Responding to Institutional Child Abuse in Ireland.

A Foucauldian Analysis

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THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REDACTED AT THE REQUEST OF THE AUTHOR, FOR REASONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY:

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**Declaration**

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Preface

A.1. Preface to Portfolio

This portfolio comprises three sections: an empirical research project, a publishable paper and an extended case study. Each piece of work was completed during my training as a counselling psychologist at City University and together they are intended to demonstrate my competencies as a Counselling Psychologist, in terms of theory, research and practice. The overarching theme of the portfolio is concerned with two fundamental questions: What are the conditions for the constitution of knowledge of abuse and emotionally difficult material? And how do we understand ourselves within that constitutive process? In other words, this portfolio is defined by two axes of inquiry which relate to epistemic and ontological questions.

The first section consists of a discourse analysis on the response to institutional child abuse in Ireland. The discourse analysis carried out is informed by the work of Michel Foucault, a French philosopher who came to prominence in the 1960s and whose work focused on the links between social practice, language and subjectivity. The scope of the analysis is restricted to two fields of inquiry: statutory reports on Irish industrial schools written between 1936 and 2009, and oral interviews, conducted in 2011 and 2012 with individuals who lived within the same topography of the industrial schools.

The objective of this research study was not to delineate the causes or the effects of institutional child abuse, but rather to inquire into the epistemological and ontological
constructions which govern the response to institutional child abuse. Therefore, previous research into institutional child abuse is examined from the same angle of inquiry, and its function as a discursive object is investigated. The problematic of a literature review as a discursive object embedded within the natural sciences is outlined and the foundations of formal research into child abuse are identified within a scientific and technological discourse. Psychological discourse is shown to construct discursive objects based on normativisation and categorization which create leveling effects, resulting in the ignoring of individual difference. The problem of universalist assumptions within the research field is raised, particularly with regard to the concept of universal rights.

The tension between official and unofficial research is taken up and framed as subjugating and subjugated knowledge. Examples of subjugated discourses discussed are literature, theatre and memoir and are considered as important responses to the problem of institutional child abuse. My study is located within the context of other discourse analytic research into institutional child abuse. The problem of research into child abuse and institutional child abuse is framed within a larger discourse of ethics and politics. It is posited that empirical research questions pivot around what is observable and visible and it is questioned whether this is a suitable methodology to inquire into that which escapes observation. In addition, research discourses appear to direct the gaze of the viewer inwards or outwards, and as such, may be classified as inward and outward-looking paradigms. Foucauldian analysis is described as a research approach which directs the gaze of the viewer on an intermediary space, between the outside and the inside, at the nexus of the individual and the social, and thus functions as a complementary research approach to traditional empirical methods, which predominately direct the gaze inwards.

The research brought to light rhetorical discourses which functioned as obfuscatory devices blocking off possibilities for the construction of institutional child abuse. Discourses
of medicine and economics were shown to operate in the construction of the subjectivity of the industrial school child according to a behaviorist paradigm. Scientific and normativising discourses were identified as key to the manner in which a response to the industrial schools was constructed. Contradictory constructions of the family were identified, in which the family was positioned as a locus for potential abuse or as a refuge from it. In addition, the systemizing effects of discourse are discussed, and it is shown how certain discursive formations such as information-processing contribute to systemizing and totalizing effects. It was concluded that discussion of institutional child abuse cannot be segregated from wider issues of law, science, medicine, education and the relationship of the state to the family. In other words institutional child abuse appears to be bound up with structures of civil and economic governance and therefore it may be meaningless to discuss institutional child abuse without reference to institutionalised child abuse.

Analysis of the interviews revealed that the response to the industrial schools is constructed by visual discourse in such a manner as to constitute a way of knowing that is truncated, atomized, split; and this implies that the ways we have of considering a problem are highly determined by socially constructed visual conventions such as the laws of Renaissance perspective. In addition, discourses of gender, democracy, nationality, religion and sexuality were found to constitute subjectivity into either/or binary opposites such as male/female, savage/polite, material/immaterial, tactics which lead to a construction of subjectivity based on categories rather than on dimensions, resulting in a petrification of subjectivity and a subsequent limitation in potential for being and knowing. The construction of ways of knowing and ways of being through language is further complicated by social disciplinary processes. The function of the institution as an instrument to discipline is examined with regard to how it positions those who are located inside the institution, and those who are located outside the institution. Implications for the clinical practice of
psychology within a social constructionist viewpoint are discussed and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is proposed as the appropriate model for a more robustly reflexive institutional psychological practice, which might allow psychologists to become more aware of how they are imbricated within discursive practice, especially in terms of regulatory and professional frameworks.

The publishable paper is a theoretical elaboration, from a psychoanalytic perspective, of an epistemological problematic identified in the empirical research, namely how knowledge of institutional abuse is split and how subjectivity is split in the constitution of that knowledge. Wilfred Bion’s description of a negative epistemology is used to analyse ways in which knowledge of institutional child abuse is constructed. The discussion of a negative epistemology is developed through an extended analysis of moral discourse. This is followed by an analysis of the response to institutional abuse using psychoanalytic theories of disavowal.

The case study was selected as a means of meditating on self and object relations expressed through oral themes. The case study examines the manner in which the client’s internal psychological life is characterized by isolation and emotional deprivation as a result of internal and external broken bonds. The effect of this isolation and deprivation results in the client using omnipotence and splitting as a means of defending from emotional pain. The case study offers an opportunity to view negative epistemic functions, alluded to in the empirical research, within the context of a dyadic therapeutic relationship.

The aim of this portfolio is to open up vistas of insight and reflection, where new self and social knowledge can be produced. It is hoped that the research study operates as a corrective to discourses marked by disavowal and denial, to evoke questions of how discourse masks or reveals abusive practices which are deeply embedded in social
transactions. It is my aim that this research study will contribute to research and to the living culture, in the sense intended by Simone Weil, when she spoke of culture as “the development of attention” (Weil, 1978, p.205). This is echoed by a respondent interviewed as part of my research who locates the potential redress to the problem of institutional child abuse within an intersubjective field of care, attention and responsibility, describing such a redress as:

“about the care of children, about the care of one another, about their responsibilities towards their own freedom, about their responsibilities that they have towards living in a society. This simply requires attention, constant attention and vigilance” (6, 239-243).
B.1 Abstract

The research study was carried out, using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis, (FDA) and involved the analysis of three statutory reports into institutional child abuse in Ireland: The Cussen Report (1936), The Kennedy Report (1970) and the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009). In addition to this, an analysis was carried out on interviews with civilians with regard to their responses to institutional child abuse. My study highlights the difficulty in demarcating institutional from institutionalised abuse and demonstrates how visual technology constructs the response to institutional child abuse. The research has brought to light significant discourses, such as a behaviourist discourse in which the subjectivity of the industrial school child was found to be constructed through the body. The key finding in this study relates to the manner in which the response to institutional abuse in Ireland appears to be bound up with processes of splitting of self and object. Subjectivity was identified as split and constructed as blind/seeing, able/disabled, male/female and so on and I have called this a fractured subjectivity. Moreover, the construction of splits in selves was shown to extend to splits between various out groups and in groups, resulting in agency and responsibility being delegated to others. Subjectivity was identified as thoroughly gendered and it was concluded that separation of gender from sex may allow for ways of rethinking essentialist accounts of personhood. The industrial school was identified as a disciplining and subjugating structure of those inside the institution and those outside the institution.
The objective of this study is to inquire into how response to institutional child abuse in Ireland is constructed through discourse, thus shedding light on how the response is constrained or liberated by specific discourses and on how individuals are positioned by these discourses. The method I have chosen to meet this objective is discourse analysis inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, and is sometimes referred to as Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). The rationale for adopting this method is discussed in the following chapter. Before introducing the socio-historical context of my research and its relation to previous research, the next section will begin with a clarification of the object of my study.

**Definitions and Demarcations**

If I presume that institutional child abuse exists a priori, as an object already extant in reality, then this would assume that institutional child abuse is not constructed through discourse, but is revealed by it. Contrary to this position the viewpoint held in this study is that institutional child abuse is a construction, a res artem object and not a res naturam object (to borrow terms used by Kroger & Wood, 1998), meaning that it is a constructed object which cannot be thought of as independent of linguistically-mediated influences. However, this does not resolve the problem of deciding the terms of reference and parameters for a review of previous research. An extensive review of the literature failed to identify previous research into how civilians construct institutional abuse. The paucity of research in this area was confirmed by Hoefnagels & Zwikker (2006) who confirmed the earlier findings
of Christy & Voigt (1994) that no studies of witnesses of child abuse (in terms of bystanders of violence) had appeared in the literature. These studies were based on the bystander theory of Latane and Darley (1970) who had found that the greater the number of bystanders, the greater the diffusion of personal responsibility and bystander apathy. However, my study seeks to analyse how the problem of institutional abuse is constructed and to predicate this on the fact of witnessing by adopting the bystander model of Latane and Darley would result in an error of method and a confusion of res naturam and res artum approaches.

Further complications are presented by the nebulosity of such terms as “abuse”, “institutions” and “child” which sponsor multiple and polyvalent constructions. The increasing specialization of professional research has necessitated and promoted conceptual demarcations, which are, in fact highly contestable. For example, in the growing literature on institutional child abuse, forensic settings do not seem to be incorporated within the field of research. An online search of child abuse, using the terms forensic and/or prison, failed to return any results linking incarceration to abuse, in the following journals: Child Abuse and Neglect (between 1977 and 2011), Child Maltreatment (between 1999 and 2011) and the Journal of Child Sexual Abuse (between 2000 and 2011). The vast majority of entries were concerned with improving the assessment diagnostic criteria of young inmates or on the effects of abuse on the child before incarceration, but I could not identify any study which identified incarceration as abuse within the terms of reference described above.

Institutional child abuse appears to be defined by assumed conventions rather than by any searching definition of institutional child abuse. Research categorization may deepen our knowledge of institutional child abuse but may also act as a false demarcator and function along the lines of the availability heuristic described by Tversky & Kahneman (1973), as a circular form of reasoning, where what is recalled is what is most familiar. In this sense, research paradigms may act as discourses which short circuit our view of phenomena. My
research study seeks to be alert to the discourses which reproduce a demarcating function, and this will be taken up later in the analysis of the reports where normative discourses are shown to have systemizing totalizing effects, reducing the possibilities of viewing an object in alternative ways.

Other problematic definitional issues stem from the restriction of the word institution to the physical setting; it is obvious that certain structures operate institutionally, even though they are not represented by stable physical boundaries, for example the army, or the Church. For instance, should hospitals be included in a review of the research? Research has indicated that abuse in hospitals may be higher than in the family home (Kendrick & Taylor, 2000). What conclusion can we draw from the fact that from the age of 16 a person can be enlisted into the British Army? An independent report into the recruitment procedures of the British Army claims that the UK is at odds with international policy which asserts that minors should not be exposed to the risks of a career in the army and found serious ethical problem with their recruitment of minors (Gee, 2007). Is this not institutional child abuse? What is institutional child abuse?

The problem of demarcating the terms of reference is thorny but perhaps a conceptual distinction may help if we distinguish between institutionalized child abuse and institutional child abuse. Institutionalized child abuse signifies child abuse that is rooted in institutional structures of governance within our society but is not necessarily locatable within a particular institution. Institutional child abuse is child abuse which occurs within a specified institution, whether that is a prison or the army. Institutional child abuse cannot occur in the absence of institutionalised child abuse. On the other hand, institutionalised child abuse can exist independent of institutional child abuse. Demarcating the terms of reference is clearly a matter of interpretation and some may argue that all child abuse is institutional. However, I wish to retain the distinction I have just made in order to provide an overview of the research
base, which will be framed within dialectic of these two conceptualisations. My inquiry is into the construction of institutional abuse as it pertains to the industrial school system in Ireland and my study will demonstrate how discussion of institutional abuse is embedded in larger institutional discourses, of law, medicine, the family, economics and so on. First, the history of the industrial school system as an institution will be briefly described in order to provide a socio-historical context for my research study.

**Socio-Historical Context of the Industrial School System**

I am mindful that a brief historical outline of the industrial school system is a socio-historical discursive practice in which certain anchor movements are privileged along a spatio-temporal line within a narrative shot through with assumptions of cause and effect, which ignores the possibility of events as merely sequential and contingent. However, written communication is proscribed and prescribed by these assumptions and in order to make ourselves understood it is necessary to work within these conventions. In brief, constructing one view of ourselves leads to a loss of another and paradoxically writing, whilst constitutive of experience, may also represent violence against experience, because to say one thing is to exclude another, a point made by Foucault in his key note speech upon being elected to the chair of philosophy at the College de France (Foucault, 1970, p.22). I draw attention to this, to emphasise how writing itself is a social construction, in which we are deeply immersed, and which is so freighted with silent assumptions that we often fail to see that writing and speaking are not transparent activities or simply descriptive acts of the world but the material marks of a human experience in the world, constituted by experience and constituting of experience. Despite these limitations, language can double-back on its own tracks and wonder about its own emergence and this reflecting and reflexive aspect of language is what makes discourse analysis a fertile ground of research.
My research is grounded in the changing discourses and debates around the detention of children in Irish industrial schools in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but the origins of the industrial schools go back much earlier to the late 18th century. In 1771, legislation in the UK provided for the provision of funds at local parish level for the hiring of overseers for the maintenance and education of orphaned children. Developments such as the “ragged schools” first started by John Pounds in 1818 provided free education for orphans and this became a prototype for a type of institutional structure for the care of children, but this was not organized at the level of central government (Schupf, 1972).

The problem of orphaned and destitute children was magnified by the huge population increases in the 19th century which overwhelmed the structural capacities of parochial organization. In 1851 a report was published by Mary Carpenter called the “Reformatory Schools for the children of the perishing and dangerous classes and for juvenile offenders” (Carpenter, 1968). The title of Carpenter’s report betrays the dual function of the reformatory schools which was to provide security for the “perishing classes” but also to ensure the security of others who might be susceptible to the “dangerous classes”. In other words, the report constructed these children as perishing and dangerous, as both threatened and threatening. The secure (incarcerated) child functions as a surety for the financial stability of the bourgeois classes. This was given vivid form by Charles Dickens (2009) in his novel Oliver Twist published in 1838, in which discourses of charity, economics, justice, crime, childhood, and anti-Semitism construct the problematic of care of orphaned children as embedded in the relationship between bourgeois and childhood security. The original title of the novel was A Parish Boy’s Progress, which expressed the changing socio-economic dynamics in 19th century Britain marked by a shift from parochial organization to urban concentration. During the same period in France, de Balzac’s novel Le Père Goriot
performed a similar function in depicting the social transformations which occurred because of the influx of citizens to the city from the provinces (de Balzac, 1835/2004).

Industrial schools were first established in Britain as a result of the 1854 Industrial Schools Act and the 1857 Reformatory Schools Act (Departmental committee on reformatory and industrial schools, 1896). In Ireland in 1853, 77,000 children under the age of 15 were living in workhouses (an estimated 6.5% of the age cohort), with an unknown number of street urchins living wild in the towns and countryside. (Commission of inquiry into the reformatory and industrial school system & Cussen, 1936). It is estimated that in excess of 80,000 children passed through the Irish industrial schools between certification in 1859 and 1936 (Cussen, 1936) and a further 170,000 children passed through these institutions between 1936 and 1970, estimated at about 1.2% of the age cohort according to the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009).

There were three government-instigated reports into the industrial school system, spanning seven decades: the Commission of inquiry into the reformatory and industrial school system & Cussen (1936), also known as the Cussen Report (1936); the Committee on Reformatory and Industrial and Industrial Schools (1970), also known as the Kennedy Report, and the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009), also known as the Ryan Report. A report commissioned by the Archbishop of Dublin into Artane, the largest industrial school in the country, was written by Fr Henry Moore in 1962 but was shelved because of its critical nature (Raftery & O’ Sullivan, 1999). However, public criticism of the industrial schools was not entirely unknown. As early as 1946, the founder of Boystown, the US organisation for orphaned boys, Edward Flanagan said during a public meeting in the Savoy cinema in Cork City:
"You are the people who permit your children and the children of your communities to go into these institutions of punishment. You can do something about it, first by keeping your children away from these institutions" (as cited in Raftery & O’ Sullivan, 1999, p. 190)

The disavowal of knowledge about institutional abuse extended deeply into Irish socio-cultural life and there was entrenched resistance to the acknowledgement of institutional abuse of children in Ireland until well into the 1990s which calls to mind the observation made by Wittgenstein: “The way to solve the problem you see in life, is to live in a way that makes what is problematic disappear” (1980, p.27). The stimulus for a discursive shift in Irish public life with regard to the industrial school system coincided with the advent and popularization of television in the 1960s and 1970s which introduced countercultural discourses such as women’s liberation and gay rights (Holt & Sheehan, 1997). The screening of televised documentaries such as “Dear Daughter” (Lentin, 1996); “Stolen Lives” (Lentin, 1999) and “States of Fear” (Raftery & O’Sullivan, 1999) documented chronic abuse of children in religious-run institutions and provoked public debate and further media coverage. In 1999 the state issued an apology to those who had been in these institutions and the government passed the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, which sat from 2000 to 2009, during which time, the testimonies of 1,014 witnesses were heard in relation to abuses committed between 1922 and 2000 (Cica, 2009, p. 10). The findings were published on the 20th May 2009 to extensive media coverage which led to a debate on historical institutional child abuse in Ireland. The following sections of this introduction will be taken up with a discussion of the historical and contemporary research into institutional child abuse but the manner in which this will be elaborated as part of a literature review has to be outlined first.
Problematic of the Literature Review

The emphasis of my study is on the epistemic and ontological constructions which govern the response to institutional child abuse rather than on a delineation of its effects and accordingly, an exhaustive review of the literature on institutional abuse, child abuse or child sexual abuse, while partially relevant, is tangential to my main concern which is to investigate how the industrial school system was constructed by those outside the system, living extra muros, in the wider society. The literature review is central to scientific method, and a cornerstone of psychological science, but rarely are its implicit assumptions scrutinized, such as the required bird’s eye perspective, which encourages authorial conventions of the traditional 19th century novel, freighted with categories of omniscience, transcendence, and the concretization of abstract universals such as the “good”, the “divine”, the “sublime” and so on. In short, the literature review is saturated with assumptions of progress and narrative coherence, assumptions which obscure inconsistencies and incongruities within and between research findings. Foucault did not use a comprehensive review of the literature as a platform for his own research work, a stance which has been criticized by scholars for its eschewal of scholarly procedural conventions (Merquior, 1991). Accordingly, it may be argued that a conventional literature review is inconsistent with the methodological approach I apply.

However, to criticise a standard approach without proposing another is to invite unwelcome criticism of nihilism. According to the psychoanalyst, Neville Symington, (1986) in his discussion of hermeneutics, the Hebrew way of addressing a subject is to contemplate a subject in the round, using different perspectives to illuminate the subject, whereas the Greek way is to argue by way of logical stages, an approach which excludes the illogical, irrational, discontinuous experience which lies at the heart of human experiencing. To adopt this distinction between traditions, my approach is not to abandon the literature review but to apply a review in accordance with the Hebraic approach, by examining research into
institutional child abuse in the round, how it comes to be constituted by various discursive formations. The objective of this approach is to document how different kinds of research into institutional child abuse function as discursive formations which construct distinct discursive objects, and in this manner are different qualities of a response to the phenomenon investigated. My aim is to illustrate how the literature review is in itself a discursive practice, which may facilitate one kind of knowledge or foreclose another.

I acknowledge the necessary lacunas dictated by my approach but envisage that a review of the literature from a discursive perspective in the round will illustrate how an overprivileging of certain discourses leads to a fragmentation of points of view and truncated perspectives. The manner in which this is discursively constituted is a major thematic motif of this thesis and will be elaborated on later. This problem of specialization in research has also been observed to be replicated within the clinical context of institutions: “policies requiring excessive specialization do not lend themselves to effective treatment and further contribute, albeit tangentially, to institutional abuse” (Shaughnessy, 1984, p.317). My overview of various kinds of research discourses does not attempt to solve this problem of fragmentation, but rather to bring it into relief.

Scientific Discourse

The formal beginnings of a sustained inquiry into child abuse came to be identified with a landmark paper written in 1962 which introduced the term “battered child syndrome” and which emphasized the physical nature of child abuse (Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuel & Silver, 1962). In addition, this study was made possible by technological discourse in the form of detailed radiological scans showing fractures of bones in infants aged between five and eight months. According to Krieger (2003), the publication of Kempe at al.’s findings was significant, not because it introduced the concept of child abuse to an
unsuspecting medical and lay community, but because it was published in a mainstream scientific journal, the Journal of the American Medical Association. Krieger points out there had been many organisations, religious and secular who had been working since the 1800s to address issues of family violence and child abuse but Kempe’s paper authorized and galvanized the response into an issue which demanded and received attention. In other words, Krieger locates the beginning of research into child abuse as fundamentally anchored within and made possible by scientific discourse.

The emergence of a response to child abuse is clearly imbricated within institutional and technological discourses which constitute the valence of what can or cannot be said. The question of the response to institutional abuse can now be turned on its head; is the response (or lack of) to child abuse a form of institutionalised child abuse? The question brings the issue of institutional child abuse outside of a discussion of the phenomenon as a problem locatable in and restricted to certain grounds of experience such as specific socio-economic groups, ethnic groups, levels of educational-attainment groups and so on because if we accept that we are dealing with child abuse which is institutionalised, the problem becomes a problem of the institutions which govern all of us. The question is now no longer, a problem of theirs prompting a response along the lines of what can we do to help them. The problem is now reformulated as a problem of ours and what should we do to help ourselves. The two positions may prompt a response of helping but they are both framed from entirely different ethical perspectives; the first position is predicated on an ethical choice whereas the second is predicated on an ethical responsibility.

The role of technological discourse in the constructions deployed by scientific discourse is exemplified in the predominance of neuroscientific discourse over the past decade, made possible by the development of technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Neuroscience as a discourse has become mobilised within
scientific and popular cultures, as can be seen in the abundance of popular and controversial works on neuroscience (Lehrer, 2007; Gladwell, 2008, Amthor, 2011). Each stage of the development of scientific discourse has been characterised by a developments of optical technology which amplifies vision at the telescopic and microscopic poles of inquiry. In other words scientific innovation is constituted by visual technological discourse. The origins of empiricism as rooted in vision is clearly stated in the opening lines of Aristotle’s metaphysics (2012) which marked a shift from the previously dominant Platonic discourse of idealism, a shift from the application of concepts and syllogistic logic to observation, from universals to particulars:

“we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things”

(p.1)

The empirical method resulted in major achievements in the technological mastery of our environment. The importance of visual discourse in the response to institutional child abuse is discussed in the next chapter with reference to geometry, architecture, painting and film.

However, what if the object of investigation does not appear in the field of vision? For example, later in this study I will show how discourse plays a central role in the repression of a response to institutional child abuse because of a splitting of object and self which banishes the object from a field of vision. Therefore, the limitations of a purely empirical method are exposed in the response to institutional child abuse. Secondly, I contend that empirical psychological discourse constructs the gaze of the viewer inwards, as a result of visual technological discourse. For example, radiology brings into the field of visibility the fractures which result from physical abuse. Neuroscience directs our gaze inwards using fMRI to analyse changes in cortical functioning. Foucault critiques psychological science as an
instrument of objectification because it derives from the shift in 19th century medical discourse when the body became an object to be scrutinised. However, we are faced with a paradox for is it not the case that some processes of objectification, such as Kempe’s study of the fractured bones of the infant, has the discursive effect of bringing into the zone of visibility the phenomenological reality of the child? In other words, scientific discourse as an objectifying instrument may also restore or bring into play the subjectivity of the object. However, in order to gain an insight into the relation of institutional child abuse to institutionalised child abuse we need to turn to other discourses which redirect our gaze back outwards into the social networks, the polis.

**Political Discourse**

It is possible that inward-looking paradigms of research into child abuse described above function to deepen a schism between clinical research and politics. This contrasts with research into child abuse from an earlier period in the 1970s such as the work of the prominent child abuse researcher David Gil (1970) on violence towards children. Gil has stated that the “primary prevention (of child abuse) is a political problem rather than a purely technical or professional issue” (Gil, 1975/2010, p. 346). Gil defines child abuse as “inflicted gaps in children’s circumstances that prevent actualization of inherent potential”. Such a statement is problematic, primarily because it results in a statement with little heuristic value because it is applicable to all children. It is also too vague for it to be operationalized and it collapses the important difference (constructed or otherwise) of child abuse and its absence. Gil’s stance has been criticised as overly attributing child abuse to economic determinants (Haddock & McQueen, 1983). However, Gil’s research may have shortcomings from the viewpoint of applied psychology but is conceptually fruitful because of the emphasis he places on child abuse as intrinsically bound up with socio-economic constructions. In other
words, the discursive function of this research is to bring into view the overlap between institutionalised child abuse and institutional child abuse.

Gil’s argument that the issue of child abuse needed to be addressed within a political dimension was reiterated by Finkelhor (1998) who advocated an international approach and underlined the importance of socio-economic interventions. More recently Gil’s approach has been taken up by O ’Donnell, Scott & Stanley (2008) who raise two important questions, which are linked to the notion of primary or secondary interventions. They ask whether child abuse intervention should be primarily addressed using a public health approach based on population measures and epidemiology, where universal healthcare, social and educational services are provided, which they call primary intervention. The second question they propose is whether secondary based measures such as targeted programs (for substance abuse or parent re-education) are effective at reducing abuse in these families, and they identify conflicting evidence for the success of these targeted program. Other studies on child abuse seem to lend support to the public health approach such as that approach undertaken by Ben Arieh (2010) in Israel who found a relation between locality hardship and higher child maltreatment rate. The study also established a clear relation between availability of social services and reported child maltreatment rates and the author recommended tackling unemployment and support for single-parent families as the best approach for combatting child abuse. In other words, this research is anchored in political discourse which is orientated outwards, and telescopes the problem of institutionalised child abuse as a social, national and international problem. The debate on institutionalised child abuse has become increasingly politicised over the past decade, especially in relation to children’s rights but this is not an unproblematic area.
Discourse of Universal Rights

Crossmaker (1991) has made a case for the setting up of a default mechanism for the safe-guarding of children’s rights in institutions. She argues that the institutionalised child loses privacy and freedom and that this amounts to de facto abuse, and to balance this deficit there must be an automatic credit of extra care to counter the child’s losses of freedom and privacy. Crossmaker’s insight is elegant in its simplicity. It is not merely a question of preventing abuse after the child has entered the institution; there must be a redress of the abuse that has already happened by virtue of the child’s institutionalisation. Crossmaker’s formation is in social work and legal rights and thus her work is informed by these discourses. Her discussion of privacy and freedom as rights is problematic because of the universalization of these putative rights and it may be argued that such rights are relative and derive from specific discursive formations such as Protestant discourse with its emphasis on individual rights and individual conscience, which has been shown to be inextricably linked to the rise of capitalism (Weber, Boehr & Wells, 2003). This discourse contrasts with the notion of communality emphasised, for example, in Catholic discourse where the social body is conceptualised as the mystical body of the Church, the communio sanctorum, the absence of which the building of the Gothic cathedrals in the 12th century would have been unimaginable because such a feat was predicated on the communality of the anonymous builders and not on individual identity. Therefore, we cannot presume or assume that individual rights are intrinsically good or bad things; they are objects constructed out of social discourses, and their effects are always subject to value judgements.

The concept of universal rights for children based on culturally and historically relative norms has been criticised as a “spurious universality” which collapses temporal, spatial and historical differences in the experience of children (Burman, 2008 p.27). In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the discourse of children’s rights. For instance, an
ombudsman for children modelled on a UN model, and applied to childcare, has been advocated as a potential partial solution to the problem of abuse of children in foster care (Marzick, 2007). The origin of the idea for national ombudspersons for children lies not in national policy but in the UN Convention for the Rights of the Child (Assembly, 1989). In Ireland, the office of ombudsperson for children was set up in 2004. These developments demonstrate the efficacy of political pressure exerted on government institutions to protect the rights of its citizens. However, as pointed out above, the enshrining of children’s rights is based on a universalist assumption which ignores the social, cultural and historical specificities of children’s experiences. Moreover, the discourse of rights does not result in the automatic translation of an aspirational discourse into a descriptive discourse. After all, slavery continued in America for almost a century after the founding of the American constitution, ostensible guarantor of the rights of all men as born equal (Dahl, 2003).

In Ireland the debate on child abuse has become framed around a question of rights and a constitutional referendum was passed on the 10th November 2012, which provided further recognition of the “impresscriptible rights” of the child. At first glance, the passing of this amendment appears to be a positive symbolic gesture in that the child’s relative vulnerability is given further recognition in law. However, I think this discourse of rights constructs and perpetuates a view that the problem of child abuse is a problem of nominalism, that changing the words will change the structures which give rise to abusive practice, and this tactic distracts from the failure to implement extant social protection mechanisms or to create new ones, that might effect structural change, leading to an amelioration in the care of children. It must be also borne in mind that Ireland ratified the International Labour Organisation Forced Labour Convention (1930) and the European Convention of Human Rights (1950) and both conventions were routinely infringed through the operation of the industrial schools during the twentieth century. It may seem incompatible to locate individual human rights as part of
the same discursive matrix as the right to bear arms and to amass wealth and property for individual gain, but these are all legacies of a discourse which constructs the individual as separate to and apart from the community. The next section will focus on a medial space between the wider social body and the individual by concentrating on the discourse of the family.

**Discourse of the Family**

The family is the most basic unit of social organisation and therefore it may be argued that it is an institution and abuse that occurs within that structure is institutional abuse. However, I wish to preserve the dialectical contrast between institutional child abuse and institutionalised child abuse outlined above and prefer to view the family within the latter frame. The family as a ground of institutionalised child abuse can be examined because it is a field in which circulates legal, religious, biblical, patriarchal discourses.

Durkin (1982) found that abuse in institutions often replicates the abuse in the family home setting, and recommended that systems therapy should be used as an intervention to address abuse. However, there is a salient difference between institutional abuse and intra-familial abuse wherein girls far outnumber boys as the victims of sexual abuse in the family. McFadden & Ryan (1992) found that the group most at risk in foster homes were girls and older children. However, in the UK, Gallagher (2000) has found that the majority of children abused in institutions were boys, which is a reversal of the paradigm of intrafamilial abuse. Gallagher also found that contrary to simplistic media representations, institutional abuse occurred across a wide variety of institutions and occupational sites. There is some evidence that a lack of leadership or the wrong kind of leadership plays a pivotal role in the existence of institutional abuse in settings in Japan in which local authorities viewed residential
institutions as the last resort for their employees to be disciplined for their misconduct (Tsuzaki, 1997). In other words, the hierarchy in local government leadership did not value the leaders of residential care units. This mirrors the situation in Ireland in which impoverished and poorly educated Brothers were entrusted with the care of industrial school children (Raftery & O’Sullivan, 1999). The role of leadership has been implicated in the attenuation or amplification of institutional abuse, and it has been argued that the potential for negative models of authority and leadership, which preserve the rights of the adult over the child, may be offset by the counterbalancing effects of an external authority such as a “Commissioner for Children” (Hawkins & Briggs, 1997). This aspect of leadership may be tied up with patriarchal structures and more research is needed in this complex area of family and social governance.

The links between religious discourse and patriarchy have been drawn out by Kennedy (2000) in her review of a ten-year period of therapeutic work with Christian clients who had been sexually abused as children. She found that these clients had invoked male deities and tenets of belief which had hindered them from disclosing sexual abuse. This finding suggests that child abuse is bound up with social/religious/mythological discourses and the authority of the patriarch. It must also be remembered that Western culture is constructed out of a Judeo-Christian tradition, in which the bible functioned as a discursive cynosure. O’Gallagher (1997) gives a fascinating account of the legal history of institutionalized child abuse, which he locates within biblical discourse, citing the example of Abraham’s plan to sacrifice Isaac, the drowning of Hebrew infants at the time of the birth of Moses and Herod’s slaughter of the innocents, as examples of ritualised form of child cruelty. Gallagher extends his discussion to practices of infanticide in ancient Rome, as illustrated in the Romulus and Remus mythology and quotes Hadrian, “*patria potestas in pietate debed, non in atrociate, consistere*” (parental authority should be exercised in affection, not atrocity) which points to
a culture of cruelty towards children which needed to be checked by legal discourse (1997, p. 8).

Considered together, these studies all point to child abuse as institutionalised within a patriarchal structure, as codified in the laws of the father (God, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed). Thus, the role of leadership might be linked to the role of the father within familial structures and social discourses which seems to map onto Jacques Lacan’s concept of the entry of the individual into the symbolic world as mediated by the law of the father (Lacan, 1973). It is likely that cultural discourses such as banking, law, medicine etc. which mediate our social relationships are based on these original codifications of the law of the father. Thus, it may be that child abuse, according to our contemporary constructions, may be located within a socio-historical formation, that it is institutionalised in the historico-legal-religious codes. The construction of the family, with regard to a response to institutional child abuse, will be taken up later in the analysis of the reports and interviews. I will be paying particular attention to discussions of legitimacy/illegitimacy, gendered subjectivity and relationship between patriarchy and abuse. This study queries concepts of individuality and my analysis will show how the subjectivity of the individual is fractured and that the boundary between the community and the individual is more porous than is ordinarily assumed. Adopting a Foucauldian line it may be argued that the dominant form of psychological research over the past century has followed on from medical discourse in taking as the individual its proper object of subject and thus perpetuates the concept of an individual subject, set apart and autonomous from the social body.

**Psychological Discourse**

What is kind of object is indicated by the term psychological discourse and what kind of object does it create? Firstly, it has to be acknowledged that there are different
psychologies which construct different discursive objects. Naturally, there is an overlap between scientific discourse and psychological discourse, as the new discipline of psychology modelled itself on the natural sciences in the early part of the twentieth century. Since then, there have been many different kinds of psychological approaches, underpinned by a plurality of epistemological sources. However, in this section I wish to discuss the discourse of psychological science, an empirical methodology which continues to maintain hegemony in the field of Western academic and clinical psychology. In brief, this discourse of psychological science is usually defined by empirical criteria of validity and reliability, concepts which allow for the generalising of findings based on hypothetical statistical probabilities of deviance or convergence around a norm.

Much of the recent research on institutional child abuse in Ireland was led by Professor Alan Carr based at University College Dublin, under the auspices of the Commission to Inquire into Child abuse (2009), which commissioned and funded research into the effects of institutional abuse on children. Prior to this, research had been carried out in Canada on abuse in religious institutions similar to those in Ireland. The detrimental effects of institutional abuse were documented by Wolfe, Francis & Straatman (2006) who found that 42% of its research sample of male “survivors” of a Canadian religious institution fulfilled a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In Ireland, Carr and colleagues profiled “survivors” of institutional abuse for different attachment styles, using the Experience in Close Relationships Inventory, and found that 44% of those assessed had fearful attachment styles (Carr et al 2009). It was also found that the more resilient survivors had more secure attachment styles (Flanagan et al, 2009). They also investigated three different domains of institutional abuse (physical, sexual and emotional) and their effects on survivors and found the prevalence of psychological disorders among survivors to be over 80% and those who had experienced both institutional and intrafamilial abuse showed higher trauma symptoms and
insecure attachment styles than those who had not experienced both institutional and intrafamilial abuse (Fitzpatrick et al, 2010). In profiles of adults survivors of severe sexual, physical and emotional institutional abuse, they found that those who had experienced sexual abuse had the most abnormal profile for PTSD, stress disorder, substance and alcohol misuse, antisocial personality disorder, trauma symptoms and life problems and survivors of severe emotional abuse were better adjusted than survivors of sexual or physical abuse (Carr et al, 2010).

The work carried out by Carr and colleagues has shed a much-needed light on the psychological sequela (according to criteria established apriori) of those adults who had been children in the institutions. However, there is a problem raised by the use of norms established by psychological measures which are introduced as if they were not contingent on historical constructions. Secondly, these constructs are retrospectively hypothesized to correlate with a period in the past in which these constructs may not have existed. An argument in defence of these studies would be that the results of the measures are compared against a contemporary norm and that this offers a reliable result and there is a measure of good sense in this defence. However, we should be cautious and maintain a scepticism towards measures such as attachment styles or PTSD which are presented as universal truths which inhere in human nature, but are more likely to be manifestations of cultural construction, which is not to say that they should not be treated seriously. Psychological science constructs a hypothesized object, for example post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as located within the individual, and therefore the focus of attention is necessarily inward-looking, that the discursive function of this particular example is to direct the gaze of the viewer back into where the hypothesized PTSD is located, inside the ex-resident and this may distract our gaze from the importance of trying to understand the relationship between the individual and the wider institution in which she is located. To critique these studies is not
I will restrict my discussion to an aspect common to all of these studies mentioned above and this is the normative use of the word “survivor” deployed to signify those who were resident in the industrial schools. The use of the word “survivor” begs the question whether the term is used transitively or in transitively. If the latter, the ex-residents are presumed to be survivors for having been in the institutions and therefore the term acts as an umbrella terms designating those who passed through the institutions, thus collapsing their experience into one term, and potentially repeating the phenomenon of objectification which has been critiqued in these reports. Moreover, many of those who testified to the commission asked for the positive aspects of their experiences in Industrial schools to be acknowledged (Cica, p.16, 2009). The overwhelmingly negative national and international reaction to the Cica report on the industrial schools has meant that such an acknowledgement of the positive has been lost in a universalising negativism of their experience. If the term “survivor” is considered in the transitive form, this leads us to ask what exactly has been survived of those who lived in the industrial schools. The term “survivor” may be potentially minimising of the experiences of those who experienced abuse because it implies an equivalence between psychological survival and biological survival and steers us in the direction of an equivalence of mind and body. Of course, the term may be the best choice as a shorthand term of reference because we must struggle with the limitations of language which may be inadequate to represent experience. My objective is simply to point out that the discursive function and effects of such a term are quite complex.

Psychological science may be described as an inward-looking paradigm and therefore throws little light on the links between the institution and structures outside, on the relationships between the institution and the wider community. In my view there is a
reflexive and retrospective myopia that blinds psychologists in Ireland to the collective failure of the discipline of psychology to respond to problem of care of the industrial school children from the 1920s onwards. This raises the question whether psychological discourse is in itself complicit in institutionalised child abuse, due to this historically inert response and this calls into question whether empiricism is an adequate epistemology for the understanding of complex social phenomena. Foucault critiqued the growing power of disciplines such as psychiatry, medicine and psychology to intervene in people’s lives (1971, 1972, 1977). Foucault claimed that these discourses functioned as dividing and classifying practices which resulted in the objectification of subjects. Central to these dividing practices was the increasing role of scientific classification, whereby the methods used by scientists such as Linnaeus in his taxonomy of botanical life, were used to classify individuals in relation to a hypothesized norm. In Foucault’s view this has resulted in the grouping of individuals into categories of normal or anomalous when these very categories are, in fact, historically contingent but the authority of scientific classification presents contingencies as causes. The effect of these dividing and classifying practices is that:

“The subject is objectified by a process of division whether within himself or from others” (Foucault, as cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 9)

This is a central theme of this study and I will later show how the subjectivity is split by multiple discourses such as rhetoric, science, architecture, law, the family and so on. Therefore, it is not difficult to see how psychological science might come in for a harsh critique from a Foucauldian perspective because it is structured around principles of division and classification in relation to normative accounts of human behaviour. As stated earlier, empiricism is based on observation and vision and these methods can only show us what we are capable of seeing; they do not tell us why we cannot see. Arguably, the potential drawback of the empirical method alerts us to the need to look for other research discourses
which might provide some insight into the historical blindness to institutional child abuse in Ireland. Psychoanalytic discourse offers a contrasting approach to thinking about institutional child abuse because of its focus on unconscious phenomena which can be inferred but not directly observed.

**Psychoanalytic Discourse**

Psychodynamic theorists such as Shields (2007) draw attention to how institutions can operate as contexts which deaden thinking, as locations of non-thought. Public inquiries have been described as “comets which come in the public gaze, enjoy a brief period of spectacular display, fade gradually, and disappear” (Coldrey, 2000, p. 34). Implicit in this analysis is the idea that public inquiries may provoke and evoke disparate feelings and intense reactions but the inquiry itself might function as a way of exhausting feelings, of paradoxically stymieing long term reflection and thinking, thus repeating the phenomenon which Shields argues is the defining characteristic of institutional abuse: lack of reflection. For example, the Irish public inquiry into child sexual abuse (Cica, 2009) resulted in vituperative attacks on the Church, which is understandable considering the role of the Church in running these institutions, but this scapegoating of the Church also diverted attention to responsibilities which lie in secular areas of Irish civilian life.

A recent study (Charleton, 2012) into the abuse of children in institutional care in 20th century Ireland was based on a moral psychology developed by the psychoanalyst Eric Fromm. Charleton puts forward the view that institutional abusers suppressed their individual freedom and found psychological security in a Catholic theology which emphasised self-abnegation. Poor economic and social conditions were seen as factors which contributed to members not developing a healthy relationship to their own freedom. Although this is a speculative inquiry, Charleton’s line of argument is supported by a study into the moral
psychology of rescuers or bystanders during the holocaust (Monroe, 2008) in which bystanders were found to view themselves as passive, lacking in control and efficacy in contrast to rescuers who were found to have a strong sense of individuality and were motivated by moral values that did not depend on the support or approval of other people. This warrants further study because it may be that the institutional structures we create in our societies promote passivity, conformity and this appears to contribute to the constitution of subjectivity which is complicit in abusive practice. Foucault’s concept of subjectivising subjectivity and subjected subjectivity may provide a fresh insight at this point; the former is a subjectivity in which the subject is active in its own formation and this allows for the possibility of resistance, whereas the latter is marked by a turning of the subject into a “docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault, 1977, p.198).

According to Visker (1995) subjectivisation involves “procedures which enable something to recognise itself as a subject” (p.81). The research carried out by Charleton and Shield seems to suggest that institutional child abuse is located in contexts in which subjectivity is subjected. The next section offers the viewpoint that there are unofficial kinds of knowledge which function in the reverse sense in that they are shown to subjectivise subjectivity.

Subjecting/Subjectivising Knowledge

Literature

The role of the industrial schools in 19th and 20th century Ireland has been largely absent from the work of leading historians of contemporary Ireland (Bartlett, 2010; Brown, 1981, 2004; Connolly, 1998; Fleming & O’ Day, 2005; Foster, 1989, 1992, 2001, 2008; Hickey & Doherty, 2003; Hill, 2003; Kee, 2003; Lee, 1989; Lyons, 1973; Moody & Martin 2001). Some attempts have been made to redress this lacuna in more recent historical work
(Raftery & O’ Sullivan, 1999; Ferriter, 2010). Interestingly, Maria Luddy (2007) has written about the Irish industrial school system within the historical context of prostitution in Ireland. It is perhaps no accident that prostitution, a significant occupation and preoccupation for women has been largely excluded from general historical accounts. This may be because we live in an era in which history continues to be written by men of letters in which the experiences of women and children appear to be of liminal concern. This ties in with Foucault’s critique of the social sciences as propagating discourses which limit our field of vision and impel us to prioritise certain experiences and to negate others.

Larson makes a useful distinction between two types of knowledge: subjugating and subjugated knowledge where the former is often represented by legal and medical discourses which possess a “cognitive exclusiveness”, (Larson as cited in McDonough, 2010 p.5) whereas subjugated knowledge includes emotional as well as rational knowledge. In Ireland, knowledge of institutional abuse subjugated in official accounts found expression in other avenues, in literature, theatre and memoir. In this sense, literature and theatre conveyed an image of a society riven by structures of abusive practices and cruelty towards children and adults. However, these subjugated discourses in turn offer the potential to subjectivise subjectivity because of the eschewal of normative strategies in the depiction of individuality.

violence, infanticide and incest in Portia Coughlan, *By the Bog of Cats* (2000) and *On Raftery’s Hill* (2002). These writers portrayed a traumatised and traumatising society, contrasting with the official accounts of Ireland, such as the 1943 broadcast of President Devalera, calling on the Irish people to share his dream of “a land whose countryside would be bright with the laughter of comely maidens” (Lee, 1989, p. 241). Four out of five children born between 1931 and 1941 emigrated in the 1950s and as Lee suggests, “The self-image of a traditional Ireland, was, it may be suggested, characterised less by hypocrisy than a capacity for self-deception on a heroic scale” (p. 652)

These works mentioned above are examples of a literary discursive object which functions as a screen upon which abuse is depicted as transecting Irish social and political life, an abuse which is inseminated into the social and individual play of difference. This is brought most vividly to life in in James Joyce’s *Dubliners* (1992) published in 1914 in which physical and moral paralysis cuts through the stories as a means of illustrating the apathetic and passive condition of Irish society. *Counterparts* tells the story of a Catholic clerk who occupies a craven position in a Protestant firm, who escapes from work by becoming drunk and socialises with other subjugates and prostitutes before returning home to beat his child. In one short story Joyce traces a relay system of institutionalised abuse which becomes displaced from work context to social context, from class to class, from gender to gender, and from generation to generation.

**Memoir**

In addition to literary representations of abusive practice, there has been a growing repertoire of survivor memoirs. (Doyle, 1988; Flynn, 2003, O’ Malley, 2005; Touher, 2001; Tyrell, 2006). One of the most interesting of these memoirs is *Founded on Fear*, by Peter Tyrell, who was a detainee in Letterfrack industrial school during the 1930s. He later joined
the British Army and spent four months in a prisoner of war camp in Germany in 1944 which he described as “heaven on earth” compared to what he had experienced in Letterfrack industrial (Tyrell, 2006, p. 308). He died by setting fire to himself on Hampstead Heath in 1967. Tyrell had campaigned vigorously in the 1950s, writing to political leaders and church representatives, for the closure of Letterfrack. Owen Sheehy Skeffington, an Irish senator, encouraged Tyrell to write an account of his experiences. This became Tyrell's memoir which was recently found among Skeffington's papers by the editor Diarmuid Whelan (Tyrell, 2006).

Unfortunately, Tyrell’s campaign to inform those in power of the abuses inflicted on defenceless children was ignored by those in authority. This calls to mind the well-known passage from Primo Levi's account of survival, where he describes a recurring dream of the inmates of the concentration camps: after surviving their ordeal, they would tell their families of what had happened but the listeners would turn their back on the survivors, rather than listen to the horror of what had happened (Levi, 1987). The following excerpt from Tyrell’s account challenges the construction of “survivor” which has been interrogated above:

“Convents and industrial schools are places where children are destroyed mentally and sometimes physically” (Tyrell, 2006, p. 322).

We can see clearly how Tyrell’s construction retains the distinction between physiology and psychology, that psychological survival cannot be reduced to physical survival, and this construction does not conform with the contemporary constructions of industrial school ex residents as “survivors”. Tyrell’s death by self-immolation is perhaps his own tragic way of eliminating any ambiguities over questions of his being a “survivor” of the industrial school system.
When Tyrell’s memoir was written during the 1950s there was little public representation of institutional abuse but this is not the case in contemporary discourse. The discourse of memoir by those who were resident in the industrial schools is a significant aspect of this contemporary discourse. The memoir as a discursive object expresses the complex relationship being played out between private individual memory and the representation of communal memories in Ireland. Research into autobiographical memory has shown how public representations of events can become adopted as private memories (Nelson, 2003). This raises the problem of whether hegemonic discourses have the potential to colonise the lives of those who may have already experienced trauma. Research into the experiences of those who had been institutionalised in the Australian state of Victoria has shown how contemporary public narratives about institutional abuse contributed to the shaping of personal memories (Murphy, 2010). This research study will become part of that on-going public discourse, which I argue, cannot be hermetically sealed off from issues of public memory, collective narrative, art and broadcasting. The discourse of literature and memoir construct an object which draws the gaze of the viewer out into the arena where public and private discourses meet. In recent times, the construction of the child has come to occupy an increasingly central role in national and international public discourse.

**Discourse of the Child**

The recent proliferation of Irish films and stories with child-centred perspectives such as Paddy Clarke Ha Ha Ha (Doyle, 1993/2010), The Butcher Boy (McCabe, 1992/2010), Angela’s Ashes (McCourt, 1996/2005) has been linked to socio-political discourses around child sexual abuse, abortion, children’s rights referenda, childcare care costs and so on (Luddy & Smith, as cited in Inglis, 2011). These authors claim that these narratives derive from a wider discursive complex which constructs the child as a lodestone for adult concerns.
Contemporary discourses construct a hybrid adult-child, now referred to in popular parlance as the kidult, perhaps best exemplified by the crossover success of Harry Potter (Rowling, 2003), children’s literature marketed for adult consumption, an indication that discursive formations are at work within contemporary culture in which childhood is configured as a central preoccupation. In other words, the discourse around children is also a discourse about adult desires for childhood, but is rarely framed thus. For example, Burman (2008) suggests that the obsessive use of childhood images in advertising is part of a capitalist discourse of repackaging putative childlike desires for adult consumption which cleverly liberates the childlike world of libidinal fantasy, normally sequestered in childlike play, now displaced onto the play of infinite consumerist activity. In other words economic discourse constructs the adult as child, in order to fuel consumption based on children’s desires, and constitutes a system based on libidinised greed.

The contemporary use of the child as a function of capital remains hidden from view and thus is not locatable as institutionalised child abuse. Intense media interest in child maltreatment cases tends to represent such cases as marginal and exceptional, and it is worth questioning whether anomalising such cases distracts the viewer’s gaze away from the centrality of institutionalised forms of child abuse immanent in our structures of governance. Furthermore, the discourse of the child is also about the relationship between adults and children and the relationship between the adult and her former incarnation as a child. Thus the discourse has a double function of testing again and again intra and inter-relational representations. Foucault’s insight into the dynamics of power as based on relation and not possession allows us a means of coming to understand the function of this discourse of childhood, which constructs a highly fermented relational brew of past and present relational cathexes, to be invested in the forces of exchange and production. Each minor act of consumption carried out on a daily basis and the multiple conversations between buyer and
seller are all instances of fluctuating relations. This is the endless play of power within the social field which is so ubiquitous and protean that it escapes observation. In this sense, the tradition empirical methods of observation fail in the analysis of this unfolding of power. How could it be observed or measured? In this manner, Foucault’s approach is of a piece with the rationalist tradition of philosophy which seeks to think about and conceptualise problems, even if these problems cannot be directly observed.

**Fractured Debates**

Recent research into child abuse has emphasized the lack of an overarching narrative of the problem of child abuse, which includes epidemiological and clinical science to communicate the scope of the problem to the policy makers and the voting public (Fairbank, Putnam & Harris, 2007). The fractured nature of contemporary approaches to child abuse also stems from the diverse methodologies uses across disciplines and the plural epistemological sources underlying these methodologies. For example, research from a social work approach tends to foreground the family unit; medical approaches concentrate on physical symptoms and injuries, psychological research attends to psychological effects of abuse such as depression, anxiety and so on (McDonough, 2010). In other words, each research methodology is constitutive of different realities.

A coordinated response to child abuse and neglect has been advocated, emphasizing the role that professionals, concerned citizens, friends and neighbours might play in responding to child abuse (Goldman, Salus, Wolcott & Kennedy, 2003). However, it is precisely the historical absence of intervention from third parties with regards to child abuse in the Irish industrial schools, which is striking, and public anger directed towards the Catholic Church has obscured inquiry into the response of Irish civilians to child abuse at all levels of society, including farmers, doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, psychologists and so forth. In fact,
concerned citizens, as represented by the Irish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty, to Children, were instrumental in the referral and recruitment of children to these institutions and whose officers were known as the “cruelty men” (Raftery & O’ Sullivan, 1999, p.21).

It has been shown that it is a fraught and complex task to demarcate what is institutional child abuse and that demarcating what is institutional child abuse may distract us from institutionalised child abuse which is immanent in the structure of economic and civil governance. In addition, we have seen how each research method is its own discursive formation which functions to direct the gaze of the viewer inwards or outwards. Scientific and psychological discourses are intrinsically bound up with technological discourse and these discourses pivot around a concept of the unitary subject. The concept of universal rights is also derived from this privileging of the unitary subject. The angle of vision in these discourses is directed inwards. Political, systemic and literary discourses construct an object which redirects the gaze outwards to the interplay between the individual and the social. The discourse of the child has been discussed as the play of power with the relational field and is linked to a Foucauldian analysis of power. Foucauldian discourse analysis redirects the gaze outwards, focusing on the medial space between the individual and the social body, functioning as a complement to the inward-gazing paradigm of scientific and psychological discourse. The Foucauldian method adopted in this research will be discussed in detail in the following section.
C3. Method

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault, as cited in Rabinow, 1991 p. 50)

Historical Context of Methodology

The objective of this research study is to analyse the epistemological and ontological constructions which govern the response to institutional child abuse in Ireland. The method I have chosen to meet this objective is discourse analysis inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, and is sometimes referred to as Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). In order to understand this method it is necessary to understand the historical context of its emergence, and with this in mind, a brief historical overview of discourse analysis and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis will be outlined.

The history of Western philosophy has debated an on-going epistemological problem which centres on two competing theories of truth: a correspondence theory of truth in which it is posited that reality can be objectively known and therefore there is a correspondence between this knowledge and the reality depicted. In other words, the description mirrors reality. This is a viewpoint allied to realist viewpoints in the history of Western philosophy. On the other hand, a coherence theory of truth posits that reality coheres out of our
constructions of the world, a theory aligned with idealist tradition viewpoints (David, as cited in Zalta, 2012). Ludwig Wittgenstein, was an Austrian philosopher who represented both these viewpoints at different periods during his philosophical career. In his early work he attempted to work out a theory of correspondence between words and reality. This found concise expression in the last words of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “whereof one speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1922/1999 p.90) Wittgenstein came to reject his earlier work, arguing that it was meaningless to try to understand linguistic communications without understanding the context of the utterance, pithily expressed by the remark, “If a lion could talk we could not understand him” (Wittgenstein, 1978, p.223 ). He developed a theory based around how language formations or “language games” were constitutive of thought, claiming that language was not a mirror of reality but was instead imbricated with reality. Here he made explicit his belief in the coherence theory of truth, that truth is knowledge which coheres within language.

The early Wittgenstein represented a trend in analytic philosophy, particularly in Anglo-American philosophy, from the 1920s to the 1950s, focusing on language as a potential mathematical system, as a correspondence theory of truth. The Wittgenstein of the 1950s and 1960s represented a growing trend in continental philosophy towards an analysis of language as a culturally embedded phenomenon, as a coherence theory of truth. Thus, there was a decided shift in philosophical discourse from the early twentieth century onwards towards an analysis of language as an epistemological inquiry orientated alternatively towards theories of correspondence and coherence. This intense interest in language as an epistemological instrument was paralleled by developments in linguistics by Charles Pierce in America and Ferdinand de Saussure, the influence of the latter came to have a profound influence on the development of continental thought from the 1940s onwards (2011).
This orientation to language as a structural system was taken up in psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan (Radzinks, 1985) and in ethnography by Claude Lévi-Strauss who applied a Saussurian model in his investigation of the codes and structures underlying culture (Lévi-Strauss, 1955). In structuralist theory, the emphasis was on the static phase of language, as language as a homogenous structure and its roots were in Enlightenment philosophy, whose legacy was a confidence in the application of reason to describe the hypothesized underlying structures of reality. However, by the late 1960s poststructuralism had gained prominence over structuralism. As Adam Shatz puts it:

“The poststructuralist demolition crew …celebrated diachrony over synchrony, events over structure, the exception over the rule, the periphery over the centre, the variable over the invariant” (2011, p.4)

Poststructuralists included such diverse figures as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Helène Cisoux, Jean Baudrillard and Julia Kristeva (Harland, 1987). These thinkers were suspicious of and critiqued the Enlightenment project of illumination by reason and viewed language as a discourse with heterogeneous features, deployed by a speaking subject, language as a signifying process and not a static system (Kristeva, 1997). In essence, the poststructuralists tended to the view that the questions we ask are intrinsically bound up with the way we ask them. In effect this marked a sea change in the social sciences which has come to be described as a “paradigm “shift”, a term used by the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (Dyer, 2006). In his view a shared world view is a paradigm and challenges to this world view may lead to a “paradigm crisis” when there is transition from one paradigm to another, for example from a Ptolemaic view of the world to a Copernican view of the world. Kuhn’s simple, but radical formulation for his time, that science was a social activity has been very influential in the philosophy of science.
Background to Social Constructionism

The 1960s was marked by a ferment of cultural activity in history, politics, philosophy, linguistics, feminism, in gender studies, anthropology, in law etc. and this had a profound impact upon psychological science (Dyer, 2006; Silverman, 2000). The epistemological grounds and assumptions of political systems were being challenged by theorists and activists who began to challenge the prevailing world view and propounded a view that reality was an artefact of our conceptualisation of it, with roots in economic, historical and ideological forces. This point of view came to be known as social constructionism; the basic premise being that the phenomena of the social world including our knowledge of it are not based on objective properties but are constructs of the mind arrived at through social interaction. The new theories of social constructionism derived from and made possible new thinking in terms of feminism, gay rights and civil rights and postcolonial movements which challenged the assumptions of the societal structures of the time.

Qualitative research methodologies in psychology evolved out of this context and became associated with this epistemological shift from knowledge acquisition and experiment to a process of reflexivity about human experience. 1992 marked a key date in British psychology in which a symposium was held by the British Psychological Society which gave a central platform to new research methodologies such as ethnographic studies, grounded theory, phenomenological and discourse analysis (Dyer, 2006). The fundamental epistemological shift in this period could be described as a move from action to reflection, from the acquisition of knowledge/models to a questioning of these very models, a shift from content to form, from structure to process, accompanied by a potential to transform educational, political, economic social and cultural life.

Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is a methodological mode of inquiry which comes out of this social constructivist tradition, which rejects the notion of a mirrored correspondence between the facts of the world and the terms used to describe them. Discourse analysts claim that if attention is paid to the way language is used to describe the world, this can lead to fruitful insights, because meaning coheres within that description. The world which we inhabit is mediated through language as well as through our senses and we come to knowledge through language, as bats come to knowledge of their world, through the proprioceptive process of echolocation. Both creatures construct, widely different realities, presumably, because of the differences in sensory mediators! The epistemological basis of discourse analysis is that our experience of the world cannot be divorced from our linguistic descriptions of that world. This epistemological shift from a correspondent, specular theory of the world, in which language is thought to mirror reality to a theory in which language is considered as constitutive and not reflective of reality, came to influence academic psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s and this influence came to be seen in such works Arguing and Thinking (Billig, 1987); Discourse and Social Psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and Discursive Psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992). These works were the beginnings of a development of a new approach to psychological research, which came to be described as discursive psychology.

Broadly speaking, there are two distinct theoretical orientations within discursive psychology; the first type proposes a discourse analysis which applies itself without regard to extra-discursive dimensions and is described as focused, technical analysis and an example of this approach is conversation analysis. The second orientation is associated with post-structuralism and takes a more contextual approach to analysis, and seeks to understand the reasons for an utterance within social and historical contexts and is described as critical discourse analysis (Wetherell, 1998). Sometimes the distinction between these two
orientations is not clear in practice and it has been proposed that research may gain from using a dual approach (Wetherell, 1998).

**Rationale for Foucauldian Discourse Analysis**

Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) is a method of discourse analysis which derives from the work of the philosopher Michel Foucault who is identified with the post-structuralist tradition. Foucault analysed the role of discourse in terms of social and historical processes in a series of seminal texts, The Order of Things, (1966/1970) Archaeology of Knowledge, (1969/1972), The Order of Discourse, (1970/1971); Discipline and Punishment (1975/1977) and the History of Sexuality (1976, 1984). What distinguishes Foucauldian discourse analysis from other forms of critical discourse analysis? Most forms of critical discourse analysis tend to focus on the actual utterances in specific contexts, whereas Foucauldian discourse analysis is concerned with identifying the structures which constitute the possibility of the context and utterance coming together, and as such, is concerned with discourse as a historico-cultural product. Billig (1997) introduces Saussure's distinction between langue and parole, in order to distinguish between FDA and other forms of critical discourse analysis. Saussure used the term langue to describe the linguistic structure and parole as the specific use of that linguistic structure. For example, adolescents in the UK sometimes use the word “sick” to describe a positive event, whereas an old person might use the word to describe an illness. In this instance, the langue is the same but the parole is completely different. Billig (1997) suggests that Foucauldian analysis is more langue than parole, because it is “concerned with the hypothetical total structure rather than particular usage” (p.41). The contrast between FDA and other approaches can also be located at the level of how research participants are viewed. In FDA, the participants are not viewed as strategic users of discourse but rather as subjects who are constructed and positioned by historically-grounded discourses (Willig, 2012). According to the historian Paul Veyne
(2010) Foucault espoused an ontic materialism (that the world exists outside our conception of it) and an epistemic relativism (that our knowledge of that reality is always mediated, partial and incomplete.

Willig (2000) makes a distinction between two types of foci in order to tease out the subtleties of Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis. The first focus of Foucauldian analysis is used in the deconstruction of expert discourses, whereas the second focus seeks to determine the ways in which the dominant discourses are reflected in quotidian language. This is a useful dichotomous distinction and is relevant to my study which combines analysis of statutory reports corresponding to the first focus and analysis of interviews with lay people, corresponding to the second focus. Willig moves discourse analysis out of an overly determined and rigid position by showing how subjects position themselves in relation to expert discourses and not necessarily in accordance with them (Willig, 2000) This is an important distinction, which was emphasized by Foucault in his late work, where he contested overly rigid and deterministic accounts of discourse. Alvesson & Skoldberg (2009) pick up on this theme in their discussion of Foucault, describing the subject as “coloured by forms of knowledge; yet that the important thing is that it is irreducible to these. Thus the subject actually functions as pockets of resistance to established forms of knowledge/power” (p. 256). These reflections had important implications for my own research because they led me to question my own assumptions regarding the passivity or activity of subjects, and be more sensitive to the places where individuals actually elude being captured by a recognizable discourse.

The problem with FDA is that there is no consensus on how it should be applied as a methodology. I see this problem arising from the fact that Foucault’s theoretical work underwent significant shifts in emphasis. In essence, Foucault work could be characterised as belonging to three distinct phases: archaeology, (an attempt to define the fundamental codes
of culture in contrast to the phenomenological project to reveal perceptions about it; genealogy which is characterised by an analysis of how discipline and power constitute subjectivity, and lastly the history of subjectivity which is concerned with ethics as a form of politics (Nealon, 2008). These changes in emphasis and theoretical approach have resulted in creative but divergent interpretations of Foucault’s work.

Within discursive psychology there are problems with regard to the use of Foucauldian theory. This derives largely from a confusion of terminology because the term “discourse” implies a reference to an exclusively linguistic object. The use of the term “discourse” has been described as an ill-chosen word by Veyne (2010) because in his view, discourse functions as a prism, the form of linguistic formations or social practices or a combination of both, which constitutes the conditions for knowledge of an object and from which the object cannot be separated (Veyne, 2010, p.6). Foucauldian discourse is a way of looking at the world, that is structured by assumptions of language and social practice. These assumptions are complex, multiple and operate beyond the awareness of the subject. I envisage Foucauldian discourse as a bird’s nest, combining different aspects of experience, the twigs of language with the grass of social practice, a structure in which the subject is nested, or as Lois McNay describes it:

“The discursive formation is not just the order of language or the representation, it is a structuring principle which governs beliefs and practice, words and things, in such a way as to produce a certain network of material relations” (1994, p. 69).

This does not look much different to Althusser’s theory of interpellation:

“Words and things intersect and become invested with particular relations of power, resulting in an interpellative act” (Althusser, as cited in Graham, 2005, p. 7.)

However, Foucault’s understanding of power is not the same as Althusser’s version of power whose conceptualisation of power derives from Marxist theory, which posits that
power is in the hands of those who control the means of production and exchange. Foucault critiqued this viewpoint as reproducing a centrist view of power, a sovereign view of power, in which power is viewed as located at the top or at the centre of the social hierarchy (Kumar, 2007). Foucault rejected the overprivileging of sovereign power, represented in monarchical structures, asserting that power is no longer effected through the dispersal of monarchical power as it had been up until the late 18th century, but is reproduced in a viral system, where the individual is both product of and vehicle of power (Foucault, 1970). In other words, Foucault conceptualised power as relational, as mobile, in constant flux.

Foucault highlighted how Enlightenment science conceals and makes possible a darker project, which is the instrumentalisation of new relations between people, which become vectors for the transmission of power. In effect, Foucault’s theory of power allows us to conceptualise power in two distinct ways as vertical/institutional and as horizontal/quotidian but it is the latter conceptualisation which allows for an examination of how individuals discipline themselves and each other in minute acts of governance. A Foucauldian approach is adopted as a method in this study, in order to investigate the relationship between discourse and power and between institutions and social practices.

**Criticism of Foucauldian Analysis**

In my view, Foucault is overly sceptical regarding his Enlightenment heritage and his writings seems to suggest that the Enlightenment processes of writing and education detract from the quintessence of life, which at times appears as the return of a repressed Catholicism, expressed in the distrust of the written word, and revealed by an overt reverence for mythos, symbol and ceremony, which are in evidence in the following badly-translated quotation:
“The adventure of childhood no longer finds expression in “le bon petit Henri” but in the misfortunes of “little Hans”. The Romance of the Rose is written today by Mary Barnes; in the place of Lancelot we have Judge Shreber” (Foucault, 1977, p. 192)

…These investigations are perhaps to psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, criminology, and to many other social sciences what the terrible power of the investigation was to the calm knowledge of the animals, the plants or the earth” (Foucault, 1977, p. 208)

In his valuation of “calm knowledge”, Foucault seems to be harking back to a pre-discursive, pre-lapsarian universe before the fall ushered in by the acquisition of language. This aspect of Foucault’s epistemological stance has been described as the “joy of non-identity” by one critic (Visker, 1995). Such a description appears hollow when viewed within contexts of loss of human identity within concentration camps or Irish industrial schools in which children in the industrial schools were deprived of their names and given new names or indeed numbers (Raftery and Sullivan, 2009). At the risk of being speculative, I suggest that the joy of non-identity is an experience afforded to those whose identity is under no particular economic, cultural, sexual or psychological threat.

In my view there has been an absence of discursive elaborations within psychiatry, pedagogy, psychology, criminology (offshoots of Enlightenment discourse) which resulted in Irish discourses of childcare becoming subsumed in ever restrictive discourses of morality, religion and economics, which functioned like algae in a pond killing off possibilities for other life. In other words, absence and not proliferation of certain kinds of Enlightenment discourse, may lie at the heart of institutional child abuse in Ireland. Therefore, I think this aspect of Foucauldian thinking in which the Enlightenment tradition is attacked needs to be carefully considered. Foucault was a child of the Enlightenment (with its strict institutional and educational formations), a tradition which has made possible the conditions of its own
critique. In other words, Foucault’s attack on Enlightenment culture is a proverbial case of biting the hand that feeds. Moreover, Foucault’s critique of Enlightenment France cannot be so easily transferred to other countries with divergent social, economic and religious histories, in which the same Enlightenment discourses might produce different effects.

Foucault developed a robust critique of processes of normativization but failed to distinguish between different kinds of normative discourses and their social effects. McNay (1994) criticises Foucault for failing to give an account of how individuals come to occupy discursively constructed subject positions. Furthermore, Foucault is snookered by his rejection of transcendental humanism because he cannot appeal to external criteria of justice, reason and so to substantiate a claim or upon which to build an ethical project. Habermas took Foucault to task for an absence of moral commitment, which he argues, requires a normative basis (as cited in Visker, 1995). Richard Rorty stated that Foucault’s work does not provide an insight into how specific networks of power shape people into individuals with a sense of moral responsibility (1986). However, viewed differently, it could be argued that Foucault’s objective was not to prescribe new norms but to illuminate the possibilities of a given situation, and to “rethink critically the phenomenological subject” (Oksala, 2005, p.7). In other words, it is a model for meditating on the possibilities of human freedom. In defence of Foucault, it is difficult to understand Rorty and Habermas’s faith in a normative morality. How does that work in degenerate cultures such as Nazi Germany or under the Khmer Rouge? Surely, the point is that Foucault allows us to scrutinise normativising processes, so that we can choose which ones we would prefer, all the time remaining aware of the contingency of our choices, which keeps alive the principle of dissent, and acts as a brook to totalising tendencies. This, in my view is a moral act which acknowledges the humility and tentativeness of a human ethical project. In essence, the Foucauldian approach is more a critical tool than a prescriptive philosophy. In this sense, I am in agreement with Kantor
(2006) who considers Foucauldian approaches to psychology as more a way of thinking about a research problem than a research method (Kantor, 2006). FDA is not an ostensive guide for the researcher, or a recipe book for conducting research, it is a means of conceptualising and thinking about problems.

**Discourse Analysis on Institutional Child Abuse**

There have been several discourse analyses carried out into the institutional abuse in Ireland, most notably, a discourse analysis on the response of the Catholic Church to six cases of sexual abuse, which found that the Church's response was often characterized by abstraction, transcendence of tone, and use of apologia rather than apology (Dunne, 2004). It is striking how this type of discourse analysis can penetrate the opacity of language, by indicating communication shifts constituted by the deployment of certain discourses. For instance apologia means a reasoned defense of one’s position, which is to be contrasted with “apology”, which is the conventional meaning that signifies remorse or guilt over an event or events. Thus, analysis of discourse allows us to capture deeper realities behind surface similarities which may go unnoticed if not described; in other words, effective discourse analysis is about the restitution of realities which are ignored, split off or masked. A recent doctoral study has applied the use of discourse analysis to the analysis of data sets from Appellate Court decisions in Ireland on child sexual abuse cases from 1930 to 2004, using FDA as a methodology and contrasting two types of knowledge: the subjugated accounts of the survivors and the formal accounts of the law, a form of subjugating knowledge (McDonough, 2010). This distinction between subjugating and subjugated is useful in exploring power relations in discourse, and is especially relevant in an Irish context because of the post-colonial makeup of the social and cultural landscape.
Ferguson (2007) has conducted an extensive longitudinal study using discourse analysis in which he cautions against projecting contemporary standards about childcare back into the past. His study is persuasive in its argument that abuse of industrial school children stemmed, in part, from dehumanizing discourses which construct the children as morally and not psychologically damaged. Ferguson illustrates his theme by pointing out examples of discourses which refer to children as “moral dirt” (Ferguson, 2007, p. 123). He argues that in order for further abuses to be avoided a radical reconstruction is required of the low status which children in care have had to endure. The work carried out by these researchers focused on three areas: the analysis of the language used by Catholic Church representatives, the analysis of documents describing the children of the industrial school system and an analysis of court decisions on child sexual abuse cases. My study has sought to add to and complement their work by focusing on those who cannot be designated by the terms survivors/victims or perpetrators/victims but are bystanding subjects within the social field in which institutional abuse took place.

Recruitment and Sampling

Respondents

I have followed Kantor (2006) in her objection to the use of the word “participants” as this term does not adequately and accurately reflect my position as academic researcher in relation to the object of research. Indeed, this is further accentuated by the methodological frame of my research which is concerned more with what is said, rather than with who is saying it. So, in a sense the phenomenological self is disregarded and can be said to be excluded from participation. So, there are two compelling reasons to prefer the term “respondent” over “participant”. In fact, the near obsolete term of “subject” would be a more
accurate and a more preferable term than “participant”, an instance of the constant need to interrogate and deconstruct notions of progress in the social sciences. The key determining component of respondent selection was willingness and a desire to communicate and a level of age maturity in order to get a sense of historical perspective on the institution discussed. Four of my respondents were over the age of 70, one was 66 and one was 46. The latter respondent was an exception but he had direct knowledge of the industrial school system as he lived near the school and had befriended boys from the institution.

I followed Smith & Osborn (2003) in their recommendation of small numbers of participants in order to facilitate in depth idiographic analysis. Ordinarily, a sample size of between five and ten is suggested and I chose six participants to be interviewed. The sampling process followed an idiographic form of enquiry, aimed at detailed understanding of individual cases rather than seeking generalisations across populations. Rather than trying to find a representative sample, I employed purposive sampling to find: ‘a more closely defined group for whom the research question will be significant “ (Smith and Osborn, 2003, p.56). Respondents who were in the industrial school system were excluded from the study because the objective was to explore the viewpoints of bystanders within the community.

**Location of Texts.**

The objective was to take a sample of Government reports on institutional abuse and this was relatively easy as there have only been three major reports produced since the foundation of the state in 1921: The Cussens Report (1936), The Kennedy Report (1970) and The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009). Two of the statutory reports were available online and were identified using a Google search for “Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse” and “Kennedy Report”. However, the Cussen report was not available online and was obtained from the National University of Ireland, Galway.
Procedure

Recruitment

My aim was to recruit my respondents from Letterfrack, a small village in the west of Ireland with a population of around 300 people. I contacted the local community radio station (Connemara Community radio, 87.8 FM) with a view to placing my recruitment advertisement on the airwaves. I wrote to the manager of the radio station with a précis of my study and I was invited onto the radio program to be interviewed. Following this short interview, on the 16th August 2011, I was contacted by an individual who had heard the radio interview, and who offered to help me in the process of recruitment by acting as a gatekeeper. Interestingly, he deconstructed my interview by pointing out how religious my language was, something to which I had been oblivious, and he told me that I had referred to shedding light on dark corners. Upon reflection, I realised that I had in mind a sentence favoured by Marcel Proust, which was a quote from St John, “Yet a little while is the light with you. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you”: John 12: 20, 35. Therefore I had been inhabited by a religious/literary discourse from which my speech was deployed, and I was completely unaware of this until meeting my interlocutor who had deconstructed my speech. He gave me the names and addresses of four individuals to whom I wrote, asking them whether they would be interesting in assisting me in my research. I received a reply from an individual and we had an initial meeting and a long informal discussion about the topic and he agreed to participate in the project but subsequently declined to be interviewed on tape. During the same period I tried to recruit in the UK because more people from Letterfrack live in the UK than in Letterfrack, and I felt that geographical distance from the community might facilitate participation. I advertised in the Irish World and in Irish Immigrant areas by placing adverts in Irish and English in local libraries, pubs, Irish centres in Camden, Hammersmith, Islington and Kilburn (Appendix 1).
I believe the distinction that anthropologists make between outsider and insider perspectives, known as Etic and Emic (Headland, Pike & Harris, 1990) played a role in the difficulties of recruitment. As someone from outside the local community, I represented the Etic contingent and this status was compounded by my institutional affiliation to an English university, a fact remarked upon by several respondents, so that this doubled my Etic status. In addition recruitment difficulties may have stemmed from a fear of a breach of anonymity, a fear which was not unfounded because there is always a question mark over whether respondents can guarantee their own anonymity to family or friends, and whether this would be practical because small communities are more porous than urban centres in terms of confidentiality. Thus the wariness of rural populations, often caricatured, of disclosure of their private lives seems entirely justified. I decided to shift my focus to another geographical location, Galway City, where I had grown up and had been educated and in which two industrial schools had been located. I asked people I knew whether they would be interested in responding to this project, and they agreed to participate.

I had decided on one female respondent, and five male respondents and this selection arose out of availability. However, following the interview with the female respondent I began to question whether my conceptualisation of discursive formation had changed from an overly behaviourist account to a more nuanced conceptualisation of how subjectivity is constituted by but is also resistant to discourse, and that even though FDA asserts the primacy of discourse and rejects the notion of an essentialist gender difference, I felt that it was important to see how discourse was received by the socially constructed male or female. In opting for a gender balance, it may be interpreted as suggesting that discourse has a different way of constructing males and females, thus preserving an essentialist category of male and female, which is incompatible with FDA. However, if we formulate the problem in another way, this epistemological contradiction can be addressed, by positing that the deployment of
discourse is mediated by socially constructed gender identities, and that male and female respondents will talk about these identities, not according to some essentialist notion of gender, but from the gender site which has been socially constructed.

Data Coding and Transcription

Each interview was recorded in audio format and transferred to computer and transcribed using a computer program called Express Dictate downloaded from the World Wide Web. All transcripts were made anonymous and identifying details changed in order to protect the confidentiality of participants. All interviews were paginated and line numbered using the line numbering function on the Microsoft word processing program which facilitated the quick referencing of an item in the raw data at a later stage of analysis. Each of the raw data items were given a reference code (See Appendix 2) Each interview was between 50 and 75 minutes length and the transcription rate averaged 50 minutes for each five minutes of the interview (50: 5) for all six interviews (See Appendix 3). All copies were password protected and were backed up in two separate locations, in physical format on the hard drive in the form of a USB key and virtually, using Drop Box, the new “in -cloud“ technology from Google.

Spontaneous Research

I used an anarchic method of research during the year period of research. I cut out newspaper articles which struck me as relevant to my methodology and to my subject matter from a variety of newspapers and magazines. I was also a subscriber to the London Review of Books and this allowed me to stay in touch with contemporary cultural discussions. This type
of spontaneous research on the fly has great potential, especially with the new applications on smart phones such as Evernote which allow for the storage of online material across a plurality of media: cartoons, articles, drawings, news reels etc. I also used an application called Flipboard which functions as a search engine which targets specific subjects in journals and magazines according to topic choice. I also found the application Pubmed Mobile, based on the The National Center for Biotechnology Information’s database search engine to be useful. This use of mobile methodology is not unlike the novelistic approach where the world is scanned by the novelist for material all the time for the project. An advantage of this process is that one becomes attuned to the talk in the cultural landscape that might be relevant to the research project, and the researcher becomes metamorphosed into an amateur detective/novelist always questing for clues. I found permission for engaging in this type of research in researchers in figures such as Eisner (1991) who found five pervasive themes in outstanding work carried out by social scientists: "imagination, somatic knowledge, empathic knowledge, a sense of place, and social cultural influences on motivation" (as cited in Kvale, 2008, p. 34). This type of spontaneous process is typical of Foucauldian-inspired research, which allows the researcher “think against and to follow unexpected changes in direction and not exclude them from what is finally produced. It is to allow chance connections, surprising lines of associations to disrupt the more disciplined aspects of a totalising elaboration” (Barker, 1998, p. 120).

**Interviewing**

I conducted a pilot interview as recommended by experts in the field of research (Madill, Gough, Lawton & Stratton, 2005) and for which I devised a semi structured interview (See Appendix 4). I set the frame of the interview at the beginning, informing the respondent that the interview would be about an hour. The questions asked in the interview related to thoughts, feelings about being asked to do interview, followed by earliest memoires
of a specific institution and views of the institution when younger and whether this viewpoint changed over time. The remaining questions focused on reactions to more contemporary accounts such as media representations and the publications of reports into institutional child abuse.

I was surprised to see how uneven my interviewing skills were and because I knew some of the individuals I interviewed, I think I joined with them far too readily at points. Also, I made too sharp a distinction between researcher and therapist, in that I consciously tried to make the interview seem more like a conversation and less like a clinical interview. The advantage of holding this position of geniality or cordiality is that the respondent is likely to have felt less interrogated and analysed and the potential for adverse effects from the interview were minimised. However, as I analysed the material I became aware of how courtesy and politeness can function as means of foreclosing dialogue, and that this stance is a discursive practice with long roots in the Amour Courtois tradition, in which perhaps rite and ritual expression are more important than communication. I also found it useful to reread guides to interviewing during the research process which highlighted some key areas which I felt I needed to attend to such as the need for specificity and brevity of questions (Barker, 2004; Kvale, 2008).

Analytic Procedure

Preliminary Signposts

How does the neophyte researcher find a way to use the Foucault’s work in an applied manner? I decided that I should read primary source literature myself in order to familiarise myself with Foucault’s thinking rather than follow a particular commentator without having any compelling rationale. I read four key texts, “The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966); The Archaeology of the Knowledge (1969); The Order of Discourse
(1970) and Discipline and Punishment (1977). I followed this by wide-ranging reading of secondary commentary. From my initial readings I compiled a bullet point list of general signposts to serve as a guideline to understand the epistemological basis of FDA. The guide proposed by Kendall and Wickham (1999) seemed to me to be opaque and rather abstract in its pointing towards the identification of discourse as a corpus of statements, identification of rules for the production of statements etc. and this made me aware of the importance of returning to primary source material.

Graham’s (2005) guide to FDA adheres to the early writings of Foucault with its emphasis on how discursive practices are shot through with the positivity of knowledge but her focus of research was on the function of the medicalised discourse of attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD) within the educational system and seemed further away from my concerns and my object of inquiry was not as recognisable a phenomenon as ADHD. Talja (1999) was closer to my focus of research in her emphasis on the analysis of variability in accounts and inconsistencies and internal contradictions which reprised Potter and Wetherell’s guide to discourse analysis (1987). The importance of silences and counter discourses was emphasised by Carabine (2001) but she neglects the processes of subjectivity. I drew on Ian Parker’s guide (1999) but concluded that a 20 stage guide to discourse analysis would be overly time-demanding and cumbersome as part of a time-limited professional doctorate. Morgan (2010) has criticised Willig and Kendall & Wickham (1999) for not paying attention to power, knowledge and governmentality, the broader tissues of meaning that make up a particular discourse. On the other hand, Morgan does not outline how such a process would not collapse into generalities and reifications based on the broader issues. In the end, I drew from the approach devised by Willig (2008), adopting the first two stages of identifying discursive constructions and discourses and using it as scaffolding on which to construct my own analytic method,
**Objective of Analysis**

The structure of the analytic approach was considered according to two approaches borrowed from linguistics, namely diachronic and synchronic analysis (Jager & Maier, 2009). The first method is concerned with how an object changes over time. I decided against this approach as it repeats the very technique I critique, which is to assume that we can track logical continuities in object and subject constructions in a chronological sense. On the other hand, the synchronic method analyses a particular something at a given, fixed point in time and does not try to make deductions about the series of events leading up to the event. This is the method most congruent with FDA which offers a technique to make visible the ways in which a subject becomes penetrated by discursive practice, which as Derek Hook points out, are not reducible to or explained neither by psychological structure nor by sociological critiques of determining social structures (2007). I envisaged the identification of discourse as an exploration of the frontier between the psychological and the sociological, in that discourse is a socio-historical event which constitutes subjectivity. The importance of the identification of discourses as furthering understanding of social processes has been highlighted by prominent critics, who have emphasised discourse as an aspect of a social subconscious:

“Discourses have remained invisible and constitute the subconscious of not the person but the thing said” (Veyne, 2010, p.8)

**Deconstructing the Author**

Before applying my analysis, I carried out a lengthy deconstruction of the author function as highlighted by Barker (1998) who drew my attention to an essay of Foucault’s entitled, “What is an author”? This allowed me to become more aware of the particular ways I was positioned by academic and institutional discourses and how these discourses
constructed the material within the interview. Some of the questions related to this stage included, “What kind of subject/object am I? What kind of subjugated subject am I? Do I become the neutraliser of contradictions? What political interest does the text serve? What are the modes of existence, distribution and circulation of text? The purpose of this stage was to try to perturb the vision I had of this research project, in order that some of the assumptions carried over by humanist / academic discourse could be interrogated. The objective was to suspend familiar concepts, pre-given unities, the real events and the already–said, to turn the text into an alien property. Barker (1998) gives examples of modes of resistance to hegemonic discourse such as writing, attacks on culture, deconstruction of the subject as pseudo-sovereign, experimenting with oneself, engaging with cultural taboos.

My final analytic guide resulted in the following seven stages

1. Identify the author function.

2. Identify discourse constructions.

3. Identify the absent discursive constructions. (Look for the non-said, the silence, the counter discourse).

4. Identify the discourses.

5. Identify the function and effects of the discourses identified.

6. Identify the master discourses or the apparatuses/ set ups which link up with several discourses.

7. Identify the positioning and how this relates to the way subjectivity is deployed, whether it is subjugated or not.

**Evolution of Analysis**

The analytic method devised as part of this research was the most demanding part of the work as this necessitated coming to terms with complex intellectual ideas expressed by
Foucault and his explicators and attempting to distil these ideas into a guide to analysis. I was fortunate in having some guidelines to fall back as safety nets which were psychologically important as at times I felt overwhelmed by the sheer weight of ideas expressed by Foucault and his commentators. When I had established my analytic guide, I drafted an analytic tool box which went through numerous drafts as my analysis progressed. I quickly realised that my analysis was not achievable within a suitable timeframe and that I needed to reconsider the way I was analysing the material. Following supervisory sessions I decided to shape my analysis according to a dual approach: to go through text line by line and to attend to how four constructions in particular were formed: The Institution, Institutional Abuse, The “Abusers”, The “Community”. In addition, I looked for convergence and divergence of construction of objects of knowledge and subjectivity.

Once I had established how mercurial subjectivity was in the interview, the task of analysis became easier as an internal resistance to the demolishing of the idea of a unified subject gave way. This was a startling discovery for me in many ways, as no matter how coherent and self-possessed the respondents were, their discourses were seamed with contradictions, which ordinarily go unnoticed but were revealed by analysis. It is almost as if human subjectivity has become a master at caulking over the seams of its own unity, by employing aesthetical devices or rhetorical devices in order to leave the auditor with an impression of a stable consistent self. This apparent seamlessness of talk has been referred to as “verbal hygiene” (Cameron, as cited in Parker, 2004), whereby language is kept neat and tidy in the objective of sustaining an image of a stable self.

In order to ensure a high quality of analysis I paid close attention to shortcomings identified in discourse analytic procedures, such as under-analysis through summary, under analysis through taking sides, under analysis through over quotation or isolated quotation, circular identification of discourses, false discourses and analysis that consists in simply
spotting features (Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter, 2003) Another way of ensuring quality was regular supervision (see Appendix 5). As I carried out my analysis I had a fresh insight, that within my post-structuralist, anti-humanist “persona” there hid a frustrated positivist. I realised that I had an on-going anxiety about the value, the efficacy and the coherence of the work I was doing. As an alternative to experimental criteria of reliability and validity, Talja (1999) has introduced the notion of specimen perspective, where research data do not describe reality but are specimens of interpretative practices. She contrasts the specimen perspective with what she calls the “factist” approach and approaches the problem of generalizability from a distinctive position of one of possibility. In other words, the possibilities generated in the research are the self-supporting criteria for its efficacy as a practice. I envisage the function of discourse analysis in a similar manner to Talja who describes discourse analysis as making visible on-going conversations, important debates and interpretative conflicts which exist in society.

Analytic Problems and Challenges

The great problem in analysis was identified by Pascal in the 17th century in his description of the problem of knowledge acquisition at macroscopic and microscopic levels. We know very little at the level of quantum mechanics or at the astronomical level, at the poles of the “infiniment petit” and the “infiniment grand” (Pascal, 1946). The danger in carrying out detailed qualitative research is that one can easily become subsumed by the sheer density of material, and the researcher runs the proverbial risk of not seeing the wood because of the trees. In order for analytic work to be productive, there must be an attempt at abstraction and generalisation at some level. The level at which this occurs is a matter of debate. I found that reducing the detail of analysis meant that the analytic procedure became more limber and I was more able to spot patterns of convergence and divergence. Initially, I had begun to analyse at a rate of one hour per 10 words and I calculated that it would take me
100 days at 8 hours day to analyse one interview! Over-detailed analysis also can result in what Parker (2004) calls textual empiricism which sponsors futile redescription. As far back as the 1950s and 1960s the great American philosopher W.V.O Quine tackled the epistemological problems of atomistic sentence-by-sentence cognitive meaning, by criticising it is as reductionist, and propounded a theory of holism in which meaning is based on synthesis as well as analysis (1964). I believe my first attempts at analysis were skewed by an overemphasis on the latter, to the detriment of meaning-making.

At an early stage of analysis I was guilty of committing the error of nuts and bolts positivism (Parker, 2004). This involves deploying a technical ability to describe what people are saying rather than attending to understanding how the discourse functions across the material. However a crucial development for me was the realisation that my analytic procedure was greatly helped by the structuring principle of divergence and convergence, which was entirely consistent with the aims of FDA. This allowed me to have some way of meaningfully working the individual analyses into a collective analysis, all the time attending to discontinuities, contradictions and shifting subjectivities. The importance of linking discourses rather than sorting the material into themes and grouping terms into categories has been highlighted as a key feature of discourse analysis (Parker, 2004). It was my belief that grouping the interviews together in analytic themes would be like pouring old wine into new bottles, and that the methodological coherence of each individual analysis would be destroyed by an architectural structuring process, which in itself, is an artefact of the classifying, ordering systems of quantitative methodology which Foucault critiqued.

**Ethical Considerations**

This study was conducted according to the ethical guidelines as outlined in the BPS guidelines for research with its emphasis on four key values: respect, competence,
responsibility and integrity (BPS Code of Ethics, 2006). Respondents were fully informed of the nature of the research (See Appendix 6) and of the potential of being perturbed by the interview. Each respondent was informed of the right to refuse to answer any question put to them and was given an information sheet with these details (See Appendix 7). In addition the respondents were informed that had a right to withdraw up to three months following completion of interview, and that thereafter the material would be at submission stage for a doctoral thesis and possible publication. The respondents were informed that the interviews would be audio-recorded and transcribed and that this material would be kept under security protected filing, and that their identity would be kept concealed at all times. They were informed that the material would be erased following examination of the thesis. Following interview, a debriefing session was conducted in which the respondent had an opportunity to describe the interviewing process, and to discuss any thoughts, reactions or feelings which had been aroused by the process. Respondents described the process as thought-provoking, interesting, and one respondent requested and was given a copy of the audio recording as a document for himself and his family.

All respondents were informed that my role as researcher was not a therapeutic role. I decided against informing my respondents of the availability of local counselling services because, I judged this to be contraindicative and unhelpful because I felt it was patronising to give them the names of counselling services as if (a) this would be the appropriate manner for them to deal with any adverse effects in this research project; (b) it presupposed that the respondents wouldn’t be aware of counselling, and (c) that they needed a younger person to instruct them in how best to deal with potential emotional distress; and lastly (d) the giving of information about counselling services might actually be iatrogenic in the sense that it might stir up issues in the respondent which did not belong to the research process; in other words the respondents might begin to question the motivation for the researcher’s reference to
counselling services. In fact, during the debrief when I asked one respondent what he would
do if he were stirred up by the material, he replied that he wouldn’t see a professional
therapist because he described that as false careerism and that in his view, naming feelings in
that process was a way of getting rid of them. Instead, I relied on my own personal judgement
to assess whether the interview had caused undue adverse effects and I concluded it hadn’t.
These decisions were made on the basis of contextual factors and with reference to ethical
guidelines for research made by Yardley (2000) who recommended:

1. Sensitivity to context
2. Commitment and rigour
3. Transparency and coherence
4. Impact and importance which may mean disseminating ideas beyond the academic
   community.

All the respondents I interviewed stated that they were happy to be involved in the research
and they valued it as a social project. In other words they saw benefit in contributing to an
increase in understanding of a common story, a principle of beneficence, a core ethical
principle as identified by Beauchamp and Childress (1994).
B4. Analysis of Statutory Reports

The construction of a response to institutional abuse at the statutory level is examined with regard to three government-instigated reports, the Commission of Inquiry into the Reformatory and Industrial School System & Cussen, G.P. (1936) also known as the Cussen Report, the Committee on Reformatory and Industrial schools (1970), also known as the Kennedy Report and the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009) also referred to as the Ryan Report.

The Cussen Report

The Cussen Report (1936) was chaired by the G.P. Cussen, Senior Justice of the District Court and the committee was comprised of a senator, a priest, a GP, and three civil servants and its remit was to “inquire into and report to the Minister of Education on the present Reformatory and Industrial Schools System in Saorstát Eireann” (Cussen, 1936, p.4). The excerpts chosen from the Cussen Report are entitled “The Nature of the Problem” (p.10-11), Grounds for Committal (p.13-17) and Method for Sending to the Industrial Schools (p.17-18) and The Care, Education and Training of Children and Young Persons in Reformatories and Industrial Schools, and their After-Care and Supervision When Discharged from these Institutions (p. 20-23). Each of these sections was chosen so that the constructions of the industrial school child could be identified within a social discursive framework.

Rhetoric of Equivocation

In the Cussen Report, language is deployed in a consistently equivocatory manner which, I contend, is a tactic of rhetorical discourse. For example, institutional care of children is constructed as “generally good” (196-197). “The children are on the whole suitably
housed, fed and clothed and their treatment is *in general* kind and humane” (67). The work of institutional care is constructed as being of a “difficult and *peculiar* nature” (209). The construction of the object through the use of abstract nouns, adverbials and concepts (nature, in general, good) means that these constructed objects are nebulous and open to sceptical inquiry. The manner in which the discourse constructs the object invites its deconstruction; for instance, the construction of the treatment as generally kind opens up the possibility of reading the treatment as particularly cruel. The children of the industrial schools are positioned as a homogenous mass, constructed grammatically in the passive tense and ontologically in an amorphous field. The function of the discourse is to construct amorphousness which results in the dissolving of particular acts of cruelty or abuse within a general system of kindness. On might speculate that such a discourse of amorphousness might related to processes of deindividuation where the individuals are fused into a unitary identity within a corporate system and this appears to be the case where children are referred to as a “general body” of pupils (300). This positioning of the children in a deindividualised mass repeats the very construction critiqued by the report’s own findings:

> In some schools monotonous marching round a school yard took the place of free play at the time for recreation. Such drill-like exercise, especially if prolonged, becomes a dreary routine deleterious to mind and body, and it should be replaced by free play and organised games that will develop in the child alertness of movement and individual confidence, and thus help to compensate in some measure for the lack of initiative and individuality that are characteristic of children reared in institutions (289-294).

The contradictory constructions of the individual mind/body and the general mind/body are again seen in this passage where the children are on the one hand positioned as individual (the child) and on the other they are reified by a unifying essentialist description: “lack of
initiative and individuality that are characteristic of children reared in institutions”. The opening up of a possible construction of individuality in the children is closed down by the construction of a unitary mind and body, “deleterious to mind and body” which positions the children once again in a uniform mass. It is not only the children who are positioned in this manner; it is intriguing to note that the only reference to mind in the Cussen Report is to the “public mind” (7). This construction of a “public mind” brings into question whether there is such a thing as a private, individual mind within the constructed field of knowledge deployed in this report. This absence of a construction of an individual mind means that the Cussen report is constructed along the lines of a behaviourist model of the world, the dominant psychological paradigm of the time, in which internal worlds (thoughts, fantasies, dreams, feelings and so on) do not appear to exist unless expressed in behavioural effects.

The use of the optative over the indicative form is not an isolated feature of Cussen and seems to point to unstable constructions characteristic of lack of clarity, with the possible function of communicating anxiety over the epistemological basis of the report, as if the report wants to know and not know something at the same time. For example, this can be seen in the odd-seeming construction of the managers of the industrial schools as carrying “out their work in an unobtrusive manner” (25-26) and again: “The Manager is the guardian and his friend, while maintaining an ever vigilant and unobtrusive discipline” (204-205). It seems to me that the term “unobtrusive” constructs the object at its vanishing point; as soon as it is constructed it is deconstructed, perhaps so that it cannot obtrude into discourse or consciousness. There are numerous examples of these equivocating constructions in the verbal form such as: “we think” (27); “we contemplate” (238); “we feel” (239); “we consider” (90). Let us examine the following statement which is an example of how a statement constructs and deconstructs itself, like a snake biting its tail:
“It follows, we suggest, that such young persons cannot in any sense be looked upon as criminals” (29).

The young persons are constructed (in the manner of a suggestion) as non-criminals but there is enough leverage within the suggestion for alternative constructions of criminality to be suggested. Inherent in this formulation are the implications that these young people may be criminals but should not be looked down upon as criminals. The ambiguity and instability of objects constructed is seen most clearly in the recommendation that “there appears to be a strong case for according the Justices a greater degree of 

elasticity

in the matter of Committals under the law as it stands” (86). This is a departure from the earlier tactics where instability and amorphousness penetrate the descriptive layers of language so that we are not sure what is being constructed. Therefore a rhetorical discourse has a double function: to construct a field of knowledge that is protean and unstable, a world of Brownian motion of molecular activity unintelligible to the naked eye but it also constructs a stable, recognisable object, which ironically, is in itself an object of instability, “a greater degree of elasticity”.

Perhaps Aristotle’s critique of the rhetoric of the sophist tradition can help us understand the function of the equivocatory discourses used in Cussen. According to one commentator, Aristotle criticised the rhetoric of the sophists because it privileged the world of possibility whereas his rhetoric privileged the world of actuality (Poulakos, 1984). Adopting this distinction, it is my contention that the function of the rhetoric of equivocation in the Cussen Report, is to embed discussion of the industrial schools in a discourse of possibilities rather than within a discourse of actuality, so that the material effects of institutionalisation escape from the reader’s view.
Legitimacy/Illegitimacy

I wish to pay particular attention in the Cussen Report to a section entitled Grounds for Committal in order to illustrate how discourses of paternity, maternity and legitimacy are instrumental in constructing the object of the industrial school child. The 14 grounds for committal outlined include begging, homelessness, having parents in prison, theft, frequenting the company of prostitutes, having parents unable to support the child, having committed an offence, being uncontrollable, being an orphan, and not attending school. The various discourses deployed in the construction of the child as suitable for committal to the industrial school can be easily identified as discourses of morality, sex, crime, education and so on. However, I wish to pay attention to the discourses of legitimacy and illegitimacy and how they come to be intertwined with discourses of paternity and maternity in the construction of the ontology of the industrial school child. In order to examine this I will be drawing from the following section which is a complex intermeshing of discourses of economics, sex, crime, paternity, maternity and issues of legitimacy:

(c) If found destitute, not being an orphan and having both his parents or surviving parents, or in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, undergoing penal servitude or imprisonment; (54-55)

(e) if the daughter, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of a father who has been convicted of an offence under the Criminal Law Amendment Acts, 1885 to 1935, in respect of any of his daughters, whether legitimate or illegitimate; (58-60)

(h) if found destitute, and if not an orphan, and his parents are or (sic) his surviving parent, or in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, is unable to support him; provided the parent or parents’ consent to committal (65-67).
A feature of the Cussen Report, which is absent in the later reports, is the construction of the family as a potential site of “abuse”. One preliminary conclusion which can be drawn from analysing the discursive strategies in the Cussen Report is that the problem constructed is not one of incest but rather one of illegitimacy through the potential pregnancy of the daughter. This issue of legitimacy can be elucidated further by deconstructing the statement in paragraph (e) in which the fact of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the abused daughter is constructed as irrelevant because, if she is illegitimate her pregnancy from incest does nothing but reconfirm her illegitimacy through the potential for carrying illegitimate progeny and therefore she is marked with a double illegitimacy. In the case of the legitimate daughter all claims to legitimacy are lost if she bears illegitimate progeny.

Humanist discourses of the integrity of personhood are thoroughly trumped in this account by legal, moral, religious and sexual discourses which discount the autonomy and legitimacy of the individual in favour of metaphysical laws, which can be traced back to the idea of original sin. The discursive strategies here point to the concept of the integral human individual as fiction. The human individual only comes into being when certain discourses (a) allow it to come into recognition and (b) authorise its legitimacy. The potential consequence of this discursive procedure is obvious because the discourse is capable of completely negating the fact of subjectivity and individual agency. For example, males are not constituted as objects of sexual predation, in contradistinction to females, and therefore the object of sexual predation of boys cannot come into view. This process calls to mind the medieval ontological argument for the proof of God put forward by Anselm in the Prosolgion written in 1078, in which God is posited as a “being than which no greater can be conceived” (Flew, 1971). Similarly, the industrial school boys do not exist as sexual objects because the male as passive object of sexual action cannot be conceived. Perhaps, this discursive procedure may relate in part, to a difficulty with which sexual abuse in institutions
emerged into discourse in Ireland, because the object of sexual violence perpetrated against young boys could not be recognised because it could not be conceived.

It is interesting to see how paragraphs (c) and (e) are instances of the absence of the father and mother respectively, where in (c) the object of the father is absent, cancelled out through the discourse of legitimacy and conversely restored in (e) where the father is constructed as sexual abuser. What is in evidence here is that the object of paternity constructed is troubling and complex, either completely absent or dangerously present and invasive. One of the functions of these two discursive strategies is to deontologise the role of the unmarried father and to remove from him all traces of paternity. The discursive strategies discussed here appear to be constitutive of a negative space, abrogating the rights of single mothers, “orphan” boys and unmarried fathers. Recently released CIA memos on state torture publicised in 2009 during a PEN event entitled Reckoning with Torture: Memos and Testimonies from the "War on Terror" are a contemporary example of this kind of delegitimising discourse, a discourse in which international prisoners are referred to as HVDs (High Value Detainees) and the interrogation centres to which they are transferred as “black sites” (De Lillo, 2009). Thus we can see how the discourse deployed betrays its function, similar to but more obviously than in the Cussen Report, which is to construct people as units to be disappeared into a negative space.

To clarify, it is not that there is a phenomenological process which comes first which gives rise to discourse; rather it is that discourse constitutes the conditions in which perception and conception arise. In other words, the discourse precedes existence; before the beginning there was the word. The whole question of legitimacy pivots around ontological constructions which have real and potentially lethal material effects. Discourses of delegitimsation are signs of an insidious process in which vested interests and power structures are enmeshed. Rhetorical and delegitimising discourses in the Cussen Report
function so that the social and sexual relations can be intensely scrutinised and controlled, so that social cohesion is preserved. Once individuals remove themselves from this grid of social control they become delegitimised, and in this case they are impoverished children, single mothers and unmarried fathers. Foucault conceptualised power as a force produced by and productive of social relations, “that power regulates relations, not objects, precisely because if power can successfully regulate the relations it gets the objects for free-” (Nealon, 2008, p. 38). In the Cussen Report we can see clearly where power is operative, in the minutiae of details which restrain and constrain relations between children and family, between children and the social body, between females and their bodies, between females and males, between fathers and children, between passive and active males and as many permutations of gender and generation that can be conceived.

**Somato-Psychic Discourse.**

In the Cussen Report, the construction of a contagious object is achieved through the deployment of a medical discourse. Fear of plague and contamination only became relatively alleviated in the late 19th century because of the advances in the science of public sanitation and disinfection (Rosen, 1993), mainly due to Semmelweis’s discovery that disinfection of the medic’s hands before the delivering of babies radically decreased the rates of mortality due to puerperal fever. This was a stroke of empirical observational genius, not fully explained until the germ theory of Pasteur in 1865 (Pittet & Boyce, 2001). Therefore, fear of death of infection from disease was not a distant memory at the time of the Cussen Report. In addition to this the Great Irish Famine of 1845 to 1849 was caused by the failure of the potato crop due to the contagious blight Phytophthora Infestans with massive mortality and consequent economic, social, familial, cultural and linguistic upheaval.
In the Cussen Report there are detailed notes on the medical care of the children and a great deal of effort is invested in constructing the “general body” of the children as at medical risk:

Only in a few instances can we find that the children are individually inspected, as is done, for example in the National Schools by the Medical Officer of Health. (303-304).

Tests for susceptibility to such a disease as diphtheria and immunisation against it, which is now more or less general throughout the National Schools, have not been carried out in the majority of certified schools (306-307).

The absence of a discourse of interiority (no reference to thoughts, attitudes, sensations or emotions) in the construction of the subjectivity of the children is underscored or perhaps compensated for by an emphasis on the discourse of disability. From the beginning of the report the industrial school is described as “the most suitable method of dealing with children suffering from disabilities” (39-40). The psychological discourse in operation is in line with the behaviourist paradigm of the day in which the exterior plane is where change can be assessed and verified, whether through tests of electrical conductance of skin or change in pulse, saliva production and so on. So, even though the word psychology and its derivative forms are never mentioned in the Cussen Report, it may be that the use of medical discourse is a means of constructing a psychological object; so, in effect medical discourse becomes a quasi-psychological discourse, a somato-psychic discourse. This masking of psychological discourse by medical discourse can be seen in the following section which deals with the problem of medical treatment in the industrial schools:

In some of the schools children with trachoma (a contagious disease of the eyes), ringworm (a contagious disease of the skin and hair) and other contagious diseases
with, in addition, children suffering from defects of sight and hearing are found mixing with the other children. This primitive and dangerous condition of affairs...

(309-312)

The passage constructs the problem as one of disease of the surfaces, of the eyes, skins and hair and other unspecified contagious diseases. What is interesting in this passage is that there are two distinct conditions described (contagious and non-contagious) and that defects of the sight and hearing are set apart from the previous description of contagious disease. However, both conditions are actually constructed as contagious because they are bundled together in the one object (the contagious object) found mixing with the other children. Therefore, the distinction between contagious and non-contagious diseases is elided and this results in the construction of physical disability as contagious. The construction of the subjectivity of the children in the school is managed through a nexus of discursive strategies, where the discourse of physical disease, and contagion allows a subject to be recognised as a contaminant and thereby medical discourse becomes deployed in the further elaboration of the subject in a social space where relations are fleshed out between child, institution and doctor. In addition, these discourses are all over-layered with the discourse of economics in which the “inadequate salaries” paid to doctors is emphasised repeatedly in the report. In fact there is a complete symmetry (almost certainly unconsciously reproduced) in the manner in which child care in the industrial school is constructed as a problem of poverty illustrated by statistics in grid-like form (17-18) and the problem of low fees paid to medical attendants in schools also accompanied by statistics in grid-like form (323-324).

In the introductory paragraphs of the report the committal of young children for short stays in the industrial schools is described as having a “salutary effect” (112). Again, the discourse is medical; salutary is defined by the OED as “ conducive to health; chiefly, serving to promote recovery from disease, or to counteract a deleterious influence” This construction
of the effects of institutionalisation is flatly contradicted by the description of the inadequate medical treatment in the schools and the presence of contagion. What is the function of these contradictory statements belonging to the same medical discourse? The statements seem irreconcilable because the schools are constructed as promoting recovery from disease and as a site for the engendering of disease.

My conclusion is that the discourse becomes contradictory when it becomes the site for a further discursive investment, one from psychological discourse and the other from economic discourse. For example, the description of the schools as “salutary” is deployed in the psychological sense, as a psychologically fit place for the rearing of children. In this sense the deployment of the word “salutary” derives from Greco-Roman discourse, a discourse adopted by neo-Imperialist Britain as seen in the dreadful imitative architecture of the 19th century, or in the mottos of University College London or the Royal Marines: mens sana in corpore sano (sound mind in a sound body). This collocation of mind and body into the one epithet amounts to a specific type of discourse which I call somato-psychic discourse and it is this discourse which is central to understanding how the industrial schools are constructed in the Cussen Report.

This can be further elucidated by examining the section on medical inspection during period of residence, where the school as a site for cure gives way to an economic discourse which demands that the school become a site of disease and contagion in order that the doctors’ fees can be raised. This is an instance of medico-economic discourse. Whether the schools are places of disease or cure is not a matter of empirical importance in the Cussen Report; what we see in the contradictory positioning of the schools is the play of power, as the facts are changed in accordance with the function of the statement and its desired effects. If the school is described as a place of health, it provides a rationale for its continuance which guarantees economic revenues for religious orders and the medical community. On the other
hand, if it is described as a place of ill-health, it provides a rationale for increased medical care and an increase in doctors’ salaries. There is a contradiction at the level of discursive description but not at the level of discursive function. In both cases the discursive function is to ensure the continuation of the existence of the schools, and this is propelled alternatively by a somato-psychic discourse and a medico-economic discourse.

Therefore, the function of medical discourse and the discourse of contagion is to keep the economic interests of certain vested interests (medics and clerics) safeguarded. To my mind, the principal problem in the Cussen Report is constructed as a problem of money, and the treatment of the bodies of children in part solves an economic need. The problem, lack of money becomes transmogrified into another problem (the treatment of children) whereas in effect, the second problem is really a solution to the first problem. Thus an economic problem is addressed by medical discourse in which the bodies of children are treated, and become the site for the signs of psychological signs of health, understood from a behaviourist perspective. In other words, the children are constructed according to somato-psychic constructions using discourses of contagion, medicine and economics. According to Foucault in Discipline and Punishment, “in every penitentiary, there functions a social and medico-psychological service” (1977, p. 270). I would argue that the discursive formations in Cussen construct the industrial school not as containing a medico-psychological service; rather they are a medico-psychological service along the lines which I have described.
The Kennedy Report

The Kennedy Report was published in 1970, three years before Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1962, a review of second level education was initiated by the Organization for Economic and Co-Development (OECD) in co-operation with the Department of Education and this report was delivered in 1966. This was part of a strategic move on the part of the Irish authorities to satisfy conditions of membership to accede to the European Economic Community. The Kennedy Report came out of the findings of a committee set up by the Government to survey the industrial schools system and its inaugural meeting was in October 1967. It was chaired by District Justice Eileen Kennedy and its members included civil servants, members of the Religious Congregations, a medical officer and a psychologist. The section analysed is Chapter 4 entitled Residential Care and Recommendations (p.13-26) and was selected because it was dealt substantively with the schools, the residents within and the proposal for a solution to the problem of institutional care, thus providing a number of different vantage points for a discourse analysis.

Psycho-Scientific Discourse

The Kennedy Report is unambiguous in its embrace of psychological discourse and this is seen in the proliferation of terms such as “attachment” (173) “developmental” (56) and “emotion” (92). This is clear indication of the influence of psychological discourse, specifically with regard to the theory of attachment and its relation to psychological health in young infants:

“The main disadvantages they are likely to suffer are a lack of experience of deep attachment to parent figures who provide security and with whom they can identify (172-174)”
This clearly shows that the Kennedy Report had come under the influence of psychological discourses based on studies of attachment between infant and caregiver (Bowlby, 1958, 1960; 1969; Bowlby & Ainsworth, 1951; Bowlby, Robertson & Rosenbluth, 1952). The Kennedy Report also draws on the discourse of science in order to construct a theory of childhood through discourses of modernity and science:

“It (child care system) may have been admirable at one time but it is now no longer suited to the requirements of our modern and more scientific age…” (14-15)

“It is also clear that the rules and regulations for the certification of Industrial Schools do not conform with modern thinking in the field of child care” (11-12)

It is notable that the previous childcare system in the guise of the industrial school system of the past fifty years is constructed as admirable. It is not made clear why this “admirable” system should be thrown over because of a “modern” and “scientific” age, as if these terms indicated incontestable progress. It is also not clear what modern means in this context but it must be remembered that this report was delivered within the context of Ireland’s application to the EEC in cooperation with the OECD and therefore it is possible that contextual economic developmental discourses are at play in the above construction.

Ireland was one of the most economically backward countries in Europe throughout the first half of the twentieth century, mainly because of insular isolationist policies (Lee, 1989). In the Kennedy Report the developmental discourse is of two kinds, individual and economic and the economic becomes mapped onto the individual, so that the two developmental discourses become conflated into one psycho-economic developmental discourse. Secondly, by constructing its époque as more modern and scientific there is an inference that the period leading prior to 1970 was an unscientific and pre-modern age.
As part of its remit the Kennedy committee commissioned a report from the department of psychology at University College Dublin, headed by Fr Doherty, Professor of Logic and Psychology, an appellation revealing of how psychology positioned itself within a larger field of logic and empirical science. This report applied standardised tests such as the Ravens Matrices to test perceptual ability and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) for the testing of verbal reasoning of the industrial school children. Measurement and calculation are not just restricted to assessments and empirical investigations described in the report but appear to be fundamental to the construction of the problematic of “abuse” in the Kennedy Report. Scientific psychological discourse is instrumental in creating a recognisable object: the industrial school child; however, at the same time it constructs a particular type of child whose subjectivity is subjugated to the imperatives of scientific psychology. Foucault captures this phenomenon very well, describing a carceral system which “combines in a single figure discourses and architecture, coercive regulations and scientific propositions, real social effects and invisible utopias, programmes of correcting delinquents and mechanisms that reinforce delinquency” (1977, p. 270).

In the Kennedy Report there is an insistence on the importance of training and professional development. For example, the lack of professional development is described as “the damage which it could do to the children in care is incalculable” (44-45). In this instance, damage to the children in care is constructed as incalculable according to two discourses; of rhetoric and science, in which the former communicates the severity of “damage” and the latter constructs the impossibility of measurement of “damage” according to the principles of scientific procedure. The scientific discourse as it is applies in the Kennedy Report results in the construction of particular objects, variables of assessment as in the following quotation where the emphasis is on the scientific stance of empirical observation, underscored by the deployment of the word “surveys”:
“Our visits, discussions and surveys have given us concrete and valuable information”

(17)

The objects referred to as “concrete and valuable information” remind us that the presence of one kind of discourse always signals the absence of another, in this case discourses of love, symbolism, imagination, fantasy and so on. The reference to valuable concrete information points to an investment in the concrete, which according to a psychoanalytic discourse, is often accompanied by a resistance to symbolic thought, often a feature of psychosomatic conditions (Gottlieb, 2003; James, 1979; Segal, 1957). In this manner, the Kennedy Report has become like a psychosomatic patient, a body which speaks its story through concrete symptoms. This again recalls the discourse identified in Cussen where the psychology is constructed through a somato-psychic discourse, through the body.

**Norms**

In my view, the discourse of scientific method and in particular the application of standardised methods of statistical analysis in which samples are assessed in relation to norms is a core element of the architecture of the Kennedy Report. The use of the word “normal” alerts the reader to an insistent construction of normative categories. The main category employed as a norm in the discussion on institutional abuse is the family. The family is constructed as a norm and a model to be emulated. In the summary of recommendations which is a brief one-page document, the family is referred to twice as a normative construct: “normal family unit, normal family” The use of the adjective “normal” further extends to the description of “normal children” (p.15) and “normal homes” (p.18). Not only is the family home constructed as normal it is also constructed as “natural” (189). This kind of discursive procedure overlaps with the more readily obvious scientific normative discourse to be found in the section dealing with the psychological assessment of children’s
IQ where the IQ score of the children are found to be much lower than in the “normal population” (p.111). This last example may seem a banal example of conventional statistical description but I am suggesting that this discourse becomes smeared over other sites of communication where we would not ordinarily expect to find it. In other words, statistical discourse based on normativisation does not remain isolated and atomised within its own field of operation but affects the quality of thought in other areas of inquiry.

So, for example, the comparison of the children to a normal population becomes reconfigured in other sections of the report as the comparison of children to a normal family unit. However, although the statement has been constituted by scientific discourse, it has now migrated into a different discourse, a discourse of child care. Even though the discourse of normativity is still evident on the surface, it is not immediately recognisable as it has found another context in which it appears to be immanent, as emerging naturally from this context, as if it were always thus. This may have something to do with the lability of discursive process and how quickly a way of talking can become institutionalised and thereby “normalised” or “naturalised”. This is one of the reasons why discursive analysis, especially from a Foucauldian perspective, brings a certain institutionalised way of talking into relief, so that its status can be interrogated, which allows for a new possibilities of liberty to be constituted. The danger of unchecked institutionalised social practices is that they create subjugated subjects or “docile bodies” to adopt Foucault’s term (1977, p. 133).

I argue that psychological discourse, which relates to normative discourse is in turn allied to constructions of the family as natural and normal, and functions as part of the carceral architecture described by Foucault. In the Cussen Report (1936) the family is constructed as a potential site of neglect and sexual abuse but in the Kennedy Report (1970) the family is constructed as a visible utopia, as a refuge from abuse. The children in industrial schools are constructed as being at a disadvantage “compared with children who are reared
in normal homes and certainly compared with those reared in homes that have stable family backgrounds and reasonable incomes” (Kennedy, 1970, p.18). The ascription of ideal values to the family is implied when the report constructs unstable and impoverished family, an “abnormal” family as more preferable than the industrial school. However, this formulation ignores the inescapable fact that many of the industrial school children were there because of familial poverty, abuse and neglect (Raftery & O’ Sullivan, 1999). Article 41.1.1° of the Irish Constitution (na hEireann, 1937) “recognizes the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law” (Bu nreacht na hEireann, 1937). This construction of the family in the Constitution is closer to the construction of the family in the Kennedy Report than it is to the construction of the family in the Cussen Report, even though the latter report was almost contemporary with the publication of the Constitution. It is likely that the manner in which the family is constructed in the Irish Constitution became institutionalised over time across a wide variety of domains: judicial, statutory, educational, medical, journalistic, religious and so on. This may explain why the Irish Constitution and the Kennedy Report construct the family as an almost identical object.

**Discourse of Professionalism**

Whereas the construction of the problem in the Cussen Report was largely one in economic terms, in the Kennedy Report the problem constructed is one of professionalism. In fact abusive practices in industrial schools are constructed as due to a lack of professional training in Child Care. “This lack of awareness is, we think, due to lack of professional training in Child Care” (24). “Provision of training should take precedence over any other recommendations” (48-49). The insistent use of discourse of training and professionalism results in the absence of other discourses which might account for the occurrence of abuse within the institution. However, the possibility of knowledge is heavily circumscribed by the
equation made between lack of awareness and abusive practice, which removes the possibility that abusive practice can coincide with awareness of it as an abusive practice. The function of the discourse of professionalism and training is to locate the occurrence of abuse as arising as a result of something absent; in other words the model of abuse constructed is a deficit model. What is the function of these discourses of professionalism? An immediate consequence of the construction of abuse as occurring because of lack of training is to exculpate individuals from acts of abuse and to locate the failure in a systematic failure rather than an individual failure. Secondly, because the problem of abuse is constructed as stemming from a deficit and not an asset, the logical follow on from such a discursive strategy is to add something to the existing structure, in this case training. This could lead, in practice, to a foreclosing of the problem by resolving to remedy the deficit by running training programs and so on, rather than opening up or being attentive to the possible reasons for the abuse.

The role of leadership is discussed within the context of the emphasis on training and bad management is constructed as “lack of appreciation of the reasoning behind proposals” to improve ways of working and thus a conflict between a trained subordinate and an untrained superior who routinely vetoes the proposals of his better-trained subordinate is explained away as lack of understanding. The function of this discourse is to construct an epistemology which explains bad practice as lack of understanding but this construction serves to remove out of the field of vision the conflict between the two parties. The implication of such a construction is clear: that increased understanding and transparency would wash out the power struggles between the individuals and it masks the power play which the Foucauldian scholar McNay described as “the agonistic struggle that takes place between free individuals” (McNay, 1994 p.50) This is a key feature of Foucauldian thought, the relationships between people are sites for minute struggles and influences and the metaphor employed by Foucault
to describe these sites as military. Interpreting Foucault, Rabinow describes this inter-relational field as “a battleground and not a conversation” (Rabinow, 1991). It is this force-field of tension and conflict which the discursive strategies in Kennedy attempt to cover up.

In the Kennedy Report ignorance is stressed as an important factor in potentially abusive practice but ignorance is not just restricted to the school alone, the public is also constructed as unaware. So we have an epistemological discourse which positions three different actors in the same place; the children, the staff and the public. Recommendations are made to “make the public aware of and interested in the development in the child care field” (58-59). This deserves further examination as the effect of constructing the people outside the institution under the unitary noun is to give an impression of a homogenous grouping of people on the outside. In another instance the community outside is constructed as having “the public eye”. The effects of this discourse is to wash over the field of competing interests in society and to smooth over the privileges of certain sectors in order that the power struggle and the inevitable conflict in relations is eliminated from view. For of course, there were people in the public who were more aware than others of the industrial schools, namely the religious orders, the local doctors, gardeners, cooks, police, the local judiciary and merchant class:

“These children are totally dependent on the community and we feel that, once the public is aware of their needs, it will be prepared to meet these to the full” (319-320)

The function of the construction of a univocal society is to mask the difference in access to knowledge and individual difference in the perception of reality. According to Foucault, power and knowledge exist in a feedback relationship, whereby knowledge is not equated with power but it provides the conditions for the mobilisation of power and conversely, power in terms of a relational transaction or event can provide the new
conditions for knowledge (Rabinow, 1991). It is this alliance of power and its relationship to knowledge which is repeatedly masked by the discursive strategies in this report.

The discourses in the Kennedy Report function as a means of advocating further training and the development of industrial schools along the lines of smaller family units. According to one reading it may seem that the children are constructed as psychological sentient beings within the discursive matrix of psychological science, but it must be remembered that the children are also constructed as psychologically damaged prior to their admission to the institution. They are constructed as of a “passive, introverted nature” that can “merge into the institutional background to such a degree that their emotional and mental problems may go unnoticed and untended” (91-92). So, the children are constructed as merging into the institution, because of their “passive introverted natures”, and not because of the manner in which the institution might construct their personalities. The construction of the children through psychological discourse as having “emotional scars of a deep and abiding nature” (99-100) cements this essentialist account of the children. Therefore, this construction of the children is radically different to that put forward in the Cussen Report in which poverty and not psychological damage is the central problem of institutionalised child care.

B.4.3 Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse

The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (Cica) was established on the 23rd May 2000 with the aim of conducting an inquiry into the abuse of children in institutions from the 1940 to the present day. The commission was chaired by High Court Justice Sean Ryan and made up of staff drawn from various disciplines: a child care director, a psychologist, a retired consultant paediatrician, and two social workers. This committee heard testimonies over a nine-year period from those involved in the industrial school, and from those who had
been there as children. The Cica is a mammoth document and I have selected a small section of that document, which is the summary of conclusions of the findings of the Commission and thus serves as a distillation of the major construction indicated by the response. I would like to focus specifically on conclusions of the Commission’s findings in terms of how they constructed the problem of abuse. Because this report is relatively recent, it may take some time before it can be assessed from a historically discursive perspective. Nevertheless, I will give a brief outline of the key discourses in operation in Cica, as I see it, bearing in mind that I am very much a product of the discourses elaborated in Cica, which may mean a greater reflective and reflexive blindness than in my discussion of the Cussen and Kennedy reports.

The first point to be made is how the word “abuse” is absent in the Cussen and Kennedy reports but occurs 395 times in Cica. Secondly, it is interesting to note that the title of my own study includes the word “abuse” and it is evident that I am a product as well as a disseminator of contemporary discourses. The objectives and aims of Cica are clearly stated in its report which declares its mandate to investigate abuse according to four different types: physical, sexual, neglect and emotional and this framing of the objectives maps onto the discursive shift in research into child abuse from the early emphasis on physical abuse in the early sixties to include sexual abuse from the 1970s onwards and later emotional abuse and neglect in the 80s and 90s (Clark, Clark & Adamec, 2007).

**Psycho-Cultural Discourse**

The model of psychological discourse which informed Kennedy, as discussed, was a model based on empirical scientific processes. In Cica, the discourse of psychology seems to be subsumed into a broader discursive network of uncertain appellation, at times referred to as development or emotional needs:
“Services should be tailored to the developmental, educational and health needs of the particular child” (395-396).

There are several interesting aspects to this statement. Firstly, the child is constructed as an individual and particular and not as part of a group. Secondly, the needs of children are constructed according to four categories, one of which is developmental. Within the Kennedy Report psychological health is constructed primarily as deriving from having close family-like attachments. In Cica, there is a much wider-lensed construction of psychological health, which is constructed as cultural. The deployment of historical and political discourse demonstrates how the problem of the industrial school system is now constructed within an historical context:

“From the mid-1920s in England, smaller more family-like settings were established and they were seen as providing a better standard of care for children in need” (20-22)

“Counselling and mental health services have a significant role in alleviating the effects of childhood abuse and its legacy on the following generations” (383-384)

“The pervasiveness of emotional abuse of children in care throughout the relevant period points to damaging cultural attitudes of many who taught in and operated these schools” (291-293)

Abuse is constructed within a socio-cultural context, as pervasive and is implicated in cultural attitudes which are constructed as damaging. The managers and teachers of the schools are positioned as having cultural attitudes but this positioning of managers as having an attitude is not entirely consistent with constructions in which they are described as “having lost sight of the purpose for which the institutions were established” (403). It seems as if the
congregations simultaneously occupy irreconcilable positions, that they possess attitudes which are damaging while having lost sight of the purposes for which the schools were established. The discourse underlying this formulation is based on the concept of possession/dispossession, which may stem from a rudimentary discourse of economics, where emotions and attitudes are constructed as tangible assets to be banked or withdrawn. The problem is that the construction is not coherent in Cica, because it is not clear where cultural attitudes are located and the inference to be made from the construction is that these attitudes can be renounced, as if the individual could extirpate herself from culture. In other words, the managers and workers are constructed from and independent of culturally-determined positions, which is a logical impossibility. Male religious congregations were constructed as not willing to accept responsibility and the State and the Congregations are constructed as blind to the purposes for which the institutions were established:

“The State and the Congregations lost sight of the purpose for which the institutions were established “(401-403)

The religious congregations are constructed as disbelieving of reports of sexual abuse occurring in the past, despite the wide availability of extensive evidence of criminal misconduct from Garda investigations and the Commission describes them as “defensive, disbelieving of much of the evidence of the Investigation Committee in respect of sexual abuse in institutions" (176-179). This positioning of the religious as aware but not acting upon awareness contrasts markedly with the repeated constructions in the Cussen and Kennedy reports in which “abuse” is constructed as occurring as a result of lack of awareness and ignorance. However, in Cica the problem is constructed in a very different manner, as occurring despite awareness and not because of a lack of it. This conforms to the growing body of international evidence which has demonstrated that the Catholic Church has been aware, for decades, of the problem of child abuse at parochial, provincial, national and
international levels and responded with a policy of cover-up, moving known abusers to localities where the abuse would become unknown to the local community (Crosson-Tower, 2005, p.193)

Discourse of Systems

The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse constructs the problem of institutional care of children within a socio-historical context and introduces a causal hypothesis without providing a supporting rationale. I would like to examine this with reference to the following quotation:

“The system of large-scale institutionalisation was a response to a nineteenth century social problem, which was outdated and incapable of meeting the needs of individual children” (7)

There are several complex manoeuvres going on in the above statement. Firstly, institutionalisation is constructed as a system, a construction which is repeated many times throughout the report, and which functions to create an object of coherence and rationality. However, the construction of abuse as systematic needs to be unpacked as multiple meanings and connotations spin out of this construction. According to the Merriam Webster dictionary the word systematic refers to a “coherent body of thoughts and ideas” and it is this construction which I would like to query in its usage in Cica. In the following excerpt, the system is positioned as making it difficult but not impossible for individual difference to be expressed:

the system as managed by the Congregations made it difficult for individual religious who tried to respond to the emotional needs of the children in their care. Witnesses
from the religious Congregations described the conflict they experienced in fulfilling their religious vows (294-296).

However, this construction of resistance to and conflict with the system is an isolated instance of disharmony or lack of coherence and is overshadowed by the hegemonic discursive strategies expressed in short, trenchant statements which construct the industrial school system as systematic, coherent and less riven with conflict than it appears to be in this passage. This construction itself crowds out other alternative constructions, such as the possibility that abuse may not reside exclusively in the area of conscious, rational intention associated with system. This tendency to construct the abuse as systematic has its counterpart in the insistence on constructing disparate religious orders that ran the institution as one coherent body.

In my view, the discourse which underpins the construction of the schools as systems and abuse as systematic is an information-processing discourse. This way of thinking is so ingrained in culture, that using the computer as a model or metaphor for the human mind has become ubiquitous and unquestioned (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sowa, 1984). The use of technological epistemology as a metaphor with which to investigate human life has been challenged by authors such as the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion who maintained that knowledge based on analysis of inanimate life is an inadequate model with which to understand animate life (Bion, 1984, p. 14). The manner in which the discourse of technology and information processing has percolated into the general culture can be seen in the predominance of information-processing models of psychological treatment such as cognitive behavioural therapy, which is the core therapy recommended by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Guidance (Rawlins & Culyer, 2004). This strand of Bion’s thought has been developed by Robert Caper (1999) who describes the fetishisation of natural sciences
within contemporary culture, as resulting in the shunning of relationships with people in favour of relationships with part objects, such as money, things, or parts of bodies. These perverse relationships exist in a bio-feedback relationship with contemporary capitalism, in which they are its combustive fuel and fossilised remains. No doubt, the catastrophic destruction of our environment derives from the same perversity, the refusal to recognise its animate characteristics.

Furthermore the construction of the schools as a place of systematic abuse is undermined by the contradictory construction of the schools as a place where “there were no uniform, objective standards of physical care on which the inspections could be based” (29-30). If the schools are positioned as lacking uniformity, how are we to understand them as places of systematic abuse? Moreover, the construction of the institution as a place of systemic abuse seems to be challenged by competing constructions of the institution:

“Many witnesses who complained of abuse nevertheless expressed some positive memories: small gestures of kindness were vividly recalled. A word of consideration or encouragement, or an act of sympathy or understanding had a profound effect” (43-45)

The problem is that this construction of the institution as both positive and negative becomes overwhelmed by a hegemonic discourse which is negative. This hegemonising process is consolidated by media and televisual discourses which privilege the sound bite over nuanced analysis.

**Historical Discourse**

To construct large scale institutionalisation as a response to a 19th century social problem is to ignore a related question, which is what kind of response is large-scale
institutionalisation to children “needing” care? In other words, to construct the large-scale institutionalisation of children as a response to a 19th century social problem functions as a self-evident truth which forecloses the possibility of querying that response or imagining other responses, such as the possibility that institutionalisation was also a response to a 20th century problem. So, the use of historical discourse functions as a Trojan Horse which carries with it assumptions of divine omniscience where the eye of God is replaced by the all-knowing eye of an ahistorical historian. This is a historical discourse which derives from transcendental humanism, a discourse in which a teleological ahistorical viewpoint is privileged.

A short analysis cannot do justice to the findings of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse and my objective has been to simply show how discursive formations constructs objects which impact upon our understanding, and which may open up or block possibilities for considering alternative realities. Foucault has been heavily and sometimes justly criticised for the weaknesses of his methodology but the strength of his thinking and what it offers us, is not just a means of imagining alternatives in the past but more crucially, understanding alternatives for the present, so that we become refreshed to ourselves again. In this way FDA is as much an attitude of poetry, as a work of analysis, a means of imagining our past and present lives in a different metre.

In the three reports analysed the construction of the industrial schools is deployed through a discourse of professional reporting, which constructs an object of knowledge characterised by certain stylistics such as methodological coherence and professional rhetoric. However, the gain in formal process and focus results in a loss of contradiction, colour, tonality and breadth of attention, and thus distracts from the complex manner in which abuse is embedded in our social and self-transactions. This will be the focus of
attention in the following chapter which is an analysis of oral interviews with people living in a community in which an industrial school was located.
B.5. Interviews

“To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal, sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary, looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another” (Baktin as cited in Talja, 1999, p.12)

The tradition of oral culture has been side-lined over the last couple of centuries by a graphocentric educational system and attention to the oral history of places has been described as a way of tapping into the rich sedimentations of a human ecology (Said, 2003). The following analyses aim to tap into that human ecology and are based on written transcriptions of oral interviews. Recent research has shown that this process of transcribing an interview to text is not a transparent process, but an active and constructive one (Frosh, as cited in Willig, 2012). The situation is further complicated when one begins to question the rigid demarcation between oral and written discourse, as the respondents’ oral statements are constructed out of numerous written and visual materials such as academic texts, journalism, the Constitution, scripture, poetry, the civil archive (reports), music, historical writing, genre (biography, memoir, novel). In turn, each of these forms and genres are smeared with multiple discourses: patriarchal, religious, educational, pedagogical, patriotic, and political and so on. Thus each interview is constructed out of multiple motivations.

The centrality of textual motivation to speech has been a core principle of Judaeo-Christian discourse, transmitted through the hermeneutic tradition, manifest in the opening lines of the Gospel according to John. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John, 1:1. King James Version). Perhaps, the true distinguishing feature of unrecorded oral speech is that is content without form. However, once an interview is recorded, it becomes temporally bound and structured, becoming
transformed into entity that is content with form, a text. Therefore, by way of clarification the
interviews analysed here are no longer oral objects, but rather texts constructed from oral
speech. The interviews I recorded were oral co-constructions, born out of a moment, out of a
context with innumerable, knowable and unknowable determinants: personal, social,
historical, fashioned out of commonalties and differences, the weather, accidents of mood,
happenstance, a combination of the aleatory and the planned. This oral event is structured or
circumscribed by the audio recording, which in this instance becomes the canvas that frames
the encounter. The material reality of our conversation is captured by a recording, fixed as a
photograph in a solution, an inversion of Marx’s famous formulation of “all that is solid melts
into air” (Marx, 1983, p.4).

This analysis will begin by an examination of the manner in which visual discourse is
instrumental in the construction of a response to institutional abuse. This is followed by an
analysis of subjectivity as it is constituted, in relation to those inside the institution and those
outside the institution, paying particular attention to contradictory positionings of individuals
and groups, and how gender and subjectivity interact to position subject and object within the
debate on institutional abuse. The objective is not to just analyse the object of institutional
abuse as constituted in these interviews, but also to analyse the subjectivity constituted in the
construction of that object. The role of moral discourse and its relationship to religious
discourse and the function of this discourse are discussed within the context of institutional
child abuse. Lastly, the function of the industrial schools as a disciplining mechanism is
described, with reference to its disciplining of the children inside the institution and of the
community outside the institution. I wish to show that the construction of the institutional
abuse in these interviews cannot be atomised and sealed off from constructions of social and
political life. It is hoped that this analysis will provide some insight into how institutional
child abuse is part of a larger constructive process of self and society.
Visual Discourse

Foucauldian analysis is concerned with how respondents are positioned by discourse and how roles come to be adopted in order that an utterance can be expressed. In this section I concentrate on how visual discourse operates within verbal accounts, and in particular how visual discourse gives rise to discursive subjects and the objects of which they speak. In the introduction it was shown how visual technologies are imbricated in the construction of an epistemic response to child abuse. In this section, I would like to draw attention to visual technologies such as painting, architecture, geometry and film which are immanent in the constructive grammar of what we see and what we say.

Painting

The use of visual material to construct knowledge is seen clearly in these interviews; for instance, the discourse of painting constructs materiality in a plastic manner, as in this example in which there is cross-wiring of visual and verbal modalities: “Different blobs come out of different…” (3, 575). Visual discourse constructs the material, with reference to foreground and background, using the perspectival discourses of Renaissance art in which a visual construction is deployed from a homocentric discourse, a historically-constructed phenomenon analysed by the art historian Edwin Panofsky (1996). The importance of perspectival conventions and their role as a discursive function can be seen in the following excerpt:

“I need to give you a little bit of background on this” (1, 100). “We used to see these boys labouring in the fields (1, 21).
The construction deployed here constructs the subjects as seen but this is contradicted by a later construction in which the residents are constructed as not seen:

And I worked in there actually. I had forgotten this. I was an apprentice to an interior decorator. And he’d got this job to essentially paint the inside of this place. St Joseph’s and the first thing that struck me was, that that in the few weeks I was there, from 8 o’ clock in the morning to 6 in the evening, I never met another child.” (1, 147-153).

Both constructions are deployed through techniques borrowed from the discourse of painting and possibly film. In the first image the boys are constructed in the foreground as in a Millet painting or in a tracking shot of a chain gang in a Hollywood movie. In the second construction the boys are constructed beyond the vanishing point of the pictorial perspective. The use of visual discourse is so effective that I unwittingly comment and try to deconstruct later in the interview:

“You paint a picture, not paint a picture but give a very vivid account” (1, 702).

Filmic Discourse

Film is a fundamental discursive operation in terms of the structuring of the response to the institutional abuse and this is linked back to a privileging of the perceptual. For example, I as interviewer construct knowledge as perception in the beginning of the interview: “What is your perception of it” (1, 58) and my discourse is instrumental in the construction of a worldview (weltanschaung) out of a perception (anschauung). There are numerous references to films in the interviews at the level of content, references to filmic codes, stand-off at noon, calling to mind High Noon (Zinneman, 1952), the reference to Steven McQueen
as “graduate” of the industrial schools, the use of US movie slang, “the clean-up guy”, the “fucking pseudo-Vatican hitman” (1, 925):

Yeah, But I mean, they were very, I mean some of the guys were very funny and very inventive, and emm, you know, every trick in the book. One particular story I love and I have often thought it would make a great short film. (2, 346-348)

“You know that film, the Magdalens by Peter what’s his name—it’s a very monochrome piece” (6, 196).

Film constructs the response at the level of content but also at the formal level of semantics; in other words, filmic codes become part of the grammar of the signified scene. For example, one respondent constructs a scene in which he is in the industrial school, a scene reminiscent of the constructions found in the genre of horror, such as Kubrick’s The Shining (Kubrick, 1980): “I was in these long corridors which were incredibly quiet, and you felt an atmosphere (1, 153-154).

**Geometry**

In these interviews it is striking how often the scenes are constructed along two visual planes: the vertical and horizontal. The society is constructed as poisoned from the emanations and fumes from below (the horizontal plane):

In a sense, if this isn’t too awkward a comparison, poisoned rivers blow fumes and people don’t actually know that the fumes are coming from that goddamn river. This society, due to its previous corruption, has put out fumes and people are poisoned by these fumes (1, 635-639).
An attitude of satire in the analytical field of current affairs and television which would have looked at this (abuse) as emanations of Irish political, social, religious, familial values. (6, 221-222)

The society is constructed as having been poisoned from the river of corruption which flows underneath. This discourse is contrasted with vertical discourse in which man’s elevation (in line with humanist constructions of the individual is emphasised, “You elevate people by giving them elevated things” (1, 748). And liberty is constructed as elevation:

They knew that if I don’t get the power I’m going to wind up like them, over there, them people coming out in coffins through the windows because the stairs were too narrow, so you had to get them out the top window (1, 646-648).

Even in death, escape is constructed as happening on the vertical axis, presumably to get as far away as possible from the ground linked to lack of oxygen, death, dying and putrefaction. The point of elevation is also constructed as the plane of dominant power, shown in the references to the clergy as “up there” (5, 205) and “up on his high horse” (5, 211).

**Architecture**

In addition to the use of geometric discourse we have its natural extension in the deployment of architectural discourse. We see how key architectural features become structuring principles of discourse, such as the parish house, town planning, social housing, the school, the hospital and so on:

“I mean they had this huge understanding not just of their own little perch, pump, patch but they read the papers, they knew world stuff” (3, 712)

They weren’t at all the sort of priests to be put sitting in the parlour. (3, 644)
I kind of feel sad for my 15 year-old grandchild who really has no...because of so much negative stuff that she’s aware of that she can’t see beyond that to see that’s only a very small, a very small window in a very large, you know landscape. (3, 974-977)

We can see how architectural features (windows, doors, walls etc.) can act as framing devices or portals, a discursive practice which constitutes objects such as the inside/outside, the fragile/robust, the sheltered/the exposed etc. Architectural terms are deployed to construct the physical body in space, thus demonstrating how the discourse of architecture relates to the discourse of the body, “He went into the bowels of the room” (2, 125); “he didn’t know what was going on behind closed doors” (2, 128); “that goes all out the window when you’re on the hurling pitch” (2, 196); “You see what goes on inside closed doors is a very different thing from what’s shown on the outside” (5, 494). The institution is described as a “closed shop” (5, 487). “I can actually remember seeing them climbing out the windows” (2, 225) “he was good and open” (Line 290). There is a very vivid account given by a respondent in which the use of architecture as a discourse allows for a contrast to be elaborated between the marmoreal/classical cold forms linked to economics, power and patriarchy and the helplessness and powerlessness of mother and child.

And I remember there, there was a huge house there, a pseudo-Georgian house as I recall and I went with my mother into this- there was a marble-covered hall and it had that vibe, that silent vibe and this priest came out. I shan’t name him and he had a white napkin in his hands and he was patting his lips. And he said to my mother “What do you mean coming here, disturbing-not disturbing me- interrupting my dinner”? It was about noon time and my mother began to cry, to blurt out or tried to blurt out whatever complaint she had about my father. And he told her: “you ought to be ashamed of yourself coming here complaining about your husband, don’t you
realise blah blah blah.” We started to get out and so we got outside and my mother was still crying and I took her hand and I said, “don’t mind him mother, he’s only a fucker”. And she hit me. So you were caught every way. (1, 315-322)

The respondent constructs a scene in which his mother and himself are dominated, and this social domination is expressed through the architectural artefacts such as the Georgian House, the ascendancy symbol par excellence which now becomes the site of a privileging of Catholic power, a “pseudo-Georgian” house. Thus an oppressive structure (Colonialist hegemony) is displaced onto another domineering dispensation (Catholic hegemony) which maintains the status quo, a change in surface but not in the structure of social relations, in the same manner in which the Royal Mail phone boxes were preserved upon independence in 1921 but were painted green. I believe these objects serve as ostensive codes for the understanding of social practices, which has been described in recent research as a form of material semiotics by Reavey (2010) in which objects can play mediating roles in the construction of narrative. For example, the respondent as an elderly man deconstructs the given forms of the architecture and interrogates those forms by bringing into view how these very objects are constructed out of a phallic power, with imperial and colonial traces. As Elif Bautman puts it, objects “stand for the rules we live by” (2012. P. 39). It is not just the priest that is constructed as a fucker, the actual architecture is a fucker and now the same subjugating discourse, of mute architectural forms inscribed by the order of things, is at the same time transformed by means of verbal expression. The verbal expression within the interview functions represents an attack on a culture which had sanctioned or had given rise to the attack on mother and son. In this sense, the respondent’s narration acts as a form of resistance in line with Barker’s (1998) Foucauldian conceptualisation of resistance as an attack on culture. In this manner I think that the possibilities of resistance cannot be simply
reduced to an individual narrative, but rather the individual narrative serves as a platform of resistance to a larger practice from which it has emerged.

**Freedom and Friendship**

The industrial school boys are constructed as part of an undifferentiated mass, as part of a deindividuated corpus, as products of public places, “dormitories” or in “cinemas” and are represented as having no personal belongings: “they all had to go in” (2, 14), “they all lived in dormitories” (2, 16) you’re in a dormitory, you’ve no personal space”, “I don’t even remember their faces turning to look at us” (4, 137-138). The position of “orphan” seems to be a passive site where the possibilities of action and change are non-existent. The discursive practice of dress brings the category of the institutionalised child into the zone of visibility, and simultaneously constructs and legitimises the piteous nature of this ontological category. The discourse of dress allows for the difference to be inscribed and constructed in the social sphere and this is a recurrent theme in all interviews:

He got this pair of 1940s show band horrible boots (2, 124)

Clothing marked off in a much more accentuated way classes and your position in society and em if you were expected to dress in a way that represented your social status. Em, obviously whoever designed these wanted to mark off the, the, the band as special (4, 372-375)

There is change in status or a change in dress very often and a uniformity to mark off that particular stage (6, 73).

However, at times the industrial schools boys escape these collective constructions, usually through discourses of sport and friendship when they are reconstructed as active and individual which points to the discourse of friendship as potentially subjectivising. The
function of this discourse of friendship is not entirely clear. It appears that the discourse acts as a way of facilitating speech:

“It’s because my friendship is so strong that I keep referring” (2, 499).

However, the discourse of friendship seems to be restricted within tightly confined zones of one or two people. In other words, the discourse of friendship contrasts radically with the notion of friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for example, where he presents friendship as a fundamental cornerstone of political life, where friendship acts as a cohesive element within small groups and this radiates out into larger virtuous circles until that becomes a polis defined by friendship (Aristotle, 2009). In this interview the discourse of friendship seems to have contradictory functions: it allows a conversation to be started but forbids its extension beyond the dyad into wider conversations. The boys from the community are constructed as free, in contradistinction to the industrial school children:

They were under control. We would have had more of a freedom than them as a group. (2, 42-43)

It is questionable how free these community boys were as actors in their community. One would imagine that they were not free, as they were children and thus had little power. In a sense this doubt is confirmed by the discourse around punishment and the compulsive demands of society on children, indicating that the speaker’s own assumption of freedom of the community boy should be questioned:

“You were bad if you were caught not going to mass” (2, 401)

Freedom is constructed as predicated on individuality, although this is not true in the case of the group activity of sport where it becomes a site of escape (maybe it was a bit of an escape for them” (2, 99). Yet, maybe escape should not be confounded with freedom as the escape
might also be intended as an escape from reality, and thus the reality remains unchanged and the possibilities for freedom barred. This is confirmed in other places where the industrial school boys are constructed as “inmates” and needing escape (2, 90). However, when individual residents are described as friends, great emphasis is placed on the adjective, “particular” and the earlier emphasis on the group structure is reversed and the individual is privileged by humanistic discourse, “Everyone is an individual and everyone has their own spirit and their own soul and character” (2, 537).

What to make of the discontinuities of construction of both industrial school boy and community boy? How is it that it appears that they occupy contradictory positions of subjectivity and what are the implications of these bilocatory strategies? Univocal positions or consistent viewpoints are rare in these interviews, as has been shown by the construction of the residents alternately as an undifferentiated mass and as individuals. An initial conclusion that can be drawn is that subjectivity is inherently unstable in this account and it leads us to be suspicious of simplistic accounts of coherent, unified selves in the debate on institutional abuse.

**Communities**

**Knowing/Not Knowing.**

One of the striking features of these interviews is how ways of knowing about something are constructed. The language used by the respondents is not a transparent symbolic system, it is transfigured by discursive practices; in other words language becomes an unstable set of signifying properties as soon as it becomes accultured. A simple way of putting this is to say that words do not mean what they mean until they do what they do. Knowledge of the industrial school system is constructed by the respondents as conferring an authority to speak about the subject. This was an almost universal response among
respondents when I asked them to interview: that they didn’t know enough about the system. “I didn’t know much about the industrial school system” (5, 5). Personal knowledge of the system is described as “marginal” (6, 44). “We wouldn’t have the phrase or we wouldn’t have the knowledge. We wouldn’t be able to verbalise that” (4, 71-72). And yet later in the interview the same respondent says: “I knew then that there was something strange about them” (4, 31). Another respondent is unequivocal about abuse as known, “And we knew that they were being beaten” (1, 329-321). ”It was a well-known fact but not mentioned in polite circles” (1, 315-316). “Everyone knew about it but it’s just now that it’s being spoken about” (1, 388-389).

A further contradiction is brought into relief by the construction of the community as knowing: “people had to have some idea of what was going on in there” (2,465) which contradicts the earlier construction of the father as not knowing (2, 128). This is further complicated by the distinction made in the following statement between awareness and knowledge:

“But we were always aware…it was a very secretive place and we didn’t really know what was going on” (2, 20)

So there is an uncompromising contradiction in constructions here, that is smoothed over by the narrative flow and only comes to light by breaking up the surface of the text through the process of deconstruction.

It is evident that there is a cleavage in how knowledge is constructed according to two categories: awareness and knowing. Perhaps, what is constructed in this account is an awareness of not having knowledge, almost as if understanding of the world is acquired through proprioception but is not elaborated through cognition. “We kind of felt they were just different” (2, 14). The discourse of awareness is perhaps a folk discourse, a
proprioceptive knowledge such as animal sensing, later reprised in the discourse of animal husbandry, where referring to abuse is described as “frightening the horses” (4, 316).

Practice seems to be linked to processes of realisation. Awareness is constructed as passive, as not necessarily conducive to action, whereas realisation, according to the OED is “to give real existence to something” marking a shift from inert to active knowledge:

We didn’t quite realise that it was endemic, that it was almost a working part of the culture if I could put it that way without being facetious. (1, 38-40)

Well, I didn’t actually think about it because it was just the way things were but, but the spectre of that oppressive dark society followed me all my life (1, 618-620)

In addition to the distinction between awareness and knowledge, realisation is also constructed as a particular epistemological stance which creates a space from which something can be thought of as apart from culture. In other words lack of realisation and lack of thought is intimately bound up with the working culture constructed as top heavy and top down, both spectre and sceptre.

The paradox raised here is that resistance to this working culture is constructed as non-existent in the past but resistance in the form of thought and reflection are constructed as operational now, which means that the working culture must have contained elements which worked against it to create these new conditions. This contradicts the construction of the oppressive culture as a totalising disciplinary mechanism. This argument is taken up by Lois McNay who has argued that Foucault overemphasised the reduction of the subject to an effect of disciplinary discourse, “Where Habermas sees the dialectics of freedom, Foucault sees the progressive subsumption of bodies under an inexorable disciplinary power” (1994, p.106). Foucault acknowledged his overemphasis of disciplinary power in his later work (Foucault,
1980) and this led him to an increasing focus on techniques of the self as dominating discursive practices. In other words, people actively seek out and recruit their own submission within the culture to which they belong, though they do not invent the techniques which they choose as these are handed down through socio-historical discourse.

Seeing/Not Seeing

A respondent uses the same construction twice: “A blind eye was thrown at the problem” (2, 454, 461). Vision is constructed as both able and disabled, as passive (was thrown) and active (but does not see). Within these discourses there is something about the nature of knowing and not knowing something at the same time. This evocative image expressed in the passive tense recalls a theatrical discourse, calling to mind in particular Sophocles’ drama Oedipus (Sophocles & Fagles, 1984) in which the eponymous protagonist blinds himself upon discovering that he has killed his father and married his mother. The reference to the blind eye is also the image of the camera, a blind eye recording impassively without comment as the images are captured through the lens and are photochemically stored on the negative. Of course, this particular construction contrasts with contemporary scientific constructivist accounts of visual perception in which vision is represented as much more of an active phenomena than was formerly thought (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003).

What are the implications of this in terms of the construction of subjectivities? The problem lies at the interface between visual construction and a general epistemology of which visual construction is but a part. Visual discourse in the manner outlined above is based on passivity, on a naïve model of correspondence between subject and object, in which reality is constructed as independent of perceptual activity, in which objects are revealed rather than constructed. Thus visual discourse in this manner promotes a naïve realism, and this visual
discourse becomes intermeshed with non-visual constructive activity, becoming concealed within and indistinguishable from the process of thinking, so that construction of objects will in part derive from a quality of a just-so-ness, a relic of the passivity inherent in normative visual discourse. These discursive operations of visual passivity insist on subjugating subjectivity, moulding people into passive receptacles of experience. This ensures the frustration of resistance and the upholding of hegemonic structures because the effect of this visual discourse is to produce a view of reality that it is just so, and to prevent an apprehension of reality as possibly other than what it seems. In other words, the visual discourse constructs a normative account of reality, based on the principles and concepts which have become ingrained in the way humans reflect on their situation. That is to say, that we think more like the classical painters of the 17th century who obeyed the laws of homocentric perspective than the painters of the 20th century such as Picasso or Cezanne who broke these laws in a new plastic configuration of space.

**Fractured Subjectivity: Colonial Selves.**

It must be remembered that the term “community” may be more fluid than we commonly take for granted, and as Wetherell (2007) remarks, it may lie at the boundary of fantasy and actuality. In other words, the term community is a discursive construction that may nor may not have a correlative in reality depending on what is being said and who is doing the saying. The community is constructed in contradictory ways as knowing/not knowing, as savage/polite, as honest/corrupt, as adult/child, mocking/considerate, ashamed/shameless etc. For example, one respondent constructs shame and shamelessness as both cause and solution to the problem of abuse:

We should be ashamed of our lives – that’s how I feel about it. (5, 321)
they were so ashamed for fear anybody would know their girls were pregnant. I mean it was terrible, to think that you'd actually worry more about what the neighbours thought about you rather than your own child. I would never get over that. I wouldn’t give a hoot what the neighbours thought about me. (5, 333-337)

In other words the community is positioned as either too ashamed or not ashamed enough. In the first example the speaker positions herself as part of a communal structure, but in the second example she positions herself as not belonging to the community of the ashamed; she positions herself outside of the community, thus underscoring the shifting and highly unstable ontological status of the community.

There are multiple contradictions at play in the construction of the community within each interview. This is given articulate expression in the following construction of the Irish community:

they were yet able to perpetrate these awful brutalities and you know Lawrence said something about the Arabs, how baffling they were to people, because he said their mind was like a palimpsest, there was one script underneath another script that had been written over it. That’s this country to a T. And also he said that the Arabs could hold two contradictory ideas in their heads and they would never meet each other, they would never find themselves in conflict as they would carry these two contradictions in their minds. It was exactly the same here, (1, 446-455).

This positioning of the Irish as equivocal Arabs is linked to binary schizoid constructions. For example, in the following excerpt Ireland is constructed as a place of suffocating politeness:

So, in polite society you couldn’t talk about the industrial school, as it was called (1, 500-501)
However, only minutes beforehand the Irish had been constructed as unremittingly savage indigenes incapable of appraising their own situation:

And I find independent observers, travellers writing on Ireland and the consistent word is savagery amongst all of them, that the population was reduced to a level of savagery, that, you know, they were quite happy to murder each other over a bottle of poitín or a , or a bit of a field or whatever. So, I mean it’s like the aboriginal thing , isn’t it, the aboriginal races don’ t come off very well, you know when the imperialists arrive, because the whole thing of clan of sect whatever, tribe breaks down instantly (1, 411- 419).

The Irish are reconstructed from a colonial perspective and the independent observation is validated, a distinct irony in that the speaker is speaking from a post-colonial perspective, from a position of putative independence, but the discourse reproduces a pre-independence pre-1921 colonised subjectivity, in which the native ontology is contingent upon the independent/ imperial eye. Of course what the construction points to is that the distinction between post-colonial and colonial may be too sharp, that this post-colonial subject is in fact, at times a colonial subject, because he has not been freed from the pinions of a colonising discourse. Further examples of fractured subjectivities can be seen in the following statements from one respondent:

“ We didn’t know anything that had gone on previously” (5, 49-50)

“ We wouldn’t like to dwell on it too much “ –you’d go crazy. ” (5,109)

“I could never understand why it hadn’t come out sooner with doctors” (5, 84-85)

“There had to be loads of people who knew what was going on “ (5, 119)
On the one hand the respondent is positioning herself as part of the community indicated by the first person plural pronoun in the first two statements. However, in the latter two statements knowledge is constructed as belonging to an out group, in particular doctors and unspecified others. This positioning results in a splitting of the idea of a cohesive community, and results in many possibilities such as various out-groups and in groups (professionals/non-professionals) but in essence, knowledge is constructed as belonging to the third person plural, a group to which the speaker does not belong, which calls into question who or what the community is.

Community and Democracy

This complexity of the construction of the community is also revealed in the insistence of constructions of community derived from a “demotic discourse” in which people are constructed using discourse of morality as ordinary, decent and good. “They were ordinary guys, ordinary guys” (2, 17). This is most readily seen in such terms as “the auld stock, the honest people” (1, 814) which construct the community within a genealogical/genetic construction of honest inheritance, passed on through the “stock”. One of the functions of this demotic discourse is that subjects construct themselves as figures who are “ordinary” in order that no claims can be made on them and this tactic can be read as a divestment of agency and responsibility. This type of democratic discourse is troubling and serves to construct subjects, whose extra-ordinariness becomes concealed from themselves, thus foreclosing any possibility of transformation or revolt.

Demotic discourse appears to have the function of upholding static structures within the body politic. The etymological roots of the term ordinary range from “a rule”, “a formula”, “a servant” and “a soldier”, which give some clue as to the prescriptive and ordering function of the discourse (Mirriam Webster). Perhaps, the function of this discourse is to estrange
people from the potential strangeness of the human condition. The use of demotic discourse results in a normativity in which complex subjectivity is reduced to a categorical term, ordinary. At the semantic level, in which subjectivity is in part constructed and expressed, possibilities for action are deferred, and subjectivity appears to be locked into passivity by the ordering processes of language. This process is not dissimilar to the positioning of the subject or object within a group term, indicated here by the use of the first person plural:

And emm, we always sort of expected somebody to subpoena the records of the Galway diocese, which they obviously haven’t. (1, 82-84).

The expectation or the viewpoint is established from the perspective of an undescribed “we”, although this viewpoint is qualified and its own uncertain status as an epistemic object is emphasised by the adverbial modifier, “sort of”. The uncertain relationship between individual and group subjectivity is revealed by the pronominal shifts between singular and plural. The cognitive process or perspective is located in the plural “we” but the object of expectation is the singular somebody. Put another way, this is a reversal of the idea of storming the Bastille, where the force of the crowd leads to the overthrow of the Bastille. In this case, the crowd, “we” is impotent and the “I” is constructed as agentive.

Elsewhere the speaker positions herself as part of the “regular people” (5, 489) or as part of a collective signified as “funny little machines” (5, 496), thus indicating regularity and mechanization as constructed features of the community, which begs the question whether irregular people are less like little machines. This calls to mind the findings discussed in the introduction of Monroe (2008) and Charleton (2012) who put forward the view that social conformity and individual passivity may be implicated in the propagation of abusive practices. Individual agency and the community are discussed by another respondent:
“This is the way people divest themselves of personal freedom, and to divest themselves of personal responsibility and manage therefore to allow despicable and unspeakable things to happen” (6, 99-100).

Interestingly, the verb “divest”, with its origins in the medieval Latin, divestire which means to undress, picks up on the discursive practice of the dress of the industrial school children, noted earlier, and which all respondents comment on. The speaker goes on to construct the community as stunted from arrested development, mixing political and developmental metaphors:

“But I think they were disabled” (6, 268)

“The Irish suffer from post-colonial adolescence” (6, 272)

“How are we going to grow up if we don’t ask those questions”? (6, 279)

In these interviews, there seems to be little possibility for occupying medial positions along a dimension between shame and shamelessness, savagery and politeness and so forth, that the function of the discourse appears to result in the foisting of positions on the subject so it can become constituted and known. The subject is usually positioned in terms of binary categories, victim or hero, rebel or conformist, naïve or knowledgeable, pacifist or warrior, brave or cowardly, private or public, as male or female and so on. In other words, discourse constructs antinomies of nature and reifies essential subject positions, thereby constructing a material reality out of linguistic/conceptual categories. It is possible that this binary splitting constituted by discourse results in a bio-feedback hardening of this feature, thus barring possibilities of a discourse more constitutive of complex subjective positions and genuine transformation. The effect of this discursive process is that idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies
are levelled out, resulting in a limited vision of subjectivity, where the subject is subjugated into either/or categories as in the following:

“‘You know all the idealists were killed in the Rising (said sarcastically) and all the powerbrokers survived in my opinion. All of the poets, all of them were shot’ (1, 576-577).

This discourse of binary opposites cancels out the possibility that a poet may also be a powerbroker, as in the case of Mao Tse-Tung or Radovan Karadzic. We can see how the microdiscursive procedures of totalising categories are achieved through absolutist discourse, reinforcing binary categorisation: “all the idealists were killed, all the powerbrokers survived. All of the poets, all of them.” What becomes clear in analysing the interviews is how community is a constructed idea which changes within and between interviews. In each interview, there is a concerted effort to construct individuals as within a community which is not abusive, and outside a community that is abusive. This is related to what one participant has termed a “divesting” of responsibility. Taken further, we could say that the abusive community is constructed as uninhabited which poses a challenge for a theorisation of communal ethics and collective responsibility.

**Gendered Subjectivities**

**Subjugated Selves**

Firstly, I would like to emphasise these discourses are very complex and are often deployed so that individuals may occupy either gender role, regardless of sex. For example a male respondent very clearly constructs his family in the matrilineal line: “We six children of my mother’s (1, 28). However, in another male respondent’s account, the family is constructed in the patrilineal line, “the generation of my father” (2, 115). All three female
respondents construct the problem of abuse in the wider context of the role of wives and mothers in society, which point to the very particular manner in which subjectivity is constructed through gender and this has implications for the resistance to and redeployment of that discourse. It may be argued that having experienced one’s subjectivity constructed through gender allows one to critique it more closely, as there is more at stake.

**Abuse and Patriarchy**

I would like to examine how the subjectivity of women is constructed along the same lines as the subjectivity of the industrial school children within the context of a patriarchal society. The industrial schools boys are constructed as passive figures:

- they were renowned for their passivity and consequently were bullied in …as …the…They pretty much continued being abused in another institution called, “The Army”. And it is, it is as though they- I don’t want to be speculative, philosophical or psychological about this but it did seem that if they had settled on that as a method of life that for, for, for food and shelter came with it sort of abuse. Ehh, (sigh) (1, 49-55)

The industrial school boys are constructed as essentially passive and this passivity is doubly reinforced by the contradiction that they are active in choosing their passivity, “they had settled on that as a way of life”. The following accounts show how women and children are also constructed, according to a patriarchal discourse, in the passive position:

- Again serving the men (5, 380).
- Where did married women go when they were beaten up themselves? (3, 826-827)
- You could fight as much as you liked, there was no out (3, 854).
However, this construction of women as passive is contested by an alternative matriarchal construction of women as powerful and this matriarchy is located at the level of praxis:

I mean women’s lib was lived and practised because I can still remember being told in school…if you teach a woman you teach a whole family; if you teach a man you only teach a man (3, 730).

This construction of women as conduits of education and architects of family culture is challenged by the construction of women as passive subjects embedded (sexually and culturally) within the patriarchal domain. Patriarchal, matriarchal, carceral, religious, matrimonial and architectural discourses are condensed in the following brief statement, “If you married you made your bed and laid on it” (3, 848). The marriage bed is constructed, not so much as a place of erotic bliss, but rather as a site of Procrustean torture. Women are constructed not as the powerbrokers but as the abused who need to be jailed in order to be protected from the violence from men:

she said there were nights when the guards would put the women up in the cells for their own protection. There was nowhere else to go and they would try to help by keeping them in the cells. They couldn’t take a man and lock him up. But…I mean that’s what I ‘m talking about, you have to look at what’s going on in the whole society at the time and this was only the seventies. (3, 841-845)

In this example, women are constructed as being wide open to the abuse of what Hilary Brown has called “unchecked male power”, which she has identified as one of the contributing factors to potential institutional abuse (1999, p.106). At the larger level of judicial process, the law does not check the power of violent men within the context of matrimony, but instead the married women have to check themselves, into a carceral space where they position themselves as criminal and displace themselves from the position of
spousal contract, thus drawing on the discourse of checking male power (prisons) to protect themselves from unchecked male power (violent husbands).

It is revealing to trace the power relations of marriage by concentrating on the signifiers of matrimony indicated by the terms subjugate, conjugal, conjugate. In all of these cognate terms the Latin *jugum* is present, which means yoke, and thus we can see how the relations between man and wife are constituted in some way by the discourse of agricultural bondage, with its ramifying discourses of technology, fertility, meteorology and so forth.

Several respondents challenge the viewpoint that institutional abuse can be found inscribed in bricks and mortar, in the physical entity that is the institution. Instead, institutional abuse is found as exceeding physical boundaries and penetrating into other spheres of influence:

I feel that the concept of institution has to be broadened to include the home. Ha ha ha ha ..you know , O God…Better not get on to that. (1, 335-337).

In this sense, institutional abuse can also be described as virtual, but a virtuality with real effects. This can be seen in the following instance where the mother/child dyad is constructed as caught up in the matrices of a virtual institution:

“But the fact of the matter is that many of those who wound up in the Irish institutionalised mother and baby system didn’t have the wherewithal, didn’t have anybody to look after them and were shunned by their families (6, 178-180)

The discourse of gender has implications for the debate on institutional child abuse because it locates the debate more firmly within the larger context of power relations between men and women, and between adults and children, and opens up the possibilities for
discussion of passivity and activity as a function which is not to be found in essential
categories of men or women but rather as effects of discursive functions.

Subjectivity and Sexuality

Patriarchy is constructed as the locus for abuse by all three female respondents. This is
seen in several instances with variant discursive strategies in operation. One woman locates
the abuse firmly in the patriarchal family and points to an omnidirectional abuse by the
father:

“They were a family being seriously abused in every direction by their father” (3, 613).

The same respondent constructs the Church using the discourse of monarchy, and sovereign
male power is described in phrases such as, “The prince of the Church” (3, 296). “Abuse “is
constructed in terms of male economic power, “that business with his father” (3, 552). The
function of these discourses (in which economics, sexuality and violence are intertwined) is
to point to the seriousness of patriarchal abuse within the society, and that the issue of abuse
within institutions is connected back to a patriarchal discourse of sexuality within the wider
society.

Furthermore, the issue of institutional abuse as independent of gender is being
challenged here repeatedly. “Your man was an Opus Dei and he could not see himself doing
anything about a man of the church” (3, 622-623). However, the positioning of the speaker is
never univocal or adamantly consistent because the very construction of abuse as linked to
patriarchy is being constantly challenged by the construction of patriarchal benevolence, “I
have known enough of the good guys” (3, 961) . This paradoxical construction of men is
most vividly illustrated in the binary constructions of male broadcasters, one who is incapable of dealing with the issue and another who is instrumental in allowing abuse to be spoken about on the airwaves and who “could cope with those kind of horrific stories” (3, 547). In this sense patriarchy is presented as both able and disabled and the constructions reveal a complex critique of the patriarchal roles defined in Irish society, as both complicit in and resistant to abuse.

Two types of men are constructed in the following accounts. The first type is a man who is disembodied, who is physically inert but who holds a position of power, as signalled by the discourses of monarchy and papacy:

“we had Eugene O Callaghan who was the prince of the Church driving an Austin Prince. No he didn’t drive it, he had the driver but emm (laughter)” (3, 303-305)

In the following construction, a second type of man is constructed out of the materiality of human desires and material practices (eating and drinking, talking, dressing) in which men are described as:

normal human beings. Who stood with their back to the fire eating their porridge and drinking out of a mug. (3, 657-658)

Yeah, yeah. P died ten years ago after having just come back from Rome, having done his PHD on some German something. Some women wanted to come into my aunt’s and there was a long laneway and they wanted to come and see Fr P. And lately he had been known as Dr P but he never allowed anyone to use…This one said: “Is Fr P at home”. And she said : “what way did you come in”? “I came in the back road”. And she said, “Did you not see him? He’s out there digging ditches or planting trees or something”. So…that, that was my experience of the Church , (3, 644-651).
Here we have two versions of male sexuality; in the first version, the male is constructed as a version of negative power and this is rooted in the construction of the man as immaterial. In the second version of a man, another cleric, we see masculinity constructed as linked to processes of materiality and the body. Taken further, we could say that the immaterial man and thus the non-sexual man is constructed as a negative force, a construction of a possible invisible diabolical presence. On the other hand, the material and by extension, the sexual man is constructed as a benign presence. This may be linked to an aspect of the Pauline tradition within Christianity in which repression of sexuality was seen as potentially harmful:

“Better marry than burn” (Cor, 1: 79).

Paul’s injunction is a recognition of the dangers of a repressed sexuality, and is a rebuttal of Platonic idealism, and its Christian avatars, such as the Augustinian disdain for the material life as articulated by a respondent:

We were terrified; we lived in terror day and night because of that Augustinian belief, flesh is corrupt, you bastards are in bad shape, no matter what you do you’re going to die and procreation is simply a filthy necessity which hopefully we’ll grow out of. (1, 661-665)

The construction of a valued materiality also raise questions about a Neo-Platonist tradition in Catholicism, in which ideas are thought to govern the body and this creates a deadly dualism in which the body plays second fiddle to the idea of the body. The construction of male sexuality is problematic and questions are raised about the role of male sexuality and its links with power and the negative implications of a Platonised, idealised male sexuality. It is not difficult to see how such a disregard for materiality, carried forth through the Neo-Platonic Christian tradition, contributed to the conditions in which abuse
occurs. The thinking promoted by such a discourse could be formulated like this: If the body
*doesn’t matter, then its injury is no matter.* This discourse is related to the extreme idealist
position advocated by the philosopher Berkeley, *esse est percipi,* (Downing, 2005, as cited in
Zalta, 2012) that to be is to be perceived; and if the body is not seen, then it does not exist.

The role of the father was discussed in the introduction with regard to the codification
of patriarchial edicts within the religious and legal rites of Judaeo-Christian culture. This
operation of the paternal figure as a symbolic totem is in evidence in this respondent’s
account, in which the threat of being sent to the industrial school is linked to the father:

I remember my father, and many parents of the time, saying if we were bold we were
threatened to be sent to Letterfrack which had another industrial school out there,
emmm (2, 10-12).

It seems to me, that this positioning of the father as authority is complemented by a
positioning of the woman in a sentimental, impotent role:

They were very holy women and they went to mass every day and they used to help
with flowers in the church and whatever, you know. They were from a much older
generation, my dad’s generation. Things were different (2, 271-272, )

Here, women are constructed as aesthetic, fragrant and delicate objects but this construction
is contested in the following passage:

No girls got the same treatment but they wouldn’t have been sexually abused as much
as the boys. That’s the difference; they would have got a lot of physical abuse. Nuns
were vicious. They used to even whip them with canes and what have you. Sure we
even had that in primary schools ourselves going back 50 years ago. Ah she was a
lunatic. I remember two or three really wild girls in my class in Ballina and they’d
just tease her and hide the cane. And the next thing she’d find the cane and she’d be aaaaa…going like this …aa.aaaaa and she’d be nearly getting herself into a sweat and she’d starting running around the class hitting whoever she saw or whatever legs were on view under the desk with the cane. She was a nutter and like that’s 50 years ago (358-366)…Because women wouldn’t be into that as men. You see men were so frustrated (5, 376)

The women are constructed as not sexual abusers because they are not frustrated like men and yet the construction of the nun as physical abuser seems to suggest frustration and sex, if viewed within a psychoanalytic discourse, in which beatings and sadistic scenes derive from the sexual instincts. So, there is something about female sexuality which is known and revealed but at the same time must be concealed through a discourse of madness or eccentricity and so on. A similar process is to be seen in the following moving account:

And another thing was, another girl called Jacqueline had a , had obviously had a visitor on the Sunday and she came in with two little plastic hair slides and she was only seven and she was fiddling with them or playing and the nun took them off her and to this day I see, it upsets me. She took them off her and she put them on the pot-bellied stove and we watched them melt. That still bothers me… (3, 189-194)

This event is constructed as cruelty, not as an attack on female sexuality, both the nun’s and the child’s. What these constructions point to is a troubled construction of gendered sexuality. It seems difficult for female sexuality to be constructed in its materiality. Perhaps, this is related to the influence of the discursive practice of Catholicism, in which the impotence and potency of women is no more clearly exhibited than in the figure of the Virgin Mary, who is the most important female actor in Western Christianity as mother of God, as a subject
forever passive/disabled in conception and active/enabled in birth, whose sexual materiality is entirely absent within that discourse.

**Moral Discourse**

Ferguson (2007) has emphasised how abuse of industrial school children stemmed, in part, from dehumanizing discourses, which constructed the children as morally and not psychologically damaged, in which children are referred to as “moral dirt” (Ferguson, 2007, p. 123). My research into institutional abuse has confirmed Ferguson’s findings. Moral discourse is a striking and insistent feature of each interview. Industrial school children are described in moral terms as “good guys (2, 17), good ordinary guys (2, 172) and the institution is described as “where the bad people go” (2, 116). The children in the industrial school are referred to by another interviewee as “having failed from my conscience” (4, 281) and the subsequent exchange between interviewer and interviewee seemed to indicate that this may have been a slip between conscience and consciousness, demonstrating the contiguity of constructions of conscience and consciousness. The absence of conscience is underlined by another respondent: “I think if you haven’t a conscience, you’re a very dangerous human being” (5, 467).

According to Merriam Webster, conscience is defined as the consciousness of moral goodness or blameworthiness. This word is etymologically rooted in science, which comes from the Latin for knowledge, scientia which is also related to scindere, the Latin verb to split. Interestingly, it may be related to the Sanskrit chyati, “he cuts off”. What these etymologies reveal is something about the nature of knowledge which involves cutting off or
splitting. In order to know something, one has to not know something else and this is also true of the cognate form conscience. The following exchange points to a morality which is constructed as all pervasive and tyrannical:

So abuse in institutions takes many many forms and I think the psychological terror that we lived under as children, and this terror...you came by this terror in the same manner as you came by breathing the air. Nobody told you like that your body was dirty and bad and you didn’t want to touch your private parts. Nobody told you that but there was an, an atmosphere of repression (1, 419-426)

So complete as it was in Ireland, so total and so unfathomable and so all pervasive that it was like oxygen (1, 672)

This construction of the communication of terror is constructed within the context of a moral injunction to refrain from masturbation, which is mediated through non-linguistic channels suggesting a process of osmosis. This is worthy of further examination because it seems to me that the respondent is describing a situation in which something is signified without an identifiable signifier. This can be better understood if we draw on a theory suggested by the French psychoanalyst Laplanche who hypothesised a form of early communication to the infant, who receives messages from the outside world which exceeds the infant’s capacity for assimilation, which Laplanche (1999) described as enigmatic signifiers. If we consider the respondent’s construction in this light, the enigma is not what is communicated but in how this is communicated. In other words, the respondent’s construction of a moral injunction operates within a field of enigmatic signification. He feels something and knows something but does not know from where it comes; the enigma is in the transmission. This is a perfect illustration of Foucault’s theory of how discourse operates as a “materialism of the incorporeal” (Foucault, 1971, p. 60), elaborated upon by McNay:
Power relations can materially penetrate the body in depth, without depending even on the mediation of the subject’s own representations (1994, p.125).

Cultural communication operates at a supra-individual level and is mediated through linguistic and non-linguistic channels, through which messages are transmitted in the form of a material semiotics based on visual, auditory, olfactory and haptic stimuli.

It is interesting that the 19th century precursors of the industrial schools and other carceral institutions were known as moral hospitals as can be seen from this quote from a Victorian journal called Popular Science, “Prisons are moral hospitals where moral diseases are not only cared for but science learns the moral laws of life” (Seymour, 1873, p. 590). According to my research institutional child abuse is still framed within a moral discourse, perhaps a legacy trace of this 19th century discourse. A respondent links institutional abuse to “a notion of righteousness that seemed to emanate from a notion of Catholicism that is really dead thank God” (6, 92-92). The righteousness does not seem to be located in isolated pockets, or in individuals who abuse but the emphasis is on an emanative discourse, discourse as shape without recognisable form, like snow which melts into the bodies of those who inhabit the discursive space.

Recent scholarly work has shown how Irish Catholicism was heavily influenced by Jansenism in the 16th and 17th centuries, because Irish clerics were educated in Paris where Jansenism had a loyal following (Chambers, 2008). Jansenism was a theological approach based on the work of St Augustine, which laid emphasis on the depravity of the individual being who depends on God for the grace of forgiveness, but this act of grace is independent of the will of the sinner, and in this respect it was sometimes referred to as Catholic Calvinism. This absence of human free will goes against standard Catholic teaching, in which the gift of grace is contingent on human assent. I believe two discursive strands run like
seams through Irish Catholicism, a discourse which is orientated towards free will and radical social justice (the Jesuit tradition) and another which is marked by a deep, enervating conservatism (the Jansenist tradition). In my view, dehumanising discourses of morality pivot around the legacies of Jansenist discourse: absence of individual will and contempt for the body.

**Discipline and Punishment**

In five out of the six interviews each respondent spoke about the common and pervasive threat of being sent to the industrial school if the child was “bold”:

When I was transferred to St Brendan’s School, a national school in 1946, I would say, yes, 1946 of similar, (inaudible) I heard that word every day and it was used as a threat every single day. You’d almost. You’d either hear of a boy who was sent to Letterfrack or a boy who had escaped from Letterfrack and there was, ..It was, it was It was extremely dramatic for me because I had never …Letterfrack. What is this? (1, 114-121)

I remember my father, and many parents of the time, saying if we were bold we were threatened to be sent to Letterfrack which had another industrial school out there, emm (2, 10-12)

You know, but really wouldn’t have known, I suppose until I came to Galway in the late seventies or probably a bit before that I would have heard of Letterfrack (3, 41-42)

In Galway we knew about Letterfrack; Letterfrack again entered into the language of Galway in the same way as Bedlam House became in London or the way we say, that
person should be in Ballinasloe, meaning that everybody here knows that Ballinasloe is a psychiatric hospital and to be sent to Letterfrack was the threat for, so you’d be afraid to mitch school or for a serious crime as in stealing sweets from Woolworths, as I say mitching school or things like that. The threat of ending up in Letterfrack, it was a phrase, you’d be sent to Letterfrack (4, 338-344)

But then everyone knew about Letterfrack as a threat (5, 477)

The industrial schools are constructed as separate, defined monolithic units, “the industrial school and the whole world of it”. (2, 9). This construction of the schools as massive structures contrasts with the manner in which speech is deployed within interviews, where adverbial constructions emphasise fragmentary aspects of reality, “a bit of a taboo”. This fragmentary discourse can be found throughout all interviews in the use of multiple qualifiers such as “a bit of, a little, just, kind of” and the constant use of modal verbs such as might, may, known features of Hiberno-English (Dolan, 2006). This fragmentary (fragile) discourse contrasts with the way in which discursive formations constitute an irrefragable object of the institution/Church, “you don’t mess with the Church” (Line 455). It seems to me that the function of these discourses is to inhibit thought by constructing an object that appears to be resistant to being broken down into understanding, thereby cohering against interpretation and understanding, much in the same way that a prison wall is reinforced to withstand its being breached

Foucault characterises the use of discipline according to five rules in his semiotechnique of power (1977, p. 94):

1. The rule of minimum quantity.
2. The rule of sufficient ideality.
3. The rule of perfect certainty.
4. The rule of common truth evidence.

5. The rule of optimal specification.

Each of these rules is in evidence in the use of the industrial school as a disciplinary device, the rule of minimum quantity in the use of one word (Letterfrack) has massive signifying power as seen in the above material from the interviews; the rule of sufficient ideality is seen in the fact that the idea of being sent to the industrial school acted as ample threat and this did not need behavioural reinforcement, the rule of perfect certainty is evident in the witnessing of the school and the inmates, and this is also related to the rule of common truth evidence. And lastly, the rule of optimal specification can be seen in how the threat is issued in terms of specified and classified behaviours: being bold (undisciplined) and theft.

These interviews have yielded a wealth of material in relation to how individuals respond to institutional child abuse in Ireland through complex discursive visual strategies, and this led to an extended analysis of the manner in which the response was constructed showing fractures between knowing/not knowing, seeing/not seeing and these fractures were accompanied by split subjectivities such as male/female, active/passive, sexual/chaste and so forth, and this was discussed within larger discursive contexts of patriarchy, community and colonialism. The role and function of moral discourse and the disciplining function of the institution was examined in terms of its effects on those inside and those outside the institution. In the next chapter, I would like to expand on some of these themes by extending the discussion within the broader context of psychological research.
B.5. Discussion and Evaluation of Analysis

The Set up

Foucault used the terms dispositif to denote a type of discursive enmeshment in which several discourses may combine to form a structural property which regulates social relations. In other words, the set-up is a structuring or constituting discourse of significant value, a prism or fishbowl through which we construct reality (Veyne, 2010). The term dispositif has been routinely translated as “apparatus”; however this is a somewhat awkward and opaque translation and the term “set-up” used by translator Janet Lloyd gives a more accurate sense of its meaning (Veyne, 2010). The philosopher Agamben describes the “set-up” in a manner which gives us a clear picture of its function, as “anything that has the capacity to capture, orientate, determine, intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, opinions, behaviours or discourses of living beings” (Agamben, 2009, p. 14). Identification of the set-ups allows for a clearer understanding of the distribution of power as constructed in the reports and interviews which, as pointed out previously, are channelled through relations between self and other. Subjectivities and objects were identified as split by discursive formations within the reports and interviews. This splitting of self or object into contradictory modes is evidence for the pressure of two or more competing discourses operating on the subject. Identification of the set up allows us to view in a clear way the translation of power into social relations and demonstrate how power is operative and productive, as Foucault points out:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse (Rabinow, p. 61)

I have indicated how the Cussen Report (1936) seems to want to know and not want to know something at the same time in its use of equivocatory strategies, optative forms and
ambiguous terms. A behaviourist type set-up predominates in the Cussen Report, by which the subjectivity of the children in industrial schools is constituted through the discourse of the body. I call this set-up a somato-psychic discourse in which the discourses of education, medicine and economics combine to constitute a prototype of a behavioural object, the industrial school child. The family is also a key set-up in Cussen Report, a matrix in which discourses of legitimacy and illegitimacy circulate. It is interesting to consider how the family is constructed as a problematic site in Cussen Report, as a locus of potential abuse, but this is reversed in Kennedy Report (1970) where the family is constructed as an idealised locale. The Cussen Report is closer to contemporary constructions of the family as a site of abuse, which has been well documented by researchers such as Finkelhor, 1983; Hotaling, Finkelhor & Kirkpatrick & Straus, 1988; Patton, 1991 and Miller & Knudson, 2007). The construction of child abuse in the Cussen Report and the Kennedy Report raises questions about the freedom of individuals in society, pertaining to whether subjectivities are subjugated or subjectivised within certain discursive parameters, in family or non-family settings, alerting us to how these emancipatory or imprisoning settings are constructed by historically and culturally contingent discourses.

In the Kennedy Report (1970), the set-up is empirical science associated with notions of modernity and normativity, which constructs the problem of the industrial schools as a problem of pre-modernity and lack of professionalization. Professionalization and training are constructed as the solutions to “abuse”, as if abuse occurred because of a deficit in awareness and knowledge. This implies that the reasons for abuse stem not from a lack of moral knowledge, but from a lack of professional knowledge. Knowledge of a problem is split and the split off knowledge is privileged as a response, which is in this case professional knowledge, and therefore the opportunity for the problem to be considered as both a moral and a professional problem is lost. In addition, the family set-up is constructed as normal and
natural, providing a rationale for the argument to model the industrial school on the family unit.

The discourse of developmental psychology, and its emphasis on attachment theory is also in evidence in the Kennedy Report and this dovetails with the idealisation of the family, a prominent feature of that report. The problem raised by the deployment of such a discursive object, the family as site of ideal attachment, results in a simplified formulation of the problem of institutional care of children, whereby reductive binary logic dictates that the problem of institutional care derives from an absence of family-like attributes. This implication of an ideal family may derive from Judaeo-Christian discourses of a pre-lapsarian fantasy, of a return to before the fall, to an unblemished Edenic state, that is to say the family before the process of its own institutionalisation as the fallen family. The discourse of developmental psychology has come under critical scrutiny recently in the work of Burman (2008) who makes a persuasive argument that developmental psychology remains freighted with essentialist assumptions. She describes how the “child” is a discursive object in itself that constructs our understanding of children as outside historical and cultural contingency, that “it also personifies for the modern Western imaginary the sense of loss” (Burman, 2008, p. 49). The implication of her analysis is that it is difficult for us to see the child as socially constructed because children function as repositories of a sense of self that is bound up with some essence. This is emphasised in developmental psychology, in particular attachment-related clinical work, where the capacity of an adult to relate a coherent story of one’s childhood is correlated to positive psychological health. The irony of such a situation, to carry Burman’s insight further, is that good psychological health, as predicated on being able to tell a coherent story of childhood essence, ties us to essentialist viewpoints of the child.

In the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, (2009), we see how the problems of the industrial schools are constructed as “abuse” within the template of a psycho-cultural
discourse and how the problem of institutional abuse is constructed as systematic, a construction which may derive from the computer as set-up, with its influential metaphorisation of human mental life as an information processing system of interconnecting parts. The use of information processing as a systems metaphor for human psychology is a predominant feature of contemporary discourse (Taggart & Valenzi, 2007) and its predominance in Cica is underscored by the multiple constructions of institutional abuse as systematic, a discourse with potential totalising effects, overshadowing dissenting discursive voices. This stands in complete contrast to the equivocatory discourses in the Cussen Report. Cica, in my view, smoothes over the splits in self and object knowledge by constructing institutional abuse as systematic, privileging a rationalistic account which appears to be a revival of the behaviourist model in Cussen in which the industrial schools are constructed as systems which have effects on individuals without asking whether the individuals (inside or outside) have effects on the institution. Moreover, it may be argued that the lack of an equivocatory discourse in Cica might be as problematic as its presence in the Cussen Report.

Rather than trying to make value judgements on the respective merits of either discursive strategy, it is more instructive to examine the possible functions of these strategies within their social contexts. It is likely that the equivocatory and ambiguous discursive objects in Cussen derive from and reflect the insecurity and identity flux of the new Irish State, slowly emerging from guerrilla warfare from 1919 to 1921, civil war from 1922 to 1923 and the constant threat of armed insurrection until the politicisation of Fianna Fail, the anti-Treaty party in 1932 (Lee, 1989). On the other hand, the unequivocal, systematic and totalising discourses of Cica may have functioned as a counterbalance and a compensation for the incompleteness of the previous reports: Cussen (1936) and Kennedy (1970). In addition the discourses deployed in Cica may function as counterweights to the powerful discourses of the Catholic Church. In other words, Cica has assumed the discursive power,
formerly belonging to the Catholic Church, to summon witnesses and to construct a version of events which approach the nature of the definitive. The most obvious historical form of this judicial/inquiring discourse was the Catholic Inquisition in France, Spain and Portugal in the early to late medieval period.

It is not my aim to discover a definitive account of the problem of children and institutional care in the reports and interviews. Rather, the objective is to illustrate how the discourses deployed in the interviews and reports do not represent a transparent reality, but instead construct a version of a reality which may or may not approximate to an agreed consensus. The dangers of unquestioned discourses may mean that the very formal properties which resulted in the incapacity to respond to institutional abuse in the past will be repeated in the future. And, it is precisely these totalising discourses which construct versions of reality which appear to be impervious to questioning that Foucauldian Discourse Analysis calls to task. In effect, FDA allows for the possibility of a dynamic rather than a static, sclerotic construction of reality, with the aim of making visible the on-going conflict of interpretative process, to which this study belongs.

Contradictions and discontinuities proliferate within and between texts, within and between eras. It has been seen in the reports how the problem of institutional abuse is constructed by set-ups which screen out certain aspects of the problem. The same process has been identified in the interviews in which epistemological splits occur as a result of visual constructions. For example, I have shown that the response to abuse is constructed in very precise ways according to geometry, architecture, painting and film. To take one of these modalities, geometry, we have seen how the abuse has been constructed as something which emanates from below, associated with putrefaction and disease, whereas power and knowledge are constructed as happening on an elevated plane. No doubt the geometrical constructions on the horizontal and vertical planes intermesh with theological discourses
(heaven and hell) or biology (putrefaction/aeration) and so on, but the point of emphasis is that geometrical patterns in this instance contribute to a construction of the response, and that these patterns in turn derive from a way of looking at the word with socio-historical determinants.

The key finding of this study relates to the manner in which knowledge of institutional abuse is split. In the interviews there are multiple examples of how knowledge is split between different forms of experience such as awareness, knowledge and realisation, demonstrating how stratified and complex are the ways we come to construct our knowledge of institutional abuse. In addition to the splits in seeing and knowing, there are splits in the construction of subjects, in which people are constructed as blind/seeing, able/disabled, male/female and so on and I have called this a fractured subjectivity. There is a lack of awareness in respondents and interviewer of how fractured subjectivity is, how riven and contradictory are our positions and viewpoints of self and other. An example of this fractured subjectivity can be seen in the section where the Irish mind is constructed as a palimpsest with contradictory scripts overlaying each other. Moreover, the construction of splits in selves extends to splits between groupings, various out groups and in groups in which responsibility of knowing is located, for example doctors or professionals. In other words, authority and responsibility are delegated to certain groups in society. As a result of the analysis of democratic constructions, I have argued that is possible to see democratic discourse as encouraging this splitting process in individuals where they split off agency and extra-ordinariness from their subjectivity.

The analysis of the role of gender and sexuality in the construction of subjectivity was discussed with reference to the material and sexual aspects of the constructions of male and female. The split representation of male sexuality is also in evidence in the reports, especially Cussen (1936) where female children, but not male children, are constructed as sexual objects.
and I argue that this may have made it harder for the sexual abuse of male children to become recognised as a problem within institutions. On the other hand, in the interviews boys are constructed as sexual objects. Clearly, the constructions of male sexuality waver between positions of passivity and activity, and it may be that public discourses around sex and men are beginning to change as monolithic, rigid constructions of male sexuality break up, which had formerly obscured male positions as both abuser and abused. This construction of male sexuality is, in part, maintained in the interviews where women are not constructed as sexual abusers. The constructions of female sexuality are equally complex and women are constructed as both powerbrokers within the family and yet are positioned as victims of male violence. In addition to this, female sexuality is constructed, in relation to male sexuality and not independent of it. These contradictory constructions point to a deep ambivalence in the descriptions of human sexuality within the discourse of institutional child abuse.

The separation of gender from sexuality allows us to consider ways of moving out of an essentialist account of personhood based on sex, which repeats the formal sets of relations determined by those supposed essences. Instead, there is a possibility that if we become more aware of how complex and divided we are as individuals, and that if we acknowledge that we can occupy positions of both vulnerability and power, of action and passivity, of sexual desire and agape, then it is less likely that we will be inclined to divest ourselves of our ethical responsibilities to ourselves and others.

The industrial school is constructed in two ways which map onto Foucault’s conceptualisation of power. In the first, the school is constructed as a disciplinary institution and can be envisaged as a top-down disciplining structure, as part of what Foucault called “the carceral net” (Foucault, 1977, p. 300). The second type of disciplining discourse does not take place at the level of brutality and vertical dominance, but instead operates at the symbolic level, at the level of ideality as argued by Foucault in Discipline and Punishment.
Foucault realised in the years following publication of Discipline and Punishment that he had overemphasised the first type of disciplinary procedure and had neglected to analyse the ways in which individuals govern themselves and others within an intersubjective field (Foucault, 1980). He developed a theory of governmentality which allowed him to find ways of thinking about the manner in which self-regulation and regulation of others is bound up with governing practices, which originate in historical discourses (Foucault, 1980). His theory of governmentality was a natural extension of his theory of power as productive because governmentality offers positive and negative conceptualisations of governance, at individual and social levels. Foucault’s notion of governmentality is a fruitful means of understanding the industrial school system in Ireland because it allows for the conceptualisation and mobilisation of resistance which opens up new possibilities for the speaker, thereby inscribing investments of power at new relational points. Governmentality opens up possibilities for practice and creates the potential for enlarged subjectivities, for the fluid occupation of multiple subjective sites, allowing for a greater purchase of power within the grid of social relations, and a great potential for empathy and communication within and between plural selves.

Governmentality facilitates the description of local subjugated knowledge in defiance of totalising systems, powerful hegemonies and related vested interests. Genealogy is the process whereby that knowledge, once revealed, is deployed in contrast to dominant forms of knowledge. Thus articulated, genealogy is a project of intellectual possibilities and resistance with practical but non-prescriptive applications and this is the frame within which I view this research. To this end, Foucault’s concept of governmentality can be read as a way out of hopelessness. In this concept, he brought together notions of self-governance and governance of others as a possible ethico-political project but did not specify how that could be achieved,
possibly because such a specification may have led to a prescriptiveness, which his entire project ran counter to.

**Limitations of the Research**

I have argued for a knowledge which would encompass larger parts of subjectivity, and I have maintained that highly specialised ways of knowing may run counter to knowing what is important in our lives and the lives of those who live with us. This study straddles multiple domains of psychology, philosophy, sociology, history, and politics and so on because the topic of institutional abuse cannot be demarcated so neatly or understood from within isolated discourses. However, the limitation of such an approach means that what has been gained in multidisciplinarity has been lost in terms of focus. I would have liked to have pursued certain lines of inquiry, such as a more sustained analysis of historical discourses, especially in relation to the construction of the child but this was not possible due to limitations of space. My aim was to open up lines of inquiries which might offer starting points for other researchers from other disciplines to take forward in more conclusive directions, and therefore it is hoped that any shortcomings in my research can be corrected in the work of others. A further limitation is an artefact of the methodology, resulting in the loss of a phenomenological richness in the accounts of my respondents because my research was focused on the subject positions open to and occupied by the respondents and did not inquire in the phenomenological experience of their response to institutional abuse. However, to have attempted this would have resulted in methodological incoherence.

The reader should be suspicious of the disjunction between the confidence with which I elaborate on the analysis and the uncertain and unstable sites of subjectivity identified within the analysis. Is there not a glaring contradiction in evidence here between the stability of the subject position I occupy and the fluidity of subjective positions identified in the reports and
interviews with respondents? Do I refuse to take my own deconstructive medicine? I am mindful that to privilege certain lines of inquiry in this research is to ignore others and I am implicated and imbricated within the discursive webs which I comment on. This problem stems in part from the academic discourse which demands that a thesis follow certain formal conventions such as narrative continuity and so on, in order that the requirements of qualification are satisfied. This means that I am imbricated in an academic discourse increasingly constructed by a managerial-consumerist discourse, a point remarked upon by one of the respondents.

“A university is like a qualifying place so that you can work in the bank or post office, that kind of shit, it’s not a place of enlightenment” (1, 809)

The problematic of academic discourse has been a neglected area but Michael Billig’s work in rhetoric and language has exposed the banalities of academic convention. For example, he has highlighted how academic writing is contaminated by the use of the passive tense which is indicative of and repeats empiricist assumptions of neutral truth claims, by rendering them as agentless claims (2011). I have paid attention in my research to the role of author and attempted to deconstruct myself as academic author during the analytic process.

However, can this process of deconstruction spiral into an almost infinite regression, whereby the language is constantly deconstructed from multiple cultural, historical and social viewpoints? Is there a danger that this process could lead to what Coyle calls an “infinite regress” of text (as cited in Dyer, 2006, p. 142). Carried to its logical conclusion there appears to be a self-defeating entropism at the heart of the deconstructive enterprise, in which the very conditions for thought and communication are at risk of being dismantled. It is my contention that the position of the researcher vis-à-vis the object of inquiry will determine the necessary limitations of the deconstructive activity, and the ethical stance of
the researcher will be determinative in the drawing of the boundaries of research. In other words, the motivations and intentions of the researcher are key to determining whether the project becomes an infinite regress of text, a ludic post-modern game or whether the stakes are higher, and whether this ethical stance has resonance for others, even if contested by the academic community. In order to explore this I will examine my role in constructing the research object by exploring this process of reflexivity.

**Reflexivity**

Reflexivity has been defined as the role and impact of the researcher on the research. Within quantitative research, the problem of “demand characteristics” (Orne, as cited in Dyer, 2006, p. 120) in which the demands of the researcher or participant have determinative properties on the research outcome has become increasingly acknowledged as a serious empirical problem (Rosenthal, 2002; Zizzo, 2010). The problem of reflexivity, has been widely discussed in the natural sciences, especially in the field of quantum mechanics, where the characteristics of observed phenomena are known to alter as a result of observation (Stapp, 2011). The role of the researcher in language-orientated research is no freer from researcher effects, because description and explanation is at the level of language, which is laden with individual and cultural assumptions. I would like to give a brief illustration of how I implicate myself in the discursive constructions of my respondents. In the following exchange the direction of influence is not clear because there the constructive force works from both ends; it is bi-directional and thus it is an illustration of a co-constructed or a polyconstructed exchange:

R  I don’t …probably when we came here in the seventies ….going out to the national park in Letterfrack, knowing the existence of the building and what the place looked like (3, 466-467).
I But the building was in your consciousness, in your mind (3, 475)

R And there was plenty of worse and there was plenty of better..you know and if you think of art and music and buildings...you know everything. It ..you know..I find when I walk in to somewhere like Notre Dame or any of the places in Europe particularly I kind of feel sad for my 15 year old grandchild (3, 972-975)

Here we can see how the respondent introduces the building into discourse which I then construct as an object of her consciousness, and not just an object of discourse, betraying the phenomenological/humanist discourse which produces my discourse. It is not clear from this dialogue which party has become the receiving site for the dissemination of the constituting discourse. The respondent introduces the term but it appears that I cement it as a point of fascination and towards the end of the interview, the respondent clearly aligns the importance of buildings with art and music and with the intergenerational transmission of culture. In this short example, we can clearly see how the object of the institution is constructed as visible within the National Park, which I then construct as a building within her consciousness. This building is later constructed as Notre Dame, as a lodestone for the transmission of European culture through the conduit of Catholicism. In a short few lines we can identify the polyconstructed nature of the exchange and the complexity of the constitutive nature of architectural, topographical, psychological, religious, cultural, musical, generational and academic discourses. Of course, during the interview this process carried on beyond my awareness but during the analysis, I was able to be aware of the poly-constructivity, and to see how the material is shaped by discourses deployed by respondent and interviewer. Such attention does not mean that one’s role in the shaping of the material is less significant but it does allow for a greater flexibility in analysing that significance.
It seems to me that reflexivity in research is based on an interrogative ethics: What kind of a person am I when I do this kind of research? Why am I doing it? And to what end? The problem is that as soon as someone tries to formulate this and systemise it, it can easily become a set-up which seeks to capture, orientate reality in such a way as to convince another and to dominate rather than to communicate. Therefore, in a way, the reflexive position in research acts as a stay against research becoming desiccated and passionless. The concept of research as invested with strong personal feelings became a prime area of investigation of the social scientist, Michael Polanyi, who came to emphasise the role of more tacit forms of knowing in the role of creativity in the social science, forms which contrasted with the more standard methods of reasoned and critical interrogation (1962). In my view, Polanyi’s viewpoint is useful but limited because it presents a view of knowledge within a cognitive scientific framework, which ignore the sources of passion and joy which originate within the unconscious. This is my personal view, which cannot be empirically substantiated but is shared by many including the writer Christopher Bollas who has developed a theory of the unconscious in which he says objects stimulate us unconsciously in plural ways (1993, 1995). These objects can stimulate us sensationally, structurally, conceptually, symbolically, mnemically and projectively in an unconscious manner (Bollas, 1993, p. 34). These objects function to release our idiom, Bollas’s word for each individual’s particular way of experiencing the world. Thus, this is an aesthetic experience and, following Bollas, my choice of research was not made solely on the basis of conscious selection but was also invoked by unconscious desire for my idiom to be expressed through the research object and functions as a form of redress in the meaning given to it by the poet Seamus Heaney. He describes poetry as a form of redress, and cites one of the etymologies of redress from hunting: “To bring the hounds (or deer) back to the proper course. In this redress there is no
hint of ethical obligation; it is more a matter of finding a course for the breakaway of innate capacity, a course where something is unhindered, yet directed, can sweep ahead into its full potential” (Heany, 2002, p. 260).

The drift in academia over the past decade towards a culture of mandatory research output is the result of a foie-gras system of knowledge acquisition, where research output functions as a token of career advancement. Interestingly, Billig (2012) locates his shift towards discursive psychology in the freedom and relative autonomy he enjoyed as a young academic in Birmingham University in the 1980s. He read old texts on rhetoric for pleasure because he was bored with the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. In other words, research is motivated by pleasure and aesthetics, and this has been a fundamental part of my relationship to this research project.

**Evaluation of Research**

How can this work be evaluated? The claims I make do not have a universal fixed status, because these claims cannot be extricated from cultural and individual biases. Taylor (2001) proposed that rigour should be central to the process of evaluating qualitative research and describes the criteria for rigour as richness of detail and an explication of the process of analysis (p.320). In addition to this, coherence and fruitfulness of findings have been emphasised by Potter & Wetherell, 1987 as cited in Taylor, 2001. Throughout my research I have paid attention to these conditions of rigour, as evidenced by the detailed notes on my analysis as outlined in the methodology chapter. The process of research supervision also functioned as a means of providing an external point of validation.

I believe my research fulfils the criteria of fruitfulness and coherence and complements the work carried out by other discourse analysts. I have integrated aspects of Ferguson’s theory of moral discourse into my discussion of the importance of moral discourse in
constructing specific kinds of Catholic discourse. Likewise, I have used McDonough’s (2010) distinction between subjugating and subjectivising discourses of post-colonial subjectivity and expanded it within the context of a discussion of how individuals take up passive and active roles with regard to matters of gender and power. My study forms a natural counterpoint to the objective of Dunne’s analysis of the response of the Catholic Church to child sexual abuse. My area of research has focused on an unexamined aspect which is the response of the civilian community to institutional child abuse. It is my belief that my findings have contributed to our understanding of how we respond to institutional child abuse and this will stimulate further discussion in this area and across disciplines. For me, a further test of evaluation is whether my study has stimulated the reader and evoked a response, and in this sense I agree with Lacan’s formulation that the function of language is not to inform but to evoke (Lacan, as cited in Khan, 1981, p. 121) and therefore this test of evaluation rests with the individual reader.

**Psychology and Foucauldian Analysis**

I see Foucauldian analysis as located within a tradition of a hermeneutics of suspicion which offers psychologists an ancillary means of being sceptical towards our own claims. In fact, counselling psychology has been at the receiving end of trenchant criticism by Parker (1997) who reads counselling psychology as having cannibalised the resources of therapeutic work, while functioning as a vehicle for the dissemination of the norms of academic psychology. The analysis of discourse in this study has shown how processes of normativization need to be constantly interrogated. For example, the analysis of the Kennedy Report (1970) showed how discourses of professionalization and the fetishisation of training had the potential for blocking possibilities for reflective engagement. Ironically further training and professionalism may be a disciplinary discursive practice which subjugates psychologists. I am not in principle against further training but the function of training has to
be analysed, whether this training subjectivises or subjugates the psychologist. This needs to be thought about because of the increasing turn towards disciplining and regulation within psychology, without a corresponding concentration on therapeutic openness. Psychologists in the UK work under two regulatory bodies, British Psychological Society (BPS) and the Health Professions Council (HCPC), with separate codes of ethics and guidelines, which function as a binocular Panopticon, the model of disciplinary surveillance which Foucault took from Jeremy Bentham’s design of institutions in the 18th century (Foucault, 1977).

Charelton’s insight referred to in the introduction seems particularly apposite, that the caring professions need to have security in their own freedom (2012). The author concludes by suggesting that those who work in the caring profession need to have security in their own freedom. If the author is correct, the implications of his conclusions are substantial because it may be argued that the increasing trend toward managerialist emphasis on output and surveillance of staff must have a constraining effect on an individual sense of freedom and thus be counterproductive and iatrogenic. A study examining 232 allegations of child abuse in New York State mental health operated facilities, resulted in a significant 4-variable model predicting that environmental stresses placed on professional childcare workers could potentially resulted in incidents of child maltreatment and neglect within a given month in institutional settings (Blatt & Brown, 1986). It may be that that the environmental stressors also impact upon an individual carer’s security in her own freedom. This warrants further research because current practice which is intended to address and redress abuse, may in fact be implicated in the propagation of abuse.

The concept of an inner act of freedom on the therapist’s part has become central to clinical psychoanalytic theory (Symington, 1983). How is this inner act of freedom supposed to operate if the therapist is caught in a disciplinary complex of constant surveillance? From my discussions with other psychologists in training, we believe that the disciplinary
mechanisms are prioritised, in some cases, over therapeutic work and that such an emphasis on disciplining has resulted in iatrogenic effects within the clinical work carried out because the therapist is under constant scrutiny from these processes. This warrants further discussion and research and Foucault’s theory of disciplinary regulation provides a good model for a critique of these processes. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis allows us a means of querying what we do, and how we do it within the discursive flow of institutional practice, and to reflect on how we are transformed by discourse. What FDA allows is for practice to be situated in a new form of critical psychology, in the analysis of what is said which can then lead to a debate on why and for what purpose it is said.

**Application of Research**

According to Willig (1999) the application of research can take several forms: the research can provide a space for alternative constructions; act as a campaign to inform strategies, lobby to further an aim, it can be a therapeutic intervention or it can be educative. This research study has provided a space for alternative constructions to be considered. However, my research is also consistent with Foucault’s stance which is to steer clear of prescriptive injunctions and therefore the usefulness of research does not take the form of recommendations, but seeks instead to encourage debate, reflection and analysis. A constant theme of this research project has been a sustained interrogation of the epistemological basis of a response to institutional child abuse and my aim was to give a detailed description of the complexity of what we know and how we come to know it. In this sense, my research has been carried out very much in the spirit of Foucauldian analysis as described by Michel Foucault in a lecture given in Berkeley in 1980.

“I would like to add one final word about the practical significance of this form of analysis…. This would be a theoretical analysis of a political dimension. I mean an analysis that relates to what we are willing to accept in our world, to accept and to
refuse and to change both in ourselves and in our circumstances. In sum, it is a quest for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical philosophy which seeks to determine the limits of possible knowledge of the object but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject and transforming ourselves (Foucault, 1980)

This is worth quoting in full because it shows very clearly how Foucault is positioning his analytic approach within an ethical and political dimension, ethics in terms of an individual’s relationship to self and politics in terms of the relationship with others.

**Conclusion:**

The late Tony Judt said that the thrall in which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imagine alternatives, describing such a people as “captive minds” (2011, p.120). It is this ability to imagine alternatives which is characteristic of Foucault’s approach. Foucault is often lumped in with a postmodernist textual tradition associated with an ironic style or a cool detachment from worldly concerns, which could be described as a return to a style of Greek metaphysics in which philosophy is aestheticized as a pleasurable end in itself. The problem with such an approach is that it cements privilege and drives a wedge between those with intellectual gifts and those with other gifts (strength, kindness, humour, courage, artistry and so on.). I contend that Foucault does not represent this ironic tradition because his analysis of discourse questioned the epistemological prisms through which we organise our lives and thus addresses the limits of knowledge. Irony has been described as the voice of those who come to enjoy their cage (Hyde, 1963/2007) and it is precisely Foucault’s legacy as a non-ironist, and his articulation of a philosophy of discourse which allows us to se déprendre, to free ourselves from (or at lease question) these discourses, these cages. The function of discourse as an active dynamic structuring agent
reminds me of an aphorism by Kafka: “A cage went in search of a bird” (Kafka, 2006, p.42).

This is a vivid description of Foucault’s view of discourse, as not just a cage we inhabit, as if by choice (the illusion of free will), but as a cage which is a cultural historical product which we do not choose. However, though we cannot choose the cage that chooses us, we can choose to escape a cage to be seized by another, and this is my understanding of the impossibility of free will and the possibility of a relative freedom, which is always mediated by discourse.

This study has shown how discourses of rhetoric, behaviourism, the family, the law, medicine, science, information-processing, the visual arts, religion, architecture, gender, sexuality among others construct splits in our knowledge of institutional child abuse and how subjectivity is split in the constitution of that knowledge, and therefore this study has brought into relief the limits of knowledge and freedom which govern the response to institutional abuse.

In my view, the tendency to explain the problem of institutional child abuse according to totalising and hegemonic discourses promotes splitting of our knowledge and of ourselves and may be a symptom of the problem we are trying to address. Thus ironically, the very conditions (splitting, specialisation, and systemisation) which gave rise to institutional child abuse in the first instance are repeated in the formulation of a response to the problem. Institutional child abuse cannot be discussed in any meaningful way if it is sealed off from an inquiry into the discursive practices which govern our relationships to each other. This study focused on a response to institutional child abuse in Ireland but I have argued that the problem permeates our political and institutional structures at a global level. The problem may be that child abuse is institutionalised within the social and political structures which govern us. Institutional child abuse and institutionalised child abuse are facets of the same problem and this study has shown how one leaches into the other.
Researchers have identified that governmental policy in recent years has shifted from a focus on social justice and inequality centred on social class and family to a narrower, utilitarian focus of social exclusion and social investment (Fawcett, Featherstone and Goddard, 2004). This shift may be expressed as a shift from a Kantian position of the categorical imperative, which is underpinned by a philosophy of equal rights for all individuals to a Benthamite approach, where the aim is to create a better society for the majority of its stakeholders. The problem with the latter Benthamite approach is that it is often proposed as if the society in question were an autonomous entity, and not part of a global economy defined by numerous nutritive and parasitical interdependencies. The advantage of this approach allows policy makers to avoid uncomfortable considerations of ethical boundaries and responsibilities. Contemporary capitalist institutions safeguard economic regulations at transnational levels, policed through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, The European Bank and Moody’s Corporation Credit Rating.

Conversely, issues of human dignity and ethics are delegated to the responsibility of the nation state. However, the nation state is a model which is collapsing and unless our ethical, political and psychological systems address this, we may remain undeceived about our ambitions but will remain deluded about our capacity to implement these ambitions. These conditions create an inverse relationship of power without responsibility and responsibility without power, a phenomenon which has been highlighted by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in his book Liquid Modernity (2000). Therefore, I argue that clinical and political discourses ought to be subsumed within a metadiscourse of ethics which takes account of the present world order. This raises the question whether the real struggle may lie, not in the elaboration of psychological theories in and for zoned off countries (gated communities) but in exposing the role of discourse in this bipolar geopolitical game.
The solving of child abuse in one jurisdiction, for it to continue in another, is not an adequate response as this perpetuates the on-going disavowal of the problem of the other. In my view, care of self cannot be divorced from care of others, and therefore not caring for others is not caring for self. This is an ethical viewpoint which is radically incompatible with contemporary capitalist ideology in which care of self is not conditional on care of others, a world in which there is power without responsibility and responsibility without power. As long as such an ideology prevails, institutionalised child abuse and thus institutional child abuse will always be with us.
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Appendix 1: Research Advertisment

I am carrying out research on industrial schools as part of doctoral research in counselling psychology. I am interested in finding out the views of people who lived in the Letterfrack/Clifden area from the 1930s to 1970s. I would like to interview a small number of people from these areas in order to learn of their views, responses and feelings towards the industrial schools which existed in their areas. The study has been granted ethical approval and is strictly confidential and anonymous. If you feel you can help me or if you know of someone who may help me and you would like further information, please contact me at the above address or at [redacted] or at [redacted]

Yours sincerely,

Fógra

Is mise Eoghan O Neachtain. Faoi láthair táim ag déanamh taighde faoi na scoileanna saothair. Táim again sna tuairimí agus smaointí do na daoine a bhi ina gcónaí í Litír Freac agus sa gClóchán idir na 1930s agus na 1970s. Táim ag iarraidh déanamh agallaimh le roinnt daoine sna gceantair síúd. Tá céad fáighte ó thaobh eitic mairidh leis an staidir seo agus beidh feiniúlacht agus eolas connithe go cúramach faoi rún. Tá an t-ollamh Carla Willig ag maoirsíú an staidir seo agus is féidir teangmháil a dhéanamh léi ag [redacted]

Tá an taighde seo páirtíocht den tráchtas í síceoláfocht teiripeacha.

Is mise le meas,
Appendix 2. List of Raw Data Reference Coding.

Statutory Reports


Kennedy: Coiste fiosrúcháin chóras scoileanna ceartúchain agus saothair tuarascáil.
Committee on Reformatory and Industrial schools (1970). Also known as The Kennedy Report.


Interviews

Interview 1 codes as 1 Line numbered 1 to 1037 (1.5 spacing)
Interview 2 coded as 2 Line numbered 1 to 542 (1.5 spacing)
Interview 3 coded as 3 Line numbered 1 to 978 (1.5 spacing)
Interview 4 coded as 4 Line numbered 1 to 535 (1.5 spacing)
Interview 5 coded as 5 Line numbered 1 to 602 (1.5 spacing)
Interview 6 coded as 6. Line numbered 1 to 331 (1.15 spacing)

Website addresses used to access raw data:

www.childabusecommission.ie/
Appendix 3: Transcription time

Time spent transcribing:

1 minute of text took 10 minutes to transcribe

Interview 1: 1hr10mins = 11.7 hours
Interview 2: 50 minutes = 8.3 hours
Interview 3: 1hr 15mins = 12.5 hours
Interview 4: 1hr 3 mins = 10.5 hours
Interview 5: 57mins = 9.5 hours
Interview 6: 38mins = 6.3 hours

Total transcription time: 58.8 hours.
Appendix 4: Semi-Structured Interview- Guidelines.

- Setting the frame. About an hour.
- Any thoughts, feelings on being asked to do this interview?
- How would you describe your response to St Josephs? Impressions of place and boys there.
- What is the earliest memory you have of coming to know of St Joseph’s?
- What was your view if any of the place when you were younger?
- What was your view of how others saw the place? Was it talked about among people?
- Did your view change over time?
- What was your reaction to the media response? How did you feel at the time?
- How has your response changed over time?
- What is your understanding of how the state apology in 1999?
- The Commission into child abuse published its findings in 2009. What was your response to that report?
- How do you feel now in talking about this
- Elaborate on the person’s use of language.
Appendix 5: Example of Supervisory Notes

16th August 2012

Session 7:

Questions prior to supervision:

Who is the external supervisor?

Ask about the sending of the forms relating to submission.

Ask for any material in office relating to potential external supervisor’s work.

Discuss the publishable paper.

During Session:

We discussed the section on the methodology in relation to the long introduction on experimental psychology and Prof Willig felt there was no need for an extended disquisition on the history of psychology. I said I was using previous theses as guides and she said that everybody was doing this but it was not essential to the section. I said that I had read somewhere that there is no need for psychologists from the non-experimental tradition to continue to defend themselves in a shrill manner but I had played safe following the path of others. I cut down the experimental section completely and Prof Willig advised to keep the Wittgenstein stuff and the social constructionist stuff, not as a defence of qualitative research but as an illustration of the site of emergence of discourse analysis.

Prof Willig discussed my writing on disavowal and mentioned Billig as a point of reference and I consulted his work afterwards. We also discussed this aspect of the “blind eye” and she
mentioned this word in German: “unseheime” which literally means unseeing. No such word in English. But it also has the connotation of unheimlich.

Prof Willing lent me her copy of Ian Parker’s Psychoanalytic Culture (1996)

We discussed Frosh (1997) and how the difficulties he encountered in marrying social constructionism with psychoanalysis.

Advised to reference one or two articles previously published by selected journal.
Appendix 6: Informed Consent Form

Consent to Participate in Research

Date:

Researcher’s Name: Eoghan O Neachtain

Supervisor: Professor Carla Willig

Institution: Department of Psychology, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB

Email: [Email]

Supervisor’s email: [Email]

“Response to institutional child abuse in Ireland. A discourse analysis.”

This is a written informed consent form to check that you are happy with the information that you have been given about the study, you are aware of your rights as a participant, and to confirm that you wish to take part in this research.

Please read the following and sign below if you understand and agree with the statements:

☐ I understand that I must be at least 18 years old to participate in this project.

☐ I understand that my participation in this study will involve attending an interview, which will last 45-60 minutes.
☐ I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without prejudice, and that
all material collected about me will be destroyed immediately. I have the right to withdraw
up to three months after completion of the interview. Following this period the research will
be at the submission stage for doctorate.

☐ I understand that I am free to send any questions, or discuss any concerns, with
the researcher or the researcher’s supervisor at the above address.

☐ I understand that the information provided by me will be held
anonymously, so that it is impossible to trace this information back to me
individually.

☐ I understand that any interview material will be kept securely (in a locked unit
and a password protected computer) and will be destroyed one year after this study ends.

☐ I understand that the interview is for research purposes only and does not
constitute therapy.

☐ I understand the details of the research as explained to me by the researcher,
and that it is being conducted as part of a doctoral study at City University.

☐ I understand that I am free to refuse to answer any questions asked in the
interview.

☐ I have received enough information about the research to decide whether I want
to take part.

☐ I agree to take part in this study.

☐ I confirm that quotations from the interview can be used in the final research study and other publications, and I understand that these will be used anonymously.

Signature of participant: Date:

____________________________________________________________

I, the researcher, agree to comply with the above statement and I am signing on behalf of anyone else who may be involved in the research process (e.g. supervisor, examiner).

Signature of researcher: Date:

__________________________________________
Appendix 7: Information Sheet

Date:

Researcher’s Name: Eoghan O Neachtain

Supervisor: Professor Carla Willig

Institution: Department of Psychology, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB

Email: [REDACTED]

Supervisor’s email: [REDACTED]

Study Title: “Response to institutional child abuse in Ireland. A discourse analysis”

You are being invited to take part in a research study that is being carried out as part of a doctoral requirement at City University. Before you decide to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being carried out and what it will involve. Please take your time to read the following information carefully, and discuss it with others if you wish. Please feel free to ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Purpose of research:
The aim of the study is to explore how people talk about institutional abuse in Ireland. The aim of this study is to increase our knowledge of how people respond to institutional abuse. The views of non–professionals about events that affect their community have been neglected in the research literature. This research will add to our understanding of how people respond to institutional abuse.

**What will happen to me if I take part?**

In order for our interview to take place your consent is required. This must be informed consent, which means that you must fully understand the process of this research.

If you consent to being interviewed, this will mean that we will make an appointment to meet at a place of your convenience for approximately 45 minutes to one hour. If you wish to preserve your anonymity you may wish to consider the location of our interview.

I will ensure that your identity is kept anonymous and that you are not identifiable by any distinguishing personal or biographical details.

The interview is confidential and confidentiality will only be breached in exceptional cases, where there is a perceived threat to your life or to the life of another person.

You can stop the interview at any stage if you are experiencing any adverse reactions and you can do this without having to offer a reason.

If I feel that you are suffering any ill effects from the interview I may stop the interview in order that you feel safe and at ease.

The interview will then be written up and discussed in a final report, which may be published. All interview material will be anonymous and no identifiable details will be included in any
notes, interview transcripts or final written reports. All written interview material (including notes and transcripts) will be stored in a lockable unit, for which only I have a key. Interview transcripts will be stored on my personal computer, which is password protected.

This interview will be conducted by myself, a Counselling Psychologist in Training, and will provide an opportunity for you to discuss your experiences in a safe and non-judgemental environment. However, please note that this is a research interview and I cannot offer psychological assistance but am willing to refer you to services that provide psychological support. Details of how to contact counselling organisations and emergency support numbers will be provided at the end of the interview, and can be provided at any time upon request.

It is rare for interviewees to experience negative reactions but there is a slight risk of experiencing unpleasant emotions or difficult feelings due to the nature of the topic being discussed.

You may keep this information sheet and, if you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form prior to being interviewed. Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You do not have to take part if you do not want to. If you decide to take part, you may withdraw at any time without giving reason and without prejudice. Any material collected will be destroyed immediately.

An Ethics Committee reviews all proposals for research using human participants before they can proceed. Two people from City University’s Department of Psychology have reviewed and approved this proposal. Thank you for expressing an interest in my research and for taking the time to read this form.
Responding to Institutional Child Abuse:

Psychoanalytic Theory and Negative Epistemic Function

Word Count: 6,492 words
Abstract

The objective of this paper is to use psychoanalytic theory to elaborate on the principal findings identified in a recent study I carried out on responses to institutional child abuse in Ireland. This study was carried out using Foucauldian analysis. A brief summary of the research study is outlined and examples from the study will be discussed in the main body of the paper in order to establish links between the research findings and psychoanalytic theory. The rationale for applying psychoanalytic theory is described in relation to the splitting of subjectivity. This is followed by a theoretical conceptualisation of a negative epistemic function developed by the psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion (1984). The paper concludes with an examination of disavowal as a central feature of negative epistemic function with regard to responding to institutional child abuse in Ireland. It is argued that the problem of responding to institutional child abuse may be less a problem of what we know than how we know. In other words, I argue that negative epistemic function plays a key role in understanding the response to institutional child abuse and that psychoanalytic theory is a key to understanding that negative epistemic function.

Key words: Institutional child abuse, Foucault, psychoanalysis, Bion.
Summary of Research Paper

The research study was carried out inspired by an analytic approach based on Michel Foucault’s writings (1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1976, 1977) and involved the analysis of three statutory reports into institutional child abuse in Ireland: The Cussen Report (1936), The Kennedy Report (1970) and the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009). In addition to this, an analysis was carried out on interviews with civilians with regard to their response to institutional child abuse. My study highlights the difficulty in demarcating institutional from institutionalised abuse and demonstrates how visual technology constructs the response to institutional child abuse. The research brought to light significant discourses, such as a behaviourist discourse in which the subjectivity of the industrial school child was found to be constructed through the body. The key finding in this study relates to the manner in which the response to institutional abuse in Ireland appears to be bound up with processes of splitting of self and object. Subjectivity was identified as split: blind/seeing, able/disabled, male/female and so on and I have called this a fractured subjectivity. Moreover, the construction of splits in selves was shown to extend to splits between various out groups and in groups, resulting in agency and responsibility being delegated to others. Subjectivity was identified as thoroughly gendered and it was concluded that separation of gender from sex may allow for ways of rethinking essentialist accounts of personhood. The industrial school was identified as a disciplining and subjugating structure of those inside the institution and those outside the institution.
Rationale for Application of Psychoanalytic Theory

The psychoanalytic process is an intensely charged intersubjective site, in which cherished viewpoints come to be seen as false leads and vice-versa. It is a dynamic conception of the human psyche and of human communication which is profoundly travestied and parodied by a form of psychoanalytic analysis based on the reification of respondent material into fixed psychoanalytic categories. By way of clarification, I am in agreement with Frosh’s criticism of the use of psychoanalytic analysis of raw material on the basis of one or two short interviews, a process which he describes as “ethical violence”, borrowing a term used by Judith Butler (Willig, 2012, p.173) in that it has the potential to cement viewpoints of individuals from a superficial epistemic basis. Even, character analysis based on individuals who are long dead, such as Freud’s fanciful analysis of Leonardo da Vinci, (Freud, 2001) is of a dubious quality, in my opinion.

In this paper, the use of psychoanalytic theory is applied as a second order of analysis, a means of exploring discursive objects already identified in the study described above. The rationale for using psychoanalytic discourse to investigate the findings of discourse analysis has been highlighted by prominent researchers such as Parker (1994):

“Subjectivity is always split and anarchic and analysis requires perhaps the use of psychoanalytic ideas” (as cited in Bannister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994, p. 105)

The findings from my research show that discourses of medicine, psychology, crime, economics, information-processing, sex, gender, morality result in the splitting of subjectivities and psychoanalytic theories offer distinct analytic advantages because splitting
has long been a feature of psychoanalytic observation and analysis (Freud, 1927/2001; Klein, 1946, 1952). I do not aim to use psychoanalytic theory to provide a causal explanation of the epistemological basis of a response to institutional abuse but instead seek to use psychoanalytic theory as a means of opening up conversations about aspects of the debate on institutional abuse which have gone unremarked or unnoticed. I believe that the exclusion of the role of the unconscious with regard to institutional abuse in Ireland has resulted in an impoverished and incomplete debate. Psychoanalytic theory offers a binocular perspective (conscious and unconscious) on human functioning and social practice and in this manner offers a way of knowing about that which we do not want to know, of that which has been split off from consciousness. This splitting of self and object is such a salient aspect of the findings established in my study that the application of psychoanalytic theory provides an excellent model for extending the debate on institutional child abuse in Ireland.

**Bion’s epistemological theory**

I will be drawing primarily on Bion’s seminal work, “Learning from Experience” (1984) in which he devised a psychoanalytic epistemology which makes a distinction between two ways of knowing, which he termed K and –K. K is knowledge which derives from “emotions suffusing the psyche” (p. 94) and –K consists in a type of knowledge which is mechanistic, denuded of emotional feeling that may be adequate for thinking about inanimate objects but not for thinking about animate objects. Bion’s emphasis is on the distinction (that often becomes elided) between knowing animate and inanimate life forms and he clarifies and distinguishes between the contexts in which each of these ways of knowing are applied in the pursuit of the object of knowledge referred to here as y:

“The techniques employed by those who have a scientific outlook have achieved most success when y is an inanimate object” (Bion, 1984, p. 67).
Bion is not rejecting the Enlightenment tradition of scientific knowledge; rather he is calling into question the manner and context of its application and its functionality within the domain of animate life. He contrasts two different responses to a potentially painful emotional reality: evasion and modification. He describes a situation whereby $x \, K \, y$ may be understood as $x$ coming to know $y$, wherein $y$ is an object of knowledge which causes pain; $x$ experiences $y$ within an emotional frame in which knowledge of $y$ is partial and contingent. This could be interpreted within a post-structuralist lens for Bion is describing a process of coming to know a painful emotional reality that is partial and contingent and invested with epistemic uncertainty. However, when there is an attempt to evade a painful reality, there often can appear to be a formula which looks like $x \, K \, y$, in the sense that $x$ has a piece of knowledge about $y$. However, according to Bion, this is a sham because this formula no longer represents the painful experience but a supposedly painless one. Bion’s argument is complex but from my understanding, what he wishes to accentuate is that evasion differs from modification because it involves a complete transformation of reality, in this case from pain to no pain, which amounts to a denial of feeling and a substitution of lifelessness for that feeling. The former is an example of $K$ thinking and the latter is an example of $–K$ thinking because the mental mechanism used to evade the feeling is the same mechanism which substitutes a relationship to an animate object for a relationship to an inanimate object.

Bion’s epistemological theory of $K$ and $–K$ maps onto his theory of unconscious transformation. According to Bion, before an emotional experience can be had, the raw material of an encounter is transformed into prototypical thoughts, which he calls alpha elements, and which can be stored and made available for abstraction. In contrast, beta elements are concrete psychic entities which cannot be mentated or “entertained in the mind” (Symington & Symington, 1996) and thus cannot lead to the growth of thought. Applying Bion’s theory, I posit that institutional abuse did not become a focus of debate in Ireland until
the 1990s because it remained at the level of a cultural beta element, an object unmentated within the cultural psyche. Our impoverished understanding of institutional child abuse may be because of methodological and theoretical lack. And when faced with difficult questions we may look for a means of understanding the problem which depends on known but unsuitable methods. This could result in a short-circuiting of feeling and emotion because we have departed from the original problem and substituted that problem for another problem. In other words, borrowing from Bion’s theory, I contend that the reality of institutional child abuse was evaded and not modified.

The question of evasion and modification can be formulated in the following manner: The problem of our blindness to the welfare of a large number of vulnerable, defenceless children becomes substituted by another problem, which can be addressed by scientific methods such as: What is the rate of depression scores in a sample of ex-industrial school children according to a statistical measure of anxiety and depression based on norms? Let me clarify that I am not suggesting that this is an instance of −K. What I am saying is, in line with Bion’s theory, that there is a potential for −K to be operational when we evade a reality rather than trying to modify that reality and that the process of substitution that I have described is an evasive process. Secondly, the use of scientific method, in accordance with Bion’s theory, may not be a suitable instrument with which to investigate the problem of the aetiology of institutional abuse and the response to it. In fact the cause of institutional abuse and the response to institutional abuse are likely to derive from the same −K processes. I suggest that the response to the industrial school children in Ireland over the last 100 years was dominated by - K processes and that these processes predominated over large areas of human inquiry, from the media, to the judiciary, the educational establishment, the medical establishment.
Analysis of the Cussen Report (1936) showed that the industrial school children were constructed through a behaviourist discourse in which inner mental states did not figure as a relevant epistemic reference point. For example, in the following passage, it can be seen the children are constructed as objects of contagion which require medical intervention:

“In some of the schools children with trachoma (a contagious disease of the eyes) ringworm (a contagious disease of the skin and hair) and other contagious disease with, in addition, children, suffering from defects of sight and hearing are found mixing with other children.” (Cussen, 1936, p.50)

Behaviourist discourse is unambiguously deployed by a respondent to construct human beings as “little funny machines ourselves”. In other words, this behaviourist construction of human beings as machines, as mindless objects is an example of thinking about animate life as if it were inanimate, an instance of what Bion called – K.

In the Kennedy Report (1970) I identified normative and scientific discourses as posing a problem in the discussion of institutional abuse because these approaches stem from generalising and totalising perspectives in which individuality and individual difference is lost. The following is an example, in my view, of the potential operation of Bion’s –K:

“Our visits, discussions and surveys have given us concrete and valuable information”

(Kennedy, 1970, p.13)

The objects referred to as “concrete and valuable information” remind us that the presence of one kind of discourse always signals the absence of another, in this case discourses of love, symbolism, imagination, fantasy and so on. The reference to valuable concrete information points to an investment in the concrete, which according to a psychoanalytic discourse, is often accompanied by a resistance to symbolic thought, often a feature of psychosomatic
conditions (James, 1979; Gottlieb, 2003; Segal, 1988). In this manner, the Kennedy Report has become like a psychosomatic patient, a body which speaks its story through concrete symptoms. This again recalls the discourse identified in the Cussen Report where the industrial school children are constructed through a somato-psychic discourse, through the body.

In addition, it was also established that a systematic/information processing discourse was deployed in the discussion of the industrial schools in the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009):

The system of large-scale institutionalisation was a response to a nineteenth century social problem, which was outdated and incapable of meeting the needs of individual children…

The system as managed by the Congregations made it difficult for individual religious who tried to respond to the emotional needs of the children in their care

(Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 6.2)

Institutionalisation is constructed as a system, a construction which is repeated many times throughout the report, and which functions to create an object of coherence and rationality. The problem of systemisation as identified by Foucault was that systemisation could lead to totalisation which truncates a complex and contradictory reality. A simple illustration of this is the repetitive sound bites of televisual news which function as a systemising force, filling the vacuum where thinking or feeling might occur. Foucault’s oeuvre can be considered as a sustained critique of “the will to knowledge”, the forms of objectification of the subject through dividing practices, scientific classification and normalization (Rabinow, 1991, p. 7)
“Knowable man (soul, individuality, consciousness, conduct whatever it is called) is the object-effect of the analytical investment of this domination-observation” (1977, p. 305)

I read Foucault as putting forward the idea that these dividing and classifying processes result in a phenomenological destruction. For example, in the Birth of the Clinic, Foucault showed how the body came to be treated increasingly as a thing, to be scrutinised, studied and understood (1973). In my view there is a correspondence between Foucault’s critique of the objectification of the subject and Bion’s analysis of \(-\text{K}\). Foucault included psychoanalysis along with psychology and psychiatry as objectifying practices. However, Bion’s version of psychoanalysis is centred on a fundamental concern shared by Foucault and this is the aspect of psychic life which escapes analysis, which Bion called \(\text{O}\). This is the mysterium tremens, the unknowable mystery of life which can only be approached. Both Foucault and Bion are Romantics, in the sense of Keat’s philosophy of negative capability whereby an individual remains open to the unfolding of experience, even though that experience is not yet known (Keats, 1899). Foucault rejected the tenets of structuralist epistemologies, in the shape of the French Marxist and psychoanalytic theories of his time in favour of a dynamic concept of subjectivity which is being constantly remade by historically determined discourse. Likewise Bion steered away from the reifying tendencies of certain strands of psychoanalytic thinking and this has been expressed as a shift from analysing the personality in terms of structure to function:

“Bion saw the personality as being composed, not of structures such as are implied by the terms ego, id, super-ego and the unconscious, but as a series of functions, of variables in relationship to other variables” (Symington & Symington, 1996)
The problem of systemisation and totalisation was recognised by Bion within psychoanalytic discourse and he theorised this in the form of –K. Bion’s theory must appear strange at first glance, because our way of thinking in terms of inanimate objects is so ingrained in culture. For example the use of information-processing as a metaphor for the human mind has become ubiquitous and unquestioned (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Sowa, 1984) and is an underlying paradigm of cognitive behavioural therapy, which is at the forefront of mental health care as recommended by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Bion’s thought has been developed by Robert Caper (2000) into a critique of the fetishisation of natural sciences within contemporary culture, which he claims, has resulted in the shunning of relationships with people in favour of relationships with part objects, such as money, things, or parts of bodies. These perverse relationships exist in a bio-feedback relationship with contemporary capitalism, in which they are its combustive fuel and fossilised remains. No doubt, the catastrophic destruction of our environment derives from the same perversity, the refusal to recognise its animate characteristics, a tragic illustration of the results of –K.

In my study, I make a distinction between official hegemonic professional discourse (subjugating discourses) and discourses which issue from a site that is less invested with institutional power (subjugated discourses). Academic, scientific, legal and educational discourses are described as subjugating, and literature, theatre and memoir were shown to function as subjugated discourses, conveying an image of a society riven by structures of abusive practices and cruelty towards children and adults. For example, in the following is an excerpt from a memoir written by Peter Tyrell in the late 1950s. Tyrell wrote a manuscript of his experience of Letterfrack Industrial school where he had been in the 1930s:
“Convents and industrial schools are places where children are destroyed mentally and sometimes physically” (Tyrell, 2006, p. 322).

Here we can see clearly how psychological survival is not predicated on physical survival, and therefore does not conform to contemporary constructions of industrial school residents as “survivors” which implies a correlation between psychological and physical survival. I also found that the literary discursive object functions as a screen upon which abuse is depicted. For example, James Joyce’s Dubliners (1992) published in 1914 depicts the physical and moral paralysis of Ireland during the Edwardian era. In Counterparts, he tells the story of a Catholic clerk who occupies a subjugated position in a Protestant firm, who escapes from work, gets drunk, socialises with other subjugates and prostitutes before returning home to beat his child. In this short story Joyce traces a relay system of institutional abuse which becomes displaced from work context to social context, from class to class, from gender to gender, and from generation to generation.

Do not these forms of knowledge, characterised by the emotional investment of their authors, demonstrate a refusal to evade painful realities? On the other hand, the subjugating discourses of law, medicine, psychology, religion and education seem to point to versions of –K, at least in relation to the problem of institutional child abuse. It was shown in my study that these subjugating discourses were evasive in their response to abuse within the general society and within the industrial school. Bion’s theory allows us to rethink the dichotomous thinking forced upon us by the terms fact and fiction. Bion’s theory allows us to see that a fact may indeed be a fiction, in the sense that it is so when it involves an evasion or a denial of reality, whereas fiction may indeed be a closer approximation to reality because the psychic function that recognises animate life is in operation, that K knowledge is operative. In my view, the subjugated discourses of literature and theatre tapped into and described an
imaginative lack in post-colonial Ireland, which manifested itself, in a stale lifeless encounter with reality, a –K production propagated and sustained by political, religious, legal and educational discourses.

**Bion’s theory of the “super” ego.**

Bion draws attention to a type of thinking which is dominated by a “super” ego which is completely different from the super-ego as usually understood in psychoanalysis. The “super” ego referred to is a dynamic force in the psyche which asserts moral superiority and is described as a negative function, which destroys rather than promotes knowledge:

“This destructive activity is tinged with “moral” qualities derived from the “super” ego quality of – (♂ ♀)” (1984, p. 98)

The symbols (♂ ♀) refer to Bion’s concept of the contained and container in which he hypothesized maternal function acts as the container (♀) for the infant’s anxieties, which when contained (♂) are metabolized and returned to the baby in a digested form. This is a past remarkable process because it is so common. We see it all the time when an infant’s wailing is not mirrored back as wailing but taken in and metabolized and mirrored back to the infant in less anxiety-provoking way. This process promotes learning and communication but Bion asserts that there is a negative form of this process which may be actively destructive within the psyche, whereby the “super” ego is allied to a negative, corrosive form of anti-container/contained. The following passage might explicate this process more clearly:

“In –K the breast is felt enviously to remove the good or valuable element in the fear of dying and force the worthless residue back into the infant. The infant who started with a fear of dying ends up containing an endless dread” (1984, p. 96)
Bion uses the breast, in this example as a symbol of the maternal function, a source of emotional as well as nutritional almentation, and the key to understanding what happens here is the reference to envy. In this hypothesised scenario, the infant ends up with a psychic state of affairs which has deteriorated far beyond a fear of dying, because that projected fear has not been contained by the breast, it has become reintrojected back, along with the original envy of the breast for being absent. The psyche experiences a nameless dread and the will to live, which is necessary for the fear of dying, has been removed because it has been part of the goodness removed from the envious breast and thus a debased anti-containing function has been installed within the psyche, as a “super” ego which continues to militate against emotional growth. The operation of the “super” ego curtails learning because the psyche has been stripped of its own potential to process experience.

Of course, Bion’s theory evolved out the dyadic psychoanalytic encounter and I do not wish to suggest that this conceptualisation of an individual psyche maps neatly onto a discursive response. However, there are several points of convergence between Bion’s theory of the “super” ego and the discursive constructions deployed with regard to responding to institutional child abuse in Ireland. For example, Ferguson (2007) has argued that abuse of industrial school children stemmed, in part, from dehumanizing discourses, which constructed the children as morally and not psychologically damaged, in which children are referred to as “moral dirt” (p. 123). In my view, this superiority cuts the speaker off from what is deemed a morally inferior object. In my study I identified moral discourse as a central feature of the construction of the industrial school children. Industrial school children are described as “good guys, good ordinary guys” or alternatively as belonging to the institution “where the bad people go”. The problematic of institutional abuse is constructed by one respondent as “a notion of righteousness that seemed to emanate from a notion of Catholicism that is really dead thank God”. This discourse of righteousness is not unlike the
“super” egoic activity described by Bion and is connected, in my view, to a strain of Irish Catholicism with links to Jansenism. Jansenism was a theological approach based on the work of St Augustine, which laid emphasis on the depravity of the individual being who depends on God for the grace of forgiveness, but this act of grace is independent of the will of the sinner, and in this respect it was sometimes referred to as Catholic Calvinism. This absence of human free will goes against standard Catholic teaching, in which the gift of grace is contingent on human assent. Jansenism appears to pivot around dynamics of denigration and debasement of the individual who is stripped of agency and mental functioning, who is bad and powerless. Again, I am reminded of Bion’s conceptualisation of a dynamic negative epistemic function:

The process of denudation continues until - ♂ - ♀ represents hardly more than an empty superiority-inferiority that in turn degenerates to nullity (p. 97)

Recent scholarly work has shown how Irish Catholicism was heavily influenced by Jansenism in the 16th and 17th centuries, because Irish clerics were educated in Paris where Jansenism had a loyal following (Chambers, 2010). I propose that the influence of this Jansenist discourse constituted the conditions for the activity of a righteous moralistic discourse, which alternatively can be viewed through a psychoanalytic prism as a “super” egoic activity which amounts to the destruction of the conditions of the possibility of truth:

“The emergence of any tendency to search for the truth, to establish contact with reality … is met with destructive attacks on the tendency and the reassertion of the moral superiority” (Bion, 1984, p. 98)

How does Bion’s concept of the “super” ego relate to the concept of conscience? According to Merriam Webster, conscience is defined as the consciousness of moral goodness or blameworthiness. This word is etymologically rooted in science, which comes from the Latin
for knowledge, scientia which is also related to scindere, the Latin verb to split. Interestingly, it may be related to the Sanskrit chyati, “he cuts off”. What these etymologies reveal is something about the nature of knowledge which involves cutting off or splitting. In order to know something, one has to not know something else and this is also true of the cognate form conscience. I conjecture that there are two forms of conscience, one in which conscience promotes consciousness, a version of K according to Bion, and the other which is a debased form, cut off from consciousness and thus it becomes the “super” ego, the instrument of –K. In my research study, an interviewee may be making a possible reference to this “super” egoic conscience: “I think if you haven’t a conscience, you’re a very dangerous human being” (p.128). I believe this absence of conscience referred to here is the debased conscience, the “super” ego morality described by Bion. The children in the industrial school are referred to by another interviewee as “having failed from my conscience” (p.128). I wonder, following Bion, whether the discourse of the respondent represents the dynamic of a failure of a consciousness due to bad conscience.

In my view there is a strong possibility that there is a socio-cultural analogue of the “super” ego theorised by Bion, an active antagonist of truth and knowledge. Institutional child abuse, viewed in this light, becomes less about what we know than our lack of psychological capacity to know. Bion’s theory allows us to consider that there may be deficiencies in the way we think, especially if that thinking is governed by the moralism described above:

“Bion was to state later in his life that he never found much evidence for a super-ego, ego and id, meaning that he found evidence for a crushing, depleting morality, a container (symbol) that crushed life and liveliness” (Symington & Symington, 1996, p.148)
Therefore, the problem of institutional child abuse may be considered as a problem of epistemic function, that within a cultural field, the presence of a crushing morality resulted in the depletion of thought and liveliness. The following section is taken up with an analysis of how this contact with liveliness might have been negated through processes of disavowal.

**Disavowal**

Freud used the term disavowal to describe a phenomenon of mental activity in which the ego contains two perceptual viewpoints of external reality, one which takes reality into consideration and the other which disavows reality, replacing it by the product of desire (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). How can we come to an understanding of knowledge of the industrial school system in Ireland which seemed to include and preclude knowledge about potential institutional abuse? The problem of disavowal is framed within a visual metaphor by one of the respondents, “A blind eye was thrown at the problem” I would like to discuss this construction of the problem of disavowal by drawing on the work of two contemporary analysts, associated with the Kleinian school of psychoanalysis, who have written two papers which reference the concept of the blind eye alluded to by the respondent in the above quotation.

The first paper is called “Turning a Blind Eye: The Cover Up for Oedipus” by John Steiner (1985) and the second paper is called “The Blindness of the Seeing Eye: Inverse Symmetry as a Defence against Reality” by Ronald Britton (1994). Steiner calls our attention to the distortion and misrepresentation of reality which he describes as turning a blind eye. He contrasts a traditional viewpoint of the Oedipus Complex which posits that the incestuous and murderous impulses of the Oedipus Complex are unconscious with the viewpoint he presents in this paper of an oedipal situation where insight is available but is turned away from and misrepresented. This process of turning away from what may be recognised is made
possible by a cover up and he convincingly shows how all the major protagonists in the
drama fail to ask obvious questions. In other words, individuals collude with each other to
evade and misrepresent an aspect of reality of which they are aware but wish to disavow.
This manifests in the refusal by Oedipus, Jocasta, Creon and the Elders to acknowledge the
oedipal crime because this will disturb the homeostasis of the society in which they value
their positions. Steiner describes that a possible outcome of such a cover up is the arrest of
mourning and an associative reparative process, because if there is no crime, there is nothing
to mourn. He goes on to say that if the oedipal crime were to be acknowledged the external
couple (Jocasta and Oedipus) would be attacked, but instead the internal representation of an
internal intercourse is attacked, which he links to the respect for truth. The external status quo
is preserved but an inner corruption reigns, represented by the plague in the play.

This paper provides several key insights which may lead to starting points for a
discussion of disavowal as constructed in my research. The same processes described by
Steiner characterises the response to institutional abuse in Ireland, except that they are
modelled on an inverted Oedipal situation, where the couple is denied not by the
internal/external child but by the parents. In other words, it may be argued that there was a
refusal among adults to recognise that the children in the industrial schools were born out of a
coming together of two individuals from the community, which allows for the covering up of
the claims and affiliations to the wider symbolic and actual community that the children
might enjoy. This is clearly illustrated by the importance of discourses of legitimacy in the
reports and interviews where the legitimacy of the children is concretely related to
theological-juridical conventions of legitimisation through martial bonds. For example, in the
Cussen Report the grounds for committal of the industrial school child demonstrate
discourses of legitimacy:
(c) If found destitute, not being an orphan and having both his parents or surviving parents, or in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, undergoing penal servitude or imprisonment;

(e) if the daughter, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of a father who has been convicted of an offence under the Criminal Law Amendment Acts, 1885 to 1935, in respect of any of his daughters, whether legitimate or illegitimate;

(h) if found destitute, and if not an orphan, and his parents are or (sic) his surviving parent, or in the case of an illegitimate child, his mother, is unable to support him; provided the parent or parents’ consent to committal

(Cussen, 1936 p. 60)

Viewed through the psychoanalytic discourse of Steiner’s paper, we gain a deeper understanding of the manner in which processes of denial or reality and cover up have very real consequences in terms of those who are not included in the oedipal configurations of the societal web. These consequences may be that those who are excluded are deontologised, that they do not exist and therefore cannot be thought about within the larger social networks. Limitations in the capacity to think have been linked to a failure to conceive of parental intercourse (Britton, 1989). Following the oedipal analogy, it could be posited that the exclusion of the industrial school child from public discourse maps onto an exclusion from a symbolic intercourse, that the parents of the industrial school child cannot come together to have intercourse because they have been delegitimised by discourses of religion.

In the second paper, Ronald Britton quotes Freud’s term “the blindness of the seeing eye” (as cited in Britton, 1994, p. 365) to describe what Freud’s translator Strachey came to translate as disavowal. Freud describes the mechanism of disavowal as a feature of psychosis
because it is contingent upon a denial of reality. However, disavowal is qualified by Basch (1983) as unlike psychotic denial because “it obliterates only the significance of things, not their perception” (as cited by Britton, 1994 p. 365). Britton develops his theme by describing a defensive organisation characterised by disavowal which lies at the centre of the individual’s mental life and characterises his or her whole relationship to the world, so that the blind but seeing eye knows and does not know features of external and internal reality. Britton draws on his clinical experience within a Kleinian framework to illustrate how disavowal interferes with and may arrest the normal processes of projection and introjection between analyst and patient.

It is this cyclical exchange which gives depth, texture and meaning to experience, in which investments can be drawn down from the external world or external objects can be suffused with internal representations. If there is excessive anxiety in an individual, the exchange between daily life and phantasy life is interrupted. According to a Kleinian perspective, the early mental life of the infant is host to rich unconscious fantasies dominated by aggression and hostility. If the external reality is felt to resemble this inner phantasmal world, this may lead to an almost uncontainable psychotic anxiety, and in order to avert this process the traffic between internal phantasy and external reality is halted, resulting in a possible deadening effect on the individual. The fairy-tale as horror story is a cultural product derived from these fantasies, as both adults and children play with the horror that children may be locked up, devoured and eaten by an evil protagonist. If the fairy tale becomes a reality, or is believed to have become a reality, then an enjoyable process can tip over into disavowal or psychosis.

Britton illustrates his theme with a clinical example of therapeutic sessions with a four-year-old girl. The day before this particular session the girl had witnessed a traumatic family scene; her father physically attacked her mother and the mother attempted suicide. Within the
therapy, the young girl re-enacts the scene through play with domestic animals but as she continues the play she builds a wall between the domestic animals and the wild animals, including a crocodile which she briefly touched with her finger. However, following an interpretation by Britton that she was afraid that her wild thoughts would get mixed up with what had happened at home, she took the crocodile and brought it over the wall to attack the mother pig. In the following session she reconstructed her divided world by having a human crawl over the barrier and join the wild animals. Britton emphasises how the wall that divides the domestic from the wild animals represents the symbolic barrier between external reality and phantasy life, and that this wall represents a defence from a confusion of internal and external reality. However, if that defence becomes too rigid the channel between internal and externality reality becomes blocked, blocking possibilities for external reality to be suffused with internal fantasy and for internal fantasy to be modified by external reality, which interrupts the creative process of psychic integration and emotional growth.

Drawing from this paper, I suggest that the actual wall between the industrial schools and the community, also represented a symbolic wall. Thus, a physical and psychic barrier was placed between these children and the outside world and that this wall may have cemented processes of disavowal. The fantasy of cruelty to children as represented in the European fairy-tale, is to my mind, consonant with a Kleinian perspective of what has been called the archaic super-ego, an infantile cauldron of fantasy that pivots around issues of survival, of integration in the face of constant fragmentation and annihilation (Caper, 1999). Perhaps, this is what makes the nightmare fairy-tale such an enjoyable product, because it is understood as a symbolic representation of the very real phylogenetic and psychological victory of having made it into the world, because the margins for coming into existence are extremely slim and we cannot survive unaided. However, let us suppose that the symbol is in fact a reality and children are being locked up, devoured, abused and killed. How does the
potential witness deal with this? Is it not plausible, following Britton’s analysis of disavowal that the onlooker constructs a psychic barrier, as with the young girl in Britton’s case, in order to separate inner phantasy from an external reality and that this process constitutes a process of disavowal; in other words, “a blind eye was thrown at the problem”.

In conclusion, psychoanalytic theory allows us a means of viewing the problematic of the institutional abuse of children in Ireland, through the application of a psychoanalytic epistemology and how a specific way of knowing called –K may be implicated in the construction of a response to institutional child abuse. Secondly, this form of negative epistemic function is linked to a process called “super” ego which is described as a superiority without morality which is transmitted through moral discourses which appear to be germane to the discussion of institutional child abuse. Processes of disavowal are emphasized as fundamental to any understanding of the relationships between the community at large and the industrial school children.
References


Appendix 1: Guidelines for Publishable Paper

Journal Selected: Language and Psychoanalysis

Contributor Guidelines:

For Contributors

Manuscript submission

Please submit an electronic version of your manuscripts to the editors Laura Cariola-Zanetić and Andrew Wilson. You will receive an acknowledgment once your submission has been accepted for the blind peer review process, which may take approximately 2 to 3 months.

Author's guidelines

Manuscript:

· Authors need to confirm with a cover letter that the manuscript has not been published previously and is not being submitted currently to another journal.
· Manuscripts are only published in the English language.

Word limit:

· Submissions for main articles should be approximately 3,000-10,000 words in length and include an abstract of about 200 words and up to seven keywords.
· Short research reports, book reviews, and readers' comments should be approximately 500-2,500 words in length.
· Interviews and obituaries should not exceed 4,000 words in length.

Style:

· Manuscripts should be double-spaced, in Times 12-point font, and in .doc, .docx, or .rtf format.
· Manuscripts should follow the style conventions as outlined by the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 6th edition.
Appendix 2: Letter to Journal Editors.

Dear Laura Cariola-Zanetić and Andrew Wilson,

Please find attached an electronic version of my paper which is entitled, “Responding to Institutional Child Abuse and Negative Epistemic Function: A Psychoanalytic View”. The paper includes an abstract of 195 words. This paper has not been published previously and is not under consideration for any other journals. The word count is 6,492 words. It has been previously submitted as part of a portfolio for a professional doctorate in counselling psychology.

Yours sincerely,

Eoghan Naughton