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Entry deterrence and experimentation under demand uncertainty

Jain, N. (2011). Entry deterrence and experimentation under demand uncertainty. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(4), pp. 464-472. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.09.001

Abstract

We examine the effect of a threat of entry on experimentation about demand by an incumbent monopolist when there is a fixed cost of entry. We show that experimentation may itself be used as a tool for entry deterrence and derive conditions under which experimentation reduces the probability of entry. These conditions depend on the entry rule which in turn depends on entry costs. We show that if experimentation does not deter entry, the monopolist incumbent experiments less. We also characterize experimentation and entry in the linear-uniform example, and show that cost of entry and experimentation do not have a monotonic relationship. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2011 Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
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