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Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option

Che, X. and Yang, Y. (2012). Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option. Economics Letters, 116(3), pp. 469-471. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.031

Abstract

Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament effect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © Elsevier 2012. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: Cooperative R&D, Patent protection, R&D incentives
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Arts & Social Sciences > Economics
URI: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22464
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