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The Changing Portrayal of Migrants: from the Political to the Humanitarian

A Case Study of Two Migrants’ Rights Organisations in Spain and Britain

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Abstract

The portrayal of migrants in Spanish and British media and political discourse has been the focus of much recent academic study and is largely concerned with negative images. Where positive or sympathetic portrayals have been examined, they alert us to pitfalls: compassion aroused by the portrayal of migrants as victims is a double-edged sword because victims need an external agent to empower them and, therefore, are deprived of their own agency. The image of the ‘passive’ and ‘rightless’ migrant has been counteracted by literature that portrays migrants as ‘political activists’ mobilising to demand legalisation of their immigration status. This portrayal of the ‘activist migrant’ can be viewed as ‘utopian’ whereby migrants are transformed into a new historical subject for social change and, as such, become the site for the projection of political hopes and desires.

This study focuses on an area of research that has received little attention – how migrants’ rights organisations portray migrants. Two organisations provided the research sites for the case studies: Sevilla Acoge, based in Seville, Spain, and Praxis, based in London, Britain. As demonstrated in this thesis, both of them were strongly influenced by the radical leftist ideas of liberation theology. The thesis argues that over a period of approximately thirty years (from the 1980s to the early 2010s) the portrayal of migrants shifted from a political to a humanitarian framing. More specifically, it shows that these changing portrayals reflected shifts in the organisations’ values and expressed a sense of disappointment in the politics of the past that had aimed to change society through collective political action.

This cross-country, comparative and longitudinal study uses a mixed-methods approach to investigate the changing portrayals of migrants. The case studies illustrate the consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political approach to migrants’ rights and the implications of this for the possibilities of political action and empowerment.
Introduction

On 29th August 1793, Toussaint L’Ouverture called on the black slaves of San Domingo, present day Haiti, to take literally the ideals of liberty and equality enshrined in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen:

I want Liberty and Equality to reign in San Domingo. I work to bring them into existence. Unite yourselves to us, brothers, and fight with us for the same cause, etc. (quoted in C.L.R James [1980 [1969]: 102).

On 28th March 1949, the British Secretary of State expressed fear that the people of the British colonies might take too literally the ideals of liberty and equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

I fully recognise the potentialities of the Declaration as a source of embarrassment to colonial governments, both because its nature can easily be misunderstood and because of the likelihood that communist propaganda will endeavour to make particular use of it in regard to the colonies (secret circular on display at Taking liberties: struggles for British rights and freedoms, exhibition at British Library 2012).

In 2004, the political theorist Wendy Brown, looking back over fifty years of the Universal Declaration’s existence from her twenty-first century perspective, expressed some very different concerns:

Is the prevention or mitigation of suffering promised by human rights the most that can be hoped for at this point in history? Is this where we are, namely, at a historical juncture in which all more ambitious justice projects seem remote if not utopian by comparison with the task of limiting abuses of individuals? Is the prospect of a more substantive democratisation of power so dim that the relief and reduction of human suffering is all that progressives can hope for? (Brown 2004: 462).
For over two hundred years, the aspiration to take those universal rights of freedom and equality animated political struggles around the world. Today, Brown fears that human rights aim at no more than ‘the reduction of suffering’ and ‘a pure defence of the innocent and the powerless against power’ (ibid.: 453). She observes that, in the contemporary era, the concept of human rights has become detached from political struggles. The above examples from different historical moments in time – the late Enlightenment, the early post-Second World War and the contemporary period – reflect significant processes of political and social change that imply a shift away from viewing people as political subjects to that of objects of humanitarian concern.

Writing on the concept of human rights in the contemporary period, Brown (1995, 2004) and Pupavac (2001, 2008, 2012) indicate that demands for ‘the rights of the rightless’ take an anti-political form in the sense that the ‘rightless’ are not viewed as political subjects, nor is collective political action understood as the way to guarantee rights. They claim that this outlook was not always the case and they attribute this shift to widespread political disenchantment.

Brown (1995: 26, 2004) identifies a lowering of horizons in human rights activism, which aims at nothing more than the relief of suffering. She interprets this lack of ambition as a retreat from the belief in more emancipatory projects of the past. For Brown, contemporary human rights activism expresses the fatalism of progressives who have lost their conviction about human capabilities and the possibility to forge a collective political alternative. She poses the question of whether human rights ‘stand for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?’ (Brown 2004: 454). Following a similar train of thought, Pupavac (2001) indicates a reversal in the understanding of rights in recent times. She claims that the conception of modern rights was formerly based on people’s capacity to take their own rights but, in the contemporary era, it is
based on the idea of rights granted to someone by others. This, Pupavac suggests, has led to a presumption that individuals without formal rights have no capacity to realise their own rights and, therefore, need an external agent to enforce them on their behalf. Pupavac and Brown concur that the change in the understanding of rights stems from liberal and radicals’ disillusionment in collective political action to transform society and to address the plight of the excluded, marginalised, weak or powerless. This suggests that the human subject at the centre of human rights activism is defined by its vulnerability, a view confirmed by Turner (2006), who regards humankind as ‘biologically vulnerable and in need of protection’ (ibid. 26).

This thesis explores the reflections above by examining the changing portrayal of migrants by migrants’ rights organisations over a period of approximately thirty years. It argues that the consequences and significance of these changes can be better understood by looking back into history at the social and political shifts over time that have led to the contemporary moment, and, in turn, influence the way in which migrants’ rights organisations portray migrants.

The two organisations that provide the sites for these explorations, one in Spain, the other in Britain, were established in the 1980s. The Spanish organisation Sevilla Acoge was founded in 1985, when the period of ‘turbulent times’ (Flores Sánchez 2010: 94) during the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had subsided and a mood of desencanto [disenchantment or disillusionment] with politics had set in. The British organisation Praxis was founded in 1983, during the ‘tumultuous times’, as the organisation put it, when the defeat of the miners’ strike was imminent and a sense of limits in what political action could achieve was consolidating around the British prime minister’s slogan of ‘There is no alternative’ (‘TINA’). Both organisations were influenced by the radical Christianity of liberation theology with its principle of solidarity with the ‘poor’ – the ‘poor’ meaning, in their case, ‘migrants’.
There are several factors that may have influenced these organisations’ portrayal of migrants, all of which are acknowledged in this thesis. One factor is recognised by Pupavac (2008: 271), who suggests that migrants’ rights organisations emphasise the positive and sympathetic images of migrants to counteract the negative media representations. Recent academic literature in both Spain and Britain has paid particular attention to these negative images (Crawley et al. 2016; Allen and Blinder 2013; Threadgold 2009; Sachetti and Trigo 2009; Zapata-Barrero 2008). This is unsurprising given their rise: the use of negative portrayals in media and political discourse during the period of the case studies’ lives was at times intense, leading to real consequences. The racist riots of 2001 in the southern Andalucian town of El Ejido could be attributed to the way in which the ruling party politicised immigration during its general election campaign, while simultaneously encouraging, through its informal immigration policy, tens of thousands of ‘illegal’ migrants to gather in rural towns at harvest times to work (see Chapter 3.3); the media fanned social fear with its constant images of a migrant ‘invasion’. Another consequence, in the British context, was illustrated when the government politicised the issue of asylum in 2002 as numbers of asylum applications rose. The media images of ‘illegal’ migrants from the refugee camp in Sangatte, France, attempting to enter Britain night after night (Buchanan et al. 2003; Threadgold 2009) justified the government’s decision to halve asylum applications by finding the majority of cases to be unfounded, thus turning refugees from countries of conflict such as Iraq and Afghanistan into ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. In both cases, evidence suggests that governments initiated the negative political discourse rather than the media, which followed suite (Statham and Geddes 2006; Zapata-Barrero 2008).

The negative portrayals in media and political discourse analysed in the Spanish and British literature have taken similar forms. Tsoukala (2005: 170) categorises all these stereotyped images into different types of threats that ‘illegal’ migrants are said to pose to society. The
first is as a socio-economic threat whereby migrants are portrayed as putting at risk the welfare state, taking the jobs of the native population, causing urban decay, perpetuating the informal economy and under-cutting wages. The second is that of a security threat whereby migrants are linked to organised crime (trafficking, prostitution, etc.), delinquency and terrorism. The final category consists of the threat to national identity in terms of changing or challenging the dominant culture with inferior cultural values.

The less frequent alternative representations – that is, positive or sympathetic portrayals – are also explored in the literature (Sachetti and Trigo 2009; Zapata-Barrero 2008; Pupavac 2008; Anderson 2008). They can be categorised on two levels. The first category refers to migrants as a social, economic and cultural benefit to society. This portrayal emphasises migrants as contributors to the economy, to culture, particularly to the arts, and as possessing attributes that are lacking in the wider population – namely, characteristics such as ‘hard-working’, ‘highly skilled’ and ‘well-educated’. The juxtaposition of migrants’ positive attributes to the negative traits of the ‘native’ population arises in the Spanish case study in Chapter 5. The second category consists of migrants as people in need of support and protection. This portrayal emphasises migrants as victims of trafficking, exploited and abused by employers, living and working in bad conditions, made vulnerable by law and policy and at risk of poor mental health. This category of images becomes dominant in both case studies and can be characterised as a ‘humanitarian portrayal’.

The analysis of the portrayal of migrants by migrants’ rights organisations has been neglected in the academic literature, and yet the few academics who have approached this subject, for example, Gil Araújo (2002), Pupavac (2008) and Anderson (2008), hint at a rich seam for investigation. In the Spanish context, Gil Araújo (2002) examines the relationship between government funding and migrants’ rights organisations to demonstrate how these organisations’
portrayals of migrants conform to the government’s outlook and represent co-option by the state. The issue of the case-study organisations’ funding and co-option is discussed in Chapter 7, but, as will be shown, a different interpretation to Gil Araújo’s is made in light of the empirical evidence. In the British context, Pupavac (2008) and Anderson (2008) explore why migrants’ rights organisations cultivate migrants as objects of compassion. While both theorists understand the organisations’ desire to counter negative images, they point out the dangers of representations that elicit emotions of pity and compassion: the portrayal of migrants as victims implies that they have no agency and that they need an external agent to empower them. The implications of these theorists’ reflections are thoroughly explored in the case studies in Chapters 5–7. They expose a contradiction: both organisations claimed to promote the agency of migrants, and yet, when the predominant portrayal of migrants became that of vulnerability, migrants’ own empowerment through political subjectivity was curtailed.

In his well-known book *Ways of seeing*, John Berger (1972) suggests that images are always embodiments of the portrayer’s perception. This perspective is adopted in this study to explore how the portrayal of migrants by the two migrants’ rights organisations may represent the embodiment of their own outlooks and values. It therefore focuses on this other ‘way of seeing’, distinct from the more tangible strands that could also be said to influence the portrayals. The main aim of this thesis is to explore the metaphoric side underlying the literal representations. The research questions to make these explorations are as follows:

1. How do migrants’ rights organisations portray migrants?
2. How have these portrayals changed over the past thirty years?
3. What is the political and social significance of these portrayals?
These research questions aim to understand how and why, over a period of almost thirty years (from the 1980s to the early 2010s), two migrants’ rights organisations – one in Spain and one in Britain – portrayed migrants in the way that they did. This thesis tests the ideas of Brown (1995, 2004) and Pupavac (2001, 2008, 2012) through the research questions. It finds that a shift from the political to the humanitarian framing of migrants took place, and that this shift was premised on a sense of disappointment in the earlier promise of politics. The retreat of the political led to the foregrounding of humanitarian concerns and the humanitarian framing of migrants, which had at its centre a human subject that was predominantly defined as vulnerable. This thesis demonstrates that when migrants acted as political subjects their image clashed with the organisations’ outlook, which led to material consequences for the lives of migrants.

The approach taken in this thesis to answer the research questions is one that insists on taking a broad historical perspective to understand the long-term developments that have led us to the contemporary moment (the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century). The body of literature on which this thesis draws to establish a theoretical framework reflects this approach, as does the research methodology. The philosophical assumptions of Norbert Elias’ theory of social processes are adopted to grasp how social and personality structures change over time – the idea of ‘the reconfiguration of subjectivity’ attempts to convey these long-term shifts; the work of Jacoby (1971), Lasch (1991[1979]), Sennett (2002 [1977], 2006) and Berger et al. (1973) contributes to the understanding of a particular reconfiguration of subjectivity that ostensibly has taken place in more recent times. This will become clearer in the final section of the Introduction, which sets out an outline of the thesis.
Definitions, terminology and some conceptual issues

Some of the key terms used in this thesis require explanation because they may be unfamiliar to the reader. This applies to the concepts of ‘regularisation’ and ‘interculturalism’. Other terms are inextricably linked to ethical questions and/or philosophical issues. For example, what should we call people who live and work in countries without legal permission? Or, why should we use the term ‘subjectivity’ and ‘political subjectivity’ when talking about individual and collective actors?

These and other issues will be explained below. Other terms not discussed here will be explained as they are introduced. One additional point needs to be made. Much of the theoretical literature on which this thesis draws was written by social theorists and political thinkers of an earlier generation, for example, Hannah Arendt. These writers use vocabulary that may be regarded as outmoded, for instance, ‘man’, ‘mankind’ and ‘men’. We live in times in which there is an increasing sensitivity towards language, leading to these terms and others to be viewed by some as controversial or offensive. When these theorists’ work is cited, it is hoped that their use of language will not irritate, distract or detract from their important insights.

‘Interculturalism’ and ‘intercultural mediation’

In contemporary Britain, the concept of ‘interculturalism’ is not as familiar as that of ‘multiculturalism’ although they are not dissimilar (see Chapter 1.4 for further discussion). While Taylor (2012) claims that all the key elements of interculturalism exist in multiculturalism, advocates of interculturalism, such as Zapata-Barrero (2012), Malgesini and Giménez (2000) and Cantle (2012), see it as addressing the latter’s shortcomings. Zapata-Barrero (2012: 1) defines interculturalism as a ‘third way between assimilation and multiculturalism’. He points to the main distinguishing feature of interculturalism – the interaction
between the ‘host’ and the different ethnic minority cultures that coexist in one society. In terms of government policies, Spain adopted ‘interculturalism’, rather than ‘multiculturalism’, because of multiculturalism’s supposed disadvantages (set out in the Spanish government’s *Second strategic plan for citizenship and integration 2011–14*). One perceived shortcoming of multiculturalism is that of the separation, if not ghettoisation, of different minority ethnic communities. Interculturalism seeks to address this issue; it aims to construct a society based on mutual understanding and communication between the different communities that make up multicultural or multiethnic countries. In this respect, it corresponds closely to the notion of social cohesion that was adopted in Britain following the disturbances in northern towns in 2001.

‘Regularisation’

The term ‘regularisation’ has been subject to criticism because it is seen to embody the state’s standpoint of who may or may not be included within the polity (No one is illegal 2006; De Genova 2002). The eligibility criteria are set by the state and each regularisation is often accompanied by harsher immigration legislation. In Spain, regularisations were part of its immigration policy from 1985 to 2005; there was no parallel in the British context even though the government did announce a series of regularisations in the 1970s, which it called ‘amnesties’, to accompany changes in immigration legislation. It also implemented a regularisation in the 2000s to deal with a backlog of unresolved asylum cases, although, to avoid controversy, it did not name it as such. This study needs practical working terms and will use those defined by Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler (2009): ‘regularisation’ and ‘regularisation programme’ will mean large-scale, one-off and time-limited procedures whereby governments grant legal status to people living and working in a country without authorisation. The term ‘regularisation mechanism’ is adopted to refer to case-by-case, ongoing regularisation processes.
‘Migrant’ and ‘illegality’

In this thesis, the term ‘migrant’ will be employed generically to cover people with different categories of legal status, including refugees. The term ‘migrants’ rights organisation’ implies a similar use of the all-encompassing term ‘migrant’ and will refer to organisations that advocate for migrants’ (and refugees’) rights that were not set up by migrants themselves.

King (2016), a No Borders ‘activist researcher’, chooses the term ‘migrant’ as a political statement of equality, to avoid what she understands as the divide and rule of people when they are categorised as either economic migrants or refugees: economic migrants’ mobility is seen as less legitimate than ‘genuine’ refugees. Crawley et al. (2016) offer another egalitarian definition of ‘migrant’:

[P]eople who move from one place to another in order to find work or better living conditions. It includes those coming to the UK for work, to study, to join family members and in search of international protection (ibid.: 4).

Because these authors place an emphasis on the notion of mobility in their definition, they expose the inadequacy of the term ‘migrant’ – it does not represent the large proportion of minority ethnic people who settle in countries like Britain, and increasingly, Spain, and who therefore cannot be described as ‘on the move’ (Gilligan and Marley 2010). This exemplifies why the application of one word to embrace the list of numerous variables can confuse rather than clarify. Schuster (2016) emphasises this point further by demonstrating that the hierarchy between those who choose and those who are forced to move is fictitious – in reality, no distinct boundaries exist because people’s motives for moving are often mixed and defy rigid legal categorisation. Hannah Arendt described how people, in the interwar years (1918–1939) in Europe, found a loophole to avoid repatriation by claiming to
be stateless so that ‘so-called “economic immigrants”... mixed with the waves of refugees into a tangle that never again could be unravelling’ (2004 [1948]: 363). It is clear that this is still the case today. As Schuster (2003) observes:

> It is now almost axiomatic that as the legal gateways for migration to the industrialised states have swung shut, more and more migrants are trying to squeeze through the door reserved for refugees (ibid. 2003: 24).

Not only is it impossible to meaningfully sort people into precise legal categories but also these categories shift according to government law and policy. Today's asylum seeker is tomorrow’s ‘illegal’ migrant. Or, in the case of Spain, this year’s ‘regularised’ migrant is next year's 'illegal' migrant (see Chapter 3). In this thesis, the use of the term ‘migrant’, while not satisfactory, is based on a pragmatic decision to enable one word to refer to people who fall under many different and changing immigration categories.

The question of what adjectives to use to describe migrants without legal status raises more difficulties. Squire (2009) adopts the rather unwieldy term ‘asylum-seeker-cum-illegal migrant’ in the British context to convey the conflation of legality and illegality that has taken place in British political and media discourse. De Genova (2002) emphasises how the law generates the ‘illegality’ of migrants – their immigration status is dependent on the vagaries of immigration law and policy. He uses the adjective ‘illegal’ in inverted commas in a way that might seem provocative because the term ‘illegal migrant’ (without inverted commas) frequently appears in political and media discourse, despite the existence of press codes of practice in both Spain and Britain that recommend against its use. The negative connotations conjure up the threatening spectacle of illegality, as discussed above. For King (2016: 16), language has the power to change the world, and she believes that we can do so by rejecting derogatory language. This
thesis understands language differently – that is, it reflects lived experience and it changes as we transform our world (Williams 1961: 16). Adjectives that are seen as neutral and inoffensive, such as ‘irregular’ and ‘undocumented’ might have replaced ‘illegal’ (in inverted commas) in much academic writing and among practitioners in recent years; however, the concern to remove the term ‘illegal migrant’ from language has not prevented the deterioration of migrants’ rights. The restrictive immigration legislation and ‘hostile environment’ in both Spain and Britain has intensified within the timeframe of this thesis. Taking the lead from the migration theorist De Genova (2002), who writes from a standpoint of freedom of movement, the adjective ‘illegal’ (always in inverted commas) is employed in this thesis to refer to people without legal status. The collocation of the adjective ‘illegal’ in inverted commas with the term ‘migrant’ puts the emphasis on the law as the generator of illegality and this highlights the source of the problem most clearly.

**How do we talk about our ‘selves’?**

Elliott (2007: 13) argues that the language used by social theorists to conceptualise the self varies according to how they view the longstanding debate over the individual and society – to what extent we determine our world, and to what extent our world determines us. Perhaps we lack the conceptual vocabulary to adequately express terms whose meanings constantly change over time and according to contexts. The dichotomous approach to defining terms does not always enhance our understanding. Elliott (ibid.: 143) is aware how not only the terms for the self but also for human subjectivity itself are not static. He sketches the broad political, economic and social trends that have restructured human subjectivity into something instable and fragmented in recent times (ibid.: 143).

The work of Norbert Elias (1997, 2001, 1978) possibly offers the best way to move from the dichotomous approach to the individual and
society. Elias shows how individuals in society cannot extricate themselves from an interwoven relationship that constantly evolves over time. Transformations in society have corresponding shifts in the personality structures of society’s members, which he calls ‘social habitus’. Social and personality structures mutually influence each other and constantly (but slowly) reconfigure. This is how ‘the reconfiguration of subjectivity’ is understood in this thesis. In Chapter 2.1 the work of social theorists (for example, Jacoby (1973), Lasch (1991 [1979]), Sennett (2002 [1977], 2006) and Berger et al. (1973) is drawn on to enable us to grasp recent processes involved in the particular reconfiguration of subjectivity in the late twentieth century.

In this thesis the term ‘political subjectivity’ is employed to refer to human actors’ capacity to intervene in society to effect change through collective political action. The adjective ‘political’, placed together with ‘subjectivity’, is deliberately used to convey the idea that collective political action is constituted by individual human subjects. The theorists explored in Chapter 1.1 who analyse recent migrant mobilisations in Europe and North America tend to use the terms ‘political subjectivity’ and ‘political agency’ interchangeably, and yet, although similar in meaning, ‘agency’ does not encompass the individual, subjective aspect. Jean-Paul Sartre’s definition of political subjectivity most eloquently expresses the meaning intended in this thesis:

Political subjectivity is the collective actions, of willing something together with others. The political freedom we want for ourselves depends on us wanting it for others (Sartre 1973 [1946]: 51).

Sartre’s definition also falls short as it does not take into account the limitations imposed on us when we act collectively. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 2.
In this thesis, the meanings of the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘subject’ and ‘agency’ and ‘agent’ are not tied to a particular sociological or philosophical tradition. Instead, they are based on the etymology of their Latin roots – subjectum [the grammatical subject], and the infinitive verb subicere [to make subject, to subordinate]; agere [to do, to set in motion], agentem [actor/doer]. In combination they capture a particular understanding of the human condition: we are subjects at the same time as being subjected (by social circumstances and by other human subjects); we act, and yet, our actions are subjected to others’ actions and wills.

**Outline of the thesis**

This thesis starts with reflections on the change in the understanding of rights that imply a corresponding shift in how the subjects of those rights are viewed – from political subjects to vulnerable objects. The first three chapters explore these reflections through an examination of long-term historical shifts. This provides the context for the research questions and the analysis of the case studies. Chapters 1 and 2 develop the theoretical perspective, whereas Chapter 3 offers a more historical description of the socio-political environments of both case studies.

Chapter 1 begins by questioning whether the resurgence of political subjectivity, demonstrated by recent migrant mobilisations, contradicts the theorists Brown (1995, 2004) and Pupavac (2001, 2008, 2012), who contend that political subjectivity has diminished. It shows that rather than a contradiction, two significant tensions exist. The first arises when political subjectivity resurfaces within a context of lowered expectations of what collective political action can achieve. This leads to a clash between the interests of migrants’ rights organisations and those of migrants. The second tension emerges between migration theorists, such as Nyers (2003), Balibar (2004), McNevin (2006) and Squire (2009), who project their own hopes and desires onto migrants and their struggles, resulting in a ‘utopian’ portrayal of migrants and a
mismatch between the desires of the theorists and those of migrants. This chapter proceeds to explain how this ‘utopian’ portrayal is part of a historical pattern in left-wing imagination – idealised portrayals reflect the transference of hope onto people who subsequently fail to live up to expectations, leading to disappointment. Here it is argued that a number of reversals in progressive thinking took place, starting with Marxist-oriented Frankfurt School theorists who adopted a ‘mass society’ perspective (Giner 1976; Berman 2010 [1982]; Bell 2000 [1960]) premised on disappointment in the working class; the impact of the reversals consolidated with the New Left, whose outlook remains influential in contemporary anti-racist thinking today (Malik 2013). The reversals can be summarised as a dismissal of the working class as the agent for social change; the eclipse of ambiguity towards modernity and any promises it may have contained (Berman 2010[1982]; Bell 2000 [1960]); and a turn against the universalist outlook of the Enlightenment that had previously characterised leftist thinking (Bronner 2004). In this context interculturalism, similar to multiculturalism, is explained as part of these reversals, at the heart of which lies ‘the politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1994). It is argued that this politics belongs to the ‘cultural turn’, which is also a ‘therapeutic turn’. The embrace of ‘the politics of recognition’ and the rejection of ‘the politics of universalism’ (ibid.) in progressive intellectual thought has implications for the meaning of human empowerment, as drawn out through the work of Fanon (2001 [1961]). The contrast between Fanon’s notion of empowerment through political action and the idea of a ‘therapeutic’ empowerment through an external agent (or through public recognition) is key to this thesis. This chapter ends with a possible reconciliation between universalism and particularism (or difference) through the ideas of the political thinker Hannah Arendt.

Chapter 2 explores the reconfiguration of subjectivity in the context of a political retreat (Jacoby 1971), in which the site of struggle for social change shifted from the outside world (capitalism) to the inner world of the psyche. This shift arguably led to a ‘therapeutic sensibility’ and the
notion of a vulnerable human subject (Lasch 1991[1979]). The chapter proceeds by identifying what is specific to the contemporary post-Cold War period and finds that the particular reconfiguration of subjectivity emerges when politics, and the political identity it confers, no longer provide an integrating role; the collapse of politics outside of the old polarised, ideological framework leads to a loss of meaning that was generated by a shared understanding of the world within that framework. Its loss results in the search for more individuated ways of making sense of the world and one's place in it, as exemplified by the self-referential 'life-politics' of Giddens (1991). Arendt's meaning of politics is explored and is shown to address many of the present day conundrums, such as integration into a political community and mass migration. The chapter ends with reflections on politics and the nation state. It concludes that politics needs borders but that, in light of Arendt's understanding of politics, this does not preclude freedom of movement.

Chapter 3 gives a descriptive historical background for understanding liberation theology, starting at the turn of the nineteenth century. It describes the more recent social and political experiences of the two case-study countries and their different immigration histories, concentrating on the more recent period (from the 1970s). It provides historical evidence of the process of political disappointment that took place in both countries in the early 1980s – desencanto in Spain, and 'TINA' in Britain.

Chapter 4 sets out the methodology applied in this study: a grounded theory approach, underpinned by the philosophical assumptions of Elias' theory of social processes, whereby long-term mutual changes in social and personality structures constantly reconfigure subjectivity. It explains the rationale for using a mixed-methods, cross-national, comparative and longitudinal research design and describes the research process.
Chapters 5–7 analyse the data from the two case studies, demonstrating how the case-study organisations portrayed migrants over a period of approximately thirty years, what these portrayals revealed, and their political and social significance.

Chapter 5 focuses on two pivotal moments in the Spanish case-study organisation – the introduction of interculturalism in 1991, which led to a portrayal of migrants as damaged through the experience of the migration process, and the migrant occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide in 2002, in which migrants were portrayed as ‘manipulated’ and in which their political struggle was delegitimised. It is argued that the humanitarian framing of migrants, rather than their portrayal as political subjects, had implications for the meaning of empowerment: the idea of protection from harm (the humanitarian outlook) trumped the political subjectivity of migrants; within a humanitarian perspective the intermediary was shown to act as the external agent to empower, rather than migrants empowering themselves through their own action. This chapter contends that the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable and in need of empowerment was premised on an earlier disappointment with ordinary people and with the possibility of their collective political action to transform society.

Chapter 6 focuses on two turning points in the British case-study organisation – the ‘kairos moment’, when the organisation’s work moved away from political solidarity to that of providing services to migrants, and the ‘Rwandan affair’, in which one of the organisation’s employees, a Rwandan refugee, was publically accused of genocide. This chapter illustrates that from the mid-1980s to the early 2010s there was a shift in the organisation’s portrayal of migrants – from a political framing, where migrants were viewed as self-empowered political subjects actively fighting their own political struggles, to a humanitarian framing, where migrants were shown as vulnerable and in need of empowerment. As this case study demonstrates, the humanitarian framing, exemplified in the 2006 Rwandan affair, had
serious consequences: while the organisation promoted its principle of solidarity with 'the vulnerable' in the abstract, no solidarity was offered to one particular migrant who was at his most vulnerable. The shift from the political to the humanitarian is shown to be premised on disappointment with the earlier political struggles in the 'Third World' – the national liberation, anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorship struggles of the late 1970s to the 1990s.

Chapter 7 brings together the case studies into a comparison. It compares the most significant portrayals of migrants and finds that the portrayals were united by a common thread: they embodied the values of both organisations, and these values shifted from the political to the humanitarian. Arguably, this shift reflected the disappointment in collective political action of the past that had aimed to transform society. This chapter closes with an exploration of the political and social significance of the portrayal of migrants at a more abstract level, drawing on the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It highlights the following three key issues: that of the loss of a particular form of integration through politics that contributes to a specific reconfiguration of subjectivity; the difficulty of making political judgements outside of ideologically informed frameworks of the past; and how to act politically (and be in solidarity) when the human subject at the centre of rights and justice is viewed as predominantly vulnerable.
Chapter 1 The migration of the subject

This chapter starts by exposing an apparent contradiction: in the Introduction to this thesis, Brown (1995, 2004) and Pupavac (2001, 2008, 2012) implied that political subjectivity had diminished as earlier political struggles to take rights ceded to humanitarian demands to confer rights. Yet, this chapter provides empirical evidence of the resurgence of political subjectivity, demonstrated by migrants mobilising to demand their rights. It is shown that no contradiction exists, but rather, the empirical reality introduces two tensions: first, political subjectivity has not vanished; however, it acts in a political environment of lowered expectations, leading to ‘the humanitarian dilemma’ whereby migrant rights’ organisations delegitimise political struggles to win small gains on humanitarian grounds. This leads to a tension between the organisations’ interests and that of migrants. Second, migration theorists, inspired by the political struggles of migrants, project their own hopes and desires onto them, the result of which is a ‘utopian’ portrayal of migrants and a mismatch between the desires of the theorists and that of migrants.

This chapter proceeds to demonstrate that the ‘utopian’ portrayal is part of a historical pattern in leftist imagination. It represents the transference of hope onto idealised portrayals of people who disappoint when they fail to live up to expectations. It is argued that a series of reversals in progressive thinking took place, starting with Marxist-oriented Frankfurt School theorists, who seemingly adopted a ‘mass society’ outlook in their attitude towards the ‘masses’ in the post-Second World War period. This trend continued in the New Left and is influential in contemporary anti-racist thinking (Pupavac 2012; Malik 2013). The reversals consist of three significant shifts, all of which are premised on disappointment: the loss of faith in ordinary people and their political subjectivity; the eclipse of ambiguity towards modernity; and the rejection of the universalism of the Enlightenment that had
previously been the hallmark of left-wing thinking (Bronner 2004). In this context, interculturalism, similar to multiculturalism, reflects these reversals, at the heart of which lies the politics of recognition. This politics is interpreted as part of the ‘cultural turn’, which is also a ‘therapeutic turn’. The implications for the meaning of empowerment are revealed and related to the trend in progressive thinking to promote the politics of recognition while demoting the politics of universalism. This chapter ends by suggesting that Arendt (2004 [1951]: 382) found a possible reconciliation between the politics of universalism and recognition (or difference) in her understanding of equality as political equality that thrives on difference rather than equal recognition of difference in the public sphere.

1.1 Migrant mobilisations and the resurgence of political subjectivity


The literature that analyses the recent proliferation of migrant mobilisations describes how they arose in a specific context: changes in European immigration and asylum law and policy from the 1990s generated several millions of ‘illegal’ migrants in the European Union, a situation paralleled in North America (Nyers 2003; Balibar 2004; Laubenthal 2007; De Genova 2009). According to these theorists, this
production of “illegality”’ (De Genova 2002: 428) and the intensification of restrictive laws, comprising internal as well as external immigration controls, led to the unexpected: political action by people who usually attempt to remain invisible from the authorities to avoid the risk of deportation.

‘Illegal’ migrants were previously characterised in the literature as lacking agency, that is, as ‘civic dead citizens’, ‘voiceless’ and ‘locked into a position of social and political invisibility’ (Gibney 2000: 19). The literature on migrant mobilisations focuses on the political subjectivity of ‘illegal’ migrants and brings to light an empirical reality that challenges the fatalistic perspective of migrants as victims in an inescapable state of vulnerability because of their lack of rights. Rather than conceiving of them as ‘civic dead citizens’, the literature portrays migrants without legal status as embodying a version of citizenship that is active and rights-taking. This interpretation leads to an important insight: migrant mobilisations play a twofold role for migration theorists. They provide evidence with which to portray migrants as political subjects, as well as offering a useful site for theorising the meaning of citizenship in an increasingly globalised world where traditional collective political action in the nation state has receded. The upsurge of political subjectivity, exemplified by migrants mobilising to demand that the state grants them legal status is, for some of the migration theorists, an act of subversion in which state sovereignty is challenged and an opportunity is opened up to go beyond national politics. This observation is illustrated by Balibar (2004) and Nyers (2003) in the examples below, demonstrating that the portrayal of migrants reflects both the empirical reality and the desires of migration theorists.

Balibar (2004) in his analysis of the mobilisations that started in France in 1996, known as the sans-papiers movement, views migrants as having the potential to transform citizenship through their political action. The capacity and courage of non-citizens to act politically
without being prompted by external actors, in solidarity with those who are already part of the polity is, for Balibar, an act of citizenship in itself. Balibar interprets the *sans-papiers*’ eruption into the public space as ‘active citizenship’ or ‘direct participation in public affairs’ (ibid.: 48). This active citizenship, which then encourages an ‘activist solidarity’ (ibid.) is considered to be a step towards transforming citizenship: it has the potential to expand the polity, as did working-class men in the past, followed by women who demanded through their political action the democratisation of, and inclusion in, the public sphere. Today, Balibar affirms, it is the turn of migrants to lead the way to the transformation of citizenship and to the ‘democratisation of borders’ – ‘Immigrants [are] today’s proletarians’, he proclaims (ibid.: 50).

Nyers (2003) interprets the political activism of Algerians in Québec who self-organised to demand their legal status as ‘recreating’ citizenship and ‘reinvigorating democratic politics’ (ibid.: 1090). He introduces the concept of ‘a taking-subjectivity’ (ibid.), which reinstates the practice of taking rights, rather than waiting for them to be conferred by the state. On this account, citizenship can, and should, be conceived in terms of its active, participatory, and democratic dimensions. In addition, Nyers identifies a subversive element to non-citizens who claim the right to legal status because they challenge the state’s control over who can and who cannot be part of the political community. The demands of non-citizens are said to undermine the sovereignty of the state:

> If people without legal status demonstrate a taking-subjectivity when they do not have legal status, they make visible the violent paradoxes of sovereignty. Taking on the status of a political activist engaged in acts of self-determination is worrying for the sovereign order (ibid.: 1080).

Nyers sees the contemporary historical juncture, ‘globalisation of late modernity’, in which the situation of ‘illegal’ migrants in western states
constantly presents a challenge to state sovereignty, as providing an opportunity to rethink political action beyond the nation state.

The political subjectivity of migrants inspires Anderson (2010), Krause (2008), De Genova (2009) and Però (2007); however, they uncover a tension underlying all the migrant mobilisations, which is key to this thesis: the gains made through collective action are achieved by withdrawing from the political, that is, by exchanging a political for a humanitarian agenda. This is exemplified by Anderson’s research on female domestic migrant workers in private households in Britain. Anderson describes how the myth of the docile female migrant without agency was dispelled when, against all expectations, these women overcame the extreme isolation of the private sphere and stepped into the public domain to demand the legalisation of their immigration status. Anderson claims that these migrant workers made citizenship through their collective political action, which consisted of joining a trade union, building grassroots solidarity and negotiating with the Home Office. Yet the concessions they won from the state were not the result of a political approach, rather, a humanitarian one: recent British government concerns with human trafficking provided an opportunity for migrants’ rights organisations to portray the domestic workers as victims of trafficking in order to strengthen their case. While Anderson understands this as pragmatism to make gains in a politically hostile climate, she also highlights the dangers. Echoing Pupavac (2008) and Brown (1995), she believes that the portrayal of migrants as victims, that is, being constructed as vulnerable in order to deserve to receive state protection, excludes them from having agency. This leads Anderson to an important conclusion – ‘human trafficking sucks the politics out of citizenship’ (2010: 72).

Nyers (2003), Krause (2008) and Però (2007) draw out the above conflict, indicating that a problem exists particularly where the allies in solidarity with migrants are service-providing organisations. Però (2007), in his analysis of the Barcelona migrant mobilisations and
church occupations in 2001, questions whether government-funded migrants’ rights organisations jettison their independence. He concludes that the organisations that deliver services contracted out to them by the local authority conformed to government policy during the protests; they feared losing political patronage and so their interests diverged from the interests of migrants who made more demanding claims on the state. The question of state funding and to what extent it may influence both the portrayal of migrants and the organisations’ actions arises in different forms in the two case-study organisations and will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Krause (2008), in her discussion of the sans papiers movement, demonstrates how organisations acting in solidarity with migrants played a restraining role, albeit out of seemingly good intentions. Mindful of the inhospitable climate for any progressive changes in immigration law, these organisations argued that small concessions could be won only on the government’s terms and so they wanted to take forward individual cases for regularisation on compassionate grounds. Political solidarity and principled stances were judged to be expedient and a hindrance to making practical gains for a few people. Dividing migrants up according to their chances of individual success of being granted legal status took precedence, contrary to the desires of many of the migrants, who staunchly refused to be divided into the ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’, that is, who the state considered more or less deserving of regularisation. This indicates that a compassionate approach has the potential to delegitimise the political struggles of migrants. A similar scenario arose in the Spanish case study in the 2002 migrant occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide, which is analysed in Chapter 5.

In this thesis, the tension between political and humanitarian approaches to struggles for migrants’ rights by migrants’ rights organisations will be called ‘the humanitarian dilemma’. While the notion of the ‘humanitarian dilemma’ reveals a divergence between the
strategies of migrants and that of migrants’ rights organisations, some of the literature on migrant mobilisations implies that there may also be a mismatch between migrants’ desires and the desires of the migration theorists. This is exemplified by De Genova (2009) and Squire (2009), whose desires for migrants to act as a catalyst for a new form of citizenship outside of the nation state or to play a subversive role by rejecting state sovereignty may not be shared by migrants themselves, as illustrated below.

De Genova (2009) is critical of the way in which migrants attempted to gain legitimacy in the 2006 Day without Migrants mobilisations in the United States. Mass mobilisations took place around the country to protest against the passing of a new immigration law, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, which would criminalise the estimated eleven million ‘illegal’ migrants living in the United States. These protests culminated in a one-day strike and boycott on May Day 2006, supported by several millions of people. De Genova interprets this as an extraordinary show of strength from migrants, a positive upsurge of political subjectivity and ‘an insubordinate act of making themselves visible’ (ibid.: 450). Yet he calls the protests ‘defensive’ and ‘limited’ because migrants generated a ‘legitimating discourse’ – they carried the United States’ flag and various placards declaring that they were patriotic, good, hard-working migrants, despite being ‘illegal’. While De Genova regards the mobilisation of several million migrants without legal status as their discovery of the power of collective action, he interprets it as reflecting a conformity and complicity. He expresses disappointment that migrants displayed loyalty to the state and a desire to be included in the nation, rather than to challenge its existence.

Through her analysis of the situation in Britain under the 1997–2007 Labour government, Squire (2009) illustrates the clearest example of migration theorists who have no expectations of national politics and thus use their theorising around migrant mobilisations to go beyond
national borders to reinvigorate politics. She claims that the government's populist style of politics created a consensus against migrants that could not be challenged. Squire understands national politics as emptied of political possibilities and her solution is to move beyond the nation state to a new cosmopolitan political alternative. She places her hopes in migrants' political subjectivity, which provides the catalyst to create a new form of politics, outside of any territoriality. With this move, Squire circumvents the domestic arena rather than address the crisis of political subjectivity. This escape from the national also reveals a lack of trust in citizens; while Squire's understanding of the state of national politics is similar to Bauman's (see Chapter 2), he is sympathetic to ordinary people, or to the 'left behind' (Bauman 1998, 2003), as well as to migrants on the move. Squire, on the contrary, has no illusions in the political capacity of ordinary citizens and pins her hopes on migrants to overcome the political impasse. In this respect, she makes the following assertion:

It is in drawing attention to the political agency of refugees and migrants in this way that our analysis might move beyond a territorial frame of political community – a frame that is constituted both through and against various processes of deterritorialisation (ibid. 2009: 146).

The resurgence of political subjectivity demonstrated by migrant mobilisations is as inspiring as its portrayal is problematic. None of the migration theorists above offer an explanation for the decline of political subjectivity on the national level. Instead, migrants represent a new hope for its revival. In 1999 Cohen made insightful observations about ‘utopian representations’ whereby the migrant becomes

a transgressive subject replacing the ‘international proletariat’ as a site for the projection of revolutionary hopes (1999: 10).
An updated version that chimes well with contemporary times and with the wishful thinking that is implied in much of the literature explored above comes from Andersson (2014) in his in-depth fieldwork investigating migration and the ‘illegality industry’. He makes the following observation:

The figure of the irregular migrant, obsessed over by western states, has also become a source of inspiration for radical intellectuals, journalists, and activists in recent years. In their accounts and campaigns, the migrant often appears as a heroic or even revolutionary subject: a symbol of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’, a rebellious burner of borders, or a repository of the dream of free worldwide movement (2014: 247).

The implication we can draw from Cohen and Andersson is that the portrayal of migrants reflects the preoccupations of the portrayer rather than the actual reflection of migrants. While the empirical reality is mirrored in the portrayal of migrants as political activists, there is another dimension: the portrayal of migrants can be seen as part of a historical pattern in left-wing imagination that consists of the idealisation of, and subsequent disappointment in, groups of people excluded and marginalised by the polity. The next section will demonstrate how this process of idealisation has historical precedents. It looks at the journey from the idealisation to the vilification of that former ‘revolutionary subject’, the working class, and its replacement by other sites for the ‘projection of revolutionary hopes’.

1.2 From the celebration to the vilification of the masses: historical and sociological explanations for the rise of the migrant as a new universal subject

It is useful to view periods of recent sociological history as being defined by what makes them distinct from previous periods. Social theorists associate the 1960s and 1970s with the ‘cultural turn’
(Eagleton 2000; Elliott 2007), the 1980s with the ‘end of the working class’ (Gorz 1982; Tilly 2004) and the 1990s with the ‘end of history’, epitomised in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Fukuyama 1993). On this account, we have reached the ‘endpoint’ of human ideological development with the so-called triumph of liberal democracy. Historical periodisation, however, should not exclude an awareness of the fact that the defining features that characterise a particular era may already be present in earlier times, as illustrated below.

The writing of the Marxist-oriented Frankfurt School theorists both in the pre- and post-Second World War periods influenced a reversal in leftist attitudes towards ordinary people or the working class. Giner (1976) fits some of the main representatives of the Frankfurt School, for example, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm, into the category of thinkers who interpret the world through a ‘mass society’ outlook. Although mass society theory has a long tradition in western thought, grounded in a particular portrayal of the majority of society by an elite minority (ibid.), here we are concerned with the mass society outlook that arose with the expansion of democracy in modern societies and the rise of mass politics. It may be surprising to place Marxist-oriented thinkers inside a body of thought that is usually categorised as conservative whereby the ‘masses’ are held in contempt and feared. Prior to the Second World War, Marxists were defined by their celebration of the ‘masses’ – the revolutionary class that would lead the way to emancipation and the new socialist society (Berman 2010 [1982]). Giner and Berman argue that this sentiment gradually diminished and was suddenly eclipsed in the post-Second World War period when progressive radicals embraced an outlook previously only held by conservative thinkers.
Berman observes:

What is more surprising, and more disturbing, is the extent to which this perspective thrived among some of the participatory democrats of the recent New Left (2010: 29).

Giner makes the point more starkly:

The traditions of the mass society theory had been confined to conservative thought. Indeed, they were one of its hallmarks. Yet, on the eve of the Second World War, but very especially after it, ‘progressive’, socialist and radical political theory and sociology widely adopted the theory (1976: 249).

The embrace of a mass society outlook by progressive intellectuals can be interpreted as an expression of disappointment in the working class because it did not fulfil the historic role Marx had ostensibly assigned to it. By placing this group of German Marxist academics firmly in their historical context we can gain a fuller explanation for the sense of disillusionment that pervades their work. Giner (1976), Bell (2010 [1960]), Callinicos (1999) and Villa (2008) see the shift in perceptions as a reflection of despair arising out of two sets of European historical events. One such set of events occurred during the First World War in which the socialist movement suffered a ‘political and moral defeat’ following its high point in the pre-First World War period (Giner 1976: 250). The other consisted of events between 1936 and 1942: the Spanish Civil War, the Nazis in power in Germany and the Soviet Union’s betrayal of the anti-fascist movement. In combination, these historical occurrences marked the defeat of working-class struggles. While a sense of pessimism arising from such a reversal may be understandable, it does not explain why the collapse of the working-class movement should lead to contempt and to the adoption of a mass society outlook. Bell offers a convincing explanation and indicates the dangers that lie in idealised portrayals. He suggests that the idealisation
of the ‘masses’ by radical leftist thinkers rapidly turned into vilification because the idealised version of ordinary people never had a real existence:

From the start, Marxism, too, spoke of ‘the masses’ and glorified them where pessimism shunned them. The formal coincidence in this abstract treatment of the people and its different components goes a long way to explain the choice of the mass society theory as the most plausible ideology to be adopted by disappointed or frustrated radicals (Bell 2010 [1960]: 251).

The first three chapters of this thesis, which take a long historical view, illustrate how the paradigm of idealisation and vilification, based on hope and on subsequent disillusionment, repeats itself in history. It emerges again in the data chapters of this thesis, demonstrating how the portrayal of migrants by migrants’ rights organisations is another version of this reoccurring pattern, albeit in a different context.

The New Left

The ideas of the Frankfurt School consolidated in the post-Second World War period and they were taken up by the New Left and the new social movements (Giner 1976, Callinicos 1999, Villa 2008). The key features that distinguished the New Left from the traditional left can be categorised as follows: first, the New Left emerged outside of the traditional institutions of the working class, such as the Communist and Socialist parties and the associated trade unions; second, it relocated the agent of social transformation from the labour movement to new social movements outside of the working class, mainly in the university; third, its focus for theorising turned away from the economic to the cultural sphere; fourth, its goal was not to take political power (Heartfield 2006; Susen 2010; Dubet 2004; Melucci 1989). These features are interrelated, but they do not necessarily fit such neat distinctions,
as explained at the end of this section; rather they expose some contradictions that are particularly relevant to the Spanish case study.

**The discrediting of the traditional institutions of the working class**

In the post-Second World War period, the traditional institutions of the working class were discredited (Marcuse 1964; Giner 1976; Heartfield 2006), which explains why the New Left developed, to a large extent, outside of them. The founding document of the New Left, the *Port Huron Statement*, written by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1962, stated that ‘the dreams of the older left were perverted by Stalinism and never recreated’ (1962: 3). Marcuse, the Frankfurt School theorist who became one of the New Left’s iconic figures, was insightful in his description of the growing irrelevance of the western Stalinist and Socialist parties, which once had large working-class support. He expressed particular contempt for the role of European Communist parties and their co-option into the capitalist state:

> As for the strong Communist parties in France and Italy, they bear witness to the general trend of circumstances by adhering to a minimum programme which shelves the revolutionary seizure of power and complies with the rules of the parliamentary game … If they have agreed to work within the framework of the established system, it is not merely on tactical grounds and as short-range strategy, but because their social base has been weakened and their objectives altered by the transformation of the capitalist system (as have the objectives of the Soviet Union which has endorsed this change in policy). These national Communist parties play the historical role of legal opposition parties ‘condemned’ to be non-radical. They testify to the depth and scope of capitalist integration, and to the conditions which make the qualitative difference of conflicting interests appear as quantitative differences within the established society (1964: 21).
In addition to the discrediting of traditional working-class institutions, the working class itself was perceived by the intellectuals associated with the New Left, for example, Marcuse and C. Wright Mills, as acquiescent, co-opted or reactionary. In *One dimensional man*, Marcuse held no hope in ordinary people being capable of exercising political subjectivity through old methods of collective action because in contemporary capitalist society consumer culture controlled them:

The totalitarian tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional ways and means of protest ineffective – perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of popular sovereignty. This illusion contains some truth: ‘the people’, previously the ferment of social change, have ‘moved up’ to become the ferment of social cohesion (ibid.: 257).

**From old to new social movements**

The New Left (as defined above, in opposition to the traditional left) relocated the agent of social transformation from the labour movement to new social movements outside of the working class. *The Port Huron Declaration* identified universities and students as the potential new site for bringing about social change, in alliance with black civil rights campaigners and others excluded from mainstream society. Marcuse identified a new historical subject among the excluded and marginalised; he saw them as having the potential to overthrow capitalism because of their outsider position:

However, underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force
which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game (ibid.: 256–57).

Scott (1990: 16) claims that Marcuse ‘discovered’ the new historical subject outside of the working class, and yet, there were earlier ‘discoveries’. Birchall (2013) writes that national liberation movements in the ‘Third World’, predominantly consisting of peasants, had become the focus for revolutionary hopes of the European left by the 1960s. An early substantiation of such a claim can be found in Sartre’s well-known introduction to Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the earth*, published in 1961. Sartre expressed his own hopes for ‘third world’ revolution by replacing the Marxist slogan ‘Workers of the world unite’ with ‘Natives of all under-developed countries unite!’ (quoted in Arendt 1972: 123).

The identification of new revolutionary subjects arose out of the historical context and actual events in Europe and the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a result of the post-war boom and increased affluence, the student population grew and began to contest prevailing authority, in contrast to the labour movement, which appeared more acquiescent. Unrest also came from outside of the traditional working class, for example, from civil rights movements in the United States and Northern Ireland, and decolonisation and anti-imperialist struggles from Cuba to Vietnam. The Marxist-oriented sociological thinkers in Europe and the United States were part of the fabric of the times, influenced by events around them, as well as by each other’s ideas. C. Wright Mills, a sociological theorist associated with the New Left, along with Marcuse, claimed that the working class as an agent of change was ‘historically outmoded’ and that ‘a possible immediate radical agency for change’ existed in a new political force made up of students and intellectuals (quoted in Bell [2000 [1960]: 424). Other sites were also identified – the historian Tony Judt described André Gorz, best known for his 1982 *Farewell to the working class*, as placing hopes in the rise of a new radical class to replace the traditional working class that would represent
the birth of a new caste of casual, temporary workers – a ‘non-class of non-workers’ – at once marginal to modern life and yet somehow right at its heart (2010: 739).

**From the economic to the cultural sphere**

The shift of focus from economic to cultural questions was not initiated by the New Left. As Callinicos (2005: 246) points out, the Frankfurt School started to make this ‘cultural turn’ earlier, under the directorship of Horkheimer, in Germany in the 1930s prior to exile in the United States. Held (1980: 25) rightly argues that the concerns of the Frankfurt School did not simply turn from the economy to culture, rather, its critique of capitalist society was holistic. There was, nevertheless, a perceptible shift, particularly in the post-Second World War period, towards culture away from the Marxist critique of political economy that can be associated with disillusionment in the role played by the working class, whereby it did not live up to expectations as the agent for social change. This cannot be disentangled from the final key difference between the traditional left and the New Left – that of taking power. The aim of overthrowing the capitalist economic system was replaced by a cultural revolution; taking collective political responsibility for transforming the world was overridden by an emphasis on individual change (Hobsbawm 1998). The old social movements, as Heartfield (2006) and Susen (2010) have commented, aimed to overthrow the existing order and take power, whereas the new social movements had no such ambitions. In her essay *On violence*, Arendt, who admired the energy and joy in action of the 1968 student movement, observed ironically:

> They have no inkling of what power means, and if power were lying in the street and they knew it was lying there, they are certainly the last to be ready to stoop down and pick it up (1972: 206).
Explaining the contradictions

The four key distinguishing features of the New Left (and the new social movements) identified above appear to be contradicted by the case studies discussed in Chapters 5–7, therefore, an explanation is needed. First, the New Left and new social movements in Spain developed within the traditional institutions of the working class rather than outside. Some of the literature on the new social movements links their ascendance to the role they played in opposing the traditional political parties and institutions of the working class. Dubet (2004) attributes the weakening legitimacy of these traditional institutions directly to the pressure put on them by the new social movements. Heartfield (2006) has a different interpretation – the new social movements rose in inverse proportion to the lack of legitimacy of the old traditional left. This interpretation fits the history of Spain: insights offered by Castells (1983), Alonso (1991) and Álvarez-Junco (1994) support this reading. Under Franco the traditional working-class parties and institutions were outlawed, and courageously operated clandestinely. In the 1960s and 1970s, despite their illegality, they were associated with daring interventions, for which they were subjected to brutal repression. They did not lose their legitimacy, rather, they gained credibility (Alonso 1991: 86).

In Spain the new social movements arose outside of the labour–capital conflict, for example the ‘citizens’ movement’ at the local neighbourhood level, which Castells (1983) describes in detail. Yet they were mostly inside the illegal Spanish Communist Party, or at least closely connected to it. During Spain’s transition to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Chapter 3), Spain’s Marxist Communist and Socialist parties played a similar role of betrayal as that given in Marcuse’s account above. Thus, the dramatic and rapid loss of legitimacy of the traditional parties and institutions of the working class brought the Spanish experience into line with other western
European countries at a later stage. The new social movements in Spain only emerged outside of the traditional left after the loss of legitimacy of the old revolutionary left-wing parties.

It was explained that the New Left dissociated the agent of social change from the working class and located it in new social movements. Scott (1990) and Birchall (2013) suggest that the pattern of identifying new historical subjects, followed by subsequent disappointment when they failed to live up to expectations, ended in the 1970s. In fact, the pattern of locating new agents of social change recurs in sociological writing up to the present – Andersson (2014) and King (2016) provide twenty-first century examples, as does the empirical data of the case studies explored in Chapters 5 and 6. This demonstrates that the notion of the historical subject does not completely vanish, as Giddens would have it (1994: 249). It remains in some form, no matter how attenuated, in both the migration theory literature and in the case studies, where it is reflected in the portrayal of migrants.

It was argued that the New Left turned its theorising away from the economic to the cultural sphere and had no ambition to take power or overthrow the capitalist system. Giddens (1994: 3) confirms this, and implies that the new social movements marked a break from the older social movements because they were outside of the ideological struggles of the past. Yet it is evident in the British case study that revolutionary upsurges and struggles taking place around the world as late as the 1990s were animated by Marxist rhetoric and ideas. The ‘cultural turn’ appeared to be contradicted by the fact that traditional politics inside the old ideological framework was alive and well outside of the West. Although referring to a slightly earlier era, Eagleton (2000) is insightful. He observed that cultural issues moved into the foreground in Europe and the United States as the class struggle appeared to be ‘frozen over’ (ibid.: 126). Instead, lifestyle and identity politics became the new battleground. On the other hand, he
demonstrated that cultural issues were only in the background of the revolutionary struggles of national liberation movements:

Culture in the West became the grammar of political struggle. In the colonised world, the era of national liberation struggles, the cultural question took a back seat to political ones, although revolutionary nationalism was deeply rooted in the idea of culture (ibid.).

This explains why the ‘cultural turn’ did not imply a complete disappearance of the earlier political and economic demands made by revolutionary social movements: they aimed to overthrow the capitalist system and to implement socialism. In the case studies, disappointment in the working class and the discrediting of working-class institutions, and disillusionment in ‘third world’ revolutionary movements, arrived at a later stage, when these struggles had subsided.

The next section goes back further into history to look at shifting attitudes towards modernity prior to the First World War, and the dissociation of the Enlightenment from leftist thinking in the post-Second World War period.

1.3 Modernity, Enlightenment and the eclipse of ambiguities

This section examines the attitudes towards modernity of three theorists writing prior to the First World War – Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and José Ortega y Gasset – all of whom could be called ‘embattled liberals’, a term used by Berman (2010 [1982]: 28) to describe Weber. These attitudes are compared with those of the Frankfurt School theorists, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, writing prior to, and following, the Second World War. By bringing these theorists into a comparison, the arguments of Giner (1976), Bell (2010 [1960]) and Berman (2010 [1982]), as discussed in Section 1.2, are confirmed. These Frankfurt School theorists marked an eclipse of
ambiguity towards modernity in left-wing thinking as well as a reversal in attitudes of Marxist-oriented thinkers towards 'the masses'. This is of particular relevance to the Spanish case study, where an unambivalent, negative attitude towards modernity and ordinary Spanish people ran through the documents analysed, influencing the case-study organisation's portrayal of migrants (see Chapter 5). This section also sets the scene for the reversal in left-wing thinking towards the Enlightenment and its universalist outlook, discussed in 1.4 and 1.5.

The tension or ambivalence towards modernity that existed in the work of late nineteenth century theorists, reflecting the ‘thrill and the dread of a world in which “all that is solid melts into air”’ (Berman 2010 [1982]: 13), is succinctly expressed below:

To loathe and rail against the consequences of modernity while being thrilled by its possibilities (ibid.: 14).

The speed at which European social structures and culture were transformed is well described by Durkheim:

Over a very short space of time very profound changes have occurred in the structure of our societies. They have liberated themselves from the segmentary model with a speed and in proportions without precedent in history. Thus the morality corresponding to this type of society has lost influence, but without its successor developing quickly enough to occupy the space left vacant in our consciousness (Durkheim 1933 [1893]: 339).

The consequences of modernity and its impact on society preoccupied Durkheim and Weber, particularly the loss of binding values that could cohere and give meaning to society's members. They also had a related concern – how to maintain social order in newly liberalising mass democracies in which former religious and social hierarchies and moral norms were dissolving. Despite these concerns, neither Durkheim nor
Weber showed any nostalgic yearning for a time prior to incipient industrial capitalism. Durkheim optimistically believed that modern European societies were in transition, and that a new morality would emerge from the structures and institutions arising out of the new division of labour. The ‘mechanical solidarity’ of traditional society may have broken down, but ‘organic solidarity’ (Durkheim 1933 [1893]) would cohere modern societies in the future. For Durkheim (2002 [1897]), the anomie or normlessness created by modernity as a result of the breakdown of traditional communities would only be temporary.

Weber’s view of modern industrial capitalism was less optimistic than that of Durkheim. Weber’s best-known notions widely used in contemporary sociology were utterly pessimistic, for example, the ‘disenchantment of the world’ in which all the magic in traditional societies had vanished as bureaucratisation pushed out any values other than the logic of calculable means-ends rationale, that is, instrumental rationality (Weber 2009 [1915]: 155). His metaphor of the iron cage of industrial capitalism left little hope in people’s capacity to act outside of their inescapable fate in this disenchanted world, driven not by values and ethics but by the soullessness of an ever-expanding system of bureaucratisation (Weber 1985 [1905]: 181). This reflects Weber’s undeniable pessimism. Yet Poggi (2005) makes the following observation:

> Weber does not express any backward-looking lamentation about the ravages of modernity. His view is that society must embrace the present, in all its contradictions and paradoxes (ibid.: 68).

While Durkheim and Weber have been considered to hold a mass society outlook because of their mistrust of the ‘masses’ entering the public sphere in newly-democratising societies (Giner 1976), the Spanish theorist Ortega y Gasset, a contemporary of both Durkheim and Weber, is seen as the mass society exponent par excellence (Giner 1976: 76; Bell 2000 [1960]: 23). Contrary to Bell’s opinion that ‘(i)n Ortega,
one finds the most sweeping attack against all “modernity” (2000 [1960]: 23), a closer reading of Ortega y Gasset’s paradigmatic text, *Revolt of the masses*, reveals a mixture of excitement and trepidation towards modernity. Ortega y Gasset was more extreme than either Durkheim or Weber, both in his celebration of the transformations and promises of modernity and in his strident attack on the new type of individual arising out of mass society.

Ortega y Gasset’s description of ordinary people is pertinent to this study because Marcuse’s 1960s depiction is reminiscent of it. The ‘masses’ or the ‘average man’, according to Ortega y Gasset, enjoyed the fruits of expanded social rights and new technology that produced accessible consumer goods, ignorant of how they were produced. This new character type had no desire to distinguish himself or herself from anyone else, and lacked any capacity for critical thinking. Ortega y Gasset’s contempt for the *demos* is clear. What makes his work significant is that while his loathing of ‘hyperdemocracy’ and his contempt for the ‘average man’ was unambiguous, he expressed a thrill in modernity’s possibilities even if it was also problematic:

> Our present day life as a programme of possibilities is magnificent, exuberant, superior to all others known to history. But by the very fact that its scope is greater, it has overflowed all the channels, principles, norms, ideals handed down by tradition. It is more life than all previous existence, and therefore all the more problematical. It can find no direction from the past. It has to discover its own destiny (ibid.: 113).

He saw a positive side of the ‘triumph of the masses’, in which, once the constraints of the traditional social structures had loosened, people could make their own life choices – modernity opened the door to unprecedented potential (ibid: 108). This is in marked contrast to Marcuse, who unwittingly updated Ortega y Gasset’s mass society portrayal:
The people recognise themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobiles, hi-fi sets, split-level homes, kitchen equipment (Marcuse 1964: 9).

While Marcuse’s description was equally condemning, it retained none of his predecessor’s ambivalence and allowed no escape from what could be seen as an iron cage that was even more oppressive than Weber’s (Villa 2008: 23). For Marcuse, mass man and woman were so duped by the comfortable, affluent life offered by the ‘totally administered system’ that they had no possibility of becoming critical of it:

In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this question cannot be taken as their own ... The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation (Marcuse 1964: 6–7).

Ortega y Gasset held ambivalent views towards modernity, but he was unequivocal about what could be understood as the spirit of the Enlightenment – critique. He viewed as problematic modern societies’ neglect of those Enlightenment tools of critical thinking and the use of reason. Some of the Frankfurt School theorists, on the other hand, not only ended the ambivalence towards modernity – that love–hate relationship described above – they also turned against the Enlightenment.

The publication of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment in 1947 marked a complete change of perception towards the
Enlightenment from leftist quarters that continues to dominate sociological thinking today. This observation is explored further in Section 1.4. Adorno and Horkheimer (1997 [1947]) in their examination of capitalist culture, epitomised by the Hollywood culture industry, portrayed ordinary people within this culture not as potential political subjects but as subjected, manipulated and dominated by ‘a totally administered system’ created by the mass media, mass leisure and mass production. Rather than the famous challenge sapere aude, that is, have the courage to think for yourself, and use your own understanding, as Kant put forward in his 1784 essay An answer to the question, what is Enlightenment?, the motto we can extract from Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment is arguably 'Enlightenment is totalitarian' (1997 [1947]: 24), thus tracing a direct line from the Enlightenment to totalitarianism.

Bronner (2004) highlights the importance of this turn against the Enlightenment because it signified a radical break. He claims that the Enlightenment belief in the universal human capacity for reason and its critical use provided the starting point for progressive politics, free from prejudices and tradition (2004: 29). Bronner asserts that for the past two centuries, where one positioned oneself in relation to the Enlightenment ‘used to be a marker of whether you were left or right, radicals on the side of Enlightenment’ (2004: 2). Both Bronner (2004) and Villa (2008) hold the Frankfurt School representatives, Horkheimer and Adorno, largely responsible for dissociating the Enlightenment from progressive ideas and linking it to modern totalitarianism. Weber's theory of rationalisation and his concept of the disenchantment of the world are heavily present in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Callinicos 1999: 178; Villa 2008: 146), but Weber did not conflate modernity with the Enlightenment. Rather, he expressed his wistfulness at the disappearance of the spirit of the Enlightenment with the advent of industrial capitalism:
The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading (Weber 1985 [1930]: 181).

Horkheimer and Adorno (1986 [1947]), by contrast, saw nothing to salvage in modernity or the Enlightenment. In another startling turn, they inverted that emblematic Enlightenment image, Goya's famous frontispiece entitled The sleep of reason produces monsters; instead, they depicted ‘instrumental rationality’ as the producer of monstrosities:

The essence of enlightenment is the alternative whose ineradicability is that of domination. Men have always had to choose between their subjection to nature or the subjection of nature to the Self. With the extension of the bourgeois commodity economy, the dark horizon of myth is illumined by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose cold rays the seed of the new barbarism grows to fruition. (ibid.: 32).

In Horkheimer and Adorno's mass consumer society there was no room for political subjectivity because it could not produce morally autonomous individuals, only manipulated ones who merged into one mass of conformists. The Enlightenment was, according to these theorists, nothing more than ‘wholesale deception of the masses’ (ibid.: 42).

In summary, some of the key representatives of the Frankfurt School made three interrelated reversals or retreats of significance to this thesis: first, the retreat from any faith in ordinary people's political subjectivity; second, the end of ambiguity towards modernity; and third, the turn against the tenets of the Enlightenment, leading to the conflation of the Enlightenment with totalitarianism. This final idea became, and is commonplace, in contemporary currents of sociological thinking from Bauman (1989) to Giddens (1990: 172).
Prior to the Second World War, the Frankfurt-based *Institut für Sozialforschung* [Institute for Social Research], later known as the Frankfurt School, focused its research on the German working class. Based on their work before their exile from Nazi Germany, Horkheimer and Adorno constructed the ‘authoritarian personality’ thesis as an explanation for why the ‘masses’ succumbed to Nazism and fascism (Callinicos 1999: 246; Villa 2008; Giner 1976: 143). Their thesis of the authoritarian personality, their retreat from any faith in ordinary people and the conflation of the Enlightenment with totalitarianism were in direct contrast to the perspective of the political thinker Hannah Arendt. Her background and experiences were similar to many of the Frankfurt School members as a German Jewish intellectual who went into exile from Nazi Germany and eventually settled in the United States. Yet she drew opposite conclusions to her contemporaries in the Frankfurt School. She saw no causal link between modernity, Enlightenment, totalitarianism, or the Holocaust. She did not see the working class as more prone to totalitarian solutions than other social classes (Arendt 1966) nor did she make any categorical condemnation of ordinary people (Arendt 2004 [1951]: 19). She saw Nazism as a phenomenon that broke with western tradition, not as a logical consequence of it, as the quotations below illustrate:

Nazism owes nothing to any part of the western tradition, be it German or not, Catholic or Protestant, Christian, Greek or Roman ... Ideologically speaking Nazism begins with no traditional basis at all, and it would be better to realise the danger of this radical negation of any tradition, which was the main feature of Nazism from the beginning ... On the contrary, Nazism is actually the breakdown of all German and European traditions, the good as well as the bad ... (Arendt 1994a: 108–9).

The Nothing from which Nazism sprang could be defined in less mystical terms as the vacuum resulting from an almost simultaneous breakdown of Europe's social and political structures (ibid.: 111).
In contradistinction to the analysis of some of the Frankfurt School’s main representatives, Arendt understood the crisis of liberalism as one of the important factors that allowed a vacuum to develop in which the ‘alternative modernities’ (Griffin 2007: 55) of Nazism and Stalinism could flourish.

Another striking contrast between Arendt and the Frankfurt School thinkers lies in their attitude towards the Enlightenment. Arendt’s writing on the Enlightenment shared with Weber that sentiment mentioned above: the Enlightenment started full of promise, which was gradually extinguished. Arendt’s friend and mentor, the philosopher Karl Jaspers, rebuked her for not appreciating sufficiently the Enlightenment (1992: 193), and yet, she admired and shaped her thinking through two of the greatest representatives of the German Enlightenment: Emmanuel Kant and Gotthold Lessing.

In her discussion of critique, Arendt (1992) illustrated through Kant that the Enlightenment’s defining feature was its negative attitude of subjecting everything to critical examination:

Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to such criticism everything must submit. Religion ... and legislation ... may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination (Kant’s preface to Critique of pure reason, quoted in Arendt 1992: 32).

The above captures the liberating aspect of the Enlightenment, or the ‘age of critique’, in which subjecting everything to questioning results in thinking for oneself. Critique as ‘a new way of thinking and not a mere preparation for a new doctrine’ (ibid.) broke the pattern of dogmatic thinking without falling into relativism. Kant’s notion of critique established open-ended critical thinking. It involved ongoing questioning and contestation that ruled out the creation of a permanent
truth for all times. This did not lead Arendt into the relativism of postmodernist thinking because of the importance she gave to the human capacity for judgement. She agreed with Kant that judgement required ‘an enlarged mentality’, that is, a plurality involving the different ways of seeing of the many people living together in a polity, in order to form opinions and make open-ended judgements.

The capacity for judgement explains why Arendt opened the door that the Frankfurt School shut on political subjectivity and the possibility for people to act politically. This is explored further in Chapter 2. It is also pertinent to the case-study chapters of this thesis, in which, over the course of thirty years, the traditional ‘black-and-white’ frameworks for making political judgements and acting politically vanished.

The next section explores a very different notion of plurality to that of Arendt’s – multiculturalism, and the Spanish version, interculturalism – which arise in societies consisting of a plurality of minority ethnic groups. The dissociation of left-wing thinking from the ideas of the Enlightenment (Bronner 2004) signified a turn away from a universalist outlook, and consequently, led to a suspicion of ideas that were once held to be universally applicable; the loss of belief in ideas that could have universal relevance to all of humanity had implications for the meaning of politics. This is discussed in the following section and is revisited in the case studies. This section also introduces the notion of the human subject damaged by misrecognition that will provide a link to Chapter 2 and the idea of the reconfiguration of subjectivity.

1.4 Multiculturalism and interculturalism – the end of universal understanding?

In the British sociological milieu, the concept of interculturalism is not as familiar as that of multiculturalism. Chapter 3, which describes the
different immigration histories of Spain and Britain, shows that Spain introduced intercultural policies for managing its recent phenomenon of migration, and it considered interculturalism to be an alternative to multiculturalism. The meaning of multiculturalism is seldom explained by those using the term in the academic literature and beyond. Parekh (2006), Miller (2006) and Malik (2013) provide some clarity by identifying three distinct meanings of multiculturalism:

- As an empirical reality, that is, a description of many contemporary societies, or 'the lived experience of diversity' (Malik 2013: 7).

- As a political project to manage diversity, consisting of government policies to support minority cultures to maintain their distinct cultural identities and to offer public recognition of these identities.

- As a philosophy, or even an ideology, where the celebration of cultural diversity is seen as a good in itself and public recognition of minority cultures is understood as an ethos.

The three distinctions can be said to apply to interculturalism, and all three arise in the Spanish case study in Chapter 5, where the notion of interculturalism emerges as key to the analysis of the portrayal of migrants. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the normative meaning of interculturalism, that is, as a philosophy or ideology. In this section, the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘interculturalism’ are used in this normative sense.

The meaning of interculturalism is best defined in comparison to multiculturalism. Meer and Modood (2012) and Taylor (2012) argue that all the components of interculturalism coincide with multiculturalism’s foundational features. They argue that interculturalism’s supposed key differences – interaction between
cultures and the creation of a new political community based on this interaction – exist within multiculturalism. These theorists regard interculturalism as complementary to multiculturalism, not as an alternative. Zapata-Barrero (2012) and Cantle (2012), on the other hand, insist that interculturalism is distinct from multiculturalism. Zapata-Barrero (2012: 1) calls it a ‘third way between assimilation and multiculturalism’. Both theorists believe that interaction, the key concept of interculturalism, makes it qualitatively different to multiculturalism – interaction affects social change by creating a new kind of polity. Cantle offers a clear distinction:

Whereas multiculturalism is concerned with respecting and acknowledging cultural diversity, allowing different cultures to coexist, and in a sense, reinforcing differences, the key feature of interculturalism and what differentiates it from multiculturalism is its sense of openness, dialogue and interaction between cultures leading to long-term change in both relational and institutional arrangements (2012: 157).

In opposition to this view, Parekh (2016) points out that interaction, dialogue and creating a new shared political community have always been part of multiculturalist theory. Zapata-Barrero and Cantle disagree and argue that interculturalism is needed to counter the perceived shortcomings of multiculturalism, that is, fragmentation and segregation through the promotion of cultural diversity rather than communality through the promotion of interaction and respect for different cultural identities. They say that the contemporary situation of ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2006), brought about by new migration in the age of globalisation, makes multiculturalism inadequate for contemporary times.

By challenging the ideas of multiculturalism, interculturalist theorists give multiculturalist theorists the opportunity to restate multiculturalism’s key features. It appears that the supposedly
distinctive features of interculturalism already exist within multiculturalism – what is different is the emphasis placed on the various features. Whichever side of the argument we take, there is a similarity between them that does not emerge in the above discussion. They are both part of the ‘cultural turn’, which is also a ‘therapeutic turn’ because at the heart of multiculturalism and interculturalism lies ‘the politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1994). This mode of politics, which is synonymous with ‘the politics of difference’ and ‘identity politics’ (ibid.), centres on the idea that withholding recognition of cultural identity causes psychological harm. This is key to Taylor’s seminal essay, Politics of recognition (1994), and his thoughts on authenticity, identity and misrecognition. However, as will be shown below, it has implications for notions of empowerment.

Multiculturalism is often presented as a positive development arising from the radical demands of the New Left in the 1960s (Parekh 2006; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Miller 2006). It is seen as an advance on the limitations imposed by a Marxist analysis of the primacy of class, which neglected sex and race inequality. For this reason, Banting and Kymlicka see the rise of multiculturalism as a continuation of the ‘modern human rights revolution’:

The same human rights ideals that inspired the struggle against colonialism, racial segregation, and caste discrimination have also inspired the struggle by other historically disadvantaged ethnocultural groups to contest the lingering manifestations of ethnic and racial hierarchy (2006: 9).

This raises the issue of universalism and particularism. The early human rights struggles for equality were underpinned by a universalist philosophy (Sen 2006) that had the potential to unite rather than divide, for example, the black civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King emphasised political equality over cultural recognition, that is, equal, not different rights. While advocates of multiculturalism
claim that multiculturalism is all-inclusive because it can address every form of inequality, not just class or material and economic inequality, some of multiculturalism's progressive and leftist critics (Sen 2006; Malik 1996; Jacoby 1999) see the primacy given to cultural equality as leading to fragmented societies consisting of numerous self-contained cultures with little hope of developing a collective emancipatory project.

Taylor (1994) understands the notions of equality and identity as modern phenomena that emerged in western societies when traditional ideas of honour, based on hierarchy, gave way to ideas of dignity, based on equal recognition of the individual. He sees 'two modes of politics' deriving from the politics of equal recognition, one of which is 'the politics of universalism', the other, 'the politics of difference'. The first mode implies that everyone should have the same rights recognised, whereas the second mode moves in an opposite direction – everyone should have their distinctness, or their unique identity, recognised. As Taylor says, the two modes come into conflict with each other and the tension between them animates the discussion on multiculturalism. According to Parekh, no multicultural society has yet managed to achieve such a reconciliation:

... cultivating among their citizens a common sense of belonging while respecting their legitimate cultural differences and cherishing plural cultural identities without weakening the shared and precious identity of shared citizenship. This is a formidable political task and no multicultural society so far has succeeded in tackling it (Parekh 2000: 343).

Taylor and other advocates of multiculturalism see the second mode, the politics of difference, as having been historically neglected and therefore in need of redress. Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2006) and Modood (2013) argue that the two modes of politics are both desirable and, in theory, compatible. Kymlicka (1995) perceives universal rights,
such as freedom of speech and universal suffrage, or the ‘traditional human rights principles’ (ibid.: 18) as he calls them, as valid but in need of supplementation with special rights for minority cultures. He believes that this ‘group differentiated citizenship’ (ibid.: 125) is compatible with universality because it signifies that minority groups receive public recognition and support, as well as the dominant or majority culture in society – this leads to justice for all. Parekh (2006) asserts that public recognition of minority groups is a prerequisite for building a shared commitment to a political community, and so the reconciliation between Taylor’s two modes of politics is desirable even though no mechanism to enable it has yet been found. Modood claims that multiculturalism is not about cultural rights displacing universal political equality or economic opportunities. Instead, he talks of an ‘extended concept of equality’ (2013: 33) that allows equal membership in the political community as well as offering everyone respect:

Multiculturalism can be defined as the challenging, the dismantling, the remoulding of public identity in order to achieve an equality of citizenship (ibid.).

Yet Jacoby (1999) and Malik (1996) think that the two modes of politics set out by Taylor, and endorsed by Kymlicka (1995), Parekh (2006) and Modood (2013), are irreconcilable – they also contend that the politics of difference is undesirable. This should not be confused with difference being undesirable. They critique multiculturalism from a left-wing, progressive perspective that favours diversity and immigration, but they interpret the rise of multiculturalism as emerging out of a sense of fatalism and despair in the possibilities of structural social change. Identity politics for these two writers marks the loss of faith in more ambitious political projects for equality and social justice. While Jacoby accepts as positive those multicultural policies that lead to the diversification of workforces and of the educational curriculum, that is, ‘more voices and different faces’ (1999: 63), he sees these tangible changes as largely symbolic; the left, he argues, has elevated the notion
of pluralism into an ideology to compensate for the absence of more transformative political projects:

Stripped of a radical idiom, robbed of a utopian hope, liberals and leftists retreat in the name of progress to celebrate diversity. With few ideas on how a future should be shaped, they embrace all ideas. Pluralism becomes the catch-all, the alpha and omega of political thinking. Dressed up as multiculturalism, it has become the opium of disillusioned intellectuals, the ideology of an era without an ideology (ibid.: 32).

Jacoby could be accused of subscribing to what Kymlicka and Banting (2006:13) call the ‘crowding out’ and the ‘misdiagnosis’ theories, whereby the embrace of multiculturalism is seen by left-wing critics as the diversion of political energies away from the ‘real issues’. Yet rather than a distraction from politics, Jacoby understands multiculturalism as walking into a vacuum created by the defeat of utopian hopes in alternative political projects. He despairs at the poverty of left-wing political imagination, which he interprets as adopting the old liberal notion of pluralism as if it is something new: ‘as a conceptual and political breakthrough’ (1999: xii). For Jacoby, this reflects a political retreat and is a sign of the times – ‘an age of political exhaustion’ (ibid.: 10).

Caricatures of multiculturalism portray it as being completely hostile to the notion of universalism. The advocates of multiculturalism discussed above cannot be accused of that; however, they can never reconcile the universal and the particular so long as they understand universalism as the dominant group’s particular identity masquerading as the universal. Malik’s view that equality has been redefined from ‘the right to be the same’ to ‘the right to be different’ (Malik 2013: 8) is too glib to be able to show whether universalism and particularism are mutually exclusive. After all, in the real world most people want the same rights under the law even though in many multicultural societies people also
want additional rights that are culturally specific. Yet it is the demand for the right to have equal public recognition of cultural identities that moves us onto ‘a battleground’ that Bauman (2004: 77) perceptively calls ‘identity’s natural home’. In this sense, interculturalism is no different.

**Therapeutic versus political empowerment**

As a philosopher of ‘the self’, Taylor is well-placed to explain how modernity brought with it a shift in the understanding of the self and a new ‘ideal of authenticity’. Taylor explains that this ideal of authenticity, the notion that we each have ‘an original way of being human’, was first articulated by Herder at the end of the eighteenth century (ibid.: 30). Ideas of self-realisation, self-fulfilment and the discovery of our inner selves constituted what Taylor calls ‘a massive subjective turn in modern culture’ (ibid.: 29). Herder, according to Taylor, understood this unique way of being as applicable not only to individuals, but also to ‘culture-bearing people’ – the volk. Herder criticised European colonialism for preventing other cultures from finding their own unique ways of being, but he also argued that each culture was in need of maintaining its authenticity against any form of miscegenation. This has led Herder to be interpreted as an ambiguous figure in the literature on multiculturalism: Parekh (2006: 67) considers the positive legacy of Herder as leading away from racial thinking; Malik (2009: 126) sees him as an unwitting precursor to racial thinking.

Taylor (1994: 36) claims that the denial of cultural recognition is a form of oppression and one that causes psychic harm. According to Taylor, it was Fanon who consolidated the idea that cultural misrecognition caused psychological damage in his 1961 book *The wretched of the earth*, in which he analysed the Algerian anti-colonial struggle against France. Fanon argued that the colonisers imposed what they believed to be their superior culture on the colonised at the same time as portraying the colonised culture as inferior. In this double move the
colonised internalised the demeaning images of themselves. Taylor says that this pattern is long established, starting as early as 1492 when the Europeans, in their colonisation of the Americas, projected an image of the indigenous and colonised people as inferior and uncivilised. In contemporary times, Taylor says, recognition is understood as a vital human need and its denial, or misrecognition, constitutes a harm. Parekh concurs with Taylor:

Our understanding of the nature, sources and subtle forms of violence is deeper, and we appreciate that just as groups of people can be oppressed economically and politically, they can also be oppressed and humiliated culturally, that these and other forms of oppression reinforce each other, and that the concern for social justice needs to include not just economic but also cultural rights and well-being. Thanks further to the developments in the sociology of knowledge, psychoanalysis and cultural psychology, we appreciate better than before that culture deeply matters to people, that their self-esteem depends on others’ recognition and respect, and that our tendency to mistake the cultural for the natural and to unwittingly universalise our beliefs and practices causes much harm and injustice to others (2006: 8).

Fanon’s anti-colonial study offers rich material on which to draw and Taylor’s conclusions are valuable. Yet Fanon’s text has been used to confirm arguments against universalism when it could be subjected to a different reading. In his famous introduction to The wretched of the earth, Sartre made an invective against western humanism as ‘an ideology of lies’ and a project of hypocrisy to justify the violence, exploitation and plunder of imperialism. He mocked the slogan of the French Revolution as consisting of empty words – ‘Chatter, chatter: liberty, equality, fraternity, love, honour, patriotism and what have you’ (2001[1961]: 22). Sartre, in the quotation below deals his coup de grâce:

High-minded people, liberal or just soft-hearted, protest that they were
shocked by the inconsistency; but they were either mistaken or dishonest, for with us there is nothing more consistent than a racist humanism since the European has only been able to become a man through creating slaves and monsters (ibid.: 22).

Sartre appears to reflect not Fanon's line of thought but rather Aimé Césaire's thinking; in his 1955 Discourse on colonialism Césaire made a parallel between the brutality of western colonisation and that of Nazism. He exposed the double standards of the West in this condemning statement:

The very distinguished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him (ibid.).

Césaire's final conclusion was that a direct line ran from western civilisation to Nazism: 'At the end of formal humanism and philosophic renunciation, there is Hitler' (ibid.: 37).

In fact, Fanon, although stridently critical of western hypocrisy and actively supportive of armed struggle to overthrow colonialism, provided a more nuanced view. He did not trace a linear path from the Enlightenment and modernity to Nazism, and, contrary to his proponents, he neither condemned universalism nor did he elevate particularism in the form of cultural identity. Sartre was mistaken when he said that Fanon spoke only to the colonised. While under no illusions about the difficulties of winning support, Fanon expected political solidarity from European people against their governments' colonial policies for the benefit of all people:

This is a huge task which consists of reintroducing mankind into the world, the whole of mankind, will be carried out with the indispensable help of the European peoples, who themselves must realise that in the past they have often joined the ranks of our common masters where colonial questions were concerned. To achieve this, the European
peoples must first decide to wake up and shake themselves, use their brains, and stop playing the stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty (2001 [1961]: 84).

Above, Fanon showed that although he was not entirely confident that European workers would rise to the occasion, he did not see them as incapable of using their own minds, nor did he dismiss European culture as racist. He had a respect for European thought, which he saw as providing a collective or universal solution that could bring about a ‘new man’ (ibid.: 255):

All the elements of a solution to the great problems of humanity have, at different times, existed in European thought. But Europeans have not carried out in practice the mission which fell to them, which consisted of bringing their whole weight to bear violently upon these elements, of modifying their arrangement and their nature, of changing them and, finally, of bringing the problem of mankind to an infinitely higher plane (ibid.: 253).

Fanon (ibid.: 74) emphasised the universal as opposed to the particular when he condemned colonialism for compartmentalising people into ethnic groups as a tool to divide and rule; for Fanon, self-respect was not about cultural recognition, rather, it was about taking political responsibility. Involvement in the collective national liberation struggle empowered everyone and restored the self-respect of a whole people who had been deprived of it by colonialism:

When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation they will allow one to set themselves up as ‘liberators’. They show themselves to be jealous of the results of their action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fate of their country in the hands of a living god. Yesterday they were completely irresponsible; today they mean to understand everything and make all decisions (ibid.).
Fanon’s belief that self-respect and empowerment were restored to people through direct political action and not through an abstract notion of cultural recognition is key to the notion of empowerment. Whatever one’s opinion of violence in the struggle for emancipation, Fanon portrayed the strong political subjects that developed out of the struggle for liberation from political domination:

At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect (ibid.: 74).

As will be illustrated in the case-study chapters of this thesis, when the earlier collective political struggles ebbed away and political subjectivity declined, so the meaning of empowerment changed from Fanon’s robust version to a therapeutically informed notion.

The Introduction to this thesis started with a reminder of how the ideals of the French Revolution (liberty, equality and fraternity), which developed out of the Enlightenment, proceeded to act as a catalyst, setting into motion emancipatory movements throughout the world for freedom against slavery and domination. These emancipatory movements, taking inspiration from those universal ideals, continued until the late twentieth century. Todorov (1993) and Malik (1996) argue that progressive anti-racist thinking inverts the idea of universalism so that it has become synonymous with colonialism, imperialism and racism. From the analysis of Fanon’s work, only a universalist politics could lead to greater human freedom through collective political action. The politics of recognition with the damaged, rather than political, human subject at its centre has implications for meaning of politics and empowerment. The case studies will show how the humanitarian approach to migrants’ rights led to an understanding of the human subject as vulnerable; this, in turn, led to consequences when migrants as political subjects contradicted the humanitarian portrayal of migrants as vulnerable. The shift from the political to the
humanitarian is theorised in Chapter 2. The final section of this chapter explores whether there is any mechanism available to reconcile the tension between universalist and particularist politics.

1.5 Equality and difference – reconciling the irreconcilable?

Bauman (2004) asks a key question that both multicultural and intercultural theorists have sought to answer: How is it possible to live together in light of profound cultural differences? Or, in Bauman’s words: ‘how to achieve unity in (in spite of?) difference and how to preserve difference in (in spite of?) unity’ (2004: 41–42). Bauman paints a bleak picture that implies that no reconciliation is possible. With the end of the ‘integrating powers of class’ Bauman describes ‘a proliferation of battlegrounds’ (ibid.: 36) on which an infinity of group identities fight over their grievances, jealously guarding their particular issues. He makes the possibility of building any common ground or any politics with a common purpose seem remote. Hannah Arendt and her understanding of politics open up a way to both reconcile, and to go beyond the binaries of the universal and particular. This will be discussed in Chapter 2; however, another reconciliation is required: that of equality and difference. In the final part of this chapter, Arendt’s ideas on this matter are explored in an attempt to show that they can take us further towards reconciliation between equality and difference, without devaluing difference, and at the same time, avoiding its politicisation.

Arendt consistently criticised the particularism of identity politics and she supported a universalism that is out of synch with contemporary sensibilities. In her 1969 essay On Violence, she wrote that black students needed decent basic education and not ‘soul courses’, taking her stance from black civil rights activist Rustin Bayard. She feared that pandering to black students’ demands for culturally specific university curriculums would later be seen as ‘another trap of the white man to
prevent Negroes from acquiring an adequate education’ (1972: 194). She thought that she would be vindicated in the future, but she was mistaken, as demonstrated in the fact that in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, identity politics has become stronger than ever. Arendt’s independent and critical thinking did not make her popular in her own times nor did it lead her to always make the right judgement, and yet, her thinking on universalism and particularism, and equality and difference can help to advance thinking on this matter.

For Arendt, there was nothing natural about equality, contrary to the universal declarations that ‘we are born equal’. Rather, it was socially constructed through the political organisation of our societies:

Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organisation insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organisation … (Arendt 2004 [1951]: 382).

Difference, on the other hand, was ‘natural’, that is biologically given. Of course, Arendt did not take into account developments in identity – Chapter 2 shows how Giddens was prescient in his anticipation of the path taken by identity politics and our capacity to change the physical characteristics of the body with which we are born. However, Arendt stated that difference should not be politicised: only if one is attacked for that difference must one stand up and defend oneself as that particular identity, and society should also show political solidarity in defence of the universal principle of justice for all. Arendt used the example of the Dreyfus affair to illustrate the consequences of not doing so. The significance of the Dreyfus affair was as follows: the failure to defend the French Jewish army officer Dreyfus as a member of an oppressed people when he was framed by a fellow officer and
imprisoned on a treason charge, marked the final collapse of the one universal value of the French Revolution that, according to Arendt, could have saved the century from subsequent disaster – the principle of justice for all before the law. France was divided into two camps – those who believed in ‘abstract’ or universal justice and those who believed in the particular nation state of France:

There was only one basis on which Dreyfus could or should have been saved. The intrigues of a corrupt Parliament, the dry rot of a collapsing society, and the clergy’s lust for power should have been met squarely with the stern Jacobin concept of the nation based upon human rights – that republican view of communal life which asserts that (in the words of Clemenceau) by infringing on the rights of one you infringe on the rights of all (ibid.: 137).

Not to defend the universalism of the republic, as Arendt bitterly commented, meant that the Dreyfus affair, closing in 1909, was a ‘dress rehearsal for the later performance’, or ‘the prelude to Nazism’ (ibid.: 20).

Arendt understood the psychological comfort and warmth of being together with one’s own culture as a refuge from persecution and racism. It made ‘insult and injury’ bearable but she said that in political terms it was ‘absolutely irrelevant’ (Arendt 1951c: 17). To make a politics out of one’s hurt and suffering was contrary to the meaning of politics and a retreat from the public realm, although perfectly understandable in extreme circumstances. Brown (1995) takes Arendt’s thinking into the context of the late twentieth century, the ‘age of identity politics’ (ibid.: 54). She sees the past universal political identities being replaced by ‘politicised cultural identities’ (ibid.). Brown does not believe that these ‘politicised cultural identities’, each with ‘its own history of suffering and pain’ (ibid.: 74), can further the pursuit of an emancipatory democratic project. This form of identity, for Brown, politicises what is not political – pain. Yet without
dismissing the hurt and suffering contained within these identities, she recommends finding a balance that acknowledges the pain without encouraging ‘the steady slide of political into therapeutic discourse’ (ibid.). Here Brown succinctly articulates how the ‘cultural turn’ is also a ‘therapeutic turn’ as discussed in the previous section.

Arendt’s way of reconciling equality and difference can only be understood in relation to her notion of politics, which is discussed in Chapter 2. For Arendt, equality could only be experienced through political integration, not the integration into those older political identities, based on class, or political ideology, but through collective political organisation in which everyone is an active participant. The mode of political organisation that Arendt envisaged is very different to the current mode of politics that exists in modern democracies, which might be described as a mere shadow of what political equality could look like. Yet even this limited political equality contains an unsurpassed egalitarianism:

Under modern conditions, this equality has its most important embodiment in the right to vote, according to which the judgement and opinion of the most exalted citizen are on a par with the judgement and opinion of the hardly literate (Arendt 2006 [1963]: 237).

Arendt valued difference but was critical of the politics of difference. Political equality thrived on difference and, without it, there would be stasis: if everyone saw everything from the same point of view there would be no contestation and no way to move forward. The only way to reconcile equality and difference, then, was not by politicising difference and demanding its recognition in the public sphere, but rather, by everyone sharing their difference (or their different perspectives because of their difference) in the political sphere where they could participate in their own self-government. This exacting mode of politics is discussed in the following chapter.
Summary

This chapter demonstrated that at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries political subjectivity had not vanished, but rather it acted within a vacuum. Migrants’ rights organisations that supported migrant mobilisations faced a ‘humanitarian dilemma’ which resulted in the devaluation of political struggles for the sake of small gains on humanitarian grounds; this clashed with migrants’ interests. Migrant theorists inspired by the upsurge of political subjectivity placed ‘utopian’ hopes on migrants who were not necessarily conscious of the role they were expected to play.

The transferral of hopes onto migrants was seen as part of a pattern that reoccurred since the 1960s with the ‘cultural turn’ away from the working class and the labour–capital conflict. Mass society theory usefully illustrated how the idealisation of the working class switched to its vilification in the eyes of disappointed leftist intellectuals and activists. This led to a transferral of political illusions onto other ‘ready-made vanguards’. This chapter argued that the ‘cultural turn’ was also a ‘therapeutic turn’. Furthermore, multiculturalism and interculturalism were part of this double turn, and both were premised on a damaged, rather than a political human subject. The collapse of more ambitious political projects for social change gave rise to a rejection of universalist outlooks. The traditional form of emancipatory politics gave way to the three synonymous forms of politics, that of ‘the politics of identity’, ‘the politics of difference’ and ‘the politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1994). The idea of empowerment shifted from a political notion (empowerment through collective struggle and emancipation) to a therapeutic one. This shift gave rise to the conception of a vulnerable human subject at the centre of politics. This chapter concludes that reconciliation between the politics of universalism and that of difference is possible if we have political equality, not just before the law, or through being governed by our elected representatives, but through a politics that
consists of self-government and active participation in the political sphere by all of us. Chapter 2 explores this reconciliation in more depth.
Chapter 2 Political subjectivity without borders

This chapter builds on the discussion started in Chapter 1, in which the politics of recognition was shown to have at its centre a damaged human subject. This chapter draws on a body of literature that identifies the long-term social and political changes that reconfigure human subjectivity (Jacoby 1971; Lasch 1991[1979]; Sennett 2002 [1977]; Berger et al. 1973). This reconfiguration of subjectivity is predominantly defined by a lack of a ‘strong, stable sense of selfhood’ (Lasch 1991 [1979]: 239), infused with ‘therapeutic sensibilities’ (ibid.: 7). The focus for change migrates from the external world (the fight against capitalism) to the inner, subjective world of the individual. The chapter proceeds to explore the context for a particular reconfiguration of subjectivity in the post-Cold War period, in which political identity no longer provides an integrating role and in which the loss of a shared understanding of the world through politics collapses as the earlier polarised, ideological framework disappears. This is followed by a detailed examination of Hannah Arendt’s meaning of politics and an explanation as to why a prejudice against politics exists in the western political tradition. Freedom from politics rather than political action as human freedom is shown to lead to consequences such as the humanitarian aims of political struggles overwhelming the goal of achieving political freedom. It is argued that Arendt provides the opportunity to conceive of politics outside of earlier ideological frameworks in which political actors are not complete authors of their actions, but, nevertheless, can aim for collective human freedom. The chapter concludes with a discussion on why politics needs borders, and why this does not preclude freedom of movement. The two notions are compatible with a bounded territory if politics is understood in the sense meant by Arendt, whereby it has the capacity to integrate everyone into a polity.
2.1 The reconfiguration of subjectivity and an end to identity conferring institutions

In his 1971 article *The politics of subjectivity*, Russell Jacoby makes an intriguing statement: ‘The cult of subjectivity is the direct response to its eclipse’ (Jacoby 1971: 126). Captured in this line is an anticipation of the concerns that the social critic Christopher Lasch later articulated in *Culture of narcissism* (1991[1979]). These works, together with Berger et al.’s 1973 *The homeless mind* and Sennett’s *The fall of public man* (2002 [1977]), possibly offer some of the most insightful analyses of the long-term process of change that has taken place in western societies. These changes have led to a particular kind of reconfiguration of human subjectivity; this reconfiguration should be understood as the mutual and corresponding changes in personality and social structures, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis and as developed further below. Jacoby’s statement above, together with the historical context in which it was made, provide the starting point for exploring the reconfiguration of subjectivity in contemporary times.

Jacoby (1971) observed in the New Left and the associated women’s movement a preoccupation with transforming the inner world of the self, rather than the outer world. The intense focus on subjectivity signalled an inward turn to heal the psyche damaged by capitalism instead of confronting capitalist society that wreaked damage on the individual. Jacoby interpreted this move as a political retreat, which he believed led to the diminishing of the human subject. This inward shift could still be couched in Marxist language: the New Left discovered a ‘different’ Marx in *The economic and philosophical notebooks* and reinterpreted his concept of labour alienation as an emotional, subjective condition that spoke to the modern individual’s feelings of alienation (Judt 2010: 403; Jacoby 1971: 125).

Progressive critics of the New Left and of the politics of the women’s movement (for example, Jacoby and Sennett), saw reflected in the
slogan ‘the personal is political, the political is personal’ a degradation of politics whereby private concerns became public and, consequently, the public realm became depoliticised. Sennett (2002 [1977]) explained this development and traced historically the arrival at such a juncture in his exploration of the emergence of the public realm. He observed how, in contemporary times, the personal encroached on the impersonal public realm:

People are working out in terms of personal feelings public matters which properly can be dealt with only through codes of impersonal meaning (ibid.: 5).

Sennett used the clinical term ‘narcissism’ to best describe the new personality structures produced by social changes, whereby the individual was preoccupied solely with his or her own needs and self-fulfilment. He explained the rise of this narcissistic personality type as a disorder:

This character disorder has arisen because a new kind of society encourages the growth of its psychic components and erases a sense of meaningful social encounter outside its terms, outside the boundaries of the single self, in public (ibid.: 8).

Lasch (1991[1979]) took further Sennett’s description of the narcissistic traits of the modern individual: he showed how narcissistic personality structures neither reflected rampant individualism nor a robust sense of self, that earlier western ideal of the individual. Instead, the modern individual had a weak sense of self (ibid.: 239). Lasch believed, contrary to the popular understanding of narcissism as a synonym for egoism, that the clinical understanding provided a more accurate description of the modern individual who depended on others for validation. Self-esteem became dependent on the mirror reflection, not of the self, but of the world, that is, something external to the self and so, a psychological dependence developed on external agencies to
validate the individual. In contrast to Jacoby, Lasch credited the New Left with the discovery of this modern phenomenon, whereby the political was trivialised and ‘collective grievances’ were ‘transformed into personal problems amenable to therapeutic intervention’ (ibid: 14). However, he also demonstrated that by the 1970s the New Left had lost its own insights. It accommodated to the ‘therapeutic sensibility’ (ibid: 7) that, according to Lasch, pervaded modern western society, and it embraced as positive the rise of the dominant personality trait of individuals as vulnerable and in need of psychic healing. This particular reconfiguration of subjectivity is pertinent to the analysis of data discussed in the case-study chapters and to the portrayal of migrants by the two migrants’ rights organisations, where the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable reflected a shift to a predominantly humanitarian framing rather than the earlier emphasis on political framing.

One of the consequences of modernity explored by Lasch and Berger et al. was the loss of meaning outside of the self, leading to inner emptiness and a feeling of homelessness in the world. Berger et al. (1973) examined the impact of ‘homelessness’ of the modern individual through a comparison with traditional societies, in which religion provided ‘the overarching canopy of symbols for the meaningful integration of society’ (ibid.: 73); the disintegration of this ‘canopy’ under the conditions of modernity deprived people of the sense of feeling ‘at home’ in the world, and yet it liberated them – it gave rise to the ‘pluralisation of life-worlds’ in which the individual could choose his or her own life. The modern ideal of the self was premised on the notion of the autonomous individual, free to take his or her own path in life; identity became a ‘life plan’ constantly in the making; however, the liberating aspect of modernity also had its disconcerting side. The absence of any common integrative symbols or any single authority to cohere people together signified the coexistence of many ‘discrepant life-worlds’, in which identity became unstable; it was open-ended, under constant revision and forever shifting in and out of different life-worlds, the result of which was a ‘permanent identity crisis’. The
pluralisation of life-worlds, according to Berger et al., led to the modern human condition of ‘homelessness’, that is, we feel ‘a metaphysical loss of ‘home’ (ibid.: 76) and our lives take on a ‘migratory character’:

The pluralistic structures of modern society have made the life of more and more individuals migratory, ever-changing, mobile. In everyday life the modern individual continuously alternates between highly discrepant and often contradictory social worlds. Not only are an increasing number of individuals in a modern society uprooted from their original social milieu, but, in addition, no succeeding milieu succeeds in becoming truly ‘home’ either (ibid.: 165).

In Chapter 5, which deals with the Spanish case study, the above description of the condition of homelessness and the migratory character of modern existence appears in a remarkably similar fashion, where it applies to both migrants and the general human condition. In the Spanish case study, it is argued that the portrayal of migrants as a metaphor for the human condition reflected social and political changes in which commitments to the political struggle subsided and politics no longer cohered people around a common meaning. This makes the discussion of Berger et al.’s work particularly relevant.

Underlying the discussion on the reconfiguration of subjectivity and the social and political changes that influenced this reconfiguration is the longstanding debate over structure and agency, or the older theme of the individual and society. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine these debates in detail, but the approach of the sociologist Norbert Elias has proved to be the most useful for this thesis for a number of reasons:

1. Elias (2001 [1939]) illustrates how the individual and society are inextricably woven into an ever-evolving network of reciprocal relationships, which reshapes society and individuals within society simultaneously. Individuals change
society and in the process change themselves continually. The reconfiguration of subjectivity is the mutual change in personality and social structures. This understanding rules out any dichotomous approach to the individual and society.

2. Elias demonstrates that, because of the omnipresent network of different agents acting together, there is an element of unpredictability in human action that confounds any predetermined plans in a perplexing but fascinating way:

The interplay of actions, purposes and plans of many people is not itself something intended or planned, and is ultimately immune to planning ... Over and over again the deeds and works of individual people, woven into the social net, take on an appearance that was not premeditated. Again and again, therefore, people stand before the outcome of their own actions like the apprentice magician before the spirits he has conjured up and which, once at large, are no longer in his power. They look with astonishment at the convolutions and formations of the historical flow which they themselves constitute but do not control (ibid.: 62).

3. Elias developed the concept of ‘social habitus’ to show theoretically how the human psyche, the social and historical all converge. Although this may not be unique to Elias, his concept provides a succinct way of analysing the elements that go into the reconfiguration of subjectivity at any point in time. It is important to distinguish this conception from Bourdieu’s idea of ‘habitus’, which is also an attempt to overcome the dichotomous approach to the human agent and social structure. Bourdieu’s notion is, arguably, more deterministic and ideologically charged than Elias’. Bourdieu called his own concept of habitus ‘socialised subjectivity’ (1992: 126); he described the patterns of behaviour through socialisation as so deeply engrained, and domination by class society as so entrenched that individuals have little hope of
breaking from their inherited patterns of socialised behaviour.

The above points should not be interpreted as ceding to a fatalistic or pessimistic view of human and political subjectivity that contradicts the Marxist notion of the history-making capabilities of humanity. This will be discussed in the following sections.

Sociological thinking on the individual and society has, perhaps, not developed hugely since Marx's times. Marx's idea of the self-changing individual human subject is set out clearly in *The German Ideology*. Giddens (1971) interpreted Marx's ideas thus:

Human consciousness is conditioned by the dialectical interplay between subject and object, in which man actively shapes the world he lives in at the same time as it shapes him (ibid.: 21).

Yet it is still relevant to see what is particular to contemporary times and the specificity of today's 'peculiar form of social habitus' (Elias 2001: 204). The inward turn, identified by Jacoby and Lasch above, with its intense focus on the transformation of the self rather than the external focus on the struggle for social transformation has been labelled by other theorists as 'radical reflexivity' of the self (Taylor 1989: 176), or 'radical subjectivity' (Sennett (2002 [1977]: 22). These writers see the traits of the modern individual as the most recent product of a long and complex process of development and refer implicitly to what Taylor called the 'massive subjective turn in modern culture' (1991: 26). These traits can be seen to relate to the defining feature of modernity – transience. The phrase from *the Communist Manifesto*, 'all that is solid melts into air', is commonplace in sociological writing. Sennett (2006) points out that the sense of temporality has been the norm not the exception since Marx’s times; Giddens (1991) sees the characteristics of today's modernity or 'high modernity', as no more than an intense and radical version of earlier periods. It is
therefore important to address, in a less abstract way, what is specific today that reconfigures the human subject in its current form and why it is relevant to this thesis to identify what is novel. The discussion below attempts to draw out the unprecedented and its significance.

Berger et al. (1973) explored the impact of technological production on the personality structures of workers in advanced industrial societies. In his empirical research on the world of workers in the contemporary globalised economy, Sennett (2006) appears to update Berger et al.’s analysis by exploring the structural changes in the workplace in the twenty-first century, and the consequences of these changes on people’s lives and their subjectivity. While Sennett focuses on one particular sector, the large, hi-tech, global finance and service industries, he claims that his findings indicate more widespread cultural changes beyond this sector. In the twenty-first century, the workplace has been dismantled as a site for creating a sense of identity: employment contracts are increasingly short-term and casual, people are forever moving on, and skills need to be quickly acquired rather than gained over time; the stable environments in which people had thought of their lives as long-term narratives have vanished and, as a result, subjectivity has been reconfigured into something unstable and insecure. Although much of what Sennett claims echoes Berger et al. (1973), he writes at a time when profound changes have taken place since the fall of the Berlin Wall. If we compare Sennett with Berger et al. (over three decades apart), a striking difference is revealed: in 1973 the importance of class and the labour movement was still a significant factor in conferring collective identities. The industries in which people worked were conducive to encouraging collective identification with ‘organised labour’ and ‘the working class’. These identifications were still politically significant when Berger et al. wrote perceptively of work and class as an ‘anchor’ in a secular world (ibid.: 85). In 2006 when Sennett carried out his research, these collective identities had lost their significance, and with them, the old forms of political subjectivity that shared a common goal on a worldwide scale.
Closely related to the issue of class and the labour movement is party politics. What is specific and unprecedented in the post-Cold War period is the collapse of traditional party politics and the way in which politics, until recently, had conferred a collective political identity on large numbers of society’s members. The political theorist Peter Mair provides major insights into this development. Mair (2006) shows that conventional political expressions of democracy – for example, allegiance to political parties and voting at elections – have become less vigorous throughout Europe. Mair’s analysis of trends in declining voter participation in elections throughout Europe is important because it explores what it means when large numbers of people in society vacate the political sphere where they had once exercised a degree of control over the political decision-making process. He observes that the exit of the *demos* from democracy (ibid.: 43) was identified several decades ago, in the 1960s. While this is not a new trend it now takes a blatant form. The level of participation in European national elections between 1950 and 1980 remained fairly constant with average turnout levels in the lower end of 80 per cent; however, these levels plummeted towards the end of the twentieth century and have continued downwards in the twenty-first century. Mair observes this trend in both the long-established northern European as well as in the newer southern European democracies. Of particular relevance to this study is Spain and Britain. The 2000 elections in Spain and the 2001 elections in Britain registered all-time lows in voter turn-out of 68 per cent and 59 per cent respectively, a downward trend that has continued in subsequent elections of the twenty-first century.

The empirical evidence of declining voter participation is accompanied by another more significant trend. Mair shows not only that almost half the voting population no longer participates in the electoral process, but in addition, those who do vote have lost any strong identification with a particular party. The ratio of party membership to the electorate fell sharply between 1980 and the end of the 1990s throughout western
Europe. This weakening in political party identification, he argues, increases the trend towards conventional politics becoming a passive spectator activity. The activities associated with political campaigning during elections, such as canvassing, persuading others of why they should vote for their candidate and attending mass meetings, have dwindled. Mair calls this the ‘hollowing out of mass politics’ (2006: 8).

Mair correctly perceives far-reaching social repercussions as a consequence of the loss of identification with political parties and the decline of the European mass party system. Political parties provided a source of identity that connected large numbers of people to each other through a broadly shared outlook, organised around a common political attachment. Political party identification integrated people into a much wider social network than just a political party because of the existence of what Mair calls ‘sister organisations’ – for example, trade unions, churches, mutual societies and social clubs. He traces their disintegration over the last thirty years and concludes that the weakening of traditional collective identities is a result of the increasing individualisation of society, which has led to a retreat towards more privatised worlds. Mair indicates that although this has been a gradual process, there is something unique to the contemporary period – with the end of the Cold War the ideological political projects of the past vanished almost completely and, with them, the older forms of citizens’ engagement, commitment and contestation.

Mair’s intention in exploring recent trends in the conventional forms of parliamentary democracy and the multi-party system is not to expose them as deficient or to mourn their decline. He is more concerned with what it means for politics in practical terms. Whatever the shortcomings of the political party system, Mair captures the positive significance of their role, which he does not believe can be replaced by new social movements and organised interest groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Ultimately, the former have the potential to offer far more inclusion than the latter:
When parties organised their own channels of representation, and when they functioned as mass parties, their reach was potentially inclusive. When representation is channelled through organised interests, on the other hand, however loosely defined, then it is almost inevitable that while some interests will be organised into politics, others will be organised out ... In other words, and as in the past, votes offer a voice to those who might otherwise find themselves excluded from organised civil society, a voice which was always recognised by the mass party, but which may now find itself neglected as those mass parties pass away (2003: 17).

While Mair provides empirical evidence of the transformation of politics across Europe and the wider world, Lechner (1997) interprets at an abstract level the reasons for this transformation and its impact on the social and cultural fabric of societies. For Lechner, the twentieth century was characterised by an ideological polarisation between two alternative social models, capitalism and socialism. This polarisation provided a structure that shaped the political stances and conflicts throughout the world. It also generated a scheme with which to interpret a complex social reality. Regardless of whether these interpretations were simplistic or mistaken, Lechner observes that they produced a long-lasting political framework within which people could place themselves and collectively make sense of their world. The collapse of the Berlin Wall swept away this scheme, leaving a vacuum. What is new about the contemporary post-Cold War period is that the meaning-generating role that politics played in the modern secular world has come to an end with no replacement. Lechner shows that although politics could polarise, it could also integrate. In his exploration of the integrating role that political parties have played, he makes a perceptive comment:

Their main job is to offer interpretive schemes and practical options which allow citizens to order their values, their preferences and their fears, and to integrate them into collective identities (1997: 171–72).
Lechner demonstrates what modern politics has meant in the past in order to reveal what is novel about today’s world. Modern politics had been the tool with which people shaped the future instead of accepting their fate. While there may be no guarantee that the future we construct leads to a better society, politics provided a hope in the possibility to transform society, rather than keeping the status quo. Lechner identifies the hallmark of our times as the failure ‘to generate new horizons’, in which politics no longer promises any social goals for a better common future (1997: 179). Politics becomes nothing more than administrative processes and technocracy; because political parties and their leadership no longer confer meaning to social processes, they cannot offer any interpretive code to integrate a collective of people into a shared identity. This leads to the withering of competing visions for a better future, and the implications for collective political action are profound.

The analysis of Berger et al. (1973), Mair (2006) and Lechner (1997) is relevant to this thesis as they demonstrate clearly how, until recently, the identification with class politics provided a shared interpretive meaning that could integrate large numbers of people into a common understanding of the world. With the decline of such a collective identification, this meaning vanished. Not only do these theorists articulate the way in which the capacity of politics to integrate people into a collective identity has diminished, they also capture the accompanying sense of limits to what political action can achieve. This sense of limits, further illustrated in Chapter 3.2 provides the backdrop against which the analysis of the portrayal of migrants is carried out in the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6.

In light of the transformations described above, it is important to understand how the notion of ‘life-politics’ as developed by the sociologist Giddens (1991) indicates the direction of travel in post-Cold War politics. Giddens’ notion of ‘life-politics’ arises after the complete
orientation away from class as a form of ‘meta-identity’ (Bauman 2004: 35). Having dispensed with the radical leftist ideas about a universal agent for social change as discussed in Chapter 1.2, Giddens (1994, 1991) claims, with hindsight, that there never was a universal historical subject of the working class nor of any other subsequent variation. He asserts that the idea of a revolutionary subject as a ‘ready-made vanguard’ that ‘will more or less automatically come to our rescue (1994: 249) was misguided, particularly when such a ‘vanguard’ supposedly consisted of the world’s most deprived and marginalised people. Regardless of whether or not the notion of the universal subject was ill-conceived, a long-lasting political framework was built around it and large numbers of people collectively made sense of their world through it. The collapse of the Berlin Wall swept away this scheme and left behind a vacuum. Giddens builds his idea of life-politics in this vacuum; he shows how people can still develop a sense of identity even in the contemporary world of intensified flux, provisionality and globalising forces. Rather than reaching negative conclusions about the ‘radical subjectivity’ of modern identity, as did Sennett and Lasch, Giddens embraces it. His notion of life-politics, which develops a sense of self in a constantly changing world, makes a politics out of the self-referential.

Giddens’ endeavour to create a sense of self from within, to weather the storm of the external environment in flux, is a therapeutic one. In this era of ‘high modernity’, Giddens suggests that we can have control and mastery over our lives if we embrace the idea of therapy or self-therapy to help us develop a coherent sense of self through our life narrative or autobiography. Self-history appears to be the only stable thing to anchor ourselves in today’s world. Giddens shifts the focus of politics from emancipation to self-actualisation and in doing so, goes further than the New Left in making an elaborate politics of the personal in the face of the collapse of traditional emancipatory politics. He does not go as far as to say that traditional forms of emancipatory politics, with its emphasis on freedom from exploitation, oppression and inequality, are
outmoded, but rather the politics of choice and lifestyle, which he calls ‘life-politics’, assumes greater importance. This politics is concerned less with contestations in the external world and more with ‘contestations deriving from the reflexive project of the self’ (1991: 215).

Giddens redefines the meaning of politics by embracing uncritically the current state of affairs. The politics of lifestyle, similar to identity politics, can never lead to any shared consensus because, as Giddens says: ‘The more we return to existential issues, the more we find moral disagreements’ (ibid.: 231). This begs the question – if everyone has their own internally referential authority, what kind of politics can ever be formed? In the following section, a very different meaning of politics is explored.

2.2 Hannah Arendt and the meaning of politics: political action and freedom

The exploration of Arendt’s meaning of politics has particular significance for this thesis for several reasons: first, by understanding Arendt’s meaning of politics it will become clear what is meant by anti-politics, a term that has been used in this thesis in the discussion of the work of Brown (2004) and Pupavac (2008, 2012). Arguably, anti-politics has a long history in western thought, although it takes different forms, varying in accordance with social and political experiences of each era. Arendt’s analysis of the anti-political tendency in the western tradition, which she traced up to her own times, enables us to bring it up to date, in light of political experiences in contemporary times, specifically, the fall of the Berlin Wall and its political impact (see Mair (2006) and Lechner (1997) in the section above). Second, although Arendt had a lifelong loathing of the nation state (see Section 2.4 below), she had no contempt of the people within the nation state. Her understanding of politics was based on the potential of people’s
capacity to act, and their capability to judge, outside of ideological or ready-made theoretical frameworks. This leads to the third significance: Arendt politicised the meaning of citizenship in a way that differs from some of the migration theorists explored in Chapter 1.1. While their solution to ‘reinvigorating’ citizenship lies in bypassing the domestic political arena out of despair of their national populations’ lack of political action, Arendt reconceived politics as a collective project of political action capable of integrating everyone into the existing polity through active participation, irrespective of numbers, different cultures or countries of origin.

Arendt's notion of politics is more democratic – and more exacting – than anything that has existed in the past or present. Throughout her work she retained a cautious optimism in our capacity to act and to create spaces of political freedom that, given a chance, could flourish into a new form of government and political system. Although her political concepts may appear abstract, when she exerted her political imagination of what this new form could be, it was always rooted in what had actually happened in history.

Arendt explored the tangible, albeit fleeting, examples of people spontaneously coming together to create a political space in the form of councils, soviets or Räte, which have repeatedly emerged in times of revolution or crisis ever since the French Revolution. While these embryonic forms of an alternative political system, as Arendt saw them, never developed into a long-lasting political structure, they offered inspiring glimpses of what could be. They were, for Arendt, ‘buried treasure’ that remained underexplored or ignored, as if they were unrealistic or utopian political exercises rather than a serious alternative to the European political party system and representative government that developed with the inception of the nation state.

Arendt drew on the concrete experiences of the council systems that she understood as emerging spontaneously in all the political upheavals
of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries – for example, during the French Revolution, in Germany and Austria at the end of the First World War with the Räte system, and in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. They emerged in parallel with, or outside of, the political party system and went beyond representative, parliamentary democracy. Arendt used two particular examples of the council system: that of the 1917 Russian Revolution, and that of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, both of which she believed lasted long enough for her to make an accurate assessment of their importance:

In both instances councils or soviets had sprang up everywhere, completely independent of one another, workers', soldiers', and peasants' councils in the case of Russia, the most disparate kinds of councils in the case of Hungary: neighbourhood councils that emerged in all residential districts, so-called revolutionary councils that grew out of fighting together in the streets, councils of writers and artists, born in the coffee houses of Budapest, students' and youths' councils at the universities, workers’ councils in the factories, councils in the army, among civil servants, and so on. The formation of a council in each of these disparate groups turned a more or less accidental proximity into a political institution. The most striking aspect of these spontaneous developments is that in both instances it took these independent and highly disparate organs no more than a few weeks, in the case of Russia, or a few days, in the case of Hungary, to begin a process of coordination and integration through the formation of higher councils of a regional or provincial character, from which finally the delegates to an assembly representing the whole country could be chosen (2006 [1963]: 258–59).

In the two historical examples above, Arendt observed the following: when people were left to their own devices they came up with the principles of the council system and of federation. Ordinary people in different times and places came up with similar practical and political responses without any theory or prescription and they did so in a remarkably orderly fashion:
Instead of the mob rule which might have been expected, there appeared immediately, almost simultaneously with the uprising itself, the Revolutionary and Workers’ Councils, that is, the same organisation which for more than a hundred years now has emerged whenever the people have been permitted for a few days, or a few weeks or months, to follow their own political devices without a government (or a party program) imposed from above (Arendt 1958: 497).

Arendt marvelled at the capacity of people to organise themselves into political institutions that intuitively replicated the ward system that emerged in the American Revolution. She described this pattern of political organisation as consisting of ‘elementary republics’ or ‘miniature federated units’. Arendt did not fall into the trap of the idealisation/vilification paradigm, described in Chapter 1. Nor did she romanticise ordinary people, and yet she expressed an extraordinary faith in their capacity to act and a trust that they could produce order rather than anarchy or ‘mob rule’ when given the chance to act (Arendt 2006: 255). Arendt’s own marvel at these glimpses of an alternative political formation made her determined to bring them to light, even in the face of the repeated failure of the seeds of this political freedom to grow:

It was nothing more or less than this hope for a transformation of the state, for a new form of government that would permit every member of the modern egalitarian society to become a ‘participator’ in public affairs, that was buried in the disasters of twentieth century revolutions (ibid.: 256–7).

Arendt saw the council system as the only tangible democratic alternative to the existing political system, which had become oligarchic, in the sense that only the few had the privilege of ‘public happiness’. Arendt saw representative parliamentary democracy and the party political system as deficient because, although it allowed the gradual extension of franchise to wider groups in society, it also became the mechanism by which the majority of people handed over control to
their elected representatives. Thus, they relinquished their own participation in self-rule (ibid.: 127), making mass political participation redundant. Arendt observed that the gradual decline of modern political institutions and mechanisms through which people could participate in self-government, and the widening gulf between the governing representatives and the represented, led to the majority of the population becoming politically sidelined (Arendt 2006 [1963], 2005, 1972a, 1972b).

The shortcomings of democratic, representative government and the political party system have been discussed by other political thinkers, such as Crick (1967), Gamble (2000), Mair (2006) and Villa (2008). They all concur that, despite the democratic deficit in existing political systems, more representation and democracy is desirable rather than less. Arendt twice sketched out her idea of what a different political system to our current one might look like. It took the form of government built on more democracy, that is, more direct participation than anything that has existed before. Her imagination dared to take her beyond that mainstay of modern democracy – universal suffrage (1972c, 2006 [1963]). Perhaps now is not the right moment to question such fundamentals of modern democracy. Contemporary scepticism towards democracy and representative government, even among progressive theorists, for example, Žižek (2017), expresses fears that ordinary people should not be trusted with their vote. Arendt’s criticisms of existing democracy, however, were not because of a fear of, or a lack of trust in, people, but rather because there was not enough faith in their capacity for participation in self-government. Arendt’s writing on political action has been evaluated as the most radical theoretical rethinking on the subject in recent times (Villa 2000: 7). Her explanations as to why these inspiring spaces of political freedom never developed into a new form of government is not only part of that rethinking, but also a reappraisal of the whole western political tradition. Arendt made three contributions that offer an explanation as to why these preludes to a new form of government did not come into
fruition, and why each attempt to keep alive such examples of participatory political activity ended in failure.

Arendt observed that the political party system emerged in the incipient nation state in parallel with the council system. The spontaneously formed people’s clubs and societies of the French Revolution and the communal council system presented a challenge to the emerging political party system: the two systems were based on different principles. The parallel council system consisted of ‘federated units’ or ‘elementary republics’ that spread throughout the country; people came alive through their political involvement and discovered the pleasure of politics in debate and contestation, for example, in local-level public meetings to discuss the drafting of the constitution. This was the meaning of ‘public freedom’, or ‘public happiness’ as it had been called in the American Revolution, and people found their identity in their political involvement. Arendt believed that the two parallel systems could not coexist because the communal council system was an incipient form of government that challenged the party political system. The dynamic participation of people in their own government posed a threat to the survival of the party system and so it was crushed every time it emerged, either through boring the participants with bureaucracy, or by physical force (Arendt 2006 [1963]). It is not far-fetched to recall more recent historical examples, for instance, Chapter 3 describes how the action of ordinary people in Spain’s transition to democracy was quickly depoliticised as their representatives diffused the highly-charged political situation of mobilisations and protest through negotiated agreements and compromises with the Francoist regime. All the examples of collective political action that are discussed in this thesis, whether in the literature or in the case studies, show how political subjectivity has not disappeared but it faces obstacles that makes it less sustainable and perhaps even less feasible. These obstacles will be discussed in the case-study chapters. They relate to the issues below in Arendt’s second contribution that explains why the highly political alternative of the council system never consolidated.
Arendt traced the history of western political thought that established a longstanding prejudice against the notion of freedom as political action and which installed the idea of freedom as meaning ‘freedom from politics’ (Arendt 1998 [1958], 2006 [1954], 1960). This tradition encouraged the anti-political desire to be free from the exacting political responsibilities of self-government. Arendt claimed that the experiences of twentieth century politics, namely, fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, further entrenched the prejudice that freedom from politics was desirable (2006 [1954]). She looked back to the ancient Greek *polis* not out of a nostalgic hankering for the past, but because, no matter how remote, it provided a tangible example of when politics and freedom coincided.

For the ancient Greeks, freedom existed only in the realm of politics, in the *polis*, where those who could free themselves from the necessities of life stepped out of the private realm of the household, a sphere ruled by inequality, and into the public realm, in which everyone was equal as no one ruled nor was ruled by anyone else. Access to this political freedom was limited to a small minority and relied on the existence of the inequality and coercion of the majority (Arendt 1998 [1958]: 32, 2006 [1954]: 154). For this reason, Arendt indicated that the ancient Greek understanding of equality had no connection to our current understanding of equality and justice. She extracted from the *polis* what she thought needed to be retrieved – the meaning of politics as interlinked with freedom and action: ‘The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action’ (2006 [1954]: 146).

For Arendt, the separation of politics from freedom, which was deeply rooted in the western philosophical and political tradition, led to the degradation of the meaning of politics and to the tradition of freedom as freedom from politics. The western political tradition of freedom from politics gave primacy to a different kind of freedom – what we call ‘negative liberty’. This was evident in the American Bill of Rights and
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which Arendt interpreted not as instruments of freedom and self-government but as mechanisms to protect the private individual against government. Neither had anything to do with the right to be an active participator in self-government (Arendt 2006 [1954]: 257). Instead, they encouraged the ‘degeneration of the citoyen into the bourgeois’ (2004 [1951]: 105) and led to ‘[t]he victory of bourgeois values over the citizen’s sense of responsibility’ (2004 [1951]: 106).

In this respect, Arendt’s reflections on freedom contain strong echoes of Marx’s On the Jewish Question. For Marx, the citizen was active, participating and political, whereas man was the bourgeois private individual. The French Declaration enshrined the notion of freedom that catered for the latter, according to Marx, by ensuring

> the right to do everything that harms no one else ... The right of man to liberty is based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself (Marx 2002 [1844]: 60).

Arendt did not dismiss the notion of ‘negative liberty’ (synonymous with civil liberties), which included the most elementary liberty for Arendt – freedom of movement (2006 [1963], 1951c), as well as freedom of speech and thought, of assembly and association. In themselves they could not guarantee freedom: negative liberties were ‘the results of liberation but they were by no means the actual content of freedom’ (2006 [1963]: 22). This leads Arendt’s understanding of freedom to diverge from liberals such as Isaiah Berlin and his famous essay Two concepts of liberty (1992 [1969]). Berlin represents the anti-political tradition of which Arendt was critical; he saw negative liberty, that is, freedom from restraints (ibid: 121), as the best way to entrench freedom whereas for Arendt negative liberty was a prerequisite in order to achieve freedom as a political way of life, that is, positive
freedom. Berlin veered in a different direction to Arendt because he saw dangers in positive freedom – it inevitably ended in coercion. Berlin provides a clear twentieth century example of the western liberal tradition’s prejudice against politics. Arendt viewed the French Revolution and subsequent revolutions as problematic not only because they ended in coercion, as did Berlin, but more importantly, because they did not unconditionally establish their goal as political freedom:

Freedom, which only seldom – in times of crisis, or revolution – becomes the direct aim of political action, is actually the reason why men live together in political organisation at all. Without it, political life as such would be meaningless (2006 [1954]: 146).

Arendt said that in times of revolution it was ‘difficult to say where the mere desire for liberation, that is, to be free from oppression, ends and the desire for freedom as the political way of life begins (ibid.: 23). She saw this ambiguity as the dilemma that has arisen in all revolutions since the French Revolution because they gave priority to the ‘social question’ rather than the founding of political freedom (ibid.: 51). Arendt implied that the issue of poverty and the need for basic necessities of life (the social) for the majority of people was so compelling that any strictly political aim vanished in the course of the revolution, or after the taking of power. In this respect, we come full circle back to Berlin and his prejudice against positive freedom: it led to governments forcing onto people what was good for them, rather than seeing them as prospective citizens who were equally up to the task of founding freedom. Instead, they were swept aside so that freedom from necessity could be achieved for them, rather than them achieving a new form of government for themselves. Arendt (1951c) also explored the ideas of compassion, pity and solidarity with ‘the poor’ or the ‘wretched’ and the ‘unfortunate’ – whatever was the particular fashionable term of the era: she observed how revolutionaries were driven by emotions elicited by the suffering of the ‘poor’ to the
detriment of the political aim of the revolution, which captures something key to this thesis – the tendency for the political to be trumped by the humanitarian. A similar tendency emerged in the literature on the resurgence of political subjectivity and migrant mobilisations in Chapter 1.1 and in the case studies. It is discussed in relation to the empirical chapters in Chapters 5–7.

Arendt’s interpretation of the French Revolution as being doomed because its goal of political freedom was overtaken by sentiments of pity for the poor is as fascinating as it is hard to digest. It has led political theorists as diverse as Brown (1995) and Parekh (1981) to find her elevation of political freedom over the ‘social question’ as a step too far. It seems perverse to criticise twentieth century revolutions for prioritising the issues of social conditions of poverty and injustice. Arendt could be accused of a similar insensitivity to Marx, who she ultimately found to be ‘neither interested in justice nor freedom’ (1992b: 216) after initially seeing him as ‘a revolutionary whom a passion for justice has seized by the scruff of the neck’ (ibid.: 160). Yet Arendt was correct in her observation that no revolution has ever solved the ‘social question’ and that freedom from necessity was, and still is, an aspiration in most parts of the world. If we understand the meaning of politics as Arendt did, prioritising the political may be the best way to establish justice and to resolve the ‘social question’. As the case studies will illustrate, the humanitarian taking precedence over the political, and the concern for the plight of ‘vulnerable migrants’ did not prevent harm or lead to greater justice.

Arendt’s discussion of the notions of compassion, solidarity and pity are important to this thesis because they relate to the clash of humanitarian and political values. According to Arendt, compassion – a deeply human emotion and commendable – could awaken a solidarity with the ‘poor’, and this solidarity could go beyond the particular suffering, towards more abstract ideas of justice for all. Pity, on the other hand, was an alternative to solidarity with the ‘poor’, and what Arendt (2006 [1963]:
interpreted as the perversion of compassion. It thrived on the existence of the ‘weak’ and the ‘poor’ whose suffering became glorified by those who pitied their suffering. The ‘poor’ were abstracted, in need of saving by others, and those who set out to save them became the ‘virtuous’. The confusion of the political and the humanitarian led not to the ‘politics of pity’ as Boltanski (1999) suggested, but rather to the ‘anti-politics’ of pity. Arendt saw the fatal combination and yet, in a surprising observation, she said that it was Lenin, in the practical experience of the Russian Revolution, who understood the importance of separating the social question and the political without ignoring either. The elimination of necessity and scarcity, for Arendt, was an issue belonging to the realm of administration, in which society’s ‘collective household tasks’ were looked after; Lenin correctly saw that these practical tasks could be taken care of through technology completely outside of the political sphere – his solution was ‘[e]lectrification plus soviets’ (Arendt 2006 [1963]: 56). The problem of poverty could be solved through technical and administrative, not political, means – electrification was one example of how this could be achieved; the soviet system, the new body politic that had emerged during the Russian Revolution, would be the space for political freedom, thus separating the technical from the political. However, this separation was never implemented and the social question became ‘the very content as well as the ultimate end of government and power’ (ibid.: 99).

In the case of the French Revolution, according to Arendt, the ‘poor’ were not regarded as prospective citizens equally up to the task of founding freedom, rather, they were regarded as objects of pity who needed to be freed from necessity. The aspiration for political freedom and active citizenship disappeared and solidarity with the ‘wretched’ and the ‘unfortunate’ (Arendt 1951c: 14) signified a humanitarian intervention rather than a political one. The aim of the Revolution consolidated into one that ‘improves the lot of the unfortunate rather than justice for all’ (2006 [1963]: 62), and this became the hallmark of
subsequent revolutions. The aim of sustaining active participation in government was never incorporated into any constitution. The ward system consisting of ‘elementary republics’ was only an afterthought. This is why Arendt called these thwarted attempts to bring into existence a different form of government the ‘buried treasure’ of the twentieth century revolutions.

Arendt’s understanding of politics amounts to a highly political alternative that demands an onerous involvement in public life; it is the side of human experience from which most of us are cut off. People who have been involved in such tumultuous events as revolution or political resistance have described it as resembling authentic human happiness (2006 [1961]: 5, 2006 [1963]: 272). Towards the end of her life Arendt reiterated her belief in the human capacity to produce such political alternatives, but she thought that the contemporary political environment was shrinking that possibility (Arendt 2005: 108). The reason for this diminishing prospect of such a political alternative lies in a third contribution Arendt made in her explanation as to why the majority of people absent themselves from politics.

Nothing has yet adequately described the kind of joy people discovered when they participated in collective political action in the moments of upheaval mentioned above. Perhaps these occasional displays of ‘political freedom’ were too evanescent to really capture and name them, which is why they have remained a ‘buried treasure’. This does not signify that they can never re-emerge. In Chapter 3 one can see an echo of this pattern repeating itself in Spain in the 1970s. Political disillusionment that became known as desencanto set in when the joy in collective political action was hindered by the mainstream leftist political parties. During Spain’s largest migrant occupation of 2002, analysed in the Spanish case study in Chapter 5, it is suggested that this ‘buried treasure’ was glimpsed again, and that it was curtailed by the humanitarian concerns of the migrants’ rights organisations. This
makes Arendt’s understanding of politics particularly pertinent to this thesis.

2.3 Making history outside of ideology

Although Marx understood modernity’s defining characteristic as transience, Berman (2010) implied that the idea of living in such a state of impermanence was too hard for Marx to bear; he lost his own insights into modernity’s temporality by giving an impossible solidity to his vision of an alternative modernity, the future communist society. Arendt made a similar criticism of Marx: she praised him for his insights as a historian and his relentless critique in the spirit of the Enlightenment, and yet she criticised his ideas for being prone to conversion into dogmatic ideology that ultimately would become disastrous (Arendt 2005, 1951b, 1992; Arendt and Jaspers 1992). Arendt made two interrelated challenges to Marx, both relevant to this thesis. One is the notion of sovereignty and its association with freedom; the other is the idea of making history. The following quotation from *The eighteenth Brumaire* can be interpreted as Marx’s awareness of the limitations imposed on human agency:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past (Marx 2000 [1852]: 329).

Marx (2000 [1844]: 53) was acutely aware of what he referred to as our ‘illusory sovereignty’ under capitalism and implied that we could only transcend this condition and find ‘real freedom’ under socialism. Yet Marx did not sufficiently acknowledge that we also act in a tangled relationship with many others in the present, and for this reason we cannot be the complete authors of our actions, only actors. In relation to politics, Arendt understood this well:

> Since I act in a web of relationships which consists of the actions and the
desires of others, I never can foretell what ultimately will come out of what I am doing now. This is the reason why we can act politically but ‘cannot make history’ (1994: 196).

What may seem a trivial difference between Marx and Arendt regarding the making of history is actually a fundamental issue that led Arendt to reassess her initial liking of Marx. For Arendt, the Marxist tradition of making history or making a revolution as if it were a product, executed according to a preconceived plan, was not only delusory but dangerous. It violated the principle that we live in a condition of plurality in which ‘we can never become master of our actions as we are master of our productive capacity’ (ibid.: 276). The meaning of politics for Arendt was freedom and yet freedom was identical, not with sovereignty, but with non-sovereignty. She accused Marx of being the originator of the confusion between political action and the making of history. She interpreted his famous dictum: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it’ as the start of a dangerous trend (2005: 86), and she believed that this was an error in Marx’s thinking that allowed his ideas to be developed into a totalitarian ideology (Arendt 2005: 196, 1994, 2006 [1961]. The unpredictability of political action meant that politics was always open-ended and could never, or should never, reach a fixed goal. That would mean to close the door on the new and unexpected, which living and acting together in a plurality always entails. Politics with a fixed end meant the end of politics; for this reason, Arendt accused Marx of aspiring to something that would be appalling – a politics-less society (Arendt 2005: 153).

Arendt’s emphasis on the human condition of ‘non-sovereignty’ led some writers, for example Jacoby (1999) and Mészáros (1970), to accuse Arendt of thinking that action was futile. That could not be further from Arendt’s thought, as shown by her optimism in the human capacity to act (see Section 2.2), and as reflected in all her writing from The Human Condition onwards.
Arendt understood that Marx was not the originator of the idea that we make history in a similar way to fabricating objects. She traced this degradation of politics, as she saw it, to the beginning of the western political and philosophic tradition, starting with Plato. Arendt (1998 [1958]: 225) interpreted Plato’s *The Republic* as his attempt to make a blueprint to replace unpredictable action with fabrication. She believed that from Plato onwards it was not so much a fear of the people (the mass society outlook) but rather the fear of action and its unpredictability that led to this idea of politics. Arendt, rather than fearing action, marvelled at the inherent element in the human condition to start something new through action. She expressed a certain amount of optimism when she called action ‘the one miracle-working faculty of man’ (ibid.: 246), whereby the unexpected and improbable can always happen (ibid.: 178). The condition of non-sovereignty and our capacity for action was not a reason for despair, on the contrary, it ‘contains certain potentialities which enable it to survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty’ (ibid.: 236).

As Arendt herself admitted, it sounded unworldly to talk about politics without an end product and as open-ended; it swam against the current of the longstanding political tradition. This could sound like a call for radical relativism, but relativism is avoided if we link Arendt’s open-ended notion of politics and action to the capacity to make judgements, which she saw as the most political of human faculties. This is a particularly important idea for this thesis as the case studies were embedded in a context in which the traditional framework for politics was collapsing. The radical leftist political tradition judged and acted within the ‘black-and-white’ moral framework of what Trotsky had called ‘their morals and ours’ (1986 [1938]). By contrast, Arendt showed how we have the capacity and the responsibility to make judgements outside of any ideological framework. Her emphasis on judgement is key as it provides the way to reject the absolute truth found in ideology without landing in the trap of relativism or ‘post-modernism’. The faculty of judgement cannot be separated from the
notion of critique or critical thinking as discussed in Chapter 1.3. The issue of independent thinking and making judgements is crucial to the British case study, in which the case-study organisation faced a moral and political dilemma; it could not find the tools to judge outside of the old ‘black-and-white’ framework that had served it in the past, when the polarised world of capitalism and socialism shaped its thinking.

If we live in times in which traditional moral frameworks have lost any authority, as Arendt believed and other theorists, for example MacIntyre (2007), believe, then Arendt is possibly the political thinker who gives us a glimmer of hope because she points to the opportunity that arises from our perplexing times. Instead of looking back to revive old traditions and standards, as does MacIntyre (ibid.), we are free to use our own judgement – to think ‘without a banister’, as Arendt called it (quoted in Hill 1979: 336). While MacIntyre (2007) finds no way of making moral judgements without the existence of traditional authoritative frameworks, Arendt saw our faculty of judgement and our capacity for action as essential tools for living in a world in which traditional frameworks had collapsed.

2.4 Freedom of movement and the nation state: politics and borders

The section above illustrates Arendt’s view that even though the idea of human sovereignty is fictitious it does not mean that we cannot act; it means that because we live in a plurality of many different wills and opinions, our actions are both limited and susceptible to unintended consequences. The same can be said of the idea of nation-state sovereignty. As Pécoud and Guchteneire (2007) observe in their writing on a world without borders, there never was a ‘once-perfect sovereignty’. Any discussion on freedom of movement should be underpinned by the awareness of the limitations of both individual and state sovereignty. It would also be useful to keep in mind Arendt’s
notion of politics when thinking about freedom of movement and the question of borders.

Arendt said that freedom of movement was the greatest, the oldest and most elementary of all negative liberties:

> Being able to depart for where we will is the prototypal gesture of being free, as limitation of freedom of movement has from time immemorial been the precondition for enslavement (Arendt 2014c [1951]: 9).

The above statement should not be taken out of context because it is immediately followed by a qualification:

> Freedom of movement is also the indispensable condition for action, and it is in action that men primarily experience freedom in the world. When men are deprived of the public space – which is constituted by acting together and then fills of its own accord with the events and stories that develop into history – they retreat to their freedom of thought (ibid.).

Arendt brings together freedom of movement as the negative liberty *par excellence* and positive freedom, that is, freedom as political action, the basis for real human freedom (see the discussion on negative and positive liberty in Section 2.2). The connection between the two has influenced the thinking in this thesis and has helped to clarify why the idea of freedom of movement is distinct from the notion of migration without borders. The exploration of these ideas rests on an understanding that the political space we create together can only arise through ‘the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion’ (2014 [1951]: 54), whereby ordinary people actively participate in self-government:

> For political freedom, generally speaking, means the right 'to be a participator in government', or it means nothing (2006: 210).
The implications of this cannot be underestimated – it does not resolve the conflict between the nation state and freedom of movement, but it indicates the path to follow if we believe that freedom of movement should be a universal right.

Arendt’s thinking provides an important alternative to the views of migration theorists discussed in Chapter 1.1, which demonstrated a desire to bypass national populations in order to reinvigorate politics and to create a better world. Arendt thought that ‘the most unlimited democracy’ could only materialise within territorially limited boundaries. The existing political unit in which we live is the nation state, to which Arendt had a life-long loathing. However, she understood that at its inception it was related to a democratic form of government (1994 [1948]: 216) that had the potential to cohere a plurality of people into a self-ruling collective polity. It did not live up to its potential: the nation state underwent a rapid degeneration and quashed any notion of people’s self-government; it generated nationalism as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘blood and soul’ to cohere the polity’s citizens. The result was that

the nation had conquered the state, national interest had priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce ‘right is what is good for the German people’ (ibid.: 275).

Does this mean that the particularism of the nation state should be replaced by more cosmopolitan ideals? Chapter 1.1 explored the migration theorists who aspired to a cosmopolitan or even a stateless world. When we use our political imagination to think about an alternative way of organising political life to that of the nation state, it would be useful to have at the base of any reimagining a common starting point: any polity should be built on the most democratic, participatory and accountable form of government. The political thinkers Brown (2010), Benhabib (2004) and Arendt (2004 [1951])
contend with the contradiction inherent in the nation state – the particular and universal – first laid down in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen – and whether it can ever be reconciled within our current mode of political organisation. They all agree, however, that we can only act politically within delineated boundaries and only in the particular (for example, as citizens of a specific territory).

The radical political theorist Wendy Brown (2010) addresses the question ‘how is an unbounded polity possible?’ and concludes that states (enclosed by borders) are

the only meaningful sites of political citizenship and rights guarantees, as well as the most enduring emblems of security, however thin practices of citizenship have become, however compromised and unevenly distributed rights may be, even in democracies (ibid.: 67–8).

Brown remains sceptical of those who advocate for global citizenship or ‘democracy without borders’ (ibid.: 45) and claims that political citizenship can only have meaning within borders. Benhabib (2004, 2011, 2009) accepts the need for an ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ because democracy ‘needs closure’ – that is, democracy can exist only within the borders of a defined territory.

Recent sociological writing about migration in a globalised world often expresses a sense of inevitability in which globalising forces create a world of people on the move and weaken the nation state. On this account, we have no choice but to embrace those forces (Bauman 1998; Sassen 2006). For Bauman (2003) and Lechner (1997) globalisation leads to political paralysis. While Susen (2015: 128) warns against such ‘alarmist’ claims, for some it is an opportunity (Sassen 2006; Giddens 1991; Anderson et al. 2009). Of particular relevance to this thesis is how globalisation is perceived to impact on politics within the nation state. Bauman (1998, 2003) understands politics as being forced out of
its national boundaries, into the global sphere where a globalised political structure has yet to emerge; citizens remain attached to a local territory but can have little influence on political life in their locality. There is no possibility of politics within the national arena, and yet no new global space exists in which politics can appear:

Whoever thinks of doing something about the plight of the world, of improving the current shape of the human condition, adding something to human possessions or altering the mode in which they are used – would rather look elsewhere. Focusing hopes and efforts on the extant, hopelessly local tools of joint action to the place to which it has moved. The name of this place is no-place, no-land, no-territory (Bauman 2003: 18).

Bauman’s understanding of the contemporary state of politics is pessimistic because the process of globalisation is seen to deprive people of political subjectivity in the old nation-state framework with the ensuing result: ‘Being local in a globalised world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation’ (Bauman 1998: 2). Sassen (2006) takes a more optimistic position to Bauman – the globalising trends are an opportunity to move towards a more cosmopolitan form of politics, which she sees as already existing in the tangible example of the European Union (EU). This is the view influential among the migration theorists explored in Chapter 1.1, but it is a problematic one. Mair (2006), who explored the ‘hollowing out’ of western democracy, showed that where electorates have become estranged from their national, political institutions, the problem is not solved by moving politics to the EU. Mair (2007) describes the EU as a political structure that is deliberately built to be less accountable to national electorates. Moreover, he suggests that the EU has a fear of people:

the tendency is to believe that the structures of power and decision-making may need to be protected from the people (ibid.: 103).

The EU’s development away from accountability to national electorates
worries Mair, whereas Žižek (2017) believes it to be a safety net because he mistrusts ordinary people in a democracy to ‘do the right thing’ (ibid.: 11). He poses the question of what happens in a democracy if the majority vote for what is morally wrong. Arendt posed a similar question to Žižek: what if the majority of society one day democratically voted to get rid of a part of its members (2004 [1948]: 379)? She was acutely aware of the inherent danger whereby we, the people, are the guarantors of rights in a democracy. As mentioned in Chapter 1.5, there can be no certainty that we will guarantee each other our rights but this uncertainty led Arendt to open her imagination to a political form of government that placed even greater responsibility on, and trust in, ordinary people. The historical reluctance to trust ordinary people’s participation in politics, discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, makes the idea of such a form of government sound unrealistic, yet without it democratic politics can have no meaning.

**Can we reconcile freedom of movement and the nation state?**

In the actual world, the question is whether there is any way to reconcile freedom of movement with the existence of the nation state and whether, ultimately, nationalism is synonymous with xenophobia and racism. Benhabib believes that she has found a reconciliation by thinking with Arendt but going beyond her. Arendt’s well-known phrase ‘the right to have rights’ was intended to capture the paradox that played itself out in the years between the First and Second World War, when hundreds of thousands of people lost their right to belong to any political community and found that there was no such thing as the ‘rights of man’ but only those of nationals. According to Benhabib (2004), we have made progress since Arendt’s days. Belonging to a polity can be based on civic not ethnic membership, and we are in the process of developing international laws and institutions that can guarantee human rights regardless of national status. Benhabib (2004, 2011, 2009) suggests a way to go beyond Arendt and to reconcile the nation state, democracy and the rights of citizens with
cosmopolitanism, universal human rights obligations and ‘porous borders’. Her reconciliation is a compromise – ‘cosmopolitanism without illusions’, which she reaches through a series of thought processes she calls ‘democratic iterations’ (Benhabib 2009: 37). These consist of the following reasoning:

- The nation state does not automatically produce the kind of nationalism Arendt had in mind, now that civic, not ethnic membership, can be a criterion for citizenship.

- An ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are necessary because democracy ‘needs closure’ – that is, democracy can only exist within the borders of a defined territory.

- In a cosmopolitan and globalised world, borders of the nation state are ‘porous’. Benhabib takes further Kant’s idea of universal hospitality by regarding the guest (migrants and refugees) as ‘a potential citizen and political consociate’ (ibid.: 41).

- The distinction between human rights and citizens’ rights cannot be eliminated, nor does Benhabib think that it would be desirable. To do so would dissolve what is essential to democracy – borders that define a spatially limited territory.

- Because the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ need to exist, the polity will always exclude some people from its membership. Benhabib believes that through the practice of ‘democratic iterations’, a solidarity can develop from within the borders, and from without. This implies some kind of national conversation whereby, through rational debate, citizens are persuaded to agree to meet international human rights obligations, rather than having universal norms imposed upon them (ibid.: 38). While this may sound eminently sensible, it is rather abstract
and far removed from the rough and tumble of robust, practical political action that is Arendt’s notion of politics.

Benhabib’s position, while sympathetic to the cause of migrants and refugees, is not dissimilar to writers such as Goodhart (2013), Collier (2014) and Baudet (2012), who take a harsher position against ‘porous borders’. All three arrive at some compromise to suit the globalised world: Goodhart favours ‘moderate nationalism’; Collier prefers ‘a benign sense of nationalism’; and Baudet talks of a more theoretical compromise – ‘sovereign cosmopolitanism’ and ‘multicultural nationalism’. These writers all uphold the idea of a nation state that is open to newcomers of any national origin, albeit at a slower pace and in smaller numbers than recent years, and all oppose supranationalism – the imposition of international law on nations. The main difference with Benhabib is that they describe the symptoms of the nation state’s loss of cohesion as if they were the causes, whereas Benhabib reveals the causes of the symptoms:

Immigration and porous borders, rather than being causes of the decline of citizenship, are themselves caused by the same maelstroms which are undermining national political institutions: namely, the globalisation of capital, financial, and labour markets (although people are never as mobile as money and assets); lack of control over the movements of stocks and bonds; emergence of catch-all and ideologically non-differential mass parties; the rise of mass media politics and the eclipse of local votes and campaigns. This general malaise can hardly be blamed on migrants, refugees, and asylees (2004: 116).

Brown (2010), similar to Benhabib (2004, 2011, 2009), is clear that the problem afflicting western democracies is not immigration but waning citizenship. Both theorists attribute the weakening of the nation state and the sense of loss of control to globalisation. Brown suggests that this impacts on people’s psychic security: she analyses the proliferation of visible walls being built at nation states’ frontiers as symbols of a
national sense of existential insecurity when national borders are dissolved by globalising forces:

Containment with an increasingly boundaryless world is one kind of psychic longing animating the desire for walls (ibid.: 118).

Many liberal writers who argue for open borders, for example, Goodin (1992), Carens (1992) and Kymlicka (1995), include a proviso: that restrictions are needed if large numbers of migrants threaten to overwhelm the dominant culture. They coincide with those liberal writers discussed above who argue for less migration (Goodhart, Collier, Baudet) because they connect immigration to the idea of social capital and its collapse, widely discussed in the influential work of Putman (2007; 2000). Much has been written about the phenomenon of new migration with its ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2006) and the alleged problems this poses in terms of integration. Arendt understood that the integration of individuals into society was not primarily about numbers (too many) or nationality (too different) but one of political organisation. Everyone can be integrated into a given society by integrating into the political sphere, that is, by becoming a participator in government. Benhabib (2004), Brown (1995) and Parekh (1981) criticise Arendt for giving such primacy to politics, and few people aspire to such a demanding solution as Arendt. Some theorists associated with the No Borders movement are perhaps an exception. They have recently started to develop a theory for a No Borders politics and their ideas are examined below.

**No Borders politics as an alternative?**

Theorists in favour of a No Borders politics, for example, Anderson et al. (2009) and King (2016), claim to provide a radical political alternative that is not utopian because it is based on what already happens in practice – the refusal of the border. Their project sounds ambitious: it demands a complete transformation of the world as it exists by
rejecting capitalism, nationalism and state-controlled citizenship (Anderson et al. 2009: 12), thus dismissing the notion of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ as upheld by Benhabib, Brown and Arendt. Migrants are central to the emancipatory project of No Borders politics; they have a subversive role to play, and in this way, No Borders politics overlaps with some migration theorists explored in Chapter 1.1, for example, McNevin (2006) and Nyers (2003). King (2016) understands that migrants may not be conscious that their daily acts of refusing the border constitute a subversive act, and yet, by evading border controls, she says, they refuse state sovereignty and this constitutes a rejection of the state.

The literature explored in Chapter 1.1 on migrant mobilisations and the No Borders literature is inspiring because it understands that freedom of movement is fundamental to the notion of agency and it represents our capacity for action – it is a tribute to the human spirit not to accept one’s fate passively. Anderson et al. (2009: 82) observe that, in human history the act of refusing the border has always happened, no matter what obstacles are put in people’s way. However, two sets of ideals collide: theorists such as King (2016: 25), who calls herself an activist researcher, see themselves as part of a No Borders global network; they desire freedom of movement for all, in a world without borders and without states, whereas the political thinkers Arendt, Brown and Benhabib want people to be able to move freely and to integrate into a robust political community within borders.

Unlike Baudet (2012), who thinks that democracies can exist only in the form of a nation state, we could imagine a different kind of political unit from the nation state, but a state nonetheless. It would need to consist of ‘the most unlimited democracy’ in whatever form that takes; and of those political spaces of democracy rarely glimpsed and experienced, and yet tangible, as outlined in Section 2.2. These political spaces are very different to the ones proposed and enacted by No Border theorists as part of the No Borders network. For example, King (2016) bases her
politics on an escape by attempting to create an alternative society outside of the state, in which capitalist social relations do not apply; her project rests on cultivating human values of mutual cooperation, reciprocity, affection and friendship (ibid.: 32), which are similar to the values of the ‘intercultural utopia’, the microcosm of an ideal society that the Spanish case-study organisation sought to create, as will be shown in Chapter 5. An understanding that politics needs borders (and a state of some kind) may appear to be conservative in comparison to the radical rejection of borders and the state by No Borders politics. Yet if we open our imagination to a new form of political organisation as seen in Section 2.2 we could build a world in which freedom of movement existed while retaining the notion of borders. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7.

Summary

This chapter started by connecting the idea of the reconfiguration of subjectivity to the political retreat of the New Left (Jacoby 1971). It explored the implications of such a retreat – the inward turn, loss of meaning outside of the self and the rise of a conception of the human subject as vulnerable. While the notion of vulnerability related to the previous chapter, Section 1.4, in which a robust political subject (Fanon 2001 [1961]) gave way to sensibilities that promoted a vulnerable or damaged subject (Taylor 1994; Brown 1995), this chapter highlighted what was specific to the contemporary era: the decline of traditional class politics and its associated political parties as well as the end of ideological polarisation between two alternative social models, capitalism and socialism. These more recent developments were shown to diminish the capacity of politics to integrate large numbers of people into a shared sense of meaning and purpose, leaving behind a vacuum. This chapter proceeded to explore Arendt’s understanding of politics, which, it was suggested, if taken seriously, could offer new ways of thinking about many of the present day conundrums, such as the
meaning of integration in a secular world, and freedom of movement. Of particular significance was Arendt’s exploration of the western political tradition's antipathy towards politics. Her notion of politics, by contrast, meant self-government involving the idea of a demanding and unlimited form of democracy. This chapter concluded by challenging the climate of low expectations of political life through Arendt’s meaning of politics and human freedom as collective political action.
Chapter 3 Contextualising the case studies

This chapter aims to give an understanding of radical Christianity, which played a key role in the formation and development of the Spanish and British case-study organisations; at times it seemed indistinguishable from Marxism or socialist radicalism. The aim of this chapter is also to capture the atmosphere in both countries at the end of the 1970s up to the mid-1980s, when the case-study organisations began their lives. The upsurge of left-wing militancy and strike action, and the level of police violence as well as racist violence (in the case of Britain) that characterised this period, seem remote from an early twenty-first century perspective. Both case-study organisations were established at a time when there was a sense of lowering political expectations and disappointment. In Spain this was expressed by the term desencanto [disenchantment or disillusionment], as the enthusiasm for Spain’s new democracy rapidly evaporated. In Britain, the catchphrase touted by the Conservative prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, best expresses the mood: ‘There is no alternative’ – or, simply, ‘TINA’. This chapter also surveys the immigration legal and policy framework of Spain, Britain and the European Union, thus providing the changing backdrop against which both case-study organisations carried out their work. The chapter concludes with a comparison between the different contexts and experiences of Spain and Britain.

3.1 Explaining the rise of radical Christianity

Prior to the First World War, the Catholic church had grown concerned about the spread of socialism throughout the industrialising world. It feared its loss of influence over ordinary people, who, increasingly, were being attracted to socialist movements (Smith 1991; Sennett 2012). The Rerum Novarum encyclical of 1891 addressed the issue of
how to retain the relevance of Catholic principles in societies that were becoming more secular and polarised. It presented the Catholic church as a critic both of capitalism and of socialism. Catholic social action movements, such as Catholic Action, arising from the 1891 encyclical, demonstrated how the Catholic church could promote social justice without socialism (Smith 1991). While Sennett (2012: 264) claims that these movements posed themselves as a Christian alternative to both Marxist socialism and capitalism, in fact they not only dovetailed with Marxism, they often converged completely with it. This observation is explored in the context of the second half of the twentieth century in Chapter 7.

The post–Second World War period in Europe brought economic growth, rising prosperity and a lull in the social upheavals of the inter-war years. By the late 1950s, however, Catholic social action movements took a radical turn, particularly in Latin America, but also in Spain during Franco’s dictatorship.

Pope John XXIII’s creation of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), known as Vatican II, could be interpreted as the Christian equivalent of the 1962 Port Huron Declaration (see Chapter 1.2). Vatican II and its encyclicals should not be seen as a cynical move to regain the church’s loss of authority, rather, it intuitively captured the mood of the times in which many Christians were already questioning the role of the church. The new principles that emerged from Vatican II chimed with this mood: atheism was not to be condemned, dialogue with communism was to be encouraged, and rather than a retreat from politics, the church was to commit itself to the social and political activism of its lay members (Smith 1991). In addition, freedoms of religious expression, association and election of one’s own rulers were upheld as Christian values (Cooper 1976; Gilmour 1985). In the 1960s, influenced by Vatican II, some members of the Spanish clergy became worker-priests, living and working alongside the Spanish working class, experiencing
directly their living conditions and supporting their struggles (Carr and Fusi 1981). This was the case of the key actor in the Spanish case study.

After Vatican II, liberation theology emerged as the expression of radical Christianity, particularly in Latin America but also throughout the world. The Brazilian bishop Dom Helder Camera, who had been the national chaplain of Catholic Action in Brazil since 1947, and not previously viewed as a radical, became a vocal critic of the capitalist economic system. At the end of the second Vatican Council (1965), Camera organised a group of African, Latin American and Asian bishops who collectively produced a document entitled *Message to the people of the Third World*, which declared: ‘the people of the Third World are the proletariat of today’s humanity’ (Gutiérrez 1988, quoted in Smith 1991: 137). The document, which spoke of the wealthy who waged class warfare against the workers, stated that ‘true socialism is Christianity integrally lived’ (ibid.). In 1965 Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest and sociologist, educated in Europe, followed the radical message. He gave up the priesthood to join the Colombian guerrilla movement, the *Ejército Nacional de Liberación* (ELN), convinced that armed struggle was the only way to change society: ‘I took off my cassock to be more like a priest’ (quoted in Smith ibid.: 16).

In 1968, over one hundred Latin American bishops came together at the Medellín conference to develop a practical strategy to apply Vatican II to Latin America. The elements that became known as liberation theology were laid out in Medellín: the bishops committed the church to ‘an authentic liberation’ through a project of radical social change, having analysed the social and economic situation of Latin America. They concluded that the church would devote itself to a ‘solidarity with the poor’ and a ‘preference to the poorest and most needy sectors’ (ibid.: 19). This language and sentiment permeated both case-study organisations (see Chapters 5–7). There appeared to be no incongruity between Christianity and socialism, or ‘socialism in the name of the Christian gospel’ (ibid.) nor any incompatibility with the armed
struggle. Influenced by Freire's *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (1972 [1968]) the ‘poor’, that is, ‘the oppressed’, were seen as active participators in the construction of a new society and ‘agents of their own history’. The role of the church’s pastoral action, in line with Freire’s theory and practice, was to raise consciousness so that people would understand their rights and how to make use of them. This gave rise to the creation of the base ecclesial communities that were key in galvanising support for revolutionary action in some Latin American countries, for example, Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The term ‘liberation theology’ was coined in 1969 at a conference on the church’s role in socio-economic development in Latin America, sponsored by the World Council of Churches (WCC). The Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez shifted the focus from Latin America’s development to its dependency. He stressed the need for liberation from imperialism and from the Latin American ruling class in order to create conditions for radical social transformation. He called this ‘the theology of liberation’.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, socialism and radical Christianity were inextricably linked in Latin America and in Spain. Preston (1986) revealed that in a 1969 survey of over 18,000 Spanish priests, 24.8 per cent thought of themselves as socialists compared to 2.4 per cent who considered themselves to be Falangists. In Chile in 1971, the organisation ‘Christians for Socialism’ brought together all Christian denominations to prevent the official church from opposing the elected Marxist-socialist president, Salvador Allende. The credibility of both moderate and leftist Christians increased because they were often the target of repression following the military coups and installation of dictatorships throughout Latin America during the 1970s and early 1980s. This was the context that led to the politicisation of the founder of the British case-study organisation. Although radical liberation theology in Latin America became more moderate in the 1970s (Smith 1991), there were still tangible examples of practical liberation
theology in action, for example, the 1979 armed insurrection by the Sandinista guerrilla movement, the FSLN, which overthrew the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. The insurrection was at its strongest in the areas in which the base ecclesial communities were rooted. Three Catholic priests, saturated with the ideas of liberation theology and who supported the armed insurrection, were appointed to the revolutionary Sandinista government.

In Spain Vatican II also found a resonance. The freedoms it promoted were exactly those denied by Franco, who was supported by the church. Vatican II gave confidence to those in the Catholic church who were influenced by Catholic Action and who were already openly opposing Franco’s regime. Carr and Fusi (1981) state that the Spanish clergy underwent a radicalisation as it discovered Marxism; its average age dropped by ten years between 1964 and 1974. This radicalisation was observable in the Spanish worker-priests living and working in the industrial suburbs and, in the case of rural Andalucía, among the jornaleros, the agricultural workers. By 1973 many Spanish bishops were associated with the leftist political opposition to Franco. This led Cooper (1976) to conclude that Catholicism and socialism were compatible. Priests were involved in demonstrations, strikes and struggles for land, and they were imprisoned and repressed by the authorities from the 1960s up to early 1980s. Some of the worker-priests became active in the clandestine communist party trade union, Comisiones obreras (CC OO), in the working-class suburbs. The worker-priest Diamantino García founded the radical left agricultural workers’ trade union, Sindicato Obreros Campesinos (SOC), which remained illegal until 1977. His close associate was the worker-priest Esteban Tabares, one of the key figures in the Spanish case-study organisation.

By the late 1980s, liberation theology’s rhetoric dissociated itself from socialism. According to Smith (1991), Gutiérrez, the theologian who coined the term ‘liberation theology’ in 1969, changed emphasis in what could be seen as a Christian ‘cultural turn’: ‘rather than economic,
structural analysis, it was more the human relational aspect’ (ibid: 230). It was argued above that radical Christianity dovetailed, or even converged, with Marxism. This implies that both may have shared a similar fate, as illustrated by one interviewee in the British case-study organisation, who asked the following rhetorical question: ‘Did radical Christian socialism die in the organisation or throughout the world?’ (Praxis interview 01 2011). Gutiérrez’s shift of emphasis reflected a change in values; in Chapters 5–7 it will be demonstrated that a shift in values took place in both case-study organisations – from the political to the humanitarian. It will be argued that this shift related to disappointment in the promise of collective political action of the past and is reflected in the case-study organisations, both of which were influenced by liberation theology. This, in turn, was reflected in their portrayal of migrants.

3.2 Spain and Britain in the 1970s and early 1980s

In the 1970s and 1980s Spain and Britain went through a period of economic recession and austerity. They both underwent economic transformation, with deindustrialisation, the loss of traditional manufacturing jobs, a gradual shift to employment in the service sector and the increased casualisation of labour contracts. Yet the country-specific contexts in which these changes took place were very different: Spain, a southern European country, was a dictatorship until 1975; Britain was a northern European liberal democracy. The economic downturn of 1973 impacted on both countries in different ways. For example, Spain received back hundreds of thousands of its emigrant workers who had lost their jobs in other European countries; Britain further restricted entry to immigrant workers from the Commonwealth and its former colonies. Despite these, and other differences between the two countries, there were some significant similarities that gave them a shared context. These similarities are explored below.
In the 1960s and early 1970s in Europe, the traditional manufacturing industries were in decline, as was traditional agricultural production. In Spain, for instance, the agricultural sector employed half of all Spanish workers in 1950. By 1971 it employed just one-fifth due to the introduction of mechanisation. The pace of job losses accelerated with the onset of economic recession triggered by the oil crisis in 1973. In Spain between 1975 and 1985 some 1.8 million jobs were lost in the traditional industries, such as mining, steel and shipbuilding (Judt 2010; Carr and Fusi 1981). In Britain during a comparable period, the mining workforce fell from 718,000 to 43,000; steel and shipbuilding industries followed a similar trend. In both countries, there was an upsurge of strike action throughout the 1970s. In Spain in 1977 and 1978, the number of working days lost to strikes was the highest in Europe (ibid.). In Britain in 1979, 29.4 million days were lost in strike action, the highest number of days recorded since the 1929 General Strike (Marwick 2003). In both countries there was resistance to stop the deterioration of people’s living conditions. This took place despite the illegality of such action and its repression in Spain under Franco, and in Britain, despite the post-Second World War history of consensus in managing industrial relations.

**Spain**

Spain underwent a period of economic growth under Franco’s dictatorship from 1959 until the oil crisis of 1973. During this period, Communist party members successfully infiltrated Franco’s ‘vertical’ trade unions; they operated clandestinely and organised parallel workers’ commissions from the inside, which eventually became the Communist party’s separate trade union, *comisiones obreras* (CC OO) (Ellwood 1976). By 1970, industrial relations had deteriorated, resulting in an upsurge of illegal strike action: a strike of 20,000 miners in northern Spain, Asturias, forced the government to import coal; subsequent strikes spread throughout Spain, from the shipyards in the north, the metro workers in central Spain’s capital, Madrid, to the
agricultural workers in the rural south, and the construction workers in Granada. By the time of Franco's death in 1975, despite the repression, illegal strikes and street protests were challenging the regime’s authority. The transition to democracy after Franco’s death was accompanied by further strikes and protests not only for economic but also for political demands. Carr and Fusi (1981) asked the relevant question of how the transition to democracy and its consolidation was achieved in an economic recession and in an atmosphere of continued strikes, protests and violence. The answer lies in the role of the newly legalised opposition parties and the compromises they made. An examination of these compromises, particularly the series of agreements known as the Moncloa Pacts that lasted between 1977 and 1982, also answers another significant question: why was enthusiasm for the new Spanish democracy so short-lived? These questions are addressed below.

By the 1970s, the clandestine Communist party, through its trade union CC OO had a solid working-class base and formed the most effective opposition to Franco’s regime (Gilmour 1985). After Franco's death, Adolfo Suárez, one of Franco's loyal ministers, was appointed as prime minister by the King of Spain (reinstated by Franco as head of state). The left-wing opposition demanded a complete break with the Franco regime and the restoration of a republican Spain; however, in a series of negotiations behind closed doors with the main Spanish leftist opposition parties, namely the Spanish Socialist party (PSOE) led by Felipe González, and the Spanish Communist party (CP) led by Santiago Carrillo, Suárez carried out a skilful balancing act to manage a return to democracy under the old regime’s control. He prepared the ground for democratic elections by legalising the main left-wing parties in exchange for their recognition of the monarchy. The first democratic election since the Spanish Civil War took place in 1977. Voter turn out was 80 per cent and Suárez’s coalition party, the UCD won with 34.7 per cent of the vote. The PSOE won 29.2 per cent of the vote and the CP 10 per cent (ibid.: 182).
After the results of the 1977 elections, the main leftist parties were anxious to gain respectability by demonstrating their commitment to democracy through reforms rather than a complete break from Francoism. Suárez negotiated with the PSOE and the CP to accept a series of agreements on wage caps below the rate of inflation, known as the Moncloa Pacts. In return for controlling the demands of the organised labour movement, over which the CP had particular influence, some reforms were promised. Preston (1986) and Carr and Fusi (1981) interpret the Moncloa Pacts as a sign of the left’s maturity in supporting the transition to democracy, and yet few of the reforms promised by Suárez were kept. The first Moncloa Pact resulted in the CP, PSOE and their associated trade unions, CC OO and UGT accepting wage caps of 20 per cent when inflation was running at 29 per cent (Gilmour 1985: 189). The quotation below from a Catholic social action publication of 11th November 1977 reflects a sense of bitterness:

Now the government asks the opposition politicians’ permission. And they say ‘yes’, they say that we all have to tighten our belts. But it doesn’t take much to say and write ‘all’. We know only too well who it is who really has to tighten their belts (quoted in Flores Sánchez 2010: 129).

Between 1979 and 1982 the main leftist political parties made politics technocratic: the Spanish constitution was drafted behind closed doors and former principles of commitment to a Spanish republic and to Marxism were dropped. In 1982 the PSOE won the general election; it started a programme of economic austerity and a massive reorganisation of industry, known as reconstrucciones, similar to the economic policies of the Conservative government in Britain. The notion of desencanto consolidated. One of the left-wing parties outside of the PSOE, the Workers’ party (PT), disbanded after the PSOE’s 1982 electoral victory. Of significance to the Spanish case study is the impact this had on the worker-priest movement in rural Andalucía and their hopes for change. The members of the agricultural workers’ trade
union, SOC, founded by worker-priest Diamantino García, were predominantly members of the Andalucian PT, and the disbanding of the party led to the collapse of SOC (Flores Sánchez 2011). This is an illustration of the rapid disintegration of the left outside of the PSOE. The pun ‘we were better off against Franco’, to mock the right-wing dictum ‘we were better off with Franco’ (Preston 1986: 153), expresses the disillusionment of radical leftist hopes.

**Britain**

The post-Second World War consensus in managing industrial relations in Britain started to break down in the 1970s and finally ruptured in the 1980s (Marwick 2003). The 1970s signalled the end of the ‘social contract’ – the agreement between organised labour (the trade unions), employers and government that had contained class conflict since 1945 through negotiation and collective bargaining. In 1972 and 1974 the miners went on strike as a result of the Conservative government’s anti-inflation policies and restrictions on pay rises. The Labour government was re-elected in 1974 on a programme that promised to restore the social contract, whereby the three players in the old relationship were expected to make sacrifices. This amounted to the Labour party using the social contract to hold down wages and break public sector pay settlement agreements (Heartfield 2017); it culminated in the strike action of the ‘winter of discontent’, 1978–79.

With the election of the Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979, Marwick (2003) claims that the consensus came to an abrupt end, as did the euphemistic ‘beer and sandwiches at number 10’, that is, the consultations between government and trade union leaders. The miners’ strike of 1984–85 to prevent pit closures exemplified the new shape of industrial relations, in which the state violently confronted the striking miners. With the miners’ defeat a mood of powerlessness consolidated.
In the period prior to the Thatcher era the immigrant workforce was largely outside of the social contract, often discriminated against in the workplace and kept in low-skilled jobs without opportunities of promotion (Heartfield 2017: 50). The complicity of the trade unions to keep the status quo did not prevent strike action outside of trade union control, for example Courtauld’s Red Scar mill strike in Lancashire in 1965, the first significant immigrant workers’ strike of the post-war period (Sivanandan 1981). However, strike action rarely had the labour movement’s wider support. The Grunwick strike in 1977 was an unexpected exception: Asian women workers at the Grunwick photographic processing factory in North West London went on strike over the racism of their employer and to demand union recognition; in an unprecedented show of solidarity, British workers supported them. The issue of racism went further than employment and is specific to Britain at this time. Sivanandan (1981) showed how racism and racial violence were part of the British social fabric in which the victims were more likely to be arrested than the perpetrators. The description below captures the level of violence of the period:

Our mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers are attacked and murdered in the streets. The police do nothing. Our homes and places of worship are burned to the ground. Nobody is arrested. Families are burned to death. The murderers and fire bombers speak openly of their organised violence against our communities. They are not charged with conspiracy (Race and Class 1981: 232).

Racism was not passively accepted by the ‘victims’ nor were displays of solidarity absent. In the early 1960s a boycott of a Bristol bus company, inspired by the United States civil rights movement, forced the company to lift its ban on employing black drivers. In 1965 the militant organisation Racial Action Adjustment Society (RAAS) was established with its call of ‘Black men, unite, we have nothing to lose but our fears’ (Sivanandan 1981: 122). RAAS played an important role in its support of the Red Scar mill strike, mentioned above. Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), a coalition of organisations in which many
black political activists were involved, was seen by some as a foundation for a British civil rights movement (FitzGerald 1984). Sivanandan (1981) describes how the establishment saw it as influenced less by Martin Luther King and more by Malcolm X. The co-option of CARD's less radical members into the new Race Relations legal structures led to CARD's disintegration in 1968, to the relief of the elites. FitzGerald (1984: 60) quotes Sivanandan, referring to the Race Relations Commission: ‘the Commission took up the black cause and killed it’.

In the 1970s and early 1980s protests against racism continued, with and without wider solidarity. Following the racist murders of thirteen young black people in the 1981 firebombing of a house during a New Year's Eve party in New Cross, South London, a day of protest took place in which over 10,000 mostly black demonstrators marched to parliament (Heartfield 2017: 68). Police racism and harassment remained intense, triggering the 1980–81 inner city riots. The 1980s remained a decade of polarisation, but political demoralisation and the sense that there was no alternative to the present situation was strong (Heartfield 2006: 161). Trade union membership decreased and strike action declined; the non-unionised jobs in the new, casual and flexible labour market increased. Deindustrialisation had destroyed communities and unemployment hit the working-class areas the hardest. The sense of political disappointment was twofold: working-class people were disappointed with their traditional institutions and radical left-wing people were disappointed with the working class for voting for the Conservative party and electing Margaret Thatcher.
3.3 The immigration legal framework in Spain and Britain

Spain

Spain moved from a country of emigration to one of immigration in the mid-1980s but did not regard itself as such until 2000 (Gil Araújo 2002; Cornelius 2004; Aja and Arango 2006). Spain’s first modern immigration law, the 1985 Law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners, known as the Ley de Extranjería, was passed under the Socialist government and remained in force until 2000. It bore little relationship to the immigration situation in Spain: it was adopted as a rushed measure a few months prior to Spain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) to reassure the northern European countries that Spain would not be an easy entry point for migration (Gil Araújo 2002).

Prior to the 1985 law, immigration status was of little interest to the authorities. Tens of thousands of Latin Americans, mostly fleeing military dictatorships in the 1970s, had settled in Spain. Along with Filipinos, Portuguese and Andorrans, they did not need work permits due to a law passed by Franco in 1969 (Rius Sant 2007). Spain also had a large established Moroccan community, mainly in Catalonia. In the absence of visa requirements for Moroccan nationals, they could enter Spain legally and work without authorisation. The existence of an extensive informal economy, representing between 25 to 30 per cent of the Spanish GDP (Moreno Fuentes 2004), meant that migrant labour, authorised or not, was easily assimilated.

The 1985 immigration law introduced strict entry controls that closed almost all the legal routes into Spain. Those migrants already living and working in Spain without authorisation were suddenly subject to deportation. The law also contained measures to severely curtail the basic rights of all migrants on Spanish territory. This included the explicit prohibition of the freedom of association, the right to join a
trade union, to strike and to demonstrate (Moreno Fuentes 2004; Aja and Arango 2006). These restrictions remained in place until 2000.

The introduction of the 1985 law was met with protest from human rights’, Moroccan workers’ and church-aligned organisations as well as trade unions and left-wing political parties. The Spanish case-study organisation was formed at this time, in recognition of the new obstacles migrants faced in Spain. The 1985 law introduced Spain’s first regularisation programme. According to Moreno Fuentes (2004) the process was carried out within a similar spirit of restriction embodied in the law itself. The number of migrants who applied for regularisation was low because, at the initial stage, many people who came forward to apply were detained. 44,000 people applied, out of whom 23,000 were granted a one-year work or residence permit. One year on, only 13,000 of them retained their legal status because they were unable to meet the strict conditions for renewal (ibid.). The pattern of gaining legal status for one year and losing it again until the next regularisation programme was regularly repeated until 2001, when a case-by-case mechanism for legalisation was introduced, based on the establishment of social ties in Spain. This illustrates that migration was viewed as a temporary phenomenon in Spain until 2001.

Spain’s entry into the EEC and the drastic restructuring of the labour market under the PSOE government of Felipe González led to a period of economic growth from 1986 to 1992. The massive redundancies brought about by the closure of industry were partially compensated by the expansion of the service sector, characterised by temporary contracts, low salaries and job insecurity. This period coincided with the development of the Spanish welfare state and more resources directed towards the Spanish education system. Although unemployment levels stood at 21 per cent in 1985, the newly created low skilled, low-paid, flexible jobs were not acceptable to many Spanish people, whose expectations had risen in recent years (Cachón Rodríguez 2006; Gil Araújo 2002). The Spanish economy needed
migrant labour, and a blind eye was turned to the 1985 legal immigration framework. The numbers of ‘illegal’ migrants increased rapidly and were readily incorporated into the informal labour market.

By 1991 it was clear that the 1985 law had generated the phenomenon of large numbers of ‘illegal’ migrants and a second regularisation programme was announced. Gortázar (2000) attributes this regularisation programme to the government acquiescing to social pressure from mobilisations that took place between 1989 and 1991 against the 1985 law, and that called for another regularisation. Moreno Fuentes (2004) disagrees: he claims that the rationale for the 1991 regularisation programme was less to do with domestic pressure than with foreign relations. Spain was due to be incorporated into the Schengen Convention, which would abolish internal borders between the Schengen member states; as part of the conditions of membership, Spain was required to impose tighter visa restrictions on non-European Community countries. The Spanish government negotiated an agreement with Morocco: in exchange for reintroducing visa requirements, which had been suppressed between the two countries since 1964, it would regularise the situation of those currently living and working in Spain without legal authorisation. This agreement ended the pattern of circular migration for Moroccans and marked the start of the *patera* phenomenon – the dangerous journeys migrants made in flimsy boats (*pateras*) initially across the straits of Gibraltar, to reach Spain.

From 1993 the Spanish government introduced a quota system for migrant workers in an attempt to regulate migration into Spain. Migrant workers were required to apply for a work permit in their country of origin. These quotas or *contingentes* operated until 1999. In practice, this policy became a government loophole to its own restrictive immigration legislation. Instead of applying from abroad, work permits were issued to migrants in Spain already working without permission. This quota system was seen as an unofficial annual
regularisation programme (Gortázar 2000; Cachón Rodríguez 2006; González-Enríquez 2010); however, ‘illegal’ migration continued because the quotas were set below the level of the labour market’s real demands and so more migrant labour was required.

In 1996 reforms to the 1985 immigration law were introduced to facilitate family reunification, bringing Spain in line with the EU and to introduce a mechanism for people who had been in Spain legally for five years to gain permanent residency. The 1996 reforms were also accompanied by another regularisation programme.

Spanish agricultural business expanded rapidly from the 1990s, thriving on ‘illegal’ migrant labour. There was no provision of housing or other services for migrant workers, and this lack of provision led migrants to be viewed as a conspicuous ‘social problem’, particularly in Spain’s agricultural regions. From the early 1990s there were several incidents of racist violence, for example in El Ejido in southern Spain and Fraga in the north (Ruis Sant 2007).

In 1994 the Ministry of Social Services elaborated the first migrant integration strategy: *Interministerial Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants*. One of the main objectives of the plan was for the social integration of ‘settled’ migrants, that is, migrants with legal status. The other main objective was to prevent ‘illegal’ migration through cooperation with the countries from which migrants came and through more restrictive measures (Gil Aráujo 2002: 169). The plan established two bodies that still exist today – the national and regional consultation forums on the issue of non-EU (formerly non-EC) migration, and the Permanent Observatory on Immigration to commission research on migration and integration to inform government policy. The 1985 immigration law was replaced in 2000 by legislation that acknowledged Spain as both a transit and destination country for migration. The 1985 law had focused solely on restrictions, whereas the new law, the *Ley Orgánica 4/2000*, introduced the other side of the immigration strategy
coin, that is, integration, as indicated by its full name, the Law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration. The 2000 law contained important innovations: while it remained as restrictive on entry controls as its predecessor, it gave the right to free health care on the same basis as Spaniards and to free primary and secondary school education regardless of immigration status. These rights only applied to migrants who registered on the municipal residents’ census, the padrón, thus making them visible to the authorities (Santolaya 2006). The 2000 law introduced a continuous mechanism for regularisation, arraigo social, so that migrants sufficiently rooted in their local community could legalise their status; it put an end to the quota system, which was replaced by a new policy of agreements with third countries to provide migrant workers to fill labour shortages. This marked the start of the ‘circular migration’ programmes much praised by the EU. Another regularisation programme accompanied the new immigration law.

The new law came into force as the conservative Popular party (PP) in power started its election campaign. The anti-migrant rhetoric of the PP was intense, issuing statements proclaiming that the ‘threshold of tolerance’ had been reached, and not everyone could be absorbed (Gil Araújo 2002), even though, according to the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, it was during the period of the PP’s government that the foreign-born population had risen rapidly from 1.37 per cent to 7.02 per cent. Moroccans were the largest percentage of the migrant population and also the most established. ‘Illegal’ and ‘legal’ Moroccan migrants lived and worked side by side. In the Almerían agricultural town of El Ejido racist violence had been experienced for almost a decade (Ruis Sant 2007); in the climate of politicised anti-migrant rhetoric from the ruling party during the general election campaign, a racist riot broke out on 5th February 2000. Moroccan migrants’ properties and shops were burned down, as was the makeshift housing of some of the thousands of migrants working in the agricultural industry. In an unprecedented occurrence, the migrant agricultural
workers, mostly Moroccan, called a strike and paralysed agricultural production. They demanded immediate regularisation for those without legal status, immediate emergency accommodation for those who had lost their homes, a programme of housing for migrant workers and compensation for those whose property had been damaged (ibid.).

On 12th February an agreement known as the El Ejido Pact was signed between the strikers, government and agricultural businesses and the strike leaders called off the action. However, the Pact was reneged on – the demands of the striking migrants were not met but their bargaining power had already dissipated by the strike being ended. Many Moroccans who returned to work found that female agricultural workers from eastern Europe had been recruited in their place (Higginbottom 2000). The PP won a majority in the March 2000 elections; it proceeded to reform the new immigration law to withdraw the social rights of ‘illegal’ migrants and to implement deportation orders within 48 hours. The PP also amended the 2000 immigration law to restrict work permits to the province and to the sector for which they were issued. This made it impossible for migrant seasonal workers to be able to move from region to region to work legally in the different harvests. This context provides the backdrop for the Spanish case study. The period 2000–2001 was characterised by migrants’ mobilisations demanding regularisation, decent working and living conditions, and changes to the law. Four separate regularisations took place following migrant mobilisations and occupations of public buildings and churches. The occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide in Seville (2002), analysed in the Spanish case study (Chapter 5), marked a change in policy on regularisation. No significant regularisation took place again until 2005, with the election of a new government.
### Table 1: Summary of Spanish regularisation processes 1985–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regularisation process and date</th>
<th>Numbers, category regularised, duration of permits issued</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme July 1985</td>
<td>34,832 one year</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme June 1991</td>
<td>109,135 three years</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanism 1993–1999</td>
<td>140,000 one year</td>
<td>PSOE/PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme April 1996</td>
<td>21,382 one year</td>
<td>PSOE/PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Jan Feb March 2000</td>
<td>199,926 one year</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme January 2001</td>
<td>Special programme for ‘illegal’ Ecuadorians</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme February 2001</td>
<td>Refused applicants from March 2000 programme one year</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme June 2001</td>
<td>232,674 one year</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceptional regularisation March 2004</td>
<td>Victims and families of Madrid terrorist attack on trains in the country ‘illegally’ and/or working ‘illegally’ offered Spanish citizenship</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme February 2005</td>
<td>578,375 one year</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanism through <em>arraigo social</em> since 2001 and ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td>PP/PSOE continuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2000 the Spanish immigration policy framework clearly established its twin-track strategy of immigration control and social integration of migrants. The Global Programme for the Regulation and Coordination of Foreign Affairs and Immigration in Spain, known as GRECO, set out the state framework for the integration of non-EU migrants for the period 2000–04 and integration plans were implemented throughout Spain. GRECO also set out the restrictive framework for the prevention of ‘illegal migration’: in 1999, €150 million was approved to establish the ‘Integrated System of External Surveillance’ (‘SIVE’) to control the Spanish coastline and intercept migrant boats crossing the straits of
Gibraltar; barbed-wire fencing was erected around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco to prevent ‘illegal’ entry into Spanish territory and surveillance technologies were installed.

In 2004 the PSOE returned to government; in 2005 it announced a new regularisation programme as well as new measures to increase border surveillance and internal controls through workplace checks (Arango and Jachimowicz 2005). The main aim of the regularisation programme was to reduce the size of the informal economy. The implementation of the regularisation programme involved trade unions, migrant-led organisations and NGOs. These non-state organisations were funded to run information points throughout the country. One requirement for regularisation was proof of residency through registration on the municipal census; however, widespread protests that took place during this period pressurised the government to allow regularisation using other evidence of residency: finally, even an expulsion order was considered sufficient proof of residency for regularisation.

While Spain was criticised by EU member states for carrying out a large-scale regularisation programme (Kraler 2009), the government strongly defended the economic benefits it brought. It consistently rejected claims by the opposition party, the PP, that the regularisation programme led to a ‘pull factor’, and yet the PSOE government intensified immigration control. It reoriented its immigration policy to the externalisation of border control under its Plan África (Aja and Arango 2008). The coastline surveillance system, SIVE, was expanded in 2007 to cover the Canary Islands, which had become the latest entry point for migrant boats, even though empirical evidence showed that migration from Africa by sea was a minor migration route (de Haas 2007a). The Spanish government justified its increased measures to prevent immigration on humanitarian grounds following the ‘patera crisis‘ of 2006, in which the number of migrant boats arriving in Spain rose by over 50 per cent – the new aim of immigration control was to prevent deaths at sea.
From 2008 the economic crisis in Spain was accompanied by even tougher immigration policy. Spain was at the forefront of the EU Returns directive (2008) and it introduced an immigration bill that proposed to make it a criminal offence to house or support ‘illegal’ migrants. This proposal was withdrawn after protests against what was widely perceived as the ‘criminalisation of solidarity’. The church threatened civil disobedience if the government persisted. The new immigration law came into force at the end of 2009 without an accompanying regularisation programme, supposedly because of pressure from the EU: the recently approved EU Asylum and Immigration Pact discouraged large-scale regularisation programmes as a solution to migrant ‘illegality’.

Asylum seeking played an insignificant part in Spanish immigration history because of what were perceived as notorious measures to thwart attempts to claim asylum in Spain (CEAR 2012). Asylum figures were comparable to Britain for 1985–1988. From 1988 until the end of the case-study period an average of 5,000 asylum applications were made annually. The patera issue is of greater interest because it mirrors the British handling of the asylum phenomenon – the start of the phenomenon directly related to changes in immigration law: when legal routes were closed down, ‘illegal’ routes opened up.

Table 2: Arrivals by sea in pateras between 1999 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,857</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15,025</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18,517</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16,670</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>14,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19,176</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15,674</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interior ministry, Spanish government.
Spain’s shift from a country of emigration to a country of immigration signified a rise in the foreign-born population: it increased by 5.6 million in just over a decade (1998–2009). In 1982 the foreign-born population formed 0.52 per cent of the Spanish population; from 1996 to 2004, under the PP government, it rose from 1.37 per cent to 7 per cent; between 2004 and 2011, under the PSOE, it rose from 7 per cent to 12 per cent. This final period takes into account the expansion of the EU and EU migration to Spain. The percentage stabilised at 12.02 per cent in 2012.

The Spanish government adopted interculturalism as its integration, or migration management, policy and viewed multiculturalism as a policy that led to ghettoisation (see Chapters 1.4 and Chapter 5). The Spanish autonomous regions and their regional and local governments had an important responsibility for immigration integration. Andalucia, where the Spanish case study was based, had its own regional integration plans.

Spain’s citizenship policies demonstrated a clear bias for migrants viewed as having cultural affinities with Spain, that is, Latin Americans, who received preferential treatment. Some Latin American nationalities were eligible to apply for citizenship after two years of legal residence, for others, after five years; some non-Latin American nationalities, for example Moroccans, were only eligible after ten years, despite the fact that they were the largest and most longstanding migrant group in Spain.

Table 3: Spanish immigration legislation and policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political party in government</th>
<th>Law/policy</th>
<th>Brief summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938–1975</td>
<td>Military dictatorship Franco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political party in government</td>
<td>Law/policy</td>
<td>Brief summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners (Foreigners’ Law)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td><em>First plan for the social integration of immigrants</em></td>
<td>Set up parameters of future integration policy. Established Social Integration Forum for integration (consultation body) and Permanent Observatory of Immigration to Spain (commissions research for policy making).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political party in government</td>
<td>Law/policy</td>
<td>Brief summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        |                              | **Law 8/2000**  
*Global programme on regulation and coordination of immigration in Spain (GRECO) 2000–2008* | possibility to regularise after 2 years (*arraigo social*)  
Reversal of some of the above changes  
Legal migrants portrayed as active contributors to Spain's economy and a desirable phenomenon, security issues emphasised and the need to fight illegal migration. |
| 2001   | PP                           | *First plan for integration of immigrants in Andalucía*                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2003   | PP                           |                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2006   | PSOE                         | *Second plan for integration of immigrants in Andalucía 2006–2009*      |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 2007   | PSOE                         | *First strategic plan for citizenship and integration 2007–10*           | Integration budget of €200 million euros                                                                                                                                                                    |
*Second Plan África 2009–2012*  
*Second strategic plan for citizenship and integration 2011–14* |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

Source: Gil Araujo (2002), Aja and Arango (2006); Aja and Arango (2008)
Britain

Britain is characterised as ‘a country of immigration’ (Layton-Henry 2004). The 1948 Nationality Act gave the right of citizens from the Commonwealth and colonies to freely enter and live in Britain as British subjects; between 1953 and 1962 over a quarter of a million African-Caribbeans arrived in Britain, and 143,000 people from India and Pakistan (Heartfield 2017: 46). This ‘open border’ policy enshrined in the 1948 Act was accompanied by the political establishment’s concern over the social impact of migration as shown by the reaction to the ‘spontaneous’ arrivals of 492 Jamaicans on the Empire Windrush in 1948. The sentiments voiced by a group of Labour MPs at this time set the tone of political discourse that has not hugely changed:

[A]n influx of coloured people domiciled here is likely to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public and social life and to bring discord and unhappiness to all concerned (ibid.: 46–47).

Against the backdrop of concern with the consequences of non-white immigration, non-white workers from the New Commonwealth countries were reluctantly recruited to meet the post-war labour shortages only after the European Voluntary Worker Scheme failed to recruit sufficient European migrant workers (Schuster and Solomos 2004; Somerville 2007).

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was the first of a series of post-war immigration laws designed to restrict the immigration and settlement of black Commonwealth and former colonies citizens culminating in the 1981 British Nationality Act (Grant and Martin 1985; Spencer 1997). The new post-war policy of strict immigration control was justified on the grounds of maintaining good race relations following racist attacks in Nottingham and in London’s Notting Hill
district that led to riots in 1958. The relationship between race relations and immigration controls developed into a twin-track strategy that has been pursued by successive British governments ever since. The 1962 Act (under a Conservative government), the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (under Labour), the Immigration Act (Conservative) and the 1981 British Nationality Act (Conservative, based on proposals set out in Labour’s 1977 Green Paper) cannot be seen separately from the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976. Roy Hattersley’s 1965 phrase ‘integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible’ (quoted in Solomos 2003) continues to shape British immigration policy today. The definition of integration given by Roy Jenkins, Labour Home Secretary, in 1966, has also continued to underlie subsequent multicultural policies, with integration understood

not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance (quoted in Zetter et al. 2002).

Heartfield (2017) points out a contradiction that arose from the series of restrictive immigration controls introduced between 1962 and 1981, and the three race relations acts: racism was legitimised through the restrictive immigration legislation and through the political discourse that preceded and followed each new law; the 1962 law turned people from the New Commonwealth countries into second-class citizens, and yet anti-discrimination legislation was passed to prevent discrimination. People were supposed to be treated the same by public authorities, but the 1971 law turned black people into suspected criminals with its creation of the category of ‘illegal entrant’. In 1973, the Illegal Immigration Intelligence Service Unit was set up to detect and deport ‘illegals’ and raids on workplaces became commonplace. In 1974 Roy Jenkins, again as home secretary, announced an ‘amnesty’ for some immigrants caught up in the changes brought about by the law while also insisting that the government would
make every effort to suppress the smuggling of immigrants and where a person has entered illegally on or after 1 January 1973 he will normally be removed from the country (quoted in Layton-Henry 1985: 334).

Few people applied, for fear of deportation, fully aware of the widespread practice of police stop and searches, arrests and deportations prior to the announcement of the amnesty.

In the run-up to the 1979 general election, the Conservatives stated that they would be tough on ‘illegal immigrants’ and people overstaying and working in breach of the immigration rules. Once they were in power, a spate of highly publicised raids on workplaces took place and police harassment of black people intensified.

1985–1997

In the late 1980s the focus of immigration policy changed to a new concern, that of asylum seekers. A succession of laws aimed at curtailing their entry was introduced by the Conservative government and, with greater intensity, by the governments of New Labour. Between 1993 and 2009 eight pieces of primary legislation to deal with asylum and immigration were passed, all of which contained measures that treated asylum seekers as bogus refugees.

The 1996 law excluded asylum seekers from the benefit system if they claimed asylum once they were already in Britain. These ‘in-country’ applicants were assumed to be automatically ‘bogus’. The 1999 law, preceded by the white paper Fairer, faster and firmer: A modern approach to immigration and asylum, withdrew all asylum seekers from the mainstream welfare benefit system and set up alternative support in the form of vouchers and forced dispersal outside of London for those in need of housing. New asylum seekers were also excluded from
access to the labour market while their claims were pending. Social pressure, particularly from the Trade Union Congress (TUC), eventually led to vouchers being replaced by cash.

1997–2010

A year after New Labour came into power it implemented a ‘backlog clearance’ of pending asylum claims, granting either indefinite leave to remain or leave to remain for four years to asylum seekers who had been waiting many years for decisions on their cases. The government blamed the accumulation of pending asylum cases on the Conservative government’s poor administration but insisted that the backlog clearance did not constitute an ‘amnesty’. In addition, a small number of overseas domestic workers without legal status were regularised between 1998 and 1999 following pressure from the NGOs who drew attention to the plight of these women in a particularly precarious situation. A less reported regularisation of overstayers who had been in the country for over seven years, took place in 2000 to deal with a legal anomaly in the new 1999 law. According to Lenoel (2009), most people who came forward were given legal status. As before, the government insisted that this did not constitute an ‘amnesty’.

Similar to Spain, Britain experienced uninterrupted economic growth between 1997 and 2007, and by the end of the 1990s there were growing labour shortages (Schuster and Solomos 2004). Asylum claims continued to rise and measures to curb this form of unsolicited migration intensified. At the same time a new approach to immigration emerged. By early 2001, 100,000 work permits were being issued annually to non-EU workers, compared to 40,000 in the mid-1990s (Flynn 2003). Work permits continued to be issued at this level from 2002 to 2006. The new approach was justified in the 2002 white paper, Secure borders, safe havens: integration with diversity in modern Britain, which introduced into immigration policy the concept of ‘managed migration’ (Somerville 2007). The approach consisted of an
increasingly tough stance on asylum and measures to combat ‘illegal immigration’, as well as celebrating the benefits of economic migration. Hansen (2000) quotes the immigration minister as stating that she wanted to be the first immigration minister to say ‘immigration is a good thing’. The three subsequent immigration acts passed in 2002, 2004 and 2006 all followed the spirit of the white paper.

Table 4: Asylum applications including dependents 1985–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>32,830</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>60,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>43,965</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5,865</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>30,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5,739</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>41,500</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>16,775</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>38,200</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>91,200</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>31,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>32,300</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>98,900</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>30,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>73,400</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>91,600</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>22,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>28,500</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>103,080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office statistics

According to McGhee (2005) and Schuster and Solomos (2004) the integration side of the integration-immigration control couplet underwent a change under New Labour, following the northern town disturbances in 2001. They see the new emphasis on ‘community cohesion’ as the dismantling of multiculturalism in Britain and a move to assimilation, following an acknowledgement of the failure of past integration policy. The Community Cohesion Review (2001) states that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges (quoted in McGhee 2005 unpaginated).

McGhee argues that the ‘failed integration hypothesis’ as expressed above, was central to all the community cohesion policies and strategies
since 2001. Cantle, now an advocate of interculturalism (see Chapter 1.4) was key in this policy shift, which could be interpreted as a move towards interculturalism rather than assimilation. As shown in Chapter 1.4, multiculturalism and interculturalism differ only in emphasis: interculturalism places the accent on interaction and building a new common culture, an emphasis that is noticeable in the government strategy document *Strength in diversity* (2004).

The key strategy document *Controlling our borders, making migration work for Britain* (2005), which preceded the 2006 immigration law, marked the end to the emphasis on asylum (Somerville 2007). In addition to unprecedented internal controls of non-EU migrants and the incorporation of non-government bodies into a regime of immigration control, the document introduced the notion of the ‘global approach to migration’, which Britain had promoted during its EU presidency whereby ‘illegal’ migration would be prevented through more international cooperation, the use of new technologies and intelligence operations focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean. This converges with Spain’s immigration policies, notably its *Plan África* mentioned above.

The foreign-born population in 1961 was 4.9 per cent (ONS annual population survey). By 1981 it had risen to 6.2 per cent and remained at that level while Britain pursued a ‘zero-immigration’ policy, which left few routes open to legal entry – that of family reunification and seeking asylum. In 2001 the percentage had risen to 8.3 per cent, and in 2010 to 12.7 per cent (ibid.). Under the Labour government 1997–2010, 2.5 million foreign-born people were added to the population.

The objective of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, when it took power in 2010 was to drastically reduced the numbers of non-EU migrants coming into the country through an immigration cap to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands, that is, to levels prior to New Labour’s governments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political party in government</th>
<th>Law/policy</th>
<th>Brief summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945–1962</td>
<td>1945–51 Labour</td>
<td>British Nationality Act (BNA) 1948</td>
<td>Commonwealth citizens and people from British colonies have full rights to move and reside in UK as British subjects (CUKC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951–1964 Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Douglas-Home (1963–1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Labour Wilson (1964–1966)</td>
<td>White paper on immigration from the Commonwealth</td>
<td>Links extension of controls with introduction of further integration measures, including funding for hospitals and local authorities, to address issues raised by recruitment of migrants into NHS. Key issue: reduction to Commonwealth Immigrants Act’s quotas and abolishing unskilled labour quotas. Powers to deport extended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Race Relations Act</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination legislation linking positive measures for integrating migrants with the necessity for immigration control. Discrimination illegal in certain ‘places of public resort’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political party in government</td>
<td>Law/policy</td>
<td>Brief summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extension of Race Relations Act 1965</td>
<td>A defence of the above legislation – restrict numbers to prevent racial discrimination. Legislation extended to make discrimination illegal in housing, employment, education and the Crown as ‘places of public resort’. Community Relations Commission set up to promote ‘harmonious community relations’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Immigration Appeals Act</td>
<td>Only Commonwealth immigrants with parent or grandparent born in Britain (patrials) have the right to enter. Non-patrials only allowed to enter Britain for 6 months and only to work with permission. The right to deport non-patrials implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political party in government</td>
<td>Law/policy</td>
<td>Brief summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Conservative Thatcher (1990)</td>
<td>Immigration Act</td>
<td>Removed entitlements of permanent residents and citizens to family unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Immigration and Asylum Act</td>
<td>Dispersal policy of asylum seekers outside of London, end of access to benefit system, end of entitlement to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>White paper <em>Secure borders, safe havens: integration with diversity in modern Britain</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Asylum and Immigration (treatment of claimants, etc.) Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>White paper <em>Controlling our borders: making migration work for Britain</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Home Office Integration matters: a national strategy for refugee integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Labour Blair (2007)</td>
<td><em>A points-based system: making migration work for Britain</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Political party in government</td>
<td>Law/policy</td>
<td>Brief summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fair, effective, transparent and trusted: rebuilding confidence in our immigration system  
Enforcing the rules: a strategy to ensure and enforce compliance with our immigration laws  
UK Borders Act  
Our shared future: final report of the Commission of Integration and Cohesion |  |
| 2008 | Labour | Criminal Justice and Immigration Act  
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act |  |
| 2009 | Labour | Immigration and Citizenship Act |  |
| 2010 | Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Cameron (2010) | Immigration and Citizenship Act | Election pledge to bring down net migration to 10s of 100s; multiculturalism stated to be a policy failure. |


### 3.4 Drawing together the differences and similarities

Some striking differences between the Spanish and British immigration contexts were highlighted above and can be summarised as follows:

1. Regularisation as a policy tool was an important factor in Spanish immigration policy, whereas it played no significant role in Britain. On the other hand, seeking asylum played an important role in shaping British immigration policy since the 1990s, whereas it played little role in Spain.
2. Since the late 1990s Spain implemented few pieces of immigration legislation, in spite of its own acknowledgement as a country of immigration. By contrast, Britain was hyperactive in this regard – for example, the New Labour government implemented six immigration and asylum laws between 1999 and 2009.

3. Until the late 1990s, Spain considered itself as a country of emigration. Conversely, Britain had long been considered a country of immigration, with a history of immigrants arriving mainly from the former empire and colonies.

4. Spain had no history of race-relations legislation. It adopted interculturalism as a policy for managing diversity brought about by immigration in the mid-2000s. In contrast, Britain had the most extensive race-relations laws in Europe (Heartfield 2017). It adopted multiculturalism as its policy for managing diversity in the 1960s.

There were significant differences between Spain and Britain in terms of their respective political history, namely that Spain only returned to democracy after almost 40 years of dictatorship. Yet the similarities described in Section 3.2 above – that is, the sense of political disillusionment and the mood of resignation – are of great significance with regard to the background of the case studies. The similarities between the Spanish and British contexts can be summarised as follows:

1. The background regarding the ‘turbulent times’ and political polarisation that continued into the 1980s and the subsequent disappointment provided a similar starting point for both case studies in terms of left-wing politics: they shared a sense of disillusionment with collective political action and a
disappointment in the working class. This common climate
gave rise to a widespread understanding that what could be
realistically expected from political action was considerably
limited. The mood of resignation or even fatalism was later
consolidated by the repercussions of the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the end of the world polarised between competing social
models, and the idea of ‘the end of history’ (Gamble 2000).

2. A new ‘super-diversity’ existed in both countries. In Spain,
new migration from North Africa, Latin America and Romania
increased from the late 1990s. The enlargement of the EU led
to many unauthorised eastern Europeans already in Spain
legalising their unauthorised status. In Britain, new migration
consisted of the increase in asylum seeking from countries not
part of the former empire or its colonies, EU migration and
the increased number of work permits for highly skilled
migrants. Vertovec (2006) meant more than nationality when
he coined the term ‘super-diversity’ to express the new
diversity of migrants. He noted, above all, the varying range
of immigration status and associated rights or lack of rights. In
terms of numbers there was a similar development in both
countries: In Spain, in less than a decade the foreign-born
population quadrupled between 2001 and 2010 from 8.3 per
cent to 12.7 per cent. In Britain, in less than a decade, it
tripled between 2004 and 2010 from 7 per cent to 12 per
cent.

3. Both Spain and Britain established a twin-track strategy of
immigration control and social integration or social cohesion
through intercultural or multicultural policies. Spain’s
‘intercultural’ and Britain’s ‘multicultural’ model of
integration had remarkably similar policy objectives, despite
the claim that interculturalism addressed multiculturalism’s
shortcomings and its ghettoisation of minorities. New
Labour’s shift in emphasis in its multicultural policies to community cohesion converged, to a large extent, with Spanish interculturalism.

4. Spain and Britain converged within the EU policy framework on matters of immigration and asylum:

Since the 1990s EU immigration and asylum policy were dominated by the objective to fight against ‘illegal migration’ (Castles 2004; de Haas 2007b; Triandafyllidou 2010). The harmonisation of EU immigration and asylum policy focused on this objective. Lahav (2014: 458), for instance, makes the following assessment:

[The] Europeanisation of migration, ironically, has most advanced in migration policy areas that satisfy the desire of national politicians to keep foreigners out (ibid.).

This observation explains the convergence between Spain and Britain regarding their immigration policies. Spain, on occasion, used the EU’s restrictive framework to justify its own harsh policies; Britain, while frequently opting out of EU regulations, opted into all EU measures regarding ‘illegal migration’ (Balzacq and Carrera 2005). Geddes (2005) points out that while Britain opted out of the Amsterdam treaty on migration, it supported all the treaty’s restrictive measures on the entry of non-EU migrants into Europe. Irrespective of the significant differences between them, both countries had a remarkably similar approach to non-EU migration particularly since the establishment of ‘Fortress Europe’ in 1992, which introduced freedom of movement for EU citizens and intensified measures to restrict the movement of third-country nationals.
Summary

The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, by describing the historical context of two different European countries it showed that, despite their dissimilarities, one particular common denominator provided a shared backdrop for the case studies – that of political disappointment in the early 1980s. It set the backdrop against which the relocation of sites for political struggle, or for projects for rights and justice shifted from the working class to migrants. Birchall (2013) indicated that this shift took place in the 1970s, but the case studies will demonstrate that it occurred at a later stage. Second, this chapter explored the immigration law and policy background of both countries to show how one dimension of the portrayal of migrants by the migrants’ rights organisations in the case studies might be rooted in the empirical reality of changing immigration law and policy that generated ‘illegality’ and ‘vulnerability’. Yet it also demonstrated that the vulnerabilities created by the law did not preclude migrants from exercising their political subjectivity.
Chapter 4 Methodology and research processes

The previous chapters provided both an underlying theoretical framework and a historical background for the data analysis carried out in Chapters 5 to 7. They explored the significant shifts that took place in a period mostly prior to the inception of the case-study organisations. The following chapters explore how these earlier and more contemporary political and social shifts that occurred in the lifetime of the two case-study organisations (between 1983 and 2012) were reflected in their portrayal of migrants. The two case-study organisations – one in Seville, Spain (Sevilla Acoge) and the other in London, Britain (Praxis) – provide the focus for the main questions guiding this research:

- How do migrants’ rights organisations portray migrants?
- How did these portrayals change over thirty years?
- What is the political and social significance of these portrayals?

To address these questions, a mixed-methods design was devised, suited to qualitative research, consisting of a grounded theory and case study approach. In addition, the mixed-methods design includes content analysis, predominantly qualitative, but also with a small quantitative element in the form of word count exercises. Below, the choice and rationale of these methodological approaches is explained; the research processes and techniques employed in this thesis are also clarified and justified.

A case study approach

Yin (2009) regards the case study as a suitable tool for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions – that is, questions of an open-ended nature, as are the research questions above. He suggests that case studies are not samples and, therefore, not fully representative. They are, however, thorough
investigations of social processes from which it may be possible to draw analytical generalisations. It would not have been feasible to carry out research in numerous organisations in two different countries in an attempt to gain a more representative sample, and this was not the aim. A key objective of this research project was to compare how the portrayal of migrants by two case-study organisations may reflect political and social developments of those two different countries. While this investigation may provide insights that could have wider significance beyond the two case studies in this thesis, they are intended to be examples, not samples.

This study is comparative, cross-national and longitudinal. It is comparative and cross-national in the sense that it compares two migrants’ rights organisations and their portrayal of migrants in two different European countries; it is longitudinal in the sense that it explores their portrayal of migrants across a period of almost thirty years (1983–2012). The rationale for carrying out such a study was to be able to understand how migrants’ rights organisations in these two European countries with distinct histories and different political and social backgrounds portrayed migrants, and how their portrayal may have changed over time, given the significant historical moments the organisations lived through – for example, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Chapter 3 drew attention to specific differences between the countries, particularly the immigration law and policy contexts, but it also highlighted the striking similarities in terms of the shared sense of disillusionment in the promise of politics that was part of the atmosphere of the early 1980s.

**Selection criteria**

In line with the rationale, the organisations were selected for the case studies using the following criteria:
1. They advocated for migrants’ rights, but they were not set up by migrants themselves. The aim was to explore how migrants’ rights organisations portrayed migrants rather than to examine migrants’ self-representations, although self-representations were analysed where they appeared.

2. They were service providers and publically funded, as well as being organisations that campaigned for change. The literature, for example, Però (2007) and Gil Araújo (2002), claimed that government funding influenced the way in which migrants’ rights organisations portrayed migrants and so it was important to be able to test their claim.

3. They had been in existence for approximately thirty years; they had the organisational documentation and memory stretching back over those years. The aim was to identify organisations that had existed prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, so that it would be possible to trace shifts in their portrayal of migrants against the backdrop of significant political and social changes.

Of the two organisations selected – Sevilla Acoge in Seville (Spain) and Praxis in London (Britain) – the former was founded in 1985, and the latter in 1983. Both organisations started off informally, mainly run by volunteers and with little funding, and both developed into highly respected, well-funded organisations. Before I embarked upon my research, I did not know that both organisations were influenced by the radical Christian ideas of liberation theology. This unexpected parallel became key to the similarities explored in the data analysis.

On a practical level, the choice of case studies was influenced by my long-term familiarity with the migrant and refugee sector in London and Seville. I have worked in the London refugee and migrant voluntary sector for over twenty years. Moreover, I have been visiting Seville and making contacts in the migrant sector over the last ten years. My
knowledge of the sector, combined with my personal and professional contacts in both research sites, gave me easy access. I also speak fluent Spanish.

**Grounded theory**

I ‘discovered’ grounded theory when I attended an NVIVO training course, just after I had started my empirical work. I found that I was already intuitively using some of its techniques. The research methodology and techniques of grounded theory, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Corbin and Strauss (2008), were the ones with which I had the greatest affinity, and therefore I adopted them. These methods include some distinctive features: bringing together the data collection and its analysis from the start of the research in order to set the direction of the next round of collecting data and its analysis in an ongoing process; memo writing – a procedure in which the analysis or the raising of data to a conceptual level takes place throughout the whole research process and in which concepts and interrelations between concepts are pursued and developed until they feel plausible; theoretical sampling, whereby initial ‘hunches’ turn into detective work by finding data that throws more light onto underdeveloped themes or concepts that have emerged; and theoretical saturation whereby the process of going back and forth between the data and the analysis ends when concepts are fully developed theoretically. This also signifies the need to go out to the literature throughout the research process as explained in the section below on data analysis, which describes the iterative process that took place between the analysis of the empirical data and the theoretical framework.

Criticisms of the imprecise use of the label grounded theory to cover a wide range of methods come from many quarters (Bryant and Charmaz 2007; Bryman 2008). Indiscriminate use of the label appears to stem from a lack of awareness of the philosophical and epistemological basis
on which the methodological approach rests. Grounded theory arose amidst the sociological debates taking place in the 1960s in the United States, particularly around the sociology of knowledge (Bryant and Charmaz 2007); sociologists were reacting against perceived flaws in mainstream sociology of the time (Strübing 2007). Corbin and Strauss (2008) make clear that grounded theory is underpinned by North American pragmatist philosophy, although this was not clearly spelled out in 1967. They illustrate that Chicago School symbolic interactionism has affinities with pragmatist philosophy, and that this also has an influential bearing on the methodology (Corbin and Strauss 2008, Strübing 2007).

The above illustrates how fundamental the philosophical underpinnings are to grounded theory, and yet, while Corbin (2008) encourages users of her grounded theory methods to understand the philosophical assumptions that underpin the theory, she does not disapprove of researchers who want to use her methods and techniques to produce rich description rather than to generate theory (ibid. 2008: 16). But others claim that the distinctive feature of grounded theory is the purpose of generating theory (Bryant and Charmaz 2007); the originators of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss, claimed in their 1967 work that the aim of generating sociological theory was the raison d’être of sociology.

The question of whether or not we can call a methodological approach grounded theory when it is detached from the philosophical and epistemological assumptions of its originators is unresolved, as is the question of whether or not we can use grounded theory methodology without the aim of generating theory from the data. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve these questions, but I have found my own way to use both the methodology of grounded theory and its aim to produce a provisional theoretical framework. My methodological approach is not underpinned by the pragmatist philosophical assumptions of grounded theory (Charmaz 2006; Corbin and Strauss
2008; Strübing 2007); instead, my philosophical orientation derives from Norbert Elias and what he described as a ‘theory of social processes’ (Elias 1997). This orientation overlaps with the pragmatist presuppositions underlying grounded theory, which, arguably, makes it compatible with a grounded theory approach. The core shared assumptions are as follows: the social world is in a constant state of flux; social phenomena, insofar as they are interrelated and form part of an interactional whole, cannot be understood in isolation from one another; they are continually shaped and reshaped by human actions and interactions. In short, the social world evolves in an incessant and dynamic process. Below, a summary of this sociological perspective attempts to draw out some of the methodological implications. In Elias’ words:

Because human societies are endless processes, an open-ended theoretical perspective is needed to understand them (ibid.: 371).

From this perspective, grounded theory is a suitable methodological approach to adopt for this research project.

A theory of social processes

There are three interlocking elements in Elias’ theory of social processes. The first is that it is as much a theory of social processes as it is one of historical process, without which, Elias claimed, we cannot understand the present. The past, or history, is knitted into the present, which is a transient moment in time, moving into the future:

Current social relations are only one moment in a long-term process, which leads from the past through the present and beyond into the future (ibid.: 357).

Elias insisted that, given the fluidity of social reality, it can only be understood by bringing history into its view so that we can trace the
transformations that have led to our point of arrival in the present (ibid.). While there is nothing novel about the insight that change is the norm and not the exceptional state of society, as discussed in Chapter 2, this perception has possibly intensified since Elias’ death in 1990; it was previously mentioned that the sensation of ‘all that is solid melts into air’ is ubiquitous in recent sociological writing that attempts to understand the contemporary era. This increased sense of the impermanence of our world, coupled with a profound lack of certainty, has led some social theorists towards radically relativist and extreme social constructivist positions, as Corbin and Strauss (2008: 55) point out. Elias, however, gives us the tools to think about the world in a more fruitful way. Each moment in the development of our societies is historically, socially and culturally specific. This insight need not take us down the path of sceptical relativism, nor does it signify that there is nothing stable in the social world. Instead, it requires us to investigate the historical development of social phenomena in order to understand them in their current form: their meaning in a historically specific context may change more than their outward appearance. This is key to this study, which attempts to show how shifts in the portrayal of migrants provided insights into political and social changes within two different geographical locations, at the same time as explaining how and why we arrived at this point, thus acknowledging the continual process of movement in society.

The second element at the centre of Elias’ theory of social processes is human actors, who constantly shape and reshape the social world through their actions and interactions. Actors are responsible for the historical transformations taking place over time, yet the outcome of their actions and interactions are largely unpredictable.

The third element consists of the changes brought about by these human actions and interactions, and by relationships and interrelationships. These transform the social structures in which we live, as well as our personality structures, because the two are
Elias (2001: 25) referred to this interrelationship as a ‘network’ in a process of constant reshaping and gradual transformation. This is a useful way of looking at social change and the reconfiguration of subjectivity, which is key to this research’s focus – the changing portrayals of migrants. The aim is to capture what is specific about the particular historical moment of the ‘network’ and the corresponding form of human subjectivity.

Elias’ philosophical orientation is significant because it moves us away from the conceptual way of thinking about the world in dualistic terms, a mode of thought that confines us to irresolvable discussions about the individual versus society, subject versus object, the psyche versus the social (Elias 1978). Elias’ outlook is particularly pertinent to contemporary academic discussions on grounded theory in which different stances are taken along a continuum ranging from strong objectivism (Glaser), mild social constructionism (Strauss and Corbin) to varieties of strong social constructionism (Charmaz). While this research favours a mild social constructionism variant with its acknowledgement of an objective reality, the preference is to move from an antithetical approach of choosing between a constructionist or objectivist stance. The approach taken in this research is one that attempts to understand the intermeshed character of individuals and society as mutually influencing one another.

Elias’ theory of social processes, as a methodological approach, implies that we live in a complex world in which we cannot understand social phenomena or social issues outside of the notion of change, processes and interrelationships. We need to understand the specific historical, social and cultural contexts in which they exist, not in isolation from one another, but in an interconnected way, and with the understanding that they do not stand still in time. They cannot be understood in a binary fashion, but rather through all the multiple elements that constitute them. A ready-made theoretical framework would not fit the exploration of society in movement, and this is where grounded theory,
underpinned by Elias’ theory of social processes, offers a way to produce a provisional theoretical framework based on the empirical evidence. How this worked out in practice is explained in the section on data analysis.

**Data collection**

The case study approach, as Yin (ibid.) points out, allows the use of more than one method to collect data. Multiple sources of data were drawn on for the case studies. They were as follows:

- organisational documents – Annual Reports, minutes of committee meetings, conference reports and training manuals;
- journal articles and published books written by the organisations’ key players or in which the organisations and their key players appeared;
- press articles and reports;
- other NGO reports.

The above are listed in Appendix 1.

- semi-structured interviews with long-standing members of the organisations and people involved in the organisations at different stages of their history;
- interviews with key people that already existed in the public domain.

These are listed in Appendix 2.
These different sources of data brought together different perspectives and contradictions, but enabled a triangulation.

Grounded theory entails a process of simultaneous data collection, analysis and coding. Below is a description of how this was carried out in the initial stages. As stated above, data for the case studies was drawn mainly from organisational documents and interviews, supplemented by newspaper articles, journals, reports and books relating to the case-study organisations, some of which were authored by the interviewees. Two interviews were not conducted by myself: one was a television interview archived on the Spanish national television (RTVE) website, and the other was a pre-existing interview conducted by a community research project (the Refugee Community History Project), archived in the Museum of London.

On the first visit to the Spanish case-study organisation, Sevilla Acoge, I obtained the Annual Reports (memorias) from the first, dated 1987, up to 2010. The final years’ Annual Reports were digitalised and accessible to download in PDF format from the organisation’s website. Most of the Annual Reports were lengthy (over 100 pages of A4 size paper) – they amounted to almost 2000 pages in total. I skim read them over two days, making brief notes on significant or interesting themes. I had already started analysing the documents from the British case-study organisation Praxis, and so I was able to make comparisons, spotting common or distinct thematic codes. I then made a decision on which Annual Reports I would select to photocopy for content analysis. I selected all the Annual Reports corresponding to the years of the Annual Reports that existed for Praxis and all the Annual Reports for the early years. Praxis only started to produce Annual Reports from 1991 but ample organisational documentation existed for the earlier years, which I planned to analyse. The only source of documentation that existed for the early years of Sevilla Acoge was the first Annual Reports. Subsequently I found other documentation, for example a
significant document that was used for the organisation’s intercultural training. All the documentation was in Spanish.

On the first visit to *Praxis* I was given a box full of documents. It included most of the early Annual Reports from 1991 to 2006. The final years were available to download in digital form from the organisation’s website. These Annual Reports were considerably shorter than the Spanish ones, approximately 200 pages in total. I spent the day reading and making a note of all the documents and made a selection of ones to be used for further analysis, particularly minutes of meetings corresponding to the years when no Annual Reports existed. Where duplicate copies of documents existed, I asked permission to keep them; I asked permission to take away other documents to photocopy.

**Interviews**

I undertook 18 interviews between the period 2011 and 2013. Being based in London I had easy access to *Praxis* and potential interviewees; I visited Spain three times to conduct interviews relating to *Sevilla Acoge*. Two additional interviews were used that had been conducted for different research purposes (see Appendix 2). Interviewees were all people who had been associated with the organisations throughout their whole history or at particular times, mostly present or past employees and volunteers. All interviews were conducted in Spanish in the Spanish case study; in the British case study, all interviews were in English, even when interviewees’ first language was Spanish, because the interviewees preferred to speak English.

**Access**

The first interview in each case study was with the key person who had been in the organisation for almost the full length of the organisation’s existence. Prior to the interview I read thoroughly the organisational
documents mentioned above, and prepared a list of questions for semi-structured interviews. The initial interviews led me to identify new potential interviewees. I asked the first interviewees whether they objected to me interviewing these people; in some cases they facilitated the arrangement of the interviews, or told me how to contact the people. Because I had worked in the migrant and refugee sector in London for many years I knew a few of the interviewees as colleagues and was always granted an interview. In Spain, I had also developed contacts and friendships over the years and was always given access.

Each interview suggested not only other potentially useful interviewees but also reports, press articles and other sources to read and analyse. Sometimes I came across unexpected coincidences that led to rich sources of data I could not have anticipated. For example, I found a letter in the box of documents I was given in Praxis, written by someone I knew independently. I had no idea of her connection with the organisation; when I contacted her, she explained that she had been an old friend of the founder of Praxis, Robert Kemble, who had died in 1981. She emailed me what she called her ‘Kemble memorabilia’, which included an important document that set off a new line of investigation. Another coincidence was that my first interviewee in Praxis referred to someone who would have been an important interviewee, but who had died in 2008. Because of my work in the migrant and refugee sector, I was aware that an interview already existed with him, as part of a refugee life history project, archived in the Museum of London: this data became crucial to my analysis. The sense of serendipity continued in Spain: I had wanted to interview a key person, the Andalucían ombudsman, but he was not easy to access. By chance, I was in a small Andalucían town, visiting friends who were going to an evening book launch and the author of the book was the ombudsman. He granted me an interview for the following day in Seville and I had time to read his book, which gave me more scope for developing the questions I had planned to ask. These coincidences during the research process made it
exciting, as did the thrill of discovering something unexpected through interviews and following up the lead.

**Truth, reliability and ethics**

Most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face; only one interview was carried out by telephone. I used a list of questions to guide my interviews, specific to each interviewee, which I drew up after considerable preparation. I emailed interviewees prior to the interview with an explanation of the purpose of my research, what I wanted to talk to them about and seeking in advance their permission to record them. I used the music-recording programme on my laptop, which produced a high-quality recording. I noticed that people felt more relaxed with having my laptop on the table, rather than a separate digital recorder. Everyone I interviewed understood the nature of PhD research. I assured all of the interviewees that if I quoted them, they would not be attributed directly by name, except in the case of three interviewees who had a more public profile, had published their own writing and had been written about in the public domain. They understood that they could be identified and a couple of times I was told that something was ‘off the record’, which I respected. I quoted from one interview not conducted by myself and which already existed in the public domain. Sadly, the interviewee is no longer alive. I wanted to maintain a buffer between the interviewees and their words where they were not in the public domain so the quotations used from their interviews are referenced in an anonymous way, by coding them according to organisation, number and year of interview, for example, SA interview 01 2011, that is, *Sevilla Acoge*, interview number one, conducted in 2011. In order to be consistent, I maintained this coding system even where the interviews were with an identified individual whose views were already in the public domain. In the case of the interview conducted by the Refugee Community History Project (RCHP), it appears as RCHP interview 2006.
Although my initial interviews consisted of a lot of ‘fact-gathering’ questions, mostly my interviews were probing, in order to get different perspectives either on specific incidents and events of significance in the organisations' history, or on different periods of the organisations' life. Memory, of course, is unreliable. One key interviewee confessed, looking back over thirty years, that he had a terrible memory, although much of what he recalled appeared to be very accurate and triangulated with other data sources. In the case of another key interviewee, he contradicted other data sources in what appeared to be a complete memory lapse. I interpreted this as genuine, not intentional. During the course of the research, two controversial issues emerged, one in each organisation, which were significant to my analysis. I found plenty of data sources relating to these issues, including press coverage of the time that helped me to include multiple perspectives and to triangulate the data.

My first point of contact with each organisation was with the key person (the chief executive in the British case study and the secretary of management committee in the Spanish case study) who agreed for their organisations to be my case studies. When I began my research, there was no system in place to obtain ethical clearance and so I proceeded in an informal fashion: the agreement was through email correspondence and on my visit to the British organisation I gave the chief executive a letter from the Sociology Department signed by my supervisor stating that I would follow the university policy and regulations on ethics, data protection and confidentiality. Although a similar letter was presented to the Spanish case-study organisation, I was told that it was not required. I was a kind of an ‘insider’, particularly in the British scenario. Sennett (2006) describes inexperienced researchers as prone to over-empathising and being drawn into the interviewee's narrative unquestioningly. My experience was different as I was often more sceptical and this placed me in an uncomfortable position. I had privileged access to interviewees and never struggled to establish trust; people were generous with their time and were open with me, often
revealing unexpected issues I could never have known about. I found myself facing what I can only describe as conflicting loyalties – interviewees trusted me and they brought up controversial issues that had happened in the life of each organisation, which for a researcher, were fascinating; they were exciting discoveries that would change the direction of my analysis or add more dimensionality to concepts that were emerging. I respected the times when I was told that some things were ‘off the record’, so these did not come into the data analysis, but I was conscious of the fact that even though I had a duty to represent the perspectives of the different interviewees accurately, I was the one who would interpret the data – the power of analysis lay with me – and I was aware that my interpretation may not be shared by the participants. An ethics review of my research took place in 2014 for which I provided evidence of how informal consent was obtained and an account of how I carried out my research taking into consideration ethical principles. I provided copies of email correspondence with interviewees as evidence. The review found that there were no concerns.

Data analysis

Carrying out data collection and analysis as a simultaneous process was easier in the British case study as I was able to go back out into the field to interview people quickly if my theoretical sampling pointed me in a particular direction. In the Spanish case study I sometimes had to wait several months before I could follow interview leads. I transcribed each interview myself as soon as possible after it took place when it was fresh in my mind. This also served as an initial coding exercise of emerging themes that could be developed when I returned to the transcripts for more in-depth analysis. I transcribed all the Spanish interviews in the original language and analysed them directly from the Spanish transcripts. I only translated sections to use as quotations and I take full responsibility for their quality and accuracy. All the British case-study interviews were conducted in English because the participants spoke English, although often not as their first language. I kept faithful to the original speech in the quotations I used without
making changes for the sake of clarity. Where relevant I noted laughter, hand gestures, a change of register in the speech or voice of participants.

For my first interviews with the key person in each case-study organisation – the secretary of Sevilla Acoge, who had worked there since 1987, and the chief executive of Praxis, who had worked in the organisation since 1983 – I had formulated most of my questions in advance after a thorough reading of the Annual Reports and internal organisational documents. I used the list of questions I had drawn up as guidance and if anything unexpected arose in the course of the interview I would ask further questions. During these initial interviews, I identified a number of concepts that seemed to be important and which I realised I would need to pursue with other interviewees. Each subsequent interview led to either the development of the concepts by their confirmation, or by the discovery of a different angle – both of which deepened their meaning. Because I was making a comparative analysis not only within one case study over a period of time but also across two different countries, the comparative study between the two case studies revealed even more than I imagined. Concepts arising in the two different case studies at different stages of the organisations’ histories led to questions to pursue, for example, why they arose in one context and not the other, or why one particular portrayal of migrants was so present in one organisation and absent in another. The continuous process of contrasting when and how concepts emerged through the analysis of the interviews had its parallel in the analysis of the Annual Reports. Sometimes, during the interviews, my eyes were opened to concepts I had not noticed or given importance to when reading the Annual Reports and other documents, and vice versa. For example, I was made aware of the importance of the concept of interculturalism in the Spanish case study and the idea of kairos in the British case study through my first interviews with the key actors in the organisations. I was alerted to other important concepts through the analysis of documents, which I then pursued through interviews.
Content analysis of Annual Reports – another ‘slice of data’

I scanned the organisations’ Annual Reports that were not already in a digital form and converted them into searchable documents. I read each electronic Annual Report and highlighted every single reference to migrants where they appeared as a noun (proper and common), as subject and object of sentences, as nouns from verbs and adjectives (e.g., the displaced), collective nouns, pronouns (I, we, they, etc.) and indefinite pronouns. This amounted to approximately 70 different categories of ‘migrant as noun’ for each organisation. I then placed each category of ‘migrant as noun’ into one of 48 coded categories I had created. I devised Excel spreadsheets for each organisation. The first was a list of every category of ‘migrant as noun’ by year to enable a word count. The second was a list of each ‘migrant as noun’ by year, cut and pasted from the Annual Reports with their word collocation, which was coded according to the categories in which they fitted. I produced one final Excel spreadsheet for the British case study in order to carry out a content analysis of the images that appeared in the Annual Reports. There were too few images in the Spanish Annual Reports to make a comparable study.

The systematic search for ‘migrant as noun’ was for two reasons: one was to be able to search the documents using these keywords so that I could code them and place them within the categories. The other exercise was to count the frequency of these words as they appeared, disappeared, increased or diminished over the years. The arrival, departure, absence, presence, frequency and year in which they occurred or disappeared provided invaluable insights. This form of content analysis provided me with another ‘slice of data’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 57). As the research proceeded I found that I did not need many of the categories I had coded. In developing the thematic strands through other data analysis I drew on very few of the coded categories for my analysis, for example, the rise of migrants as intercultural
mediators (in the Spanish case study) or the rise of migrants as vulnerable (in the British case study). Having invested a large amount of time in the coding exercise, a much simpler exercise proved to be more fruitful – a word search of the Annual Reports, as demonstrated in the tables in Chapters 5 and 6 to chart the rise of interculturalism and the rise of ‘the vulnerable’. The process of manually coding ‘migrant as noun’ was still a useful exercise as it sensitised me to the data and it led to one of the most interesting discoveries: the absence of a particular category in the Spanish Annual Reports: that of migrants as political activists.

**Other data and memo writing**

I subjected all other documents, including interview transcripts, to analysis by theoretically coding concepts as they emerged. Throughout the process the writing of memos was key. It allowed me to develop my thinking from roughly sketched out ideas – based on a hunch that they might be important – to fully formed conceptual themes. By returning to those initial memos I could trace how my conceptual thinking developed over time. All those inspired moments when something was triggered through interviewing, going over the data, or reading the literature were captured at a point in time. It allowed me to see whether ‘hunches’ developed into fully formed concepts – or whether they were abandoned.

**The iterative process between the empirical and the theoretical**

I had carried out an extensive literature review prior to starting my empirical research and I took many insights from the theorists I was reading. However, the theoretical framework for this thesis developed parallel to the data analysis in an iterative process. In a few instances the literature did echo in an uncanny way the empirical data, for example, I never anticipated that abstract theories on left-wing disappointment in modernity and in ordinary people (mass society theory) I discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 would be reflected so clearly in
the empirical data of the Spanish case study. On the other hand, the empirical data mostly led me in unexpected directions so that I often found myself revisiting the literature to gain further insights into particular concepts, to make shifts in my original emphasis, or to explore a new angle. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 on making judgements outside of any traditional moral framework provides an example of how the theoretical framework arose out of the empirical data. It developed through a train of thought stimulated by the observation that the actors in the early days of the British case study organisation took sides in political struggles with relative ease. The theme of the 'black-and-white' days, in which solidarity meant taking sides in the political conflicts emerged from these times of polarisation between left- and right-wing positions.

The British organisation’s involvement in the *Kairos Europa* movement led me to go back out to the literature to discover the origin of the *Kairos movement* and the meaning of *Kairos*, which turned out to be connected to the idea of taking sides – the moral duty to make a judgement and not to remain neutral in a moment of crisis. This discovery allowed a comparison at a later stage of the British organisation’s life when the ‘black-and-white’ days had vanished, which subsequently led to the question of how the organisation made judgements outside of the earlier clear-cut political framework. In order to explore the idea of making judgements outside of any traditional political or moral framework I went back out to the literature, in this case, to Arendt, to reflect further on the implications of judging when earlier frameworks for judgement had collapsed. The constant movement between the empirical and the theoretical was how I arrived at a way to interpret the ‘Rwandan Affair’ – the pivotal event in the British case study, in which no judgement was made and neutrality was seen as necessary to protect the interests of ‘the vulnerable’. The process was one of a constant intermeshing of the empirical with the theoretical that developed into a theoretical framework, which, in turn,
helped to organise the telling of the two case studies’ stories rather than merely confirming theoretical insights.

This chapter set out the research questions and the method of data collection and analysis used in this study. The following chapters present the empirical data from the two case studies.
Chapter 5  Interculturalism – a radical alternative or a reflection of disillusionment? The Spanish case study, *Sevilla Acoge*

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on two pivotal moments that influenced the way in which the organisation portrayed migrants – the introduction of interculturalism in 1991, which led to a portrayal of migrants as damaged through the experience of the migration process, and the migrant occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide in 2002, in which the political struggle of migrants was delegitimised. Despite the intense period of migrant mobilisations from 1996 to 2002, migrants were never portrayed by *Sevilla Acoge* as political activists; when they acted politically they were portrayed as manipulated. The idea of protection from harm trumped the political subjectivity of migrants, as exemplified in the 2002 migrant occupation. The story of *Sevilla Acoge* illustrates how the humanitarian framing of migrants, and their portrayal as vulnerable and in need of empowerment was premised on an earlier disappointment with ordinary people and with the possibility of collective political action to transform society for the better. As this case study will show, the humanitarian framing had implications for the meaning of empowerment – *Sevilla Acoge’s* constant promotion of migrants as ‘their own agents’ was ultimately curtailed on humanitarian grounds. Within a humanitarian perspective it is the intermediary who acts as an external agent, rather than migrants themselves.
5.2 The creation and development of *Sevilla Acoge*

*Sevilla Acoge* was founded in 1985 by a Spanish Christian activist, Reyes García, on her return from working in Burkina Faso with the Christian missionaries *Padres Blancos de África*. It was the first Spanish organisation in Andalucía, and possibly the whole of Spain, to work exclusively with migrants. This claim was repeatedly made in the Annual Reports and is supported by the relevant literature (Rius Sant 2007). The founder of the organisation identified five other Spanish people to become the first members of the organisation, two of whom were Christians influenced by liberation theology, active in the radicalised Spanish Christian grassroots ecclesial communities (*comunidades de bases cristianas*). In 1987 Esteban Tabares, a worker-priest who was also influenced by liberation theology, joined the organisation. Reyes García played a key role in *Sevilla Acoge* until her death in 2009, as founder, as director, and finally as the chair of the organisation’s governing body. She was succeeded by Omar El Hartiti, a Moroccan migrant who had worked with *Sevilla Acoge* since 1991. Tabares was an influential figure in the organisation from 1987 onwards in many different roles in the organisation and on the governing body.

From 1987 onwards *Sevilla Acoge* set up other *Acoges* throughout Andalucía, the first of which was *Almería Acoge*. In 1991, the *Acoges* were networked to form a federated structure called *Andalucía Acoge*. The existence of this federation is significant because it meant that much of the work *Sevilla Acoge* initiated had a reach beyond Seville. The adoption of interculturalism, along with the start of intercultural training from 1991, explored below, was cascaded throughout the federation. In 2006 *Sevilla Acoge* and *Almería Acoge* left the federation, or rather, it was voted that they leave. The reason for this was because of differences in strategy: *Sevilla Acoge* had ambitions to work at a national level, which would allow it to apply for European Union (EU)
funding, while the other smaller Acoges wanted to remain local (SA interview 01 2011).

Although Sevilla Acoge was established by Christians, it was independent of the Catholic church and non-denominational. In 2005 Sevilla Acoge converted its legal status from ‘association’ to ‘foundation’, the equivalent of registering with the Charity Commission in the British context. This marked the growing professionalisation and external regulation of the organisation.

The founder’s motive for establishing the organisation was a simple one, based on the notion of hospitality. Her aim was to return the hospitality and welcome she had received in Africa:

She spent three years in Burkina Faso and the impact of this and her experience there strongly affected her so that when she returned to Seville she always repeated: ‘In Africa I never felt either white or foreign. I now have to reciprocate and give back the same treatment I received. In Africa I received a welcome. So in Seville I am going to make sure that Africans who come to Seville feel welcome just as I felt in Burkina Faso.’ And this word ‘welcome’ and her experience of it affected her so strongly that the association up to this day is called Sevilla Acoge [Seville Welcomes] (SA interview 01 2011).

Tabares’ trajectory was different to, and more complex than that of the founder’s, although they were both motivated by their Christian beliefs. The political and historical context given in Chapter 3 is essential for understanding Tabares’ motivation and commitment to the organisation for almost thirty years. He had been part of the Spanish worker-priest movement during the period of political upheaval that existed towards the end of Franco’s dictatorship and the transition to democracy. In the seventeen years prior to joining Sevilla Acoge, Tabares had been involved in those ‘turbulent times’ (Flores Sánchez 2011), that is, in the struggle for land and work alongside the landless
poor in the Sierra Sur, a rural area in the province of Seville. By the mid-1980s, hopes for a complete break with Francoism and far-reaching social change through collective political action had been frustrated. The group of six worker-priests among the Andalucian rural population had dissolved. Diamantino García, the best-known of the group and founder of the Sindicato de Obreros del Campo (SOC), the first Andalucian rural workers’ trade union, left the Sierra Sur in 1985 to set up the Andalucian human rights organisation Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía [For Human Rights in Andalucía]; Tabares left the rural area for Seville in 1987 to join Sevilla Acoge. Flores Sánchez (2011) associates the worker-priests’ turn away from the rural workers movement both with the movement’s decline and with the start of new migration to Spain at the end of the 1980s. It can also be said to mark the political disenchantment known as desencanto that had replaced the sense of optimism in the tangible possibilities for radical change that had existed immediately after Franco’s death. The worker-priests, influenced by radical Catholic social action and, specifically, liberation theology, were committed to a ‘preferential option for the poor’. In Andalucía, their focus of attention had been the Spanish agricultural workers; however, since the introduction of the restrictive 1985 immigration law (see Chapter 3), the situation of migrants had deteriorated and migrants became the ‘new poor’. Tabares expressed how his commitment had always been ‘to the most disadvantaged, the poorest of people’ and migrants had now superseded the Spanish rural workers:

By the time I went to live in Seville, leaving the context of rural Andalucía, the community most similar to the Andalucian rural labourers were immigrants, foreigners ... Who are the poor, here, in this context, from my point of view and given my life history? It is immigrants. There are other layers of poor but one of the poorest layers and most disadvantaged is foreign immigrants (SA interview 02 2011).
The worker-priests’ attention did not turn away from the rural workers just because living and working conditions had improved with the transition to democracy. Flores Sánchez captures the disappointment experienced by the worker-priests as the militancy subsided, apathy set in and consumer society was embraced. He describes how the focus of the worker-priests’ condemnation moved from the political system to the moral values of society. They saw the former political values of ordinary people becoming degraded by consumerism and the influence of popular culture:

They waged a war against television, against soaps and even children’s programmes, which according to them, were making people stupid (Flores Sánchez 2011: 123).

The politicised environment in which Tabares had been immersed and the ensuing sense of disappointment experienced by the worker-priests when seventeen years of work in the Sierra Sur disintegrated is well documented by Flores Sánchez (2010, 2011). This sense of disappointment underlies the philosophy of interculturalism that was adopted by the organisation soon after Tabares joined it. As the following sections illustrate, the embrace of interculturalism represented an expression of the disappointment in ordinary Spanish people and in the failed attempt to change society through radical politics and collective action.

5.3 The emergence of interculturalism

The concepts of multiculturalism and interculturalism were explored in Chapter 1.4, in which Meer and Modood (2012) argued, against Cantle (2012), that the seemingly distinguishing features of interculturalism were shared by multiculturalism. The prevailing trend in Spain, however, was to view interculturalism as a way to overcome the perceived shortcomings of multiculturalism. Spanish academics, for
example, Malgesini and Giménez (2000) and Zapata-Barrero (2012), argue that multiculturalism as a policy causes ghettoisation and separation, similar to the ‘parallel lives’ described by Cantle (2001). The compilation of intercultural training materials developed by Sevilla Acoge and published in a document called Approaching the other (1996) illustrated that train of academic thought. For example, interculturalism was said to be

the overcoming of multiculturalism understood as different cultures coexisting in sealed compartments and without any interchange (El Acercamiento al Otro (EAO) [Approaching the other] 1996: 58).

The term interculturalidad or ‘interculturalism’ and the adjective ‘intercultural’ appeared for the first time in the organisation’s 1991 Annual Report and remained a constant presence throughout the years analysed for this case study.

Table 6: The rise of interculturalism

![Graph showing the rise of 'intercultural' in Sevilla Acoge's Annual Reports 1987 - 2012]

Source: word count Sevilla Acoge Annual Reports 1987–2012

From 1991 to 1994 Sevilla Acoge was funded by the European Community Commission’s European Social Fund (ESF) and co-funded by the Regional Government of Andalucía [Junta de Andalucía]. The funding had two stated objectives:
To achieve the integration of immigrant families into society and into the labour market and to train a group of trainers to support social agents who work in a multicultural environment (Annual Report 1991: 56).

*Sevilla Acoge* claimed to be one of the first organisations in Spain to have pioneered the intercultural approach to migrant integration, prior to the Spanish government’s adoption of interculturalism as its integration policy. The European Union (EU) did not introduce the notion of ‘intercultural dialogue’ until 2005 (see the Council of Europe’s *Strategy for developing intercultural dialogue* 28th October 2005). This suggests that the work *Sevilla Acoge* developed was not because of any external pressure from funding requirements of the ESF grant. The organisation’s funding and the issue of independence is discussed in Chapter 7.

The concept of interculturalism as a philosophy was introduced into *Sevilla Acoge* by an organisation in Belgium, the Brussels Centre for Intercultural Action (CBAI), which provided intensive ‘training of trainers’ courses. CBAI’s notion of interculturalism began to permeate *Sevilla Acoge* and the *Acoge* federation from 1991. Javier Leunda, an anthropologist from CBAI, trained eighteen people from the federation: twelve Spanish and six migrant members, including Reyes García, Esteban Tabares and Omar El Hartiti, the three most influential people in the organisation. In 1994 *Sevilla Acoge* adopted the Belgian strapline for its own: *Unir sin Confundir, Distinguir sin Separar* – loosely translated as ‘Together, not the Same, Different, not Separate’.

Interculturalism could be seen as a social policy to manage the recent phenomenon of new migration in Spain or even as a philosophy of social transformation (Malgesini and Giménez 2000). For *Sevilla Acoge* it was both. As a social policy goal the organisation promoted an intercultural approach to the integration of migrants and adopted this
approach in its work, as well as exemplifying it within the organisation. As a philosophy it worked on an abstract level whereby Spanish society was portrayed as the product of a degraded modern culture that could be transformed for the better through migrants; migrants, on the other hand, were portrayed as untainted by modernity. This philosophic outlook with its antipathy towards modernity ran through Sevilla Acoge’s approach to interculturalism and is explored in Section 5.4.

Interculturalism as a social policy worked on two levels in Sevilla Acoge. The first level was aimed externally: the social integration of migrants into Spanish society and managing diversity through policy implementation was a clear objective of Sevilla Acoge. The chair of the organisation expressed a sense of pride for having initiated the intercultural approach to migrants’ integration:

*Sevilla Acoge* is a pioneer in interculturalism, and even if it does not work a hundred per cent, it gets close to the mark. We committed ourselves to it and today we can reflect on the results. But you have to recognise that if an organisation like *Sevilla Acoge* or others who have taken that path, have more vision than the state’s own policies, that is quite something – to commit to interculturalism as a model for integration for an organisation as small as Sevilla Acoge and to be ahead of the state in how it deals with the issue of immigration (SA interview 06 2011).

Interculturalism, for *Sevilla Acoge*, was a practical response to managing the new diversity in Spain brought about by migration:

But for the moment, in education, health, public spaces and workplaces there is a growing noticeable presence of people belonging to other cultures and that needs a mechanism to manage it. And a mechanism that is agreed on by all the political parties. And the intercultural model is, I believe, the suitable way to manage diversity (ibid.).
Further below, it will be shown that Sevilla Acoge admitted to having very limited success in almost thirty years in its attempt to influence the Spanish government to adopt a meaningful intercultural social policy on integration. Internally, however, it had more success in putting into practice its understanding of interculturalism so that Sevilla Acoge became a 'laboratory' or a microcosm of what an intercultural society should look like:

We see Sevilla Acoge as a small laboratory of what happens in society: intercultural coexistence (Annual Report 2010: 1).

In practice, it meant transforming Sevilla Acoge from an all-Spanish organisation to a culturally diverse one. In response to the question whether there were any turning points in Sevilla Acoge’s history, Tabares said that it was the introduction of interculturalism through the intercultural training in 1991. He explained that the first group to be trained consisted of predominantly Spanish people committed to the migrant cause and this made them self-conscious, not only about the lack of cultural diversity within the organisation but also the contentious issue of Spanish people acting on behalf of migrants rather than migrants acting for themselves. The first intercultural training was the point at which the organisation became aware of its need to change:

This training changed our entire focus of work. We realised the importance of what cultural diversity is. And the importance for Sevilla Acoge itself, that it should not just consist of Spanish people but, through the organisation's statutes and attitude, immigrants themselves. So those who wanted to be part of the organisation could – and not just as beneficiaries but as actors (SA interview 01 2011).

The intercultural experiment within the organisation created a multicultural workforce. The Annual Reports over the years commented on the numbers of migrants versus Spanish people with paid jobs in the organisation. For example:
The work contained in the 2002 Annual Report and many other daily activities which are not easy to capture or record, have been carried out thanks to the efforts of a multidisciplinary and multi-ethnic team consisting of 150 people: thirty four with contracts of employment and the rest volunteers. Out of this team only twelve are Spanish; the rest are from Morocco, Sahara, Senegal, Armenia, Peru, Brazil etc. (Annual Report 2002: 1).

The intercultural training sensitised Sevilla Acoge to the importance of cultural diversity within the organisation as well as to the need to promote migrants as actors, not as passive recipients of services. After 1994 new ESF funding was received for the training of intercultural mediators from migrant communities so that migrants themselves would become the protagonists in the organisation’s work with migrants:

And we put a lot of emphasis then as we do now on the importance of the input of intercultural mediators born or originating from immigrant communities themselves. It should not only be Spanish people who learn to be mediators but above all, immigrant persons trained as mediators should be the ones who intervene (SA interview 01 2011).

This was Sevilla Acoge's bid to create a more equal society, with itself leading by example. The organisation was to exemplify what an intercultural Spanish society should look like. It was also a bid to move away from the paternalistic model of charitable work, as Tabares explained:

The chair of the organisation is a Moroccan, the chief executive is a Brazilian, on the board there are, umm, five people who are not Spanish and at every level of responsibility at the highest level down to the day-to-day management there are immigrant people. So within Sevilla Acoge diversity has been an important element specific to this
organisation and in this way we learnt partly to overcome the charitable framework of assistance and to move towards work more amongst equals (SA interview 01 2011).

The chair made a similar point, emphasising that the goal of Sevilla Acoge’s intercultural policy was to reduce the Spanish presence and visibility in the organisation:

If it hadn’t been for the founder members’ vision I wouldn’t be at the head of the organisation, the chief executive who is from Brazil wouldn’t be there, the person from Camaroon who is responsible for two departments would not be there, the person from Senegal who is responsible for the mediators would not be there. Spanish people are becoming the minority (SA interview 06 2012).

The chair also confirmed that interculturalism was a philosophy and that Tabares had been key in its development:

It is an organisation that is structured around a philosophy. Esteban is one of the people who provided the leadership at that time, the ideology, and we are the result of that, aren’t we? Of that philosophic vision (SA interview 06 2012).

The notion of interculturalism as a philosophy is substantiated by a compilation of intercultural training materials and reflections published in 1996 entitled El Acercamiento al Otro (EAO) [Approaching the other]. This 400-page document set out beliefs that underpinned Sevilla Acoge’s intercultural philosophy. In his 2012 interview Tabares said that the training material still formed the basis of the organisation's intercultural outlook. Its ideas echoed in the organisation’s Annual Reports as well as in several of the interviews conducted with people who worked in the organisation. The intercultural training material contained a section written by Tabares, parts of which were repeated or paraphrased in Sevilla Acoge’s Annual Reports throughout the years. The following section explores the
philosophy of interculturalism contained in these documents, and shows how this philosophy was constructed around a condemning critique of modernity.

5.4 Interculturalism as a philosophy of social change – a loathing of modernity

According to *Sevilla Acoge*, interculturalism presented an opportunity to create a new kind of society out of the cultural diversity brought by recent migration to Spain. Cultural diversity was seen to offer the possibility to transform society through a synthesis between the host country and migrants’ values. The aim was not assimilation but rather, the collective process of creating a new society. As the intercultural training document stated, ‘[w]e are all on the journey towards producing a new social model’ (EAO 1996: 76). *Sevilla Acoge’s* interculturalism could be seen as a philosophy of social change, rather than just a social policy project because it was underpinned by transformative values that were to lead to a radical alternative to the existing society. There was no blueprint for this society:

There are no magic formulas and nor are there any models in existence in the real world, because we are in a new situation, unknown before now. No one can predict how a world so engaged in intercommunication may work out (EAO 1996: 75).

An explanation as to how the transformation could take place in practice follows in Section 5.7 of this chapter, in which the process of social change through intercultural work between volunteers and migrants is explored. In this section, the key to a future intercultural society is shown to lie in a re-education of society.

The intercultural training materials described how the ‘host’ or ‘dominant’ society regarded itself and its values as superior, and its way of seeing the world as the only valid way of being; as such, western
society had a preference for the assimilation of migrants into its supposedly superior way of being, and assimilation was synonymous with ethnocentrism: ‘a reflection of the host country’s cultural superiority, exercised through domination’ (ibid.: 76). Interculturalism aimed to make the ‘host’ or ‘dominant’ culture question its own values and critically reappraise them. The best of western or modernity’s values were to be synthesised with traditional values, that is, the values of migrants, to produce a new culture:

In the West there exists a historical capital of values which is being lost today and which forms a bridge between tradition and modernity. On the other hand, there are values in traditional cultures that could balance the one-sidedness of modernity. A new synthesis is to be made between values of which we are repositories and those that the traditions of the South offer us. This synthesis will not only be theoretical and ideological but ethical, behavioural (ibid.: 75).

Although the above referred to ‘a historical capital’ of western values that should be retained, no examples of positive western values ever appeared in the intercultural training materials, or in Sevilla Acoge’s Annual Reports. The organisation’s evaluation of modernity was negative, in which its ills were thoroughly exposed. The intercultural training document (EAO 1996: 110–122, 123–139) contained a systematic critique of modernity through a comparison between modern and traditional societies, as summarised below.

The term ‘modernity’ was defined in EAO as a culture that evolved in the West around the second half of the fifteenth century. A brief survey of the history of western ideas was given to illustrate how modernity developed and how contemporary nihilism could be traced through a direct line connecting Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Contemporary modernity’s nihilism was expressed in the notion of the ‘death of God’, according to which authority and tradition could no longer provide the overarching meaning for western societies and according to which
individual will [albedrío] constituted the most important drive, unrestrained by any encompassing morality. Of particular importance was a critique of the two pivotal values around which modernity was said to be built. The first was individualism:

The central supposition of modernity is individualism: the isolated individual, considered in his own right (his life, well-being, will) it is the supreme value, before all other values, the one that evaluates them and gives them meaning.

The individual, that is, his point of view of reality, his will or his desire, his sovereignty and legitimacy, precedes and dominates all the other social or group considerations and in the last instance, these considerations are subordinated to him. The individual is the subject of verbs and predicates in our society (ibid.: 110).

The second, seen as a closely related key value, was the relation between things, as opposed to the relation between people:

the relation of man to things prevails over the relation between man and man ... And this means that money – the universal equivalent of all things – rules: the aim of every interpersonal or group relation and every human enterprise is money, as far as success or failure is concerned (ibid.: 111–112).

At the beginning of the section on modernity, it was stated that the aim was not to polarise, but rather, to provide an understanding of differences between the value systems and frames of references for two different cultures: that of modernity and that of traditional society. This was said to be the fundamental point of departure for ‘taking the intercultural path’ (ibid.: 110), that is, embarking on the intercultural training. The claim not to polarise was contradicted by the initial comparison between the two cultures that were clearly placed in opposition to each other:
Contrary to the principal value of the West, in traditional societies the individual is not the subject or object of social life, but the primacy lies in the group, particularly family groups, as the basic units of society (EAO 1996: 113).

The second key value in opposition to modernity gives primacy to relations between people above the relation between things (ibid.: 114).

In other sections of the intercultural training document and in the Annual Reports, the choice of vocabulary often conjured up an unattractive picture of human behaviour in the West, for example:

In other words, while western man seeks to satisfy his desire and anxiety in an exaggeration of doing, in a bulimia of objects and money, the traditional man looks for satisfaction in a multiplication and reinforcement of social relations and alliances (ibid.: 116).

There was no trace of the ambivalent, or love-hate relationship with modernity that was described in Chapter 1.3. The individual, at the centre of modernity, was not given any positive evaluation; the accent lay on the negative features of the modern individual tainted by all the different phases of the modernisation process. Migrants, on the other hand, were portrayed as the embodiment of certain values that Sevilla Acoge upheld as positive. This was in direct contrast to ordinary Spanish people, who were portrayed in a one-dimensional fashion, as the embodiment of excessive individualism. Below, it will be suggested that this negative portrayal reflected pessimism about ordinary people that stemmed not necessarily from real-life experience, but rather, from the collapse of earlier political optimism in ordinary people’s capacity to transform society through their collective action. The following section examines the values that migrants were said to embody and the way in which western societies were assumed to have lost these values through the impact of modernity.
5.5 Migrants and utopian portrayal – their values and ‘ours’.

The idea of the ‘utopian’ portrayal of migrants was introduced at the start of this thesis. Cohen (1999) claimed that migrants became ‘the “transgressive subject” replacing the “international proletariat” as a site for the projection of revolutionary hopes’ (ibid.: 10). This notion of the ‘utopian’ portrayal fitted well with the portrayal of migrants by the migration theorists explored in Chapter 1.1, in which migrants were the protagonists of migrant mobilisations. In the case of Sevilla Acoge, it projected onto migrants its utopian vision for a new society, where the hope lay in the regenerative power of migrants to transform society through interculturalism and not through collective political action.

The previous section uncovered a vein of moral condemnation that ran through the documents analysed, supporting Flores Sánchez (2011) that a sense of disappointment with ordinary people was a key reason why the worker-priests shifted their attention away from the rural workers to different sites – in the case of Tabares, to migrants. Migrants represented values that Spanish people had once possessed but had been lost through the impact of modernity:

Immigrants enrich us and complement us with their own cultural values. Some of those values were present in our own culture and we have been losing them because of the uniformity being imposed on us by modernity, consumer society and technical and utilitarian demands, which are making us into one-dimensional beings: to possess in order to consume, all equal in order to make us need and buy the same things throughout the world (Annual Report 1998: 5).

The language in the Annual Report quoted above is reminiscent of Marcuse (1964) and his description of ‘one-dimensional man’. Sevilla Acoge also identified migrants (or the marginalised of society) as the new historical subject for social transformation, as did Marcuse (see Chapter 1.2); however, migrants played a different kind of vanguard
role for *Sevilla Acoge*. Because migrants were seen to retain some of the values Spanish society had lost, their presence in Spanish society was seen as an opportunity to re-educate society through a change of values. This idea was central to *Sevilla Acoge's* thinking on social transformation. In its 2000 Annual Report it reported that it had adopted this vision at the federation's 1994 Annual General Meeting (AGM):

In the IV Annual General Meeting of *Andalucía Acoge* (1994) we adopted the vision by which we must be guided: ‘a commitment to a change of values, for a transformation of society which will lead us to a new social model based more on solidarity, in which different cultures fit and live together and where people's freedoms, rights and values are promoted’. We make this utopian vision real and we try to live it in our commitment to immigrants (Annual Report 2000: 3).

The importance of ‘a change of values’ remained core to the organisation’s vision and was repeated in the later Annual Reports:

Although many things are different now, the vision that brought the organisation into existence and which motivates it is still valid: ‘For a change of values, for a social transformation which will lead us to a new social model based more on solidarity’ (Annual Report 2009 and Annual Report 2010).

Migrants represented ‘a source of values’, ‘carriers of values’ (EOA 1996: 9) or, in one more poetic moment, ‘transporting agents of cultural pollen’ (ibid.: 8). The values migrants were said to possess that Spanish society had supposedly lost, are significant. The worker-priests had much admired the values forged in collective struggle, for example, solidarity, commitment and self-sacrifice to a cause; these values had been located in the Andalucian rural workers but they had apparently disappeared when political apathy and consumerism took over. They were now found in migrants. Migration itself was seen as an act of altruism and solidarity in which migrants sacrificed their individual
lives for the collective life of their families by subjecting themselves to harsh working and living conditions in exchange for being able to send remittances back home:

To migrate is an act of generosity whereby the person sacrifices themselves for the benefit of the collective, in which the individual good is subordinated to the necessary family solidarity (EAO 1996: 5).

Yet outside of the framework of the political struggle, these values of solidarity and self-sacrifice took on a different meaning, one that was pre-political in the sense that they belonged to the private or family sphere rather than the public. They were also values associated with pre-industrial societies before the advent of modernity:

Immigrants generally come from a traditional world where human relations and ties come first and foremost. They learn to live in a classical economy where the person is key and they are only sustained by the land and nature as a whole. To come to form part of an aggressive market economy, where money comes before and after the person, its axis and centre, means for them having to assume rules of the game for which they were not trained (ibid.: 73).

The founder of Sevilla Acoge had said that the aim of the organisation was to reciprocate the hospitality she had found in Africa, where white Europeans were welcomed. This sentiment was echoed in the intercultural training materials:

Hospitality, that sense of generosity even where scarcity and economic insecurity prevails is a manifestation of the dominance of the relationship between people rather than things (ibid.: 116).

Above, an opposition was set up between the human world of migrants and the inhuman world of the West; this contrast was developed through migrants being assigned a moral function of re-educating Spanish society:
When we relate directly to immigrants, we receive from them those fundamental values like: the meaning of family, respect of the elderly, solidarity and hospitality they have between themselves, the overarching religious meaning of all of life, the value of personal relations, happiness even when living with little, love of their origins, sacrifice and making an effort for their own people, etc. (Annual Report 1998: 5).

One of the principal aims of the intercultural training and education was to make ‘us’ question western values and society. It aimed to make Spanish society confront itself by ‘positioning ourselves in front of migrants as if before a mirror’ (EAO 1996: 70). In direct comparison to migrants’ values and their culture, Spanish society was to critically appraise itself and make ‘an epistemological shift’ by questioning the ‘basic pillars’ of its identity (ibid.: 77). Sevilla Acoge’s appraisal was infused with a sense of nostalgia for a golden age of traditional social values:

Shouldn’t we regain some aspects of these values that we have lost or are on the verge of losing completely? Haven’t we left behind something important on the path to ‘modernity’ and shouldn’t we go back and look for it? … Do we feel so proud and satisfied with our own civilisation? (ibid.).

All the values migrants were said to possess arose from traditional society. It is striking that progressive thinking was traditionally characterised by its attitude towards modernity as emancipation from the narrow confines of the family, clan, tribe and stifling community and traditions; it had valued development and technological advances (Berger et al. 1973), but Sevilla Acoge expressed its longing to escape the developed world:
We look for and are attracted by a rural world without pollution, that reflection and memory of what we were not so long ago, certain that this development is not what we want either (EAO 1996: 77).

In the process of exposing, or critiquing, modernity, a juxtaposition was set up between the portrayal of migrants and the portrayal of Spanish society that could be said to be the other side of the same coin. The following section examines this portrayal.

5.6 From the portrayal of migrants to the portrayal of Spanish society

As the sections above illustrated, modernity, according to Sevilla Acoge, was a bankrupt western culture with no redeeming features. The portrayal of migrants as embodying positive values of altruism, solidarity, self-sacrifice, the importance of family and community, exposed what contemporary western societies were said to have lost through the impact of modernity. Sevilla Acoge’s ‘utopian’ portrayal of migrants ran parallel to a counter-portrayal of Spanish society, reminiscent of the post-Second World War period mass society outlook explored in Chapter 1. Drawing on insights from Giner (1976), the portrayal of ordinary Spanish people by Sevilla Acoge could be seen to reflect a disappointment in the ‘masses’ and in the possibilities of collective political action.

The intercultural training materials depicted the personality traits of the individuals who constituted Spanish society: they were superficial, conformist, possessed excessive individualism and were motivated purely by financial interest. These individuals were said to be engendered by the existing economic system that drove them to desire ‘more for the sake of more’, ‘the new for the sake of new’ (EAO 1996: 243). They were primarily consumers:
With the growing deterritorialisation of the economy and the hugely intensifying invasion of the model of man almost exclusively as consumer (ibid.: 244–45).

In Sevilla Acoge's Annual Reports, this ‘model of man’ was portrayed in a less abstract fashion. The majority of Spanish society was deemed to be motivated solely by economic benefit and therefore only able to judge the worth of migrants through this narrow focus, as ‘cheap labour’ and useful for the economy:

Everyone speaks about ‘those people’ who they mostly do not know, but whom they think are the cause of some of our problems, although they reluctantly recognise that we need them for our economy (Annual Report 2007: 4).

At times the Annual Reports shifted register to speak in the voice of Spanish people who were portrayed as holding negative attitudes towards migrants. This, in turn, produced a negative picture of ordinary people. In 1991, in anticipation of Fortress Europe and increased restrictions on non-European migration (see Chapter 3), the Annual Report expressed people’s selfishness in their rejection of migrants coming to their wealthy countries in which ‘there is too much of everything and no one wants to share (Annual Report 1991: 13). Over fifteen years later, the Annual Reports continued to reflect ordinary people and their reaction to migrants in a similar way:

During the previous decades, Europe benefited from foreign workers (although they were mostly expelled to the peripheries of society, vulnerable because of xenophobia), but now they are an obstacle, they are not necessary. We are in times of crisis, we no longer want them here. They are an ‘excess’ population, and they must go (Annual Report 2008: 5).
In the 2008 Annual Report the chair’s introduction expressed an impassioned condemnation of society in which migrants exposed ‘us’ for a lack of positive values:

When the notion of hospitality is broken, all that is left is fear of those who arrive: what are they going to take from us? ... What immigrant people do is take away our masks. This immense multitude who knock at our doors and crash against our walls come to break our social system’s big lie, with its talk of human rights when the only thing that matters is the rights of capital. They come to demolish the myth of development, because half of humanity is increasingly sinking into quicksand. They come to tear up the lie that stretches over us like a protective awning under which we live our comfortable lives. They come to uncover our deep-seated personal and collective selfishness (Annual Report 2008: 5).

The stereotyped voices of ordinary people and their opinion of migrants captured in the Sevilla Acoge Annual Reports were, at times, replicated by Tabares in his interview. He believed that the Spanish negative attitudes had been consistent since the start of the phenomenon of new migration to Spain and the rejection of migrants had intensified with the onset of the economic crisis:

Spanish society was taken by surprise by immigration because up to then it had only seen foreign tourists. And tourists were seen favourably because they brought wealth to the country. But the arrival of immigrants caught them by surprise. ‘What are so many people doing here, they are taking our jobs, they are taking advantage of our social services, our health service, our schools.’ And a reaction is provoked, firstly, one of surprise and then of not wanting them, of rejection. That is on the one hand. But because we have had years of strong economic progress people therefore say (imitates a working-class Andalucían accent) ‘it’s just that we need them because who else is going to pick the olives or the strawberries, or who is going to make a profit for us, who is going to look after my old folks. They are necessary, we don’t like them being here but we need them, end of
story.’ But since we have been in economic recession for the last four years and the unemployment figures of Spaniards keep going up and many Spanish people say we no longer need them, that they should leave, but they don’t leave, they stay, and so rejection increases, it increases more and more, a rejection that is even stronger than at the beginning (SA interview 02 2011).

These negative representations of ordinary people, which were produced through their caricatured voices and opinions, stood in direct contrast to the ‘utopian’ representations of migrants whose values were seen as superior to those of Spanish society:

These people who are considered as useless (what can a poor immigrant bring us or contribute?), are the ones who teach us that life is more than a commercial transaction (EAO 1996: 8).

After almost two decades of promoting interculturalism and providing intercultural training and mediation, Tabares painted a bleak picture in which there had been no change in Spanish attitudes. Outside of the microcosm of Sevilla Acoge it appeared that the organisation’s attempts to create an intercultural ‘utopia’ since 1991 had failed. This sense of failure to change Spanish society was echoed in an interview with one of Sevilla Acoge’s Senegalese intercultural mediators. In response to the question whether Spanish attitudes had changed since he had started working as an intercultural mediator, he said:

Not much. We were talking earlier in a meeting about the existence of prejudices, that is, the prejudices which are there no matter how long you live together with someone who is different. It is not that they are erased, they are there. People can get used to living with difference but at any given moment it is like pressing a button, out jumps the prejudices, out jumps the mistrust, etc, etc. (SA interview 05 2012).

The negative portrayal of Spanish society could be interpreted as a reflection of the empirical reality in which racism persisted; on the
other hand, it could be viewed as a vilification of ordinary people, just as the portrayal of migrants was an idealisation. Sevilla Acoge did not trust in ordinary Spanish people’s ability to accept the recent phenomenon of migration in their society, and yet plenty of empirical evidence was found during the course of this research to show that ordinary Spaniards were living a genuinely intercultural existence, particularly in urban working-class neighbourhoods, as confirmed by the increase in mixed race couples and children in Spain, including in Seville (Moreno Maestro 2006; Steingress 2012). This is not to deny the existence of racism in Spanish society, but the portrayal of Spanish people that emerged from the organisation’s documents and some of the interviews did not acknowledge what were arguably positive indications of intercultural life. The following section explores further the negative portrayal of Spanish society and the damage it is said to inflict on migrants through ‘symbolic violence’. It also examines the way in which the supposed disintegration experienced by migrants as a result of migrating is claimed to be the experience of the whole of society caused by the processes of modernity. As such, migrants will be shown to be a metaphor for western societies’ own collective psychological condition.

5.7 The portrayal of migrants as a metaphor for the human condition

The intercultural training document (EAO 1996) that Sevilla Acoge used for almost two decades depicted migrants as suffering a psychological disintegration in the process of migration:

As we have already said: the man/woman who has emigrated has undergone dispersal, rupture, has disintegrated. He/she has been left without their coat, without their skin, that is, the people to whom they belong, without their family, without a substantial part of themselves. This dispersal cannot be overcome without recomposing and

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reconstructing the family and the dispersed part of the community (EAO 1996: 75).

The profound identity crisis and disintegration experienced by migrants was attributed to the abrupt severing from everything that gave them meaning, particularly the taken-for-granted values and customs which had permeated their lives before migrating:

Migration is fundamentally a phenomenon of dispersal and rupture: separation from one’s own people and possessions. There is a profound break with one’s society of origin, where one was socialised, in which one learnt to be and exist. For the most part, what one has learnt ceases to be valid and is called into question when it comes into contact and is contrasted on entering another world. The stay among us is marked by a permanent tension between conserving what one was and learning to live like us, in an attempt not to end up disintegrating (broken and split off from what one has learnt to be) and integrating, or at least adapting to avoid being rejected (EAO 1996: 72).

The intense psychological suffering caused by the process of migration was expressed in a less abstract, but very similar way, to the intercultural training document by one of Sevilla Acoge’s Senegalese intercultural mediators:

Suffering because I don’t know what is happening to me, I don’t understand the other person’s ways, suffering because they don’t let me live as I have been brought up to live, etc., etc., etc., and of course from here comes rejection, lack of communication, when we have to live with different ways. Life is rich but to have to internalise ours ... (SA interview 05 2012).

The intercultural mediator went on to describe migrants’ experiences in Spain:
What I mean is, something as simple as this: a Moroccan family is in their home but an hour later they are at the school, and then the next hour they are with the social worker. These are all spaces where each space requires a different way of being ... at home it is different – perhaps they manage the situation better because everyone sees things in the same way. But the day to day, this multitude of life situations brings with it a certain pain, suffering, frustration (ibid.).

This portrayal of migrants bears an uncanny resemblance to Berger et al.’s (1973) ‘pluralisation of life worlds’ discussed in Chapter 2.1. In the citation above, migrants experienced a similar sense of discrepancy as they shifted from one ‘life world’ to another. In another echo of Berger et al.’s condition of ‘homelessness’, also discussed in Chapter 2.1, migrants were portrayed as an exaggerated version of ourselves living in the atmosphere of ‘all that is solid melts into air’, that world of constant mobility, which according to many sociological thinkers, including Berger et al., profoundly affected the self in modern society. What began as a description of migrants’ psychic state ended up as a description of the modern condition of us all:

Disintegration in an environment where the mobility and dynamism with which customs and values change and renew themselves is so rapid that it makes us all suffer from a form of the same disease, the common symptom being vertigo. Everything is modifiable, and is fleeting, everything is in constant change. The reference to the past increasingly carries less weight; the present is composed of gusts of wind and the future is so uncertain that we dare not think about it (EAO 1996: 72).

The portrayal of migrants as afflicted by disintegration was, therefore, a mirror image of the human condition in general:

Immigrants, therefore, reveal to us our own image of isolated individuals, deprived of protection and cover, at the mercy of the money we earn, unemployment, life insurance, ever ‘freer’, that is, ever
distanced from each other. We must never lose sight of the fact that the situation of immigrants is the most extreme form of alienation that stalks the whole of society (ibid.: 73).

Because migrants’ psychic condition was said to be ‘ours’, albeit as a less extreme version, the implication was that society had a shared interest in overcoming it. The salvation, or the regeneration of society supposedly lay in migrants’ presence and the intercultural opportunity:

A process in two senses: from the personal and cultural disintegration of the immigrant, from the very act of migration and from the disintegration and cultural crisis here, in western society; towards an enrichment and regeneration that the encounter gives to both (ibid.).

Migrants were said to act as a mirror, sometimes reflecting back ‘our’ own condition, other times exposing ‘our’ contradictions (ibid.: 72). Migrants also revealed that Spanish society had not only lost its former positive values under the impact of modernity as discussed in Sections 5.6 and 5.7 but also its sense of belonging:

All the great transformations through which we are living are producing a profound break with what we were and the experience of isolation and anonymity is growing exponentially. The values of freedom and of the individual compared to the ties of community frequently end in a radical sensation of not belonging to anyone, not counting for anyone and that no one really counts for you (ibid.).

The above implied that the aspiration for individual freedom, at the heart of modernity, was overvalued. When Berger et al. (1973) wrote about the deepening condition of ‘homelessness’ in the second half of the twentieth century, there was still an underlying consent in progressive thinking at the time: although the collapse of an overarching ‘canopy’ of meaning generated new sets of problems, modernity gave rise to the promise of human freedom. It made tangible the goal of liberation from the stifling constraints imposed by the lack
of modernisation. For leftist radicals, this potential freedom was realisable through a collective ideological political project, as was the case for one of the most influential players in Sevilla Acoge, for whom the socialist political project was blended with Christianity through liberation theology. The collapse of this project after a final upsurge in the 1970s and early 1980s removed that tangible hope of an alternative modernity and left a vacuum. Sevilla Acoge’s embrace of interculturalism could be interpreted as a reflection of the end of earlier convictions in the possibilities of achieving that socialist project. Instead, a different route to an alternative society was found in which migrants were to play a key role:

Immigrants are, despite everything, a part of the solution. Because of their proximity, mutual and common destiny, Spanish people and immigrants should become aware that the time has come to invent a new way of seeing and of being seen. We should work to transform difference into richness and to move towards a future capable of a new social equilibrium between identity and alterity, between ‘me’ and ‘you’, between us and the others (EOA 1996: 73).

For Sevilla Acoge the only way to humanise the modern world appeared to be through migrants:

In the face of dispersal, rupture and loneliness, we have reached the point where we have established relationships based on friendship, solidarity, complementarity, the discovery of the other’s value, the need we have for the other. We continue to develop feelings of true affection and of belonging. We feel that we belong to someone, that we do not have clients or users, but friends. That we are part of their human frame of reference. That we are to a great extent part of their home and family. We experience belonging to someone, accompanying them and feeling that we are accompanied, experiencing the company as something sacred, untouchable, necessary and essential for making us human (Annual Report 1996: 6).
Migrants became a metaphor for the human condition as well as shouldering the responsibility for society's regeneration. The portrayal of migrants ultimately was more about ‘us’ than about migrants. It expressed a longing for the human, emotional interconnectedness that appeared to be missing from modern life. However, as will be shown below, there was a time when this feeling of integration and human connectedness arose spontaneously among the Andalucían rural workers in their collective political struggle. Integration through the warmth of human affection and friendship with migrants could be viewed as a replacement to the loss of integration through politics and political solidarity.

5.8 Spanish volunteers and the re-education of society

The above section demonstrated how Sevilla Acoge placed the burden of unrealistic hopes on migrants to bring about a new society. This section explores how the organisation also placed this responsibility on its Spanish volunteers, who became the exception to the negative portrayal of Spanish society. Sevilla Acoge’s Spanish volunteers all underwent intercultural training that amounted to a re-education programme for Spanish people working with migrants. The psychological disintegration of migrants described above was compounded with their experience of ‘symbolic violence’ (EAO 1996: 7), which Spanish society was said to inflict on them. The intercultural training was to ensure that volunteers did not unconsciously commit ‘symbolic violence’. In Chapter 1.4 it was asserted that interculturalism had a therapeutic kernel, the meaning of which is explained below.

The original intercultural training programme consisted of 600 hours including weeklong residential in 1992 and 1993. In order for the training to be effective, the participants needed to consist of a mix of the ‘host’ or ‘dominating’ society and the ‘dominated’, that is, migrants, so that the intercultural re-education process could take place in practice,
not through any theoretical teaching (EAO 1996: 20, 80). Migrants gained cultural recognition and respect through the training process at the same time as serving as a tool in the re-education of Spanish people:

All these ethnocentric, racist attitudes, stereotypes, ideological prejudices etc., block and interfere with the process of recognition of the other and of their social and cultural difference. The first step is, therefore, to control one’s own prejudices and ethnocentric attitudes, value judgements and xenophobic reactions ... let the immigrant ‘have his say’ – explain his past and present socio-cultural reality etc., awaken in him the feeling of being accepted and recognised. He will then be able to recover his dignity and restore his alienated image. He will no longer be an invalid, but an equal companion in social and socio-educational action (EAO 1996: 65, 73).

Although it was claimed that the training was not a therapy group, the techniques were therapeutic. The three core aptitudes needed for working with migrants were ‘Knowing’, ‘Knowing how to’ and ‘Knowing how to be’. ‘Knowing’ meant knowing about migration and its causes, the countries and cultures from which people come; ‘knowing how to’ meant knowing how to intervene in work with migrants; and, most significantly, ‘knowing how to be’ signified knowing how to behave appropriately and change oneself in order not to negate migrants’ culture and identity. This final element reflected the therapeutic sensibility of the intercultural training. It was seen as fundamental, without which, no intercultural relationship could exist:

How you see me in our relationship, how I see myself – where there is no mismatch one feels confirmed and recognised by the other and there is reciprocity and the sensation of psychological comfort. If the match is lasting and the interlocutors are sufficiently close, it creates the propitious conditions for personal development. If not, the negation of important aspects of the other’s personality. In this case, communication will be very difficult or impossible (ibid.: 40).
Although the above implied a two-way process, it was the Spanish side of the equation that threatened to impose western culture on the ‘other’, and it was the migrant’s side that was under threat.

The intercultural interpretation of racism was a psychological one and this helps to explain why re-education and attitudinal change were so important to Sevilla Acoge:

Racism is not a specific mode of contempt found only in Modernity. Anthropologically racism is fear of the other ... Racism has a single anthropological basis: it is a phenomenon of defensive reaction to the other’s difference. The reaction poses the question of ‘who is the best out of the two’ and I reply ‘I am the best.’ (ibid.: 128).

Throughout the intercultural training document, racism, in its ahistorical, psychological understanding of the term, was conflated with prejudice, to which everyone was seen to be prone and which was applicable to all societies. Yet the aim of the intercultural training was to highlight that racism was inherent to western, rather than traditional cultures, and that western societies socialised all its members from birth so that everyone’s attitudes were deeply ingrained. This meant that ethnocentric prejudices and behaviour would manifest themselves automatically and a correction programme was seen as necessary in order to control them:

Our selective perceptions, our prejudices, our ethnocentric attitudes are serious obstacles for opening ourselves up to accept diversity. We cannot suppress such factors, only hold them in check better to correct them afterwards. This takes time and doesn’t work without numerous attempts and continuous mistakes (ibid.: 62).

The intercultural training contained a pessimistic outlook about the possibilities of overcoming prejudices. This was echoed above, in one of the interviews with a Senegalese intercultural mediator who viewed Spanish people’s potential to change as limited. The intercultural
training created a mistrust of Spanish people’s spontaneous ability to communicate with, and relate to migrants, unless they had been trained to act in an appropriate fashion. Volunteers represented a select group of Spanish people who were trained to act appropriately. Together with migrants, they became Sevilla Acoge’s hope for a new society. There were references throughout the Annual Reports to ‘creating a new way of living’ (1995: 55); ‘a utopia’ (1998: 5); ‘a new way of seeing and to be seen’ (2000: 60); ‘the building of a new humanity’ (1996: 1); ‘a new civilisation’(1990: 121). The ‘utopia’ Sevilla Acoge attempted to build was an intercultural society and Spanish volunteers had an important role to play in creating the new society.

Similar to migrants, volunteers were seen as a source of some of those values that were in short supply in the modern world, in particular, altruism and solidarity. For Sevilla Acoge those values embodied in Spanish volunteers were not sufficient. Volunteers needed to be re-educated as part of the organisation’s vision to change society through a change of values:

We aim to promote social change and for this the participation of volunteers is fundamental to change things, to build new projects, to transform. The first instrument for change is people themselves. It is people who change and, in doing so, they change things. That change is through education and so we educate ourselves collectively (Annual Report 2008).

Sevilla Acoge’s volunteers also required training to ‘know how to be’:

In Sevilla Acoge we give a decisive importance to the permanent training of the team as well as our volunteers who support the various projects. It is not enough to ‘want’ to help the other, but it is necessary ‘to know’ how to do it appropriately, above all taking into account cultural diversity and each one’s own differences (Annual Report 2000: 98).
'Knowing how to be' with migrants, as explained above, was a key element of the intercultural training. In the introduction of the 1996 intercultural training document, Tabares wrote:

To overcome ethnocentrism and to be conscious of the mental and social mechanisms that determine our way of situating ourselves in the real world and before the other is no easy task. Our own vision of things is something so obvious for each one of us, like the air we breathe. And yet there are other ways of living life. We all form part of this immense rainbow – humanity. This training helps us to know how to situate ourselves correctly before the other, avoiding domination and contempt, symbolic violence in our belief that they are inferior because they are not like us, and in this way forcing them into cultural uniformity and into assuming the lowest status categories and jobs (EAO 1996: 6).

The above illustrates that the re-education programme was concerned with social transformation through changing the behaviour and attitudes of Spanish society. The transformation started with the self-selected minority, volunteers, who underwent the intercultural training to dismantle any notions of cultural superiority in order to minimise the damage caused to migrants by symbolic violence. This aim remained consistent as reiterated in the 2000 Annual Report:

To understand and accept the other's framework and not to impose our cultural framework and our values through harsh, assimilating symbolic violence (Annual Report 2000: 7).

*Sevilla Acoge* placed a lot of hope in its volunteers. The 1996 and 2000 Annual Reports gave particular insight into the importance of volunteers in the creation of the new intercultural society. They were seen to counteract the materialism and utilitarianism of modern society because they put into practice more human values in their work with migrants:
In societies like ours, where modernity is firmly established, the Market has become an indisputable ‘absolute’, to the extent that people are subordinated to the altars of utility, to profit, or competitiveness. In the face of this, our voluntary action with immigrants aims to be a ‘business’ of the useless, where dividends are not shared and where time is not money, but rather the opportunity for relationships, friendships and intercommunication (Annual Report 1996: 6).

Volunteers were seen to counteract modernity's values; they also represented a shift towards a more human form of politics, which could flourish in the space left by the decay of older political models, both western capitalism and eastern-block socialism (Annual Report 2000: 9). Volunteering became ‘another way of doing politics that emphasises the human scale’ (1996: 6). The challenge for volunteers in Sevilla Acoge was to move from providing a service to becoming committed (ibid.: 6), and commitment was highly demanding:

Through our training in Sevilla Acoge we have to gradually facilitate the step from service providing to commitment. Because commitment is not something one lives by the hour or in certain places, rather it is a way of thinking and living which takes hold of us completely, all over and for ever (Annual Report 2000: 8)

The total commitment expected from volunteers was converted into a form of politics: their action produced an internal transformation within the volunteer at the same time as changing reality. They become ‘militants of change’, not as the traditional political party activist, ‘but politics nonetheless’ (Annual Report 2000: 9). Volunteers were portrayed as a minority within Spanish society who had retained certain positive values – altruism, solidarity and commitment – that the rest of society had lost. They had been socialised into racism but the intercultural training they received made them aware of their unconscious ethnocentrism and helped them to eradicate or control any impulses to impose their western cultural framework onto migrants.
Once they had been sensitised to 'know how to be' with migrants they could promote the intercultural project as a new way of seeing and being, which had the potential to lead to a new society.

5.9 The significance of migrants as intercultural mediators

The figure of the migrant as intercultural mediator first appeared in the 1995 Annual Report, over a decade before the idea of intercultural mediation took off in Spain. At face value, the intercultural mediator's role was to facilitate migrants' integration into Spanish society by acting as the 'bridge' (EAO 1996: 79) between migrant communities and the rest of society. The idea of intercultural mediation became mainstream in Spain from 2006, particularly after the social cohesion agenda and the importance of intercultural dialogue was promoted by the EU. In 2012 Sevilla Acoge described the role of the intercultural mediator as

vital for the prevention and resolution of cultural conflicts and to help prevent and/or resolve conflicts of interest and/or of values between professionals in different areas and migrants who are users of services in different areas (Annual Report 2012).

There was, however, a deeper significance of the intercultural mediators outside of the practical description. The role of intercultural mediators should be understood in conjunction with the philosophy underlying Sevilla Acoge's interculturalism, which entered the organisation through CBAI's intercultural training of the most influential actors in Sevilla Acoge during 1992–94. This training was the precursor to a programme that trained migrants to become intercultural mediators, and it set the philosophical base for the subsequent training.
Sevilla Acoge wanted migrants to regain their autonomy and become ‘their own subjects’ and ‘active agents in their own processes’ (Annual Report 1996: 6). Having been sensitised through the intercultural training, the organisation understood that Spanish people should not be the ones to help migrants to re-integrate, hence the importance of creating intercultural mediators:

Obviously it is impossible to do this from outside and by agents external to the person/people. It must be subjects with sensitivity and charisma chosen from that piece of broken community who must prepare themselves to take on this essential task for them and for the whole of the community with whom we are destined to live. It must be the other himself/herself as a person and as people who have a voice and speak in the first person plural (EAO 1996: 58).

The role of the intercultural mediator was fourfold. First, newly arrived migrants were seen to suffer from psychological disintegration as a result of migration; intercultural mediation was to help their process of re-integration (EAO 1996: 75). Second, Sevilla Acoge was aware that intervention by an external agency to empower migrants was a contradiction. If those who empowered migrants were migrants themselves, it was thought to overcome the contradiction. Therefore, migrants who had gone through similar experiences and shared a similar culture to the people they supported, were trained as intercultural mediators. Third, the training of intercultural mediators opened the door to the possibilities of a new job niche in which some migrants would be able to obtain jobs that Sevilla Acoge deemed as dignified work. Before the role of intercultural mediator was introduced into the organisation, Sevilla Acoge tried, with little success, to challenge stereotypical images of migrants in low status jobs, such as street selling and domestic service, by encouraging them to take up different types of work:

The need to change their position in society. Rejection because of being foreign, reinforced by their economic situation, that is, being a
poor foreigner, having different customs; for predominantly occupying certain sectors of the labour market. It seems that there is a social consensus that a foreigner can only find work in certain sectors (agriculture, street selling, domestic service, etc.). It is difficult to break this stereotype (Annual Report 1996: 23).

The employment of migrants as intercultural mediators aimed to break the stereotypes. Fourth, through supporting their own communities, migrant intercultural mediators would gain self-esteem that they too had allegedly lost in the process of migration. This could be viewed as one of the therapeutic objectives of interculturalism. In Sevilla Acoge’s self-evaluation of projects where intercultural mediators were used, success was measured against how the intercultural mediator developed, as much as the service user, and how self-esteem was raised, through increased feelings of being valued by contributing to their own community’s well-being (Annual Report 1995: 5; Annual Report 1998: 36).

5.10 Migrants portrayed as activists – a conspicuous absence: the 2002 migrant occupation

Chapter 3 described the upsurge of migrant mobilisations throughout Spain, particularly between 2000 and 2002, against a background of changing immigration law and the announcement of Spain’s fifth regularisation programme. In Andalucía, the Acoge federation supported migrants in local mobilisations, occupations of churches, universities and trade union buildings. It was involved in the first strike of migrant agricultural workers in Spain, which paralysed agricultural production following the racist riot in El Ejido in 2000, also described in Chapter 3.

The political subjectivity of migrants, actively demanding legal status and equal rights to Spanish workers, appeared only once in the Annual
Reports of *Sevilla Acoge* – in 2002, where there was one mention of the migrant occupation of one of Seville’s universities, the University of Pablo de Olavide. This near absence of migrants portrayed as political activists was intriguing because some of the key actors in the organisation, particularly Tabares and El Hartiti, were no strangers to political militancy themselves. El Hartiti, who had led the migrant strike in El Ejido, was described by the Spanish press as ‘the most combative’ (*El País* 4th February 2001); Tabares had been active in the militant struggles of the rural workers and had promoted the strategy of occupations of land and public buildings to gain rights. As an organisation, *Sevilla Acoge* had been involved in mobilisations against immigration legislation and in favour of government regularisation programmes (Gortázar 2000), confirming Tabares’ comment that *Sevilla Acoge* was always at the forefront of migrants’ demands, ‘in the street etc., against the government when necessary, making ‘protests with proposals’ (SA interview 01 2012).

A question arises from this: why, when migrants were portrayed in the Annual Reports as ‘protagonists’ (Annual Report 1995: 150, Annual Report 1998: 55), ‘masters of their own destiny’ (Annual Report 2000: 143), and ‘autonomous actors’ (Annual Report 1996: 10), did this refer mainly to their protagonism as intercultural mediators. This could reflect pragmatism, because the Annual Reports were written for a dual audience: the public interested in the organisation’s activities, and the funders, in particular the statutory bodies (local, regional, national government as well as the EU). It could also illustrate the fact that Reyes García, the founder of *Sevilla Acoge*, and influential in the organisation until her death in 2009, came from a different, less radical Christian tradition to the worker-priest movement in which Tabares was rooted. It could even express a conformism or collaborationism of which some critics have accused similar organisations (Però 2000; CGT 2004). These speculations do not provide a complete or convincing answer to the question. To understand the conspicuous absence of the portrayal of migrants as activists, a number of interviewees were asked
to recall the events of the 2002 occupation and each version of events was compared. An uncomfortable tension in the different versions arose which provoked more questions than they gave answers: most of the interviewees who recalled the 2002 occupation saw the migrants as manipulated, and yet this portrayal contradicted the image of migrants as actors and decision-makers in their own right, promoted by *Sevilla Acoge* in its documents. Below, the significance of this contradiction is drawn out through the analysis of the different versions of the one event.

The event was reported in the 2002 Annual Report thus:

Occupation of immigrants in the University of Pablo de Olavide. From 10th of June to 12th of August, a large group of unregularised immigrants played a leading role in a long and difficult occupation to ask for everyone’s regularisation, under the demand of ‘Papers for all’. From the first day to the last, our association, *Sevilla Acoge*, was there and supported in different ways the people who underwent this occupation. For humanitarian reasons and out of solidarity, we had to be with them as far as we could be (Annual Report 2002: 30).

In the section of the same Annual Report, which provided information on the organisation’s legal advice service, a concern was expressed about changes in the immigration law:

In the year 2002 there have been a series of harsh, heavy modifications to the legislation regulating the rights and freedoms of foreigners, as well as the requirements demanded of immigrants in order to reside and work. Getting the correct permits continues to be their main concern in order to normalise their socio-laboral situation. The simple fact of being unregularised as a reason for expulsion causes a state of fear, which hinders the process of ‘normalisation’. However, the changes introduced by the legislation have made things even worse (ibid.: 7).
This section came prior to the mention of the occupation and stated clearly that the organisation saw protest as legitimate:

Many immigrants experience harsh legal and social conditions and it is fair to seek urgent radical change. It is necessary to force and to push the constituted institutional framework so that principles of human equality and equity are made to apply to them as well. Protest with proposals is the principle which moves Sevilla Acoge so that – together with other associations, institutions and communities – we can one day reach a fair society for all (Annual Report 2002: 30).

Yet there was no mention that the occupation took place against the backdrop of the 2002 EU Seville summit, which focused on ‘illegal immigration’ and at which the Spanish prime minister proclaimed loudly in front of his EU counterparts his intentions to tighten immigration controls.

El Hartiti’s account in his interview provided a useful historical context to the occupation because he connected it to earlier events of the rural town of El Ejido in Almería where the race riots of 2000 and subsequent migration mobilisations took place. He explained how in 2002 he had asked to transfer from Almería Acoge to Sevilla Acoge after becoming physically and emotionally exhausted by the rhythm of work, the events of El Ejido and the continuing migrant occupations and strikes that took place in other locations in Almería. In February 2000 he had been on unpaid leave from Almería Acoge and had set up in El Ejido two locutorios, the telephone shops established for migrants to call home. These were burned down in the race riots, so he was both victim and activist: he was one of the main leaders of the strike action that followed the riots, which involved predominantly Moroccan workers, with and without legal status.

Further investigation of El Hartiti’s role in the strike, through newspaper articles and reports from the period, were revealing. He had
been at the forefront of the strike action that had temporarily paralysed agricultural production in El Ejido. The migrant labour force was in a strong negotiating position when its representatives signed the El Ejido pact – the agreement between the government, employers and migrants, setting out the conditions on which the migrants would end the strike and return to work. When the strikers went back to work, the local authority and national government, however, reneged on most of the terms agreed, including the promise of regularisation. The momentum and morale of the migrant workforce was lost and the agricultural businesses started to substitute the Moroccan labour force, seen as militant and conflictive, for a feminised workforce, perceived as more docile (see Chapter 3 for the policy strategy behind the changing migrant demographic profile). Several of the long-standing activists in El Ejido left the town, including El Hartiti who transferred to Sevilla Acoge. The sense of demoralisation following the strike was profound – as the Andalucían ombudsman said, ‘betrayal is demoralising’ (SA interview 10 2013) and:

The El Ejido pact was not honoured. It was all a lie, nothing was honoured. When you promise something and don’t honour it, it leads to disillusionment (ibid.).

Within two weeks of starting work in Sevilla Acoge, the university occupation began and El Hartiti, as the organisation’s intercultural mediator, was sent to intervene. His assessment of the situation was that the migrants were not in a position of strength to demand ‘Papers for all’, and that the outcome, if they did not compromise, would be deportation not regularisation. The strategy of Sevilla Acoge was, therefore, to negotiate the regularisation of those who could be regularised, using the existing law, and to negotiate with the government not to deport those who could not be regularised under the law, in exchange for ending the occupation. This strategy conflicted with the one put forward by the occupying migrants and so there were two incompatible positions, that of Sevilla Acoge (and other NGOs), and
that of a group of migrants who would not compromise to end the occupation unless papers were conceded to everyone. However, El Hartiti blamed the ‘sad end’ to the occupation, that is, approximately 240 deportations, not on the migrants’ strategy, but rather on ‘groups’ allegedly controlling the occupation.

The second version of events was Tabares’ account. In his interview, when discussing the occupation, he used the word ‘manipulation’ several times:

In our opinion it was a manipulation of immigrants by two or three political associations, wanting to take advantage of the Seville summit.

We intervened, not by supporting the occupation, because it looked like a manipulation to us.

What we didn’t support was the manipulation, the manipulation of immigrants for political ends to damage the government and Spain (SA interview 01 2012).

The migrants were not viewed as political actors in the occupation, rather, they were seen to have been used by other external actors pursuing political aims. The intransigent demand of ‘Papers for all’ was for Tabares,

absurd because no government is going to do that and certainly not under pressure, not indiscriminately’ (ibid.).

In his recollection of the event, the occupation ended with Sevilla Acoge negotiating papers for a small group of migrants. He confidently, but inaccurately, recalled that no one was arrested or deported.

The third and fourth versions come from the Andalucían ombudsman, José Chamizo (who later became a board member of Sevilla Acoge) and his technical assistant, Ignacio Toscano, who at the time of the
occupation was a volunteer for Caritas and a paid worker in the University of Pablo de Olavide, where the occupation took place. The university rector requested the intervention of the ombudsman to negotiate a solution, and asked both Sevilla Acoge and Caritas (in the person of Toscano), to mediate with the migrants involved in the occupation. In the ombudsman’s memoirs published in 2013, he stated that by 2002 the strategy of occupations for regularisation had come to an end, that is, the government was no longer going to submit to that kind of pressure. That was his position from the start of his negotiations with the migrants, and one that was supported by El Hartiti and Toscano, as expressed in their interviews. Toscano put the occupation in the context of the EU summit:

But the government was no longer going to regularise through occupations, especially not when it was on display in front of Europe (SA interview 09 2013).

The ombudsman, both in his book (2013: 82) and in his interview, stressed, as did Tabares, that the migrants were manipulated by ‘outsiders’ who used them for their own political aims. Toscano emphasised in his interview that these ‘outsiders’ had put the most vulnerable people in the firing line.

All of the above interviewees started from the position that the demand for ‘Papers for All’ was unrealistic because the mood of the government had changed and, therefore, it was a dangerous strategy. Most of these interviewees expressed distaste for what they saw as the politicisation of the occupation by outsiders. The attempts to ascertain from the interviewees who these outsiders were only solicited vague responses: ‘Outsiders, not from Seville – from Huelva’ (SA interview 01 2011), ‘Communist Worker something, ADITE’ (SA interview 09 2013). The version missing so far was that of the elusive ‘manipulators’ which was eventually found in a report published by the anarchist trade union CGT
and written by Red de Apoyo de Sevilla [Seville Support Network], entitled The bitter strawberry [La fresa amarga].

This report provided a very different version of events as well as an in-depth analysis of the exploitation of migrant labour in the strawberry agricultural business in the province of Huelva. It showed how national immigration legislation and policy, which supported the exploitation, also created situations of tension and antagonism within the agricultural areas where large numbers of migrants without legal status, predominantly men, lived rough or in makeshift housing in order to be on hand for work. The Huelva strawberry industry required a workforce of approximately 20,000 workers each season. In recent years, some of the migrant rural workers had mobilised against the exploitation and its causes, that is, immigration law. The occupation of 2002 was a culmination of these mobilisations. In this version, migrants were autonomous actors determined to fight for decent working and living conditions and to protest against some of the absurdities of Spanish immigration law. Some migrants with legal status only had permission to work in one specified province of Spain, even though agricultural work required moving around the country, depending on the needs of the harvests. The situation in Huelva at the start of the strawberry harvest, also described by Ruis Sanz (2007), was one in which thousands of migrant workers, many without legal status or in breach of their conditions, lived in housing resembling shanty towns on the outskirts of the strawberry-producing towns.

The report was alert to how the political climate changed when the 2002 immigration law came into force, and to how various migrant struggles ended in police repression and deportations. It stated that the migrants were aware of this, and yet thousands of them decided to protest against their working conditions. Their demands were as follows: the right to work, the right to decent housing, papers for all, the authorisation to work in other sectors of the economy – not only in
agriculture, and the right to residency permits that covered the whole of Spain – not just the region in which they had sought their permits.

The report described how migrant workers, scattered around the province of Huelva, on the outskirts of the towns, came together in a remarkable display of political organisation, similar to that glimmer of a more exacting politics that Hannah Arendt observed (see Chapter 2.2), and which she saw as arising in times of crisis where people came together to act collectively in a far more democratic way than traditional politics demanded. This may sound fantastical, but the description of this migrant mobilisation is strangely reminiscent of the ‘buried treasure’ described in Chapter 2.1. The decision-making process used before and during the occupation could be seen as an inspiring example of collective political action, where a public space was created in which people were actively engaged in discussing, arguing, and deciding on courses of action. This was empowerment in its true sense, through political action, without an external agent involved, as discussed in Chapter 1.4, although of course, it was far removed from any notion of ‘taking power’ in such a context. Below is a description of that process, according to the account in The bitter strawberry.

Public meetings [asambleas] were held in all the ‘shanty towns’, led by one leader or jefe de grupo, elected by the meeting. Discussions took place and decisions were made by a majority vote. The leaders of each public meeting met to feed back, and collectively they proposed the idea of making their case known in the Andalucian capital, Seville, by occupying a church – 1,400 migrants signed up to be part of an occupation in Seville. A support network, a group of Spanish individuals in solidarity with the migrant workers, was tasked with finding the best place for the occupation, using contacts among the Christian grassroots ecclesial communities, parish priests and migrants’ rights organisations, particularly targeting those involved with the Andalucian rural workers’ occupations in the past. However, the support network returned to Huelva without securing any support for the occupation;
Tabares confirmed in his interview that he was approached to help but had refused. The support network went back to the *assembleas* in the shanty towns to explain the risks involved in an occupation without wider support and the possibilities of eviction and deportation. The numbers of migrants who initially signed up to the occupation dropped from 1,400 to 600. The strategy was reformulated and the University of Pablo Olavide in Seville was chosen instead. According to the report, the final number of migrants who decided to occupy was 475. Once the university occupation had started, a similar process of democratic decision-making was used as described above. The migrants had organised themselves into nineteen *assembleas* for the purpose of discussion, each with a leader. The leaders then communicated the demands from the *assembleas* to the university and the ombudsman, and then fed back their responses to the *assembleas*.

According to the report, the ombudsman had alienated the migrants at the start of the occupation on 15th June 2002 when he positioned himself against their strategy. He had communicated to them that there would not be ‘papers for all’ and ‘occupations are no longer an option for making demands in Spain’ (Red de Apoyo De Sevilla 2003: 13). This was confirmed both in his interview and in his 2013 memoirs. His proposal was for each migrant to provide proof of identity to the authorities, give any documental evidence to support their personal case for regularisation, after which each case would be considered individually, with no guarantee of a positive resolution. The ombudsman’s proposal was rejected. From this point on, the notion of the migrants’ manipulation by the support network was disseminated through the media and through interviews in the press given by the supporting migrants’ rights organisations. The press articles from the time report the ‘manipulation’ by outsiders by quoting the migrants’ rights organisations that expressed this view (see Appendix for press coverage).
The report discussed the role of El Hartiti from Sevilla Acoge and of Toscano, the university employee and Caritas volunteer. They were seen as divisive because they aimed to influence groups of migrants to adopt the ombudsman’s position. A minority of migrants eventually accepted the ombudsman’s proposal, but the majority wanted a solution with a slightly different, nevertheless important, condition attached: they agreed to end the occupation and accept a case-by-case consideration, provided that the ombudsman would be involved in each case resolution as a form of guarantee. This was not accepted, the occupation was further weakened by division and on 7th August the rector allowed the police to enter the university to evict the migrants. The occupation, which had started on 15th June, ended. According to the report, 210 migrants were deported – and hardly anyone was regularised.

The report evaluated the occupation and concluded that it ended in defeat with negative consequences for the individual participating migrants and beyond – immigration policy remained unchanged as did the situation of migrants in Huelva and other agricultural regions of Spain (and continues so today). Yet the report recognised that the occupation had been an inspiring example of self-organisation without precedent in the region – the demands made were not unrealistic, they were the only way to challenge the source of the problem, that is, Spain's immigration laws that aided and abetted labour exploitation. From a political perspective the occupation, although it ended in defeat, represented an attempt by migrants to empower themselves through collective action to change the situation that disempowered them. Yet from the humanitarian perspective of Sevilla Acoge nothing positive could be gleaned from the experience of the occupation. This section concludes with a brief explanation of the clash between the political and humanitarian perspectives.

The majority version of the occupation, and the one widely disseminated in the media, was that the migrants involved in the
occupation were manipulated by outsiders who were playing politics with them. The minority version was that migrants were exercising political subjectivity and aimed for more than just individual regularisation. The majority’s humanitarian perspective was concerned with the protection of migrants and avoiding harm at all costs. The minority’s view was that migrants involved in the occupation went beyond humanitarian demands and put political solidarity into practice: some migrants with legal status took part in the occupation to achieve legal status for all, and some, who were given the opportunity to regularise their status in return for breaking the occupation, sacrificed this for the collective goal. The fact that migrants’ rights organisations almost unanimously viewed this action to be hopelessly unrealistic and as putting migrants in harm’s way, was arguably an indication of the ‘humanitarian dilemma’ (discussed in Chapter 1.1); it implied that when the belief in a broad transformational project for social change was lost, the sense of limits in what political action could achieve took over. The occupation represented the practical consequences of this sense of limits in which the humanitarian was prioritised over the political. The role of intercultural mediators could be seen to fit into this analysis. The 2002 Annual Report proudly portrayed its intercultural mediator, El Hartiti, as being awarded a ‘medal of honour’ by the university for his role in the occupation. This appeared to be the preferred portrayal rather than migrants portrayed as political activists, using their political imagination to challenge the culture of low expectations, as portrayed in *The bitter strawberry*.

### 5.11 The intercultural utopia – a radical alternative?

*Sevilla Acoge* had a vision of an alternative society, which it believed could be achieved through interculturalism. In the abstract, this alternative sounded like a radical stretch of the political imagination:
It is this ethical radicalism that makes us realistic, because we understand realism not as resignation to what there is, but as an active search for ways and possible solutions. A realism that is fed on dreams, desires and utopias. Anything that can be imagined socially can be realised. If we want to, of course (Annual Report 2000: 9).

In the introduction to the 2000 Annual Report, the organisation took up an activist, rebellious stance against the mood of fatalism that seemingly afflicted society. Using a well-known Spanish cliché, ‘What cannot be cannot be, and what’s more, it is impossible’ (ibid.), Sevilla Acoge captured the sense of the ‘end of history’, the catchphrase made famous by Fukuyama, but the organisation mocked the triumphant claim that utopias were dead and all that remained was pragmatism and ‘what is realistic’. In defiance of this fatalism, Sevilla Acoge presented itself as in the vanguard for pushing forward radical change:

We know that marginalisation is not casual, but is caused. It is one of the rotten fruits of a social and economic system that is unjust because it is unequal and – in the jungle of interests – the strong exclude the weak. Consequently, if marginalisation and exclusion are caused by the dominant system, the true solutions have to come from radical and effective changes in that system. Our independence and autonomy must be used to distance our analysis from the official versions and to uncover the complexity of social processes. These values allow us to put forward more rigorously the very conditions of our action and not to risk landing up legitimating the system we want to fight and change (Annual Report 2000: 7).

Sevilla Acoge maintained a fierce condemnation of the capitalist system throughout the years examined in this case study. The Annual Reports illustrated how the structural causes of migration and social problems were never ignored; the organisation constantly demanded ‘profound changes in the system’ (ibid.: 5). Sevilla Acoge claimed that solidarity with migrants was not only ‘a handkerchief to dry tears’ (ibid.) but one that included protest and political struggle: ‘We want to live a dissident
solidarity, not a complacent one’ (ibid.). Sevilla Acoge’s volunteers were described as ‘militants of change’ (ibid.); the organisation adopted the optimism of a Chilean communist poet to demonstrate its determination not to give up the fight:

If the reality is hard to change and they close off our paths, we can always sing with Pablo Neruda: ‘Although they cut all the flowers, they will not stop the spring’ (ibid.: 9).

Yet in practice, Sevilla Acoge did not let its political imagination soar, rather, it limited its own aspirations for change. This was illustrated by the absence of the portrayal of migrants as political activists, and through the organisation’s view that, when migrants did exert their political subjectivity, in the case of the occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide (discussed in the previous section), they were viewed as being manipulated. The portrayal of migrants as manipulated rather than as being empowered through collective political action revealed that the notion of empowerment had shifted away from the earlier idea of political empowerment, to a humanitarian, or even a therapeutic one.

In 2000 the organisation expressed its refusal to resign itself to the world as it was and to fight for whatever could be imagined. Yet the idea of freedom of movement, which could be said to capture the spirit of human agency in which risks are taken and no obstacles are too difficult to surmount in a bid for freedom, was replaced by an aspiration for a humane, managed migration policy:

What we need to do is to create legal mechanisms that respect human rights and promote the flow of immigrant workers with all their rights and not to leave migratory movements in the hands of the traffickers who control workers, which is even worse ... So it is not a case of saying naïvely ‘down with the borders’ but rather it is a case of having a positive position of ‘up with respect for human rights’. And from this outlook of respect for human rights, work out a better way of managing borders (SA interview 01 2011).
The quotation above suggests that *Sevilla Acoge*, in its bid to uphold human rights, would rather prevent migrants from exercising their own agency than allowing them to choose to risk their lives. In the case of the occupation, upholding human rights signified the devaluation of political values, in the sense that the political courage of migrants, prepared to sacrifice their chance for individual regularisation for a greater political aim, was not valued.

Since 1987 the organisation worked predominantly with ‘illegal’ migrants and publically condemned the immigration laws that deprived them of legal status. Almost thirty years later the situation had not improved: the majority of *Sevilla Acoge’s* service users were ‘illegal’ and immigration laws were even more restrictive. The organisation saw interculturalism as giving rise to a new society in which migrants would be treated with dignity and respect; their culture would be recognised rather than denigrated. The philosophy of interculturalism, while never ignoring the structural causes of migrants’ circumstances, placed the emphasis for change on personal transformation of attitudes and behaviour. Interculturalism did not divert the organisation away from the structural causes of social problems, as Kymlicka and Banting (2006) claim some critics of multiculturalism believe, rather, its embrace reflected the political exhaustion and retreat identified by Jacoby (1999), who regards the multicultural vision of society not as radical, but as resembling that of a liberal democracy (see Chapter 1.4).

In a similar way, the intercultural society, rather than a radical reimagining of what exists, was, in *Sevilla Acoge’s* own words, mild:

> We need to move towards a plural, respectful society humanely enriched by differences (*Annual Report 2000*: 4).
The case of *Sevilla Acoge* illustrates the dilemmas and contradictions that emerged when the bridge to an alternative society was broken. In the past, that bridge had been, for many left-wing activists, the belief that change was possible through the collective political action of ordinary people and the struggle for a socialist society; the extinguishing of that belief lowered expectations of what was possible to achieve. The politicised and radical rhetoric found in many of the documents explored in this chapter was contradicted by a sense of limits to what could be realistically achieved in practice. The source of this low horizon was the disillusionment and a loss of hope in ordinary people. In the past they had been viewed as capable of courageous struggles against capitalism, but this outlook, in the Spanish context, was eclipsed when earlier collective political action had subsided. Previously in this chapter it was explained how migrants symbolically replaced the Andalucian agricultural workers and came to represent the new ‘poor’. Yet in the Andalucian countryside, migrants literally replaced the Spanish rural workforce to become the new agricultural workers. They showed themselves to be as capable of demanding rights through collective political action as their predecessors. The occupation vividly illustrated the consequences of what happened when migrants’ attempted to act politically within a vacuum of wider political solidarity, in times when political subjectivity had diminished. The broad political outlook that integrated many people into a wider network of shared understanding and values had vanished and, in the case of *Sevilla Acoge*, the meaning of integration reverted to what could be called a pre-political notion – integration through family belonging, friendship and human affection (see Chapter 2.1 for the discussion on the reconfiguration of subjectivity and the decline of social institutions that conferred political identity onto large numbers of people).

This case study exemplified the way in which the shift from a political to a humanitarian understanding of rights had significant implications
for the meaning of empowerment. In the Introduction and Chapter 1 of this thesis, the humanitarian notion of empowerment, with its aim of relieving the suffering of the vulnerable and victims, was said to negate the very notion of self-empowerment because an external agent was required to empower the disempowered. While *Sevilla Acoge* constantly promoted migrants as ‘their own agents’ and ‘actors’, ultimately the organisation curtailed migrants’ agency on humanitarian grounds, in order to protect them from harm. The idea that protection from harm trumps agency was embedded in the organisation’s human rights-based approach and could be seen to lead to a move against freedom, in both the negative and positive sense (as discussed in Chapter 2.2). The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 7: Whatever happened to freedom? explores such a claim further, in comparison with the British case study. The following chapter explores how similar trends worked themselves out in a different context.
Chapter 6 From politics with passion to compassion without politics. The British case study, *Praxis*

6.1 Introduction

The story of *Praxis* illustrates that from the mid-1980s to the early 2010s there was a shift in the organisation's portrayal of migrants – from a political framing, where migrants were viewed as self-empowered political subjects, actively fighting their own political struggles, to a humanitarian framing, where migrants were shown as vulnerable and in need of empowerment. Two pivotal moments – *Kairos Europa* in 1991 and the Rwandan affair in 2006 – show with particular clarity the consequences of this shift from the political to humanitarian. It had implications not only for the meaning of empowerment and solidarity but also for the making of judgements outside of the ‘black-and-white’ political framework. As this case study demonstrates, *Praxis*’ emphasis on migrants as vulnerable became an abstract, and, as exemplified in the 2006 Rwandan affair in which a member of *Praxis* staff, a Rwandan refugee, was publically accused of genocide, no political solidarity was offered to protect him, only solidarity with ‘the vulnerable’ in the abstract. The disappointment with earlier ‘third world’ and anti-imperialist political struggles led the organisation’s focus of work to change, and as this chapter shows, results in two significant portrayals of migrants: that of migrants as political activists (which prevailed from 1985 to 1998) and migrants as vulnerable (which became dominant from 2006).

The chapter is divided into four periods in order to trace the shifts that took place. The first period is 1983–1990, a time when political activism and discourse took place within the binary framework of left- and right-wing positions, characterised in this case study as ‘the black-and-white days’. The second period is 1990–1998, a period of change
when the organisation reoriented its focus to welfare and social needs of migrants, called the *kairos* moment. The third period is 1998–2006, a period marked by the end of old black-and-white politics and different patterns of migration. The final period is 2006–2012, characterised by the rise of the notion of migrants as vulnerable.

6.2 The creation and development of *Praxis*

*Praxis* started as a project within the Robert Kemble Christian Institute (RKCI), a charity and company limited by guarantee founded by friends of the late Presbyterian minister, Robert Kemble, in 1983. Kemble left in his will, dated May 1981, a property in Goodge Street, central London, that he had bought for the specific purpose of creating a Christian resource centre in the heart of the capital city. Along with the property, he also left some financial assets and the following instructions to his friends in his will:

> I shall expect that they can find ways together of continuing to give practical expression to my life’s hope (this is most recently described in my paper ‘Aims for a City Centre Christian Resource.’ (*Last will and testament* May 1981).

It is important to go back a few years to understand what Kemble’s ‘life’s hope’ was and how it developed, because *Praxis*, despite its own evolution and eventual independence from RKCI, remained faithful to the original aims.

Through the analysis of three documents written by Kemble between 1979 and 1981 it is possible to capture the original thinking that drove him to establish a Christian resource centre, and thus, put his ideas into practice. These documents also complement the historical description given in Chapter 3 of the radicalisation of Christianity and the influence of liberation theology.
In a 1979 article published in an alternative Christian journal, Kemble reflected on his experience as a minister in Wigan working with young people. He identified that traditional Christianity had little meaning for them and that the gulf between the religious and secular world appeared unbreachable:

There were two separate sets of moral values; there was an incomprehension of the language and symbols of the more ‘religious' or the more ‘secular' group' and there was a basically different way of understanding what it meant to belong to this one world (One for Christian renewal 1979).

Kemble was living at a time when struggles in ‘third world' countries, inspired by radical Christianity and secular ideology alike, were capturing the imagination of young people, and for this reason Kemble asked for a period of leave from his ministry to travel to those parts of the world
to discover how other churches were relating the gospel and the new experience of the young generation, to share in what many western youngsters are learning from the Third World (ibid.).

In the interview with the chief executive of Praxis, who had also been the first employee of RKCI, he commented with a hint of cynicism, that this eighteen-month period of travel made a Marxist out of Kemble:

Robert Kemble had done his kind of tour of the world, he'd been in Latin America, in apartheid South Africa, in the Philippines, spent some time in Geneva. So he came back as a radicalised, you know, Christian Marxist having been a nice evangelical Presbyterian (Praxis interview 01 2011).

Kemble’s ‘conversion’ was not so straightforward as the above implies: there was an ambivalence at the heart of his radical Christianity. In
1976 he returned to London from his travels, influenced by liberation theology, which, in Chapter 3, was shown to echo Marxist rhetoric and revolutionary action. What triggered the churches in Latin America and elsewhere to radicalise, however, was initially their attempt to remain relevant in the world when the traditional conservative church was losing authority. Arguably, this led Kemble to embrace liberation theology and explains his move to the left of the political spectrum. Kemble’s desire to direct his energies into an ‘alternative form of ministry’, as he called his project for a Christian city centre resource, reflected his attempt to maintain the credibility of Christianity in a secular world at a time when social polarisation was divided along radical left and right political lines.

On his return to Britain Kemble reestablished contact with his Christian friends in London to develop a network to build his work. He discovered that many of those friends were now embarrassed by the church and had moved towards secular politics, while retaining their former moral values:

If once they had been in a Sunday School or Fellowship of Youth with me, now they were embarrassed to go to church. Many had retained a deep respect for moral truth and human rights, but had made their way from the churches into the alternative society growth movement or political organisations (Proposal for a city house church, January 1981).

Through this network, Kemble found ‘an enormous constituency of goodwill without the church’ (ibid.). This constituency was made up of individuals and groups outside the church who put so much commitment into pressure campaigns, third world lobbies, human rights, action research, adult education, ecology, race relations, community development, residents’ associations and the like (ibid.).
The existence of such commitment motivated Kemble to demonstrate that there was an alternative, activist Christianity that was as relevant and committed as the secular activism he had discovered outside of the church:

> It is essential that we participate. The comparatively small amount of effort and attention which the church gives to such things leads many to suspect that those who worship God have little concern for struggles of liberation (ibid.).

Above, Kemble expressed both an admiration for the ‘goodwill’ external to the church and a sense of competition. There was also a further tension in his thinking on the political developments both in the West and in this ‘Third World’:

> Christians are being overtaken by secular humanists in the West; and the Third World is looking towards atheistic socialism for its political future (One for Christian renewal 1979).

The above could be interpreted as an expression of Kemble's antipathy towards secular humanism and atheistic socialism. It indicates that his radicalisation may have been driven by pressure from the polarisation in society between the anti-capitalist left and the anti-socialist right, in which there was a moral imperative to take sides. This is an important observation because when this pressure vanished and the old political framework collapsed, so too did the imperative to take a stance on the political conflicts that were brought into the organisation. This theme is explored in the later sections of this chapter. In Chapter 3, the period 1973–1982 in Britain was called ‘the time of troubles’ characterised by ‘outbursts of militancy, violence and terrorism’ (Marwick 2003: 177). The year 1979 was defined by militant strike action, ‘the winter of discontent’, and the election of the right-wing Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher. These were polarised times between the left and right. Kemble was determined to make Christianity relevant to those
sectors of society involved in struggles both in Britain and in the ‘Third World’, by engaging with the various political campaign groups; his idea of the Christian city centre resource was to facilitate social and political action by Christians. With an inheritance from his father (who died in 1978), Kemble was able to buy the property from which to coordinate those activities.

Kemble died unexpectedly in 1981, having drawn up a handwritten will in which he appointed four friends ‘to continue his life’s hope’ that he had already detailed in an earlier document containing the plans he had for the property’s use. In 1983 Kemble’s friends officially constituted the Robert Kemble Christian Institute (RKCI) and employed its first worker, the resident coordinator, who remained employed by the organisation throughout the period explored in the case study (1983–2012), which, as mentioned above, is divided into four periods: 1983–1990, 1990–1998, 1998–2006 and 2006–2012. These periods are both chronological and thematic. Below, the changing structure of the organisation and the different groups that worked within it is discussed to provide useful organisational background for Sections 6.3 to 6.6.

1983–1990

RKCI was not established with an exclusive purpose of supporting refugees and migrants. Initially RKCI’s stated aim was to bring together individual Christians and Christian groups for study and action on the issues of poverty and homelessness (A history of 12, Goodge Street 1984).

The first Christian groups to work inside RKCI were as follows: Church Action on Namibia (CAN); Emergency – Campaigning and Training on Housing Rights; Worship/Pastoral Network; Policy Group on Prophetic Christians in Britain; and Policy Group on International Solidarity. This last organisation consisted of Latin American groups, including the
Salvador Allende Cultural Centre (SACC). CAN was set up by RKCI and the house was used by many Namibians and South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) members in exile. SACC was set up by a Chilean refugee and appears under two names in minutes of meetings – Chilean Socialist Party in Britain and Salvador Allende Cultural Centre.

The initial period of the organisation's life was described in retrospect as ‘anarchy’ (The future governance of Praxis 15th July 2003). The first trustees, all friends of Kemble, did not provide any direction and so the resident coordinator began to develop and coordinate activities in an ad-hoc manner, interpreting Kemble's wishes as they were outlined in his will:

I mean it was a completely open page, they really had no idea what they wanted. Robert Kemble had left a will and, have you seen that? Robert Kemble had left a will and a kind of description of what was to be in the house (Praxis interview 01 2011).

In 1985 RKCI adopted a collective structure in which each group elected two representatives to run the collective of groups through the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC). The aims and principles of RKCI were clearly stated in a document written by the resident coordinator that demonstrated the importance of liberation theology in shaping the organisation:

To seek to discover the gospel of Christ using the methodology of liberation theology in action, worship and reflection; and to run a centre for that purpose. The methodology of liberation theology is a process which starts from concrete events, the world as it is, firmly set in our social, political and economic context. Then our worship and reflection turn our action towards the movement for liberation ... turn our action towards the ‘option for the poor (A Collective Structure 1985).
In another document – also written by the resident coordinator, dated June 1985, and entitled *A centre of contextual theology* – the Medellín and Puebla conferences, mentioned in Chapter 3, were referred to, as was the organisation’s commitment to ‘a preferential option for the poor’. These are both important references to liberation theology:

3.5 Any commitment to a social *praxis* geared to the overcoming of poverty must therefore take seriously the formulas of the 2 conferences of the Latin American bishops ... It is our intention to continue to work with others towards a Christian social *praxis* in Britain which centres on a preferential option for the poor ... by the resourcing of a network of Christians involved in social and political action (*A centre of contextual theology* 1985).

In 1986, the decision was taken to sell the Goodge Street property and to relocate RKCI to more suitable premises in the East End, attached to the United Reform Church. The collective of groups was named ‘*Praxis*’, which became a project of the RKCI and an entity in its own right, although not yet independent from RKCI. From this point onwards the case-study organisation will be referred to as *Praxis*. The resident coordinator became the *Praxis* community development worker in 1986. During this first period in *Praxis*’ history, liberation theology and ‘radical Christianity’ were promoted openly as the organisation’s ideological and theological stance. In a public job advertisement for an administrator, it stated that the job was for ‘a project involving a range of activities intended to discover a “liberation theology” in Britain’ (advert June 1986). *Praxis* was described as ‘an enabling organisation, facilitating campaigns against injustice and enriching and publicising the message of radical Christianity’ and as seeking to ‘propagate the message of liberation theology’ (minutes of PCC special meeting 12th October 1989).

The six *Praxis* groups mentioned above that made up the collective existed throughout this period and constituted the work of the
organisation. In 1988 and 1989 another organisation was named in the minutes as being within the Praxis collective structure: Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF), which took part in anti-deportation campaigns. CAN, SACC and CARAF could all be viewed as Christian alternatives to equivalent secular left-wing solidarity organisations, such as Namibia Solidarity Campaign (NSC), Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC) and Campaign against Racism and Fascism (CARF). This sense of competition is discussed in Section 6.6.

1990–1998

In this second period Praxis became an organisation exclusively for refugees and migrants because of the nature of the groups that formed the collective structure. The British Christian groups vanished: CAN closed following Namibian independence, CARAF 'bit the dust' (evaluation report 13th November 1990) and the Theology group was dissolved. A new group, Fitun, was set up by an East Timorese political exile campaigning against the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The international solidarity work continued intensely under the name of ‘development education’, and the Latin American Group became particularly active during this period but the focus of the organisation’s work was reviewed. It turned towards projects that met the practical needs of refugees and migrants living in Britain. This led Praxis to become a service provider. The collective structure was brought to an end and a membership structure replaced it so that the groups were fully integrated into Praxis. In 1996 the community development worker, formerly the resident coordinator was appointed as director of Praxis and the organisation became hierarchal. In 1998 Praxis established itself as an organisation independent of RKCI and became a legal entity in its own right – a registered charity and company limited by guarantee. As expressed in the 1998 business plan, it no longer seemed appropriate to be part of a Christian organisation when the majority of its service users belonged to different faiths:
As the work of Praxis has developed in recent years to work with people of different faith backgrounds, it has been resolved to incorporate in its own right, whilst maintaining a close relationship with the Robert Kemble Trust (Praxis business plan 1998).

The last public mention of the organisation’s ‘radical Christianity’ and adherence to the methodology and ideas of liberation theology was in 1992.

During this period, the groups working within Praxis were the following: Ibero-American Women’s Group, SACC, Vamos Juntos, Fitun, Somali Homeless Project, Latin American Group, Caawimada Soomaliland, La Paila and La Nueva Generación. In 1996 Refugee Education Unit (REU), a project set up by three large charitable trusts, was placed in Praxis, the aim of which was to support young refugees, particularly men from Francophone Africa, to access education. At the end of this period the minutes state that the funds from RKCI were almost depleted.

1998–2006

During this period, Praxis, now independent from RKCI, professionalised and consolidated as a highly respected service-providing organisation delivering government contracts. In Moving Forward: Business Plan 2000–03, the original founder, Robert Kemble, was described as ‘a former minister of the URC who devoted his life to the service of the socially excluded’, thus distancing the organisation from its radical Christian past. The Latin American and East Timorese political campaigns ended; development education, that is, international solidarity work, was mentioned for the last time in 2003. The groups during this period were as follows: Umubano-Rwandan Refugee Community Association, Somali Women’s Group, Burundi Refugee Group, Ibero-American Women’s Group, SACC, Vamos Juntos, La Nueva Generación, Praxis Panthers (football team), Forum of African
Human Rights Defenders and Burkina Faso Community Association. In 2006 the director became the chief executive.

2006–2012

*Praxis* defined the period from 2008 as one characterised by ‘the rise of the precariat’. *Praxis* groups were rarely mentioned in the Annual Reports of this period. The chief executive wrote in a publication on community development (*Change from experience – a pedagogy for community-based change* (CFE) 2007) that ‘the organisation *Praxis* derives its name from a fascination with the work of Paolo Freire’, thus reconnecting *Praxis* with the methodology of liberation theology, but in a very different political context.

6.3 The black-and-white days: the passion of politics within the left–right framework

During the early years of the organisation, 1983–1990, *Praxis* worked within a framework of radical Christianity and liberation theology, as described above. At this stage of the organisation’s life, liberation theology was widely associated with liberation through armed struggle. It is noticeable how clear-cut the political world appeared and how little *Praxis* doubted with whom it should be in solidarity. The organisation’s first Annual Report was not produced until 1992; however, the minutes of the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) meetings and other documents give insight into this observation. For example, the November 1989 minutes of the PCC stated that the Annual General Meeting (AGM) would commemorate the anniversary of Camilo Torres’ assassination in Colombia. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Torres, a Colombian priest, was liberation theology’s most radical exponent and a member of one of Colombia’s guerrilla movements, the National Liberation Army (ELN). Another example is seen through the work of CAN, the group *Praxis* set up itself, following a conference in 1984.
organised by the Namibia Solidarity Campaign (NSC) at City University entitled *Namibia 1884–1984: 100 years of foreign occupation, 100 years of struggle*. CAN unconditionally supported SWAPO, the national liberation movement that had taken up the armed struggle in 1966, and worked with SWAPO exiles in London.

The black-and-white moral framework that provided clarity with regard to taking sides in political conflicts existed in the organisation during this period. While the sociological literature discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 describes the loss of such certainty even before the end of the Cold War, in *Praxis*, the period up to 1990 showed no uncertainty. This could be attributed to the following reasons:

First, the political refugees working within *Praxis* had an unshakeable belief in their politics and the tangibility of their goal. They were all left-wing militants who aimed to bring down their countries’ repressive regimes, which were backed by western imperialism. *Praxis* groups were mostly aligned to specific left-wing political parties that were involved in militant struggles against their governments:

So what I am trying to say is that I think all of us, at the beginning, probably still are somehow, were socialists. We were socialist, we believed in, the only way to go forward was to make the revolution which means overthrow the system ... so what I am trying to say is that we all came with different degrees of socialist ideas in our head because we belonged to left-wing parties (*Praxis* interview 04 2011).

Second, as illustrated by the quotation above, the refugee activists were fighting for socialism, a political ideology that was shared by the British campaigners. The ‘radical change in our country’ referred to below was a desire held in common:

So the answer is we all came here from different circumstances and in our case, I can talk for the Chileans, we were all militants, so we were
not like sympathisers no, we were not sympathisers, we were militants and we wanted a radical change in our country. That is why the Americans hit us so hard because if they didn't hit us hard we were going to stand up again and carry on fighting (ibid.).

Third, the militant struggles at this time were full of hope and the goal of an alternative society through collective political action felt tangible, as expressed by one Colombian political refugee:

But also it was a time of lots of hope and positivity. It was when it was thought that the popular or social movement of the country and the political movements of opposition could affect change in the situation. There was a time, let's say from 1980 to 1990, those years were very positive, with a lot of activity, a strong peasant movement, a militant and combative trade union movement that achieved very important things, to which, to some extent, I could contribute. I mean it was a time of hope even though there were so many deaths along the way. Because that was also the time of major political repression in the country, all the people, most of the leaders from that generation were assassinated. However we thought it was worthwhile and it was viable, it was viable to keep on fighting and keep on sacrificing ourselves for that (RCHP interview 2006).

Although the collapse of the Berlin Wall was imminent, the political context of the Cold War still provided a basis for the polarised conflicts between socialism and capitalism. One CAN member made the following observation:

And it was before the Berlin Wall collapsed so we still had two ideologies opposing each other in most of the ‘80s (Praxis interview 03 2011).

The Cold War divisions provided a straightforward framework for the left to decide who was morally right or wrong. The United States and other western states supported dictatorships and repression in order to
stop the spread of ‘communism’, that is, any opposition to the western-backed regimes:

Obviously, when Praxis started in the ’80s, there were military dictatorships in South America, all over, everywhere, Central America and South America, and the Americans, the North Americans, the United States, they had a lot of power and influence over those dictatorships so most of them, well, all of them were pro-America. And as you know, Nixon and Kissinger were actively responsible for the military coup in Chile, openly, they never denied it and they never felt sorry about what they had done because of the Cold War. This is what they said, they had to stop the expansion of communism in their own backyards (Praxis interview 04 2011).

This led to the simple morals of opposites in the British activists’ solidarity, as expressed by one British former CAN member:

As you say, the whole thing was polarised. In Britain it was Thatcher, you know, extreme right stuff happening, and us. And there was the Cold War still happening and then there were these liberation movements so you had to be, you couldn’t come down, you know, Thatcher was saying these were terrorists, blah blah blah, you couldn’t come down on that side so you had to back these people (Praxis interview 03 2011).

The groups working inside Praxis were aligned to political parties and campaigned as representatives of those parties. CAN’s exiled Namibian activist members belonged to SWAPO and the British activists followed their lead, as one CAN member stated:

Solidarity meant working alongside people and supporting them. It meant a radical change from a charitable approach, it wasn’t a question of helping people, it was primarily political and it was following the lead of people in the situation and not dictating what they should do (Praxis interview 03 2011).
Political solidarity implied supporting the politics of the national liberation movement, but towards the end of this period it did not signify a complete suspension of judgement. Internal discussion took place when one of the CAN members, a Namibian SWAPO exile, was detained by SWAPO in 1989. Even though a moral judgement was made to publically support SWAPO uncritically so as not to undermine it, one CAN member recalled that the incident created a dilemma internally:

"It wasn’t easy to know what was going on. But when Bienca was detained it was clear to us, because until then, well, things were known but there were counter-arguments and it was possible to believe them (Praxis interview 03 2011).

The notion of political solidarity, that is, the British activists in solidarity with the causes of political refugees, retained the Marxist meaning of internationalism in the sense that it aimed not only to denounce repressive regimes and British and U.S support for those regimes, but it was also a fight against the British government. This is evident in the reaction recorded in the minutes of the PCC meeting in 1989 on the eve of the SWAPO election victory in Namibia:

**SWAPO HAS WON!**

The result of the election in Namibia came through on the new fax during the meeting

**NAMIBIA TODAY! CHILE TOMORROW! BRITAIN THE DAY AFTER!**

(emphasis in the original) (minutes of PCC meeting 14th November 1989).

The idea that a radical change in Britain could be imminent, as had occurred in Namibia, may have been wishful thinking, but it should be seen in the context of the polarised times in Britain in the 1980s, the backdrop to the early years of *Praxis*, as recalled by its chief executive:

"That was a really kind of tumultuous time, I think, in, well in Britain anyway, it was Thatcher, Falklands, pre-Falklands, oh no, it might have
been, and everything was going on in Northern Ireland ... and it was a very, kind of heavy time, I mean, everyone thought that their phones had been tapped, especially Christian CND and those kind of groups, so very strange times (Praxis interview 01 2011).

The enthusiasm with which the British Christian campaigners of CAN embraced ‘third world’ struggles, however, echoes the notion of ‘vicarious pleasure’ (Birchall 2013) mentioned in Chapter 1, whereby the fading hopes of radical change in the West were transferred to those countries where militant struggles were still vigorously being fought. One former CAN member recalled the British miners’ strike of 1984 in his interview, commenting that ‘throughout the ’80s it was a really depressing time in Britain with Thatcherism’. It was easier for the British campaigners to get passionate about politics where the political struggles of refugee activists were so full of conviction and a sense of possibility. As one Praxis member, a Colombian refugee, said:

We people have this illusion, this dream that was there, that we were able to change the world (RCHP interview 2006).

The notion that collective political action could transform society, through those ongoing national liberation struggles and guerrilla movements, provided a route to politicisation for many British secular and Christian activists. Talking about the exiled SWAPO activists in London, one of the former CAN members recalled that

they were very politicised as well, and they politicised us and they changed our lives beyond doubt in lots of ways (Praxis interview 03 2011).

The passion and conviction in politics that existed for the exiled activists spread to those in solidarity with them. This is illustrated by two quotations below, the first from the interview with one Colombian refugee and the second from the interview with one of the British CAN campaigners:
We, I can’t remember having any other discussions other than what was happening in Colombia, my life was a continuation, I never broke, I never said I am now a refugee in England and not anymore the political activist that I used to be there, in Colombia. It continued. Here we wanted to be militants as we were there, right? (Praxis interview 09 2011).

We lived and breathed it ... It was a bit obsessive really. I heard years later from someone who shared the house with us at that time, ‘Everything was about Namibia’ and she wasn’t particularly into Namibia, at times it really got too much (Praxis interview 03 2011).

The political refugees of the early period in Praxis portrayed themselves as militants proud of their convictions and actions. This self-portrayal was confirmed by the chief executive of Praxis. He described the refugees of the first period in Praxis as

strong, politicised refugees, huge amount of self-consciousness, self-awareness, self-esteem, absolutely caught up with a political cause, you know, which gives them all that motivation and strength (Praxis interview 01 2011).

He also called them ‘gold-plated refugees’ in the sense that they were supported by British solidarity campaigns and the trade union solidarity movement and ‘fêted wherever they went’ (ibid.). This reflected the historical moment: British trade union solidarity was relatively strong; the Chileans and Colombian refugees of this period were largely political activists and often trade unionists themselves, so they were able to integrate easily into this movement. They were also ‘gold-plated’ because, in the case of the Chileans, they were offered university grants from an organisation, World University Service (WUS), so that they could study, and they all had access to the universal welfare rights system because the immigration rules had not yet excluded people seeking asylum from welfare benefit entitlement (see Chapter 3). They were empowered through their politics; no matter
what experiences they had undergone, they did not see themselves in a client-service provider relationship with *Praxis*. Instead, they wanted *Praxis* to provide the space and support for them to do their political and cultural activities. One political refugee remembered that even advice service provision outside of *Praxis* was not about a professional client–caseworker relationship:

> In those days caseworkers used to go to your house. These caseworkers had the opportunity to share with you not just your case but part of your life. There was a lot of commitment and a lot of interest ... I never saw those people like my caseworker or legal representative, no, they were like comrades (laughter) in those days ... Yeh, and I remember very well those days when they used to come to our flat and they used to go to all the political solidarity events (*Praxis interview 09 2011*).

The politics of the refugee activists and *Praxis’* commitment to those politics encouraged the organisation to ignore the Charity Commission’s regulations. Campaigning for and supporting political parties were not permitted under charity law, but two examples show that the organisation turned a blind eye. In one case *Praxis* collected £1,603 at a fundraising event to contribute to the SWAPO election campaign appeal, as evidenced in the PCC meeting minutes (21st June 1989) and confirmed by Saunders (2009). In the second case, one of *Praxis’* groups, set up by a Chilean refugee, called itself the Salvador Allende Cultural Centre, which was often written with a slash: SAAC/Chilean Socialist Party in Britain.

Although Birchall (2013) was referring to political activity in European countries in the 1970s, his description could equally apply to this period in *Praxis’* history:

> It was a time of collective action. Individuals were involved in rallies, demonstrations, conferences, research centres; they joined
groupuscules of the far left or mainstream political parties (Birchall 2013: 152).

Birchall claims that by the 1980s

some of the more naïve illusions about the Third World's potential for spearheading world revolution had perished (Birchall 2013: 153).

The ‘vicarious pleasure’ (ibid.: 159) the European left had experienced in supporting these movements had turned to disillusionment. This could be true of some of the British activists in Praxis. One CAN member said her 'biggest disillusionment' came in 1988 when another of their members, a SWAPO activist in exile, was arrested by SWAPO, under suspicion of being a spy, while visiting her family in Africa. It was only a decade later, however, that illusions in those ‘third world’ movements to bring about an alternative social model finally broke down within Praxis, as will be discussed in Section 6.6. During the period under discussion in this section, it was clear which side the organisation should take in the political conflicts, and the portrayal of migrants was also unambiguous – they were political activists, empowered by their politics, passionate and committed to a cause. This portrayal applied as much to the self-representations as to the organisation's own portrayal of migrants at this time. Political commitment and political solidarity were upheld by both Praxis and the refugee activists; this created a convergence of values throughout the first period.

6.4 The kairos moment: change and continuity

The previous section showed how a clear-cut political and moral framework existed within Praxis through its groups engaged in the politics of liberation struggles. British Christians were engaged in political solidarity work with exiled activists, who were involved in the struggle for liberation of their own countries from military dictatorship
(in the case of Chile) or from the domination by the South African apartheid regime (in the case of Namibia). As illustrated above, towards the end of the period the black-and-white method of making judgements was not beyond questioning. Human rights abuses of the national liberation movements were known about, but the polarised politics of the time gave rise to external uncritical support even if limited critical discussion took place internally. Knowledge of human rights violations by liberation movements made the British activists uncomfortable, and yet these paled into insignificance compared with the abuse of the regimes in power, supported by western imperialism. For Praxis it had been clear whose side to take. In the period under discussion in this section, the black-and-white moral framework remained intact for the refugee political activists inside Praxis, but as the political certainties of the Cold War world collapsed, the framework became less straightforward for the organisation. This led to internal tensions – Praxis was committed to its refugee and migrant groups doing ‘their own stuff’ (Praxis interview 01 2011) and supported their activities; however, the politics of some of the refugee groups presented a dilemma, as illustrated below.

At the start of the period 1990–1998 a shift of focus took place in the organisation’s work that will be referred to as a ‘kairos moment’. The notion of kairos was introduced into Praxis through its relationship with the Kairos Europa movement, a network supported by the World Council of Churches (WCC) with which Praxis was involved from 1990 to 1998. In retrospect, the notion of kairos was defined by the chief executive of Praxis thus:

*Kairos is the opportune moment – a particular and distinctive point within chronological time where events conspire to create the need and opportunity for change (CFE 2007: 33).*

Yet Kairos signified more than that: it implied both a crisis and the chance to begin something new. At the beginning of the 1990s, the
A kairos moment was triggered by the end of the Cold War and the start of new global trends, including the advent of Fortress Europe in 1992 (see Chapter 3). The Kairos Europa movement stated that

the whole world is being confronted with such a KAIROS – a life-threatening crisis offering opportunities for liberation from the yoke of an ever more unregulated capitalism (Kairos Europa website accessed 31st January 2014).

The sentiment contained in the statement above could explain why Praxis referred retrospectively to the organisation’s ‘radical Christian ethic’ (The future governance of Praxis 15th July 2003).

Kairos also signified taking sides. It is important to understand that the kairos movement originated in apartheid South Africa. Its theological underpinnings were set out in the publication, A challenge to the churches (1985), in which the violence of the apartheid regime was denounced and the South African churches were called on to actively take sides against the regime during the 1985 state of emergency. This was seen as a kairos moment, that is, ‘a critical time for the poor and the oppressed’ (ibid.). Less than a decade later Kairos Europa defined kairos as ‘a decisive moment for conversion and a new beginning in the face of severe crisis’, or, in more secular terms, the ‘moment of truth, decisive time to take action’. In 1989, anticipating the impact of Fortress Europe, the idea of a European Kairos process arose at the first ecumenical assembly of European Christian churches (ibid.). Underlying Kairos Europa was the radical Christian responsibility to take sides, as the original kairos in apartheid South Africa had done.

In the period under discussion here, kairos signified for Praxis the need to take sides with newly arrived people coming from the post-Cold War world trouble spots. It was anticipated that they would face difficulty entering Britain with its increasingly restrictive immigration laws; they would also face additional problems once they arrived, given the
climate of hostility generated by the Fortress Europe project. This led Praxis to shift its focus of work to the issues facing refugee and migrants in Britain. However, this shift of focus did not imply a sudden collapse of the politics of the radical left inside the organisation. There was both a turning point in the organisation, and paradoxically, continuity. Yet there was one significant break with the previous period: the kairos moment represented not only a shift of focus in Praxis’ work towards practical support for refugees and migrants in Britain, it also represented a move away from the British Christian solidarity groups. It marked the conscious decision that the Praxis groups should be initiated by refugees and migrants themselves, determining their own activities, rather than activities initiated by British solidarity campaigners, as had been the case with CAN. The justification for this shift was clearly articulated in an evaluation report:

It was inevitable that the work of Praxis would take on a new shape. 1989/90 was the year of independence, democracy and elections in both Chile and Namibia. The Berlin Wall collapsed and Mandela was released … Thatcherism is coming to an end. 1992 looms on the horizon … So an analysis has been formulated which has re-shaped the agenda for the project. Praxis cannot remain a flag waver, it has to be more rooted in practical action. The reasons for this are self-apparent. Namibia and Chile set new agendas. We have become a better known project in East London and a better managed project. So people want more of us. And the people who want more are people who need more, especially refugee groups (evaluation report 13th November 1990).

The community development worker, the author of this report, implied above that British solidarity work meant being a ‘flag waver’, that is, cheering on other people’s struggles, rather than something of practical value. The new political context and the pressing issue of Fortress Europe made the ‘flag waver’ activity redundant. The kairos moment in Praxis represented the shift in focus to the conditions of refugees and migrants living in Britain, and simultaneously, a way of detaching the organisation from the British Christian left. This refocus was expressed
by a Praxis employee whose words were captured in the PCC meeting minutes of the time. It is worth quoting them at length, as her interpretation was contemporaneous to events:

I think it would help people to understand if we clearly state that Praxis has undergone a certain shift in its stress in orientation. The way I understand it, Praxis in the beginning advocated the issues of the people in the third world countries, to create solidarity work for them in Britain, and to help effect changes in these countries. The people involved in these groups are primarily British people with some input from exiles from these third world countries. Due to the various changes in many of the third world countries as well as in the international solidarity movement, this type of work for Praxis became difficult to sustain.

A shift in orientation has happened. The stress in the issues went to taking up the issues and problems of people from third world countries living in Britain and then to create action and programmes which will somehow change and improve their living condition in Britain and in Europe. The people involved in these activities are primarily from the ethnic minority background ... Praxis should therefore state that one of its mission is to work towards the empowerment of the people from third world countries living in Britain. Praxis supports and respects the black people’s struggle for self-determination through their practical projects. These, I think, are still synonymous to the Christian commitment of the Robert Kemble Trust (minutes of the PCC meeting 15th January 1992).

The shift of focus – that of improving the lives of refugees and migrants in Britain, became a new aim of the organisation and Praxis became a service provider, particularly of funded advice services, to meet the identified needs. It signified the shedding of the Christian British left’s political solidarity, which was a legacy from Kemble, without abandoning his ideas of developing a liberation theology appropriate to Britain. It also signified a shift in meaning of both solidarity and empowerment. This will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
Radical politics did not disappear from the organisation in this period. On the contrary, new groups with a political focus were incorporated as members and Praxis supported their campaigning. The key political activists of two new groups – Fitun and the Latin American Group – were associated with left-wing political parties in East Timor and Colombia, respectively. Praxis remained committed to the international solidarity work of its politicised groups throughout this period, although the work was now called ‘development education’. What disappeared in this period was the British Christian left-wing solidarity element. CAN closed following the election victory of SWAPO in Namibia, the Theology group vanished, and the organisation became exclusively for refugees and migrants. The ending of the British Christian left involvement in Praxis implied a criticism of it. The chief executive had referred dismissively to their activities as ‘flag waving’ and, in retrospect, he expressed a scepticism about British solidarity with the ‘third world’ movements:

I had a really strong feeling that this idea of the Third World and the struggles over there was a very bourgeois kind of concept (Praxis interview 01 2011).

The kairos moment consisted of a reassessment of the context in which the organisation was working and a refocus. International solidarity, now called ‘development education’, meant letting the refugee groups get on with their own political campaigning and activities, if that was what they saw their needs to be, while the organisation provided them the space and resources to do it. That was the new meaning of solidarity and as the chief executive said, it was a shift that happened by itself:

So I think because it was only me and there was no support from a management group, what actually happened was that the space was owned, you know you could allow people to come and do their stuff which actually by the time it came to 1992 and it became obvious in
the Kairos event that migration was the issue that would in future connect the South and what we really wanted to think about. In a sense that had already happened by default. All our groups were run by refugees (Praxis interview 01 2011).

After the departure of the British Christian initiatives it is important to understand how Praxis' involvement in the Kairos Europa movement kept alive the sense of radical Christianity. The organisation's first Annual Report illustrated the extent of this involvement:

In the past year Praxis staff and volunteers have played a pivotal role within Kairos Europa. This is a network, supported by the World Council of Churches, of organisations who perceive the opportunities and the dangers of the changes within Europe and necessity to work on a European level in the future ... Praxis has played a key role in the establishment of this network and in its plans for a major event in Strasbourg in June 1992 (Annual Report 1991).

Praxis agreed for the community development worker to represent the organisation at the launch of Kairos Europa – Towards a Europe for Justice, in Monteforte, Italy in May 1990. Several Praxis members participated in a ‘People’s Parliament’ in Strasbourg in 1992, which drew up the Kairos declaration in June 1992 following a week-long event of debates and discussions. The Latin American Group in Praxis was particularly active. The Kairos declaration contained radical and rebellious language:

We are living a Kairos moment … We do not accept this Europe, it is destroying us and our future! We do not accept this economy, it is plundering our planet! We do not accept politicians, who despise the people they are supposed to serve.

It ended with
No to a Fortress Europe perpetuating the old colonial claims to domination. Yes to a Europe of Justice with borders open to all continents as part of a humane society worldwide! (*Kairos declaration* June 1992).

The influence of *Kairos Europa* on *Praxis*’ work during this period was evident from the Annual Reports, for example:

The Agenda set at Strasbourg was vast. *Praxis* has been responding to it ever since. The focus of our work since 1992 has been the integration of our response to the devastating increase in the crisis in Latin America, Caribbean, Africa and Asia, with its consequent migration to Europe, the closing of the frontiers of Europe; the growing marginalisation of the poor in the Inner Cities. Through *Kairos* we were given a vision of how we might work (*Annual Report 1996*).

The *Kairos Europa* agenda influenced much of *Praxis*’ development education programme, for example, anti-colonial counter-celebrations to commemorate 500 years since Columbus’ ‘discovery’ of the Americas and the 1994 *Praxis* conference entitled *Latin America – Returning to democracy?* *Praxis* was also active in campaigning against new immigration legislation, for example against the introduction of Britain’s first asylum-specific piece of legislation in 1993.

During this period the convictions of the political refugee activists in the member groups remained unshaken and they continued to take sides in their national political conflicts even as the Cold War framework collapsed. For example, a member of the *Praxis* Latin American Group and the Colombian Committee for Human Rights, which held its meetings in *Praxis*, was asked to advocate on behalf of the Colombian guerrilla movement in the peace negotiations in Venezuela in 1991. He expressed his dilemma when deciding whether to accept the invitation: as a high-profile political refugee who had suffered an assassination attack in Colombia, to negotiate on behalf of
the guerrilla movement would be interpreted as taking sides. Any involvement would 'stigmatise' him further and endanger him:

So the insurgency communicated with me to ask if I would act in an advisory capacity mainly around the human rights and legal areas in those negotiations. It was a very difficult decision, on the one hand because it would mean I would be more stigmatised in the future as the state would be able to use it to justify its persecution against me, to discredit me and disqualify me for having participated in advising the insurgency (RCHP interview 2006).

His dilemma was about his personal safety and reputation but it was not about whether it was right or wrong to advocate for the left-wing guerrillas. He made the decision to accept the invitation because he remained convinced that the activities of the guerrilla movement could never be regarded as morally equivalent to the violence of the state:

And in other activities, I have closely followed the peace process in Colombia. I have been very involved in that because I consider that one of the big problems Colombia has is the institutional violence and the necessary response of certain sectors of the population who have organised themselves into guerrilla groups. And at the same time how the state has been protecting not only the criminal impunity of a different order, common delinquency, but also the criminal activity of the state agents and their paramilitary structures and their financiers, promoters (ibid.).

This Colombian Praxis member represented the political and moral values of commitment, solidarity and self-sacrifice. He chose to put himself in harm’s way because it was a price worth paying. This point is particularly pertinent as it echoes the theme that emerged in the Spanish case study during the university occupation by migrants, in which political solidarity also meant possible self-sacrifice, that is, the risk of deportation. This theme will be further explored in Chapter 7. In the case of Praxis, the Colombian refugee’s moral framework was clear-
cut and partisan – he made the decision that it was morally correct not to remain neutral no matter what the risk. In the spirit of kairos (he had been involved in the Kairos Europa movement) he saw it as a betrayal not to take sides. His moral clarity was in keeping with the original kairos document that chastised Christians who would not take a stand with people when they resorted to violence in an attempt to defend themselves from the state’s violence: ‘To denounce violent resistance is to acquiesce to the militarisation of the apartheid state’ (*Challenge to the churches* 1985: 15). The document was unequivocal on taking sides and on the issue of violence:

In practice what one calls ‘violence’ and what one calls ‘self-defence’ seems to depend upon which side one is on. To call all physical force ‘violence’ is to try to be neutral and to refuse to make a judgment about who is right and who is wrong. The attempt to remain neutral in this kind of conflict is futile. Neutrality enables the status quo of oppression (and therefore violence) to continue. It is a way of giving tacit support to the oppressor (ibid.: 20).

The above introduces the notion of making a judgement. At the start of the document a parallel was made between the idea of ‘crisis’ and ‘judgement’ thus:

A crisis is a judgement that brings out the best in some people and the worst in others. A crisis is a moment of truth that show us up for what we really are (ibid.: 7).

This is significant because, in the post-Cold War period, *Praxis* as an organisation could not be so unequivocal and, in the following section, the moral responsibility to take sides in a crisis and to make a judgement put the organisation to the test. In this period *Praxis* continued to take sides, for example with its East Timorese group, *Fitun*, which campaigned against the Indonesian occupation of East Timor – it supported a demonstration outside the Indonesian embassy, following the massacre of 180 people (recorded both in the Annual
Report of 1991 and the PCC meeting minutes of 21st November 1991), and took sides with its East Timorese member when he was arrested at a conference in Malaysia. The incident was included in the 1996 Annual Report:

This received international media attention when it was illegally broken up and [one of our members] was one of those illegally arrested (Annual Report 1996: 6).

*Praxis* continued to support the Latin American Group’s activities, for example, the *Latin America – Returning to Democracy?* campaign. This campaign, however, threw into question the simple black-and-white political framework. In 1994 the campaign organised a conference to which it invited speakers from Latin American-based human rights organisations. The human rights campaigning work described below was seemingly uncontroversial:

It was a particularly busy campaigning year with the launch of a major initiative entitled ‘Latin America: Returning to Democracy?’ This looked at the democratic question throughout the continent, asking how real was democratic change in the face of increasing poverty and continued human rights abuses. During November 1994 *Praxis* invited resource persons from Peru, El Salvador and Chile to give first hand testimonies of democratic reforms in their respective countries (Annual Report 1995: 4).

And yet the conference became fraught with the politics of Latin America, introducing new tensions into the organisation. The discussions, candidly recorded in the conference report, revealed that there was no longer agreement on the moral equivalence over the use of violence. The speaker, Pablo Rojas, from a Lima-based Peruvian human rights organisation stated that ‘the violence comes from two main sources, the army and *Sendero Luminoso*’. This statement led on to the next observation:
There were discussions throughout the campaign as to what extent these two organisations should share the blame for the violence and many strong differences of opinion were expressed (conference report *Latin America – returning to democracy?* 1994: 7).

The report concluded that the majority of the participants of the conference agreed with the human rights speaker that both sides were to blame:

According to Pablo Rojas, however, and the majority agreed with his analysis, both of these groups violate human rights systematically and both are involved in a propaganda battle attempting to deny their culpability, attempting to lay the blame solely at the other side’s door (ibid.).

It is clear from the extract above that, by 1994, the black-and-white framework no longer held for everyone. The idea of a moral equivalence – that violence on all sides was equally wrong – was publically expressed, which was a marked change to the previous period in the organisation’s history.

Another incident during the conference illustrated that human rights had not yet become detached from politics, as it did in the final period of the organisation’s history explored below. Although *Praxis* publically supported and admired the work of human rights activists working in dangerous situations in their own countries, it could no longer be sure whether it was on the morally right or wrong side. The invited speaker, Osiris Bayter, president of a Colombian human rights organisation based in the Magdalena Medio, ‘the darkest spot on the human rights map of Colombia’ (ibid.: 12), explained that people in her organisation had been the target of death threats, assassinations and disappearances. She gave a bleak picture of the continued state violence and how ‘attempts to bring the guerrilleros of different factions into the political process’ (ibid.) were being thwarted by the systematic state-sponsored assassination of its leadership. The report concluded:
It is always an impressive and challenging experience to meet people like Osiris who are able to give testimony in their own being to the conflict and the bravery and sadness of those who look to a more just future (ibid.).

The chief executive of Praxis, however, recalled in his interview that someone took him aside and told him that the human rights organisation represented by the speaker was collaborating with the guerrilla movement and was responsible for a massacre of the indigenous community. The conference highlighted to Praxis that being in solidarity involved taking a political stance, and it was not confident to do so because, as expressed below:

> It becomes less clear who is good and who is bad, and it becomes less clear who you are in solidarity with and why you are in solidarity with them (Praxis interview 01 2011).

These moral doubts became more extreme as the old black-and-white framework collapsed further, as shown in the following section.

The kairos moment, which introduced the aim of providing services to refugees and migrants, added a further tension within the organisation. The Praxis groups were partisan, supporting a particular political movement in the struggles in their own countries; however, service provision and securing funding for services demanded a non-partisan, non-judgemental approach. The 1994/95 Praxis handbook stated that service provision must be given regardless of ‘political persuasion’. Yet, the introduction of immigration advice as a service proved to be polarising when two sides of a political struggle both wanted help with their asylum claims:

> So some of the big clashes with the Colombians you know was when ... you would get paramilitaries coming in for advice and then this furious response (Praxis interview 01 2011).
One of the Latin American interviewees who has been involved in *Praxis* in various capacities over the years thought it was a very British trait to be politically neutral:

> And at that time I felt I was very partisan myself, I still am. People find it very difficult to accept me, the English, the British way of everybody loving everybody. I am not very keen on this thinking ... I have also been very selective in the cases I take on because it is immoral to see in the same place torturers and the victims of torturers. But then the English idea of it is that it doesn't matter. If you need something, I remember many years ago someone in Amnesty, a Quaker, a friend of mine, said, ‘if Hitler was being persecuted, we would help him’ and I said ‘that is a very interesting statement’ but people do not understand how basically immoral it is to mix everything ([*Praxis* interview 07 2011]).

Rather than a cultural trait, the idea of neutrality could be interpreted as a reflection of the consequences of wider social and political developments: the collapse of the old political framework and the loss of tools with which to make moral judgements led the organisation to avoid making political judgements. This did not mean that it stopped supporting ‘unpopular causes’. Solidarity, in the sense of taking sides with people in need because of the problems they faced as newly-arrived refugees and migrants in Britain in the 1990s, was not a popular cause and *Praxis* stood up against racism and challenged immigration law:

> It is a contradiction to the fear of the popular press and the repression of current trends in legislation against refugees and migrants. We are happy to have accepted the challenge of these times and contribute to a movement for justice for people on the move ([*Annual Report 1995*: 3]).

But this stance was not politically explosive, unlike that of making political judgements that could potentially lead to unpredictable
consequences and embroil the organisation in controversy. As illustrated in the 1994 conference report, even solidarity with human rights activists, as opposed to party political activists, was contentious. The following sections illustrate how a crisis in the organisation led to what could be viewed as a crisis of political judgement. This is possibly one of the key factors that explain why human rights became detached from politics and why the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable became the dominant portrayal.

6.5 The Rwandan affair of 2006: making political judgements outside of the black-and-white framework

The previous section exposed three tensions that emerged within Praxis when it, first, had to decide whether there was a moral equivalence between state and left-wing non-state violence; second, when it had to decide with whom it should be in solidarity; and third, when it became a service provider, committed to providing services in a non-partisan way. This section shows that these tensions were resolved through the avoidance of taking a political position outside of the black-and-white framework. The implications are explored as they played out in the ‘Rwandan affair’ when a Praxis Rwandan employee, and member of the Rwandan refugee Praxis group, Umubano, was publically accused of genocide. This crisis could be seen as another kairos moment, but the context to previous kairos moments (discussed above) was very different. The spirit of the 1985 kairos, which signified taking sides against the apartheid regime, prevailed in the first period; in the second period, the 1992 kairos Europa continued to mean taking sides in struggles against state violence, although an ambiguity emerged, as explored above. In the period discussed below, political positions were no longer taken, and the dominant ethos became one of neutrality.

In the 2003 Annual Report commemorating twenty years of the organisation’s existence, the chair of Praxis described the new context
two decades on and how politically the world had become a more confusing place:

The last twenty years have seen massive changes in the world and in our city – London. When *Praxis* began apartheid was doing its worst in South Africa, Latin America was dominated by dictators and the Cold War was being fought in local wars throughout the ‘Third World’. Much has changed and some for the good, but the world is in a deeper crisis than it was then – witness the Middle East, Congo, Liberia, ‘war-lords’, people-trafficking and organised crime. Conflict has become more intractable and difficult to analyse (Annual Report 2003: 1).

This global backdrop provides some context for the most politically explosive event of the organisation’s history, despite the subsidence of *Praxis* groups’ radical politics of the first two periods. The chief executive brought up the Rwandan incident in his interview:

We got caught up in the maelstrom that featured in the papers, we did get caught in a maelstrom of accusation and counter accusations about who the groups were in *Praxis* (*Praxis* interview 01 2011).

More background and a description of the events that constitute this ‘maelstrom’ is needed in order to fully understand why this should be considered another pivotal moment in *Praxis*’ evolution. This period was characterised by *Praxis* as one of ‘new migration patterns’ (Annual Report 2012: 10). *Praxis* had started to offer services, particularly around education and employment, to one such ‘new community’ – recently arrived Rwandan refugees. In 1999 Rwandan service users set up a Rwandan refugee community association, *Umubano*, which became one of the new *Praxis* groups. It had a large membership of over 200. The aim of the new group was simply ‘to bring Rwandans together for self-support and mutual enrichment (Annual Report 2001: 7). Rwandans became an important community for *Praxis* during the period 1998–2006. In addition to becoming one of the *Praxis* groups, Rwandans were volunteers, and several Rwandans were employed as
staff members. One employee, a Rwandan medical doctor, ran Praxis’ prestigious government-funded programme for training overseas qualified doctors, nurses and midwives so that they could gain employment in the NHS. This employee represented Praxis on a taskforce advising the British government on the requalification of refugee health professionals. In October 2006, on his way to work, he was stopped in the street by the BBC journalist Fergal Keane with a television camera. The filming of this incident was part of an investigative documentary that was broadcast on 6th November 2006. The BBC press release stated: ‘Rwanda Genocide Suspect in UK. British charity employs doctor accused of crimes against humanity’ (quoted in Harmon Snow 2008). Fergal Keane’s investigation for the BBC revealed that ‘a man – wanted for genocide in Rwanda – is living and working in Britain’ (BBC news 6th November 2006). Praxis immediately suspended the employee and then dismissed him. He was arrested in December 2006.

The Rwandan incident represented another ‘kairos moment’ in the history of Praxis, and yet, it illustrated that outside of the old clear-cut political framework, rather than a crisis that spurred the organisation into taking sides, there was a crisis of judgement. A neutral position was adopted that was in marked contrast to the past. Neutrality was criticised by one of the interviewees quoted in the previous section. That outlook chimed with the original 1985 kairos document that viewed neutrality as irresponsible because it ‘enables the status quo of oppression (and therefore violence) to continue (Challenge to the churches: the Kairos document 1985: 15). Praxis could not side with this Rwandan refugee in the crisis because it could not make a judgement:

Praxis has never attempted to form a judgement in relation to guilt or innocence, that is the responsibility of others and beyond our competency. We are very aware of the complexity of the issues (email correspondence between Praxis and Harmon Snow, quoted in Harmon Snow 2008).
The difficulty, complexity and dilemma facing the organisation in this unprecedented situation is not in any doubt. It was hard to establish the facts, as the chief executive said:

They’re a really hard community to engage with because there is a secret history of Rwanda that people don’t want to talk about and I think that the Rwandan situation is that victim and perpetrator just get really messed up because it’s such a messy story and I don’t think I will ever know (Praxis interview 01 2011).

The claim that it was too complex to determine who was the victim and who was the perpetrator led to Praxis’ insistence on neutrality and that it was not its responsibility to judge:

It was certainly public that one of our staff was accused of genocide and one of the people that was expeditioned. The court refused to extradite them because they wouldn’t get a fair trial in Rwanda so in a sense the accusation still stands against him although publically I’ve always said I am absolutely neutral as whether or not he’s guilty or not, it is not our job to find out whether he is or not (Praxis interview 01 2011).

It is understandable that the organisation, which had developed into a well-funded and highly respected service provider, had to maintain its reputation. It also had to keep the trust and confidence of its service users. However, as difficult and complex as the issue may have been, it is legitimate to question whether Praxis’ only possible response was that of withholding judgement, particularly when the impact on the employee’s life was to be so profound. The excerpt above suggested that the consequence of Fergal Keane’s investigation led to nothing more than an unresolved accusation against the ex-employee. It did not mention that he was in a British prison from 2006–2009, and was re-arrested and re-imprisoned in 2013 (Islington Gazette 4th July 2013). He was eventually released and electronically tagged. Unlike the past periods where arrests of Praxis members resulted in an outcry, that was
not the case here. Below, it is suggested that the suspension of judgement should be understood as a wider trend in contemporary times rather than relevant to a particular organisation, constrained by its obligation to its funders and to its service users. There was no doubt that the organisation was in an invidious position. Its reputation and its funding were at stake, as one of the Rwandan *ex-Praxis* employees expressed:

As I said I could try, although not to justify, to understand that *Praxis* was so dependent on funders that it could not have ignored public opinion and the public opinion was hang him. The newspapers, the government, the funders, in particular. And at that time we would have agreed, they would have taken back our grant immediately (*Praxis* interview 08 2011).

Yet, according to the journalist Harmon Snow, it was possible to know who was the victim and who was the perpetrator. And it was possible to understand the Rwandan situation outside of the mainstream, unified narrative and to form an independent view in order to take sides. This position is explained below, although it is still a controversial opinion despite the existence of well-corroborated evidence that supports it.

Harmon Snow provided evidence that the *Praxis* incident was politically motivated. According to this investigative journalist the *Praxis* employee, along with three other Rwandans, was framed in a Rwandan state-sponsored effort to 'hunt down critics of the Rwandan dictatorship and legitimate refugees and drag them back to Rwanda' (Harmon Snow 2008). He revealed that Britain was heavily infiltrated by Rwandan informants who had claimed asylum in order to work for their government in the Rwandan embassy. There were allegations that some of the *Praxis* Rwandan refugee volunteers were informants who had infiltrated the organisation to frame people like the *Praxis* employee, so the chief executive's comment made sense when he said:
We are aware that there are all kinds of allegations and counter allegations in the community and sorting out the victim from the perpetrator is extremely hard (Praxis interview 01 2011).

In the past, Praxis had taken sides with SWAPO despite the knowledge that SWAPO was infiltrated by spies and, as Saunders (2009: 450) said, ‘suspicion and paranoia abounded'. Below it is revealed that one of Kemble’s friends named in his will to carry out his ‘life’s hope’ was exposed as an MI5 informant. Politics had never been a clean game, but sides were taken in political conflicts when the world was understood through the prism of polarised ideologies. The Rwandan situation was portrayed as too complex to understand because it was outside of the polarised politics of the Cold War. It was seen not as a political struggle, rather, it was seemingly about ‘race’ or ‘tribal’ conflict and violence outside of any framework of understanding. Two different interviewees who had been involved in Praxis expressed their inability to understand the Rwandan situation because it was so different to the old political struggles and conflicts they had been part of in the past:

It was a shift. The Rwandans as well, because what was happening in Rwanda, it was a completely different kind of difficulty to South America. It was race or something like that ... I don’t say it in the negative sense, I am saying that in Rwanda, what happened is that the Rwandans were not politically persecuted people in general. It was a situation of genocide, the hutus massacred the tutsis – terrible! (Praxis interview 07 2011).

Well, Rwanda is slightly different isn’t it, it was to a certain degree, I wouldn’t say it was a struggle for liberation as such which is based on political ideology. It was more a kind of struggle against a tyrannical tribe, or against tribal interests or a group of people within the country ... So I think that kind of experience for them is slightly different. I don’t know much about Rwanda, whether they have any ideological base for that (Praxis interview 05 2011).
Harmon Snow contradicted the opinion that the Rwandan war and terror was a tribal conflict. His view was that it was political and that the *Praxis* employee was a victim of political persecution. A political tool was used against him, that of genocide labelling. As Harmon Snow explained:

The genocide label is used as a brand and a weapon against anyone who deviates from the Rwandan government's policies or falls out of favour with the elite criminal networks in power (Harmon Snow 2008).

Harman Snow challenged the accepted narrative about Rwanda and insisted that an accurate picture could have been arrived at:

The so-called ‘Rwanda Genocide’ is one of the most widely misunderstood events in contemporary history, and not because the evidence is lacking or because the truth is obscured by butchery (ibid.).

To question the use of the term ‘genocide’ to describe what happened in Rwanda had been considered unspeakable until the publication, over two decades later, of reputable, independent historical accounts that threw into doubt the existing mainstream narrative. It is not the place of this thesis to go into any detail of the Rwandan conflict and what sparked the escalation of warfare in 1994, but as Harmon Snow and other writers such as Collins (2014) claimed, the portrayal of the conflict as ‘meaningless tribal savagery’ was irresponsible because sufficient information was available to make deeper political analysis. The ‘Rwandan affair’ was no doubt an enormously difficult situation for *Praxis* to deal with but a comparison could be made with the early years when the organisation supported SWAPO and evidence came to light about SWAPO’s human rights abuses. *Praxis* made a judgement to continue to support, and not to publically criticise, SWAPO as it would undermine the goal of the struggle – national liberation and the
creation of a socialist state. The black-and-white ideological framework assisted Praxis to make a judgement in order to take sides. The formula used in political solidarity was often that if the western powers supported one side in a conflict, therefore, the other side's struggle was legitimate and worthy of support. In the case of the Rwandan situation, western governments, in particular those in Britain, the United States, Belgium and Canada, were, according to Harmon Snow, actively assisting the Kagame regime in hunting refugees and critics, because all four governments backed the Rwanda Patriotic Front's guerrilla war, 1990–1994, and the years of terrorism that have followed, 1994–2008 (Harmon Snow 2008).

The Rwandan incident represented in Praxis the climax of a process that had started earlier – ‘that it becomes less clear who is good and who is bad’ and ‘who you are in solidarity with’. With the loss of clarity in a post-Cold War world, making judgements was seen to be too difficult.

The author of a 2014 historical analysis of the Rwandan war, Barry Collins, put into context the contemporary crisis of judgement:

The beauty of the term genocide is that one word is a political analysis and a moral certainty, it’s just one word, it is the media magic word and that is all you need. You say the word genocide and you have already implied a full story, which you've got not enough time to tell and you've got a moral certainty about who was right and who was wrong and to journalists who were trying to weave their way in a very confusing post-Cold War environment where the terms of left and right and so on were no longer really relevant this was a very ready-made analysis to embrace, and superficially it seemed to fit the facts (What really happened in Rwanda? Spiked Review of Books August 2014).
The end of the old political framework signified a loss of the universally understandable political struggles. As demonstrated in the sections above, making judgements within that black-and-white political framework was morally problematic and there is no need to look back to the past with any nostalgia. In a reassessment, the CAN campaigners of the early 1980s, referring to their support of SWAPO, said

I think we could have still supported them publically without being so uncritical ourselves about our position (Praxis interview 03 2011).

Saunders also reassessed the work of Namibian Solidarity Campaign (NSC) thus:

With hindsight we can see that solidarity work was sometimes too uncritical and overly propagandistic (Saunders 2009: 454).

Such a reassessment might be valuable if it led to an understanding that the simple black-and-white framework of the past was an obstacle to making independent political judgements. In the case of Praxis, however, it led to a form of anti-politics, as defined and explained in Chapter 2.2. The notion of anti-politics is explored in the following section and explains how siding with ‘the vulnerable’ and the ‘politically blameless’ victims of global politics (Pupavac 2008: 276), avoided the risks associated with supporting morally ambiguous causes or making ‘bad’ judgements. It also illustrates how the avoidance of judgement diminishes political thinking, and therefore the capacity to act politically. This theme was explored in Chapter 2 in an abstract fashion. In the context of this data analysis it becomes hugely significant.

**6.6 The rise of the vulnerable**

The previous section looked at how the end of the black-and-white framework led to an inability to take sides in a world that was no longer defined by the former ideological polarisation. In this section a
reassessment that took place in the organisation is explored. The rise of the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable defined this period and reflected the shift from a black-and-white understanding to an inability to understand. The vulnerability of migrants existed because of material circumstances – increasingly harsh immigration and asylum law and the situations of conflict from which people came. Yet, by comparing the past portrayal of migrants with that of this final and most recent period, it became clear that the shift in portrayal did not only reflect changing material circumstances, it also represented a shift from the political to the humanitarian. It revealed that the loss of political certainties that led to political values of solidarity, commitment and self-sacrifice for a cause, much admired in the organisation's earlier history, were replaced by humanitarian values. This marked the end of illusions in politics for wider social transformation. This theme, which is of key significance, will be further developed in Chapter 7.

Table 7: Word count of 'vulnerable' used as adjective and collective noun

Source: Praxis Annual Reports

A description of who Praxis considered to be vulnerable in this final period (2006–2012) is as follows:
Every day *Praxis* engages with some of the most vulnerable in society – people displaced from their countries and forced of necessity to move to a safer environment. Some have fled war. Others seek safety from violence in their homes, some have been tricked into paying traffickers exorbitant fees for non-existence opportunities; others just need a means to provide financial support for their families (Annual Report 2007 unpaginated).

*Praxis* maintains its deep commitment to vulnerable migrants. We engage immediately and practically with refugees, asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking, people on temporary work permits, including eastern Europeans and undocumented migrants (Annual Report 2008 unpaginated).

The rise of ‘vulnerable’ as an adjective and collective noun in the later Annual Reports reflected *Praxis’* focus on ‘undocumented migrants’ and the phenomenon of ‘failed asylum seekers’ as a consequence of British asylum policy and increasingly harsh immigration law (see Chapter 3). The growth in numbers of people without any rights or few rights in Britain provided the material reasons for the rise of vulnerability. This thesis, however, argues that the rise of ‘the vulnerable’ is significant not so much because it reflected the material circumstances, but rather, because it coincided with the decline of political subjectivity. The notion of diminished political subjectivity is explored further in Chapter 7, in comparison with the Spanish case study so that the wider implications are understood in a broader context.

The first two existing Annual Reports (1991 and 1993) rarely used the term ‘vulnerable’. This does not signify that migrants and refugees were portrayed solely as politicised and emotionally robust. On the contrary, the text in the early Annual Reports evoked images of people suffering, bereaved and traumatised:

One of the most traumatic events of the past year was the news of the massacre of more than one hundred and fifty men, women and
children by the Indonesian army in Dili, East Timor. It was a tragic reminder of this forgotten suffering (Annual Report 1991).

Many are distressed and bereaved. Practically all will have lost family and friends in the fighting (Annual Report 1993).

However the scale of the issues which this community poses and the depth of suffering experience by the Somali people whose country has collapsed into chaos, and whose community is both shocked and grieving (Annual Report 1993).

In the 1990s Praxis started to provide therapeutic services to address psychological suffering and distress. Mental health, particularly that of the Somali community, was highlighted. Praxis’ chief executive described the Somali community as having experienced ‘a total disruption’ (Praxis interview 01 2011) and ‘this fracturing of a whole community and culture’ (ibid.). Yet the vignettes of suffering shown above, and the provision of services to address psychological needs in the early period of the organisation, did not conjure up a picture of vulnerability because they were balanced by photographic images of protest and political action. The content analysis of these images in the Annual Reports revealed photographs of refugees and migrants demonstrating against governments and carrying placards and banners with slogans condemning government action, for example: ‘Suharto – South East Asia’s Saddam Hussein’, ‘Immigration laws are racist, stop racist asylum bill’.
Figure 1. Images of protest from *Praxis* Annual Report 1993

- 'Immigration laws are racist'
- 'Suharto – South East Asia’s Saddam Hussein'
- 'Justice – punish the guilty'
Other images showing a politics of defiance included a portrait of the Marxist Chilean president Salvador Allende, and a photograph of a Praxis member of the East Timorese group pictured next to the radical investigative journalist and documentary maker John Pilger – with a caption explaining their collaboration in the making of Pilger's documentary *Death of a nation*.

The use of the term ‘vulnerable’ in the Annual Reports rose sharply from 2007, although there was a moderate increase and constant presence from 1996, possibly related to the introduction of counselling services for refugees with specific psychological needs resulting from the trauma caused by their experiences:

Many refugees experience psychological distress. It is a consequence of the violent conflicts which people have to live through (Annual Report 1997: 6).

During this final period, the community said to be particularly affected was the Rwandan community and other Francophone-speaking refugees from Africa:

We have developed a special skill in working with more complex cases. Our services include counselling support, for victims of the recent conflicts in French-speaking Africa – Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Annual Report 2004: 5–6).

The rise of therapeutic services may be linked to the notion of vulnerability; however, it is more important to understand why migrants and refugees of this final period were portrayed as being especially vulnerable compared to refugees in the past. In his interview, the chief executive of Praxis made the comparison: he first identified a fundamental difference between their experiences, particularly in the case of the Rwandans – that of the level of violence experienced:
You put the experience of Chile, the repression in Chile and the repression in Apartheid South Africa alongside the war in the Congo or the genocide in Rwanda or what's gone on in Sudan, it is hard to say, but there is something qualitatively different about the experiences in terms of just the levels of violence, you know, I can't think of another word for what has gone on in all of that, drugged child soldiers, you know, machetes. Apartheid South Africa or Pinochet's Chile were not ... the Rwanda stuff was just huge ... so a lot of stuff around mental health with Rwandans as well (Praxis interview 01 2011).

Another interviewee, a Rwandan refugee who worked in Praxis for several years, expressed a different opinion. He did not think that the Rwandans who used Praxis' services were more vulnerable than the Latin Americans because of what they had experienced before arriving in Britain. He explained that the Rwandans who came to Praxis were unlikely to have witnessed the worst violence:

How is it possible to know who witnessed these things? But remember those who came here in 1995, they wouldn’t have been the ones most traumatised who would have come later, who had been through the whole of the Congo. They came later. People went from Rwanda to Congo, from Congo they were pursued, walked up to Congo Brazzaville. They witnessed the killings. But the first arrivals who were driven out of the country were able to get to Nairobi and brought here (Praxis interview 08 2011).

The extreme situation described by one Colombian refugee involved in Praxis from 1990 to 1998 suggested that experiences that could cause intense psychological distress and trauma were comparable:

And also for me the years 1984–1988, when I suffered the assassination attempt, are indelible because it was a time when I received many death threats through pamphlets, through phone calls, through messages, through other people and when I practically saw the extermination of all the people who surrounded me. From that time until 1988, four or five years I saw all the people who worked
with me – lawyers, trade union leaders, peasant leaders, ordinary citizens, all were exterminated, all were assassinated. Those were years of a lot of tension, a lot of uncertainty mainly because I was always thinking ‘when is it going to be my turn?’ So, let’s say those four years were years that marked my life and that of my family. In those four years I lost three brothers, assassinated, I lost a cousin and the worst thing was that nothing could be done because the state, the policy of state terrorism was responsible for this situation. At the same time, something that really marks you was, or that marked me, was that I had to abandon my country (RCHP interview 2006).

*Praxis*’ chief executive observed something that was more significant than what he saw as the qualitative difference in the level of violence between the Latin American case and the African one. It is worth returning to the insightful observation he made in his interview regarding the way in which political identity, both individual and collective, could produce a robust subjectivity: ‘strong politicised refugees’, ‘huge amount of self-esteem’, ‘absolutely caught up with a political cause’, ‘motivated’. The Colombian refugee quoted above exemplified well this strong political identity produced in someone motivated by commitment to a political cause.

The experiences of this particular Colombian refugee in his own country and his forced exile in Britain led to severe psychological trauma, but his political identity helped him to reintegrate into a meaningful life. There are three relevant strands to his own description of his experience. First, the violence from which he had fled was not the cause of his trauma, rather it was the loss of his identity in exile. He had been actively involved in oppositional politics, he had been a respected lawyer advocating for the banana workers’ trade union and now he was disabled – paralysed from the waist down, following an assassination attack, unable to speak for himself because he was a Spanish-speaker with little English. He went from independence to dependency:
I was coming from political activity as a lawyer in my country, participating in all the activities of a political, oppositional nature, etc., etc., ... and here it was totally nullified. To have to wait, to expect someone else to speak for you. You end up in a situation even worse than that of the illiterate because the illiterate may not be able to read or write but they can speak (RCHP interview 2006).

So, that first year was blow after blow and that didn't allow any stability and you can imagine what it means psychologically to leave your family, your friends, the work, your profession, to leave the social environment, leave the struggle (ibid.).

The second strand relates to his political identity that made him determined not to give up in adverse circumstances, and, therefore, facilitated a process of reintegration rather than disintegration:

The Human Rights Committee was a fundamental support in my situation. As soon as I was able to sit in a wheelchair I started going to the committee’s meetings, I started writing and at that time also Amnesty International had a campaign about Colombia, condemning the situation and so I supported Amnesty in the sense of participating in different meetings organised about Colombia. Psychologically speaking that was positive and allowed me at least not to remain isolated from my political and social environment (ibid.).

This strand provides an interesting comparison with the Spanish case study in which migrants were portrayed as suffering from disintegration, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Third, it is significant that the political situation in Colombia in the 1990s was still understood by a wider solidarity movement through a common critical analysis and by people who shared a political attachment to a cause. This ability to connect people through some kind of universal understanding was a source of psychological support:
I think it has been fundamental to be able to work in defence of human rights and to be linked to an international critical current ... this has allowed me to recover and maintain high morale and not to fall into depression and crisis, which an indefinite continuing exile produces (ibid.).

The literature explored in Chapter 2.1 on the loss of political integration (Mair 2006; Lechner 1997) and the sense of psychological disintegration in the absence of overarching meaning (Berger et al. 1973) particularly resonate with the empirical findings from this data analysis.

To summarise the three strands: the experience of loss of identity, which threatened to cause psychological disintegration, was produced by the loss of one’s former life, rather than the trauma from violence; reintegration was possible through politics and by maintaining one’s strong political identity; the wider solidarity and ‘universal’ understanding of the political situation meant that there was an existing network into which the political refugee could integrate. The last two strands had seemingly disappeared by the time of the Rwandan refugees’ arrival and their involvement with Praxis. Praxis’ chief executive implied that there was no longer any political identity available to create that former resilience:

Well I don’t think the Rwanda stuff is going to create strong political identities, I mean Rwanda is really complex, and we’ve had real difficulties with the Rwandan stuff (Praxis interview 01 2011).

One of the Rwandan ex-employees of Praxis offered an interesting insight into this apparent weakness of Rwandan political identity compared to the Latin American politicised refugees. Rwandan refugees, such as himself, were in political opposition to a brutal dictatorship, and even in Britain, political opponents were not safe to voice any dissent because informants were operating. To be in open
political opposition in exile was more dangerous than it had been for the Latin Americans. He threw light on what made Rwandan refugees in Britain so reticent and apparently apolitical:

I think the majority who came here were Hutus so because they were Hutus they were afraid of back home, that if they were politically active they would be followed up and identified as, which has happened actually, this is an open secret, that if you are active, especially for someone who was a civil servant, you would immediately be labelled as someone who is involved in the genocide, it is very easy to buy that (Praxis interview 01 2011).

The political ideologies that had animated conflict throughout the world for over a century and had provided a framework for understanding political conflicts were absent in the post-Cold War conflict of Rwanda but that did not signify that the conflict was not a political one. It was not impossible to understand the complexity of a situation that was outside of the old political framework, as shown in Section 6.4. What was needed was a reassessment to be able to make sense of the different political circumstances. In the next section the reassessment that the organisation undertook is examined.

6.7 Reassessment or disillusionment? Reviewing the politics of the past with eyes of the present

Some of the Praxis group members had experienced disillusionment, having idealised or been overly uncritical about political struggles they had supported:

It was difficult for us 15 years ago to accept that the FARC was creating crimes in its own areas of the country but then that view changed with the years and although not sharing the same view as the government there are people who are critical of what FARC was doing in some regions and some of us came to the conclusion that there were also
people who were victims of guerrilla activity ... there is disillusionment *(Praxis interview 09 2011)*.

I think, speaking for myself, I was idealistic about SWAPO beyond what came to be ... it was following the lead of people in the situation and not dictating what they should do. Which again when you come to human rights abuses by the movements that you are in solidarity with makes it quite difficult because you’ve said it is right that they should lead and you should take a back seat because of previous colonial relationships *(Praxis interview 03 2011)*.

In his interview, *Praxis*’ chief executive explained that for him, it was not disillusionment, rather a reassessment:

I don’t know whether I would call it disillusionment, I’d call it reassessment ... I mean, I think it was just about being a bit more sophisticated, a bit more intelligent and a bit more worldly-wise in the light of experience which is actually reflection. I mean, I don't think it is wrong that we went through that kind of period but who in the world are we in solidarity with now *(Praxis interview 01 2011)*.

The tension that lay in the original impulse for the radicalisation of Christianity and the emergence of liberation theology is pertinent here. At the beginning of this chapter the founder’s ambiguity, and even antipathy, towards the secular radical left was highlighted. For grassroots Christianity to remain relevant while secular radical left-wing ideas were spurring mass movements into action it came under pressure to embrace similar ideas. The political world of the period under discussion in this section is one in which that impulse had subsided, as implied by the ironic comment:

Yeah, the question is whether radical Christian socialism died in *Praxis* or whether it died everywhere! (laughter) *(Praxis interview 01 2011).*
The reassessment took place within the context of the end of the traditional polarising ideologies. There had been a current of cynicism within the organisation about the embrace of left-wing politics from the start as shown in Section 6.3. An analysis of this cynicism led to some revealing contradictions. First, the solidarity groups in *Praxis* could be seen to counter the solidarity campaigns set up by the British secular left-wing parties:

The Chileans coming in, they were really looking for a space where they could be Chileans doing their Chilean stuff outside of the Chile Solidarity Campaign or whatever, which was you know controlled by political parties I don’t know which ones, but anti-apartheid was Communist Party. It was just pure and simple, Namibian Solidarity Campaign that certainly had a hard left wiring from the UK end (*Praxis* interview 01 2011).

While antipathy was expressed towards the British leftist parties, the organisation supported all the member group activists who were militants in left-wing parties from their own countries. This contradiction vanished when the organisation stopped its unconditional support to the ‘third world’ left. Its idealisation had disappeared, and hence, the reassessment. The idea that left-wing politics was inherently dangerous developed in retrospect after it had already lost traction:

The real big problem that was around for a lot of people who really believed in social justice and human rights and all that stuff, but the problem was this hard left kind of activity, which was leftist activity which was always going on at that time and that’s the Harry Newton kind of element of this, you know, dangerous in its own right (*Praxis* interview 01 2011).

The reference to Harry Newton, Kemble’s friend, who was entrusted in Kemble’s will to carry out his ‘life’s hope’, brought under scrutiny not only the British secular left but also the Christian left. The mistrust
consolidated retrospectively and spread wider as knowledge emerged about informants among the radical left:

And the fourth trustee who I never met was a guy called Harry Newton who was really left lefty, who was involved in all the kind of left groups, he was just actively engaged in all left-wing, Christian left wing activities. And when Spy Catcher, the book, was published in Australia about MI5, Harry Newton was named as an agent provocateur so all this time Harry Newton had been stirring up the Christian left and reporting on them (Praxis interview 01 2011).

This revelation was corroborated by the Marxist historian John Saville in his 2003 Memoirs from the left. Part of the reassessment that took place brought into question the black-and-white days when political ideology of the left indicated who one should support – it turned out that one could never really know who one was supporting:

That’s what I am saying about the hard fundamental left, that it was not as wonderful as you suddenly realised. It was, you know, the romantic view of the guerrillas in South America (Praxis interview 01 2011).

The change of political climate in the post-war period allowed for a reassessment in Praxis about all the ‘hard left’ movements with which it had been in solidarity. The reassessment was twofold: first, in retrospect the ‘hard left’ was never trustworthy, not even the ‘third world’ left. Second, once the flaws were exposed in the radical left, those traditional political values associated with it – for example, solidarity, commitment and self-sacrifice to the political cause – were in need of a reappraisal. The final section of this chapter examines the reappraisal of political values.
6.8 Solidarity – the tenderness of the people: from the political to the humanitarian

In light of the reassessment discussed above, this section looks at the change in meaning of a key concept that existed throughout the life of the organisation, that of solidarity. In 1988 Praxis organised its annual Easter conference around the theme of solidarity:

As last year, we are following a particular theme which is important to the work and thinking of the project. It is to be ‘Solidarity – the tenderness of the people’ (letter to Praxis management committee dated 1988).

The chief executive recalled asking one of the SWAPO activists from CAN to run a workshop on solidarity at this Easter conference. He asked her what she wanted from Praxis and remembered her replying thus:

‘We need a shoulder to cry on’, and she just, I remember her saying, ‘we need a shoulder to cry on’ and it was just somehow much more human interconnectedness and I think it was that sense of humanity in solidarity that came across to me at the time more than the kind of political, you know, (raises fist and punches air) fist-raising kind of stuff as being really important (Praxis interview 01 2011).

This ‘hunch’ that there was a more human kind of solidarity than that of the political type was quietly expressed in 1994 by the chief executive, writing in his former role as community development worker:

Solidarity begins and ends with the personal. It is not moving from one fashionable political cause to another (Return to Democracy in Latin America? 1994: 4).

Between 1983 and 1998 a more human sentiment coexisted with the ‘fist-raising’ political solidarity to which some of the member groups in
Praxis were still firmly wedded. When the pressure to be swept along with the prevailing political mood subsided, that is, when secular radical socialism disappeared as well as its Christian version, personal or human solidarity came to the fore. It is interesting to compare this shift to similar shifts in the sociological literature, for example, Sennett (2012) who has discussed the fratricidal versus fraternal left, that is, the ‘political’ versus ‘social’ solidarity. This can be seen as a similar reassessment to that which took place at a wider level than this case study and it will be further explored in Chapter 7.

The change in the meaning of solidarity had consolidated by 2007, the year in which the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable started to increase. This consolidation is illustrated in a paper written by Praxis’ chief executive in 2007: Change from experience – a pedagogy for community-based change (CFE). The document’s discussion on the meaning of solidarity can be interpreted as reflecting the shifts that had occurred in Praxis since its inception to the present times. The paper recalled the origins of the organisation’s name as being inspired by its admiration for Paolo Freire and his seminal book, Pedagogy of the oppressed (see Chapter 3). The document stated that Praxis was rooted in the radical ethical value of solidarity:

Praxis itself is an organisation rooted in a considered set of principles. It has at its heart some fundamental (perhaps in our current climate better described as radical) values. The rootedness of the values or ethic is in solidarity (CFE 2007: 30).

‘True’ solidarity was explained to mean, first, a solidarity that aimed for a transformation ‘of the dynamics that create exclusion’ and second, one that was ‘dependent on qualities of gentleness, openness, commitment to the other’ (CFE 2007: 11). Movements that were rooted in a political ideology could never achieve ‘true solidarity’ because they did not recognise ‘the complexity of diversity':
'True' solidarity stood in opposition to the political solidarity of ideological movements of whatever tradition or hue that seek to determine monolithic structures and identifications’ (ibid. 2007: 30).

The paper explained how the old political solidarity with its strong set of values provided ‘a sense of purpose’ but because it was attached to a particular ideology it also created the ‘dynamics for internecine strife’ (ibid.: 34). The lesson to be learned from the experience of Praxis was that organisations founded on a particular ideological base needed ‘to deconstruct their foundational values in order to enable the continuation of those values reconstructed within a new context’ (ibid.)

The reassessment Praxis undertook was valuable because it questioned the black-and-white framework that informed political solidarity and found that it did not allow for nuanced critical thinking because it was often based on the absolute truth of an ideological position. Praxis ‘deconstructed’ and ‘reconstructed’ its own foundational values and redefined solidarity for the new times. The new times were those of the post-Cold War in which the old politics had vanished, as had the hopes for any radical social transformation. It could be argued that the reconstructed value of solidarity was a therapeutic one, based on human tenderness and the ‘shoulder to cry on’. The notion of solidarity with the vulnerable could also be interpreted as anti-political, in the sense that it eschewed the making of political judgement and rejected seeking a resolution in collective political action, as had been the case in the past. This does not mean that Praxis lost its critical stance towards the structural causes of people’s vulnerability and suffering. The critical stance Praxis took throughout its history never disappeared, as illustrated in the following examples from both the 1998 and 2012 Annual Reports:

The Asylum and Immigration Act 1999 is now in force. The fall out from the negative and hostile policy framework is poor health,

Over the years we have seen the link between global events and the vulnerable migrants that come to the UK seeking support and the impact ever-tighter legislation has had upon their changing circumstances (Annual Report 2012).

As discussed in Chapter 1, Brown (2004) viewed the rise of human rights in contemporary times as stemming from an anti-political impulse as human rights detached from politics. This led her to question whether human rights activism as a project for the protection of victims of conflicts was all that could be hoped for in today’s political climate, in light of the collapse of more ambitious collective political projects. The notion of solidarity with the vulnerable as anti-political resonates with Brown’s ideas. As shown in Section 6.6 some of Praxis members found this attitude frustrating because of their continued political convictions. In Praxis and in the wider world these political convictions were dying out. In the past, political solidarity had been related to a political human rights activism. The political activists of the years 1983–1998 were engaged in struggles for human rights and political change in their countries and they demanded political solidarity. For this reason, we can understand the shift in the meaning of solidarity as being related to a change in the content of human rights. It became a concern with protection, while solidarity with the vulnerable took the form of a ‘duty of care’:

Praxis is seeking to protect the rights of vulnerable migrants in an increasingly precarious world (Annual Report 2011).

We are totally committed to raising the profile of the needs of migrants and highlight the duty of care which our society has for very vulnerable people (Annual Report 2012).
The Rwandan affair showed that ‘solidarity with the vulnerable’ had serious consequences. In making its decision about how to act, the organisation decided that it had to dismiss its Rwandan employee to protect its vulnerable service users: ‘As an organisation which works with vulnerable people we have a duty of care primarily to them ... (private communication with chief executive, Praxis, 13th March 2008 quoted in Harmon Snow 2008). As illustrated at the start of this section, underlying the political solidarity was Praxis’ more human, emotional solidarity. In the Rwandan affair solidarity consolidated not only as the personal, comforting notion but also as a ‘duty of care to the vulnerable’. The following contradiction emerged from this duty of care: the warm, human solidarity, ‘starting with the personal’ implied a solidarity with concrete and particular human beings, whereas the cold political solidarity implied solidarity with something more abstract and ideological, and therefore less human. Yet a reversal took place whereby the vulnerable or the vulnerable user group became the abstract and general, and the individual Rwandan refugee and employee of the organisation was the real flesh-and-blood person. Even though he was at his most vulnerable and deprived of the most fundamental of human rights – the right not to be imprisoned without a fair trial, the organisation could not be in solidarity with him:

*Praxis* has never attempted to form a judgement in relation to guilt or innocence that is the responsibility of others and beyond our competency (quoted in Harmon Snow 2008).

Solidarity with the vulnerable in the abstract became a way of not having to make a judgement and avoiding politics.

**Summary**

This case study showed how in the post-Cold War period the portrayal of migrants revealed the doubts and disappointments in the earlier
promise of the left’s political action to build a better future. The predominant portrayal of migrants as political activists gave way to the portrayal of vulnerability. When the earlier left-wing politics diminished and vanished, it was discredited in retrospect and a distaste for its supposedly unsentimental and abstract values was replaced by a return to the human and personal values embodied in humanitarianism. While this process may have reflected changes in the empirical reality, this case study demonstrated that there was a metaphoric dimension to the literal description of migrants. It exemplified how the humanitarian framing of migrants trumped the political; when a political event occurred (the Rwandan affair), no adequate frameworks existed through which to explain or respond to such an event – the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable allowed the organisation to avoid making a political judgement. The issue of making judgements outside of the black-and-white framework will be explored in the following chapter, in which the thematic strands of both case studies are brought together in a comparison.
Chapter 7  Whatever happened to freedom? Bringing together the Spanish and British case studies

The previous two chapters analysed how the case-study organisations portrayed migrants over a period of approximately thirty years and what these portrayals revealed. This chapter brings together the case studies into a comparison. It starts by examining the two organisations’ funding history; it then compares the most significant portrayals of migrants and finds that while differences existed, the portrayals were united by a common thread: migrants embodied the values of both organisations and these values shifted from the political to the humanitarian. This shift reflected the disappointment in collective political action of the past that had socialism as its goal to transform society. The turning point in both organisations occurred at a similar time, 1991, when the focus of work changed with the introduction of interculturalism in Sevilla Acoge and the involvement in Kairos Europa in Praxis. The consequences of this shift, in which the humanitarian trumped the political, were particularly clear in relation to two pivotal events – the migrant occupation of 2002 (Sevilla Acoge) and the Rwandan affair of 2006 (Praxis). The chapter closes with an exploration of the political and social significance of the portrayal of migrants at a more abstract level, drawing on the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and Chapter 2.

7.1 The funding issue – a ‘red herring’?

The funding issue was briefly mentioned in the two case-study chapters, but a question posed in the Introduction to this thesis has not yet been answered: namely, the question of whether the public funding of migrants’ rights organisations compromised their independence and led to their co-option, thus influencing how they portrayed migrants.
Rinken (2002) makes an observation about Spanish migrants’ rights organisations that may apply to their British counterparts. Many of these organisations, he affirms, have two sides: they start as campaigning organisations and then develop into service providers, contracted by the public sector to deliver practical day-to-day welfare work. Because they still retain a campaigning role that goes beyond service delivery, there is a tension between these two functions. This is a useful way of understanding migrants’ rights organisations’ actions. Statham and Geddes (2006) also draw interesting conclusions about publically funded service-providing migrants’ rights organisations: they reveal that these organisations exert influence on government immigration policy making, and yet they find them to be weak actors – these organisations limit their own actions, precisely because of their relationship to the state. Gil Aráujo (2002) and Peró (2007), by contrast, do not perceive any tension, rather, they interpret the actions of state-funded migrants’ rights organisations as conforming to government policy because they are co-opted. The questions raised by the literature will be used to explore whether or not the portrayal of migrants by both case-study organisations were influenced by their relationship with their funders.

**How did the organisations perceive funding and independence?**

**Sevilla Acoge**

From 1985 to 1991 the founder of the organisation and one social worker were paid employees, funded by church-based donations; in 1991 *Sevilla Acoge* received European funding through the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Andalucían regional government. From 1991 onwards the organisation was funded by the European Union, national, regional and local government, including the Directorate-General of Migration (the Spanish government department for immigration matters) and, from 1995, the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs. From 2007 the organisation was heavily dependent on public funding.
Table 8: *Sevilla Acoge* funding history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income</th>
<th>Public funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012 – 13</td>
<td>€728,716.26</td>
<td>79 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 – 11</td>
<td>€1,082,435</td>
<td>85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 – 10</td>
<td>€1,136,284</td>
<td>82 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 – 09</td>
<td>€1,233,521</td>
<td>84 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 – 08</td>
<td>€1,011,805</td>
<td>78 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Sevilla Acoge* Annual Reports

In 1991 *Sevilla Acoge* initiated its intercultural work, which was publically funded under the ESF funding criteria of ‘the social integration of immigrants’ (Annual Report 1991), without any reference to interculturalism. As *Sevilla Acoge* said, it pioneered the intercultural approach to migrants’ social integration, not the government. Only in later years did intercultural training and mediation become a mainstream objective of funders as Spain adopted an intercultural approach to migrant integration. *Sevilla Acoge* believed that it influenced government migration and integration policy through protesting against unfair law and policy as well as by sitting on the national and regional government forums on migration and integration issues (see Chapter 5). The mantra was always: ‘on the street protesting, challenging and making proposals’ (Annual Report 2002: 30). A fierce rhetorical independence was maintained throughout the years: ‘We do not mortgage our autonomy and independence in exchange for financial resources’ (Annual Report 2000: 7). The starting point for cooperation with the state was always based on what *Sevilla Acoge* thought was ‘good for immigrants’:

> We have always been and want to continue to be in a position of cooperating with the state in everything that is good for immigrants. But if it seems to us that some legal state ruling is against immigrants we will oppose it (SA interview 01 2012).

Tabares was conscious that funders set the terms but, if the funding objectives were not in the interest of migrants, *Sevilla Acoge* did not accept the funding: ‘funders dictate, but we don’t accept if it doesn’t
match’ (ibid.). And yet, in 2002 it was clear that the organisation’s understanding of migrants’ interests did not coincide with migrants’ own understanding and this led to the clash of interests in the 2002 university occupation, as discussed in Chapter 5. This was not the same as co-option – it was rather a reflection of a shift in values from the political to the humanitarian. After 2002 a reappraisal appeared to have taken place whereby the former ‘dissident’ and ‘critical solidarity’ the organisation had said it practiced (Annual Report 1995: 23 and Annual Report 2000: 5), underwent a change, as expressed by Tabares:

Organisations that practice this critical solidarity are going to get little support from other institutions, very little support, very little financial support (SA interview 01 2012).

The word ‘solidarity’, as discussed in Chapter 5, was replaced with the term ‘social justice’. We can speculate whether the 2002 occupation and the final negative images of helicopters flying over the university, the eviction and police arrest of the remaining occupying migrants (see Appendix 1 for press coverage) influenced how migrants were portrayed – not as political actors but as manipulated ‘victims’. However, the main factor influencing the organisation was that its humanitarian values had become paramount, and these were incompatible with any former values of political solidarity. The humanitarian trumped the political because humanitarian values were integral to the organisation’s outlook. This outlook was crucial in determining how migrants were portrayed.

**Praxis**

From 1983 to 1989 RKTI used its own funds to cover the costs of the maintenance and running of the house from which it operated. The salary of one full-time staff member, the resident coordinator, and running costs, were funded by the United Reform Church. The groups within the organisation also made financial contributions. Between 1985 and 1990 the annual income from RKTI’s funds stood at around
£60,000. From 1991 the organisation’s income increased through public funding, mostly government and local government (the primary health care trust, Department of Work and Pensions, London Borough of Tower Hamlets, Home Office and charitable trusts). From 2007 the organisation was heavily dependent on public funding.

Table 9: Praxis funding history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total income</th>
<th>Public funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012–13</td>
<td>£1,200,17</td>
<td>71 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>£1,504,587</td>
<td>64 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>£1,764,610</td>
<td>61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>£1,323,778</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>£1,064,832</td>
<td>52 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Praxis Annual Reports

Similar to Sevilla Acoge, Praxis was aware of its obligation to funders, and specific to Britain’s Charity Commission. At the start of the organisation’s life, however, the passion for political causes overrode any other considerations. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the donations from a fundraising event went to support SWAPO’s election campaign, something strictly prohibited under charity law. The changing attitude towards public funding is well-documented in the minutes of the PCC meetings. By 1991 the collective structure of the organisation was seen to be a barrier to successful fundraising and was a key factor in the organisation’s change to a more formal structure. It needed to change ‘to become presentable to funders’ (minutes of PCC meeting 21st November 1991). This provides evidence that Praxis made itself ‘funder-ready’ rather than that the funders made demands on the organisation. Praxis set its own new priorities and made a conscious decision to change as the radicalism of the organisation diminished.

There was increased awareness of what needed to be communicated externally as the organisation professionalised, and what could only be expressed internally. One set of minutes recorded a Praxis member discussing the draft of an organisational management manual thus:
He said he is a committed socialist but if this paper will be presented to the funding agencies then the word socialist and socialist analysis should be removed from the paper (minutes of PCC meeting 15th January 1992).

In retrospect, this group member remembered how even the name of his group was not straightforward when Praxis started to fundraise:

I think we had to drop that, because in my case I began to understand more about how the system worked, especially with the Charity Commission ... even the name Salvador Allende Cultural Centre, for Praxis, I am not quite sure whether that was a liability or not, because people associated it with communism, or dogmatic socialism (Praxis interview 04 2011).

In 1993 Praxis showed the importance of maintaining its independence. The organisation applied to the London Borough of Tower Hamlets for a small grant (under £70,000) because larger amounts of funding required entering into a service contract with the local authority that could compromise independence. The smaller grant meant that Praxis could receive public funding ‘without contradicting Praxis’ (minutes of PCC meeting 18th February 1993).

There is evidence that Praxis had a mutual relationship with some charitable funders. For example, the chief executive described how one major funder incorporated his views on the needs of migrants into their funding criteria:

When they did their annual review the issues we brought to them was the issue of undocumented migrants, I am sure others did as well, but I remember when they were presenting their review I said 'I'm really pleased that this is in, and she said 'that's because it's your idea', so I mean ... there's been a good interaction with that small groups of trusts (Praxis interview 01 2011).
This was confirmed by the funder:

*Praxis* did have a lot of influence on us for the last quinquennial and the strand of work that we had. And that is good because, you know, we are not on the ground all the time. We might read things and we might visit but the doing and getting the sense of what is happening ... So you know within the sector there are some very key people who I really respect and would go to ask what is happening, say on domestic violence or migration or whatever. And those people are really influential on us (*Praxis* interview 06 2011).

Similar to *Sevilla Acoge*, in the later years of the organisation’s life there was a convergence of interests between funders and the organisation, even in the case of the most target-driven government funding, for example, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP):

I think the contracts we've had with the employment work have all given us a space to be ourselves and to do stuff that we want ... I’m not bothered that it has come through a DWP contract (*Praxis* interview 01 2011).

By 2006, the year of the Rwandan affair, the understanding of what was in the best interests of migrants had changed because their ‘client group’ had become, according to *Praxis*, the most vulnerable of migrants towards whom they had a ‘duty of care’. Although Chapter 6 showed that the organisation would have risked its funding if it had acted any differently, it could be argued that, in a similar way to *Sevilla Acoge*, the humanitarian version of solidarity had already overtaken the earlier political solidarity with its different values. The fear of negative portrayal (a *Praxis* member accused of genocide) and the risk of loss of funding may have played a part in influencing the organisation’s portrayal of migrants, but the shift from political to humanitarian values was the crucial factor.
In conclusion, both case-study organisations had similar funding histories: they started with a small amount of funding that came without strings attached, mainly from the churches and religious communities; in the first ten years of their existence they became funded by local and national government (and regional government in the case of Spain), as well as the European Union; by 2012, the final year analysed in the case studies, they were heavily reliant on public funding. The academic literature suggests that this funding would compromise their work and limit their actions in contesting and challenging immigration law and policy. Yet, rather than a process of co-option, the case studies illustrated a more interesting process: the disappearance of any hopes for radical social transformation through collective political action led to a shift in the focus of the organisations’ work: in the case of Sevilla Acoge, interculturalism, in the case of Praxis, Kairos Europa work to address the practical issues facing newly-arrived migrants from post-Cold War conflicts in the politically hostile environment of Fortress Europe.

Both organisations changed the focus of their work at a similar time, around 1991. Once the hopes for any radical social transformation had disappeared, and the focus of work had shifted, the perceived needs of migrants led the organisations to prioritise humanitarian and welfare issues, which fitted well with funders’ priorities. In the later years, both organisations admitted to changing the vocabulary they used in public documents to make them more attractive to funders. For instance, in the Spanish case, ‘social justice’ was preferred to ‘solidarity’ to detach it from its political connotations; in the British case, ‘social justice’ replaced ‘socialism’. This change of language should not simply be seen as co-option by government or opportunism to fit funders’ priorities: neither organisation was coerced into changing its priorities, rather their priorities had already changed, and thus, they coincided with the funders’ outlook.
The issue of funding was, arguably, a ‘red herring’ because the shifts in the portrayal of migrants would be better interpreted as a reflection of the loss of earlier political hopes and a convergence with, rather than co-option by, the state. The aim of both organisations had become ‘social justice’ rather than the collective political project of ‘socialism’ by the time they became publicly funded.

7.2 The portrayal of migrants by Sevilla Acoge and Praxis: differences and similarities

To explore the differences and similarities between both case-study organisations it will be useful to recap the most significant portrayals of migrants that appeared in each organisation in a period of approximately thirty years.

In the Spanish case study, migrants were portrayed as the embodiment of a set of values that had vanished in Spanish society – for example, selflessness, altruism and self-sacrifice. These values resembled a depoliticised version of those associated with the Andalucian agricultural workers, forged in their collective political struggles under Franco and during the transition to democracy. The portrayal of Spanish society was juxtaposed to that of migrants: it was viewed as egoistic, greedy, consumerist, xenophobic and as inflicting damage on migrants through ‘symbolic violence’; hopes were placed on migrants as a catalyst for social change through a transformation of values. Migrants were also portrayed as predominantly vulnerable: Sevilla Acoge worked mainly with ‘illegal’ economic migrants, who were portrayed as damaged by the migration process, which led to their psychological disintegration and disempowerment. From 1991, when interculturalism was introduced into the organisation, migrants as intercultural mediators were portrayed as key to the reintegration process and to the re-empowerment of migrants. The positive portrayal of migrants as political activists that featured in the literature on migrant mobilisations, explored in Chapter 1.1, is significant because of
its absence. Instead, migrants involved in the 2002 occupation of the University of Pablo Olavide to demand their rights were portrayed negatively, that is, as manipulated.

In the British case study, by contrast, during the first fifteen years of the organisation’s life, migrants were portrayed as political activists, committed to a political cause and to fighting for human rights in their own countries. Parallel to this robust image of migrants was a portrayal of migrants suffering the consequences of loss, repression and destruction, and yet, migrants’ self-representations illustrated the process of overcoming psychological distress and disintegration through their reintegration into political life in exile. In later years the portrayal of migrants as embodying the political values of commitment, sacrifice, courage and solidarity vanished. One negative portrayal of migrants, a Rwandan refugee, an employee of Praxis, accused of genocide by the British media in 2006, was understandably absent from the organisation’s public history. It was, nevertheless, of great significance because after 2006 there was a marked rise in the portrayal of migrants as predominantly vulnerable, that is, of migrants traumatised by their experiences, lacking in political subjectivity and in need of empowerment.

There are a number of factors that could be said to have influenced these portrayals of migrants:

1. Increasingly harsh immigration law and policy created situations of precariousness and vulnerability. Hence, the portrayals of migrants as vulnerable were faithful representations of the empirical reality (see Chapter 3).

2. Negative media and political discourse led organisations to portray migrants in a sympathetic light to counter the negative stereotypes (see Introduction to this thesis). Sympathetic portrayals of migrants as
vulnerable could also be seen to help make small gains for migrants in a hostile climate (see Chapter 1.1).

3. The end of the Cold War marked the end of earlier ideological struggles that produced ‘political exiles’. The global wars in the post-Cold War period differed from those of the Cold War and generated new waves of asylum seekers fleeing different forms of conflict and violence. In the British case study the portrayal of migrants as traumatised victims and vulnerable could be seen to reflect the reality of changing migration patterns.

4. Migrant rights’ organisations that provided services to migrants professionalised in order to obtain public funding. Their dependence on state funding may have contributed to how they portrayed migrants (see Section 7.1 above).

All these factors have been acknowledged in this thesis. However, this study focuses on another perspective, one that lies beneath the surface of the other more tangible strands. This thesis argues that the portrayals of migrants reflected shifts in the organisations’ own outlooks, whereby their humanitarian values trumped political ones. The portrayal of migrants embodied the organisations’ values that changed over time. In both cases, these changing values expressed the sense of disappointment in the politics of the past that had aimed to transform society through collective political action, the ultimate goal of which had been socialism. In the Spanish case, there was a particular disappointment with ordinary people that corresponded directly to the experiences of the worker-priests; they suffered a political disenchantment with the Spanish agricultural workers, whom they perceived as succumbing to consumerist society in post-Franco Spain when the political struggles had collapsed (see Chapters 3 and 5). In the British case, the disillusionment could be attributed to the discrediting of the ‘third world’ revolutionary struggles and their subsequent association with human rights abuses (see Chapters 1 and 6). The
differences and similarities between the two case-study organisations are discussed below in more detail and concrete examples are given of the consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political.

There were three significant differences between the portrayal of migrants in both case studies:

- The positive portrayal of migrants in juxtaposition to the negative portrayal of the rest of society was unique to the Spanish case study, as was the elevation of migrants’ traditional values in contrast to modernity’s values. This can be attributed to the adoption of interculturalism as a philosophy that pervaded Sevilla Acoge from 1991. This influenced its portrayal of migrants who, in the organisation’s imagination, were untainted by the degraded values of modernity.

- The humanitarian framing of migrants as vulnerable excluded the portrayal of migrants as political subjects (or activists) in Sevilla Acoge, whereas in Praxis the humanitarian and political framing coexisted for the first fifteen years of the organisation’s life. The absence of migrants portrayed as political activists in Sevilla Acoge was particularly surprising for two reasons: first, because one of the organisation’s key actor symbolically replaced the Spanish agricultural workers with migrants as the ‘new poor’ and therefore as a site for radicalism (see below), and yet, when migrants literally substituted the Spanish workforce in the Andalucian burgeoning agriculture businesses and proved themselves to be as militant as their predecessors in their struggles for their rights, their portrayal as political subjects was absent – instead they were portrayed as ‘manipulated’; second, another key actor in the organisation had led the migrant agricultural workers’ strike in El Ejido in 2001 and was no stranger to collective political organising to demand...
rights; however, he also portrayed the migrants involved in the 2002 occupation as ‘manipulated’.

- The hope in ambitious emancipatory projects of social transformation through collective political action, namely, socialism, had died prior to the formation of Sevilla Acoge, reflecting the mood of political disillusionment or desencanto and the particular experience of the worker-priest movement in Andalucia (see Chapters 3.1 and 5). In Praxis the hope of social transformation through collective political action and the goal of socialism remained alive until the late 1990s because migrants who were involved in their countries’ struggles for liberation existed within the organisation until 1998.

The similarities between both organisations were striking, although they worked themselves out in different ways. A common thread ran through both case studies: the values of the organisation shifted from the political to the humanitarian as political disappointment consolidated in the late 1980s and early 1990s; this was represented by the turning points in both organisations that happened at a similar time (1991) when they refocused the emphasis of their work – the introduction of interculturalism in Sevilla Acoge and the involvement in the Kairos Europa movement in Praxis. It is important to highlight that both organisations were part of the radical left political tradition of liberation theology; this political tradition cannot be separated from its secular equivalent, and as such it shares the trajectory traced in this thesis, one that travelled from hope in collective political action, a common political understanding, and integration into a collective sense of purpose, to disappointment and the loss of the integrating capacities of politics.
Solidarity with the ‘poor’ - from the political to the humanitarian

Both organisations were committed to solidarity with the ‘poor’ that came from a Christian spiritual motivation. This is expressed by the Spanish case-study organisation thus:

But the motivation from the start, from 1970 until today is the same, a spiritual motivation ... Following Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth led me, has always led me to a commitment with the most disadvantaged, the poorest people (SA interview 01 2011).

The notion of the ‘poor’ was broad, encompassing different groups of people; however, the ‘poor’ shared a particular characteristic – an inherent radicalism:

The poor are always radical. That is, commitment to justice and for human dignity is rooted in ordinary people, in the poorest in society. In Latin America they take one form, in Andalucía and Seville, another. The gospel has to be rooted in the poor (ibid).

For both organisations, the ‘poor’ constituted migrants: exploited economic migrants without rights in the case of Spain; political exiles, refugees from war-torn countries or ‘failed’ asylum-seekers without rights in the case of Britain. The term was synonymous with the ‘oppressed’. Liberation theology had highlighted the need to be in solidarity with the ‘poor’ and the ‘oppressed’, and to put this solidarity into practice through political involvement, as expressed by the founder of Praxis:

I would deliberately take the option of being in solidarity with the poor, wherever they happened to live. I would press with all cultural and political means available to change the attitude and behaviour of people, church and government towards the oppressed, whether in the third or first world. (ONE for Christian Renewal Spring 1979).
The relationship between liberation theology and Marxist or socialist ideals was discussed in Chapter 3.1. It is captured in the words of Tabares, who had been key to the development of the underlying philosophy of *Sevilla Acoge*, as was illustrated in Chapter 5:

Radical Christianity is an inner dynamic. It is an inner dynamic which is nourished and reinforced by socio-political commitment, which naturally fits well with the socialist ideal (SA interview 02 2012).

The idea of the ‘poor’ and the ‘oppressed’ as being inherently radical was not the preserve of the Christian left, as shown by the New Left’s location of sites of potential radicalism among the outsiders of society (see Chapter 1.2). Despite the spiritual motivation, solidarity with the ‘poor’ appeared to be indistinguishable from the secular left’s version. Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, dedicated ‘[t]o the oppressed, and to those who suffer with them and fight at their side’ (Freire 1972[1968]), was influential among the radical Christian left, as well as the secular left (Smith 1991: 252). Sennett (2012: 40), in his discussion on solidarity, identified a ‘divided path’ between the humanitarian, cooperative values of the ‘social’ left, often inspired by the Catholic social action movement, and the less human values of the ‘political’ left. Yet it was clear that in liberation theology these two currents were not mutually exclusive: the case studies illustrated a shift in emphasis from one to the other. The humanitarian values of Christian solidarity with the ‘poor’ transformed into the political values of their left-wing secular radical counterparts at a time of robust political subjectivity; when political subjectivity declined, their values reverted to humanitarian Christian values and the eclipse of the political values. The implications of this reversion are illustrated below.
7.3 The changing meaning of solidarity and empowerment – the consequences

At the beginning of the 1990s, both organisations shifted their focus of work and in doing so they reconceived migrants as vulnerable and in need of empowerment. Sevilla Acoge adopted interculturalism in 1991 as an approach to migrants’ social integration, yet, as discussed in Chapter 1.4 and illustrated in Chapter 5, interculturalism was not only a policy tool, but also a philosophy of social transformation through a change of values. At the heart of interculturalism lay a therapeutic imperative – to heal the damage caused to migrants by the process of migration. In the case of Praxis, the involvement in the Kairos Europa movement from 1991 refocused its work from political solidarity with activist migrants to social welfare and integration issues. This new focus was to address migrants’ precarious lives in Britain and the trauma they suffered because of their past experiences. The 1991 turning points revealed a significant parallel between Sevilla Acoge and Praxis that can be explained by the common backdrop to both organisations, as explored in Chapter 3 – the mood of disenchantment with collective political action in the late 1980s and the sense of diminished political subjectivity. The notion of solidarity and the values that underpinned it were revised from a political to a humanitarian conception, reflecting the sense of disappointment and the lowered horizons for the possibility of political action to affect any ambitious social change. The consequences of these revisions became clear when political subjectivity resurfaced (in the Spanish case study) or when political judgement was needed to determine action in critical moments (both case studies).

From 1991 the values underpinning Sevilla Acoge’s solidarity were inspired by the philosophy of interculturalism. By drawing on Jacoby’s critique of multiculturalism, which was shown to apply equally to interculturalism (see Chapter 1.4), we can interpret Sevilla Acoge’s
embrace of interculturalism as a reflection of leftist and radicals’ despair and the ‘index of the exhaustion of political thinking’ (Jacoby 1999: 33). The political values that sustained the earlier solidarity with Spanish agricultural workers were forged in collective struggle; they consisted of self-sacrifice for a cause, commitment to the group over one’s own interests and the principles of self-organising. There was also an overarching goal – that of socialism, with its long history developing from the French Revolution. In the Introduction to this thesis an example was given whereby the principles of the French Revolution were taken literally. Sevilla Acoge reappraised these values in light of contemporary times because, according to Tabares:

All these big concepts have been devalued by our way of life, devalued. Big words like solidarity, equality, fraternity, the great principles of the French Revolution have been diminished (SA interview 01 2012).

Solidarity was seen as ‘a worn-out word’ (ibid.) and was replaced by the term ‘social justice’:

Because if we practice social justice there is no need for solidarity. We take recourse to solidarity because there is no justice (ibid.).

In Praxis, the political and humanitarian coexisted from the start of the organisation’s life, sometimes in tension with each other. This tension increased from 1991 to 1998: the political exiles of the early years were fully empowered by their politics and wanted political solidarity, and yet, at the height of this political activism Praxis identified a different kind of solidarity it could give – ‘a shoulder to cry on’ (Praxis interview 01 2011). One Colombian political activist showed his annoyance at being offered sympathy in the early 1990s because he did not want to be seen as an individual victim, but rather, as part of a collective struggle:
For example when I would talk about my case of persecution and violence at a conference I was trying to do it in the least personalised way I could because I was interested in them understanding that what happened to me was happening to many other people who didn’t have the privilege of leaving the country ... but they wanted to understand more about my particular case than the collective case, the collective situation. So, that would create some distance between my conception of things and theirs (RCHP interview 2006).

The tension between the political activists and the organisation could be observed when the organisation replaced the term ‘socialism’ with ‘social justice’ (see 7.1 above), because in the minds and political practices of some of the Praxis groups, the struggle for socialism continued until the late 1990s.

By 2008 solidarity had lost any political charge and it meant standing with the most vulnerable and advocating on their behalf: ‘Are we tough enough to argue the case for the most vulnerable?’ (Praxis Annual Report 2008: 5). The definition of solidarity became detached from the political values of the past:

The rootedness of the values or ethic is in solidarity. Solidarity itself is dependent on qualities of gentleness, openness, commitment to the other (CFC 2007: 30).

In fact, solidarity was defined in juxtaposition to the politics of the past:

This stands in direct contradiction to ideological movements of whatever tradition or hue that seek to determine monolithic structures and identifications. True solidarity requires recognition of the complexity of diversity and the difficulties we too often face in seeking to learn from each other (ibid.)

The humanitarian framing of migrants as vulnerable had implications for the notion of solidarity. Its meaning was revised and this revision
led to significant, practical consequences as demonstrated with particular clarity by two pivotal events: the 2002 migrant occupation of the University of Pablo Olavide and the 2006 Rwandan affair. Both events brought out a tension: how to be in solidarity with migrants if the image of migrants in the real world did not conform to the organisation’s own portrayal, one that was shaped not by political but by humanitarian values. In both cases the humanitarian values trumped the political, with consequences for the lives of individual migrants.

The theoretical discussion in Chapter 2.2 revealed the dangers contained in the notion of solidarity motivated by humanitarianism in which solidarity with the ‘suffering of the poor’ in times of revolution neither solved the issues of poverty, nor founded political freedom. The ‘humanitarian’ overwhelmed ‘the political’ with disastrous consequences (Arendt 2006 [1963]: 51, 79). These insights are relevant to the analysis of the two pivotal events, both of which revealed the serious consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political.

The two events took place after the organisations had redefined the meaning of solidarity in a period of declining political subjectivity. Migrants were portrayed as vulnerable and in need of empowerment, but the migrants involved in the two events did not conform to this portrayal.

The main issue that presented itself to Sevilla Acoge during the 2002 migrant occupation of the University of Pablo Olavide was how to reconcile the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable and in need of empowerment when the political subjectivity of migrants resurfaced. Pupavac (2012) makes a pertinent observation about human rights activism: that it ‘marginalises individuals as political subjects and delegitimises political contestation’ (2012: 3). This appears to explain Sevilla Acoge’s response: when the political emerged unexpectedly, it collided with the organisation’s consolidated humanitarian outlook – the term coined in Chapter 1.1, the ‘humanitarian dilemma’, to describe
the tension between the political and humanitarian approach to migrants’ rights, surfaced as a clash of values. The empirical data in the Spanish case study also resembled closely Pupavac’s more abstract assertions that ‘the human rights discourse threw doubt on the moral capacity of people to act’, and that ‘it delegitimised the political subject’ (ibid.).

Pupavac insightfully points out that

importantly, human rights subjects are active agents of their rights when they are grounded in political struggle’ (2012: 14).

Yet, when migrants attempted to empower themselves through collective political action to demand their rights and for wider political changes, this action was devalued by the organisation. Instead of portraying them as political subjects, it viewed them as ‘manipulated’. When migrants displayed those political values forged in struggle, previously admired by the worker-priests, it went against the humanitarian interests of the organisation. The idea of self-sacrifice for a political cause no longer figured in the values of Sevilla Acoge, whereas for some of the migrants involved in the occupation it was a moral imperative:

Some of the migrants in the internment centres did what they had to do – they had to fight and preferred to be deported having fought, rather than to be deported at a later stage by police, without at least having fought to change the situation (Red de apoyo de Sevilla 2003: 19).

The ombudsman’s comment on the ‘sad end’ of the occupation (echoed by El Hartiti in Chapter 5) demonstrated that the political values were not completely delegitimised, but rather, the ‘humanitarian dilemma’ (the tension between the political and humanitarian approach to human rights) resolved itself in favour of the humanitarian:
A sad end that could have had a different outcome if the situation of the migrants had been attended to, not certain legitimate but inhumane interests (Chamizo 2013: 82).

The consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political in the British case study was exemplified in the Rwandan affair. Political subjectivity had declined, but in this case it did not resurface; instead, politics that no longer fitted the neat black-and-white framework intruded into the organisation. In the past, political judgements were made within this framework and sides were taken in political conflicts, despite difficult moral issues around the use of violence and human rights abuses (see Chapter 6.3). In the Rwandan affair a political judgement was needed more than ever but it was avoided on humanitarian grounds: the organisation claimed that it had to remain neutral because it had a duty of care to its vulnerable service users and so it could not take a political position. Political solidarity with a particular individual was needed to fight for his freedom, but instead, humanitarian solidarity with the abstract ‘vulnerable’ was given. The humanitarian overwhelmed the political and an individual in need of solidarity was left unsupported.

The revision had implications for the notion of empowerment in both organisations. Political subjects were self-empowering (see Fanon (2001 [1961] in Chapter 1.4), whereas the ‘vulnerable’ needed an external agent to empower them (see Pupavac (2008, 2012) and Anderson (2008) in Chapter 1.1). Empowerment changed from political empowerment through collective action to therapeutic empowerment, that is, empowerment by an external agent that could restore migrants’ self-confidence and self-esteem – their sense of self that was damaged in the migration process.

Both organisations had been conscious that empowerment by an external agent was a contradiction. Sevilla Acoge attempted to resolve this by training migrant intercultural mediators who could empower
other migrants on the organisation’s behalf. In Praxis the notion of empowerment as the responsibility of the organisation only emerged after migrants were reconceived as vulnerable rather than political subjects. For example, in the first Annual Reports migrants spoke as empowered actors in the first person plural:

We come from many countries including Chile, Colombia, East Timor, El Salvador, Ghana, Ireland, we are active on a European front, have close relationships with projects in Namibia, the Philippines and Chile. We are here to respond to the immense need and potential of our communities here in the Inner City and to the human rights of all our countries (Annual Report 1992: 1).

The voice of migrants as fully empowered subjects was later eclipsed by the organisation’s voice, as illustrated in the 2009 Annual Report when it became the responsibility of the organisation to empower migrants:

We empower them to sweep away the obstacles in their path and take their place in the rich cultural and economic life of the capital (Praxis Annual Report 2009: 2).

In summary, the consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political can be described as follows:

• Migrants became defined as vulnerable, which implied their reliance on an external agent for their empowerment.

• The humanitarian view of the human subject as vulnerable became incompatible with the previously dominant conception of the human subject as political.

• Migrants’ agency was curtailed. By portraying migrants who acted politically as manipulated, Sevilla Acoge justified thwarting migrants’ agency – manipulated objects could not know what was best for them. Instead, they were reduced to objects of
compassion – that is, vulnerable people who had been placed in the firing line for the political interests of others.

- Migrants who acted politically were delegitimised as political subjects and their political struggle was devalued.

- Migrants who acted politically (in the migrant occupation) or who were caught up in politics (in the Rwandan affair) were individuals in need of solidarity; they were vulnerable without it, and yet solidarity was only offered to ‘the vulnerable’ in the abstract.

- The humanitarian approach to solidarity with ‘the vulnerable’ avoided the need to make political judgements in complex situations outside of the black-and-white political framework of the past.

- The humanising, personal and emotional rhetoric of the humanitarian approach was valued over the depersonalising, abstracting, political rhetoric; however, in moments of crisis, humanitarianism failed the individual in need.

- The humanitarian approach did not prevent harm to the concrete individual migrants – 201 migrants were deported at the end of the university occupation, and one person was imprisoned without trial in the Rwandan affair.

The discussion throughout this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the rise of the humanitarian portrayal of migrants as vulnerable and the disappearance of the notion of empowerment through politics could be attributed directly to the organisations’ experiences of disappointment with collective political action, rather than to the changing circumstances of migrants that made them more vulnerable than in the past. The disappointment resulted in the humanitarian
trumping the political, the consequences of which are listed above. The parallel turning points and pivotal events in both organisations illustrated the tension between the portrayal of migrants by the migrants' rights organisations and migrants themselves when the humanitarian superseded the political. In 1991 Sevilla Acoge adopted its interculturalist philosophy and reimagined the 'poor and oppressed' as vulnerable migrants without political subjectivity, following the disappointment with the Spanish agricultural workers, the earlier version of the 'poor and oppressed'. When the migrant agricultural workers acted as political subjects in the university occupation (2002), this contradicted the organisation's portrayal of migrants as vulnerable. In 1991 Praxis adopted a new approach through the Kairos Europa movement and redefined the 'poor and oppressed' as vulnerable migrants at a time when the image of the courageous political activist was thrown into doubt and as the political struggles in the 'Third World' became less clear-cut. The image of one particular migrant, a political subject, caught up in the politics of Rwanda, contradicted the organisation's portrayal of vulnerable migrants.

7.4 The portrayal of migrants: its political and social significance

The long-term changes that were analysed in Chapter 1 and 2 set up the theoretical framework of this thesis to give an understanding of how we arrived at the contemporary moment. The empirical data from the case studies, analysed within the theoretical framework, did not lead to abstract conclusions: the shift in the framing of migrants from the political to the humanitarian had material consequences, as illustrated above. The portrayal of migrants by the two migrants’ rights organisations over a period of thirty years demonstrated empirical evidence of a particular trajectory. This trajectory may be specific to the organisations, both of which were influenced by liberation theology, but as discussed in this chapter and in Chapter 3, liberation theology followed a similar path to secular left-wing radicalism and so it would
not be implausible to suggest that the examples provided by the two case studies could have wider implications.

The main issues of political and social significance we can draw from the two organisations’ portrayals of migrants, using the theoretical framework, are as follows:

- The political and social experiences of recent decades influenced the reconfiguration of subjectivity whereby the human subject became defined more by its vulnerability than by its political robustness.

- The loss of a particular form of integration through political attachment strengthened the version of the human subject as vulnerable.

- The weakening of the ideologically informed political framework of the past led to the difficulty of making political judgements outside of such a framework.

- Outside of the political framework of the past and within the framing of a human subject reconfigured as vulnerable, to act politically (and to be in solidarity) became fraught with contradictions.

The above points are discussed in more depth by revisiting the literature reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2. Pupavac (2012) observed that human rights activism had often been connected to wider radical political struggles. This observation was pertinent to both case studies. The organisations experienced disappointment in the radical collective political struggles with which they had been involved. Against a backdrop of worldwide political changes, their commitment to Christian Marxist socialism, which had provided a way of seeing the world, making judgements and acting politically, weakened and
vanished. The case studies illustrated that the loss of this framework of understanding and acting was gradual; contrary to Lechner (1997), who perceived a more dramatic break, it did not disappear suddenly with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, although these historical events may have accelerated the trend.

In Chapter 1.2 and 1.3 the loss of traditional authority as a mechanism to meaningfully integrate society’s members was shown to be a central concern of classical social theorists (Durkheim 1933 [1893]; Weber 1985 [1905]). Of particular relevance to this thesis was the idea of leftist political ideology as an alternative authority that could integrate large numbers of people into a shared way of understanding the secular world and changing it. Paxton (2005: 50) described a ‘community of socialists’ that existed in the early twentieth century in which workers had been integrated from generation to generation into ‘a rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and rallies’. Yet, as C. Wright Mills (2000 [1959]) observed, this way of understanding the world was coming to an end. At the end of the 1950s he wrote of the two ideologies that had emerged from the Enlightenment as follows:

> Our major orientations – liberalism and socialism – have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves (ibid.: 166).

Bell (2000 [1960]), writing at a similar time, placed a particular emphasis on the exhaustion of Marxist ideology, that ‘road to action’ (2000 [1960]: 393) and ‘driver of revolutions’ in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Chapter 1.4 argued that Bell’s proclamation of the ‘end of ideology’ was premature; nevertheless, his definition of ideology is a useful one – as an all-embracing belief system infused with passion that entailed a commitment to transform social reality (ibid.: 400). Such an ideological belief system generated meaning through
political attachment. It is understandable that its collapse would leave behind a significant vacuum.

Mills and Bell were both premature in their conclusions: the case studies found evidence that politics continued to have the power to integrate people into a meaningful, shared understanding of themselves and their societies, albeit in smaller numbers than in the past. In the Spanish case study, for a small minority, the sense of political integration through an attachment to a political cause disintegrated in the early 1980s (prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall). By contrast, in the British case study, for some, it remained until the late 1990s and early 2000s. The issue of political and social significance for today is that when the political subjectivity of migrants appears, it emerges in a qualitatively different context. Chapter 2.1 explored social theorists, such as Jacoby (1971), Lasch (1991[1979]), Sennett (2002 [1977], 2006) and Berger et al. (1973) to make sense of the reconfiguration of subjectivity. In summary, the New Left’s political retreat marked ‘a therapeutic turn’ in which the human subject was predominantly reconfigured as damaged, in need of psychic care and recognition from others, rather than as a robust subject, self-empowered through politics. This exploration of a shift from the political to the therapeutic attempted to connect the idea of the weakening of political identity to the rise of the notion of the vulnerable human subject. The case studies demonstrated how the humanitarian perspective defined migrants by their vulnerability, at a time when political subjectivity had diminished and politics had lost its capacity to integrate.

The Spanish case study provided the clearest example of the loss of integration through politics. The intercultural philosophy could be seen as stepping into a vacuum. It was embedded in a critique of modernity that found no solace in the earlier demanding form of political belonging through commitment to a universally understood cause (socialism); instead, integration from the intercultural perspective was based on personal affection and belonging that was more akin to
intimate friendship and family relations. This integration through a sense of psychological comfort was a substitute for political integration, and as Arendt said, it was ‘politically irrelevant’ (1951c: 17). It was a retreat from politics that had once promised to change society. The earlier notion of empowerment through collective political action that gave people a strong sense of self was replaced by the notion of empowerment by an external agent to help migrants to overcome their vulnerable status. This shift towards the vulnerable subject was revealed by the portrayal of migrants in both organisations when those former collective sources of political identity around a common political attachment had collapsed. It came into conflict with migrants who attempted to exercise political subjectivity and who defied notions of vulnerability.

The second issue of political and social significance is that of making political judgements outside of the old black-and-white framework as theorised in Chapter 2.3 and analysed in Chapter 6.5. The black-and-white framework had its flaws and its reappraisal could have offered the opportunity to rethink, as Arendt believed we were capable of doing:

The loss of standards, which does indeed define the modern world in its facticity and cannot be reversed by any sort of return to the good old days or by some arbitrary promulgation of new standards and values, is therefore a catastrophe in the moral world only if one assumes that people are actually incapable of judging things per se, that their faculty of judgement is inadequate for making original judgements (Arendt 2005: 104).

Instead of finding a way to make political judgements outside of the old framework, the portrayal of migrants as vulnerable, as opposed to political subjects, allowed the organisations to sidestep the political issues. Rather than thinking outside of the old framework, both case-study organisations based their decisions to act on humanitarian values
that avoided political judgement – the prevention of harm and the protection of the vulnerable. To be in solidarity with the vulnerable was straightforward; however, to be in solidarity with people as political subjects when the clear-cut politics of the past had collapsed required more exacting, independent thinking. If we revisit the theme of the human capacity for judgement as discussed in Chapter 2.3, we can take our present day situation as an opportunity to rethink outside of any ideological framework. While this might be a demanding task, it could provide the way out of the impasse in which both case-study organisations found themselves.

The third issue of political and social significance is that of how to act politically in a time characterised by the sense of political limits and the lowering of horizons for far-reaching social change. This sense of political limits was captured by the atmosphere of Spain’s desencanto during the transition period to democracy, and of ‘TINA’ in Thatcher’s Britain (Chapter 3.2). It was consolidated further by the notion of ‘the end of history’, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the cessation of competing alternative social models (Chapters 1.2, 3.4, 5.11). The notions of the humanitarian trumping the political and the sense of political limits were connected because they were both premised on the loss of hope in what had once appeared as a tangible goal of social change (socialism) through collective political action. Without such a bridge to social transformation, the horizons became considerably lower; the humanitarian framework of values can be seen as part of the lowering of horizons. The frustration with the pervading sense of political limits was voiced by one interviewee who understood the existing climate but did not think that we should give up hope in the collective endeavour to change the world:

In the sense that the disappointment, that ‘everything is lost, nothing can be done’, the ideological defeat’, I think it is still worthwhile to keep the flags of dignity flying and later on, maybe in the next generation, although it will be something that many citizens of the
world will have to achieve, and in this current phase, that is so difficult (RCHP interview 2006).

This expression of defiance in the face of failed political attempts to change the societies in which we live, together with the example of the migrant occupation in which migrants challenged the humanitarian framing by migrants’ rights organisations, are valuable reminders that the idea of political action as freedom is worthwhile even if there is no guarantee of reaching the goal.


Conclusion

This thesis set out to examine an under-explored area of research – how migrants’ rights organisations portray migrants. It covered a period of approximately thirty years in the lives of two organisations (from the 1980s to the 2010s) in order to analyse the changing portrayals, how and why they changed, and to draw out their political and social significance. Taking as a starting point the claims made by Brown (1995, 2004) and Pupavac (2001, 2008, 2012) – that there had been a shift from the political to the humanitarian understanding of rights – this thesis aimed to explore the validity of their assertions and, more specifically, to assess whether or not they were reflected in the changing portrayal of migrants by organisations that advocated for migrants’ rights.

According to Brown and Pupavac, the aforementioned shift was premised on disappointment with collective political action and the diminishing sense of possibility in ambitious political projects for human freedom – notably the goal of socialism. The implication of these authors’ claims was that political subjectivity had diminished; however, this appeared to be contradicted by its resurgence, as seen in migrant mobilisations in Europe and North America at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries. This apparent contradiction was explored and was found to be a tension rather than a contradiction. The term ‘the humanitarian dilemma’ was coined to describe such a tension and in the case studies where it arose, it resolved itself through the humanitarian trumping the political. By bringing together the empirical data and the theoretical framework, this thesis showed why the humanitarian prevailed over the political and the consequences of this process for political subjectivity.
Based on the empirical evidence in Chapters 5 and 6, this thesis argues that the changing portrayal of migrants by two migrants’ rights organisations marked a shift from a political to a humanitarian approach to migrants’ rights that was premised on political disappointment. Various factors that may have influenced these changing portrayals were acknowledged (listed in Chapter 7.2: 288–89); however, the central argument of this thesis is that the portrayal of migrants reflected the organisations’ own shift in values and that, moreover, this was influenced by the sense of political disappointment. The case studies – two organisations in two European countries – provided examples of this shift and they demonstrated the material consequences of the humanitarian trumping the political (listed in Chapter 7.3: 300–01). The differences that existed between the two case studies’ political and social contexts, and their immigration histories were described in Chapter 3.4: 143–46; the differences in the portrayals of migrants by both case-study organisations were described in Chapter 7.2: 290–91. Yet despite these differences, both case studies revealed a common denominator that connected the country-specific differences and the distinct portrayals of migrants – that of disillusionment in the politics of the past that had aimed to transform society through collective political action. This was key to explaining the shift in the organisations’ values, the organisations’ understanding of solidarity and empowerment, and how they portrayed migrants.

Using the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2, and the historical background described in Chapter 3, it was possible to understand why the case studies revealed parallel trajectories when their contexts were so different. The explanation lay in the fact that they were both part of the long-term political and social developments discussed in Chapters 1–3. The more recent trends were of particular relevance, but the discussion of historical reversals in leftist and progressive thinking aimed to demonstrate the way in which long-term changes also contributed to developments in contemporary times.
While it can be argued that there were multiple strands that influenced the organisations’ portrayal of migrants, this thesis focused on one in particular – political disappointment that led to a shift from the foregrounding of political values to that of humanitarian values. This shift was linked to the reconfiguration of subjectivity, whereby the dominant trait of the human subject at the centre of politics became that of vulnerability as political subjectivity diminished. This reconfiguration was related to broader political and social trends and changes in the outside world. This ‘way of seeing’ (Berger 1972) the portrayal of migrants, its practical consequences, as well as its political and social significance, is possibly the new contribution that this thesis makes to the relevant literature in migration studies.

The main issues of political and social significance that were drawn from the two organisations’ portrayals of migrants were as follows: that of the loss of a form of integration through politics that contributed to a particular reconfiguration of subjectivity; the difficulty of making political judgements outside of ideologically informed frameworks; and how to act politically (and be in solidarity) when the human subject at the centre of rights and justice is viewed as predominantly vulnerable.

The empirical chapters shaped the theoretical framework, which in turn, helped to make sense of the data. This iterative relationship is described in the methodology chapter. Unexpected discoveries were made as the data was collected and analysed, indicating the need to review additional literature as well as to look for other sources to triangulate the data. This was the case when the unexpected turning points and pivotal events in the organisations were uncovered: the notions of interculturalism and Kairos required investigation, as did the migrant occupation of 2002 and the Rwandan affair of 2006. In other cases the data corroborated the validity of the tentative theoretical framework early on, for example, the Spanish case study provided empirical data that supported the more abstract claims of Giner (1976) and Bell (2000 [1960]) that the mass society outlook adopted by leftist
intellectual thinkers and activists marked their disappointment with ordinary people and in the possibility of social transformation through traditional collective political action (See Chapter 1.2 and 1.3). The insights of Berman (2010 [1982]) and Giner (1976) regarding attitudes towards modernity were also confirmed by the discovery of the modernity-loathing philosophy of interculturalism.

There are a number of limitations to the empirical research of this study. One of the main limitations is as follows.

The case-study organisations provided two examples that offered a rich source of data for in-depth analysis. They told compelling stories of political disappointment, the shift to a humanitarian framing of migrants and the consequences of this framing. As such, they were valuable explorations in themselves and were not intended to be representative samples. However, both examples selected for this study were organisations influenced by the radical left Christian tradition of liberation theology. It would have been useful to compare the trajectories of other similar organisations outside of the radical Christian tradition but that was not feasible (see below). The literature did point to the similarity between secular Marxist and Christian radicalism, and yet, it was only at the end of the journey that it became clear how closely they interrelated. The empirical data showed that the values of Christian leftist radicals transformed into the political values of their left-wing secular radical counterparts at a time of robust political subjectivity; when political subjectivity declined, their values reverted to humanitarian Christian values; at the same time, the political values of secular left-wing radicals shifted to humanitarian values, thus resembling more closely those of radical Christianity. These shifts were illustrated by the worker-priest movement, which initially embraced the political values of the Spanish agricultural workers and then reverted to humanitarian values when the collective political struggles collapsed. These humanitarian values were integrated into the organisation in its early years and consolidated with the
introduction of interculturalism. The shifts were also demonstrated in the British case study by the reappraisal that took place: in retrospect the political values of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggles were found to be flawed once these movements had subsided. In both organisations the humanitarian approach was prioritised and solidarity was with ‘vulnerable’ rather than political subjects. It would have been valuable to explore this process in migrants’ rights organisations that did not have a liberation theology orientation.

Another limitation to the empirical research was due to practical constraints – it was not feasible to carry out more than two in-depth case studies within the timescale of this research project. It would have been worthwhile to understand how the shift from the political to the humanitarian worked out in different national contexts (if at all). Finally, while the self-representation of migrants was analysed where it emerged, it was not the focus of this research. This aspect could have provided another layer of analysis. All these limitations point to future areas of research – for example, more case studies along similar lines to this study, in different countries and outside of the radical left-wing Christian tradition; and a study that explores self-representations of migrants to understand whether these coincide or clash with the shifting portrayals of migrants by the organisations.

The presence of the political thinker Hannah Arendt is clearly felt throughout this thesis, therefore, an explanation is required as to why I drew so heavily on her work and thinking. I started this research from the position of freedom of movement – that people should be able to move and settle in whichever country they choose and for whatever reason. I was curious to understand why the case-study organisations did not make freedom of movement for all migrants central to their notion of rights and justice. I found in Arendt’s writing scattered references to this fundamental negative liberty – ‘the prototypal gesture of being free’ (Arendt 1951c: 9) – and discovered how it was inseparable from her thinking on political action as freedom. Her much
quoted, and perhaps misunderstood, phrase ‘the right to have rights’ (2004 [1951]: 376) implied a territorially bounded place in which freedom – that is, political action – could become a reality:

The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective (ibid).

During the years of researching and writing this thesis, I have changed my thinking, prompted by Arendt: I have concluded that the notion of politics within borders does not necessarily constitute a lowering of horizons in what is politically possible if freedom is understood as synonymous with political action. On the contrary, it is only ‘within spatial limits’ (Arendt 2006 [1963]: 279) that freedom can become ‘not a concept, but a living political reality’ (Arendt 1951c: 14). The little known story of the university occupation by migrants in Seville, which so amazed me when I came across it, provided an example of one of those moments when ordinary people, in this case, migrant agricultural workers, came together and through their collective action created a space in which political action as freedom was glimpsed. The actors lived an intensely political time, and although it was short-lived and did not achieve its goal, it demonstrated how politics within borders can come to life when least expected, if people act together and take collective responsibility. They attempted to change national law and policy, and to make the Spanish government accountable to them, even though they were not citizens. Rather than interpreting this action by non-citizens as a negation of borders, I have understood this show of exacting political involvement as proof that freedom of movement is possible in a world that consists of territories delineated by borders (nation states in today’s world). It indicates to me that a more exacting political life within the nation state would make issues of migration (in terms of numbers of people, cultures and national origins) irrelevant. A polity in which people are integrated through their active participation is not a naïve idealised scenario but rather a recognition of our capacity
to act, and although we rarely experience it, the exhilarating sense of integration when we act politically. I never expected to find in my empirical investigation a tangible example of such a moment. Combined with my theoretical explorations this discovery leads me to be cautiously optimistic that one day we will find a practical resolution between freedom of movement, that quintessential expression of human agency, and the nation state, the prevailing political unit in the contemporary world.
Appendices

Appendix 1: documentary sources

Sevilla Acoge

Organisational documents:


Total number of pages: 1,000


Reports:

UCOMM union-communiste.org, July–August 2002. El encierro de inmigrantes en la Universidad Pablo de Olavide: la patronal y el gobierno preparan la explotación y el racismo.

Revista Mugak no. 21 2003. SOS Racismo Notas de reflexión en torno al encierro de la Olavide desde la Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía.

Newspaper articles:

El Ejido racist riot and migrant strike

El País 16th February 2000 Inmigrantes de El Ejido advierten de que el conflicto sigue vivo y puede ‘estallar’

El País 25th April 2000 Los magrebíes se encierran para exigir que se cumpla el pacto de El Ejido

El País 4th February 2001 “El apartheid” sobrevive en El Ejido

The occupation of the University of Pablo de Olavide, Seville, 2002:

El País 16th July 2002 El encierro de le la Pablo de Olavide cumple 36 días sin visos de solución inmediata

El País 10th July 2002 Chamizo liga la tramitación administrativa al fin de la protesta

Universia.net 8th August 2002 Finalizado el encierro de inmigrantes en la Universidad Pablo de Olavide

Rojoynegro.info 1st March 2003 La Universidad Pablo de Olavide ofreció trabajo y papeles a los inmigrantes que denunciaron a la Red

Webislam.com 25th June 2002 Manifiesto de la asamblea del encierro de trabajadores inmigrantes en la Universidad Pablo de Olavide (Sevilla).

Media interviews:

Praxis

Organisational documents:

Annual Reports from 1991–2012

Total number of pages: 200

Proposal for a city house church January 1981, written by Robert Kemble
Last will and testament May 1981, hand written by Robert Kemble
A proposition for a city church house April 1983
A history of 12, Goodge Place W1 March 1984, leaflet produced by RKCI
A collective structure – aims and principles 1985
A centre of contextual theology – a paper June 1985
Job advertisement June 1986
Evaluation report for 1980/90
Amendments to first draft of the management manual February 1992
Minutes of Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) meetings 1986–1993
Rooting the uprooted: a strategic plan 1997–2002
Business plan 1999–2000
Moving forward: business plan 2000–2003
The future governance of Praxis 15th July 2003

Conference reports:

Desolation or promise 1990
Latin America: Returning to democracy? 1994
Precarious lives and new migration: policy scenarios for vulnerable migrants 2012
**Other documents**

*Towards theology and ministry appropriate to the secular city*, article written by Robert Kemble published in ONE for Christian renewal.


**Newspaper articles:**

*Islington Gazette* July 2013 Family of Islington doctor accused of Rwandan genocide say UK government is ‘failing’ him

*Evening Standard* 6th January 2016 Doctor's relief as judge blocks extradition bid over genocide claims

**Online articles:**


**Media interviews:**


**Obituaries:**

*The Guardian* 17th July 2008 Luis Asdrúbal Jiménez,
Appendix 2: Interviewees

The names of interviewees have been preserved where they are known publically through their own published writing or through the media reporting on their activities relating to the case studies. The names of other interviewees are not used. When interviewees are directly quoted from interviews I conducted with them these interviews are coded according to organisation, number and year of interview, for example, SA 01 2011 – Sevilla Acoge, interview number one, conducted in 2011. In the case of the interview I quote from that was conducted by the Refugee Community History Project (RCHP), it appears as RCHP interview 2006. These codes do not appear in this appendix (see Chapter 5 on creating a buffer).

Case studies

Sevilla Acoge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Nature of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Esteban Tabares, <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> Worker-priest who worked with organisation since 1987</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> Duration: 65 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>12/05/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteban Tabares, <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> (as above)</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> Duration: 20 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>13/09/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> founder members</td>
<td>Face-to-face at <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> Duration: 53 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>13/09/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> founder members</td>
<td>Face-to-face at his workplace Duration: 30 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>14/09/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend of worker-priests in <em>Sierra Sur</em>, Seville and rural economist</td>
<td>Face-to-face in café Duration: 40 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>14/09/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Omar El Hartiti, intercultural mediator</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at <em>Sevilla Acoge</em></td>
<td>24/05/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Nature of interview</td>
<td>Date of interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>since 1990, chair of <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> since 2008</td>
<td>Duration: 74 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>25/05/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegalese intercultural mediator since 1999</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at <em>Sevilla Acoge</em> Duration: 45 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>28/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist and anthropologist, author of research on Senegalese migrant communities in Seville</td>
<td>Face-to-face in café Duration: 40 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>28/05/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Chamizo, Andalucían ombudsman</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at the Andalucian Duration: 30 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>17/06/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to Andalucían ombudsman</td>
<td>Face-to-face Duration: 20 mins Interview in Spanish</td>
<td>17/06/13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Praxis*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Nature of interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Praxis</em> chief executive</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his office at <em>Praxis</em> Duration: 103 mins</td>
<td>18/03/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of <em>Praxis</em> group members from 1990 to 1998</td>
<td>Phone interview Duration: 38 mins</td>
<td>16/04/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Two of <em>Praxis</em> group members from 1984 to 1991</td>
<td>Face-to-face at their workplace Duration: 32 mins</td>
<td>17/06/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of <em>Praxis</em> group members from 1984 to 2004</td>
<td>Face-to-face in café Duration: 60 mins</td>
<td>04/07/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employee of <em>Praxis</em> in 1990 and 1991</td>
<td>Face-to-face in her workplace Duration: 60 mins</td>
<td>23/08/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of <em>Praxis</em> group members from 1990 and Management Committee member from 2000 to 2012</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his workplace Duration: 65 mins</td>
<td>28/10/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employee of <em>Praxis</em> and <em>Praxis</em> group member from 1999 to 2007</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his workplace Duration: 60 mins</td>
<td>25/11/11</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Praxis</em> group member</td>
<td>Face-to-face in his workplace Duration: 60 mins</td>
<td>02/12/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workplace</td>
<td>Duration: 70 mins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asdrúbal Jiménez, <em>Praxis</em> group member who died in 2008</td>
<td>Interview conducted by Diana Palmerín in three face-to-face meetings at the interviewee’s home for the Refugee Community History Project (RCHP), archived in the Museum of London. Duration: 360 mins. Interview in Spanish.</td>
<td>02/02/06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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