should involve culture (HAEU EN-78) and the Commissioners meeting (at Vuidevoorde) in 1973 to debate the Commission’s role in the Union process also agreed that

‘although culture is a national competence any transfer to the European level was justified if this is essential to the functioning of the Union’ (SEC(73) 4594: 4).

Officials in DGXII also thought that the wider political context, namely the Community’s political and economic crisis at the time (recession, the oil crisis) and the inability of EC leaders to make decisions (Dinan 1994), opened a window to relaunch culture on the European agenda as,

259 HAEU BDT 64/84, 102 Note pour M. Schuster, Directeur général de la DGXII, Bruxelles, le 27 mars 1974; and also HAEU BDT 144/87, 67 Note pour M. le Professeur Dahrendorf, 25.IV.1974
260 HAEU EN-78, Note à l’attention de Monsieur Noel Secrétaire général de la Commission, 12 juillet 1973
261 SEC(73)4594 [HAEU EN-000078] Note pour MM. Les membres de la Commission, 3 décembre 1973
‘the current phase of disintegration of the Community might not be unfavourable to actions that could make the inability of member states to work together [...] look less obvious’ (BDT 144/87: 2).262

Grégoire was therefore asked (April 1974) to draft a new memorandum. But the problem of limited legal authority to deal with culture persisted. Commissioner Dahrendorf, for example, did not want to leave scope ‘for theological discussions on the competences of the Community’ (HAEU BDT 144/87: 3263). He insisted that the 1974 Memorandum set its boundaries and objectives clearly and that it needed to be framed in a way that justified Community action (that is, according to the EEC Treaty). This explains why the new memorandum was now titled ‘Community action in the cultural sector’ (SEC(74) 3485264) as opposed to ‘Community action in the culture domain’, the 1972 version.

Once again, the 1974 Memorandum’s first area of intervention was the application of the EEC Treaty to cultural production and distribution activities. The second action area included the cultural preparation for European Union – as the document states,

‘A key variable has now intervened: the Community will become a European Union. [...] The Commission has the duty to prepare the transformation of the Community into European Union. How could it fulfil this duty if it neglected the cultural preparation of European man? [...] Only the Commission can take the initiative and implement it successfully and in an appropriate timeframe. But we need to start working immediately: this is a long term task and the 1980 deadline is fast approaching’ (HAEU BDT 144/87: 13265).

The third action point recycled the 1972 Memorandum’s cooperation proposals, namely a fund for the protection of monuments and sites and action against the theft of works of art and heritage.

262 HAEU BDT 144/87, 67 Note pour M. le Professeur Dahrendorf, 25.IV.1974
263 HAEU BDT 64/84, 102 Note pour M. Schuster, Directeur général de la DGXII, Bruxelles, le 27 mars 1974
264 SEC(74) 3485 Memorandum, Action Communautaire dans le secteur culturel (Communication de M. Dahrendorf), 17 septembre 1974. This author’s emphasis.
265 Op. Cit. Footnote 251
7.4.4 Deciding not to decide

Commissioner Dahrendorf was generally favourable to the culture Memorandum but there were technical issues: the evidence base was weak (HAEU BDT 144/87, 67: 266) and many measures overlapped with the actions of other DGs. Politically, Dahrendorf was also concerned with the Council’s reaction. The Council presidency was held by France at the time and French President Giscard d’Estaing (like his predecessor Pompidou) was sensitive to the Commission’s involvement in culture. The French feared that it could interfere with French national cultural policy (Grégoire 2000). As political decision makers, Commissioners are attentive to the reputational costs for the Commission of submitting proposals which might not be supported at a later stage of the decision-making process (i.e. in the Council) and are unlikely to support such proposals.

At this juncture, thus, Dahrendorf decided not to submit the Memorandum to the College’s vote. Dahrendorf was also leaving the Commission to take up the post of director of the London School of Economics and did not want to leave a hastily approved policy paper for his successor to deal with. He decided to keep it as an internal document of the Commission (COM(74) PV 309267) which was not unusual in terms of the ‘incubation’ of new policy fields; but Commissioners confirmed their intention to revise and submit the memorandum to the Council in due course (COM(74) PV 309: 13-15).

The Chefs de cabinet268 produced a policy specification with eight priority measures which targeted particular cultural sector issues across the proposal’s three broad themes: within the application of the treaty to cultural sector activity the measures had to do

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266 HAEU BDT 144/87, 67 Note for the attention of Mr Bath, 28th August 1974
267 HAEU COM(74) Procès-verbal de la trois cent neuvième réunion de la Commission tenue à Luxembourg, (Kirchberg) (séance de nuit)
268 The chefs de cabinet (of all Commissioners) met weekly (chaired by Emile Noel, the Secretary General) to prepare the meeting of the College of Commissioners: to review the agenda and go through and decide on the fate of proposals in advance.
specifically with the elimination of barriers to the circulation of cultural goods and services, cultural exchanges and the fiscal operation of foundations and sponsorship; for the cultural preparation for European Union they recommended measures for the dissemination of the ‘common cultural elements’; and in terms of member state collaboration the emphasis was on the protection of cultural heritage and the theft of works of art and heritage.

For the second, consecutive time now, a cultural policy memorandum had successfully careered through the policy process to the Commission’s decision agenda – a (the) key point in a policy process – but no decision was taken. Not dissimilarly to 1972, the Commissioners supported the cultural policy proposal but delayed making a decision to a later stage. The time for culture had just not come yet.

In institutional and process terms, the two political events that acted as motivators for the initiation of the second policy cycle were: the European leaders decision to establish a political union by 1980 (culture and political union were associated since the Fouchet Plans in 1961); and the crisis – institutional and political – that gripped the Community at the time, the negative ‘image’ of which culture could supposedly soften, although the variable that directly impacted on the policy process was the (incubation) institutional process that the Commission had in place to fulfil its ambition to expand.

In the 2nd policy cycle, the social mechanisms that activated the above processes were: actor certification, of Grégoire as a claims maker for the new policy, and for the Commission, externally; the appropriation of an organisational base – the culture division – to oversee the process; policy entrepreneurship and brokerage, both performed by
Grégoire in using his political resources to promote the issue; and the Commission/EP coalition, which allowed a legal basis for the issue to build up.

The non-decision can be explained in the context of the incubation routine – the proposal was not viable, technically, hence the Commissioners’ decision not to decide but to support further investment.

7.5 Assembling the final proposal: changing tactics

The reformulation of the Commission’s proposal for Community action in the cultural sector resumed in 1975 but the tactics now changed. The cultural proposal was now reaching maturity and, other than technical quality, the Commission also needed to ensure its political feasibility. Work on the Memorandum now focused in particular on softening up and developing legitimacy, which involved mainly gathering an evidence base to underpin the proposed actions and the cultivation of stakeholders.

7.5.1 Cultivating legitimacy

7.5.1.1 Using knowledge and expertise

The need to generate evidence led to the creation of the Cultural Sector Division’s own programme of commissioned research,

‘Getting a snapshot of the cultural sector in each country of the Community was an urgent task. […] it was the only way to enable the Commission to propose the approximation and harmonisation [of laws] that would close the gaps [between national legislations]. […] The studies effectively guided Community action in the cultural sector’ (Grégoire 2000: 196-198).

According to Kingdon (1995) entrepreneurs attempt to ‘soften up’ both policy communities, which tend to be inertia-bound and resistant to major changes, and larger publics, getting them used to new ideas and building acceptance for their proposals.
By 1977 over ten research studies\textsuperscript{270} had been tendered by external experts and a number of other research projects were underway – cf. Appendix 2 for a list of the research commissioned in 1975-78 (HAEU BAC 144/1987, 56: Annex I\textsuperscript{271}). This research was conducted by well-known European scholars from academia and the cultural world. The Commission exploited the legitimising capacity of expert advice (Guigner 2004; Radaelli 1999; Cram 1997) to make up for the deficient political legitimacy of its cultural remit and soften up its forthcoming Memorandum. This was a common tactic in the Commission.

Of course, the studies not only created a precedent for Commission action in the field but, as their titles demonstrate, the evidence gathered allowed the Commission to identify the right kind of (European) ‘problem’ which required its favoured (Community level action) ‘solution’ – which further reinforced its hold on this policy area.

But if policy proposals must be technically feasible, they also need to be politically well informed (Cini 1996: 29). Thus far, the dynamics of the agenda and policy processes had occurred within the Commission (and EP). Outside these institutional boundaries, however, the extension of Community policy competence to culture remained a contested issue. The legitimising effort now also extended to external policy stakeholders.

7.5.1.2 Softening up

In areas where political agreement is likely to be problematic the Commission employs a strategy of ‘softening up’ (Majone 1992: 6). In this case it meant involving a range of

\textsuperscript{270} These studies were invariably surveys and comparative studies of particular sectors, issues or legislation including the nine EEC member states. This knowledge base was complemented by the research reports of the Cultural Sector Division stagiaires. Stagiaire researchers were typically qualified professionals with an interest in the work of the Division; in the 1970s many were academics – the majority had a PhD or postgraduate qualification – but also lawyers, teachers etc. Some of these reports were substantial, upwards 25K in word-length. See also HAEU BDT 64/84, folder 96 Note pour M. Schuster, Démarrage de l’action communautaire dans le secteur culturel, Bruxelles, le 9 avril 1976.

\textsuperscript{271} HAEU BAC 144/1987 folder 56 Annexe I, Etudes ‘secteur culturel’
external actors in the process – a dedicated committee of experts created by the Commission and a process of consultation with the sector. Hitherto, apart from the research reports, there had been no meaningful communication with external parties or stakeholders.

The purpose of the ‘Cultural Sector Group,’ which was unofficial, internal to DG XII and purely consultative in nature (HAEU BDT 144/87, 168: 1), was to have a sounding board for the Commission’s ideas, an information point between the Commission and the member states and to initiate a network of contacts (HAEU BDT 144/87, 168: 1). The Commission had handpicked national personalities, government officials, public interest organisations and academics. The Group had a modest or negligible impact on proceedings; but it did rubber-stamp the Commission’s 1977 Memorandum. The high profile individuals/organisations added (technical, at least) legitimacy to the Memorandum.

Grégoire also embarked on an extensive round of consultations with stakeholders, mainly European or international sectoral organisations (HAEU BDT 144/87). Sixteen such

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272 The expert group was an old idea (modeled on a successful education committee) which Dahrendorf had opposed in 1973, but on this occasion it was the Italian government (in the EC presidency in Jun-Dec 1975) who insisted on it. The Italians wanted to expand EC action in the area of culture and build support for it. See for example, HAEU BDT 144/87, 65 Vermerk für Herrn Brunner, Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft im Bereich der Kultur, Brüssel, den 8. Oktober 1975

273 HAEU BDT 144/87, 168 Note pour M. le commissaire Brunner, Groupe ‘Secteur culturel’, Bruxelles, 29.IX.1976

274 Ibid.

275 The Group members in 1976 were: Charles Bertin, president of the Belgian Committee of the Dramatic Authors Society, and Jan Briers director of the Flemish Radio-Television and director of the Festival of Flanders (Belgium); Hendrik Brugmans, Emeritus rector of the College of Europe (Netherlands); Michele CIFarelli, Senator and Vice-President of Italia Nostra (Italy); Richard Hoggart, Principal of Goldsmith’s College and UNESCO, later joined by Keith Jeffery from the Arts Council of Great Britain (UK); Pierre Moulinier, Research director at the State Secretariat for Culture (France); Hjalte Rasmussen, Chairman of the Danish Society for European Studies (Denmark); Guy Wagner, General Secretary of the Council for Cultural Animation (Luxembourg); Edward Walsh, Director of the National Institute for Higher Education of Limerick (Ireland); Günter Schödel, Director, Abteilung VI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Germany). Some members changed in 1977 and again in 1978.

276 HAEU BDT 144/87 folders 55, 65, 168. For example: International Federation of Actors, whose members at the time included the US and the USSR; International Federation of Musicians, Federation of...
meetings took place in 1976-1977 (and another eighteen in 1978-1979 as the Commission tried to put pressure on the Council to adopt the Memorandum). The purpose was to communicate the Commission’s proposals and sound out potential issues, drum up support for it and build a policy community. Again, the impact of this consultation on the new Memorandum was negligible; but it involved a variety of stakeholders – well established international umbrella organisations – which enabled the Commission to claim support from a wide constituency of interests.

7.5.2 The Commission and Parliament: win-win purposeful opportunism

The Commission’s tactics also changed (intensified) in terms of its interaction with the EP, in particular with the Culture Committee. This working relationship was, once again, informally brokered by Robert Grégoire. Grégoire attended every meeting of the culture committee and was relatively at home in the EP. He was as well-known for his lobbying of individual MEPs as for his stage-management of proceedings in the committee and even the plenary.277 By his own admission,

‘The president and the members of the Culture Committee let me intervene whenever I wanted and allowed me to express myself freely […]. Equally, I didn’t feel in any way uneasy about my position as a civil servant of the European Commission […]. At my own risk, what mattered was to produce results quickly.’ (Grégoire 2000: 209-210).

The Committee’s openness was not accidental and owed as much to the opportunity to shape the culture agenda as to bureaucratic politics. Fearing possible closure, as the EP embarked on a review of its committee structure, the Culture Committee did its best to keep busy and show results (COM2 2009). The Committee had a history of closure,

the Trade Unions of Audio Visual Workers; the International Confederation of Authors and Composers Rights; the International Institute of Historic Castles, etc.

277 Interviewees described how Grégoire would ‘run the show’ in the EP, telling people where to sit and what to do and helping MEPs with their (culture) speeches and also resolutions and reports. He also produced copious notes for their interventions in Parliament and sometimes intervened directly with explanatory comments. He supported Commissioners in their EP appearances in similar ways (Grégoire 2000: 209-210; NGO1 2009; COM2 2009; CON2 2010). For a general discussion of the relationship between the Commission and the EP in the 1970s see for example Corbett et al (1998), Cini (1996).
merger and resumption reflecting the changeable interest of the EP in culture over the years.\textsuperscript{278}

This was a win-win inter-institutional relationship: the Commission looked to Parliament for legitimating its policy and administrative actions (Cini 1996; Westlake 1994). Parliament, in turn, performed its role of oversight of the actions of the Commission at the same time fulfilling its ambition to directly influence policy.

It was in its oversight capacity, and as in 1975-76 work on the Memorandum stalled in the Commission,\textsuperscript{279} that the EP’s Culture Committee took on a more proactive stance, prodding the Commission into reporting on its work on the Memorandum periodically and adopting a number of resolutions.\textsuperscript{280} The EP virtually ‘became the motor’ (Grégoire 2000: 211; COM2 2009) of Community action in the cultural sector; although it is conceivable that it was Grégoire who entrepreneurially used his influence in the EP’s Culture Committee to this effect, in order to get things moving in the Commission.

Indeed, Grégoire had his own turf politics to fight in the Commission. DGX Information planned to create a European Foundation to promote cultural and information projects. The Rome European Council (March 1977) had approved the Foundation and influential members of the Commission were being lobbied for support. All this now put the Memorandum\textsuperscript{281} at risk. In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the EP (or the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item The EP’s Youth and Cultural Affairs Committee did in fact lose its battle on this occasion but cultural affairs were taken over by the über influential Political Affairs Committee.
\item See for example HAEU BDT 64/84 folder 102 Note pour M. Brunner, in which the director of DGXII Schuster tries to persuade Commissioner Brunner to ‘volunteer’ a presentation to the EP before they ask.
\item See for example, SEC(76)217 ‘L’action communautaire dans le secteur culturel (document de travail de M. Brunner’; European Parliament (1976b) which will be cited in the Commission’s 1977 policy paper as providinga legal basis for it, together with four other documents; and (1976c).
\item The Foundation became a competitive issue right through to decision day. Anecdotal evidence shows how one high ranking official had even written to Commissioner Brunner suggesting that any general cultural policy statement [the Communication] were held back until ‘we see how the matter [Foundation] fares in the Council’. On the day that the Commission’s Communication was sent to the Commissioners
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EP-Commission alliance) went a step further to legitimise and institutionalise Community action in the cultural sector; which follows next.

7.5.2.1 Inserting a new culture article in the EC budget

The preparation of concrete proposals for the memorandum by the Cultural Sector Division required the undertaking of preparatory projects and activity, which led the Commission to incorporate a new article for culture in its budget for 1976. This was, of course, opposed by the Council because culture did not have a legal basis. But the Commission had labelled the new budget line as ‘specific cultural projects.’ ‘Specific projects’ were a non-compulsory expenditure category under which small specific operations could be entered/voted in the European budget by the EP on its own (it had full decision powers for this expenditure category and no need for a Council decision).

The budget, authority on which was shared by the Council and the EP, was often an instrument of institutional politics, especially in the 1970s. Despite the intense opposition of the Council, thus, the EP voted (unanimously) to include the new culture article in the EC budget – Article 393 ‘expenditure on cultural projects’.

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*In this instance, this was a ‘token entry’ – in 1976 a ‘token entry’ referred to a new activity that might be developed in the future. It made it possible to present items in a way that allowed an item of expenditure to be recognised in principle and appropriations to be allocated to it later (Strasser 1978). The Commission used this mechanism as a basis to launch new policies at the time. See also Lindner (2006) for an analysis of the EC budget process.*

*Non-compulsory actions such as pilot projects, studies, investigations, do not necessarily depend on Council regulations to receive a budgetary appropriation. They can be based on soft law provisions.*
The appropriation to be allocated to this budget entry was minimal (27600 u.c.\textsuperscript{284}) but the insertion of an article for culture into the EC budget ‘represented an immense triumph’ (Grégoire 2000: 201) for the new policy domain. Firstly, insertion in the EC budget provided an institutional foundation and a precedent for a new issue-area that had no legal basis in Community legislation (Pollack 2003). As a former Commission official put it, ‘the budget was important. It meant that it was there’ (COM2 2009).

Secondly, once a budget line was created it was very difficult to remove; and once there, it potentially served as a basis for further action and expenditure (Grégoire 2000: 203), which it did, in this instance.

Thus, by the end of 1976, with the support of the EP in tow, a dedicated budget line, the broad consultation cum-legitimation exercise underway and the Memorandum text getting ready, it was clear that the different pieces of the jigsaw – or the three streams of problem, policy and politics, as Kingdon would have it – were coming together. The Commission agreed that the memorandum would become a Communication\textsuperscript{285} from the Commission to the Council.

\textbf{7.6 The protracted decision-making process}

The Commission was convinced that the wider political moment was

‘particularly favourable. […] culture is starting to arouse the interest of public opinion […].’ (European Parliament 1976a\textsuperscript{286}).

\textsuperscript{284} u.c (French unités de compte) or European Currency Unit was an accounting unit used by the EC, based on the currencies of the member states; it was not a currency in its own right.

\textsuperscript{285} A communication is a means of providing (or communicating) an official opinion on an area of policy. It is usually produced by the European Commission on a particular subject though is not legally binding.

\textsuperscript{286} Intervention of Guido Brunner (then European Commissioner for culture).
It may well have seemed so at the time, as the European Union idea gathered momentum in the European (EC’s) public sphere. The 1976 Tindemans Report on European Union (Tindemans 1976), which had been discussed by the European leaders at their Hague Council of November 1976, had massive European media coverage, and its wide popularity at the time suggested that the time was right for the Commission’s move on culture. The Report had a cultural undertone although, in fact, its emphasis lay more explicitly on the human – and not specifically cultural – dimension of the Union project.

The Commission finally adopted its ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council of Ministers on Community action in the cultural sector’ (COM(77) 560) (hereinafter the Communication) on 16 November 1977 (COM(77) PV 450 final). Once in the Council, the Communication was sent to the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and the EP for their Opinions. Both the ECOSOC and the EP returned positive opinions (the EP voted the Communication by unanimity but because of its congested agenda, the vote only took place in January 1979, over a year later).

Obtaining the consensus of the member states was, however, more difficult. France was fundamentally opposed to any extension of Community competences, especially to cultural matters. In Germany culture was (constitutionally) an exclusive competence of the Länder which, politically, put the Federal government in a difficult position. In Denmark there was opposition in principle (Jones 2006) but there were also legal issues around the Nordic Council’s regional cultural programme. Belgium’s and The

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287 This was also the perception of the British government, see for example VAM ACGB 119/132. In reality, despite all the publicity, the report (which is still cited today as an influencer in the development of a cultural competence in the EC) did not have any impact and was in fact disliked by both the Council and the Commission.
288 COM(77) PV 450 final, Bruxelles, le 30 novembre 1977
289 The Nordic Council included Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. At the time only Denmark was a member of the EEC. Sweden and Finland would only join the Community in 1992.
Netherlands’ ‘indecision didn’t look too promising’ (Grégoire 2000: 194). Italy, Luxembourg and Ireland were the only governments who supported the Commission’s Communication.

The British government was sceptical. The Commission’s Communication was debated at Westminster. In the Commons Gordon Oakes, the Minister of State of the Department of Education and Science (at the time responsible for cultural affairs), assured the Commons that the document

‘will not receive an uncritical welcome from British Ministers and officials if and when’ it is discussed in Brussels’ (VAM ACGB 119/166)

In the Lords debate Lord Trefgarne (a member of the House of Lords Offices Committee and previously EU sub-committee) told the House that,

‘at the present moment action will not be hurried […]. […] before further action is taken on the Commission’s proposals the Government will be given ample time and opportunity to consider the proposals and their consequences’ (Hansard, HL Deb 05 July 1979 vol 401 cc523-76: 22).

Delaying tactics at national level would always prove an effective means of stalling decision-making in Brussels.

Conversely, insofar as Council presidencies have a hand in selecting the agenda and priorities for their term, they are in a position to control Council’s decisions in some

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290 However, the minutes of the meetings of officials from the relevant government departments – Arts Council, British Council, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Office of Arts and Libraries (DES) – reveal that their position was more open than the Parliamentary debates suggest. A good example is VAM ACGB 119/129

291 House of Commons in June 1978 (Hansard, HC Deb 23 June 1978 vol 952 cc936-99); in the House of Lords’ Select Committee appointed by the government for the effect in 1978-79; and in the House of Lords debate of July 1979 (Hansard, HL Deb 05 July 1979 vol 401 cc523-76: 22).

292 This author’s italics

293 See also the contribution of the Minister for the Arts, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge.
The fact that in the first semester of 1978 the Council presidency fell to Denmark, followed by Germany and then France, did not bode well for ‘Community action in the cultural sector’ in the two years following the 1977 submission. According to one official working in the Council Secretariat at the time,

‘s we know it [Commission’s Communication] had been sent, but inside [the Council] you were, especially at that time, in the hands of the presidency. And nothing happened’ (CON2 2010; also CON1 2009).

This explains why, despite the ECOSOC’s and the EP’s positive opinions, the Commission’s Communication never made it to any decision agenda or even a COREPER meeting. In fact, the Commission never received a response from the Council to its 1977 Communication on Community action in the cultural sector.

Thus, six years and three policy cycles after Spinelli’s attempt to get a policy on culture off the ground in the European Commission, the Memorandum on ‘Community action in the cultural sector’ finally cleared all the technical, legal and political hurdles in the Commission’s decision process in 1977, although a decision remained to be made in the Council.

7.7 Conclusion
The evidence and the preceding analysis of the formation of cultural policy in the European Commission in 1972-77 confirms the utility of using an analytical framework combining an institutional processual approach with social mechanisms, to explain the formation of supranational cultural policy in the European Commission in the 1970s. In particular, the episode highlights the following important factors:

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294 Each rotating EC Presidency sets the agenda for its six month tenure. Although this is done in consultation with other institutions, namely with the European Commission, presidencies do find the means to shape the agenda to suit their preferences, for example, to include or exclude items.
First, although the three policy cycles initiated and progressed inside the Commission, contextual events nevertheless influenced the issue’s trajectory at particular points. To use the counterfactual argument, cultural policy would not have developed without this interaction. Thus, the 1969 Hague summit opened the door to soft policy issues (thus far ignored by European leaders); eurosclerosis and the 1973 economic/political crisis prompted the Commission to make a move on the 1974 Memorandum. Conversely, the 1980 deadline for political union decided at Paris in 1972 helped Grégoire rationalise Cultural (as opposed to socio-economic) cultural action and MEP Lady Elles to justify her call on the Commission to develop cultural proposals on the basis of European cultural identity.

Second, the episode also shows how institutional frameworks shaped the policy process and its outcome. The EEC Treaty was a key institutional variable that interacted with or pervaded the cultural policy process shaping direction and outcomes – the change from culture to cultural sector (from the 1972 to 1974 memoranda) is a case in point. But institutions interacted with the policy process in other ways, not least through the instrumental use of the rules of the game, such as invoking Article 235 to create the concept of ‘Community action’ and justify cultural policy action under the EEC Treaty. A process design feature that allowed cultural policy to gradually accumulate a legal and institutional acquis was the Commission’s system to incubate new policy areas – it also explains the longevity of what was a sensitive, controversial agenda issue.

Third, the chapter also confirms the importance of mechanisms (and chains of mechanisms) as the causal links in the interaction of political contexts, processes and institutions explained above; and, consequently, in the transformation of these
interactions into tangible outcomes. Dahrendorf’s certification of Grégoire as a claims
maker for the Commission’s and its emerging cultural policy, for example, was vital for
the latter’s subsequent, key action as a policy entrepreneur. Using the language of
Kingdon (1995), one could say that, ultimately, these two social mechanisms enabled
Grégoire to first, shape, and then, couple the streams (processes) of problem, policy and
politics (Kingdon 1995).
CHAPTER 8
A fresh boost for European union and cultural policy, 1983-87

8.1 Introduction
The final episode of policy formation in the EC examined in this thesis concerns developments in the cultural policy domain in the European Community in 1983-1988 which culminated with the Commission’s paper A fresh Boost for Culture in the EC (COM(87) 603 Final) in 1987. In the mid-1980s, ten years after its previous (1977) paper, the Commission set out, again, to launch a new cultural policy. The effort coincided with, indeed was intimately related to, the broader venture to advance European integration and effect institutional reform, treaty revision and new policy competences (which would ultimately culminate with the Maastricht Treaty and the single market in 1992).

However, in contrast with the previous episode which emerged and developed through European Commission officials’ initiatives to create a new policy domain, that is, ‘from below’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006), the 1987 Commission’s paper emerged after a four year long, well supported high level agenda-setting process, that is, ‘from above’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006). Led first by Mitterrand (President of France) and then by Delors (President of the European Commission), the goal to place culture in the European political and reform agendas ultimately failed. Nevertheless, this agenda setting exercise launched a new policy dynamic in the Commission, ‘from below’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006), at the same time as a new long political window of opportunity (1992) emerged – the outcome of this interaction was the Commission’s 1987 ‘Fresh Boost’ paper.

Thus, this episode comprises two policy cycles and this chapter presents a narrative of this policy experience based on its causal reconstruction. The chapter vindicates the
choice of an institutional processual analytical framework – it explains how political context factors interacted with the efforts of individual and/or collective actors, their choices and ideas, the institutional settings in which such interactions took place and the mechanisms they activated. The argument therefore focuses on flows of interaction, the subtle interplay between beliefs and action as experience unfolds, and on context in motion (Barzelay and Gallego 2006: 538).

This chapter is structured in the following manner. The event narrative mapping presented next page charts the events and political processes in this episode – the episode occurred in the period 1983-88. Section 2 reviews the antecedent and contextual events that opened successive political windows and how political events and ideas generated political impetus to place culture on the high level European union and reform agenda. Section 3 focuses on the first policy cycle proper and the efforts of Commission President Jacques Delors to place culture on the treaty revision agenda and examines the process factors that shaped the issue trajectory and the (ultimately unsuccessful) outcome of this process. Section 4 follows the policy process’ move to a different policy ‘low politics’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006) dynamic and process leading to the ‘A Fresh Boost’ Commission paper (European Commission 1987b). The following Section 5 accounts for the decision-making process in the Council. Section 6 draws together the main themes of the chapter, showing the benefit of examining the formation of (European) policy using a processual-institutional framework of analysis. The episode reflects the importance of process contexts, macro and micro, as well as the role of structural and institutional features and social mechanisms in the trajectory of the culture issue and formation of cultural policy.
Figure 8.1: Event narrative mapping of the policy episode 1983-87

PE0 The European Act (Genscher-Colombo) 1981

PE1 From Community to Union
PE1.1 Solemn Declaration Stuttgart ‘83
PE1.2 EP Draft Treaty 84
PE1.3 Treaty revision reports: Adornino/Dooge

PE2 Establishing an institutional venue for cultural cooperation: the Culture Council 1984

PE3 Jack Lang and l’Europe culturelle
PE3.1 Querying European competition rules re culture
PE3.2 Mobilising European culture ministers
PE3.3 Shaping the EC culture agenda

CE1 The (new) Delors Commission, 1985-

CE2 European Councils 1984-87

CE2 Milan Council 1985: convening of IGC agreed

CE3 White Paper: implementing the internal market

CE4 Developing policy ideas within the Commission, 1986-87
CE4.1 Looking for policy direction
CE4.2 Unsuccessful agenda-setting at Florence

CE5 Single European Act, 1986

E1 Culture on the Commission’s agenda, 1985-86
E1.1 Placing culture on the treaty revision’s agenda
E1.1.1 Delors’ vision for Europe
E1.1.2 The Commission’s agenda and culture
E1.1.3 The Commission’s IGC agenda and culture

E1.3 Creating a specialised policy venue for culture, 1985
E1.3.1 Allocating culture to Commissioner portfolio
E1.3.2 Reorganising the policy machinery: the new DGX

E2 IGC negotiations re culture, late 1985-
E2.1 Unsuccessful bid to insert cultural competence in the revised Treaty

E3 Agenda and policy formulation in the Culture Council, 1985-
E3.1 Formulating policy and agenda building…
E3.2 …but reaching an impasse

E4 Developing policy ideas within the Commission, 1986-87
E4.1 Looking for policy direction
E4.2 Unsuccessful agenda-setting at Florence

E5 Alternative formulation, 1987
E4.2 Generating a policy proposal: ‘A fresh boost for culture in the Community

E6 Council decision making, 1987-88
E6.1 The Culture Council’s Resolution (May 1988): new cultural policy priorities
E6.2 The Council’s culture advisory committee

RE1 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) re Treaty revision and Union, late 1985

RE2 French agenda for cultural cooperation: the Blue Book, 1987

RE3 European Foundation rejected in Netherlands 1987

RE4 Establishing an institutional venue for cultural cooperation: the Culture Council 1984

RE5 Single European Act, 1986

HE1 ‘Objective1992’: Single Market and European Union

HE2 Delors Commission first term 1985-88

LE2 Hanover European Council, June 1988


1981-84 Episode: 1985-87

8.2 Reviving European integration and political union: the cultural turn?

The 1980s heralded a new start for the EC after the relative stagnation of European integration in the 1970s. The forces of change not only welled up from within Europe but swept in from abroad (Gillingham 2003: 152) spurring member states of the European Community to close ranks and make progress with European integration. Proposals for institutional change started to emerge in the first half of the 1980s, showing the desire to revitalize political cooperation and move toward union. A common element to Union proposals at the time was the unanimous support for the extension of the Community’s policy competencies to culture. For the first time, the political climate seemed to be favourable to the rise of culture on the Community’s agenda.

But whilst these initiatives were of little or no direct consequence, indirectly, the various efforts to create a union and to introduce a cultural competence contributed to the EC’s revival later in the 1980s. Importantly, they also generated momentum for culture to climb on the union’s agenda. This chain of events – the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) and its initial (1981) incarnation, the Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act, the EP’s Draft Treaty establishing the European Union (1984) and the European Councils of Fontainebleau (1984) and Milan (1985) – forged a path that shaped subsequent events, culminating in the 1985 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to amend the EEC treaties\(^{295}\) and, of particular relevance to this episode, to include culture therein.

8.2.1 Building momentum

The Stuttgart Declaration on European Union issued by Heads of State at the end of the European Council in Stuttgart in June 1983, expressed their commitment to the

\(^{295}\) The outcome of the 1985 IGC was the Single European Act (1986)
development of the European Union and identified the policies they recognised as key in this process as well as the need to ‘complement Community action’ with cooperation in cultural matters. Cooperation measures would include educational exchanges, the dissemination of information about European history and culture to promote a European awareness, protection of the cultural heritage and the wide dissemination of the works of creative (artists, writers) inside and outside the Community. Institutionally, the Declaration not only placed cultural cooperation on the agenda of the Community but provided a legal basis for cooperation to formally develop.\(^{296}\)

The Stuttgart Declaration, in fact, marked the conclusion of a two year long debate on the development of political cooperation in the Community. The debate had started at the European Council in London in November 1981 when the Foreign Affairs ministers of Germany and Italy (Genscher and Colombo respectively) presented a project for a ‘European Act’ (hereinafter Genscher-Colombo). Among other things, Genscher-Colombo called for institutional reform and in particular for the establishment of a Council of the Ministers responsible for Culture

\[…\] to promote awareness of the common cultural origins as a facet of European identity whilst at the same time drawing on the existing variety of individual traditions and intensifying the mutual exchange of experiences’ (Genscher-Colombo 1981).

These proposals were echoed by the French government which also proposed a European cultural policy at the London Council (for reasons explained below the French

\(^{296}\) Cultural cooperation and methods had in fact been discussed at a first informal meeting of EC Culture Ministers in Naples (Italy) in September 1982, the result of French Culture Minister Jack Lang’s campaign to mobilise other EC Culture Ministers for the issue of culture in the EC’s framework, and it is conceivable that the Stuttgart Declaration’s provision for cultural cooperation reflected (or even codified) developments that were underway. The meeting was arranged to provide the opportunity for the Ten’s Culture Ministers (plus new EC applicant states Portugal and Spain) to get together and discuss a strategy for culture in the Community (COM1 2008).
government was an active European cultural agenda setter from the early 1980s, cf. 8.2.2).


The Draft Treaty was adopted by the EP in February 1984 with a majority of 237 to 31 (Schmuck 1990) and had the assertive – and vocal – support of President Mitterrand of France; but despite approval in the Italian, Belgian, Irish and French parliaments (Corbett 1990) it failed to be ratified.

In terms of process, thus, political events in the first half of the 1980s were contextual factors that helped not only the idea of union gain traction but also revived the coupling of political union and culture formally claimed by the Fouchet Plans some twenty years before (cf. Chapter 5). In this context, the linkage between union and culture gained a momentum that was instrumental in consolidating the notion of culture as a building block in the development of European integration and the next phase of the EC, fuelling political support for placing culture on the European political agenda.

297 Spinelli had been the person responsible for initiating a cultural policy in the Commission in 1972.
298 The Italian and Belgian parliaments in fact voted unanimously on its ratification, see for example European Parliament (1985)
The political event that followed, the French presidency of the EC, in the first semester 1984, was one of those punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1991) moments that launched the process to transform conviction and political mood into institutional change.

8.2.2 Punctuating the equilibrium: Mitterrand, ideas, interests and institutions

Such transformation owed mainly to the direct involvement of French president François Mitterrand and the (his) European policy of France. Socialist Mitterrand had conceived of a new model of European society, a Europe of the peoples, a vision of Europe as a social and cultural space. Thus, throughout the course of 1982-84, while culture minister Jack Lang engaged in multiple initiatives to kick-start l’Europe culturelle (cultural Europe) and European north-south dialogue, and rallied European culture ministers to establish a Culture Council in the EC, Mitterrand advocated the development of a Europe of the peoples and a corresponding policy ‘space’ at the highest political levels. 299

But however sincerely felt Mitterrand’s European conviction was, he was equally alert to the importance of Europe to the achievement of French objectives, whether political, economic, or even cultural-economic. For example, as the European common market deregulation affected French films, television and books (cultural industries were part of the socialist economic/industrial renewal programme 300), so the French government mobilised to influence European supranational policy for its own purposes (which explains how books and the audiovisual were at the top of Jack Lang’s agenda at the culture ministers meeting in Naples, cf. footnote 297 above).

299 Although commentators note that this was no more than the transposition of Mitterrand’s failed dream of a socialist France into Europe (see for example Defarges 1985; Cole 1994) – as the failure of socialist policies transpired two years into Mitterrand’s government, in 1982, so the French president took on a pro-European stance.

Whether for ideological or instrumental reasons, or both, thus, the emphasis placed on the integration of French priorities – including cultural policies – with European policy became the means through which Mitterrand refocused French socio-economic reform and which in turn enabled him to exert influence over supranational policy – more Europe meant more France.  

8.2.2.1 The French presidency of the EC in 1984

This process also enabled Mitterrand to claim a leading role for France – as well as for himself – in Europe (see, for example, Cole 1994). His role in stimulating and steering the process and progression of European integration was of particular consequence during the French EC presidency in the first semester of 1984, in the course of which he personally campaigned to promote (among others) the relaunch of European integration, the Europe of the peoples initiative and closer cooperation on the European agenda.

Because of its function as ‘process-manager’ (Tallberg 2006), the Council presidency enjoys the privilege and unique opportunities to steer or even impose national priorities on the European agenda (see for example, Tallberg 2006, 2010; Wartjen 2007). The presidency not only schedules formal and informal meetings and structures agendas but also chairs negotiations and the decision-making machinery. During the six months of his EC presidency, Mitterrand, véritable homme-orchestre (Defarges 1985) (a truly one-man band), travelled relentlessly to European capitals, setting about the task to promote his agenda for Europe with ‘methodical persistence’ (Defarges 1985), holding no fewer than thirty bilateral meetings with the other nine EC leaders (Dinan 1994), other than the statutory presidential meetings with EC institutions.

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301 See, for example, Littoz-Monnet (2007) for a comprehensive analysis of three relevant cases.
In a speech to the EP in Strasbourg in May 1984 he referred specifically to culture as one of the elements of European unity, stressing the need to extend the Community’s competences to new fields – said he,

‘Europe […] has yet to realise the full extent of the economic, cultural and political stakes of the coming century. […] A new situation calls for a new treaty which must not, of course, be a substitute for existing treaties, but an extension of them to fields they do not currently cover’ (Mitterrand 1984).

At Fontainebleau (cf. 8.2.4 below) a month later, Mitterrand ‘solemnly and severely’ alerted governments moving toward the unification and revival of Europe to focus more on the needs of European citizens (Santer 1985). It seemed that ‘the pace of events hung on the French president’s most cryptic comment’ (Keating and Murphy 1990: 231).

This was the first time in the history of the EC presidency that the role of the EC president was personalized in this way, which was in sharp contrast with the typical, collective (preparatory) summit approach – the French president was not only the architect of the European policy of France, he was Europe’s chief builder. Mitterrand now possessed significant process resources: he was process manager; he had clear objectives; chairmanship of the EC presidency provided privileged access to national information which enabled him to entrepreneurially engineer agreements and broker agendas; and, due to its influence, size and demography, moreover, France’s power status meant (in the EEC context) that what France wants is important.

Mitterrand was an actor at the centre of an exceptional configuration of events, processes and resources which positioned him uniquely to champion an agenda for culture in Europe. He had the idea – a new European society and the role of culture in it; he had an

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302 Which was also by virtue of his confessional tours. So-called confessional tours are the meetings that the European presidency has with national leaders in which it learns about the direction of national thinking, interests, and which enables it to plan agendas, meetings, votings, future decisions etc.
interest (however instrumental) – national/French; he had the institutions – the French presidency followed by the EC presidency; he had the political window – the Fontainebleau European Council; and had the resources inherent to the above.

In terms of process, the mechanisms that helped Mitterrand transform ideas, interests, institutions and resources into the tangible outcome of formally initiating culture on the European political agenda at Fontainebleau, was the activation of the (concatenated) agency mechanisms of policy entrepreneurship and of logic of appropriateness. Logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 2004) explains Mitterrand’s behaviour with reference to his political identity and beliefs, the leadership ambition of France in relation to Europe and his motivation to be seen to act appropriately in these conditions. As a policy entrepreneur he was instrumental in rallying support for his ideas by identifying the ‘problem’, shaping the terms of the cultural policy debate and building coalitions using the resources – via politics, personal, presidency – available to him.

8.2.3 From Fontainebleau to Milan

But Mitterrand’s role was critical at the French presidency’s closing European Council of Fontainebleau of 25-26 June 1984, when heads of state decided on ‘a new start’ (Mitterrand quoted in European Community Information Service 1984) for the European Community. Particularly significant was the decision, as a result of Mitterrand’s pressure (Cole 1994: 123), to set up two ad hoc committees: one to study measures to establish a Europe of the peoples – the ‘Committee for a People’s Europe’ (hereinafter Adonnino Committee); the other to look into institutional reform and the feasibility of a new treaty – the ‘Committee for Institutional Affairs’ (hereinafter Dooge Committee).³⁰³

³⁰³ The two Committees became known as Dooge and Adonnino after their respective presidents Irish Minister James Dooge and Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino.
But if Fontainebleau formally opened a ‘problems’ window for culture (through ‘A People’s Europe’), the Milan European Council, a year later, was the agenda setting exercise, toward the end of the transformation process that Mitterrand had galvanized, that formally placed culture on the EC’s institutional reform plans, namely the treaty’s revision agenda.

Both the Adonnino and Dooge Committees’ reports submitted at Milan\(^{304}\) reflected and confirmed EC member state support for the extension of Community competence to culture. The Adonnino report on ‘A People’s Europe’ was adopted, with proposals for culture, youth, education and sport aimed to involve ‘the citizens of Europe more determinedly in the construction of Europe’ (Adonnino 1985). Specifically cultural initiatives focused on the promotion of European identity, the use of audiovisual methods in its dissemination, access to cultural events and the European City of Culture project.

The Dooge Committee was supposed to examine institutional and treaty reform but it too recommended the extension of Community activities to culture in the following phase of European reform (Dooge 1985; 1984).\(^{305}\) Although the report mainly reiterated the cultural cooperation objectives of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart two years before, culture received a wide measure of support from the Dooge Committee (Keating and Murphy 1990: 226) but it was not explored in detail because of the overlap with the Adonnino Committee.

\(^{304}\) The French government also submitted its ‘Memorandum on a People’s Europe’ at Milan placing a particular emphasis on culture and young people.

\(^{305}\) Both the interim (1984) and final (1985) Dooge reports dedicate a section to culture but whilst in the 1984 Interim Report the notion of culture is broad, with a heading titled ‘Promotion of the common values of civilisation’, and calls for action in the social, human rights, judicial, cultural and university areas (Dooge 1984: 15-16), the 1985 final report shows a far more focused and narrower conception of the term (culture) – the respective heading is now ‘Promotion of common cultural values’ and recommended actions include heritage, cultural creation, media, language and the free circulation of cultural goods (Dooge 1985: 20-21). The thinking and the language clearly changed between the two reports which suggests that debate was ongoing between the interim and final versions of the report.
Given British and Danish objections to reform, however, there was no agreement on the full report and the debate was deferred to an Intergovernmental Conference to take place in November (1985), for which the European Commission, as the EC’s executive, was tasked to prepare proposals to modify or complete the EEC Treaty – in effect, to prepare an agenda for the new treaty negotiations. Culture, most significantly, was one of six sectors\(^\text{306}\) (Endo 1999: 141) singled out for study by the Commission.

In the circumstance, the appointment of a new European Commission (which had taken office in January 1985) became a key piece in this jigsaw. Not least because of the role that its new president, Jacques Delors\(^\text{307}\) would play. Mitterrand’s former Economy and Finance Minister, Delors was a catalyst of change at a juncture of institutional reform in the Community and as the move to the internal market and a European political union by 1992 was decided. It would prove to be a turning point for culture in the European agenda – it initiated a process to legally recognize culture on the European treaties.

Had the time for culture finally come?

### 8.3 Relaunching the culture issue at a Treaty reform juncture

#### 8.3.1 Jacobs Delors: policy entrepreneur and ingénieur\(^\text{308}\)

With a new Commission and president there was a new Commission agenda. Delors shared Mitterrand’s vision of a European society and was equally committed to a social

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306 The other five were the establishment of the internal market, cohesion, technology, environment and monetary questions.

307 Jacques Delors was Mitterrand government’s Economy and Finance Minister between 1981 and July 1984 and had been an MEP before that (1979-81). He was a close friend and allegedly protégé of Mitterrand’s. By the time he was designated as Commission President, in July 1984, he had been a key element in the dynamic French EC presidency of January-June 1984, very experienced and widely respected in European political circles. The Delors Commission started in January 1985.

308 Dyson and Featherstone (1999) describe Delors as an ingénieur, which they define as a manipulator of EC institutional venues for negotiation to help shape outcomes. They also characterize him as an animateur for mobilising enthusiasm and galvanizing the negotiation process into action, finding means of putting policy experts to work in a framework of their own choosing; and a policy entrepreneur.
and cultural Europe, a concern that is explicit in the first Working Programme of the Delors Commission of March 1985 – it pledged that

‘Community action in its cultural and human dimension must be one of the key elements in the realisation of the European project’ (European Commission 1985: 52).

A high ranking Commission official at the time explains that,

‘Delors tended to evoke culture as a general factor likely to strengthen (or even create) the [European] citizens’ sense of belonging to the Community (COM6 2010).

But there was an equally strong cultural-economic dimension to the Commission working programme. Main aims included the removal of barriers in the European ‘communication’ space and also cultural creation and cooperation, mainly in the sectors of the audiovisual, books and heritage. Thus, in his inaugural speech to the EP as president of the Commission, Delors chose to highlight the importance (cultural and economic) of the culture industry, which he thought was key to the post-industrial regeneration of the economies of the member states. He said,

‘the culture industry will tomorrow be one of the biggest industries, a creator or wealth and jobs. Under the terms of the treaty we do not have the resources to implement a culture policy; but we are going to tackle it along economic lines. […] We have to build a powerful European culture industry that will enable us to be in control of both the medium and its content, maintaining our standards of civilization, and encouraging the creative people amongst us’ (European Commission 1985a: 64).

Delors had, in fact, moved to the Commission more or less directly from Mitterrand’s government. Europe and culture were two dimensions of the French economic recovery plan for which Delors had been responsible as minister for the economy four years before. It is not that surprising, therefore, that Delors’ agenda for Europe was somewhat reminiscent of the French government’s programme. 309 If Delors’ emphasis on the

309 See, for example, Cini (1996) for interesting thoughts on the France-Commission linkage in the Delors Commission; although the French government’s persistent lobbying of and direct links to the European Commission especially in the Delors era are well documented.
economic reflected the importance the Commission attributed to the potential of the
cultural industries in post-industrial regeneration, his preoccupation with the cultural and
the forging of a collective European consciousness and identity showed his concern with
the soft aspects of integration and the future European Union.

Thus, while a succession of events in the process context in the period of 1981-84 built
political momentum for institutional reform, political union, and for culture, in 1985,
turnover in the European Commission opened the ‘executive’ window that could catalyse
all these developments and effectively turn them into policy change. More, the tasking
of the Commission at Milan (June 1985) with preparing proposals for the EEC Treaty
revision at the IGC later in November 1985, opened a further, political-legislative window
of opportunity for Delors to tackle the perennial issue of Community cultural competence
directly and legislatively through the high politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006).

Delors’ leadership and the working methods he promoted in the Commission were
process design features that structured the processes described above. The functional
relationship between the president’s strategy and the Commission machinery ensured that
the general presidential line was followed (if not enforced) across the Commission with
strategic policy areas playing to it (see for example, Ross 1994; Endo 1999; Drake 2000).
This is in contrast with less goal-oriented or strategic previous Commissions.310 This
organisational (process) feature was an ideal breeding ground for presidential policy
entrepreneurship as the key mechanism responsible for transforming political conditions
and features into formal cultural agenda proposals.

310 Previous Commission administrations were traditionally more horizontal and fragmented, a more
appropriate setup for someone entrepreneurial like Grégoire in the 1970s, for example, to develop a new
policy field. Before the Delors era, working relationships were based to an extent on personal networking
and relationships. According to former Commission officials interviewed for this research until the rules
were tightened up, adding a budget line for a project, for instance, could be agreed over the phone first and
the appropriate justification added later (COM2 2009; COM5 2010).
8.3.2 The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference

In his ‘brilliant exposé’ (De Ruyt 1987: 70) to the inaugural session of the IGC on 9 September 1985 Delors outlined the Commission’s plans for Treaty reform and unambiguously stated his intentions to add a cultural competence to the Treaty – said Delors,

‘[European Union] stewardship [...] extends to social affairs, culture and the will to live together. […] Over and above what constitutes the essential base of a united Europe, the Commission will also be making proposals [...] for additions to the Treaty with regard to [...] culture’ (Delors 1985).\(^{311}\)

At the end of September, the Commission’s proposal for the revision of the Treaty of Rome targeted five new areas of Community responsibility, culture among them,

![Diagram of new policy competences](image)

**Figure 8.2:** European Commission’s diagram of new policy competences (European Commission, Press Office 1985: 8)

The proposed new treaty article on culture – ‘Promoting common cultural values’ (European Commission 1985b: Annex III) – focused on the Community’s role in promoting common cultural values and Europe’s identity (the audiovisual, which had an economic significance, was included in the internal market programme\(^{312}\) as one of the

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\(^{311}\) Delors had, in fact, been explicit and made reference to the need to include cultural competence in the treaty amendments on a number of important speeches, Commission Opinions etc during 1984-85.

\(^{312}\) Cf. the 1985 Commission’s White paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ (European Commission 1985c), a comprehensive plan identifying 300 measures to be addressed in order to complete the European common, single market.
future growth areas); it more or less restated the cultural cooperation objectives laid down in the Stuttgart declaration of 1983:

‘Article ... [sic]

1. The Community shall, in the exercise of its powers, contribute to the affirmation of the cultural identity of Europe and the promotion of common cultural values, while respecting their diversity. Special attention shall be paid to improving knowledge of each nation’s culture and history and to developing new means of communication, particularly the audio-visual media.

2. In pursuance of the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the widest possible cooperation shall be sought with other European countries and with the international organisations that have responsibilities in the cultural field, notably the Council of Europe’ (European Commission 1985b: Annex III).³¹³

In fact, and as one Commission official observed,

‘the proposal for the amendment of the EEC Treaty that the Commission made to the Intergovernmental Conference no more than formalised [ongoing] cultural action […]]. The amendment would have had the advantage of introducing the word “culture” into the Treaty and to put an end to the permanent opposition of the Danish for whom all it takes is that an action that would normally be a Community matter has a hint of culture for it to be off limits competence-wise’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 426: 2³¹⁴).

France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands supported the new article and the expansion of Community competence to culture.³¹⁵ Mitterrand, specifically, hoped that the Community would have powers in the area of culture (Lalumière 2006). Portugal and Spain, the two new EEC acceding member states (as of January 1986) invited to the IGC as observers, also backed the expansion to cultural competence.

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³¹³ In retrospect, the article bears some resemblance with Article 128 on Culture of the future Maastricht Treaty some six years later.
³¹⁴ HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 426 Note on ‘Politique culturelle ou action culturelle communautaire?’ of 30.11.1985
³¹⁵ According to De Ruyt (1987), Italy and the Netherlands had also tabled proposals on culture but the agenda was very congested and these were not discussed for lack of time.
At the same time, the wider cultural policy community gathered in the Madrid Congress ‘The European cultural space’\textsuperscript{316} organised by the European Commission, the EP and the City of Madrid. Bringing together a host of high profile intellectual and political figures – Baudrillard, Jorge Luis Borges, Simone Veil were some of the speakers but there were also contributions from Delors and the European Commissioner for Culture, Carlo Ripa di Meana – the congress tried to influence events at the IGC with a four page Manifesto, calling on European leaders to

‘make the necessary institutional arrangements the enable Europe to move from the state of market to that of cultural space’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 426: 2\textsuperscript{317}).

But this was a drop in the ocean. Back in the negotiations, Denmark and Germany\textsuperscript{318} strongly opposed supranational involvement in culture. Denmark was opposed in principle; German resistance was due to the fact that culture was an issue for the Länder (not the federal government). Culture became tangled up with the internal market. The Germans, as the British, refused to accept the Commission’s proposed social policy. The Danish government, however, was keen on social policy, a key area of Delors’ internal market programme. Delors needed not only to keep Denmark at the negotiation table but needed the Danish vote to save the internal market. He had to make a choice – he dropped the culture article\textsuperscript{319} from the negotiations (Endo 1999).

Naturally, the more cleavages and the higher the diversity of norms there are to an issue, the less likely it is for actors to share common criteria with which to evaluate arguments,

\textsuperscript{316} See for example Lanoo (1987) and Europe/AIIP (1985) for a comprehensive overview of the Congress, programme, participants etc.
\textsuperscript{318} See for example Catherine Lalumiére’s interview on the Franco-German disputes in the 1985 IGC which provides a detailed account of Germany’s reactions to the European Commission proposals for new Community competence on culture and social policy.
\textsuperscript{319} For detailed accounts of the IGC and national positions see Endo (1999), De Ruyt (1987), Gazzo (1986), Olivi and Giacone (2007).
which, according to Panke (2006), induces bargaining rather than argumentative dynamics. This was the case, in this instance; culture was ‘no-go’ (Closa cited in Panke 2006) for Denmark and Germany and there was therefore little prospect of progressing through argument or persuasion. Moreover, by nature, IGCs look to a productive conclusion (they are convened to resolve a particular issue) and the negotiation mindset is therefore to maximise possible gains and minimize any risk of derailment (see, for example, Lodge 1998). In the present case, the greater end-game was Treaty reform and that is what mattered – culture was a small, secondary issue.

Hence, although the outcome of the IGC, the Single European Act (SEA) signed in February 1986, introduced new areas of Community competence, like culture, areas where the EEC had become active but on which the Treaty of Rome said nothing (Grant 1994), the time for culture had just not come yet. Research evidence, in fact, shows that Delors anticipated that culture might be a ‘tricky’ issue (Delors 1985; COM2 2009), but it is not unusual in these negotiations to include overambitious proposals that open up ground for the future or smaller issues that can be traded off for more pressing concerns (Lodge 1998) – it is possible that Delors was just testing the waters (for example, to flag up the issue at the IGC but to pursue it later through another avenue, for example, the Council).

Thus, despite the opening of a political-legislative window at the IGC and the presence of the three streams of problem, policy and politics (the latter, partially at least), ultimately, the fate of the culture issue at this juncture was shaped by process and

320 Social policy, the environment, cohesion, education, ICT (including the audiovisual), among others.
321 Delors’ support for the culture issue remained unabated, but according to one of the interviewees for this research he grew skeptical about the possibility of ever being able to insert any article on culture into the Maastricht Treaty (COM2 2009).
institutional features. On the one hand, culture was a low status, contentious and divisive issue, which placed it on a bargaining (rather than argumentative) negotiating path; on the other, the IGC’s main focus and aim was to agree treaty revision and the internal market, high politics aims. The intersection of these process design features and the IGC process context pushed Delors to drop culture from the negotiations (and look for/engender alternative routes).

Still, one of the institutional reforms introduced by the SEA was the Commission president’s full membership of the European Council, which offered Delors a new platform from which to exert direct influence on governmental leaders – his skills in managing information, interests and opportunities in the (essentially intergovernmental) European Council are well documented (Cini 1996: 183; Endo 1999; Ross 1994; Drake 2000). Persistent, ingénieur (Dyson and Featherstone 1999) (engineer-ing, ingenious), Delors still sought to use this alternative institutional, high politics route, post-IGC, to place culture on the Community agenda. He now planned to mobilise the European Council (HAEU BDT 101/99 426: 1; European Commission 1986) to devote some time in 1986 to discuss the Community’s role in the cultural sector (European Commission 1986: 30), and sure enough the main aim of the cultural section of the Commission’s Working Programme for 1986 (European Commission 1986) was to work on cultural proposals for the European Council.

But the revision of the Treaty of Rome proved a messy and protracted affair (Dinan 1994: 120) to which the enlargement to a Community of twelve in January 1986 added further challenges. The European Council’s agenda had other priorities and Delors’ anticipated debate on culture did not materialise.

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322 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 426 ‘Culture – future development’, note from Commissioner Ripa di Meana, probably 1986
8.3.3 Strengthening the policy venue for culture in the Commission

In the meantime, the dynamic associated with the IGC-SEA and the internal market programme had produced new policies, goals and activities in the Commission. The relatively high status of the culture issue in the Delors 1985 and 1986 Commission working programmes had also prompted a reorganisation of the Commission’s cultural policy machinery. Delors not only created a Commission portfolio for culture under Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana\(^{323}\) but also moved the Cultural Sector Division\(^{324}\) to a Directorate General, DGX, now called Information Communication and Culture. The division’s new title ‘Cultural Action and Audiovisual Policy’\(^{325}\) was revealing of the Commission’s priorities for the sector.\(^{326}\)

The new Culture Council had also added significant policy business. Instigated by France, and meeting formally for the first time during the French EC presidency (1984), the Council was a dual institutional venue making intergovernmental cooperation within the Community framework. The Commission’s role was sometimes to follow-up on projects/proposals, sometimes it was invited to follow-up and in other cases decisions were purely intergovernmental – ministers ‘wore different hats’ (CON1 2009: CON2 2010) according to what they wanted from different projects. Over the next couple of years\(^{327}\) (June 1984 – November 1986), the Culture Council built a diverse agenda – including books, audiovisual, television, training for cultural workers, the European

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\(^{323}\) Ripa di Meana was a former socialist MEP (Italy) in the 1979-84 legislature. His background included politics, journalism and culture which possibly influenced his selection to head what was a diverse portfolio: institutional reform, information policy, culture and tourism. Ripa di Meana had started his career as a journalist and also an editor. In the 1970s he was elected regional councilor in Lombardy for the Italian Socialist Party and became also associated with cultural and tourism organizations; he was president of the Venice Biennale from 1974-78. His European political career started in the EP.

\(^{324}\) The Cultural Sector Division had been part of the Secretariat General of the Commission since 1981, following the reorganisation, at the time, of DG Education.

\(^{325}\) The division was staffed according to the two fields of action. This research focuses on the ‘cultural action’ side and not on the audiovisual policy aspect.

\(^{326}\) The audiovisual would soon take off as a policy area in its own right although it was only in 1989 that a dedicated administrative division was created in DGX.

\(^{327}\) The Culture Council met twice a year: June (first formal meeting) and November 1984, May and December 1985, and November 1986 (plus an informal meeting in June 1986).
cultural capital, heritage and sponsorship. But there were frequent disputes over project funding and by December 1986 the Culture Council had not only failed to deliver (HAEU BDT 101/99 426328) but had reached a deadlock.

8.4 As the IGC window closes, that of 1992 opens – the return of old ambitions

The situation with the Culture Council and the onset of the internal market six years later as the Commission set off on the road to 1992 (a horizon event), contributed to the revival of the Commission’s old ambition to develop a (supranational) cultural policy. Not only would the single market create an (internally) borderless Community that affected the freedom of movement of cultural goods, services and workers but other common policies – competition, regional, technology – also had implications for culture; on which Ripa di Meana liked to quote French Minister Jack Lang’s famous motto that ‘books should not be treated in the same way as soap’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 422: 2329). There was therefore work to be done and catching the 1992 window meant that

‘A relaunch of the culture issue [in the Commission] is thus imperative’ (HAEU BDT 101/99, 425330).

A process feature that added to this ‘imperative’ was the term of office of the Delors Commission: 1988.331 We now know that Delors served three mandates over 1985-95 but in 1986 the outlook was necessarily short-sighted. Delors was a champion of the culture issue and any new plans needed to take advantage of his remaining years in office (1986-88). This was a very short window which called for action.332

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328 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 426 ‘Culture – future development’, note from Commissioner Ripa di Meana, undated (probably 1985-86)
329 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 422 Culture – future development, probably 1986
330 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 425 Note à l’attention de M. Froschmaier, Directeur Général, Bruxelles, le 21 avril 1987
331 The European Commission’s term of office is normally four years.
332 We also know, now, that at that time Ripa di Meana was already eyeing another portfolio in the post-1988 Commission – the environment (which he got) – and needed to show results; which meant that his own window was equally short.
In 1986, thus, following the debacle of culture at the IGC and the deadlock in the Culture Council, the Commission initiated a new cycle of agenda setting, prompted by the intersection of the strategic problem and political (long) window of 1992 opening in the political stream and the (short) window believed to close in the Commission/policy stream in 1988.

Ripa di Meana also figured that this political juncture (preparation for 1992 union and internal market) was the right time to debate the big issues relevant to cultural activity (HAEU BDT 101/99, 422; 333) at Community level, and his cabinet and DGX began to consider ‘future prospects and [policy] choices’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 422334) for a Community cultural policy for 1988-92. In the run-up to 1992, the ‘logical’ approach was to,

‘demonstrate [the] coherence [of action in the cultural sector] with the priorities and deadlines of economic integration that derive from the Common goals and decisions adopted by the Community institutions in 1985 [IGC] and the first months of 1986 [SEA and internal market] [...] [and] emphasise the interdependence between cultural and economic matters’ (BDT 101/99, 422335).

The ´economic impact of culture, on which Delors was equally keen´ (COM5 2010) became a key idea in the Commissioner’s agenda for culture. More, one of the new key sectors of the internal market programme was the audiovisual (cf. the Commission’s 1986 White Paper). There was awareness of its impact on culture and the argument went,

‘[t]heir intersection with intellectual and artistic creation will change our way of life and how we conceive of culture whilst leading to a myriad of developments which will take us to a new stage of our civilisation’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 422336).

333 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 422 Note de dossier, Gerardo Mombelli, Bruxelles, le 7 juillet 1986
335 Ibid.
In order to promote this agenda, therefore, the Commission decided to organise a European conference focusing on the linkages between culture, technology and the economy.

### 8.4.1 Agenda-setting in Florence

The conference – ‘Changing Europe: the cultural challenge. Culture, technology, economy’ – took place in Florence on 25-27 March 1987, a date that symbolically coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. The event, supposed to be ‘a turning point after the long spell in the wilderness for culture in European policy’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 422), aimed to set the Commission’s cultural agenda, ‘a first stage in a maieutic process aimed at launching a policy to support culture in the Community’ (HAEU BDT 101/99 422). The first chapter of the Conference programme – ‘Florence: the birth of a policy for culture in the Community’ (HAEU BDT101/99 422) – asserted this ambition clearly. Four studies were commissioned to provide evidence for the linkage between economy, culture and technology.

But the Commission’s other (competing?) aim to show it was responsive and that the design of EC cultural policy would follow a bottom-up process (the maieutic process) opened the conference to as many participants as agendas and ideas, creating a ‘very substantial menu and digestion was difficult’ (HAEU BDT 101/99, 425: 3). The range

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337 It is worth noting that a 1982 report by the French government’s General Planning Board on ‘The cultural imperative’ addressed precisely the linkage between culture, the development of the new information and communication technologies and the economy.


340 Ibid.

341 The studies were carried out by Batelle, Futuribles, Zentrum für Kulturforschung and the Bureau d’Informations et de Prévisions Économiques (BIPE)

342 See, for example, Calligaro (2013) for a detailed description of the conference and its programme of events.

343 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 425 Note to M. F. Froschmaier, Brussels, 21 April, 1987
of themes discussed – sponsorship, publishing, cable and satellite TV, heritage, cultural statistics and others – diluted the initial agenda and focus ultimately defeating the purpose:

‘the attempt to suggest that the cultural aspect of technological innovation merited special attention, or a dedicated policy at Community level, was all but ignored’ (COM6 2010).

Ripa di Meana’s hopes of setting the European agenda for culture at Florence had backfired. Calligaro’s (2013) description of the proceedings would suggest that it failed, one could speculate, because of the unwieldy design of the conference programme and management, that is, process design factors.

8.4.2 A (re)focusing event: the intergovernmental French Blue Book

The French government also celebrated the Treaty of Rome’s anniversary with the launch of its own European agenda for education and culture, the ‘Blue book for a Europe of education and culture’ (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication 1987) (henceforth Blue Book). Knowing the Commission’s plans to launch a Community cultural policy at Florence, the French government put an alternative on the table344 in which it basically ‘proposed to shelve the competence issue and to make pragmatic progress in cultural cooperation’ (De Witte 1989: 15). The French government was, like other governments, wary of the Commission’s role on culture but it was equally motivated by genuine frustration with the institutional and budgetary wrangling, and the lack of progress of cultural cooperation at European level in the Culture Council, and

‘Rather than desperately trying to reach an agreement between twelve states on the principles and means of a Community measure [as in the Culture Council], we will seek to work together with the member states who wish to be involved’ (Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication 1987: 5).

344 The French were traditionally active and proactive agenda-setters and there is evidence of the use of ‘shock tactics’ (a radical position or an influential paper coming out of the blue) to facilitate control over the agenda; from the Fouchet plan to the European University negotiations, and also in European Councils.
The Blue Book therefore offered a more open, à la carte (Vergès 1989) type of intergovernmental cultural cooperation, in which states could partake in the projects they were interested in and which could then be realised within a Community, Council of Europe (including non-EEC states) or intergovernmental framework.

Most or all of the Blue Book´s projects – audiovisual, books, training and sponsorship – were actually on the Culture Council´s agenda. But the Blue Book´s flexible cooperation was well received – the project of a support mechanism for film and television, for example, was immediately taken up by nine EC member states and three non-EC states (see, for example, Olivier 1988).

Member states were also positive — the bilateral agreements between France and Germany and the powerful Paris-Bonn axis at the time meant Germany was likely to support the Blue Book agenda; and if the two key EC players agreed, other EC member states had little option but to join the bandwagon – in Britain,

‘The Office for Arts and Libraries and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office interpretation is that the Blue Book results from a French plot to win the cultural leadership of Europe and that the UK interest will be damaged ‘if we don’t join in’; […] the Blue Book picks up many EEC proposals and France is beginning to run with them’ (VAM ACGB/35/310345).

In fact, in terms of the policy process, what the Blue Book did was to put a concrete, fresh (if repackaged) policy alternative on the table... where there was none, following the failed agenda setting initiative of the Commission at Florence. With the Blue Book, the French seized the initiative to advocate an intergovernmental cultural policy and Council as ‘the´ policy making venue, as much as created a little provocation, une provocation

345 VAM ACGB/35/310 Internal memo on meeting of Cultural Coordinating Committee, ACGB, 5 November 1987
positive (Olivier 1988) to get things moving and bring the stalemate in the dual Commission-Culture Council to an end.

8.4.3 A ‘Community focused’ alternative: the Commission’s ‘A Fresh Boost’

Indeed, the Blue Book spurred the European Commission into action. By the end of April, a month later, the Commission had a draft action programme for the five years of 1988-92. The Commission acknowledged the French Blue Book proposals:

‘[it] wishes to draw inspiration from the concrete proposals presented by the French government in its Blue Book […] Indeed, the proposed actions have the merit of focusing on the Community’s efforts in the major challenges, namely: the audiovisual, new technologies, training, removing language barriers, development of exchanges and information. These concerns are consistent with the Community’s action dynamic in which the Commission […] is already engaged (HAEU BDT 101/99 425: 9346).

But then the Commission used it and the momentum it generated to launch its new policy to give a fresh boost to culture in the European Community.347 Gerardo Mombelli, Ripa di Meana’s chef de cabinet, had a diplomatic – but astute – take on the Blue Book event; said he,

‘The Blue Book showed that the interest of the Commission in a relaunch of the [Community’s] cultural policy was not an isolated event. This was clearly in contrast with the reluctance and suspicion aroused by the European ideas and projects relating to culture. […] At any rate, the Commission could not miss the opportunity to underline […] the attention paid to this matter [culture] by an important member state’ (COM6 2010).

The new Commission’s programme for 1988-92 ‘A fresh boost for culture in the European Community’ (COM(87) 603 Final) (hereinafter, ‘A fresh boost’) combined the Community’s medium-term aims – the 1992 internal market and European Union targets – with policy proposals from the Culture Council’s agenda; although, in contrast with the

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346 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 425 Note à l’attention de M. Froschmaier, Directeur Général, Bruxelles, le 27 avril 1987
347 It is interesting to note that every internal document of the Commission (concerning the 1987 Boost paper) refers to the Blue Book as a key event but there is no mention of it in the final Fresh Boost paper.
intergovernmental French proposal, the Commission’s Fresh Boost was clearly driven by the (supranational) aims of the Commission and mostly implemented through its preferred method of Community action. It targeted five areas of action:

(1) the creation of a European cultural area which sought to attain the completion of the internal market for cultural goods and services including the business sponsorship of cultural activities, action on books and translation;

(2) the promotion of a European audiovisual industry (media, broadcasting, cinema and television);

(3) access to cultural resources, focusing on the European as much as regional and local cultures namely through the promotion of multilingualism, regional cultures and a young people’s pass;

(4) training for the cultural sector, for cultural administrators, sound and video, and restoration specialists; and

(5) dialogue with the rest of the world which sought to promote information and dialogue with non-EC countries.

In terms of process, thus, the alternative-specification phase in the Commission can be characterised as one of problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963) where agency is explained as arising from a problem of organisational performance, for example, a previous unsuccessful attempt to produce a policy alternative – in this case, the failure of the Florence attempt to create its much publicised cultural policy for the Community exposed the Commission (the EC’s executive); a situation that was only exacerbated by the French paper, an alternative which advocated intergovernmental cultural cooperation and which was well received by policy stakeholders, especially the Council.
The potential of these events to jeopardise the Commission’s role of supranational policy initiator triggered a ‘search’ focused on mending that performance shortfall (Greve 2003). The priority was to create a policy to meet institutional expectations about the Commission’s policy role (and less to produce the best policy). Ad hoc research initiatives, staff brainstorming sessions are examples of organisational behaviors that constitute problemistic search (Greve 2003); which explains how a first draft of the Fresh Boost paper, which significantly differed from the Florence agenda, materialized in just one month after the Blue Book and Florence events.

The ‘Fresh Boost’ Commission Communication was approved by the Commission and sent to the Council in December 1987 (it also received positive opinions from both the EP and the ECOSOC) just in time for an informal meeting of the Culture Council in Copenhagen.

8.5 The aftermath – decision taking in the Council

There were now two policy alternatives on the table – the French government’s Blue Book and the Commission’s Fresh Boost. At Copenhagen, the Culture Ministers took ‘a decisive step towards a new start in cultural cooperation in Europe;’ they decided to focus ‘on a first multiannual programme’ (HAEU BDT 101/99, 427348) to be agreed at the next Culture Council meeting in 1988.

8.5.1 The Culture Council’s cultural policy

The Culture Council meeting in May 1988, under the German EC presidency, agreed its new cultural policy; but chose to articulate it in the same terms as the intergovernmental Blue Book. In fact, the Council’s four agenda priorities – the audiovisual, books, training

348 HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 427 Aide-Memoire for the meeting on Tuesday 3 May 1988 with Mr Luce
of cultural workers, business sponsorship, and other actions (Council and Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs 1988) – were by and large shared by both policy alternatives, but ‘A Fresh Boost’ was for all intents and purposes a supranational policy. The Culture Council’s explicit alignment with the (intergovernmental) French discourse sent a clear message that the setting of the European agenda for culture lay primarily with the member states.349

This was less than surprising. Germany – France’s close ally – and Denmark were historically opponents of Community cultural competence and the sequence of these two EC presidencies over 12 months (July 1987 – June 1988) provided an extended window of opportunity, and all the resources associated with two EC presidencies – agenda structuring, information, softening up, time – that enabled them to re-think the Culture Council’s operation and agenda. But more was to come.

8.5.2 Primacy to intergovernmentalism: the Commission rebuffed

The Ministers also decided to create a new committee within the Council’s sphere – the Committee for Cultural Affairs350 (hereinafter Culture Committee) – involving member state and Commission delegates. Its remit was to review future cooperation proposals, prepare the Culture Council’s work on the cultural priorities and follow their implementation, which meant a significant scaling down of the Commission’s role, now basically

‘[to] implement, in close cooperation with the Committee on cultural affairs, actions decided on by the Council or the Council and the Ministers meeting within the Council that are to be implemented at Community level. The

349 Although Belgium, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands supported close supranational involvement.
350 This structure was inspired in the Education Committee formed in 1976. The Education Committee reflected the nature of action in the field of education – cooperation stemmed mainly from the political will of the member states to work together within the Community framework in a non-binding manner whilst competence remained with the member states (European Commission 2006). The system tried to protect the diversity of education systems and avoid harmonisation.
Commission may be invited to assume a coordinating function [...] (Council and Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs 1988).

This decision reaffirmed (and confirmed) the Council’s resolve to keep a firm grip on European cultural policy, and the predominance of the intergovernmental method in this area.

In a context where member state principals/governments tried to make EC cultural policy almost exclusively intergovernmental, the Commission’s (supranational) policy proposal was (perhaps willingly?) interpreted as agency slack, that is, unwanted independent action by an agent and the overreach of their delegated authority (see Heldt 2013). In this view, based on principal-agent theory, in designing its own policy and outcomes, the Commission (agent) acted independently from member states (principals) and overreached its delegated authority. At a key policy decision-making point, the Culture Council seized the opportunity to exercise its formal authority on the Commission. It generated a cultural policy that broadly followed the French intergovernmental proposal and created and certified a new actor – the advisory Culture Committee – to monitor the Commission on its behalf; which in practice was not far from withdrawing validation, or decertifying, the Commission, defying its role as ‘the’ institutional policy initiator.

8.6 Conclusion

The episode analysed in this chapter validates this research’s choice to examine policy formation through an institutional processualist lens. The evidence presented supports the argument that process/es, institutions and causal mechanisms and the interaction

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351 In fact, this was an already watered down version of a proposal from Denmark and the UK at Copenhagen, so radical that is was deemed by the Director of the General Secretariat of the Council, Wolfgang Pini, as ‘extremely dangerous from the point of view of the respect for the institutional rules of the European Communities’, see for example, HAEU BDT 101/99 folder 422 Note à l’attention de M. Santarelli, Directeur général, Bruxelles le 22 février 1988
between them impact an issue’s career through the policy process, playing a formative role in the outcome.

First, similarly to previous episodes, the analysis shows the importance of process context factors in the mobilisation of the culture issue and agenda initiation. This is particularly interesting in this episode, because it was valid for both policy cycles despite their different origins: one was initiated from above, through the high politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006); the other from below, following a low politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006). In the first case it was the union and treaty revision window and relevant events in the political stream – by and large, European Councils – that successively created institutional events and windows (and impetus) for the initiation of culture to the European agenda and its progress through the agenda cycle. In 1987 it was the long problem window opened by the plan to materialise these same political objectives in 1992 – a new treaty and the internal market – that mobilised the Commission to launch its new cultural policy, the Fresh Boost paper.

Political turnover, in particular, was a process (inner) context feature that facilitated the initiation and setting of new agendas and ideas. First with Mitterrand and the 1984 EC presidency, and then with Delors, who took the Commission´s presidency in 1985 to head a newly appointed College of Commissioners, who then placed culture on the Commission´s agenda. In 1987-88, political turnover, through the consecutive Danish and German EC presidencies (and respective Culture Councils) ensured that the intergovernmental agenda prevailed over the Commission´s supranational policy approach.
Competing institutional conceptions – between intergovernmental and supranational approaches – eventually also shaped the decision-making stage of the Fresh Boost paper (although this may have been a reaction motivated by the wider debate over intergovernmental/supranational powers opened by the SEA’s institutional revision which gave greater agenda powers to the Commission).

Second, similarly to the 1960s and 1970s episodes, policy specification (a Fresh Boost) was the outcome of problemistic search (March and Cyert 1963), search in the proximity of the current symptom and activities (Greve 2003) and solutions that are the possible rather than the desirable or best policy – in this instance a Fresh Boost was a mix of Blue Book, Culture Council, Commissioner and 1992 agendas.

Third, the chapter confirms the causal role of social mechanisms and how they link initial specified conditions to a specific outcome, as throughout this episode, policy entrepreneurship was, again, a key social mechanism that transformed ideas into agendas in both policy cycles. Mitterrand was the policy entrepreneur that mobilized the issue in the first, high politics cycle, followed by Delors who placed it on the Commission’s agenda in the second cycle.

Similarly to other episodes, in both cases, policy entrepreneurship can best be understood in terms of the identity (i.e. certification) of the actors/entrepreneurs rather than explained by reward theories (Kingdon 1995), that is, the mechanisms of certification and entrepreneurship operated jointly. Mitterrand’s and Delors’ success in taking the issue as far as they did is partly explained by the activation of the mechanism of actor certification: their authority – political, institutional, personal – largely contributed to the success of
their entrepreneurial action to place culture, a low status, low politics issue, on the high level European political agenda.
PART THREE

Part Three includes two chapters. Chapter 9 performs a comparative analysis of the four policy formation experiences and derives theoretical generalisations from the findings. Chapter 10 draws the study to a conclusion, reflecting on its contributions, the theoretical lessons learned and possible avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 9
Comparing EC cultural policy formation

9.1 Introduction
This research and thesis were motivated by the recognition that despite the lack of treaty basis (pre-Maastricht) and the lack (apparent, at least) of the market logic which rationalised other EC policies, cultural agendas emerged and policies formed in the EC at certain junctures of the European integration journey. Trying to address this apparent inconsistency, the main question that this thesis set out to answer was why and how, then, European public cultural policy came to form.

To answer this question four episodes of policy formation were selected. The research used historical data from archives and informants, and elected case oriented research as its research strategy. Case-oriented research focuses on the causal effects of particular variables on specific outcomes (policy choice in this case) by assessing and comparing their relationships both within and between episodes. In this framework the study looked at the episodes as ‘complex wholes’ and as ‘interpretable combinations of parts’ (Ragin 1987: 6), a choice that fitted well with the historically interpretive and causally analytic (Ragin 1987: 35) goals of the research. To briefly rehearse Ragin’s argument to study a historical experiences as wholes, the view is that the only way to understand multiple conjunctural causation is to examine similarities and differences in context, to show how/why different combinations of conditions have the same causal effect. Episode comparison then enables the research to develop theory-like empirical generalisations.

To make sense of these ‘interpretable combinations of parts’ (Ragin 1987: 6) and understand policy formation, the research adopted an institutional-processual approach,
drawing on Kingdon’s multiple streams theory (on which the episodes’ policy processes were modeled) and consideration of a range of institutional and process factors (Ragin 1987: 6) to help explain how these ‘parts’ combined and affected the dynamics of policy formation. The empirical evidence presented in the previous four chapters supports the general argument of this thesis that process/es, institutions and causal mechanisms and the interaction between them influence the career of an issue through the policy process and that they play a formative role in the outcome.

The comparative study of the four episodes will therefore shed some light on how the culture issue progressed (or stumbled) through the policy process – it will seek to: understand the outcomes of processes of individual episodes; identify and explain analytically significant similarities and differences between the episodes; and formulate limited generalisations (limited to the four cases) about the causes of theoretically defined phenomena (for example, agenda initiation, policy entrepreneurship) that are common to the baseline of policy experiences. These findings or generalisations will be theory-like statements about the configurations of factors that affect the formation of cultural policy in the EC.

Specifically, the analysis will reveal the factors that most significantly affected the formation of cultural policy in the EC and which can be grouped in the categories of: contextual political events (the political stream), institutional contexts, and aspects of the process itself (for example, organisational routines). The analysis will also reveal the decisive role played by entrepreneurs (central in Kingdon’s model, anyway) in different stages of the policy process and will look at what motivated the entrepreneurial efforts of these individuals. This chapter identifies these factors and explains how and why such events impacted across the cases.
The analysis will also reveal, moreover, other variables with causal significance that further enhance our understanding of cultural policy formation processes in the EC, the constancy of which determines their consideration as findings and in the case comparisons.

To systematically compare and underline the main similarities and difference among the episodes the evidence in this chapter is organised by taking into account the framework of analysis and the factors that this research found systematically impacted on policy formation. This chapter is therefore structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 focuses on the contextual factors, political and institutional, and how these intersected and impacted the culture issue and the policy making process in the four episodes. Section 3 highlights the effect of process design features (Barzelay and Shvets 2004) and is followed by Section 4 discussing the significance of culture’s agenda status on the policy process, and Section 5 reflecting on the role of entrepreneurs in the episodes and the dynamics that activated and motivated the operation of policy entrepreneurs. Section 6 presents the findings of the research, using the four secondary research questions to structure the narrative and to help formulate limited generalisations from the comparative study.

9.2 Contextual factors

9.2.1 The political stream

All episode narratives reveal how events flowing in the political stream impacted on policy formation processes, especially on the initiation of the culture issue on the European agenda. All four episodes occurred in the context of political change in the European Community, in particular at junctures of the integration process when the issue of political unification was high on the European agenda. In the first 1955-57 case the
context of political change led to the creation of the European Community itself; the 1961-62 case ensued from the EC member states’ debate over and negotiation for European political unification; the 1972-77 case was initiated at a time of transition from an economic community to political unification; the 1987 case occurred in the run-up to/preparation for the 1992 single market and European Union.

It would seem, at first sight, that the coupled image of political unification and culture might explain the initiation on the culture agenda in these instances. We believe that there is more coincidence than causation, here, and that the explanation has to do with the agenda process itself. One has to remember that despite this coupled image (or in spite of it), member state support for culture was always extremely fragmented and posture simply hostile. Conversely, ‘big’ decision (Peterson and Bomberg 1999) European events involve a relatively long and complex agenda negotiation process with many entry points (the case with Mitterrand is a good illustration of this) which allows greater opportunity for minor issues to climb on the European agenda; which is not so much the case with the ‘regular’ European summit.

In addition, the evidence shows that in the 1955, 1961 and 1984 episodes, agenda initiation resulted from the intersection of national (cultural) politics and European major political events and that all these episodes involved the strategic repackaging of national issues as European level problems in order to activate European level intervention to suit national interests.

In the 1955 case it was the confluence of events in the political stream that led to the initiation of culture on the European agenda. In the first place, the German question and

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352 Although this image may have more significance for federalists (but this is not discussed in this thesis).
Chancellor Adenauer’s pro-Western vision shaped the imperative to integrate Germany into Western Europe and the aim to cultivate the European idea, especially among German young generations. Secondly, actors and political élites operating in the European (and Western) education policy arena debated the role (problem) of university education and the mobilisation of young people in the European construction. In the background, thirdly, the Cold War, was the systemic, major political event that affected, connected and energized all of those agendas, particularly the cultural Cold War and the aggressive youth campaigns of the 1950s. In this context, the 1955 Messina negotiations for the new European community were the political window (and venue) for Germany (Hallstein) to define the German and European youth issues as a European (shared) problem and to propose a cultural-educational agenda (solution) for the new community.

The 1960s case also shows the impact of politics in issue initiation and how events flowing in the French (national) and European problems, policies and politics streams converged, propelling cultural cooperation to the European agenda. The issue originated in a European education policy arena event, the failed attempt by France to control the European university project being negotiated in the EEC Council. France had an assertive external cultural policy, fueled by De Gaulle's grand vision, and had a strategic interest in the project. The 1961 Paris summit, masterminded by De Gaulle in his ambition to secure a role of European leadership for France, was the first formal agenda-setting event of the Six’s move to establish an intergovernmental European political union – it offered the perfect alternative decision venue for France to repackage the university issue as a European problem and marshal European intervention that suited French goals. The issue was mobilized on the European political agenda at the summit as a French proposal for European cultural cooperation.
In the 1980s episode the issue was also mobilized and agenda induced by contextual political factors. This was valid for both policy cycles (initiated respectively by Mitterrand and Delors), although they had different origins: the first cycle was initiated and progressed in the high politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006); the second from below, following a low politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006). In the first cycle, the culture issue was packaged in the ‘People’s Europe’ initiative which was formally launched at the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council. But momentum for culture in the political stream had built in tandem with the union and treaty reform events since the early 1980s, and the culture issue was also taken up by the institutional reform Dooge Committee. Culture was now included in both the image and political-institutional agendas.

At the 1985 Milan Council to agree treaty reform the European Commission was tasked to generate proposals to revise the Treaty and specifically to investigate the case of culture, one of six new sectors. Thus, initially culture rose to the agenda as part of the bigger ‘People’s Europe’ image ‘problem’, but a year later was also one of the issues to be considered as part of the treaty revision ‘solution’. At the other end of the cycle, though, culture reached the Single European Act decision agenda, the crucial 1985 Intergovernmental Conference, but lack of political support sealed its fate.

The following policy cycle followed a typical ‘inside initiative’ (Cobb et al 1976), ‘low politics’ (Princen and Rhinard 2006) agenda dynamics model – the agenda was set by Delors in successive Commission’s work programmes (1985-1988). Yet the issue was only fully mobilized by the political window of the 1992 Single Market (horizon) event which opened in the Commission in 1986 through the implementation of the Single

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European Act and the preparations for 1992. The development of new programmes/policies for 1992 spurred the Commission into launching a new cultural policy cycle, capitalising on the single market window for cultural goods, services and workers (the outcome would be the 1987 Fresh Boost paper). The move was also influenced by events in the Commission’s political stream itself: on one hand, the unhappiness of the Commission with the Culture Council’s disregard for its institutional policy roles; on the other, the stalemate and ineffectiveness of the Culture Council, an added political incentive for the Commission unilaterally to reassume (or resume) its executive role in cultural policy.

The 1970s episode is different from the others in that all the three policy cycles observed in this episode initiated inside the Commission. But events in the broader political context nevertheless interacted with the policy process, directly or indirectly affecting it at different points in time. To use the counterfactual argument, cultural policy would not have developed in the way that it did without these interactions.

In the background, the then not long past 1969 Hague summit initiated the path leading to a new phase of development of the integration project, opening the door to new policies and soft policy areas hitherto ignored by European leaders. Conversely, the crippling political crisis that affected the EC in the early 1970s had a direct impact on the culture issue’s trajectory. In 1973, so-called eurosclerosis (Dinan 1994) sparked fears about the future of European integration, inspiring a theory of change in the European Commission about how the affective power of culture might soften the public’s perception of the EC’s institutional crisis – which prompted the Commission to launch its second cultural policy cycle, what would become the 1974 Memorandum proposal.
Political events also shaped the opportunities available to policy makers in European institutions wanting (and waiting) to mobilise a cultural agenda. The 1980 (horizon, cf. section 3.4.1.1, paragraph 5) deadline for political union, decided at the Paris summit of October 1972, impacted on the Commission’s (Grégoire’s) definition of the culture issue prompting the strategic addition of a cultural-political component – rationalized as ‘man’s preparation for political union’ – to the initial socio-economic formulation of culture. A year later, the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity (which focused on European security and not culture) was seized by MEP Elles to reframe European identity as a (European) cultural ‘problem’ and rationalise the European Parliament’s call on the Commission to develop policy proposals on culture.

9.2.2 Institutional framework
Institutional frameworks and institutions also affected the trajectory of the culture issue in a variety of ways but played a different role – instrumentally or not – in each case.

The 1950s case narrative reveals how in all three IGCs of Messina, Venice and Val Duchesse institutional procedures and rules propelled the issue to the following stage of the negotiation, irrespective of the lack of political support or of authoritative decisions on the issue. At Messina, an institutional decision determined that, given the lack of time to get through the long decision agenda, the European university issue was automatically transferred to the agenda of the next negotiation round. At the following Venice IGC, the European university was a tangential issue in the nuclear energy section of the Spaak report, but however marginal, in institutional terms being in the treaty agenda meant that the issue had to be considered – it was eventually approved. Finally, as Hallstein calculated, once it earned a place in a Treaty the university would be implemented – in a treaty like Euratom, the university’s vague formulation was an opportunity.
In the 1960s case, an obvious institutional factor to consider is venue-shopping, the institutional process (or strategy) that French officials engaged in when they found an alternative decision venue that was more amenable to their plans. The move propelled the university issue, repackaged as cultural cooperation, to the Paris summit’s agenda. The concept of venue-shopping emphasizes actors’ strategies but also takes into account the rule-bound contexts to which actors respond (Guiraudon 2000) and in this regard the Paris summit was a much more favourable decision venue for French objectives in the cultural domain (the summit was, moreover, hosted (and masterminded) by France which managed the agenda and talks). It not only allowed France to place their preferred cultural cooperation image in the broader European political cooperation agenda, where it could be more easily framed as a shared European – and union – problem, but it put the culture agenda on the high politics agenda route (Princen and Rinhard 2006) whence decisions can create real political momentum for the issue, a far cry from the inertia of the Council committee’s low politics route, encumbered by consensus and other rules.

Institutional context was again a key factor shaping progress and outcomes in the Pescatore Group negotiations. The conflict that opposed France to the Five from the initial sessions of the Pescatore Group pressed Pescatore to use an institutional prerogative of the chairmanship: the possibility to engineer agreement by ‘planting’ (Tallberg 2010) a proposal on the table, sidestepping small politics and polarization; and with it also the norm of decisions by consensus. In a way institutions shaped the outcome, which is borne out by the counterfactual that the outcome would have been different had the decision method been majority voting – the Five would have outvoted France and created a different cultural cooperation policy.
Institutional factors were also responsible for the eventual failure of the cultural cooperation initiative. The end for cultural cooperation was determined by the collapse of the wider political union draft treaty negotiations, in spite of the Fouchet committee’s backing for work to continue on the cultural conventions. Cultural cooperation was an integral part of the union institutional framework and without the treaty there was no cultural cooperation.

In the European Commission cases – 1970s and 1980s – an overarching feature of the institutional framework that must be considered to explain any aspect of policy formation is the European Commission and its role of initiator, manager and implementer of European policies.

The EEC Treaty was another crucial institutional variable that not only interacted with but pervaded the cultural policy process, in the sense that fitness with the treaty, its remit and tasks was a necessary condition for cultural policy (any European public policy) to advance in the European agenda or policy process. In the 1970s case, the EEC Treaty constituted an (structural) institutional framework which shaped problem definition or, put in another way, provided a policy ‘solution’ around which cultural ‘problems’ were then defined. The change from culture to cultural sector between the 1972 and 1974 memoranda, and the further specification of the 1974 memorandum, illustrates the progressive and thorough re-definition of ‘problems’ in terms of the application of the EEC Treaty – whether this related to economic, fiscal or market cultural activity, the dissemination of a common cultural dimension or the protection of cultural heritage.

In the 1980s case, the Single European Act (1986) again provided the institutional framework that defined the policy solution offered by the Commission’s cultural policy,
that is, to establish a common market for cultural undertakings. In the initial agenda (Florence), the keynote was on the link between culture, technology (a key new policy of the SEA which included the audiovisual) and the economy. Florence having failed, the Commission’s policy proposal went for the creation of an internal market for cultural goods and services and a European audiovisual industry.

The narrative also reveals that in the 1970s case institutions were used instrumentally by the Commission to institutionalize its cultural policy. In 1972, for example, the Commission cited Article 235 (EEC Treaty) to create ‘Community action,’ an institutional device to avoid the contentious term ‘cultural policy’ and at the same time rationalise and legally justify action in the sector. In 1973-74, the deliberate use of institutional procedures – EP calls for Commission action, Parliamentary questions to the Commission and plenary debates and resolutions – enabled the European Commission-EP alliance to build a (soft) acquis communautaire and gradually institutionalise a European public policy for culture. Institutional tactics were deployed again in 1976, when a budget line for culture was inserted through the instrumental use of specific Parliamentary budget powers (a budget was a key institutional step in the embedding of a new policy in the system).

Finally, institutions were instrumental in the decision (or non-decision, as the case may be) making process. In December 1972 political uncertainty determined that a decision on the 1972 Memorandum was postponed, although the Commission activated institutional instruments to ensure that the issue was logged in the decision agenda for the new 1973 Commission. Conversely, in 1977-78 a succession of unfavourable Council presidencies kept the Commission’s Communication on cultural action off the Council’s
decision agenda to avoid making a decision. National governments also used institutional delay tactics for similar purposes.

In 1987, the narrative also shows how, when it came to make a decision on the Commission’s ‘A fresh boost’ policy paper, the Culture Council used its institutional prerogatives to take control over European cultural policy making (and away from the supranational European Commission). It did this by creating a new policy venue in the Council – the Committee for Cultural Affairs – which was given a policy formulation role (formally a Commission function) and oversight of policy implementation and coordination of the executive tasks now assigned to the Commission. This meant that, institutionally, European cultural policy making was now intergovernmental and firmly in the hands of the member states.

9.3 Process design features

Features of the organizational environment in which policy making develops also (inevitably) impacted on issue trajectories and outcomes. All policy episodes in this research were affected by such organisational aspects, be it organizational context and culture; structure/governance, as manifested in roles and decision rights; or cognitive techniques such as problem solving or techniques for negotiating.

In the 1950s episode the analytically significant process feature that affected actors and their actions and, as a result, the career of the issue, was the approach to the negotiations – in particular, the results oriented ‘Spaak procedure’ and the negotiating techniques he adopted\(^\text{354}\) to deal with congested agendas and sieve the diverse interests on the table. On one hand, the prioritisation of issues and the use of time as a tactic to control debate and

\(^{354}\) Cf. Chapter 5
exclude emerging agenda issues meant that the marginal European university issue or a
cultural agenda was never discussed, so it was (never rejected and) always deferred to a
later stage, which allowed it to carry on. On the other, Spaak’s emphasis on consensus
led to lowest common denominator solutions and very general policy statements; which
ultimately helped the university find a general fit with the nuclear energy (Euratom)
agenda.

In the 1970s case, the development of cultural policy needs to be seen as embedded in the
process that the 1970s Commission had in place to incubate new policy areas: gradually
building up an institutional and legal basis, developing proposals and getting them ready
for when a window opened (Cram 1997; Cini 1996). This Commission bias toward policy
innovation and initiation rather than implementation, has been well documented in the
literature (see for example Peters 2001; Laffan 1997). The process allowed not only an
entrepreneurial Commissioner – Spinelli – to task an official to investigate and report on
a new policy area, which immediately triggered agenda initiation, but supported, over the
next six years, two further cycles of policy development and gradual institutionalization.

Such processes obviously entailed the use of resources and governance arrangements,
also causal features in the process, in that they affected the actions, identities and efforts
of actors and their outcomes – for example, in 1973, Dahrendorf, himself a newly
appointed Commissioner with oversight for culture (as a non-portfolio issue), appointed
a dedicated official and established a (policy) venue which effected the long policy
(incubation) process – the outcome was the 1977 Commission’s Communication to the
Council on ‘Community action in cultural sector’.
The 1980s case shares some similarities in terms of process design, as one feature that affected the trajectory of the culture issue at several points of the policy process was connected with organizational turnover. The case narrative shows how turnover in the Commission, with the launch of the Delors Commission in January 1985, created a new window for culture in the policy stream, as Delors made culture a regular item of the Commission’s working agenda. The creation in 1986 of a cultural policy venue in the Commission and the appointment of a new Commissioner (Ripa di Meana) to oversee culture, enabled the launch of the second policy cycle of this episode and would eventually translate into the ‘Fresh Boost’ paper in 1987.

An organizational process feature that was common to three of the episodes was the process of policy generation, more akin to a process of problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963; Greve 2003) than to the typical (as conventional policy theory would have it) rational, formal exhaustive study of alternatives. A problemistic search is a search oriented towards producing (in this case) a policy in response to a performance problem. According to the theory this will normally occur in conditions of organizational stress though in this case this is compounded by the need for policy to agree with the overarching treaty framework.

All 1961, 1977 and 1987 policy development/search episodes occurred in the context of some form of underperformance (no- or a poor quality policy) under conditions of organizational stress (time, politics). In 1961, a contentious stalemate in the Pescatore Group led to Pescatore’s ‘planted’ conventions solution; in 1974, the proposal’s inconsistency with the EEC Treaty and other Commission policies prompted the Chefs de cabinet’s to issue detailed specifications to ensure the final version met institutional treaty requirements; and in 1987 the pressure to quickly produce an adequate Commission
alternative to the French Blue Book resulted in the Commission’s policy embracing the SEA (toward 1992) agenda but also a mix of Blue Book and Culture Council agendas (rather than a policy resulting from a rational, alternative (re)search process).

### 9.4 Issue status

A finding that was common to most cases was the causal importance of issue status in the issue’s career through the policy process. Despite instances where due to high profile proponents (for example, Mitterrand) or attachment to high profile issues (for example, European union) the issue had a high status on the agenda – and these tended to be ‘big’ decision (Peterson and Bomberg 1999) events – in fact it fared better when its agenda status was low.

In the 1950s episode there was little or no support for the culture issue which meant that, politically, culture had a low, almost non-issue status. But if this obstructed its rise to the political decision-making agenda/s, its interaction with process and institutional rules created opportunities for the issue to career through consecutive negotiating stages – successfully ultimately. In the 1970s case, Grégoire deliberately kept the culture issue’s status low in the Commission for fear that too much ‘noise’ might stir the controversy over the legal authority of the Community to deal with culture and trigger countervailing forces (such as member states and orthodox sectors of the Commission itself).

The 1960s and 1980s cases also share common attributes. In the 1961-62 episode the cultural cooperation issue started with the high status that came with being a proposal from General De Gaulle and enveloped in the high profile Political Union project. The European leaders’ support for the issue (Paris summit) and the committee established to define cultural cooperation helped it retain its status throughout the process, although this
was ultimately jeopardised by the collapse of the Fouchet negotiations. In the 1985
policy cycle the culture issue also initially benefited from the sponsorship of Mitterrand
and the high profile of being enveloped with the European union project. At the IGC
negotiations, however, culture’s status on the agenda was far more ambiguous and the
issue was eventually defeated by other, more pressing policy concerns.

In sum, although no consistent, clear pattern was observed (in this small sample of four
cases), the culture issue seems nevertheless to fare better as a low status issue in the low
politics policy stream, where, given the dynamic nature of the policy process, there may
be more opportunities for agenda climbing. High status, conversely, occurred mainly on
the initial agenda stages, benefiting from attachment to bigger, high profile agenda issues
– invariably the union project – and/or signals from the political leadership, the case with
De Gaulle and Mitterrand. What explains both patterns in terms of status is the political
sensitivity of the culture issue and the fragility of political support for it.

9.5 Policy entrepreneurs

9.5.1 Explaining policy entrepreneurs’ efforts in a context

There is ample case evidence in three of the episodes that policy entrepreneurs played a
key role in agenda setting and policy formation.355 This section looks at the roles of
policy entrepreneurs356 in the episodes in the context of the institutional-processual
perspective but also examines policy entrepreneurship as a causal, agency mechanism, to

355 The 1960s episode did not turn out so much evidence of policy entrepreneurship – indeed, Pescatore’s
performance had only a modest entrepreneurial element to it, and it is the activation of the mechanism of
actor certification that ultimately explains the successful outcome of his intervention. But the lack of
evidence could also reflect the type of data that the research was able to collect for this case – mainly
meeting minutes, documents, archived ministry communications – and no personal accounts of what
happened/who did what in the negotiation (of the kind usually found in memoirs or similar from
participants). Conversely, secondary sources, where anecdotal accounts or observations can sometimes be
found, barely mention the cultural cooperation issue or the Pescatore Group.
356 Cf. Appendix 1 for a summary appraisal of the roles and functions of policy entrepreneurs in all the
episodes.
explain how entrepreneurship was activated and operated in a context and how it linked contexts/situations to outcomes. This approach did in fact shed some new light on the policy entrepreneurship mechanism as the research found, for example, that it often operated jointly with other social mechanisms in effecting the relationship/s between institutional-process factors and outcomes. These will also be considered in this section as relevant.

In the 1950s case, Hallstein was the policy entrepreneur whose efforts were critical at key points in the process – he converted aims and ideas into (ultimately) a treaty article. The early agenda-setting stage clearly shows Hallstein as a strong advocate for culture (the university project), from the start a low status issue with little or no political support. Hallstein used his resources – institutional/procedural experience and knowledge, persistence, skill, influence – to navigate the negotiation processes and steer the issue to an alternative decision venue/agenda (the Euratom Committee), keeping it ‘alive’ and rolling. He did not hesitate to use pressure tactics or to push last minute decisions at key, narrow windows in the process. Hallstein defined and redefined the ‘problem’ to fit ‘solutions’ as the need arose, strategically ‘paddling’ (Kingdon 1995) through the negotiations, joining the streams of problem, policy and politics, to eventually secure a place in a/the Treaty for the university project.

Hallstein’s policy entrepreneurship was activated by political, contextual factors. The episode narrative shows how in the mid-1950s, the Cold War in the background, German politics, societal circumstances and the need to induce the cultural change necessary to fight nationalist sentiment converged with debates in the European education policy arena to mobilise universities and young people in the European construction.
The chief German negotiator for the Messina talks, Hallstein, a keen advocate of university reform and of engaging European youth in the European idea, packaged both German and European ‘problems’ in the cultural-educational ‘European university’ proposal and promoted his (German government’s) ‘solution’ to the European agenda when the Messina negotiations window opened in 1955. What activated his entrepreneurial effort to initiate the issue on the European agenda was his attribution of an opportunity to the Messina talks to discuss a new European community.

At the end of the cycle, it was the mechanism of actor certification operating jointly with policy entrepreneurship that helped translate Hallstein’s entrepreneurial actions into a successful outcome. Actor certification was activated with particular consequence at the closing minutes of the last session of the Val Duchesse IGC, when Hallstein made a final push to include the university in the Euratom Treaty. His success is explained by the fact that even though delegates were hitherto indifferent to the university and were under pressure to vote at the last minute, Hallstein was considered to be a certified actor and his university bid was validated – he was a chief negotiator, an authoritative position, he had the trust of Adenauer and was his close political ally and was a renowned academic and busy international speaker on European and constitutional matters.

In the 1970s episode, the policy agenda emerges from a low politics route (Princen and Rhinard 2006) and builds mainly internally in the European Commission, and here too policy entrepreneurship was closely associated with actor certification and opportunity.

Issue initiation can be attributed to the operation of policy entrepreneurship. The narrative reveals how Commissioner Spinelli took the initiative to commission research

357 Cf. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2  
358 Ibid.
on a new policy area and to advocate it in the Council, kick-starting the policy formation process. The activation of Spinelli’s entrepreneurship is explained by a mix of factors: activism – he had started a number of other policies in the Commission; strong political conviction – a federalist, he believed that the future of integration entailed the Community’s involvement in societal policies; an authoritative position – as a Commissioner he could make sure that the emerging culture agenda made it to the Commission’s decision agenda; and opportunity – the predictable window of the Commissioners’ weekly decision meetings. The outcome was the 1972 Memorandum proposal of a European agenda for culture.

The narrative also reveals that if Spinelli set the process in motion Grégoire followed as the policy entrepreneur who took the issue further and eventually (six years later) to a successful (Commission) decision. A typical entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995), Grégoire persistently invested his resources – effort, institutional knowledge, political networks, advocacy – in achieving his goal to create an EC cultural policy. He matched ‘problems’ with ‘policies’ and ‘political events’ over three policy cycles; he built up political support for the issue and eventually coupled the three streams when a (predictable) Commission window opened.

Again, policy entrepreneurship did not operate singly but in concatenation with other mechanisms. One such mechanism, actor certification, was activated by Grégoire’s appointment as the director of the newly established Cultural Sector Division in the Commission, which identified him as a credible, legitimate – certified – claims maker for culture, both inside and outside of the European Commission.
Certification only reinforced Grégoire’s role as a policy entrepreneur and allowed him to mobilise the EP and its alliance with the Commission, broadening the scope of institutional support for the culture agenda. Grégoire’s certification and entrepreneurship were activated by opportunity – in 1973 it was Parliament’s commission of a report on heritage to MEP Elles. In 1976, as the Commission stalled, Grégoire used his certified agent status in the EP’s Culture Committee to (remotely) prod the Commission to move the policy process forward and to create a budget line which further institutionalized the Commission’s cultural policy.

In terms of Kingdon’s (1995) theoretical model, Grégoire coupled ‘problems’ with ‘policies’ and strategically exploited ‘political events/opportunities’ over three policy cycles, waiting for a (winning) window to open. He worked strategically to create an institutional basis and support for the issue and successfully coupled the three streams when a (predictable) decision window eventually opened in the Commission.

In the 1980s episode, the case evidence clearly shows that in the pre-1985 phase the mechanism of policy entrepreneurship was responsible for mobilizing the culture issue and for translating ideas into an agenda. French president Mitterrand was the policy entrepreneur who championed a cultural agenda for the Community as he tirelessly campaigned for European unification. He constructed the ‘problem’ – the need (in the context of unification) for the Community to focus on its citizens; he articulated a ‘solution’ – the creation of a Europe of the peoples, which he lobbied for during his EC presidency; and at the June 1984 Fontainebleau Council (the supreme decision-making authority in the EC) he successfully pushed for the creation of a committee to make proposals on a people’s Europe (including culture) as part of treaty reform. A typical
policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995), Mitterrand opened the window and stood at it, joining the three streams or problem, policy and politics.

Mitterrand’s entrepreneurship benefited from political events (opportunities) and most probably operated jointly with the mechanism of certification. The narrative shows that attribution of opportunity was also key to the activation of Mitterrand’s policy entrepreneurship. These were, in fact, several opportunities and by 1984 Mitterrand was at the centre of an exceptional political configuration. Of particular consequence, the French EC Presidency in 1984, of which Mitterrand was process manager, activated the opportunity to engineer agreement and place the issue on the European French presidency agenda whilst in the June Fontainebleau European Council he ‘entrepreneurially’ seized the opportunity to include a people’s Europe (including culture) in the decision agenda for treaty reform that was launched at the Council.

Certification was activated by the Council’s (member states) assessment of Mitterrand’s commitment to unification and to building a Europe of the people. Fontainebleau closed France’s and Mitterrand’s European presidency which had enabled him to project an image of authority and European leadership. The activation of the certification mechanism mobilised the Council to support Mitterrand’s bid to set up a committee to study the establishment of a people’s Europe (an idea which he pushed for) as part of treaty reform.

In 1985, policy entrepreneurship was again the key agency mechanism responsible for initiating the second cultural policy cycle of the episode. The central character was now Jacques Delors, the first Commission president to unambiguously tackle the perennial issue of Community competence on culture. He not only set the Commission’s agenda
for culture systematically in the Commission’s annual working programmes but fully
(re)established a cultural policy venue in the Commission –Commissioner, Directorate
General and administrative unit (the eventual outcome of which was the 1987 ‘Fresh
Boost’ paper). He also advocated an SEA article on culture and, following its failure,
strategised to promote the issue in the alternative Council venue.

Policy entrepreneurship was activated by the opportunity provided by administrative
turnover – a new Commission College and agenda. Although involved only in the issue
initiation stage, Delors displayed the key qualities of a policy entrepreneur (see Kingdon
1995): he had claim to a hearing, he had the authoritative decision position to create
agenda change, and was willing to invest much competed for personal and political
resources to formally place culture on the Commission’s agenda.

9.5.2 Using personal history to explain policy entrepreneurs’ efforts

But causation is constituted by outside and inside variables (cf. Chapter 2) and it is their
mix that creates the unique outcomes that arise from the intersection of contextual factors
with the social mechanism. One inside causal mechanism (or motivator) that was
systematically and consistently associated with cultural policy entrepreneurship in our
sample was personal belief/s formed through political learning from past experience.

Evidence from the episodes systematically showed that all the sample’s policy
entrepreneurs had had a/some connection with the culture issue in their career life course;
which contrasts with Kingdon’s (1995: 122) model of policy entrepreneurship in which
policy entrepreneurs act rationally[^359] and are motivated by, for example, the advancement
of political career or personal interest. These findings follow below.

[^359]: According to rational choice theory individuals act to maximize their perceived utilities (Falleti and
Lynch 2009).
A set of historical memories and career experiences shaped Hallstein’s approach to European integration; in particular, the lessons from his experience as a university professor of law during Nazism; as a soldier and prisoner of war who organized a university for inmates; his stint at Washington’s Georgetown University (1948-49) where he first came across academic exchanges; his job as Vice-Chancellor of Frankfurt University (1946-48), after the war, leading the democratic reorganization of the university and the reorganization and de-nazification of the higher-education system in the Western German occupied zone (1946-47); and his involvement in the creation of a German Unesco committee (1949-50), a step in Germany’s reintegration into the international community.

In 1950-57, after entering politics by the hand of Adenauer, Hallstein became State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, participating in and heading the negotiation of a series of treaties that enabled Germany’s return to the international stage and determined its future for decades. As a politician, in the context of a brewing Cold War, Hallstein was particularly sensitive to the situation of young people, in (Western) Europe, but particularly in Germany and in relation to the German question. Seen in this context, Hallstein’s proposal at Messina to set up a European University and disseminate a European cultural dimension is entirely consistent with his beliefs and career life course. Hallstein (the first president of the European Commission) went on to openly advocate the extension of Community competence to cultural policy.

Altiero Spinelli’s initiation of a policy for culture in the Commission also resonates with his previous experiences, personal trajectory and beliefs. Spinelli did not, in fact, have

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360 First at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign Private and International Private Law (1929-30) and then at the University of Rostock (1930-41). In 1941 he became director of the Institute for Comparative Law and of the Institute for Commercial Law in the Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe University in Frankfurt.
an explicit interest in culture, but believed that the Community (post 1969) had ‘arrived at a point where a qualitative leap is necessary if it does not want to perish’ (Spinelli in Preda 2005).

He believed that after the destruction caused by the excesses of nationalism as manifested in Nazism and fascism, the Europe of nation states would be replaced by a European federation of states leading to a truly European society, a fairer and freer society free from the gambles of national politicians (Spinelli 1960). These beliefs led him to abandon national politics to engage in a ‘new way’ (Spinelli 1960): politics at European level, involving the European people and a European assembly rather than national politics and governments.

Spinelli saw the Commission as the motor of European integration and in 1970 became European Commissioner. In the Commission he advocated the political and institutional reform of the Community, treaty revision, the expansion of the policy competencies of the Commission\textsuperscript{361} and the direct participation of the European peoples in the European construction and government. Elected to the European Parliament in 1981, Spinelli went on to create a ‘Draft Treaty on European Union’. The Treaty included a policy for culture and was approved by Parliament in 1984 (though member states did not ratify it).

Robert Grégoire’s case was entirely different. A Commission official (the first one to hold responsibility for culture), it was Grégoire’s career trajectory that positioned him in a way that allowed him to intervene on culture, although biographical aspects are also explanatory. Grégoire had started his career in theatre and unionism, joining the

\textsuperscript{361} During his six years in the Commission, Spinelli initiated and developed Community policies for research, industry, education, the regions, environment, and culture, none of which existed before he joined (Corbett 1996).
European (ECSC) civil service in 1951 where he was involved in the vocational training and social and leisure issues of workers across borders. By 1971 he had moved to the Commission’s Teaching and Education Unit as the official dealing with the cultural aspects of education; and, in a way, when in 1971 Commissioner Spinelli tasked him to investigate the feasibility of a policy in the area of culture Grégoire was in the right place at the right time. In his own words,

‘The treaty rulings that I came to know backwards and forwards by virtue of my various union and Community jobs allowed me to understand its relevance to culture’ (Grégoire 2000: 185).

Not a politician, Grégoire is a clear example of a bureaucratic/institutional policy entrepreneur. Implementing a Community cultural policy became his personal crusade (COM2 2009; NGO1 2010; COM3 2010; CON2 2010) until he left the Commission in 1985.

Mitterrand’s interest in culture was already manifest in the/his first Socialist government (1981), when it assigned a role to the cultural industries in the revitalization of the national (French) economy and industry (cf. section 8.2.2 above; also Littoz-Monnet 2007; Girard 1997; Desneux 1990; France. Commissariat Général du Plan 1983). He also embarked on an ambitious project of cultural buildings – les grands projets – designed to (develop the state-led economy and) project an image of French grandeur and cultural leadership (for example Looseley 1995; Northcutt 1991; Cole 1994). Internationally, as part of his socialist vision, in the early 1980s Mitterrand launched an aggressive external cultural policy to build a European cultural force against imperialism and promote the North-South cultural dialogue (Desneux 1990; Favier and Martin-Roland 1990; France. Commissariat Général du Plan 1984).
But as the early vision of a Socialist France against capitalism grew fainter, Mitterrand’s economic policies needed refreshing. The answer was turning to Europe as a force against globalization and Americanisation and to reframe France’s problems as European. However, ensuring that French interests were protected meant France assuming a role of leader of Europe. The idea of a Socialist France thus gave way to the idea of a European social space… with Mitterrand as the guardian of the European idea and leading the creation of a Europe of solidarity, a ‘People’s Europe’. Mitterrand’s entrepreneurial intervention in promoting a European agenda for culture can therefore be seen as a result of his ideological, social vision for Europe (though it also reflects the French cultural diplomatic tradition and was also partly an instrument of his political leadership drive).

By contrast, Delors, when he arrived in Brussels he was known for what the French call a pro-European de raison, who embraced the European cause for rational, specific reasons rather than ideological or political motivations. Like most French politicians, Delors was sensitive to the importance of symbols and the preservation of fundamental (state building, in this case, French) national values, and his genuine convictions about European unification led him to often reiterate that the Community’s destiny was not only to be a market but also an organised – social and cultural – space. He conceived of ‘culture as a general factor likely to strengthen the [European] citizens sense of belonging to the Community’ (COM6 2010).

As a finance minister of Mitterrand, moreover, Delors had played a role in the French government’s plans of investment in the French cultural industries to help renovate the national economy. Both dimensions – politico-cultural and economic – were fundamental pillars of the cultural policy agendas that Delors overtly promoted as European Commission president. They are consistent with the experiences of his career life course.
9.6 Generalising about the formation of cultural policy in the EC

Following on from the above findings, the next task of this thesis is to formulate generalisations – limited historical generalisations – about ‘how cultural policy formed and evolved in the EC’. To do that and fully answer this central research question, this section will be structured by the second-level research questions (cf. Chapter 1) as they defined the focus of the study and structured the investigation (it is useful to remember at this point that the context for this research – pre- Maastricht – was characterized by the absence of treaty competence in culture).

9.6.1 Why did the episodes occur?

In short, the initiation of the episodes was due to the presence of the following variables (these points are further elaborated below):

1. Events in the European political stream
2. The intersection of national cultural politics and European political stream events
3. The action of policy entrepreneurs

First, the politics of EC cultural policy formation were clearly influenced by events in the political stream; and this was particularly significant at the stage of agenda initiation. With the exception of the 1970s episode, in the other episodes culture was initiated on the European political agenda at political or institutional change European events. These were not just any European political events. They were specific in that they were all key turning points in the European integration process and all specifically concerned with further integration and/or union – Messina, Fouchet Plans, SEA toward single market and European Union. The coupling of the culture issue with the integration/union agenda was a constant in these; even, perhaps peculiarly, in the 1987 policy paper, the first agenda cycle of which was mobilised by the then ‘horizon’ event of 1992.
Second, in most episodes the mobilization of the European cultural agenda resulted from the intersection of national cultural politics/agendas and events in the European political stream, whereby European level policy intervention was pursued with a view to address national issues. The (trigger) reason for placing culture on the European agenda was often instrumental, more so than ideological (for example, European, pro-federalist). In 1955 this was the societal implications of the ‘German question’; in 1961 this was connected with the expansion of French cultural cooperation plans; and in the early 1980s it had to do as much with the reframing of French ‘problems’ as European as with the European leadership of France.362

A general common denominator here seems to be the fact that the initiation phase of European cultural policy formation is sensitive to the combination of two sets of factors: high level political conditions and events flowing in the European political stream, and the constellation of problems and politics in national cultural policy arenas.

Third, agenda initiation (in all episodes) required the involvement of policy entrepreneurs. It would be fair to suggest that without their intervention the culture issue would have probably not emerged or ever progressed to a European agenda; not least because of its lack of legal basis, which makes the actions of policy entrepreneurs all the more significant. Issue advocates were all characterized by their strong beliefs but they were also all certified actors who were authoritative individuals in their own right and respected by others. Generalizing, the action of a policy entrepreneur and one that is also a high profile issue ‘champion’ may well be conditions that are specific to culture, given its more often than not low status on the political agenda.

362 Littoz-Monnet (2007) arrived at similar conclusions in her research on European cultural policy resulting from the ‘communitarisation’ of national cultural policies (although her policy sample and time frame are quite specific).
To conclude, the above analytic generalisations validate Kingdon’s (1995) model of agenda-issue initiation which premises that changes in the political stream open windows of opportunity for new agendas – be it because new problems capture the attention of politicians/political context or because of turnover, for example, a new Commission College. Still according to Kingdon, key to taking advantage of such window openings is the action of policy entrepreneurs, and here Kingdon’s model was again verified. However, the model also premises that before they reach the agenda, issues/ideas will have been floating around in a systemic agenda for some time, and that did not happen here (the exception was the 1984/Mitterrand policy cycle); which may find explanation in the origin of these issues: either national issues reframed as European, quickly trying to catch windows randomly opened by political events, or agendas that emerged inside the executive itself, the European Commission. This is a limitation of Kingdon’s theory (discussed in 10.2.3).

9.6.2 How did the culture issue progress in the four episodes?

In short, the following are the variables which influenced (and explain) the culture issue’s progression in the four episodes (these are further elaborated below),

1. Institutions and institutional frameworks e.g. Treaty
2. Commission’s new policy incubation routine (Commission episodes 1970s, 1980s)
3. Policy development characterized by problemistic search
4. The action of policy entrepreneurs

In contrast with agenda initiation, political events did not play a significant role in the career of the issue as it progressed through the proposal generation phase of the policy process (the semi-exception was the 1970s episode in which political events affected policy-making in some way, but only indirectly). Rather, its dynamics seem to be
affected by the degree of contact between policy generation activities and their institutional and process contexts.

First, in both the 1970s and 1980s Commission episodes, treaty frameworks were a major institutional factor of impact on the policy making process in that they provided deductive policy ‘solutions’ to which cultural ‘problems’ were matched (the lack of formal treaty basis for culture notwithstanding). This was the case with the 1977 Commission paper and the EEC Treaty and the 1987 Commission paper and the Single European Act (or its projected outcome, the 1992 single market). The earlier episodes were different in that policy specification occurred as part of treaty negotiations rather than through an executive such as the Commission. Though even here, the treaties being negotiated nevertheless shaped the outcomes of unfolding cultural policy/principles – in 1957 the university project’s issue image changed once it entered the Euratom treaty agenda; in 1961, the cultural cooperation programme was agreed, but as an element of the wider political cooperation (political union treaty) being negotiated. When this collapsed cultural cooperation folded.

Other than the treaties, this research showed how institutional setting and rules and procedures also influenced the issue’s career (and therefore its outcomes) whether their enactment was calculated or not. However, it did not turn up any institutional variable singly or systematically impacting the formation of cultural policy across the sample; and while this empirical finding validates the neo-institutionalist approach, it does not warrant a generalizing statement; the influence of institutions on the policy process (from negotiation rules to the insertion of budget lines or the deliberate use of European Parliament procedures/prerogatives) has been reported in other European public policy
research (see for example Rhinard 2010; Princen 2009; Tallberg 2006; Guigner 2003; Cram 1996; Cini 1996; Pollack 1994; Majone 1993).

Second, the routine in place in the Commission in the 1970s (and to a certain extent in the 1980s) to incubate new issues/policies facilitated policy entrepreneurial activity, further enabling their development. One key process design feature that supported policy development in both cases, was the creation of a dedicated cultural policy venue from where systematic, legitimised political and policy processes could then flow.

Third, a pattern of policy development that was common to all episodes was that the policy generation process was one of problemistic search (Cyert and March 1963) rather than the conventional rational, alternatives search/research process (see Kingdon 1995). A typical outcome of such a process is the achievement of satisficing\textsuperscript{363} rather than best\textsuperscript{364} policy choices, which was also a common outcome in the episodes. Satisficing is arguably a condition implicit in/of the overarching treaty institutional framework since rather than starting with problems, the process starts with existing (treaty) policy solutions which then determine, or are matched to policy problems.

Fourth, issue progression through the policy cycle (in all but one episode, the 1980s) required the involvement of policy entrepreneurs, without whose agency the culture issue would probably not have progressed in the European agenda and policy processes. The know-how and intervention of entrepreneurs was particularly adept in the navigation of institutional contexts, strategic issue framing (not least in those contexts), advocacy and the coupling of the problem, policy and politics streams when a window opened. Pescatore’s entrepreneurial role in the 1960s was modest and mainly confined to the

\textsuperscript{363} Satisficing policy: the minimal policy solution required to address the problem.

\textsuperscript{364} Best policy solution: the most appropriate solution to the problem.
institutional context of the Fouchet negotiations. But, generalizing, and similarly to entrepreneurial roles in agenda initiation, issue progression in all the episodes also benefited from the involvement of authoritative issue ‘champions’ which, again, may be a condition that is specific to culture, given its low status on the political agenda.

These analytical generalisations challenge Kingdon’s model of policy alternative specification. Whilst Kingdon (1995) likens this stage to a ‘natural’ selection process in which, depending on specific criteria, some policy ideas survive and others are discarded, in this sample, natural selection is replaced by a search, guided by the principles set by the treaties. This further questions Kingdon’s premise that the long softening up of policy ideas is critical to policy change (the only example of softening up in this sample was in the 1977 paper but this was a sufficient and not a necessary condition). These differences further emphasise the extent to which the treaty framework defines or confines the development of European public policy.

9.6.3 What explains the outcome of each episode?

The decision making processes were all very different in the four episodes. The first level of difference is in the decision making settings in the episodes, as the institutional arrangements in which the 1950s, 1960s and 1984-85 episodes’ decisions occurred – European Councils, IGCs – were different from those of the European Commission, in which the 1970s and 1987 episodes occurred. This is because the dynamics that operate in decisions taken in the intergovernmental, negotiating/bargaining context of European Councils are different from those in the supranational executive Commission, where decisions are the ‘collective responsibility’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 38) of the College. In this context two generalisations were formulated.
First, the successful decision-making on culture (whether these were intermediate\textsuperscript{365} or ultimate decisions) in the intergovernmental cases – 1950s, 1960s, 1984-85 – depended on the presence of a certified actor advocating/supporting culture’s inclusion on the decision agenda and/or pushing attention to the issue at the point of decision. This was the case with Hallstein, De Gaulle, Pescatore (as far as the research could see), and Mitterrand, some of whom were also issue entrepreneurs. Their interventions were decisive and without their efforts, decisions on culture would have had a different outcome. Culture is normally a low status, politically sensitive issue and that may explain why the intervention of an issue champion is or may be a condition for successful decision-making.

Conversely, second, the institutional decision-making arrangements of the Commission mean that College decisions are at the end of a careful preparatory – technical and political-consensus seeking – process which paves the way for a swift decision/adoptions. This being said, the Commission remains a political microcosm; culture remains a low status (sensitive) issue in this context; and political leadership is crucial at this stage of the process. The empirical evidence shows that Spinelli campaigned to place the 1972 Memorandum on the Commission’s decision agenda and that, for example, Emile Noël (the European Commission’s long-term secretary-general) was also a key, pro-culture figure in the background in the 1970s episode (see Grégoire 2000; anecdotal evidence from Commission archives). But the data gathered by this research does not substantiate\textsuperscript{366} their intervention explicitly and the above claim cannot therefore be tested rigorously.

\textsuperscript{365} By intermediate we mean formal decisions made at/for different stages of the policy cycle; for example, the decision to study/generate a solution for cultural cooperation at the Bonn summit of July 1961 or the decision to include culture on the European agenda in the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984.

\textsuperscript{366} Data to demonstrate this would be difficult to find in an archive given the mostly relational, social/networking nature of such political events, which are not necessarily documented.
The above generally supports Kingdon’s (1995: 201-203) model of policy decision-making. In the (1) European Council episodes the culture problem, policy and politics streams were successfully joined (by advocates) at the point that a decision window opened. But although the Commission is a different institution, (2) we suggest that this may also be valid for its decision cases. Commission meetings are ‘regularly scheduled’ (Kingdon 1995: 188) and therefore decision widows are predictable, but, still, their politics are not or less so, leaving scope for the stream coupling action of policy entrepreneurs.

9.6.4 What was the role played by policy entrepreneurs and what motivated them to intervene?

First, in all episodes, the policy process was affected by the efforts of policy entrepreneurs: individuals operated from a variety of political locations (from high profile politicians to civil servants), advocated the culture issue and pushed it on the European agenda, steered their proposals through the policy process and coupled the streams as a political decision window opened. These findings generally validate Kingdon’s model.

Second, to explain how policy entrepreneurship was activated this thesis followed McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow’s (2001: 27) assumption that social mechanisms do not operate in isolation but are part of a bigger, causal process. This is in contrast with Kingdon (1995) who presents policy entrepreneurship as individual, rationally motivated action. The evidence in this sample demonstrates that policy entrepreneurs were mobilized by a combination of factors. Extrinsic activators common to all episodes were (1) the attribution of an opportunity (to an event/s) for action by policy entrepreneurs; and (2) actor certification especially in decision-making events. For example, Hallstein, could operate entrepreneurially because he identified opportunities to do so and because …he
could(!), he was a certified actor. Grégoire would not have been able to operate entrepreneurially when opportunities arose had he not been certified as the Commission’s ‘agent’ for culture.

Moreover, third, all policy entrepreneurs had interacted with or had a longstanding interest in the culture issue. Given the specificity of the culture issue domain, its normally low status on political agendas and, realistically, its limited potential in terms of the political rewards assumed by Kingdon’s model, this attribute – understanding, interest – may well be a characteristic specific to policy entrepreneurs operating in the cultural policy arena. This challenges Kingdon’s model (1995: 179-181, 204-205) which sees entrepreneurial action activated by rational, personal political gain incentives.

Chapter 8 compared the four episodes in order to find how and why cultural policy formed in the European Community. To effect the comparison a number of theoretically informed variables which were found to be analytically significant consistently and systematically across the episodes were tested. The testing and comparison of the political and institutional contextual factors, process design features, and the agency of cultural policy entrepreneurs, as well as other relevant variables that emerged systematically in the research process, enabled the identification of similarities and differences between the four policy formation experiences. Finally, plotting these findings against the research questions that structured this study enabled the formulation of (limited) generalising statements about the formation of cultural policy in the EC.

In the next, final chapter, we discuss the significance of this research project to the field of policy- and cultural policy research, consider the contributions of this research and suggest possible avenues for future research opened here.
CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

This thesis has investigated the formation of cultural policy in the European Community in four policy experiences (pre-Maastricht). The purpose was to provide an account of this little known or researched European policy sector and make sense of it; for the benefit of European integration and cultural policy research. The general question investigated was, why and how cultural policy formed in the European Community – which did not recognize culture as an area of concern until Maastricht in 1992 – and understand how European Community institutions supported the development of a cultural policy over three decades (until the Maastricht treaty provided a full legal basis for culture).

The study generated a narrative which is theoretically guided by a framework based on a model of the policy process which privileges the pre-decision phase; and an institutional process-based approach which emphasises the influence of institutional and process contexts and the role of social mechanisms in linking contexts and action to explain outcomes. The combination of these theoretical constituents helped explain why and how cultural policy formed in the European Community. Focused on four policy formation episodes the study revealed four ‘stories’ (narratives) and a history of European cultural policy unknown thus far.

The previous chapter compared the findings from the empirical research and answered the study’s main research questions about: (1) why the policy episodes occurred; (2) how the culture issue progressed in the four episodes; (3) what explains the outcome of each episode; and (4) the role of cultural policy entrepreneurs and what motivated them to
intervene. These answers were in the form of generalizing theoretical statements about the formation of cultural policy in the EC.

Specifically, the analysis revealed that the factors that most significantly affected the formation of cultural policy in the EC were: (1) contextual political events (the political stream) – European and national – consistently played a role in the initiation of the culture issue on the European agenda. (2) Institutional contexts shaped the issue’s/policy trajectory and the development and formulation of policy in both process and substantive terms. (3) Aspects of the process itself (organisational routines, culture) were also found to affect issue trajectory. (4) Policy entrepreneurs (also central in Kingdon’s model) played significant roles – advocacy, coalition building, navigating the institutional framework, pushing the agenda – while ‘rafting’, navigating or joining the streams at different stages of the policy process. The research also looked at policy entrepreneurship through an institutional-processual lens to explain how entrepreneurs operated in this context, and at what motivated the entrepreneurial efforts of these individuals. This chapter reflects on the significance of such factors in theorising the formation of cultural policy.

The analysis also revealed the causal significance of other variables, which further enhance our understanding of cultural policy formation processes in the EC. Their constancy determined their consideration in the episode comparisons here. They were (following on from the above list): (5) the influence of issue status on the career of the culture issue. (6) The close association – or concatenation (Gambetta 1998: 105) – of entrepreneurship with other social mechanisms, namely ‘attribution of opportunity’ and ‘actor certification’ (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2006). (7) The role of identity/personal
history in (cultural) policy entrepreneurship which, we will suggest, may be specific to cultural policy.

Having done that, this chapter reflects on and tries to make sense of the research’s significance and its contribution/s. Following this introduction, thus, Section 2 discusses the location of this research in the cultural policy researchscape. The following Section 3 reflects on this study’s contributions, from the historical understanding of the European cultural policy sector to its theoretical understanding both as a cultural- and a European public policy, to the assessment of the suitability of Kingdon’s model to this policy and/or the (European) context (and, in turn, the implications of these findings for the model). Section 4 discusses the limitations of this research and the design choices made whilst Section 5 concludes the chapter with some thoughts on the possible direction/s that future research might follow.

10.2 Locating this research in the cultural policy researchscape

An immediate question that cultural policy scholars might legitimately raise about this thesis might be: what does this thesis add to cultural policy research and its debates, and/or what difference does it make. There are several possible answers to these questions and any assessment of possible contributions made clearly depends on the perspective one takes, that is, what is this research a ‘case’ of (in field terms). An important point to bear in mind is that this study is concerned with cultural policy but that it is also concerned with European public policy.

This research contrasts with conventional cultural policy research (cf. Chapter 2) in that cultural policy research focuses on national policy whereas this research’s interest is in international (European, in this case) cultural policy, a development the significance of
which is only likely to rise in an increasingly global but also regional world. Put in another way, it would not have been possible to explain European cultural policy/ies from conventional cultural policy research perspectives, not least given the nature of the institutional system where European policy-making is nested.

Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, cultural policy research tends to focus on policy output and content and their rhetorical or ideological features, whereas this research is interested in how policy initiates and forms up to (and including) the point of decision making (excluding implementation which much cultural policy research deals with).

Conversely, whilst most cultural policy research is concerned with the cultural element of cultural policy, examining questions such as culture (as inferred from policy texts), the philosophical or ideological positions of these policies, or their implementation and effects – often examined from a cultural studies, political, economic, sociological and other perspectives (see Gray 2010) – this research is interested in explaining policy formation from the perspective of the political and institutional dynamics that shape the policy process; what some might suggest is primarily a study of European public policy with cultural policy as its case study.

We also discussed how cultural policy research tends to assume cultural policy to be a rational process. Research approaches have also (consequently) tended to favour a static perspective on policy (which stems from the focus on outputs and outcomes), failing to recognise the ‘making’ aspect of policy and the essentially dynamic nature of the policy process that generates – and therefore explains – those outputs and outcomes. Such an approach ignores the constitutive role of contention and mobilisation in cultural policy, the messiness of political processes and the influence of context or process. In the same
vein, cultural policy research has also missed the role of individuals in the making of cultural policy (the exception is Ahearne 2010).

In the context of the above, there is in fact little to connect or relate this thesis and conventional cultural policy research in terms of substantive interests and thus we see the significance of or the value added by the present thesis in relation of cultural policy research primarily as methodological. Not only in relation to its focus on the ‘making’ element of policy (as opposed to policy output), but also in relation to the theoretical lens/es utilised to investigate and understand cultural policy making and choices. And in this sense we agree with Gray’s (2010) view that although this kind of research is located in and uses models from other disciplines, its subject is, still, cultural policy and the questions raised are important; certainly so in relation to the methodologies used to analyse and understand it.

10.3 So, what lessons have we learned from this research?

Although perhaps peripheral to conventional cultural policy researchscape (as seen above they have differing objectives and analytical interests), this research on the formation of cultural policy in the European Community nevertheless contributes to the scholarly research and literature in a number of ways. First, importantly, it adds to the historical understanding of European cultural policy, (still) an under-researched area of European public policy (or, for that matter, of cultural policy research). It does so by using thus far unexplored (to our knowledge) data sources, interviews with participants and by writing a historical, analytic narrative of these policy experiences. To this (analytic) end, second, the study also aims to make a theoretical contribution to research on European public policy formation, namely through its findings on key aspects of cultural policy formation, namely agenda initiation, policy formulation and the role of policy entrepreneurs.
Third, testing Kingdon’s American-politics based model of the policy process on the European ‘government’ system carried its challenges and this (learning) process generated some insights into the model and its effectiveness to explain the (cultural) policy process in the European institutional context. Last but not least, perhaps a sub-aspect of the above, a fourth contribution of this research, is the utility of the research strategy deployed in this study which has yet to be used to study cultural policy. We next expand on these a bit further.

10.3.1 EC cultural policy: historical understanding

The historical reporting and understanding of the four episodes is an original contribution of this research project. The first reason for such an assertion is straightforward, simply owing to the fact that the Commission-based episodes, for example, are not only the result of primary research but were never researched or accounted for before. So, whilst the literature normally places the advent of cultural policy in the European Community in 1974 and attributes it to the European Parliament, this thesis has shown not only that this is inaccurate but that the sequence of events in the formation of cultural policy in the 1970s (which indeed involved Parliament) was quite different (cf. Chapter 7).

Likewise, copious (in most instances) research exists on the early (summit-based) political events although this tends to overlook culture; whether because culture was considered a marginal issue by scholars or because other aspects were more attractive from the point of view of the/ir research agenda. The Fouchet negotiations (1961 episode), for example, were the object of significant research and publications over the last 60 years but the cultural cooperation issue and related events are simply ignored in

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367 Cf. Chapter 2
368 One fact that emerged early on in this (our) research experience was that the low status of the culture issue is not only a feature of the political world but seems to be something of a ‘no-go’ area among the (political) scholarly community.
this literature, the rare reference to culture made only in passing. The same applies to developments in the early 1980s or the 1986 Single European Act negotiations.

The importance of historical understanding is that it provides a meaningful context for and helps explain how European cultural policy evolved in the way that it did; and in part where it is today. The current EU’s ‘Creative Europe Programme (2014 to 2020)’ (European Commission 2013), is clearly underpinned by two fundamental drivers – developing the (cultural) market, and furthering the cultural (bringing people together) dimension. As this thesis explained, the market aspect has to do with the pervading institutional framework of the treaty and formally emerged in the 1977 Commission paper; the cultural dialogue aspect recurrently surfaced at turning points of the political and institutional development of the EEC, though (as this thesis found out) it emerged in 1955 and was coupled with the union ‘problem’ in 1961.

The two pathways became institutionalized as pillars of European cultural policy in the 1977 Commission paper. And although European cultural policy has, of course, evolved and changed in response to changing environments and demands, the two pillars of European cultural policy have endured, not only influencing the policy’s trajectory per se but (it appears) constraining actors and the ideas associated with this policy (Rhinard 2010: 215). But this adds to our knowledge and understanding in terms of the dialogue between continuity and change and in historical and contemporaneous sense-making terms.

If we had to single out an element that was absent from the conventional cultural policy literature reviewed in Chapter 2, that would be the long term perspective on policy, including what in policy analysis terms would mostly translate as policy change. Cultural
policy research, whether of the applied, critical, hybrid, national or European variety, has tended to focus primarily on contemporaneous policy problems – e.g. social impact, cultural value, multiculturalism, ‘the Dome’ – and/or the ‘frozen moments’ of a policy experience; which is possibly a consequence of a primary concern with policy ex-post decision i.e. policy output (text), its outcomes and impact. Policy or agenda research taking an in some way longitudinal (or even historical) or a change perspective that could help explain, for example, policy direction/choices, change or trends is hard to come by.  

In this sense, this research’s focus on change (formation) places it in the periphery, if not completely outside, of the ‘many halves of cultural policy research’ discussed in Chapter 2; though this may in fact be what encourages us to see the approach followed in this thesis as a (new) contribution.

10.3.2 EC cultural policy: theoretical understanding

The choice of a comparative-historical research strategy for this project was mainly concerned with the comparison of data across time (given the small, historical sample) and the extrapolation of causation. The goal was to illuminate how particular factors (independent variables) affected policy process outcomes (dependent variables) (see Mahoney 2004). This research strategy provided some insights and opened up a more advanced understanding of the emergence and evolution of cultural policy in the

369 A good example of this (and of the ‘frozen moment’ approach) is the recent article by Hesmondhalgh et al (2015) assessing the extent to which the cultural policies of ‘New Labour (the UK Labour government of 1997–2010)’ were neo-liberal. Not only do the authors recognise that ‘Neo-liberalism is shown to be a significant but rather crude tool for evaluating and explaining New Labour’s cultural policies’ (Hesmondhalgh et al 2015: 97) but we in fact note the thirteen year-long timespan of this research question which encompasses three Labour governments – policy/ies would have changed during a single five year government cycle, let alone three.
European Community. The limited theoretical generalisations from the experiences examined (cf. Chapter 9) show a number of significant factors:

First, the pattern of access of culture to the European political agenda was quite consistent: political events, predominantly change- or history-making\(^{370}\) (Peterson and Bomberg 1999) events associated with union were particularly amenable to the inclusion of culture on the European political agenda. This is explained not only by the fact that (low status) culture was a boundary issue (Rochefort and Cobb 1994) of union, but also that ‘big’ decision\(^ {371}\) (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 4) European events (at least those leading to major institutional change) tend to involve a negotiation process, providing multiple little windows for advocates to advance the culture issue (in our sample we found that low status facilitated issue survival in negotiations).

Second, another consistent finding was that European Community cultural policy is informed by the institutional, treaty framework under which it is made\(^ {372}\) and that this is a necessary condition for the issue or policy to progress. But the research also found that this, in turn, induced (in this sample) a search-like, deliberative policy formulation process which was narrowly framed by the treaty.

A third significant finding that consistently arose from the cultural policy experiences was the role of policy entrepreneurs in advocating and promoting the culture issue. Their role was decisive in the agenda initiation and decision stages, especially in intergovernmental settings such as European summits.

\(^{370}\) As opposed to, for example, the European Councils dealing with the systemic agenda, domestic issues or a specific issue e.g. further enlargement.

\(^{371}\) According to Peterson and Bomberg (1999:4) big decisions are ‘bigger than policies’ and ‘may redefine the EU’s competence or alter institutions in ways that lead to changes in EU policy’.

\(^{372}\) A quick scan of the current ‘Creative Europe’ programme (2014-20) indicates that this remains the case.
Kingdon’s (1995) model, which the research drew on, obviously helped locate policy entrepreneurs and their activities – individuals who sense that the time for an issue is coming and wait for a window in which they then couple the problem, policy and politics streams. In this model, policy entrepreneurs wait and respond to events in the three streams; and this was indeed validated by ‘our’ cultural policy entrepreneurs.

But the four cultural policy episodes shed further light on policy entrepreneurs. In these episodes policy entrepreneurs were all certified actors, all had interacted with the culture issue in their career life experience and all had strong (informed?) beliefs about the issue. It could probably be said that the episodes would not have happened if they had not intervened; the implication being that there is something about cultural policy entrepreneurs that is or may be specific and which Kingdon’s institutional-inspired framework does not capture. We therefore go beyond Kingdon’s template to suggest that the identity of cultural policy entrepreneurs is causally related to their agency and that it needs to be factored in in any explanation of how the mechanism of policy entrepreneurship is activated.\(^{373}\)

More, although the above will apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to most policies, we believe that the model of policy entrepreneur found in European cultural policy is relevant to and can be generalised to cultural policy (at international or national level),\(^{374}\) especially in governments where the agenda status of culture is low (most governments),

\(^{373}\) Barzelay (2003) draws not so dissimilar conclusions with regards to the agency and identity of political entrepreneurs, albeit in a different policy sector. See also Corbett (2005). In this instance we can only suggest this causality as this was a consistent empirical observation but research would be needed to demonstrate/validate it.

\(^{374}\) The findings of this thesis seem to resonate, for example, with the change of British cultural policy in 1997. Not only was the ‘dramatic’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) change of the policy agenda to the cultural industries enabled by political turnover – new Labour’s ascent to power – which provided an opportunity for a new agenda, but (then) Culture Secretary Chris Smith showed all the attributes of a policy entrepreneur (in the context of government/Cabinet): he promoted the issue, he was a certified actor and one whose career experience had involved significant contact with the field.
where the issue image is perceived as complex, specialist or high-brow and where the nature of political support is fragmented; either because of the attributes just mentioned or because the policy community is small or both (features which probably apply to all or most public cultural policies). In a nutshell, the more difficult the policy’s image, the greater the need for the intervention of an authoritative policy entrepreneur especially at issue initiation and decision stages.

10.3.3 EC cultural policy and Kingdon’s model: theoretical reflections

The research also learned critically from, with and about Kingdon’s model (1995) of the policy process. The model performed extremely well in terms of explaining the cultural policy process in our episodes; both the narrative structure and the findings on all the episodes owing significantly to the model (and its ontologically fitting combination with institutional-processualism). But this is not to say that the model’s application to the European institutional context was without problems.

Firstly, in all the episodes the agenda setting process did not, as Kingdon premises (1995), start in the systemic agenda, then progressing to the government agenda (although Kingdon himself alludes to this possibility in his revised model of 1995). In this case, culture was invariably initiated to the European agenda from within the system, whether through the high politics (high level European councils) route or the low politics, policy-making system (see Princen and Rhinard 2006). This is explained by the specificity of the European institutional and political contexts – there isn’t a European demos, public opinion or media channels to speak of, and there isn’t therefore a systemic, public agenda.

This European specific feature may also explain why culture was initiated by actors (individuals) rather than governmental structures as Kingdon postulates (1995: 230).
Secondly, Kingdon’s policy formulation process presupposes a ‘soup’ (Kingdon 1995: 116-144) in which policy ideas float – whence ‘alternatives’ – and from which a policy is chosen through a selection process. Kingdon’s model is inspired in Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) garbage can model but the model’s emphasis on randomness could not quite explain this sample’s policy formulation events. All policies, without exception, stemmed from a guided search- rather than s/election process. Kingdon’s proposed criteria of feasibility, values, budgets and politicians’ receptivity (1995: 200) for policy selection (from the ‘soup’) do in fact apply, but the treaty framework is an implicit institutional constraint which sits above and frames the process (and in turn focuses the search).

The third note is about policy entrepreneurs, which Kingdon deals with from an extrinsic point of view, that is, how their agency is activated by the external environments in which they operate. This perspective clearly fits the ontological foundations of the model and is indeed necessary to explain what or how this mechanism is activated, but its application to our research episodes proved deficient in that it generated only a partial explanation. On the one hand, we used the analytical device of social mechanisms (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2001; Hedström and Swedberg 1996) to qualify the relationship between context and action and found that policy entrepreneurship was invariably associated with the social mechanisms of ‘attribution of opportunity’ and ‘actor certification’. On the other, no doubt, other than responsive or reactive, individuals are also proactive and mobilized by social-cognitive processes (motivation, identity) and these are intrinsic. For a model to explain policy entrepreneurship satisfactorily, therefore, both perspectives need to be considered.

375 With the exception of ‘public acceptability’ (Kingdon 1995) criterion, not relevant here; cf. paragraph above.
What can be concluded from the above appraisal is that where this thesis’ policy experiences are concerned, Kingdon’s model is an effective explanatory model but that it has limitations. The first problem – agenda origin – is a limitation though it does not challenge the model’s application or validity – this research was still able to determine how issues started as political issues and how they arrived on the agenda; if anything, it tests the flexibility of the model and its relevance to diverse agenda/initiation situations.

The policy formulation findings challenge Kingdon’s notions of ‘soup’ and ‘choice’ but this is a condition of the institutional contexts – European executive (Commission) and treaty negotiations – in which the culture issue surfaced in our episodes. With a sample of four cases we cannot begin to challenge the model, or not statistically; but we can add a qualitative note to it, that the policy community where Kingdon locates the ‘soup’ and ‘choice’ may be a single institution and/or constrained by fundamental institutions.

The third issue, policy entrepreneurs, reveals the limitations of Kindon’s approach to a social, agency mechanism such as policy entrepreneurship (however ontologically fitting with the model). This challenges the model to some extent, though its suitability to a research case will clearly depend on the case and its research objectives.

10.4 Limits of this research

This thesis recognises, of course, that the approach followed to investigate the EC cultural policy is just one possible explanation for these four policy episodes. Similarly to other empirical studies in public policy some of the choices made here inevitably structure or condition the explanations (and results) of the research – these are discussed below.
The research emphasis on the process understanding of cultural policy making could be seen as in some way conditioning. The process focus led to the choice of a case-oriented strategy, examining episodes or cases as wholes, where the causal significance of an event or structure depends on the context (Ragin 1987: xiii). But researching a bounded policy experience/s (rather than its linear progression) means that longitudinal processes or historical dynamics that could conceivably play a role in the evolution of the policy or in the episodes are not included in the analysis (except when cases last long enough for such dynamics to operate).

An explanatory framework that could have explored causation from a longitudinal, historical perspective is historical institutionalism, which theorises that preceding steps in a particular direction induce a path376 or further movement in the same direction (Pierson 2000). Historical institutionalism could have possibly revealed whether policy choices made by the Commission in the 1970s, for example, affected subsequent developments in this policy and how this might have constrained or influenced future policy options and decisions (for example the 1987 ‘Fresh boost’ paper).

Another condition relates to the fact that the definition of the episodes is restricted to the pre-decision and decision events of the policy making process and excludes the (post-decision) implementation phase. The emphasis on the initial and pre-decision phase of political processes and its rationale is an interest and a perspective (indeed, a bias) that the research shares with Kingdon (1995) – Kingdon’s model does not have an interest in policy outcomes, dealing, rather, with the processes that generate them – but it is nevertheless a limitation of the research design.

376 A key concept in Historical Institutionalism is ‘path dependence’ according to which once a policy ‘has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct any easy reversal of the initial choice’ (Levi 1997: 28)
Conversely, while the Commission initiates policy and makes decisions, ultimately, any final decisions on policy emanates from the Council (which considers proposals from the Commission). However, in the 1970s-80s period, depending on the objectives of a policy (for example, common market implementation) the Commission could initiate and implement policy based on its decision. This was the case with the 1977 paper which was submitted to the Council for a decision (which was never made) but still the policy was implemented. The 1987 paper was less straightforward given the dual institutional cultural policy venue in place then, which brought together the Commission and the Council.

10.5 Directions for future research

This thesis showed the potential of cultural policy as an area of (academic) research. Some of its findings in fact share similarities with research on other Commission policies emerging at the same time, in the 1970s (see Princen 2009; Rhinard 2010; Tallberg 2006; Smith 2004; Guigner 2004; Cram 1997; Pollack 1994).

The success of the European Community/Union as a global political and economic regional entity inspired similar projects elsewhere and although this thesis would be very cautious about any normative theoretical aspirations, the current research will help understand similar cultural policy experiences emerging in the international arena. One of the things the thesis has established is how the relationship between the EU and culture is longstanding, a fact that a glimpse at recent and current EU culture programmes further confirms. This is a policy sector relevant to both European public policy and cultural policy research that still remains unexplored.
This thesis focused on four (isolated) policy experiences and a full picture of the culture issue’s career in the European Community pre- and post-Maastricht is yet to emerge: in terms of mapping and understanding. This historical understanding could be enhanced in future research if coupled with a question about whether or to what extent the theoretical generalisations formulated above change post-Maastricht after the cultural policy domain stabilised. Moreover, little or no research exists on the current cultural policy of the European Union although the principles it displays in its programmes resonate with those that framed the Commission’s first policy papers; in future research it would be interesting to compare policy formation pre- and post-Maastricht.

From a historical perspective, the focus on four isolated episodes means that other episodes both between and after them remain to be studied. The archival search for this thesis indicates that the European Parliament, for example, developed a very active campaign to promote a cultural cooperation policy since the early 1960s which involved EEC member states putting forward proposals on cultural cooperation at the highest political level in 1964-65 – this has not been investigated yet either.

At the other end of our period of interest, the insertion of Article 128 in the Maastricht Treaty remains unresearched. By all accounts, the evidence gathered by this research suggests that this was seen as a ‘long shot’ and that Delors himself, for example, did not believe that culture would ever be (legally) recognised as a policy area of the EU; yet (as before) it found its way into the Maastricht Treaty. Many intriguing questions remain unanswered: what caused this to happen? How and why did culture ‘land’ on the Maastricht agenda? Moreover, on a more current note, recent and current EU cultural policy or policies remain, as far as we know, unresearched and this alone could open a new segment of research.
This thesis has demonstrated that the successful application of our combined theoretical framework to study the formation of cultural policy (both effected for the first time in this thesis) indicates that it can be applied to examine other cultural policy experiences or relevant research questions, both at national and international level.

A significant contribution of this thesis was to apply, and to indicate limitations, of Kingdon’s model to study cultural policy (per se and as a European public policy). Policy formulation was the example elaborated here. We found that the model did not operate very well in (and because of) the specific conditions of the European institutional framework. In this sense, it would be interesting to remember that in national cultural policy/ies, the conditions surrounding policy formulation probably contrast with the American-system-based ‘generous “primeval soup” bowl’ that Kingdon’s model assumes, precisely because of the specificities of this policy and nature of the policy community normally associated with its making. This would be an interesting test for future research to perform.

Policy entrepreneurship is another example where research may be pushed further. We found that Kingdon’s model of the policy entrepreneur did not have enough scope to ‘capture’ what we found to be the specific qualities that cultural policy entrepreneurs display (which may indeed may be relevant to other policies); we further suggested that these may be relevant to national cultural policy. Again, this is a theoretical model demanding further examination that could contribute to current (general) policy entrepreneurship literature. Without doubt, this thesis has opened up a field that will keep researchers busy for some time to come.
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   - EG.B.B-104
   European Movement Collection:
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   Emile Noël Collection:
   - EN 78
   - EN 664
   Franco Maria Malfatti Collection:
   - FMM 37
   Federalist European Union Collection:
   - UEF 183
   - UEF 185
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Table A.1: Policy Entrepreneurs: their roles and functions in the cultural policy process in the four episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>Policy Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Policy stage</th>
<th>How / entrepreneurial functions</th>
<th>Outcome (intermediate / final)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1955-57  | Walter Hallstein     | German Chief Negotiator at Messina Conference | Proposed European cultural project for (new) European Community | Agenda setting | - Coupled problem-policy-politics and Messina window  
- Strategic issue definition (at Messina)  
- Resources used: belief, clout, Adenauer pol support | Issue initiation |
|          |                     |     |      | Policy specification | - Process navigation / system know-how  
- Venue shopping and strategic issue re-framing re boundary issue | Issue specification |
|          |                     |     |      | Decision-making | - Used resources: belief, backing, position, persistence, clout, time, institutions | Article in EURATOM Treaty |
| 1961-62  | Pierre Pescatore    | Luxembourg Chief Negotiator and Legal Expert at Fouchet Plan Negotiations | Chair of Pescatore Sub-committee (Fouchet Committee) | Policy specification | - System know-how / navigated institutional framework  
- Engineered policy solution | Cultural cooperation conventions |
| 1972-77  | Altiero Spinelli    | European Commissioner (Education) | Mobilised culture issue/policy in European Commission | Agenda setting | - Commissioned report on feasibility of E cultural policy  
- Issue advocacy (Commission, COREPER) | - Issue initiation and entrance  
- First Commission Culture Memorandum |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>Policy Entrepreneur</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Policy stage</th>
<th>How / entrepreneurial functions</th>
<th>Outcome (intermediate / final)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-77</td>
<td>Robert Grégoire</td>
<td>Director, Commission’s Cultural Sector Division</td>
<td>Established cultural policy domain in the European Commission (and EC)</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>- Problem definition and re-definition over 3 policy cycles</td>
<td>Issue specification</td>
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<td>Policy formulation</td>
<td>- Joined (Treaty) solution to problem</td>
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<td>- Developed policy capacity</td>
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<td>- Brokered coalition Commission-EP</td>
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<td>- Developed institutnl/budget/legal basis</td>
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<td>- Promoted legitimacy</td>
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<td>- Softening up of policy community</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>- Resources used: agency, certification, networking, persistence, institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>- Coupling of problems-policies-politics</td>
<td>1977 Commission Paper</td>
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<td>1984-87</td>
<td>François Mitterrand</td>
<td>President of France and of European French Presidency (1984 1st semester)</td>
<td>Engineered access of cultural agenda to (formal) European political agenda</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>- Strategic problem construction</td>
<td>Issue initiation</td>
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<td>- Seized agenda opportunities in context in motion</td>
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<td>- High level advocacy, lobbying, mobilised support for agenda decisions</td>
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<td>- Pushed taskforce to develop agenda</td>
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<td>- Coupled problem to policy to politics</td>
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<td>- Resources used: presidencies (institutional), position, leadership, persistence, belief</td>
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<td>- Issue expansion</td>
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<td>- Issue entrance in high level European agenda</td>
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<td>1985-87</td>
<td>Jacques Delors</td>
<td>President, European Commission</td>
<td>Mobilised culture issue/policy in European Commission</td>
<td>Agenda setting</td>
<td>- Included culture in Commission annual work programme</td>
<td>Issue initiation</td>
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<td>- Created cult/pol venue in Commission</td>
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<td>- Advocacy (high political level)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Resources used: new Commission agenda, new treaty, position, belief</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

Cultural sector (European) research commissioned by the European Commission in 1975-78:

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