Model: Adjudicator (Left)

Model: Adjudicator (Right)

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
CCF_active
0
CCF_enabler
CC_enabler
CH1_OK
1
CH1_Safe_Failure
0
CH1_US_Failure
0
CH2_OK
1
CH2_Safe_Failure
0
CH2_US_Failure
0
System_OK
1
System_Safe_Failure
0
System_Unsafe_State
0

Timed Activity: Common_failure

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

CC_failure_rate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
System_OK_Act
System_SS_Act
System_US_Act

Input Gate: Common_mode_enabler
Predicate
 

((CH1_OK->Mark() > 0) && (CH2_OK->Mark() > 0) && (System_OK->Mark() > 0) && (CCF_enabler->Mark() > 0))
Function
 

;

Input Gate: Sys_OK_Gate
Predicate
 

(((CH1_OK->Mark() != 0) || (CH2_OK->Mark() != 0)) && (System_OK->Mark() == 0))
Function
 

;

Input Gate: System_SS
Predicate
 

(CH1_OK->Mark() == 0) && (CH2_OK->Mark() == 0) && (System_Safe_Failure->Mark() == 0) && ((CH1_Safe_Failure->Mark() != 0) || (CH2_Safe_Failure->Mark() != 0))
Function
 

;

Input Gate: System_US_Gate
Predicate
 

(CH1_OK->Mark() == 0) && (CH2_OK->Mark() == 0) && (CH1_Safe_Failure->Mark() == 0) && (CH2_Safe_Failure->Mark() == 0) && (System_Unsafe_State->Mark() == 0)
Function
 

;

Input Gate: System_state_enabler
Predicate
 

(System_OK->Mark() > 0)
Function
 

;

Output Gate: Set_both_Gate
Function
 

CCF_active->Mark() = 2;

Output Gate: Syste_US_Gate
Function
 

System_OK->Mark() = 0;
System_Safe_Failure->Mark() = 0;
System_Unsafe_State->Mark() = 1;

Output Gate: System_OK_Gate
Function
 

System_OK->Mark() = 1;
System_Safe_Failure->Mark() = 0;
System_Unsafe_State->Mark() = 0;

Output Gate: System_SF_Gate
Function
 

System_OK->Mark() = 0;
System_Safe_Failure->Mark() = 1;
System_Unsafe_State->Mark() = 0;

Model: Adversary (Left)

Model: Adversary (Right)

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
AttackedID_1
0
AttackedID_2
0
C_CH_1_attacked
0
C_CH_2_attacked
0
Channel1_attacked
0
Channel2_attacked
0
ConfAttack_in_progress
0
ControlAttack_in_progress
0
Start
attack_count
Torque_Attack_in_progress
0
single_both_enabler
single_SS_enabler_is_0

Timed Activity: Attacker_Profile

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

AttackRate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

SS_Conf_Attack
case 2

TorqueAttack
case 3

ControlConfAttack

Instantaneous Activity: C_CH_Select
Case Distributions
 case 1

0.5
case 2

0.5

Instantaneous Activity: SW_CH_Select
Case Distributions
 case 1

0.5
case 2

0.5

Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
Both_SS_conf_attacked

Input Gate: BothChannels_attacked_enabled
Predicate
 

(single_both_enabler->Mark() > 0)
Function
 

;

Input Gate: SingleChannel_attacked_enabler
Predicate
 

(single_both_enabler->Mark() == 0)
Function
 

;

Output Gate: Both_Gate
Function
 

AttackedID_1->Mark()=1;
Channel1_attacked->Mark()=1;
AttackedID_2->Mark()=2;
Channel2_attacked->Mark()=1;

Output Gate: SetID_1
Function
 

AttackedID_1->Mark()=1;

Output Gate: SetID_2
Function
 

AttackedID_2->Mark()=2;

Model: Control_configuration_channel

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
Attack_in_progress
0
Correct
1
Incorrect
0
OK_state
1
Safe_failure
0
Unsafe_state_2
0

Timed Activity: Correct_incorrect

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

0.01
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

0.5
case 2

0.5

Timed Activity: Detection_window

Distribution Parameters
 Mean

0.125
Variance

0.00001
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Timed Activity: Repair_conf

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

100
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

0.9
case 2

0.1

Input Gate: Attack_enabler
Predicate
 

((OK_state->Mark() != 0) || (Safe_failure->Mark() != 0))
Function
 

;

Output Gate: Successful_attack
Function
 

Unsafe_state_2->Mark() = 1;
OK_state->Mark() = 0;
Safe_failure->Mark() = 0;
Correct->Mark() = 1;	
// The last statement is only here to allow for future attacks 
// if unsafe_2 is recovered from.
// Once Unsafe_state_2 is set to non-zero, 
// the future attackes will be blocked by the input gate, Attack_enabler.

Model: SW_channel (Left)

Model: SW_channel (Right)

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
CCF_active
0
Channel_OK
1
Configuration_state
1
Safe_state
0
System_OK
1
Unsafe_state
0
Unsafe_state_2
0
channel_failure
0

Timed Activity: Diagnosis

Distribution Parameters
 Value

0.0000277778
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

return(failure_coverage);
case 2

return((double)(1.0) - failure_coverage);

Timed Activity: OK_failure

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

channel_failure_rate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Timed Activity: Repair_unsafe

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

USF_repair_rate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Timed Activity: Safe_fail_OK

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

SS_repair_rate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
CCF_propagate

Input Gate: Input_Gate1
Predicate
 

(System_OK->Mark() > 0)
Function
 

;

Input Gate: Unsafe_Gate
Predicate
 

((Unsafe_state->Mark() > 0) || (Unsafe_state_2->Mark() > 0))
Function
 

// Repar results in resets unsafe fail states. 
Unsafe_state->Mark() = 0;
Unsafe_state_2->Mark() = 0;

Output Gate: safe_vs_unsafe2_gate
Function
 

if(Configuration_state->Mark() > 0)
  {
    Safe_state->Mark() = 1;
    Unsafe_state_2->Mark() = 0;
  }
else
  {
    Unsafe_state_2->Mark() = 1;
    Safe_state->Mark() = 0;
  }
// Now set Channel_OK to 0
Channel_OK->Mark() = 0;

Model: T_Conf_channel (Left)

Model: T_Conf_channel (Right)

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
Attack_Active
0
Attack_in_progress
0
Debugging
0
Detected_safely
0
Detected_unsafely
0
Detection_prob
0
Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp
0
Missed_OK
0
Missed_unsafe
0
System_OK
1
System_safe
0
System_unsafe
0
T_a_cur_value
0
T_cur_value
0
T_increment
0
T_value_step
0
Torque_state
1
step_rate
0
window_start
0

Timed Activity: Detection_window

Distribution Parameters
 Value

t_window
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Timed Activity: T_inc_step

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

step_rate->Mark()
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Timed Activity: Torque_request

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

torque_req_rate
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)

Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
torque_loop_step

Input Gate: Detection_enabler
Predicate
 

(System_OK->Mark() > 0)
Function
 

;

Input Gate: OneAttack_Gate
Predicate
 

(T_increment->Mark() == 0)
Function
 

;

Input Gate: Zoom_Gate
Predicate
 

(T_increment->Mark() > 0)
Function
 

;

Output Gate: Normal_Torque_Gate
Function
 

Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp->Mark() = BaseModelClass::LastActionTime;
T_cur_value->Mark() = (double)(0.0); // Overrides whatever it might have become.
// Here could set T_cur_value to a non-zero value, but not done yet. 
// In other words, the model assumes implicitly that T_cur_value will 
// be 0 at the time a torque attack is launched.

Output Gate: T_Gate
Function
 

static UserDistributions dist(0, 31415);
// Set the value of the offset.
double offset = dist.Normal(T_V_Offset_mean,T_V_Offset_stddev);
double value = (double)(T_V_steps_min);
if(T_V_steps_min != T_V_steps_max)
  value = dist.Uniform((double)(T_V_steps_min),(double)(T_V_steps_max));
// assigns a random number of tokens to Torque_increment, i.e.how many steps will be used to set the new torque. 
T_increment->Mark() = (int)(value);
// Detection probability is defined as a global variable D_T_attack_prob (double).
Detection_prob->Mark() = D_T_attack_prob;
// Set the T_value_step
T_value_step->Mark() = offset / T_increment->Mark();
// The torque value remains unchanged
step_rate->Mark() = T_V_step_interval_mean;
// Now take the tamstamp of the start of the window
window_start->Mark() = (double)(0.0);	// Attack starts only after the first increment.
T_a_cur_value->Mark() = T_cur_value->Mark();	// Takes a snapshot of the current values.

Output Gate: T_S_Gate
Function
 

static UserDistributions dist_output(0, 31415);
double detect_output = dist_output.Uniform((double)(0.0),(double)(1.0));
double old_value = T_cur_value->Mark();
T_a_cur_value->Mark() += T_value_step->Mark();
double old_stamp = Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp->Mark();
Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp->Mark() = BaseModelClass::LastActionTime;
double offset = T_a_cur_value->Mark() - T_cur_value->Mark();
double stamp_offset = Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp->Mark() - old_stamp;
double t_difference = Last_Valid_Torque_timestamp->Mark() - window_start->Mark();
Debugging->Mark() = 0; 
if(offset > v_delta)
  Debugging->Mark() += 1;
if(stamp_offset < t_delta)
  Debugging->Mark() += 2;
if(detect_output > D_T_attack_prob)
  Debugging->Mark() += 4;
if((offset > v_delta) || (stamp_offset < t_delta) || (detect_output > D_T_attack_prob))
  {
    // Here the difference between the 'correct' value/stamp and 
    // the 'current' value/stamp exceeds the thresholds 
    // or detection on the output (D_T_attack_prob).
    // Detection of a violation of the thresholds.
      if((t_difference < t_window) || (window_start->Mark() == (double)(0.0)))
        {
	  // Here dection on time. If first increment in a chain always on time.
	  Detected_safely->Mark()++;
        }
      else
        {
	  if(Detected_safely->Mark() == 0)	// If detected safely, then ignore subsequent detections.
	  Detected_unsafely->Mark() = 1;
        }
    }
else
  {
    // Here is the attack has not been detected. 
    // Now check if T_a_cur_value->Mark()deviation is grater than v_delta
    if(T_a_cur_value->Mark() > v_delta)
      Missed_unsafe->Mark()++;
    else
      Missed_OK->Mark()++;
  }
T_cur_value->Mark() = T_a_cur_value->Mark();
if(window_start->Mark() == (double)(0.0))
  window_start->Mark() = BaseModelClass::LastActionTime;

Output Gate: close_window_Gate
Function
 

if((Detected_safely->Mark() > 0) || (System_OK->Mark() == 0))
  {
    // If the system is not OK, then no changes of the system state will apply.
    // Similarly, if safe detection has taken place, the attack has no consequences (i.e. will be filtered). 
  }
else
  {
    if(Detected_unsafely->Mark() > 0)
      {
    	// This will lead to an attempt to move to a safe state.
    	if(System_OK->Mark() > 0)
      	  {
	    // Set the system to System_safe state (detected but, but attack longer than 3 cycles).
	    System_OK->Mark() = 0;
	    System_safe->Mark() = 1;
	    System_unsafe->Mark() = 0;
       	  }
      }
    else
      {
        if(Missed_unsafe->Mark() > 0)	// If only OK misses - do nothing. 
	  {
      	    // Here the attack has not been detected at all and at least one of the misses is unsafe. 
      	    // The system will be moving to a unsafe state.
      	    System_OK->Mark() = 0;
      	    System_safe->Mark() = 0;
      	    System_unsafe->Mark() = 1;
	  }
      }
  }
// Now reset the leftovers from the attack.
T_increment->Mark() = 0;
Detected_safely->Mark() = 0;
Detected_unsafely->Mark() = 0;
Missed_OK->Mark() = 0;
Missed_unsafe->Mark() = 0;
T_cur_value->Mark() = (double)(0.0);
T_value_step->Mark() = (double)(0.0);
Attack_Active->Mark() = 0;	// Abort dealing with the attack.

Model: configuration_channel (Left)

Model: configuration_channel (Right)

Place Attributes:
Place Names Initial Markings
Attack_in_progress
0
Channel_attacked_ID
0
Correct
1
Incorrect_1
0
Incorrect_2
0

Timed Activity: Correct_Incorrect_1

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

100
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(1.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
case 2

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return(attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(0.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return(attack_CH2_success_pr);

Timed Activity: Correct_Incorrect_2

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

100
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(1.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
case 2

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return(attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(0.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return(attack_CH2_success_pr);

Timed Activity: Incorrect_1_Incorrect_2

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

0.0000001
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(0.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
case 2

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return(attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(1.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//  return(attack_CH2_success_pr);

Timed Activity: Incorrect_2_Incorrect_1

Distribution Parameters
 Rate

0.00001
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(0.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//  return((double)(1.0) - attack_CH2_success_pr);
case 2

switch(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark())
  {
    case 1:
      return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
     break;
    case 2:
      return(attack_CH2_success_pr);
     break;
    default :
      return(1.0);
     break;
  }
// if(Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() == 1)
//   return(attack_CH1_success_pr);
// else
//   return(attack_CH2_success_pr);

Timed Activity: Restore_Conf_1

Distribution Parameters
 Value

Configuration_validation_Duration
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

return(Config_repair_success);
case 2

return((double)(1.0) - Config_repair_success);

Timed Activity: Restore_Conf_2

Distribution Parameters
 Value

Configuration_validation_Duration
Activation Predicate
(none)
Reactivation Predicate
(none)
Case Distributions
 case 1

return(Config_repair_success);
case 2

return((double)(1.0) - Config_repair_success);

Output Gate: R_Output_Gate_1
Function
 

if(Attack_in_progress->Mark() == 0)
  Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() = 0;

Output Gate: R_Output_Gate_2
Function
 

if(Attack_in_progress->Mark() == 0)
  Channel_attacked_ID->Mark() = 0;

Model: Common_failure

Join Node: Simultaneous_failure :
Action Name
Submodel Action
OK_failure CH_1->Common_failure
CH_2->Common_failure

Model: Div_SW

Join Node: Channel_1 :
State Variable Name
Submodel Variables
Attack_enabled configuration_channel_1->Attack_in_progress
CCF_active SW_channel_1->CCF_active
CH_OK SW_channel_1->Channel_OK
Control_conf_channel_1->OK_state
C_attack_enabled Control_conf_channel_1->Attack_in_progress
Channel_attacked_ID configuration_channel_1->Channel_attacked_ID
ConfigurationOK SW_channel_1->Configuration_state
configuration_channel_1->Correct
Safe_state SW_channel_1->Safe_state
Control_conf_channel_1->Safe_failure
System_OK SW_channel_1->System_OK
Unsafe_state_2 SW_channel_1->Unsafe_state_2
Control_conf_channel_1->Unsafe_state_2

Join Node: Channel_2 :
State Variable Name
Submodel Variables
Attack_enabled configuration_channel_2->Attack_in_progress
CCF_active SW_channel_2->CCF_active
CH2_OK SW_channel_2->Channel_OK
Control_conf_channel_2->OK_state
CH2_Safe_state SW_channel_2->Safe_state
Control_conf_channel_2->Safe_failure
C_attack_enabled Control_conf_channel_2->Attack_in_progress
Channel_attacked_ID configuration_channel_2->Channel_attacked_ID
ConfigurationOK SW_channel_2->Configuration_state
configuration_channel_2->Correct
System_OK SW_channel_2->System_OK
Unsafe_state_2 SW_channel_2->Unsafe_state_2
Control_conf_channel_2->Unsafe_state_2

Join Node: Div_Software :
State Variable Name
Submodel Variables
Attack_conf_1 Channel_1->Attack_enabled
Adversary->Channel1_attacked
Attack_conf_2 Channel_2->Attack_enabled
Adversary->Channel2_attacked
AttackedID_1 Channel_1->Channel_attacked_ID
Adversary->AttackedID_1
AttackedID_2 Channel_2->Channel_attacked_ID
Adversary->AttackedID_2
CCF_active Channel_1->CCF_active
Channel_2->CCF_active
Adjudicator->CCF_active
CH1_OK Channel_1->CH_OK
Adjudicator->CH1_OK
CH1_Safe_State Channel_1->Safe_state
Adjudicator->CH1_Safe_Failure
CH2_OK Channel_2->CH2_OK
Adjudicator->CH2_OK
CH2_Safe_State Channel_2->CH2_Safe_state
Adjudicator->CH2_Safe_Failure
C_CH_1_attacked Channel_1->C_attack_enabled
Adversary->C_CH_1_attacked
C_CH_2_attacked Channel_2->C_attack_enabled
Adversary->C_CH_2_attacked
System_OK Channel_1->System_OK
Channel_2->System_OK
Adjudicator->System_OK
T_Conf_channel->System_OK
System_Safe_Failure Adjudicator->System_Safe_Failure
T_Conf_channel->System_safe
System_Unsafe_State Adjudicator->System_Unsafe_State
T_Conf_channel->System_unsafe
Torque_Attack_in_progress Adversary->Torque_Attack_in_progress
T_Conf_channel->Attack_in_progress

Performance Variable Model: MTT_emotor
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name Div_SW
Model Type Rep/Join

Performance Variable : MTT_SF
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_Safe_Failure->Mark() > 0)
  return(0.0);
else
  return(1.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate Distribution
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,
Stop Time 100000.0,
Distributions Lower Bound on Distribution Estimate 0.0
Upper Bound on Distribution Estimate 100000.0
Step Size on Distribution Estimate 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 1.0

Performance Variable : MTT_USF
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_Unsafe_State->Mark() > 0)
  return(0.0);
else
  return(1.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate Distribution
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,
Stop Time 100000.0,
Distributions Lower Bound on Distribution Estimate 0.0
Upper Bound on Distribution Estimate 100000.0
Step Size on Distribution Estimate 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 1.0

Performance Variable : system_SF_count
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions Adjudicator->System_SS_Act
(Reward is over all Available Models)

return(1.0);
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)
Simulator Statistics Type Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate Distribution
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,
Stop Time 100000.0,
Distributions Lower Bound on Distribution Estimate 0.0
Upper Bound on Distribution Estimate 1000.0
Step Size on Distribution Estimate 100.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Performance Variable : System_failure
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if((Adjudicator->System_Safe_Failure->Mark() > 0) || (Adjudicator->System_Unsafe_State->Mark()))
  return(1.0);
else
  return(0.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate Distribution
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,
Stop Time 100000,
Distributions Lower Bound on Distribution Estimate 0.0
Upper Bound on Distribution Estimate 100000.0
Step Size on Distribution Estimate 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Performance Variable : System_OK
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_OK->Mark() > 0)
  return(1.0);
else
  return(0.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate Distribution
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,
Stop Time 100000.0,
Distributions Lower Bound on Distribution Estimate 0.0
Upper Bound on Distribution Estimate 100000.0
Step Size on Distribution Estimate 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Performance Variable : impulse_SF
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_Safe_Failure->Mark() > 0)
  return(1.0);
else
  return(0.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Instant of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,1000.0,2000.0,3000.0,4000.0,5000.0,6000.0,7000.0,8000.0,9000.0,10000.0,11000.0,12000.0,13000.0,14000.0,15000.0,16000.0,17000.0,18000.0,19000.0,20000.0,21000.0,22000.0,23000.0,24000.0,25000.0,26000.0,27000.0,28000.0,29000.0,30000.0,31000.0,32000.0,33000.0,34000.0,35000.0,36000.0,37000.0,38000.0,39000.0,40000.0,41000.0,42000.0,43000.0,44000.0,45000.0,46000.0,47000.0,48000.0,49000.0,50000.0,51000.0,52000.0,53000.0,54000.0,55000.0,56000.0,57000.0,58000.0,59000.0,60000.0,61000.0,62000.0,63000.0,64000.0,65000.0,66000.0,67000.0,68000.0,69000.0,70000.0,71000.0,72000.0,73000.0,74000.0,75000.0,76000.0,77000.0,78000.0,79000.0,80000.0,81000.0,82000.0,83000.0,84000.0,85000.0,86000.0,87000.0,88000.0,89000.0,90000.0,91000.0,92000.0,93000.0,94000.0,95000.0,96000.0,97000.0,98000.0,99000.0,100000.0,
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Performance Variable : impulse_USF
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_Unsafe_State->Mark() > 0)
  return(1.0);
else
  return(0.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Instant of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,1000.0,2000.0,3000.0,4000.0,5000.0,6000.0,7000.0,8000.0,9000.0,10000.0,11000.0,12000.0,13000.0,14000.0,15000.0,16000.0,17000.0,18000.0,19000.0,20000.0,21000.0,22000.0,23000.0,24000.0,25000.0,26000.0,27000.0,28000.0,29000.0,30000.0,31000.0,32000.0,33000.0,34000.0,35000.0,36000.0,37000.0,38000.0,39000.0,40000.0,41000.0,42000.0,43000.0,44000.0,45000.0,46000.0,47000.0,48000.0,49000.0,50000.0,51000.0,52000.0,53000.0,54000.0,55000.0,56000.0,57000.0,58000.0,59000.0,60000.0,61000.0,62000.0,63000.0,64000.0,65000.0,66000.0,67000.0,68000.0,69000.0,70000.0,71000.0,72000.0,73000.0,74000.0,75000.0,76000.0,77000.0,78000.0,79000.0,80000.0,81000.0,82000.0,83000.0,84000.0,85000.0,86000.0,87000.0,88000.0,89000.0,90000.0,91000.0,92000.0,93000.0,94000.0,95000.0,96000.0,97000.0,98000.0,99000.0,100000.0,
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Performance Variable : impulse_OK
Affecting Models Adjudicator
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over all Available Models)

if(Adjudicator->System_OK->Mark() > 0)
  return(1.0);
else
  return(0.0);
Simulator Statistics Type Instant of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0,1000.0,2000.0,3000.0,4000.0,5000.0,6000.0,7000.0,8000.0,9000.0,10000.0,11000.0,12000.0,13000.0,14000.0,15000.0,16000.0,17000.0,18000.0,19000.0,20000.0,21000.0,22000.0,23000.0,24000.0,25000.0,26000.0,27000.0,28000.0,29000.0,30000.0,31000.0,32000.0,33000.0,34000.0,35000.0,36000.0,37000.0,38000.0,39000.0,40000.0,41000.0,42000.0,43000.0,44000.0,45000.0,46000.0,47000.0,48000.0,49000.0,50000.0,51000.0,52000.0,53000.0,54000.0,55000.0,56000.0,57000.0,58000.0,59000.0,60000.0,61000.0,62000.0,63000.0,64000.0,65000.0,66000.0,67000.0,68000.0,69000.0,70000.0,71000.0,72000.0,73000.0,74000.0,75000.0,76000.0,77000.0,78000.0,79000.0,80000.0,81000.0,82000.0,83000.0,84000.0,85000.0,86000.0,87000.0,88000.0,89000.0,90000.0,91000.0,92000.0,93000.0,94000.0,95000.0,96000.0,97000.0,98000.0,99000.0,100000.0,
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1

Set Study: exp1a:
Experiment
Variable
Type
Value
Base_line AttackRate double 0.01
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.0E-4
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0.0
D_T_attack_prob double 0.0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1.0
SS_repair_rate double 36.0
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360.0
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 10
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 0
t_delta double 10.0
t_window double 25.0
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
No_attack_CC_enabled_03 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.01
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.01
T_V_steps_max short 3
T_V_steps_min short 1
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 0
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.3
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 0
t_delta double 30
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
No_attack_CC_enabled_05 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1

Set Study: exp1b:
Experiment
Variable
Type
Value
No_attack_CC_enabled_05 CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.01
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.01
T_V_steps_max short 3
T_V_steps_min short 1
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 0
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.5
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 0
t_delta double 30
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
No_attack_CC_enabled_08 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.01
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.01
T_V_steps_max short 3
T_V_steps_min short 1
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 0
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 0
t_delta double 30
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
No_attack_no_CC AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 0
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6

Set Study: exp1c:
Experiment
Variable
Type
Value
No_attack_no_CC Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 0
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 0
t_delta double 10
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
SS_conf_CC_enabled_both_ch_36_36 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 36
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 10
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 1
t_delta double 10
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
SS_conf_attack_CC_both_enabled_360_36 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50

Set Study: exp1d:
Experiment
Variable
Type
Value
SS_conf_attack_CC_both_enabled_360_36 ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 360
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 36
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 10
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 1
t_delta double 10
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
SS_conf_attack_CC_enabled_both__ch_3.6_36 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0
SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 3.6
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 36
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 10
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 1
t_delta double 10
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2
SS_conf_attack_CC_enabled_both_ch_36_360 AttackRate double 0.001
CC_enabler short 1
CC_failure_rate double 1.00E-04
Config_repair_success double 0.6
Configuration_validation_Duration double 0.1
Configuration_validation_increments short 50
ControlConfAttack double 0
D_T_attack_prob double 0

Set Study: exp1e:
Experiment
Variable
Type
Value
SS_conf_attack_CC_enabled_both_ch_36_360 SS_Conf_Attack double 1
SS_repair_rate double 36
T_V_Offset_mean double 0.5
T_V_Offset_stddev double 0.1
T_V_step_interval_mean double 0.05
T_V_steps_max short 7
T_V_steps_min short 3
TorqueAttack double 0.5
USF_repair_rate double 360
attack_CH1_success_pr double 0.2
attack_CH2_success_pr double 0.1
attack_count short 10
channel_failure_rate double 0.001
failure_coverage double 0.8
single_SS_enabler_is_0 short 1
t_delta double 10
t_window double 25
torque_req_rate double 0.02
v_delta double 0.2

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