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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>Association for Civil Rights in Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Arab Peace Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJC</td>
<td>High Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAHD</td>
<td>Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>The Israel Democracy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCRI</td>
<td>Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>New Israel Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli Shekel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVDR</td>
<td>Non-Violent Direct Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVR</td>
<td>Non-Violent Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACBI</td>
<td>Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCATI</td>
<td>Public Committee Against Torture in Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGGM</td>
<td>Pensioenfonds voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke belangen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHR</td>
<td>Physicians for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Social Movement Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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Finally, my thanks go to all the activists who gave me their time, opened up to me and let me enter their world for the sake of this project.

תודה רבה לכולם
DECLARATION

I declare that the work presented in this thesis, except those elements specifically declared, is all my own work carried out and finished at City University London.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. Using a framework based in social movement theory it argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, not all parts of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in the period following the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000. By placing greater emphasis on the internal dynamics of social movement theory: collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures, and by building a three-fold typology of Israeli peace activism: a liberal Zionist component; a radical component; and a human rights component, it argues that it was only the liberal Zionist component that demobilised following the outbreak of violence in 2000. The radical and human rights component continued to mobilise, with new groups emerging, presenting alternative and innovative ways to challenge the prevailing situation.

This study is based on interviews with activists in Israel, participant observation and primary data from the publications and websites of the activist groups, focusing on the period between 2000 and 2014. Through this, new empirical data to further the understanding of Israeli peace activism has been provided. This study further contributes to the literature on Israeli peace activism by unearthing new collective action frames, the evolution of tactical repertoires and a shift in the mobilising structures. Furthermore, by disaggregating the internal dynamics before analysing how they interact with the external environment, the political opportunity structures, this dissertation identifies different cycles of contention for the three components of Israeli peace activism.

The empirical analysis has also led to contributions in the field of social movement theory. It shows that impact should be conceived of beyond the policy arena, with emphasis given to other areas of impact, such as mobilisation, cultural shifts and norm entrepreneurship. It also identifies a number of aspects of social movement theory that require refinement: the relationship between the government and a social movement; the connection between the international dimension and a domestic social movement; and the role of gender dynamics.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 INTRODUCTION

A variety of studies and accounts of Israeli peace activism have been produced throughout Israel’s history (Hermann, 2009, 2002; Kabasakal et al., 2004; Kidron, 2004; Gordon, 2003; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer, 1996). The conventional perspective argues that the movement was paralysed following the second Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israel in 2000, unable and unwilling to respond to the unfolding events. As the 2000s progressed it is argued that the movement became politically irrelevant, leading to the disappearance of any significant peace activities,

‘The peace-minded ordinary people, who for nearly three decades could be relied on to come out in their hundreds and thousands once or twice a year (and sometimes more frequently when the situation clearly demanded it) have disappeared from the streets since that fatal time in 2000’ (Keller and Zilversmidt, 2008:13).

‘...the bitter disappointment with the political chaos and accelerating violence that followed Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the later electoral victory of Hamas in early 2006, led to a complete halt of peace activism in Israel. Not even the...Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006...nor the Annapolis peace initiative of late 2007, were successful in revitalising the movement, which is admittedly a historical remnant today and no longer a relevant political actuality’ (Hermann, 2009:10).

According to similar accounts, exhaustion and disillusionment, alongside an inability for the peace movement to form an agenda in response to the outbreaks of violence in this period, marked the decline of the Israeli peace movement, as ‘many of the most prominent peace activists, silent and disillusioned, retired to the seclusion of their homes’ (Newman, 2002). Whilst these scholars are right in arguing that Israeli peace activism has been in decline since the second Intifada and unable to revitalise activities to a level comparable to the 1980s and 1990s, this dissertation will argue that it has only been the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism that experienced this decline. Many of the existing radical groups and human rights groups have continued to mobilise and, alongside emerging groups, present different peace promoting voices and ways of challenging the current situation, showing that they are far from paralysed. In fact, the paralysis of the liberal Zionist component became the point of creation of a ‘clearer and louder message of dissent’ (Fridman, 2008:37).

In arguing this, the overall contribution of this dissertation will be to detail the emerging waves of activism for the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism, whilst explaining why the liberal Zionists did not respond to the prevailing realities. It will provide an evolution of Hermann’s
(2009) work by developing an in-depth understanding of Israeli peace activism since the second *Intifada* through a comprehensive study of the transformation of the characteristics of Israeli peace activism post 2000. This will bring to light an array of voices and groups actively promoting and working towards change in the region.

The study of Israeli peace activism will be approached through a framework based in social movement theory. A peace movement is arguably a type of social movement, with a social movement defined as,

‘Sequences of contentious politics based on underlying social networks, on resonant collective action frames and a capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents’ (Tarrow, 2011:7).

Whilst Israeli peace activism might be too fragmented to fit the full definition and unable to maintain continuous challenges against the authorities, the tools of social movement theory still have explanatory power even in relation to activism falling short of a sustained large-scale movement and have been applied to studies of such activism successfully (Staggenborg and Lecomte, 2009; Tilly and Wood, 2009; Carty and Onyett, 2007; Snow et al, 2007; Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Meyer, 2004; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Meyer, 2002; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997; Markoff, 1996; Diamond, 1995).

This dissertation will make use of Tarrow’s (2011) framework, which synthesises four factors from social movement theory: collective action frames, the ways in which activists ‘fashion shared understandings’ to encourage mobilisation (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:6); tactical repertoires, the tactics that activists know how to employ to achieve their shared goals (Tilly, 1995:41); mobilisation structures, the underlying infrastructures of a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:67) and political opportunity structures (POS), factors in the external environment that facilitate or constrain activism (Tilly, 1978). Whilst some scholars have applied aspects of social movement theory to their studies of Israeli peace activism (Ginsburg, 2009; Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004, 2002; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Peleg, 2000), there is a general emphasis on the external factors that affect a social movement, such as the nature of the government, public opinion and perceptions on the peace process. A focus on these external factors has led scholars to conclude that the marginality of Israeli peace activism and their inability to influence policy change, confirm their political irrelevancy (Hermann, 2009, 2002). Whilst the groups that have been operating since the second *Intifada* have had limited influence on the government or public, a heavy focus on the external factors that affect Israeli peace activism and contextualising it within the Oslo peace process, the process towards achieving a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians that began in 1993, leaves little attention to the internal features of Israeli peace activism, thus overlooking those groups formulating different ideas surrounding the conflict and the potential impact these groups are having beyond the policy arena. There are a variety of groups that have continued to operate and emerge since the outbreak of the second *Intifada*, providing new ways of confronting the realities that are less concerned with a political peace process.
There is therefore a need to give greater attention to the internal characteristics of a social movement to understand the internal dynamics and give weight to agency in social movement activities. In doing so, this dissertation will unearth new elements of Israeli peace activism: new collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilising structures, contributing to both the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory. Once these have been explored, the connection with the external environment can be analysed. Giving equal attention to the internal characteristics will also unearth different areas of impact, beyond the policy realm. In doing so, this dissertation will further contribute to the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory.

This dissertation will approach Israeli peace activism through three components that it is comprised of: the liberal Zionist component, the radical component and the human rights component. Previous studies have distinguished between liberal Zionist and radical groups (Hermann, 2009; Kaminer, 1996) however, this study will go further. Firstly, it will be more detailed in outlining and analysing each component. Secondly, it will identify a third set of groups – the human rights component, which has experienced an alternative trajectory to the groups within the liberal Zionist and radical components, and thirdly it will analyse the differences between the categories, thus formulating a three-fold typology of Israeli peace activism.

The groups were categorised through the ways in which they frame themselves, the problems and solutions to the conflict, their tactical repertoires and their mobilisation structures. Groups in the liberal Zionist component believe that the Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own but on the basis of a liberal democracy. They became the largest voice of Israeli peace activists proposing a two-state solution, although they did not initially consider the idea of a Palestinian state. They seek to ensure the peace and security of Israel through incisive debate and democratic practices. They tend to be the least confrontational in their tactical repertoires, aiming to mobilise the Israeli public and influence the government. The radical groups are those groups that consistently put the Palestinians at the centre of the problems of and solutions to the conflict, focusing on peace out of moral concerns for the Palestinians, either in ensuring their rights are acknowledged in peace agreements, helping alleviate the suffering on the ground, or acting in solidarity of their claims. They have always presented more confrontational collective action frames and tactical repertoires than the liberal Zionist component. There has not been a consistent political agenda amongst the radical groups and have included anti-Zionists, those calling for a binational state and those who do not propose a political solution. However, their collective action frames have always been further from the mainstream Israeli public and state narrative than the liberal Zionist groups and therefore ‘radical’ refers to their position on the margins of Israeli society, rather than their political perspective. The third category is the human rights component. ‘Human rights’ in this context refers to the everyday entitlements of Palestinians and Arab Citizens of Israel, which are argued to be violated by the actions of Israel. These include, but are not limited to, freedom of movement, access to food and water, the right to education, and individual and collective security. A range of organisations and groups constitute this component, each highlighting the ways in
which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation adversely affect the lives of Palestinians. Through their collective action frames and tactical repertoires they aim to hold the Israeli government accountable for their actions towards the Palestinians and Arab Citizens of Israel and ensure the Israeli public are aware of what is being done in their name. They do not tend promote a political solution to the conflict but focus on the realities of the situation. Whilst some of their tactics overlap with groups in the radical component, the efforts of the groups in the human rights component to speak to the Israeli government and public, places them in a different component, which experienced its own trajectory.

Israeli peace activism is in a state of flux since the break-down of the Camp David talks and outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and so the demarcations into the different components may not be strict; some organisations may display characteristics that cross-over into the different components and the groups may perceive themselves as more ‘radical’ or more ‘moderate’ than the other groups within their category however, key trends in the collective action frames and differences in their trajectories can be identified that enable the categorisation of the groups into this typology.¹ Such typologies have a strong precedent in the study of peace movements (Ceadel, 1987, 1980) and it helps to understand in more detail how Israeli peace activism has transformed, as well as highlighting some interesting theoretical implications, particularly that groups with different internal characteristics, despite dealing with the same area of contention, can experience different trajectories. This typology has the potential to be used as a prism to study of other social movements, enabling more details to be uncovered and a more in-depth analysis to be given than when treating a social movement as one unit of analysis.

In a study of Israeli peace activism from the first intifada, Kaminer (1996) argues that the radical groups were the agenda setters and that whilst Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), the largest of the liberal Zionist groups, was able to mobilise mass demonstrations, such as 50,000 to 80,000 people in January 1988 against the government’s response to the first intifada, it was the pressure of the ‘small wheel of the bicycle’- the radical component - that pushed the ‘big wheel’ – the liberal Zionist component - to take certain positions and mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. Ideas that originated in the radical groups, such as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was the true representatives of the Palestinian people, eventually diffused into the liberal Zionist groups and later government policy. In the period beginning with the second intifada, the ‘big wheel; little wheel’ dynamic no longer holds true and a new trajectory in Israeli peace activism can be identified. Whilst, the ‘big wheel’ did slowdown, this dissertation will show that the ‘small wheel’, the radical component, along with the human rights component, continued to mobilise and developed new ideas, showing that not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralysed.

The liberal Zionists did try to mobilise its previous support base but further moderated the way in which it presented the conflict and its solutions, in order to try and stay relevant to the mainstream Israeli public. This led to a polarisation in Israeli peace activism, as the radical and human rights groups moved

¹ Appendix 1 includes the category assigned to each group
further away from mainstream Israeli consensus. This polarisation can be identified in the immediate wake of the outbreak of the second Intifada, with the liberal Zionist and radical groups taking opposing perspectives on the situation. Polarisation deepened throughout the 2000s, as the liberal Zionist component moved towards the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, in order to stay in-line with mainstream public opinion. The liberal Zionist groups shifted to focus almost solely on the peace and security of Israel, removing any pro-Palestinian sentiments from their image whereas, the radical component focused even more directly on solidarity by emphasising the story of Palestinian suffering, which has presented an opportunity to re-posit the concept of peace and develop new motivations for acting. The human rights component of Israeli peace activism that developed in the first Intifada has in some ways attempted to balance the two poles created by the liberal Zionist and radical components by revealing the suffering of the Palestinians and confronting Israeli policies but without pushing a political agenda that challenges the fundamental tenets of liberal Zionism in order to try to influence the Israeli public and government. In doing so they too are finding new ways to confront the situation.

Differences and shifts can also be noted in the tactical repertoires, with the liberal Zionist groups less willing to employ confrontational tactics, given their desire to influence the mainstream Israeli public. The radical groups were able to be more confrontational and experienced an evolution in their tactical repertoire. The human rights groups focused on issues relating to revealing human rights violations and providing humanitarian services and their tactics reflected their specific goals. Furthermore, whilst they presented more confrontational collective action frames, they still wanted to influence the Israeli public and therefore used more moderate tactics than the radical groups. In general there was an expansion in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism however the decision to employ certain tactics was based on the collective action frames and target audiences. There was also an overall shift in the map of mobilisation structures, whilst certain remnants of mobilisation structures from the previous phases remained, such as the importance of informal, familiar networks. Many within the radical component have given up trying to influence the mainstream Israeli public and have instead attempted to mobilise individuals from marginalised sectors of Israeli society, as well as turning their attentions to the international dimension, through transnational social movements. The human rights component, as well as trying to attract the Israeli public, is also focusing on mobilising support in the international dimension. A dynamic is forming whereby, as the Israeli public and government turns away from the ideas of Israeli peace activism, the activists have begun to find alternative mobilising structures abroad.

Having identified and explained the internal features of the components of Israeli peace activism, this study will then analyse how they interact with the external environment. The liberal Zionist component is more constrained by changes in the political opportunity structures, particularly the nature of Israeli public opinion and the government, which explains why they went through a period of demobilisation. The radical component has always been less constrained and tends to perceive opportunities to mobilise when the liberal Zionists do not and therefore react more quickly. The human rights groups react to the prevailing realities on the ground by challenging the policies and actions of the Israeli
authorities but are sensitive to the state of Israeli public opinion and therefore use more contained collective action frames. In the third phase of Israeli peace activism after the outbreak of the second Intifada, three waves of activism can be identified for each of these categories. The liberal Zionist component, as conventionally argued, went through a period of demobilisation and lost their ability to be political relevant. The radical groups experienced a new wave of activism, with an evolution in their tactical repertoires, more confrontational collective action frames and innovative mobilisation structures. The human rights groups continued with their focus on reporting on the realities, with new groups emerging and new tactical repertoires forming.

Whilst Israeli peace activism in general and the radical and human rights components in particular are small and marginalised sectors of Israeli society, it is still important to study them. Firstly, given the dynamic highlighted above, whereby the radical groups acted as norm entrepreneurs, with the ideas of a few dozen activists in the late 1960s becoming government policy in the 1990s (Levy, 2013), how their ideas and activism develops is important for a long-term understanding of shifting discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secondly, although their marginalisation means they are unlikely to have an impact in terms of policy change in Israel, or influencing the public, at least in the short-term, impact should not only be identified in the political realm. Impact can be identified in other areas, such as the ability to mobilise and maintain activism, affect culture within society (Staggenborg, 1995) and in changing the dominant discourse (Bernstein, 2003).

This chapter will continue by outlining the research questions of this dissertation; it will then clarify and define some key terms used throughout; it will provide justification for the period of study and then outline the methodology used for this study. It will identify the limitations inherent in this study before presenting an outline of the structure of the dissertation.

2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This dissertation is framed by one overriding research question: How has the nature of Israeli peace activism transformed since the second Intifada? In answering this question a detailed account of certain aspects of Israeli peace activism will be explored. This will be compared with Israeli activism before the second Intifada, in order to highlight the key transformations. Four main aspects of a social movement will be explored in order to answer this question: the collective action frames, the tactical repertoires, the mobilisations structures and how these interact with the political opportunity structures. This will enable a detailed exploration of different characteristics of Israeli peace activism and thus its transformation. In order to answer this question, this dissertation will make use of a variety of mechanisms and processes within social movement theory, particularly ‘dynamics of contention’ from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), further outlined by Tarrow (2011). This dynamic approach enables the study to move away from treating a social movement as a static phenomenon and will provide more detailed explanations for how Israeli peace activism has transformed. In doing so, this dissertation will contribute a further case study through which to apply these dynamics.
In answering this main question, insights will also be given to some secondary themes: the relationship between a government and a social movement; the connection between the international dimension and a domestic social movement; the role of gender; the nature of cycles of contention within a social movement; and the definition of impact.

3 KEY TERMS

Some clarification over the use of certain terms is necessary at this stage. Hermann (2009:63-4) explains that the term ‘Israeli peace movement’ is an ‘analytic construct rather than a concrete entity’, noting that the ‘movement’ was always comprised of various individual organisations and groups that held different underlying beliefs and ideas about the conflict. She gives justification for the use of the term ‘peace movement’ because the many groups saw themselves as one body that was opposed to the nationalist camp and that many outsiders also saw them as one movement. I have chosen, however, to use the term ‘Israeli peace activism’ as the overarching analytical unit of this study. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, it helps in distinguishing periods in which the groups and components were more or less fragmented. Secondly, the term ‘Israeli peace movement’ has become a euphemism for the liberal Zionist component and therefore does not encapsulate the full range of groups that are operating. I use the term ‘peace movement’ in the period where there was an organisation that was capable of rallying together hundreds of thousands of participants and when the other groups would join them for mass demonstrations. I use the term ‘Israeli peace activism’ at times when there was more fragmentation, such as in the first decades of the State of Israel and the period post-2000.

Further complexities arise in using the term ‘peace.’ Some of the radical and human rights components no longer use the term ‘peace,’ having either rejected support for a peace process since the second Intifada over action on the ground, or focused on the human rights violations rather than a political agreement. The term ‘anti-occupation’ activism is more accurate however, in order to maintain analytic simplicity and a comparative element with previous studies, the term Israeli ‘peace’ activism will continue to be used. Further complexities arise when using certain labels to name events or realities as they come laden with ideological perspectives. For example, the war in 1948 can be referred to as the War of Independence or the Nakba (Catastrophe). In general attempts will be made to use the most neutral term available, for example all wars will be denoted by the year in which they occurred however terms used by the activists will be given where it helps identify their perspective. Hebrew or Arabic names for the organisations will be used throughout, unless a particular organisation is mostly known through their English name. Hebrew and Arabic words will be written in transliterations, using italics to highlight the foreign word or phrase. The English name of the organisation will be given in brackets after the first mention, which may not always be a direct translation of the Hebrew or Arabic term but is how the organisation is referred to in English.

A note must also be made about the use of the terms ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ when considering the context within which Israeli peace activism operates and how the activists perceive changes in these
arenas. Both *Intifadas* and the construction of the separation barrier\(^2\) are considered Israeli domestic issues since the economic, social, political and political-geographical factors related to these are located in the polity called Israel. Furthermore, the peace activists consider the *Intifadas* and the construction of the separation barrier as domestic issues rather than related to an international conflict. ‘International’ refers to factors that are located outside the polity called Israel. The Gaza Strip post the Israeli disengagement in 2005 is an example of an ‘international’ factor, particularly with the Hamas take-over and control of the territory.

There are also a number of key terms within social movement theory which will be used throughout. ‘Collective action frames’ are the shared understandings, ideas and messages used by a social movement (Tarrow, 2011:44); ‘tactical repertoires’ or ‘repertoires of contention’ are the tactics that a social movement or the individual groups have available to them (Tilly, 1978:41); ‘mobilisation structures’ are the infrastructures that form a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:61); ‘political opportunity structures’ are elements of the external context that can affect the trajectory of a social movement (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:66); and a ‘cycle of contention’ denotes the rise and fall of social movement activities (Tarrow, 2011:199). Further theoretical terms will be defined in chapter 2.

### 4 PERIOD OF STUDY

This study of Israeli peace activism will begin with the outbreak of the second *Intifada* in 2000. Given the focus of the dissertation on the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism, this starting point is appropriate since according to the interviews conducted and other accounts of Israeli peace activism in the second *Intifada*, a significant change, as a result of the outbreak of violence can be noted,

> ‘When the *Intifada* came, there were two processes going on at the same time. There was the mainstream left [the liberal Zionist component], which became more right wing. The radical left became more and more radicalised at the same time. You can say that both the mainstream and radical left were becoming polarised. This process brought much more actions into the radical left. During the Oslo-era, the radical left was much quieter. Today, since the beginning of the second *Intifada*, there is a demo almost every day. So many new movements came to life, working really hard against the situation’ (Yossi in Lakoff, [no date]).

The period of study will end in Sept 2014, which marks a fourteen year time-frame for this study. This is a significantly large period in which to identify key shifts and characteristics. Hermann (2009) provides a similar time-frame of fourteen and a half years for her study, between 1993 and

\(^2\) The separation barrier runs between Israel and the West Bank, although not directly along the Green Armistice Line. It was built by Israel, beginning in 2002, in response to the outbreak of Palestinian violence. The purpose and route of the barrier, as well as how it should be named, are highly contentious issues. In an attempt to avoid political connotations, I shall refer to it as the ‘separation barrier,’ although it can be argued that there is no neutral term for this structure.
2008, setting a suitable precedent to follow. By the end of this fourteen year period from 2000 to 2014, the three distinct components can be clearly identified and their particular internal characteristics, and how they interact with the external environment, discernible. This period will be described as ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of the Israeli peace movement; three cycles of contention’. Future research should consider whether the differences and fragmentation identified between the components in this period have changed and should identify if and when the cycles shift.

A historical overview will be provided that starts in 1967. This too reflects a significant change in the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism. Whilst there were some peace efforts prior to this, they were only the efforts of small groups of intellectuals. In 1967, Israeli peace activism developed a clear agenda in response to the outcomes of the war. The concept of ‘ceding the land for peace’ was developed, with two categories of groups forming: the radical groups and the liberal Zionist groups. This phase can be described as ‘individual attempts at peace activism’. In 1977/8 the next phase of Israeli peace activism can be identified, described as the ‘birth and coming of age of a peace movement’. The largest peace group, Shalom Achshav, emerged at the beginning of this period to encourage the newly elected right-wing government to continue on the path to peace with Egypt. It was able to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public and acted as a rallying point for the different groups that emerged in this phase (Simons, 2013a). Whilst three distinct components of Israeli peace activism emerged in the phase of the ‘birth and coming of age of a peace movement’, at points they could be seen rallying together in support of a two-state solution, particularly in the beginning of the Oslo peace process. It was in the outbreak of the second Intifada, which followed the failure of the Camp David II Summit, that the peace movement became fragmented and no longer able to rally together, signalling the start of the next phase, ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of the Israeli peace movement; three cycles of contention’.

Whilst other scholars have identified different points to demarcate changes in Israeli peace activism, they do so through their focus on the external changes (Hermann, 2009). Accordingly, a change in government or the peace process signalled a new phase of Israeli peace activism. Given the focus on the internal characteristics of Israeli peace activism, this study has identified shifting phases according to larger changes inside Israeli peace activism; when the activists themselves experienced a change or there was a clear shift in activities or collective action frames.

5 METHODOLOGY

In gathering data to answer my research question, I adopted the qualitative methods that have been employed as the standard approach to studying these groups (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hermann 2009, 2002; Lamarche, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Bar-On, 1996, 1988, 1985a). It is important to follow the methods that have been previously employed
in order to provide a direct refinement and development of the analyses already conducted. Furthermore, quantitative research methods are based on fixed cases and aim to test and measure certain hypotheses of the relationships between set variables. This limits the flexibility to adapt the concepts according to the ways in which the relevant actors see themselves. It sets the variables before approaching the units of analysis. The study of a social movement requires more flexible research methods in order to allow for the refinement of the concepts that initiated the study, based on the perspectives of those actually involved in the social movement (Ragin, 1994:137). Since the study of a social movement is in some respects the study of the narratives of those individuals and groups of individuals involved in the social movement, qualitative research methods are appropriate as they allow for an appreciation of the individuals’ understandings and interactions, rather than testing the correlations between previously defined variables (Silverman, 2005: 9). It helps to unearth nuances and subtleties that may have been overlooked by more structured data gathering. Furthermore, one goal in studying social movements is to give a voice to certain marginalised sectors of society, which is best done through qualitative research methods (Ragin, 1994:83). Some quantitative measurement of certain aspects of social movements, such as calculating the amount of funding it receives per annum or referring to public opinion polls, will help to compare and contrast certain elements of and dynamics within a social movement and will be used in Chapter 6 when looking at organisational structures and Chapter 7 in identifying shifts in Israeli peace activism. However, it would be difficult to gain accurate quantitative data for other aspects, such as the number of events held, due to the informal and ad hoc nature of a social movement and its component parts. Such methods are only partially employed when researching social movements, with scholars favouring interviews, testimonials and participant observation (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hermann, 2009, 2002; Lamarche, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Bar-On, 1996, 1988, 1985a).

5.1 DATA SPECIFICATION

A peace movement is made up of a number of organisational forms and individuals: peace organisations; networks and groups; peace activists, both those connected to an organisation as either core or periphery activists and those who consider themselves independent; intellectuals; and funding organisations. Recognising these parts of a peace movement helps the researcher to identify their particular unit of analysis, which will, in turn, inform their research methodology. Three main approaches have been most commonly taken in the study of peace movements. The first considers a single peace organisation or a few particular peace organisations. This requires detailed research in order to provide a narrow, in depth study of the singular organisation (Gordon 2010; Hallward, 2009; Lieberfield, 2009, 2009b; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Halperin, 2007; Grossman and Kaplan, 2006; Gordon, 2003; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000; Svirsky, 2001a; Helman and Rapoport, 1997). The second approach is to focus on one aspect of a peace movement. For example, Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002) looked at the role of formal peace organisations in conflict resolution, not including the more informal networks. They, therefore, began by mapping and collecting data on the established peace
organisations in the countries of study. They then produced a representative sample to enable more detailed research. The third approach is to research a peace movement as one unit of analysis. This requires the gathering of data from and about all the constituent parts, as well as information and opinions about the movement as a whole. The researcher must cover a broader range of data, collecting information across the entire peace movement. The unit of analysis of this study is Israeli peace activism, on the aggregate level, similar to Hermann (2009) and Kaminer (1996) and therefore the third approach to data specification and collection will be taken. However, unlike Hermann (2009) and Kaminer (1996) the analysis of Israeli peace activism will be done through the three-fold typology outlined above.

The first way to identify data sources is through the different organisations, both formal and informal, which are operating in Israel. A list of all the peace organisations that have been active in Israel since 1967 was compiled (Appendix 1). This is based upon a list drawn up by Hermann (2009:267-275) and added to from useful internet resources, in particular ‘Insight on Conflict’ and ‘Just Vision’, and prior knowledge of certain groups. Categorisation into the three components was not done at this stage. This was done following the initial analysis of the data collected and will be elaborated on further below. Identifying individual activists within these organisations and groups, as well as independent ones, is the second step. An initial list of individual activists was made from individuals I was already familiar with, individuals that were personally suggested to me and those who were mentioned on news and commentary websites. Further individuals were identified through a method of snowballing and referral and through my attendance at peace activities and events in Israel. Facebook also provided a useful way of identifying individuals by looking at the members of relevant groups. It was also an effective way of making contact with individuals not previously known to me.

Funding organisations, which were identified through the websites of the peace organisations and the Rasham Ha’amutot (Israeli Registrar for Non-Profits), were also consulted. Much of the funding of left-wing Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in Israel comes from the New Israel Fund and their initiative for social change, Shatil (Seedling), the Director of which I interviewed, who provided some useful information on the funding sources of Israeli peace activism and helped to identify further individuals and organisations for me to approach. Data related to government decisions and positions on the conflict are also useful. Government policy documents and speeches from Prime Ministers were used to detail the context in which Israeli peace activism is operating. These were easily accessed from the government website. Data from opposition forces was also gathered, both through interviews and through their publications and websites.

Secondary sources were also useful in adding further details. This included studies and accounts from activists and academics, namely Gordon (2010), Kaufman-Lacusta (2010), Hallward (2009), Hermann (2009, 2002), Marteu (2009), Pallister Wilkins, (2009), Halperin (2007), Shulman (2007), Halper (2005), Gordon (2003), Peleg (2000), Bar-On (1996, 1985a, 1985b), Kaminer (1996). Newspaper articles, both in print and on the Internet, particularly from the left wing newspaper Ha’aretz and online commentary
websites, such as +972mag, Bitterlemons, Occupation Magazine and other editorials were also useful. In some instances, primary sources, such as testimonies, were extracted from these, adding to the rich set of primary data for this study.

5.2 DATA COLLECTION

Data was collected through both semi-ethnographic fieldwork and online research. Ethnography is a methodological approach within the field of qualitative research that uses a range of methods to gather data (Scott-Jones, 2010). The underlying facet of ethnography is the immersion of the researcher in the social setting or group that they are researching. During an extended period of time the researcher observes the behaviour of the participants; listens and records what is being said and asks questions (Bryman, 2012). Whilst some interchange the terms ‘ethnography’ and ‘participant observation’, ethnography is more than mere observation of participants. Ethnography involves different levels of active or passive participation of the researcher in events and activities, with the researcher immersing themselves in the groups being studied. Direct involvement in social movements, particularly marginalised sectors of society, seems to be the most effective way to gain accurate and useful insights into movement activity. By developing relationships with the activists and becoming ‘one of them’ it is possible to discover why they join the activities and why they remain active. Burnham et al. (2008) question why this method has not been employed more in the social sciences as it provides insider knowledge of the movement activity. This method was the main method through which Hermann (2009) gathered her data. Furthermore, the majority of studies on the Israeli peace movement, including Hermann’s, were written by self-proclaimed activists. In order for my research to gain credibility amongst these scholars I spent six months in Israel involving myself with the groups in a similar manner. Data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews with individuals and participant observation of active peace groups, as well as informal conversations.

Interviews formed a large proportion of the data collected and included interviews with individual activists, both core and periphery across the spectrum of groups, organisation leaders, intellectuals, former Members of Knesset (Israeli Parliament) and journalists, all of which were held in English and most recorded. A total of fifty interviews conducted by the author informed this study. Ethical approval was received from City University London. The network of Israeli peace activists is small and most people know or know of each other, which enabled me to obtain the large number of interviews with activists across the spectrum of groups. I stopped meeting individuals once I felt that enough data was gathered to build a picture of Israeli peace activism. The interviews conducted were semi-structured and open-ended so that I could direct the conversation in a specific way whilst allowing for the respondent to elaborate with additional information. Structured interviews would have been too rigid and would not have allowed the respondent to fully express how they felt about the issues being asked. However, some direction was needed in order that I received the information to answer my research question. Experience found that the interviewees required only one or two questions and felt comfortable telling their story in their own way. Some interviewees were asked for specific details, depending on their
position in an organisation, or to clarify something another interviewee had said. Prior research into the organisation or the individual helped to direct the interview questions and to unearth information that was not possible to find through other methods. In situations where I was unable to meet face-to-face with an interviewee, I asked them to answer some questions via e-mail. It was, however, preferable to meet in person, as this allowed for the interviewee to elaborate further than e-mail correspondence allowed. One of the purposes of the interviews was to verify some of my working assumptions, particularly whether the second Intifada was a suitable starting point for a study of the transformation of the peace movement.

During the period of fieldwork I attended a range of events and activities of the different groups. I attended three tours, with Emek Shaveh (Archaeology in the Shadow of Conflict) in the City of David and village of Silwan. Ir Amim (City of Nation/People) through East Jerusalem and Jerusalem Peace Makers in Hebron. I went to demonstrations held by Nashim b’Shachor (Women in Black) and Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit/Border). I attended solidarity actions with Lochamim l’Shalom (Combatants for Peace), Solidariut Sheikh Jarrah (Solidarity Shiekh Jarrah) and Ta’ayush (Life in Common/Partnership) and accompanied Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch). I went to discussion forums held by the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom (The Coalition of Women for Peace), Lochamim l’Shalom and Lo Metsaytot (We Do Not Obey).

Whilst ethnography and the different methods it uses provide direct access to the activities and members of social movements, it has both analytical implications and practical difficulties. Analytically, participant observation impedes with researcher objectivity (Hermann, 2009:41) and should be taken into consideration when analysing the data. In particular, the issue of reflexivity has been stressed in the literature on ethnography (Scott-Jones, 2010; Gray, 2009; Coffey, 1999). One way to ensure that reflexivity was not overlooked was to record my own reflections on activities that I participated in and observed. This ensured that I was aware of my prejudices and biases with respect to the research. It is also important to maintain a balance between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ (Gray, 2009:400). Having worked for a peace promoting NGO in Israel, facilitated and participated in peace activities, as well as developing relationships with Israeli activists, in conducting this study I cannot claim to be a complete outsider. However, I was not born in Israel nor have I become a citizen of Israel and am not emotionally connected in the way that some of the scholars clearly portray (Shulman, 2007; Kabasakal et al., 2004; Kaufman, 1988; Bar-On, 1988; Amit, 1983).

Online resources were gathered in both English and Hebrew to gather further primary and secondary sources to ensure that there was detailed information about all the groups operating. Information was collected from their publications, websites, minutes of meetings, petitions, event advertisements and e-mails sent to mailing lists. Articles written by intellectuals and journalists and lectures given added to this set of data. There are also two useful collections on Israeli peace activism that were also consulted, particularly for groups that were founded before 2000: ‘the Israeli-left archive’, which has collated information on some of the main peace organisations from the sixties, seventies and eighties, including
primary documents; and The Other Israel, a magazine which detailed the activities across the spectrum of groups between 1983 to today and is available online. Further primary resources were gathered from printed publications and flyers of the organisations and groups. Internet-based research was particularly useful when direct access to individual activists was restricted. In some cases the pages of certain websites were no longer accessible. In such instances the ‘Way Back Machine’, an internet library of historical digital collections, was used to access these web pages and documents. Given that a large amount of primary data was collected through the internet, including collecting newspaper articles, alternative media pieces and information from the organisations’ websites, which filled in the gaps from the ethnographic fieldwork, this study is best described as semi-ethnographic.

It should be noted that the breadth and depth of data gathered per group varied. For example, long-time activists were able to provide more insight into Israeli peace activism than activists attending their first protest and the larger, more formal organisations had more available data than the informal networks of volunteers. This meant that some groups and individuals were researched in more detail than others. However, a combination of data from a variety of primary and secondary sources enabled the gathering of information for all the groups operating in this phase. Whilst there is a greater focus on some groups and individuals within the dissertation, this is due to their prominence and is done so alongside a broader, more general picture of each component of Israeli peace activism.

5.3 DATA ANALYSIS

The data has been analysed through traditional qualitative analysis. The conceptual framework based on social movement theory has helped to inform this analysis. The transcripts of the interviews conducted and the data collected was coded along the lines of the four powers of movement: collective action frame; tactical repertoires, mobilising structures and interactions with political opportunity structures. Each of these elements was then extracted from the interviews and other data sources to inform each of the empirical chapters. For example, the meaning work the activists and groups went through, the ways in which they perceived the origins of the conflict, the prevailing realities and any potential solutions, were extracted to inform the chapter on collective action frames. Framing processes and the mechanisms and processes outlined by Tarrow (2011) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) were then used to analyse how and why the collective action frames had developed as suggested. A similar process was taken for each of the internal dynamics, extracting the characteristics based on the particular aspect of the social movement and then analysing them through the tools available in social movement theory. Finally, the interaction between these characteristics was analysed in relation to the political opportunity structures, first by referring to the data and then by applying the mechanisms and processes of social movement theory.

Having identified the internal characteristics of each of the groups, commonalities between them were used to build the three-fold typology of the components of Israeli peace activism. The trajectory of Israeli peace activism was then analysed for each of these components. This three-fold typology not only
helped to detail empirically the distinct parts of Israeli peace activism, it also provided a further analytical lens through which to approach the study of Israeli peace activism. The combination of the analytic tools of social movement theory and the typology is useful for two main reasons. Firstly it enabled the separate characteristics to be disaggregated and explained in turn before analysing how they relate to each other. Secondly, as the typology developed, it provided further analytical tools with which to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. For example, in understanding why certain tactics were used by the radical groups and not the liberal Zionist groups or why the different components experienced different trajectories, their collective action frames were consulted.

6 LIMITATIONS

Hermann (2009:40-44) makes clear the extensive limitations in researching social movements. Firstly, she notes the difficulty in accessing past information due to the often unorganised nature of social movement organisations (SMOs) that fail to keep accurate records of activities. Whilst this meant that information from some groups was not accessible, the majority of the peace groups have now set up websites with access to archived information and publications. Furthermore, some individuals have kept their own archives. Secondly, there is often a lack of a clear organisation structure which makes it hard to follow decision making processes or trace leaders. In order to acquire representative information, a number of different sources were consulted for each group. Thirdly, Hermann notes that activities tend to be sporadic and spontaneous, making it difficult to keep track of them. However, contacts I developed assisted me in finding information on these activities. Fourthly, she notes that some organisations do not have formal membership but operate an inclusive, open mode of participation. Furthermore, many participants tend to be active members of a number of organisations. I made sure to question participants on which groups they are involved with and what activities they have attended, in order to try and overcome this limitation.

Despite potential to make adjustments in order to take into account these limitations, particularly by consulting a variety of data sources, it should be noted that the reliability and authenticity of data gathered cannot be determined beyond reasonable doubt.

7 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters, in addition to this one. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory. It first identifies developments in social movement theory, providing the foundations for the conceptual framework for this dissertation. It reviews the literature and builds a framework based on the four powers of movement: collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures and political opportunity structures. It then outlines the dynamic approach to social movements, which will also inform the framework of this dissertation. In addition, through a survey of the literature, this chapter identifies four key areas in which this dissertation will contribute to the theoretical literature, the role of the government, the international dimension, gender dynamics and cycles of contention. The chapter
then surveys the available literature on Israeli peace activism and in doing so, highlights the overall argument of this dissertation in relation to the conventional perspective. Through a blended analysis of these two bodies of literature this chapter will also outline further areas in which this dissertation will shed new light: collective action frames, repertoires of contention, mobilisation structures and the impact of a social movement.

Chapter 3 presents an historical overview of Israeli peace activism, divided according to the two phases identified above. Using existing studies it disaggregates the three internal characteristics of Israeli peace activism in each of these phases and how they interacted with the political opportunity structures for each component of Israeli peace activism. It identifies and explains in particular the role of the radical component as norm entrepreneurs, nipping at the heels of the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism; the ability for the liberal Zionists to mobilise large numbers and the emergence of the human rights component. This provides a useful point of comparison for the study of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada in the following chapters.

Chapters 4-6 are divided according to the internal characteristics of a social movement. Chapter 4 outlines and analyses the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada, highlighting the polarisation between the liberal Zionist component, and the radical and human rights component. It also emphasises that, given the innovative collective action frames formed by the radical and human rights components, not all parts of Israeli peace activism was paralysed. It also identifies some key framing processes during this phase. Chapter 5 turns to the tactical repertoires, highlighting the contained forms that are used by the liberal Zionist groups, who are unable to organise the mass demonstrations that they had once been able to. It also tracks the evolution of tactics in the radical component, which has shifted from humanitarian aid to co-resistance with Palestinians, to elements of boycott, divestment and sanctions. A clear innovation across all components can be seen in the use of tours, which is specifically aimed at influencing foreign visitors and provides insight into the connections with the international community. Chapter 6 looks at the mobilisation structures, mapping those that are available to each component of Israeli peace activism, noting in particular that the target audience of the liberal Zionist groups, the Israeli public, has turned away from the ideas of peace activism. It also identifies the shifts in identities in the activists and in particular the increasing role of international mobilisation structures.

Chapter 7 brings the study of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada together by providing an analysis of how the internal dynamics interact with the prevailing political opportunity structures. In doing so it identifies the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism, with a different cycle of contention developing for each of the components of Israeli peace activism; the liberal Zionist component demobilised, the human rights component continued with a similar cycle of contention and the radical component experienced a new cycle of contention. This is explained by the ways in which they perceived and responded to the political opportunity structures and their interaction with opposition forces. This chapter also highlights the role of the international political opportunity structures, an
understudied area of social movement theory. It also looks at the areas in which Israeli peace activism is having an impact, beyond the policy realm.

Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the main findings of this dissertation. It summarises each of the chapters and provides an overall understanding of the nature of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. It also highlights the theoretical contributions of this study and points to areas for further research.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1 INTRODUCTION

Social movement theory will provide the theoretical foundations for the study of Israeli peace activism. The conceptual tools that constitute social movement theory provide a clear and logical way of analysing different aspects of contentious activity. There are a large variety of concepts with potential explanatory power that form social movement theory and I will extract, refine and build upon those elements which are most relevant and useful in understanding the case of the Israeli peace activism. The theoretical perspective will draw particularly on the work of Tarrow (2011, 2005), Tilly (1995) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). Their combined work provides a suitable and useful foundation on which to base my theoretical framework. The analytical tools they expound have been applied to case studies, which highlight their explanatory power in understanding certain elements of movement activity and activism (Tarrow, 2011, Tilly and Wood, 2009; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002).

Tarrow (2011) has succeeded in synthesising the various analytical tools developed in social movement theory. He outlines ‘fours powers of movement’: collective action frames, ‘how social movements construct meaning for action’ (Goffman in Tarrow, 2011:144); tactical repertoires, ‘the ways in which people act together in pursuit of shared interests’ (Tilly, 1978:41); mobilisation structures, ‘the fundamental infrastructures that support and condition citizen mobilisation’ (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:61); and political opportunity structures, ‘factors of the external environment in which a social movement operates that facilitate or constrain activities’ (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:66). These will frame this dissertation. However, as will be argued below, greater attention will be given to the internal dynamics: collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisations structures, in order to identify the characteristics of Israeli peace activism, before turning to how they interact with the external power of movement, political opportunity structures. This analysis will be supplemented by the theory of ‘dynamics of contention’ (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2011), which puts the powers of movement in motion, enabling an understanding of the trajectories of Israeli peace activism, rather than single episodes. This will lead to the identification and analysis of cycles of contention, which denote the cyclical booms and busts of social movement activity. In addition, attention will be given to underexplored areas of social movement theory, the international dimension and gender dynamics. The nature of the government, which has often been posited as the key element influencing the trajectory of a social movement (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Tilly, 1995; Wolfsfeld, 1988; McAdam, 1982), will also be considered to determine whether Israeli peace activism conforms to existing models.

A number of scholars have also directly applied social movement theory to their studies of the Israeli peace movement (Ginsburg, 2009; Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004, 2002; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002; Peleg, 2000) and whilst others do not refer directly to social movement theory, it is possible to relate some of their conclusions and evaluations to aspects of social movement theory.
2 SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

There are a number of definitions of a social movement, dependent on where the focus lies. Some emphasise the external-facing nature of a social movement, based on the view that a social movement seeks to influence external forces: ‘a social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations engaged in a political or cultural conflict’ (Diani, 1992:13). Others are explicit in noting that the social movement is in conflict with decision-makers and authority-holders, stating that the social movement is ‘engaged in conflict with the power holders and other status-quo representatives. As such, movements develop collective identities…even through their waging of conflict to bring about social change’ (Coy 2001, viii). These definitions are based on Tilly’s (1978) work that argues that a social movement is defined according to its relationship with politics and should be analysed as such. Tarrow (2011:9) also considers the interactions between a social movement and the external forces as important. He defines a social movement as ‘collective
challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.’ This definition, whilst acknowledging the external forces, also points to a greater concern for the internal characteristics of a social movement by considering the shared goals and links between the activists. It is this approach that this dissertation will take, since giving preference to the external factors will not enable a detailed understanding of what is going on inside the movement. Whilst the external factors do play an important role, it is how the internal characteristics interact with the external environment that explains the trajectory of a social movement.

Tarrow (2011) develops a synthesis of social movement theory that enables an understanding of each of the factors within his definition. This synthesis involves ‘four powers of movement’: collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures and political opportunity structures. This dissertation will be analysed and structured along these powers of movement. They were not initially theorised by Tarrow (2011) but are collated elements which had been advanced in the field of social movements. The development of each of the powers of movement will be outlined in turn, highlighting why disaggregating each of the powers of movement before assessing how they interact with each other, provides the most complete characterisation and understanding of a social movement.

2.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The ‘political process model’, which refers to the theory of political opportunity structures, was developed to focus on a social movement’s response to and interaction with the context in which it was operating, particularly the political environment (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:16). This was based on Tilly’s work (1978) in which he identified certain conditions for mobilisation, in particular whether the environment provides opportunities or threats for mobilisation and whether it will facilitate or repress movement claims. This led to a tradition of looking at how the ‘political opportunity structures’, the factors in the external environment that facilitate or constrain activism (Tilly, 1978), affect a social movement. Tarrow (1983) and McAdam (1982) continued to argue that there is a link between institutionalised politics and a social movement. However, criticisms arose that political opportunities were in danger of explaining everything, and therefore explaining nothing. According to Gamson and Meyer (1996:275), ‘the concept of political opportunity structures is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment.’

Attempts were therefore made to build a schema of POS to narrow its explanatory scope (Tarrow, 1994; Kriesi, 1995). This focused mainly on the nature of the institutionalised political system. In particular, the role of the government was considered an important variable of political opportunity structures (Tilly 1995; Wolfsfeld, 1988; McAdam, 1982), with some arguing this to be the main factor in affecting the ability of a social movement or group to achieve their goals and influence policy change (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002:213). McAdam, McCarthy and Zald identify four dimensions of the POS related to the institutionalised political system:
1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system;
2) The stability of the broad set of elite alignments;
3) The presence of allies within the elite
4) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996:10)

This model argues that the government and political elites play a significant role in either facilitating or constraining movement activity and that a social movement aims to directly impact the government, either by encouraging elites to promote the message of the movement, in order to change policy, or by making the public aware of certain actions of the government. Furthermore, the government has the ability to quash or encourage specific extra-parliamentary activities through the police force or military. Whilst this model is useful in those instances where a social movement does wish to impact the institutionalised political system, it does not account for those cases where the activists are not interested in having influence in that arena or in circumstances where the relationship between the government and the social movement may be more complex than the model allows for. The relationship between Israeli peace activism and the institutionalised political system, in particular the relationship with the government, will be considered in order to determine whether it conforms to the theory.

The political process model was criticised for ignoring social movement agency (Morris, 2000). Attempts have been made to attribute agency to social movements by focusing on how they respond to political opportunity structures. According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:15), whilst a movement may emerge from changes in the political opportunity structures, the trajectory of the social movement will depend upon their own strategies. Furthermore, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue that political opportunities and threats must be attributed to the external environment by social movement actors in order to exist as such. Political opportunities are defined as ‘sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow, 2011:32) and political threats are ‘those factors...that discourage contention’ (Tarrow, 2011:32). This confers a significant amount of agency on the social movement. However, how they respond is not arbitrary but depends on their internal dynamics, particularly how they frame the prevailing realities. This dissertation will therefore focus on delving into the internal dynamics of a social movement prior to understanding how they perceive and respond to political opportunity structures in order to provide greater insights. These will now be outlined in the order they will be explored in the dissertation. Whilst there is no chronological order in which a social movement develops its internal characteristics, in trying to understand and explain their trajectories it serves well to begin with the collective action frames, to determine how the social movement views the external realities and themselves, then the tactical repertoires, which are often strongly related to the collective action frames, followed by the mobilisation structures, which identifies the organisational bases that the movement is built on.
2.2 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

A further dimension of social movement theory emerged based on criticisms that there had been a lack of attention to ideas, sentiments and culture in previous approaches, such as the political process model. Building from Goffman’s (1974) ‘frame analysis,’ a number of scholars brought a social psychological dimension to studies of social movements (Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow, et al. 1986). Framing refers to the ways in which social movements assign meaning to themselves and the prevailing realities. According to McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:6) the term refers to the ‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’. It is important to focus on collective actions frames because,

‘Whatever else social movement actors do, they seek to affect interpretations of reality among various audiences; they engage in this framing work because they assume, rightly or wrongly, that meaning is prefatory to action’ (Benford, 1997:410).

Benford and Snow (2000) identify a range of core framing tasks that will help in understanding Israeli peace activism. Diagnostic framing is the identification of the problems and causes of the issue of contention (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Prognostic framing is the task of proposing a solution to the area of contention, or the strategies for reaching such a solution (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Motivational framing is the task of presenting the ideas and messages that encourage people to act (Benford and Snow, 2000:616). Benford and Snow (2000) also identify a number of framing processes that will be useful in explaining the changes in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism over time. Frame bridging is the process of connecting two previously unconnected frames related to a particular issue (Benford and Snow, 2000:624). Frame extension is the process of adding other issues to the primary concern of the social movement organisation (Benford and Snow, 2000:625). Frame transformation is the process of shifting old understandings and beliefs regarding an area of contention or creating new ideas (Benford and Snow, 2000:625). Frame amplification is the process of ‘embellishing, clarifying or invigorating’ existing understandings and beliefs (Benford and Snow, 2000:625). The core framing tasks and the framing processes will be analysed in relation to each of the components to help distinguish between them and to characterise and analyse their trajectories.

The ability of a group or a movement to mobilise individuals and achieve change, whether in government policy or in challenging certain ideas and norms in society depends in part on the extent to which the message they present, the meanings they construct and the identity they portray, resonate with individuals and general trends in society (Benford and Snow, 2000:618-622). In order to mobilise the public, activists must frame their goals and purpose in a way that resonates with their target audience. Understanding how different groups seek to challenge Israeli political culture will be significant in analysing the relative success of different peace groups in achieving mobilisation and challenging prevailing opinions. The greater the extent to which a peace group can raise awareness of the issues, by leading public campaigns and gaining media attention, in a way that does not antagonise
the Israeli public but does shock them enough to re-focus on the continued occupation, the more likely they will be to mobilise individuals for their cause. A comparison of studies undertaken of two prominent Israeli women’s peace groups, Arba Imahot and Nashim b’Shachor, provide clear evidence of the effect of identity and issue framing, despite the fact that these scholars do not explicitly refer to framing as an analytical tool for understanding social movement groups (Ginsberg, 2009; Lieberfeld, 2009a, 2009b; Lemish and Barzel, 2000, Shadmi, 2000; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer 1996, Sharoni, 1995). The studies show that the ways in which these two groups framed themselves determined levels of mobilisation achieved and ability to influence policy change. Therefore, an understanding of the political culture of Israel and public opinion will help to understand whether Israeli peace activism is able to attract participants through their collective action frames. However, in some cases activists may have decided not to influence the public and therefore the level of resonation with them is not relevant in analysing their trajectory. However, they will have a target audience and so how they resonate with this will be important.

In addition, the ability for a social movement to build a common message or goal will determine the level of cohesion amongst the different organisations and groups and therefore their potential for mass mobilisation. According to social movement theory, a ‘master collective action frame’, which is wide enough in scope, with adequate cultural resonance to encompass smaller movements and organisations (Benford and Snow, 2000:618-619), helps to unite a movement. The collective action frames of Israeli peace activism will be analysed to determine whether a master frame was developed during the different phases.

2.3 TACTICAL REPERTOIRES

Studies that focused on the political process model also looked at the forms of contention that people employed, which came to be known as ‘contentious repertoires’ or ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1995). They are ‘the ways in which people act together in pursuit of shared interests’ (Tilly, 1995:41). These are not only ways in which actors act and the methods they employ but also what they know to do since, according to Tilly (1995), repertoires are culturally embedded and socially constructed. This means that activists build on previously known forms of collective action, demonstrating what the actors ‘know how to do’ and what the audience would expect them to do (Tarrow, 2011:39), rather than inventing tactics from nothing. Therefore, changes tend to be incremental. Studies that aim to synthesise the powers of movement tend not to treat repertoires of contention as a distinct factor but include them in one of the other powers of movement (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). However, in this dissertation they will be treated as a separate factor that provides further characterisation and explanation of the trajectory of a social movement, following the approach of Tarrow (2011).

The relative success of different types of tactics is a contested issue, in particular whether violent methods are more likely to achieve change than non-violent methods. Adding theories of non-violent
activism to social movement theory can provide further understanding of why actors chose certain tactics and whether they brought about change and be will used in this dissertation. Pape (2005) and Arregún-Toft (2005) argue that movements choose violent methods because they are more effective in achieving their desired outcomes. However, studies on non-violent action have shown otherwise (Tarrow 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Sharp, 2003, 1973a, 1973b; Scott, 1985). The studies show that whilst violent action may attract more attention from the media and the authorities, fewer participants are likely to join in and the goals of the movement may be undermined, with the authorities having more leverage to suppress the action. Non-violent but disruptive behaviour, whilst not as news-worthy, is likely to be a more acceptable form of action for the mainstream public as it is seen as less risky and a more legitimate form of demonstrating. Individuals often choose this form of action because they have understood that violent action is unnecessary and counterproductive (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).

Whilst over time non-violent action tends to lose its innovative edge, reducing the power it contained, which can result in periphery activists withdrawing their participation (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007), the large variety of non-violent methods that are available to activists (Sharp, 1973a) can overcome the problem. Furthermore, if the authorities respond with repression and violence then, not only does this gain media attention but, empathy is directed towards the protestors (Gordon, 2010). One form of non-violent action is known as ‘direct action’, whereby activists aim to create change directly through their actions and not by making claims on authorities or another party. Direct action can be provocative enough to be suppressed but not violent enough to receive condemnation from the public. Scott (1985) in his study of the resistance of peasant communities argues that small-scale tactics can also be effective. He notes how ‘everyday forms of resistance’ can slowly chip away at the area of contention and can eventually lead to change, which will provide an interesting element to consider in studying Israeli peace activism.

It must be noted that a social movement or group does not have an unlimited choice of tactics available to them but are constrained by the context within which they act and the resources they have available to them (Meyer, 2004). Levels of mobilisation are dependent on individuals’ attitudes of what is an acceptable form of action (Wolfsfeld, 1988). This is based in the political culture, which influence what a society thinks is acceptable and therefore will determine whether certain tactics will encourage or dissuade individuals from participating. Political opportunity structures, organisational structures and ideological positions inform the range of tactics that may be available to actors, who then choose which of these to employ that are consistent with and reinforce their ‘ideological identity’ (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). The appropriateness of certain tactics in the eyes of Israeli society will be explored.

2.4 MOBILISATION STRUCTURES

Following renewed interest in social movements in 1960s, with the Civil Rights Movement and the Anti-war movement, McCarthy and Zald (1977) began to focus on the increasing availability of
resources to individuals and groups as means of explaining how social movements form and develop. Their resource mobilisation theory became a dominant paradigm in social movement studies (Tarrow, 2011:24). They argued for the importance of the availability of resources if a social movement is to mobilise however, it was later noted that this is not sufficient; mobilisation also requires the coordination of available resources and a strategic attempt to convert these into collective action (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007:116). Resource mobilisation also puts emphasis on the ‘organisational bases’ of a social movement (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:15) that refer to the ‘fundamental infrastructures that support and condition mobilisation’ (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:67), which act as the ‘building blocks’ of a social movement (McCarthy, 1996).

McCarthy (1996:145) stressed the importance of mapping the mobilisation structures in order to characterise the different forms and allow for a comparison across movements and over time. He maps four ‘dimensions of movement-mobilising structures’ (McCarthy, 1996:145; Figure 1). His model brings together the range and variety of mobilisation forms that have been identified and developed by social movement scholars. He divides these along four dimensions: informal, non-movement structures; informal movement structures; formal non-movement structures; and formal movement structures. These incorporate the broad range of mobilisation structures from ‘social movement organisation forms’ to the ‘range of everyday life micro mobilisation structural social locations’ (McCarthy, 1996:145). This model will be used to map the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism.

### Figure 1 Dimensions of movement-mobilising structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-movement</th>
<th>Movement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship networks</td>
<td>Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work networks</td>
<td>Professional associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activist networks</td>
<td>SMOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affinity groups</td>
<td>Protests committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Memory communities</td>
<td>Movement schools</td>
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Source: McCarthy (1996:145)

According to Clemens (1996) movement actors engage in debate over the most appropriate forms of organisation and must frame the appropriateness in order to mobilise individuals. Social movement studies have developed generalisations over appropriateness of different organisation forms. Staggenborg (1995) finds that social movement organisations that have a radical ideology and are committed to participatory democracy and empowerment are likely to produce cultural change, whereas organisations with more formal structures are better able to achieve specific policy outcomes. Others look at the extent of centralisation within the organisation (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). They argue that a decentralised organisation will allow for greater fluidity and dynamism, which actually preserves the cohesiveness of the organisation. However, a stronger, more formal organisational structure may have greater success in mobilising participants and resources, thus increasing their potential to influence policy change. This is because it promotes a common objective and creates a strong degree of coordination amongst participants (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). The
organisational forms of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism will be explored, identifying their appropriateness in relation to the collective action frames and their ability to mobilise given certain political opportunity structures.

2.5 THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE POWERS OF MOVEMENT

Initially these frameworks for understanding social movement theory were treated as different schools of thought. In the 1980s students in North America began to adopt a common agenda for studying social movements that brought together each of these factors (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). However, as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001:16) argue, they tended to put emphasis on one of the lines of thought and did not provide a full synthesis. Attempts were therefore made to synthesise each of these elements. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) argued that the three factors, collective action frames, political opportunity structures and mobilisation structures interact with each other, with changes in one affecting the others. Tarrow (2011) goes further to include repertoires of contention as a fourth ‘power of movement’. It is these interactive relationships that help to explain the emergence, trajectory and impact of the movement and are therefore essential in understanding a social movement.

For example, a collective action frame may shift in order to attract a new mobilisation target or the nature of public opinion may inhibit a collective action frame gaining resonance. Whilst the interactive nature of the powers of movement is essential to fully understand social movement activity, disaggregating the characteristics of a movement into the four separate factors enables a more detailed understanding of the social movement. Once they have been outlined and explained in turn, they can then be brought together to fully understand the trajectory of a social movement.

2.6 CYCLES OF CONTENTION

This classic social movement agenda served the basis of studies of social movements but has been criticised for being overly static and structural (Tarrow, 2011; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, 2001; Snow and Benford, 2000). Attempts were put forward to develop a more dynamic approach to the study of social movements. Rather than focusing on the ‘labelled boxes,’ the dynamic approach to mobilisation looks more closely at the arrows that connect the boxes (Tarrow, 2011:190; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:18), thereby explaining the ‘how’ of social movement mobilisation. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001:189) developed a ‘dynamic, interactive framework for analysing mobilisation in contentious politics.’ This led to the development of a theory of cycles of contention, which refers to the waves of activity in a social movement. A cycle of contention is defined as,

‘A phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention employed and the creation of new or transformed collective action frames...’ (Tarrow: 2011:199).
How certain ‘broad change processes’, which are shifts in the political opportunity structures, are perceived will determine the trajectory of the cycle of contention. Attributing an opportunity to mobilise to a shift in the political opportunity structures leads to a process of innovation, producing ‘new or transformed symbols, frames of meaning and ideologies to justify and dignify collective action’ (Tarrow, 2011: 204). Organisational and social resources, which include different types of mobilisation structures, are also appropriated in the process of innovation. How the authorities respond will then affect the continued trajectory of the social movement.

Cycles of contention can be understood through the mechanisms and processes that are outlined in the dynamic approach. For example, exhaustion forms as a result of weariness and disillusionment due to the lack of progress of a movement (Tarrow, 2011:190). Exhaustion leads to arguments between activists and divisions over what methods should be used and what goals should be pursued, which can contribute to an attribution of threat to the shifting political opportunity structures and thus the demobilisation of the movement. Klandermans (2009:128) in researching union activism in the US in 1991 notes that activists became burnt out, they lost motivation and became cynical, leading to an ‘erosion of support’. Radicalisation is another mechanism that can be identified in a cycle of contention whereby there is a shift in ideological perspectives towards more extreme positions and the adoption of more disruptive tactics (Tarrow, 2011:190). This can lead to either the attribution of an opportunity to the prevailing realities or an attribution of threat, often depending on the extent of the radicalisation and the response from the authorities.

The processes and mechanisms that are involved in the trajectory of a social movement tend to be determined by, and in turn determine, their collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures. Given that it is argued that the trajectory of a social movement is dependent on the ways in which they perceive the changes in the political opportunity structures, groups within the social movement that have different internal characteristics will therefore perceive the political opportunity structures differently. It is therefore possible for different parts of a social movement to experience different processes and therefore go through differing cycles of contention. This is not explicit in the theory of cycles of contention and therefore suggests an extension is needed whereby different components of the same social movement, who are engaged in the same overall struggle, can experience different cycles of contention in the same time period. Cycles of contention will be identified and explained for each of the components of Israeli peace activism.

Whilst these mechanisms and processes are an important and useful progression of social movement theory and help explain further elements of the social movement trajectory, it does not require ignoring the classical social movement agenda. The four factors: collective action frames; tactical repertoires; and mobilisation structures provide a suitable way of unearthing the characteristics of a social movement and the analytical tools that can be taken from each of the original schools of thought still provide useful ways of understanding a social movement. The mechanisms and processes and the concept of cycles of contention can be used in addition to the classical social movement agenda,
providing further insights but not at the expense of disaggregating the powers of movement. This approach will be taken in this study of Israeli peace activism. The main empirical chapters of this dissertation will explore each of the internal factors for the three components of Israeli peace activism. Having identified and explained these characteristics, how they interact with the political opportunity structures and the cycles of contention will be explored using the mechanisms and processes highlighted by Tarrow (2011) and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001).

2.7 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

The links between a domestic movement and the international dimension have been shown to play an important role in movement trajectory (Poloni-Staudriger, 2014; Batliwala and Brown, 2006; Tarrow, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997). Most of these studies look at transnational activism and how the domestic context affects transnational activism however, the broader connection between the international arena and a domestic social movement also needs to be explored. The international dimension in this case should not be conceived of as a separate structure that is located above the domestic level and determines the actions of states and domestic actors by virtue of the structural relationship as conceived by Waltz (1979) and Keohane and Nye (1977). For the purposes of understanding a social movement, it is more appropriate and useful to conceive the international dimension as the individual empirical elements that occur on international level and interact with and affect a domestic social movement. For example, events that occur amongst states in the international level such as wars or peace agreements; resolutions passed by international institutions; networks that cross borders and ideas that are spread globally. The connection between the international arena and a domestic social movement can be seen both in mobilising structures and political opportunity structures.

2.7.1 INTERNATIONAL MOBILISING STRUCTURES

International mobilising structures have mainly been conceived through the ways in which a domestic movement seeks to increase its material capacity and gain a new audience to help further their cause. Some do look at how and why a domestic social movement connects with international mobilisation structures and their studies will be useful in this case (Tarrow, 2005; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Keck and Sikkink (1998) theorise the process by which domestic actors, who are unable to achieve change locally, appeal to the international dimension, most often transnational advocacy networks, defined as ‘actors working internationally on an issue, bound together by shared values and a dense exchange of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:89), to promote their cause and pressure their own governments to put pressure on the government of the country in which the social movement is operating. This is known as the ‘boomerang process’. Key mechanisms involved are diffusion, which allows for the spread of different forms of activism to different parts of the world and brokerage, which creates links between previously unconnected actors to allow for transnational communication. Through these processes domestic actors
are able to gain access to new resources, information and legitimacy (Tarrow, 2005:190-199). Such links can create the possibility for domestic activists to increase their material capacity and benefit from the diffusion of collective action frames. Furthermore if transnational networks are promoting similar causes to that of a social movement, this will increase their chances of achieving policy change and challenging dominant perceptions of the conflict.

Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) note that often when the ‘boomerang’ comes back, it is still unable to achieve an impact in the domestic arena and therefore they conceive of a ‘spiral model’, where the boomerang is continuously thrown back out to the international dimension, until change is achieved locally. Tarrow (2005) suggests a refinement of the boomerang process through his ‘composite model of externalisation’. This argues that the nature of the closed opportunity structures domestically will affect how the boomerang is framed. Tarrow (2005:195) notes that the validation and legitimisation of transnational activism on domestic soil is difficult because foreign intervention of any kind is viewed as suspect and has the potential to threaten power asymmetries. He identifies two possible domestic blockages, either a lack of responsiveness or repression, arguing that these will lead to different trajectories for the social movement.

Each of these theories provides interesting insights into how a domestic movement appeals to mobilisation structures in the international dimension. However, it would be useful to combine the spiral model with Tarrow’s model in order to provide a more detailed understanding of the trajectory of the domestic social movement. In some cases the nature of the blockage may shift each time the boomerang returns home and therefore the trajectory, framing and potential impact of the social movement will shift. This will be particularly useful in understanding how the way in which the domestic realm perceives connections between a social movement and the international arena affects the social movement. Attention will be given to the international mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism, as well as how this is perceived by domestic structures, which will shed new light on this area of social movement theory.

2.7.2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The international dimension of political opportunity will also arguably play a role in determining the extent to which a group is able to mobilise or achieve their goals in a similar way that domestic structures do. Whilst a number of scholars refer to political opportunity in their accounts of the Israeli peace movement (Hermann, 2009, 2002, 1996; Meyer, 2004; Peleg, 2000), there is not an explicit reference to international political opportunity structures. Some scholars do make reference to the effect of the Gulf War on Israeli peace activism, arguing that the Gulf War was a severe blow for Israeli peace activism since Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein challenged the legitimacy of the peace movement’s claim that the Palestinians wanted peace with Israel (Hermann, 2009; Kaminer, 1996).
However, there is a lack of attention, in both the theoretical literature and the literature on Israel, to the various factors of the international dimension that are not immediately connected to the situation in Israel, that could shape and in turn be shaped by a domestic peace movement. Domestic movements do not only occur within the domestic arena but also within an international context. There are certain opportunities and threats in the international dimension that, if perceived as such, can facilitate or constrain domestic activities. This can be as a result of the international environment, within which the movement operates, shifting or events that directly affect the movement. Whilst Tarrow’s (2005:80) process of internalisation, which describes the migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics, makes an important step towards understanding the role of international pressures, it focuses on aspects of the international dimension that directly impact a social movement, namely pressure from international institutions on a government, which will elicit a certain response from the social movement. This concept does not cover general shifts in the international arena that are not directed at the country in which the movement is operating but can still impact the trajectory of the social movement, which requires further theorisation. This dissertation will consider shifts in the international dimension, both direct and indirect to Israeli peace activism, and how they impact the trajectory of the social movement, again shedding new light.

2.8 THE ROLE OF GENDER DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Gender dynamics can also be identified as an important factor affecting and explaining social movement activity. Ferree and Mueller (2007) argue that gender needs to be incorporated into social movement theory. Whilst there have been studies on Israeli women’s peace activism and their role and dynamics in relation to the gender dynamics in Israeli society (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011; Levy, 2007; Werczberger, 2001; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000; Sharoni, 1995), there has been less attention given to incorporating a gender dynamic in understanding the peace movement as a whole.

Studies have noted that historically there has been greater participation of women than men in extra-parliamentary activity in Israel, with many peace groups being started and sustained by women (Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer, 1996). Cohen (2001:95) argues that perhaps men find it easier to compartmentalise their emotional reactions to suffering, whereas women are less able to do so and feel the need to act in response to their moral reactions. The conventional explanation, however, seems to be that institutionalised politics in Israel is relatively closed to women (Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Shadmi, 2000) and that they tend to be excluded from issues of national security (Halperin, 2007; Shadmi, 2000), partly based on their exclusion from combat and elite units in Israel’s military until the middle of the 1990s (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011; Levy, 2007). The stress placed on the unequal and inferior position of women in Israeli society needs to be considered further to ensure that the gender roles they assign are not overly rigid.
Sharoni (1995) and Werczberger (2001) confirm the arguments put forward above, noting that women have historically been excluded from the negotiating table, a symptom of the underlying gender relations in Israeli society. The rhetoric in Israel is one which stresses the masculine image of men fighting and protecting, with women and children representing victims in need of protection (Sharoni, 1995:23-24). Prime Minister David Ben Gurion referred to these gender roles in public speeches, highlighting women’s fertility as a national priority. 3 The importance placed on the military in Israeli society further embeds these gender dynamics, with women excluded from high ranking positions, which spills into civilian life through the creation of an ‘old boy’s’ network (Werczberger, 2001). In states with prominent militaries, it is argued that the social hierarchy of citizens is structured by the republican ethos, whereby an individual’s status in society is directly related to their contribution to the collective ‘common good’ (Shafir, 1998). The male combat soldier tends to be the main recipient of social status through the republican ethos. Women have generally been restricted from gaining the benefits of the republican ethos since they were barred from combat duties. This therefore constrains women’s voices on issues of national security and renders males voices the dominant authority (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). This was the prevailing situation for the first four and a half decades of Israel, with women not having access to combat roles in the military. However, women began to gain access to these roles in the 1990s, partly as a result of the demand from women to be allowed access to all military roles, including combat, in order to re-structure their status in society (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011: 745).

This changing situation has resulted in many examples where Israeli women have obtained equal opportunities as men and are not excluded from institutionalised politics or debates on national security. At the beginning of 2012 the three leaders of the opposition parties were all women and there are a number of women in other influential positions in Israeli society. However, whilst women do have access to positions of power in Israeli society, they are arguably not struggling for underlying gender equality but for the ‘recognition of their ability to appear masculine’ (Levy, 2007:113; Sharoni, 1995: 17). One prominent example was Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was considered a woman playing at being a man and did not challenge the dominance of the patriarchy in Israel nor empower women to advance their status (Sharoni, 1995:99). Furthermore, the Israeli military has not become a site for gender equality, with women being faced with a sometimes hostile environment (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Within certain activist networks, a similar criticism has been posed, whereby a culture has been created which requires female participants to act in a way that ‘emulates the self-confidence, space-taking behaviours of men’ (Gordon, 2010:425). Given these findings a gender-sensitive lens is needed to unearth the role of gender inequalities in shaping the way we have come to understand women in Israeli society and therefore how to understand the role of women in Israeli peace activism.

3 David Ben Gurion stated that, ‘increasing the Jewish birth-rate is a vital need for the existence of Israel, and [that] a Jewish woman who does not bring at least four children into the world is defrauding the Jewish mission’ (in Sharoni, 1995: 119).
However, this needs to go further. Most studies on Israeli women’s peace activism have focused in particular on the role of women’s peace activism without considering the wider issue of the role of gender dynamics within the Israeli peace activism as a whole. Ferree and Mueller (2007) argue that beyond an understanding of the socio-political role of women in society, social movement theory needs to consider the gender dimension from the outset in order to provide a ‘more dynamic, long-term and less state-centred approach’ (Ferree and Mueller, 2007:577). They suggest a refinement of the classical social movement agenda and adopt a ‘gendered repertoire of contention’ that addresses ‘gendered opportunities through gendered structures of mobilisation with gendered rhetoric of meaning’ (Ferree and Mueller, 2007:587). They argue that the powers of movement are not gender neutral and therefore the study of all social movements should be looked at through a gendered lens. Ferree and Mueller (2007) also make an important distinction between ‘feminism’ and women’s movements, which is needed to enable studies on how the women’s movements relate to feminism. This distinction is particularly important in Israeli peace activism, where not all women’s groups were feminist and not all feminist groups were women’s groups. Following Ferree and Mueller’s (2007) approach, this dissertation will be attentive to gender dynamics in the use of social movement theory to study Israeli peace activism, providing further insights to build on their approach.

2.9 UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

In understanding the trajectory of a social movement activity, some understanding of impact is needed. However, analysing the impact of a social movement is difficult since there is no agreed upon criteria with which to assess these outcomes (Hermann, 2009:35). Furthermore, it is almost impossible to determine causal links between social movement activity and a change in policy, public opinion or facts on the ground, as there are inevitably other factors that influence the situation. Additionally, as noted by Johnson (2000:1) in writing about the anti-war movement against US action in Vietnam, leaders are often reluctant to admit that any decision they make were directly influenced by public pressure or dissent. This is confirmed by Hermann’s (2002: 94-95) analysis of the role of the Israeli peace movement in the Oslo peace process, in which she notes that the Israeli peace movement was not given any recognition for the role it played.

Despite these limitations, there have been attempts to define social movement impact by both studies on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory (Golan, 2014a; Hermann, 2009, 2002; Bernstein, 2003; Bar-On, 1996; Kaminer, 1996; Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978; Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 1982; Staggenborg, 1995; della Porta, 1999). Gamson (1990) outlined impact in political terms and studies followed that considered impact as the ability for a social movement to have their claims acknowledged and met by the political elites and in policy changes (McAdam, 1982; Tilly 1978).

However, studies moved beyond this to consider impact in terms of challenges to dominant beliefs (Melucci, 1989; Touraine, 1981), particularly with the increased emphasis on the connections between culture and social movements (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). Efforts were therefore made to encapsulate a broader understanding of social movement impact (Bernstein, 2003; della Porta, 1999;
Staggenborg (1995). Some have argued that success or failure should be attributed to smaller, more specific areas, such as the success of Nashim b’Shachor (Women in Black) in simply forcing passers-by to question their assumptions (Svirsky, 2001a) or the recent success of the activists in the village of Bil’in in getting the route of the separation barrier moved (Hallward, 2009). Others argue that the process is just as significant as the outcome and success should not be determined solely on specific achievements (Hallward, 2009:535). Therefore, attention will be given to the more limited areas in which Israeli peace activism might be having success.

Staggenborg (1995) provides the most useful framework that considers different areas in which movements can have impact; in the policy arena, in mobilisation and through culture. These open up the potential to view social movement impact in a variety of ways, including the ability to mobilise individuals, achieve policy change, achieve change on the ground, shift public opinion, stop human rights abuses and end a conflict. Bernstein (2003) adds that included in this framework should be a discursive impact, such as the work of della Porta (1999), since a movement can also shift the ways in which ideas, problems and solutions are presented. This can be described as norm entrepreneurship (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and will be useful in understanding the impact of Israeli peace activism. Using Staggenborg’s (1995) framework, with the addition of norm entrepreneurship, allows for a much broader appreciation of social movement impact than solely focusing on the policy arena.

This dissertation will make use of this understanding of impact, considering if Israeli peace activism has impacted the policy arena, if they have succeeded in mobilising the public, whether they have affected the prevailing culture and if they have engaged in norm entrepreneurship. By disaggregating the internal dynamics, impact in each of these areas will be considered, as well as in the overall situation. While claims of success cannot be conclusively attributed solely to Israeli peace activism, some attempt will be made at emphasising the influence it has had in the past and the potential for the current activities to create change.

3 ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

The empirical body of literature that looks at Israeli peace activism can be divided into four areas: the work of Tamar Hermann, studies on individual peace groups, studies on activism after the second Intifada and first hand experiences of activists. The most significant analysis of Israeli peace activism for the purpose of this study is Hermann’s (2009) detailed analysis of the peace movement from 1993 to 2008. This is a culmination of a number of works she has produced on the topic (2002, 1996). Her analysis is based on an interesting combination of a theory of political opportunity structures and theories of public opinion. She provides a comprehensive overview of the trajectory of the Israeli peace movement in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, identifying in particular its role in the peace process. She does give attention to all the groups operating in her period of study but overall focuses more closely on the story of the liberal Zionist parts of the Israeli peace movement, tracing their
foundations, the euphoria in witnessing the Oslo peace process and their demise as the process began to break down.

Of particular interest in Hermann’s theoretical framework is her use of Tarrow’s (1996) division of political opportunity structures into state-centred and proximate opportunities and threats. State-centred opportunity structures enable a comparison of the relationship between state and movement across countries whereas proximate opportunity structures refer to the ‘signals that groups receive from the immediate political environment or through changes in their resources or capacities’ (Hermann, 2009:19). Whilst Hermann acknowledges that proximate opportunity structures include the opportunities specific to individual groups and that this will affect the groups’ mobilisation potential and strategies, she does not explicitly identify that the opportunities are perceived differently depending on the collective action frames of the groups. Whilst Hermann acknowledges framing and resource mobilisation, she chooses to follow Tarrow’s (2001:6) remark that social movement theory would benefit from integrating it with other concepts that have illuminated social movements and chooses to integrate theories of public opinion with political opportunity structures.

Since Hermann (2009) is an established pollster in Israel, it is unsurprising that she aims to connect the plight of the peace movement with mainstream public opinion. She claims that political opportunity structures are insufficient in fully explaining the fate of the peace movement and a theory of public opinion needs to be integrated, particularly due to the role that public opinion has in influencing policy decisions (Hermann, 2009:26). She notes that in issues of peace and security, the public has been shown to play a specific role in transforming relationships between the sides in a conflict (Bell and O’Rourke in Hermann, 2009:27). She therefore argues for a pluralist theory of democracy in which a variety of ‘interest organisations’ try to influence policy, which places a peace movement in the pool of actors trying to have influence and who are in competition with other actors to mobilise the public behind their particular cause (2009:29). The importance of public opinion is therefore highlighted when trying to achieve policy change. However, this does not take into account those groups that may not wish to influence the public or policy, at least in the short term. Therefore, whilst it is a useful addition to political opportunity structures, the combined theory that Hermann (2009) puts forward is not sufficient as a framework that provides the whole picture of a peace movement. It fails to appreciate the usefulness of the internal powers of movement in illuminating social movement characteristics and how the interaction between these and political opportunity structures can provide more details of the trajectories and dynamics of different parts of a social movement.

In Hermann’s analysis of Israeli peace activism between 1967-1998 as part of Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld’s (2002) comparative study of peace and conflict resolution organisations in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, she does make more reference to the four powers of movement, although without explicit reference to the individual conceptual tools. She does this in order to explain the failure of the movement to become a significant political actor during this time. Again, her focus is
on the factors that enabled or inhibited the peace movement from influencing decision-makers, rather than an analysis of the internal characteristics in and of themselves.

A number of useful studies have been conducted on the emerging groups since 2000 (Svirsky, 2012; Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Hallward, 2009; Marteu, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Fridman, 2008). This body of literature provides interesting insights into the new phenomenon of joint activism between Israelis and Palestinians however, they focus solely on the joint Israeli-Palestinian peace activism and do not consider the many other Israeli groups actively promoting peace across a broad ideological, organisational and tactical spectrum. Furthermore, these studies do not place the contemporary activism in the context of the overall trajectory of the Israeli peace movement and thus do not make a comparison with the earlier peace activities of pre-2000 activism. This dissertation will provide an overview of Israeli peace activism before the second Intifada as a point of comparison for activism post-2000, allowing for an understanding of the similarities and differences over time.

There are a number of other empirical studies that detail and analyse individual peace groups from both periods of activism (Perry, 2011; Gordon, 2010; Halperin, 2007; Grossman and Kalpan, 2006; Kidron, 2004; Seitz, 2003; Svirsky, 2001a; Lemish and Barzel, 2000; Helman and Rapoport, 1997). These will provide some empirical details to add to both the historical overview and the study of Israeli peace activism post-2000. There is also a body of work that looks at the effect of the second Intifada on dialogue groups (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007; Bar-On and Awan, 2006; Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven, 2006; Baskin and Al-Haq, 2004; Halabi and Sonnenschein, 2004; Maoz, 2004). Dialogue groups between Israelis and Palestinians became one of the most prolific forms of activism during the Oslo peace process however, as these studies argue, the second Intifada led to the severe decline in such activities due to restriction of movement and increased mistrust and fear.

There also a number of useful publications providing first-hand experience of Israeli peace activism. Some provide autobiographical accounts (Bardin, 2012; Shulman, 2007; Warschawski, 2005; Reshef, 1996), which detail the experiences of some key activists of Israeli peace activism. There are also some collections of interviews and blog posts from Israeli peace activists (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Kabasakal et al. 2004; Kidron, 2004; Diase, 1992; Rosenwasser, 1992), which include the personal reflections of activists in different periods of time. Whilst they provided limited analyses, they will help to inform the empirical details of this study.

4 ISRAELI POLITICAL CULTURE

The political culture of a society helps to determine what may or may not be acceptable to the mainstream public and therefore what messages may or may not resonate. It is useful to have a general understanding of this when considering the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. The term ‘political culture’ is a broad concept which can incorporate a fairly large variety of factors. On a general level it refers to the elements of a society that have an impact on the ways in which an individual chooses to
act. These elements include a society’s history, its social demographics, its culture and traditions, its religion, its ideological foundations, the relationship between the individual and the collective and the importance placed on certain institutions. These elements tend to determine what is or what is not considered an appropriate way to act in both the public and private sphere, either consciously or unconsciously. This, in turn, affects the ways in which individuals choose to act. The ‘political’ aspect of ‘political culture’ refers to the beliefs and attitudes of the collective and the individual with respect to politics and tends to guide political and extra-parliamentary opinions and actions. Some studies of Israeli peace activism have provided useful outlines of Israeli political culture and the socio-political context within which the peace promoting groups are functioning (Hermann, 2009; Norell, 2002; Bar-Tal, 2000, 1998; Wolfsfeld, 1988) that will help to inform the empirical chapters.

Of greatest significance in helping to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism is the psychological aspect of Israeli political culture. The Jewish people and Jewish Israelis have developed a particular collective psychological consciousness as a result of a sense of ‘victimisation’ throughout the ancient and modern history of the Jewish people, combined with being involved in an intractable conflict (Fridman, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2000, 1998). Furthermore, the deep mistrust that has formed between Israelis and Palestinians and the perception of a personal security threat, as well as the ways in which certain governments have framed the conflict, has informed the way in which the Israeli public view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Stan Cohen (2001) explains that the defensive self-image of Israelis and the strong sense of victimhood have led to a ‘denial of the victim,’ whereby the presence of others’ suffering is sometimes excluded from the Israeli consciousness. In some instances societies block out certain occurrences, not because they do not believe that they are occurring but, as a coping mechanism for continuing with everyday life. A collective state of denial has become embedded within Israeli society and amounts to some degree of ‘switching off’ from the situation (Fridman, 2008:3). A combination of ‘victimhood’ and ‘getting on with life’ underlies this collective state of denial of Israeli society and will help to explain the immobilisation of Israelis and why certain peace groups were seen as more legitimate than others.

5 CONCLUSION

Through an analysis of certain variables of social movement theory within the context of Israeli peace activism, this chapter has produced a development and refinement of a theoretical framework with which to assess the changes and continuities in Israeli peace activism from 1967 to 2014. In particular Tarrow’s (2011) four powers of movement help to identify the characteristics of a social movement in order to understand its trajectory. This review has shown that an appreciation of the internal dynamics provides greater understanding of a social movement, which can then be further analysed through the interaction with the political opportunity structures. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that using the mechanisms and processes involved in the theory of cycles of contention provides an additional way to explore Israeli peace activism and enables a more detailed understanding of the differences between the different component parts. This review has also shown that there are some
aspects of social movement theory that need to be assessed with relation to the case of Israeli peace activism, namely the relationship between the government and how to approach impact. In addition it has shown that there are some underdeveloped areas of social movement theory that will be explored in this dissertation, namely the international dimension and gender dynamics.

This dissertation will pay detailed attention to each of the internal dynamics in turn, in the order set out in this review, before analysing how they interact with each other and the political opportunity structures. Cycles of contention will then be identified, using the mechanisms and processes from the dynamic model. In approaching the transformation of Israeli peace activism through this framework, this study will show that unlike the conventional argument, not all components of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in the second Intifada. This will provide a refinement to current studies of Israeli peace activism. In addition, the empirical chapters will add further details to the existing studies on Israeli peace activism, further adding to this body of literature. It will also identify new framing processes, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures that contribute to both the literature on Israeli peace activism and social movement theory.

This dissertation will now turn to an historical overview of the first two phases of Israeli peace activism, approached through Tarrow’s (2011) four powers of movement and the additional theoretical considerations outlined in this chapter.
CHAPTER 3

FROM INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE ACTIVISM TO THE BIRTH OF A PEACE MOVEMENT

1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an historical overview of Israeli peace activism between the aftermath of the 1967 war, in which the surrounding Arab nations went to war with Israel and Israel experienced a ‘stunning victory,’ capturing the Sinai Desert, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the West Bank in six days (Bregman, 2002:91), and the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000. This chapter will examine Israeli peace activism in the period between 1967 and 2000 by identifying the internal dynamics: the collective action frames, the tactical repertoires and the mobilisation structures and how they interact with the political opportunity structures to form cycles of contention. This will provide a clear point of comparison for the analysis and exploration of Israeli peace activism post-2000 and highlight some of the origins and legacies of Israeli peace activism, from which much of the more recent peace activism has developed.

This chapter will begin with the aftermath of the 1967 war. Whilst there were some attempts by individuals to alleviate tensions between Arabs and Jews in the pre-state era and the first decades of the State of Israel and some of the individuals involved in peace activism prior to 1967, such as Martin Buber and Uri Avneri, have influenced future generations of peace activism, this period will not be considered, since their attempts can at best be described as proto-activism and in reality were not more than the intellectual debates of a handful of individuals (Hermann, 2009:74). Therefore, the historical outline will begin following the 1967 war when attempts at activism began. It will end in 2000 with the outbreak of the second Intifada. According to conventional wisdom it was this point that marked the paralysis of the Israeli peace movement, described by Hermann (2009) as the ‘shattered dream’ of the Israeli peace movement, since it signified the failure of the peace process that the movement had pushed for. This study will show however, that this point did not lead to the paralysis of the whole movement but led to the emergence of new forms of activism, accelerating the fragmentation and polarisation of Israeli peace activism, with new voices emerging.

Two distinct phases of activism can be identified between 1967 and 2000. The period between 1967 and 1977 can be described as, ‘individual, disparate attempts at peace activism’ and the period between 1977 and 2000 can be described as, ‘the birth and coming of age of a peace movement.’ A different demarcation of phases could have been made within this period. Hermann (2009), for example, takes the approach of dividing her study according to changes in political opportunity structures, in particular the potential of the movement to influence the government and public opinion in Israel. Her divisions therefore correlate with changes in government and public opinion, which create more than two distinct phases. However, given this study aims to provide a greater focus on the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism, the divisions are made based on the internal changes and evolution of Israeli peace activism itself.
The first phase is characterised by individual, disparate peace initiatives that formed into two components, liberal Zionist groups and radical groups, distinguished through their collective action frames; the ways in which they framed themselves and the prevailing realities. For both components, the outcome of the 1967 war, which involved a shift from an existential conflict to a limited conflict over the fate of the territories that the Arabs lost in the 1967 war, was perceived as an opportunity to present a tangible solution to end the conflict through conceding territories acquired in the war. The liberal Zionist component focused on a general concept of ‘land for peace,’ whereas the radical component began to concentrate on a two-state solution that put the Palestinians at the centre of negotiations and solutions. The two components were loosely connected and both were marginal within Israeli society. They were both based on a variety of informal, familiar networks and later expanded to include other mobilising structures, such as reservist soldiers for the liberal Zionist component and immigrant students for the radical component. A repertoire of contention began to form, mainly around demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities, with the radical component also engaged in meetings with Palestinian representatives. The initiatives gradually developed into more sustained challenges against the Israeli government, with expanded mobilising structures and more complex collective action frames. The ideas of the activists from both components however did not resonate with the Israeli public and whilst the opportunities for extra-parliamentary activity expanded in this phase, particularly after the 1973 war, where Israel was unprepared for an attack by Egypt and the decisions makers were criticised for not anticipating the strike, it was not widely accepted in Israeli society, which meant both components were unable to develop into a movement with a strong support base (Hermann, 2009:79-88).

In 1977 the Avoda (Labour) government experienced its first defeat, which created the opportunity for the individual attempts at peace activism to morph into a movement. This marked the beginning of the second phase, with the creation of Shalom Achshav in 1978, the largest peace group in Israel, the emergence of an Israeli peace movement and a new cycle of contention. In this phase three components of Israeli peace activism can be identified: ‘liberal Zionist’, ‘radical’ and ‘human rights’, each presenting a different framing of themselves, the prevailing problems and potential solutions. In this phase, the liberal Zionist component, represented by Shalom Achshav, was the most prominent and had the greatest mobilising potential, focusing on the mainstream Israeli public. As well as an expanded repertoire of contention, they continued to use demonstrations in significant locations in Israeli cities, which became a common part of the liberal Zionist repertoire of contention. However, as Kaminer (1996) argues, it was the radical component that were the agenda setters, acting as the ‘small wheel’ of the bicycle that pushed the ‘big wheel’ – the liberal Zionist component - to take certain positions and mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. Ideas that originated in the radical component, such as recognition that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was the true representatives of the Palestinian people, eventually diffused into the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism and later government policy. This highlights the role of the radical component as norm entrepreneurs, signalling the importance of studying the radical component, despite their small numbers and position.
on the margins of Israeli society. They also developed more confrontational tactical repertoires, such as direct action and boycott. A human rights component also emerged that found innovative ways to frame and challenge the situation through revealing the realities on the ground and challenging government policies. They tended to use less confrontational tactics than the radical groups, focusing on reporting, protesting human rights violations or providing humanitarian services. At times the three components unified into a movement, with strong coordination however, in other periods of this phase, there was disunity and fragmentation both between components and within the components (Kaminer, 1996).

Towards the end of the phase, ‘the birth and coming of age of the Israeli peace movement,’ the Israeli government, headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, made peace its goal and following secret talks it signed the Declaration of Principles in 1993. This marked a huge success for the Israeli peace movement, since it put forward plans for a negotiated agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, with a two-state solution at its core. The peace movement unified around this however, in the years that followed, there was stalling in the implementation of the agreements, particularly when Benjamin Netanyahu was elected in 1996. This gave all components of Israeli peace activism an impetus to mobilise and encourage the government to continue on the path to peace. However, Palestinian attacks in the mid-1990s made it difficult for the liberal-Zionist component to mobilise the public (Hermann, 2009). Hope was put into the Camp David II summit in 2000 where Ehud Barak met with Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton to discuss some of the outstanding issues, such as the issue of refugees and Jerusalem, in order to reach a ‘final-status agreement’.

The failure of Camp David II and the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000 marked the end of the second phase of Israeli peace activism and the beginning of the third phase, ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism: three cycles of contention’. Ehud Barak left the negotiations claiming that, ‘there was no partner for peace’ (ABC News, 2000). The public were quick to accept these words, which meant the liberal Zionist component, which was focused on mass mobilisation, was unable to present a strong peace promoting voice. The outbreak of violence served to confirm this rhetoric. In such an atmosphere of violence and antagonism the liberal Zionist groups became paralysed (Hermann, 2009). However, groups in the radical and human rights components continued to act and new groups emerged in response to the second Intifada. This marks the end of the second phase and the beginning of the third phase, ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of the Israeli peace movement: three cycles of contention.’

This chapter will consider each of the two phases between 1967 and 2000 sequentially. For each, it will identify and explain the internal dynamics in turn: the collective action frames, the repertoire of contention and the mobilising structures. It will then consider how these internal dynamics interacted with the political opportunity structures and cycles that formed. For each of these factors, differences between the three components of Israeli peace activism will be identified and explained in order to build a clear typology and characterisation of the state of Israeli peace activism in each phase. Once
each of the phases has been examined, implications and points of comparison for the next phase of Israeli peace activism will be outlined.

This chapter mainly makes use of existing studies of the Israeli peace movement, both overall accounts (Hermann, 2009; Bar-On, 1996, 1985a, 1985b; Kaminer, 1996; Hall-Cathala, 1990), as well as studies on specific peace groups or themes (Kaufman, Salem and Verhoeven, 2006; Adwan and Bar-On, 2000; Sharoni, 1995; Rosenwasser, 1992) and autobiographies of peace activists (Bardin, 2012; Warshawski, 2005). Information from websites has been used to provide further details on individual peace organisations. Interviews conducted by the author in Israel between January 2013 and July 2013 for the empirical study of Israeli peace activism from 2000 have also been referred to in this chapter, in instances where the activists had been previously involved and had further insights to add to the historical context. ‘The Other Israel,’ an English-language newsletter that has documented Israeli peace activism since 1982 was also consulted.

2 THE FIRST PHASE: INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE ACTIVISM

This phase of Israeli peace activism is best characterised as ‘individual and disparate attempts at creating peace.’ Whilst there were are number of groups that emerged and a variety of activities promoting peace organised, including a few notable public protests, a sustained campaign of contentious politics cannot be identified and there was not a coordinated effort between groups and activities (Hermann, 2009:81). The peace activism that occurred in this phase cannot therefore be defined as a peace movement. However, there was a clear development in the collective action frames of the peace activists, with the emergence of two distinct components, the ‘liberal Zionist’ and the ‘radical’ (Figure 2). The radical component tended to present more confrontational collective action frames however, the differences between the two components were not particularly stark in this phase due to the infancy of Israeli peace activism in Israel. Some opportunities to mobilise were perceived in the political opportunity structures, which alongside a gradual expansion of mobilisation structures for both components, laid the foundations for a movement to emerge in the following phase. However, certain constraints, particularly fear and mistrust of the Arabs as a result of the wars in this phase, meant this was not possible during this phase.
The main framing of Israeli peace activism in this phase was based on returning the territories occupied in the 1967 war. The shift from an existential conflict to a limited one that focused on the realities created by the war created a polarisation in Israeli society between those who wanted to annex the territories occupied by Israel in the war and those who saw an opportunity to make peace with the Arab countries. Peace activism centred on ceding the territories acquired in the war. Two collective action frames emerged around this, signalling the division of Israeli peace activism into two components. The liberal Zionist component framed the situation through the doctrine of ‘land for peace,’ whereby the territories Israel acquired in the war, the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank and Sinai Desert, should be conceded to Israel’s Arab neighbours in exchange for peace agreements to ensure peace and security for Israel (Hermann, 2009:80). The peace groups now had a tangible solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that presented a direct link between the security of Israel and peace, enabling the groups to gain more legitimacy than previous attempts at peace activism. Whilst the proto-peace activism of the pre state and early state years was characterised by marginalised, ‘radical’ groups and individuals, this framing created a liberal Zionist component that was closer to the political mainstream, promoting peace for the long-term security of Israel. This discourse continued to underlie the framing of the liberal Zionist groups.

Two examples characterise the liberal Zionist framing of peace activism in this phase. HaTnua l’Shalom uBitachon (The Movement for Peace and Security) emerged in Israel in July 1968 and cautioned against permanent Israeli presence in the territories occupied during the war (Kaminer, 1996: 9) and proposed...
contact with Arab leaders or groups that were willing to engage in dialogue with the aim of using the territories as a bargaining chip for peace (Hermann, 2009:80). Furthermore, distancing themselves from the experience of the earlier radical groups, it attempted to not be seen as an elitist intellectual group but opened itself up to the general public, with debates and pluralism encouraged and no fixed organisational commitments required for participation (Hermann, 2009:79).

This more moderate framing continued in response to other events. Following the 1973 war a protest group formed out of the spontaneous vigil of reserve soldier Motti Ashkenazi, which called for the dismissal of Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister, and for responsibility to be taken for Israel’s miscalculations in anticipating the Egyptian attack (Bar-On, 1996:73). This resonated with public reaction to the war that called for investigations into the Israeli government and military for their failure to anticipate the attacks (Bregman, 2002:143). The vigil developed into a peace group, Yisrael Shelanu, HaTnua Letmura (Our Israel: The Movement for Change), of which a significant proportion were reservist soldiers. The way in which the group framed themselves, as patriotic soldiers, fresh from the battlefield, fighting for ‘Our Israel’ (Bar-On, 1996:73), highlighted their liberal Zionist framing and helped them to mobilise support. They received more support than other extra-parliamentary attempts at criticising or questioning the government to date (Bar-On, 1996:73). In addition, they did not take a partisan line nor involve themselves in policy questions (Kaminer, 1996:18). This broad framing meant they did not alienate potential participants who held certain perspectives on the conflict and could therefore draw on a wide support base. Furthermore, the demand they were making was seemingly modest compared to some of the previous examples of contentious activity, with the group simply asking for those who were responsible for the mistakes of the war to take responsibility for their decisions and actions. Golda Meir and her government resigned in 1974, in part due to public pressure (Kaminer, 1996:19).

The identity of the peace activists was also in opposition to the identity of the annexationist groups that emerged in this phase. The annexationist groups tended to be made up of religious-nationalists, particularly the most prominent group, Gush Emunim (Bloc of Faithful). This was in contrast to the mainly secular make-up of the peace groups. The link between identity, religious affiliation and political ideology and the stereotypes that developed with it, run deeply through Israeli society. In order to try to combat this, Oz v’Shalom (Strength and Peace), a small religious peace group, was formed in 1975 to show that not all religious individuals argued for annexation of Judea and Samaria. Through a process of

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4 By the end of the first week there were more than 5000 signatures calling for the dismissal of Dayan (Bar-On, 1996:73).
5 Although the group did not propose a particular political agenda, Ashkenazi, in an interview with Ha’aretz, stated that there must be, ‘an active wrestling with the Palestinian problem, and that means acknowledging that this problem is at the centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that there is room for a sovereign Palestinian state on the soil of historic Eretz Yisrael’ (Ashkenazi in Rabinovich & Reinharz, 2008:286).
6 For detailed studies of Gush Emunim, see Newman (1985, 1982).
frame extension they aimed to persuade religious Zionists that annexation and control of another people ran counter to Jewish values and teachings (Hermann, 2002:100).

The radical component that developed in this phase also argued that the land acquired in the war must be conceded for the sake of peace (Bar-On, 1996:46). However, in addition they proposed direct negotiations with the PLO, as the true representatives of the Palestinian people, instead of ‘Arab’ leaders, placing the Palestinians at the centre of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This came directly from the ideas and activities of individuals and intellectual groups from earlier years, such as *HaMoatza haYisraelit l’Shalom Yisrael-Palestin* (The Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace), which had begun considering the idea of a two-state solution (Hermann, 2009:85-6). These ideas were however ‘a total taboo’ in Israeli society, even amongst most peace activists (Hermann, 2009:85), highlighting their ‘radical’ nature.

### 2.2 THE BEGINNINGS OF A REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION

This phase built the foundations for the repertoire of contention of the Israeli peace movement, drawn from experiences of the Jewish community in Europe and influenced by protest groups and individuals from around the world. Tactics were initially limited, with little strategizing behind them, characterised more by spontaneous actions and mainly involved demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities for both components. Protests were often sparked off by the actions of small groups of individuals, which had simply wanted to express their personal dissatisfaction or concerns and were not aiming at mass mobilisation. However, when their actions resonated with the public, such as the vigil of the reservist soldier Motti Ashkenazi (Bar-On, 1996:73) or the letter from high school teenagers expressing their concerns for fighting in a ‘fruitless war’ (Shem Tov cited in Bar-On, 1996:57), the public were drawn to the street to voice their common dissatisfaction (Bar-on, 1996:73). These demonstrations were often held outside the Prime Minister’s residence in Jerusalem, which became a well-used and symbolic location for protests. Protest became the most common tactic used and it began to be seen as a legitimate way of expressing concerns in the public sphere (Wolfsfeld, 1988). The advent of television brought further legitimacy to demonstrations due to exposure to anti-war protests in the United States and Europe (Wolfsfeld, 1988:11); providing an example of how the international dimension can influence a domestic social movement.

In addition, groups of intellectuals mobilised around debates and discussions and the more radical of these, such as Uri Avneri, developed contacts and meetings with Palestinians. The idea of meeting with PLO officials was completely rejected by Israeli society, since it was regarded as a terrorist organisation (Hermann, 2009:85). Hermann (2009:86) argues however, that these informal meetings provided a

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7 Avneri began meetings with Palestinians in the mid to late 70s, leading to a meeting in Beirut between Avneri and Yasser Arafat. See Avneri (1985) for a personal account of the secret meetings from 1974 to 1982 between the two sides. See Avneri et al. (1975) for a transcription of a discussion held by some of these intellectuals in November 1974 in order to provide a “dovish” contribution to the national assessment which followed the war they had warned against (1975:vi).
precedent for the informal channels that led to the Oslo Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993. This is an example, of which more arise in the next phase, of where the radical groups take more risks than the liberal Zionist groups and push the boundaries for the sake of peace.

2.3 BUILDING MOBILISING STRUCTURES

The mobilising structures during this phase were also limited. Initially, both components of Israeli peace activism tended to be built around familiar networks, some of which were activist networks from the previous phase, including university academics and reservist soldiers. There were little attempts to mobilise the public at large and there were no sophisticated mobilising strategies (Bar-On, 1996:73). However, following the 1973 war, the public was more willing to listen to criticisms of the government and therefore became a more available target (Hermann, 2009:82-3). There were some examples of attempts to reach out to a wider participant base. For example, HaTnua l’Shalom uBitachon defined itself as a grassroots initiative and advertised its meetings to the public (Hermann, 2009:79). Mobilising structures gradually expanded as peace activism became more common, with the formalisation of some networks into organisations, such as HaGesher: Nashim Yehudiot v’Araviot l’Shalom b’Hamizrach Hatichon (The Bridge: Jewish and Arab Women for Peace in the Middle East) and the creation of forums for discussion, such as HaMoatza haYisraelit l’Shalom Yisrael-Falestin (Herman, 2009:85).

The radical groups were boosted by a wave of student immigration from Latin America, the United States and Europe between 1967 and 1977 (Kaminer, 1996:10). Many of these individuals were involved in radical student activism in their home countries and influenced student groups in Israel, particularly the organising principles and tactics of the Israeli student movement. They worked on ‘the principle of spontaneity,’ with a ‘participatory style of organisation’ that was far removed from traditional organisation structures, such as elected bodies (Kaminer, 1996:12). The movement had ‘enthusiasm and energy’ based on the principle that ‘ideology disunites’ and ‘action unites’ (Kaminer, 1996:12) and employed tactics of confrontation. This made it attractive and exciting to the younger generation and helped create a role for itself on the far left of Israeli peace activities. There are clear legacies from this in the radical activism post-2000.

Mobilisation structures in general expanded with the advent of television, creating the opportunity for mass exposure. However, exposure requires the media to report on peace activities or present the realities of the situation in ways that were in line with how the peace activists perceived them. This was more common following the 1973 war, when the media began a process of self-reflection and adopted a much more critical view of the government (Mann, 2015:87), after concluding that they had been part of ‘the complacency, the excessive self-confidence... [and] the ignoring of the reality’ that led to the miscalculations of the events leading up to the 1973 war (Ben Porat et al. in Mann, 2015:87).

By the end of this period the mobilising structures had ripened and expanded in such a way that would enable the mass mobilisation of a peace movement in the beginning of the following phase: networks of
activists presenting different peace agendas and ideological perspectives had been built; the experience of spontaneous mobilisation in direct response to certain situations provided a new formula for activism; the public accepted extra-parliamentary activities as a means of political expression; dissatisfaction with the government grew; and solidarity and support for some of the ideas promoted by peace activists developed within the Israeli public.

2.4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: MIXED OPPORTUNITIES

During this phase, the political opportunity structures had a very strong impact on the trajectory and internal dynamics of the peace movement. Activism emerged and formed directly out of changes in the political opportunity structures, which gradually opened throughout this phase for all forms of extra-parliamentary activity (Hermann, 2009). The political opportunity structures of this phase constrained the ability for a peace movement to emerge but both components still perceived opportunities to mobilise and to pursue their individual peace-building attempts. Whilst differences can be identified in their collective action frames and tactical repertoires, which were more confrontational amongst the radical component, both components were faced with similar political opportunity structures. This was because the ideas of both components were marginalised and the previous decades had not seen an active civil society (Bar-On, 1996:72). The radical component however, still maintained their contact with Palestinian officials, despite the unfavourable environment.

The nature of the government played a significant role in affecting peace activism. Political opportunity structures were closed to extra parliamentary activity until the late 1960s, due to the centrality of the governing authority in the pre-state era and early state years, which was elevated to a ‘supreme symbol of Zionism’ (Levy, 1997:36) and embedded through a policy known as Mamlachtiyut (Statism) (Don-Yehiya, 1995:171). This constrained the potential for an active civil society. The aftermath of the war in 1967, in which Israel achieved an unexpected victory, was perceived as an opening of the political opportunity structures for Israeli peace activism firstly, because a tangible solution for the achievement of peace with security emerged and secondly, because all forms of extra-parliamentary activity received greater legitimacy and were tolerated more than they had been previously (Norell, 2002:75). This was because the authority of the Israeli government had been established and therefore it was more accepting to an active civil society.

The failure of Israel to anticipate the attack from the neighbouring Arab countries in the 1973 war further provided an opportunity for extra parliamentary activity and peace activism. It highlighted that the Israeli government and security apparatus were prone to mistakes, undermining the hitherto omnipotence of the state (Lebel and Lewin, 2015:1-2). Gradually, civil society groups in Israel achieved greater legitimacy than before to critique the government, especially on foreign policy issues, allowing discourse over security issues and foreign affairs to enter the public realm (Hermann, 2009:82-3). These factors encouraged further proliferation of a variety of peace groups and initiatives from the mid-70s (Hermann, 2009:83; Appendix 1).
The opening of political opportunity structures can also be seen with the shift in the political culture of Israel that occurred with the younger generation gaining aspirations of personal mobility (Wolfsfeld, 1988:11), which meant they were less willing to accept the situation they were in and more willing to appeal to the government for change. Furthermore, this new generation were not Holocaust survivors or the founding generation of the state and therefore more willing to criticise the authorities (Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven, 2006:41).

However, whilst these more favourable political opportunity structures might suggest that the Israeli peace efforts could develop into a substantial force, two main factors in the prevailing political opportunity structures inhibited both components’ ability to mobilise into a movement or convince the government into entering peace negotiations with the Arabs. Firstly, the perceived and experienced threat from the Arab countries, as a result of the wars in this phase, created hostility and fear among Israelis. The 1967 war created a stimulus for increased radicalisation in the Palestinian quest for liberation, particularly since the Israelis were now occupying the land that had been set aside for an Arab state in the 1947 Partition Plan so, despite the David and Goliath victory of Israel, Israelis were still fearful of the Arab threat (Bar-On, 1996:72). Secondly, the War of Attrition from 1968 to 1970, during which there were a number of confrontations between Israel and Egypt mainly along the Suez Canal, only sought to re-emphasise to the Israeli government and public that the Arabs were enemies of Israel and the possibility of peace became even more remote, with many Israelis claiming ‘there is nobody to talk to anyhow’ (Bar-On, 1996:33). The surprise attack from the Arab countries in the 1973 war confirmed their fears. This marginalised both components of Israeli peace activism since they were proposing negotiations with the enemy, whether the Palestinians or the Arabs. The difference between the components is that the radical component engaged with Palestinian officials despite the taboo behind it, thus pushing their activism forward when the liberal Zionist component was unable to.

The second constraining factor of the political opportunity structures was the strength of the opposition forces and counter framing. The euphoria that followed the unprecedented victory of Israel in defeating the Arab countries in the 1967 war created a spike in nationalistic feelings, which at the time reduced the likelihood of individuals wishing to challenge the government. Furthermore, those who felt a religious and historical connection with Judea and Samaria were not willing to hand over the land they had been yearning for millennia arguing that ‘no Israeli government had the right to forfeit sovereignty over this sacred territory’ (Kaminer, 1996:8).

Whilst there was a development in the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism, with two components forming and building collective action frames, tactical repertoires and mobilisation structures, the emergence and trajectory of these were constrained by the political opportunity structures. The discourse of security and the threat felt by Israelis from their Arab neighbours were strong forces in constraining the potential for peace activism to influence government policy or mobilise the public. However, both components continued in their attempts to develop and present peace promoting
voices, which laid the foundations for a peace movement to emerge, signalling the start of the next phase of Israeli peace activism, ‘the coming of age of a peace movement in Israel’.

3 THE SECOND PHASE: THE COMING OF AGE OF A PEACE MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL

In this phase the individual attempts at peace activism morphed into a movement, signalling a new cycle of contention, with an increase in size of contention and innovative collective action frames and with the development of three components, ‘liberal Zionist,’ ‘radical’ and ‘human rights’ (Figure 3). The movement as a whole expanded, with the liberal Zionist component becoming the most prominent within Israeli society and often being mistakenly referred to as ‘the Israel peace movement,’ whereas it only represented one part of the movement, with the other components presenting different characteristics and dynamics.

The liberal Zionist component continued with the framing that presented peace as necessary for the continuity and security of Israel. A new grassroots group, Shalom Achshav, emerged with the loudest voice in the peace movement. It was able to mobilise the Israeli public and became a rallying point for the other peace groups from across the components (Simons, 2013a). It later recognised the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people, something the radical component had already been promoting. The radical component continued to focus on peace out of moral concerns for the Palestinians, having identified them as both the victims of and the solution to the conflict. The radical component tended to act as the agenda setters, pushing the boundaries and taking greater risks than the liberal Zionist component for the sake of peace, pushing the liberal Zionists to be more confrontational (Kaminer, 1996:48). A third component also emerged presenting further ways through which to frame and challenge the situation. It encompassed a variety of collective action frames that mobilised around revealing the realities of the situation particularly human rights abuses and policies of the Israeli government, as well as providing humanitarian services. Some overlap can be identified with the other two components however; they also exhibit significantly different characteristics which justifies treating them as a separate component.

The peace movement as a whole fluctuated between periods of unity and coordination and periods of disunity and dispersal, depending on both external and internal developments. As the phase progressed, all components could be seen rallying together under the broad banner of ‘two-states for two people’. Despite the general perception of an opening of the political opportunity structures, there were periods in which the ability to mobilise large numbers and influence policy was more likely than at other times and different for each component, with the radical and human rights components often continuing with their activities when the liberal Zionist component did not perceive an opportunity to mobilise. This is mainly due to the ways in which they framed themselves, with the radical and human rights components less constrained by the prevailing attitudes and more willing to be confrontational, highlighting their role as agenda setters.
Figure 3. The main characteristics of the second phase: ‘The birth and coming of age of a peace movement’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Action Frames</th>
<th>Liberal Zionist Component</th>
<th>Radical Component</th>
<th>Human rights Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Peace’ for the security and continuity of the Jewish state</td>
<td>‘Peace’ out of moral concerns for the Palestinians</td>
<td>reservist soldiers ‘proven worth but not willing to cross red line;’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strategy of not being ‘too far in front’ of the mainstream</td>
<td>PLO as representatives of Palestinians</td>
<td>Human rights organisations - dealing with ‘human rights’ not ‘peace’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Two-state solution for survival of Israel (towards late 1980s)</td>
<td>Two-state solution for Palestinian self-determination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gendered frames</td>
<td>Gendered frames</td>
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<tr>
<th>Repertoire of Contention</th>
<th>Liberal Zionist Component</th>
<th>Radical Component</th>
<th>Human rights Component</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities</td>
<td>Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities</td>
<td>Documenting Human Rights Violations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Documenting the settlements</td>
<td>Protests in Palestinians areas</td>
<td>Conscientious Objection</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Specific forms of protest in Israeli towns and cities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>People-to-people activities</td>
<td>People-to-people activities</td>
<td>Humanitarian services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Meeting Palestinians</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
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<td>Settlements boycott</td>
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<th>Mobilising Structures</th>
<th>Liberal Zionist Component</th>
<th>Radical Component</th>
<th>Human rights Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream Israeli public</td>
<td>Informal networks</td>
<td>Former liberal Zionist activists</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rallying point</td>
<td>Ad hoc coalitions and committees</td>
<td>Single identity/professional networks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Process of institutionalisation in 1990s</td>
<td>Arab Citizens of Israel</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>International funding</td>
<td>Palestinians</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Former liberal Zionist activists</td>
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<th>Political Opportunity Structures</th>
<th>Liberal Zionist Component</th>
<th>Radical Component</th>
<th>Human rights Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affected by state of public opinion</td>
<td>Continuously confrontational no matter state of public opinion/government/peace process</td>
<td>Continuously confrontational no matter state of public opinion/government/peace process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex relationship with the government</td>
<td>Bypass the government</td>
<td>Attributed opportunity to emerge in first Intifada</td>
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<tr>
<td>More hesitant in attributing opportunities</td>
<td>Early risers</td>
<td>Reactive to changes in the situation</td>
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<td>Quiet when peace process progressing</td>
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3.1 MULTIPLE COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

3.1.1 THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: SHALOM ACHSHAV IS FOUNDED

The liberal Zionist component, most closely associated with Shalom Achshav, came of age in this phase, developing collective action frames that were able to mobilise hundreds and thousands of
Israelis for the cause of peace. As explained in an interview with one of the core leaders of *Shalom Achshav*, the group strategically framed itself and the messages it portrayed in ways that would resonate with the Israeli public in order to mobilise them to put pressure on the government (Golan, 2013), rather than forcing a message that the public would not be ready to accept and therefore would not mobilise around. They urged for peace with Israel’s neighbours as the only way in which Israel could exist securely in the region and they flew Israeli flags at demonstrations, using broad, inclusive slogans (Bar-On, 1996:106). An example can be seen with the first Lebanon war in 1982, in which *Shalom Achshav* were hesitant in voicing opposition to the war until the negative consequences of the war became apparent to the Israeli public (Kaminer, 1996:35). In general *Shalom Achshav* tended to take a step back if peace talks were moving forward (Bar-On, 1996:114), partly because they did not want to hinder the efforts, partly because they did not want to give leverage to the opposition and partly because they wanted to frame their response in line with the prevailing mood amongst the Israeli public (Bar-On, 1996:114).^8^ Unlike the radical groups, *Shalom Achshav* was initially reluctant to recognise the PLO as the body to negotiate with and they did not focus on the plight of the Palestinians as an impetus for achieving peace in the region. The first *Intifada* presented an opportunity for frame transformation, where they acknowledged that a new situation had been created, which required condemnation of Israeli policies and even dialogue with Palestinian representatives (Kaminer, 1996: 99-101). After the PLO publicly proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in terms that meant alongside Israel and also denounced terror in November and December 1988 (Kaminer, 1996: 110-111), *Shalom Achshav* openly called for direct negotiations with the PLO and for Israel to recognise ‘the national existence of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza’ (Kaminer, 1996:113). Whilst this was still a marginalised concept within Israeli society, the shift in the PLO position presented an opportunity to try to influence the public.

Instances of frame bridging can also be identified in the liberal Zionist component in order to mobilise previously immobilised sectors of Israeli society by finding an issue that directly resonated with their everyday lives and connecting it to peace activism or mobilising around a related issue when they were not able to mobilise around peace activism. Three interesting examples can be identified.

*Mizrach l’Shalom* (East for Peace), a group of Mizrahi (Jews of Arab origin) peace activists advocated similar views to *Shalom Achshav* with regards to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, its leaders were aware that in order to attract members of the Mizrahi community they would have to also advocate for social justice (El Baz cited in Bar-On, 1996:167) to connect the struggle for peace to issues relevant to the Mizrahi community, who tended in this period to be part of the lower socio-economic strata of Israeli society where social justice was at the heart of their concerns. This was the first instance of frame bridging amongst Israeli peace groups. Another example can be seen following the election of Rabbi Meir Kahane as a Member of Knesset, who promoted racist ideas and

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^8^ See Wolfsfeld (1988) for a theory of extra-parliamentary participation based on public dissatisfaction with the political establishment.
policies and gained some committed supporters (Sprinzak, 1991: 169-187). The liberal Zionists, as well as some radical groups, made a link between the cause of the growing racism and the occupation (Hall-Cathala, 1990:62). Anti-racist activities were organised by members of the liberal Zionist groups in response to the rising popularity of Kahane, including a number of co-existence projects. These included activities run by Givat Haviva (The Centre for a Shared Society), an Arab-Jewish education centre; Neve Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam (Oasis of Peace), a joint Israeli-Arab village and Sadaka Re’ut (Friendship), a joint Israeli-Arab youth movement. These groups, whilst focusing on the relationship between Arab citizens of Israel and Israeli Jews and attempting to combat racism in Israeli society, also framed their efforts as promoting peace in the region.

A further attempt questioned the level of democracy in Israel. Keshev (The Centre for the Protection of Democracy in Israel) was founded out of a concern for the ‘deterioration of the public discourse and threats to democracy in Israel after the Rabin assassination’ (Keshev, [no date]). In the latter half of the 2000s as anti-democratic laws were discussed and passed in the Knesset, the liberal Zionist component began to bridge issues of ‘peace’ and ‘democracy,’ with Keshev acting as a key resource and foundation.

3.1.2 PUSHING THE AGENDA: THE RADICAL COMPONENT

Shalom Achshav, despite its growth and prominence in this phase, did not represent all the peace promoting voices in Israel and was not able to satisfy those who felt that the Palestinians were at the heart of the conflict and at the heart of the solution (Kaminer, 1996:31). The radical component continued to operate, pushing more confrontational collective action frames of the origins and solutions to the conflict, acting as norm entrepreneurs and agenda setters.\(^9\)

The radical groups had always been supporters of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and following the 1967 war became increasingly convinced of the need for a separate Palestinian State, where the Palestinians could achieve self-determination without compromising Israeli sovereignty (Kaminer, 1996:27). The first Intifada later provided a concrete example for them that the occupation must end because of the injustice being done to the Palestinians (Warschawski in Bar-On, 1996:224). The radical component were the first to respond to the first Intifada based on the idea that, ‘those who refused to be against the Intifada…understood that the Intifada was not against them’ (Jerusalem Post in Kaminer, 1996:48). They framed the Intifada as an expected and justified response to the occupation.

Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), a group made up of activists involved in the radical left, became one of the leading voices of the radical component in the 1990s, constantly ‘challenging the hegemony’ of the liberal Zionist component (Kaminer, 1996:48). They were critical of Shalom Achshav for having been drawn into the Avoda-Meretz (Vigour) coalition that was elected in 1992, and argued there was a need for a genuinely independent peace group that was willing to challenge the government (Bar-On, 1996:308). This group has maintained a presence within the peace movement, made up of key activists

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from the 1970s and 1980s, including Uri Avneri, Michel Warschawski and Matti Peled. Much of their work was put into producing newsletters and bulletins and they were always present at peace demonstrations with highly visible signs that depicted the Israeli and Palestinian flags side by side (Hermann, 2009:109). They tried to ensure that the peace movement was constantly challenging the situation with Avneri stating that ‘Gush Shalom was formed to put the peace movement back on the street and give the left a sense of direction’ (Avneri in Bar-On, 1996:308).

One group in the radical component, HaShana HaEsrim V’Achat (The Twenty First Year), founded in 1988, presented an even more critical and radical framing of the situation. They argued that Israeli society as a whole had developed into a ‘system of occupation’, which should be overcome through resistance to military service and other areas such as consumerism and language (Kaminer, 1996:54). They lacked, however, the clarity of how to implement their total opposition to the system (Hermann, 2009:100), providing an example of where overly ideological framing can hinder pragmatic strategies. However, the ideas they promoted were later given tangible actions in the radical component with the boycott movement that initially formed in the late 1980s and fully developed in the mid-2000s.

Although Shalom Achshav also began to frame the solution along the lines of a two-state solution, which blurred some of the difference in framing between the two components (Bar-On, 1996:263), the radical groups continued to propose an end to the occupation for ‘moral’ reasons whereas the liberal Zionist groups were largely focused on ending the occupation to ensure the security and stability of Israel. This underlies one of the main distinctions between the liberal Zionist component, which was often faced with the dilemma between promoting universal human rights that is concerned with the plight of the Palestinians and particularistic values inherent in Zionism (Simons, 2013a) and the radical groups, which promoted universal values of human rights above all else and therefore focused on the plight of the Palestinians. This division was never healed and continued to deepen throughout more recent years of Israeli peace activism.

Although the government also began promoting a two-state solution, many within the radical groups did not accept the Oslo agreements as a fair solution to the situation, arguing that the details of the Oslo Accords were biased towards Israel. They published a petition in the lead up to Camp David II in Ha’aretz stating,

‘We call on the Israeli peace camp to act in order to change dangerous government policy which pretends to lead to peace, but which might continue indefinitely and even exacerbate the reality of historic injustice, robbery, inequality and dependence, and conclusively prevent peace and reconciliation between the two peoples’ (The Other Israel, 2000:9).

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10 See The Other Israel (1994) for details of activities of the solidarity groups during the peace process.
This position caused deep ideological divisions between the liberal Zionist and radical components of the peace movement (Hermann, 2002:103).

3.1.3 NEW WAYS TO FRAME THE SITUATION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT

A number of groups emerged focusing broadly on the issue of Palestinian rights, presenting new ways to frame and challenge the prevailing realities. They form the human rights component and can be distinguished by their specific focus on revealing the realities of the situation, challenging human rights violations and the policies of the Israeli authorities. They emerged particularly during the first Lebanon War and the first Intifada. Two emerging parts of the human rights component were particularly prominent in this phase: a refusal movement and a human rights movement. 11

3.1.3.1 The refusal movement

Yesh Gvul (There is a limit/border) emerged out of the dissatisfaction with the actions of the government and out of the perceived over-cautiousness of Shalom Achshav in the first Lebanon War in 1982 (Bar-On, 1996:149). For many reservist soldiers the Lebanon War had crossed a line they were not willing to and so Yesh Gvul was formed based on selective refusal to serve in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). 12 The group began with a petition by reservists objecting to service in Lebanon and, after receiving some initial support, began a range of activities, which focused on providing support, assistance and publicity to those who chose to refuse. Kidron (2004:5) notes that Yesh Gvul has never been the largest group in the peace movement but it gained moral and political weight, in part because the refusers it supported were prepared to go to prison for their cause, a practical act that often speaks louder than a protest of slogans. Whilst questioning military service and refusing to perform a national duty was beyond what was deemed acceptable for the majority of Israelis at this time (Levy, 2008), the fact that the leaders had all already served in the army and ‘proven their worth in action’ (Yuval Neriya in Hall-Cathala:39), meant they were not ignored.

Despite the radical act of refusing, many of the refusers did not consider themselves part of the radical component but closer to the liberal Zionist activists (Warschawski in Rosenwasser, 1992:171). However, refusal was not accepted by the liberal Zionist component in this phase, including Shalom Achshav, who framed themselves as ‘refrain[ing] from transgressing the limits of the law and demand[ing] that its supporters maintain military discipline despite political opposition to steps of the government’ (Bar-On in Kaminer, 1996:77). Since they wanted to appeal to mainstream public opinion, they felt that disobeying the law would be counterproductive and would push the movement to the margins (Kaminer, 1996:78). This led some Shalom Achshav activists, who did not agree with this to become active in Yesh Gvul (Bar-On, 1996:230).

11 Some of the clusters of groups within the human rights component are commonly referred to as ‘movements.’ Whilst they may not fit under the definition of a social movement, this term will be used in line with the existing literature (Kaminer, 1996; Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009).

3.1.3.2 Human rights organisations

A number of groups emerged reframing the conflict as a human rights issue. In particular, the deterioration of the situation in the territories for the Palestinians during the first Intifada led some to argue that it was imperative to focus on the immediate and troubling policies within the territories rather than develop long term political solutions (Kaminer, 1996:174). Many were critical of the routine protests of the peace movement and the political battles they centred on (Kaminer, 1996:174) and aimed to create more stable, apolitical organisations that focused on human rights and revealed the hidden realities of being an occupying force. The main group to emerge was B’Tselem (‘In the Image of’/the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), established in March 1989 by Dedi Zucker, a member of Shalom Achshav. It was set up to,

‘Endeavour to document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel’ (B’Tselem, [no date, a]).

Many of the human rights groups argue that they are not part of the Israeli peace movement but identify themselves as part of a separate human rights movement (Hary, 2013). This is to ensure focus is given to their reports on human rights violations rather than being caught up in partisan politics (Bar-On, 1996:245). Whilst they claim to have no political orientation and frame themselves as nonpartisan, their work in documenting various human rights violations in the occupied territories appeared to the public as political opposition to the occupation (Bar-On, 1996:245) and therefore part of the peace movement. B’Tselem was able to build its credibility through maintaining close relations with the IDF, who did not often deny the reports that were sent to them (Kaminer, 1996:177). Despite this many of the reports were criticised as exaggerations (Bar-On, 1996:244).

3.1.4 GENDERED COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES

This phase saw the emergence of an independent women’s movement who challenged the prevailing situation.13 Some parts of the movement can be aligned with the liberal Zionist component, focusing on the safety and security of Israel and of Israeli citizens; others are more closely aligned with the radical component, particularly due to their feminist perspective, whilst others are part of the human rights component, focused on revealing the realities on the ground and provide humanitarian services. This section will consider the specific gendered framing of these groups across the spectrum of the three components. Studies on the Arba Imahot, which was created in 1997 following an accident in Southern Lebanon where two Israeli helicopters collided, killing 73 Israeli soldiers, have argued that this

13 There have been a number of articles and books dedicated to the women’s peace movement in Israel during the Intifada (Micalef, 1992; Sharoni, 1995; Helman & Rapoport, 1997; Helman, 1999; Shadmi, 2000; Svirsky, 2001a) See Sharoni (1995) for a history of women’s resistance in Israel up to the Oslo Accords. See Aharoni (2001) for a collection of information, letters, poems about women’s peace building and women peace builders from Haifa.
group was successful in achieving its goals, mainly in pressuring the Israeli government to withdraw forces from Southern Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 2009a, 2009b; Lemish and Barzel, 2000, Kaminer 1996). They framed themselves as ‘mothers,’ rather than ‘citizens’, which served as a means of legitimising themselves in the public sphere (Lemish and Barzel, 2000:153), voicing their concerns from the perspective of mothers of those who were fighting and dying in the war. It was through this maternal identity, their perceived contribution to the state through motherhood, and their role in bringing-up Israeli warriors (Ginsberg, 2009:99) that the movement gained legitimacy within Israeli society. Their protest was based on the concept of ‘republican motherhood,’ whereby women earn their citizenship and legitimisation to protest against the state through their contribution to the demographic struggle (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Through this legitimisation the women were conferred the right to express their views on peace and security in the public sphere (Lieberfeld, 2009b:153).

Furthermore, they chose a single issue, which focused not on support for the enemy but on the concern for the safety of their sons, which gained empathy across the sectors of society with compulsory conscription. By working within ‘the rules of the game’ and emphasising identities and issues which resonated with the public rather than antagonising them, they were able to mobilise widespread support, which some have argued helped lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 2009a; Lemish and Barzel 2000; Shadmi 2000).

In the first intifada, the framing of the women’s movement shifted away from such traditional gender divisions. The women decided to ‘step out of prevailing roles as mothers’ (Sharoni, 1995:111) and enter the discourse on national security and the Israeli Palestinian conflict as equal citizens. There was also a realisation that ‘women’s issues’ were intertwined with militarism, inequality and oppression and reinforced by the occupation (Sharoni, 1995:111). The women were also able to transcend their national identities and identify with the Palestinian women in their roles as women in their respective patriarchies. According to one activist, ‘in general we [Israelis, Palestinians, Arab citizens of Israel], have the same ideas and the same struggle’ (Anonymous in Rosenwasser, 1992:75). This ‘sisterhood concept’ led to the emergence of many joint Israeli, Palestinian women’s activities (Hermann, 2009:101).

Nashim b’Shachor (Women in Black) was the most prominent group within the women’s peace movement and the first to form in response to the first intifada. The modern feminist movement that had emerged in Israel in the early 1970s (Kaminer, 1996:82) and the international radical women’s movements, such as the women of Plaza de Mayo (Kaminer, 1996:82) influenced the innovative way in which they framed the prevailing realities. Whilst not all their members viewed themselves as feminists (Helman and Rapoport, 1997:683), they developed a very specific feminist framing of their protests (Shadmi, 2000: 25-26). First, the women expressed themselves through their bodies, standing in a

14 Sharoni (1995:13-14) notes however, that the feminism of the Palestinian and Israeli women are shaped by their particular contexts and must not be ignored through a generalised ‘sisterhood’ concept. This is a radical perspective which seeks to highlight the asymmetries between the Palestinians and Israelis and is reflective of the framing of the radical component in the next phase.
15 See Helman & Rapoport (1997) and Shadmi (2000) for personal accounts of the activities, role and trajectory of Nashim b’Shachor.
public, central area, which sought to challenge the traditional position of women as being reserved for
the private sphere; their physical presence in public areas blurred the distinction between the public
and private spheres. Second, they wore all black, partly as an expression of grief and also to renounce
the image of women as pure and angelic. Third, the constant presence at a particular time and place
exposed their protest to the many passers-by from different backgrounds. This mode of protest, the
ways in which the women framed themselves and their message through the use of particular symbols,
‘presented an alternative interpretation of the place of women in Israeli politics and society’ (Helman
and Rapoport, 1997:685). They succeeded in identifying the links between women’s issues and politics,
both local and international, thus ‘opening new possibilities for social and political mobilising’ (Sharoni,
1995:122). They also acted as a public ‘moral conscience’, ‘making it difficult for people, who [did] not
want to know, to not know’ (Hannah Safran in Diase, 1992:200). The reaction of the public to Nashim
b’Shachor, however, was much less welcoming than towards Arba Imahot and they were less able to
mobilise large numbers or contribute to government policy change.

These two cases clearly highlight the effect of framing and identity construction on the levels of
mobilisation and support and on the ability to impact policy change. Sharoni (1995:107-109) presents a
similar analysis, with similar conclusions, in her comparison between the two earlier women’s
movements, Horim/Imahot Neged Shtika (Parents /Mothers Against Silence) and Nashim Neged Plisha
l’Levanon (Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon).

3.2 EXPANDING AND RADICALISING THE REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

Demonstrations were the main form of activism employed in this phase, although there was
some innovation in the specific forms of protest, particularly by the radical component. Non-protest
based tactical repertoires were also developed, providing alternative avenues for individuals to become
involved in peace activism. A number of tactical innovations also emerged towards the end of this
phase, aiming to create change without having to influence the government.

3.2.1 DEMONSTRATIONS

In an effort to influence the mainstream Israeli public, Shalom Achshav was careful to employ
tactics that would be acceptable to the majority of Israelis. Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities
therefore became the main form of activity for Shalom Achshav, with an emphasis on keeping within the
legal framework of protest in Israel and avoiding overly confrontational signs or chants in order to
attract as many participants as possible (Bar-On, 1996:148). In instances where the actions of some
members of the demonstration became more confrontational, their moderate position and their
connections to Members of Knesset meant the response from the authorities was restrained and only a
cautionary tone was taken (Hall-Cathala, 1990:55).

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16 See Simons (2013b) for a study of Shalom Achshav’s use of political images for peace.
The actions of the radical groups were often more confrontational and during this phase they began to protest alongside Palestinians in Palestinian areas, which made them even more marginalised. Whilst their tactics were considered more confrontational, they still used protest as the core of their contentious activity but often more provocative than the liberal Zionist protest groups. Two examples highlight the protests of the radical groups. *HaVaad l'Solidariut im Bir Zeit* (The Committee for Solidarity with *Bir Zeit*) rallied alongside Palestinians and in solidarity against the collective closure enforced against the University of Bir Zeit and *HaShana HaEsrim V’Achat* held a solidarity protest outside one of the prisons, with a mass ‘camp-out’ of the activists (Bar-On, 1996:225). The concept of Israelis travelling to protest in ‘solidarity’ with Palestinians at the locations where the Palestinians were affected was a novel innovation in the protest formation. At this stage it was only sporadic but it became the main method of protesting of the radical groups in the mid to late-2000s.

### 3.2.2 NON-PROTEST BASED TACTICS

Whilst demonstrations had become the main method of voicing political contention in Israel, it was not the only tactic available to the peace movement. The groups that were focusing on different aspects or ways of solving the conflict, with alternative targets across the components, used different methods to achieve their goals, such as research and advocacy, ‘people-to-people’ activities and humanitarian aid, highlighting the link between collective action frames and tactical repertoires.

In 1990 *Shalom Achshav* established a ‘Settlement Watch’ project, with the aim of monitoring and reporting on settlement building in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Bar-On, 1996:267). This was a departure from their traditional method of mass mobilisation in demonstrations and enabled them to continue to operate and challenge the situation in periods where mass mobilisation was unlikely. This project continued and became the central activity of *Shalom Achshav* as participation dramatically declined in the 2000s.

Many of the groups that formed in the first phase of Israeli peace activism were intellectual groups that acted as informal think-thanks. In this phase, these groups developed into more formal, institutionalised organisations. For example, the *Merkaz Bneleumi l'Shalom b'haMizrach Hatichon* (International Centre for Peace in the Middle East (ICPME)) was established by some prominent members of the radical left, such as Avneri and Flapam, with the aim to provide more innovative approaches to solving the conflict, in order to push the debate and encourage the leaders to take more daring initiatives (Bar-On, 1996:189). During the first *Intifada*, as the need for a political solution became even clearer, two influential think-tanks involved in informal diplomacy emerged, aligned with the liberal Zionist component. The *Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information* (IPCRI) was founded in 1988 and, whilst direct causality cannot be established, many of the policy ideas that the organisation developed were included in the Oslo Declaration of Principles (Baskin in Bar-On, 1996:256). The

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17 The author was an intern and employee of IPCRI Sept 2009 – June 2010.
Economic Cooperation Foundation was established in 1990 by senior officials, including Dr Yair Hirschfeld, the initiator of the Oslo process.

A new element to the human rights component emerged in the first Intifada, providing humanitarian services to the Palestinians, in order to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians in the short term. Whilst they showed elements of solidarity with the Palestinians, they differed from the radical groups in that they also provided reports on the human rights situation in the occupied territories, provided services to Israelis and had more formal organisational structures. The groups tended to form along professional lines, using their skills in a particular service area to provide support for Palestinians. Examples include Imut (Mental Health Workers for the Advancement of Peace), a group of mental health professionals, providing services to those suffering mental illness and researching the psychological barriers to peace (Kaminer, 1996:143). They were criticised for taking a political position as psychologists however, they provided important services and brought new ideas into the discourse of the Israeli peace movement. Of particular importance was the work of Professor Stan Cohen, who put forward a theory of denial amongst Israeli society, based on the sense of ‘permanent victimhood’ of Jewish Israelis (Kaminer, 1996:145).

Rofim l’Zhuyot Adam (Physicians for Human Rights), a local branch of the International Non-Governmental Organisation, provided medical services in the territories where facilities were inadequate (PHR, [no date]); Rabanim l’maan Zchuyot haAdam (Rabbis for Human Rights), a group of Reform and Conservative Rabbis originally from the United States provided invaluable assistance to Palestinians in the territories (Kaminer, 1996:151) and Ossim Shalom (Doing Peace/ Social Workers for Peace and Welfare) felt that social work was political work and worked with individual communities providing support and using their professional expertise to promote welfare, peace and human rights (Sheffer, 2013). Kav l’Oved (Worker’s Hotline) was formed with the aim of providing legal aid to Palestinians from the territories who worked in Israel. They highlighted the frequent violations of workers’ rights. (Kaminer, 1996:184). Whilst not directly connected to the peace movement, the organisation can be linked to the way the human rights component challenged the first Intifada, since the prevailing realities caused further discrimination with many Palestinians losing their jobs within Israel due to the growing animosity. These groups ‘survived’ through the next phase of Israeli peace activism, continuing to provide services as a means to challenge the occupation.

The human rights organisations began to document and report on what was going on in the occupied territories, as a means of holding the government accountable. B’Tselem has provided regular reports on the situation in the occupied territories since its founding and has become a significant force in challenging the policies and practices of the Israeli authorities, laying the way for a number of other human rights groups to emerge. Another prominent human rights group founded in this phase was haVaad haZiburi Neged Inuyim (the Public Committee Against Torture (PCATI)). PCATI was established in response to allegations made by Palestinians about psychological and physical torture during Israeli

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19 See B’Tselem ([no date, b]) for their publications from 1989 to present.
interrogations (Cohen in Rosenwasser, 1992:165). PCATI, with the help of B’Tselem, undertook a special research project into Palestinian interrogations, which concluded that almost every prisoner they interviewed had been subjected to some form of torture. The report received an unprecedented amount of coverage, although a lot of criticism for defending Palestinian prisoners (Kaminer, 1996: 178-182).

When the Rabin government began to put forward, to some degree, the agenda that the peace movement was promoting, it became unclear for some what the purpose of the peace movement was. Some groups therefore shifted their activities to peace-building through ‘people to people’ activities, as part of the reconciliation process. These activities were based on the contact hypothesis, whereby contact with the ‘Other’ makes it harder to feel hatred or mistrust (Kuriansky, 2007; Hewston and Brown, 1986). Two basic tenets of ‘peace-building’ in this phase can be determined. Firstly, the aim was to meet the ‘Other’ on a personal level on the basis of a feeling that the ‘...fates [of Israelis and Palestinians] are intertwined’ (Veronika Cohen in Rosenwasser, 1992:24), but avoided talking about anything ‘political’ (Stolov, 2005). Secondly, the concept of ‘co-existence’ underlined many of the activities, with groups promoting co-existence through dialogue and getting to know each other.

One example is Hug Horim Shakulim (Parent’s Circle-Families Forum), which was set up by Yitzhak Frankenthal, a bereaved father, in 1994, as a support group for Israelis and Palestinians who had lost a child as a result of the conflict and to promote peace and coexistence (Hermann, 2009:142). The public perception of the group was mixed. On the one hand, the fact that parents whose children had been killed as a result of the conflict could meet and reconcile with the ‘Other’ showed that it was possible but, on the other hand, it was seen by some as abnormal and even unnatural (Hermann, 2009:143). Other examples include haMoatza Bein Dotit Meta’emet b’Yisrael (The Inter-religious Coordination Council in Israel), which aims to use religion as a positive force towards peace; Kav Adom (Red Line), which brought together Arabs and Jews from the Galilee; and Seeds of Peace, a youth encounter programme. Informal dialogue groups were also formed by individuals who had a desire to meet with the ‘Other’. Towards the end of this phase people-to-people activities were the most prolific form of peace activity and were supported by the two governments but, as the situation in the occupied territories failed to improve, dialogue often turned into action (Bardin, 2012).

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21 The contact hypothesis takes a psychological approach to reconciliation and involves individuals in conflict meeting each other and getting to know each other on an equal footing, based on the belief that, ‘it is much harder to hate the people you really know’ (Kuriansky, 2007:1-2).

22 See Bardin (2012) for an account of his participation in dialogue and solidarity activities with Palestinians in the West Bank.
3.2.3 TACTICAL INNOVATIONS

A number of tactical innovations were seen in the radical component towards the mid to late 1990s, particularly when Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister. These innovations were different attempts to create change without appealing to the government, which was not receptive to the ideas they were promoting.

3.2.3.1 Non-violent direct action

The peace movement had been criticised in the past for not taking risks and for not being able to provide practical measures to counter the right-wing opposition. In particular, *Shalom Achshav* was criticised for ‘not [being] willing to pay for change’ (Nabila Espanoli in Rosenwasser, 1992:150). Towards the end of this phase of Israeli peace activism, when the government was actively carrying out steps to undermine the Oslo peace process, the radical component employed tactics that went beyond traditional demonstrations and began using practical acts of solidarity to challenge the occupation at the place of the violations, a tactic known as non-violent direct action. This mode of action, whilst on a small scale during this period, increased in scope as the violations increased overtime.

House demolitions, in particular, became a significant rallying point for direct action. A joint newspaper advertisement signed by *Bat Shalom* (Daughter of Peace), *Gush Shalom*, *Shalom Achshav* and *Meretz* against the perceived government campaign of house demolitions created the basis for the creation of the *haVaad haYisraeli Neged Harisat Batim* (Israel Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD)), which carried out a number of actions in the late 1990s (The Other Israel, 1996a:6). Activists employed ‘direct action’ by protesting in front of the Palestinian houses that had received demolition orders, in some cases helping to rebuild the Palestinian homes following the demolitions.23 This group remained active throughout the 2000s and 2010s. In this phase, the distinction in tactics between the components is less clear and the core, radical fringe of *Shalom Achshav* was involved in going to West Bank demonstrations and engaging in non-violent direct action (Golan, 2013). However, this was not their main method of challenging the situation and promoting peace.

3.2.3.2 Boycott

Boycotting became a tactic of *Gush Shalom*, developed from the ideas of *HaShana HaEsrim V’Achat*. This tactic became more significant and widespread in the 2000s and 2010s, highlighting the role of the radical component as norm entrepreneurs. They initiated a call to the Israeli public to refrain from buying products that were produced in the Israeli settlements within the West Bank or Gaza Strip (Avneri, 1997:7). This coincided with the start of the international boycott movement, as a means of pressuring the Netanyahu government into halting settlement construction and implementing the Oslo agreements. However, even amongst the peace movement, the idea of a boycott was not wide spread.

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23 See The Other Israel (1997a, 1997b) for examples of some of the activities organised by ICAHD in this period.
and was a highly controversial issue since it ‘introduces the breaking of ethnic ranks, [and shows a] refusal to regard the struggle between peace seekers and settlers as ‘a family quarrel among Jews’ (The Other Israel, 1998:12), as the peace activists are treating the settlers as the enemy, rather than working with them to overcome their problems, as members of the same ‘ethnic rank’.

3.3 EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING MOBILISATION STRUCTURES

Mobilising structures were also divided along the three components. The radical and liberal Zionist components used their informal networks and grassroots social movement organisations from the previous phase from which to draw support. The human rights component accessed new mobilising structures, in particular along professional lines. Of significance for all components were the expatriate networks, particularly those from North America, academic networks, professional networks and students. In this phase all three components targeted the Israeli public and government. The movement as a whole fluctuated between periods of unity and coordination and periods of disunity and dispersal, depending on both external and internal developments.

The liberal Zionist component’s primary target audience was the mainstream public and Shalom Achshav developed the material, human and moral resources to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public, more than had been seen previously, with hundreds of thousands drawn to the streets for different demonstrations in the early 1980s (Hermann, 2009:92). Furthermore, it actively sought to mobilise previously immobilised or unconnected members of the Israeli public, through publicity campaigns. As such, it became the ‘face’ of the Israeli peace movement amongst the Israeli public, with the peace movement and Shalom Achshav often being treated as one and the same thing. Shalom Achshav feared that the emergence of new groups would lead to a splintering of the peace movement, increasing competition and reducing the potential for mass participation in their demonstrations. They therefore made efforts to communicate and coordinate with the smaller groups, particularly those that reached out to sectors of Israeli society that they were unable to (Bar-On, 1996:168-9). In this sense it acted as a centralising organisation, as is often witnessed in social movements (Smith, Pagnucco and Chatfield, 1997:64).

A distinguishing mobilising structure of the radical components was the formation of committees or ad hoc coalitions, particularly in instances when then wanted to focus on a particular campaign. There was a realisation that if there was an issue that the different groups could rally over together, their mobilisation potential would be greater. Two committees emerged in the first years of this phase, HaVaad l’Solidariut im Bir Zeit and HaVaad Neged haMilchama b’Levanon (The Committee Against the War in Lebanon), bringing together activists from across the radical components in support of these issues. Dai l’Kibush (Enough of the Occupation/End the Occupation) was formed out of activists from across the spectrum of the radical groups and was a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee. It set the bar of intense activities during the first year of the Intifada, holding weekly vigils protesting the brutality of the Israeli response to the Intifada and conducting visits to villages, refugee camps and hospitals in the
territories, in acts of solidarity (Kaminer, 1996:50-51). The radical collective action frames and tactics opened the possibility for Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel to join this committee (Bar-On, 1996:224).

The human rights component tended to be built out of those who had been active in the liberal Zionist component but were looking for different avenues from which to challenge the situation. For example, some of those who set up B’Tselem had come from Shalom Achshav but wanted to focus on the human rights violations or refuseniks joining Yesh Gvul. The emergence of new groups is typical in a cycle of contention (Tarrow, 2011) and opened up avenues for new participants to be mobilised.

During the first half of this phase, all components of the movement were mainly characterised by horizontal, voluntary groups, with decisions made through consensus. The movement as a whole was rich in human resources, particularly individuals skilled in public relations, which helped the groups achieve media attention (Hermann, 2009). As the phase continued there was an increase in professionalization and institutionalisation amongst the groups, particularly alongside the increase in international interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the late 1980s and therefore an increase in the flow of funding to the region. Shalom Achshav took on paid staff after a period of deliberation over whether this might compromise its grassroots focus and consensus-orientated decision making (Golan, 2013). A higher proportion of the budget of the peace organisations became directed towards salaries as opposed to funding activities (Hermann, 2002:114) and the peace movement received the criticism of becoming a ‘peace industry,’ with activists ‘benefitting’ from the conflict. Many of the new grassroots groups that emerged in the 2000s were particularly critical of this development in the peace movement (Neiman, 2013). Contrary to the conclusion of Kaminer (1996:217), who believed that the increased institutionalisation of the Israeli peace movement brought an increase in knowledge and tools that enabled it to reach out to a wide support base, Hermann (2002:114) argues that the institutionalisation of peace groups in the 1990s actually led to a decline in their grassroots support, due to centralisation of power within the organisation.

3.3.1 GENDER DYNAMICS AND MOBILISING STRUCTURES

With the emergence of a women’s peace movement, the role of gender in the Israeli peace movement became apparent. Gender had a clear impact on the mobilisation structures. Many of the women who built the independent women’s groups had been previously active in the mixed-gender groups. However, they argued that the Israeli peace movement was guilty of reproducing the unequal gender dynamics of Israeli society, with women often doing the menial work within the peace organisations, whilst the men held the leadership positions,

‘Women became marginal in their own organisations, forced to deal with trivial matters rather than decision making. Women felt that within the framework of ‘mixed organisations’ they were stifled’ (Ostrowitz in Micalef, 1992:238).
This therefore led some of the women to decide to build their own independent women’s movement.

A particularly distinctive nature of the women’s peace movement, compared with the Israeli peace movement at large, was the level of cooperation amongst the different groups (Kaminer, 1996: 96), due to their ability to put aside ideological differences and act based on shared experiences as women (Sharoni, 1995). A number of women’s networks and coalitions formed, including *Shani-Nashim Neged hakibush* (Women against the Occupation) and *RESHET* (Israeli Women’s Peace Net). The willingness of the women’s groups to cooperate and sometimes share resources enabled it to become stronger than if the individual groups acted alone.

A further mobilising ability particular to the women’s movement was the high level of interaction, cooperation and solidarity they had with Palestinian women, directly connected to their framing. This was seen in the involvement of Israel and Palestinian women in international conferences and the founding of an umbrella organisation *Nashim v’Shalom* (Women and Peace) to coordinate between the different Israeli and Palestinian women’s groups (Sharoni, 1997:117).

### 3.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

In the late 1980s, the international community became more involved in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, in coordination with the Oslo agreements, invested money into the various peace activities, particularly the organisations that involved cooperation or dialogue with Palestinians (Dajani and Baskin, 2006:87). The increase in funding gave the organisations the opportunity to expand both their organisational structures and their activities, enabling them to reach out to more members of the public. In some instances, the involvement of international organisations went deeper, with the funders directly influencing the organisational and operating structures of the organisations they funded (Hermann, 2002:114). For example, *Bat Shalom* was formally established in 1994 as a feminist group and is the Israeli side of the Israeli-Palestinian Jerusalem Link Women’s Joint Venture for Peace. It benefitted financially from foreign funding but was required to build its organisational structures and modes of action based on recommendations from the donors, resulting in professional structures with paid staff (Hermann, 2006:50), thus losing some of their autonomy as grassroots activists.

Whilst international funding may have aided mobilisation and improved the efficiency of the organisations, due to the strict target requirements of the funders, foreign funding also helped cause fragmentation within the peace movement in this period, with smaller groups unable to compete with the larger, more developed organisations for the available funding (Hermann, 2002:115). One organisation that received a significant amount of criticism from the smaller organisations was *Merkaz Peres l’Shalom* (Peres Centre for Peace), which was set up by former Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

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24 Between 1993 and 2000 $26 million was given by international donors to people-to-people activities (Dajani and Baskin (2006:95).
during the Oslo process, and managed to raise significant amount of funds. Much of the international funding that the smaller groups had received was redirected to the centre (Hermann, 2009: 150-153).

3.3.3 THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA

After the 1973 war the media was more open to criticising and holding the government to account than before and therefore made more effort to document the Israeli peace movement (Mann, 2015), which assisted in its ability to mobilise the Israeli public. For example, it was due to the positive and widespread response of the media to the campaign of Arba Imahot that the group was able to mobilise participants and influence public opinion and government policy in Lebanon (Lieberfeld, 2009a:318). A number of groups also paid for weekly advertisements in national newspapers in order to spread their ideas, Gush Shalom being a prominent example. Hermann (2009:161) notes that the media in the second half of the 1990s lost interest in most of the peace activities, as the activities became less news-worthy and as Israelis became less interested in alternative views to the mainstream, which arguably contributed to the beginnings of the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist component.

Israeli peace activists began to use the Internet as a mobilisation tool, as well as a tactical repertoire, in order ‘to find ways to circumvent the negative effects of dissipating interest of the media and the decreasing level of grassroots participation in protest activities’ (Hermann, 2009:162). The internet is argued to help facilitate collective action by assisting in mobilising individuals and making them aware of what is going on by distributing resources (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003; Bennet 2003). It also connects people who cannot meet physically, which became particularly useful as the restriction of movement for Palestinians increased (Hermann, 2009:162). However, Hermann (2009:162) also notes that shifting to attempts at online mobilisation can actually inhibit the mobilisation of participants and increase the isolation of the activists, as online forums often only involve those who are already active and the general public is no longer confronted by flyers and billboards. However, if used alongside traditional methods of disseminating information and mobilisation, the internet can be used to expand mobilising structures and enable the rapid dissemination of information. The peace movement in Israel was quick to make use of the new technological resources that became available to them in the late 1990s (Hermann, 2009:162).

Initially, alternative media centres developed, beginning with a basic website Ariga (Weave) as early as 1995, which was founded by a veteran journalist in Israel and as of January 1997 claimed to reach an estimated audience of 5,000 people (Ariga, 1998). Other websites include, The MidEast Web for Coexistence, with the aim to ‘weave a world-wide web of Arabs, Jews and others who want to build a new Middle East based on coexistence and neighbourly relations’ (MidEast Web, [no date]). On the more radical spectrum, Gush Shalom had an active discussion forum on their website (Hara and Shachaf, 2008) and Indymedia Israel was set up in 1999, as one of the autonomous local outlets of the Independent Media Centre, which grew out of the global justice movement’s coverage and reports on
various social injustices and social movements (Morris, 2004:326). This is one of the first examples of the connection of radical peace groups in Israel to the transnational anti-globalisation movement.

3.3.4 COORDINATION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT

At the beginning of this phase the peace movement was characterised as a diverse, yet coordinated movement, with the different components mobilising together and seeking to influence the mainstream Israeli public, for example in response to the continuation of the Lebanon War (Kaminer, 1996:40). However, the way in which the groups framed other events such as the first Intifada, the Gulf War and the Oslo Agreements, led to instances of fragmentation in the movement but, they were able to rally together on other occasions to promote ‘two states for two peoples’.

The relationship between the radical component and Shalom Achshav with respect to coordinated mobilisation was more complex. Activists within the radical component often criticised Shalom Achshav for their hesitancy in responding to certain events, such as the Lebanon War and the first Intifada (Bar-On, 1996:148). The radical groups therefore mobilised their own networks independently of Shalom Achshav. On occasion, some activists from within Shalom Achshav would join these radical groups when they felt that Shalom Achshav were too hesitant or even set up splinter groups, such as Yesh Gvul (Bar-On, 1996:148-49). The radical component was also seen at the rallies of Shalom Achshav in this phase, albeit with their own banners and chanting their own, more confrontational slogans (Hermann, 2009:109). However, during the Oslo period, such coordination between the radical and the liberal Zionist components was less common as the ideological positions became incompatible. In the next phase, the radical component began to actively refuse to join the liberal Zionist activities (Neiman, 2013). Their absence was often welcomed by the liberal Zionist activists, who argued that their confrontational approach gave the peace movement a bad name.

3.4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION

The election of the first right-wing government in Israel’s history in 1977 provided the opportunity for a mass movement to emerge from the individual attempts of peace activism that had been operating previously. The three components each perceived and experienced the political opportunities of this phase differently, highlighting three cycles of contention. However, at certain points, particularly in coordinating in favour of peace agreements, the cycles converged. The liberal Zionist component was most sensitive to the prevailing political opportunity structures, given their desire to mobilise the public and influence the government. The radical groups were less concerned with changes and continued to operate despite unfavourable conditions, creating a spiral of opportunities for themselves, which is where the perception of one opportunity to mobilise and the collective action that follows, leads to the perception of further opportunities to mobilise and so on. The human rights component emerged directly from a shift in the political opportunity structures during the first Intifada but formed their own trajectory in the period following. Given these differences, certain
changes in the political opportunity structures were more or less significant depending on how they were perceived by each component.

3.4.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: SENSITIVE TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

3.4.1.1 Public opinion

The framing of Shalom Achshav was directly linked to their strategy of mass mobilisation. Shalom Achshav aimed to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public and therefore they had to be sensitive to the prevailing mood of the public at large (Bar-On, 1996:101). Their ability or decision to organise a demonstration, in response to a certain event or the actions or inaction of the Israeli government, was therefore determined by whether they would be able to mobilise large numbers. They were careful to stay within the legal boundaries of protest, in order not to discourage potential individuals from participating and to gain some legitimacy amongst the authorities. It should be noted that whilst Shalom Achshav was able to mobilise the largest amount of participants within the peace movement, due to its ability to resonate with the mainstream Israeli public, it was still marginalised amongst Israeli society as a whole and experienced much opposition.

3.4.1.2 The government

Given the desire for the liberal Zionist component to influence the government, it tended to be impacted by changes in the government. However, the changes that occurred within the Israeli peace movement in response to or alongside the changes in the government are not fully explained by the political process model, suggesting the need for greater nuance when approaching the relationship between a social movement and the government.

Firstly, the perception of an opportunity in the political opportunity structures is argued to play an important role in leading to the emergence of a cycle of contention (Tarrow, 2011). However, in this case, it was actually the shrinking of the political opportunity structures with respect to the government that enabled a movement to develop, which marks the beginning of the second phase of the Israeli peace movement and a new cycle of contention. In 1977 Israel witnessed the first defeat of an Avoda government and the election of the right wing Likud (Consolidation)-led government. The increased levels of concern for the stalling of the new government with respect to peace with Egypt provided a suitable impetus for protest, with the peace movement situated firmly in opposition and able to criticise and pressure the new government (Hall-Cathala, 1990:16). This, combined with the internal developments of the previous phase, explains how the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism matured into a movement.

Secondly, in cases where the agenda of a social movement is facilitated by the government, it is argued that the movement tends to demobilise, since they are no longer needed (Tarrow, 2011:190). For example, when the Declaration of Principles was signed in 1993, which attempted to set a framework that would form the basis of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the peace movement had
achieved their goal since the government was putting forward, at least in general, a similar agenda to the one that the peace movement had been promoting. In Israel, many within the liberal Zionist component therefore argued that the role of the movement in promoting peace had become obsolete (Bar-On, 1996:299). However, despite some promotion of similar goals, the government may not be fully implementing their obligations. This was the case in Israel, where the government was stalling in implementing their side of the agreements. In such a case, a movement is faced with a dilemma; whether to mobilise or not. In Israel, despite the agreements not moving forward as they had wanted, the liberal Zionist component felt that vocalising criticism at this point would undermine the government which was moving forward with a peace process. Furthermore they did not want to associate themselves with the government, since the negative perception of the peace movement may have harmed the image of the government.

Members of the liberal Zionist component decided not to publicly criticise the government, although some privately met with Rabin to voice their concerns (Golan, 2013). In this situation, according to the political process model, the political opportunity structures were open, since Meretz, the political party closest to the liberal Zionist peace movement was a senior partner in the coalition. However, other factors meant that the liberal Zionist component of the peace movement were unable to publicly question the government or try to influence their policies, even when it strayed from their agenda. This suggests that access to elites does not, in all cases, make the opportunities greater for a social movement to mobilise and have an influence on government policy. In some instances it seems that if the movement becomes too close to the government it can paralyse its ability to challenge the government for fear of undermining it and strengthening the opposition, which is viewed as a worse scenario.

The election of Barak and his Yisrael Ahot (One Israel) government in 1999 provides a further example. The liberal Zionist component did not perceive an opportunity to mobilise since they believed that Barak, with his commitment to renew peace negotiations and his celebrated military career, was the man to fulfil what Rabin had started (Hermann, 2009:174-5). Some members of the peace movement were willing to overlook Barak’s ‘courtship of the settlers’ as long as the peace process was moving forward (Keller, 1999:11). This was a similar situation as when Rabin came to power, where the peace movement questioned both the necessity and effectiveness of demonstrating when the government was promoting their ideas, at least in general.

Overall therefore, the liberal Zionist component tended to feel more confident when a right-wing government was in power since they were free to criticise them. For example, the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 created a new impetus for action for the liberal Zionist component of the peace movement (Hermann, 2009:143). In the wake of the death of the first Israeli Prime Minister to seriously pursue peace with the Palestinians, the opportunities were expanded for the liberal Zionist peace movement to mobilise the public to ensure that the peace process was not derailed. Many of the liberal Zionist peace activists who had been quiet in the past two years took to the
streets, in part because of the guilt placed on them that they had not done anything to counter the ‘hate camp’ that had been emerging against Rabin (Hermann, 2009:144). Mishmarot haShalom (Guards of Peace) and Dor Shalom (Peace Generation) emerged to protect the peace process and counter those who were against it.

3.4.1.3 The international dimension

The effect of the Gulf War on the trajectory of the Israeli peace activism points to important theoretical implications with respect to the relationship between international political opportunity structures and a domestic social movement. Similar dynamics can be identified in the following phase of Israeli peace activism, which will help to shed light on the theoretical approach to the international arena.

Although the peace movement peaked in the late 1980s and had developed and strengthened its internal mechanisms and resources, the Gulf crisis and then the Gulf War in 1991 almost immediately closed the political opportunity structures to liberal Zionist peace activism, causing the movement to become paralysed. The liberal Zionist component decided to ally itself with the US version of the situation and argued that Saddam Hussein was a significant threat to Israel. Shalom Achshav believed that certain threats must be dealt with by military means (Bar-On, 1996:280) and therefore did not protest against the war. They also understood that whilst missiles were landing in Israel, the possibilities for peace activities were remote, primarily because during periods of direct threat, Israeli citizens tend to unite under the national consensus. The lack of condemnation of the war from Shalom Achshav caused a number of schisms between the liberal Zionist groups and other peace actors, particularly the radical component of the peace movement and international peace movements (Bar-On, 1996:280).

The perceived and actual responses from the Palestinians to the Gulf War had the effect of deepening the fear and mistrust of Israelis towards Palestinians, which further affected the peace movement. The PLO showed support and sympathy for the position of Iraq (Kaminer, 1996:189), even Palestinian ‘friends’ of the peace movement, Faisal Husseini and Sari Nusseibeh, expressed their sympathy with the Iraqi predicament (Bar-On, 1996: 272). Whilst Shalom Achshav did attempt to continue as normal with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order that the issue would not be forgotten in the midst of changing realities (Kaminer, 1996:201), in the eyes of the Israeli public, this was not the time to be speaking with the ‘enemy.’ Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein reinforced the scepticism that many Israelis had towards the real intentions of the Palestinians. This sentiment was deepened when the media exaggerated reports that Palestinians were ‘dancing on rooftops’ as Scud missiles were launched towards Israel (Bar-On, 1996:282; Kaminer, 1996:202).

3.4.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: CONTINUOUSLY CRITICAL

For the radical component of Israeli peace activism, the way in which they framed the origins of the conflict often enabled it to act in times when the liberal Zionists remained silent. They were
interested in influencing the government but felt confrontation was needed and therefore continued acting according to their ideological perspectives and framing of the situation, no matter the prevailing political opportunity structures. This allowed them to act as agenda-setters, rather than be hesitant and solely reactive. Furthermore, growing international interest in the conflict, in part because of the repressive response to the first intifada from the Israeli authorities, led to increased funding and media attention to peace activities in Israel, which strengthened the mobilising structures of the groups. Also, as protest became routinized, new and innovative methods of contentious activities were developed in order to achieve greater visibility and groups were organised along new dimensions, which enabled more personal paths for political involvement (Kaminer, 1996:48).

The influence of the radical left on Shalom Achshav can in part be explained through the theoretical explanation that ‘early risers’ have the effect of triggering ‘processes of diffusion, extension, imitation and reaction’ among other parts of a social movement (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:205). The acceptance of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians by Shalom Achshav and their proposal of a two-state solution found its origins in the radical groups. This is explained by social movement theory whereby,

‘Old organisations do not necessarily give way to new ones in the course of a cycle, many exiting organisations adopt the radical tactics of their competitors and adjust their discourse into a broader, more aggressive public stance’ (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:205)

3.4.2.1 The government

The relationship between the radical component and the Israeli governments in this phase was less complicated as their framing meant that in general they were continuously critical of the actions of the governments and would continue to confront them until the aspirations of the Palestinians were realised and their suffering, as a result of the occupation, ended. The radical component did initially question their purpose when the Rabin government came to power with a policy of peace (Zilversmidt, 1994:3) but, their framing of the situation reflected a rejection of the content of the Oslo agreements and therefore they had an impetus and ability to criticise the government for the imbalanced nature of the agreements.

The radical component also questioned the actions of Barak from the start of his election with ‘the atmosphere of optimism, good will and high expectations that followed Barak’s election…wiped out overnight…the nickname ‘Barakyahu’ [referencing Netanyahu] quickly became a byword’ (Keller and Zilversmidt, 1999:1). They argued that Barak’s plans to annex the big settlement blocs to Israel would cut the Palestinian territory into ‘disconnected enclaves, making a mockery of the statehood and sovereignty which Barak [was] supposedly ready to offer the Palestinians’ (Keller and Zilversmidt, 1999:5). They therefore did perceive an opportunity and necessity to mobilise against the government.
Whilst, in the general, the successive Israeli governments of this phase and the Israeli political system were not repressive towards peace activism and were more accepting than previously to extra-parliamentary activism, the radical groups were sometimes the targets of government repression, restricting their ability to organise activities and implement their strategies. The authorities were not willing to allow voices that stepped over a certain line, particularly those who promoted anti-Zionist ideas or liaised too closely with the Palestinians (Warschawski, 2002). HaMerkaz l’Informatzia Alternativit (The Alternative Information Centre), a joint Israeli-Palestinian organisation, experienced such repression from the authorities. It was closed by Israeli authorities and the Director of the centre was arrested, under the threat that, ‘if you want to work with them [Palestinians], you will be treated exactly the way they are’ (Warschawski cited in Rosenwasser, 1992:157).

3.4.2.2 The international dimension

The radical component continued their activities against the occupation and presented an anti-war voice during the Gulf War, which placed them apart from the liberal Zionist component and even more marginalised from the Israeli public. They argued that the Gulf War simply proved that the Israeli peace camp, referring to the liberal Zionist component, was not a ‘true peace movement’ or a ‘true human rights movement,’ since they only saw human rights and self-determination as a means to achieve their values of security, Zionism and Jewishness (Warschawski in Rosenwasser, 1992:226-250). This further highlights that the radical component were continuously critical, tending to continue to operate and push their agenda even when the prevailing realities were unfavourable to the ideas they were presenting.

3.4.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: EMERGING FROM A SHIFT IN THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

During the first Intifada, the Israeli peace movement reached its peak in terms of numbers of organisations and groups that were active, the intensity of their activities, the variety of tactical repertoires, the diverse forms of mobilising structures, the attention that was given to it by the international media and the division in ideological perspectives (Hermann, 2002). Alongside the proliferation in groups, cleavages within the peace movement were deepened during the Intifada (Kaufman, 1988:77), with a number of smaller organisations finding different ideological paths to base their activism on or innovative tactics to employ.

The first Intifada was also perceived as an opportunity for alternative ways of challenging the situation to emerge, since the authorities were preoccupied with dealing with the first Intifada and the public were more open to alternative perspectives on the emerging events (Hermann, 2009:98), and led to the emergence of the human rights component. The human rights organisations became an integral part of

See Hermann (2002:105) for a graphical representation of this dramatic increase in the emergence of new peace groups.
the peace movement, broadening its remit and providing tangible and credible data to justify political protests. The work of *B’Tselem* was particularly significant for the peace movement in Israel during the first Intifada. It brought to the attention of the public, media and authorities the extent of human rights violations in the territories and provided something tangible for the peace movement to present to the public as a mobilising resource (Kaminer, 1996:178).

A debate emerged within the *B’Tselem* over whether to publish its reports in English and disseminate them abroad. Some felt that it was one thing to criticise your own government but quite another to provide ‘propaganda ammunition’ to enemies by ‘washing your dirty linen’ abroad (Kaminer, 1996:177). Despite the potential to further turn public opinion away from the organisation, developments in the international arena encouraged the human rights movement to continue their efforts. For example, in April 1988, Amnesty International held a global tour to promote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United States focused in particular on ‘human rights’ abuses in criticising Israeli policy towards the first Intifada (Kaminer, 1996:174). These factors highlight the influence the international dimension can have on a domestic social movement, either through diffusion of ideology and tactics from transnational social movements, or due to the opinions and rhetoric of the international community aligning with those of the social movement.

The tactics of the human rights component were also affected by shifting political opportunity structures and perceptions of them. The Intifada had a direct effect on some of the tactics employed. In the first instance, building on its foundations from the Lebanon war, *Yesh Gvul* found a specific method with which to resist the occupation, which was selective refusal to serve in the occupied territories (Kaminer, 1996:64). The repression of the Intifada led to a situation in which individuals marked a difference between ‘legitimate’ duties of the IDF in defending Israel and her citizens and ‘unacceptable’ assignments in the occupied territories (Kidron, 2004: 55). The concept behind the movement was ‘individual choice-collective support’ (Kaminer, 1996:72), whereby the movement understood the difficult decision that is involved in refusing to serve yet, once the decision had been made, they would provide full backing. During the Intifada they expanded their activities to publications to raise awareness of the motivations behind selective refusal. Close to 200 reservists were jailed, with even more refusing (Kidron, 2004:23).

Overall, the groups that comprised the human rights component experienced changes in political opportunity structures differently, based on the type of activity. The human rights groups and professional groups were able to maintain continuous activities, since they were dealing with the effects of the Israeli occupation. The refusal movement continuously supported conscientious objection but their numbers often increased in times of conflict, such as the first Intifada (Kidron, 2004).

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26 Not all of the human rights group would accept that they come under the umbrella of the Israeli peace movement, arguing that they are simply part of the human rights movement. However, the Israeli public tended to treat them as part of the peace movement and ‘human rights’ became an issue of the political left.
The international political opportunity structures shifted again following the Gulf War and created opportunities for the Israeli government to take-up the ideas of the Israeli peace movement and turn it into policy, highlighting how international political opportunity structures can affect a domestic social movement. The regional and global changes that resulted from the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the Bush administration pushing for a new world order that was void of violent regional conflicts (Hermann, 2009:107). This led to the Madrid conference in 1991, a multilateral peace conference between Arab countries and Israel, mediated by the United States. A ‘Terms of Reference’ was drawn up and a decision was made to continue discussions. This caused the Israeli right-wing parties to pull out of the coalition leading to the collapse of the government and a call for new elections in Israel. An Avoda coalition government, with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister was elected. The government made peace its main goal and in August 1993 the ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DOP) were signed and the following month the Oslo framework was adopted. It seemed that after decades of activism the peace movement had achieved its goals and therefore especially for the liberal-Zionist component, there was less need to come out to demonstrate.

During the Camp David summit between Barak, Arafat and Clinton in 2000, the political opportunity structures were temporarily opened to groups across all three components, with Barak issuing an appeal to the peace movement asking them ‘not to abandon the streets to the right-wingers’ (Barak in Keller, 2000a:10). This led the components to join together under the banner of Mate Tnuot haShalom (Peace Movement Headquarters). Whilst the radical groups may have been more critical and sceptical of Barak’s motives, they found common ground to rally with the liberal Zionist groups, mainly a desire to see the summit reach a successful conclusion, although ‘successful’ may have had different interpretations amongst the groups (Keller, 2000a:10). However, as news of the failure of the summit reached the peace movement, the opportunity for cooperation between the components was closed. According to long-time activist Adam Keller, as soon as they heard Barak’s press conference where he placed the blame entirely on Arafat,

‘It became obvious that, at least for the immediate future, the time had come for a parting of ways [of those involved in the Peace Headquarters]; the Peace Headquarters had been built on the assumption that Barak would return with a peace agreement, around which moderates and radicals could unite in further campaigning.’ (Keller, 2000a:12).

Without a peace agreement, with the Israeli public accepting Barak’s rhetoric that there was no partner for peace and the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Israeli peace movement splintered with the various groups responding to and experiencing the shifting political opportunity structures differently. This led to the polarisation and fragmentation between the components of the peace movement. This

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27 It must be noted that Barak was not in general sympathetic to the peace movement (Hermann, 2009:177).
polarisation, which is common to social movements, made it extremely difficult for the components to rally together, marking the start of the next phase of Israeli peace activism, ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism: three cycles of contention’. The liberal Zionist component continued to demobilise, the human rights component maintained their challenges and the radical component experienced a new cycle of contention.

4 IMPLICATIONS

During these first two phases of Israeli peace activism individual attempts at promoting peace with Israel’s Arab neighbours morphed into a mass movement that begun to promote the concept of a two-state solution. Some key characteristics of each component developed, as well as the dynamics between them, which will act as points of comparison for the next phase of Israeli peace activism. Some interesting theoretical implications also emerged from this overview of Israeli peace activism from 1967 to 2000.

The liberal Zionist component evolved and expanded from its emergence in the first phase of Israeli peace activism. They developed more complex collective action frames, based on the initial concept of ‘land for peace’ and evolving to ‘two states for two peoples.’ From the first Intifada they began to recognise the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people but experienced showed that framing the message of peace activism as upholding the future of Israel was more likely to achieve mobilisation than calling for negotiations with the PLO. They aimed to build mass mobilisation beginning with informal networks and expanding to the general public through publicity campaigns but made sure they did not present overly confrontational views or tactics in order to have greater resonance with the Israeli public. They built a repertoire of contention that became gradually more accepted by Israeli society as extra-parliamentary activity became more common, focusing on demonstrations and vigils in Israeli towns and cities, with some more radical members meeting with Palestinians and conducting actions in the West Bank. Overall they were very sensitive to the prevailing political opportunity structures, since they did not want to present positions that were too far ahead of the Israeli public and wanted to influence the government and support it when it was on the path to peace. This meant that the activists were often hesitant to be critical in order not to antagonise their targets.

The radical component on the other hand was constantly critical of the prevailing realities. From the beginning of their activism they recognised the PLO and met with Palestinian officials. They tended to present ‘peace’ out of moral concerns for the Palestinians, placing them at the centre of both the causes and solutions to the conflict. Their tactics gradually became more confrontational, developing some key innovations that became more prominent in the third phase of Israeli peace activism. In particular, their role as norm entrepreneurs was highlighted through the introduction of ‘boycott’ as a means to challenge the occupation. They also began with informal networks but were able to include Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel amongst their networks. Overall they were less sensitive to the political opportunity structures. Whilst they were, in these phases, interested in influencing the Israeli public and government, they did not moderate their positions in order to do this. This meant they continued to
operate even when the public and government were not willing to accept their ideas or were hostile towards them.

The human rights component emerged in the second phase, in response to the first Intifada, recognising that the uprising required different responses than the liberal Zionist and the radical components had been presenting. They developed collection action frames that focused on revealing and reporting on the realities and policies of the occupation. The conscientious objectors did not want to be part of these policies and therefore refused to serve, in doing so highlighting what was happening on the ground. The human rights organisations became particularly prominent and laid the foundations of a growing human rights movement in the following phase. The tactics in the human rights component were reflective of the particular identity they developed, allowing for innovation in the repertoire of contention, such as the provision of humanitarian services to the Palestinians. Many of these organisations and groups were formed by activists who had been previously active but wanted a different way to challenge the situation. The human rights component, although they emerged from a change in the political opportunity structures, took a similar trajectory to the radical component, continuously being confrontation and reacting to changes in the situation, no matter the state of Israeli public opinion or the nature of the government.

Key dynamics between the components can be identified across these two phases. In general the radical groups were more confrontational, developing more innovative collective action frames and tactics than the liberal Zionist component. Whilst causality cannot be determined, the radical component can be defined as norm entrepreneurs, since ideas that originated amongst them diffused into the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism, which mobilised the public to pressure the government into making those ideas policy. The liberal Zionist component throughout these phases was not far behind the radical component, tending to take-up the positions and tactics of the radical component when they felt the moment was ripe, such as recognising the PLO and meeting with Palestinians. The human rights component that emerged in the first Intifada specialised in revealing the realities of the occupation and holding the government of Israel accountable for its policies and actions, providing new avenues to challenge the prevailing realities and therefore also pushing the agenda of Israeli peace activism.

Despite experiencing different cycles of contention in the second phase of Israeli peace activism, the components converged in support of the peace agreements. However slow developments with the peace agreements and the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 led to the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism and marked a new phase, ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism: three cycles of contention.’

In outlining and explaining the characteristics of Israeli peace activism prior to 2000, this chapter has unearthed some interesting theoretical implications. Firstly, that the connection between international political opportunity structures and a domestic social movement requires further theorisation and will be explored in Chapter 7. Secondly, the particular role of gender dynamics in the powers of movement was given more attention than conventionally done so in social movement theory and will continue to
be explored within each of the following chapters. Thirdly, complexities in the relationship between the government and the peace movement were discovered, particularly in the second phase of the peace movement. Similar dynamics can be identified in the following phase, requiring some refinements to the political process model and will be explored further in Chapter 7.

Having laid out some of the key elements and dynamics in the history of Israeli peace activism, it is now possible to delve into Israeli peace activism post 2000: ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of the Israeli peace movement; three cycles of contention’.
CHAPTER 4
BEYOND PARALYSIS: A NEW FRAMING OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter approaches Israeli peace activism through ‘framing’ which refers to the underlying collective action frames and framing processes that highlight and account for the ideas, beliefs, problem identification and solutions of the groups and organisations. In looking at the collective action frames and framing processes, this chapter will provide a detailed study of the meaning work that Israeli activists are engaged in, unearthing a different angle from which to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism from those focused on external factors. Furthermore, it adds to the literature on the framing perspective, in particular by providing a dynamic approach that looks at transformations in the collective action frames through framing processes rather than a static approach, which has been subject to much criticism by frame analysis theorists (Snow and Benford, 2000; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Benford, 1997).

As argued by Kaminer (1996), it was the pressure of the ‘small wheel of the bicycle’ - the radical component - that pushed the ‘big wheel’ – the liberal Zionist component - to take certain positions and mobilise sooner than they would have otherwise. In the period beginning with the second Intifada, the ‘big wheel; little wheel’ dynamic no longer holds true and a new trajectory in Israeli peace activism can be identified. As conventionally argued, the ‘big wheel’ began to slowdown, becoming paralysed in the 2000s. However, this chapter will show that the ‘small wheel,’ the radical component, along with the human rights component, continued to move and develop new ideas, showing that not all components became paralysed.

The consequence of this shifting dynamic has been the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism (Figure 4). This polarisation can be identified in the immediate wake of the outbreak of the second Intifada, with the liberal Zionist and radical components taking opposing perspectives on the situation. This polarisation deepened throughout the 2000s, as the liberal Zionist component moved towards the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, in order to stay in-line with mainstream consensus. The radical component, in contrast, further radicalised and, in doing so, has developed new collective action frames through different framing processes that challenge mainstream consensus, highlighting their role as ‘early risers’ and norm entrepreneurs. This is most clearly seen through an analysis of the components’ positions with regards to concerns for the Palestinians versus particularistic principles inherent in Zionism. The liberal Zionist component shifted to focus almost solely on particularistic concerns, removing any pro-Palestinian sentiments from their image whereas, the radical component focused even more directly on emphasising the story of Palestinian suffering, which has presented an opportunity to re-posit the concept of peace and develop new motivations for acting but, placing them even further away from mainstream Israeli public opinion. The human rights component has in some ways attempted to balance the two poles created by the liberal Zionist and radical components, by
revealing the suffering of the Palestinians but by also trying to reach out to the Israeli public and lobby the government. In doing so they too are finding new ways to confront the occupation.

The polarisation and fragmentation in the ways in which the components frame and confront the situation in this phase, as exemplified in their different approaches to criticising the IDF and the criticisms they level at each other, as well as the lack of a solution that could be backed by all the components, has meant that cooperation or coordination across the components in this phase has been limited and unlikely. However, one area in which the framing of the situation enabled the components to mobilise together was in the neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah between 2010 and 2012, which began with a radical approach to an injustice frame and led to the mobilisation of individuals from across the peace components. This highlights the role of the radical component as ‘early risers,’ developing new ways to confront the realities but, also points to the potential for cooperation of all components in the future.

This chapter will first consider the shift in Israeli peace activism from a fairly unified movement to the polarisation and fragmentation of the components in the wake of the outbreak of the second intifada by identifying the ways in which they framed this. I will then identify the collective action frames of each component in this phase. The chapter will then turn to the relation between the components, focusing on how they challenge each other through the issue of normalisation and how they view the IDF. It will then turn to a case in an East Jerusalem neighbourhood where the components were able to reconcile their differences and protest together. The chapter will then consider the role of gender in the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, identifying shifts from the gendered frames in the previous phases. This chapter will conclude with some of the key changes in the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism.

Figure 4. Collective action frames of the third phase: ‘The polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism; three cycles of contention’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Action Frames</th>
<th>Liberal Zionist Component</th>
<th>Radical Component</th>
<th>Human rights Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Particularism of Zionism</td>
<td>• Universal values – justice and equality</td>
<td>• Balance between universal values and particularism of Zionism</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Settlements as the main obstacle for peace</td>
<td>• Rejection of term ‘peace’</td>
<td>• Rights-based framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Peace for the future of a Jewish democratic State</td>
<td>• Harm reduction of Palestinian suffering</td>
<td>• Gendered framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Two-state solution</td>
<td>• Co-resistance, solidarity</td>
<td>• Revealing hidden realities</td>
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<td>• Against oppression</td>
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<td>• Some radical feminism</td>
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2 POLARISATION IN THE WAKE OF THE SECOND INTIFADA

Despite the brief alignment of the components of Israeli peace activism in supporting Barak at Camp David II, the failure of the summit sparked a progressive polarisation between the liberal Zionist and radical components, with the two taking opposing positions in response to Barak’s rhetoric that there was ‘no partner for peace on the Palestinian side’ (ABC News, 2000). An introduction to a chronicle of pamphlets by Anarchistsim Neged HaGader (Anarchists Against the Wall) explains that,

‘In Israel, the failure of the Oslo Accords resulted in a general nationalist entrenchment and shift to the right, including within the so-called Peace Camp [liberal Zionist component]. This had the opposite effect on those at the far Left end of the spectrum, however, as the realization of why Oslo failed led many to permanently let go of the coattails of the Zionist Left’ (Gordon and Grietzer, 2013).

Shalom Achshav and the liberal Zionist component maintained a similar prognostic framing from the previous phase, particularly the strategy of not positioning themselves too far in front of public opinion with respect to the conflict in order not to ‘lose the public’ (Golan, 2013). This meant that, given public opinion at the time, which showed the all-time lowest Israeli Jewish public support for the Oslo process (Yaar and Hermann, 2001; Hermann, 2009:276), they strategically accepted Barak’s rhetoric and, as explained in an interview with a veteran Shalom Achshav activist, they made a ‘very strong effort, a direct effort to change [their] image to be moderate’, by ridding the component of any pro-Palestinian sentiments (Golan, 2013). The suicide bombings by Palestinians only reinforced this shift, with many within the movement feeling betrayed by the Palestinians (Hilsum, 2001), including some of the leadership (Golan, 2013). Throughout this phase Shalom Achshav chose a pragmatic as opposed to a principled approach, which meant a reduction in calls for large scale protests and a shift in their diagnostic framing to even greater focus on the settlements as the main obstacle to peace. The strategy of Shalom Achshav is summed up by Hagit Ofran, the Director of the Shalom Achshav Settlements Watch Project,

‘We try to influence public opinion. Influencing public opinion requires that we relate to the political agenda so our message resonates within public discourse... [we] attempt to speak the language mainstream Israelis might be able to listen to – or at least the media that nourishes what the mainstream can accept’ (Ofran, 2010).

In stark contrast, the radical groups refused to accept Barak’s rhetoric and shifted their prognostic framing, which involved giving up promoting a political solution and further radicalising as the Intifada progressed. According to peace activist Irit Halperin,

‘The second Intifada showed that the peace camp had to use a much more radical perspective that would be able to confront the mainstream belief about the reasons for the conflict and the ways to resolve it. Resisting the mainstream ideology gave
these groups the capability to confront the traditional meaning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' (2007:335).

This radicalisation can be identified in the shifts in the way in which the radical component framed the conflict, through a number of framing processes. These shifts provide evidence for the argument that the radical component of Israeli peace activism was not paralysed following the outbreak of the second Intifada but continued to challenge the realities, finding different ways to confront the situation. In direct response to the second Intifada and the failure of the Camp David II Summit, Reuven Kaminer explained in an interview with the author that some activists stated that, 'we no longer do politics; we did and we got screwed over. Now if we want to do something to make a difference, we do something direct, we fill up a truck' (Kaminer, 2013). This emphasises the shift towards a primarily reactive role in this phase, with the radical component framing themselves and their activities in response to the realities on the ground, in an attempt to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians and raise awareness of their situation. This set them further apart from the liberal Zionist component and in many ways brought them into confrontation with them, whilst bringing them closer to the human rights component.

3 POLARISATION DEEPPENED

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada the polarisation between these components has deepened and can be most clearly determined and understood through an analysis of the extent to which concern for the Palestinians are emphasised in the framing of each of the components. Whilst all components are acting with the aim to end the occupation, there is a difference in the motivations behind this; whether removing the occupation is an end in itself, as the radical component would argue, or a means to an end, as the liberal Zionist component has always proposed. A tension had been present in the Zionist movement between universal principles of humanity and the particularism of Zionism (Greenstein, 2014) and this tension was historically reflected in the Israeli peace movement, with Shalom Achshav in particular struggling to reconcile the two (Simons, 2013a). Its public framing in its peak years prioritised the importance of peace for the sake of the security of Israel whilst internally, members were often involved in activities in the West Bank that were solely aimed at reducing harm experienced by the Palestinians. Since the second Intifada, Shalom Achshav has shifted towards an even more particularistic approach, focusing on the future of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in its attempt to stay within mainstream consensus but, as Hermann (2009) argues, has been unable to present a relevant position for individuals to mobilise around, given the prevailing realities. The radical component however, is exclusively centred on universal principles, which emerges as a focus on the suffering of the Palestinians, which releases it from the state narrative. This enables them to present innovative and confrontational collective action frames yet, ones that are too far removed from mainstream Israeli public opinion. The human rights component seems to be attempting provide a balance by confronting the policies of the Israeli authorities towards the Palestinians, without prioritising their claims over Israel’s.
3.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: STICKING WITH CONSENSUS

Shalom Achshav has continued its efforts to rid itself of pro-Palestinian sentiments since the second Intifada and a public relations team was involved in making the organisation seem ‘more Israeli’ (Golan, 2013). This is exemplified by a new Shalom Achshav flag. The main logo of Shalom Achshav uses a combination of black Hebrew letters in the traditional font used in religious text and red newspaper-style font, whereas the new flag has the world ‘Shalom’ (peace) written in blue inside two horizontal blue lines. This is a close mirroring of the Israeli flag, used as a means of representing Shalom Achshav as patriotic towards Israel.

A number of framing processes can be identified in the liberal Zionist component’s attempt to stay relevant to their target audience, the Israeli public. Frame extension can be seen in Shalom Achshav’s criticism of the West Bank settlements as the ‘main obstacle for peace’ (Ofri in Gal, 2012). Their Settlement Watch Project has become the central raison d’être of Shalom Achshav, and arguably the only effective strategy it currently has in promoting a two-state solution. This situates them in direct opposition to the settlement movement, similar to the situation following the aftermath of the 1967 war. The Settlement Watch Project gives Shalom Achshav a tool with which to highlight to the Israeli public the extent to which the settlements, their continued expansion and government support for them, hinder the possibility of a two-state solution.

However, the aftermath of the 2005 unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza, which Shalom Achshav supported, saw Hamas take-over the Gaza Strip and rockets fired into Southern Israel, which meant that the doctrine of ‘land for peace,’ on which the criticism of settlements is based, no longer holds resonance amongst the Israeli public. Furthermore, the concept that peace would bring security was questioned since arguably the peace process only led to increased personal insecurity for Israeli citizens. In recognition of this the liberal Zionist component tried to re-sell the two-state solution through frame transformation and frame amplification that argues for its necessity as ‘the only solution that will ensure the future of Israel as Jewish and democratic’ (Bar, 2013). According to Yariv Oppenheimer, Director General of Shalom Achshav, ‘if Israel will continue to control the West Bank, we [Israel] are going to lose our identity either as a Jewish State or as a democratic state’ (Oppenheimer, 2011). This is in contrast to some of the radical groups who argue that by definition Israel cannot be ‘Jewish and democratic’,

‘Because a “Jewish” state – as opposed to a state whose culture is Jewish or is “a national homeland” for Jews – will always be a racist, discriminatory state... A state that

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28 See Simons (2013b) for a detailed analysis of this logo. See Tartakover (1978) for the original logo.
sees itself as “a Jewish State” is inherently an exclusive state, because a person cannot become Palestinian-Jewish or Muslim-Jewish’ (Sheizaf, 2013a).\textsuperscript{30}

A sense of urgency is added to the framing given by Shalom Achshav, with the claim that ‘the window of opportunity’ for a two-state solution is coming to an end.\textsuperscript{31} The severity of this is further exaggerated by appealing to growing international isolation with arguments such as, ‘the enlightened world is slowly wising up to the “Israebluff”...and is no longer willing to cooperate and finance an undemocratic project that morally contradicts its values’ (Oppenheimer, 2013).

The liberal Zionist component was able to further articulate this message during a wave of laws that were passed in Israel between 2010 and 2012, which were considered anti-democratic by many of the left wing organisations. These laws, which included a Basic Law that declares Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People and a bill that proposed limiting foreign funding to human rights NGOs, were described as creating a ‘tug of war between neo-nationalist Israel and democratic Israel’ (Chazan, 2012).

The issue of democracy became relevant for civil society groups dealing with a range of issues including gender inequality and racism. This gave the liberal Zionist peace component the opportunity to create a master frame of democracy to bring together different organisations with the potential to suggest that the occupation is the biggest threat to democracy for Israel. This was exemplified in a small wave of anti-democracy protests in which Oppenheimer declared, ‘this is where the democratic revolution will start’ (Oppenheimer in Cohen, 2011). However, these protests did not maintain any significant momentum.

There has also been an attempt by the liberal Zionist component to connect issues of economics with the peace process, through frame bridging. Kol Echad (One Voice), a student organisation, held a protest following the 2011 social protests on Rothschild Boulevard, which was the main and symbolic location of the social protest. They built an ice wall which had images and items inside related to social issues, such as public housing. According to an interview with their Jerusalem coordinator, their slogan was, ‘social issues are frozen as long as the negotiations [between Israel and Palestine] are frozen’ (Peretz, 2013).

Shalom Achshav directly connected the socio-economic problems in Israel with the occupation and in particular the settlements, responding to the public outrage over the increase in the price of cottage cheese in 2011 with the slogan, ‘this cottage will cost you more’ (Shelef, 2011), referring to houses in the West Bank settlements. However, the main part of the social justice movement actively refused to make the connection with the occupation for fear of alienating or discouraging wide-spread mobilisation of the public. In the protests, ‘to avoid any “political” stain, the protest leaders wrapped themselves in Israeli flags and concluded the vigils with Hatikve, Israel’s national anthem, in a show of consensual patriotism’ (Ben Efrat, 2012). Some saw the conscious exclusion of the occupation from the collective action frame of the social justice protests as strategically wise,

\textsuperscript{30} This issue emerged particularly in response to Netanyahu’s condition for the Palestinians to recognise Israel as a ‘Jewish State’ (Harel, Issacharoff and Eldar, 2009).

\textsuperscript{31} See for example Baskin (2013).
‘There was never a choice between a social struggle focused on the occupation and a social struggle temporarily putting the conflict aside, because the first attempt would have flopped’ (Reider, 2011a).

This blocked the liberal Zionist peace component from using the social justice protests to mobilise against the settlements. Despite some shifts in their framing, the liberal Zionist peace component has not been able to develop a collective action frame that resonates with the Israeli public to encourage their mobilisation.

3.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: CHALLENGING CONSENSUS

The radical groups are less concerned with resonating with the Israeli public and are therefore able to be more confrontational in challenging the realities and policies of the Israeli government, presenting new ideas and understandings of the conflict. Polarisation from the liberal Zionist component can be identified in their rejection of some of the frames that the liberal Zionist component put forward. In particular, some are critical of the liberal Zionist component for accepting the basic concepts behind a Jewish state, which entails some non-universalistic characteristics (Gordon, 2003). The radical groups chose instead to focus on telling the story of Palestinian suffering, criticising Shalom Achshav for not acknowledging the Palestinian historical narrative and for not ‘confront[ing] history from the standpoint of the oppressed’ (Gordon, 2003:43). These ideas have manifested through a number of framing processes, which present examples of norm entrepreneurship in practice.

According to an interview between the author and a writer and activist, ‘harm reduction’ became a central tenet of the radical left (Ben Ami, 2013). Activities following the second Intifada involved, ‘going to places where the occupation and expulsion actually take place’ (Inbar in Dana and Sheizaf, 2011), with the explicit aim to ‘confront racism and discrimination where they happen’ (Inbar in Dana and Sheizaf, 2011). This is reflective of some of the radical groups and often members of Shalom Achshav in the previous phase, which began demonstrating at the place of violations. However, in this current phase, such solidarity actions define the identity of the activist groups and are not merely a part of their tactical repertoire, representing a process of frame transformation. The terms ‘co-resistance’ and ‘solidarity’ have replaced the concept of ‘co-existence’ that characterised the movement’s aims and tactics in previous phases.32 One of the first groups to emerge along these lines, and as a result of the events of the second Intifada, was Ta’ayush (Partnership/life in common), which created the framework of joint Arab-Jewish humanitarian solidarity activism that underlay much of the collective action frames and tactical repertoires of the radical groups in this phase.33

Some groups within the radical component have also begun to reject the term ‘peace’, citing it as an abstract concept and one only to be associated with Shalom Achshav and the Oslo Peace Accords, which they argue favoured the Israeli side (Matar, 2013; Alghazi, 2004). A number of activists explained to this

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32 See in particular Anarchistim Neged haGader and Solidariut.
33 See speech by Gadi Alghazi (2004), founder of Ta’ayush.
author that many groups within the radical component instead refer to themselves as ‘anti-occupation, anti-apartheid, anti-wall’ activists as opposed to ‘peace’ activists, representing what one activist called the maturation of the peace movement, as opposed to its death (Baum, 2013; Matar, 2013). Some have also transformed their prognostic framing of the situation to centre on ‘justice’ and ‘equality,’ which can be seen in a number of mission statements of the radical groups. For example,

‘Together we strive for a future of equality, justice and peace through concrete, daily, non-violent actions of solidarity to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to achieve full civil equality for all’ (Ta’ayush, [no date]).

‘The vision of peace is indivisible from the vision of justice and equality. We seek to install all three principles into all aspects of Israeli society’ (Coalition of Women for a Just Peace, 2001).

One example of how the language of ‘justice’ and ‘equality’ has influenced the radical groups is the emphasis on 1948, when the State of Israel was declared, as the beginning of the Israeli occupation as opposed to since the aftermath of the 1967 war, which is the starting point for the liberal Zionist groups. Zochrot (Remembering) is an Israeli organisation that seeks to raise awareness of the Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) of 1948 in the Israeli Jewish consciousness and supports the right of return for Palestinian refugees, something that is widely opposed within Israeli society, with 80.5 percent of respondents in 2014 opposing that Israel accepts a limited number of Palestinian refugees in return for a final peace agreement (Yaar and Hermann, 2014). The focus on historical narratives represents a frame transformation that can be linked to the work of New Historians, such as Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé.

According to Gush Shalom, the role of the new peace camp following the collapse of Camp David was to ‘lead public opinion to a brave reassessment of the national “narrative” and rid it of false myths’ (Avneri, 2001), something the radical component has been attempting to do. In framing themselves in this way, they have developed joint actions with Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel that acknowledges the perspective of the Palestinians.

The collective action frames of the radical component have extended to include the discourse of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ that is particularly prevalent in the young generation of activists. A process of frame bridging can be identified in the connections that the activists make between the oppression inherent in the occupation with oppression in other areas of Israeli society, such as the lower socio-economic sector of the Mizrahi community, women, refugees and migrant workers. These groups seek to combat all forms of oppression whilst being constantly aware of their privilege as mainly Ashkenazi (Jews from Eastern Europe), educated Jews. This is also an example of frame extension, whereby the identified struggle has extended beyond that of peace or ending the occupation to one of combatting all forms of oppression, which are seen as intertwined with each other. Tarabut-Hithabrut (Come Together/Associate) was formed out of members of Ta’ayush with these principles in mind. A member of Tarabut-Hithabrut explained to the author that whilst the goals and work of Ta’ayush was extremely
important and had managed to shift the discourse amongst the radical groups, something that could mobilise a wider participant base and form into a political movement was needed (Ball, 2013). Tarabut-Hithabrut is a front of the Hadash (Communist) political party and seeks to empower those from oppressed communities to ‘free themselves’ and to see themselves not as victims of different ills of society but, as activists struggling against their shared oppression (Ball, 2013). This frame extension has had the effect of shifting the identity of activists within the radical groups. The division between those who are represented within the movement and those who are not was explained to the author as more closely associated with class division than the ethnic divisions of the previous phases (Anonymous, A., 2013). Whilst the peace activists still remain predominantly Ashkenazi, middle class Jews, there is a greater awareness of the need to shift their framing in order to expand the membership to marginalised groups.

The social justice movement could have been a platform to connect oppression and inequalities within Israeli society with the occupation. However, as noted, only a small part of the social justice movement bridged this protest with the fight against the occupation. Members of the radical groups against the occupation were quick to make the connection and criticise those who chose to ignore the ‘political’ and focus solely on the ‘social.’ Matan Kaminer, a contentious objector and part of a family of radical leftists wrote,

‘Zionism is a colonial movement, which has over its history shifted from expropriation of land from the native Palestinians (roughly 1917-1967), to their exploitation as a cheap labour force (1967-1993), and finally to their exclusion and marginalization (1993 to the present day). Any class struggle in Israel, which ignored this oppressive relationship would be, inevitably, a false one’ (Kaminer, 2011).

The main argument underlying the radical groups’ response to the social justice movement was that you simply cannot have social justice without an end to the occupation. However, as noted this discourse did not infiltrate the mainstream social justice movement, who chose to attempt mass mobilisation by actively ignoring the role of the occupation in issues of social justice.

The collective action frames of the radical component since the second Intifada has led to further marginalisation in Israeli society and the liberal Zionist component has been quick to disassociate themselves from the radical component, although they too are considered as a marginal sector of society. The liberal Zionist component is critical of the radical component’s sole focus on the Palestinians, arguing that the radical component has gone too far in acknowledging injustices towards Palestinians, only contributing to the delegitimisation campaign against Israel in the international community. One activist retold a joke circulated about the current state of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada, whereby ‘you bring together a number of Palestinians who do not like Israelis with a group of Israelis who do not like themselves, so you have a common denominator’ (Boms, 2013). The criticism levelled is that the radical component has adopted a narrative that became only concerned for
the Palestinians and in doing so presented to the Palestinians a message that Israel is solely at fault and the Palestinians are the victim and need not take responsibility for the conflict. These criticisms highlight the increased polarisation between these two components and the difficulties in reconciling the differences, as well as the unlikelihood that the Israeli public will adopt the ideas of the radical component.

A joint Israeli-Palestinian group emerged towards the end of the second Intifada that is situated on the more moderate end of the radical component. Lochamim l’Shalom (Combatants for Peace) was founded as a group of ex-combatants from both sides. It began with Israelis who had recently decided to refuse to conduct their reserve army duty in the occupied territories however, they felt that the debate needed to extend beyond the Israeli side and to reach those Palestinians who had been involved in violence for the Palestinian struggle and who were now opposed to it (Perry, 2011). In defining themselves as bi-national, acting both in solidarity with the Palestinians and out of concern for the peace and security of Israel, Lochamim l’Shalom has succeeded in attracting significant numbers of new members (Perry, 2011). In particular, they conduct solidarity and resistance activities in order to show their condemnation for the suffering of the Palestinians but are clear in their goal of a two-state solution that allows Israelis participants to maintain a Zionist outlook, highlighted by the bi-national identity of the group, as opposed to a Palestinian solidarity group. They conduct dialogue activities in order for the two sides to get to know each other but are clear that they are not a ‘dialogue’ group based on the contact hypothesis. The group is also open to non-combatants; the reason, as explained to the author, is that in ‘militarized societies such as ours [Israeli and Palestinian] everyone was in one way or another involved in the violence and we needed everybody in order to change that’ (Wishnitzer, 2013). The combination of these collective action frames has shown signs of success in terms of resonance with the Israeli public. Around 2,500 people attended their joint Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony in 2013 (Combatants for Peace, 2013), including this author. In an interview between the author and one of the core leaders of Shalom Achshav, she explained that she felt the organisation should have abandoned their strategy of not reaching too far beyond the Israeli consensus, and instead taken the direction similar to Lochamim l’Shalom (Golan, 2013).

3.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: FOCUSSING ON HIDDEN REALITIES

Groups within the human rights component seem to be responding to the criticisms levelled at the liberal Zionist and radical components by focusing their attention on revealing hidden realities and challenging policies rather than prioritising either the claims of the Palestinians or of Israel. In doing so, they try to speak to the Israeli public, whilst also developing more confrontational collective action frames. Whilst they attempt to provide this balance, their ideas have not had much resonance amongst Israeli society and furthermore, as will be explored in Chapter 7, they have received a significant amount of criticism.
Whilst the radical component has framed itself in a way that does not try to appeal to Israeli public and the liberal Zionist component tries not to develop frames that are too confrontational for the Israeli public, groups in the human rights component are challenging the Israeli public by reporting on what goes on in the occupied territories. It is argued that Israeli society has become oblivious of the occupation or at least in denial of its existence, with ‘Israeli society continuing to turn a blind eye and to deny what is done in its name’ (Ir Amim, [no date]). Since terrorist attacks within Israel became minimal and the ‘problem’ was separated with a barrier, it is relatively easy for a member of the general Israeli public to ignore the continuing occupation in the West Bank. According to Cohen’s ‘States of Denial’ (2001), Israelis tend to block out what is happening in order to continue with their everyday lives so, the aim of the human rights component is to bring the occupation back to the attention of the Israeli public.

The human rights groups continued their efforts from the previous phase to raise awareness of the occupation by providing information to both Israeli society and the international community. The human rights groups are keen to differentiate themselves from the political groups by taking a rights-based approach as opposed to a solidarity approach and work on cases or issues that are seen as a violation of these rights. Whilst the radical component of Israeli peace activism have become less concerned with appealing to Israeli public opinion, the human rights organisations are actively seeking to ‘expand and diversify its base of public support’ (El-Ad in Surusco, 2013a), by bringing the Israeli public out of its apathy, ignorance or denial. Many human rights issues relating to the Palestinians, such as military courts, are inaccessible to Israelis and therefore little attention is paid towards it (Montell in Surusco, 2013b). Therefore, part of mission of the human rights organisations is to make the Israeli public aware of the human rights situation in the West Bank and the Gaza strip, with the hope that something will make them enraged. There is an understanding however, that the Israeli public may not be open to the language of human rights and so these organisations ‘need to think about how to make human rights relevant to people that are less secular, less liberal and have a different set of values than the liberal, secular set of values’ (El-Ad in Surusco, 2013a). This affects the way in which they present their mission and activities. According to an interview between the author and Tania Hary of the human rights organisation, Gisha (Legal Centre for Freedom of Movement),

‘We define ourselves in the community of human rights organisations...we do not see ourselves as a peace organisation or a political organisation per se because we are working within the framework of human rights and international law. It is important for us to do that and maintain that professionalism in order to make the message heard. Of course we are identified with the left but...we are trying to say that respect for human rights should not be an issue that is reserved for the left or leftist discourse’ (Hary, 2013).

A number of groups, such as B’Tselem and haAguda l’Zehuyot HaEzrach b’Yisrael (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) were involved in these activities in the previous phase of Israeli peace activism, particularly since the first Intifada however, given the shifting political context, more self-
defined human rights groups have emerged with this aim (Appendix 1). A number of other Israeli NGOs have also emerged with the goal of combatting the ignorance of many Israelis, motivated by the belief that, ‘people need to know what is going on to make changes, to try and achieve something’ (Ir Amim Tour Guide, 2013). Ir Amim (City of People) and Emek Shaveh (Valley of Worth) focus their efforts on Jerusalem to raise awareness about the situation there (Tatarsky, 2013). Ir Amim looks at the ramifications of the policies in Jerusalem in terms of politics, security and humanitarian issues, highlighting the complexities and the differences between Jewish neighbourhoods and Palestinian neighbourhoods. Emek Shaveh focuses on the role of archaeology in political conflict, arguing that archaeology is political because the archaeologists get to decide what gets seen and what does not (Emek Shaveh Tour Guide, 2013). In an interview with the Director, he outlined to the author that the aim of the organisation is to ‘explain the role of archaeology in the conflict and to understand how it has influenced life here’, particularly since the organisation believes that ‘Israelis are not aware that archaeology is a political tool’ (Mizrahi, 2013).

Shovrim Shtika (Breaking the Silence) is a unique organisation that is centred on the testimonies of Israeli soldiers who have served in the West Bank and Gaza, starting with those who were active in the second Intifada. They aim to, ‘make heard the voices of these soldiers, pushing Israel to face the reality whose creation it has enabled’ and ‘take it upon themselves to expose the Israeli public to the reality of everyday life in the occupied territories’ (Breaking the Silence, [no date]). They have gathered thousands of testimonies from combat soldiers, starting with those who served in the second Intifada, in order to highlight the detrimental effects of the occupation on young Israelis due to the ‘reality in which young soldiers face a civilian population on a daily basis, and are engaged in the control of that population’s everyday life’ (Breaking the Silence, [no date]), the details of which are often not spoken about when the soldiers return to civilian life.

In revealing hidden realities, the human rights component is placing itself in confrontation with mainstream consensus, which either ignores or denies these realities. However, they try to make the public aware of what is being done in their name, in order to hold the government accountable, without being too confrontational. Whilst this shows an attempt at balancing the poles of the liberal Zionist and radical components, the groups within the human rights component have not succeeded in engaging the Israeli public, due to the high regard towards the IDF in Israeli society as a ‘people’s army’ based on compulsory conscription. Some have also received criticism from the radical component for only dealing with the day-to-day problems of occupation and not seeking to confront its fundamental causes (Bar-On, 1996:245), further showing that Israeli peace activism continues to be fragmented.

4 CHALLENGING EACH OTHER: NORMALISATION

The criticisms that each component of Israeli peace activism presents to the other components has resulted in an increased inability to reconcile differences and furthered the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. One of the strongest criticisms of the radical component
towards both the liberal Zionist and the human rights components is their engagement in normalisation. The anti-normalisation discourse within the context of Israeli-Palestinian peace building represents a variety of attitudes (Salem, 2005). The radical component have appropriated the Palestinian perspective where ‘normalisation’ is, ‘the process of building open and reciprocal relations with Israel in all fields, including the political, economic, social, cultural, educational, legal, and security fields’ (Salem in Salem, 2005). The radical groups have used this to distinguish their joint actions from those of the liberal Zionist and human rights components, as well as to criticise such activities. Some groups within the radical component also criticise Lochamim l’Shalom since, despite their solidarity activism, their bi-national identity means they are engaging in normalisation (Gur, 2013).

The radical component believes that the situation from which the Palestinians and Israelis come from is not equal and that such asymmetries should not be reproduced when conducting joint activities. They argue that the people-to-people dialogue activities based on the contact hypothesis are guilty of treating the two parties as if they were meeting each other on an equal footing and this ‘benefits the well placed and powerful (the Israeli side), and exacerbates the asymmetry of power in the dialogue room’ (Poppy, 2012). The language of ‘privilege,’ ‘oppression’ and ‘justice’ in the radical component is extended towards the relationship with Palestinian activists, with the Israeli activists ensuring that they acknowledge their ‘privileged status as Israeli Jews’ (Dana and Sheizaf, 2011). This connects to their framing of ‘peace’, since it is argued that, ‘in trying to talk to each other, “as equals” dialogue posits peace without justice (“normalising the occupation”)’ (Poppy, 2012). Therefore, any activities that involve joint actions between Israelis and Palestinians must show solidarity with Palestinian suffering under the occupation (Salem, 2005) and be presented in the framework of ‘co-resistance’. One activist explained to the author that in the radical component, Jews and Palestinians ‘demonstrate together, get arrested together and get shot at together’ (Matar, 2013).

A common response from Israeli Jewish members of the liberal Zionist peace component with respect to accusations of normalisation is that it is not their place to be discussing the issue; that it is part of the Palestinian discourse and that it is the prerogative of individual Palestinians to decide with whom they do and do not work (Goldenblatt, 2013; Finkel, 2013; Fuchs, 2013). The issue of normalisation and the different stances towards it amongst Israeli peace activists have the effect of further entrenching the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism.

5 CHALLENGING MAINSTREAM INSTITUTIONS: THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES

Fragmentation can also be identified through the ways in which the different components of Israeli peace activism challenge the IDF. Whilst the standing of the IDF in the eyes of the Israeli public fluctuates in response to different events, as an institution it is still regarded as one of the most important of Israeli society (Leyy, 2007). Therefore, the challenges that the components pose to the IDF places them on the margins of Israeli society. However, there are differences in the ways in which the components challenge the IDF, which has enabled the liberal Zionist component to retain some
credibility amongst centre-left Israelis, whilst further marginalising and delegitimising in the eyes of the Israeli public the radical component. *Shalom Achshav* was founded out of the Officer’s Letter written by reservist officers pleading with the Israeli government to continue on the path to peace with Egypt (Reshef, 1996). This gave the group legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli public, since the individuals involved had the necessary security credentials and patriotism (Golan, 2013). As evidence for the more moderate approach of *Shalom Achshav* in the 2000s, the current General Director of *Shalom Achshav* continues to do his reserve duty in the West Bank (Blumenthal, 2015).

In the middle of the spectrum, although still a marginalised position in Israeli society, is the perspective of *Lochamim l’Shalom* (Combatants for Peace), who request that its members do not serve in the occupied territories (Reich, 2013) and often protest in front of the IDF in their solidarity activities with Palestinians. *Shovrim Shtika* (Breaking the Silence) also sits in the middle and is fairly unique in that it provides a space for soldiers to give testimonies of their experiences serving in the occupied territories. Whilst they have gained interest in Israeli society, the group was criticised following Operation Cast Lead in 2009 for ‘airing dirty laundry in public,’ as some of the testimonies informed part of the Goldstone report.  

Two groups that present the most critical challenges towards the IDF are *Anarchistim Neged haGader* and *Profil Hadash* (New Profile). As explained to the author by some core activists, although *Anarchistim Neged haGader* as a group do not have an anarchist vision or goals (Wagner, 2013), its anarchism frames the mode of operation (Snitz, 2013a), which has brought them into direct confrontation with the Israeli army at West Bank demonstrations. Whilst their role was to initially act as shields between the army and the Palestinians (Anarchists Against the Wall, [no date]), with the army less likely to harm Israelis, this has become less effective and the Israeli activists have become to also be considered a threat. *Profil Hadash* takes the most radical perspective, presenting a collective action frame of de-militarisation of Israeli society. They have bridged a radical feminist frame with one of de-militarisation, arguing that there is a direct link between militarism and patriarchy and only a de-militarisation of Israeli society will foster values of tolerance and democracy (New Profile, [no date]). They support conscientious objectors and take issue with some of the more veteran refusal groups, such as *Yesh Gvul* (There is a Limit/Border), firstly, because it is made up of mainly male reservist refusers and secondly, because the refuseniks ‘heroised’ the conscientious objectors with slogans such as, ‘I have love in the refusers elite unit.’ Heroism is seen as a masculine value, which they seek to remove through feminisation (Vardi, 2013).

Challenging the IDF, both through refusal and in criticising its actions, is considered anti-patriotic in Israeli society. In the recent Gaza crisis in summer 2014, those who voiced opposition received harsh criticism, the most public being *Ha’aretz* journalist Gideon Levy, who criticised those involved in the air force bombings in Gaza, and was accused of treason and received death threats (Fraser, 2014). This explains why *Shalom Achshav* is careful to minimise their criticism of the IDF in order not to stray too far

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from mainstream consensus. However, it means that they are not continuously acting as an opposition force, thus failing to either challenge the government or criticise the prevailing realities.

6 RECONCILING DIFFERENCES: INJUSTICE FRAMING PROVES TO BE SUCCESSFUL

Despite the fragmentation in Israeli peace activism, in 2009 members of the radical groups succeeded in framing a particular issue in a way that resonated with a larger audience, including those from the liberal Zionist and human rights components, and succeeded in mobilising the largest radical group that they have managed to gather in this phase, with an estimated peak of 5000 participants in March 2010 (Shabi, 2010). This episode in Israeli peace activism provides an example of successful framing, which was based on an injustice frame that did not directly challenge a Zionist ideology or the state narrative.

The protest began with a small group of radical left wing Israeli students showing their solidarity for Palestinian families who were being evicted from their homes in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. This was followed by some veteran activists who, as explained in an interview with the author, saw the opportunity to frame this situation in a clear, accessible manner that would encourage the involvement of not only the radical fringes of Israeli peace activism (Sharon, 2013). It was the obvious and simple injustice of the situation in Sheikh Jarrah, where Palestinian residents were being evicted from their homes to be immediately replaced by Jewish settlers, who claimed ownership from before the State of Israel was created, that helped to mobilise participants. Following Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the law enabled Jews who had lost property in East Jerusalem in the 1948 war to be able to reclaim it. However, Palestinian property that was abandoned in the 1948 war, could not be reclaimed and became state property (Gorenberg, 2010). Whilst the initial involvement of activists was borne out of the framing of Palestinian solidarity, an activist explained to the author that the ‘clear cut story’ brought out members of the liberal Zionist groups (Benninga, 2013), temporarily bridging the chasm that had become entrenched between the liberal Zionist and radical component of Israeli peace activism. He explained that the location of the injustice, a fifteen minute walk from the centre of Jewish West Jerusalem and along the bus route to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in a ‘fairly safe middle-class Palestinian neighbourhood’ (Benninga, 2013), encouraged further participation.

The swell of Israeli peace activism in Sheikh Jarrah however, did not last more than a few years. A number of reasons can explain this and there is a fair amount of gossip and finger pointing over why it fell apart (Benninga, 2013; Sharon, 2013). With respect to the issue of framing, an ideological disagreement arose within the core group between those who wanted to use the opportunity to push the solidarity agenda and those that felt that ‘purity of heart’ would be at the cost of effectiveness in building a mass movement (Sharon, 2013). ‘Purity of heart’ refers to maintaining solidarity with the Palestinian families in Sheikh Jarrah, in case of future eviction orders, as opposed to moving on to other cases of injustice, even if it would help build a movement. This is connected to a common phenomenon, particularly within left wing movements, whereby critique and ideological commitment can cause fragmentation and are sometimes in contradiction with pragmatic developments.
7 SHIFTING GENDER DYNAMICS: FRAGMENTATION AND RADICALISATION IN THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT

A feminist framing of Israeli peace activism became prominent in the first Intifada, with the foundation of Nashim b’Shachor (Women in Black) and gender dynamics have continued to play a role in the framing of Israeli peace activism. Significant shifts can be identified that reflect some of the overall shifts in Israeli peace activism in this phase of ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism: three cycles of contention’, as well as shifting dynamics in Israeli society and a radicalisation of the feminist movement in Israel.

More recent testimonies of Shovrim Shtika have helped to unearth a new gender dynamic in anti-war voices (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011). Increasing opportunities for women in the military service provides a new source of anti-war criticism that moves beyond the existing two frames for female anti-war voices, those of ‘motherhood’ and ‘feminism connected to human rights,’ which both drew their legitimacy from the fact that ‘they could remain “clean” of sordid military affairs’ (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011:741). The new avenue for gendered criticism of Israeli militarism comes directly from the military experience of women, with criticism levelled towards the macho and immature behaviour of the male soldiers that they serve alongside, combined with their empathy for the Palestinians (Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder, 2011:750). According to Sasson-Levy, Levy and Lomsky-Feder (2011:759), ‘in using a “feminine” voice deriving from the “masculine” arena, [the female soldiers] propose an alternative framing of soldiering, of gender identities and of anti-war discourse.’

Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) emerged as part of the human rights component dealing with revealing and confronting hidden realities, particularly human rights abuses, in direct response to the second Intifada. Members of Machsom Watch stand at checkpoints, reporting what goes on in order to ‘shake mainstream, middle of the road public opinion from its denial and refusal to see what is actually done in its name to the Palestinian population’ (Kaufman, 2008:53). A core member explained to the author that they also try to make life better for the Palestinians, such as through persuading the army to build a shelter at a checkpoint so the Palestinians do not have to stand in the rain (Linder, 2013). Gender plays a significant role in a mainly practical sense. As a group that situates themselves almost physically between the IDF or Border Police and the Palestinians, their identity as women enables them to disassociate themselves from the Israeli soldiers and present themselves as assisting the Palestinians, whereas, as explained to the author, Israeli men are mostly regarded by Palestinians as their enemies; as people who were or still are in the army (Linder, 2013). Furthermore, their fast response to the second Intifada, establishing themselves three months after it began, can be closely linked to their identity as women, with the women ‘listening to the Palestinian public mood’ and recognising their ‘personal responsibility’ to ‘criticise the occupation as an immoral system’ (Halperin, 2007:337-338).

There has also been a radicalisation in women’s peace activism. A new women’s coalition formed in the second Intifada that can be described as more radical than the previous phase and is a significant driving
force within the radical component. The Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom (The Coalition of Women for Peace) formed out of existing women’s peace groups, with different identities and political backgrounds but, as told to the author, all ‘critical women, radical feminists who have critiques about everything, including [themselves], especially themselves’ (Baum, 2013). Although a continuation of the women’s movement from the 1980s and 1990s, particularly Nashim b’Sachor, under the coalition they adopted an explicitly feminist vision of peace, including ‘opposition to the militarism that permeates both societies, an equal role for women in negotiations for peace, and a society that cares more about education, health, art and the poor than it does about maintaining an army’ (Svirsky, 2004). Consistent with developments in the global feminist movement, feminism within the radical component of the Israeli peace movement does not equate to highlighting and lobbying for ‘women’s issues’ but something much broader and structural; radical feminism underlies every aspect of the coalition, from its organising principles to its theatrical tactical repertoires (Meyer and Whittier, 1994), to their attention to emotions (Epstein in Meyer and Whittier, 1994) and the direct link made between militarism and patriarchy.

For the younger generation of radical activists, some of whom grew up in the youth movements of Meretz and Shalom Achshav but were radicalised by the events of the second Intifada, the gender dimension became an inherent aspect of their discourses surrounding the conflict and Israeli society. According to an interview with a radical activist, ‘the struggle against the occupation and apartheid should not put aside the struggle against sexual violence and discrimination and the oppression of women because...they are very interlinked’ (Rothschild, 2013). She argues that even amongst the radical component there is sexism and misogyny and still male dominance. However, unlike the generation before her who built an independent women’s peace movement to overcome these issues, Rothschild believes that the radical component should be a feminist movement consisting of both men and women.

8 MOVING FORWARD: NEW IDEAS

Part of the inability for cooperation amongst Israeli peace activists is due to the fact that there is no tangible shared solution that all the groups are able to rally under, beyond ‘ending the occupation’. The radical component, despite the continuous ideological debates and shifts in discourse, has not put forward any new solutions and has not developed tangible prognostic or motivational frames. In an interview with a central member of the radical component she explained to the author that,

‘The radical movement does not have a clear agenda, a clear solution, a clear plan to put in front of people and say, ok, here is our vision for the future, this is what we are trying to achieve’ (Rothschild, 2013).

Yet, most of the radical groups are critical of the two-state solution, which remains the focal solution for the liberal Zionist component. In recent years some groups within the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism have been attempting to put forward new paradigms or at least acknowledge the need for a new paradigm with respect to the two-state solution in order to present something new for
the Israeli mainstream public to rally behind. According to an interview between the author and Yael Patir, former employee of the Merkaz Peres l’Shalom, former Director of the Forum Irgunei haShalom (Peace NGO Forum) and currently the Israeli link for J-Street,

‘The left needs a new product to sell. The product the peace camp sold to the public, you cannot sell it anymore, it is done, and it is dead. The two-state solution is still the only way forward as I see it but you have to build it within a paradigm that resonates’ (Patir, 2013).

This shift comes as a result of three factors: one, the realisation that Oslo cannot be sold to the Israeli public anymore; two, the understanding that the left has lacked a clear political agenda since the Oslo years; and three, calls from within the Palestinian community for Israelis to ‘go back home and change your public’ (Patir, 2013). For Patir, her work with J-Street is an attempt in this direction. She argues that the new realities demand for American engagement, which requires American politics to shift so the President has enough space to act. Whilst not presenting a new paradigm for the two-state solution, she is presenting a new approach which seeks to appeal to the Jewish diaspora, particularly in the United States, thus representing a re-framing of the targets of the Israeli peace movement.

Dan Goldenblatt, the new co-Director of the Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), which changed its name in 2013 to Israel Palestine Creative Regional Initiatives, is working on a new paradigm. He argues that the separation paradigm is unrealistic and his team is therefore developing a ‘sharing paradigm’ that is not a one state solution but some form of confederation resolution (Goldenblatt, 2013). IPCRI was involved in developing some of the ideas that underlay the Oslo Agreements but has now recognised that the realities require an alternative framing of the solution to the conflict.

A new organisation, Molad (The Centre for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy) that was established by activists who became active in the radical component of Israeli peace activism in the 2000s, is attempting to coordinate the fragmented peace groups and to provide fresh ideas and policies. The leaders understand, in line with the theoretical perspective, that a delicate framing balance is needed, explaining to the author that,

‘The challenge is that you want to be as broad as you can but at the same time not being so broad that you are losing your identity and you are not actually trying to advance anything…it is a fine balance’ (Sharon, 2013).

This is a challenge that Shalom Achshav succeeded in achieving in the 1980s and 1990s, developing a clear master frame of a two-state solution that enabled the mass mobilisation of Israeli participants but, has not been replicated since.
9 CONCLUSION

The challenge of developing a master frame that all components and groups can rally under together is particularly difficult in this current phase of the Israeli peace activism due to the polarisation and fragmentation between the radical, liberal Zionist and human rights components, and even within each component. The ways in which they frame themselves, the underlying problems and their proposed solutions are in stark contrast with one another, making any formal coordination or unification unlikely. However, despite the inability to present a unified front or to affect government policy, Israeli peace activism has experienced interesting and potentially important framing processes, which has created new collective action frames that have opened up new opportunities for mobilisation and change.

This is particularly true for the radical component, which through a process of radicalisation, are reassessing the origins of the conflict and re-framing ways in which to confront it. By focusing on universal values, such as justice and equality, they are shifting the meaning of ‘peace’ and how it can be achieved. They are more focused on 1948 as the start of the Israeli occupation and acknowledge the suffering of the Palestinians by focusing on harm reduction and emphasising the privilege of the Israeli activists. This has increased the activism that is centred on solidarity with the Palestinians. Although at present their activities are focused on alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and ignoring the Israeli public, this process of norm entrepreneurship points towards the ‘early riser’ role that the radical component has traditionally played.

Given the paralysis of the liberal Zionist component, having moved towards the centre of the Israeli political spectrum and no longer presenting a truly critical position, the human rights component and the moderate end of the radical component could be arguably starting to fit the role the liberal Zionist component once did, reflecting the beginnings of the ‘big wheel-small wheel’ dynamic that Kaminer (1996) identified between the radical and liberal Zionist component in previous phases of Israeli peace activism. These groups attempt to influence the Israeli public but using collective action frames and tactical repertoires that are more confrontational, such as protesting alongside Palestinian activists, which were developed from the radical component. This can already be seen firstly, in the human rights component’s focus on revealing hidden realities, through which they are able to confront the Israeli public to ‘wake-up’ to the Palestinian suffering without prioritising the Palestinian cause, presenting a more radical position than the liberal Zionist component but, without being too contentious. Secondly, those groups on the moderate end of the radical component, particularly Lochamim l’Shalom, who are attempting to balance the particularism of Zionism with concerns for the Palestinians, suggesting they are not incompatible and neither should be ignored. They are, however, being ‘nipped at the heels’ by the more radical groups within the radical component to ensure they are continuously critical, through issues such as normalisation or pushing for more confrontational challenges towards the IDF. The effect of these shifting dynamics has meant the liberal Zionist component has become redundant, particularly since the concept of the two-state solution has been adopted by mainstream Israeli discourse and they are not presenting anything more confrontational, as conventionally argued (Hermann, 2009). However,
the human rights component and radical component have maintained their momentum, with new ideas and new framing of the causes, problems and solutions to the conflict, confirming the argument that not all components of Israeli peace activism became paralysed. This can be further seen in the shifts in tactical repertoires, which will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
AN EXPANDED REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION FOR ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

1 INTRODUCTION

The tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism provides a further avenue through which to understand the trajectory of peace activism since the second Intifada, as well as offering an additional means of demarcating between the components and highlighting the ways in which they interact and influence each other. Tactical repertoires are the ‘ways in which people act together in pursuit of shared interests’ (Tilly, 1995:41). Shifts in tactical repertoires are most likely to be incremental and directly related to the framing of the groups, their mobilising structures and both the domestic and international context within which they operate. Furthermore, the tactics that are available to a social movement depends both on the internal characteristics of the groups and how extra-parliamentary activity is perceived in the society in which they operate. Israel is considered an intensely political society (Shamir and Shamir, 2000; Arian, 1995) in which protest is an acceptable form of political action (Norell, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 1988). Therefore, in general, protest in Israel, is not a barrier to mobilisation. However, tactics that are seen as more confrontational are not widely accepted.

Tarrow (2011:99) identifies three overarching types of tactics: violent, which are the most dramatic and employ methods using violence; contained, which are built on routines people are most familiar with and are accepted by the authorities; and disruptive, which ‘break with routine, startle bystanders and leaves elites disorientated, at least for a time’ (Tarrow: 2011:99). Disruptive tactics are where innovation is most likely to occur but there is a high probability of them turning either violent or becoming contained. Israeli peace activism is centred on disruptive and contained. In this phase, the liberal Zionist component has mainly continued with their known routines, employing tactics that were once disruptive but overtime became contained. They continued with tactics based on nonviolent demonstrations and persuasion in Israeli towns and cities, which aimed to stay within the legal limits of protest in Israel, representing a contained action. Whilst the frequency and volume of these activities were less than the previous phases, they were still employed when deemed appropriate. Groups in the human rights component have also continued with contained tactics but with more confrontational collective action frames. The radical groups have employed more disruptive tactics, experiencing an evolution in their nonviolent action repertoire and developing slight innovations. They were at the forefront of employing new means with which to challenge the situation. In particular, their focus away from influencing public opinion has enabled them to use even more confrontational tactics, highlighting the connection between collective action frames and tactical repertoires. One innovation in the tactical repertoire of all three components is the use of tours to highlight the situation in the West Bank. Whilst tours had been used on a small scale previously, in this phase of Israeli peace activism, its use and purpose expanded, in particular in an attempt to mobilise the international community. According to theoretical studies, it is common for social movements to employ both innovative and contained tactics...
in the course of a cycle of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:50), as seen in the case of Israeli peace activism.

Although the activities and participant numbers of Israeli peace activism may be smaller than in previous phases (Hermann, 2009), the fact that both an evolution and innovation in tactics has occurred further supports the argument that Israeli peace activism as a whole was not paralysed following the second Intifada but took a new trajectory. Whilst the evolved tactics highlighted in this chapter, particularly the use of non-violent direct action and resistance by Israeli activists alongside Palestinian activists, has been documented (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Marteu, 2009), it has not been done so in conjunction with the other tactics that are available, both innovations and the continuation of known tactics. This chapter considers the full array of tactics used by Israeli peace activists, providing a more comprehensive study of the repertoire of contention of Israeli peace activists since 2000 (Figure 5). Furthermore, by analysing these tactics through the lenses of the different components of Israeli peace activism and in conjunction with an application of theories of repertoires of contention, this chapter gives an in-depth understanding of how the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism has developed over time. Some attention is given to how the framing of the components influenced the tactics available to them and how the shifting environment affected the trajectory, in order to provide some interesting explanations at this stage. However, effort has been made to focus solely on the tactical repertoires themselves using theories of repertoires and dynamics of contention (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 1995). This will enable a more detailed study of the repertoires themselves to be brought to a discussion of the interactive nature of the powers of movement in Chapter 7.

This chapter will consider three forms of tactics in turn. It will begin by examining and outlining the contained tactics, identifying in particular those tactics that have continued from the previous phase and become routine within the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, namely demonstrations, conscientious objection, people-to-people activities, research and information and legal means. These have been most commonly employed by the liberal Zionist component and the human rights component. This chapter will then turn to the evolution of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, tracing the development from demonstrations to humanitarian action, to non-violent direct action (NVDR) to non-violent resistance (NVR) to boycott. This evolution is most clearly seen amongst and directed by the radical component. A consideration of the evolution of online activism across all components of Israeli peace activism will also be considered. The chapter will then turn to the key innovation in this phase, which can be identified across all components; the use of tours. Finally the chapter will conclude by identifying and explaining the overall expansion and fragmentation in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, highlighting the greater potential for achieving change through the use of multiple tactics.
2 CONTINUATION: CONTAINED COLLECTIVE ACTION

Demonstrations, vigils and lobbying are some of the contained tactics in the repertoire of Israeli extra-parliamentary activity and can be identified at some point across all components. However, it is the liberal Zionist and human rights components that have more commonly employed contained tactics due to their attempts to influence the Israeli public and government. Demonstrations in Israeli towns have been held to mark certain events; some Israelis periodically continue to refuse to conduct their military service; people-to-people activities based on the contact hypothesis resumed towards the end of the second Intifada; think tanks and track-II initiatives continue to work on developing a solution to the conflict; human rights organisations maintain constant reports and documentation of human rights abuses and legal means have been used to challenge policies and practices of the occupation. This conforms to Tilly’s (1995) theory that repertoires of contention are culturally embedded and therefore do not change dramatically. However shifts in social interaction and environment will mean that no tactic is employed in the same way overtime (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:50), which creates the opportunity for small scale innovations even in contained and known tactics.

2.1 DEMONSTRATIONS

Demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities had traditionally been the main tactic of Israeli peace activism, most commonly employed by the liberal Zionist component that rallied hundreds of thousands of Israelis in the late 1980s. Whilst demonstrations are no longer the core tactic employed since the second Intifada, in particular because the liberal Zionist component lost the ability to mobilise the same numbers as in the 1980s and 1990s, and therefore limited their decision to call for demonstrations, peace organisations still held demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities throughout this phase. However, as has been argued (Hermann, 2009), overall the numbers have declined, particularly since the building
of the separation barrier and end of the second Intifada, as shown in the declining numbers at the annual Rabin memorial rallies. In 2002 there were 60,000 to 100,000 Israelis demonstrating (Zilversmidt, 2003/4:24); in 2003 there were between 100,000 to 150,000 people in the square (Zilversmidt, 2003/4:24); in 2005 it was estimated at 200,000 (Keller and Zilversmidt, 2006:4); in 2007 there were about 150,000 protesters (Keller, 2007a:12). In the 2010s, there have been signs of waning interest in the annual rally (Jeffay, 2010), with only 20,000 reported to have attended the annual rally in 2012 (Lior, 2012).

For the liberal Zionist component, their use of demonstrations conforms to the theoretical perspective whereby people tend to employ tactics that are known and easy to deploy; demonstrations in Israel are seen as ‘worthy and time-honoured formula in the Israeli peace movement’ (Keller, 2007b:14). However, what was once a disruptive tactic has now become institutionalised with both demonstrators and the authorities playing by the rules of the game, losing much of its effectiveness in challenging the authorities (Tarrow, 2011:112). Furthermore, given the difficulty in being able to mobilise large numbers of the Israeli public in this phase, the aim of demonstrations as a mobilising tool for the liberal Zionist component has become less significant and the role of demonstrations has shifted from a mobilising tactic to an expression and reaffirmation of the very existence of the activists. As explained to the author by one activist, they are a way ‘for us to hear ourselves, see ourselves, meet with people, reaffirm our existence to ourselves and somewhat to the outside world, to say we are still here, we haven’t given up’ (Baum, 2013). They therefore retain some significance for Israeli peace activism, although different from previously.

In the previous phases of Israeli peace activism certain locations became symbolic for demonstrations. For example, Rabin Square in Tel Aviv, as it was so named following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, became the central site for mass demonstrations of the peace movement. Since the square had previously been filled with hundreds and thousands of protesters, caution was given to choosing this as a site for demonstrations following 2000, when it was acknowledged that participation was unlikely to reach such numbers (Peace Now, 2001a:11-12). Use of the square was therefore mainly limited to the annual Rabin Memorial demonstration, which is considered the ‘annual moment when the Peace Camp stands up to be counted’ (Shlomot in Keller, 2007a:11).

The anniversary of the beginning of the occupation and the anniversary of the start of the second Intifada were explained to the author as two additional symbolic events that the peace activists from across the components felt needed a large public demonstration (Baum, 2013). The forty year anniversary of the occupation was a particularly poignant event. Activists had long prepared a week of consecutive protest events, with an umbrella group, ‘Occupation 40,’ publicising the list of activities (Keller, 2007b:14). Despite ideological differences between the range of activists, a rally and a march were held on Saturday 9 June 2007, with a number of speakers, mainly veteran peace activists such as Naomi Chazan, former Member of Knesset and Director of the New Israel Fund (Keller, 2007b:13-16).
In addition to these annual mass rallies, smaller rallies were organised by organisations and coalitions in response to certain actions of the Israeli government. These were held in the smaller symbolic locations, such as outside the Prime Minister’s residence and in Paris Square in Jerusalem, the site of the Nashim B’Shachor vigils since 1988. Marches were also conducted in an attempt to draw attention from the Israeli public. For example, in March 2001, Shalom Achshav organised a picket line against settlements in front of Jerusalem town hall (Peace Now, 2001b:15). Demonstrations were also called in 2002 at the height of Operation Defensive Shield, the Israeli government’s largest military operation against the Palestinian population in the West Bank since 1967 (The Other Israel, 2002a:16-17).

Despite the organisation of these demonstrations it was acknowledged by all components that demonstrations had lost their impact as a mobilisation method and as a disruptive tactic. In the previous phase demonstrations were not only used to portray a message to the government and broader public but as a means of mobilising individuals into acting. However, it is no longer used as a mobilising tool or the main tactic employed by Israeli peace activists to challenge the situation.

2.2 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

Refusing to enlist in military service, either reserve duty or post-high school national duty, has continued to be a way to challenge the Israeli government’s policies and the IDF’s actions, with a steady continuation of individuals or groups publicly announcing their refusal, as well as those who avoid service without declaring themselves as conscientious objectors. ‘Refuseniks’ are a key part of the human rights component, presenting a specific means of challenging the conflict that highlights their objection to the policies of the Israeli authorities. These anti-war voices, however small, confirm the existence of some form of Israeli peace movement. According to the left-wing magazine, The Other Israel,

‘Refusal had been on the upsurge since the beginning of the present cycle of bloodshed in October 2000. Throughout 2001 Yesh Gvul, the long-standing refusers’ support group, got on its hot line hundreds of calls from soldiers who could not stand the occupation duty to which they were ordered. There was also an unprecedented increase of youngsters refusing military service altogether, with their cases getting the support of New Profile, founded in the 1990s. And in June 2001, there was the Refusal Letter signed by 62 high school pupils facing conscription. Altogether, in the past year and half more than a thousand soldiers have signed various personal or collective declarations of refusal, and several dozen have undergone terms of imprisonment’ (Yesh Gvul, 2002:25).

Whilst conscientious objection is part of the human rights component of Israeli peace activism, differences can be noted amongst different refusal groups; either the motivation behind the act or the extent of refusal. On the more moderate side is a group of reservists refusing to serve that emerged in 2002, Ometz l’Sarev (Courage to Refuse), who framed their refusal by declaring themselves as patriots and Zionists, ‘speaking with authority of having come directly from the field’ (The Other Israel, 2002b:25)
and arguing that in fact, refusal to serve in the occupied territories is Zionist (Courage to Refuse, 2003). They tended to continue to serve in defensive operations but refuse to serve in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Slightly more radical is the veteran group, Yesh Gvul, which extends back to the first Lebanon war in 1982 and supports those that have previously done their compulsory service post High School and are now refusing to conduct their reserve duty. However, they support all forms of selective refusal based on the belief that, ‘every soldier is responsible for his actions’ (Kidren in Gorenberg, 2002). Throughout the current phase of Israeli peace activism, reservist soldiers and pilots have selectively refused to serve, both in the occupied territories and in Gaza \(^{35}\) and in 2014 the first intelligence unit voiced their objections (Cohen, 2014).

On the more radical end of the ‘refuseniks’ spectrum are high-school refusers, those who refuse to enter the IDF altogether. According to an interview with an activist who is very critical of compulsory national service, some teenagers find ways around having to serve, such as through psychiatric discharge, known as Profile 21 (Golany, 2013), whereas others have chosen to publicly declare themselves as conscientious objectors, risking imprisonment but, gaining the attention of the public and authorities in the process. These ‘refuseniks’ are known as the Shministim (Seniors). In 2014 there was an estimated three thousand Shministim (Chelala, 2014) with fifty teenagers writing to Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2014 declaring their refusal to serve (AFP, 2014). Although the occupation is part of the reason why the Shministim refuse to serve in the IDF, there are often many other reasons for not wanting to serve, including feminist politics and pacifist ideals however, one recent contentious objector told that author that attention to the occupation is seen as a strategic reason for refusal (Vardi, 2013), in order to create a public act of protest, forcing Israelis to ‘look at the harsh day-to-day reality of occupation’ (White, 2008). One of the most recent signatories explains that part of her motivation in refusing to serve was to raise awareness, declaring that ‘it’s enough for me to know that one other person read the letter and changed his or her mind [about the occupation]. That’s how I know I’ve done my job’ (Lax in Konrad, 2014).

Whilst refusal is significant in that it challenges and confronts an important institution in Israeli society, the authorities have found a means of responding to reduce their impact, either by not jailing the reservist refusers, as this only brings them attention, or using ‘firm action’ to delegitimise the high-school refusers in the eyes of the public (Baruch, 2014).

2.3 PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES

The use of people-to-people activities can mainly be seen in the liberal Zionist component. They were a prolific form of peace activity in the years both leading up to and during the Oslo Agreements (Kaufman, Salem, Verhoeven, 2006) and had the aim of breaking down barriers between the two sides, humanising the other and ‘transforming the relationship between the parties’ (Maoz, \(^{35}\) See the website of Profil Hadash and the website of Yesh Gvul (Appendix 1) for examples of conscientious objectors in these operations.)
The second Intifada dealt a severe blow to these activities with many of the groups unable to continue (Maoz, 2004), due to a combination of fear and mistrust between the two sides, the increased taboo of meeting with the enemy who were in the midst of fighting with each other, and the restriction of movement. Furthermore, there was a questioning of the ‘value’ of activities that brought the two sides together, given the new violent reality (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007:198). However, there were those who wished to continue since they felt that ‘the past years of violence in the Middle East make psycho-political dialogue and people-to-people contacts more necessary than ever’ (Spielberg, 2007:253).

The groups can be divided into those that were active before and succeeded in ‘surviving’ the Intifada and those that emerged during or following the Intifada. The groups that managed to maintain some activities needed to make adjustments in how they conducted their dialogue activities, which represent small scale innovations in the face of shifting realities. The Director of a youth encounter group explained to the author that their activities had to confront the realities, rather than ignore them (Atsmon, 2013) and they had to shift how the activities were practically conducted. For example, Seeds of Peace created virtual forums since it was more difficult for Palestinians and Israelis to travel to meet with each other (Kuriansky, 2007). Halonot: Afikim Letikshoret (Windows: Channels for Communication) developed a system of writing letters between Israeli and Palestinian youth, encouraging the teenagers to express their feelings about the conflict around them (Atsmon, 2013) and the Hug Horim Shakulim set up a chat-line called Hello Shalom, Hello Salam in order for Israelis and Palestinians to be able to continue to speak to each other (Hello Shalom, Hello Salaam, 2002).

Three groups emerged during the second Intifada aimed at creating a physical and psychological space for Israelis and Palestinians to meet and ‘experience each other’s humanity’ (Vazana, 2009), which follows the contact hypothesis that formed the basis of people-to-people contacts in the 1990s. The Sulha Peace Project is an encounter group that brings the two sides together and is based on a traditional Palestinian peace making process that creates an opportunity for individuals to ‘cool down’ until a conflict is resolved (Jabbour, 1996). The author met with individuals active in two further groups to understand the motivation behind them. The All Nations Café was set up with the aim of ‘breaking barriers’ (Or, 2013) and acted as a meeting place for people from different countries, backgrounds and ethnicities. The Centre for Emerging Futures was set up in 2004 under the principle that the more people get to know each other, the better (Fuchs, 2013). They hold ‘Global Village Square’ meetings for those who are curious to meet with someone from the other side. As a tactic, these meeting points for Israelis and Palestinians aim to break down general preconceptions that Israelis and Palestinians have of each other and create a space where individuals can vent their frustrations.

2.4 RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Professional organisations have continued to develop projects that focus on producing research, information and policy recommendations and often involve cooperation between Israelis and
Palestinians. This includes think tanks, track II diplomacy initiatives and human rights research. These have tended to come from the liberal Zionist and human rights component.

The think tanks of the liberal Zionist component that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s continued to operate, such as the Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF) and Ecopace Mizrach Tichon (EcoPeace Middle East). They have continued to develop policy recommendations and position papers, mainly based on the issues that remained unsolved following Camp David II, in an attempt to push forward with the peace process. The Foreign Media Office of Ecopace Mizrach Tichon explained to the author that the organisation has focused specifically on environmental issues, dealing with sustainable regional development in the context of peaceful relations (Edelstein, 2013). Some of the publications are made available to the public, while others are restricted since they were developed in closed-door track II meetings with recommendations solely for the viewing of decision makers. Two conflict resolution initiatives released in the early 2000s were developed from track II negotiations. In 2002, HaMifkad HaLeumi (The People’s Referendum) was set up to canvass support for the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Initiative, which put forward proposals for a peace initiative that deal with the sticking points between the two sides, such as the issue of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem. Yozmat Geneva (Geneva Initiative) was released in 2003 and led by Yossi Beilin, the initiator and architect of the 1993 Oslo Accords, when he was Deputy Foreign Minister in Rabin’s government, who decided to continue negotiations with Palestinians after the official process had broken down, despite not having authority to do so. In opinion polls Yozmat Geneva was recorded to have gained the support of thirty to forty percent of the Israeli public in 2003 in part simply because people were made aware of the initiative as the organisation produced millions of copies of the document and posted it through every door in Israel (Keller and Zilversmidt, 2003/4:11). On a more grassroots level is Mohot shel Shalom (Minds of Peace), which holds public negotiation congresses in town centres, giving the opportunity for the general public to discuss the situation and come up with agreements (Handelman, [no date]). The tactics of informal diplomacy directly show that there is ‘a partner for peace’ on both sides and they highlight to the public and to the two governments that agreements can be reached between Israelis and Palestinians, even on the most difficult points.

Think tanks have historically played a significant role in the development of peace activities and in generating new ideas, seen by some as being prefatory to any people-to-people activities. The new Co-Director of IPCRI explained in an interview that, ‘right now to talk about proper peace education without having an alternative plan, I think it is difficult to do, once we do have a plan, then we will be able to get back into peace education’ (Goldenblatt, 2013). The leaders of Molad, who were heavily involved in a variety of radical grassroots initiatives since the second Intifada, in groups such as Shovrim Shtika, also explained to the author that they have come to the realisation that a,

36 See ECF ([no date]) for selected project publications from the Economic Cooperation Foundation and see (IPCRI, [no date]) for a list of research and information conducted by IPCRI.
‘Grassroots movement has its limitations...it is time and energy consuming [and]... the peace movement, if we can call it that, is very lacking in ideas and you cannot hope to expand without really being able to articulate new ideas and being able to convey those ideas’ (Sharon, 2013).

They are therefore shifting to research and analysis in order to ‘inject quality content into the Israeli public discourse’ (Molad, [no date, a]). This shift is explained by Tarrow as, ‘the lure of politics [which] draws activists towards more contained forms [of activism] such as lobbying [and] publishing,’ (2011:104).

Reporting on human rights abuses has a similar goal in generating information but is focused on the problems of the occupation rather than the solutions. This continued to be a significant tactic for the human rights component, namely the human rights organisations, as a means of revealing hidden narratives. B’Tselem and ACRI, the two oldest and most established human rights organisations, continue to publish and disseminate reports on the civil and human rights situation in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. Machsom Watch also focus much of their attention on writing reports of their observations at the checkpoints. According to one activist, ‘the importance of this activity [being present at checkpoints] is documentation of the very routine, the dark reality of daily life in the checkpoints’ (Yehudit Kirsten-Keshet in Isachar, 2003). Yesh Din (There is Justice) was founded in 2005 by members from Machsom Watch and also focuses on human rights violations but with an expanded area of research to cover the whole of the West Bank. Their activities ‘focus on the extent of Israel’s implementation of its duty to protect the Palestinian civilians under its armed forces’ (Yesh Din, [no date]), providing regular reports on the situation for the Palestinians. Whilst not directly related to human rights, Shalom Achshav is also involved in disseminating on the ground information from the West Bank. Particularly since the 2005 disengagement of Israel from Gaza, it has become a specialist professional organisation focused on revealing problems of the occupation by reporting on settlement activity and has built up a ‘reputation as a credible and accurate information source about the settlements’ (Ofran, 2010).

2.5 LEGAL TACTICS

The research of the human rights organisations and the Settlement Watch Project is often used to inform the legal actions that continued to be used by all three components in this phase. This is not a new method of confrontation, with ACRI using legal tactics from its inception in 1972 to ‘set precedents, raise issues of principle, and affect broad-based policy change’ (ACRI, [no date]). In 1987 they dealt with issues of deportation of Palestinians considered a threat to Israel (H CJ, 785/87); in the first Intifada they offered legal assistance to those involved in nonviolent actions (Bardin, 2012:13) and throughout the 2000s they have petitioned the Supreme Court on issues that cover their three goals, with ACRI citing eleven ‘landmark cases’ between 2002 and 2011 (ACRI, 2013). Other human rights groups followed their lead: PCATI petitioned the High Court of Justice against the legality of methods of ‘moderate physical
pressure’ during interrogations of Palestinians (HCJ 5100/94); B’Tselem and Rofim l’Zchuyot Adam, along with five other human rights organisations, petitioned for state authorities to explain the use of Palestinians as ‘human shields’ during military operations in the West Bank (HCJ 3799/02); Shalam Achshav lodged a Supreme Court appeal against the Migron settlement outpost, with evidence of Palestinian land ownership (HCJ, 8887/06); and Gisha has a legal centre to assist Palestinians from Gaza who need to travel outside of Gaza. They provide lawyers to sign affidavits and if that does not work, they take the case to court (Hary, 2013). One of the biggest successes of using legal action was the Supreme Court order for the route of the planned separation barrier in Bil’in to be moved so that it did not separate Palestinians from their land (HCJ 8414/05). However, Michael Sfard, the lawyer for the case, notes that it was not the legal petition alone that achieved this but a combination of the legal route and the demonstrations (Sfard in Surrusco, 2013c), with legal work and the grassroots activism on the ground often used in strategic collaboration (Vardi, 2013).

The use of legal challenges by more groups against the occupation in this phase can be linked to the decision made by the International Court of Justice in 2004 to declare the building of the barrier on Palestinian land illegal under the ‘Legal Consequences for the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ (ICJ, 2004) and the attention that the case brought to the situation. This gives the activists some weight when taking related cases to the Israeli Supreme Court.

Legal means have also continued to be a necessity for those activists in the radical component, both Israeli and Palestinian, who are arrested during actions in the West Bank, with legal representation provided to both Palestinians and Israelis by some of the human rights groups. Similar legal representation was provided to Palestinians by Israeli groups in the first Intifada (Cohen in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010:38).

There is significant debate over the effectiveness of using legal means to challenge the occupation. According to some, if a principled petition is brought to the High Court and the case fails, then it legitimises and legalises certain practices under the Law of Occupation (Hary, 2013; Sheizaf, 2012a). Some therefore tend to avoid the more principled cases for fear of rubber stamping elements of the occupation by the High Court of Justice (Hary, 2013) and argue the goal is to focus on individual cases. Others argue that the High Court should not be used at all as a means of challenging the occupation since it is just ‘one of the branches that institutionalises it [the occupation]’, as the High Court of Justice ‘never questions or stops Israeli policies. At best, it asks for some adjustments to be made’ (Sheizaf, 2011a). According to this argument, even when a petition is successful the rulings can actually make it easier for certain practices to be carried out. For example, ACRI took a case to the High Court over a segregated road in the West Bank and won. However, the decision actually enabled the IDF to legally continue as they had been, since the Justices ruled that, ‘the military commander doesn’t have the authority to completely – highlight completely – ban the road to Palestinian traffic’ (El-Ad in Surrusco,

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37 See for example, Shulman’s (2007) account during early years of the second Intifada and the arrest of Ta’ayush activist Ezra Nawi (Ha’aretz, 2012).
The Commander did not completely close the road, thus following the ruling but, only on rare occasions allowed Palestinians to use the road.

However, whilst acknowledging legal tactics will not end the occupation, others argue that appealing to the High Court of Justice is worthwhile, despite some negative consequences (Kretzmer, 2012; Wiener, 2012). Kretzmer’s (2012) review of the contribution of the High Court of Justice in the law of belligerent occupation in dealing with petitions relating to the occupied territories argues that in bringing these cases to Court, often the authorities will reconsider their actions in the face of a judicial review. Wiener (2012) argues that cases that assist individuals, such as preventing the demolition of a house are worthwhile in and of themselves because even if not successful, they ‘provide an additional voice to the victim of the occupation.’ Furthermore, it helps in giving attention to these issues, which are often not dealt with in the Israeli public sphere.

3 EVOLUTION: DISRUPTIVE NON-VIOLENT ACTION

From the early days of the second Intifada, an evolution in the tactical repertoire available to the radical component can be identified. This is reflective of and connected to the shifts in collective action frames of the radical component, which made available more confrontational modes of operation. Building on the initial developments in the tactics of the radical component in the late 1990s, the central tactics shifted from nonviolent demonstrations in Israeli towns to nonviolent direct action in the West Bank. Israeli activists use the term nonviolent direct action (NVDA) to describe those tactics that Sharp (1973a, 1973b) would define as nonviolent intervention, which is where the opponents are more directly challenged by the activists physically seeking to change a situation in the present through certain actions, rather than demonstrating for the authorities to make a change.

This started in the form of humanitarian action with the aim, similar to the emerging activities of the human rights component in the first Intifada, of alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians in the short-term and evolved into nonviolent direct action, aimed at directly changing the realities on the ground. Although the activists continued to label their activities as nonviolent direct action, it has become more accurate to describe most of the tactics employed since the early days of the separation barrier as nonviolent resistance (NVR), which have elements of both direct action and demonstrations. Israeli activists make a distinction between nonviolent direct action and nonviolent resistance to denote the difference between actively changing a situation in the present and protesting against a situation. These would both fall under Sharp’s definition of nonviolent intervention (1973, 1973b). Whilst these demonstrations still continue on a weekly basis, the next step in this evolution of tactical repertoires has been towards nonviolent non-cooperation, which affects the ability of the authorities to maintain normalcy in the system (Sharp, 1973a, 1973b), through efforts based on boycott, divestment and sanctions. It should be noted that this evolution was not a linear, chronological shift; the different actions sometimes occurred simultaneously and one did not fully replace the other. However, the influence of one tactic on another can be identified in the order outlined.
Activism in the West Bank was not a new phenomenon. Activists from the radical component had consistently developed contacts with Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza from as early as the 1970s (Warschawski, 2002) and individuals from the liberal Zionist component began conducting dialogue activities in the West Bank during the first Intifada (Bardin, 2012). As Shalom Achshav became closer to the Palestinian cause in the late 1980s, they also developed contacts with Palestinians (Hermann, 2009). However, on most occasions the liberal Zionist component would respect any restrictions placed on the meetings and avoided confrontation with the IDF (Hermann, 2009), unlike the radical activists who were willing to confront the authorities if necessary. There were members of Shalom Achshav who organised demonstrations at checkpoints or by settlements in the West Bank during the mid-to-late 90s (Hermann, 2009) however, these activities were not the core of Shalom Achshav’s tactical repertoire and were often conducted by their youth wing and core activists. As explained to the author, the liberal Zionist component halted all such activities in the wake of the second Intifada (Golan, 2014b), leaving the radical and human rights components to pursue these forms of activism. Given the decline of activities held within Israel proper, a re-balancing of where the main forms of activism were held in this phase can be clearly identified, with much greater attention than before on acting where the occupation is taking place.

The evolution in the tactical repertoire identified in Israeli peace activism is mainly observed in the radical component and clearly led by them. The human rights and liberal Zionist components have employed some of these tactics at times and locations that are felt appropriate and often with specific limitations on the use of some of these tactics, such as a stricter limit on what can be considered non-violent. This fits well with McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001:49) belief that repertoires are limited to what is considered ‘feasible and intelligible’ to a particular set of actors, suggesting that tactics are directly connected to the ways in which the activists frame themselves, the prevailing problems and the solutions to the conflict.

3.1 FROM DEMONSTRATIONS TO HUMANITARIAN ACTION

As the realities of the second Intifada became clear, along with the futile results of the vigils and demonstrations, action became the focus of the radical component of Israeli peace activism and, as explained to the author, ‘protest no longer forms part of the main language of our [the Israeli activists’] work’ (Baum, 2013). The realisation that current tactics being employed were not suitable for the situation occurred early on in the Intifada, particularly in response to the provocative and violent events that sparked the second Intifada, most significantly the inflammatory visit of Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount and the killing of thirteen Arab citizens of Israel. According to one activist writing for The Other Israel,

‘A whole cluster of activities which we intended to include in this issue [of The Other Israel] became outdated overnight. Events from before the explosion now seem almost

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38 See for example The Other Israel (1996b) and Zilversmidt (1995).
irrelevant. These included the campaign launched by Gush Shalom for "Jerusalem -- Capital of Two States", with big ads in the papers and an impressive vigil at the foot of the Old City walls attended by Israelis and Palestinians; [and] the follow-up in the form of a Peace Now march under a not so different slogan...These, and much more, that demanded our time and energy seem now to belong to a different era -- an era from which we are irrevocably separated by the storm of aroused passions, flying bullets and spilled blood that began after that fateful morning when Ariel Sharon managed to pull off the supreme provocation’ (Keller, 2000b:3).

With the realisation that ‘protest for its own sake did not seem effective, solidarity actions with a humanitarian tone [became] the mobilising force’ (Bdeir and Halevi, 2002). The first group to employ humanitarian action was Ta’ayush, a joint Israeli and Palestinian organisation that sent convoys of food and clothing to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who were suffering due to closures and curfews. Their actions had remnants of the humanitarian groups in the human rights component, such as Rabanim l’maan Zchuyot haAd. However, the joint nature of their activism, their grassroots emphasis, the focus on justice in their collective action frames and the more confrontational tactics they employed later, places them in the radical component. According to an interview between the author and veteran peace activist Reuven Kaminer,

‘Ta’ayush discovered something, that people in the radical left did not believe in any kind of political process so, instead of organising a demonstration with 150 people by the Prime Minister’s office, they said, let’s fill up a truck with goods and go to one of the areas and bring them stuff’ (Kaminer, 2013).

The tactics employed by Ta’ayush and other groups encouraged the mechanism of brokerage, which ‘links previously unconnected social sites’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:102). Ta’ayush was able to mediate new relations between Palestinians and Israelis through humanitarian action, which further encouraged its use and feasibility. The foundation for joint Israeli-Palestinian action that focused on ‘doing’ rather than protesting was built from these actions and had a significant influence in the continued evolution of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism.

3.2 FROM HUMANITARIAN ACTION TO NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION

Alongside humanitarian action emerged a conscious and strategic move towards nonviolent direct action amongst the radical component, which developed into ‘the central strategy of the Israeli peace movement during the recent Intifada’ (Svirsky, [no date]). Svirsky explains that whilst there were some examples of direct action in the previous phase, it was not a significant or regular part of the repertoire of contention until this phase.

Nonviolent direct action was initiated and led by women’s groups and individual women from the radical component. For example, members of the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom stood in front of army bulldozers,
chained themselves to olive trees and rebuilt demolished homes (Svirsky, 2004). One activist, Ilana Hammerman, employed direct action and civil disobedience by smuggling Palestinians from the West Bank into Israel without permits. Through a group she founded, Lo Metsaytot (We Do Not Obey), Israeli women have organized different direct actions, such as replacing army signs at the checkpoints which instill fear and separation, with signs exclaiming that Israelis and Palestinians ‘refuse to be enemies’ (Matar, 2013). Actions that Ta’ayush conducted in the first few months of 2001, alongside the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom (Coalition of Women for Peace), Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), Rabanim l’maan Zchuyot haAdam, haMercaz l’Informazia Alternativit and ICAHD, also included tactics that resembled direct action such as dismantling roadblocks and filling trenches that had been created by the Israeli army to ensure closure of the Palestinian villages (Svirsky, [no date]). The Palestinian olive harvest in particular has become a central site for acts of nonviolent direct action, bringing together activists from across the components, including Shalom Achshav. They travel to the West Bank in order to assist farmers with their harvest and ‘to guarantee the safety of the Palestinians against attacks from the settlers and the army while they harvest their olive crop’ (Ta’ayush, 2001).

The use of nonviolent direct action can be seen as an evolution from humanitarian action, involving disruptive tactics that not only assist Palestinians’ daily lives but also aim to actively counter certain practices of the Israeli authorities on the ground. The forms of direct action employed built on the acquired experience of veteran activists in accessing areas of the West Bank and in having the necessary relationships with Palestinians.

The liberal Zionist component has avoided employing direct action, since they were not willing to participate in civil disobedience (Svirsky, [no date]) but preferred to stay within the lines of legal protest. In conformity with the theory of tactical repertoires, the identities and the framing of the liberal Zionist component meant direct action was not a feasible or strategic tactic for them to employ and was not part of the tactical repertoire that was available to them. As explained to the author, in the previous phase, members of Shalom Achshav would encourage people to join them for ‘sit-ins’ in the occupied territories however, following the second Intifada they refrained from such activities (Golan, 2014b). In this phase some dissident members of Shalom Achshav, frustrated with their lack of movement towards nonviolent direct action, participated in the activities of other groups (Golan, 2013).

3.3 FROM NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION TO NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE

Whilst direct action formed a central part of the activism of the radical component, direct action no longer continues to be the most suitable term to describe the majority of the tactics employed by the activists. According to an interview with one activist, ‘direct action is supposed to mean going to where there is a wrong doing and changing it without asking for anyone’s permission’ (Wagner, 2013). The actions that have taken place since the construction of the separation barrier, whilst they have elements of direct action, such as cutting barbed wire sections of the barrier, cannot be described as direct action since they fail to reach a point in which they make a change, such as actually cutting
through the wire and crossing the barrier, due to the life-threatening nature of such an act. The activities therefore more closely resemble demonstrations, since the activists know in advance they will not succeed in the ‘direct action’ but are re-enacting the same scene with the IDF and can therefore be referred to as nonviolent resistance. The demonstrations used in nonviolent resistance in Israel differ from demonstrations in the 1990s in that they are located at the site of the violation and are aimed at challenging the Israeli authorities, not at mobilising the Israeli public. Furthermore they tend to be more confrontational.

Regular demonstrations in the form of nonviolent resistance against the separation barrier were incorporated in the repertoire of contention of the radical component in 2003 following a four-month protest camp formed by Palestinian, Israeli and international activists in the Palestinian village of Mas‘ha, whose land was being cut off due to the erection of the separation barrier (Baum, 2013). This marked the starting point of Anarchistim Neged HaGader, a group of Israeli activists that decided to join the Palestinian popular struggle against the separation barrier, through direct resistance (Active Stills, 2009). Each week Israeli activists travel to the West Bank to join Palestinians in resisting the separation barrier, which has spread to different Palestinian villages, most notably Bil‘in, Nabi Saleh and Al Ma‘asara.39

The move to nonviolent resistance as a key tactic of the radical groups can be explained by appealing to the mechanism of appropriation, which ‘paves the way for innovative action by re-orientating an existing group to a new conception of its collective purpose’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:102). Following a few years of developing relationships with Palestinian activists and shifting their focus to solidarity-based actions, the Israelis joined the Palestinian activists in their popular struggle against the separation barrier, which became the site and target of much of the activism of the radical groups. Furthermore, the involvement of international activists from the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) set the tone of what it meant to act in solidarity with the Palestinian activists, to which Israeli activists followed. One activist explained to the author that the aesthetics of nonviolent resistance against the separation barrier also has clear influences from the anti-globalisation movement (Sharon, 2013), exemplifying how tactics can diffuse from the international dimension to a domestic context.40

The use of NVR by the more moderate groups in the radical component, particularly Lochamim l’Shalom, opened the debate over the extent to which such tactics could be considered nonviolent both in principle and in practice and led to disagreements within the radical component in the use and implementation of nonviolent resistance, allowing the opportunity for small scale innovations, modifying the repertoire of nonviolent resistance (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:138) and opening the space for new activists to mobilise. Whilst a core member of Anarchistim Neged HaGader explained to the author that ‘violence is not really [their] tactics, or the tactics of the demonstrations that [they]...
are part of’ (Snitz, 2013a), they have received a reputation of being part of violent demonstrations with other activists arguing that, ‘the non-violent demonstrations are very violent...a lot of these demonstrations create violence’ (Or, 2013). Even if the activists did not employ violent tactics, they are criticised because they are fully aware that the demonstrations provoke a violent response from the IDF, with rubber bullets and tear gas shot at the demonstrators. However, other activists explained to the author that provoking a violent response through nonviolent means is legitimate and does not constitute a violent demonstration on behalf of the activists (Rothman, 2013).

A further argument centres on whether stone throwing (a symbol of Palestinian resistance) constitutes violence and, if it does, then Israeli support for a demonstration that involves stone throwing suggests that they legitimise the use of violence. Some argued that whilst the activists from Anarchistim Neged HaGader are not employing violence themselves, their presence ‘gives a seal of approval to rock throwing’ (Rothman, 2013), which puts into question whether this group can be seen as nonviolent.

In order to distance themselves from demonstrations involving some level of violence or provocation of it, Lochamim I’Shalom have developed creative methods in order to emphasise the nonviolent nature of their protest, signifying small scale innovations. They developed creative ways of demonstrating against the Israeli army and the occupation without employing violence or encouraging a violent response from soldiers. One activist described to the author that in the activities of Lochamin L’Shalom,

‘We avoid violence because the army can be very violent; they are just kids and they are terrified...we play football in front of the army, we have flown kites...we try to come with something original’ (Lester, 2013).

In a demonstration attended by the author in the Palestinian village of Tulkarem in the West Bank, the Israeli and Palestinian activists put on a theatrical performance in front of the IDF that highlighted the struggle of the Palestinians. In moderating the way in which they conduct NVR in the West Bank, the demonstrations of Lochamin L’Shalom are less risky than Anarchistim Neged haGader and therefore are likely to attract more participants or at least more support in general. However travelling to the West Bank is risky for Israelis in itself, especially to areas that are prohibited for Israelis to travel to.

Younger radical activists have also tried to add performance to nonviolent resistance. Some notable examples are the activists that dressed up as clowns for the weekly Friday protest in the village of al-Ma’asara; described by one activist as, ‘the bitter nose-less clowns with the uniforms and the big oversized weapons [referring to the Israeli army] on one side and the sweet clowns on the other side.’ The aim was to ‘highlight the absurdity of all forms of repression’ (Ben-Abba, 2012). A drumming group called Yasamba, linked to the transnational anti-globalisation group of the same name, can also be found at many of the West Bank demonstrations and in Jerusalem. They create a festival-like feeling to the demonstration, encouraging participants to sing and chant. These small-scale innovations link to the
theory in which ‘stereotyped performances lose effectiveness’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:138) and therefore activists look for ways to dramatize the action to re-gain attention.

3.4 FROM NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO BOYCOTT

As activists were becoming exhausted from running back and forth from demonstrations that often involved violence; no longer being able to deal with the post trauma, some looked for ways in which they could act whilst not having to subject themselves to these risks (Baum, 2013). They felt that a new tactic was needed since they had, ‘tried everything – demonstrations, petitions, and international pressure’ and so they felt the next step would be to try a boycott (Khulood in Svirsky, 2006).

Whilst the use of boycott by Israeli activists as a means of opposing the Israeli occupation has its origins in the late 1980s with the HaShana HaEsrim v’Achat and was given a tangible campaign by Gush Shalom in 1997 with their call to boycott goods that came from the settlements (Avneri, 1997:7), it was not until after the outbreak of the second Intifada that Israeli initiatives began to emerge calling for a comprehensive boycott of Israel. The first call was initiated in April 2001 by Professor Rachel Giora and Professor Tanya Reinhart, collecting an initial 35 signatories calling for a worldwide boycott of Israeli goods and avoidance of leisure travel to Israel (Giora, 2010). Similar boycott calls in the first years of the second Intifada were made by Israeli academics but, the activist groups and organisations were yet to take a stance on this issue or employ this as a key tactic. It was only in response to a number of Palestinian calls for a boycott against Israel, starting with a group of sixteen Palestinian civil society organisations in August 2002 (Badil, 2002); followed by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) in July 2004 (PACBI, 2004); and culminating in the Palestinian Call for Boycotts, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel in July 2005 (BDS Movement, 2005), that the Israeli activist response began to gain momentum. Initially, the more established radical groups, such as Nashim b’Shachor, ICAHD, ACRI and Profil Hadash issued statements supporting the boycott (Giora, 2010) and conferences were organised to discuss this method of resisting the occupation (Giora, 2010). Discussions were then held in 2007 and 2008 amongst the radical component to decide the ways in which the BDS campaign could be built within Israeli society and what use could be made of ‘organised Jewish-Israeli endorsement for the campaign’ (Snitz and Harush, 2008).

The extent to which BDS is employed depends not only on the component of Israeli peace activism but, also on individual groups. Only a small portion of the radical groups are calling for full BDS, mainly those involved in Boycott from Within and Anarchistim Neged haGader. Gush Shalom, one of the key players of the radical component in the first two phases of Israeli peace activism and the group that first initiated a boycott campaign, maintains that boycott of settlements only is the most strategic method since, ‘a boycott must serve the purpose of isolating the settlers and the individuals and institutions that support them – but not declaring war on Israel and the Israeli people as such’ (Avneri, 2009). This brings them more in line with Shalom Achshav, which supports a boycott of settlement goods, something which they
only publicly declared in December 2011 following the passing of the Boycott Law\textsuperscript{41} in Knesset, which made a call for boycott an offence against the law (Hartman, 2011). This is in line with the framing strategy of Shalom Achshav not to place themselves too far ahead of the Israeli public.

From the radical component, two means with which to support and implement a boycott have emerged. The first was formed by those who decided to join the Palestinian call for boycott, using the 2005 initiative as their framework. They viewed this as ‘potentially the most powerful nonviolent campaign possible to stop the ongoing war crimes committed in the name of the Jewish people’ (Snitz and Harush, 2008). An activist from a group called Boycott from Within explained to the author that the group formed with the view that, ‘a message from Israelis [Jews] carries more weight than any other messages about BDS’ (Neiman, 2013), as it encourages the removal of criticisms that BDS in anti-Semitic. This group often uses creative performances to communicate about the occupation and the need to boycott Israel. One activist told the author that they organised a flash mob at the beginning of a concert of the Cape Town Opera in Israel, distributing leaflets with information about South African Apartheid and the situation in Israel and Palestine, gaining the attention of the audience without disturbing the concert (Rothschild, 2013).

The second tactic was formed by Koalitziat Nashim L’Shalom, bringing together a group of economic researchers under the group, Mi Marviha? (Who Profits), set up in 2007. Dalit Baum (2013), the director of the project, explained to the author that whilst the BDS movement has the potential to be very successful, it is unclear how Israelis can boycott Israel if they live and work in Israel. They therefore turned their efforts towards corporations who profit from the occupation based on the idea that,

‘We do know that nobody likes corporations profiting from human rights violations...we know that the occupation is costly but it is costly to the state, while the economy is benefitting through the private sector, following the privatisation of the 1990s...so maybe by focusing on the corporations, we can find a new audience and new allies because corporations are not people and because corporate crime goes in many different directions and many people suffer from it’ (Baum, 2013).

Mi Marviha? have formed a professional research group, which provides information services and research services for BDS campaigns all around the world (Baum, 2011). Baum notes that their database of corporations involved in the occupation is not a boycott list and that different methods should be used in approaching the different companies (Baum in Nieuwhof, 2009).

BDS as a tactic highlights the connection between the international dimension and a domestic movement. According to a member of Boycott from Within, ‘once you do BDS work, you do a lot of global work’ (Rothschild, 2013). Firstly they are simply part of the larger, global BDS movement and secondly, a reciprocal relationship in the diffusion of tactics and ideas between the international activism

\textsuperscript{41} For English translation of the ‘Boycott Law’ see ACRI (2011).
and the domestic activism can be noted in this case. Tactics of the Palestinian and international BDS movement, which have conducted campaigns such as approaching artists to not perform in Israel or Universities not to collaborate with Israeli institutions, diffused into Israeli peace activism through the Boycott From Within group. On the other side, the focus on corporations has had the effect of influencing the tactics of the international BDS movement by providing targets for boycott and accurate information to base their tactics on.

BDS is arguably one of the more successful tactics employed by Israeli peace activists. Indications of success of the BDS movement can be seen in four areas. Firstly, examples of international institutions that decided to divest from Israel, such the decision by Veolia, a service and utility company, to pull out from investing in the Jerusalem light rail (Baum, 2011). Secondly, BDS has been gaining attention amongst the international mainstream with an article in the print edition of The Economist published in February 2014 explaining that international financial institutions are beginning to consider an Israeli boycott and Israeli businessmen are becoming increasingly concerned (The Economist, 2014). Thirdly, the European Union submitted guidelines in July 7, 2013 that went into effect in January 2014, ‘forbidding any funding, cooperation, awarding of scholarships, research funds or prizes to anyone residing in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem’ (Ravid, 2013).

Fourthly, this rise in the BDS movement has resulted in the mobilisation of an anti-BDS campaign both in Israel and across the world. Responses to the EU Guidelines and to the international BDS movement by Israeli officials suggest that they are concerned about the growing impact of BDS and can therefore be a final indicator of the growing success of the movement. Netanyahu came out aggressively towards the EU Guidelines (Shiezaf, 2013) and described BDS as ‘the latest chapter in a long and dark history of anti-Semitism’ (Netanyahu, 2014a) and in the 2011 Knesset passed the Boycott Law. These highlight the concern Israeli authorities have towards BDS, of which Israeli activists play a part.

Whilst the evolution in tactical repertoires seems to present ‘new’ and innovative tactics, they were not dramatic innovations in the tactical repertoire available to the peace movement. Similar tactics had been used amongst the more radical groups and even Shalom Achshav in preceding years but had not become the main form of activism. According to Tarrow’s theory on ‘paradigmatic change,’ what may seem like ‘sudden breakthroughs’ in contentious action, are more the result of the ‘slow, historical evolution of the repertoire of contention’ (2011:116-117) and best describes these changes in Israeli peace activism.

3.5 AN EVOLUTION IN ONLINE ACTIVISM AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA

An evolution can also be seen in the use of the internet across all three components, which can be considered a part of the repertoire of contention of a social movement, as well as a mobilisation structure. The different types of online tactics used by Israeli peace activists can be divided into four categories: alternative media sites that give attention to activism on the ground; social media as a

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42 For the full guidelines see EU (2013).
platform to spread information; activism in the form of blogs; and virtual meeting points for Israelis and Palestinians.

Based on the efforts of Indymedia in the late 1990s, alternative media sites have emerged across the components of peace activism in Israel. They aim to provide information about what is happening in the West Bank and Gaza and report on Israeli activism. There is a belief amongst all the components that there is ‘a growing discrepancy between the grim realities they observe in the occupied territories and the way in which it was and is reported in the mainstream media’ (Occupation Magazine, [no date]), making it difficult to bring information about the situation of the Palestinians to the established media (Raz, 2013). The alternative media sites therefore aim to fill this gap in information.

For example, Radio Kol HaShalom (Radio All for Peace), which was set up by former Member of Knesset and former Director of Shalom Achshav, Mossi Raz, along with his Palestinian counterpart Maysa Baransi-Siniora, broadcast the radio show online as well as through a transmitter. On the radical end of the spectrum is Magazine HaKibush (Occupation Magazine), which spreads information about what is happening beyond the Green Line43, as well as recording the various activities of the activists, both Israeli and Palestinian. The contributors themselves are mainly activists from the radical and human rights components. Written in English is a ‘blog based web-magazine’, +972 Mag, which provides news articles and opinion pieces on all events and stories that are considered progressive in Israel and Palestine. It also documents the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism. As explained to the author by its co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, Noam Sheizaf, their aim is to ‘raise a different voice and be part of the political conversation in English…[since] there is a strong international dimension to the conflict right now, so it makes sense to be part of it because it influences life out here’ (Sheizaf, 2013a). However, he is clear that the site is run by journalists and not activists, unlike Magazine HaKibush and Radio Kol HaShalom, and that their organisational goal, to be a respected media outlet, is more important than any political goals. Despite this, a number of the regular writers define themselves as peace activists and whilst the site itself may not be described as an activist site, it is a tool that activists can use to disseminate information and details about their activities.

Alongside the spreading of information by these alternative media sites are social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, which have also been used strategically to spread footage of the realities in the West Bank and Gaza and the various anti-occupation and peace activities. Many of the groups operating in the West Bank film and take photographs of their events and encounters with the IDF and post them to social media sites, to raise awareness of these events. According to the Executive Director of B’Tselem, ‘video is effective in getting people’s attention. When you have actual evidence of crimes taking place it’s much more likely you’re going to get the investigation opened…In addition, video helps you get your foot in the door of opening up the conversation’ (Montell in Surrusco, 2013b). One recent video succeeded in spreading into the mainstream media. The video showed an IDF officer ramming a

43 The Green Line is the demarcation lines set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
rifle in the face of a Danish activist at a West Bank demonstration. As a result of the footage spreading, including being picked up by international mainstream media, the officer was discharged from the army (Kalman, 2012). Whilst it did not lead to the end of the occupation or a change in policies, it had the impact of revealing something to the Israeli public, which according to Bradley Burston from *Ha’aretz*,

‘Forced a moment of pause. Of reflection. Of wondering where we [Israelis] are headed...the occupation will never be the same. Not because it has changed in the slightest. But because - having seen the merest slice of it - we have’ (Burston, 2012).

A photography collective, ActiveStills, was established in 2005 with this idea as its *raison d’être*, specifically to ‘shape public attitudes and to raise awareness on issues that are generally absent from public discourse’ (ActiveStills, [no date]). As well as disseminating the photographs online and in public spaces, they have also been printed in the mainstream media, which enables the realities to reach a wider audience.

There are also personal blogs written in both English and Hebrew that document the activities and thoughts of the activists. A recent conscientious objector and member of a new group in the radical component of Israeli peace activism, All That’s Left, told the author that ‘sometimes writing can definitely be a tool of activism’ (Rothman, 2013) and so for some activists, their individual blogs are also part of their tactical repertoire. Ilan Landau, who can reach up to 15,000 readers of his Hebrew blog, explained to the author that he believes that activism on the ground is much more important but, that online writing ‘feeds into the big picture...by creating alternative political knowledge to the mainstream...not just information but telling people how to think about what is going on’ (Landau, 2013).

The use of social media is directly connected to the external environment in which it operates, both domestic and international. Through the dissemination of information and opening the space for dialogue, the activists provide an alternative portrayal of the situation from mainstream news outlets, thus challenging commonly held beliefs and narratives. For those who have access to social media, this can have the effect of shifting individual thoughts and ideas on the conflict in an accessible manner. However, social media can also be a platform for reaffirming particularistic narratives, especially in times of heightened conflict, when the sides often take defensive positions and retreat back to one-sided narratives or previously held viewpoints.

The internet is also useful as a mobilizing tool in advertising events and activities to individuals. The significance of the internet as a mobilizing tool lies first in its simplicity in connecting individuals and building an online network of supporters towards a cause, as well as allowing for increased connectivity between Israeli activists and international activists, strengthening ties and enabling a faster flow of

44 The author has received ‘Emergency Calls for Action’, through mailing lists of groups including Gush Shalom, Rabanim l’maan Zchuyot haAdam and Ta’ayush.
information and diffusion of tactical repertoires. However, the effectiveness of the internet as a mobilizing tool should not be exaggerated for reasons including the fact that in the pre-internet period hundreds and thousands were mobilised for demonstrations and the limited ability to verify online information. Despite these limitations, Israeli peace activism has made use of the internet to mobilise participants.

4 INNOVATIONS: TOURING THE WEST BANK

Whilst an evolution in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism most accurately describes the main developments in the tactics employed in this phase, particularly for the radical component, one key innovation can also be identified: tours. This innovation is seen across the three components with little difference between them. Tours can be described as an awareness raising and mobilising tactic and has become a significant part of the repertoire of contention of Israeli peace activism. The international dimension has played an influential role in the development of the use of tours, with both tourists and important foreign figures acting as targets of the tours.

Tours had been used previously by Israeli peace activists, for example a dialogue group active in the first Intifada organised ‘A Taste of Peace’ to open their activities to the wider public. The aim was to ‘tour the sites in what will someday be the Palestinian State…meet local Palestinians’ (Bardin, 2012:88). This tour was sponsored by Shalom Achshav and advertised under their name in order to gain wider support. Shalom Achshav also ran their own tours from the mid-1990s to educate individuals about the settlements (Herman, 2009:136) and continue to run politically motivated tours to the settlements and outposts in the West Bank for Israeli students, ‘to get young Israelis to see with their own eyes the reality beyond the Green Line’ (Peace Now, [no date]). Despite these, the tours that began in the 2000s had a very different aim and format, highlighting their innovative nature. The tours were aimed at revealing hidden narratives and raising awareness of Palestinian suffering, as part of the human rights component’s goal to remove the Israeli ‘state of denial’ and the radical component’s aim to focus on Palestinian suffering. ICAHD explains the aim of their tours as an attempt to,

‘Gain an overview of some of the main issues facing a population living under occupation - house demolitions, displacement, education, refugees, water, lack of freedom of movement, women’s issues – and discrimination within the state of Israel’ (ICHAD, 2014).

Shovrim Shtika was one of the first groups to run an organised tour with this goal in mind, focusing on the Old City of Hebron and led by former combatant soldiers who had served there during the second Intifada. They began with a photo exhibition in June 2004 in Tel Aviv, entitled ‘Bringing Hebron to Tel Aviv’ (Shaul in Brown, 2006). The use of tours diffused to different organisations and expanded to

45 Garrett (2006) provides a detailed account of debates surrounding the effectiveness of the Internet for mobilisation of social movements and Tarrow (2011:137-38) provides a theoretical discussion.

46 The author attended the tours of Shovrim Shtika, Emek Shaveh, Ir Amim and Jerusalem Peace Makers, January to July 2013.
different areas in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. A radical youth group called Yeledim shel Avraham (Children of Abraham) who were active in the later years of the second Intifada, also begun their activities with organised tours in Hebron. The location, as explained to the author, was chosen ‘because it has a shock and awe effect. It is the one place where you have the entire structure of occupation condensed’ (Sharon, 2013). Lochamim L’Shalom organise tours aimed at highlighting life under occupation, ‘to show what daily life is like for Palestinians under military occupation, and thus fill a gap in the information provided by the media’ (Combatants for Peace, [no date]) and ‘with the purpose of expanding and deepening the participants’ knowledge of the area’ (Combatants for Peace, [no date]).

Two groups that also focus on revealing hidden narratives and spreading information are Emek Shaveh, which runs alternative archaeological tours in Silwan/City of David that the author attended and Ir Amim, which runs study tours in Jerusalem to ‘introduce participants to the social, economic and political issues impacting life in the city’ (Ir Amim, [no date]). The increase in the use of tours and in particular the focus on the Palestinian experience in the West Bank has re-cast the space in a different light from the liberal Zionist groups. The practice of walking through the occupied territories from the perspective of the Palestinians is a different experience, one that reveals the realities and narratives that Israelis arguably ignore or deny.

Zochrot, which also deals with revealing hidden narratives, has been running tours since the start of the second Intifada. The focus of these tours is not the West Bank but the unrecognised Arab villages within Israel. This is connected to their radical framing that the Israeli occupation began in 1948. Similar to other groups, it was explained in an interview between the author and Director of Zochrot that the tours began out of a desire of one individual to show others an injustice they had discovered (Bronstein Aparicio, 2013).

Groups that deal with people-to-people activities within the liberal Zionist component also use tours similar to those in the late 1980s, aimed at both Israelis and Palestinians participants in order to overcome the disconnect between the two sides that has formed due to the separation barrier. These include tours by IPCRI to West Bank cities, which were started by a group of Israelis and Palestinians who met at a seminar organised by IPCRI and aim to challenge preconceptions and misunderstandings (IPCRI, [no date, a]). More informal tours based on a similar motivation are run by Israeli and Palestinian friends, such as Visit Israel and Palestine (Shwarczenberg, 2013). The author also attended the tour of a religious group, the Jerusalem Peace Makers, who organise tours to Hebron with a focus, not on highlighting the occupation but, explaining the dual narrative of the city, with participants meeting and listening to both settlers and Palestinians who live there.

As social movement theory suggests, as a movement approaches difficulties either in participation levels or in their interaction with the opposition, the activists use their ‘tools selectively and creatively to outguess opponents and increase participation’ (McAdam in Tarrow, 2011). The use of tours became a suitable way both for public outreach at a time where mobilising for mass demonstrations became near impossible, and for revealing the complexities of the conflict and notable effects of the occupation,
encouraging participants to become more involved as activists or funders. A number of activists interviewed explained that their route into activism involved a learning process that was often instigated by participation in a tour, which created an impetus to act (Anonymous, B., 2013; Benninga, 2013; Oren, 2013). However, it must be noted that some level of political awareness and engagement is needed to decide to join a tour in the first place. The tours have targeted the Israeli public, politicians, journalists, diplomats, school and university students, Members of Knesset and international tourists. However, restrictions in movement for Israelis entering the West Bank and general Israeli fear of travelling into the West Bank has meant outreach to the Israeli public has remained limited. Furthermore, most tours run on the weekend, which means there is direct competition between groups in recruiting participants.

There is a clear international focus to the tours, with all the groups running tours in English, as well as Hebrew and sometimes Arabic. This is connected to the role tourism plays in Israeli society as a means of spreading narratives. For example, international officials are often taken to Yad Vashem (Holocaust Museum) when making visits to Israel. The tours of the peace activists therefore target foreign visitors in order to highlight the realities of the occupation and encourage them to return to their governments and persuade them to put pressure on the Israeli government. There is also a large tourist sector in Israel aimed at the Jewish Diaspora. For example, a worldwide organisation, Taglit (Birthright) has given hundreds of thousands of Jewish young adults from the diaspora a free trip to Israel since 1999 with the aim of ‘strengthen[ing] bonds with the land and people of Israel’ (Taglit-Birthright, [no date]). Shovrim Shtika has specifically begun to target their tours to Taglit participants who stay on after their organised trip has finished (Zonszein, 2011), in order to show them other realities of Israel.

The introduction of tours across a range of groups and all three components suggests an expansion of the tactical repertoire available to the Israeli activists. In conducting tours, Israeli peace activists have appropriated a conventional method that is available to and used by different sectors of Israeli civil society to challenge Israeli policies and raise awareness of the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank.

5 IMPLICATIONS: AN EXPANSION AND FRAGMENTATION IN THE TACTICAL REPERTOIRE OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

In this phase of Israeli peace activism there is a broader spectrum of tactics being employed and more significantly, a fragmentation in the suitability of certain tactics for each component, given the ways in which they have framed themselves. The liberal Zionist and the human rights components tended to continue with known and contained tactics. The use of contained tactics gives the potential of mobilising those who were woken up to activism by the second Intifada but not ‘ready’ to undergo the risks involved in NVDA and NVR in the West Bank, providing an avenue for new activists to mobilise.

The radical component moved to progressively more confrontational and disruptive tactics. This points to some interesting implications and dynamics. The shift to conducting most of their activities in the

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47 For example, President Obama visited Yad Vashem in March 2013 (Maltz, 2013) and June 2008 (Zeleny, 2008).
West Bank is a direct reflection of the ways in which the radical activists frame their activism, in terms of ‘harm reduction’ and ‘justice.’ In re-balancing the location of the tactics to predominantly areas where human rights violations are taking place, the activists are reinforcing their focus on Palestinian suffering and the need to remove the occupation as an end in itself. The activists today are taking greater risks than ever before, coming regularly into confrontation with the IDF, being subject to tear gas, rubber bullets and occasionally live ammunition at the West Bank demonstrations and sometimes being arrested for their activities. Despite the risks, this has had the effect of deepening the relationships between the activists, both amongst the Israeli activists and also with the Palestinian activists, confirming the ‘co-resistance’ model whereby Jews and Palestinians, ‘demonstrate together, get arrested together and get shot at together’ (Matar, 2013).

The expansion in the use of legal tactics and tours in this phase also points to some interesting implications. Legal tactics and tours, although employed differently by each component, provide a way to reach out to the Israeli public, decision makers and international community. Both these tactics use conventional means for contentious purposes; to highlight the injustices of the occupation and make an example of certain aspects. Whilst legal tactics are criticised for the role they may play in reinforcing the occupation, they also succeed in ensuring that the issues of the occupation are being constantly debated in the highest legal structure in Israel. The tours are useful in raising awareness to the international community, both tourists from the Jewish diaspora and foreign influential figures, the realities of occupation.

According to Feinstein (2009), for optimal change, a combination of tactical approaches is required (Feinstein, 2009). The variety of tactics available across the spectrum of Israeli peace activism therefore suggests greater potential to achieve change. For example, legal action can change individual aspects of the occupation, whereas continued demonstrations against the state and the barrier as a whole is required for any long term change. Reports on human rights violations, conducted by field researchers, bring to light the issues that require solidarity activism or legal approaches. By using multiple tactics, both disruptive and contained, the movement will have a better chance of achieving change than employing only one tactic, since it provides more entry points for different individuals who wish to participate and means the authorities have to respond to different situations, making it more complicated than dealing with a known routine.

Furthermore, the expanded and evolved tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism, whilst not having an impact on policy, is finding alternative routes through which to gain impact. The small scale actions, conducted on the margins of Israeli society, often led by individuals and based on informal networks, have some clear connections to Scott’s (1985) *Weapons of the Weak*, whereby overt rebellions are unlikely but ‘everyday forms of resistance’ can still have a form of impact. The continued, regular efforts of the activists to chip away at the occupation and reveal the injustices caused by it can be likened to such ‘everyday forms of resistance.’ Whilst the context in which the Israeli activists are operating highlights a divergence from Scott’s study since these individuals are not the victims of the injustices but
are acting in solidarity of others and therefore experience more difficulties in mobilising participants and creating change, similar tactics can be seen and therefore the potential for ‘chipping away’ can be noted. Further areas in which these tactics can achieve impact will be considered in Chapter 7. The following chapter will turn to the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism.
CHAPTER 6
A SHIFTING MAP OF MOBILISATION STRUCTURES

1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter turns to the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. Mobilisation structures are the ‘fundamental infrastructures that support and condition citizen mobilisation’ (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997:67). As explained in chapter 2, it is useful to follow McCarthy’s (1996:145, Figure 1) typology of mobilisation structures in order to identify the different structures available to each of the three components and to track changes and continuities from the previous phases of peace activism in Israel. A detailed study of civil society organisations in Israel was conducted by the European Commission in Israel in 2013. This will help to inform this chapter however the mobilisation structures were not mapped as distinctly as will be attempted below and Israeli peace activism was not given separate attention from other civil society organisations.

Israeli peace activism is still in flux, a little unsure of its identity and where it is heading, particularly given the shock it faced in the second Intifada. It therefore has many remnants of the characteristics in mobilisation structures from the previous phase, such as the importance of informal, familiar networks, the central role given to social movement organisations, the predominance of Ashkenazi middle-class activists and the heavy reliance on external sources of funding. Despite this, there have been some interesting shifts and developments in the mobilisation structures, with some clear fault lines emerging between the components that were not seen previously (Figure 6).

The radical component has focused on small group activities rather than mass mobilisation and there has been a return to horizontally structured organisations, with participatory-style decision making, in part out of the rejection of the liberal Zionist component’s process of institutionalisation in the 1990s. Feminist modes of operating have played an interesting role in influencing these shifts. Enduring coalitions have formed in the radical component to pool resources together and is showing signs of developing into a social movement community (SMC), which are the ‘informal networks of politicised individuals, with fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures and malleable divisions of labour’ (Buechler, 1990:42) and is a new and significant shift. There has also been a greater attempt at diversifying the social make-up of Israeli peace activists amongst the radical component to include marginalised sectors of Israeli society. However, whilst greater attention is given to this, there has not been a significant change. A significant change in composition can be identified with the return of younger activists, many of whom were awakened by the events of the second Intifada.

The human rights component is made up of both grassroots and national professional SMOs. The refusenik and humanitarian groups have similar elements to the radical component whereas those reporting on human rights violations have developed into national professional SMOs similar to the liberal Zionist component, in order to gain legitimacy in their work and ensure steady flows of funding.
The liberal Zionist component had to find ways of compensating for the loss of their grassroots support by continuing the process of institutionalisation from the 1990s, as identified by Hermann (2009; 2002), towards national professional SMOs. Some of the organisations still try to build mass support, such as Kol Echad but through institutionalised organisations. The differences across the components further highlight the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism in this phase.

Despite the availability of certain mobilisation structures and the attempts to mobilise, Israeli peace activism remains marginalised in Israeli society due to the framing of all components and their numbers remain low. This has encouraged one of the most significant changes in the mobilisation structures; a shift towards a greater global focus of Israeli peace activism. With an inability to influence the Israeli public and government in this phase, activists have become more connected to global movements, with the international arena presenting new mobilisation structures.

This chapter will first disaggregate Israeli peace activism into the different mobilisation structures according to McCarthy’s typology (1996:145, Figure 1). It will begin by looking at the formal movement structures, turning first to social movement organisations. It will outline and explain the continued process of institutionalisation amongst the liberal Zionist groups, the shift to more horizontally structured organisations in the radical component and the mixture of SMOs seen in the human rights component. It will then consider the informal movement structures, namely the activist networks that have moved from the liberal Zionist component to the radical and human rights component. This chapter will then look at non-movement informal networks, such as familiar and work networks that play a significant role especially amongst the smaller and more radical groups. Finally, in mapping the mobilisation structures it will uncover additional mobilisation structures to add to McCarthy’s typology; non-movement movements, which are other social movements that act as mobilisation structures for Israeli peace activism, and international mobilising structures, which have become more important in this phase. Having mapped the mobilisation structures, this chapter will then consider the shifting composition of Israeli peace activism, highlighting the attempts by the radical component to be more inclusive, and will explore the issue of funding for Israeli peace activism before turning to some implications of these findings.

2 A CHANGING LANDSCAPE: MAPPING THE MOBILISATION STRUCTURES OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

Movement mobilisation structures can vary across a spectrum of more or less formal and by their location in or outside of the movement in question (McCarthy, 1996). Israeli peace activism in this phase is made up of an even more diverse set of mobilisation structures than previously, cutting across three of McCarthy’s dimensions (1996; Figure 1): formal movement, informal non-movement, and informal movement (Figure 6).
2.1 FORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATIONS

On the more formal end of the spectrum of mobilising structures are social movement organisations (SMOs), which represent the main component of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism and have done so since the proliferation of such structures in the first Intifada. This term defines a range of organisations that vary in their internal structures (McCarthy, 1996:144). There is a wide diversity of SMOs in Israel, ranging from grassroots SMOs that are structured horizontally to national professional SMOs that have stricter hierarchical forms. In this phase the liberal Zionist component has continued a process of institutionalisation towards national professional SMOs that began in the end of the previous phase. The radical groups have given greater attention to participatory-style organisation and built horizontally structured organisations. This was influenced by some of the radical groups in the previous phases, as well as the early stages of the liberal Zionist groups. The human rights component is made up of a mixture of SMOs, depending on the particular specialisation of the group.

The main change in the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism in this phase has been a scale shift from mass mobilisation to small group activities, which has resulted in both a decrease in participant numbers for each activity and an increase in SMOs. This is mainly due to loss of the liberal Zionist component’s grassroots support base, which accounts for its shift towards a national professional

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48 Based on McCarthy’s dimensions (1996:145).
organisation in order to maintain some activities. It is furthered by the increase in specialised SMOs in the human rights and radical components, which are each focusing on a specific aspect of the situation to challenge and therefore tend to be smaller than organisations aimed at mass mobilisation for a broad issue.

2.1.1 THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT: CONTINUED INSTITUTIONALISATION

The liberal Zionist component is most commonly comprised of national professional SMOs, which include elements such as a professional office, a large direct mail membership (McCarthy, 1996:144) and registration with the Rasham Ha’Amutot (Israeli Registrar for Non-Profits). Shalom Achshav was initially considered a grassroots SMO in the 1980s and then became a mixed SMO as it became more hierarchically structured, particularly with the hiring of a bigger staff base in the 1990s (Golan, 2013). Following the second Intifada and the loss of its grassroots support base, it has morphed into a national professional SMO, with weak ties to its membership base and an almost sole focus on the Settlement Watch Project. It is therefore now a professionalised SMO amongst many others, with a particular specialisation, rather than being a large grassroots movement or acting as a rallying point for other groups, as it was in its inception and peak years. Hermann (2002:115) notes that in the case of Shalom Achshav, institutionalisation helped to maintain the organisational activities but led to ‘dissension among those activists who resented the movement’s new, highly institutional character.’

2.1.2 THE RADICAL COMPONENT: GRASSROOTS, HORIZONTAL STRUCTURES

Historically within the Israeli peace movement there has been a mixture of hierarchically and horizontally structured organisations. In this phase, there was an increased attempt amongst the radical component at organising along horizontal structures, in direct contrast to the process of institutionalisation that occurred within the liberal Zionist component in the 1990s. The groups comprising the radical component tend to be grassroots SMOs, almost exclusively volunteer based and built around horizontal structures. The origins of this participatory style of organising can be seen in the radical immigrant student groups that formed in the late 1960s, early 1970s. This type of SMO covers most of the radical groups, such as Ta’ayush, Anarchistim Naged HaGader, Lo-Metsaytot and Profil Hadash. As explained by Profil Hadash, a feminist organisation that calls for the de-militarisation of Israeli society, this form of organisation requires its members to,

‘Participate on a voluntary basis, rarely with remuneration, in activities that are non-hierarchical...[and] with some functions paid with small stipends. These, and appearing before audiences abroad, are taken on by rotation offering everyone a chance’ (Hiller, [no date]).

Significantly, these groups do not to register with the Rasham Ha’amutot due to the following clause, which suggests that those organisations that are highly critical of the State of Israel and have anti-Zionist or non-Zionist underpinnings are not eligible for registrations,
‘An amuta [not-for-profit organisation] shall not be registered if any of its objects negates the existence or democratic character of the State of Israel or if there are reasonable grounds for concluding that the amuta will be used as a cover for illegal activities.’

(Amutot Law, 1980: 3)

However, not all groups in the radical component have been able to operate solely as voluntary organisations. The Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom, a coalition of radical women’s organisations, went through a process of institutionalisation in the mid-2000s. This process has moved them away from a completely grassroots, horizontally structured organisation to a mixed organisation, which tried to balance a national office with a grassroots membership. The current co-ordinator of the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom explained to the author that the organisation was a very active voluntary group in the radical component in the early years of the second intifada but, as the activities continued, there was a need for a coordinator with a salary (Dak, 2013). Diani (in Tarrow 2011) notes that social movement organisations tend to struggle with the balance between creating a strong organisational structure whilst ensuring contact with their grassroots base, as Shalom Achshav seemingly failed to do. As further explained to the author, the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom has succeeded in maintaining this balance mainly due to their constant awareness of this struggle between being an effective organisation through its paid staff members, which requires adhering to funding objectives, whilst staying true to their political message and the autonomy of the activists (Dak, 2013). It manages to achieve this through feminist organising principles, which encourages it to work on the basis of consensus decision making (Baum, 2013). This helps to decentralise the power away from the organisational centre and into the hands of the activists themselves. However, given they have paid, regular staff they cannot always ensure that power is held by activists.

The radical component’s attention to horizontal structures and grassroots activism can be explained through three main processes. The first is out of criticism towards the peace industry of the 1990s, a term used to denote the peace-building activities that went alongside the political peace process. The criticism comes from two angles, one is that individuals earning from their peace work are arguably ‘profiting from the conflict’ and that their salaries take funds away from direct projects on the ground. Secondly the groups referred to under the term ‘peace industry’ were those that ran alongside the Oslo peace process, creating dialogue programs for co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians, and the assumptions which underpinned these activities are rejected by the radical activists (Giacaman, 2009). Therefore, in order to distance themselves from the peace industry, there has been a greater shift towards horizontal structures that promote grassroots voluntary activism on the ground.

The second driving force towards horizontal structures can be identified in the attention given to alleviating ‘all forms of oppression’ (Ball, 2013). Hierarchies are rejected as systems of power that only reinforce existing asymmetries in power relations, whether they are built around ethnicity, nationality, age, gender or another factor. By ensuring the organisational structures are horizontal, there is an
attempt to bring egalitarian framing into the structures and practices of the groups. According to an interview with an activist in *Tarabut-Hithabrut*, they are,

‘Continuously trying to avoid or be aware of the hierarchies within *Tarabut*, which is a difficult thing. You cannot avoid the fact that power relations to a certain extent replicate themselves since there are still existent power relations in society therefore, if you are a male academic in your fifties, your opinion and your thoughts are sometimes more powerful. It is a continuous struggle within *Tarabut* but, it is a struggle that is based on a deep affinity and trust’ (Ball, 2013).

The third driving force is the shift towards feminist organising principles, as seen in the new feminist organisations, which are structured around empowerment and member participation (Ferree and Martin, 1995). As Staggenborg (1995) and Martin (1990) note, there is not one form of feminist organising and not all feminist organisations are based on consensus decision making and horizontal structures. However, amongst some of the Israeli peace organisations, the organising principles have been based on these concepts, with acknowledgement of their feminist routes. According to an interview with a prominent figure in the radical left, ‘since the second Intifada there has been a more feminist perspective [amongst activists] and also a more radical view of what feminism means’ (Vardi, 2013). Part of this is an emphasis on the ‘feminist ideals of collectively, respect and democracy’ (Acker, 1995:138) in their organisational structures.

One of the consequences of a focus on horizontal structures has been the issue of hidden hierarchies; a situation in which groups claim to be horizontally organised but exhibit power imbalances that are often structured along gendered-lines. This criticism is often levelled at *Anarchistim Neged HaGader*, which is built on anarchist modes of operation and emphasises egalitarianism and democracy (Snitz, 2013a; Pallister-Willkins, 2009). However, as explained to the author by an activist in *Anarchistim Neged HaGader*,

‘Although allegedly there is not a hierarchy, it is subtle. There is one person who knows the most things and owns the most power and knows how much money we have and which villages we are working with and...he is an older man, an academic man, a middle class man and a heterosexual man. These things are not coincidental and many effects will be subtle...who is speaking in meetings, who has more effect in decision making, who has the last word and who speaks to the media’ (Rothschild, 2013).

*Solidariut Sheikh Jarrah* suffered from an undiscussed creation of a hierarchy and in part disbanded because this affected the relationship between the core activists. Whilst disagreements over the goals of the group following initial success in the neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah also provide some explanation for the disbanding of the group, as outlined in Chapter 4, others argue that gender dynamics, along with generational dynamics and organisational structure played a role. Sahar Vardi (2013) argues that at some point a few individuals began taking a leading role, which she did not feel was necessary. She
explains that ‘it had a big effect on a lot of people leaving, mostly women because they did not feel they could be involved.’ Whilst it is common for disagreements and power struggles to occur in non-hierarchical groups, Sahar explained to the author that the participants did not take the time to talk through the issues and come to a consensus.

In contrast, the success of transparent horizontal organising can be seen in a disagreement in Profil Hadash over whether individuals, who receive compensation for their work in the organisation, should be recognised as employees and receive workers’ rights. Some members argued that they did not want to become employers as they would have to abide by certain hierarchical mechanisms. Profil Hadash almost halted all other activities whilst discussing this issue; all their energy was put into building alternative employment mechanisms that would fit with their horizontal structures (Vardi, 2013). As Staggenborg (1995:343) notes, it is common in collectivist-based decision making for groups to focus on the process at the expense of their goals. However, whilst Profil Hadash, which was founded in 1998, may have been less effective in the short-term, in the long-term the organisation did not become a victim of internal disagreements leading to the break-up of the organisation, because, as a core member explained to the author, they made time to ‘discuss everything over and over and to listen to every point of view’ (Dolev, 2013).

According to Staggenborg (1995) horizontally-structured organisations tend not to last and have shorter life-spans than hierarchical and institutionalised organisations. However, from the experience of Israeli peace organisations, it seems that the type of organisation structure is less important in explaining their trajectories than the level of transparency in the way in which they are structured. Those that are aware and transparent in their structure and adapt their work accordingly seem to have a longer life-span than those whose structures are hidden or not yet decided upon: Shalom Achshav became aware that it had lost contact with its grassroots base and became a highly institutionalised and professionalized organisation, which has helped it to run the successful Settlement Watch Project; the Koalitziot Nashim i’Shalom makes sure it constantly assesses the balance between institutionalisation and grassroots empowerment, making it one of the most prominent and active groups in this phase; Profil Hadash works solely on collective organising principles and ‘survived’ the second Intifada and internal disagreements; whereas Solidariut, with its unspoken hierarchical structure, disbanded after a couple of years.

2.1.3 THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: MIXED STRUCTURES

There are a variety of structures amongst the human rights component, depending on the specific focus of the individual groups. For example, the refusal movement is a grassroots, voluntary movement that supports and advises those who are in the process of refusing their military service. The humanitarian groups also tend to be voluntary, with small groups of individuals choosing one issue to dedicate their time to, such as Adam l’lo Gvulot (Humans Without Borders). In some cases, there are one or two paid staff and Board Members, particularly if they are registered charities. ICAHD is
registered as a non-for profit in the UK and whilst it has elements of the radical component, in particular the solidarity actions in the West Bank, they also publish reports and disseminate information internationally, which accounts for their more formal structure. The human rights organisations tend to be the most formal, having developed into national professional SMOs since their foundation in the first Intifada, with hierarchical organisational structures, Boards of Trustees and are registered to the Rasham Ha’Amutot. This suits their tactical repertoires since they need to have legitimacy if their reports of human rights violations are going to be taken seriously and they need expert fundraisers to ensure there is a constant flow of funding for their work. However, as will be discussed later, despite their accepted registration to the Rasham Ha’Amutot, the sources of their funding from international bodies are used to delegitimise and question their activities.

2.1.4 INCREASING ENTRY POINTS TO ACTIVISM

Social movement organisations have played a central role in the mobilisation of new activists. New organisations in this phase, which have developed new ways of framing the conflict and alternative methods of acting, have created opportunities for new activists to mobilise. According to social movement theory, ‘would-be activists must either create an organisation vehicle or utilise an existing one and transform it into an instrument of contention’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:47), placing strong emphasis on the importance of SMOs in the mobilisation of activists. In this phase, some existing organisations transformed their structure and purpose to reformulate the SMO in order to remain relevant in the changing context or, alternatively, new organisations were formed out of the existing ones. This can be seen across components, although most commonly amongst the radical component as they gained a larger voice in Israeli peace activism. According to Tarrow (2011:190), early risers in a cycle of contention provide ‘incentives for new movement organisations to be created’, which is a process that can be identified in the formalisation of groups in the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism. A number of such cases can be identified in this phase.

Ta’ayush was the first group to play this mobilising role, acting as a launch pad for other organisations. According to Bdeir and Halevi (2002), following the outbreak of the second Intifada, ‘willingly or not, Ta’ayush became central in the mobilisation of activists for the struggle against the occupation and for civil equality in Israel’ and ‘became a school for activists’, highlighted by the influence it has had on emerging groups. Some of the newer groups established in the mid to late 2000s were developed from Ta’ayush. For example, it was explained to the author that Anarchistim Neged haGader was developed during a Ta’ayush action (Baum, 2013), shifting the attention of direct action onto the separation barrier. Tarabut-Hithabrut was also formed by key members of Ta’ayush who, following the second Lebanon war in 2006, felt that ‘activism required a broader vision’ and therefore aimed to provide a more concrete political movement out of the goals and actions of Ta’ayush (Tarabut-Hithabrut, 2009).

The School for Peace at the village of Neve Shalom Wahat al Salam is a further example of a movement school. It has consistently trained peace activists, some of whom have gone on to found their own
organisations or become leading individuals in anti-occupation activities in the radical and human rights components. Examples include human rights lawyer Michael Sfard, who co-founded *Yesh Din*, and founder of *Zochrot*, Eitan Bronstein Aparicio, which is why founding member of the School, Nava Sonnenschein, told the author that she has been focusing on training individuals who have the potential to become ‘agents for change’ (Sonnenschein, 2013).

Some organisations also provide entry points for new individuals to participate in peace activism. *Shovrim Shtika*, in particular, provided an entry point for a younger generation of activists, particularly those who had recently served their military duty. A central activist in the Sheikh Jarrah protests explained to the author that he began his activist journey in a tour of Hebron with *Shovrim Shtika*, and then became active in *Ta’ayush*, which led him to the struggle in Sheikh Jarrah (Benninga, 2013). Sheikh Jarrah also became a mobilisation site for previously immobilised activists, partly due to its location as an ‘in-between space, not Israel proper, not as inaccessible or frightening as the West Bank’ (Gorenberg, 2010). Some of the newly mobilised activists gained more confidence to then join the demonstrations against the separation barrier or looked for other organisations to become more permanent members of, such as *Lochamim l’Shalom*. One recently mobilised activist described to the author his journey starting from the Sheikh Jarrah protests,

‘I was not really involved, and then when Sheikh Jarrah started, I went to take photos and saw the injustice there and started getting involved. When you find out what is really happening, you have to get involved. I then went to a few demos in Bil’in and Al-Ma’asara. At first I was scared. I started with a smaller demonstration but then you realise that it is not as bad and you can avoid the tear gas if you stay at the back and walk away when things start heating up. I then decided to join the Bethlehem-Jerusalem branch of *Lochamim l’Shalom*’ (Oren, 2013).

One consequence of the process whereby activists move between organisations or set up new organisations with a different specialisation is that there tends to be a cross-over of activists. This helps to create a sense of community (Vardi, 2013) but, the relatively large number of groups (Appendix 1) compared to the number of regular activists, means that numbers tend to remain small at each activity, as the activists spread themselves across the organisations and activities.49

### 2.2 FORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: COALITIONS - INCREASING POLARISATION OF COMPONENTS

Both free-standing protest committees that link different mobilisation structures together for a temporary campaign and ad-hoc coalitions that have formed around specific longer-term issues had

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49 Reports and interviews, not including the annual Rabin memorials, place the maximum number of activists at an event organised by the radical and human rights components of Israeli peace activism in this phase at 5,000 (Baum, 2013; Gutwick, 2013; Wagner, 2013; Omer-Mann, 2011; Shabi, 2010; Foldesh, 2002).
been part of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism in the previous phase and particularly began to emerge in the late 1990s however, in this phase they were strengthened, with more enduring coalitions forming, particularly in the radical and human rights components, which are connected on a more regular basis. The collective action frames of the liberal Zionist component were too removed from that of the radical and human rights components meaning that they have not joined these coalitions. This differs significantly from the previous phases where it was the liberal Zionist component that acted as a rallying point for all the other groups.

According to Tarrow, Levi and Murphy, coalitions are ‘collaborative, means-orientated arrangements that permit distinct organisation entities to pool resources and effect change’ (Tarrow, Levi and Murphy in Tarrow, 2011:191). The greater presence and deepening of coalitions in this phase conforms to social movement theory, whereby coalitions form in cycles of contention when ‘new issues are suddenly placed on the agenda, old social movement organisations have become set in their ways, and new ones are still in the process of formation’ (Tarrow, 2011:192), as has been the case for Israeli peace activism in the period since the second Intifada.

Jerusalem has emerged as a prominent location for organisations to work together in confronting certain issues by forming protest campaign committees, although in reality less formal that the term suggests. For example, Silwan, a Palestinian neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, which is where the City of David is located, became an issue and site for coordination of a number of groups and organisations from both the radical and human rights components in the past few years. Ir Amin and Emek Shaveh have been working together to form a master plan for the old city in Silwan and sometimes run joint tours (Tatarsky, 2013). Solidariut (Solidarity), Rabanim l’Maan Zchuyot haAdam and ICHAD have also been active in Silwan. The situation in Sheikh Jarrah, as described in Chapter 4, also created an opportunity for different groups to mobilise together.

Enduring coalitions, in which different groups, mainly from the radical and human rights components, have joined together for re-occurring or continuous campaigns are a significant feature in this phase. Two notable examples are the Olive Harvest Coalition and the Coalition Against the Siege and War in Gaza. The Olive Harvest Coalition begun in 2002, when a group of Israeli and international organisations and groups assisted with the Palestinian harvest of olives, which was being threatened by the actions of Jewish settlers. The activity has become a tradition amongst the radical and human rights groups, which join together each year for this harvest, both veteran groups, such as Gush Shalom and newly established ones since the second Intifada, such as Machsom Watch. The Coalition Against the Siege and War in Gaza was first formed in 2006 with 16 left-wing organisations and was initiated by the Koalitiziat Nashim l’Shalom, which organised a range of events in response to Israeli violence in the Gaza Strip. In 2008 it expanded in response to Operation Cast Lead to 28 left-wing organisations, including

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50 See Tarrow (2011:191-192) for a theoretical outline of coalition formation in social movements.
51 See for example an Olive Harvest Call to Action (The Olive Harvest Coalition, 2008),
52 See for Coalition Against the Siege on Gaza (2006) for a Campaign overview.
organisations that are not normally associated directly with peace activism, such as HaKeshet HaDemocratit HaMizrachit (The Democratic Mizrahi Rainbow).

A core group of organisations and individuals involved in these and other coalitions began to emerge. It was explained to the author that they, unofficially and mockingly, referred to themselves as the ‘Coalition of Coalitions’, to denote a regular coalition that would be ‘formed, disbanded and re-formed time and time again…at almost every year’s anniversary of the occupation, harvest season, actions against the Second Lebanon War, military operations in Gaza and more’ (Matar, 2013). This coalition strengthened around the struggle against the security barrier and built regular contacts so that when they needed support or wanted to organise an action, they would form a meeting of all those people (Matar, 2013).

Whilst there are difficulties in coordination amongst the groups, due to nuances in their framing and tactical repertoires, which continually cause divisions as new issues arise (Tzidikiahu, 2013), the enduring coalitions that developed in this phase point towards the formation of a social movement community. According to Buechler (1990:42), a SMC is made up of, ‘informal networks of politicised individuals with fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures, and malleable divisions of labour.’ At this stage, the divisions of activists and activities is more formally split between different SMOs and the boundaries less fluid but, the movement of activists between the groups and the situation whereby different groups take charge for different campaigns point towards the development of a social movement community and has been described similarly by a number of activists (Benninga, 2013; Vardi, 2013).

A coalition of liberal Zionist, and some human rights organisations, came together to form the Forum Irgunei haShalom. One of the defining features that differentiated this forum from the coalitions of the radical and human rights components is that is it centred on discussion rather than the action that characterises the coordination amongst the radical and human rights components. According to their original mission statement, ‘the Forum creates a network to enable organisations to share and develop skills needed in a changing political environment, providing them with greater means of communication and information flow’ (The Centre for Near East Policy Research, [no date]), and according to an interview with its Executive Director, ‘is not an activist organisation’ (Finkel, 2013). It was the idea of the former Director of the Merkaz Peres l'Shalom, Ron Pundak, and was officially formed in 2006. Whilst there is no overt coordination of the members of the Forum in organising activities, its success lies in the knowledge that the organisations have ‘some sort of safety net and that people dealing with the same problems that they do can discuss, exchange ideas and experiences’ (Finkel, 2013).

The use of coalitions amongst the radical and human rights components puts into question the ‘radical flank effect’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001:162), which argues that the moderate groups of a social movement tend to join forces in order to distance themselves from the radical wing. In the Israeli case it
is the radical groups that have joined forces to distance and distinguish themselves from the liberal Zionist groups.

2.3 INFORMAL MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: DISSIDENTS FROM THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT MOVE TO THE RADICALS

In addition to SMOs, informal networks have been important mobilisation structures for Israeli peace activism. ‘Activist networks’ are networks of individuals who are connected due to their previous involvement in movement activism and have been particularly significant in this phase of Israeli peace activism. Activists who had been affiliated with the liberal Zionist component, particularly Shalom Achshav, prior to the second Intifada, joined the community of activists that formed the radical and human rights components in this phase, due to their disappointment at the hesitancy of the liberal Zionist component in mobilising against the Israeli government’s response to the Intifada and their further moderation away from publicly declaring support for the Palestinians. This occurred in the previous phases with individuals leaving Shalom Achshav to set up organisations that were more relevant, with B’Tselem a prominent example. In this phase, a leading member of Shalom Achshav mentioned to the author that, in particular, the activists of Lochamim l’Shalom were from the remnants of Shalom Achshav, who she describes as ‘our people...they were in the movement or left the movement...our hinterland’ (Golan, 2013).

Some younger individuals who grew up in Meretz or Avoda youth movements explained to the author that they also defected to the radical component, having become radicalised by the second Intifada. They became active in groups such as Ta’ayush and Anarchistim Neged HaGader (Neiman, 2013; Rothschild, 2013; Vardi, 2013). Youth movements are an example of one of a number of entry points into Israeli peace activism for the younger generation.

2.4 INFORMAL NON MOVEMENT STRUCTURES: NETWORKS OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Informal networks that are not already part of the Israeli peace movement have also always been a significant mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activism, as is commonly found in social movement mobilisation (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980 in McCarthy, 1996:142). They are ‘the basic structures of everyday life’ (McCarthy, 1996:142). In the case of Israeli peace activism informal networks of friends, families and work colleagues have continued to play a central role in the mobilisation of activists, particularly amongst the more marginalised groups in the radical component. This was notable in Ta’ayush activities, with key activists recruited through family or works ties (Vardi, 2013). Often the activities of the humanitarian groups do not actually require large numbers and sometimes only one or two people. Therefore, it is often a case of a friend brings a friend. As explained to the author, Adam l’lo Gvulot sends a driver to pick up Palestinians from a check point and take them to an Israeli hospital or visits patients in hospital (Lester, 2013) and Machsom Watch sends two or three women to each checkpoint twice a day to monitor them (Linder, 2013). Whilst a significant pool of activists would reduce the amount of time and effort the individuals had to put into their activism, if
there are too many people wanting to help there may not be enough activities for them to be involved in. As explained to the author, often it is a significant amount of work to coordinate volunteers and the organisations do not have the resources for this (Lester, 2013; Linder, 2013).

Furthermore, given the sensitivity around certain actions and the marginalisation of the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, word of mouth through the familiar, informal networks are the most common way to mobilise individuals amongst the radical and human rights components. Showrim Shitika works by asking those who give testimonies whether they can recommend a friend or asking those who go on a tour whether they would like to give a testimony (Gavryahu, 2013). Dialogue groups also use word of mouth amongst informal networks because, as explained to the author, despite the activity not causing risk to the participants, there is a stigma attached to those who are involved in dialogue activities due to issues of normalisation, which can be particularly threatening for the Palestinians engaged in the activity (Fuchs, 2013).

For some groups in the radical component, the high level of personal risk of the tactics employed meant that little attention was given to active recruitment. According to an activist from Anarchistim Neged haGader, ‘we don’t really mobilise, we do not ever recruit, partly out of responsibility because their lives are at risk and I would not want to invite someone to risk their lives’ (Snitz, 2013a). Therefore, numbers remain small and limited to informal connections.

2.5 NON MOVEMENT MOVEMENTS: INTRODUCING OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Although not included in McCarthy’s mapping of different mobilisation structures, social movements from outside the peace camp have also played a role as mobilising structures for Israeli peace activism. One activist explained in an interview with the author that his education in activism came from the Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (LGBT) movement before he was awakened by the second Intifada to the need to challenge the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Yonay, 2013). A shared message can be identified with the foundation of Kvisa Shchora (Black Laundry) in 2001, which represented an alignment in ideologies of a component of the LGBT movement and the anti-occupation movement (Baum, 2006). There have not been similar shared messages with other social movements since activists tend to cross over to the different movements rather than the movements developing a shared platform. For example, the social justice movement in Israel did not created an alignment in framing with the peace or anti-occupation groups. There are however activists who are involved across causes (Rothschild, 2013), with the potential to introduce other activists to Israeli peace activism and therefore other movements play a role as a mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activism.

2.6 INTERNATIONAL MOBILISATION STRUCTURES

The international community has also become an important mobilisation structure in this phase and in some cases international groups and organisations are prioritised over targeting the Israeli public. In the previous phases the international community played a primarily fundraising role, with ‘Friends’
groups of certain organisations set up abroad to raise necessary funds for the groups based in Israel. Examples include American Friends of Peace Now and Oasis of Peace UK, which supports Neve Shalom Wahat al Salam. In this phase the role of the international community goes beyond funding; it acts as a target for Israeli peace activists to mobilise and an international voice for their cause.

The liberal Zionist component and parts of the human rights component continue to try to mobilise the Jewish Diaspora since, as one activist explained, there is a general belief amongst Diaspora Jews that ‘whatever happens to Israel affects our lives because we are Jewish and it affects our politics’ (Patir, 2013). Interviews between the author and some groups confirmed their international focus. Shovrim Shtika dedicates 20-25% of their work to influencing the international community, disseminating information and conducting speaking tours (Gavryahu, 2013) and Kol Ehad send Israelis and Palestinians to speak abroad, to try to build a message of peace (Peretz, 2013). In recent years a new dynamic between the Jewish diaspora and Israel has emerged. Independent groups with progressive views towards Israel have been set up in the diaspora, such as JStreet in the US and Yachad (Together) in the UK, to try to shift the conversation between Israelis and Diaspora Jews towards a reassessment of what it means to be ‘pro-Israel’ (Patir, 2013). There is therefore a mutual mobilisation relationship between the progressive Jewish groups in the diaspora and the activist groups in Israel.

The radical component tends to be linked with transnational social movements, namely the anti-globalisation movement, the Palestinian Solidarity movement and the international Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement. There are also close ties to the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), who are most notable for activism against the separation barrier.53 For those in the radical component, who have given up on mobilising the Israeli public, the international mobilising structures have become a key target to attract. Anarchistim Neged HaGader is in particular connected to these movements and, as explained to the author, believes that they ‘are more an extension of the international movement in Israel than an extension of the Israeli movement’ (Snitz, 2013a). According to one activist, this dynamic materialised with the solidarity work with the Palestinians and led to shifts in collective action frames and the tactical repertoire,

‘Thanks to the Palestinians inviting us [to their protests], suddenly you say, I am actually part of a global movement, which I was not before, I was part of an Israeli movement. If I am part of a global movement then my audience is very different, maybe my audience is not the public at all and my tools are different’ (Baum, 2013).

This further shows the role of other social movements in the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism. As will be discussed in chapter 7, increasing ties to the international dimension, whilst giving Israeli peace activism a new audience, has served to further marginalise it domestically.

53 See Sandercock (2004) and Seitz (2003) for studies on ISM.
2.7 CONCLUSION

This diverse range of mobilisation structures confirms the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. This fragmentation was also identified in the 2013 European Commission that mapped the entire range of civil society organisations, of which Israeli peace activism forms a part. The study confirmed that there are a ‘multiplicity of individual actors dealing with the same field or subject’ (European Commission, 2013:38), which is similar in the realm of peace activism although, the use of coalitions can help to alleviate the potential detrimental aspects of such a dynamic. The next section will identify some interesting shifts in the identity composition of the activists involved, encouraged by the shifting map of mobilisation structures, as well as the shifting collective action frames.

3 COMPOSITION

In Israel, peace activism has always been dominated by the Ashkenazi middle-class (Wolfsfeld, 1988) and there have been difficulties reaching beyond this. Israeli peace activism is often considered to be an elitist group, dominated by educated individuals who have both the time and disposable income to be part of the activities (Wolfsfeld, 1988). This creates an exclusive nature that can hinder the mobilisation of a wider spectrum of participants (Hermann, 2009; Shadmi, 2000; Newman and Hermann, 1992). The composition of Israel peace activism continues to be a majority of Ashkenazi, educated, middle-class individuals, many of whom are immigrants to Israel from North America or have experience living and working in foreign countries. Although there has not been a significant change in the composition of Israeli peace activism since its early stages, in this phase there have been greater attempts on the part of the radical activists to mobilise different sectors of Israeli society, in order to increase the diversity in the socio-demographic characteristics of the activists.

3.1. THE RADICALS ATTRACTING MARGINAL GROUPS IN ISRAELI SOCIETY

Given the framing shift of the radical component to Palestinian solidarity and co-resistance, as well as a focus on ‘all forms of oppression’, the mobilisation structures available to this component have expanded to include groups that had been previously marginalised from Israeli peace activism. Two main shifts towards the mobilisation of marginalised communities can be identified. Firstly, there has been a focus on mobilising the more marginalised members of the Jewish Israeli population, such as the lower socio-economic sector of the Mizrahi community, whose social mobility remains low as an outcome of the way in which they were absorbed into Israeli society, despite a proportion of the Mizrahi community improving their socio-economic status and achieving high positions in Israeli institutions54 and secondly, an increased ability for Arab citizens of Israel to join in with the activities. Whilst these mobilising structures have become more accessible, there is still not a pronounced membership from these communities.

54 See Tzfadia and Yiftachel (2004) for a study of the continuing periphery of Mizrahim and Chetrit (2000) for a history of the increasing influence of Mizrahim, particularly in the political sphere.
Difficulties in mobilising the Mizrachi community to Israeli peace activism are in part due to the traditional relationship between the Mizrachim and Ashkenazim. The state was founded by mainly middle class Ashkenazim from Eastern Europe. For the first few decades of the state, they held the powerful positions in the government, in the military and in society as a whole. Jewish immigrants from Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s became marginalised sectors of society, representing the lower classes. They were opposed to globalisation and the peace process as they believed it would lead to further socioeconomic inequalities and further perpetuated the view that the Ashkenazi peace camp was the ‘societal adversaries’ of the Mizrachim (Levy, 2007).

The Koolitziat Nashim l'Shalom has actively tried to attract Mizrachi Jews, mainly through the Mizrachi feminist movement (Baum, 2013) and their links to Isha l'Isha (Woman to Woman), a feminist group active in Haifa. However, the effectiveness has been limited. This can be attributed in part to the damage that was created in the phase, ‘the birth and coming of age of the peace movement’ where, as explained to the author, there was a dismissal on behalf of Israeli peace activism, even the radical component, of ‘other issues of oppression except the occupation’ (Dak, 2013), thereby ignoring the plight of the Mizrachi community in Israel. The fall out has been a feeling of alienation amongst Mizrachi individuals who want to become involved in peace activism. The following has been discovered in a recent study of currently active Mizrachi peace activists,

‘The findings indicated different levels of alienation, some very high, on part of the Mizrachi participants towards the Ashkenazi participants in the same activities. Most of the participants expressed feelings of being in the minority, not only numerically but also emotionally and cognitively. They felt like an unwanted minority and in some cases even sensed antagonism from the Ashkenazi members of the same activities. Some of the interviewees expressed extreme hostility to the point of refusing to participate in activism events and dialogue meetings with Palestinians along with Ashkenazim and chose to attend separate Mizrachi activities and organisations. On the other hand, those same participants expressed affinity, identification and a sense of comfort with the Palestinians’ (Hazan, 2013a:4).

Netta Hazan is herself an active Mizrachi member of Lochamim l'Shalom and other peace groups and explained to the author that when she began becoming active she was naturally drawn to the Palestinian activists, since she shared a language and culture with them. However, overtime, she has become more comfortable with her Ashkenazi counterparts (Hazan, 2013b).

Tarabut-Hithabrut has been making a conscious effort to deal with these issues and to mobilise and empower activists from marginalised communities in Israel. At an event organised by the group, an activist explained to the author that, ‘the left wing never counted the working classes as a group they should be addressing’ (Anonymous, A., 2013). Therefore they try to work on the basis whereby,
‘We don’t put barriers or make tests for anyone, especially not oppressed people because our view is that they should free themselves and that is the basic principle, that they should present themselves and free themselves, they are not just victims, they are struggling together’ (Ball, 2013).

By acknowledging all forms of oppression and connecting them, Tarabut-Hithabrut has enabled an expansion of their mobilising structures, creating the opportunity for those from the lower socio-economic classes to become activists in the broader struggle against oppression, which includes the Palestinian struggle.

The framing shift of the radical left towards Palestinian solidarity and co-resistance has also created an opportunity for Arab citizens of Israel to become active in some of these organisations. In the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism in the previous phases, it has been argued that, ‘there was no place for self-respecting Arabs’ (Kaminer, 2013), and arguably remains true of the liberal Zionist component, due to the lack of attention to Palestinian needs and history. The frame transformation of the radical left however has enabled Arab citizens of Israel to become active in grassroots groups such as Ta’ayush and the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom.

3.2 THE RETURN OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION ACROSS COMPONENTS

This phase saw the increased involvement of younger activists, aged in their twenties and thirties, across components, through student groups, the graduation of individuals from the liberal Zionist youth movements and the excitement brought by the shifting tactical repertoires. Hermann (2002) explains that there was a lack of involvement of the younger generation in peace activism in the phase, ‘individual attempts at peace activism’. She argues that the creation of Shalom Achshav in 1978 mobilised the younger generation, who had not been previously attracted to Israeli peace activism. However, over the next two decades, as the age of the activists increased, fewer younger members joined and the ‘movement’s youthful image gradually eroded and it came to be viewed as middle-aged and anachronistic’ (Hermann, 2002:117). Youth movements were set up in an attempt to mobilise the younger generation. Hermann notes however that, ‘their presence apparently had little effect on the movement’s agenda, activities, and image’ (Hermann, 2002:117). This inability to change the liberal Zionist movement from within, along with the events surrounding the second Intifada, provides an explanation for why the younger members were attracted to the radical and human rights components.

The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 was also a factor in mobilising young people, creating a group known as the ‘children of the candles,’ who were active in organisations such as Dor Shalom (Peace Generation) (Lev-Ari, 2002) and later Kol Echad, which focuses on mobilising student support for a two-state solution.

The younger generation have not only become members of activists groups and organisations but have also initiated and led their own actions. According to one activist, ‘we cannot wait and expect that someone would come and lead the younger generation…so we have to get up and start struggling and
create in Israel a different force’ (Ben Sasson in Garcia-Navarro, 2010). Ben Sasson was referring to the demonstrations that emerged around East Jerusalem in 2010, such as in Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan.

Professor Joel Beinin, who has been an activist in Israel and has researched ‘high-risk activism’ in the West Bank (Beinin, 2014), made the following observation on the situation in Silwan,

‘...the young organisers [of the Silwan demonstrations] are not concerned with ideology as such. Some call themselves Zionist; some do not...As such, the new protest generation has a very different social make-up than the mostly older and resolutely secularist ‘left Zionists’ of Peace Now, the nearly defunct Meretz party and the Labour party. The protests are animated by social networks that have been formed over the last decade in struggles against Israeli’s separation barrier and efforts to protect the Palestinians of the south Hebron hills’ (Beinin, 2010:6).

The difference of the younger activists in this phase is their level of commitment to their cause. This is particularly pronounced for members of Anarchistim Neged HaGader, whereby ‘one no longer comes to a demonstration and goes home; rather, the protest penetrates the lifestyle of the activists’ (Lev-Ari, 2002).

David Newman wrote in 2002 in his analysis of the ‘falling apart of the peace movement’ that, ‘there is a need for new, young leadership by people whose lives will be affected by what happens in the next 30 years.’ He mentions that one glimmer of hope was the creation of Ta’ayush, which has proven to be a significant entry point for a number of activists in this phase; opening the doors for the mobilisation of younger people.

Within the mobilisation of the younger generation has been a shifting dynamic in the religious nature of peace activism. In previous phases, those espousing a particular religious dimension to their peace activism created organisations based around that focus. Examples include Oz v’Shalom (Strength and Peace) and Rabanim l’maan Chzuyot haAdam (Rabbis for Human Rights). In this phase however, rather than creating separate religiously orientated peace and human rights organisations, religious individuals have become involved in peace activism alongside those individuals who may see themselves as secular or across a spectrum of religiosity. According to Ben Sasson, ‘today there is not a religious left, but religious leftists’ (Sasson in Furstenburg, 2011). The concentration of the religious activists has been seen most clearly in the Sheikh Jarrah protests. A religious activist who was involved in founding Shovrim Shtika explains that his presence at the Sheikh Jarrah protests, alongside a variety of activists, was a ‘full and supreme realisation of [his] religious existence’ (Manekin in Hasson, 2010). The mixing of religious and secular peace activists is arguably a combination of the liberal and secular renewed interest in Jewish learning and the conscious focus on values of human rights by the progressive Orthodox communities (Furstenbug, 2011). This further highlights the expanding mobilisation structures of the radical and the human rights components that suggest greater inclusivity than in previous phases of Israeli peace activism.
4 MOBILISATION BEYOND PEOPLE: FUNDING

Funding is a core concern for not-for-profit organisations and activists' groups, especially the availability of funds and the potential restraints that external funding may bring (Edwards and McCarthy, 2007). Whilst it is difficult to get a full detailed picture of the funding trends and amounts for Israeli peace activism, since there is not complete information regarding all funding sources for all the groups, it is possible to build a basic picture. According to the European Commission 2013 report on Israeli civil society organisations, funds come from three main areas: government sources, self-generated income and philanthropy (European Commission, 2013). In the case of Israeli peace activism, international government sources and philanthropy account for the large majority of funding; national funding and self-generated income is low. Three interesting trends can be identified: firstly, that direct foreign government funding has ignored the shifting trajectory of Israeli peace activism and continued to fund the more liberal Zionist groups; secondly, the central role played by the New Israel Fund as directing funds to the human rights component; and thirdly, the innovative ways in which the smaller and more radical groups have attracted funding.

International government funding agencies tend to focus on peace building, conflict resolution and human rights related activities, with often the same small pool of grantees receiving support across the donors (European Commission, 2013:55-56). From 1993 to 2000, during the peace process, it was estimated that USD 20 - 25 million was given to different people-to-people and conflict resolution projects in Israel (Baskin and Al-Qaq, 2004), significantly less than other conflict zones (Herzog and Hai, 2005). It was only in the late 1990s that larger funds, connected to the provision for civil society activities stated in the Declaration of Principles, began to come in from the European Union (EU) and United States (Herzog and Hai, 2005). For example in 1998 the EU began an annual EURO 5 – 10 million ‘Partnership for Peace Programme’ and the US allocated USD 10 million. Despite the shifting political opportunity structures and transforming landscape of peace activism in Israel after 2000, these funds continued to go to the liberal Zionist groups and those that existed prior to the second Intifada, such as Merkaz Peres l’Shalom and Hug Horim Shakulim. Funding to the radical and human rights organisations tends to be distributed from third party bodies in foreign countries, such as the NGO Development Centre, whose largest contributors are Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland combined and Trocaire, the overseas development agency of the Catholic Church of Ireland.

Given the political sensitivity surrounding the Israeli peace organisations and the commitment to continue the Oslo peace process by the donors, it is unsurprising that the EU, European countries and the US do not directly fund the radical and human rights groups.

The largest funding body for Israeli peace activism is the New Israel Fund (NIF). They direct funds to a broad range of NGOs, including those that come under the heading of ‘Civil and Human Rights,’ of which

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55 The second annual call for proposals was only given in 2001 due to internal EU scandals (Herzog and Hai, 2005:30).
56 See European Partnership for Peace Programme ([no date]) for list of recipients.
the Israeli peace and human rights group form a part.\textsuperscript{57} For example, in 2010 the NIF allocated USD 5,561,160 across the Civil and Human Rights Organisations (NIF 2010). The NIF receives its funds from private donors and foundations, including the Moriah Fund, the Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation. In 2013, the Ford Foundation did not renew its five-year USD 20 million donation to the NIF for a third time, which was a significant blow to the funding pool for Israeli peace and human rights organisations. According to reports, there was no specific reason for their decision not to renew funding, other than the foundation had shifted their priorities (European Commission, 2013:56).

In addition to their drop in funding, The New Israel Fund was the victim of a ‘delegitimisation’ accusation, with a campaign orchestrated by right-wing organisation, \textit{Im Tirtzu} (If You Will It), claiming that the NIF was responsible for the Goldstone Report and included a personal attack on Naomi Chazan, former President of the NIF (Chazan, 2010). There were also objections levelled at the NIF due to the ‘anti-Israel’ groups they purportedly support (The Algemeiner, 2014). These criticisms actually had the effect of increasing NIFs support abroad, with a rise in donations (Benhorin, 2010), particularly since the NIF is not only a funding body but an important organisation in identifying the eroding of democracy in Israeli society and leading the fight against it (Chazan, 2012). Given its role, it also acts as an international mobilising structure, mainly for the human rights organisations operating in Israel, highlighting again the importance of the international dimension in understanding the trajectory of Israeli peace activism.

There are a number of groups in Israel that are not funded by big international donors. These are often the radical groups, which are volunteer-based and do not have professional fundraising teams. Time and energy are therefore expended to raise the funds needed to conduct the activities, which makes it difficult to maintain consistent levels of activities. One successful fundraising campaign was set up on an online fundraising platform, Indiegogo, which succeeded in raising USD 21,000 to buy a truck for central Ta’ayush member, Ezra Nawi, who spends his time travelling throughout the South Hebron Hills assisting Palestinians (Snitz, 2013b). Given the humanitarian nature of his work, as well as the increased global support for the Palestinian cause, the success of this campaign is not surprising. A common method of fundraising for the activists groups is to ask individual supporters to donate through web pages\textsuperscript{58} and e-mail newsletters tend to include calls for donations.\textsuperscript{59} In many cases the funds are needed to pay for legal costs although, as explained to the author, the lawyers are aware that they may never receive payment for their work (Wagner, 2013).

A number of issues arise from this reliance on external, particularly foreign, funding. Firstly, similar to the constraints placed on the organisational structure of \textit{Bat Shalom} in the 1990s; external funders may place limitations, impose political views or require certain targets to be met, which can constrain the discussion.

\textsuperscript{57} For example in 2009 GBP 361,406 was given to ACRI; GBP 24,688 to \textit{Machsom Watch} and GBP 96,750 to \textit{Ir Amim} (NIF, 2009).

\textsuperscript{58} See for example the websites of \textit{Anarchistim Neged haGader} and Centre for Emerging Futures (Appendix 1).

\textsuperscript{59} The author is on the mailing list for many of the active groups.
autonomy of the activists. +972mag found that most of the funding they attracted were from donors who were interested in the political aspects of the website and less so its role as a new media outlet, which is the focus they had hoped to gain (Sheizaf, 2013b). This could affect the direction that the website will need to take and where the funds are directed. Secondly, in this phase in particular, peace and human rights NGOs have been subjected to criticisms and attacks over the source of their funding, with a stigma attached to those civil society organisations that receive international funding,⁶⁰ as support from international donors is seen in Israel as ‘an interference in internal affairs of the country’ (European Commission, 2013:54). A ‘Foreign Funding Law’ (Book of Statutes, 2279) was passed in Knesset in March 2011 and requires all NGOs to declare the sources of their funding above NIS 20,000 from foreign governments or third parties linked to foreign governments. Whilst it promotes transparency amongst non-for-profit organisations in Israel, it is a watered down law from a bill that proposed limiting the amount of foreign funding that NGOs could receive.

Whilst investment in Israeli peace and human rights projects continued despite the second Intifada and new emerging groups were supported through the New Israel Fund, reliance on international donor support and lack of support from local philanthropists (European Commission, 2013:56) has left the financial position of Israeli peace groups in a precarious position. Jeff Halper from ICAHD reported in 2012 to be in ‘financial collapse’ due to ‘over dependency on a few major donors’ (Halper, 2012). As the European Commission report (2013) identifies, very few civil society organisations, including the peace organisations, have self-generating incomes, making them almost solely reliant on external funding.

5 IMPLICATIONS

5.1 THE POLARISATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

The mapping and analysis of the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism have further demonstrated that Israeli peace activism in this phase is polarised and fragmented. The radical component has focused on grassroots activities, based on informal networks, with attempts at horizontal organising and a more inclusive atmosphere. The liberal Zionist component on the other hand has continued with the process of institutionalisation and professionalization, providing specialisation in particular areas. The human rights components has elements of both of these, with the human rights organisations showing similarities with the liberal Zionist component and the humanitarian groups more closely resembling the radical component.

Hermann (2009:63) argues that the Israeli peace movement never presented a clear strategy or a single narrative and therefore there were always difficulties in the level of cohesion. Whilst this statement is an accurate explanation of previous activity, a comparison between pre-2000 and post-2000 activism shows that in the past Israeli peace activism was more cohesive, with a clearer common objective than we can see in the activities today. Evidence for this can be identified from the fact that there no longer

⁶⁰ NGO Monitor is an organisation set up to identify and make public the sources of funding of NGOs and will be discussed in Chapter 7.
seems to be one organisation directing a collective agenda. Even though Shalom Achshav is still active, it no longer acts as a rallying point for all the groups (Simons, 2013a).

There has not been an agenda put forward that is suitable for all the groups to rally together under (Patir, 2013; Sharon, 2013), even during renewed negotiations, wars, or flare-ups in violence, and therefore the groups continue to work on issues specifically relevant to their own agendas and through means that they feel most connected to, with coordination only under certain circumstances. Furthermore, at times the ideological differences between groups have hindered the potential for coordinated activities and have meant that certain groups were not willing to work with others, even when there was agreement over the particular issue. For example, Ometz l’Sarev were not willing to let Profil Hadash protest against the situation in Gaza with them as they did not want to be connected to a radical feminist group that supported full army service refusers (Dolev, 2013). The nuances in framing, as well as the lack of an umbrella organisation or rallying body, means that unification or long-term cooperation is unlikely, even within and across the radical and human rights components. This conforms to Tarrow’s (2011:131) ‘Tyranny of Decentralisation,’ whereby activist-based organisations or movements, where influence is decentralised and activists hold autonomy, tends to result in a ‘lack of coordination and continuity.’

In addition to fragmentation in Israeli peace activism caused by differences between the collective action frames and tactical repertoires of the components, the shift in the Israeli economy from a welfare state to a neo-liberal economy provides a further explanation for the increase in fragmentation. In 1985 Israel implemented the Economic Stabilisation Program to combat its economic crisis. This marked a significant change from deep government intervention in the economy to one based on market forces (Ben-Bassat, 2002:1). A neo-liberalist economy leads to an increase in disintegration and exclusion compared to the welfare state, which encourages social cohesion (MacGregor, 1999:92). Furthermore, the cutting back of the public sector means a greater role for and intensification of community based and non-governmental organisations (Marteu 2009). This can account for the variety of groups dealing with issues on the ground and also the move towards a social movement community in the radical component.

There has been an attempt to reduce some of the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism and pool resources from a number of small groups through the coalitions. However, these also contribute to the polarisation of Israeli peace activism. The increased coordination amongst the radical component, with some groups from the human rights component, is pointing towards the development of a social movement community, whilst the liberal Zionist component is not included, due to fundamental differences in their collective action frames and tactical repertoires. This contrasts to previous phases of peace activism where the radical groups were invited to rallies organised by the liberal Zionist activists, highlighting the clear shift in this phase.
5.2 THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

It can be argued that given the fragmentation of Israeli peace activism, the small numbers of active individuals and the lack of support within Israel, at best, advocates abroad have become essential to Israeli peace activism with one commentator stating that, ‘they [Israeli activists] desperately need allies abroad who believe in their goals, and can help define and advance their movement’ (Chandler, 2011). The international community are acting as a mobilisation structure for Israeli peace activists, whilst the Israeli public cannot be mobilised.

However, the consequence of greater connection to the international community has been further marginalisation of peace activism in Israel, as the Israeli public and authorities tend to be wary and critical of ties with the international community, particularly in the NGO sector. The empirical and theoretical implications of this new dynamic will be further explored in the following chapter, which brings together the four powers of movement through a focus on the political opportunity structures and cycles of contention.
CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: THREE CYCLES OF CONTENTION

1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers the overall transformations in Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada, which point towards the emergence of a new cycle of contention. A cycle of contention is defined as,

‘A phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilised to less mobilised sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action frames, a combination of organised and unorganised participation, and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities’ (Tarrow, 2011:199)

Whilst the trajectory of Israeli peace activism does not conform to all of the elements of this definition, such as the intensity and size of contention, there are a number of elements that have been demonstrated, such as transformed collective action frames and innovative repertoires of contention, highlighting a new wave of activism. Significant in the case of Israeli peace activism is that different cycles can be identified in the three different components of activism. This suggests an extension of the theory of cycles of contention, whereby there may be more than one cycle of contention occurring simultaneously for different parts of a social movement. In the Israeli case the liberal Zionist component continued to demobilise, encouraged by the attribution of threat to mobilisation to the prevailing realities; the mechanisms of facilitation, whereby some of the claims of the social movement are satisfied by the government (Tarrow, 2011:190) and exhaustion, whereby, in response to prevailing realities, ‘people wearied of life in the streets'; along with shifts in their target audience away from the ideas they were promoting. The radical component went through a process of radicalisation, which led to the attribution of opportunities to the prevailing realities, creating a spiral of opportunities for mobilisation. This led to the development of innovative collection action through different mobilisation structures. The human rights component continued along their previous cycle, alongside a process of externalisation, whereby domestic actors seek to influence external actors, which has brought them closer to the international arena.

In order to identify and explain the cycles of contention, an analysis of how the powers of movement interact with each other must be given. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) note that the powers of movement do not act in isolation of each other but interact through different relationships that help explain the emergence, trajectory and impact of a movement. They note that there are many relationships that exist between the powers of movement and the relevance of these depends on the questions being asked. This chapter will focus on how Israeli peace activism has transformed and its
ongoing development, including barriers to mobilisation and influence, as well as the impact that Israeli peace activism has had in this phase. Having focused thus far on the internal powers of movement, this chapter will give attention to the external power of movement; political opportunity structures. This term refers to factors of the external environment in which the social movement operates that facilitate or constrain activism (Gamson and Meyer, 1996), such as the nature of the government, public opinion, political culture and domestic and international events (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:13). However, according to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) political opportunities structures are only opportunities or threats to mobilisation if they are perceived as such; they should not be treated as ‘objective’ but, must be seen from the perspective of the social movement actors. The attribution of threat, ‘those factors...that discourage contention’ (Tarrow, 2011:32), or opportunities, ‘sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow, 2011:32), by social movement actors is therefore crucial. In addition, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:15) note that whilst movements may emerge from political opportunity structures, ‘their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions’ and scholars often ‘underestimate the ability of challenging groups to generate and sustain movements despite recalcitrant political structures’ (Morris, 2000:447). This highlights the important role of agency and the internal powers of movement.

In addition, recent theoretical accounts of social movement theory (Tarrow, 2011; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001) have attempted to move beyond the approach that treats the powers of movement as static factors that correlate and interact with each other and have provided a variety of mechanisms and processes that explain the ‘how’ of a social movement trajectory; the ‘arrows’ that connect the ‘boxes’ of the classical social movement paradigm (Tarrow, 2011:190). These will be used to explain the different cycles of the three components of Israeli peace activism.

This chapter will first outline the main shifts in the political opportunity structures in this phase: the changes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely the outbreak of the second Intifada, the disengagement plan and the building of the separation barrier. It will also look at changes in the nature of the government and changes in Israeli public opinion. It will then outline shifts in the international POS, which is an often understudied area of social movement theory but have played a role in Israeli peace activism. This chapter will consider direct shifts in the international arena that affect the POS for Israeli peace activism, such as the situation in Gaza, the Arab Peace Initiative and contemporary transnational social movements dealing with the issue of Palestine. It will also consider indirect changes in the international arena: the global war on terror and the Arab uprisings, which shifted the domestic POS.

Having outlined the main changes in the POS, this chapter will turn to how each of the components perceived these changes and how this affected their trajectories. It will identify and explain three cycles of contention: the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist component; the emergence of a new cycle of contention for the radical component; and the continuation of the human rights component. Three models will be built by analysing how the four powers of movement interact with each other in each
component and through the dynamic mechanisms and processes. Once the models have been explained, it will be possible to identify some key theoretical implications and highlight some areas of impact that Israeli peace activism is having.

2 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

This section will highlight the shifts in the political opportunity structures since the outbreak of the second Intifada, considering the main broad change processes, which are changes in the context in which a social movement operates, that can be considered an opportunity or threat for a social movement to mobilise (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001).

The progression of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the effects on the ground are significant political opportunity structures. The outbreak and continuation of the second Intifada, the disengagement plan, where Israel withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West Bank and the erection of the separation barrier along the West Bank can be considered broad domestic changes that could impact Israeli peace activism. There were also changes in the nature of the Israeli government, which has become progressively more right wing, particularly since 2009, and Israeli public opinion has shifted further away from the views of Israeli peace activism. If the effect of POS are theorised as being objective then these changes would signal the closing of the political opportunity structures in Israel and lowers the possibility of Israeli peace activism being able to mobilise and achieve change. However, perceived subjectively by each component or group, the shifting political opportunity structures actually resulted in different outcomes for the different components, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

International events and policies can also play a role as political opportunity structures that impact a domestic social movement. For example, the domestic country may engage in an international conflict, the international community may get involved in a conflict, through UN resolutions, military intervention or offers to broker a peace agreement. In the case of Israel, the operations conducting by Israelis in the Gaza Strip following its withdrawal in 2005 presented opportunities for some groups to mobilise. The Arab Peace Initiative, put forward by the Arab League, also represented a change in the POS directly related to Israeli peace activism. The growth of international and transnational movements focused on the conflict also shifted the POS. Other changes in the international POS that were not directly linked to the domestic social movement also had an impact on the ability for Israeli peace activism to mobilise and create change. The Global War on Terror and the Arab Uprisings are two important international factors to consider in this case and suggest that the wider international context must be taken into account when understanding a domestic social movement.
2.1 DOMESTIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

2.1.1 THE SECOND INTIFADA

The failure to reach a peace agreement at Camp David in 2000 between Israel and the Palestinians, the return of Prime Minister Barak claiming there ‘was no partner for peace’ on the Palestinian side and the outbreak of the second Intifada in October 2000 signified a new broad change in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some argue that the outbreak of violence signified an ‘earthquake’ for Israelis (Bar-Tal and Halperon, 2007) however Hermann argues that these events simply confirmed the mistrust felt by Jewish Israelis towards the Palestinians (Hermann, 2009:187). Whilst the majority of Israeli Jews may have already been mistrusting of the Palestinians before the outbreak of the second Intifada, with Hermann (2009: 187) noting that there was only a 3% rise between February 2000 and March 2001, from 69% to 72%, in respondents’ belief that the Palestinians would destroy Israel if they were able, there was a fall in the Peace Index from 61.2 in October 1999 to 51.5 in July 2001 (Yaar and Hermann, 1999, 2000), signifying a reduction in the belief in the possibility of peace with the Palestinians following the outbreak of the Intifada.

During the second Intifada, Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli towns and cities played a significant role (Schweitzer, 2010). The use of arms by the Palestinians led to military responses by the Israeli forces, as well as the more discreet tactic of political assassinations (Bregman, 2002:210-224). The height of violence from the Palestinian side occurred in 2002, with a total of 53 suicide attacks in Israel (General Security Service, 2010). The vicious cycle of violence continued and following a Palestinian suicide bombing at a hotel resort in Netanya, the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, which was the largest-scale military incursion into West Bank towns since 1967, with the aim of stopping the suicide attacks. Israel was criticised for its actions against the Palestinians, which including demolition of houses, arbitrary detention, mass closures of business and villages, and the use of torture (Amnesty International, 2002).

2.1.2 THE SEPARATION BARRIER

Israel has used a variety of security measures in the latter years of the Intifada and throughout the late 2000s and 2010s in order to quell and deter attacks from Palestinians. These have included roadblocks, collective curfews and checkpoints. The largest security measure has been the building of the separation barrier, which aimed at stopping potential terrorists from the West Bank entering Israel. Since the construction of the barrier it has been argued that the number of Palestinian attacks has declined by ninety percent (Bard, 2015) and acts as a deterrent. The effect of the barrier of the lives of the Palestinians has also been significant. The barrier has been criticised for not following the Green Line but cutting into the West Bank, often appropriating Palestinian land. In doing so it has caused a number of human rights violations, such as restriction of movement, making it difficult for Palestinians to reach their farm land, or the creation of enclaves, cutting off villages from the surrounding areas (B’Tselem,
Both the erection and consequences of the separation barrier are important shifts in the POS that were perceived differently by the different components of Israeli peace activism.

2.1.3 THE NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada, there have been six new governments elected in Israel, half of which were headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. The governments have in general been progressively more right-wing, particularly since Netanyahu was re-elected in 2009. Whilst not all changes in the government can be considered large shifts in the POS, since their ideological commitments or policy preferences were not always significantly different, there are some key changes in this period that affected the prevailing political opportunity structures.

The first significant change was the election of Ariel Sharon and his Likud government in February 2001. According to Hermann (2009:189) this marked the end of the Oslo process and the collapse of the Israeli left, which has not been able to form a government since Barak became Prime Minister in 1999. The ‘peace camp,’ namely the political parties on the left of the political spectrum that were affiliated to the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism has seen declining voting numbers. Meretz and Avoda combined held a total of 15.9 percent in the 2013 elections compared with 34.2 percent of votes in the 1996 elections (IDI, 2013, 1996). Arguably, it has been the inability of the Israeli political left to provide a suitable response to the prevailing realities, encouraging the shift rightwards in Israeli voting tendencies towards more hawkish positions.

Sharon was elected again as Prime Minister in 2003, doubling the number of Likud seats to thirty-six. It was during this period that he implemented the disengagement plan and started to construct the separation barrier, key changes in the POS affecting Israeli peace activism. In 2005 a new centrist political party, Kadima (Forward), was set up by some former Likud members and later joined by some Avoda members in order to continue with the disengagement plan. In 2006 Ehud Olmert was elected Prime Minister as the head of the Kadima party. The Olmert government shifted the POS by moving forward with peace talks with the Palestinian Authority however, Israeli peace activists were suspicious, some because Olmert was suspected, and later convicted, of corruption, and others because of his decision to launch Operation Cast Lead, the first large-scale military action in Gaza.

The most significant shift in the POS in terms of creating an unfavourable environment for Israeli peace activism was the election of Netanyahu and the Likud party in 2009. Since then Israelis have elected a progressively more right-wing government headed by Netanyahu. Whilst Likud had always held the second largest amount of votes in elections held between 1996 and 2009 and the more pragmatic members made efforts to improve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as Sharon, it is the rise of other right-wing parties that highlight this shift to the right in voting trends and led to an increasingly more right-wing government. For example, Yisrael Beiteenu (Israel is Our Home), a right-wing nationalist party, Netanyahu had previously been the Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999.

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61 Netanyahu had previously been the Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999.
rose from 2.6 percent of votes in 1999 to 11.7 percent in 2006, joining the ruling party to form Likud Beitenu with 23.3 percent of votes in 2013. Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home), a right-wing, nationalist religious party, was founded in 2009, receiving 2.9 percent of votes in 2009, which rose to 9.1 percent of votes in 2013. Yesh Atid (There is a Future), a centrist party, founded in 2012 gained 14.3 percent of the votes in the 2013 elections (ID, 2013, 2009, 2006, 1999). Whilst voting trends do not shift solely due to views on security, the conflict and the peace process, with the rise of Yesh Atid attributed to economic and social issues, since 2000 perceptions of security have influenced voting trends and therefore further marginalised peace voices.

As will be explored in the sections below, the governments of Netanyahu have actively sought to limit the voices and actions of all components of Israeli peace activism and so his continued position as Prime Minister has significantly affected the POS for Israeli peace activism.

2.1.4 PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion represents a further aspect of the external environment that can affect the trajectory of a peace movement. In Hermann’s (2009) study of the Israeli peace movement she makes explicit the need to consider public opinion as a distinct mobilising factor. As she argues, in this phase of Israeli peace activism the opinions of the Israeli public became less and less in line with that of Israeli peace activism.

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada three shifts in Israeli public opinion can be identified. There is an increased feeling of personal insecurity with the second Intifada and the rockets fired at Israel from Gaza, as well as increased mistrust towards the Palestinians. At the same time there is a belief that the status quo in the West Bank is the best option both economically and in terms of security. Thirdly, there has been increasing anti-Arab sentiments within Israel. These shifts have meant that there is an increasing disparity between the ideas and actions of Israeli peace activism and those of Israeli public opinion.

In general public opinion in Israel can be determined by the security situation. When there is a threat, such as during the Intifada and during the Gaza flare-ups, there is a general retreat to a nationalistic mentality where fear and insecurity dominates and the public unify under this. Furthermore, support for all three main Gaza operations since 2008 has been high amongst the Israeli public. In December 2008, 60 percent of respondents supported a military operation in the Gaza Strip (Midgam Poll in Klein, 2014). In November 2012, only 24 percent of respondents supported a cease-fire with Hamas (Channel 2 Poll in Times of Israel, 2012) and in July 2014, 96 percent of respondents felt that Israel had used an appropriate amount of force against Hamas during Operation Protective Edge (Yaar and Hermann, 2014b). These figures highlight the extent to which the Israeli public supported the operations in Gaza and therefore the unlikelihood of them mobilising in anti-war activities.
Alongside feelings of increased personal insecurity, there has been an increased mistrust of the Palestinians as negotiating partners since 2000, as identified by the Negotiations Index. There has been a drop from 51.5 percent support of peace negotiations from respondents in 2001 to 46.4 percent support in July 2013 (Yaar and Hermann, 2001, 2013). The Index gives a general picture of declining support for negotiations.

Although there have been some perceptions of personal insecurity in Israel, it is at the same time argued that since the end of the second Intifada, the actual threat for Israelis has been fairly low compared with other periods. In particular regards to the occupation, the Israeli public are satisfied with the status quo and therefore do not see an urgent need to change the situation (Warschawski in Sela, 2013). According to Warschawski, ‘the majority has no reason to budge, so it went home...They’re asleep, they’re living with a sense that nothing is urgent. From a security standpoint, we have never had it so good.’ Furthermore, according to Gidon Levy, ‘Israelis do not want to know anything about the occupation...they do not care at all, it is not on their agenda, on the contrary it is becoming less and less on the agenda’ (Levy, 2013). They are therefore unlikely to mobilise against it.

A third shift has been increasing racist anti-Arab sentiments on the streets in Israel, as well as disdain for ‘leftists.’ There has been changing attitudes towards Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, partly due to the Gaza conflicts and partly due to the fact that Israelis and Palestinians no longer interact as they did before the separation barrier, meaning stereotypes and fear of the ‘Other’ increase. By extension, those who call for solidarity with Palestinians are also treated with suspicion, at best. For example, a High School teacher who made negative comments about the IDF and expressed ‘extreme left’ views was threatened with dismissal after a student reported him (Raved, 2014). Whilst there had always existed disdain for leftists in Israel, with one incident where peace activist Emil Grunzweig was killed by a grenade thrown by an Israeli Jew at a Shalom Achshav rally, there has been an increase in racist sentiments in Israel and by extension, a rise in disdain towards the peace activists. This increase in racism is signified by a wave of anti-Arab violence within Israel in the 2010s, with attacks against Arab citizens of Israel, such as the ‘lynching’ of an Arab teenager in Jerusalem in 2012 (Hasson, 2012). Such attacks present an internal rift between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel.

These shifts in Israeli public opinion will affect the liberal Zionist and human rights groups that are concerned with mobilising the Israeli public but are less likely to be perceived as a threat by the radical component, which is not interested in changing Israeli public opinion.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

There have been a number of changes in the international POS. How they are perceived by the activists and how they interact with the domestic opportunity structures will determine the impact on...
the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. The conflicts with the Gaza Strip presented opportunities for the radical and human rights components to mobilise in anti-war activities and out of humanitarian concerns. The Arab Peace Initiative presented a potential opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise; transnational social movements provided an opportunity for the more radical groups to reach out to the international dimension; the global war on terror indirectly affected the domestic POS by reinforcing and legitimising military steps to combat terrorism; and the Arab Uprising had some impact in restricting POS for Israeli peace activism.

2.2.1 THE SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP

In 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, evacuating the settlements and removing the IDF, thus shifting the realities again. Despite the disengagement, Israel has continued to control the borders of the Gaza Strip; with some arguing that they have enforced an illegal ‘blockade’ (Chomsky and Pappé, 2011), maintaining control of Gaza’s sea and air space and the entry and exit points. In 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian national elections and took over Gaza by force in 2007. After Hamas took over Israel increased the restrictions on Gaza but these were eased in 2010 (B’Tselem, 2011b).

Since the early 2000s there have been rockets fired intermittently towards Israel from the Gaza Strip, with thirty Israeli civilian fatalities (Nguyen, 2014), increasing the fear of Israeli citizens, particularly those in Southern Israel. There have been three major operations of the IDF in Gaza, in 2008/9, 2012 and 2014. Israel has been criticised by the international community for its ‘excessive use of force’ against the Gaza Strip (UN, 2014: GA/SPD/574) and concerns have been raised over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza (OCHA, 2014, 2012, 2009). The situation in Gaza has therefore presented a further shift in the POS but, perceived differently by the different components, acting as a mobilising opportunity only for the radical and human rights components.

2.2.2 THE ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE

The Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was adopted by the Arab League in March 2002, was a direct change in the POS connected to Israeli peace activism. It represents an example of how aspects of the international arena could open opportunities for domestic peace activism. The Saudis initially put forward the API in the early 1980s, however it did not initially pass the Arab League. According to the think tank Molad, the Saudis were able to push the initiative in the early 2000s because of regional events: the second Intifada, the September 11 attacks and Iran’s desire for regional power. The API was adopted due to the desire for Saudi Arabia to improve their image in the West following 9/11, where fifteen of the nineteen terrorists were citizens of Saudi Arabia, coupled with the fear from other Arab countries that the escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the failure of the Arab countries to curb it, would lead to unrest in those Arab countries (Molad, [no date, b]).
Certain elements of the API would be very difficult to sell to Israelis but there are key points that could help promote it as the basis of negotiations. These are the clauses that state that the Arab nations would affirm ‘security for all the states of the region’ (API, 2002:3.1) and ‘establish normal relations with Israel’ (API, 2002: 3.2). These statements suggest the recognition of Israel and the desire to create peace and stability in the region. Most significantly, these statements were initiated by the Arab world, rather than imposed by a third party. The left had often been criticised for not providing an answer to Israelis’ security concerns, leading to its loss in credibility. This initiative provided an answer for the Israeli left to push.

However, despite these initiatives, the Israeli governments in this phase have not been receptive towards the API. The Sharon government was too heavily concerned with the second intifada (Teitlebaum in Eyadat, 2011); Olmert showed interest (Moran, 2007) but was removed from Office before anything could come of it and according the Netanyahu, the API is outdated and does not take into account the rise of Hamas and ISIS (Keinon, 2014). There has therefore never been a clear positive response from the Israeli government towards the API. However, the Arab League has continued to ratify the initiative, even with the turmoil in the Arab world, at the Baghdad summit in 2012 and again at the Doha summit in 2013.

This change in the POS presents a potential opportunity to those peace groups that promote negotiated peace agreements, as it gives them something to mobilise the Israeli public around and call on the government to respond to. However, since the Israeli government has not yet been willing to base negotiations on the API, whilst regional and international events and discourses had the potential to open the POS for Israeli peace activism, the centrality of domestic political opportunity structures counter-acted the opportunities presented by the international arena. This scenario seems particularly likely in issues of peace and security.

2.2.3 TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The BDS Movement and other transnational social movements dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have also shifted the international political opportunity structures. The BDS Movement was launched in 2005 after the Palestinian call, with the aim of ‘taking effective action to end Israeli impunity and hold Israel accountable under international law’ (BDS Movement, [no date]). The movement has had the effect of raising awareness of the Palestinian situation and Israel’s actions around the world. Although direct causality cannot be determined, a number of companies have divested from Israel, such as Dutch pension fund PGGM and large supermarket chains across Europe have boycotted products from the settlements, such as SuperValu in Ireland.63 Whilst Israel claims that there has yet to be an impact on its economy (Coren and Zrahiya, 2015), the BDS Movement is clearly gaining support and achieving successes.

63 For a list of ‘BDS successes’ see The Palestine Portal ([no date]).
2.2.4 THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

The ‘Global War on Terror’ played an indirect role in reinforcing the closed political opportunity structures in Israel. The September 11 attacks coincided with the first year of the second Intifada and legitimised and encouraged the steps Israel was taking to combat the Intifada. According to Eiland (2010:30), ‘suddenly, it became legitimate “to fight terror”’ and Arafat, who had been supported by the international community in his struggle against the Israeli occupation, was now being confronted to stop the Palestinian terrorism. The changes in the international arena gave Israel the green light to use necessary measures to curb Palestinian terrorism, including the military incursions and political assassinations, which shifted the domestic POS in favour of military action over peace agreements.

The campaign against terrorism that followed led by the United States, the rise of extremist groups in the Middle East and the increasing prominence of Iran have been used by different Israeli governments in the 2000s and 2010s as means to justify their policies towards the Palestinians, by equating the threats felt by Israel with the threats felt by the US and the West. These real and perceived threats have enabled Israeli governments to bolster their security rhetoric and military action, presenting opposing ideas to that of Israeli peace activism. This has been a significant factor in further marginalising the ideas of Israeli peace activism across all components.

The then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used the opportunity to liken the Palestinian terrorists in Israel to the terrorists that targeted the US and called for coordination in eliminating such threats. He stated in a CNN broadcast,

‘War against terror is an international war, a war of a coalition of the free world against all the terror groups and against whoever believes they can pose a threat to freedom.
This is a war between the good and the bad, between humanity and those who are blood-thirsty’ (Sharon in CNN, 2001).

Shimon Peres, the then Foreign Minister, remarked along similar lines that, ‘the fight against terror is an international struggle of the free world against the forces of darkness who seek to destroy our liberty and our way of life. I believe that together we can defeat these forces of evil’ (Peres in CNN, 2001). In 2002 the US Senate agreed that Israel and the US were ‘engaged in a common struggle against terrorism’ (Gregory, 2004:190) and the essence of the suicide attacks in Israel were ‘identical to the attacks on our country of September 11’ (Gregory, 2004:191).

The above comments were made at the height of the second Intifada when Israel was subjected to suicide bombings. Since his election in 2009, Netanyahu has continued to make similar statements, likening Hamas to ISIS, arguing that they are ‘branches of the same poisonous tree’ (Netanyahu, 2014b). Netanyahu actually edited a book preceding the September 11 attacks entitled, ‘Terrorism: How the West Can Win’, which highlighted the need for coordinating Western forces, of which he includes Israel, against terrorism (Netanyahu, 1987). Whilst US policy towards Israel has not been entirely consistent
throughout the 2000s and 2010s, with varying levels of condemnation for Israel’s actions and different attempts towards a peace process, there has been general support for Israel without significant pressure for them to change their policies (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006), given the West’s fight against terrorism and the strategic position of Israel as ‘the only democracy in the Middle East.’ According to Keohane and Nye (1972), national security tends to be considered of greater significance than ‘transnational commitments’ such as universal respect for human rights, which explains America’s support for Israel despite the human rights abuses inherent in the occupation. This has therefore marginalised the peace promoting voices or anti-occupation voices in Israel since they are perceived as contrary to the security discourse and actions, which are prioritised over the concerns that Israeli peace activism was voicing.

2.2.5 THE ARAB UPRISINGS

The Arab uprisings that began in 2011 were a further change in the international POS that could have shifted the Israeli POS for peace activism. However they were mainly focused on internal issues relevant to each country and did not address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Katz, 2013), despite some small groups giving attention to the issue (Anonymous, 2015). However, there were some security-related fears from within the Israeli government that the power vacuums created would be filled by extremist Islamists and that the agreements with Egypt and Jordan would be nullified (Netanyahu, 2011). This presented a threat to Israeli peace activism, since Israel was concerned with securing their borders and maintaining the buffer zones between the Arab countries, including the West Bank. The agreements have so-far been upheld but, the continued uncertainties could allow Israel to use them to justify their hawkish security-rhetoric and policies. However, this only reinforces similar rhetoric and policies that were developed in response to the Global War on Terror and therefore does not represent anything new.

In terms of activism, the Arab uprisings had little impact on the efforts within Israel, with little attention given to the uprisings amongst Israeli peace activists. Some inspiration was seen in the J14 social justice protests, which emerged in the summer of 2011, namely the diffusion of slogans from the Egyptian protest. Gamson (2011) notes that the influence was not connected to the ‘injustice’ component, since the protests in Israel were dealing solely with domestic issues but, was connected to the agency component of collective action frames, whereby the activists were inspired by the external events to change their own circumstances. Given the social justice movement chose to ignore the occupation, no link however, can be made with Israeli peace activism.

Furthermore, although beyond the scope of this dissertation, the uprisings also had little impact on the Palestinian popular movement who were mainly quiescent throughout the wave of uprisings across the

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64 The vast majority of the activists interviewed did not reference the Arab Uprisings.
65 At a J14 rally on 6 August 2011 a large placard cited the Tahrir slogan in Arabic, ‘Go!’ and the phrase ‘Egypt is here’ in Hebrew (ActiveStills in Sheizaf, 2011b). The central chant was ‘the people demand social justice,’ with echoes of the Egyptian, ‘the people demand the fall of the regime,’ (Goldman, 2013).
Arab world, with only a small movement emerging that called for unity between Fatah and Hamas, which led to talks and a temporary reconciliation agreement (Beinin, 2011). They too were more concerned with internal issues than regional changes.

It is clear, therefore, that events and norms in the international arena can have the effect of closing or reinforcing closed domestic political opportunity structures for a social movement, even if not directly connected to movement. Having outlined the key shifts in the POS in this phase of Israeli peace activism, this chapter will now consider how the POS were perceived by each component of Israeli peace activism and how the four powers of movement interacted with each other for each component. A different cycle of contention for each component will be identified and explained.

3 CYCLE ONE: DEMOBILISATION OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT

Having been active for decades pushing a two state solution, the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism witnessed their efforts bring about a political peace agreement in the early 1990s, which meant they no longer needed to mobilise to the extent they had done in the preceding years. The stagnation of the peace agreements in the mid-1990s then encouraged the liberal Zionist component to try to re-mobilise. However, the combination of the shifts in the POS in the early 2000s meant they were now unable and unwilling to mobilise in the manner they had done previously. A threat was attributed to the shifting POS, meaning conditions were, in general, not considered ripe in this phase for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise for their goals, which led to their demobilisation. The collective action frames that centred on the particularism of liberal Zionism meant that they focused on promoting peace for the continuity and security of Israel, rather than out of concerns for the plight of the Palestinians. The new realities made it difficult for the them to mobilise their resources, in particular because public opinion had shifted further away from the ideas of Israeli peace activism (Hermann, 2009:191). The relationship between the liberal Zionist component and the different governments since 2000 also contributed to their demobilisation. Furthermore, counter-movement dynamics from the settler movement played a role in reducing the opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise and further contributed to its demobilisation. All factors combined, their cycle of contention drew to a close. Two mechanisms contributed to the way in which the liberal Zionist groups responded to the shifting POS: exhaustion, from the strain of being active on the streets for decades and facilitation of the two-state solution by Israeli governments, at least in their rhetoric. Some groups continued with certain activities however, the activities have either become more contained or have lost any form of influence. Figure 7 highlights the cycle of contention for the liberal Zionist component, which will be unpacked in the following sections.

Hermann (2009) provides a comprehensive study of the demobilisation of the liberal Zionist movement.
3.1 ATTRIBUTION OF THREAT TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

3.1.1 THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND PERCEIVED AS THREATS TO MOBILISATION

The realities following the failure of Camp David in 2000 and the outbreak of violence were perceived as threats to mobilisation for the liberal Zionist component, particularly due to the Israeli authorities’ harsh measures towards the Palestinians (Hermann, 2009:191). The violence perpetrated by the Palestinians also caused fear and hatred amongst Israeli society, including members of Israeli peace activism. Despite the repressive actions of the IDF towards the Palestinians during the Intifada, the liberal Zionist component did not perceive it as an opportunity to mobilise. Whilst it has been argued that a peace movement mobilises against impending wars and/or eruptions of violence, which provide a stimulus for action (Cortright, 2008; Meyer, 2004; Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002), the liberal Zionist component’s response, or lack of, to Israel’s actions against the second Intifada requires a different explanation. Hixon (2000: xiii) notes that peace movements are not necessarily pacifist in nature; rather they mobilise to promote ‘national responsibility toward universal codes of behaviour which the state is violating’. It can be suggested along these lines that, as a result of the specific nature of the second Intifada, the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism did not believe the state to be violating universal codes of conduct since the personal security of Israelis was being violated and the state has a duty to protect its citizens in the face of violence. In the case of the second Intifada, the fear felt by Israelis, as explained by Jones (2005), highlights why, in such circumstances, a peace movement may not present an anti-war voice,

‘Such violence [Palestinian suicide bombings], often indiscriminate in its choice of targets, is seen as a strategic threat to Israel since at its heart lies the atavistic fear that such violence denies the legality, if not the reality, of the other’ (Jones, 2005:1-2).

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67 Figures 7, 8 and 9 are adapted from Tarrow (2011:189), ‘A Dynamic, Interactive Framework for Analysing Mobilisation in Contentious Politics.’
With the safety of individual Israeli civilians threatened on a daily basis, the mainstream public were not against the Israeli government and IDF using force to protect its citizens, as highlighted by the large electoral margin in the election of Ariel Sharon, the man responsible for not preventing the Sabra and Shatilla massacre (Hermann, 2009:191), and therefore the liberal Zionist peace activists were unable to mobilise against Israel’s actions.

In the immediate wake of the *Intifada*, demobilisation can also be explained by Tarrow’s (2011:198) mechanism of exhaustion. As described by a veteran activist,

‘The peace-minded ordinary people, who for nearly three decades could be relied on to come out in their hundreds and thousands once or twice a year (and sometimes more frequently when the situation clearly demanded it) have disappeared from the streets since that fatal time in 2000’ (Keller and Zilversmidt, 2008:13).

Having been active for decades in promoting a two-state solution, the activists finally saw their ideas reach a political agreement, only for them to crumble with the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 and the outbreak of the second *Intifada*.

The disengagement plan is an example of how the mechanism of facilitation leads to demobilisation of a social movement. Although conducted unilaterally by Israel, in essence, withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank is what the liberal Zionist component had been pushing for. Hermann (2009:227) notes that whilst the moderate elements of Israeli peace activism did not actively support the disengagement plan, inaction in opposing the plan highlighted their agreement with it. There were some that criticised the unilateral nature of the plan (Hermann, 2009:228) but in general their silence showed their compliance. Given that the majority of public opinion was consistently in favour of the disengagement (Hermann, 2009:226), it is unsurprising that the liberal Zionist groups and in particular *Shalom Achshav* took this approach. However, this meant it was compliant in the policies of a right-wing government.

3.1.2 THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT: A COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP

The shifts in the nature of the government in this phase points to the closing of the political opportunity structures for those wanting to influence the government on issues of peace and security. Firstly, as explained above, some of the ideas of the peace movement were facilitated by the government so, they did not need to mobilise and secondly, the shift towards progressively more right-wing governments meant the liberal Zionist components no longer had allies in the government and their ideas were removed from the hawkish positions of the coalitions. However, there are some developments that the classical political process model does not account for, which can be seen in the complicated relationship the liberal Zionist component has traditionally had with the Israeli government. These developments further increased the attribution of threat that the liberal Zionist component gave to the possibility of mobilisation.
The model assumes that having elite allies in the government will open the opportunities for challengers to yield influence (Tilly, 1978). In accordance with the model, despite the break-down of the Camp David Summit and the violence that broke out in 2000, the political opportunity structures should have been open at that point for the liberal Zionist component to influence the government. This is because they had access to the some Members of the Knesset who were closely aligned with Shalom Achshav, such as Naomi Chazan and Mossi Raz of Meretz and Yossi Beilin of Avoda. However, the close affiliation Shalom Achshav had with members of the ruling coalition did not encourage mobilisation. Whilst there may have been private meetings to try and persuade the political elites to continue with negotiations, they did not publicly try to lobby the government (Gordon, 2003). There a number of reasons for this, similar to the situation when Rabin was Prime Minister. Firstly, the opportunity may have been open in terms of access to the government but it was closed in terms of finding a suitable framing of the situation; it was not clear what to protest against and therefore the activists were paralysed in terms of an agenda. Secondly, they did not want to undermine the government and give leverage to the opposition and therefore chose to remain silent. Thirdly, they were concerned that in associating with the governments of Rabin and Barak, the peace movement’s unpatriotic image would tarnish the governments’ efforts at peace. The relationship between the government and a social movement is therefore more complex than the political process model assumes. If the organisation or movement is too close to the government, it can create difficulties in challenging it, at least publicly, even when there is a desire to do so; what is conventionally argued to be an opportunity was not actually perceived as such by the liberal Zionist component at this point.

In general, therefore, the liberal Zionist component has tended to be more comfortable in the opposition, where they can publicly mobilise to criticise the government. However, in this phase they have been unable to present a viable alternative to the centrist and right-wing governments, since the idea of the two-state solution has been taken up by the consecutive governments in this phase, at least in their rhetoric. This is a further example of facilitation, whereby some of the claims of the challengers are satisfied and therefore the need for them to mobilise is reduced. As Hermann (2009) argues, the liberal Zionist component therefore became politically irrelevant. Their political irrelevancy is highlighted by the inability of Shalom Achshav to get ‘its people’ in the Knesset. The liberal Zionist component has often had members who have been elected as Members of Knesset. In this phase however, the Director of Shalom Achshav, Yariv Oppenheimer, did not receive a place in the Knesset having been listed 27th on the Avoda list.

3.1.3 ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION TURNING AWAY

The shift in Israeli public opinion in this phase was also perceived as a threat to mobilisation for the liberal Zionist component, further contributing to its demobilisation. Given the desire of the liberal Zionist component to mobilise the Israeli public, they toned-down their positions to resonate more closely with public opinion however, they have yet to find a collective action frame that resonates.
Shalom Achshav tried to resonate with the Israeli public by transforming their collective action frame to include the idea of ‘security,’ arguing that a two-state solution is the only way to ensure that Israel would be secure. However, the situation in Gaza has succeeded in putting into question the concept of ‘land for peace’ and peace activists have yet to find a concrete, peaceful security-orientated answer to the rockets being fired into Israel.

The move of Israeli public opinion away from the ideas of Israeli peace activism has led to declining mobilisation structures for the liberal Zionist component and therefore an inability to mobilise resources. In the previous phase mass grassroots support was the biggest resource for the liberal Zionist groups. However, in this phase, given that individuals do not believe there is a partner to negotiate with, there has been little motivation to mobilise to pressure the government into negotiations. Furthermore, a poll conducted in August 2009 found that 41 percent of respondents felt that Shalom Achshav had caused damage to Israel (Maagar Mohot Survey Institute in Lerner, 2009). Given the Israeli public is the target audience of the liberal Zionist component, their shift away from the ideas of the liberal Zionist component accounts for demobilisation.

3.2 FROM PROACTIVE TO REACTIVE ACTIVISM

Whilst the goal of the liberal Zionist component is to lobby the government to negotiate a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the above factors have meant that they have been unable to mobilise for proactive measures. Their activism has therefore shifted to reactive initiatives. Most notably Shalom Achshav has focused much of their resources on the Settlement Watch Project, which monitors the building of settlements in the West Bank, producing regular reports on activities in the Settlements, both of illegal outposts and government approved building works. This specialisation highlights the shift from a mass grassroots movement to the institutionalisation of an NGO with skilled employees. It is this area of their activism that brings them closer to the radical and human rights component, since they are focused on the realities on the ground.

3.2.1 COUNTER-MOVEMENT DYNAMICS

The Settlement Watch Project has had the effect of exacerbating tensions between Shalom Achshav and the settler movement, which represents the main counter-movement of the liberal Zionist component. A counter movement is defined as a ‘movement that makes contrary claims simultaneously to those of the original movement’ (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996:1631) and plays an important role in the dynamics of a social movement, acting as a threat to mobilisation. The Israeli peace movement has traditionally been in direct opposition to the settler movement, with Shalom Achshav and Gush Emunim representing the two main responses to the 1967 war respectively: land for peace or annexation. Gush Emunim has arguably achieved its goals to a greater extent than Shalom Achshav (Newman and Hermann, 1982). A number of reasons can be cited for this. For example, Gush Emunim’s view that the Arabs are perpetual enemies was often in line with general public opinion (Newman and Hermann, 1982: 524). Furthermore, Gush Emunim had clearer links with the government, with Newman and
Hermann arguing that they have ‘become an extra-parliamentary implementational arm of the policies pursued by the Likud government’ (Newmann and Hermann, 1982:525). By contrast, Shalom Achshav, had more complicated ties with the government. It was also the tactical repertoires of the settler movement that enabled much of its success since they actively went and created facts on the ground by building outposts from the start of their campaign, rather than solely trying to lobby the government or influence the public. Shalom Achshav has therefore tended to play a reactive role in confronting Gush Emunim and settlement building, particularly since the creation of the Settlement Watch Project in 1990. They try to bring to the attention of the Israeli public and the international community the expansion of the settlements.

This opposition from the settlers has become violent in this phase, with a strategy of ‘price-tags’ being used by extreme Israeli settlers, beginning in response to Ariel Sharon’s disengagement plan. ‘Price-tags’ are acts of vengeance by extremist settlers against the removal of settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. According to journalist Amos Harel,

‘The extreme right has sought to establish a ‘balance of terror,’ in which every state action aimed at them – from demolishing a caravan in an outpost to restricting the movements of those suspected of harassing Palestinian olive harvesters – generates an immediate, violent reaction’ (Harel, 2008).

Most often the ‘price-tag’ attacks are acts of violence or vandalism against the IDF and Palestinians but members of Shalom Achshav have also been subjected to similar attacks in more recent years. For example, in September 2011 threats were painted near the apartment of the head of Shalom Achshav’s Settlement Watch Project, with the words ‘Price Tag Migron’ and ‘Peace Now, the end is near’, and in November 2011 the Jerusalem office of Shalom Achshav was evacuated following a bomb threat (Friedman, 2015). Whilst leaders of the settler movement (Shragai, 2008), Israeli rabbis (AFP, 2011) and Netanyahu (Keinon and Lazaroff, 2011) have condemned these acts, there have been relatively few arrests of the perpetrators and little attempts to stop the vandalism. According to a report by Yesh Din, between 2005 and 2013 only 8.5% of investigations opened against ‘price-tags’ in the West Bank resulted in indictment (Yesh Din, 2013).

This opposition has led Shalom Achshav to further emphasise that the settlements are ‘the main obstacle to peace’ (Ofran in Gal, 2012), which encourages retaliation from the settler movement. Whilst this acts as a threat to mobilisation, since it makes activists wary, it also confers some relevancy on Shalom Achshav, since the opposition suggests that the settlers feel threatened by the activities of Shalom Achshav.

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68 Migron is the name of an outpost in the West Bank, which was deemed as illegally built on Palestinian land by the Supreme Court and ordered to be dismantled. 161
3.3 ATTRIBUTING THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Different aspects of the international arena have been perceived as threats, whilst others as opportunities for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise. The operations in Gaza did not have the effect of re-mobilising the quietened liberal Zionist component and it has only been the radical and human rights groups that have responded. This follows a similar pattern to that during the second Intifada, with the radical and human rights components reacting against Israel’s actions and calling for an end to violence, whilst the liberal Zionist component was more hesitant. The perception that the situation in Gaza was not an opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise is linked to their focus on particularism. At times of crisis the liberal Zionist component are forced to choose between particularism and universal values (Greenstein, 2014), and along with the Israeli public tend to retreat to their particularistic, nationalistic narratives, falling ‘silent when sirens start to wail’ (Raz in Fraser, 2014). According to an activist from the liberal Zionist component, whilst she was against the operations in Gaza, she found that her companions in the peace camp justified the Israeli attack as a response to the Hamas rockets. She notes that, ‘the widespread sense that there was “no choice” has permeated and deeply divided the Israeli peace camp ever since’ (Chazan, 2009).

Shalom Achshav did decide to mobilise against Operation Protective Edge in 2014, joining a protest of an estimated ten thousand Israelis under the slogan, ‘changing direction: towards peace, away from war’, a month after the hostilities broke out (+972 mag, 2014). Shalom Achshav were careful to wait until the extent of the damages and casualties caused by the operation had been determined, rather than protesting the operation in and of itself, a further example of how the collective action frames of each group or component determine when an opportunity to mobilise is perceived.

Kol Echad (One Voice), who are attempting to build a movement of students within the liberal Zionist component, based on support for a two state solution, also responded to Operation Protective Edge, which focused on concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘negotiations.’ The difference is that Kol Echad has a sister movement, Kol Echad Palestine, and therefore could not stay silent. A Facebook post shows a statement from Kol Echad in response to the 2014 operation,

‘We at OneVoice are united in asking our political leaders to recognize that the preservation of life must always be paramount. This dangerous escalation and the tragic loss of civilian life are proof that the status quo is unsustainable. That is why we are calling for a mutual ceasefire to ensure the safety of innocent lives. Those of us committed to an end to conflict and occupation, and the realization of a two-state solution, understand that violence can never achieve a just peace’ (One Voice, 2014).

This takes a non-confrontational approach, careful not to place blame in any direction.

In order for the liberal Zionist component to remain relevant, they need to present a solution that is viable for both the Israeli public and Israeli government in a way that answers the concerns that have
arisen in this phase, which they can push and mobilise behind (Patir, 2013). Without proof that there was a partner for peace and with deep security concerns, peace initiatives have not held much grounding amongst the Israeli public and there has been a lack of alternatives coming from Israeli peace activism. The Arab Peace Initiative was seen as a potential answer.

Whilst the API was first introduced in 2002, it was not until after the end of the second Intifada and the 2007 Arab summit, where Saudi Arabia further encouraged the initiative, that Israeli civil society, mostly from the liberal Zionist component attributed this as an opportunity to mobilise (The Centre for Democracy and Community Development, 2014). The Forum Irgunei haShalom established a task force to consider responses to the API, IPCRI promoted the API through various means, including Track II Diplomacy workshops and Shalom Achshav organised a demonstration in Jerusalem. Kol Echad has in particular continued to promote a two-state solution based on the API, through a variety of activities.

The API itself is more of a declaration than a peace agreement and required an Israeli declaration in response. In 2011 former security chiefs developed the Israeli Peace Initiative as the Israeli reply to the API. Forty people signed it, including former chiefs of the Shabak (General Security Service) and Mossad (Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations). In 2014 they launched a new organisation, Mefakdim l’maan Bitachon Yisrael (Commanders for Israel’s Security), which was set up in direct response to the API, calling for ‘the Israeli public to encourage Israel’s political leadership to embark on a regional effort as an appropriate response to the Arab Peace Initiative’ (Efal, 2014). The group of 150 high-ranking officers argued that, ‘those who claim regional security-political arrangements and peace with the Palestinians will undermine security are flat wrong...we know that peace agreements...are critical to the security of Israel’ (Efal, 2014). Given their positions as commanders of the IDF and the Shabak, their endorsement of the API gives it some legitimacy amongst Israeli society. The API, it seems, represents a potential opportunity for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise around. However, as noted, consecutive Israeli governments have failed to endorse the API and, most recently, Netanyahu has marked it as no longer relevant, suggesting mobilisation around the API would be fruitless at this stage.

3.4 THE DEMOBILISATION OF THE LIBERAL ZIONIST COMPONENT

The attribution of threat to mobilisation in response to the shifts in the POS in this phase explains the inability for the liberal Zionist component to mobilise their resources and therefore has led to their demobilisation. The mechanisms of exhaustion and facilitation, along with the collective action frame of liberal Zionism and counter-movement dynamics, have also played a role in the demobilisation and political irrelevancy of the liberal Zionist component, bringing their cycle of contention, which peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to a close. The attempts to remain relevant through the Settlement Watch Project have been the most significant aspect of Shalom Achshav in this phase and the opposition to the project suggests that activities which directly deal with realities on the ground and aim to reveal ‘hidden realities’ are perceived as a threat. This is more in-line with the tactics used by the human rights component, even though the framing behind it is different. It also suggests that perhaps
the liberal Zionist component, particularly Shalom Achshav, are ‘lying low’, focusing on one area and maintaining their networks until they perceive an opportunity to mobilise in a new cycle of contention, when the Israeli public is ready. The radical component, in the meantime, is engaged in a new cycle of contention, developing innovative collection action frames and mobilising different resources, filling the space left by the liberal Zionist component.

4 CYCLE TWO: A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION FOR THE RADICAL COMPONENT

Unlike the liberal Zionist component, the radical component attributed opportunities to the shifting POS, which meant they felt the situation was ripe to mobilise. This was mainly due to the process of radicalisation that occurred in the outbreak of the Intifada, which shifted the ways in which they perceived the situation. These shifts took them further away from the Israeli state narrative and mainstream thinking, which meant they were able to be more confrontational and innovative in their collective action, enabling them to appropriate organisational resources to advance their activism, signalling a new cycle of contention (Figure 8). Those that attribute opportunities to the initial broad changes are known as ‘early risers’ in a cycle of contention, acting as information brokers (Tarrow, 2011:201-202), signalling to others that the time is ripe to mobilise, highlighting the role of the radical groups in setting the agenda of Israeli peace activism. However, their radicalisation, combined with the shift rightwards in Israeli public opinion and the Israeli government meant that the radical component experienced some repression. Given this and their inability to have influence domestically, the radical component perceived opportunities to mobilise in the international arena. This helped them to maintain momentum but furthered the levels of repression. Figure 8 highlights the emerging cycle of contention for the radical component, which will be detailed in the following sections.

4.1 ATTRIBUTION OF OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

4.1.1 RESPONDING TO THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND

The early risers in this cycle of contention were from the radical component, namely Ta’ayush and the Koalitziat Nashim l’Shalom, amongst others. They perceived the breakdown of the Camp David talks, the shooting of thirteen Arab citizens of Israel in October 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the Intifada as opportunities to mobilise. The radical component radicalised their positions and tactics by seeking to counter the separation discourse in Israel and show solidarity towards the Palestinians, rather
than accept there was no partner for peace. Similar to Cortright’s (2008:1) identification that in some historical cases of peace movements the idea of ‘peace’ required ‘the active promotion of rights and equality for all’, the radical activists acknowledged the grievances of the Palestinians and their frustration of living under occupation, which encouraged the radical component to mobilise against the actions of the Israeli authorities in the second *Intifada*. They also began to realise that ‘declarations do not always stand the test of “moments of truth”’ (Bdier and Halevi, 2002) and therefore chose to ‘protest by doing’. According to *Ta’ayush*, one of the ‘early risers’, ‘at the October 2000 watershed, the Israeli Left was delineated once again, and the goals of the struggle clearer than ever’ (Bdier and Halevi, 2002).

Despite further peace talks in the 2000s and 2010s between the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority, there was a sense of disillusionment amongst the radical component with regards to the political process. Combined with unilateral moves by the Sharon government and strengthened by a progressively more right-wing government headed by Netanyahu, the radical component further radicalised during the second *Intifada*. Rather than pushing a peace agreement, the radical activists turned their attentions to dealing with issues on the ground, thus taking a mainly reactive approach to challenging the occupation. The realities external to Israeli peace activism have therefore affected their trajectory but, when and how the activists chose to respond is dependent on internal factors.

The ways in which the radical component perceived the outbreak of the second *Intifada*, the continuation of the occupation, confrontations with settlers, the building of the separation barrier and the situation in Gaza presented opportunities for organisational appropriation, which meant acquiring resources for their activities, both in the form of social movement organisations and through individual activists. Different groups emerged with a particular specialisation, with each identifying a certain element of the prevailing realities to challenge, often based on previous experience in and expertise of the field. According to an interview with a veteran activist,

‘Different groups have specialised into different types of actions...based on field action and different strategies and also based on specialisation... so, different groups became very, very good at what they do and they collect knowledge about how to do a certain action and do it well’ (Baum, 2013).

As the groups responded to prevailing realities they gained more knowledge of the field, evolving and opening up new opportunities for other groups to emerge, finding new ways to act and developing their own specialisation, creating a spiral of opportunities for the radical component to mobilise, whereby the reaction to one opportunity creates further opportunities to act. This is clearly seen by tracing the evolution of the radical component from *Ta’ayush* to *Solidariut*.

As Operation Defensive Shield changed the conditions on the ground, *Ta’ayush* acknowledged the need for a reassessment in strategy. In the first years of the second *Intifada*, whilst they had entered Palestinians villages and towns, their activities had been non-confrontational and resembled the
humanitarian groups that were operating in the human rights component. Delivery of aid requires the assistance of the IDF to get through the checkpoints and therefore the activists had to develop good relations with the authorities. Furthermore, initially the group wanted to be non-ideological in order to be open to a spectrum of activists (Hermann, 2009:193). However, a few days after Operation Defensive Shield began, on 1 April 2002, Ta’ayush decided to join a women’s group who were active against the occupation for a demonstration at A-Ram checkpoint, which was violently dispersed by the army (Bdier and Halevi, 2002). The response from the IDF marked a shift in the relationship between the army and the activists, which deteriorated as repressive efforts of the IDF in the West Bank increased and the activists attempted to confront them to assist the Palestinians. Bdeir and Halevi (2002) note that whilst Ta’ayush were not immune to opposition that emerged, they were able to respond due to the experience they had from working in Israel and the territories and the solid network they could mobilise. The response of the authorities could have been perceived as a threat to the activists but, by using existing resources and evolving their strategies, they perceived and created opportunities to continue to challenge the occupation.

The actions that continued throughout the Intifada enabled the emergence of Anarchistim Neged HaGader, which identifies its roots in Ta’ayush. Anarchistim Neged HaGader emerged as a distinct group amongst the radical component around the planned construction of the separation barrier. They argued that the barrier would lead to new forms of oppression towards the Palestinians, including separating people from their farm lands or cutting villages in two (Anarchists Against the Wall, [no date]). In contrast, Shalom Achshav supported the idea of the barrier, as long as it was built along the Green Line (Friedman and Etkes, 2006). The barrier itself became a target and site of protest, which shifted both the tactical repertoires and the relationship with the Palestinians. As noted, the Israeli Jews attend the demonstrations against the barrier as guests of the Palestinians, thus creating a direct link between Palestinian activism and the evolution of Israeli peace activism.

The tactics used by the radical component comes with a certain level of risk, particularly those who confront the IDF. The high-risk nature of this type of activism has had a direct impact on mobilisation, showing a further interactive connection between the powers of movement. On one hand, it has reduced the mobilisation potential of those activist groups engaged in these demonstrations due to the risk involved and the taboo of confronting the IDF. On the other hand, it has encouraged tighter bonds between the activists, which has helped develop the ‘community’ that is felt amongst the radical activists.

The mobilisation in Sheikh Jarrah can also be explained through this spiral of opportunities and represents a peak in the activism of the radical left. Through organisational appropriation, they were able to make use of existing mobilisation structures that had developed and strengthened through the previous decade; they benefitted from the experience of activists in the field; and were able to build on relationships that had been made with Palestinian activists. The opportunity was further expanded through the general opposition to Netanyahu from the political left, unlike the Zionist-left’s compliance.
with Sharon in the mid-2000s, which enabled joint mobilisation across the components of Israeli peace activism. Following the peak of activism in Sheikh Jarrah, which lasted around two years, the individual groups, specialising in their specific areas, continue to act, mobilising against specific injustices. New groups have also emerged, basing their activism on these radical forms. One such group is All That’s Left, a ‘collective unequivocally opposed to the occupation’ (All That’s Left, 2015). They are particularly focused on mobilising young, new immigrants and developing a Jewish diaspora angle of resistance.

Conventional protests that challenge the authorities have also been employed by the radical component in response to the realities on the ground. In this phase, unlike the liberal Zionist component, the situation in Gaza was perceived as an opportunity for the radical activists to mobilise. For some of the younger generation, Operation Cast Lead in 2008 was the first time they questioned the actions of the IDF and the idea that Israel only ever acted in the name of peace, as explained to the author in an interview with a young activist (Rothman, 2013). Such sentiments created an impetus to join the more radical avenues of peace activism. For those who were already involved in activism, Gaza was another case of injustice to protest against. In Haifa, an alliance of Jewish and Arab residents held demonstrations twice daily following the start of the operation. Jaffa also became the site for anti-war protests from the first operation, with Jews and Arabs protesting together by the neighbourhood’s Clock Tower and in 2014 protestors gathered in Rabin Square under the banner ‘Jews and Arabs Refuse to be Enemies.’ The tactics employed returned to demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities, since activists were unable to enter Gaza and act in solidarity with the population there. However, a key difference was that the demonstrations were jointly held between Israelis and Arab citizens of Israel, which was enabled by the relationships built up over the previous eight years of solidarity activism. According to veteran activist Hannah Safran, the response to the Gaza operations showed that ‘something else has developed on the ruins of the old Zionist left’ (Safran, 2009).

For the radical component, the situation in Gaza therefore presented a further situation that required solidarity with the Palestinians. This solidarity activism has further marginalised the radical component both with the Israeli public and the Israeli government. However, unlike the leading radicals in the previous phase of activism, such as Gush Shalom, these activists are increasingly less concerned in influencing the Israeli public or government.

4.1.2 TURNING AWAY FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC

The relationship between the radical component and the government is different from that of the liberal Zionist component. The reactive nature of their activism suggests that the activists did not perceive an opportunity to influence the government however, they did perceive opportunities to challenge the realities on the ground, which encouraged the shift in tactical repertoires. According to Anarchistim Neged HaGader, ‘direct action is the democratic act when democracy stops functioning’ (Anarchists Against the Wall, 2004:50), emphasising the perception that the opportunities were closed to influencing the government through accepted political routes. This assumes that the activists would
ultimately want to influence the government however, in some cases this may not be the goal of the activists. It has been argued that the more radical fringes of peace activists in Israel are not in fact acting as claim-bearers attempting to persuade the government to change their policies with regards to certain issues (Gordon, 2010; Hallward, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009). As explained to the author by an activist in the radical component, there is a feeling that they did not want to attribute legitimacy to an institution they do not believe in and therefore their goals were to change the realities on the ground by bypassing the government (Schwarzenberg, 2013). Pallister-Wilkins (2009), in her study of Anarchism Neged haGader, argues that the lack of claim making, the use of direct action and the challenge to the legitimacy of the state, necessitates an alternative theoretical approach from social movement theory. She argues that this form of activism brings into question the assumptions of the state-centric approach of social movement theory. What Pallister-Wilkins fails to understand about social movement theory is that it does not necessarily have to be state-centric. The state is one factor amongst others that can influence or be influenced by a social movement. Specifically, social movement theory does not specify government policy change as a necessary goal of a social movement organisation and thus a prerequisite to the application of the different variables of the theory. The relationship between the radical component and the Israeli government does suggest further complexities than the political process model allows for but points to a situation that can be described as ‘politics beyond the state’ (Wapner, 1995), whereby a social movement can yield influence and create change without appealing to the government.

Given that Israeli public opinion has been turning away from the ideas and beliefs of the liberal Zionist component, it is even further away from those of the radical component. However, the radical component has become less concerned with influencing the Israeli public.

4.2 INCREASING REPRESSION

Opposition towards the radical activists has been more repressive than towards other components. It is not so repressive that the activists are unable to mobilise but, it has hindered the numbers they are able to mobilise due to the risks that such repression brings. Repression can be identified through surveillance and arrests of activists, violence from the authorities towards the activists, as well as the implementation of certain laws that seek to constrain the voices of the radical component.

4.2.1 ARRESTS

The Israeli authorities had previously monitored the radical left wing activists and groups. One particular example was in 1988 when the authorities temporarily closed the Merkaz l’Informatzia Alternativit. The organisation was accused of providing assistance to illegal Palestinian organisations who were involved in orchestrating and perpetuating the first Intifada. Despite being found innocent of 30 out of 31 charges based on the 1950 Anti-terrorism Law, the Director, Michael Warschawski was sentenced to 20 months in jail. According to Warschawski, the reason for the discrepancy in the
sentence length and the charge was ‘to warn the Israeli peace movement not to get too close to the border’ (2005:129), by this he meant not to cross the line between being a critic of Israel’s policies and aligning with the enemy. Organisations have continued to be targeted and investigated when they come too close to the line. For example, in 2011 those who worked for Profil Hadash, the anti-militarization feminist organisation, were called into the police for questioning and had their computers confiscated. Whilst there were no charges, one member explained to the author that it harmed the organisation by delegitimising its activities and making members feel uneasy (Dolev, 2013).

Individual activists have also been put under surveillance and have been subject to arrests, particularly those from Anarchistim Neged HaGader. In 2007 the Shabak argued that it is obligated ‘to thwart subversive activity of parties that wish to harm the character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, even if their activity is carried out using the tools afforded them by democracy, based on the principle of ‘defensive democracy’’ (Boulus and Yakir, 2007). Whilst this is generally directed at Arab citizens of Israel with nationalist goals, it also includes those Jewish activists who are seen as aligning with the ‘enemy’, which applies particularly to those from the radical component. For example, in the early days of Ta’ayush, some activists were arrested when they engaged in humanitarian action during the Intifada (Svirsky, 2001b) and in 2012 around a dozen activists of Anarchistim Neged HaGader were called for questioning by the Shabak. The co-ordinator of the Koaliziat Nashim l’Shalom explained to the author that the arrests of activists led them to develop training programmes so that activists know what to expect and how to deal with it. Examples include learning what is supposed to happen during an investigation and who to approach for assistance; emotional support through low-cost psychologists; and explanations of the rights of a detainee in such situations (Dak, 2013).

4.2.2 VIOLENCE FROM THE AUTHORITIES

In this phase the IDF and the police have also been more violent towards Israeli peace activists than previously. For some, this has helped their cause, whilst for others it has done little to elevate their message. This is connected to the framing of the action, the type of tactic used and the identity of the opposition forces. In the Sheikh Jarrah protests the activists tried to stay within the legal limits of protests by applying for permits when they organised marches and ensuring protestors kept off the roads, as directed by the police. Some protestors disobeyed this and the police began to crack-down on the protests. According to activists David Shulman (2010) and Gil Gutwick (2013), the attempts by the police to suppress the protests led to the mobilisation of more activists. The first big clash happened in mid-December 2009 and the ‘big bang of Sheikh Jarrah happened following that, helped by the media attention’ (Gutwick, 2013). This is a common result of violent suppression of non-violent activism; where the activists gain legitimacy for maintaining their non-violent stance in the face of repression

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69 See Shulman (2007) for an account of Ta’ayush, detailing the situations where the IDF close off certain areas to prevent actions taking place and the activists have to decide whether they are willing to violate closed military zones and risk arrest.

70 The author attended a number of these protests in 2010 and witnessed the organiser’s requests for protestors to remain on the pavement.
(Sharp, 1973a, 1973b). Combined with the other factors that encouraged mobilisation in Sheikh Jarrah, the repression from the police encouraged further mobilisation.

The violence in the West Bank protests, which are more lethal than in Sheikh Jarrah, have not had a similar impact. The fact that the Israeli activists are confronting the IDF in their protests alongside Palestinians breaks a taboo in Israeli society. For a while the presence of Israelis at these protests restrained the army (Dana and Sheizaf, 2011) however, as the protests continued, the IDF used more repressive means and have developed new methods, such as skunk water to disperse the protests. To date over twenty Palestinians have been killed in these demonstrations—most often by direct hits from allegedly less lethal weapons such as rubber-coated metal bullets and tear gas canisters but sometimes with live ammunition (B’Tselem, 2015a). The IDF is considered an important institution in Israeli society, seen as a pillar in ensuring the safety of Israelis and Israel against external threats, as well as being perceived as a ‘people’s army’ due to compulsory conscription, whereas the police force deals with criminal activity and is a private institution, therefore confronting the police is perceived differently from confronting the IDF. Despite the violence towards Israelis, the protests in the West Bank have therefore not received sympathy from within Israel.

The surveillance, arrests and violence from the IDF increases the risk of the activism and therefore reduces mobilisation potential. The ability of opposition forces to either repress activities or de-legitimise the groups in the eyes of the public suggests that ultimately domestic political opportunity structures will determine whether activism can continue or not and whether they can have an impact. However, Israeli peace activists have found ways to innovate and evolve in order to bypass any constraints imposed by opposition forces through shifts in tactics, framing processes and attempts to influence the international community. Furthermore, if the activists are not interested in appealing to the state because they know that they cannot make a difference or do not wish to legitimise the institution, then they employ direct action to create immediate change on the ground, as can be seen with some of the more radical groups in this phase, particularly Ta’ayush and Anarchistim Neged HaGader. According to an interview with a member of the anti-militarisation group Profil Hadash, ‘the way in which we act in New Profile…it cannot be affected by external, political developments, events and so on. Different paths that we decided to take were not the result of wars, Intifadas, Palestinian politics or anything of the sort. It was internal’ (Dolev, 2013). This highlights the necessity of political opportunities to be perceived in order to exist as a threat or opportunity.

4.2.3 LAWS

A number of laws have been proposed and some implemented that have the potential to limit and delegitimise the voices of dissenters. They can arguably be seen to target Arab citizens of Israel and those that identify with the Palestinian struggle. Relevant to the radical component are two laws, the ‘Nakba Law’ and the ‘Anti-Boycott Law’ The ‘Nakba Law’ was enacted in March 2011 and gives authorisation to the Israeli Finance Minister to reduce state contributions to an organisation’s finances for any ‘activity that is contrary to the principles of the state’ (Adalah, 2011). This includes rejecting
Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’ and marking Israel’s Independence Day as a day of mourning, as is done by Palestinians who refer to it as the *Nakba*. Whilst this may seem financially harmful, in reality groups in violation of this law are unlikely to receive state funding in the first place due to their activities and framing. The law is more obviously harmful to Arab citizens of Israel, whilst also drawing a line at which critical discourses are permitted in Israel, thus marginalising further those groups who try to raise awareness of the Palestinian *Nakba* and question the character of the State of Israel.

The ‘Anti-Boycott Law’ was passed in July 2011 and ‘prohibits the public promotion of boycott by Israeli citizens and organisations against Israeli institutions or illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It enables the filing of civil lawsuits against anyone who calls for boycott’ (Adalah, 2012:9). As a ‘civil wrong’ it is not a criminal offence but, individuals or organisations can call for a civil lawsuit if they feel they have been discriminated against due to a boycott by another individual or organisation. The law also includes the removal of tax exemptions for organisations calling for a boycott. This clearly affects those Israeli organisations that are either members of the international BDS movement or have called for a partial boycott, such as *Gush Shalom*. In the wake of this law, some organisations involved in peace activism had to make public statements to distance themselves from the boycott debate out of financial concerns. For example, +972mag, who report on activism, stated that some of their writers support it and some do not but, as an organisation, they were unable to openly discuss this issue because of the new legislations. The Editors concluded that ‘outright calls for boycott, divestment and sanctions hold far too great a risk for our site – a risk we are not in a financial position to take’ (Reider, 2011b).

Compared with the ‘Nakba Law’ this has greater financial implications for Israeli peace activism but perhaps more significantly, serves to silence those who wish to voice opposition against the occupation. Israeli peace activists from across the spectrum responded in particular to the ‘Anti-Boycott Law’, arguing that the law is ‘anti-democratic’ and harms the democratic nature of Israel. For the liberal Zionist component, particularly *Shalom Achshav*, this created an opportunity for them to amplify their collective action frames and make use of the growing public anger towards the wave of ‘anti-democratic’ legislation, with ‘the future of a Jewish and democratic Israel’ becoming their mobilising frame in the wake of these laws. For the first time, they openly called for a boycott of settlement products (Lis and Zarchin, 2011) and headed a Facebook drive under the slogan, ‘Sue me, I boycott settlement products’, which received 8,500 ‘likes’ (Greenberg, 2011). *Gush Shalom*, who was the first group to propose a boycott of the settlements appealed to the Supreme Court against the ‘Anti-Boycott Law,’ claiming it was ‘unconstitutional,’ as it violates the right to Freedom of Expression (Art.7 cited in Keller, 2011). Furthermore it argued that boycott is a legitimate method of engaging in discourse in a liberal democracy (Keller, 2011). For a short period of time in 2011, these laws, particularly the ‘Anti-Boycott Law’ caught the attention of the Israeli public and encouraged them to react. However, the flames died down and did not succeed in re-invigorating the liberal Zionist component into sustained activism against the occupation. The fact there was little response to the *Nakba* Law highlights the connection between political opportunity structures, framing and tactical repertoires. Opposing the
‘Anti-Boycott Law’ on the grounds of democracy preservation fits into the mainstream narrative however, upholding the right to commemorate the Nakba is beyond what is deemed acceptable.

4.3 TURNING TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Given the lack of responsiveness internally and the repression towards the radical activists, some have begun to turn their attentions abroad by connecting with transnational advocacy networks. This has provided new targets for Israeli peace activism. Transnational movements that present ideas in-line with those of the radical activists act as both mobilisation structures and political opportunity structures, enabling the appropriation of new resources, mutual diffusion of tactical repertoires and increased potential to have influence. The global BDS Movement has been particularly important in furthering the efforts of the radical component of Israeli peace activism. This helps to bolster those groups working on BDS in Israel, providing them with additional resources beyond their own small numbers.

Three mechanisms can be seen in the connection between the radical component and the international community: global framing, transnational diffusion and externalisation (Tarrow, 2011:235). Global framing, where domestic issues are given broader meaning than the original collective action frames, can be seen amongst the radical activists who connect the oppression of the Palestinians to all forms of oppression, which is reflective of the global justice movement. By making this connection, greater support can be garnered for the Palestinian cause. Transnational diffusion, where similar tactical repertoires and framing are spread across borders, is a two-way dynamic whereby information and tactics are diffused between Israeli activists and international activists, leading to innovation in tactics and helping to motivate the Israeli activists. Externalisation can be seen in particular in the links with transnational social movements.

Whilst the pressure from the international dimension has not forced Israel to change its policies, the radical component has been given momentum through increased material capacity and normative support. However, turning attentions abroad has further reduced the legitimacy of the activists in Israel, which in turn led to further opposition towards the radical activists. The activists have responded by continuing to develop innovative collective action and maintain their cycle of contention.

4.4 A NEW CYCLE OF CONTENTION

The ways in which the radical component perceived the shifting POS: the realities on the ground, the nature of the government and public opinion, has led them to attribute opportunities to mobilise in response to these shifts, thus enabling a new cycle of contention. Radicalisation in their collective action frames in response to the prevailing realities enabled them to mobilise to challenge the realities and created a spiral of opportunities for others to mobilise. As the early risers appropriated resources and developed innovative collective action, other groups formed, mobilised and specialised on targeting certain aspects of the prevailing realities. Given the shifts in the government and Israeli
public opinion, the radical groups were unable to have any influence in these areas however, they decided not to focus on trying to change those positions but instead continued to employ reactive activism on the ground. This often led to repressive measures by the Israeli authorities, which encouraged further innovative collective action amongst the activists, as well as a focus on opportunities in the international arena. This, as will be explored in more detail when considering the human rights component, increased the repression domestically but, enabled the continued mobilisation of the radical component.

5 CYCLE THREE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT: A CONTINUED CYCLE OF CONTENTION

The human rights component of Israeli peace activism continued their efforts from the previous phase, attributing opportunities to the shifting political opportunity structures to act. This led to a continuation of their cycle of contention, which emerged in the first Intifada (Figure 9). The collective action frames and tactical repertoires are less confrontational than the radical component, due to their desire to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the Israeli public and to put pressure on the Israeli government to change their policies and practices towards the Palestinians. This is highlighted in the mission statement of the most established and largest human rights organisation in Israel, B’Tselem, which states that they aim,

‘To document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the occupied territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel’ (B’Tselem, [no date, a]).

In order to have influence, this requires more contained, but still innovative, tactical repertoires and collection action frames. They attribute opportunities to act to the realities on the ground, continuing to monitor and report on policies and actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in some cases protest these actions and provide humanitarian services. Despite their attempts to influence the Israeli public and Israeli government, initially there was a lack of response from these, given their attitudes to the conflict. The human rights component therefore turned their attention to perceived opportunities in the international dimension. This led to more innovative collective action, which diffused from the international dimension however, this caused increased attempts at repression from within Israel, from both the government and civil society, which served to further marginalise their voice and opposition against them. This led them to develop different collection action frames and repertoires. This in turn encouraged a cycle of repression and innovation. Figure 9 identifies the continued cycle of contention for the human rights component, which will be explored in the following sections.
5.1 ATTRIBUTING OPPORTUNITIES TO THE SHIFTING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

5.1.1 RESPONDING TO THE SECOND INTIFADA

The second Intifada was seen as an opportunity to continue efforts to protect Palestinian human rights and to hold Israeli society and government accountable to standards of human rights in the occupied territories by continuing to produce reports on the events that were happening. In 2001 and 2002 B’Tselem published the largest number of reports on human rights violations in the occupied territories since the years of the first Intifada. They included some information on the violence caused by Palestinians, however; most of the reports focused on violence and human rights violations towards the Palestinians.\(^71\) The second Intifada was perceived as an opportunity for some new groups to emerge, often in cases where individuals wanted to reveal and challenge the prevailing realities but the organisational avenues did not exist. Two significant groups in particular emerged in response to the second Intifada, Machsom Watch, which monitored the checkpoints and Shovrim Shtika, which collected testimonies of soldiers who served in the occupied territories. Similar to the reactive nature of the radical component, other events and policies of the Israeli government and IDF in this phase have presented opportunities for the human rights component to mobilise and also enabled them to sometimes join the radical groups or share resources. Whilst they were more confrontational than the liberal Zionist component, they still aimed to influence the Israeli public and therefore used more contained tactics than the radical component by monitoring and reporting on what was happening in the occupied territories. The continued efforts of the humanitarian groups and conscientious objectors also helped sustain the human rights component in this phase.

5.1.2 MOBILISING AGAINST THE SITUATION IN GAZA

The human rights organisations were particularly active in response to the situation in Gaza. In November 2006 nine organisations issued a joint statement on the ‘Gaza humanitarian Crisis’ (B’Tselem, 2006) and following each of the three major operations in 2008/9, 2012 and 2014 produced reports of

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\(^{71}\) See for example B’Tselem (2002, 2001).
Israel’s use of force in the Gaza strip.\textsuperscript{72} These reports aimed at holding Israel accountable for its actions by highlighting to the Israeli public, the Israeli Supreme Court and the international community what happened during the operations and to apply pressure on Israel to ‘respect the basic human rights of residents of the Gaza Strip, and that all parties respect international humanitarian law’ (B’Tselem, 2006). As noted, most of the Israeli public felt that the operations in Gaza were justified and therefore there was limited response to reports of the human rights groups. However, their reports both on the situation in Gaza and other issues in the occupied territories have been used in Supreme Court cases and international reports, such as the Goldstone Report.

During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, a new group of refuseniks emerged. For the first time a group from Unit 8200, an elite military intelligence unit, refused to conduct their reserve duty. Whilst they claim that they had made the decision to refuse to conduct their reserve duty in the occupied territories before the conflict broke out, the 2014 Gaza crisis opened an opportunity for them to publicly express their refusal (Beaumont, 2014). Whilst the numbers were small, with only 43 soldiers declaring their refusal, they received a large amount of media attention and harsh condemnation from the authorities, highlighting the significance of their actions.\textsuperscript{73}

The conflict with Gaza was also perceived as an opportunity for a group of Gazans and Israelis from the South of Israel, Kol Aher (Other Voice), to emerge. They protested the situation in Gaza and called for a peaceful resolution. They held a number of activities with the aim of promoting a diplomatic solution to the conflict and ending the blockade on Gaza (Kol Aher, 2014). The political opportunity structures in this case do hinder their work, since the Israelis and Gazans are no longer allowed to meet in person as they had done before the Israeli withdrawal. However, as explained to the author, they communicate via e-mail and telephone, maintaining contact even during heightened times of conflict (Chaitlin, 2013).

Whilst these groups aim to educate the Israeli public and influence the Israeli government by attempting to represent a legitimate voice in the discourse in Israel, as evidence by their contained tactical repertoires and registered NGO status, aside from the conscientious objectors, their efforts to achieve change was met by a limited response internally. Therefore, the human rights component began to look for opportunities in the international dimension.

5.2 ATTRIBUTING OPPORTUNITIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

With the lack of response in Israeli society, the human rights organisations have turned their attentions abroad, through a process of externalisation, which is where ‘domestic actors target external actors in attempts to defend their interests’ (Tarrow, 2011:235), by organising tours for foreign visitors in Israel, disseminating their reports abroad and conducting international speaking tours, both as an awareness raising tactic and for fundraising. Turning their attentions abroad suggests a situation

\textsuperscript{72} See the following reports: Operation Cast Lead (B’Tselem, 2009), Operation Pillar of Defence (B’Tselem, 2013) and Operation Protective Edge (B’Tselem, 2015b).

reflective of the boomerang process (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), where domestic actors appeal to open political opportunity structures in the international arena, alongside international mobilisation structures, to help put pressure on their state when they cannot influence their own public or government due to closed domestic political opportunity structures.

Europe has been a particular target for the human rights component. The discourse in parts of Europe is in line with different parts of Israeli peace activism, which presents signs that the international political opportunity structures for Israeli peace activism are open. There was widespread condemnation for Israel’s ‘disproportionate use of force’ in the Gaza operations\(^\text{74}\) and the European Parliament endorsed the Goldstone Report (Phillips, 2010), which concluded that Israel was guilty of a number of war crimes and human rights violations.\(^\text{75}\) There have also been calls from European governments to apply sanctions on Israel and the EU has recognised Palestine ‘in principle’ (Beaumont, 2014). These developments provide an open avenue for Israeli peace activists to disseminate their reports, particularly those dealing with human rights violations and injustices.

Whilst these connections help to increase the material capacity of Israeli peace activism, expand their mobilising structures and identify where they can have influence internationally, they have however, not been received well domestically. The level of repression towards the human rights component increased in the 2010s and further reduced the leverage of the human rights component internally, with the groups criticised for demonising and delegitimising Israel (NGO Monitor, 2015). This suggests some interesting dynamics between international opportunity structures and domestic opportunity structures.

5.3 INCREASING OPPOSITION AND ATTEMPTS AT REPRESSION

Efforts within Israel to silence and delegitimise these voices have come from both from civil society and the government. Whilst these attempts at repression can affect all components of Israeli peace activism, it is particularly significant to the human rights organisations in the human rights component, as the radical component is not concerned with legitimacy in Israel and the liberal Zionist groups have not been confrontational enough to be subjected to such opposition; the human rights organisations have therefore been the primary target of this opposition.

5.3.1 LAWS

Alongside the ‘Nakba Law’ and the ‘Anti-Boycott Law’ discussed in relation to the radical component was the passing of The ‘NGO Foreign Government Funding Law’, which particularly affects the human rights component. It was passed in February 2011 and requires NGOs to regularly submit financial reports on funding received from foreign governments and public donors. Initially it included clauses that forbade foreign donations to organisations engaged in certain activities or rhetoric. These were however removed after some opposition and the more moderate law was put forward (NGO


\(^{75}\) See UN (2009) for full report.
Monitor, 2010). The aim behind the law seems valid; to ensure greater transparency and accountability of NGOs by highlighting the involvement of foreign governments in political matters. It was argued, however, to be purposefully discriminatory against human rights NGOs (El-Ad, 2011). Since all NGOs already have to register their financial details it is argued that the goal of the law is actually to discourage foreign funding (Adalah, 2012:14). Settler groups tend to be funded by private individuals, so are beyond the remit of this law and organisations such as the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World Zionist Organisations are exempt, increasing suspicion that the law was directed at the human rights organisations and not NGOs in general.

The ‘NGO Foreign Government Funding Law’ has been particularly harmful towards the human rights organisations. They frame themselves as being part of a human rights movement and not the ‘peace movement’, aiming to produce accurate and credible reports on the human rights situation in the West Bank and Gaza. However, this law has the effect of ‘publicly delegitimising’ these groups and opening them up to state scrutiny (Lerman, 2010). The Israeli public however, did not take issue with these attempts to limit the work of the human rights organisations. As noted, in cases of threat, the Israeli public retreats to a security discourse and prioritise their security above all. According to the War and Peace Index, the security discourse in the Gaza Operation in 2008/9 trumped human rights concerns, with 57% of Israelis agreeing that national security is more important than ensuring there are no human rights violations (Yaar and Hermann, 2010).

5.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY

A number of NGOs have been founded to directly challenge the human rights component of Israeli peace activism, such as Im Tirtzu (If You Will It) and NGO Monitor. Im Tirtzu was set up in 2006 to ‘strengthen and advance the values of Zionism in Israel’ (Im Tirtzu, [no date, a]). Their mission statement actively positions themselves against Israeli peace activists, particularly the human rights and radical components. According to their website, ‘a major portion of Im Tirtzu’s efforts is devoted to combating the campaign of de-legitimization against the State of Israel and to providing responses to Post-Zionist and Anti-Zionist phenomena,’ (Im Tirtzu, [no date, a]). This was most notably seen in their campaign against the New Israel Fund, ‘The NIF Watch’, which criticises the activities of the NIF and their grantees, which Im Tirtzu believe to be against the IDF and Israel’s state policies.76 However, a Jerusalem Court ruled that aspects of Im Tirtzu had resemblances to fascism, which marked a blow to their attempts to be seen as a mainstream movement protecting the State of Israel (Sheizaf, 2013c).

NGO Monitor has proven to be a more substantial force against Israeli left-wing and human rights organisations. It is an NGO watch-dog that ‘provides information and analysis, promotes accountability, and supports discussion on the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to advance human rights and humanitarian agendas’ (NGO Monitor, [no date]), with the aim of ending ‘the practice used by certain self-declared “humanitarian NGOs” of exploiting the label “universal human rights values” to promote

76 See Im Tirtzu ([no date, b]) for the campaign.
politically and ideologically motivated agendas’ (NGO Monitor, [no date]). As a research organisation they seek to make information about NGOs transparent and available to the public. One way in which they do this is by identifying and making public the funding sources of NGOs. According to an interview between the author and the Legal Advisor of NGO Monitor one of the main motivations is that foreign governments tend to provide funding to certain organisations but are unaware that sometimes these organisations then use that funding to fund organisations in Israel and Palestine, which might promote ideas or goals that are contrary to the foreign government from where the funding originated (Herzberg, 2013). Making this information available seems like a positive step in improving the accountability of NGOs in Israel.

However, NGO Monitor has received a backlash from the NGOs that it researches, arguing that the organisation is part of a wider attempt to delegitimise dissenting voices in Israel and is regarded as a direct opposition force to Israeli peace and human rights activism. It is argued that it is ‘not an objective watchdog… [but] a partisan operation that suppresses its perceived ideological adversaries’ (Remez in Kessel and Klochendler, 2010). Further criticism claims that NGO Monitor is merely a pawn of the Netanyahu government, since the founder and Director, Gerald Steinberg, has previously worked for and was closely affiliated to the government during the early years of the organisation, thus questioning its status as an NGO, with suggestions that it has more characteristics of a Government Operated Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO) (Gurvitz and Rotem, 2014).

It is difficult to verify the various claims against each other but, what is clear is that the organisations are engaged in a ‘war of words’, attempting to gain the high-ground to ensure that their discourse is not discredited. Given the views of the Israeli public and other opposition forces at play in this phase, NGO Monitor is succeeding in reinforcing their negative views towards Israeli peace activism. Derfner (2013) notes that in response to NGO Monitor’s criticism of the origins of the funding of Shovrim Shtika, the Israeli public, who were once interested in the soldiers testimonies, became distracted by the funding issue. Sheizaf (2012b) also argues that by focusing on sources of funding, NGO Monitor succeeds in avoiding engagement in the discourse of the left-wing and human rights groups.

5.4 THE CONTINUATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPONENT

The human rights component seems to be attempting to build a middle-ground between the liberal Zionist and radical component. Whilst they challenge the situation in order reveal the realities of the occupation and hold the government accountable to its policies and actions, it is not too confrontational, particularly in the tactics employed, which tend to focus on reporting and documentation. Despite their attempts to influence Israeli public opinion and the Israeli government, there was little attention given to their efforts. However, later in this phase, in particular due to their efforts to reach out to the international dimension, they have experienced increasing opposition and attempts at repression. Despite this, they have continued steadily with their collective action, representing a continued cycle of contention.
6 IMPLICATIONS

6.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The case of Israeli peace activism has shown that the international dimension can provide both mobilisation structures, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as acting as political opportunity structures. The connection between domestic social movements and the international arena have been theorised in a number of ways. Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed the ‘boomerang process,’ whereby domestic actors who are unable to have influence internally, due to closed domestic political opportunity structures, seek assistance in the international arena. They connect with civil society actors through transnational advocacy networks in order to try to influence international institutions or foreign governments to take up their issues and put pressure on their government. Keck and Sikkink (1998:29) note that the effectiveness of international pressure, whether in the form of material sanctions or moral condemnation, will depend on how vulnerable the target state is to these.

Tarrow (2005:147-8), in considering how domestic actors become involved in transnational activism, suggests a refinement in the boomerang process though a ‘composite model of externalisation’. He argues that the nature of the ‘blockage’ of the domestic political opportunity structures will lead to different trajectories of externalisation in the boomerang process and therefore a different outcome. He argues that a lack of response will create a different pathway from a repressive response. The collective action of Israeli peace activism during the second Intifada received a lack of response in the domestic realm, which led Israeli peace activists to turn their attentions abroad. In response to the Gaza conflicts and further human rights violations in the West Bank, the activists focused their framing on solidarity and human rights discourses in part to appeal to the international community to put pressure on Israel. The government and Israeli civil society then shifted their response and began to use repressive measures to limit the activities of Israeli peace activism, particularly the human rights NGOs. Tarrow (2005) stops at the first process of externalisation and does not consider the stages when the ‘boomerang’ returns to the domestic setting. He does not consider how the domestic government may change how they view and confront the social movement once it has connected with the international community. In the case of Israeli peace activism, the connections made with the international community have reduced the legitimacy of the domestic social movement and increased repression; where there was once a lack of response, there is now repression. Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) theorise a ‘spiral’ model, which states that if the domestic government does not respond to the first set of international pressures, then the ‘boomerang’ is thrown out again in order to instigate further pressure. Linking Tarrow’s model of externalisation with the spiral model could provide an understanding of how interactions between a social movement and international political opportunity structures affects domestic political opportunity structures and therefore the trajectory of the social movement.

77 See Tarrow (2005:148) Figure 8.2 ‘A Composite Model of Externalization’
This would help to explain the direct links between a domestic social movement, the international arena and the state. However, this ignores the indirect links that the international environment may have with a social movement. As shown, there are external factors in the international arena that, although not directly connected to the domestic social movement, can still affect its trajectory and ability to create change. In the Israeli case, the US-led War on Terror and to some extent the Arab Uprisings have played a role in reinforcing Israel’s security rhetoric and enabling it to further, or at least maintain, its policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, which marginalises the voices of Israeli peace activism. It is not enough, therefore, to only look at the actors and processes directly involved in linking the domestic social movement to the international arena, indirect connections must also be considered.

6.2 THE IMPACT OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM

Having considered the powers of movement and how they interact with each other, identifying the transformations in Israeli peace activism through the different cycles of contention since the second Intifada, it is possible to note some areas in which peace activism is having an impact. The opposition towards Israeli peace activism suggests that these groups and individuals are yielding some power. This is most notable through government attempts to limit the influence and activities of the groups, as well as direct attacks from civilians towards peace activists. Much of the opposition is directed towards Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel, but, by extension, Israeli Jews who act in solidarity with Palestinians, or show concern for their predicament, are also considered with suspicion. This is nothing new, however the increased solidarity activism and rights-based framing has placed the Israeli activists closer to the Palestinian cause, thereby heightening opposition towards them. The links to the international arena furthered the opposition, particularly towards those promoting a human rights discourse. Therefore, whilst it is true that Israeli peace activism has not been able to influence Israeli public opinion and has not changed government policy towards the Palestinians, it is not the case the Israeli peace activism is irrelevant. Golan notes that ‘the campaign against these groups, and demanding action to restrain them, appear to [suggest] that the peace and human rights NGOs have had, and will continue to have, an impact on matters of war and peace’ (2014b:28-10). Impact must therefore be sought outside the policy and public opinion arenas, which can be done by considering in equal measure all the powers of movement. Furthermore, a broader understanding of impact that considers mobilisation, cultural shifts and the role of the movement in norm entrepreneurship, in addition to the policy arena (Bernstein, 2003; della Porta, 1999; Staggenborg, 1995), will provide a more detailed analysis.

The impact of Israeli peace activism can be identified in three main areas. Firstly, in turning towards the international community the activists are helping feed international pressure on Israel, as well as mobilising more resources. Secondly, the activists are creating closer relationships with the Palestinians, rejecting the separation narrative in Israel and humanising the ‘Other’. This challenges the widespread fear and mistrust of Palestinians, which gives weight to hawkish policies. Thirdly, Israeli peace activists are, as they always have been, engaged in norm entrepreneurship, developing new ideas surrounding
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is clear from the cycles of contention that it is the radical and human rights components that are having such impacts, with only the Settlement Watch Project from the liberal Zionist component affecting such change. Given that Israeli peace activism is still in flux, finding its feet following the second *Intifada*, these areas of impact have interesting implications for the future.

6.2.1 TURNING TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The shift towards the international community has had the impact of generating a larger audience for Israeli peace activism, as well as influencing the internal dynamics of activism. By identifying targets in the international community and seeking to reveal to them the realities of Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the activists could arguably be contributing to Israel’s growing international isolation (Golan, 2014a), which could then encourage the government to change its policies. By making use of their knowledge and research on the ground, they highlight the violations in human rights, monitor settlement expansion, provide information on corporations that profit from the occupation and give a voice to the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. This then gives groups abroad leverage to mobilise support and lobby their governments to put pressure on Israel. However, as shown this has had the effect of further reducing the legitimacy of Israeli peace activism within Israel, with opposition groups and the government employing tactics aimed at discrediting the work of the activists. Such opposition suggests there is fear of the impact or potential impact of Israeli peace activism in the international arena.

6.2.2 NEW RELATIONSHIPS

A key shift in activism in this phase has been the relationships developed with Palestinian activists. In the case of solidarity activism, the Israeli activists are required to acknowledge the unequal power relations and attempt not to reinforce them in their activism. In doing so, the Israeli activists are acknowledging their privileged position, enabling the Palestinians to take control of liberating themselves from oppression. Groups such as the *Hug Horim Shakulim* and *Lochamim l’Shalom* have also created new relationships by bringing shared experiences of bereavement or combat. These shifts serve to, on the one hand de-humanise the ‘Other’, and on the other acknowledge the asymmetries between the two sides. This goes against the state narrative towards the Palestinians, which presents them as the enemy, and those who work with them are branded as ‘traitors’. 78 It is interesting, therefore, to note the dialectic whereby peace activists are exhibiting greater partnership with Palestinians amid greater exclusion of the Palestinians by Israeli society. By contradicting the separation paradigm and challenging mainstream views on the Palestinians, new forms of activism have been developed, with the potential for more innovation in the future.

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78 For example, a number of protests were held criticising those who spoke out in joint Jewish and Arab protests against the operations in Gaza in the 2000s and 2010s, with chants including ‘Death to leftists’ and ‘Leftists are traitors’ (Lazareva, 2014).
An interesting conflict has arisen in the new dynamic between Israeli and Palestinian activists. The shift to Israeli activists considering themselves guests of the Palestinian activists has created some debate over appropriate dress code. Some groups explicitly ask activists to dress appropriately in their e-mail correspondence (Shalif, 2013). This has created conflicting beliefs amongst some radical activists. As explained to the author, for those activists who espouse a feminist outlook, whilst also acknowledging the asymmetrical relationship between the Palestinians and the Israelis, they are sometimes conflicted over whether to dress ‘modestly’ when going to West Bank villages, in accordance with the culture of the Palestinians, or not feeling they should be constrained by any form of dress code (Rothschild, 2013). The new relationships between the Palestinian and Israeli activists have therefore further opened the debate over the differences between the two sides.

6.2.3 NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The marginalisation of Israeli peace activism within Israel and the clear demarcation between the radical component and the liberal Zionist component has given the radical component room to be more radical than previously, placing solidarity and justice at the core of the radical collective action frames. In doing so they have created new collective action frames, which challenge mainstream views on the conflict. This has enabled an evolution in the tactical repertoires, opened up new mobilisation structures and allowed for the shifting relationships with the Palestinians and with the international community. These changes mirror the dynamics of Israeli peace activism from previous phases where the radical components developed innovative collective action, built experience in the field and nurtured contacts with the Palestinians. In the previous phases, these developments diffused into the liberal Zionist component, which was able to mobilise popular support for a negotiated settlement that later diffused into government policy. Given the demobilisation and political irrelevancy of the liberal Zionist component, the human rights component is playing the role of attempting to influence the Israeli public and government and is being influenced by the collective action frames of the radical component. Developments have brought new ideas surrounding the conflict, its origins and ways to challenge it, with a greater emphasis on a rights-based discourse rather than a discourse of ‘peace’. Whilst there is a lack of support for these ideas amongst the Israeli public and government, as evidence by the growing opposition, this opposition actually suggests that the rights-based discourse and revealing of hidden realities could have some influence.

7 CONCLUSION

There have been a number of shifts in both the domestic and international political opportunity structures in this phase of Israeli peace activism. There have been changes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most significantly the outbreak of the second Intifada, the disengagement of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, and the construction of the separation barrier. Israeli public opinion has shifted more rightwards and the Israeli government has become progressively more right wing. In the international dimension, the global war on terror has changed the dynamics in the international arena, the Arab uprisings created uncertainty in the Middle East, Israel has engaged in conflicts with Hamas in
Gaza, the Arab League put forward the Arab Peace Initiative and there has been an increase in the strength of transnational social movements dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, how these shifts affected Israeli peace activism depended on whether or not the groups attributed to them opportunities or threats to mobilisation.

The three cycles of contention identified show that the ways in which the components of Israeli peace activism framed themselves, their tactical repertoires and their mobilisation structures determined whether or not they perceived the changes as opportunities or threats. The liberal Zionist component went through a period of demobilisation due to their perception that there was not an opportunity to mobilise. This was due to exhaustion from decades of activism, which meant they lost some of their human resources; facilitation, whereby the government satisfied some of their demands and their focus on the particularism of Zionism, which meant they did not want to stray too far ahead of Israeli public opinion in aligning with the Palestinian cause. Given Israeli public opinion moved further away from ideas of peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians and the government became progressively more right wing, the liberal Zionist groups lost their target audience. Furthermore, counter-dynamics from the settler movement hindered their activities and any opportunities to mobilise around the Arab Peace Initiative were blocked internally. Therefore, as conventionally argued, the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism became paralysed and demobilised.

The radical component, however perceived the changes in the POS as opportunities to mobilise, given their radicalisation in the outbreak of the second Intifada, which led them to act almost solely in solidarity with the plight of the Palestinians. This led to an evolution in their tactical repertoires and the emergence of a new cycle of contention. Despite the small numbers and their marginalisation amongst Israeli society, as well as increasing repression from the authorities, they appropriated new organisational and social resources, through new SMOs, coalitions and new activists, enabling them to continue to challenge the prevailing realities. The human rights component also perceived the changes as opportunities to continue their activism, particularly in revealing the hidden realities of the occupation and in challenging the authorities’ policies and practices. Given the lack of response domestically, they turned their attentions to the international dimension, where they perceived opportunities to mobilise and yield influence. This led to increasing opposition and attempts at repression internally however, this did not paralyse their activities and they continue to confront the situation.

Certain international opportunity structures, most notably the global war on terror, has had the effect of further closing the political opportunities within Israel, as the government gained legitimacy in fighting terrorism militarily. However, this has not limited the efforts of the radical and human rights components who consistently find ways to challenge the shifting realities. Impact beyond the policy arena has been identified, namely stronger ties with the international community, new relationships between the Israeli activists and the Palestinians and shifting discourses surrounding the conflict. It is by approaching Israeli peace activism through the internal dynamics: collective action frames; mobilisation
structures; and tactical repertoires that enabled a more detailed understanding of how the three components perceived the shifting political opportunities, highlighting the different cycles of contention, the continued efforts of the peace activists and potential impact of Israeli peace activism.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

1 INTRODUCTION

This dissertation looked at the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada in 2000 and, in doing so, provided a detailed understanding of this sector of Israeli society. In particular it has challenged the conventional argument that the Israeli peace movement was paralysed following the outbreak of violence in 2000, arguing that it was only the liberal Zionist component that went through a period of demobilisation. This dissertation has shown that the liberal Zionist component were unable and unwilling to mobilise to the extent they had done previously, due to a combination of exhaustion from decades of activism, facilitation of some of their goals by the government, the decision to moderate their collective action frames to focus solely on the peace and security of Israel, and the strength of counter movement dynamics. However, this dissertation has also outlined two further components of Israeli peace activism that did not demobilise in the wake of the second Intifada but continued to mobilise, presenting new ways to frame and challenge the conflict. The radical groups experienced a new cycle of contention, developing more confrontational collective action frames, an evolution in their tactical repertoires and an expansion in their mobilisation structures. The human rights component were able to maintain their cycle that emerged in the first Intifada by continuing to reveal hidden realities, unearthing human rights violations, and finding ways to balance their concern for the Palestinians with influencing the Israeli public and government.

The dissertation approached Israeli peace activism through social movement theory, in particular through the four powers of movement: collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures, and political opportunity structures, as well as the dynamic approach initially put forward by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). By giving equal weight to the internal dynamics of Israeli peace activism and not solely considering how the external factors impact a social movement, this study has provided a more detailed understanding of the internal features of Israeli peace activism and how the different components interact with each other. This enabled the discovery that the three components went through different cycles of contention post-2000, due to the ways in which they perceived and interacted with the political opportunity structures, and confirmed the argument that Israeli peace activism has become polarised and fragmented, rather than paralysed.

The typology developed has also provided a novel lens through which to understand Israeli peace activism. Whilst previous studies have identified ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ groups, they failed to identify the human rights component as having a distinct trajectory and did not distinguish between these components as clearly. The typology helps to unearth greater understanding of the characteristics of Israeli peace activism and how the different elements interact with each other, uncovering some interesting dynamics.
The empirical study also enabled a reflection on some of the theoretical foundations of social movement theory. In particular, it has identified new framing processes; discovered an interesting finding when it comes to small scale tactics in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism that expands on Scott’s (1985) work; provided additional dimensions to McCarthy’s (1996) typology of mobilisation structures and shown that the level of transparency in the organisational structure determines whether an organisation is able to maintain activities. It has also shown the need for a greater appreciation of how gender affects a social movement and, through a consideration of the connection between Israeli peace activists and the Rabin and Barak governments, it has shown that the political process model with respect to access to the government is more nuanced than currently conceived. It has also discovered that different cycles of contention can operate amongst activists who are engaged in the same area of contention; and it has helped to shed more light on the connection between the international arena and a domestic social movement.

This chapter will conclude this dissertation by bringing together the main findings of the study in three sections: the transformation of Israeli peace activism post-2000; the theoretical contributions; and the responses to the research question posed at the beginning of this dissertation.

2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF ISRAELI PEACE ACTIVISM SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA

The framework used in this dissertation identified three phases of Israeli peace activism. The first phase began in the aftermath of the 1967 war and is defined as ‘individual and disparate attempts at peace activism’. The second phase began in 1977 following the election of the first right-wing government in Israel and the founding of Israel’s largest and most prominent peace group, Shalom Achshav. This period can be described as ‘the birth and coming of age of the peace movement’. The third phase, the focal point of this study, began in the wake of the second Intifada and is still continuing, although this study concludes in September 2014. It is characterised as ‘the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism; three cycles of contention’. These distinct periods are demarcated by significant changes in the internal characteristics of Israeli peace activism. Whilst the political opportunity structures did play a role in the emergence or demobilisation of elements of Israeli peace activism, how these external factors were perceived and how the components chose to respond to them is equally, if not more significant, in explaining their trajectories, which justifies demarcating the periods by the internal shifts.

Chapter 3 provided an historical overview of Israeli peace activism in the first two phases through the lenses of the four powers of movement, in order to provide a point of comparison for the third phase. In the first phase of Israeli peace activism the focus was on ceding the land acquired in the 1967 war. Two components emerged, a liberal Zionist and a radical component, with the liberal Zionist component calling for the conceding of the territories in exchange for peace with Israel’s Arab neighbours whereas, the radical component was focused on negotiating with the PLO, who they considered the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Tactical repertoires and mobilising structures were limited in
this phase as extra-parliamentary activism was not prominent in Israeli society and the attempts at peace activism were still in their infancy. However, the norm entrepreneurship and agenda setting role of the radical component can be seen in this phase, where their collective action frames and tactical repertoires were more confrontational than the liberal Zionist component. In the next phase the liberal Zionist component began to employ some of the ideas and tactics that the radical component had pursued in the first phase, namely recognition of and meeting with the PLO. The second phase represents the birth of and coming of age of a peace movement. The liberal Zionist and radical components matured, developing innovative collective action frames and tactical repertoires. This study identified a human rights component that emerged in response to the first intifada, focusing on reporting on the human rights violations, challenging Israeli policies and providing humanitarian services. Whilst the liberal Zionist component was the largest and most prominent voice of the peace movement, able to rally large numbers from the mainstream Israeli public, it was the radical and human rights components that were constantly challenging the liberal Zionist component to pursue more confrontational collective action frames, more disruptive tactics and expand their mobilising structures, which highlights the importance of studying these components despite their marginalisation. Despite some different perceptions and responses to the political opportunity structures and different cycles of contention in this phase, the three components could be seen rallying together under the banner of ‘two states for two peoples’. The characteristics and dynamics identified and analysed in this chapter proposed a novel way to approach the history of Israeli peace activism and provided a point of comparison for the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the second intifada.

The following four chapters were divided according to each of the powers of movement, identifying the characteristics of each component following the outbreak of the second intifada and explaining both the continuities and shifts. Ultimately, what was identified was the polarisation and fragmentation of the Israeli peace movement across each of the powers of movement, signalling three different cycles of contention, with the liberal Zionist component going through a period of demobilisation, the human rights component continuing its cycle from the first intifada and the radical component experiencing a new cycle of contention. This challenges the conventional argument that the peace movement was paralysed and shows that approaching Israeli peace activism through internal dynamics allows for a more nuanced understanding of its trajectory.

The differences in the components are most clearly identified through their collective action frames. Chapter 4 showed that the ways in which the radical component framed the second intifada highlighted their roles as ‘early risers’ and norm entrepreneurs, maintaining the agenda setting role that Kaminer (1996) highlighted in the earlier phases. However, in this phase the liberal Zionist component moved away from the positions of the radical component, moderating their messages further in order to try to still resonate with mainstream consensus, which no longer believed there was a partner for peace on the Palestinian side and had become more fearful of them with the suicide bombings and the rockets from Gaza. This led to the polarisation in Israeli peace activism. The human rights component seems to
be balancing the two poles of the liberal Zionist and radical components. However, they are more closely associated with the radical component due to their attention to the Palestinians yet, they are still concerned with influencing the Israeli public and government. Despite the marginalisation of the ideas of the radical and human rights component, given their role as norm entrepreneurs in the previous phases, it is important to consider the ideas they are presenting in this current phase in order to identify shifting discourses around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Some interesting framing shifts and processes occurred in this phase, particularly amongst the radical component. The key collective action frames include the focus on Palestinian suffering, co-resistance and solidarity with the Palestinians, and rejection of the term ‘peace’ in favour of terms such as ‘justice’ and ‘equality’. The concepts of ‘have’ and ‘have-nots’, privilege and oppression also informed their collective action frames. The human rights component continued with the collective action frames from the previous phase but amplified them given the continuation of the occupation. Human-rights based framing became even more significant and there was an emphasis on revealing hidden realities of the occupation. Gender-based framing was also identified as having shifted in this phase.

Chapter 5 identified and explained the continuities and shifts in the tactical repertoires of each of the components of Israeli peace activism. The way in which the components framed the prevailing realities and the origins of the conflict had a clear influence on their tactical repertoires, which expanded in this phase. Similar to the collective action frames, the radical component were pushing the bar in terms of the level of confrontation, whilst the liberal Zionist component stuck to contained collective action in order not to alienate their target audience, the Israeli public. The human rights component also tended to employ contained tactics in order to ensure credibility of their activities. Many of the tactics employed in the previous phases continued to be employed by all components, conforming to the theory of repertoires of contention, whereby activists tend to employ tactics that they are familiar with (Tilly, 1995). However, demonstrations in Israeli towns and cities, which had been the main tactic employed in the previous phases, were no longer used to the same extent, since the public was less likely to participate. Other tactics maintained their importance such as conscientious objection, research and documentation of the realities on the ground. People-to-people activities were less prominent, given constraints imposed by the second Intifada and the building of the separation barrier. Legal tactics increased in their importance and use, particularly for the human rights component however, there was much debate over its effectiveness.

The radical component experienced an evolution in their repertoire of contention, continuously finding new ways to confront the occupation. They continued with the humanitarian-based solidarity that had begun in the end of the previous phase, in order to assist Palestinians in the short term. This evolved to nonviolent direct action, with the aim of changing the facts on the ground. Nonviolent resistance then became the key tactic of the radical component, protesting alongside and in solidarity with the Palestinians, under the framing of co-resistance. Towards the middle of the 2000s this then evolved to different levels of boycott, divestment and sanctions, which has brought the radical component closer
to the international arena, a new and important dynamic in this phase. The confrontational nature of these tactics is made available due to their confrontational collective action frames. Such tactics are not available to the liberal Zionist component, since they do not want to alienate the Israeli mainstream public.

One clear innovation can be identified across all three components; tours became a significant awareness raising tactic, as well as a mobilising tool. Many of the tours were directed towards foreign visitors, in an attempt to make them aware of the realities of the occupation, again highlighting the increasing emphasis on the international community. It also highlights the ability for Israeli peace activism to continue despite the inability to influence the Israeli public. Tours, similarly to legal measures, are an interesting tactic since they are a conventional and widely used activity in Israeli society yet, they are used by Israeli peace activism as a way to bring attention to the occupation.

The expansion of the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism has meant there are more opportunities for individuals to participate, finding an activity that is most suitable for them. It also means there are multiple avenues that are challenging the occupation and working towards peace in the region. The combination of tactics suggests potential for greater success than only employing one form of tactic. On the other hand, the variety of activities, often held simultaneously, has meant that numbers attending or participating in each activity have been low. Furthermore the increase in the risk of the tactics employed discouraged mass participation.

The shifts in both the collective action frames and tactical repertoires have meant there has also been a shift in the mobilising structures of Israeli peace activism. This was explored in Chapter 6, which began by mapping the shifting mobilisation structures. Given the marginalisation of all components of Israeli peace activism, familiar informal networks are still an important mobilisation structure, as are existing activist networks and social movement organisations. In this phase a number of activists that had been involved in the liberal Zionist component joined or set up groups within either the radical or human rights components, since they were frustrated by the lack of response from the liberal Zionist component, particularly Shalom Achshav, and therefore appropriated new ways to challenge the situation. The emergence of groups in the human rights component provides the most pertinent examples. All components made use of international mobilisation structures, showing signs of the boomerang process (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The notable difference is that the liberal Zionist component continued to appeal to the Jewish diaspora, mainly for funding, whereas the radical and human rights components connected with transnational social movements, such as the anti-globalisation movement and the BDS movement. There was a clear distinction in the organisational forms across the components, with the liberal Zionist component having gone through a process of institutionalisation and therefore made up of mainly national professional SMOs. The radical component was almost solely made up of grassroots, horizontally organised, voluntary SMOs and the human rights component contained a mixture, again reflective of their collective action frames. Enduring coalitions also played an important role in pooling resources, particularly due to the number of small groups that
were operating, and suggests the formation of a social movement community amongst the radical and human rights components.

Some other interesting mobilising dynamics were unearthed. Linked to their framing, the radical groups tried to reach out to marginalised groups in Israeli society by connecting their oppression to that of the Palestinians. This was to combat the criticism that Israeli peace activism had been made up of mainly elite Ashkenazim, which alienated other groups within Israeli society. The younger generation became more active, drawn into activism by the exciting collective action frames and tactical repertoires, with many of them inspired to act because of the events in the second Intifada. Funding continued to be a challenge for Israeli peace activism. The New Israel Fund played an important role in the development of the human rights component but faced some strong opposition for allegedly supporting groups that promote BDS or demilitarization.

The study of the shifting mobilisation structures highlighted four interesting shifts in Israeli peace activism. Firstly, it further confirmed the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism due to the differences amongst the components. Secondly, it identified expanding points of entry to activism, with the emergence of new groups each specialising in a certain area. Thirdly, it identified a rise in horizontally structured organisations with an emphasis on participatory-style decision making, in part due to the collective action frames of ‘equality’ and in part due to a focus on feminist organising principles, highlighting the particular role that gender plays. Finally, one of the most significant dynamics drawn from this chapter is the increasing role of the international community as mobilisation structures, acting as targets for Israeli peace activism, particularly as the Israeli public became less interested in the messages the peace activists are presenting.

Chapter 7 considered the overall transformations in Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada by considering how the powers of movement interact with each other, through an analysis of how the components perceived and responded to the prevailing political opportunity structures. Similar to the previous phase, whilst shifts in the political opportunities enabled the emergence of certain forms of activism, it was how the components perceived these changes and how they chose to act or not act that determined their trajectory. The detailed exploration of the internal dynamics of each component in this phase enabled an understanding of how each responded to the prevailing realities. In doing so, the chapter identified distinct cycles of contention for each of the three components, confirming the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism and suggesting some refinements to the theory of cycles of contention.

The liberal Zionist component was paralysed in the wake of the second Intifada as they were unable and unwilling to challenge the prevailing realities, such as Barak’s rhetoric that there was no partner for peace, the building of the separation barrier and the conflicts with Gaza, leading to their demobilisation. Furthermore, the Israeli public, the target audience of the liberal Zionist component, shifted more towards the centre and right of the Israeli political spectrum and the parties most closely associated
with the liberal Zionist components lost their support base. Some attempts were made to support peace initiatives in this phase but there was little support for these from the Israeli public. Therefore, beyond the Settlement Watch Project, the liberal Zionist component became irrelevant and their cycle of contention, which had peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, demobilised.

The radical component, on the other hand, experienced a new cycle of contention, which emerged in the first Intifada, continuously challenging the prevailing realities, presenting innovative collective action frames, evolving their repertoire of contention and appealing to other mobilisation structures. They experienced a spiral of opportunities due to their reactive activism, which confronted various injustices, with their peak in activism seen in the Sheikh Jarrah protests. Significantly, they began to turn away from the Israeli public and government, which released them from the state narrative and enabled them to be more confrontational. Their focus shifted instead to the international dimension.

The human rights component experienced a continuation in their cycle of contention that emerged in the first Intifada, with more groups emerging to reveal the hidden realities of the occupation. Whilst they wanted to appeal to the Israeli public, their critical position towards the policies and actions of the Israeli government meant they were marginalised in Israeli society. They therefore also turned towards the international dimension. For both the radical and human rights components, their attempts to influence the international dimension and the diffusion of tactics and injection of resources from transnational networks meant they were able to maintain momentum despite the closed political opportunities within Israel. However, their connections with the international community were not welcomed within Israel and they began to receive a significant amount of opposition. However, this only encouraged further activism, particularly with a focus on the international arena and through legal avenues.

Chapter 7 also identified the main opposition forces towards the different components of Israeli peace activism. The liberal Zionist component mainly received opposition from the settler movement, given their attention to the settlements as the main obstacle to peace. The radical component was subjected to more violent and repressive opposition, with the arrests of activists, investigations into organisations and violence from the IDF. Certain laws also attempted to restrict their activities. The human rights component also received a significant amount of opposition, mainly attempts to silence or delegitimise their voices. Further laws affected how the groups operated and risked their funding opportunities and civil society groups emerged to challenge the discourse of the human rights organisations. The level of opposition suggests that Israeli peace activism is by no means irrelevant but, is perceived as a threat within Israel, particularly due to the increase in international connections and greater alignment in the framing of Israeli peace activism and some parts of the international community. Chapter 7 also highlighted the link between the international environment and Israeli peace activism, which in this case served to reinforce the security discourse in Israel and therefore further marginalise peace or anti-occupation voices. The theoretical implications of this dynamic were explored and will be returned to below.
Finally the chapter outlined the impact of Israeli peace activism in this phase. In general an analysis of the political opportunities in Israel has highlighted the centrality of the discourse of security. This has meant that, whilst extra-parliamentary voices on issues of peace and security have been more widely accepted, the possibility for them to influence policy and practice has been slim, since the security rhetoric tended to be in opposition to the ideas of Israeli peace activism. However, whilst they are unable to influence much of the Israeli public or government perspectives on security, there are signs that impact is being had elsewhere. Firstly, the relationship with the international community, as a new and strengthening dynamic, has the potential to generate larger audiences for Israeli peace activism and for other governments and international organisations to put more pressure on Israel to end the occupation and engage in peace negotiations. Secondly, new relationships are being built between the Israeli activists and Palestinian activists, which is a rejection of the separation discourse in Israel and open up new avenues for activism. Finally, as has always been the case, Israeli peace activism, particularly the radical component, are acting as norm entrepreneurs, continuously developing new collective action frames surrounding the conflict, presenting new ideas of what ‘peace’ means and challenging mainstream views. This in turn is opening up new possibilities for confronting the situation. Given the diffusion of the idea of a two-state solution from the radical component to government policy, it is important to identify and consider the ideas and messages that the radical component and the human rights component are promoting in this third phase of Israeli peace activism and further emphasises that Israeli peace activism was not paralysed in the wake of the second Intifada.

3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The empirical study has facilitated a reflection on some of the theoretical foundations of social movement theory. A number of examples within the study of Israeli peace activism point to areas in which aspects of social movement theory need to be refined, highlighting the theoretical contributions of this dissertation. As a case study, Israeli peace activism contributes details to each of the internal factors of social movement theory: various framing processes were used, innovative tactical repertoires were employed and Israeli peace activism was constituted by new forms of mobilisation structures. Furthermore, impact has been conceived in areas beyond influencing the government or policy, adding to those studies that suggest there are broader areas of impact. Finally, this study has unearthed four areas of social movement theory in which refinements are needed: cycles of contention; the role of gender dynamics; the relationship between a government and a social movement; and the dynamics between the international dimension and a domestic social movement.

3.1 FRAMING PROCESSES

In outlining and analysing the shifts in the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, this dissertation has identified some interesting framing processes in Israeli peace activism. The liberal Zionist groups engaged in frame transformation and amplification in order to try to re-sell the idea of a two-state solution to the Israeli public, by connecting it to the issue of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The radical component used a range of framing processes to frame the prevailing realities. They
engaged in frame transformation, shifting from the concept of ‘peace’ to that of ‘harm reduction’, ‘co-resistance’, ‘equality’ and ‘justice’. They also used frame extension to identify the occupation as one example of cases of oppression in Israeli society that need to be challenged. These processes had a direct impact on their tactical repertoire. The human rights component, whilst there was not a significant shift in their framing, did engage in frame amplification by focusing more explicitly on a rights-based discourse. This brought them more in line with the framing of the radical component. This study also showed, through the case of the demonstrations in Sheikh Jarrah, that a simple injustice frame identified by radical activists acting in solidarity with Palestinians can hold resonance amongst a larger audience. The specific nature of this particular case, as a fairly clear cut injustice towards the Palestinians, its location near West Jerusalem and the Hebrew University, and the low-risk involved for participants, compared with protests in the West Bank, explained how it mobilised more individuals and became a prominent issue. This has the potential to provide insights into the optimum conditions needed for successful mobilisation for future campaigns of the radical component in Israel, as well as provide suggestions for other social movements. Identifying these framing processes provide both interesting details of the shifts in the characteristics of Israeli peace activism, as well as additional examples for the theory of collective action frames.

3.2 TACTICAL REPETOIRE

The phase of Israeli peace activism following the second Intifada highlighted both an evolution and expansion in the tactical repertoire of Israeli peace activism. It showed that rather than using large campaigns, the whole spectrum of Israeli peace activism are engaged in multiple ways of gradually chipping away at the situation, through revealing realities on the ground, engaging in resistance activities, organising people-to-people activities, providing humanitarian aid, using legal measures and conducting tours. This has some similarities to Scott’s (1985) Weapons of the Weak, whereby overt rebellions are unlikely but ‘everyday forms of resistance’ can still have a form of impact. However, this case provides an interesting finding that highlights a divergence from Scott’s study, whereby those who are acting in this manner are not necessarily the victims of the injustices but are acting in solidarity with others. They therefore experience more difficulties in mobilising participants but have different avenues through which they can act and yield influence than those who are the direct victims of certain injustices. Whether this affords the activists more or less chances of achieving impact needs further study.

3.3 MOBILISATION STRUCTURES

Israeli peace activism is formed of a wide variety of mobilisation structures, many of which conform to McCarthy’s (1996) typology. However, there are additional structures which he does not include: non-movement movements and international mobilisation structures. Non-movement movements are social movements which are not part of the social movement in question but act as a mobilisation structure for it. In the Israeli case, this included the LGBT movement, the global BDS
movement and to some extent the social justice movement in Israel. The cross-over between movements and the involvement of activists from other movements can help to strengthen the movement in question and should be considered as a further dimension of mobilisation structures. Ceadel (2000:8) identifies a ‘secondary’ movement in his study of peace movements, which are those who are against war ‘as an expression of a broader associational purpose’, which refers to movements outside the peace movement that share the same message and goal. This is similar to ‘non-movement movements’, however this study of Israeli peace activism has shown that this mobilisation structure can be important for all types of social movements. International mobilisation structures have also been shown to play an increasing role in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism in the phase following the second Intifada, through diaspora Jews and transnational social movements engaged in support for the Palestinians, and should also be incorporated in McCarthy’s typology.

In addition, the study of mobilisation structures discussed the relative effectiveness of horizontal, decentralised organisations versus hierarchical, centralised organisations. It discovered that in the Israeli case, neither suggested greater effectiveness than the other. What was more significant was the level of transparency in the organisational form. Hidden hierarchies or undiscussed developments towards a hierarchy led to the disbanding of a group or organisation whereas, active decisions to shift or maintain either horizontal or hierarchical organisation helped to maintain the longevity of an organisation. When the activists and staff were in agreement over the organisational structure there was less turmoil and disruption than where there was a disagreement, no matter the particular form of organisation. This is an interesting discovery that can be explored in other social movement organisations.

3.4 THE IMPACT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

This study also showed that a social movement can have impact in areas beyond policy change or influencing public opinion. Following a framework of social movement impact based on Staggenborg (1995) and della Porta (1999), it explored impact in terms of influencing the policy arena, mobilising the public, affecting prevailing culture and engaging in norm entrepreneurship. This dissertation discovered that Israeli peace activism has succeeded in mobilising previously immobilised participants, particularly by providing multiple areas in which they can get involved. New relationships have also developed with Palestinian activists engaged in the same areas of contention, which enables the diffusion of further tactical repertoires and collective action frames. Connections have been made with the international dimension, which also affects the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. Most significantly, Israeli peace activism is re-framing the ways in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perceived, shifting the discourse around concepts of ‘peace’ and focusing more on a human-rights based discourse, which is receiving some opposition in Israeli society, suggesting that this is having an impact on the situation. Focusing on smaller and alternative areas of impact of a social movement, as opposed to large policy changes, provides a more detailed understanding of the effect it can have. The impact other social movements may be having should also be explored in this manner.
3.5 CYCLES OF CONTENTION

The shifts in Israeli peace activism throughout its history highlighted certain cases where new waves of activism emerged, signalling a new cycle of contention. However, their characteristics did not fully conform to the traditional definition of a cycle of contention yet, there were clear, dramatic changes that should be considered new cycles of contention. This suggests that the definition needs to be more flexible to incorporate different types of cycles.

Furthermore, the identification of three distinct cycles of contention suggests an extension of the theory. Following the second Intifada each of the components of Israeli peace activism, despite focusing on the same area of contention, experienced different cycles of contention, with the liberal Zionists demobilising, the human rights component continuing similarly as previously and the radicals experiencing a new cycle of contention. This confirms the claim that political opportunity structures must be perceived in order to exist as opportunities or threats to mobilisation but, it needs to be made more explicit that this can result in different components of the social movement experiencing different cycles of contention. Whilst Tarrow (2011) does identify a ‘radical flank effect’ whereby the moderate groups tend to mobilise together in order to distance themselves from the radical groups, this does not accurately describe the Israeli case and overlooks that a new cycle in the radical component emerged. In the Israeli case, it was the radical components that joined together to distance themselves from the liberal Zionist component, who were not responding or challenging the prevailing realities. As such, it was the radical component that continued to mobilise whilst the liberal Zionists demobilised.

Approaching a social movement through the typology set out in this study will assist in identifying these different cycles.

3.6 GENDER DYNAMICS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Gender dynamics have played an important role in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism, influencing in particular, framing and mobilisation structures and in turn, responses to the political opportunity structures. Specific collective action frames based on gendered framing, whether through concept of ‘women as mothers’ or various feminist ideas, such as the connection between the occupation and the oppression of women in both Israeli and Palestinian societies, can be seen throughout the second two phases of Israeli peace activism. Often women were the early risers in a cycle of contention, responding to the changing realities and impact on the Palestinians, and their frames tended to be more confrontational, radicalising over the years. Gendered elements to organisational structures were also identified, with feminist modes of organising influencing the increase in decisions made through consensus and horizontal organisational structures, identified amongst the radical component. The prevalence and impact of gender dynamics in the trajectory of Israeli peace activism suggests that a gendered theory of social movements is required rather than approaching the issue by studying women’s movements, as has tended to be the case.
3.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT

A number of examples highlighted in both the second and third phase of Israeli peace activism suggest that the relationship between a social movement and the government is more nuanced than the political process model allows for, particularly in the Rabin and Barak governments. The political process model argues that opportunities are more open to influence the government if the movement has elite allies within the government. Whilst this was sometimes the case, in other cases when the liberal Zionist component of Israeli peace activism had allies in the government, they were unable to challenge it, even if they disagreed with the way the government was moving forward. They may have privately lobbied the government but publicly they could not be confrontational. This was because they did not want to undermine their allies, give leverage to the opposition, or ruin the image of the government through association with peace activists. It seems that when a social movement becomes too close to the government, it is unable to challenge it. This suggests the political process model with respect to elite allies needs to be more nuanced. Furthermore, it should be recognised that not all social movement actors seek to influence the government and therefore the government should not be posited as the central variable in determining the trajectory of a social movement.

3.8 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION AND A DOMESTIC SOCIAL MOVEMENT

This study has also highlighted some important connections between a social movement and the international dimension. While some of these connections have already been theorised, some aspects require further theorisation. Attempts by social movements to reach out to the international community have been explored, both in seeking new mobilisation structures through international and transnational social movements and in finding open political opportunity structures in governments and international organisations in order to have influence. This was best theorised by Keck and Sikkink (1998) through the boomerang process and Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) spiral model. Tarrow (2011) has also provided useful insights into the mechanisms and processes that connect the international dimension to the domestic social movement, such as the mechanism of diffusion and the process of externalisation through global framing. These have all provided helpful ways in which to understand the trajectory of Israeli peace activism.

However, there are three connections that have been under theorised and require further exploration. Firstly, Tarrow’s (2011) ‘composite model of externalisation’ needs to be incorporated into the boomerang process and spiral model in order to understand how the response of the domestic government, whether unresponsive or repressive, or a mixture, may affect the domestic social movement and in turn the next boomerang that is thrown out if the first one is not facilitated. A second connection to consider is the changes in the international environment that are directly connected to a domestic social movement and may increase its opportunity to mobilise to create change, such as the Arab Peace Initiative. If the domestic movement perceives this as an opportunity, it can provide it with
added momentum. However, how the domestic government and public respond to the international shift will affect the level of influence. This suggests a three-fold dynamic between changes in the international political opportunity structures, a domestic social movement and domestic political opportunity structures. A final under theorised element of social movement theory is the connection between indirect aspects of the international environment and a social movement. As shown, in the Israeli case, the Global War on Terror had the effect of further marginalising Israeli peace activism within Israel, even though there was no explicit link. In exploring a social movement, a consideration of the international environment and how changes might affect the domestic political opportunity structures within which the social movement operates, must also be considered.

4 CONCLUSION

This dissertation has made three main contributions to the literature. Firstly, in providing a detailed analysis of the trajectory of Israeli peace activism post-2000; through a three-fold typology, this study has shown that not all components of Israeli peace activism were paralysed in response to the second Intifada. Secondly, it has provided a further case study through which to explore social movement theory and, in doing so, has highlighted areas in which refinements and extensions are needed. Thirdly, it has identified new collective action frames, tactical repertoires, mobilisation structures and the impact of Israeli peace activism.

This study used the four power of movement to identify and explain the shifting trajectory of Israeli peace activism since the second Intifada. It outlined three components of Israeli peace activism: a liberal Zionist component, a radical component and a human rights component. In doing so, this dissertation has further contributed to the literature. A greater understanding of the dynamics of Israeli peace activism has been provided by exploring how the different components interact with each other and by providing a more nuanced understanding of how they interact with the prevailing political opportunity structures. This has the potential to help illuminate other social movements as it shows that individual groups within a social movement can be clustered together and a similar trajectory identified. This trajectory may be different for different clusters of groups within the same social movement. Acknowledging this enables a more detailed understanding of both the characteristics and the trajectory of a social movement than if the movement is treated as one unit of analysis or if the different groups and organisations are studied in isolation of each other.

This dissertation used social movement theory in order to explain the shifts in each of these components. It disaggregated the collective actions frames, the tactical repertoires and the mobilisation structures in order to provide a more detailed exploration. It then looked at how these internal dynamics interact with the external environment. In doing so this dissertation has answered the main overriding research question set out in the beginning: how has the nature of Israeli peace activism transformed since the second Intifada? It has argued that whilst the cycle of contention for the liberal Zionist component demobilised, which meant it no longer acted as the strongest part of the Israeli
peace movement, a new cycle of contention emerged for the radical groups and the human rights component continued their activities from the previous phase. This has meant that the radical groups are no longer ‘nipping at the heels’ of the liberal Zionist component but have filled the space they left and are often challenging the human rights groups to be more confrontational and highlights the polarisation and fragmentation of Israeli peace activism. These changes have led to shifts in the collective action frames, with the radical component no longer interested in the political peace process but focusing on the realities on the ground in solidarity with the Palestinians. The human rights component report and assist the situation of the Palestinians but use less confrontational collective action frames and tactical repertoires than the radical component, so they can reach out and influence the Israeli public. There has been an evolution in the tactical repertoire of the radical component, shifting from humanitarian aid to non-violent direct action to non-violent resistance to boycott. The use of tours has provided an innovative shift across the components of Israeli peace activism and is linked to their desire to influence the international community. The radical component has also attempted to diversify the mobilisation structures of Israeli peace activism by trying to be more inclusive. Horizontal grassroots mobilisation structures have also played a greater role, based on the collective action frames of the radical component. Despite these shifts, Israeli peace activism as a whole is smaller and more marginalised than it had been in previous phases. This has meant that there is little ability or even desire to influence the Israeli public or government. However, impact has been identified in other areas, including the building of relationships with the Palestinians, increased connections with the international community and shifting discourses surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This dissertation also provided insights into the secondary themes outlined at the outset. It has shown that the relationship between the government and a social movement is more nuanced than the political process model allows for. It also identified cases where activists do not actually want to influence the government. It has shed new light on the connection between the international dimension and a domestic social movement, highlighting both direct and indirect factors that influenced Israeli peace activism. It has also highlighted the need for a more gender aware approach to social movement theory and identified ways in which gender has influenced the trajectory of Israeli peace activism. It has also shown the possibility of multiple cycles of contention in one social movement and has outlined some keys areas of impact beyond the policy arena or government that Israeli peace activism has achieved. These have presented interesting theoretical implications to be further explored by considering different case studies that are comparable to the Israeli case. This could then lead to further refinements and strengthening of the theory in each of these areas.
## APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ISRAELI PEACE GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Group (Hebrew)</th>
<th>Name of Group (English)</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Form of Contention</th>
<th>Still Active?</th>
<th>Componen</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Stills</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Uses images and photographs to raise awareness and struggles against the occupation and inequality</td>
<td>Protest/awareness raising through images</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td><a href="http://activestills.org/">http://activestills.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Kan</td>
<td>Enough is Enough</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All That’s Left</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>A collective unequivocally opposed to the occupation and committed to building the diaspora angle of resistance.</td>
<td>Non-violent direct action, non-violent resistance, humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td><a href="http://www.allthatsleftcollective.com/">http://www.allthatsleftcollective.com/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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79 An extended version of a list found in Hermann (2009:267-275)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Political Position</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anarchists Against the Wall</strong></td>
<td>Protest in different Palestinian villages against the Wall.</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Non-violent direct action, non-violent resistance</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td><a href="http://www.awalls.org/">http://www.awalls.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arba Imahot</strong></td>
<td>Organised mass demonstrations and encouraged public debate on war with Lebanon</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://www.4mothers.org.il/peilut/backgrou.htm">http://www.4mothers.org.il/peilut/backgrou.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ariga</strong></td>
<td>Web-based, independent news from Israel, emphasizing the peace process</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Online Media</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ariga.com">http://www.ariga.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Association of Forty</strong></td>
<td>Recognition of the Arab Unrecognised Villages in Israel. Provides legal advice to villagers subjected to house demolition orders</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Advocacy, legal tactics</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atid Acher</strong></td>
<td>Provides free communications and public relations work for organisations in which Israelis and Palestinians work together</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Support for peace groups</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>Website no longer active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beyond Words</strong></td>
<td>Coexistence program including training in verbal and nonverbal communication</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://www.beyondwords7.org/">http://www.beyondwords7.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bil‘in Committee of Popular Resistance</strong></td>
<td>Palestinian group organising activities against the Separation Barrier in Bil‘in</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Weekly demonstrations, with theatrical elements. Non-violent resistance</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bilin-village.org/">http://www.bilin-village.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B’Tselem</strong></td>
<td>In Our Image – The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>It endeavours to document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in Israel.</td>
<td>Human rights awareness, legal tactics, research and information</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Baderech el haSulcha</strong></td>
<td>Sulha Peace Project</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>a group of Israelis and Palestinians who meet regularly to encounter the other, creating potential for cooperation</td>
<td>Dialogue and spiritual activism</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Bat Shalom** | Daughters of Peace | 1993 | Dialogue and cooperation with twin Palestinian organisation | Dialogue | Y | Radical | [Website no longer active](http://www.sulha.com/)
<p>| <strong>Besod Siach</strong> | Besod Siach – Open Discussion Groups | 1993 | N | Liberal Zionist | n/a |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Logo</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bringing Peace Together</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Programme is a multifaceted group aiming at bringing together representatives of different peace movements in order to exchange visions and experiences with each other and thus bridge the gap between Israelis and Palestinians.</td>
<td>Dialogue and network</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustan Shalom Peace Garden</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>An Israeli NGO working in the Bedouin and Jewish communities in the Negev region of Israel since 1999, promoting sustainability and capacity building from within the communities we work.</td>
<td>Environmental action</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Emerging Futures (CEF)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Grassroots Partnership holding Global Village Square meetings</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Main Objective</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dai l’Kibush</td>
<td>End the Occupation</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>An independent Israeli coalition of political groups and individuals, both Jewish and Arab, the group expressed a clear message of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Their main goal was to influence Israeli public opinion to accept a just solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to build a democratic society in Israel</td>
<td>Demonstration, Non-violent action</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derech haShivyon</td>
<td>Way of Equality</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dor Shalom</td>
<td>Entire Generation, An</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Originally Dor Shalom. Changed name in order to remove political connotations</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dor Shalom</td>
<td>Peace Generation</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Set up in response to assassination of Rabin with the aim to get support from the public for peace</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Du Kiyum</strong></td>
<td><strong>Negev Coexistence Forum</strong></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Provide a framework for Jewish-Arab collaborative efforts in the struggle for civil equality and the advancement of mutual tolerance and coexistence. NCF, also known as “Dukium” in Hebrew, is unique in being the only Arab-Jewish organisation that remains focused solely on the specific problems confronting the Negev.</td>
<td>Developmental projects – civil society</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Cooperation Foundation</strong></td>
<td><strong>EcoPeace Middle East</strong></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>non-profit, non-governmental track II think tank based</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EcoPeace Mizrach Tichon</strong></td>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Brings together Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli environmentalists for the promotion of cooperative efforts to protect their shared environmental heritage</td>
<td>Environmental projects</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emek Shaveh</strong></td>
<td><strong>Emek Shaveh: Archaeology in the Shadow of Conflict</strong></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Views archaeology as a resource for building bridges and strengthening bonds between different peoples and cultures, and hence as an important factor impacting the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</td>
<td>Education, Tours, reports</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haAguda l’Zchuyot haEzrach b’Yisrael</strong></td>
<td>Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Deals with the entire spectrum of rights and civil liberties issues in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Aims to ensure Israel’s accountability and respect for human rights, by addressing violations committed by the Israeli authorities in Israel, the Occupied Territories, or elsewhere.</td>
<td>Legal tactics, research and information/</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haEm HaChamishit</strong></td>
<td>The Fifth Mother</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Aim to bring forward into the public arena this feminine voice as well as our maternal experience. They call for use of our expertise in solving conflict through dialogue with Palestinians, bridge-building activities and advocacy in the media</td>
<td>Dialogue and raising feminine voice</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>haForum l'Haskama Ezrachit</strong></td>
<td>Citizen’s Accord Forum between Jews and Arabs in Israel</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Works to bridge the socio-economic gaps between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens. Develops and implements community development and political advocacy programs that are concrete models for large-scale social change that can be used all over the State of Israel.</td>
<td>Development/advocacy</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HaGesher - Nashim Yehudiot v'Araviot l'shalom b'Hamizrach Hatichon</strong></td>
<td>The Bridge-Jewish and Arab women for Peace in the Middle East</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Gathered Jewish, Arab and Palestinian women to promote the status of women, and peace in the Middle East</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haKav haYarok</strong></td>
<td>The Green Line, Students Draw the Line</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hal'aa haKibush</strong></td>
<td>Down with the Occupation</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halonot</td>
<td>Windows-Channels for Communication</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Joint Israeli-Palestinian organisation that strives for a future based on</td>
<td>Dialogue and education</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haMercaz haBeinleumi l'Shalom</td>
<td>International Centre for Peace</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>N Liberal Zionist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haMerkaiz l’Informatzia Alternativit</td>
<td>Alternative Information Centre, The</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>A Palestinian and Israeli grassroots organisation to promote the human and national rights of the Palestinian people and a just peace for Palestinians and Israelis by collecting and disseminating data from the occupied territories</td>
<td>Research and Information</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamidrasha l’democratia v’l’shalom</td>
<td>Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Works to breakdown stereotypes, enhance understanding of democratic principles and promote peaceful coexistence</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>haMifkad haLeumi</td>
<td>People’s Referendum (The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Initiative)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Independent initiative with highly publicised media campaign to support resumption of renewed negotiations and signing of an accord. Sticker campaign</td>
<td>Gain support from public</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Main Objectives</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>haMizrach el haShalom</strong></td>
<td>Exclusively Mizrachi peace group of mainly young intellectuals. Call for social, economic, political reforms.</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Awareness raising, Demonstration</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haMoatza haYisraelit l'Shalom Yisrael-Palestine</strong></td>
<td>Intellectual circle, which made public declarations and developed close relation with the PLO</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Awareness raising</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haMoatza haYisraelit l'Shalom Yisrael-Palestine</strong></td>
<td>Considered a two-state solution to the conflict, believed in negotiations with the PLO</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Secret dialogue and negotiations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haMoked l'Haganat haPrat</strong></td>
<td>Israeli human rights organisation whose main objective is to assist Palestinians of the Occupied Territories whose rights are violated due to Israel's policies.</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Humanitarian action, legal tactics</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>haShana haEsrim v'Echad</strong></td>
<td>Disseminated intellectual accounts of the roots and implications of the occupation and the detailed the ways in which refusal should be expanded beyond the military to other areas.</td>
<td>21st Year</td>
<td>Conscientious objectors</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Political Position</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HaTnua l'Shalom uBitachon</td>
<td>The Movement for Peace and Security</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Cautioned against permanent Israeli presence in the territories occupied during the and proposed contact with Arab leaders willing to negotiate</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haTnua l'Tiyonut Acheret</td>
<td>Movement for Another Zionism</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad haZiburi Naged Inuyim</td>
<td>Public Committee Against Torture in Israel</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>PCATI advocates for all persons - Israelis, Palestinians, labour immigrants and other foreigners in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) – in order to protect them from torture and ill treatment by the Israeli interrogation and law enforcement authorities</td>
<td>Advocacy/humanitarian action, reports</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad l'Dialg Yisraeli-Falesinai</td>
<td>Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Group of Israelis and Palestinians meeting to try to find a resolution to the conflict</td>
<td>Dialogue, negotiations</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad l'Solidariut im Bir Zeit</td>
<td>Committee for Solidarity with Bir Zeit</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Support for Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, which was closed by Israeli authorities</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activity Type</td>
<td>Main Objective</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad l'Solidariut im Hevron</td>
<td>Hebron Solidarity Committee</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad Neged haMilchama b'Levanon</td>
<td>Committee Against the War in Lebanon</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Against the war in Lebanon</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haVaad Neged haYad haKasha</td>
<td>Committee Against the Iron Fist</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayalim Neged Shtika</td>
<td>Soldiers against Silence</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Opposed ongoing presence of Israeli soldiers in Lebanon</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haYom haShvi'i</td>
<td>Seventh Day, The</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Call for an end to the Six Day War and creation of a Jewish Democratic State by compiling and disseminating relevant articles</td>
<td>Awareness raising</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horim Neged Shtika</td>
<td>Parents Against Silence</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Originally Mothers Against Silence – protest the first Lebanon War</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hug Horim Shakulim (Mishpachot Shakulot Nifgaot Terror l'maan haShalom)</td>
<td>Parent’s Circle - Association of Bereaved Families in the Middle East</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Palestinian Israeli organisation of over 600 families, all of whom have lost a close family member as a result of the conflict.</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imahot l'Maan Shalom</td>
<td>Mothers 4 Peace</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Website no longer active</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imahot Neged Shtika</td>
<td>Mothers Against Silence</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Opposed ongoing presence of Israeli soldiers in Lebanon</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Goals/Activities</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Imut</strong></td>
<td>Mental Health Workers for the Advancement of Peace</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>A group of mental health professionals, providing services to those suffering mental illness and researching the psychological barriers to peace</td>
<td>Humanitarian service, research</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indymedia</strong></td>
<td>Indymedia Israel</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>A network of individuals, independent and alternative media activists and organisations, offering grassroots, non-corporate, non-commercial coverage of important social and political issues</td>
<td>Awareness raising through media</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interfaith Encounter Association</strong></td>
<td>Dedicated to promoting peace in the Middle East through interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural study</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Interfaith Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IPCRI</strong></td>
<td>IPCRI</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Organises public conferences, peace education workshops, Track II Diplomacy Meetings and writes policy papers, promoting a two state solution</td>
<td>Education, research and information, tours, dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel-Palestinian Science Organisation</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation and dialogue through scientific research projects</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ir Amim</strong></td>
<td>Ir Amim (City of Nation/City of People)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Educational about the situation in Jerusalem</td>
<td>Tours, reports</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ir Shalem</strong></td>
<td>Ir Shalem-Jerusalem (Front of Peace Now)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Irgun haNashim haBeinleumi l'Shalom b'Mizrach haTichon</strong></td>
<td>International Women’s Commission</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Organise international conferences to share ideas</td>
<td>Idea sharing</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Isha ‘Isha</strong></td>
<td>Woman to Woman – Haifa Feminist Centre</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Grassroots feminist organisation in Israel and one of the leading voices of women’s rights in the country.</td>
<td>Dialogue, demonstrations, education, research</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem Peace Makers</strong></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Network of independent interfaith peace-builders dedicated to encouraging understanding and reconciliation by providing information; backing up peacemakers in their outreach, promoting dialogue, visiting and contact</td>
<td>Interfaith dialogue, tours</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition</strong></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Group of leading politicians, academics, NGOs, cultural figures who were concerned for absence of formal peace process</td>
<td>Coordination, campaigns</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Just Vision</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Raise awareness and support for peace using public education campaigns such as award winning films and other</td>
<td>Raising awareness, education</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kav Adom</strong></td>
<td>Demonstration for a withdrawal from Lebanon, more aggressive than others</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kav l'Oved</strong></td>
<td>Committed to protecting the rights of disadvantaged workers employed in Israeli and by Israelis in the Occupied Territories, including Palestinians, migrant workers, subcontracted workers and new immigrants</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Humanitarian action, legal tactics</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koalitziat Nashim I'Shalom</td>
<td>Coalition of Women for Peace</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Feminist organisation against the occupation of Palestine and for a just peace bringing together women from a wide variety of identity and groups. Initiates public campaigns and education and outreach programs, working to develop and integrate a feminist discourse on all levels of society</td>
<td>Non-violent resistance, non-violent direct action, education, training</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kol Aher</td>
<td>Other Voice</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>A grassroots volunteer initiative comprised of citizens from the communities bordering the Gaza border aiming to end the siege and the attacks on both sides</td>
<td>Advocacy and Protest</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvisa Schora</td>
<td>Black Laundry</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Direct action group of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgenders and others against the occupation and for social justice</td>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leading Leaders for Peace</td>
<td>A group of individuals from all walks of life who are united under the single resolution of having our leaders meet, sit, and work together to reach a just solution to the conflict here. They call for the solidarity of various peace groups</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Dialogue, demonstrations</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo-Metsaytot</td>
<td>Women conducting acts of civil disobedience to support Palestinians</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machon Arik</td>
<td>Raise awareness of peace and reconciliation through workshops, educational activities and PR campaigns – non Political</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Awareness raising/education</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machon haNegev l'Estrategiyot shel Shalom u’Pituach</td>
<td>Promotes peace and development, focusing on the centrality of the civil society. NISPED conducts programs of education, training, project development and consultancy</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Education – civil society</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Event Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Output Type</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magnizin haKibush</td>
<td>Website providing information and</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Website providing information and commentary on the ongoing developments in</td>
<td>Awareness raising through media</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahut haChaim</td>
<td>Raise public awareness</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Raise public awareness to their common responsibility and ability to make</td>
<td>Lectures</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapat haShalom</td>
<td>Peace Quilt</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Peace Quilt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martzim Nged haShiita haKfuya b'Shtachim</td>
<td>Lecturers Against Imposed Rule in</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Lecturers Against Imposed Rule in the Territories</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate haShalom sel HaZafon</td>
<td>Peace Movement Coordinating</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Peace Movement Coordinating Committee in Haifa and the North</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mate Tnuot haShalom</td>
<td>Peace Movement Headquarters</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Peace Movement Headquarters</td>
<td>Attempted protest</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechuyavut l’Shalom V’l’Tsedek Chevrati</strong></td>
<td>Commitment to Peace and Social Justice</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Focuses on the crossroads where the peace and social justice agendas meet.</td>
<td>Reporting, research and information</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mefakdim l’maan Bitachon Yisrael</strong></td>
<td>Commanders for Israel’s Security</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Non-partisan movement of veteran senior security officials (IDF, Mossad, Shin Bet and National Police Force) who seek to promote a regional political-security initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and normalize relations with moderate Arab states.</td>
<td>Reports, lobbying</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mepeace.org</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Online network of peacemakers worldwide</td>
<td>Online transnational advocacy network</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Merkaz Peres l’Shalom</strong></td>
<td>Peres Centre for Peace</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Promotes peacebuilding between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and in particular between Israelis and Palestinians.</td>
<td>Dialogue, education</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mi Marviha?</strong></td>
<td>Who Profits?</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dedicated to exposing the commercial involvement of companies in the continuing Israeli control over Palestinian and Syrian land.</td>
<td>Disseminating information</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MidEast Web for Coexistence</td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>News and information website designed to provide balanced news reporting and publicise dialogue, peace building projects</td>
<td>Online media</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mifgash</strong></td>
<td>Educational organisation that focuses on building educational programmes on mediation skills</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Peace education and mediation</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://mifgash.org.il/">http://mifgash.org.il/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mishmarot haShalom</strong></td>
<td>Guards of Peace</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Set up in response to assassination of Rabin, Held weekly vigils</td>
<td>N Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moatza Bein Datit Meta’emet b’Yisrael</strong></td>
<td>Set up in response to assassination of Rabin, Held weekly vigils</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Uses teachings of the three monotheistic religions to promote reconciliation and coexistence</td>
<td>Y Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://mifgash.org.il/">Website no longer active</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohot shel Shalom</strong></td>
<td>Minds of Peace</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Implements Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating assemblies, called Minds of Peace Experiments aiming to create the social conditions for peace in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by grass roots effort to involve the public in the peacemaking</td>
<td>Y Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://mindsforpeace.org/">http://mindsforpeace.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nashim b’Lavan</strong></td>
<td>Women in White</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nashim b’shachor</strong></td>
<td>Women in Black</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Weekly silent vigils in town centres</td>
<td>Y Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nashim Bonot Tarbut Shalom</td>
<td>Engendering Peace</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashim l’maan Asirot Politiot</td>
<td>Women for Political Prisoners</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Supported Palestinian women in Israeli jails</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashim l’maan Kdushat haChayim</td>
<td>Women for the Sanctity of Life</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashim Neged Plisha l’Levanon</td>
<td>Women Against the Invasion of Lebanon</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Against the Invasion of Lebanon</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashim v’Shalom</td>
<td>Women and Peace</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Brought together Jewish and Arab feminists striving for peace</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neled</td>
<td>We will give Birth</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netivei Achva</td>
<td>Friendship’s way</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionism</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisan</td>
<td>Nisan Young Women Leaders</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Dedicated to the advancement of young women in Israel. Nisan’s innovative programs develop the leadership potential of Jewish and Arab Israeli young women</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionist</td>
<td>Website no longer active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohel haShalom</td>
<td>The Peace Tent</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Erected a tent in Palestinian village</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Institution Type</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open House Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Further peace and coexistence among Israeli Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem</td>
<td>Encounter and Cooperation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.seruv.org.il/defaulteng.asp">Website no longer active</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ossim Shalom</td>
<td>Social Workers for Peace and Welfare</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Israeli organisation comprised of Jewish and Arab social workers, calling for the use of dialogue</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and dialogue</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ossimshalom.org.il/article/9537.aspx">Website no longer active</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oz v'Shalom</td>
<td>Strength and Peace</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Aimed to persuade religious Zionists that annexation and control of another people ran counter to Jewish values and teachings</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oznik Media</td>
<td>News service and art gallery</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Awareness raising through media</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://oznik.com/about_oznik.htm">http://oznik.com/about_oznik.htm</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinaim v'Yisraelim l'maan e Alimut</td>
<td>Palestinians and Israelis for Non-violence (branch of IFOR)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>People who believe the conflict in the Middle East and its causes are best addressed through nonviolent activism by the two peoples</td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td><a href="http://oznik.com/about_oznik.htm">Website no longer active</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME)</td>
<td>PRIME’s purpose is to pursue mutual coexistence and peace-building through joint Israeli and Palestinian research and outreach activities.</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Research, education</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td><a href="http://vispo.com/PRIME/">http://vispo.com/PRIME/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pitchim Daf Hadash l’Shalom</strong></td>
<td>Turning a new page for peace</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Facebook group bringing Israelis, Palestinians and Internationals who believe in peace together</td>
<td>Social network</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Popular Struggle Coordination Committee</strong></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Reports on and coordinates the different demonstrations against the Separation Barrier</td>
<td>Coordination. Non-violent resistance</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td><a href="http://www.popularstruggle.org/">http://www.popularstruggle.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profil Hadash</strong></td>
<td>New Profile</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Activities against the militarization of Israeli society, aiming to transform it into a civilian one. Feminist organisation</td>
<td>Information, support for conscientious objectors</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proyekt Schunat Wolfson</strong></td>
<td>Wolfson Community Project - Acre</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radio Kol haShalom</strong></td>
<td>Radio All for Peace</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>A joint Israeli-Palestinian radio station, aiming to help resolving the conflict by bridging information between the two sides.</td>
<td>Awareness raising through journalism</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reshet</strong></td>
<td>Israeli Women’s Peace Net</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee of Women’s groups</td>
<td>Coordination, demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Coordination, awareness raising, dialogue</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reshet haShutuf haYehudit-Ararit b’Yisrael</td>
<td>Network in Israel</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Network of organisations dealing with Jewish-Arab coexistence in Israel</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>Website no longer active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalom Achshav</td>
<td>Peace Now</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Organised mass demonstrations, petition the Israeli government, disseminate information. Currently focused on stopping settlement expansion</td>
<td>Demonstrations, tours, legal tactics, lobbying, research and information</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shani - Nashim Neged haKibush</strong></td>
<td>Israeli Women Against the Occupation</td>
<td>Called for greater involvement of women in politics, expressed concerns over effects of repression in the occupied territories.</td>
<td>Education, demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shministim</strong></td>
<td>Seniors - New high-School Refuseniks Movement</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Letter to Prime Minister refusing to conduct national service in the Occupied Territories</td>
<td>Conscientious objectors</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shovrim Shtika</strong></td>
<td>Breaking the Silence</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Collects and disseminates testimonies of soldiers who served in Hebron</td>
<td>Testimonies, lectures and public campaigns, Tours</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shuvi</strong></td>
<td>Women for the Withdrawal from Gaza</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Support the idea of disengagement from Gaza</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shvil haZahav</strong></td>
<td>Middleway</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Promoting peace and a stop to the violence of the Intifada</td>
<td>Dialogue, peace walks</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Studentim l’maan haShalom</strong></td>
<td>Student Union for Peace</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ta’ayush</strong></td>
<td>Come Together/Partnership</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Direct humanitarian action – deliveries of food, blankets, clothes and medication to Palestinians</td>
<td>Humanitarian action, non-violent direct action, legal action</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarabut-Hithabrut</td>
<td>Come Together</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Aims to address the division in Israeli oppositional politics between struggles against the occupation and struggles against inequality and for social justice within Israel itself</td>
<td>Active in different campaigns across Israel/Palestine. Brings new ideas and analysis to discussions</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tarabut.info/en/home/">http://www.tarabut.info/en/home/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jerusalem Link</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Coordination committee of activities between the Jerusalem Women’s Centre (Palestinian organisation) and BatShalom (Israeli organisation)</td>
<td>Dialogue, coordination</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Website no longer active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Young Israeli Forum for Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>To encourage dialogue between young Israeli, Palestinian and European students and political activists. Some of the Israeli participants that attended the conference decided to establish a new organisation that would allow them to contribute to youth-based projects promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace and better Israeli-European relations.</td>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td><a href="http://www.yifc.org.il/">http://www.yifc.org.il/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaad haShalom haYisraeli</td>
<td>Israeli Peace Committee</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vaad haYotsrim</td>
<td>Committee of Jewish and Arab Creative Artists</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YALA Young Leaders</td>
<td>Facebook-based movement dedicated to empowering young Middle Easterners to lead their generation to a better future, through dialogue and engagement</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>Online transnational advocacy network</td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/yalaYL">https://www.facebook.com/yalaYL</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasamba</td>
<td>Part of an activist anti-capitalist transnational network, using samba as a form of political action, inspired by carnival, to confront and critique systems of domination and directly support everybody struggling against exploitation, discrimination and oppression.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>Creative protest</td>
<td><a href="http://rhythms-of-resistance.org/spip/">http://rhythms-of-resistance.org/spip/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaldei haMizrach haTichon</td>
<td>Middle East Children’s Alliance</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Humanitarian action</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mecaforpeace.org/">http://www.mecaforpeace.org/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yesh Din</strong></td>
<td>There is Justice</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Publish reports and disseminate information on human rights abuses; take legal actions and engage in direct advocacy with the authorities in order to remedy the situation; and work with the media to encourage debate on these issues.</td>
<td>Human Rights awareness, legal tactics</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yisrael Shelanu, HaTnua Letmura</strong></td>
<td>Our Israel: The Movement for Change</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Demonstration of reservist soldier for Israeli government to take responsibility for failure to anticipate 1973 attacks</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yisraelim Mitoch Bchira</strong></td>
<td>Israelis by Choice/Immigrants Against Occupation</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yotzmat Kopenhagen</strong></td>
<td>International Alliance for Arab-Israeli Peace</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Unofficial, semi-diplomatic peace initiative</td>
<td>Peace initiative</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yozmat Geneva</strong></td>
<td>Geneva Initiative</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Educate and campaign about realistic steps and solutions needed to achieve peace through different NGOs that support the Initiative</td>
<td>Education, proposed peace agreement</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Liberal Zionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zochrot</td>
<td>Remembering</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The main goal is to bring knowledge of the Palestinian Nakba to Jewish-Israeli people through organising tours for Jews and Arabs to Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948; hosting workshops and lectures; organising encounters between Palestinian refugees and the Israelis who live on their lands</td>
<td>Education/awareness raising</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Radical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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