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The Case for a Critical Hermeneutics

From the Understanding of Power
to the Power of Understanding

Simon Susen

Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the case for a critical hermeneutics. To this end, the analysis draws on the work of the contemporary social philosopher Hans-Herbert Kögler[1] — arguably, one of the most influential representatives of critical hermeneutics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The chapter is divided into four parts:

The first part focuses on Kögler's engagement with Pierre Bourdieu's plea for an *epistemological break*, suggesting that it obliges us not only to rethink the role of the paradigms of understanding and explanation in the humanities and social sciences, but also to re-examine the concept of power, especially if determinist and fatalist accounts of social life are to be rejected. The second part centers on Kögler's *hermeneutics of power*. It maintains that the exercise of power involves varying degrees of relationality, agency, mediacy, efficacy, and experientiality. Building on this assumption, it will become clear why the critical study of power cannot be dissociated from a sustained concern with domination and resistance. This insight, which lies at the core of Kögler's critical hermeneutics, paves the way for a shift in perspective from "the understanding of power" to "the power of understanding." The third part explores the idea of *critical theory as critical hermeneutics*, positing that every hermeneutically constituted background comprises three key spheres: a symbolic sphere, a practical sphere, and a subjective sphere. Their socio-ontological significance can be elucidated by reference to three — hermeneutically inspired — themes: theory and agency, hermeneutic reflexivity and dialogic subjectivity, and the "me" and the "I." The fourth part offers some *critical reflections* on important issues arising from Kögler's project, notably with regard to its limitations and shortcomings.

The chapter concludes by asserting that Kögler's critical hermeneutics raises valuable epistemological and methodological questions, whose relevance is illustrated in the far-reaching challenges that the humanities and social sciences face in the twenty-first century.

I. The Epistemological Break:
Between Understanding and Explanation

Drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Kögler analyzes the idea of an *epistemological break*. An epistemic rupture of the sort endorsed by Bourdieu obliges us to examine the relationship between the paradigm of understanding [*Verstehen*] and the paradigm of explanation [*Erklären*].[2] Both paradigms have had a significant impact on the development of the humanities and social sciences since the "methodological dispute" [*Methodenstreit*].[3] As Kögler emphasizes, however, Bourdieu's plea for an epistemological break also requires us to grapple with "the methodological question concerning *power*."[4] The issue with which we are confronted, then, involves the relationship between "the self-understanding of social actors"[5] and "the explanatory claims of social-scientific theory,"[6] including the degree to which *any* kind of knowledge-seeking engagement with the world is permeated by power dynamics. From a Bourdieusian perspective, critical social scientists—insofar as they are committed to adopting "a skeptical posture towards the operative self-understanding of social agents"[7]—need to undertake a "double epistemological break."[8] Let us consider the main assumptions underlying this two-step venture.

i. The First Break

The first break consists in a decisive rupture with what may be described as *phenomenological subjectivism*. The problem with this approach is that, as a sociological method, it is confined to "an explication of the familiar and unthematized knowledge of the social world."[9] Epistemic accounts based on this strategy are "phenomenological" in that they intend not to rise above the "pregiven meaning phenomena"[10] but, in a rather modest fashion, "to make this level accessible in its internal coherence."[11] The principal reason this methodological framework is firmly embedded in the paradigm of *understanding* is that, far from pursuing the goal of "a theoretical transcendence of the self-understanding"[12] obtained by those immersed in quotidian interactions, it is aimed at "an internal disclosure of the (largely unthematically familiar) semantic implications."[13] On this view, major insights can be acquired from studying everyday constructions of meaning and identifying them as the key source of world disclosure enjoyed by human beings.

Critical sociology à la Bourdieu, however, has a strong *objectivist* component in that it *questions* the validity of "the original self-understanding[s]"[14] in which ordinary agents tend to remain trapped. This radical break with common-sense perceptions, assumptions, and representations generated in people's lifeworlds reflects a shift from the paradigm of understanding to the paradigm of explanation and, correspondingly, a change in focus from the *phenomenological* level of an *interpretive* sociology to the *ontological* level of an *explanatory* sociology.

In short, we are faced with two different types of knowledge: *phenomenological* knowledge and *objectivist* knowledge.[15] The former endeavors "to make explicit the truth of *primary experience* of the social world,"[16] allowing for the creation of a sense of *familiarity* not only with one's environment but also, crucially, with the categories and

presuppositions constructed and mobilized when attributing meaning to the confluence of factors shaping one's existence. The latter attempts to shed light on "the *objective relations . . .* which structure practice and representations of practice"[17] and whose underlying logic, since it is not immediately obvious to the epistemically "naïve" observer, needs to be *uncovered* by the critical social scientist. Thus, in order to carry out a decisive break with the taken-for-granted and tacitly shared assumptions that have the power to "give the social world its self-evident, natural character,"[18] it is necessary to draw upon the terminological tools, epistemological insights, conceptual devices, methodological strategies, and empirical data provided by critical social science.

Pursuing this "uncovering mission,"[19] it becomes possible to engage in the process of a "distanciated construction,"[20] whereby collectively generated, implicitly shared, and intuitively mastered meanings and presuppositions are converted into an object of scrutiny. An "objectivist sociology,"[21] designed to pursue this goal, aims to *transcend* "the symbolic horizon of the participants"[22]—that is, of those who, by virtue of their everyday actions and interactions, make the production and reproduction of the social world possible in the first place. This "enlightening ambition"[23] manifests itself in a "strategy of disclosure,"[24] capable of exposing the objective conditions underlying symbolically mediated actions and experiences. On this account, common-sense perceptions, conceptions, representations, and understandings are always *potentially* common-sense misperceptions, misconceptions, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings. For their primary function is to provide social life with (effectively reassuring) degrees of stability, solidity, and predictability, rather than with (possibly disconcerting) degrees of fragility, questionability, and illegitimacy. A "structuralist argumentation"[25] draws attention to the largely "*deceptive* force of the self-understanding,"[26] relied upon by ordinary agents, and to "the *objective* regularities and structures of the agents' social world,"[27] whose underlying complexity they fail to grasp when going about their everyday lives.

ii. The Second Break

The second break consists in a decisive rupture with what may be described as *structuralist objectivism*. The problem with this approach is that, as a sociological method, it is restricted to a one-sided analysis of social structures *without* "linking them again to their correlative *praxis*."[28] The task of a genuinely reflexive sociology, however, is to offer "a *mediation* of the self-understanding of the agents with the objective conditions of symbol systems"[29]—that is, a "mediation between phenomenological and objectivist perspectives"[30] and, hence, between the *internal* point of view, formed through everyday experiences in the lifeworld, and the *external* point of view, developed on the basis of rigorous social-scientific inquiry. The intimate relationship between social structures and social practices is essential to the very possibility of human coexistence: the viability of society depends on its members' largely unconscious, and yet *active*, compliance with and reproduction of historically contingent sets of *rules*, by which normatively codified forms of life are governed.

The study of gift exchange may serve as an example, especially when contrasting Claude Lévi-Strauss's structuralist explanation with Marcel Mauss's phenomenological

interpretation. In the former, the emphasis is placed on the hidden mechanisms regulating practices of reciprocity and reversibility. In the latter, the meanings attached to these processes by knowledge-generating subjects take center stage. The double epistemological rupture envisaged by Bourdieu, however, purports to take both the structural *and* the phenomenological aspects of social life into account, thereby permitting us to comprehend "the *real functioning*"[31] of the implicit principles underpinning interactional dynamics, such as gift exchanges. In order for the second epistemological break to be successful, it is vital to relate the "theoretical abstract of objectivist knowledge back to praxis-inherent thought and action"[32]—that is, the *external* knowledge about structures examined by a social-scientific observer back to the *internal* knowledge acquired through a person's self-understanding.

A genuinely comprehensive social theory, therefore, must seek to grasp "the *dialectical* relations between the objective structures to which the objectivist mode of knowledge gives access and the structured dispositions within which those structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them."[33] *Social* agents occupy different *social* positions and acquire different *social* dispositions within different *social* fields. It is through the largely unconscious and intuitive knowledge embedded in, and mobilized by, their habitus that they are equipped with a "feel for the game"[34]—that is, with the practical capacity to decipher, to respond to, and to cope with the praxeological imperatives thrown at them, as they navigate the social world by inhabiting different sets of field-specific contexts and constellations.

Thus, the habitus serves as "the mediator between structure and praxis."[35] The habitus is a positionally determined and dispositionally constituted apparatus of perception, appreciation, and action. In other words, it makes those immersed in social life look at, attach meaning to, and interact with reality in a particular manner—and, crucially, *not* do so in another manner. It permits agents not simply to follow *rules*,[36] but, rather, to employ a range of *strategies* when positioning themselves in relation to others and mobilizing their dispositions in a way that allows them to pursue their field-contingent *interests*. Given the preponderance of social objectivity, permeating even the seemingly most autonomous forms of human subjectivity, *strategies*—far from being reducible to "the genuine product of acting subjects"[37]—are "the objectively effected result of general structures"[38] and, hence, of social constellations. These constellations are as relationally organized and spatiotemporally variable as the symbolically constituted discourses constructed to sustain them.

If, however, we buy into the logic of determinist reductionism, then we are left with a kind of "second-order sociological objectivism,"[39] which suggests that the relative autonomy and consciousness of human agents is hardly more than "the deceptively necessary semblance of a deeper, causally efficacious truth or social reality."[40] On this account, conflicts and struggles between individuals and/or social groups are strategically motivated confrontations "not of the actors themselves but of the corresponding habitus formations."[41] Indeed, such a reductive theory portrays human subjects, including their ostensibly most creative and improvisational practices, as mere epiphenomena of underlying power structures at work "behind their backs."

iii. Beyond Determinism and Fatalism

Kögler accuses Bourdieu of endorsing an explanatory position that may be described as *social determinism*.[42] According to the arguably bleak picture painted by Bourdieu's conceptual framework, human life is a permanent struggle for socially relevant—notably material, symbolic, reputational, and financial—resources. Kögler holds Bourdieu responsible for making a case for a "two-step approach"[43] that, effectively, "places itself *outside* any possible *power-critical praxis*"[44] performed by ordinary *actors*, rather than *agents*.[45] The act of "understanding" [*Verstehen*], in the sense of an epistemically valuable capacity allowing subjects to make sense of reality in a meaningful and insightful fashion, "has no role to play within the strong and theoretically *totalizing* explanatory claim of this [i.e. Bourdieu's] theory."[46]

From Kögler's point of view, Bourdieu's approach endeavors to explain "*all* thought and action as the expression of largely implicit dispositions,"[47] which are reduced to mere products of power structures, asymmetrically distributed resources, and inequitably allocated positions. Following the reductive rationale behind this "ontological model,"[48] one is led to believe that "*every* statement or action is per se the product of unconscious structures within the framework of power relations."[49] Put differently, we are faced with a theoretical account in which, owing to its totalization of power as the overriding force *determining all* social practices, it is impossible "to extract any meaning from the necessary counterconcepts to power, namely subjective freedom and reflexive awareness."[50]

It appears, then, that "the dialectic between subjective meaning and objective structures (or between understanding and explanation)"[51] is dissolved in favor of "an explanatory objectivism"[52] that tends to reduce almost every single aspect of the social world—including species-constitutive features—to an epiphenomenon of underlying power relations. By underestimating, if not denying, the epistemic significance of the interpretive, explanatory, and reflexive capacities of ordinary actors, including their various forms of understanding and self-understanding, "Bourdieu prevents the conception of power from being corrected or revised in light of *empirical-hermeneutic experiences* with another's meaning and praxis contexts."[53] It is the task of Kögler's critical hermeneutics not only to take these experiences seriously but also, in a more general sense, to unearth the foundational role they play in the construction of normatively codified forms of life.

Kögler insists, therefore, that, as an explanatory strategy, a truly critical hermeneutics must be "unfolded as *complementary* to the internal understanding of meaning,"[54] in order to do justice to "the analytical difference between self-understanding and power structure"[55] and, by implication, between the reflexive capacities of ordinary actors and the relations of inequality they experience, to a greater or lesser degree, in particular social fields. Kögler contends, however, that Bourdieu is guilty of "bracketing (via his two-step methodology) the self-understanding of the agents in such a way that the resulting account of objective structural conditions is longer amenable to dialogic mediation with symbolic orders."[56] In such a power-driven universe, determined by the constant struggle for socially relevant resources, it appears that, ultimately, every human action is motivated by "economically conceived habitus strategies."[57] Ironically, this

means that Bourdieu, despite his fierce critique of rational-choice and rational-action theories, effectively subscribes to a sociological version of instrumentalist economism.[58] What appears to predominate in such a *fatalist* conception of the social is "an objectifying will to explanation,"[59] whose proponents do "not believe it necessary to engage in a potentially self-problematizing conversation with the other,"[60] even less so if its epistemic horizon is reduced to doxa and common sense.[61] The desideratum of a critical hermeneutics à la Kögler, by contrast, is committed to fostering the idea of a social science oriented towards realizing the ideal of "dialogic openness to difference"[62] and recognizing "disparate world perspectives."[63] In essence, this project aims to combine the paradigms of understanding and explanation. Such an undertaking facilitates "a hermeneutically sensitive mediation of the *interpretive* understanding of other (and thus self-contrastive) symbolic orders with an *explanatory* approach that allows one to go beyond or to get beyond the other's (and one's own) respective self-understanding."[64] The cross-fertilization of interpretive and explanatory ambitions can be achieved "*without* either methodologically or ontologically absolutizing power."[65] This is not to ignore the pivotal role that *power* plays in the material and symbolic organization of *social reality*; this is to posit, however, that the latter cannot be reduced to a mere product of the former.

iv. Towards a Hermeneutic Analysis of Power

A hermeneutic analysis of power, as proposed by Kögler, needs to accomplish the following: instead of detaching the interpreter from power relations *as if* he or she were situated *outside* the horizon of the social, it sheds light on the degree to which "power constrains and operates on *her [or his] own symbolic horizon*."[66] Such a hermeneutically informed approach, therefore, seeks "to expose the potential effects of power that operate behind the back of *one's own* preunderstanding,"[67] rather than exclusively behind the backs of the subjects it studies. Particularly fruitful in this respect are "intercultural-interpretive encounters with foreign or unfamiliar meanings,"[68] since these oblige everyone involved in generating epistemic practices—that is, both experts and laypersons, social scientists and ordinary actors, observers and participants, outsiders and insiders—to call the validity, acceptability, and applicability of hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions into question. In brief, "hermeneutic unfamiliarity"[69] can be a source of, rather than an obstacle to, epistemic insight. Far from laying claim to "any extracultural, objective, or transcendental perspective,"[70] this critical framework aims to embrace "the natural unfamiliarity of unfamiliar naturalness for a hermeneutically sensitive, explanatory approach to power relations."[71]

Based on the previous reflections, Kögler spells out that a hermeneutic conception of power draws attention to three pitfalls:

1. The concept of power should not be employed as "a *totalizing* category."[72] It would be erroneous—as, according to Kögler, is the case in Bourdieu's "one-sided ontological framework"[73]—to conceive of *every* social practice "as the operation of power or as an outlet for strategic relations."[74] The fact that all social practices, structures, and constellations are *power-laden* does not mean that all of them are also *power-driven*.[75]

2. The concept of power should not be used as "a *transcendental* category."[76] It would be misleading to assume that every form of understanding or self-understanding is explicable by reference to a monolithic architecture, the ontological basis (and ubiquitous feature) of which is "power." Granted, *power*—as an underlying force—may be present "within one's own *preunderstanding*,"[77] even when the symbolic resources of the latter are mobilized in order to make sense of the social impact of the former. According to Kögler, however, a comprehensive theory of power must proceed, at once, inductively and deductively:

> . . . the category of power must be *specific* enough to discriminate power practices from social practices, while still *general* enough to grasp the particularities and structures of various power contexts.[78]

In short, power has *universal* features that manifest themselves in *particular* ways within relationally constituted, and hence spatiotemporally contingent, contexts. Given its typological elasticity and constitutive malleability, the "universality" of power, which pervades distinct sets of socio-historical constellations, is only *quasi*-transcendental.

3. The concept of power should not be referred to as a *determinist* category—that is, it should not be "*directly determined* as the counterconcept to truth."[79] If one makes the mistake of portraying power as "a negative category of verification,"[80] then one runs the risk of pretending that "one's own symbolic order"[81] could be "made immune to criticism."[82] In *real* life, "power" and "truth" presuppose and permeate, rather than contradict, one another. This does not mean that one determines [*bestimmt*] the other; it means, however, that they condition [*bedingen*] one another. Just as different language games are played in different forms of life, different systems of meaning are embedded in different regimes of power. The interplay between discourse and power is always as open as the contingency of social history itself.

The epistemic benefits derived from "hermeneutic and self-distanciating encounter[s] with unfamiliar meanings"[83] can hardly be overstated. As a methodological strategy, critical hermeneutics permits us, as knowledge-seeking entities, "to uncover constitutive power effects precisely where we were previously accustomed to seeing nothing but 'reality'"[84] as a seemingly "factual" given. This "reality," however, is tantamount to an ensemble of constantly shifting meanings, upon which we draw—and which we (re)construct—when relating to, making sense of, and acting upon the objective, normative, and/or subjective dimensions of our existence. In the next part, let us consider the main features of Kögler's hermeneutically informed analysis of power.

II. Hermeneutics of Power à la Kögler

Building on the preceding reflections, Kögler presents an outline of a hermeneutically informed analysis of power. This undertaking, which draws on key Foucauldian

insights, is guided by three principal objectives: (1) to avoid any kind of "ontological reduction to power,"[85] (2) to provide a critical analysis of the "productive effects of power,"[86] and (3) to develop a framework capable of grasping "the always-particular self-understanding"[87] achieved by human subjects.

In Kögler's eyes, Michel Foucault's work is useful when pursuing the aforementioned objectives, not least because, unlike Bourdieu, he does *not* propose an effectively "totalizing 'theory of power'."[88] Emphasizing the spatiotemporally contingent constitution of *all* social constellations, Foucauldian approaches dismiss the idea of advocating context-transcending accounts of power. In this spirit, Foucault's work offers, at best, conceptual devices and methodological tools—rather than a "theory," let alone an "ontology"—of power.[89]

Kögler concedes that in some of Foucault's writings, especially in his *earlier* works, "power" is portrayed as "the ontological basis of history, knowledge, and subjectivity."[90] We may add, however, that the context-dependent, and hence historically contingent, constitution of power *is* stressed in most of Foucault's intellectual interventions and reflected, unambiguously, in his shift from "archaeological"[91] to "genealogical"[92] studies. Especially in his *later* contributions, Foucault conceives of both knowledge and subjectivity as crucial dimensions of human experience, which are irreducible to relations, let alone systems, of power.[93] Motivated by this conviction, Kögler aims to integrate "basic Foucauldian concepts and methods into the framework of a critical hermeneutics,"[94] which—to his mind—represents a cross-fertilizing move through which "any reduction of meaning and critical subjectivity to 'power' is in fact conceptually excluded."[95] This project, in other words, takes seriously the species-constitutive features of "hermeneutic experience"[96] and, by doing so, prevents us from falling into the trap of realizing a "hypostatization of power,"[97] which is equivalent to a crude form of socio-ontological reductionism. The central assumptions that undergird this hermeneutic perspective will be examined in the following sections.

i. Power

According to Kögler, power is *neither* "the exclusive ontological substrate of social relations"[98] *nor* "the metaphysical ground of every symbolic or social meaning, every action or possible knowledge."[99] If this is true, then it is not possible to infer the constitution of particular social orders, including the material and symbolic elements that sustain them, from a foundational type of power, which imposes itself, in a monolithic manner, on every single aspect of human reality. Kögler does not deny that our practices are bound up with power as much as power is bound up with our practices. Still, the omnipresence of power does not prove its omnipotence.

As stressed by Kögler's critical hermeneutics, "world and power principally disclose themselves to us through a multistranded interpretive framework."[100] While the symbolic realm is inevitably infused with power relations, it is not necessarily determined by them. Since every form of understanding is situated in a hermeneutically constituted horizon of preunderstandings, the former cannot escape the overt or hidden power dynamics shaping the treasure of semantic resources provided by the latter. To the extent that "[u]nderstanding cannot be assured a preunderstanding that

has always already evaded structures of domination,"[101] it is vital to uncover "the nonconscious strains of power"[102] permeating *any* kind of symbolically mediated mode of attributing meaning to the world.

In line with Foucault's approach, Kögler rejects any attempts to portray power as a "localizable"[103] force that can be "possessed"[104] by particular individual or collective actors—for instance, by members of a specific social group, based on class, ethnicity, gender, age, (dis)ability, and/or any other key sociological variable.[105] From the perspective of critical hermeneutics, such an account is problematic—not only because it understates the complexity of power relations, but also because it may "make it all too easy for the critic of power to place herself in a position illusively 'outside power'."[106]

If, however, a scholar declares to stand in firm "solidarity with the struggle of the oppressed"[107] (defined in economic, cultural, ethnic, political, sexual, generational, mental, physical, or any other socially relevant terms) or if a researcher—following the Bourdieusian spirit—seeks "to grasp power relations completely objectively through a theoretical break,"[108] then they also run the risk of failing to acknowledge, let alone to problematize, their "own entanglement in power contexts, which unavoidably permeate the largely implicit preunderstanding and the interpretations put forward"[109] when studying reality in a *seemingly* "scientific," "disinterested," and "systematic" fashion. To be clear, social-scientific accounts of particular aspects of reality may be conceptually sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, and empirically substantiated. This does not mean, however, that these accounts—including the social conditions under which they are produced—are devoid of power relations.

To a greater or lesser extent, we are all accomplices of power.[110] If all social relations are power relations and if, furthermore, we are all situated in social relations, then we are all immersed in power relations. Hence, it is imperative to stress the *relational* constitution of power. As a relationally contingent force, power cannot be reduced to a "property" or "possession,"[111] ascribed to particular individual or collective actors, let alone to an all-encompassing "fundamental principle"[112] by means which *every* social phenomenon can be explained. Instead, power should be conceived of as "a specific social relation,"[113] established between "individuals, groups, or social institutions"[114]— that is, a multilayered reality that, at the same time, "cuts across these groupings"[115] and is irreducible to one overriding element. On this view, power should be regarded "neither as direct force nor as a consensual relation,"[116] but, rather "as the indirect efficacy of actors working on the experience of other actors."[117]

According to this—hermeneutically inspired—definition, the exercise of power involves varying degrees of (1) *relationality*, (2) *agency*, (3) *mediacy*, (4) *efficacy*, and (5) *experientiality*. To be exact, the exercise of power is contingent upon the following:

1. the capacity to participate in the construction of social relations;
2. the capacity to relate to, to act upon, and to shape reality in a purposive manner;
3. the capacity to exert influence on somebody or something by virtue of context-specific means and strategies, irrespective of whether these are employed consciously or unconsciously;
4. the capacity to have a certain degree of impact on the material and/or symbolic organization of reality;

5. the capacity to affect the ways in which other subjects experience reality, including the ways in which they experience—and, crucially, do *not* experience—the ways in which power is, or is not, exercised by themselves and/or others.

In many cases, the exercise of power entails the misrecognition of power, notably by those affected, if not governed, by it.[118] The exercise of power may occur openly or covertly, consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or unwittingly. Yet, it always requires the "recognition of the other as a free subject,"[119] even when this freedom is sought to be undermined or denied. From a Foucauldian perspective, "power relations logically presuppose the freedom of the subjects,"[120] but the former—especially when they are converted into relations of domination—"tend to arrest and negate precisely this dimension of individual self-determination."[121]

Paradoxically, the more individual or collective subjects are sought to be deprived of their *freedom* by a particular exercise of *power*, the more the latter only reinforces the agential strength of the former. Freedom constitutes "a complementary and, as it were, immanent condition of power relations."[122] Just as the exercise of power depends on the actualization of freedom, the actualization of freedom hinges on the exercise of power. The "intrinsic connection between the operation of power and the realization of freedom"[123] lies at the core of human forms of life. The moment an "operative power relationship . . . is no longer capable of being made fluid by the agents"[124] involved in its production and reproduction, it is converted into a state of *domination*.[125]

ii. Power and Domination

Drawing on the previous insights, Kögler insists on the *bottom-up*, *circular*, and *reversible* constitution of power:

· Given its *bottom-up* constitution, "power comes from below."[126] Even the most abstract modes of *macro-power* exerted by the two main domains of the *system*— that is, the state and the market—are rooted in quotidian forms of *micro-power* exercised by interacting subjects in the *lifeworld*.[127] The former manifest themselves in the predominance of instrumental, strategic, and functionalist types of reason in modern society.[128] The latter emanate from the foundational role of communicative reason, enabling subjects to engage in purposive, normative, and expressive speech acts and thereby to contribute to the symbolically mediated and discursively regulated construction of sociality.[129]

· Given its *circular* constitution, "power is principally dispersed throughout, and implanted within, the social body."[130] Hence, it is not only irreducible to "the product of a localizable subject of power,"[131] but, moreover, it cannot be indefinitely retained in one particular social space or be indeterminately monopolized by one specific actor or group of actors. Just as actors circulate, so do both the power dynamics and the power structures within and through which they navigate the social world.

· Given its *reversible* constitution, power is never forever.[132] In fact, to the degree that power relations are not "causal-nomological but intersubjective-symbolic,"[133]

they are always, at least in principle, amendable and rescindable. Not even the seemingly most consolidated power relationships, including those that can be characterized as forms of domination, contain "an a priori fixed structure or causality that absolutely determines"[134] the outcome of every action taking place within their parameters. Since power structures are normative orders,[135] they are never "ontologically fixed and causally irreversible"[136] but, on the contrary, always potentially criticizable, challengeable, and changeable.

In systems of domination, every attempt is made to undermine, if not to eliminate, the dimension of reversibility, notably by "establishing a firmly united world picture that joins together 'reality' and social hierarchy,"[137] as is often the case in the construction of dominant ideologies, designed to defend and to justify the status quo in accordance with the interests of the most powerful.[138] Indeed, when "fixed and stabilizing *structures of domination*"[139] are in place in a given context, these "always already press individuals and collective subjects into a determinate pattern of thinking, acting, and perceiving,"[140] in such a way that the legitimacy of the hegemonic system of power is reinforced. The very possibility of building effective power relations presupposes the existence of subjects enjoying an actual or potential degree of freedom.[141] Paradoxically, however, in systems of domination "this potentially expandable freedom"[142] is sought to be weakened, if not eradicated.

Following the preceding reflections, we are confronted with an intricate scenario: on the one hand, "*positions* of power and domination that have crystalized into fixed *positionalities*";[143] on the other hand, "an open and fair *struggle*, a direct conflict between *competing* interest groups or individual agents."[144] This relationship is dialectical in the sense that, as a tension-laden affair, it drives social developments — irrespective of whether these are experienced as "progressive" or "regressive," "emancipatory" or "repressive," "empowering" or "disempowering." It is impossible, however, to grasp the complexity of this dialectic without taking into account the pivotal role played by normative — and, hence, symbolic — orders in the construction of social life, including systems of domination:

> Structures of domination are built into the symbolic order itself; they belong structurally though not consciously to the world-view into which a subject qua socialization and culturalization is integrated.[145]

Thus, power relations, including those that result in forms of domination, are always already part of the symbolically constituted background horizon upon which we draw, and in which we are situated, when seeking to make sense of the objective, normative, and/or subjective dimensions of our existence. In Gadamerian terms, this means that we must "always already presuppose a linguistic world picture and linguistic competence."[146] While these may lurk in the background, they are vital to our performative capacity to inhabit symbolically mediated social roles in our lifeworld and to accomplish this in a more or less meaningful fashion.

Considering the legitimizing power of hegemonic ideologies, "the synthetic and identity-conferring power of domination   stems from its fusion with an implicitly

authorized understanding of reality,"[147] which provides the established social order with a viable degree of legitimacy and thereby makes it "appear to correspond to the natural order"[148] of things. Hence, this "synthesizing capacity"[149] of efficient modes of domination ensures that the *social order* is effectively presented as a *natural order* by virtue of the normalizing force of a corresponding *symbolic order*, which defines the parameters underlying "the holistic character of our world-disclosure."[150]

In this context, Kögler proposes to draw an *analogy* between, on the one hand, the *sociological* distinction between "*domination structure* and *power struggle*"[151] and, on the other hand, the *linguistic* distinction between "*langue* and *parole*."[152] Just as "every power struggle and every open strategy are already engaged in a field of pregiven relations of domination,"[153] "every actualization of language during speech already presupposes a system of rules and structures."[154] In other words, inasmuch as the performative aspects of power-laden practices cannot be dissociated from the structural constellations underlying social domination, the executive dimensions of symbolically mediated utterances cannot be divorced from the grammatical conventions underpinning linguistic interaction. Both cases illustrate that the pursuit of human agency is, at once, made possible and constrained by degrees of structural determinacy.

Owing to the confluence of structure and agency in every aspect of human sociality, there is no getting away from the dialectic of reproduction and transformation in the daily construction of reality. Put in Foucauldian terms, "technologies of normalization and habitualization . . . stand over against strategies of open conflict."[155] It is the task of critical social scientists to uncover the mechanisms that make subjects not only comply with behavioral, ideological, and institutional patterns of domination, but also contribute, in a productive fashion, to their efficacy by equipping them, on the basis of their symbolically mediated actions and interactions, with sustainable degrees of legitimacy.

Kögler reminds us, however, that, due to our hermeneutic resources, we are able not only to confirm but also to challenge the legitimacy of hegemonic practices, ideologies, and institutions. Because we possess the purposive potential of *Verstand*, the normative potential of *Vernunft*, and the evaluative potential of *Urteilskraft*, we have the capacity to create "*a space for reflection and action over against established interpretations and structures of domination*."[156] Owing to this capacity, the overt latency of emancipation inhabits the most consolidated systems of domination.

iii. Power, Domination, and Resistance

The concept of *resistance* captures the notion that actors have the capacity not only to contest established mechanisms of power and domination but also to engage in practices oriented towards subverting them. In every stratified form of social organization, "domination-reproducing power practices and the freedom struggles opposed to such practices"[157] reflect the dialectic of domination and emancipation. The fact that "the possibility of overthrow and the 'danger' of dissolution is built into even the most rigid of domination mechanisms"[158] indicates that social relations, including

their seemingly most solidified variants, are never forever. Indeed, "no ever-so-perfect habitualization of subjects or installation of surveillance techniques is capable of saving a domination formation from its own potential transcendence."[159] The transcendence of immanence reveals the immanence of transcendence. The most powerful system of domination cannot annihilate this tension-laden potential, which is built into every human form of life.

Just as it is vital to recognize the *fragility* inherent in each set of social arrangements,[160] however, it is important to face up to the integrationist force of complex, rather than simple, modes of domination.[161] It is no accident that "power technologies aim at a transformation of individuals in such a way as to disarm their power-endangering potential for resistance and, at the same time, productively to redirect their psychical-organic energies to the benefit of the system."[162] Following this integrationist logic of co-optation, it becomes possible to instrumentalize resources of critique and resistance[163] in order to infuse systems of domination with more, rather than less, legitimacy.

Faced with the challenge of domination in its multiple variations, critical hermeneutics sets itself the ambitious task of helping "to break the spell of power-laden forms of identity, thereby opening up possibilities for reflexive self-determination and self-empowerment"[164] and, hence, reason-guided emancipation. This process permits subjects to break out of the straitjacket of social domination only to the degree that they are protagonists of their own destiny: the potential transformation of effectively disempowering identities "has to be left to the subjects themselves."[165] Their "reflexive identity,"[166] understood in the spirit of critical hermeneutics, "can never be fixed or determined but remains an open and ongoing process of self-construction."[167] A person's identity is not only in a constant state of flux but also a realm of contestation.[168] Just as it is open to change, it is open to questioning — not only "from the outside" by others, but also "from the inside" by the identity's carrier searching for meaning.

Self-fulfilment depends on one's capacity to challenge both the parameters and the contents of normalization that dominate in a given field *if* one's sense of self is at odds with the expectations dictated by the dominant forces of one's social environment.

> The struggle for one's own identity, for the recognition of oneself and for the closely linked possibilities of social self-realization, is thus a struggle against imposed, often deeply internalized symbolic typifications as well as against their material power basis. Resistance and critique set themselves against the use of individual- and group-ontologizing labels within the symbolic-practical economy of a culture or epoch. At the same time, however, the goal is to unfold a positive picture of one's own identity, which would free itself of the earlier, domination-laden connotations. Paradoxically enough, the struggle against individualizing classification is at the same time a struggle for the free recognition of one's individuality or cultural identity.[169]

In brief, if and when one's sense of self is, to a large extent, controlled by hegemonic modes of behavioral, ideological, and/or institutional functioning, it is through the

disarticulation, and successive rearticulation, of one's identity that it becomes possible for somebody to regain a potentially empowering degree of autonomy.

iv. From the Understanding of Power to the Power of Understanding

While different structures of domination permeate different social relations, individuals are converted into corresponding subjects through "micropractices of power."[170] The most far-reaching macrophysics of power is inconceivable without a microphysics of power,[171] because all societal mechanisms of systemic steering (engineered "from above") are embedded in everyday processes of action and interaction in the lifeworld (performed "from below"). Kögler conceives of "[s]ocial power struggles"[172] as "an expression of that struggle against imposed patterns of thought, perception, and behavior that aims at a coercion-free and conscious self-realization"[173] pursued by autonomy-seeking subjects. This means that, according to his account, social struggles have a teleological outlook: resistance to social mechanisms designed to perpetuate relations of power and domination are "teleologically guided by the will to attain a good life"[174] and, by implication, by the ambition to transform the historical conditions leading to the emergence of a bad life.[175] For Kögler, this task involves taking on the challenge of emancipating oneself from the arbitrary authority of exogenously imposed identities and, instead, developing a sense of personal autonomy.

To the extent that "*[p]ower prevents human existence from corresponding to its own self-understanding,*"[176] it is, ultimately, a repressive force obstructing subjects to realize their purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective potential. Insofar as one's own cognitive and emotional universe is colonized by systemic imperatives of power and domination, however, "a certain break with the immediate self-understanding of the agents is necessary."[177] A rupture of this kind may be accomplished "through the hermeneutic experience of other epochs and foreign cultures."[178] By stepping outside one's own—socio-culturally specific—horizon, it becomes possible to question the validity of the taken-for-granted assumptions of one's own hermeneutic circle, which serves as an epistemic comfort zone.

Doxa—defined as taken-for-grantedness based on common sense[179]—can be "de-doxified" when those subscribing to it are exposed to the unexpected, unacquainted, and unfamiliar. By looking at the world through a largely or entirely unknown worldview, "the specificity and [presumed] coherence of one's own symbolic order can . . . contrastively appear in a hitherto unfamiliar light."[180] One may not be aware of the existence, let alone the idiosyncrasy and contingency, of the symbolic order upon which one commonly relies when relating to, attributing meaning to, and acting upon the world in one's everyday life.

"This defamiliarizing effect [*Verfremdungseffekt*] with respect to symbolic world-disclosure makes possible a distanciation from the naïve and customary perspective of the speaker or actor."[181] It permits subjects to distance themselves from themselves by approaching, and putting themselves in the shoes of, others. Far from being reducible to a "socio-epistemic vacation," however, such a defamiliarizing endeavor involves "hard work," in the sense that it requires us to project ourselves into another—largely or entirely unfamiliar—horizon *without* imposing our own standards—as the

ultimate yardstick by which to measure the objective, normative, and/or subjective validity of truth claims, rightness claims, and/or sincerity claims—upon another socio-cultural setting.

Kögler introduces the idea of a "*quasi-functionalist perspective*."[182] This approach ensures that functional imperatives—such as systematic stability and efficiency— "always remain subject to the self-understanding of the agents"[183] engaged in their praxeological and institutional reproduction. At the same time, this critical method "starts from the experiential suffering of the subject,"[184] permitting the social scientist "to determine what, as power, structurally inhibits good living"[185] and, thus, prevents human beings from realizing their emancipatory potential.[186] In light of this deliberate emphasis on "*their* suffering"[187]—that is, the suffering as it is *experienced* by ordinary people in their everyday lives—the social analyst is encouraged *not* to focus primarily, let alone exclusively, on "power in itself."[188] Hence, instead of using the concept of power as a sociological category defined "from above," here its meaning is assembled "from below," by drawing on people's quotidian experiences.

In this sense, Kögler's critical hermeneutics is characterized by a strong *anti-universalist* spirit: the "uniquely *hermeneutic* feature of [its] kind of power analysis is that no universal principle is introduced over against all contexts as the other of power."[189] Building on the experiences of socio-historically situated subjects, it conceives of "the concrete life projections of historical and cultural contexts as the specific antipodes of always-particular power practices and power constellations."[190] Kögler attempts to erect a hermeneutic bastion of hope and resistance by insisting on the pivotal role played not only by *historicity* but also by *individuality* in the construction of human realities:

> . . . standing over against power ontologically is *human individuality*, which can never be completely integrated into symbolic frameworks of disclosure or practical rule systems. Rather, *the "essence" of individuality* consists precisely in *projecting itself anew*; in *developing innovative and different ideas about self, world, and society*; in *opposing the prevailing interpretations and practices*.[191]

In brief, one's sense of individuality—understood, literally, as the *indivisible* aggregate of one's idiosyncrasies—represents the crucial hermeneutic reference point when exploring the purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective capacities of the human subject.

Yet, the metaphysical notion of "the abstract and pure individual is just as empty and 'transcendental' in the bad sense as the concept of total or absolute power."[192] In order to avoid endorsing the misleading idea of a socially detached, entirely autonomous, and spatiotemporally free-floating subject, we need to recognize that "both power and individuality are always situated in symbolic orders, within which the antagonism between complete conformity to a system and individual self-realization is capable of first being ignited."[193] In other words, *social orders* are *normative orders* whose hermeneutic constitution is illustrated in the construction of *symbolic orders*, marked by the tension between the imposition of systemic heteronomy and the pursuit of experiential autonomy.

III. Critical Theory as Critical Hermeneutics

Kögler's proposal to conceive of his critical theory as a critical hermeneutics is an ambitious endeavor. Underlying this project is the supposition that "every interpretive act is made possible by a largely implicit preunderstanding."[194] This preunderstanding comprises three key spheres, which allow for the emergence of a hermeneutic *background*:

1. a *symbolic* sphere, which consists of an ensemble of beliefs, principles, and assumptions;
2. a *practical* sphere, which consists of acquired habits, conventions, and practices;
3. a *subjective* sphere, which consists of an accumulation of biographical events, personal experiences, and life stories.[195]

This three-dimensional conception of hermeneutic backgrounds permits us to grasp not only how power relations influence systems of understanding, but also how both the former and the latter can be called into question by virtue of critical forms of interpretation. More specifically, Kögler makes a case for a critical hermeneutics based on the concept of "*reflexivity-in-interpretation*,"[196] by means of which individuals can distance themselves from "the taken-for-granted background of symbolic assumptions and social practices."[197] It is through "the critical practice of *self-distanciation*"[198] that it becomes possible to cultivate a reflexive sense of self-understanding, enabling not only researchers and experts but also laypersons to obtain "an enlightened insight into usually hidden linkages between symbolic relations and social networks of power."[199]

Given the complexity, multiplicity, and polycentricity of social constellations, these linkages are irreducible to a merely functional relationship between an "ideological superstructure" and an "economic base."[200] It is important, however, to recognize the "double fact"[201] that (1) every symbolic act, including every interpretation, is "grounded in some particular context"[202] and (2) each of these contexts, serving as spatiotemporally variable settings of action and interaction,"may be permeated by hitherto-unrecognized power structures."[203]

In light of this "double fact,"[204] we are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it would be an epistemic illusion to pretend that, as knowledge-generating entities, we can occupy an "Archimedean, absolute standpoint or criterion"[205] from which to raise universally valid—and, hence, irrefutable—truth claims, rightness claims, and/or sincerity claims. On the other hand, if we accept that every assertion of epistemic validity is "necessarily situated"[206] in particular—that is, socio-historically contingent— circumstances and, by implication, "never pure, context-free, or absolute,"[207] then it is far from obvious how we can rely on the presuppositional standards that are implicitly or explicitly mobilized in a specific proposition, or set of propositions, without conceding, in a relativist fashion, that these may be normatively and/or subjectively variable and, thus, entirely arbitrary. In short, we are confronted with the tension between universalism and relativism.[208]

Kögler proposes to give "a dialogic response"[209] to this dilemma. To be precise, he seeks to "combine a contextual and pluralistic conception of meaning with a critical

analysis of power"[210] by carrying out "a dialogic reconstruction of the interpretive effect of *self-distanciation*,"[211] based on a *socially reflexive* understanding of the objective, normative, and subjective aspects of one's existence by ensuring that "*the other* becomes the point of departure for critical insight into the self,"[212] including its way of relating to the world. By reconstructing "the other," notably his or her material and symbolic background, one gains access to "a critical foil from which to become, as it were, *one's own other*."[213] This intersubjectivist stance stresses the epistemic value of *perspective-taking*, especially with regard to discernments that "we could not have generated by ourselves,"[214] let alone as monological beings.

In Kögler's "dialogic model,"[215] two levels of analysis are crucial:

· At the *epistemic* level, the interpreter has to commence by identifying common concepts between him- or herself and "the other," before embarking on the more difficult exercise of differentiating the other's understandings and preunderstandings from his or her own through a dialogic process. By reconstructing basic symbolic forms, it becomes possible to relate them to the social practices in which they are embedded and which shape the subjects' world- and self-understandings. This kind of inter- and trans-subjective "hermeneutic encounter"[216] is potentially enlightening, due to its capacity to call the validity of taken-for-granted assumptions into question. For instance, a specific set of social practices, structures, and arrangements may be perceived as "empowering," "progressive," and "emancipatory" from one perspective, but as "disempowering," "retrograde," and "repressive" from another. Those subjects to whom they seem "natural," however, are invited to reflect on their justifiability, just as those to whom they appear "arbitrary" are compelled to grapple with their presumed legitimacy. The dialogic model encourages knowledge-generating subjects to engage in a dynamic process of inter- and trans-subjective *epistemic* perspective-taking, with the aim of rising above the limited horizon of their own background of intuitively accepted presuppositions.

· At the *ethical* level, "subjects are dialogically constituted as autonomous cosubjects,"[217] who, by definition, have the right to develop, to defend, and to live in accordance with "their own conceptions of self-realization."[218] Of course, these conceptions may be undermined or supported, weakened or strengthened, constrained or amplified by the social settings in which subjects are situated. The serious mistake the external interpreter must not make, however, is to impose his or her own worldview on "culturally disparate contexts,"[219] without taking into consideration "the other's concrete self-understanding and ethical vision."[220] For Kögler, this is not to posit that, as an external interpreter, one has a license to embrace a cynical, let alone fatalist, attitude "that would treat oppression in other contexts simply as a different form of life."[221] This is to contend, however, that it remains essential for the hermeneutically oriented interpreter to endorse a "contextually sensitive"[222] approach that is sociologically reflexive, in the sense that it allows for "a culturally grounded pluralism of forms of self-realization."[223] In order to pursue this "*critical-hermeneutic* objective,"[224] it is imperative to ensure that those advocating different conceptions of truth, justice, and beauty by

mobilizing divergent background assumptions enter into a *reflexive* dialogue—
that is, an inter- and trans-contextual conversation in which the impact of power
relations on the production, circulation, and reception of truth claims, rightness
claims, and sincerity claims is exposed and problematized, rather than ignored, let
alone denied.

In brief, *the interpretive practice of critical dialogue allows for enhanced degrees of self-
realization and self-determination, based on epistemically and ethically motivated forms
of self-reflection and self-distanciation*. It is the task of critical hermeneutics to facilitate
this endeavor. When doing so, however, it "never equates truth with power,"[225] validity
with legitimacy, or justifiability with authority.[226] The principal goal of "reconstructing
power-laden symbolic forms is to open up subjects a more self-determined mode of
life,"[227] thereby contributing to their self-realization. On this account, the Nietzschean
and Foucauldian hypothesis of a "will to power"[228] is not meant to refer to "an
ontological metatheorem"[229] by means of which every social practice, structure, or
constellation can be deduced from one overarching vitalist force, which manifests itself
in a constant struggle for asymmetrically distributed resources. Rather, in Kögler's
critical hermeneutics, it reflects "the interpretive decision to methodologically side
with the oppressed,"[230] the substantive decision to give a voice to the voiceless, and the
normative decision to empower the disempowered.

This project is suspicious of both *socio-ontological romanticism*,[231] which portrays
lifeworlds as pure realms of pristine intersubjectivity, and *socio-ontological fatalism*,[232]
which suggests that power is "the real and only ground of social life."[233] Indeed, instead
of "reducing the whole of the social world to the gray of everlasting and ever-renewed
forms of power,"[234] Kögler's approach pursues an emancipatory path permitting
subjects "to reopen a space for critical reflection within which [they] can reconceptualize
their identities by seeing their taken-for-granted selves as social constructions of
power,"[235] whose normative constitution they are invited to call into question and, if
desired, to subvert. Such a perspective, far from downgrading human subjects to
"power dupes,"[236] regards them as purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective
actors[237]—capable not only of producing and reproducing power relations, but also of
challenging and transforming them.

Building on the previous insights, let us explore three themes that are central to the
conceptual architecture of Kögler's program: first, *the relationship between theory and
agency*;[238] second, *the relationship between hermeneutic reflexivity and dialogic
subjectivity*;[239] and, third, *the relationship between the "me" and the "I."*[240]

i. Between Theory and Agency

Kögler strongly rejects any kind of reductionist approach that conceives of "truth (or
subjective experience) as an epiphenomenon of some more real or basic dimension."[241]
In fact, one may add that reductive accounts of this sort—which are based on a
combination of determinism, epiphenomenalism, and positivism—may be described
as *Vulgärfunktionalismus* ("vulgar functionalism"), in the sense that they presume "a
radical separation between theory and agency, between what the theorist can

objectively know and what the subjects are exposed to in their situated lives,"[242] between experts and laypersons, between the educators and the still-to-be-educated, between the enlighteners and the still-to-be-enlightened.

According to extreme versions of this dichotomous view, the difference between the two perspectives can be described as follows: the former is "nonsituated,""undistorted," "objective," "nonbiased," "analytical," "rational," "enlightened," and "fact-based"; the latter is "situation-laden," "distorted," "subjective," "biased," "interpretive," "emotional," "trapped," and "deluded." On this account, it is the task of critical social science to transcend the hermeneutically constrained horizon of ordinary people, who are "symbolically imprisoned in contextual meaning frameworks"[243] (which make them misperceive, misrepresent, and misinterpret reality) and "practically constrained by objective social forces beyond their understanding and control"[244] (which make them reproduce, reinforce, and relegitimize reality).

Critical hermeneutics à la Kögler, however, "regards this razor-sharp distinction between theorist and agent as a methodological fiction,"[245] endorsing a "dialogic approach"[246] instead. This alternative strategy pursues "a discursive mediation"[247] between different epistemic levels and, above all, builds on "the self-understanding of the situated subjects themselves."[248] Thus, rather than devaluing and inferiorizing the epistemic accomplishments of ordinary actors, it not only takes them seriously but also acknowledges that their symbolically mediated practices constitute the very foundation of communicatively sustained lifeworlds.

The reconstruction of the social world—including its symbolic dimensions—must be realized "in close co-operation *with* the subjects,"[249] rather than *above*, let alone *without*, them. Just as we must discard any kind of objectivist reductionism, we must avoid its subjectivist counterpart. Indeed, the "thesis of the background"[250] is based on the supposition that "subjects think and act on the basis of a largely implicit and unreflective preunderstanding,"[251] whose constitutive elements, and whose effects on their ways of attributing meaning and relating to the world, are largely beyond their control. This does not mean, however, that their background assumptions do not serve a central socio-ontological function. On the contrary, they "preorient and implicitly guide individual subjects"[252] as "*meaningful* premises,"[253] which are "intuitively understood"[254] and enable them to make sense of their existence and environment.

To the degree that ordinary actors tend to rely on the background structure of their habitualized ways of perceiving, appreciating, and interpreting different aspects of the world, "*the outsider*"[255] takes on the role of an external figure capable of obtaining *a reflective understanding of a largely unreflective preunderstanding*. The things that may appear "evident and natural"[256] require a considerable degree of "'explanation' and reconstruction"[257] for external and uninitiated interpreters. Hence, "the outsider" finds him- or herself in an epistemologically advantageous position in that he or she can thematize and problematize "what the insider accepts without thinking."[258] What remains largely implicit, unconscious, and unrecognized to the latter is more likely to be rendered explicit, conscious, and recognized by the former. This is not the case because "outside" interpreters find themselves in an epistemically "superior" position; rather, this is the case because their "natural unfamiliarity with the other context makes it necessary to explicate assumptions hidden within this very context."[259] The result is a

process of *defamiliarization*, whereby hitherto unquestioned background assumptions become an object of critical reflection.

Kögler insists, however, that the experience of *unfamiliarity* can have an epistemologically illuminating effect for both external interpreters *and* situated agents, since *both* sides can learn from each other by questioning the things they usually take for granted, irrespective of whether they do so as experts or as laypersons. In addition, he maintains that it would be erroneous to associate the paradigm of *interpretation* exclusively with the *symbolic* sphere and the paradigm of *explanation* exclusively with the *practical* sphere. We are, therefore, confronted with an epistemic "duo-scenario," based on the paradigms of interpretation and explanation: the former "requires a first-person or 'hermeneutic' approach,"[260] in order to understand [*verstehen*] and to grasp [*nachvollziehen*] the subjective, perspectival, and experiential constitution of the daily pursuit of meaning; the latter requires a second-person or "functional" approach, in order to explain [*erklären*] and to elucidate [*aufklären*] the objective, causal, and relational nature of the underlying structures shaping, if not determining, the course of social life.[261]

Still, Kögler repudiates this distinction, since—to his mind—it is founded on the simplistic assumption that, at the *symbolic* level, subjects "know what they really think and intend to do,"[262] while, at the *practical* level, the underlying causes, as well as the consequences, of their actions are embedded in structural patterns whose complexity escapes "the intuitive horizons of participants situated in social life."[263] Dislodging the conceptual architecture of this dualistic framework, Kögler is adamant that the pervasiveness of our lifeworld-specific backgrounds operate "at both the symbolic and the practical level"[264]—and, one may add, at the subjective level. Human subjects "organize their explicit thoughts as well as their action-oriented intentions on the basis of largely implicit interpretive schemes,"[265] which are part of their inner world, to which they have privileged access.

The symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres that constitute human forms of life depend on, overlap with, and permeate one another. Symbolic orders, which underpin different patterns of interpretation, are "shared within the context of established social practices"[266] and, for their reproduction, "do not require explicit thematization by the subjects,"[267] unless they are out of sync with the objective constraints of the world and/ or with the subjective needs of individuals, in which case they may have to be revised and reconfigured. Interpretive schemes, which are transmitted through symbolic orders, are embedded in behavioral, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning.[268] Paradoxically, they are "at once known and unknown to the subjects":[269]

· They are *practically "known"* to them, in the sense that, through their *sens pratique*,[270] they draw on them in a largely intuitive, unconscious, and unreflective manner, when navigating different spheres of the social world.
· They are *theoretically "unknown"* to them, in the sense that they tend to take them for granted and, through their *sens théorique*,[271] problematize them only in exceptional circumstances—notably in individually or collectively experienced moments of crisis and/or in discursively motivated processes of argumentation.

Kögler's dialogic strategy, then, endeavors to combine and to cross-fertilize the world- and self-understandings of ordinary actors with those generated by reflexive

researchers, who engage in the "reconstruction of hidden features"[272] shaping the symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres in which they find themselves immersed. Drawing on the distinction between "*interpreting hidden meaning structures* and *reconstructing hidden practices*,"[273] Kögler maintains that these are "inscribed in the dialectic between *interpreter/outsider* and *agent/insider*."[274] Both the symbolic and the practical levels of analysis are crucial in this respect:

1. At the *symbolic* level, it is the interpreter's task to grapple with "implicit, deep-seated ontological assumptions"[275] held by the agents under investigation. The "horizon of intelligibility"[276] formed by these assumptions provides a "ground of possibility"[277] whose main function consists in making specific sets of beliefs, principles, values, and convictions appear "rationally acceptable"[278] to those who subscribe to them, even — or, arguably, especially — if they do so unconsciously. The problem with a structuralist reading of the social is that it conceives of the symbolic sphere as "a realm sui generis,"[279] as if it were entirely detached from the subject's self-understanding, thereby reifying it into "an autonomous sphere of existence."[280] A reductive approach of this sort fails to account for the fact that the symbolic infrastructure upon which subjects draw in their everyday activities — although it operates "behind their backs" — always remains "tied to their self-understanding"[281] and, hence, contingent on their hermeneutic capacity to attribute meaning to the world.[282] Moreover, such a short-sighted view entails the risk of constructing relatively "arbitrary patterns of symbolic relations,"[283] which are projected *upon* the lifeworld by the external interpreter, rather than produced *within* the lifeworld by the agents themselves.

   If both the forms and the contents of our hermeneutic approaches depend largely, if not exclusively, on the theoretical decisions made by external interpreters, then the interpretive schemes upon which we rely in our analysis are marked by "the total arbitrariness of the 'explanatory' framework[s]"[284] imposed upon human lifeworlds from the ostensibly "objective" point of view generated by creative minds from "the outside."[285] In order for hermeneutic accounts of symbolic spheres to be empirically substantiated and dialogically constituted, they cannot be based on theoretical frameworks designed by external interpreters; rather, they "require — at least ideally — the consent of the subjects thereby interpreted."[286] In other words, they can succeed in capturing the subjects' underlying preconceptions and preconceptualizations only to the degree that "these very subjects. recognize themselves and their self-understanding in the reconstructions."[287]

   Unlike Donald Davidson[288] and Jürgen Habermas,[289] Kögler does not posit that this reconstruction process must be oriented towards, let alone attain, "a substantive consensus,"[290] following some kind of teleological logic.[291] While it is true that shared meanings and common concepts are employed "as bridgeheads to enter into dialogue with others,"[292] the hermeneutic encounter that unfolds as a "differentiating process,"[293] based on the contrast between different epistemic horizons, renders it possible to make hitherto implicit background assumptions explicit. It is the task of the interpreter to reconstruct the taken-for-granted

assumptions at work behind the agents' backs. Agents, however, need to "recognize these reconstructions as capturing the basic meaning of their explicit beliefs,"[294] in order for the interpretations provided by "the outsider" to enjoy both epistemic validity and social legitimacy in the eyes of "the insider."

2. At the *practical* level, it is important to cast light on the relationship between the critical interpreter and the situated agent. One of the main advantages of the dialogic method is that, through the "open reconstruction of symbolic orders,"[295] it avoids erecting an ethnocentric pecking order of culturally distinct forms of life, according to which some socio-ontological infrastructures, along with their ideological superstructures, are superior (and/or inferior) to others. While critical hermeneutics is, by definition, a "contextually sensitive"[296] undertaking, it conceives of practical contexts not as horizons of intelligibility but, rather, as causal realms of "influence and application."[297]

The reason for this methodological decision is that symbolically mediated intuitions "cannot serve as criteria for a correct reconstruction of the structure and impact of the practices themselves,"[298] since their hidden causes and consequences tend to escape the agents' largely implicit horizons of perception, appreciation, and interpretation. The "'derealization' of symbolic forms"[299] performed by the external interpreter can uncover the concealed "correlations between symbolic assumptions and the social practices that undermine or contradict declared and taken-for-granted purposes and meanings."[300] In this sense, it may be described as a "double hermeneutics" leading to a form of "double enlightenment": both the interpreters and the agents obtain insightful knowledge from engaging in this dialogic mode of examining the link between symbolic realms and social practices.

Once again, it is worth stressing that the "dialectic between critical interpreter and situated agent"[301] cannot be captured by "[p]urely objectifying research programs"[302]—such as positivism, structuralism, functionalism, and systems theory. The main reason for this deficiency is that they fail to take "the *phenomenon of power*"[303] seriously, since both individual and collective experiences of exclusion, marginalization, oppression, exploitation, and/or domination are, at best, underestimated by or, at worst, omitted "from their conceptual-methodological framework."[304] Granted, ordinary agents may lack the necessary conceptual and methodological devices to grasp the multilayered functioning and typological variety, let alone the agential and structural complexity, of power relations. In order to reach a comprehensive understanding of the numerous ways in which power relations operate (notably as mechanisms of exclusion, marginalization, oppression, exploitation, and/or domination), it is vital to scrutinize how they are perceived, interpreted, and experienced by the agents contributing to, or affected by, their production and reproduction.

Kögler's critical hermeneutics, then, is based on what may be described as a "dialogic dialectic," suggesting that "the theorist" and "the agent" can, and should, work hand in glove: the theorist can help the agent to obtain a better understanding of *how* power functions; at the same time, the agent can help the theorist to acquire valuable

insights into the degree to which structural constraints should, or should not, count *as* power.[305] Hence, critical hermeneutics à la Kögler argues that the challenge of interpreting both *symbolic* and *practical* presuppositions of situated agents requires both *the theorist* and *the agent* to commit to immersing themselves in "a distanciating learning experience."[306] This devotion to mutual engagement has two major implications:

· Participation in *critical dialogue* enables agents to undertake "a self-distanciation from their taken-for-granted beliefs and convictions."[307] By the same token, it permits "the theorist to avoid introducing misplaced conceptual schemes in an analysis of the other's background."[308] By reconstructing the symbolic orders in which agents find themselves immersed, all parties involved in the intersubjective exchange go through an enlightening process of *defamiliarization*: the "dialogic cross-reconstruction"[309] results in defamiliarization on both sides, meaning that *both* ordinary agents (who are situated in communicatively sustained lifeworlds) *and* theoretically informed and methodologically equipped interpreters (who are motivated by hermeneutically guided research interests) are obliged to reflect upon, and possibly to revise and to reconceptualize, their cognitive premises.

· Due to the *genealogical correlation* between *symbolic forms*, which are hermeneutically explicable, and *social practices*, which are historically localizable, it is possible to explore the extent to which the implicit background assumptions held by agents are inextricably linked to, and permeated by, "effects and functions of structural power."[310] Crucially, however, this genealogical reconstruction can, and should, *also* be carried out in relation to the interpreter's own spatiotemporal situatedness and underlying presuppositions.

In short, critical interpretation, understood in hermeneutic terms, can be considered "a process of a *truly reciprocal elucidation* of hitherto unthematized premises of meaning and action"[311]—a process that is viable only insofar as a purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective dialogue occurs between "interpretive theorist and situated agent."[312] The two sides, therefore, are immersed in a relationship of close interdependence:

· *The theorist requires the agent* to consent to the dialogic cross-reconstruction process in a reflexive and self-confident fashion. Only with such consent can (1) the "reconstruction of the other's hidden assumptions"[313] take place with, rather than without, everyone willingly involved in this process and (2) the "reconstruction of transsubjective social forces have any critical value,"[314] in the sense that ordinary people are regarded as sovereign entities—capable not only of speech and action, but also of reflection and self-justification.

· *The agent requires the theorist* to consent to the dialogic cross-reconstruction process in a non-patronizing and non-self-aggrandizing manner. Only with such consent can (1) "the theorist's unfamiliarity with the agent's background assumptions"[315] serve as a fertile ground for valuable insight obtained from direct exposure to behavioral and cognitive modes of functioning outside their comfort zones and (2) the theorist mobilize the conceptual tools and methodological

devices necessary to shed light on the underlying structures shaping the constitution and development of power constellations.

By means of a hermeneutically inspired dialogue between the two sides, a critical engagement with one another becomes possible, allowing both of them "to avoid arbitrary or ethnocentric distortions of the other."[316] Rather than subscribing to the short-sighted view that both agents and interpreters are equipped with a clear grasp of their own practices and assumptions, we need to recognize that a sustained dialogue between differently positioned subjects, across (adjacent or distant) epistemic horizons, can be a crucial source of insight and understanding.

ii. Between Hermeneutic Reflexivity and Dialogic Subjectivity

Let us turn to examining Kögler's conception of *the relationship between hermeneutic reflexivity and dialogic subjectivity*, of which the human subject—as a critical self—is a carrier. At the heart of Kögler's notion of "interpretive dialogue"[317] lies the concept of "reflexivity."[318] Indeed, one of the main aims of his critical hermeneutics is "the creation of a reflexive distance,"[319] permitting both "agents" and "theorists" to scrutinize the behavioral, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning in which they are immersed in a largely intuitive fashion. Kögler's "model of co-operative dialogue"[320] opens up new spaces for "critical self-reflection at the level of theory and at the level of agency."[321]

This approach is *horizontal* in that it seeks to promote "dialogue between members of different cultures and communities"[322] *without* erecting an epistemological hierarchy, in which some groups are *necessarily* and *unambiguously* more (or, indeed, less) insightful than others. Kögler's account, then, rejects the idea of a vertical distribution of cognitive resources and epistemic authority, according to which theorists, researchers, and experts find themselves in the hermeneutically privileged position of being able to "see through the distortions"[323] blindly reproduced by ordinary actors, who tend to rely on doxa and common sense as they navigate the social world.

Kögler's egalitarian model acknowledges that external interpreters—regardless of whether they are observers, researchers, or theorists—are *also* socially situated agents, who are "embedded in, and influenced by, [their] own unrecognized background assumptions."[324] At the same time, socially situated agents are "observers," "researchers," and "theorists" in the indigenous sense—that is, in the sense that they constantly "watch," "examine," and "analyze" key aspects of their lifeworlds. Such an egalitarian approach aims at the "*reflexive incorporation and differentiated fusion of both perspectives in one and the same agent.*"[325] The result of this "fusion of horizons"[326] [*Horizontverschmelzung*] is a genuine form of bridge-building between seemingly distant symbolic realms in which epistemic positioning takes place:

> Whereas the agent internalizes the perspective of the interpreting other in terms of theoretically informed self-perception, the theorist herself incorporates the perspectives of the agent and relates the reconstruction of the other's symbolic-practical context to her own lived experience. Thus, although analytically and initially there are two subject positions in a "real" dialogue, the *processual teleology*

of critical interpretation attempts a *distanciating fusion* of both perspectives in one and the same subject.[327]

The idea of "reflexivity-in-interpretation,"[328] however, is not meant to result in "a total self-objectification,"[329] let alone in one's artificial abstraction or alienation from one's context. Quite the reverse, it is aimed at unearthing and problematizing particular aspects of one's background "*in contrast to which* the subject develops herself as a critical and 'distinctive' self "[330] and through which the subject can develop a sense of identity. This is the point at which the *subjective* sphere and, with it, the constitution of *subjectivity* come into play.

Let us recall that, according to Kögler, every hermeneutic background has three main components: a *symbolic* sphere, a *practical* sphere, and a *subjective* sphere.[331] Subjectivity is constituted by the confluence of symbolic orders and practical structures, illustrating how the three aforementioned spheres are inextricably interrelated. In this sense, it would be erroneous to portray the subjective sphere as "a separate dimension or 'object domain' over against the other two realms."[332] Given its intrinsic connection to the symbolic and practical spheres, the subjective sphere should not be reified or hypostatized into "a distinct 'world' in and of itself,"[333] detached from the other "worlds" of human existence.

Granted, the subjective sphere enjoys a degree of "relative autonomy"[334] with respect to its contiguous two spheres. This does not mean, however, that it can be reduced to a completely separate realm, let alone an autopoietic system. Subjective elements of experience are an irreducible component of the human condition.[335] The subjectivities emerging from individual and collective experiences result in a person's "'ontological' distinctness,"[336] which is constantly being reconfigured though her "reflexive and specific stance of distanciation"[337] towards the symbolic and practical spheres in which she finds herself immersed *through*, rather than apart from, the socio-individuating power of her subjective sphere. We cannot relate to, let alone build on, our background without constructing, and potentially reconstructing, our subjectivity.

To be clear, Kögler dismisses any "naïve conceptions of individual freedom or choice"[338] that portray human subjects as largely, if not entirely, autonomous entities, equipped with free will.[339] The whole point of his critical hermeneutics is to insist that the symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres inhabited by human beings are, to a significant degree, structured "by the taken-for-granted features of their background."[340] Their intuitively guided participation in social life is made possible by the fact that, most of the time, subjects "do *not* reflectively analyze the background"[341] upon which they draw and upon which they depend — symbolically, practically, and subjectively.

Hermeneutic reflexivity, however, involves a process of *conscious distanciation*, whereby subjects embrace the opportunity "to see themselves at a distance from hitherto taken-for-granted aspects of their shared social life,"[342] including the culturally codified standards of their lifeworlds. This means that critical hermeneutics engenders a paradoxical constellation:

· On the one hand, it objectifies subjects at the "object level"[343] in a conceptually sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, and empirically substantiated fashion.

· On the other hand, it regards subjects as capable of relating to and acting upon—as well as of describing, analyzing, interpreting, explaining, and making value judgements about—the world at the "theory or reflection level."[344]

This apparent paradox can be considered "the very lifeblood of critical-hermeneutic self-constitution"[345]—that is, of the interpretive constitution permeating the lives of all subjects capable of speech and action. The human subject, far from being definable "in itself "[346] as an entirely autonomous and autopoietic being, exists in "the shared horizon of social meanings and practices,"[347] which *it shapes* as a purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective entity and by which *it is shaped* when absorbing both the agential and the structural components of its environment.

There are two levels of selfhood that are central to the construction of the subject: first, the *situated-biographical self*; and, second, the *reflexive-distanciated self*.[348] When subjects move from the first to the second level, they are converted into "an object of analysis and thematization."[349] By doing so, they distance themselves from their "lifeworldly, situated"[350] selves; in fact, this perspectival transition permits them to see their seemingly "natural selves" as social constructions—that is, as "a 'self '-relation grounded in a social situation"[351] of which they are part and which, so to speak, is part of them. Kögler's critical hermeneutics intends to contribute to this reflective process, encouraging agents to undertake "a radical break from the immediate self-understanding of situated subjectivity,"[352] by thematizing and problematizing their place in the world.

Thus, embracing a critical-hermeneutic attitude "opens up a transgressive space of self-creation that avoids deterministic or reductionist pitfalls"[353] and, instead, does justice to the complexity of the subject by comprehending "the self as a *relation* within social networks."[354] Kögler's relationalist account conceives of the "tension between the *situated* and the *distanciated* self "[355] as a source of "transgressive power,"[356] without which the very project of critical hermeneutics would be pointless. This tension, however, should not be equated with a bipolar dynamic between two mutually exclusive forces—that is, between individual autonomy and social heteronomy. Rather, it reflects a dialectical relationship that "has to be kept open."[357]

According to Kögler, there are two major currents of thought in which the aforementioned relationship has been conceptualized in an erroneous fashion.

· In the intellectual traditions shaped by *Hegel*[358] *and Marx*,[359] this reductive move occurs in simplistic interpretations of the relationship between "being" [*Sein*] and "consciousness" [*Bewußtsein*]. Here, "the gap between reflexivity and situatedness"[360] is being "sublated" [*aufgehoben*] by the subject's alleged capacity "to make fully transparent the external background conditions of [its] own social situation."[361] This view, however, underestimates the degree to which numerous dimensions of our situatedness in a specific historical context—far from ever being "absolutely transparent"[362] and intelligible—can never be explained in a conclusive manner and, on some levels, remain beyond our grasp.
· In the intellectual traditions shaped by *the later Heidegger*[363] *and Nietzsche*,[364] this short-sighted move manifests itself in what may be described as determinist conceptions of the subject, in which there is little, if any, room for human agency.

On this account,"reflexive subjectivity is nothing but the product of the (especially unhappy) Western tradition of metaphysics."[365] Insofar as both philosophical hermeneutics and poststructuralism tend to conceive of processes and structures as underlying forces that exert their influence "behind our backs," they understate the empowering role of "critical reflexivity,"[366] which consists in its capacity to convert human beings into protagonists of their "own condition of possibility"[367] by virtue of reason-guided agency.

Kögler's project is an attempt to combine and to cross-fertilize different aspects of reflexivity, notably the pivotal role it plays in making us aware of key features of our preunderstanding and practices, including the extent to which these lie beyond our control. Instead of portraying it as a monologically present attribute, however, reflexivity needs to be understood as "*dialogically constituted*,"[368] in the sense that it is only through the intersubjective engagement with others that it can be acquired and developed. The agent that comes into existence as a result of intersubjective encounters is not a wholly self-reliant "natural biographical self"[369] but, rather, a dialogically constituted being existing and evolving "*in a relation to others within these contexts*."[370] What emerges, then, is "a radically situated mode of reflexivity,"[371] which is the product of the various "horizons that have 'clashed' in dialogue"[372] and that, by doing so, have cross-fertilized each other.

Kögler proposes to take three main steps by which critical hermeneutics succeeds in *mediating between reflexivity and situatedness*:

1. Dialogic interpretation makes it possible to fuse "the subjective-reflexive stance with the abandonment of the self to an uncontrolled process of experience."[373] The dialogic attitude, which lies at the core of critical hermeneutics and reflects its intersubjectivist spirit, fulfils the role of "a consciously adopted ethos of interpretation."[374] The interpretive process itself, however, largely "escapes the control or predictive foresight of the subject."[375] Critical hermeneutics involves the fusion of being and consciousness, in which the latter cannot entirely anticipate, let alone determine, the challenges posed by the former.

2. Subjects can engage in processes of interpretation only insofar as they draw upon "a largely implicit, prereflective background understanding."[376] When exposed to largely or entirely unfamiliar patterns of thought and behavior, however,"a process of becoming reflectively aware of hitherto hidden assumptions and practices"[377] is set off. The experience of "other" modes of cognitive and behavioral modes of functioning can trigger invaluable dynamics of "critical self-reflection,"[378] which subjects are far less likely to perform when remaining caught up in their epistemic and executive comfort zones. The context-ladenness of reflexivity makes it "always already suited for situational relevance."[379] There is no such thing as "context-free" reflexivity or "socially detached" interpretation.

3. "The self" and "the other" are inextricably linked. This is not to suggest, however, that the former can be reduced to a mere effect of the latter, let alone to an epiphenomenon of a "transsubjective force"[380] — irrespective of whether it is defined in cultural, political, ideological, linguistic, economic, or any other

socially relevant terms. The main reason the self "is 'profiled' through an encounter with the other"[381] is that it evolves through "reflexive differentiation from its background context"[382] — a complex process that is inconceivable without the self's exposure to and experience of the perspectives held by other selves. Ultimately, this illustrates that, in the human world, there is no structurality without agency. The self is not subordinated to, let alone determined by, the other. The former is equipped with the capacity to draw, and to reflect, on the dialogic experiences it shares with the latter, allowing for self-constitution by virtue of co-constitution.

iii. Between the "Me" and the "I"

As Kögler reminds us, G. H. Mead has made valuable contributions to our understanding of selfhood, notably in terms of the relationship between, on the one hand, the *social, conformative, and conservative* aspects of the self (expressed in the development of *the "me"*) and, on the other hand, the *individuative, reflexive, and creative* aspects of the self (epitomized in the construction of *the "I"*).[383] Crucially, however, Mead conceives of human society as "a universal community of reflexive selves."[384] On this view, human subjects are capable not only of taking a critical distance towards the situation in which they find themselves, but also of embracing the role of active and imaginative participants in "a radically transcontextual community of interpreters,"[385] permitting them to engage in the daily exercise of perspective-taking when encountering, and trying to solve problems, with others.[386]

Kögler is eager to stress that his own approach is "both more modest and more dialogic in scope"[387] than the one developed by Mead. In essence, his version of hermeneutics conceives of "the critical self as a concretely distanciated product of reflection still tied to its context, albeit reflectively."[388] In brief, the self is a reflective and creative, as well as context-dependent and context-laden, entity capable of distancing itself *from* itself and its environment by looking *at* itself and its environment *through* itself and its environment. In this respect, Kögler insists on the *social* constitution of the self: unlike Husserlian[389] and Sartrian[390] approaches, which tend to portray the self as the ultimate "ground and source of meaning constitution"[391] and, by doing so, hypostatize the subject as "the source of the meaning-conferring act,"[392] Kögler proposes to follow a hermeneutic path that is inspired by structuralism and, consequently, recognizes the formative influence of the background of meanings.

This background, however, is a symbolically and practically constituted "realm of meaning distinctions that *delimit*, rather than *determine*, the possible space — both objective and subjective, that is, institutionally and in one's imagination — of subjective reinterpretations."[393] Kögler's account, then, does *not* advocate *determinist structuralism*, according to which subjects are largely, if not entirely, determined by their background. Rather, it defends what may be described as *agential structuralism*, in that it acknowledges everybody's capacity to reactivate and to revitalize shared meanings and assumptions *in their own way* — that is, by *combining* the social, conformative, and conservative force of the "me" with the individuative, reflexive, and creative power of the "I."[394]

Thus, the critical self à la Kögler embodies an "ethos of interpretation"[395] that is embedded in a "dialogic attitude,"[396] enabling those who embrace it to explore "their social 'genealogical' origin."[397] This change in perspective is expressed in a paradigm shift from "differentiation in itself "[398] to "differentiation for itself ":[399] the former refers to the existence of a *social self*, whose identity is shaped by its environment; the latter designates the emergence of a *reflexive self*, which "becomes aware of its origins and *thereby* becomes the possible source of new identities"[400] articulating a sense of agency inherent in the purposive, co-operative, creative, and projective potential of humanity. What comes into being, as a result, is the insight that the sustained engagement in dialogic processes is essential to constructing emancipatory forms of life, in which it is "possible to expose hidden power practices without falling into the trap of ethnocentrism"[401] or, for that matter, any other — intersectionally constituted — type of social domination, such as classism, sexism, racism, ableism, or ageism. It is this context-sensitive and power-conscious reflexivity on which Kögler's critical hermeneutics "bases both its methodological project and its ethical hope,"[402] in the pursuit of the good life and, by implication, the rejection of the social conditions that obstruct its realization.

IV. Limitations and Shortcomings

This section offers some critical reflections on important issues arising from Kögler's project, notably with regard to its limitations and shortcomings.

(i) A crucial component that is missing from Kögler's undertaking is a systematic account of our *species-constitutive features* — that is, of the elements that make us human. Arguably, among these species-constitutive facets, which are intimately interrelated, are the following: culture, language, consciousness, self-awareness, selfhood, personhood, identity, subjectivity, agency, morality, aesthetic judgement, and reason — to mention only a few.[403] Undoubtedly, Kögler's work stands in the tradition of European humanism, notably its Kantian and Habermasian variants. Thus, Kögler conceives of subjects as reason-guided creatures — capable not only of speech and action, but also of reflection and self-justification. Owing to the purposive potential of *Verstand*, the normative potential of *Vernunft*, and the evaluative potential of *Urteilskraft*, human beings have the capacity to relate to, to interpret, and to act upon the world in a reason-guided fashion.

We develop, and learn to make use of, our *Verstand*, *Vernunft*, and *Urteilskraft* by engaging in processes oriented towards *Verstehen* [understanding] through *Verständigung* [communication]. Regardless of whether we reach an understanding in the ("soft") sense of *Verständlichkeit* [intelligibility] or in the ("strong") sense of *Einverständnis* [agreement], it cannot be divorced from intersubjectively established, symbolically mediated, and linguistically constituted processes of meaning construction.[404] We relate to the world by relating to one another as meaning-searching entities.

One of the principal problems with Kögler's approach, however, is that it tends to *overstate* the role of *language and reason*, including their pivotal role in dialogic

processes, and to *understate* the role of *other attributes* that are (1) *species-constitutive* in that they make us human, (2) *species-distinctive* in that they distinguish us from other creatures, and (3) *species-generative* in that they permit us to shape the conditions of our existence. If critical hermeneutics focuses almost exclusively on the socio-ontological significance of language and reason, then it fails to do justice to the complexity and convergence of the *multiple* factors that define the human condition.

(ii) As illustrated in the previous sections, Kögler's analysis of *power* is insightful in many respects. Yet, it is also problematic on several counts.

1. Just as it is simplistic to suggest that Bourdieu's oeuvre presents a "totalizing 'theory of power',"[405] it is far from uncontroversial to contend that Foucault's studies "should be viewed as tools for deciphering social power relations, not as a 'theory' or 'ontology' of power."[406]

   Bourdieu's conception of power is far more sophisticated than Kögler is willing to concede. Given the fine-grained and nuanced nature, as well as the breadth and depth, of Bourdieu's work, it would be erroneous to reduce his multifaceted ways of conceptualizing, and problematizing, power to a rigid framework that is based on a schematic field-habitus-capital triad.[407] This is not to deny that Bourdieu's critical sociology suffers from serious shortcomings—notably objectivist and determinist, if not fatalist, tendencies.[408] This is to recognize, however, that Bourdieu himself refers to his key concepts (including "field," "habitus," and "capital") as "heuristic devices,"[409] insisting that they should *not* be misinterpreted as "theories," let alone "slogans."[410]

   In a similar vein, it is worth pointing out that Foucault's writings, even if they may not have been intended to offer a "theory" or "ontology" of power, contain substantial elements that indicate that they deliver precisely this kind of outline: a fairly *systematic* theory of power, which portrays it as a *quasi-transcendental*—and, hence, ultimately *ontological*—force at work in *all* social relations. Indeed, drawing on Foucault's analysis, the following dimensions may be regarded as intrinsic features of power in general and of the way it operates in society in particular: ubiquity, productivity, relationality, intangibility, habituality, discursivity, corporeality, polycentricity, performativity, normativity, spatiality, temporality, disciplinarity, circularity, and transcendentality.[411] One may argue over their *theoretical* significance (in terms of how power is *conceptualized*) in Foucault's writings as well as their *empirical* significance (in terms of how power is *exerted*) in society. It is hard to deny, however, that they are central to Foucault's attempt to shed light on the pivotal role that power relations play in the construction of *all* human societies.

   Social theory may be defined as "the attempt to provide a conceptually informed—and, in many cases, empirically substantiated—framework designed to (a) describe, (b) analyze, (c) interpret, (d) explain, and (e) assess the constitution, the functioning, and the development of social reality, or of particular aspects of social reality, in a more or less systematic fashion."[412] Both Bourdieu and Foucault engage in an undertaking of this sort, but this does not mean that they propose

"totalizing" (in the case of the former) or "non-ontological" (in the case of the latter) theories of power.

2. Ironically, Kögler appears to overstate "the power of power"[413] when asserting, for instance, that "*every power struggle* and *every open strategy* are already engaged in a field of pregiven *relations of domination.*"[414] It is, at best, an exaggeration or, at worst, a misrepresentation to affirm that *all* power struggles and *all* strategic modes of action are embedded in relations of domination. This is not to downplay the significance, let alone the omnipresence, of power relations in social life. This is to acknowledge, however, that it is erroneous to assume that *all* power relations — including the struggles and strategically motivated actions taking place within them — are relations of domination.

   Such a bleak view of the human world leads to *socio-ontological fatalism,*[415] a position from which Kögler aims to distance himself when accusing scholars such as Bourdieu of endorsing determinist accounts of reality. It is ironic, to say the least, that Kögler himself contends that relations of domination are an ineluctable state of affairs in *all* contexts in which power struggles and strategic actions unfold. The distinction between "power to" and "power over" is crucial in this regard:[416]

   > The former designates an entity's capacity to do something and/or to act upon the world in a particular way. In this sense, it may be described as a *productive* form of power. The latter captures an entity's capacity to exercise influence, or even control, over something or somebody in a particular way and to a specific extent. In this sense, it may be interpreted as a *coercive* form of power.[417]

   "Power to" can be defined as *the capacity of A to think or to do something in accordance with A's — consciously or unconsciously pursued — interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or convictions.* "Power over" can be defined as "*the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done.*"[418] Strictly speaking, "power over" is always parasitical upon "power to," since the former would be inconceivable without the latter. In a more fundamental sense, "power to" is an ontological precondition for the emergence of social order: subjects need to be able to exert a minimal amount of "power to," in order to construct, and to reconstruct, both the symbolic and the material elements of their existence. By contrast, "power over" — although it may be immensely potent in terms of its impact on the objective, normative, and subjective facets of our lives — does not represent a *sine qua non* of human existence.

   To a greater or lesser extent, "subjects have to be able to influence one another, in order to shape each other's interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or convictions."[419] This does not mean, however, that all modes of "power to" are obvious or latent versions of "power over." We can exert "power to" without converting it into, and without it being colonized by, "power over." In brief, whereas all relations of domination are permeated by relations of power, not all relations of power are permeated by relations of domination.

(iii) We may take Kögler's hermeneutically informed account of society to another level by positing that there are five socio-ontological conditions: (1) *relationality*, (2) *reciprocity*, (3) *reconstructability*, (4) *renormalizability*, and (5) *recognizability*.[420]

1. Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members *relate* to one another. It is made up of *relational* selves, who cannot exist in complete isolation from each other. As such, it constitutes a form of being-*with*-one-another [*Miteinandersein*].
2. Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members *reciprocate* one another. It is sustained by *reciprocal* selves, who relate to each other on the basis of quotidian actions, reactions, and interactions. As such, it constitutes a form of being-*through*-one-another [*Durcheinandersein*].
3. Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members *reconstruct* one another. It is created by *reconstructable* selves, who constantly invent and reinvent themselves as well as the realities by which they are surrounded. As such, it constitutes a form of being-*beyond*-one-another [*Jenseitsvoneinandersein* or *aufhebbares Sein*].
4. Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members *renormalize* one another. It is shaped by *renormalizable* selves, who attribute meaning and value to each other's, as well as their own, actions. As such, it constitutes a form of being-*about*-one-another [*Übereinandersein*].
5. Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members *recognize* one another. It is generated by *recognizable* selves, who seek acknowledgment, acceptance, and appreciation when establishing meaningful relationships with their fellow human beings. As such, it constitutes a form of being-*within*-one-another [*Ineinandersein*].

In short, society is a realm of human interconnections brought into existence by *relational*, *reciprocal*, *reconstructable*, *renormalizable*, and *recognizable* selves. It is based on networks of *sociality*, *mutuality*, *transformability*, *signifiability*, and *identity*, which allow for the emergence of individual and collective forms of engagement oriented towards the construction of meaning-laden realities.

(iv) Kögler has a tendency to deprecate seemingly "old," "already established," and "hegemonic" dimensions of social life, while idealizing purportedly "new," "alternative," and "counterhegemonic" ones. At the same time, one may get the impression that he effectively celebrates "the cult of individuality" in a quasi-essentialist fashion. In Kögler's critical hermeneutics, these two issues are intimately related, as illustrated in the following statement:

> . . . *the "essence" of individuality* consists precisely in *projecting itself anew*; in *developing innovative and different ideas about self, world, and society*; in *opposing the prevailing interpretations and practices*.[421]

This view, however, is far from unproblematic. The fact that particular sets of behavioral, ideological, and/or institutional modes of functioning are *established, prevalent, and/or*

hegemonic does not necessarily make them *retrograde, repressive, exploitative, or undesirable*. And the fact that particular sets of behavioral, ideological, and/or institutional modes of functioning are *emerging, marginal, and/or counterhegemonic* does not make them necessarily *progressive, inspiring, empowering, or desirable*. The latent demonization of "the hegemonic" is no less problematic than the a priori idealization of "the counterhegemonic." Hegemonic practices and structures *may or may not* contribute to different forms of social domination, just as counterhegemonic practices and structures *may or may not* contribute to different forms of human emancipation.[422]

In a similar vein, the "essence" of someone's individuality *may or may not* consist in "projecting itself anew." Different people develop different ways of combining the social, conformative, and conservative aspects of their "me" with the individuative, reflexive, and creative aspects of their "I."[423] Indeed, the idiosyncratic interplay between their "me" and their "I" is precisely what converts a living being into a person—that is, into a meaning-seeking creature with a sense of selfhood, a unique life story, and particular personality traits.

Kögler's project is not antithetical to a more complex picture of "the 'essence' of individuality,"[424] including the role it plays in the dialectic of domination and emancipation. A truly critical theory of society, however, needs to do justice to this complexity, instead of reproducing clichés about the power of individuality in the struggle with, within, and/or against hegemonic modes of sociality.

(v) Kögler provides a powerful account of the relationship between two—*seemingly distant, if not incompatible*—sides of knowledge production, which are often portrayed in terms of epistemic binaries, such as the following: ordinary people *vs.* scientists, laypersons *vs.* experts, agents *vs.* theorists, intuitive performers *vs.* critical interpreters, participants *vs.* observers, insiders *vs.* outsiders, the still-to-be-enlightened *vs.* the enlighteners—to mention only a few. Kögler is right to draw attention to the limitations and contradictions of a binary understanding of the epistemic universe prevalent in modern societies. Furthermore, he offers a persuasive critique of "epistemological breaks" à la Bourdieu—not only with respect to their tendency to paint a simplistic picture of a socio-epistemic divide that is less clear-cut and more blurred than its advocates suggest, but also with regard to their tendency to "inferiorize" the knowledge intuitively relied upon by "ordinary people" and to "superiorize" the knowledge reflectively generated by "scientists" and "researchers." This issue has been discussed by numerous commentators—often in terms of the relationship between, on the one hand, "*common sense," "doxa," and "ordinary knowledge"* and, on the other hand, "*critique," "reflexivity," and "scientific knowledge.*"[425]

What is missing from Kögler's hermeneutics, however, is a systematic inquiry into the epistemological and methodological options with which we are confronted when making sense of the distinction between *ordinary knowledge* and *scientific knowledge*. Broadly speaking, there are three main options:[426]

· *Option 1:* The former is superior to the latter, because it is based on the "genuine" (individual and/or collective) experiences made by human actors in "real life." On

this view, the former provides a degree of perspectival authenticity that the latter, due to its socially detached constitution, fails to embrace, let alone to convey.

· *Option 2:* The latter is superior to the former, because it is — at once — empirically substantiated, methodologically rigorous, epistemologically reflexive, terminologically precise, and theoretically informed. On this view, the latter guarantees a degree of epistemic certainty that the former, owing to its inevitable reliance on everyday preconceptions, fails to strive for, let alone to achieve.

· *Option 3:* Little is to be gained from constructing a rigid epistemic hierarchy between the former and the latter. Although "ordinary knowledge" and "scientific knowledge" are qualitatively different, they reflect equally legitimate types of epistemic engagement with the world. Rather than opposing "ordinary" and "scientific" ways of attributing meaning to and acting upon reality, we should seek to cross-fertilize these — arguably complementary — modes of relating to the world. As laypersons, we can navigate our everyday lives and — whether we do so consciously or unconsciously — draw on scientifically established insights. As experts, we can study objective, normative, and/or subjective aspects of the world and take ordinary people — including their conceptions, as well as their misconceptions, of reality — seriously.

In short, from an epistemological point of view, there are both advantages and disadvantages to each side of the *epistemic divide*, which — given its multilayered and intersectional constitution — may be more accurately described as an *epistemic continuum*. The seemingly distortive aspects of knowledge production — such as bias, doxa, ideology, prejudice, background, milieu, etc. — permeate both "ordinary" *and* "scientific" modes of epistemic engagement. In other words, *all* forms of knowledge production are context-laden, value-laden, meaning-laden, perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden, and tension-laden.[427] This is reflected in the fact that "[t]he question of whether we consider a statement right or wrong depends not only on *what* is being said, but also on *who* says it *when, where,* and *to whom*"[428] — and, of course, *why* and *how*. Put in sociological terms, "*objectivity* ('What?') is — inevitably — a matter of *social authority* ('Who?'), *spatiotemporal contextuality* ('Where and when?'), and *interactional relationality* ('To whom?')"[429] — as well as *causality* and/or *intentionality* ("Why?") and *modality* ("How?").

Kögler makes a strong case for the idea that a *critical dialogue* needs to be established between different agents, who are — by definition — shaped by different backgrounds, equipped with different resources, placed in different positions, and situated in different realms of the universe. Such a noble undertaking, however, must not detract from the fact that these differences *do* imply that we live in an asymmetrically organized world of unequally distributed opportunities, in which our liberating sense of agency is significantly constrained by the coercive force of structurality. Surely, Kögler's project is not incompatible with this sobering insight. As defenders of his endeavor, however, we need to remind ourselves of a crucial hermeneutic tenet: every *understanding of reality* is contingent upon a symbolically mediated and historically transmitted background allowing for the *reality of understanding*.

Summary

The main purpose of this chapter has been to examine the case for a critical hermeneutics. To this end, the previous inquiry has cast light on several aspects of the work of Hans-Herbert Kögler, who may be considered one of the most prominent advocates of critical hermeneutics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The first part has focused on Kögler's engagement with Bourdieu's plea for an *epistemological break*, drawing attention to its implications for the paradigms of understanding and explanation as well as for the critical analysis of power relations. The second part has centered on Kögler's *hermeneutics of power*. More specifically, it has discussed the relationship between power, domination, and resistance, emphasizing the pivotal role that each of these dimensions plays in the hermeneutic pursuit of understanding. The third part has been concerned with the idea of *critical theory as critical hermeneutics*, scrutinizing the confluence of the symbolic, practical, and subjective spheres of human existence. Their socio-ontological significance has been elucidated by reference to three themes: theory and agency, hermeneutic reflexivity and dialogic subjectivity, and the "me" and the "I." The fourth part has offered some *critical reflections* on important issues arising from Kögler's project, notably with regard to its limitations and shortcomings.

Notwithstanding its flaws, Kögler's critical hermeneutics represents a strong socio-philosophical program that raises valuable epistemological and methodological questions, whose relevance is illustrated in the far-reaching challenges that the humanities and social sciences face in the twenty-first century. The matters arising from the critical engagement with Kögler's program could hardly be more topical—among these are the following: the anthropocentric thesis of species-distinctiveness and human exceptionalism; the dialectic of "power to" and "power over," "empowerment" and "disempowerment," "emancipation" and "domination"; the foundations of the social, whose species-bonding universality transcends all spatiotemporally contingent forms of culturally codified particularities; binary epistemic categorizations, such as laypersons *vs.* experts, participants *vs.* observers, and insiders *vs.* outsiders. All of these issues, which—in one form or another—have been on the philosophical agenda for centuries, are here to stay. Kögler's critical hermeneutics is a strong reminder of the fact that genuinely reflexive dialogue across epistemic horizons is not an obstacle to but, rather, a prerequisite for the emergence of emancipatory practices—that is, of practices that enable us to reach an in-depth understanding of power through the power of understanding.

Notes

1 See, for example: Kögler (1990); Kögler (1992); Kögler (1994); Kögler (1996); Kögler (1996 [1992]); Kögler (1997a); Kögler (1997b); Kögler (2000); Kögler (2003); Kögler (2004 [1994]); Kögler (2005a); Kögler (2005b); Kögler (2011); Kögler (2012); Kögler (2013); Kögler (2019); Kögler, Pechriggl, and Winter (2019a); Kögler, Pechriggl, and Winter (2019b); Kögler and Stueber (2000a); Kögler and Stueber (2000b).

2   On the distinction between the paradigm of "explanation" [*Erklären*] and the paradigm of "understanding" [*Verstehen*], see, for instance: Apel (1971); Apel (1979); Bourdieu (1993b); Delanty (1997); Delanty and Strydom (2003); Dilthey (1883); Habermas (1970); Outhwaite (1986 [1975]); Outhwaite (1987); Outhwaite (1998); Outhwaite (2000); Susen (2011a); Susen (2011d); Susen (2013d: 326); Susen (2015a: 48 and 66–7).

3   On the "methodological dispute" [*Methodenstreit*], see, for instance: Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001); Neemann (1993/1994); Susen (2015a: 48 and 66–7).

4   Kögler (1996 [1992]: 215–30, italics added).

5   Ibid., 220. Cf. Celikates (2009) and Susen (2011a).

6   Kögler (1996 [1992]), 220 (quotation modified).

7   Ibid., 220 (spelling modified).

8   On this point, see ibid., 220–6. See also, for instance: Bourdieu (1980: esp. 61); Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968: esp. 46). On the centrality of this point, see, for example: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]: 175–6, 178, 179–82, 182–5, 191, and 193–4); Robbins (1998); Susen (2007: 135–7 and 262); Susen (2011c: 376); Susen (2011e: 49–51, 69, 75–6, and 82); Susen (2011a: 449–51); Susen (2012b: 689, 692, 695–8, 699–701, 710–11, and 713–15); Susen (2013c: 205–6, 223–4, and 231–2*n*22); Susen (2013d: 333–5 and 339–41); Susen (2014 [2015]: 322–3 and 340*n*30); Susen (2016b: 62–6, 73–4, 80*n*118, and 82*n*151); Susen (2016c: 198–9 and 217–18).

9   Kögler (1996 [1992]: 220).

10 Ibid., 220.

11 Ibid., 220.

12 Ibid., 220.

13 Ibid., 220.

14 Ibid., 220.

15 See Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-a: esp. 3). See also Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

16 Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-a: 3, italics added). See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

17 Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-a: 3, italics added). See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

18 Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-a: 3). See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

19 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2011e: 47, 49–51, 52, 56, 60–1, 63, 65–6, 69, 73–5, 77–8, and 82); Susen (2013a: 91 and 100*n*33); Susen (2014c: 617, 681, and 749); Susen (2015a: 73, 99, and 168); Susen (2016c: 198–9); Susen (2021c).

20 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

21 Ibid., 221.

22 Ibid., 221.

23 See Susen (2011e: 76 and 82).

24 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 221).

25 Ibid., 221.

26 Ibid., 221 (italics added).

27 Ibid., 221 (italics added).

28 Ibid., 221 (italics in original).

29 Ibid., 221 (italics added).

30 Ibid., 224.

31 Ibid., 222 (italics in original).

32 Ibid., 222.

33 Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-a: 3, italics in original). See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 222). On this point, see also Kontopoulos (1993: 222–8).

34 On this expression, see, for example: Edgerton and Roberts (2014: 200); Grenfell (2013: 281); Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer (2011: 147 and 150).

35 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 223) and Kögler (2011). On this point, see also, for instance: Bourdieu (1971); Bourdieu (1974 [1967]); Bourdieu (1977 [1972]-b); Bourdieu (1985); Bourdieu (1986); Bourdieu (2003); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a). See also, for example: Susen (2007: esp. 180–92 [Section ii, Chapter 7]); Susen (2011b: 179–81); Susen (2011c: 368–71, 376, 379, 382, 384–5, 389, 392–3, 393–7, 397–400, 403, and 409); Susen (2013b); Susen (2013c: 210, 214–15, 219, 222, 226, and 229); Susen (2013d: 324–5, 327, 331–2, 340, 344, 348–9, 354, 370, and 374); Susen (2014d: 95, 103, 105, and 110n8); Susen (2014 [2015]: 319–22, 325, 328–9, and 330); Susen (2016a: esp. 39, 30, 40, 41, 46, 60, 75, 81–6, and 94); Susen (2016b: 67 and 83); Susen (2016c: 207); Susen (2017a: 135, 140, 141–2, 146, and 148n14); Susen and Turner (2011: xviii, xxiii, xxv, and xxvi).

36 See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 223).

37 Ibid., 223.

38 Ibid., 223.

39 Ibid., 224.

40 Ibid., 224.

41 Ibid., 224.

42 On the issue of social determinism, see, for example: Gautier (2001); Habermas (2004); Inglis (2013); Quiniou (1996); Susen (2007: 13, 14, 150–2, 156, 158, 206–7, 225, 227n4, 239, 250, and 309); Susen (2013c: 203–4, 207, 209, 215–18, 220–1, 223, 225–6, and 228–9); Susen (2015a: 75, 100, 104, 129, 138, 139, 140, 160, 162, 163, 164, 295n26, and 311n4); Varela (1999).

43 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 224).

44 Ibid., 225 (italics added to "outside"; "power-critical praxis" is italicized in the original).

45 On a critical note, it may be worth pointing out that Kögler appears to use the terms "*agent(s)*" and "*actor(s)*" interchangeably. Yet, these terms should be carefully distinguished: the former tends to be employed by *Bourdieu (and Bourdieusian scholars)*, whereas the latter tends to be employed by *Boltanski (and Boltanskian scholars)*, indicating a paradigm shift from "*critical sociology*" (in which subjects tend to be portrayed as "agents," who are largely determined by the interplay between "field," "habitus," and "capital") to *the "pragmatic sociology of critique"* (in which subjects tend to be conceived of as "actors," who are equipped with critical and moral capacities). On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2014 [2015]) and Susen (2015c). Cf., for instance: Boltanski, Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a).

46 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 225, italics added).

47 Ibid., 225 (italics in original).

48 Ibid., 225.

49 Ibid., 225 (italics in original).

50 Ibid., 225.

51 Ibid., 225.

52 Ibid., 225.

53 Ibid., 226 (italics added).

54 Ibid., 227 (italics in original).

55 Ibid., 227.

56 Ibid., 227.

57 Ibid., 227. On this point, cf. Bourdieu (1994) and Bourdieu, Boltanski, and de Saint Martin (1973). For a Foucauldian account of the relationship between "power" and "strategies," see Foucault (1980b).

58 On this problem, see, for instance, Susen (2007: 103–4, 155, 168*n*21, and 209). It should be noted that Bourdieu rejects—or at least claims to reject—both *mechanistic* economism ("mechanical causes") and *finalist* economism ("conscious ends"). See Bourdieu (1990 [1980]: 50): "Finalist economism explains practices by relating them directly and exclusively to economic interests, treated as consciously posited *ends*; mechanistic economism relates them no less directly and exclusively to economic interests, defined just as narrowly but treated as *causes*. Both are unaware that practices can have other principles than mechanical causes or conscious ends and can obey an economic logic without obeying narrowly economic interests. There is an *economy of practices*, a reason immanent in practices, whose 'origin' lies neither in the 'decisions' of reason understood as rational calculation nor in the determinations of mechanisms external to and superior to the agents." (Italics added.)

59 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 227).

60 Ibid., 227.

61 On this point, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1980: 113 and 244); Bourdieu (1982a: 10 and 34); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1997: 21–6, 118, 120, 123, and 206); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968: 30, 58, and 105); Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992). See also, for example: Accardo (1997: 49); Bonnewitz (1998: 80–2); Chauviré and Fontaine (2003: 40); Hamel (2000 [1997]); Holton (2000); Myles (2004); Ostrow (2000 [1981]: 302–8); Pinto (1998: 214, 216, and 243); Susen (2007: 24, 138–41, 146*n*16, 153, 157, 159, 160, 178, 191, 215, 223, 224, 225, 226, 243, 251, 252, 253, 267, 309, and 312); Susen (2011e: 50, 76, and 82); Susen (2013c: 204–5, 208, 209, 218, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 228, and 231*n*18); Susen (2013d: 332, 340, 349, 341, 355, 356, 364, and 372); Susen (2016b: 53, 55–6, 61–6, and 72–3); Susen (2017a: 136–7, 145, and 149*n*20); Wacquant (2004).

62 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 227). Cf. Kögler (2005b) and Kögler (2012).

63 Kögler (1996 [1992], 227).

64 Ibid., 227 (italics added).

65 Ibid., 227 (italics added).

66 Ibid., 229 (italics in original).

67 Ibid., 229 (italics in original).

68 Ibid., 229.

69 Ibid., 229.

70 Ibid., 229.

71 Ibid., 229.

72 Ibid., 229 (italics in original).

73 Ibid., 229.

74 Ibid., 229.

75 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2014a); Susen (2018c).

76 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 230, italics in original).

77 Ibid., 230 (italics added).

78 Ibid., 230 (italics in original).

79 Ibid., 230 (italics in original).

80 Ibid., 230.

81 Ibid., 230.

82 Ibid., 230.
83 Ibid., 230.
84 Ibid., 230.
85 Ibid., 230.
86 Ibid., 230.
87 Ibid., 230.
88 Ibid., 231.
89 See ibid., 231. See also, for example: Foucault (1983 [1982]); Kögler (1990); Kögler (1992); Kögler (1996); Kögler (2003); Kögler (2004 [1994]). In addition, see, for instance: Foucault (2001 [1961]); Foucault (2002 [1966]); Foucault (1979 [1975]); Foucault (1978 [1976]); Foucault (1985 [1984]); Foucault (1988 [1984]); Foucault (1980a); Foucault (1988); Foucault (2005 [2001]).
90 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 231). Cf. Habermas (1987 [1985]: 266–93).
91 See Foucault (2001 [1961]) and Foucault (2002 [1966]).
92 See Foucault (1979 [1975]), Foucault (1978 [1976]), Foucault (1985 [1984]), and Foucault (1988 [1984]).
93 See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 231). Cf. Foucault (1985 [1984], esp. 3–13).
94 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 231).
95 Ibid., 231.
96 Ibid., 231. Cf. Foucault (1983 [1982]). Cf. also Foucault (1985 [1984]), esp. Introduction.
97 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 231).
98 Ibid., 232.
99 Ibid., 232.
100 Ibid., 232.
101 Ibid., 232.
102 Ibid., 232.
103 Ibid., 233.
104 Ibid., 233.
105 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2014a); Susen (2018c).
106 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 233).
107 Ibid., 233.
108 Ibid., 233.
109 Ibid., 233.
110 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2012a, esp. 297); Susen (2014a); Susen (2018c: esp. 9–10); Susen (2020a: 5, 10, 14, 15, 28, 83, 134, 139–40, 179, 294, and 308). See also, for instance: Holloway (2005 [2002]); Holloway and Susen (2013).
111 See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 233).
112 Ibid., 233.
113 Ibid., 233.
114 Ibid., 233.
115 Ibid., 233.
116 Ibid., 233.
117 Ibid., 233.
118 See ibid., 233–4.
119 Ibid., 234. Cf. Kögler (2000), Kögler (2005b), and Kögler (2012). Cf. also, for instance: Alexander and Lara (1996); Brink and Owen (2007); Baynes (2002); Fraser

and Honneth (2003); Honneth (1995 [1992]); Honneth (2002); Honneth (2012 [2010]); Susen (2007: 192–8); Susen (2015a: esp. Chapter 5).

120 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 234).
121 Ibid., 234.
122 Ibid., 234.
123 Ibid., 234.
124 Ibid., 234–5.
125 See ibid., 235.
126 Ibid., 235.
127 On Habermas's account of the relationship between "lifeworld" and "system," see, for example: Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b). See also, for instance: Apel (1992); Bohman (1989); Detel (2000); Hartmann (1985); Peters (1993: 557–60); Seemann (2004); Stikkers (1985). Furthermore, see, for example: Susen (2007: 61, 70, 71–3, 239, 245, 246, and 305); Susen (2009b: 84–5, 86–7, and 105–6); Susen (2010c: 108, 113, 117, and 119*n*31); Susen (2011d: 51).
128 See Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b).
129 See Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b).
130 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 235).
131 Ibid., 235. Cf. Foucault (1978 [1976]: esp. 92–3).
132 See, for example: Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2014a); Susen (2018c).
133 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 235). Cf. Kögler (2000), Kögler (2005b), and Kögler (2012).
134 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 235).
135 On this point, see Forst and Günther (2011a) and Forst and Günther (2011b). See also, for instance: Forst (2002 [1994]); Forst (2012 [2007]); Forst (2013); Forst (2013 [2003]); Forst (2013 [2011]); Forst (2014); Forst (2015a); Forst (2015b); Forst (2017); Forst, Hartmann, Jaeggi, and Saar (2009).
136 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 235).
137 Ibid., 236.
138 On this point, see, for example: Boltanski (2008); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Susen (2014d); Susen (2016c).
139 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 236, italics in original).
140 Ibid., 236.
141 See ibid., 236.
142 Ibid., 236.
143 Ibid., 236 (italics added).
144 Ibid., 236 (italics added).
145 Ibid., 236–7.
146 Ibid., 237.
147 Ibid., 237.
148 Ibid., 237.
149 Ibid., 237.
150 Ibid., 237.
151 Ibid., 237 (italics added).
152 Ibid., 238 (italics in original).
153 Ibid., 238.
154 Ibid., 238.
155 Ibid., 238.
156 Ibid., 239 (italics in original).

157 Ibid., 239.
158 Ibid., 240.
159 Ibid., 240.
160 On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]); Cordero (2017a); Cordero (2017b); Susen (2015a: 166, 178, and 317*n*190); Susen (2017b); Susen (2020a: 37, 152, and 275–6); Susen (2020b: 315); Susen (2021c: 27, 30, and 46).
161 On the concept of "simple domination," see, for example: Boltanski (2008: esp. 149–58); Boltanski (2009: 186–90); Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 124–6). See also, for instance: Susen (2012b: 707–10); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]: 188–90); Susen (2014c: 652–6); Susen (2016c: 212–15); Susen (2020a: 132); Susen (2021c: 48). On the concept of "complex domination," see, for example: Boltanski (2008: esp. 149–58); Boltanski (2009: 190–3); Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127–9). See also, for instance: Susen (2012b: 707–10); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]: 188–90); Susen (2014c: 652–6); Susen (2016c: 212–15); Susen (2020a: 132); Susen (2021c: 48).
162 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 241).
163 Cf. Callinicos (2006). Cf. also Browne and Susen (2014).
164 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 243).
165 Ibid., 243.
166 Ibid., 243.
167 Ibid., 243. Cf. Susen (2007: 192–8).
168 Cf. Susen (2007: 54–7 and 192–8) and Susen (2015a: 110–23).
169 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 244).
170 Ibid., 244.
171 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009a); Susen (2014a); Susen (2018c).
172 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 244).
173 Ibid., 244 (spelling modified).
174 Ibid., 244.
175 On the idea of "the good life" [*gelingendes Leben*] in contemporary critical theory, see, for instance: Rosa (1998); Rosa (2005); Rosa (2010); Rosa (2012); Rosa (2013 [2010]); Rosa (2015 [2005]); Rosa (2016); Rosa (2019 [2016]). See also Susen (2020b).
176 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 244, italics in original).
177 Ibid., 244–5.
178 Ibid., 245.
179 Cf. Susen (2007: 138, 253, and 309). Cf. also Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992).
180 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 245).
181 Ibid., 245 (quotation modified).
182 Ibid., 245 (italics in original).
183 Ibid., 245.
184 Ibid., 245.
185 Ibid., 245.
186 Cf. Susen (2015b).
187 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 246, italics in original). On this point, see also, for instance: Bernstein (2005); Boltanski (1999 [1993]); Bourdieu (1999 [1993]); Charlesworth (2000); Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese (2011); Turner (2006).
188 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 246).
189 Ibid., 246 (italics in original).

190 Ibid., 246.
191 Ibid., 246 (italics added). On this point, see also Kögler's analysis of "the fore-structure of understanding" in ibid., esp. 13, 86–9, 91–5, 100, and 105.
192 Ibid., 246.
193 Ibid., 246–7. Cf. Mead (1967 [1934]). Cf. also Susen (2010d) and Susen (2016e).
194 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 251).
195 See ibid., 251.
196 Ibid., 251 and 268 (italics added). On Kögler's conception of "reflexivity," see, for instance: Kögler (1992); Kögler (1996 [1992]); Kögler (1996); Kögler (1997a); Kögler (1997b); Kögler (2000); Kögler (2019); Kögler, Pechriggl, and Winter (2019b).
197 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 252).
198 Ibid., 252 (italics added).
199 Ibid., 252.
200 For excellent discussions of the Marxist distinction between "base" and "superstructure," see, for instance: de Lara (1982); Hall (1977); Jakubowski (1990 [1976]); Labica (1982); Larrain (1991 [1983]); Weber (1995). See also, for example: Susen (2007: 22, 72, 122, 126n9, 179, 180, 191, 210, and 227n4); Susen (2008a: 62–3 and 80); Susen (2008b: 146 and 164); Susen (2010a: 166, 172, 201, and 208); Susen (2010b: 267); Susen (2011b: 189, 193, and 194); Susen (2012a: 284, 299, and 302); Susen (2013d: 340–1); Susen (2014d); Susen (2014b: 340); Susen (2015a: 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 265, 295n27, 298n31, and 300n110); Susen (2015b: 1031); Susen (2016c: 202, 211, and 222); Susen (2017b: 116); Susen (2017c: 114–15); Susen (2017e: 6 and 64); Susen (2018a: 48); Susen (2020a: 102, 111, and 254).
201 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 252).
202 Ibid., 252.
203 Ibid., 252.
204 Ibid., 252.
205 Ibid., 252.
206 Ibid., 252.
207 Ibid., 252.
208 Cf. Susen (2015a: esp. Chapter 1).
209 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 253).
210 Ibid., 252.
211 Ibid., 252 (italics in original).
212 Ibid., 252 (italics in original).
213 Ibid., 252 (italics added).
214 Ibid., 252. Cf., for instance: Boltanski, Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a).
215 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 253). On Kögler's conception of "dialogue," see, for instance: Kögler (1992); Kögler (1996 [1992]); Kögler (2000); Kögler (2005b); Kögler (2012).
216 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 253).
217 Ibid., 253.
218 Ibid., 253. On this point, see also ibid., Chapter 4, Section 4.3.
219 Ibid., 253.
220 Ibid., 253.
221 Ibid., 253. Cf. Jaeggi (2014) and Jaeggi (2018 [2014]).
222 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 253).
223 Ibid., 253.
224 Ibid., 253 (italics in original).

225 Ibid., 254.
226 Cf. Susen (2017d) and Susen (2018b).
227 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 254).
228 See ibid., 255. See Nietzsche (1967 [1930]). See also Foucault (1979 [1975]), Foucault (1980a), Foucault (1988), Foucault (2005 [2001]). Cf. Saar (2007), Saar (2010), and Saar (2013). Cf. also Erdmann, Forst, and Honneth (1990).
229 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 254).
230 Ibid., 255.
231 On the problem of "socio-ontological romanticism" (as well as "socio-ontological optimism," "socio-ontological utopianism," and "socio-ontological idealism"), see, for example: Coles and Susen (2018: 256 and 259); Susen (2007: 13–14, 22, 44n47, 54–5, 90, 115, 121–5, 218, 226, 239, 240, 250, 252–3, 260–1, 268, 270n21, 305, and 308); Susen (2011c: 373); Susen (2013c: 229–30); Susen (2013d: 325, 327, 333, 335, 343, 344, 354, 359–60, 361–4, 367, 372, and 373); Susen (2014c: 619, 642, 646, 647, 675, 709, and 734); Susen (2014d: 102, 105, and 108); Susen (2014 [2015]: 331–2); Susen (2015a: 180, 204, and 225); Susen (2015c: 181–2); Susen (2016b: 74–5); Susen (2016c: 222); Susen (2020c: 148 and 149); Susen (2020b: 334); Susen (2020d: 753 and 754–5). In addition, see, for instance: Brunkhorst (1997); Habermas (1987 [1981]-d); Lemieux (2014).
232 On the problem of "socio-ontological fatalism" (as well as "socio-ontological pessimism," "socio-ontological defeatism," and "socio-ontological nihilism"), see, for example: Coles and Susen (2018: 256); Susen (2007: 14, 22, 54, 217, 221–6, 239, 253, 267–8, 277, 304, and 312); Susen (2011c: 405); Susen (2013c: 229–30); Susen (2013d: 327, 328–9, 333, 362, and 373); Susen (2014c: 635, 675, 690, 705, 732, and 735); Susen (2014d: 103–4); Susen (2014 [2015]: 316, 326–7, and 332); Susen (2015a: 129, 219, 244, and 275); Susen (2015c: 157–8, 174, and 181); Susen (2016b: 74–5); Susen (2016c: 222); Susen (2020c: 146–7 and 148); Susen (2020b: 321 and 334); Susen (2020d: 736 and 738); Susen (2021c: 32 and 45). In addition, see, for instance: Boltanski (1998) Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski (2011 [2009]); Boltanski (2012 [1990]); Boltanski and Chiapello (1999: esp. 27, 29, and 633–40); Boltanski, Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2000); Bourdieu (1998).
233 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 255).
234 Ibid., 255.
235 Ibid., 255.
236 Ibid., 255.
237 Cf. Susen (2007: Chapter 10).
238 See Kögler (1996 [1992]: 256–66).
239 See ibid., 266–73.
240 See ibid., 273–5.
241 Ibid., 256.
242 Ibid., 256.
243 Ibid., 256.
244 Ibid., 256.
245 Ibid., 256.
246 Ibid., 257.
247 Ibid., 257.
248 Ibid., 257.

249 Ibid., 257 (italics in original) (quotation modified).
250 Ibid., 257.
251 Ibid., 257.
252 Ibid., 257.
253 Ibid., 257 (italics in original).
254 Ibid., 257.
255 Ibid., 257 (italics in original).
256 Ibid., 257–8.
257 Ibid., 258.
258 Ibid., 258.
259 Ibid., 258.
260 Ibid., 258.
261 Cf. Habermas (1988 [1967/1970]).
262 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 258).
263 Ibid., 258. Cf. Giddens (1977).
264 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 258).
265 Ibid., 258.
266 Ibid., 259.
267 Ibid., 259.
268 Cf. Susen (2016d: esp. 460–1 [Section ii]).
269 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 259).
270 Cf. Susen (2007: 94).
271 Cf. ibid., 94.
272 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 259).
273 Ibid., 259 (italics added).
274 Ibid., 259 (italics added).
275 Ibid., 259.
276 Ibid., 259.
277 Ibid., 259.
278 Ibid., 259.
279 Ibid., 259.
280 Ibid., 259.
281 Ibid., 260.
282 Cf. Celikates (2009) and Susen (2011a).
283 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 260).
284 Ibid., 260.
285 On this point, see ibid., 260 and 312n14.
286 Ibid., 260 (quotation modified).
287 Ibid., 260 (quotation modified).
288 See, for instance, Davidson (2001 [1984]), esp. Davidson (2001 [1984/1974]).
289 See, for instance, Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b).
290 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 260). On this point, see ibid., Chapter 4.
291 See Foucault (2002 [1966]) and Löwith (1953). In addition, see Susen (2015a: Chapter 4).
292 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 260–1).
293 Ibid., 261.
294 Ibid., 261 (quotation modified). See also ibid., 313n18.
295 Ibid., 261.
296 Ibid., 261.

297 Ibid., 261. Cf. Kögler (1994).
298 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 261).
299 Ibid., 261.
300 Ibid., 261.
301 Ibid., 262.
302 Ibid., 262.
303 Ibid., 262 (italics in original).
304 Ibid., 262.
305 See ibid., 262.
306 Ibid., 262.
307 Ibid., 262.
308 Ibid., 262.
309 Ibid., 262.
310 Ibid., 263.
311 Ibid., 263 (italics in original).
312 Ibid., 263.
313 Ibid., 263.
314 Ibid., 263.
315 Ibid., 263.
316 Ibid., 263.
317 Ibid., 266.
318 Ibid., 266.
319 Ibid., 266.
320 Ibid., 266–7 (quotation modified).
321 Ibid., 267.
322 Ibid., 267.
323 Ibid., 267.
324 Ibid., 267.
325 Ibid., 267 (italics in original).
326 On the concept of the "fusion of horizons" [*Horizontverschmelzung*], see, for
     instance: Gadamer (1989 [1975]: 306–7, 374–5, 397, and 576); Gadamer (1982
     [1976/1978/1979]: 111); Gadamer (2001: 43, 48–50, 56, and 113). See also Kögler
     (1996 [1992]: 14, 71, 72, 128–41, 147, 148, 170, and 285*n*20). Furthermore, see, for
     instance: Dawson (1998 [1983]: xvi and xxiv); Delanty (2009: 253); Jain (2016: 202
     and 207); Susen (2015a: 211); Taylor (2002: 134–6 and 138–42); Vessey (2009); Vitkin
     (1995). In addition, see, for example: Dostal (2002); Gadamer (1998 [1983]); Grondin
     (2002); Habermas (1971); Harrington (1999); Harrington (2000); Harrington (2001);
     How (1995); How (1998); How (1985); How (2007); Mendelson (1979); Michelfelder
     and Palmer (1989); Outhwaite (1986 [1975]); Scheibler (2000); Wachterhauser
     (1994); Warnke (1987); Weinsheimer (1998 [1983]).
327 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 267, italics added).
328 Ibid., 251 and 268. On Kögler's conception of "reflexivity," see, for instance: Kögler
     (1992); Kögler (1996 [1992]); Kögler (1996); Kögler (1997a); Kögler (1997b); Kögler
     (2000); Kögler (2019); Kögler, Pechriggl, and Winter (2019b).
329 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 268).
330 Ibid., 268 (italics in original).
331 See ibid., 251.
332 Ibid., 268.
333 Ibid., 268.

334 Ibid., 268. On this point, cf., for instance: Susen (2007: 188–9, 213, 244, and 285); Susen (2011b: 177–8 and 186); Susen (2011e: 59, 70, and 77); Susen (2013c: 204, 207, 213, and 220); Susen (2013d: 331 and 362); Susen (2015a: 80, 81, 88, 101, 105, 129, and 266); Susen (2016a: 41, 43, 59–60, 83, and 105); Susen (2016c: 201–3); Susen (2017a: 116 and 120); Susen (2018c: 23–4 and 27).

335 On this point, cf. Foucault (1985 [1984]), esp. Introduction. For an analysis of the implications of Kögler's three-dimensional ontology, see Kögler (1990).

336 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 268).

337 Ibid., 268.

338 Ibid., 269 (spelling modified).

339 Cf. Susen (2007: 153–7).

340 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 269).

341 Ibid., 269 (italics added).

342 Ibid., 269.

343 Ibid., 269.

344 Ibid., 269.

345 Ibid., 269.

346 Ibid., 269.

347 Ibid., 269.

348 See ibid., esp. 269–70.

349 Ibid., 269.

350 Ibid., 270.

351 Ibid., 270.

352 Ibid., 270.

353 Ibid., 270.

354 Ibid., 270 (italics added).

355 Ibid., 270 (italics added).

356 Ibid., 270.

357 Ibid., 270.

358 See Hegel (1975 [1837]), Hegel (1977 [1807]), Hegel (1990 [1825–6]), and Hegel (1991 [1820]).

359 See Marx (2000/1977 [1844]), Marx (2000/1977 [1845]-a), Marx (2000/1977 [1845]-b), Marx (2000/1977 [1857–8/1941]), Marx (2000/1977 [1859]), and Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]).

360 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 270).

361 Ibid., 270.

362 Ibid., 271.

363 See Heidegger (1949 [1946]) and Heidegger (1998 [1967/1976]). See also Heidegger (1992 [1989/1924]) and Heidegger (2001 [1927]).

364 See Nietzsche (1967 [1930]), Nietzsche (1992 [1887]), and Nietzsche (1999 [1886]).

365 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 271).

366 Ibid., 271.

367 Ibid., 271.

368 Ibid., 271 (italics in original).

369 Ibid., 272.

370 Ibid., 272 (italics in original).

371 Ibid., 272.

372 Ibid., 272.

373 Ibid., 272.

374 Ibid., 272.
375 Ibid., 272. On this point, see also ibid., Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
376 Ibid., 272.
377 Ibid., 272.
378 Ibid., 272–3.
379 Ibid., 273.
380 Ibid., 273.
381 Ibid., 273.
382 Ibid., 273.
383 See ibid., 273. On this point, see, for example, Mead (1967 [1934]: esp. 173–8, 192–200, 209–13, and 273–81). See also James (1890) as well as Susen (2010d). In addition, see, for instance: Aboulafia (1999); Athens (2002); Dews (1999); Gillespie (1984); Habermas (1987 [1981]-c); Habermas (1992 [1988]); Joas (1997 [1980]); Schubert (2006); Silva (2007b); Silva (2007a); Susen (2015a: 208).
384 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 273).
385 Ibid., 273.
386 Cf. Mead (1967 [1934]). On the concept of "perspective-taking," see, for instance: Susen (2007: 82); Susen (2015a: 221 and 223); Susen (2016b: 70); Susen (2017d: 352 and 357); Susen (2018e: 1287).
387 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 273).
388 Ibid., 273.
389 See, for example: Husserl (1931); Husserl (1970); Husserl (1972 [1939]); Husserl (2012 [1913/1931]). See also, for instance: Chelstrom (2013); Farber (1984); Myles (2004).
390 See, for example: Sartre (1939); Sartre (2003 [1958/1943]); Sartre (2007 [1946]); Sartre (2008 [1974/1972]); Sartre, Auster, and Davis (1978 [1977/1976]). See also, for instance: Archard (1980); Baert (2015); Boschetti (1988 [1985]); Bourdieu (1993a); Drake (2005); Flynn (1984); Leak (2006); Thompson and Thompson (1984).
391 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 274). Cf. Frank (1989 [1984]).
392 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 274).
393 Ibid., 274 (italics added).
394 Cf. Susen (2010d).
395 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 272 and 274).
396 Ibid., 274.
397 Ibid., 274.
398 Ibid., 274.
399 Ibid., 275.
400 Ibid., 275 (italics in original).
401 Ibid., 275.
402 Ibid., 275.
403 Cf. Susen (2020c: esp. 125, 131, 137, 138, 142, 144, and 147).
404 Cf. Susen (2018d: esp. 43, 49, 50, and 54). Cf. also Susen (2021a: esp. 372–3 and 382–4).
405 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 231).
406 Ibid., 231.
407 On this point, see Susen (2007: Chapter 7). Cf. Calhoun (1995).
408 On this point, see Susen (2007: Chapter 8). See also, for instance, Susen (2013c: esp. 220–30).

409 On this point, see Bourdieu (1985). See also, for instance: Grenfell (2013: 282); Robbins (2016: 7); Susen (2013d: 348–9); Thorpe (2011: 216).

410 On this point, see, for example, Bourdieu, Schultheis, and Pfeuffer (2011 [1999/2000]: 117, italics in original): ". . . all of these terms are often used in misleading ways, without really understanding what they stand for, and hence they become *slogans*. In reality, however, these concepts — these frameworks — are only *principles* for scientific work, which is usually of mere practical nature; they are *synthetic* or *synoptic* notions, which serve to provide research programmes with scientific *orientations*."

411 See Susen (2014a).

412 Susen (2015a: 5, italics removed from the entire quotation, numbering modified). Cf. Susen (2020a: 313–4). Cf. also Susen (2022: 122, 125, and 138).

413 On this point, see his self-critical reflections — for instance, Kögler (1996 [1992]: 254–6).

414 Ibid., 238 (italics added).

415 See previous note on "socio-ontological fatalism."

416 On the distinction between "power to" and "power over," see, for instance: Hearn (2014); Holloway (2002: 28–30 and 36–7); Holloway (2010: 9, 59, 62, 68, 85, 96, 98, 124, 128, 130–5, 199, 206, 209, 224–6, 232–3, 235, 246–9, 252, 261, 277n1, 277n2, 277n5, and 280n9); Holloway and Susen (2013: esp. 36); Saar (2010); Susen (2007: 21, 24, 32, 34, 65–6, 69, 70, 87–8, 94, 105, 118, 124, 125, 144, 183, 184, 186, 187, 191, 266–7, 281, 285, 286, 290, 292, 294, and 296); Susen (2008a: 59, 65, and 71–2); Susen (2008b: 142, 145, 151, and 155–7); Susen (2012a: 312); Susen (2014a); Susen (2015a: 52 and 117–18); Susen (2015b: 1029); Susen (2018c: esp. 6–7).

417 Susen (2018c: 6, italics in original).

418 Forst (2015b: 115, italics in original).

419 Susen (2018c: 6).

420 See Susen (2007: 192–8). See also Susen (2018c: 28–9 and 32) and Susen (2021b: 393).

421 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 246, italics added).

422 On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2016c: 220 [point 6]). Cf. Susen (2014d).

423 Cf. Susen (2010d).

424 Kögler (1996 [1992]: 246).

425 On the Bourdieusian distinction between "ordinary knowledge" and "scientific knowledge," see, for example: Bourdieu (1980: 24, 43–5, 48–50, and 61); Bourdieu (1982a: 10, 15, and 32); Bourdieu (1982b: 18–19); Bourdieu (1995: esp. 3–5 and 10); Bourdieu (1997: 119, 163, 217–18, and 225–6); Bourdieu (1999: 334–5); Bourdieu (2000); Bourdieu (2001: 15); Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968: 27–49 and 100–2); Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992: esp. 117); Bourdieu, Schultheis, and Pfeuffer (2011 [1999/2000]); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992b: 150); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 213). See also, for example: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010: 155–6); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]: 597–8); Kögler (1996 [1992]: 220–7 and 229–33); Susen (2007: 135–7); Susen (2011a: esp. 450–8); Susen (2011c: 375–7, 378–80, and 403–5); Susen (2011e: 49–53, 73–5, and 81); Susen (2013c: 205–8 and 223–4); Susen (2013d: 333, 335, 339–41, and 378n158); Susen (2014d: 98–9); Susen (2014 [2015]: 322–4, 332–4, and 335); Susen (2014c: 634–5, 643, 647, 650, and 688); Susen (2015c: 167–70, 181–4, and 184–6); Susen (2016a: esp. 61–5); Susen (2016b: esp. 53, 55–6, 61–3, 66, 72, and 73–4); Susen (2017a: esp. 136–7 and 140); Susen (2021c: 43–6); Susen (2022: 122, 126–7, 132, 135, and 138); Susen and Turner (2011: xxi–xxii).

426 Cf. Susen (2012b: 713–15). Cf. also Susen (2022: 122, 126–7, 132, 135, and 138).
427 On this point, see Susen (2015a: 10). Cf. ibid., 71, 152, 174, 200, and 263.
428 Ibid., 10 (italics in original).
429 Ibid., 10 (italics in original).

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