**AFTERWORD**

**Concluding Reflections on the Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu**

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**Approaching Pierre Bourdieu**

Those who are unfamiliar, or barely familiar, with the writings of Pierre Bourdieu will find a useful and comprehensive introduction to his work in the opening chapter, entitled ‘Between Structuralism and Theory of Practice: The Cultural Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu’. In it, Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl provide us with a clear and accessible overview of some of the main philosophical and sociological themes that run through Bourdieu’s writings. Joas and Knöbl centre their analysis on five interrelated concepts that play a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s work: the concepts of (1) practice, (2) action, (3) the social, (4) cultural sociology, and (5) social science.

(1) The authors examine Bourdieu’s concept of *practice* by focusing on one of his most influential early works, namely his *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977 [1972]). As explained by Joas and Knöbl, Bourdieu’s theory of practice is based on a sympathetic but critical revision of Lévi-Strauss’s anthropological structuralism through the proposal of an alternative, somewhat refined, form of structuralism, commonly described as ‘genetic’ or ‘constructivist’ structuralism. According to Joas and Knöbl, the paradigmatic transition from Lévi-Strauss’s ‘anthropological structuralism’ to Bourdieu’s ‘genetic structuralism’ contains a number of significant presuppositional shifts. (i) The *shift from ‘rule following’ to ‘rule breaking’* is motivated by the insight that social actors do not always follow the rules imposed upon them by their social environment: the relative unpredictability of society is due to the ineluctable power of human agency. (ii) The *shift from ‘structure’ to ‘action’* is justified considering the fact that social structures cannot exist without social action: the very possibility of society is contingent upon the constant interplay between social structure and social action. (iii) The *shift from ‘theory’ to ‘practice’* is imperative to avoid falling into the
scholastic fallacy of treating ‘the things of logic’ as ‘the logic of things’ and thereby passing off ‘the reality of the model’ as ‘the model of reality’: a truly reflexive sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, needs to recognise that human life is to be conceived of as an ensemble of social practices. (iv) The shift from ‘substantialism’ to ‘relationalism’ is based on the conviction that we need to replace the substantialist with the relationalist mode of thought in order to account for the fact that social fields are defined by contingent relations between, rather than by universal properties of, social actors: society is a relationally constructed reality. (v) The shift from ‘logocentric dichotomism’ to ‘homological holism’ permits us to transcend the counterproductive antinomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches to the social: society emanates from the homological interplay between field-divided objectivities and habitus-specific subjectivities. Thus, from a Bourdieusian perspective, social practices are possible only through the homological interplay between positionally structured realms of objectivity and dispositionally constituted forms of subjectivity.

(2) Joas and Knöbl begin their examination of Bourdieu’s concept of action by pointing out that the Bourdieusian model of human action differs from ‘utilitarian’ or ‘economic’ models in three respects: first, it conceives of human action in relationalist, rather than rationalist, terms; second, it studies human action in contextualist, rather than universalist, terms; and, third, it examines human action in praxeological, rather than transcendental, terms. If human action is always relationally, contextually, and praxeologically constituted, it cannot be reduced to the outcome of a largely self-sufficient, predominantly calculative, and merely cognitive subject. The habitus constitutes a dispositionally structured apparatus of perception, appreciation, and action. Its main function is to allow social actors to confront the field-specific imperatives thrown at them in a field-divided world. The social field denotes a positionally structured realm of socialisation, interaction, and competition. Its main function is to provide social actors with a practically defined framework in which to mobilise their habitus-specific resources in relation to a habitus-divided world. Different forms of capital describe different – objectively externalised and subjectively internalised – sources of material and symbolic power. The main function of (different types of) capital is to enable social actors to compete over material and symbolic resources in relationally constituted realms. A general theory of the economy of practices needs to account for the fact that the homological interplay between habitus-specific forms of subjectivity and field-differentiated forms of objectivity lies at the heart of the struggle over capital-based resources available in a given society.

(3) The two authors continue by reflecting upon Bourdieu’s concept of the social. As they point out, field, habitus, and capital constitute the three conceptual cornerstones of the Bourdieusian architecture of the social. Yet, rather than
conceiving of these categories in isolation from each other, Bourdieusian analysis is concerned with exploring the various and often contradictory ways in which they are empirically interconnected. From a Bourdieusian perspective, the field can be regarded as the ontological foundation of the social: to be situated in different realms of social reality means to be embedded in different social fields. Social fields constitute the *espaces des possibles*, that is, the delimited and delimiting spaces of possibilities in which human actions take place. As Joas and Knöbl explain, Bourdieusian field theory and Luhmannian systems theory converge and diverge in three fundamental respects. They converge in emphasising that social fields – in the Bourdieusian sense – and social systems – in the Luhmannian sense – are characterised by their (i) constraining *ubiquity*, (ii) functional *differentiality*, and (iii) relative *autonomy*. Paradoxically, the two accounts also diverge in precisely these respects. (i) According to Bourdieu, the constraining ubiquity of social fields can be challenged through the generative power of social struggle and human agency. By contrast, according to Luhmann, there is little – if any – room for transformative malleability within social realms whose normative horizons are defined by systemic boundaries. (ii) From a Bourdieusian perspective, the functional differentiality of social fields is limited to the degree of evolutionary determinacy of a given society. Conversely, from a Luhmannian perspective, any kind of society has, in principle, the capacity to develop an infinite number of systemic realms that generate a potentially unlimited amount of spaces of delimited interactionality. (iii) Following Bourdieu, the relative autonomy of social fields is always subject to the hegemonic imperatives of a given type of society. Following Luhmann, social systems can, in principle, reproduce themselves without being dictated by the overarching imperatives of a dominant form of normativity.

(4) Joas and Knöbl provide us with useful insights into some of the key aspects of Bourdieu’s notion of cultural sociology. Far from regarding culture as a neutral and disinterested affair, Bourdieu conceives of it as a vehicle of social distinction. Given the foundational status of our daily immersion in culture, the attainment of cultural capital is a precondition for the acquisition of other forms of capital. In other words, we obtain social, economic, political, linguistic, and educational forms of capital on condition that we have access to cultural capital. Ordinary actors can participate in social life only insofar as they are exposed to cultural fields, develop a cultural habitus, and acquire cultural capital. Since the human species is a socio-constructive species, the emergence of society is inconceivable without the creation of culture. In order to develop a cultural habitus and participate in a cultural field, we need to incorporate cultural capital. Culture is inevitably interest-laden because we can develop an interest in the world only if we develop an interest in culture, and culture is necessarily power-laden because access to culture is a precondition
for access to power. Symbolic power derives from people’s generative capacity to convert the need for self-realisation into an endogenously mobilised resource of exogenously approved consecration.

(5) The authors conclude their chapter by reflecting on Bourdieu’s remarkable influence on contemporary social science. They observe that Bourdieu’s influence is particularly palpable in the Francophone, Germanophone, and Anglophone fields of social and political thought. (i) Probably more than in any other national tradition of sociology, the contemporary French academic field of sociology appears to be divided between ‘the Bourdieusians’ and ‘the Boltanskians’; whereas the former are associated with the paradigm of sociologie critique, the latter are referred to as advocates of an alternative agenda commonly described as sociologie de la critique or, more recently, sociologie pragmatique de la critique. Bourdieusians tend to regard social science as a tool to uncover the underlying mechanisms that shape the hierarchical structuration of society. By contrast, BoltanskiANS tend to conceive of social science as a tool to make sense of the various disputes generated by ordinary actors when engaging in the discursive problematisation of society. (ii) In the contemporary German academic field of sociology, Bourdieusian conceptual frameworks are increasingly popular in empirical studies on life-style. This tendency reflects the sociological significance of actors’ dependence on access to multiple forms of capital in differentiated societies: in order to enjoy the status of an empowered member of society we have no choice but to develop the capacity to acquire and mobilise capital-based resources that permit our subjectivity to relate to and act upon increasingly differentiated realms of objectivity. (iii) Despite the persisting paradigmatic predominance of economic and utilitarian approaches in the contemporary North American academic field of sociology, it appears to be more and more common to establish an elastic comfort zone between the utilitarian paradigm of ‘rational action’ in the market place and the relational paradigm of ‘interest-laden action’ in the social field. Social life, then, is driven by a permanent struggle over resources: cultural resources, economic resources, linguistic resources, educational resources, political resources, and symbolic resources. In short, the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of struggles over social resources. Ultimately, to have access to a legitimate habitus via the acquisition of legitimate capital and participation in a legitimate field means to have access to a legitimate life.

**Bourdieu and Marx (I)**

In the second chapter, entitled ‘Pierre Bourdieu: Unorthodox Marxist?’, Bridget Fowler defends the view that Bourdieu can be regarded as one of the great heirs of the Western Marxist tradition. Although she does not suggest that
Marx was the only classical sociologist whose oeuvre significantly influenced Bourdieu’s writings, Fowler argues that Marx had a distinctive impact on Bourdieu and that the significance of this influence is often downplayed when examining Bourdieusian concepts such as field, habitus, and doxa. More specifically, she claims that Bourdieu’s syntheses, which possess a masterly originality derived from a variety of intellectual traditions, were aimed at strengthening, rather than at undermining, Marx’s historical materialism. Bourdieu neither abandoned nor repudiated Marx’s materialist method, but rather converted it into a sociologically more complex and analytically more sophisticated approach, insisting upon the central importance of the ineluctable links between the material and the symbolic, the economic and the cultural, and the objective and the normative dimensions of social life.

Given his emphasis on the multidimensional constitution of human reality, it comes as no surprise that Bourdieu was strongly opposed to all forms of Vulgärmarxismus, which – as Fowler points out – fall into the traps of ‘false radicalism’ and ‘mechanical materialism’. We are therefore confronted with a curious paradox: Bourdieu provides his most powerful critique of orthodox Marxism by adopting and developing Marx’s own conceptual and methodological tools. He draws upon insights from Marxist thought whilst seeking to overcome some of its most significant shortcomings. In so doing, Bourdieu is firmly situated in the self-critical spirit of the Marxist project: just as ‘it is essential to educate the educator himself’ or herself, it is crucial to criticise the critic himself or herself (Marx, 2000/1977 [1845]: 172); and just as it is imperative to sociologise sociology itself, it is indispensable to reflect upon the process of reflection itself (Bourdieu, 1976: 104; 2001: 16, 19, and 220).

What, then, allows us to assume that Bourdieusian forms of reflection stand in the tradition of Marxist social analysis? To what extent can Bourdieu be regarded as one of the great inheritors of the Western Marxist tradition? As Fowler demonstrates on the basis of a close textual analysis, Marxist thought is an omnipresent feature in key areas of Bourdieu’s writings. In order to illustrate this, the author focuses on six Bourdieusian themes: Algeria; education and class; the cultural field; struggles within the academic field; the problem of agency; and, finally, the idea of a general theory of cultural power. As Fowler outlines in the introductory part of her chapter, we can identify a number of theoretical concerns that feature centrally both in Marxian and in Bourdieusian social analysis. These overlapping theoretical concerns, which are instances of Bourdieu’s debt to Marx, can be synthesised as follows.

(1) Relationality: The most obvious point of convergence between Marx and Bourdieu can be found in their shared conviction that human reality is the ensemble of social relations. From a sociological perspective, social life
is to be conceived of not in terms of transcendental essences or ahistorical abstractions, but in terms of spatiotemporally contingent relations between different people and between different groups of people.

(2) Practice: A further important meeting point between Marx and Bourdieu is the assumption that social life is essentially practical. Marx’s historical materialism and Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism constitute two macro-theoretical frameworks that are based on the presupposition that both the constitution and the evolution of society are shaped by the unfolding of interrelated social practices.

(3) Capital: Yet another shared concern in the works of Marx and Bourdieu is their critical engagement with the fact that, in stratified societies, access to social resources depends on access to capital. Bourdieu’s differentiation between various forms of capital – such as economic, cultural, social, linguistic, and symbolic capital – does justice to the complexity of polycentrically organised realities in which social resources are not only asymmetrically distributed but also positionally externalised and dispositionally internalised.

(4) Power: In light of the fact that our ability to act upon the world is contingent upon our hierarchically defined position in the social space, Marx and Bourdieu aim to demonstrate that asymmetrically structured social relations are interest-laden power relations. Before we can imagine the possibility of a classless reality, we need to face up to the complexities arising from the structural divisions that permeate every class-ridden society.

(5) Economic and Symbolic Power: Both Marx and Bourdieu are holistic thinkers in that they stress the inseparability of the material and the cultural, the economic and the symbolic, and the objective and the normative dimensions of social life. Bourdieu’s attempt to shift the emphasis from the study of economic power, which is central to early modern forms of orthodox Marxism, to the study of symbolic power, which is a key component of late modern versions of cultural Marxism, reflects the need to account for the sociological significance of people’s capacity to acquire social power through both material and cultural resources. What is present in class is the power of social classification; what is present in culture is the power of social representation. Power-laden divisions in the world manifest themselves in interest-laden visions of the world.

(6) Contradiction and Crisis: In both Marx’s and Bourdieu’s writings, contradiction and crisis are considered as indivisible aspects of the social world. Regardless of whether – following Marx – we focus on the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production, or – following Bourdieu – we examine the contradiction between the orthodox discourses of dominant groups and the heterodox discourses of dominated groups, we cannot make sense of material and symbolic revolutions without recognising that structural and ideological
contradictions, which can lead to small-scale and large-scale social crises, are major driving forces of historical development.

(7) Anti-Idealism: As critical thinkers who are committed to the empirical investigation of social reality, both Marx and Bourdieu are deeply suspicious of philosophical idealism. The presuppositions underlying Marx’s critique of German idealism are omnipresent in Bourdieu’s critique of European idealism: Kant’s transcendental account of reason and taste; Derrida’s merely philosophical, and hence ultimately scholastic, attack on logocentrism; Foucault’s obsession with free-floating épistèmes; Habermas’s romantic belief in the socio-ontological preponderance of communicative action in the lifeworld; or Austin’s meticulous study of language, which overestimates the power of words and underestimates the power of social roles. All of these philosophical projects are illustrative of scholastic attempts to study cognitive, discursive, or linguistic forces of human reality regardless of their socio-historical determinacy.

(8) Science: Just as Marx rejects a facile utopianism in the name of science, Bourdieu has little patience with postmodern relativism, insisting that a genuinely sociological study of human reality requires a scientific analysis of social relationality. From this perspective, neither ideal worlds, in which ‘anything is possible’, nor rainbow worlds, in which ‘anything goes’, contribute much – if anything – to the scientific world, in which ‘everything is to be questioned’. Neither the Idealpolitik of utopian reason nor the Provokationspolitik of cynical reason can play a constructive role in the Realpolitik of scientific reason.

(9) Theory and Practice: For both Marx and Bourdieu, theorising for the sake of theorising can only lead to self-sufficient and pointless forms of knowledge production. Marx regards theory as an instrument that can become a material force when absorbed and mobilised by the masses, and Bourdieu considers sociology as a normative tool that can and should be used not only to undermine the disempowering effects of social domination but also to realise the empowering potentials of social emancipation.

Bourdieu and Marx (II)

The third chapter, ‘From Marx to Bourdieu: The Limits of the Structuralism of Practice’, was originally written in French by Bruno Karsenti and was translated into English by Simon Susen. It ties in with Bridget Fowler’s conviction that the impact of Marx’s historical materialism on Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism cannot be overestimated. As the chapter’s title suggests, Marxian thought can be regarded as an integral element of the Bourdieusian project. Thus, in order to make sense of the presuppositional underpinnings
of the latter, we need to remind ourselves of the philosophical premises of the former. In relation to Bourdieu, the socio-ontological significance of these philosophical premises manifests itself in three of Marx’s key concerns: first, in his concern with anthropological distinctiveness, which is rooted in humans’ capacity to produce their own – materially constituted and symbolically mediated – means of subsistence; second, in his concern with anthropological contradictions, particularly those derived from the structural division between producers and non-producers; and, third, in his concern with anthropological development, which is inconceivable without the gradual differentiation between material labour and intellectual labour. Inspired by Marx’s oeuvre, the whole point of Bourdieu’s project is to replace the ‘game of theory’ with the ‘reality of practice’. In the ‘game of theory’, the act of critical reflection is treated as independent of, and removed from, the empirical constitution of human life. By contrast, in the ‘reality of practice’, the act of critical reflection is experienced as both dependent upon and embedded within the relational production of social existence.

With the relational production of cultural life forms in mind, Karsenti provides a detailed analysis, on a number of levels, of the cornerstones of Bourdieu’s structuralism of practice. Three levels of comparison between Marx and Bourdieu are particularly important. First, just as Marx insists upon the interwovenness of the material and the symbolic dimensions of social life, Bourdieu invites us to overcome the – arguably artificial and, in some respects, counterproductive – antinomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches in the social sciences. Second, just as from a Marxian perspective the point is not only to interpret but also to transform the world, from a Bourdieusian perspective we need to move from the ‘logic of theory’ to the ‘logic of practice’ in order to account for our ineluctable situatedness within, rather than our imaginary detachment from, the world. And, third, just as in Marx we can find an unambiguous attempt to conceive of human consciousness in terms of social determinacy derived from the physical organisation of the world, in Bourdieu we are confronted with the task of shifting from the imaginary of cognitive detachment, celebrated in scholastic forms of philosophy, to the reality of bodily engagement, explored in reflexive forms of sociology. Hence, socio-analysis – as advocated by Bourdieu – is a form of sociological psychoanalysis, compelling us to comprehend the biographical condition of human individuality in relation to the historical condition of human society: every time we seek to throw ourselves at society by virtue of individual agency, society has already thrown itself at us by virtue of its relational determinacy. In fact, the ‘belatedness’ of the human condition explains the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of human practices: our physical immersion in reality necessarily precedes our material and symbolic actions upon society.
Crucial to the paradigmatic shift from the scholastic illusion of ‘cognitive detachment’ to the critical reflection upon ‘bodily engagement’ is a normative issue: if we recognise that, as bodily beings, we are not only exposed to but also immersed in the structural contradictions of society, then we need to accept that the material and symbolic divisions by which we are surrounded are sources of separation between people that exist as classificatory schemes within people. Put differently, positional separations, which divide the social universe into competing groups and fields, manifest themselves in dispositional schemes of perception and appreciation, which impose themselves as quasi-naturalised resources upon all historically mediated forms of human action. To the extent that the positional divisions that exist in our society permeate the dispositional schemes that exist in our bodies, the structural contradictions that pervade the normative world have the power to colonise the corporeal apparatus that underlies our subjective world. There is no such thing as an innocent subject, for our inevitable immersion in the world compels us to internalise the contradictions of the world. Before we can create subversive forms of reflexivity and invent transformative modes of agency, we need to face up to the predominance of our bodily constituted complicity with established patterns of ideological and behavioural normativity.

**Bourdieu and Durkheim**

In the fourth chapter, ‘Durkheim and Bourdieu: The Common Plinth and its Cracks’, written in French by Loïc Wacquant and translated into English by Tarik Wareh, we move from Marx to another key figure in classical sociology whose writings have had an enormous impact on Bourdieu’s work: Émile Durkheim. Rather than providing a sterile comparison between Durkheim and Bourdieu, and far from suggesting that Bourdieusian sociology represents a merely Durkheimian endeavour, Wacquant, whilst acknowledging the eclectic underpinnings of Bourdieu’s work, offers a systematic and intellectually challenging account of four presuppositional pillars upon which both Durkheimian and Bourdieusian sociology are based. These four pillars, which according to Wacquant are omnipresent in the works of both Durkheim and Bourdieu, can be described as follows: (1) the attachment to rationalism, which manifests itself in the conviction that scientific knowledge can provide us with the conceptual and methodological tools that allow for a critical analysis of the social world; (2) the defence of the undividedness of social science, which is expressed in the categorical refusal of theoreticism; (3) the commitment to recognising the intimate link between sociology and historiography, which is articulated in the study of the socio-historical constitution of human existence; and (4) the recourse to ethnology as a privileged device for ‘indirect
experimentation”, which is motivated by the idea that ethnological analysis can serve as a legitimate experimental technique of sociological investigation. As stated above, Wacquant argues that the aforementioned concerns represent four normative pillars in the writings of both Durkheim and Bourdieu, particularly with regard to their respective conceptions of knowledge. According to both thinkers, sociological knowledge is by definition rationally motivated, scientifically oriented, historically informed, and ethnologically sensitive. Nevertheless, as Wacquant demonstrates, their epistemological frameworks not only converge but also diverge at various points.

(1) Both Durkheim and Bourdieu insist upon the epistemological gap between ordinary and scientific knowledge. Yet, whereas Durkheim seeks to free sociology from all presuppositional knowledge based on common sense, Bourdieu aims to construct an enlarged conception of the social, capable of accounting for the fact that insofar as the very possibility of society rests upon the homological interplay between field and habitus, the construction of a critical sociology depends on its capacity to explore the functional interplay between scientific types of reflexivity and ordinary forms of knowability.

(2) Both thinkers highlight the normative potentials of social science, which are epitomised in a threefold refusal: (i) the refusal of worldly seductions, (ii) the refusal of confinement within the scholarly microcosm, and (iii) the refusal of disciplinary fragmentation and theoricism. Paradoxically, however, the two scholars are both united and divided by this tripartite concern. (i) For Durkheim, the scientificity of sociology emanates from its purposive capacity to be guided by the rational search for objectivity. For Bourdieu, on the other hand, the scientificity of sociology derives from its contemplative capacity to embrace a self-critical position of reflexivity. (ii) Whereas Durkheim stresses the impersonal, and thus allegedly disinterested, constitution of scientific knowledge, Bourdieu emphasises the relational, and hence ultimately interest-laden, constitution of scientific knowledge. (iii) Durkheim opposes the scholastic celebration of theoricism by reminding us of the objective prevalence of social facts. Bourdieu, by contrast, seeks to move from the ‘logic of theory’ to the ‘logic of practice’ by pointing at the powerful mystery of social acts.

(3) According to both Durkheim and Bourdieu, it is the task of social scientists to uncover the historical constitution of the human condition. The spatiotemporal contingency of the human condition can be illustrated on the basis of three forms of historicisation: (i) the historicisation of human agency, (ii) the historicisation of human society, and (iii) the historicisation of human knowability. Yet, again – and again somewhat paradoxically – the two thinkers are not only united but also divided by this tripartite concern. (i) From a Durkheimian perspective, the creative power of human agency tends to be superseded by the constraining power of social factuality. From a Bourdieusian
perspective, however, the omnipresence of social factuality can be challenged by the unfolding of human agency. (ii) According to Durkheimian parameters, the preponderance of objectivity over subjectivity pervades the functional determinacy of every society. According to Bourdieusian parameters, it is the homology between positionally structured realms of objectivity and dispositionally constituted forms of subjectivity which permeates the relational determinacy of every society. (iii) In the Durkheimian universe, the validity of scientific knowledge hinges upon its objective capacity to rise above its own historicity. In the Bourdieusian universe, the validity of scientific knowledge rests upon its reflexive capacity to face up to its own historicity.

(4) Both Durkheim and Bourdieu favour a posteriori over a priori knowledge in that they are committed to the ethnological, rather than the logocentric, study of the social world; and both prefer a fortiori over arbitrary knowledge in that they are committed to scientific, rather than speculative, forms of reasoning. Yet, their respective conceptions of ethnologically informed validity also differ substantially from each other: whereas for Durkheim social-scientific research is oriented towards the discovery of irrefutable generalities that underlie the functioning of society, for Bourdieu social-scientific research cannot dispense with categorical openness to the potential refutability of all explanatory categories. In light of the above reflections we are obliged to recognise that, as Wacquant indicates in the title of his chapter, the common plinth beneath Durkheim and Bourdieu has significant cracks.

Bourdieu and Weber

Bourdieu was interviewed on several occasions in his career, and by now most of these interviews have been published and translated into English. The fifth chapter contains one that has not been previously translated into, let alone published in, English. This interview, conducted by Franz Schultheis and Andreas Pfeuffer, was published in German (see Bourdieu, 2000) one year after it took place in a café on Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris in the spring of 1999. The interview was originally conducted in French, and we are grateful to Stephan Egger, the translator of the German publication, for providing us with both the original (French) audio version and the published (German) translation.

The title of this chapter anticipates the thematic focus of the interview: ‘With Weber Against Weber: In Conversation With Pierre Bourdieu’. It is commonly accepted that some of the key elements of Marxian, Durkheimian, Weberian, and – to some extent – Simmelian sociology can be considered cornerstones of Bourdieusian thought. It is often suggested, however, that there is an imbalance between these ‘classical’ approaches in terms of their respective
influence on the development of Bourdieu’s oeuvre. More specifically, there is a pronounced tendency in the literature to presume or, in some cases, to demonstrate that both Marxian and Durkheimian sociology had a particularly strong impact on Bourdieu’s work (see, for example, chapters 2, 3, and 4 in this volume). Yet, in comparison to the previous two influences, the impact that Weberian sociology had on Bourdieu remains not only widely underestimated but also to a significant extent underexplored.

This interview, hitherto largely unknown in the Anglophone world of social science, permits and indeed compels us to challenge the notion that Marx and Durkheim can be regarded as the ‘primary’ classical influences on Bourdieu’s work, and that consequently Weber plays a somewhat ‘secondary’ role in his oeuvre. The elaborate responses given by Bourdieu in this interview illustrate not only that he had a far-reaching appreciation of Weber’s writings, but also that Weberian sociology can be considered a pierre angulaire of the entire edifice of Bourdieusian thought. The interview covers a wide range of topics and touches upon issues related to some of Bourdieu’s deepest concerns and convictions. The key assertions made in the interview shall be summarised here, somewhat provocatively, in Eleven Theses on Bourdieu:

1. The chief defect of most hitherto existing forms of materialism in France (that of Althusser included) is the disregard of Weber. Weber was not taken seriously by French Marxists because he was largely perceived as a conservative defender of ‘methodological individualism’ and ‘bourgeois philosophy’.

2. The question whether objective truth can be attributed to scientific thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Bourdieu makes this point clear when affirming that ‘[a]t the end of the day, the important thing is the research itself, that is, the research on the subject matter itself’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 117). In order to embark upon the study of society we need to engage with the reality of human practices.

3. The orthodox materialist doctrine concerning changing circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed through both material and symbolic struggles over the monopoly of legitimate power over worldly and sacred goods and that if, in principle, nothing ‘must remain as it was’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 121, italics added), it is essential to socialise and resocialise the socialisers themselves. If we can find one categorical imperative in Bourdieusian thought it is the notion that social arrangements are relatively arbitrary. Social reality ‘does not have to be – that is, it is not necessarily – like this or like that’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 121, italics in original). From Bourdieu’s constructivist perspective, ‘great philosophical revolutions’ cannot be dissociated from ‘great social revolutions’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 120). The ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity’
(Marx, 2000/1977 [1845]: 172) indicates that social actors cannot escape the homology between objectivity and subjectivity. They cannot step out of the socio-ontological interdependence between field-specific positions and habitus-specific dispositions. The homological interplay between objectivity and subjectivity underlies the construction of spatiotemporally specific arrangements in every society.

4 Weber starts from the fact of the religious permeation of the world, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. Given that, throughout history, the constitution of society appears to be characterised by the intimate intertwinement of religious and secular modes of relating to and making sense of the world, a comprehensive social science needs to develop both a ‘political economy of religion’ and a ‘critical anthropology of religion’. The former does justice to the fact that ‘the symbolic’ and ‘the material’ are two interdependent dimensions of the social world; the latter accounts for the fact that, in the long run, the social world can only survive as an enchanted – or at least quasi-enchanted – world. It is the meaning-donating function of religion which explains its pervasive power to deal with existential questions. As long as existential dilemmas are part of the human condition, religious – or at least quasi-religious – beliefs and practices will be an integral part of social life.

5 Orthodox Marxists, not satisfied with abstract thinking, want concrete action; but they do not conceive of either abstract thinking or concrete action as field-specific and habitus-dependent practices. Given the polycentric nature of complex societies, we need to recognise that different ways of making sense of and acting upon the world are positionally defined ways of being immersed in and dispositionally constituted ways of relating to the world. Polycentric social settings require centreless social theories.

6 Every human being is situated in and constituted by an ensemble of social relations. In order to understand both the positional and the dispositional determinacy of human actors, we need to capture the relations between them, for it is the contingent relations between, rather than the universal properties of, social actors which determine how they are situated in and relate to the world.

7 If the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social product and if every religion emerges under particular social conditions, then it must be the task of a critical sociology of religion to shed light on both the material and the symbolic mechanisms that contribute to either the reproduction or the transformation of religious fields. Religious fields, however, are to be conceived of not only as relations of feelings and meanings, but also as relations of power: a ‘political economy of religion’ needs to shed light on ‘the stakes in the struggles over the monopoly of the legitimate power over the sacred goods’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 119, italics removed) in order to understand that the power-laden nature of material relations
is impregnated with the interest-laden nature of symbolic relations, and vice versa.

8. To recognise that all social life is essentially practical and that all human practices are essentially social means to acknowledge that society is practically lived. It is because people have to live with one another that they encounter one another, and it is because they are situated in the world that they are invested in it.

9. The highest point of orthodox materialism – that is, of materialism that does not comprehend the multilayered complexity of practical activity – is the reduction of sociorelational realities to socioeconomic ontologies. Yet, the material and the symbolic are two irreducible components of the social world. There has never been a society whose mode of production could have been disentangled from its mode of signification, since all coexistentially established human arrangements are composed of materially constituted and symbolically mediated social relations.

10. The standpoint of dogmatic philosophy is scholastic purism; the standpoint of critical sociology is reflexive eclecticism. To engage in the critical exercise of reflexive eclecticism requires resisting the temptation of relying on intellectual inward-lookingness and thereby embarking upon a journey of transdisciplinary outward-lookingness. No tradition can possibly emerge without drawing on previously existing traditions. The success of a critical sociology depends on its capacity to overcome counterproductive boundaries between artificially divided epistemologies.

11. Social actors reproduce the world in various ways; the point is to recognise their capacity to transform it. Just as one cannot be situated in the world without perceiving the pervasive power of social constraints, ‘one cannot make any progress without a respectful sense of freedom’ (Bourdieu et al., 2011 [2000]: 117).

### Bourdieu and Nietzsche

In the sixth chapter, ‘Bourdieu and Nietzsche: Taste as a Struggle’, Keijo Rahkonen offers an insightful comparison between Bourdieusian and Nietzschean thought, which fills a significant gap in the literature. Rahkonen’s analysis is divided into five sections.

In the first section, Rahkonen examines Bourdieu’s conception of taste. It is worth mentioning that Bourdieu was one of the first thinkers to provide a sociological account of taste. Although influential scholars such as Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Thorstein Veblen, and Norbert Elias clearly touched upon the concept of taste in their writings, none of them systematically explored its sociological significance. Hence, as Rahkonen – borrowing an expression from Loïc Wacquant – points out, Bourdieu’s sociological account of taste, an elaborate version of which can be found in Distinction, can be described
as a ‘Copernican revolution in the study of taste’. Several philosophical accounts of taste – particularly those associated with Kantian thought – are based on the assumption that the nature of taste is transcendentally, and thus transhistorically, determined. By contrast, most sociological accounts of taste – notably those associated with Bourdieusian thought – put forward the idea that the constitution of taste is socially, and hence spatiotemporally, determined. Bourdieu differentiates between three different ‘universes of taste’: the realm of ‘pure taste’, oriented towards the consumption of ‘highbrow culture’ and mainly acquired by members of the dominant classes; the realm of ‘average taste’, directed towards the consumption of ‘middlebrow culture’ and particularly common amongst members of the middle classes; and the realm of ‘popular taste’, aimed at the consumption of ‘lowlbrow culture’ and spread amongst members of the lower classes. In other words, the realm of human taste is impregnated with the relationally defined interplay between positionally structured forms of objectivity and dispositionally structured forms of subjectivity, which underlies the functioning of every stratified society.

In the second section, Rahkonen examines Bourdieu’s critique of Kant’s conception of taste. The Bourdieusian sociology of taste represents a radical critique of the Kantian philosophy of taste. From a Bourdieusian perspective, Kant’s three famous critiques – the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of Judgement – are deeply flawed for failing to take into consideration the social conditioning of reason and judgement. Kant’s scholastic quest for aesthetic transcendentality disregards the ineluctable predominance of social relationality in the cultural construction of reality. If there is anything transcendental about the realm of aesthetics it is the fact that the transcendent itself is socially constituted. Rather than speculating about the analytical purity of theoretical reason, the moral universality of practical reason, or the transcendentual lawfulness of aesthetic judgement, we need to examine the social determinacy of subjectivity in order to understand why our perception and appreciation of reality cannot escape the omnipresent power of human relationality. An interest-laden society generates interest-driven actors. How we perceive, appreciate, and act upon the world depends on how we are situated in the world in relation to others. Hence, taste is a matter not of disembodied or transhistorical subjectivity but of social determinacy.

In the third section, Rahkonen explores Bourdieu’s conceptions of taste and ‘ressentiment’ in relation to power. From a Bourdieusian perspective, struggles over taste are struggles over power. If there is one truth about taste, it is that both its constitution and its meaning are constantly at stake in society. If taste is so powerful because it makes us perceive, appreciate, and act upon the world in particular ways, then neither access to nor cultivation of a particular taste can be dissociated from inclusion in or exclusion from symbolically
mediated forms of social power. If we accept that no worldly situated subject can possibly escape the endogenous power of an exogenously determined apparatus of perception, appreciation, and action, then the classificatory schemes acquired by habitus-specific dispositions cannot be divorced from social struggles over field-specific positions. Given the interest-laden nature of our immersion in the social world, a truly reflexive sociology needs to be critical of itself: of its own schemes of classification, of its own programmes of perception, of its own agendas of appreciation; in short, as Rahkonen puts it, of its own ‘ressentiments’.

The concern with the nature of ‘ressentiment’ leads Rahkonen, in the fourth section, to reflect upon Nietzsche’s conception of taste. However one interprets the role of the concept of taste in Nietzsche’s writings, there is little doubt that, from a Nietzschean perspective, not only ‘power’ and ‘truth’ but also ‘power’ and ‘taste’ are intimately interrelated: just as ‘the will to power’ cannot be disentangled from ‘the will to truth’, ‘the will to power’ cannot be dissociated from ‘the will to taste’. What we consider to be either right or wrong is often what we like to be either right or wrong. The categorising powerfulness of taste is intertwined with the stratifying tastelessness of power. In Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra we are reminded that ‘all life is dispute over taste and tasting’. For, as we may add, ‘all taste is dispute over life and living’.

And this is where, in the final section of Rahkonen’s chapter, Bourdieu enters the stage again – this time together with Nietzsche. What, then, can we learn from bringing Nietzsche and Bourdieu closer together? Following Rahkonen, one of the most obvious features they have in common is their anti-Kantianism: both are opposed to Kant’s arguably sterile and disembodied account of the subject in general and of taste in particular. To be precise, Nietzsche and Bourdieu share six anti-Kantian assumptions. First, taste is interest-laden: the symbolic differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of taste emanates from the structural differentiation between dominant and dominated social groups, whose taken-for-grantedness of habitus-specific dispositions is permeated by the interest-ladenness of field-specific positions. Second, taste is perspective-laden: our perception of the world is contingent upon our position in the world. Third, taste is context-laden: before we can make sense of the world, we have to be situated in the world; and before we can develop a taste for the world, the world has to shape our taste. Fourth, taste is culture-laden: human subjectivity cannot escape the spatiotemporal determinacy of the intrinsic relationality which permeates all coexistential forms of human objectivity. Fifth, taste is body-laden: all socially acquired dispositions are bodily located traces of quasi-naturalised conditions. Sixth, taste is power-laden: the stratifying tastelessness of power nourishes the categorising powerfulness of taste. The tasteless empowerment of the powerfully tasteful goes hand in hand with the
tasteless disempowerment of the powerfully tasteless. In short, the Wille zum Geschmack and the Wille zur Macht constitute two integral components of our Wille zur Welt.

Bourdieu and Elias

In the seventh chapter, Bowen Paulle, Bart van Heerikhuizen, and Mustafa Emirbayer discuss Bourdieu’s somewhat ambiguous relation to the oeuvre of one of the most influential thinkers in modern sociology: Norbert Elias. The chapter, succinctly entitled ‘Elias and Bourdieu’, examines both points of convergence and points of divergence between these two thinkers. The authors insist, however, that such a comparative endeavour is motivated not by the pursuit of intellectual speculation but by the convictions that we can gain fruitful insights from bringing Bourdieu and Elias closer together and that we can learn important lessons from cross-fertilising their approaches. Thus, as the authors emphasise at the beginning of their chapter, their point is not only to shed light on the similarities and differences between Elias and Bourdieu, but also, and more importantly, to demonstrate that their perspectives yield a more comprehensive and more powerful sociological vision when considered together rather than separately.

The authors suggest that we can identify a number of reasons why the various affinities and commonalities between Elias and Bourdieu have not been a subject of debate in contemporary Anglophone sociology. First, there is the significant influence of diverging historical contexts: Elias’s seminal works were produced in the years culminating in the Second World War; all of Bourdieu’s influential works were produced a quarter-century after the Second World War. Second, there is the problem of an obvious language barrier: Elias’s main works were written in German, whereas most of Bourdieu’s oeuvre was written in French, and the English translations of their respective writings are not always of the most reliable quality. Third, there is the difference in sociological emphasis: while Elias studied long-term historical trends and developments spanning several centuries, Bourdieu focused on dynamics of social reproduction in particular historical contexts. Finally, there is the dividing question of the role of sociological knowledge: according to Elias, sociological knowledge is too specialised to have a significant use value in political matters; according to Bourdieu, it is the normative task of the reflexive sociologist not only to examine the social world but also to have a constructive and emancipatory impact on its development. There are multiple reasons why the idea of bringing the works of Elias and Bourdieu closer together is far from obvious. There are, however, also a number of striking affinities and commonalities between these two thinkers. Both were heavily influenced by continental
sociologists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, as well as by continental philosophers such as Husserl, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Both fought their way through the power-laden environment of academic institutions. And both had experienced and criticised the tangible consequences of social processes of inclusion and exclusion. Hence there are profound intellectual, biographical, and ideological similarities between the two thinkers. With both the differences and the similarities between Elias and Bourdieu in mind, the chapter explores key points of convergence and divergence between them by focusing on three concepts that feature centrally in their writings: habitus, field, and power.

How is this conceptual triad deployed by Bourdieu? We must first remind ourselves that, as Bourdieu insists, the notions of habitus, field, and capital are to be regarded as interdependent concepts in his architecture of society. In other words, habitus, field, and capital constitute three societal cornerstones, which cannot exist independently of each other. A socially competent actor is equipped with a habitus, immersed in different fields, and able to acquire different forms of capital. Regardless of whether we look at Bourdieu’s earlier or later work, the ontological interdependence between these three cornerstones of the social is omnipresent in his writings: together, the dispositionally structured apparatus of the habitus, the positionally structured spaces of social fields, and the compositionally structured resources of capital form the relationally structured realm of society.

How is this conceptual triad deployed by Elias? In Elias’s writings, habitus, field, and power are also conceived of as interdependent, but what meanings does he ascribe to these categories? The defining feature of a field, in the Eliasian sense, is that it describes a social space generated by relational dynamics with constantly shifting balances and imbalances of power. According to this view, a field is composed of chains or webs of interdependent actors and actions. Given the inescapable preponderance of relationally constructed fields in social life, all our actions are inevitably caught up in dynamic chains of interdependence and constantly shifting networks of power. One of the interesting features of the habitus is that its internally located and externally materialised steering mechanisms are the embodied manifestation of the fact that micro- and macro-sociological dynamics are intimately intertwined. Thus, the pervasive power of Elias’s famous ‘civilising process’ is expressed in its capacity to shape the development of society by permeating every actor’s subjectivity and thereby establish itself as a habitus-colonising reality. Yet, as Elias insists, the development of people’s habitus often lags behind the transformation of social structures; and this is one of the reasons why macro-societal transformations normally need an enormous amount of time to insert themselves in people’s day-to-day habits. The efficacy of social power consists in its capacity to assert the presence of its powerfulness as a subtle form of quotidian
taken-for-grantedness. What is interesting from an Eliasian perspective, however, is that power is about both hierarchy and interdependence, competition and cooperation, subversion and compliance: not only do we all depend on other people, but we all depend on people who are objectively either more or less powerful than we are. In brief, to be immersed in social relations means to participate in the construction of power relations.

On the basis of these reflections, it seems justified to suggest that the works of Bourdieu and Elias are not as far apart as they may appear at first glance and that the conceptual triad of habitus, field, and power features centrally in their writings. In order to illustrate the tangible relevance of Bourdieu’s and Elias’s respective conceptual tools and sociological frameworks, Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer use the example of sport, highlighting the fact that Bourdieu and Elias were the only influential sociologists of the twentieth century to take sport seriously and to regard it as a central and indeed illuminating element of modern social life. The authors argue that if we look at Bourdieu’s and Elias’s respective approaches to sport, it becomes obvious that there is an uncanny and far-reaching similarity between them. Above all, they share the view that sport can be seen as a social field in which emotional self-control and bodily self-discipline play a particularly important role in the mobilisation of resources, the normalisation of rules, the development of abilities, and the competition between actors. As such, the field of sport is a social field par excellence, because all social fields are relationally constructed and normatively codified spaces of possibilities with specific modes of functioning and competitive struggles over power. To suggest that the field is in the habitus because the habitus is in the field is to assume that the game is in the player because the player is in the game. The power of social actors depends on their practical capacity to determine not only the outcome but also the rules of the game.

**Bourdieu and Adorno**

In the eighth chapter, Simon Susen examines the transformation of culture in modern society by drawing upon the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Theodor W. Adorno. The chapter, entitled ‘Bourdieu and Adorno on the Transformation of Culture in Modern Society: Towards a Critical Theory of Cultural Production’, comprises four sections: the first provides some general reflections on the concept of culture; the second focuses on Bourdieu’s analysis of culture, particularly his interest in the social functioning of the ‘cultural economy’; the third centres on Adorno’s analysis of culture, notably his concern with the social power of the ‘culture industry’; and the fourth offers a comparison
between Bourdieu and Adorno in relation to their respective accounts of the transformation of culture in modern society.

(1) With regard to the concept of culture, it is important to keep in mind that we can distinguish at least three interrelated meanings of culture: culture can be used as a sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic category. As a sociological category, the concept of culture refers to a specific form of life produced and reproduced by a given group of people. As such, it describes a spatiotemporally contingent mode of human coexistence: just as different life forms produce different cultures, different cultures produce different life forms. As a philosophical category, the concept of culture can be conceived of as a human ideal. As such, it designates a civilisational achievement of advanced societies, whose progressive development is determined by the transcendental power of ‘the mind’ or ‘the spirit’ and embodied in increasingly differentiated social institutions: the evolution of every society depends on the education of its members. As an aesthetic category, the concept of culture denotes a distinctively human expression of artistic creativity. As such, culture is a body of artistic and intellectual work and the vehicle for human creativity par excellence: culture is both a medium and an outcome of the distinctively human capacity to attach meaning to the world through the expressive power of artistic and intellectual production. In brief, the normative, purposive, and creative aspects of human life are realised through the sociological, philosophical, and aesthetic potentials of culture.

(2) Given the paradigmatic importance ascribed to the study of culture in his writings, Bourdieu’s sociological theory can be regarded as a cultural theory. From a Bourdieusian perspective, there is no general theory of society without a general theory of culture. When examining Bourdieu’s account of culture in general and his analysis of the cultural economy in particular, three social processes are particularly important: the differentiation, commodification, and classification of culture. (i) The differentiation of culture in the modern world manifests itself most significantly in the gradual separation between ‘the field of restricted cultural production’ and ‘the field of large-scale cultural production’. Whereas the former – created and legitimated by the société distinguée – is destined for a public of producers of distinguished cultural goods, the latter – reproduced and legitimated by the société massifiée – is destined for a public of consumers of mainstream cultural goods. (ii) The commodification of culture in the modern world indicates that, under capitalism, symbolic goods have a two-faced reality: they have both a cultural use value and an economic exchange value. The degree of commodification of culture reflects the degree of colonisation of society by the market. The commodification of culture is problematic in that it reinforces the primacy of form over function, the prevalence of the mode of representation over the object of representation, the predominance of the signifier over the signified, and thus the preponderance of
appearance over substance. (iii) The classification of culture in modern society illustrates that symbolic struggles are power struggles over the distribution of legitimate resources. Legitimately situated actors are legitimately classified and legitimately classifying actors, able to mobilise the cultural resources of their subjectivity, which they acquire through their positionally determined and dispositionally mediated exposure to society. Patterns of cultural consumption need to generate patterns of aesthetic perception and appreciation in order to produce and reproduce patterns of social legitimation.

(3) It is difficult to overemphasise the complexity of Adorno’s analysis of the transformation of culture in modern society. Yet, notwithstanding the complexity of his account, it is obvious that if there is one concept that features centrally in Adorno’s social theory in general and in his cultural theory in particular, it is the notion of the culture industry. From an Adornian perspective, the rise of the culture industry is symptomatic of the changing nature of culture under late capitalism. Inessence, the transformation of culture in modern society is reflected in three social processes: the heteronomisation, commodification, and standardisation of culture. (i) The heteronomisation of culture in the modern world is reflected in the fact that culture, although it never ceases to be an irreplaceable ‘source of artistic creativity’, is primarily used as a ‘vehicle of systemic functionality’. In the totally administered world, which is mainly driven by instrumental rationality, culture is converted into an integrationist weapon of social domination. (ii) The commodification of culture in the modern world is illustrated in the fact that culture, whose true purpose is ‘purposefulness without a purpose’, becomes degraded to an existence oriented towards ‘purposelessness for the purposes of the market’. Under late capitalism, even the most autonomous spheres of society can be heteronomised by the market. (iii) The standardisation of culture in the modern world suggests that we live in an increasingly synchronised and synchronising society in which the main function of culture is to serve as a ‘machine of reproductive sociality’, rather than as a ‘realm of transformative individuality’. For, under late capitalism, the culture industry succeeds in imposing its systemic imperatives on the whole of society, thereby forcing culture to wear the standardised corset of the standardising market and transforming social entertainment, rather than social critique, into one of the main legitimating pillars of the social order.

(4) Although there are substantial differences between Bourdieusian and Adornian thought, the two perspectives share a number of fundamental assumptions about the nature and role of culture in modern society. As demonstrated in the final section of this chapter, the two approaches converge on at least five levels. (i) Given their concern with the relationship between culture and economy, both accounts shed light on the dynamic mechanisms underlying the commodification of culture in modern society: advanced
societies have developed omnipresent cultural economies and powerful culture industries. (ii) Determined to uncover the relationship between culture and domination, both accounts explore the interest-laden nature of the systemic functionalisation of culture in modern society: every economy of symbolic goods and cultural commodities is embedded in an economy of social power. (ii) Drawing our attention to the relationship between culture and legitimacy, both accounts remind us of the stratifying pervasiveness that underpins the classification of culture in modern society: struggles over cultural classification are struggles impregnated with social patterns of ideological legitimation. (iii) In light of the intimate relationship between culture and history, both accounts insist upon the spatiotemporal determinacy of every form of cultural specificity: culture is never forever. (v) Convinced that critical sociologists need to confront the normative task of reflecting upon the relationship between culture and emancipation, both accounts permit us to make sense not only of the disempowering consequences but also of the empowering potentials of the transformation of culture in modern society: emancipatory societies are inconceivable without emancipatory forms of culture.

Bourdieu and Honneth

In the ninth chapter, ‘The Grammar of an Ambivalence’, Mauro Basaure examines Bourdieu’s influence on the critical theory developed by Axel Honneth. Basaure’s main thesis is that Honneth’s relation to Bourdieu is marked by a profound ambivalence: on the one hand, Bourdieu’s work plays a pivotal role in Honneth’s reformulation of critical theory, particularly regarding the view that social struggles are a motor of historical development; on the other hand, Honneth is deeply critical of Bourdieu’s approach, accusing him of failing to account for the normative constitution of social life and of putting forward an overly pessimistic and essentially utilitarian conception of social action. In other words, while Honneth and Bourdieu converge in conceiving of social relations as power relations, Honneth criticises Bourdieu for not paying sufficient attention to the meaning-laden normativity that allows for the interactional functioning of society. Basaure proceeds in four steps: first, he presents the cornerstones of Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition; second, he aims to explain why most commentators tend to ignore Honneth’s sympathetic reading of Bourdieu; third, he analyses the impact of Bourdieusian thought on Honneth’s theory of recognition; and, finally, he explores the common ground between Honnethian and Bourdieusian thought, in particular with regard to the role that Honneth and Bourdieu ascribe to struggles for recognition in their respective approaches to the social.
With regard to the first task, Basaure distinguishes three axes in Honneth’s theory of the struggle for recognition: (i) a moral-sociological explicative axis, (ii) a historico-philosophical reconstructive axis, and (iii) a political-sociological axis. The first axis reflects the conceptual effort to account for moral motivations behind social actions (the micro-level of intersubjective relations based on reciprocal recognition processes); the second axis is concerned with wider historical processes of moral development (the macro-level of societal relations based on collective learning processes); and the third axis captures the political nature of social struggles and the ways in which they can contribute to the normative construction of antagonistic collectives (the normative level of social relations based on contestatory processes). Central to Honneth’s theoretical framework is the assumption that all three axes have a moral dimension. Put differently, social struggles are by definition moral struggles, for every struggle over the constitution of society is concerned with the constitution of normativity. This is precisely where Honneth’s main critique of Bourdieu comes into play: he accuses Bourdieu of paying insufficient attention to the moral dimension of social struggles.

With regard to the second task, Basaure argues that contemporary theories of social struggles are characterised by a failure to differentiate between two levels of analysis, namely between the ‘why’, which is crucial to the moral-sociological axis, and the ‘how’, which is central to the political-sociological axis. Basaure claims that, in Honneth’s social theory, the former dimension is somewhat overdeveloped, while the latter aspect remains largely underdeveloped. And this appears to be one of the reasons why most commentators tend to ignore Honneth’s sympathetic reading of Bourdieu: Honneth’s emphasis on the normative nature of our daily search for various forms of social recognition seems irreconcilable with Bourdieu’s insistence upon the strategic nature of our engagement in interest-laden forms of social action. However one tries to make sense of the relationship between these two positions, the Bourdieusian use of ‘superstructural’ concepts – such as ‘interest’, ‘illusio’, and ‘doxa’ – in relation to ‘infrastructural’ concepts – such as ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ – suggests that conflicts over social power are driven by struggles over social recognition.

With regard to the third task, Basaure makes the point that, in Honneth’s writings, the political-sociological axis is seen as embedded in the moral-sociological axis. Thus, within the Honnethian framework of social analysis, we are confronted with the assumption that ‘the moral’ is preponderant over ‘the political’: social relations are primarily conceived of as moral and normative, rather than as political and purposive. Central to Honneth’s account of struggles for social recognition (soziale Anerkennung), however, is the profound ambivalence of the subject’s dependence on social esteem
(soziale Wertschätzung): just as the presence of social recognition allows for the empowerment of individuals, the absence of social recognition leads to their disempowerment. Individual or collective experiences that are characterised by feelings of social disrespect (soziale Mißachtung) are indicative of the fragility of human subjectivity: the human dependence on mechanisms of social recognition is so strong that the possibility of individual self-realisation is inconceivable without people’s capacity to be integrated into society by establishing links based on reciprocity and intersubjectivity. Bourdiesian analysis is directly relevant to this moral-sociological explicative axis in that subjects dependent on reciprocal recognition are unavoidably interest-driven: we do not only depend on but we also have an interest in social recognition, because attainment of social esteem is a precondition for sustainable access to social power. Different social groups in different social fields struggle over different forms of social power by mobilising different resources of social recognition. All forms of capital – notably economic, cultural, political, educational, and linguistic capital – acquire social value if, and only if, they are convertible into at least a minimal degree of symbolic capital. The long-term sustainability of every field-specific form of normativity is contingent upon its capacity to obtain sufficient symbolic legitimacy to assert and, if possible, impose its general acceptability.

With regard to the fourth and final task of his chapter, namely the attempt to demonstrate that Bourdiesian thought is crucial to Honneth’s sociology of recognition, Basaure asserts that Honneth has both a ‘broad’ and a ‘dynamic’ conception of social struggle: in the ‘broad’ sense, social struggles range from clearly visible and widely recognised collective movements in the public sphere to largely hidden and hardly problematised forms of conflict in the private sphere; in the ‘dynamic’ sense, social struggles change over time, and so do the ways in which they are discursively represented and politically interpreted. If we account not only for the eclectic but also for the processual nature of social struggles, then we need to accept that social conflicts over material and symbolic power, and the ways in which individual and collective actors make sense or fail to make sense of these conflicts, are constantly changing. Thus, a comprehensive critical theory needs to do justice to both the multifaceted and the dynamic nature of struggles for recognition and thereby shed light on the various ways in which the existential significance of social struggles manifests itself in the constant competition over material and symbolic resources.

**Bourdieu and Religion**

In his commentary on Bourdieu’s engagement with the sociology of religion, Bryan S. Turner offers a comprehensive account of the strengths and weaknesses of Bourdieu’s approach to religion. In essence, the chapter,
which is entitled ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Religion’, is concerned
with five issues: first, the relative decline of religion in the modern world;
second, the apparent revival of religion in the contemporary world; third,
recent attempts to reconcile secular with religious forms of reasoning; fourth,
Bourdieu’s account of religion; and, finally, the ‘new paradigm’ that has
become increasingly influential in recent North American developments in
the sociology of religion.

With regard to the first issue, the relative decline of religion in the
modern world, Turner points out that the secularisation thesis can be
regarded as a central and hitherto largely unquestioned element of classical
sociological discourse. The secularisation thesis is based on the assumption
that secularisation processes in modern societies contain five interrelated
tendencies: industrialisation, differentiation, privatisation, welfarisation,
and rationalisation. (i) The industrialisation of the social system has led
to the weakening of face-to-face ties characteristic of traditional forms of
religiously regulated societies. (ii) The differentiation of the social system into
various coexisting and competing spheres – such as the state, the market,
science, art, and religion – has degraded religion to only one field amongst
other social fields. (iii) The privatisation of the social system has contributed
to the gradual marginalisation of religion to the domestic sphere. (iv) The
welfarisation of the social system – that is, the provision of social welfare
by specialised institutions – has added to a significant improvement of
living standards and contributed to a reduction of both short-term and long-
term risks, undermining people’s dependence on belief in the uncontrollable
power of supernatural forces over empirical reality. (v) The rationalisation
of the social system, driven by the gradual replacement of faith and
superstition by reason and science, has resulted in the shift from the
‘enchanted world’ of traditional societies to the ‘disenchanted world’ of
modern societies.

With regard to the second issue, the apparent revival of religion in the
contemporary world, Turner reminds us that religion has far from disappeared
and that, consequently, in recent years more and more sociologists and
philosophers have concluded that religion needs to be taken seriously. Turner
identifies some of the key developments associated with the revival of religion
in late modern societies: the collapse of organised communism in the early
1990s, the subsequent decline of Marxism-Leninism as a quasi-religious
ideology of the Eastern socialist bloc, the rise of globalisation, and the
worldwide emergence of diasporic communities. Hence, whatever lies at the
‘heart of the heartless world’ in the contemporary context, there is substantial
evidence to suggest that religion has not only survived the transition from
traditional to modern society but that, in late modern society, in various parts
of the world – particularly in America, Africa, and Asia, but also in some
regions of continental Europe – it has expanded and gained increasing powers of adaptation, absorption, and transformation.

With regard to the third issue, concerning recent attempts to reconcile secular with religious forms of reasoning, Turner draws upon the work of Jürgen Habermas, who in his recent writings has made a sustained and vigorous effort to demonstrate that secular and religious citizens are capable of living peacefully side by side and that they are, furthermore, both morally and practically obliged to confront the challenge of establishing a fruitful dialogue between reason and faith. Secularists cannot ignore, let alone marginalise, religious practices and beliefs if they aim to be seriously involved in the construction of pluralistic and multicultural societies; at the same time, religious citizens cannot disregard, let alone demonise, secular ways of life and thought if they seek to be realistically engaged in the construction of maturing and reason-guided societies. Notwithstanding the question of whether, in late modern societies, either ‘believing without belonging’ or ‘belonging without believing’ is the predominant form of religious reproduction, there is little doubt that, in postsecular societies, there can be no ‘reasoning without believing’ just as there can be no ‘believing without reasoning’.

With regard to the fourth issue, Bourdieu’s account of religion, the obvious question to be asked is this: what, if anything, can we learn from Bourdieu’s account of religion? Turner’s answer to this question is, as he admits, somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand, it appears that Bourdieu’s analysis of religion, developed in his small oeuvre of essays on religion, is not particularly insightful and is essentially a synthesis of Max Weber’s sociological and Louis Althusser’s philosophical interpretations of religion; on the other hand, Bourdieu’s conceptual tools – such as habitus, field, and capital – do allow for the construction of a useful analytical framework that allows us to understand the sociological power of religion in terms of embodied practices, rather than in terms of disembodied beliefs. Turner argues that, given its functionalist undertones, Bourdieu’s account of religion is based on a crude combination of the Marxian contention that religion serves as the ‘opium of the people’ used to obtain ideological acceptability, the Weberian notion that religion serves as an ‘instrument of power struggles’ oriented towards the attainment of social legitimacy, and the Althusserian view that religion serves as an ‘ideological vehicle’ mobilised for the control of people’s subjectivity. From a Bourdieusian perspective, then, it is the task of a critical sociology of religion to explore the actual practices and interests of embodied actors situated in religious fields, rather than the formal beliefs and doctrines of disembodied subjects removed from those fields. According to this position, it is the ensemble of social relations which determines the ensemble of social beliefs. Despite Turner’s appreciation of Bourdieu’s approach to religion, he criticises Bourdieu for concentrating almost
exclusively on field-specific positions and habitus-specific dispositions. In other words, he accuses Bourdieu of overestimating the reproductive mechanisms of social determinacy and underestimating the transformative potentials of social agency within religious fields. The argument is underscored by Turner’s disappointment with Bourdieu’s somewhat reductive reading, and partial misrepresentation, of Weber’s sociology of religion.

With regard to the fifth issue, the ‘new paradigm’ prevalent in North American approaches to religion, the author turns his attention to a novel set of assumptions in the contemporary sociology of religion, epitomised by economic interpretations of religion. The shift from the ‘old’ European to the ‘new’ North American paradigm reflects a move away from an emphasis on symbolic and ideological dimensions to an emphasis on economic and pragmatic aspects of religious behaviour in advanced societies. This paradigmatic shift tends to be undertaken by focusing on three dimensions: (i) the resilience of religion in late modern, including secular, societies; (ii) the various social functions of religious and spiritual markets; and (iii) the cross-cultural invariability of religiously grounded demands for meaning. It is well known that Bourdieu was deeply critical of social-scientific approaches based on rational action theories. Nevertheless, somewhat counter-intuitively Turner draws our attention to the fact that there are striking similarities between Bourdieu’s analysis of religious fields and the rational choice model of religious markets: both approaches move within a sociological comfort zone founded on economic concepts such as ‘interests’, ‘stakes’, and ‘competition’. The economy of religious fields is inconceivable without a politics of religious markets. Whichever paradigm we subscribe to, however, we cannot ignore the existence of the functional dialectics of belief and practice: belief can only survive if embedded in and nourished by practice, just as practice can only survive if situated in and motivated by belief. Thus, from a Bourdieusian perspective, the sociology of religion describes another significant area of study that permits and indeed compels us to conceive of the apparent antinomy between ‘the ideological’ and ‘the practical’ as a socio-ontological unity.

**Bourdieu and Habitus**

In the eleventh chapter, ‘Bourdieu’s Sociological Fiction: A Phenomenological Reading of Habitus’, Bruno Frère provides a detailed analysis of Bourdieu’s conception of habitus. Frère points out that just as we need to be aware of the key strengths of Bourdieu’s genetic-structuralist approach, we need to identify its main weaknesses. Hence it is possible to draw on Bourdieu’s approach whilst developing it further and thereby overcoming its most significant shortcomings. Illustrating the complexity inherent in the

(1) With regard to Bourdieu’s account of the ‘homological actor’, Frère remarks that arguably the most influential French sociologist of the late twentieth century has a tendency to privilege the reproductive and mechanical, over the transformative and creative, dimensions of social action. The fact that this is a common view in the literature, not only amongst those who are deeply critical of Bourdieu’s work but also amongst those who sympathise with his approach, seems to indicate that Bourdieusian thought is particularly strong in terms of uncovering social mechanisms of reproduction and domination, but rather weak in terms of explaining social processes of transformation and emancipation. If, however, we are prepared to accept that the human proclivity towards creation and innovation as well as the human capacity of reflection and contemplation constitute integral components of ordinary social life, we are obliged to abandon a determinist view of the social, which fails to account for both the creative and the reflective potentials inherent in every ordinary subject. Although the whole point of Bourdieu’s project is to overcome the counterproductive antinomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches in the social sciences, his account of the ‘homological actor’ seems to suggest that he remains trapped in an objectivist-determinist paradigm of social action. According to this homological view, the dispositional constitution of every social actor is largely determined by the positional constitution of social fields.

(2) Seeking to move beyond Bourdieu’s purportedly determinist conception of the social, Lahire puts forward an alternative model of social action, epitomised in the concept of the ‘plural actor’. As Frère elucidates, Lahire’s alternative approach allows us to account for three key features of subjectivity in complex societies: multiplicity, irreducibility, and autonomy. Multiplicity is a constitutive component of late modern subjectivity in that the diversity of dispositions incorporated by social actors corresponds to the plurality of positions located in social fields. Irreducibility is a pivotal aspect of late modern subjectivity in that the coexistence of various dispositions developed by social actors reflects the complexity of multidimensionally structured schemes of perception and action. Autonomy is an empowering element of late modern subjectivity in that individualist societies create ‘dissonant profiles’ which illustrate that people’s attitudes, tastes, and practices do not necessarily correspond to one overriding (for example, socioeconomically defined)
disposition. In brief, unlike Bourdieu’s ‘homological actor’, conceived of as a largely predictable entity determined by the correspondence between habitus and field, Lahire’s ‘plural actor’ is an essentially unpredictable source of multi- causally determined agency in the fragmented landscape of centreless societies.

(3) In line with Lahire’s insistence upon the multifaceted constitution of the ‘plural actor’, Corcuff puts forward the concept of the ‘dynamic actor’. The most obvious feature of ‘dynamic actors’ is a ‘malleable habitus’, that is, a habitus capable of adjusting itself to the dynamic pace of life to which human actors situated in highly differentiated societies are almost inevitably exposed. As Frère points out, Corcuff’s alternative perspective permits us to make sense of three key features of subjectivity in complex societies: reflexivity, creativity, and adaptability. Actors in complex societies have the potential to develop high degrees of *reflexivity* because the constant exposure to normative complexity requires not only the practical capacity to slip back and forth between different social roles played in particular social fields, but also the critical capacity to convert one’s performative immersion in everyday forms of human agency into an object of reflection when trying to cope with role conflicts generated by the quotidian interactions taking place in differentiated societies. Actors in complex societies have the potential to develop high degrees of *creativity* because, in order to realise themselves through the development of their individuality, they are expected to be both competent carriers and self-determined creators of their identity. Actors in complex societies have the potential to develop high degrees of *adaptability* because, in order to find their individual place in the collective spaces constructed by different communities, they need to develop the ability to adjust to, and function in accordance with, various coexisting and often competing normativities. In short, unlike Bourdieu’s ‘homological actor’, reducible to a largely reproductive element in a power-driven society, Corcuff’s ‘dynamic actor’ is a transformative source of self-critical reflexivity, self-motivated creativity, and self-responsible adaptability in the fluid landscape of freedom-based societies.

(4) With the aim of overcoming the explanatory limitations arising from the philosophical obsession with the allegedly self-determining power of the ‘rational actor’, Bourdieu draws upon the works of phenomenological thinkers, in particular the writings of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to explore the sociological implications of the fact that every social actor is a ‘bodily actor’. By centring his phenomenology on the body, rather than on consciousness, Merleau-Ponty shifts the emphasis from the rationalist concern with the subject’s cognitive processing of and conscious control over the world to the phenomenological preoccupation with the actor’s corporeal immersion in and unconscious absorption of the lifeworld. Regardless
of whether one favours an Aristotelian, a Husserlian, or a Bourdieusian conception of human subjectivity, one has to accept that these perspectives converge in acknowledging that the tangible power of the habitus stems from the dispositional structures which inhabit our bodies: the various positions that we occupy in the external world of society are worthless without the numerous dispositions that we carry within the internal world of our body. To accept the preponderance of the collective over the individual elements that inhabit our subjectivity, of the external over the internal facets that constitute interactional forms of objectivity, and of the unconscious over the conscious dimensions that permeate human reality means to face up to the omnipresence of society. Bourdieu’s aphoristic statement that ‘society is God’ essentially suggests that, as members of humanity, we cannot escape the ubiquity of a relationally defined reality (Bourdieu, 2000 [1997]: 245). Given that we, as bodily entities, are physically exposed to the lawfulness, power-ladenness, and interest-drivenness of human reality, we are obliged to develop the practical capacity to cope with the material and the symbolic struggles over the normative arrangements that shape the development of society. The bodily constitution of the habitus makes the social appear natural to us: we are so used to absorbing, and thereby accepting, the givenness of the way things are that we – as bodily entities, nourished by the immersive power of everyday experience – tend to recognise the relative arbitrariness of social reality only when confronted with the crisis-ladenness of established patterns of normativity.

(5) Inspired by Bourdieu’s account of the ‘homological actor’, Lahire’s notion of the ‘plural actor’, Corcuff’s interest in the ‘dynamic actor’, and Merleau-Ponty’s examination of the ‘bodily actor’, Frère insists that we need to conceive of the human subject also as an ‘imaginative actor’. With reference to the work of Cornelius Castoriadis, Frère introduces the idea of the ‘sociological fiction’ of the habitus: the imaginary institution of society is constantly constructed and reconstructed by the imaginary apparatus of the habitus. Frère’s emphasis on the ‘fictitious’ constitution of the habitus is aimed not at suggesting that the habitus does not actually exist, but at drawing our attention to the fact that the habitus, as a perceptive and projective apparatus, has the power to bring things into being: for us, as perceiving and projecting entities, the normalisation of society is inconceivable without the externalising power of human subjectivity. As ‘imaginative actors’, we literally bring existence into being insofar as we project ourselves into the being of our existence. As Frère seeks to demonstrate in his own studies on social movements, it is by interacting with others that our need for expression about and working upon the world becomes a major resource that we need to mobilise in order to invent and reinvent our place within the world. A sociology that disregards the innovative power of imaginary
creativity cannot account for the developmental power of socio-historical contingency.

**Bourdieu and Language**

In the twelfth chapter, ‘Overcoming Semiotic Structuralism: Language and Habitus in Bourdieu’, Hans-Herbert Kögler provides an intellectually stimulating and analytically rigorous account of an ambitious philosophical project: the attempt to overcome some of the key pitfalls of semiotic structuralism by drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of language and habitus. As illustrated in Kögler’s essay, there is a noteworthy affinity between the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy – associated with the works of Saussure, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, and Searle – and the ‘reflexive turn’ in sociology – associated with the writings of Bourdieu. The affinity is in the following sense: both paradigmatic turns are motivated by the insight that human actors, insofar as they are unavoidably immersed in particular socio-historical contexts, cannot escape the preponderance of implicitly reproduced and practically mobilised background horizons. Background horizons are socially powerful because they shape people’s modes of perception, reflection, and action and, as a consequence, their spatiotemporally situated ways of relating to, making sense of, and acting upon the world.

However one conceives of the relation between necessity and freedom, objectivity and subjectivity, and structure and agency, it is imperative – as Kögler rightly insists – to explore the empowering potentials derived from one species-constitutive capacity: *intentional and reflexive agency*. The question that arises from recognising that we are not only motivationally and intentionally driven beings, but also reflexively and critically guided subjects is to what extent Bourdieu’s notion of habitus allows us to account not only for the reproductive and habitual but also for the transformative and creative elements of human action. Even if we assume that Bourdieu is right to suggest that our linguistic habitus is embedded in and largely determined by our social habitus, it is far from clear to what extent the genetic-structuralist approach permits us to do justice to the relative autonomy of linguistically mediated forms of reflexivity.

After setting the scene and elucidating the complexity of the theoretical problems arising from Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in relation to both social and linguistic practices, Kögler examines, in the first part of his chapter, the *explanatory limitations of the semiotic model of communication*. Drawing on Saussure’s semiotic structuralism, Kögler argues that every language is based on a system of signs, which constitutes not only a unified duality between ‘the signifier’ and ‘the signified’ but also, more importantly, a communicative vehicle for intelligibly
organised forms of intersubjectivity. From this perspective, a ‘diachronic’ view, which is primarily concerned with monological speech, needs to be replaced by a ‘synchronic’ view, which draws our attention to the importance of dialogical speech, when examining the very possibility of linguistically mediated forms of meaning: we need to focus on shared understandings, shared symbols, and shared meanings to make sense of the fact that our linguistic competence is primarily a social competence, that is, an interactive capacity developed through the constant exposure to and immersion in ordinary forms of intersubjectivity sustained through the linguistically mediated construction of mutual intelligibility. If, following Saussure’s externalist rather than internalist model, the construction of linguistic meaning takes place ‘between’ rather than ‘within’ speakers, then we need to be aware of three levels of intertwinement: first, the intertwinement of interpretation (know-that) and application (know-how); second, the intertwinement of language-as-a-structure (langue) and language-as-a-process (parole); and, third, the intertwinement of intelligibility (meaning) and normativity (values). This is precisely where Bourdieu’s work is helpful: from a sociological point of view, the internal organisation of a symbolic order is to be studied not as an autopoietic system of codes used by symmetrically situated subjects equipped with universally ingrained competences, but as an interest-laden market of signs mobilised by asymmetrically related actors divided by disproportionally available resources.

With this arguably Bourdieusian framework in mind, Kögler goes on to draw a broad distinction between two models of linguistic meaning: the first approach centres on the role of validity claims; the second approach focuses on the role of practical dispositions. Whereas the former is closely associated with Habermas’s theory of universal pragmatics, the latter is particularly important in Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power. The main point that these two approaches have in common is their emphasis on the performative nature of linguistic practices: speakers need to speak – that is, they need to use language – in order to be part of a speech community. Yet, one of the key points that separate these two approaches from one another is the question of the main function that language plays in society. According to Habermas, people raise validity claims as linguistic subjects who have a deep-seated need to attribute meaning to their daily participation in the social practices of their lifeworlds: society can be reproduced and transformed only through communicative action. According to Bourdieu, people raise legitimacy claims as interest-driven actors who are determined to mobilise their habitus-specific resources to position themselves in relation to one another when immersed in struggles over material and symbolic power in different social fields: society is reproduced and transformed through strategic competition. According to Kögler, the epistemological discrepancy between these two
positions is reflected in the dialectic of normative reason and practical power. Taking into account the respective merits of these models, a critical philosophy of language needs to shed light on the functional ambivalence of language: on the one hand, language is a vehicle for social normativity, communicative intelligibility, and critical reflexivity; on the other hand, language is a vehicle for social hierarchy, asymmetrical relationality, and surreptitious strategy. In short, language is both a communicative medium of rational action coordination and a purposive instrument of power-laden competition.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, we are obliged to reflect on the relationship between language, habitus, and symbolic power. Kögler’s main thesis is that Bourdieu grounds the linguistic habitus in the social habitus. According to this view, linguistically mediated background assumptions are embedded in socially inculcated dispositions. Yet, the main problem with Bourdieu’s conception of language is that, as Kögler insists, it underestimates the creative and critical potentials of linguistic actors. We need to account for the fact that subjects capable of speech and action are also capable of justification and reflection. A sociological approach that focuses almost exclusively on the relational determinacy and resourceful dispositionality of social actors fails to do justice to the anthropological specificity of linguistically mediated forms of intersubjectivity. Our sens linguistique, which inhabits our sens pratique, is not only a dispositional conglomerate, whose existence is indicative of our socially constituted determinacy, but also an empowering resource, which is indispensable to the development of our rationally grounded sense of autonomy.

In light of the empowering potentials inherent in rationally grounded forms of reflexivity, it is difficult to defend the – somewhat reductive – view that our linguistic habitus can be subordinated to our social habitus. The preponderance of social objectivity does not necessarily imply the preponderance of social heteronomy. As subjects capable of speech and reflection, we are able to develop a sense of linguistically grounded and rationally guided autonomy. To reduce the linguistic habitus to a mere subcategory of the social habitus means to treat linguistically mediated expressions of reflexivity as a peripheral element of exogenously determined forms of human agency. In opposition to this arguably ‘sociologistic’ perspective, Kögler makes a case for the view that there are at least three reasons why linguistically mediated forms of intentionality constitute an indispensable element of human agency. First, human beings are both goal-oriented and value-rational actors: the interdependence of purposive and substantive forms of rationality lies at the heart of every society. Second, human beings are both immersive and reflexive actors: the interdependence of doxic and discursive forms of rationality is fundamental to the daily unfolding of human performativity. Third, human beings are both
perspectival and transperspectival actors: the interdependence of perspective-laden and perspective-taking forms of rationality is an indispensable moral driving force of human interactionality. In short, there is no ethical agency without linguistically mediated forms of reflexivity.

**Bourdieu and Politics**

The thirteenth chapter, written by Derek Robbins, is entitled ‘Social Theory and Politics: Aron, Bourdieu and Passeron, and the Events of May 1968’. Derek Robbins is an established and internationally recognised scholar in the field of contemporary social and political theory, and his chapter is yet another example of his in-depth knowledge of twentieth century intellectual thought. In the chapter’s first section, Robbins provides us with a brief *mise-en-scène* by which he situates Aron, Bourdieu, and Passeron in their respective intellectual contexts. Particularly important with regard to Aron is the fact that from an early stage he maintained an intellectual and methodological commitment to the work of Max Weber. Due to this commitment to the Weberian view of the world, Aron’s approach is based on the assumption that there is no genuine sociology of development without a critical philosophy of history, just as there is no professional separation between scientists and politicians without a conceptual distinction between objectivity and normativity. Yet, it is striking when reflecting on the works of Passeron and Bourdieu that, whilst both were philosophers by training, they became sociologists by choice. Given that both thinkers migrated from philosophy into sociology, Passeron and Bourdieu can be regarded as ‘self-exiled intellectual emigrants’, who escaped from the age-old discipline of philosophy, and as ‘self-invited intellectual immigrants’, who sought refuge in the juvenile discipline of sociology. With the motives for their intellectual migration from philosophy to sociology in mind, it is possible to understand Passeron and Bourdieu’s radical critique of the ‘scholastic gaze’, that is, of the illusory philosophical pursuit of intellectual purity, universal validity, disinterested rationality, and value-neutrality. With their plea for a ‘sociological gaze’ in mind, one can make sense of their commitment to putting philosophy front and centre by insisting upon the socio-historical embeddedness of all forms of knowledge production.

In the chapter’s second section, Robbins focuses on the work of Aron and proposes to examine his intellectual positions with regard to two concerns: the relationship between social science and political action, and the nature of sociology as a science. With regard to the first concern, the *relationship between social science and political action*, it comes as no surprise that Aron, as a Weberian, was a strong defender of the division between science and politics and, as a result, of a strict separation between the search for scientific validity and the search for political normativity. Although Aron – following Weber – regarded
the historical nature of society as a constitutive component of human existence, he was opposed to historicist attempts to reduce the constitution of being to an evolutionary product of the hitherto-been. According to Aron, it is essential to preserve a notion of human freedom that allows us to recognise that our perceptions of the past do not necessarily shape, let alone determine, our actions in the future. Whatever may be one’s view on the role of history in general and on the role of historical consciousness in particular, it seems indisputable that the disenchantment of worldly existence, triggered by the rise of modern society, is inextricably linked to the disenchantment of worldly knowledge, driven by the rise of modern science. With regard to Aron’s second concern, the nature of sociology as a science, it is worth pointing out that – following Aron – there are two, fundamentally different, conceptions of sociology: one ‘modest’ and one ‘ambitious’ conception. According to the former, sociology is only one amongst a series of other social-scientific disciplines; according to the latter, sociology is the master discipline that both stands above and exists through other social-scientific disciplines. As Robbins remarks, Aron clearly favoured the former – that is, the ‘realistic’ – over the latter – that is, the ‘sociologistic’ – view. Thus he was concerned not to hypostatise ‘the power of the social’ into ‘the fetish of the social’. Even if, due to its general commitment to exploring the nature and development of the social world, we conceive of sociology as both the most wide-ranging and the most ambitious discipline in the social sciences, we must not assume that it therefore possesses the epistemic monopoly over the systematic study of the functioning of society.

In the chapter’s third section, Robbins sheds light on the – arguably ‘Aronian’ – nature of the research carried out by Bourdieu and Passeron in the 1960s. Profoundly disillusioned with the French higher education system and deeply critical of the exclusionary aspects of the presumably inclusionary French democracy, Bourdieu and Passeron developed a research agenda aimed at examining the underlying logic of both pedagogical and political relations in France and the ways in which they contributed to the actual reproduction, rather than the potential transformation, of established power relations. In essence, these studies demonstrated that in modern France the relative elasticity and stability of social domination was due to the interwovenness of symbolic and material, habitual and institutional, informal and formal, and cultural and economic resources of power. Yet, as Robbins insists, there were also some striking differences between Bourdieu and Passeron in terms of their respective approaches to the social. Bourdieu had a tendency to concentrate on the heteronomous, and thus ultimately reproductive, logic of field-dependent discourses, field-specific systems, and field-embedded institutions; conversely, Passeron was prepared to acknowledge the autonomous, and hence potentially transformative, logic of pluralised discourses, differentiated systems, and diversified institutions. Despite this not insignificant point of divergence derived
from a normative discrepancy between different sociological presuppositions, Bourdieu and Passeron were united in their epistemologically inspired and methodologically justified ambition to overcome what they conceived of as artificial and counterproductive dichotomies: the oppositions between positivist and hermeneutic, naturalist and anti-naturalist, and empiricist and interpretivist approaches in the social sciences. Questioning the legitimacy of widely accepted antinomies in intellectual thought, Bourdieu and Passeron established themselves as two practising social scientists who, whilst sharing an educational background in philosophy, ended up developing an interest and expertise in sociology, particularly in the sociology of education and culture. As Robbins emphasises, their academic itineraries had been heavily influenced by Aron, notably by his practical engagement with politics and his intellectual interest in political science.

Finally, Robbins reminds us that, following in Aron’s footsteps, Passeron and Bourdieu were politically engaged. They tried to link their commitment to politics with their commitment to science, and hence they sought to show both in their writings and in their actions that even if, in a classical Weberian fashion, one attempts to separate politics and science, the two spheres are inextricably interrelated. Practical questions concerning the political organisation of society cannot be separated from theoretical questions arising from the scientific study of society. Where both Bourdieu and Passeron clearly differed from Aron, however, was in their sustained efforts to bring to light the extent to which processes of pedagogical communication euphemised, and hence reproduced, mechanisms of political domination. More importantly, they differed from Aron in their radical, rather than conservative, beliefs in the liberating potentials of counter-cultures and counter-politics aimed at undermining the established doxa of the cultural and political mainstream of French society. From this perspective, a *raisonnement sociologique* can only have a constructive impact on society insofar as it conceives of itself as a *raisonnement politique*.

**Bourdieu and the Public Sphere**

In the fourteenth chapter, ‘Intellectual Critique and the Public Sphere: Between the Corporatism of the Universal and the Realpolitik of Reason’, Yves Sintomer discusses Bourdieu’s account of the nature of scientific and intellectual thought. If, following Bourdieu, we conceive of critical sociology as a systematic attempt to uncover the underlying mechanisms that determine both the constitution and the evolution of the social world and if, furthermore, we consider this task to be a normative endeavour aimed at shedding light on both different sources of social domination and different resources of human
emancipation, then the production of scientific knowledge is not an end in itself but an empowering tool that enables us to have a transformative impact on the world. Insisting on both the descriptive and the normative dimensions that permeate scientific and intellectual thought, Sintomer provides an insightful account of Bourdieu’s sociology of reason, that is, of the systematic attempt to examine the social conditions underlying the rationally grounded production of knowledge. In essence, Sintomer’s chapter offers a critical analysis of five types of reason: (1) intellectual reason, (2) scientific reason, (3) political reason, (4) critical reason, and (5) communicative reason.

(1) Reflecting upon the nature of intellectual reason, Sintomer identifies different denotative and connotative meanings of the word ‘intellectual’. First, in the broadest sense, it can be used to refer to knowledgeable and cultured people, who are equipped with the necessary educational capital to immerse themselves in intellectual fields and thereby develop an intellectual habitus. Second, in a more restricted sense, the term is used to distinguish ‘skilled labour’ from ‘manual labour’, suggesting that the former is primarily cerebral whereas the latter is mainly physical in nature. Third, in an even narrower sense, the term can be employed to characterise professional academics and artists, for whom reflexivity and creativity constitute the *sine qua non* of their everyday existence. Finally, in an even more confined – and arguably Bourdieusian – sense, the term can be used to designate those people who have the symbolically, and often institutionally, conferred authority to participate in one of the three cultural fields *par excellence* – scientific, artistic, or literary – and defend their cultural legitimacy through the affirmation of their symbolic authority in the public realms of society. As Sintomer points out, it is this last meaning which is particularly important in making sense of the multifaceted ways in which the cultural field possesses the paradoxical capacity to convert its dependence on publicity into a privilege of collective privacy: in order to be part of a distinguished cultural group, one needs to master the distinguished cultural codes that allow one to relate to, and be recognised within, a distinguished cultural field.

(2) Examining the nature of scientific reason, Sintomer reminds us that one of the most remarkable achievements of the scientific field has always been its capacity to affirm its relative autonomy in relation to other powerful realms of society. If the lasting success of the scientific field manifests itself in its relative independence from other social fields, then the pervasive influence of scientific reason is expressed in its epistemic ability to distinguish itself from other forms of social rationality. Thus, the power of scientific reason is not only due to its – endogenously developed – explanatory capacity but also due to its – exogenously recognised – epistemic autonomy: in order for scientific rationality to be a source of enlightening knowledgeability it constantly needs
to affirm and demonstrate its relative independence from other – notably political, economic, and religious – forms of rationality. In Bourdieusian terms, the scientific game can be characterised as a ‘corporatism of the universal’ because it is based on the collectively negotiated search for universal truths. Nonetheless, in order to avoid the trap of epistemic transcendentalism or epistemic relativism, it is necessary to recognise both the historical embeddedness and the emancipatory progressiveness of scientific reason: just as particular life forms produce particular language games, particular language games produce particular life forms. The functional interdependence of scientifically motivated forms of rationality and scientifically shaped forms of society reflects the fruitful interplay between reason-guided language games and reason-guided life forms.

(3) Exploring the nature of political reason, Sintomer – following Bourdieu – puts forward the idea that the ‘production of truth’ can be conceived of as a ‘politics of truth’: given the social embeddedness of all knowledge claims and given the interest-ladenness of all social conditions, we cannot deny the intrinsic normativity that inhabits the most rigorously argued claims to epistemic validity and scientific objectivity. The ‘Realpolitik of reason’, as Bourdieu calls it, is only sustainable insofar as it is guided by the ‘Realvernunft’ of politics, for a commitment to critical rationalism is worth nothing without a commitment to ethical pragmatism. As Sintomer – drawing on Bourdieu – insists, the ‘corporatism of the universal’ and the ‘Realpolitik of reason’ are closely interrelated, for the scientific quest for defensible truth claims and the political quest for justifiable rightness claims are two integral components of the civilisational search for universally acceptable legitimacy claims. The politics of universal values, however, needs to face up to the interest-laden nature of all forms of normativity in order to recognise its own socio-historical determinacy.

(4) Exploring the nature of critical reason, Sintomer frames his analysis in terms of the relationship between the ‘corporatism of the universal’ and the ‘public sphere’, that is, in light of the emancipatory potentials inherent in all forms of rationality that are exposed to public scrutiny. By definition, the aforementioned types of reason – intellectual, scientific, and political – represent critical forms of reason. Yet, what are the constitutive features of such critical forms of reason? Inspired by Bourdieu’s sociological critique of scholastic notions of reason in general and by his relentless attack on Kantian and Habermasian forms of abstract rationalism in particular, Sintomer brings five essential features of critical reason to our attention. First, critical reason is aware of its own historicity: a critical analysis of reason needs to examine the socio-historical contingency of all forms of rationality. Second, critical reason is capable of acknowledging its own partiality: a critical analysis of reason needs to explore the interest-laden normativity of all forms of rationality. Third, critical
reason does not hide away from its own determinacy: a critical analysis of reason needs to face up to the field-specific referentiality of all forms of rationality. Fourth, critical reason is prepared to put its own existence into perspective by recognising the enlightening power of epistemic plurality: a critical analysis of reason needs to accept the presuppositional elasticity underlying all forms of rationality. Finally, critical reason is inconceivable without a sustained reflection upon its own contestability: a critical analysis of reason needs to uncover the power-laden negotiability of all forms of rationality. In short, critical reason, in the Bourdieusian sense, demands the awareness of the social conditioning underlying all forms of action and reflection.

(5) In a Habermasian spirit, Sintomer offers critical reflections on Bourdieu’s account of knowledge production, insisting on the emancipatory potentials inherent in social processes oriented towards mutual understanding, epitomised in what we may refer to as communicative reason. Despite the aforementioned strengths of the reflexive-sociological approach to knowledge production, Bourdieu’s account of reason essentially suffers from three serious shortcomings: determinism, scientism, and fatalism. Bourdieu’s tendency to conceive of rationality in terms of its field-immanent determinacy prevents him from accounting for the field-transcendent autonomy of both ordinary and scientific claims to epistemic validity: epistemic validity is partly, but not exclusively, determined by its field-specific legitimacy. Bourdieu’s tendency to conceive of rationality in terms of a duality between mundane and methodical knowledgeability is based on the scientistic assumption that critical reflexivity represents a socio-professional privilege of intellectuals and experts, rather than a socio-ontological privilege of the human species. Yet, ordinary subjects capable of speech and action are also capable of reflection and action. Bourdieu’s tendency to conceive of rationality in terms of strategic, rather than communicative, action is symptomatic of his fatalistic view of the social. A one-sided focus on the monological and purposive elements of social action oriented towards power and competition, however, proves incapable of doing justice to the emancipatory potentials inherent in the dialogical and communicative elements of social action oriented towards discussion and cooperation. In brief, a ‘Realpolitik of reason’ should not only seek to recognise but also aim to realise the ‘Realpotential of reason’.

**Bourdieu and Time**

In the final chapter, ‘Practice as Temporalisation: Bourdieu and Economic Crisis’, Lisa Adkins assesses the relevance of Bourdieu’s work to economic sociology in general and to the sociology of time in particular. Specifically, she asks to what extent Bourdieu’s social theory can be a useful tool to make sense
of the recent and ongoing global economic crisis. It is Adkins’s contention that in Bourdieu’s work we can find powerful resources to study economic crisis from a sociological perspective, but that the conceptual and methodological tools borrowed from a Bourdieusian framework need to be modified and refined to exploit their explanatory power in relation to the social and political analysis of contemporary issues.

Adkins identifies five main reasons why Bourdieu’s work is not commonly used to analyse economic crises. (i) Despite his exploration of different types of capital – notably social, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital – nowhere in Bourdieu’s writings can we find an attempt, however rudimentary, to elucidate the specificity of capitalist capital. (ii) Even though he insists upon the temporal constitution of the social world in general and of social fields in particular, Bourdieu does not examine the process of abstraction and quantification of labour into temporally structured units. Insofar as he fails to consider that under capitalism labour can be converted into exchangeable equivalents, Bourdieu does not account for the specificity of capitalist labour appropriation. (iii) While he is concerned with social processes of domination and exploitation, Bourdieu does not explore the social implications of the conversion of living labour into abstract labour (let alone of living into abstract forms of capital), which is central to the very functioning of capitalism as a social system; thus, he fails to do justice to the specificity of capitalist abstraction. (iv) Notwithstanding his general interest in the sociological significance of field-specific forms of crisis, usually triggered by a confrontation between orthodox and heterodox discourses as well as between dominant and dominated groups in a given social field, Bourdieu does not provide a set of explanatory tools capable of aiding our understanding of the specificity of capitalist crisis. (v) In spite of Bourdieu’s emphasis on the dialectical nature of reproductive and transformative processes of social structuration, it is generally assumed that, within his theoretical framework of ‘generic structuralism’, the reproductive power of stasis remains prevalent over the transformative potential of crisis and that, as a consequence, Bourdieu’s approach does not account for the specificity of capitalist transformation.

Adkins goes on to assert that, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, Bourdieu offers a number of conceptual resources that permit us to make sense of recent economic events, not only in terms of a crisis of time but also in terms of a restructuring of time. Drawing on Richard Sennett’s critical account of the corrosive effects of late capitalism, she reminds us that the accumulation of flexibilised – that is, fragmented – experiences and the cultivation of weak – that is, opportunistic – ties in the post-Fordist economy have contributed to the construction of a world in which people find it increasingly difficult to develop a sense of narrative movement. Under the heading ‘Trading
the Future?’, Adkins remarks that the post-Fordist universe is a world characterised by the radical renegotiation of temporal horizons. In a world dictated by the powerful dynamics of permanent scientific innovation, compulsive large-sale technologisation, and macro-societal transformation, the temporal boundaries between past, present, and future are constantly being reshaped and resignified towards emphases on situational contingency, historical indeterminacy, and societal uncertainty. Consequently, the looking-forwardness of the human condition is absorbed into the taken-for-grantedness of the post-Fordist condition.

This is where Bourdieu is helpful. Under the heading ‘Anticipation: Time in the Making’, Adkins discusses a Husserlian theme in Bourdieu’s writings on time: according to Bourdieu, the future is always already existent in the immediate present, for human agents are ordinarily immersed in the forthcoming. Since human agents are equipped with predispositional schemes of perception and appreciation, which anticipate their positionally situated course of action, in the social world the always-still-to-be is part of the always-already-been just as the always-already-been is part of the always-still-to-be. In short, it is the protensive nature of practice which explains the extensive nature of the present. Human agents are condemned to anticipate the forthcoming within the world because they are obliged to impose their structured and structuring resources upon the world. The ineluctable preponderance of the predispositionally constituted and prereflexively executed nature of human agency is indicative of the protensive constitution of social temporality. The objective potentials that are always already inscribed in a given social field, constitute the background horizon of the subjective potentials that are still to be realised by a given social agent. To the extent that the espace de possibles is always a temps de possibles, the possibles d’un espace are always the possibles du temps: every spatially defined horizon of possibilities is also a temporally defined horizon of possibilities, and every possibility arising from a given social space is also a possibility emerging from a given social time. In other words, what is possible through a given human action is contingent upon the spatiotemporally constituted horizon of possibilities prescribed by a given social field.

If, as Adkins points out, we accept that the forthcoming is always already inscribed in the present, we have to be prepared to confront at least four issues: first, the injunction to anticipate may be an idiosyncratic feature of our present moment (the socio-historical structuration of time); second, to the degree that the forthcoming is capable of undercutting or destabilising the present, the former is preponderant over the latter (the future-laden orientation of time); third, given our simultaneous immersion in the temporal horizons of past, present, and future, we should conceive of human practices as being situated in a temporal continuum (the fluid constitution of time); and, fourth, rather than simply assuming
that time makes practice, we also need to recognise that practice makes time (*the praxeological production of time*).

In the section entitled ‘Time is Money’, Adkins stresses the sociological importance of one of the underlying principles of the capitalist economy: to be able to do things faster and more efficiently than one’s competitors is a precondition for increasing the profitability of one’s business. The hegemonic mode of production, then, is also a hegemonic mode of temporalisation: rates of profit and production depend on profit-oriented and production-driven forms of temporalisation. The entanglement of economic practice with time obliges us, as critical sociologists, to reflect upon the ways in which societies are not only spatially but also temporally structured. Every mode of production requires a particular mode of temporalisation. The key issue when exploring the structuration of time in capitalist society is that, under the rule of clock time, social phenomena and social time are separated and hence – to use Adkins’s formulation – *in clock time events do not make time but take place in time*. Rather than human practices determining time, time determines human practices.

In the section entitled ‘Money is Time’, Adkins examines the paradigmatic transformation of time in late modern societies. The slogan ‘time is money’ captures a central normative imperative of Fordist regimes of production: the more rapid and the more efficient, the more productive and the more profitable. By contrast, the slogan ‘money is time’ sums up a key normative imperative of post-Fordist regimes of production: the stronger and richer financially, the more flexible and powerful socially. Whereas under industrial capitalism time is money, in deregulated financial markets *money has become time*. Given that in the post-Fordist context, which is dictated by the pressing imperatives of the financial markets, time has ceased to operate as an external vessel for practice and has become increasingly merged with events, time itself has become a pivotal driving force of economic empowerment: in the post-Fordist world, the production of society is increasingly contingent upon the temporalisation of production. The question remains, however, to what extent the restructuration and resignification of time in the post-Fordist world have created a situation in which the experience of social life has become more abstract than in previous societies. If we now live in a world reproduced and kept alive through the collective experience of unexperienced experiences, then – as Adkins pertinently remarks – the participation in social life is potentially beyond meaning and interpretation. A society in which the control of time escapes the control of ordinary people is a society in which the search for meaning is increasingly shaped by the purposive power of systemic reproduction, rather than by the communicative power of everyday interaction. We certainly do not live in a timeless society, but we may live in a society without time.
Conclusion

From a range of authors and from a variety of perspectives, the chapters of this book provide a comprehensive and critical evaluation of the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Although they raise many difficult problems concerning Bourdieu’s legacy, they illustrate the power and scope of his sociology in shaping our understanding of modern society, especially with regard to the sociological significance of field-specific struggles over various forms of power and different resources. It is obvious that Bourdieu borrowed extensively and openly from the writings of classical sociologists, notably from the works of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, he also created a battery of concepts – such as ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ – which have profoundly influenced, and will continue to stimulate, contemporary social and political analysis. These diverse contributions demonstrate the enduring importance of classical sociology, while recognising the creative and innovative energy that derives from Bourdieu’s thought.

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References


