Not There Yet - Spain’s Security Strategy from a Human Security Perspective

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Introduction

The much-awaited Spanish Security Strategy (the Security Strategy hereinafter) became a reality in June 2011. It has been described by some as a major leap forward in Spain’s strategic thinking and planning, and by others as a crucial moment in the history of Spanish democracy (IEEE 2011: 1; Estella et al. 2010: 3). Undoubtedly, it is a confirmation of Spain’s determination to develop into a strategic partner in the provision of stability and peace in an ever-growing, complex and interdependent international security scenario. The Security Strategy is based on a broad understanding of security and on a diverse range of actors and issues interacting to formulate a common security vision fit for the twenty-first century. In particular, the frequent references in the document to a ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’, ‘responsible interdependence’, as well as the idea that security is ‘everyone’s responsibility’, are examples of the penetration of the human security discourse into Spanish security thinking. Indeed, these concepts and themes share much with key principles in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe proposed by the Human Security Study Group (HSSG 2004). Some of these concepts and themes have in past years already been translated into policies and actions. Examples include Spain’s active participation in, and support of, initiatives on gender issues, its adherence to international legal mechanisms and its commitment to the UN. The argument developed in this chapter will ultimately show that, despite this positive progress, human security principles have not yet become the ‘operating framework’ (HSSG 2007: 7) in Spain’s security thinking and practices. National security discourses do persist, reinforced by a range of political, economic and institutional obstacles.

The vision developed in the Security Strategy could be interpreted as a confirmation of Spain’s contribution to – but also learning from – an emerging common European vision of security. Within this context, the country’s relationship to the
European Union occupies an important position. The Security Strategy makes it clear that Spain’s security interests are better accomplished within a reinforced EU presence in the world. It also adds that a ‘vigorous’ external action by EU Member States plays a part in making the EU presence felt in the world (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 25). This reciprocal relationship explains Spain’s dedicated participation in the evolving Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), at both the institutional and operational levels. It also explains the explicit allusion in the Security Strategy to the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy (in addition to NATO’s Strategic Concept) as reference points in Spain’s security vision (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). Notwithstanding the role that external influences have played – to use Narcís Serra’s terminology (2010: 68–69) – this chapter will argue that from a human security point of view the evolution of Spain's security policy, and its persistent limitations, cannot be explained solely by its relation to Europe. The domestic process of democratization and modernization, driven by an impetus to end the country’s international isolationism, and to eradicate the militaristic culture associated with the fascist regime, cannot and should not be forgotten. Indeed, the Security Strategy includes the lessons from the country’s democratic transition (which includes the reform of the military forces) as one of its defining characteristics as a security actor (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 23).

The chapter is divided into five sections. The first two provide an overview of the evolution of discourses and capabilities within Spain’s security thinking. This is followed by an analysis of how the evolving security vision has translated into cooperation within the EU and NATO, and the UN. The last section analyses the Spanish contribution to peace missions. Throughout the chapter the focus will be on those elements that do conform to human security principles and those obstacles that have precluded a full endorsement of a ‘human security operating framework’ (HSSG 2007: 7).

The Spanish security strategy: discourses
The determination to develop a security strategy was mentioned by former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the swearing-in speech for his second term in office, following the 2008 electoral victory, as well as by other Cabinet ministers in appearances later that same year in front of the Parliamentary Defence Affairs
Commission (Arteaga 2008). There seems to have been a strong consensus – in policy and academic circles – over the fact that the country needed a security strategy that, in accordance with the security visions of its main allies and the multilateral organizations to which it belongs, would outline goals, threats and vulnerabilities, areas in need of action and clear decision-making structures. The resulting systematic approach to security, in consultation with Parliament and society, would ensure a comprehensive, coherent and effective security vision (Ministry of Defence 2008: 1–2; Arteaga 2008; Edwards 2008).

The 2011 Spanish Security Strategy is based on a set of principles and values that include the respect for democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, and the protection of peace, freedom, tolerance, solidarity and global development. These principles underpin the protection of Spain’s ‘vital interests’, which at the individual level include the right to life, freedom, democracy, welfare and development, and at the state level the protection of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the constitutional order and economic security (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 16). The Security Strategy does not refer explicitly to the idea of human security, but this concept is nevertheless very present in the document. Key elements in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe (HSSG 2004), such as the protection of civilians, the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the use (or the threat of use) of proportional force as a last resort are included in so far as Spain’s pursuit of its principles, values and interests could require intervention in contexts far from the national territory. Moreover, the Security Strategy is influenced by the language of legitimacy, transparency and accountability. Any Spanish action abroad must uphold international law and the principles embedded primarily in the UN Charter, respond to the country’s bilateral or multilateral obligations and have Parliamentary approval (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 22–23, 43–45). Parliamentary control, an example of ‘bottom-up accountability’ (HSSG 2004: 27–28), should be exercised through the prerogative of ‘consultation and prior consent’ to the launch of any new mission, as well as through the responsibility of government to present in Parliament – at least once a year – an overview or progress report of all Spanish deployments abroad. This parliamentary standard – set by the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence – was summarized by former Prime Minister Zapatero a couple of weeks before the law was passed as follows: ‘while this
government is in office, not a single soldier will leave without the support of Parliament’ (quoted in Herranz Surrallés 2008: 24).

Zapatero’s emphasis on popular consultation was, in part, a direct response to the decision-making procedures followed during the Iraq War by his predecessor, former Conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar. The Socialist Party’s position was that the Spanish presence in Iraq was not acceptable unless the UN took over political and military control of the situation and Iraqi institutions were quickly re-established (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 56). Spain’s participation in this military intervention therefore took place despite a complete breakdown of the political consensus over foreign and security policy that had, by and large, characterized the country for much of the post-Franco period. It also led to widespread popular opposition, with 91 per cent of the Spanish population against the presence of Spanish troops in Iraq. The Socialist Party’s victory in the March 2004 elections (former Prime Minister Zapatero’s first term in office) led to the withdrawal of all Spanish troops from Iraqi soil earlier than the agreed 30 June 2004 deadline, something that was not welcomed or accepted by the US government, or understood by some European partners. However, this withdrawal met the demands of the majority of Spanish citizens (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 56).

Beyond the Iraqi case, the track record of making Zapatero’s parliamentary pledge into a reality is mixed. It has not been applied equally to all missions with Spanish military participation. Herranz Surrallés’ research (2008: 25) shows that only the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) went through ex ante consultation and approval from the Spanish Parliament, whereas the EU military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) were debated after the missions had been established and/or the Spanish government had committed to contributing troops to those missions. In the case of the NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya, parliamentary consent was sought after the government had committed to participating in the mission. Such an approach was justified through the use of Article 17(3) of the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence, whereby when forced to take decisions due to the urgency of the situation, the government would nevertheless seek Parliament’s ratification of such decision as soon as possible (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37721; Revista Española de Defensa 2011: 16–17). However, as noted by Herranz Surrallés in
relation to the missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, this approach effectively curtails the room for parliamentary influence over governmental policy. Moreover, the CSDP military operations EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Amis II (Darfur/Sudan) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Chad/Central African Republic) did not go through Parliament (Herranz Surrallés 2008: 25, 30). The performance is poorer among CSDP civilian missions, given that – as explained by Herranz Surrallés (2008: 25–26) – these are not covered by the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence, which introduced the internal legitimacy/accountability clause. Her research therefore shows that in the 2004–2008 period none of the CSDP civilian missions with Spanish participation (Guardia Civil and/or National Police) went through parliamentary debate. In this regard, it has been noted by some commentators that the Security Strategy – launched in an almost pre-electoral campaign period – has so far lacked the support of all the main political forces in the country, which could erode its claim to legitimately represent the values and needs of the Spanish society and could turn it into a ‘paper tiger’ with no real application. The Conservative party (People’s Party or Partido Popular) – the main opposition party until it won the November 2011 legislative elections - has in the past indicated that it does not support the Security Strategy partly because it was not debated in Parliament prior to its publication (Núñez Villaverde 2011; Argumosa 2011; Villarejo 2011; Mestres 2011: 5).

The gap between discourse and practice over the role of Parliament typifies a much wider discrepancy in the evolution of Spain’s security thinking. A closer look at the Security Strategy leads to a more conservative interpretation of the influence that the human security discourse has had on Spain’s security vision. One cannot deny that Spain has moved substantially away from the discourse that dominated the debate during and immediately after the end of the Franco period – a discourse that focused on the territorial defence against Spain’s enemies (i.e. Morocco in relation to Ceuta and Melilla, and the control of the Straits of Gibraltar). At the same time, one can still today observe an ambivalent position towards a complete abandonment of core notions within a national security approach. The Security Strategy’s opening section begins with the following statement: ‘Guaranteeing the security of Spain and of its inhabitants and citizens is the responsibility of the Government …’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 9). Moreover, the list of Spain’s ‘vital interests’ does include – as previously mentioned – the individual right to life, freedom, democracy and so on, but the Security Strategy
refers to these as the fundamental rights of the Spanish people (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 16). For Estella, Torres and Cebada (2010: 28, 34–35), Spain’s contribution to international security is therefore motivated by self-interest rather than solidarity, given the increasing transnational nature of many threats and the limited capacity of individual states to protect themselves and their citizens. Moreover, as mentioned above, Spain’s vital interests also include sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, with Gibraltar described as an ‘anomaly’ that poses security problems both for Spain and Europe. No further details are provided on what these security problems are but, going back to the 2003 Strategic Defence Review, these could potentially include the curtailment of Spain’s sovereignty. The scenario included in the 2003 document is the possibility of using Gibraltar to launch operations in geographical areas of strategic importance to Spain (such as the access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic), but without needing Spanish participation (Ministry of Defence 2003: 50). The Security Strategy also talks of the use of the national airspace to protect the country from terrorists, but also attacks from other states using airplanes, ballistic or cruise missiles (carrying, potentially, weapons of mass destruction) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 26, 42). This point was also made in the 2003 Strategic Defence Review wherein it was admitted that a large-scale armed aggression against the Spanish territory or its maritime or air space was highly unlikely. However, according to this document the threat of terrorism or missile attack still required attention (Ministry of Defence 2003: 49).

This residual adherence to the idea of territorial defence is present in key security and defence documents that have preceded the Security Strategy. The 2008 National Defence Directive uses a very similar language when making the point that ‘Spain considers its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order as essential interests’ (Ministry of Defence 2008: 6). Similarly, Article 2 of the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence provides for a broader understanding of the relationship between security and defence as a means to protect, among other things, the independence and territorial integrity of the country (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37718).

This ‘cohabitation’ of national and human security discourses is most evident in the Security Strategy’s passages on the armed forces. Significant steps have been accomplished in the modernization and democratization of the armed forces – a theme intrinsic to Spain’s ‘military transition’ away from the Franco regime – in line with the need for flexible, interoperable, deployable and multifunctional troops (Prime
Minister’s Office 2011: 46). From a human security point of view, one should note the emphasis placed on the promotion of gender equality and awareness in training programmes; the sustainability of troop numbers; the depoliticization of the armed forces to ensure they serve the needs of the people rather than those of the state; and the introduction of mechanisms to enable armed personnel to readjust to civilian life and to prepare civilians for support roles within the armed forces (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 52; Serra 2010: Chs 5–6). Moreover, since 2003, debates on the use of the armed forces have included two types of missions: multilateral missions (namely of a peace-support and humanitarian nature) and missions to support Spain’s governmental authorities in ensuring the security and well-being of Spanish citizens (Ministry of Defence 2003: 58–62). The latter category of missions includes the evacuation of Spanish nationals resident abroad in situations where internal turmoil in the country where they reside endangers their lives and interests. It also covers civil emergency situations caused by natural disasters or human action, such as flood relief interventions, soil decontamination, border controls and the protection of communication lines within the national territory from terrorist attacks. Other possible tasks are the use of the armed forces to enforce environmental laws against ships carrying hazardous or contaminating materials, to deploy on firefighting missions within the national territory or to provide security when major international events are taking place on Spanish soil, such as the meetings of the European Council in Barcelona and Seville (March and June 2002 respectively).

At the same time, security debates in Spain have not been able to disassociate completely from traditional understandings of the role of armed forces. That is, that the armed forces have – in line with the Spanish constitution – a mandate to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, as well as its territorial integrity and constitutional order. The 2008 National Defence Directive stated: ‘in the national sphere, the armed forces must maintain a deterrent and response capacity that is sufficient to defend Spain’ (Ministry of Defence 2008: 6). The same message is conveyed by the 2011 Security Strategy when it mentions that the armed forces must retain a defence capacity in case the Spanish territory (including the two Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and its people come under direct attack. Spain is presented as vulnerable due to its geographical situation and history (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 44).
The Security Strategy defines Spain’s values and vital interests in relation to a range of national, regional and global threats. These threats stem from armed conflict, terrorism, weak states and/or unstable regions, organized crime, economic/financial insecurity, energy insecurity, weapons of mass destruction, cyber-threats, uncontrolled migratory movements, and environmental crises. These threats can be accentuated by a range of trends and processes, including globalization, demographic growth, poverty and inequality in certain regions of the world and even within Europe, climate change, ideological and religious extremism, and technological advancements. These threats and exacerbating factors can have defence-related, but also political, economic and social repercussions for Spain and its partners in multilateral frameworks, endangering the stability of national, regional and global systems (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: Chs 3–4).

It is clear from the above that – as explained by Núñez Villaverde (2011) – Spain has endorsed an understanding of security that no longer distinguishes between the internal and external dimensions. In this sense, it follows the trend that has permeated key EU documents in recent years, including the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011: 420–422; Núñez Villaverde 2011). As mentioned above, both of these EU documents are included in the Security Strategy as reference points in Spain’s security evolution. This is not the first time that synergies are found between the Spanish and European security discourses. Mestres’ comparison of former Prime Minister Zapatero’s June 2008 speech at the Museo del Padro (Madrid) with the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy shows one crucial common factor: both refer to the need to use the concept of human security to find a suitable approach to security matters (Mestres 2011: 4). Moreover, the 2008 National Defence Directive – another key document in the evolution of Spanish security thinking – has much in common, in terms of the threats enumerated (and even the manner these are presented8), with the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 Implementation Report (Council of the European Union 2003, 2008). The 2008 National Defence Directive understands security as a basic right, as a fundamental public good for citizens, but also as a societal requirement in relation to many of the same challenges outlined in the abovementioned EU documents; i.e. international terrorism, organized crime, weapons of mass destruction, weak or failed states and regional conflicts (due to their capacity to
generate humanitarian crises and affect energy supplies for third states), resource wars, climate change and cyberspace threats (Ministry of Defence 2008: 3–4). The 2011 Security Strategy continues this trend, showing great similarities with the threats identified in these key EU documents, but also in the security strategies of, among other countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO (IEEE 2011).

The Spanish security strategy: capabilities
In order to meet adequately the threats and risk factors facing Spain, the Security Strategy emphasizes the need for responsible and effective governance at the international and regional levels, enhanced international legal tools and further European integration. At the national level, the 2011 document also points to a greater use of a number of state and societal actors, and improved capabilities in the areas of diplomacy, security and civil protection forces, intelligence services and international cooperation/development. This latter point is one of the most innovative aspects of the Security Strategy. According to the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, security policy can have a strengthening role on the social cohesion of a polity by making society an actor – rather that the state alone – in the provision of well-being (IEEE 2010a). It is too soon to determine the impact that the Security Strategy will have within Spain, but what is clear is that it represents an important step forward in the manner security and defence policies are discussed and decided upon.

The Security Strategy consolidates, but also goes beyond, the ‘whole of government’ approach that was introduced by the 2008 National Defence Directive. The latter document broke away from the compartmentalized approach followed for much of the post-Franco period, when strategic considerations were dominated by those ministries that were most actively involved in this domain, such as the Ministry of Defence (IEEE 2011: 1; Arteaga 2008: 6–7). This directive conceived of defence policy as a state policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister, requiring an integrated, inter-ministerial and multidisciplinary approach for its design and execution. The expectation – as explicitly mentioned in that directive – was that future defence strategies would be framed within a security strategy (Ministry of Defence 2008: 1–2). The formulation of the 2008 directive was the result of a team effort by all departments in the public administration with any role in defence and security matters. Thus, the ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Treasury had an active role in its design,
as did senior members of the armed forces, the Prime Minister and the Director of the National Intelligence Services (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia). The 2011 Security Strategy goes beyond the 2008 directive by incorporating into the process the regional public administrative structures (Autonomous Communities or Comunidades Autónomas). More importantly, it provides the Prime Minister’s Office with greater leadership, executive and coordination roles through the so-called Spanish Security Council (Consejo Español de Seguridad). Already described as ‘supra-ministerial integration’ (Arteaga 2011), this newly formed Council enjoys powers in the areas of decision-making, advising, monitoring and crisis management, going beyond what previous coordinating bodies had at their disposal. Moreover, its membership is flexible, incorporating into the process governmental actors depending on the nature of the threat or issue under discussion (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 83). The work of the Spanish Security Council is complemented by two other structures that perform a wide range of activities related to the Security Strategy and have a multidisciplinary membership. These are the Interministerial Committees (Comisiones Interministeriales) and the Support Unit (Unidad de Apoyo). 

This expanded and flexible ‘whole of government’ approach is combined in the Security Strategy with greater use of the private (business) sector, societal organizations, educational institutions (e.g. university research groups) and the citizenry. One is therefore witnessing what Estella, Torres and Cebada (2010: 50) would argue is the process of moving from a ‘whole of government’ to a ‘whole of state’ approach to security. The technological know-how, the international presence and the economic and human resources at the disposal of the private sector receive particular attention, both when describing their potential security role in protecting vessels from piracy, but also infrastructures, power grids and other essential services from cyber- and terrorist attacks. Equally, the Security Strategy advocates a ‘culture of prevention and rationalization’ (i.e. not spending less, but spending better) in order to develop a responsible and efficient use of resources; this is in part a response to Spain’s precarious economic situation following the global financial crisis. The collaboration of all sectors in society, from the central state machinery to citizens, is crucial to the development of such a culture. And, last but not least, in line with the commitment to popular legitimacy in security policy, the Security Strategy mentions the role of societal actors when developing adequate national policies in domains such as migration (including
approaches to the social integration of migrants) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 9–17, 56, 72).

The incorporation of societal actors into Spain’s security policy has already begun. Relevant ministries and other state structures, and political parties, were involved in the elaboration of the Security Strategy. This approach was complemented by an open consultation process (in the form of three workshops held in Madrid and Barcelona in 2010) with the private sector (banks and businesses), think tanks, NGOs in the humanitarian, conflict and international aid fields, journalists, academics and other experts from abroad. Moreover, the Security Strategy calls for the creation of a number of operational structures to enhance Spain’s security responses, including a Social Forum (Foro Social). This structure should act as a consultative mechanism in support of the Spanish Security Council and will be composed of all the societal actors mentioned above in addition to the regional public administrative structures (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 84–85). However, the Security Strategy acknowledges that society’s contribution depends on the development of a security culture as opposed to the defence culture that dominated much of the post-Franco period. This development would involve educating citizens, professionals and security actors (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 18). At a time of economic precariousness, and with an enduring history of little societal intervention and collaboration in state matters of a defence and security nature, it is unclear how this culture of security can take root (see, for example, the views of Núñez Villaverde 2011).

The need for enhanced national preparedness also translates – in the Security Strategy – into a commitment to introduce measures that will improve existing diplomatic, military, police and international aid tools. An important motivating factor is the need to develop the relationship between (national) civilian and military actors and, thus, Spain’s potential as a civilian power in the international system – an argumentative line also explored in the 2008 National Defence Directive. Legislative and institutional reforms have already provided for formal and informal channels of coordination between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Treasury, Interior and the Intelligence Services (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 57; Arteaga 2008: 6–7). However, there is ample room for improvement in tandem with the pledges on civil–military cooperation included in the 2011 Security Strategy. Spain’s participation in peace missions has, by and large, been dominated by the contribution of troops. As noted by
Mestres (2011: 5), the emphasis on ‘Spain’s military ambitions’ during Zapatero’s governments has come at the expense of developing civilian capabilities, a gap that the previous Conservative government also failed to address. However, the Spanish armed forces are beginning to accept mixed missions with civilian actors, something that was gradually becoming an inevitability given the many development and humanitarian activities they have been called to fulfil in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Haiti (2010 earthquake), among others places. A large component of Spanish civilian deployments to peace missions has come in the form of Guardia Civil (gendarmerie-type forces) as opposed to civilian police forces (Estella et al. 2010: 45). As part of her research into the Spanish contribution to CSDP civilian missions, Sabiote (2008: 81, footnote 34) found a competitive, rather than cooperative, relationship between Guardia Civil and the National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) that affected decisions on the nature of contingents to send on international missions.

Against this background, the Security Strategy’s call for the creation of an External Integrated Response Unit (Unidad de Respuesta Integrada Exterior) is to be welcomed. This unit is meant to work as an inter-ministerial body with the role of coordinating swift responses to multilateral or national interventions abroad that require the armed forces, but also civilian elements, including judges, police, doctors, firemen, engineers and other experts in a variety of fields such as logistics, prisons, gender and customs (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 48).

If successful, enhanced civil–military capabilities and cooperation would allow Spain to provide the comprehensive approach it advocates in its Security Strategy, bringing it closer to a human security approach to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It could also help attenuate the impact of the economic difficulties currently facing the country, by using civilian actors where defence budgets can no longer provide due to cutbacks. The defence budget (as a share of the national non-financial expenditure budget) has gone from 5.23 per cent in 2009 to 4.16 per cent in 2010. The year 2011 witnessed a slight increase of the defence share to 4.77 per cent. This was due to a larger drop in the overall volume of the 2011 national non-financial expenditure budget (18.9 per cent reduction from 2010) compared with the drop in the defence share of that budget (7 per cent reduction from 2010). As explained in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, the 7 per cent reduction in the defence share is in real terms only a 3.66 per cent drop due to the fact that throughout 2010 the
resources initially earmarked for defence matters were gradually cut down in line with the government’s austerity measures. Even then, the data indicates that the additional reduction in 2011 comes at a significant price in terms of the resources normally devoted to military personnel costs (Spanish Parliament 2010b: 2, 5; Ministry of Defence 2011: 8). At the time of writing and following the November 2011 legislative elections won by the conservative People’s Party (under the leadership of Mariano Rajoy), the country is preparing for a new round of austerity measures. Against this background it will be challenging for the Security Strategy to harness the sustained attention it needs to have a real impact on security practices.

**Spain and European security organizations**

The Security Strategy reiterates that, without abandoning its bilateral commitments, Spain adheres to the goals of ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘responsible interdependence’ in the pursuit of functioning structures of global governance that cater for the increasingly transnational threats the country faces nationally, regionally and internationally (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). This is an area where Spain has already provided ample evidence of its efforts to translate words into deeds, albeit with some limitations, as highlighted in the rest of this chapter. Spain is an active participant in a variety of multilateral security forums, with an increasing emphasis on European regional organizations (namely the EU and NATO), but always in accordance with its obligations as a member of the United Nations. The origins of this commitment are to be found in the modernization and democratization processes that followed the end of the Franco regime. Integration into Western European institutions became crucial to break away from two main facets of the Franco period. First, was the isolationism from the European continent that resulted from the regime’s ideological and political disagreements with the rest of Europe and its different strategic priorities. Whereas Franco was interested in the south (i.e. Morocco and Gibraltar), most of Spain’s European neighbours focused on the threats emanating from the Soviet Union. Second, was the military status quo that permeated all aspects of Spanish society during the fascist regime. This military status quo responded to the conviction that the prime role of the military establishment was the protection of internal order and patriotic values from the threat of communism, not national defence (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 50; Serra 2010: 93–99).
Spain’s integration into Western European security organizations went through a number of phases, best exemplified in its relations with NATO, culminating in a situation where now the security of Spain is intrinsically and indissolubly linked to that of Europe (Ministry of Defence 2008: 5). This has translated into a strong adherence to the full development of the EU’s ‘actorness’ in the international system, particularly in the security and defence fields. At the same time, this commitment to the EU has not diminished Spain’s interest in contributing to the ‘transatlantic space’ through NATO. The 2011 Security Strategy refers to NATO as the ‘main intergovernmental defence alliance’ and as ‘central to the security of the [European] region’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 31). It is therefore not surprising to find that since the late 1990s (when it joined NATO’s command structures) Spain has actively participated in a number of the Alliance’s structures and operations.

The 2011 Security Strategy argues that while Spain would benefit from a strengthened EU on the world scene, it must contribute actively to this strengthening process (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 24–25). This reciprocal relationship explains the country’s active involvement in EU actions against piracy in Somalia and in the fight against illegal migration. In both instances Spain has contributed actively to the creation and development of structures (i.e. the Military Coordination of Action against Piracy in Somalia (NAVCO) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) and missions (the military operation EU NAVFOR Somalia ‘Atalanta’ against piracy in the Somali coast, the military mission to train Somali security forces (EUTM-Somalia). In both cases there was a clear awareness that the security repercussions at the national level arising from piracy and migration could not be addressed without greater activity at the EU level (Prime Minister’s Office 2011; Mestres 2011: 4). At the same time, this cooperation also has its limits. In the area of border management, Spain is committed to the free movement of people within the Union, but is not ready to relinquish all its sovereign powers. This explains its opposition in 2011, together with Germany and France, to the European Commission’s proposal to reinforce its own powers vis-à-vis national prerogatives within the Schengen Treaty. The Commission’s proposal was, at least in part, motivated by the ‘diplomatic incident’ on the French–Italian border in April 2011. For a short time, France closed its border with the south of Italy when faced with an increasing volume of refugees who
were fleeing the violence in Tunisia (but also Libya). This move was followed by a French–Italian initiative within the EU to reintroduce the capacity of Schengen Member States to impose temporary border controls when faced with similar situations in the future. Denmark further complicated the situation in May 2011 when it unilaterally decided to reinstall permanent border controls with Germany and Sweden as a means to fight cross-border criminality (La Vanguardia 2011a, 2011b).

This reciprocal relationship with Europe is also behind Spain’s conviction that the EU needs a ‘true defence policy with adequate and credible [defence] means’ in addition to other political instruments, such as the European External Action Service (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 25). Further defence integration at the EU level is Spain’s response to the cuts in defence budgets at the national level – again, the idea is not spending less, but spending better by joining forces with EU Member States. Spain’s Presidency of the Council of the EU (January to June 2010) included in its agenda the refinement of the Battlegroup concept as a means to enhance military cooperation among EU Member States, including during humanitarian crises (Spanish Presidency of the European Union 2011: 5–6). In this regard it is noteworthy that Spain is among the five countries (together with France, Italy, Germany and Poland) that in September 2011 urged Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to sponsor the creation of a permanent command centre for the planning and development of missions, as permitted by the notion of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ under the Treaty of Lisbon (El Mundo 2011).

Notwithstanding its commitment, the contribution Spain can make to further defence integration at the EU level is at least in part questionable due to the limitations imposed by its funding mechanisms and its military power. In the past, as noted by Barbé and Mestres (2007: 59–60) and even when Spanish defence budgets were growing (up to 2007), Spain encountered difficulties with the costs of unforeseen missions that operated under the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’ (such as NATO’s relief operation during the earthquake in Pakistan). Sabiote (2008: 77) adds strength to these arguments by showing how Spain’s insistence – during Zapatero’s first administration (2004–2008) – on a model of Battlegroups that favoured contributions by a small number of countries (or tactical groupings) responded to national exigencies; in particular, the small size of the Spanish military compared with that of many European
partners, both in terms of defence budgets and its initial absence from the European defence equipment market.

Spain and the United Nations

Despite the importance Spain increasingly places on its role within European security organizations, it has not abandoned its deep-rooted commitment to the United Nations. The Security Strategy states that the UN is ‘the essential source of legitimacy for international actions and the most relevant forum for world co-operation; its role is fundamental to the maintenance of international peace and security’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 31). A number of decisions and actions have been taken in the last few years that clearly illustrate Spain’s commitment to the UN system in line with a human security discourse. These include its pledge to commit 0.7 per cent of its GDP by 2015 to Official Development Assistance (ODA).\(^{13}\) There has also been a steady increase in Spanish contributions to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), reaching US$39.6 million (€29 million, approximately) in 2010, and thereby making Spain the fifth largest donor (after Norway, Sweden, UK and Netherlands) (CERF 2010).\(^{14}\) It is also fully committed to the reform of the UN Security Council, advocating an increase in the number, length of term and participatory role for non-permanent members and restricted use of the veto powers. These proposals are motivated by Spain’s commitment to make this key decision-making organ more representative and legitimate. It also supports a number of measures in the realm of international justice and human rights, including the consolidation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the work of the Human Rights Council, of which it is a member for the 2010–2013 period (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2007b; Estella \textit{et al.} 2010: 51–52; IEEE 2010b: 24).\(^{15}\) It is within this commitment to human rights and international justice that one can find one of Spain’s most important achievements within the UN system: the promotion of women’s rights, particularly during armed conflict. It is therefore surprising that the 2011 Security Strategy does not develop this aspect of Spain’s international role, only mentioning three times, and rather succinctly, the words ‘gender’ and/or ‘women’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 14, 15, 43).

The November 2010 invitation to become a member of the governing structures of UN-Women marks the culmination of Spain’s sustained work over the years on gender issues (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2010).\(^{16}\) Notable past actions
include its leading donor status in the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) during the 2004–2007 period. In 2008 it also provided UNIFEM with €50 million to launch the new Fund for Gender Equality. The Fund’s mandate is to assist multi-donor projects by governments and civil society organizations in developing countries working on the promotion of women’s political and economic empowerment at the local and national levels (UNIFEM 2007: 25, para. 8; 2008). Moreover, since 2007, Spain has incorporated Resolution 1325 to its contributions to peace missions and to its activities in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The aim is to guarantee the rights of women, adolescents and girls in conflict and post-conflict zones and incorporate them into peace negotiation and implementation processes, collaborating with Spanish civil society in the attainment of these goals (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c). On this basis, and as part of the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2010), a seminar was organized in Madrid to advocate for the introduction of measures that would ensure the gender dimension is adequately incorporated into CSDP missions. Among the suggested measures was a proposal to make recommendations to EU Member States on how best to follow Resolution 1325 within their national defence and security policies (Ministry of Defence 2010).

At the national level, this commitment to Resolution 1325 has led, for example, to efforts to fully integrate women in the armed forces with the same opportunities and welfare benefits as men, including provisions to better balance family and work. This clear commitment is further exemplified by the creation in 2005, within the Ministry of Defence, of an Observatory of Women in the Armed Forces (Observatorio de la Mujer en las Fuerzas Armadas) to monitor selection and promotion processes and the overall well-being of women. By mid-2009 over 12 per cent of the armed forces and 9.5 per cent of Spanish personnel in peace missions were women. These improvements have addressed some of the long-standing gaps with respect to women’s involvement in the Spanish armed forces, although there is still room for improvement when it comes to the presence of women in the higher military ranks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 5–9; Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c).
Spain and peace missions

Spain has participated for over 22 years in peace missions, with the first contribution taking place in 1988 when it was invited by the UN to join the UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM-I), a mission deployed to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The first Spanish participation in a multinational military operation came during the 1991 Gulf War when Spain allowed US forces en route to the Gulf region limited use of military facilities in its territory. It also sent naval units to the region as part of the Western European Union’s (WEU) enforcement of the UN embargo (Mestres 2011: 2). Since then Spain has been involved in over 50 missions, in some of them taking leading positions and with an increasing preference, some would argue, for NATO and EU operations. This commitment over the years has required a growing deployment of Spanish personnel abroad, a figure that stood at 120,000 troops by the end of 2010 (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 2).

Spain’s adherence to effective multilateralism through participation in peace missions has nevertheless been challenged by the very dangerous nature of some of the interventions. The decision in February 2006 (during former Prime Minister Zapatero’s first term in office) to withdraw the 200-strong Spanish military contingent from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) came with a 45-day notice as opposed to the standard nine months’ to a year’s notice (in this regard, for political reasons, Iraq is another example of a similar governmental position). Although the reasons that led the Ministry of Defence to take this decision do not seem to be officially known, one of the plausible explanations could be the need to ensure that the Spanish budget was not stretched too thinly by contributing to too many missions simultaneously. However, Aguirre Ernst (2006: 4) mentions an alternative explanation for the Spanish withdrawal from Haiti: the need to avoid casualties that could be used by the political opposition for electioneering purposes. Equally, Sabiote argues that Spain’s half-hearted contribution to the EU mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA could be explained by the risk levels it faced in a preceding EU military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR DR Congo), where it was among the nations that made the largest contribution (Sabiote 2008: 77–78).

Whether Spain is becoming more risk-sensitive remains the subject for ongoing debate, particularly surrounding current military deployments, of which the Spanish contingent in NATO’s ISAF is, at the time of writing, the largest. In the presentation to
the Spanish Parliament in December 2010, former Minister of Defence Chacón prioritized the provision of the highest level of protection to Spanish troops deployed in missions abroad, particularly those in Afghanistan (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 11–12).

Spain’s adherence to effective multilateralism has also been put to the test in Kosovo, but for different reasons. Spain’s non-recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo authorities seems to have been heavily influenced by a domestic (political) debate on the governance of the Spanish territory and relations between the state and the regions. Domestic politics have, therefore, been prioritized over the country’s commitments to its strategic partners in the EU and NATO (see, for example, the analysis by Torreblanca 2009; Johansson-Nogués 2008). Indeed, a range of actions taken by the Spanish government have been criticized by its allies. Examples include the 2008 decision to vote in the UN in favour of having the International Court of Justice look into the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, against the views of NATO and EU allies, and the 2009 decision to gradually withdraw all Spanish troops serving under the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). In fact, at the time of writing, Spain only has one military observer with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as well as 13 Guardia Civil officers (out of a total of 1,200 international police) in the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 32; Ioannides & Collantes-Celador 2011: 433; Torreblanca 2009; Estella et al. 2010: 45).

Conclusion
The 2011 Security Strategy confirms the remarkable transition that the country has experienced in its security thinking. It strengthens Spain’s move to endorse a much broader understanding of its shared security threats and obligations in a globalized world. More than 22 years of contributing to peace missions and other humanitarian and development actions have left a deep mark in the Spanish security thinking. The result has been a set of priorities and areas of action that include the protection of civilians, gender issues, the reinforcement of international legal instruments and the development of the EU ‘actorness’ as a way to realize its commitment to effective multilateralism. The emphasis – at least in theory – on domestic democratic control or bottom-up accountability (through Parliament) and the international legality of missions (through UN authorization) is at the top of the list of requirements Spain increasingly demands before its troops are deployed abroad.
Notwithstanding all the progress attained since the end of the Franco period, it is nevertheless debatable to what extent this endorsement of a wider understanding of security – that shares much with a human security approach – amounts to a paradigmatic shift in its security vision. Human security precepts continue to co-exist with a residual attachment to defence defined in territorial terms, not only when setting goals, but also when outlining the role of the Spanish armed forces. The growing concern with the security of Spanish personnel deployed in peace missions, and decisions taken on mission deployments on the basis of domestic imperatives, are in direct confrontation with key human security elements, such as the goal of ensuring the well-being of citizens during armed conflict or responding to the needs on the ground (HSSG 2004: 14–15). It also calls into question Spain’s commitment to effective multilateralism, not only within European security organizations, but also in the UN system.

The credibility of this evolving human security discourse and its embodiment in the form of the 2011 Security Strategy could be further called into question by the current financial situation in the country and the lack of support from all political forces. Both elements are essential if Spain is to have the time and resources to translate words into deeds, particularly in the realm of military, but more importantly civilian, capabilities. The 2011 Security Strategy is an important step in the right direction, but whether it will succeed where previous attempts could not, or only had limited effect, remains an open question. Only time will tell.

Notes
1 During the preparation of this chapter the CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs) Foundation and the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (Barcelona) provided invaluable assistance and guidance. The author would also like to thank the editors of the book for comments on previous versions of the chapter. The translations from Spanish to English are unofficial, carried out by the author. As always, any errors and omissions are the author’s responsibility alone.
2 For many, this close relationship to the EU results, at least in part from the presence of Javier Solana (former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy), who was appointed by the Spanish government in
December 2009 to lead the development of the Spanish Security Strategy (see, for example, IEEE 2011: 3).

Although this chapter highlights the importance of the Security Strategy, an analysis of Spain’s security thinking would be incomplete without references to pre-2011 documents and legislation. These include the National Defence Directives (Directivas de Defensa Nacional), the Strategic Defence Review (Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa – approved by Parliament in 2003) and the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence (Ley Orgánica 5/2005 de la Defensa Nacional). The National Defence Directives are documents prepared by the Ministry of Defence, presented to Parliament and sanctioned by the Head of Government every four years (coinciding with the government’s term in office). Prior to the 2011 Security Strategy, these directives represented Spain’s provision of a ‘security’ vision that it could share with its partners and public at home.

The other main exception was the disagreement during the 1980s between the main political forces over NATO membership (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 51). The author is grateful to Laia Mestres for her comments in relation to this point.

In its determination to improve the interoperability of the armed forces, Spain has participated in a range of European initiatives. Examples include the European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENFOR), the European Operational Rapid Force (EUROFOR), the European Naval Force (EUROMARFOR), the European Air Group (AEG) and the European Amphibious Initiative (EAI). Some of these structures were created to be used – if necessary – during NATO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UN missions (Moliner González 2008).

These types of missions were subsequently spelt out in Article 15 of the Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37720–37721).

When discussing these threats, the Security Strategy draws at times from contemporary events, including the volcano eruption in Iceland in 2010, the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes, and cyber attacks in Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Iran (2010) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011).

In the 2008 Defence Directive the problem of resource wars is presented as one that could become prominent in years to come, particularly in relation to water
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access. The language and timeframes used shared much in common with the passages on those same topics in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Additional details on each of the three workshops are available on the CIDOB Foundation’s website. The CIDOB was one of the organizers of the workshops. www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/dossiers_cidob/estrategia_espanola_de_seguridad_ad_la_sociedad_civil_y_la_ees [accessed 5 September 2011].

The author is grateful to Narcís Serra for his comments in relation to this point.

Interestingly, as early as 2006, a seminar on civil–military relations organized by the Spanish think tank Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) proposed the creation of an inter-ministerial coordinating unit, as well as highlighting the security role of the private sector and NGOs. This seminar brought together practitioners and scholars from various ministries and think tanks in Spain, as well as representatives from Norway, Canada, Germany, the EU and OSCE (Garrigues et al. 2006).

The author is grateful to Mary Martin for her comments in relation to this point.

In fact, in terms of Spanish ODA one can observe a growing financial contribution to international actions in favour of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in so far as health, poverty and gender equality are concerned. Its commitment to meet the 0.7 per cent benchmark by 2012 had at the time of writing been extended to 2015, something that could possibly be linked to the country’s financial difficulties (UN 2010).

The UN Central Emergency Response Fund is a standby fund created by the UN in 2005 to upgrade the Central Emergency Revolving Fund. It includes a grant element based on voluntary contributions from governments, private sector organizations and individuals in order to provide more effective (timely and reliable) humanitarian assistance to those populations affected by armed conflict and natural disasters (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN, 2007a). In 2010 alone, donor contributions allowed the Fund to respond to humanitarian crises in 46 countries.

For a more detailed outline of Spain’s contribution to human rights within the UN system, see UN 2010.

UN-Women stands for the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. It merges and builds on the work of a range of
existing structures and initiatives, including the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW).

17 The author is grateful to Narcís Serra for his comments in relation to this point.

18 The EU mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo proved controversial from a political point of view as the government did not receive full support from Parliament. The left-wing political party Izquierda Unida questioned the legitimacy and independence of the Congolese government to organize democratic elections against a background of serious political fragmentation in the country. This is an example of Spain diverging from human security ideas if we take into account that one of the principles advocated by the Human Security Study Group is the establishment of a legitimate domestic authority capable of upholding human security (HSSG 2004: 15–16; Sabiote 2008: 78).

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