City Research Online

Cyber Deterrence by Punishment: Role of Different Perceptions

Al Azwani, N. and Chen, T. ORCID: 0000-0001-8037-1685 (2018). Cyber Deterrence by Punishment: Role of Different Perceptions. Cyberpolitik Journal, 3(5), pp. 62-75.

Abstract

Nuclear deterrence based on mutual assured destruction seems to have successfully prevented a global nuclear war for decades. Can deterrence be effective for cyber attacks between nation-states? The cyber environment is drastically different from the nuclear case. A major difference is the possibility of different perceptions by the states which may lead to a failure of cyber deterrence. In this paper, we compare differences between nuclear deterrence and cyber deterrence. We adapt a game theoretic model from the nuclear case to the cyber environment and show that differences in perceived payoffs can lead to attack strategies where deterrence fails in cyberspace.

Publication Type: Article
Publisher Keywords: Cyber security; deterrence theory; cyber deterrence; game theory; cyber defense
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Departments: School of Mathematics, Computer Science & Engineering > Engineering > Electrical & Electronic Engineering
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/21894
[img]
Preview
Text - Accepted Version
Download (230kB) | Preview

Export

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

Actions (login required)

Admin Login Admin Login