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Towards a Critical Sociology of Dominant Ideologies: An Unexpected Reunion between Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski

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Abstract

This article aims to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski's 'La production de l'idéologie dominante' ['The production of the dominant ideology'], which was originally published in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* in 1976. More than three decades later, in 2008, a re-edited version of this study was printed in book format as *La production de l'idéologie dominante*, which was accompanied by a detailed commentary, written by Luc Boltanski and entitled *Rendre la réalité inacceptable. À propos de « La production de l'idéologie dominante »* [*Making Reality Unacceptable. Comments on 'The production of the dominant ideology'*]. In addition to containing revealing personal anecdotes and providing important sociological insights, this commentary offers an insider account of the genesis of one of the most seminal pieces Boltanski co-wrote with his intellectual father, Bourdieu. In the Anglophone literature on contemporary French sociology, however, the theoretical contributions made both in the original study and in Boltanski's commentary have received little – if any – serious attention. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature, arguing that these two texts can be regarded not only as forceful reminders of the fact that the 'dominant ideology thesis' is far from obsolete but also as essential for understanding both the personal and the intellectual underpinnings of the tension-laden relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski. Furthermore, this article offers a critical overview of the extent to which the unexpected, and partly posthumous, reunion between 'the master' (Bourdieu) and his 'dissident disciple' (Boltanski) equips us with powerful conceptual tools, which, whilst illustrating the continuing centrality of 'ideology critique', permit us to shed new light on key concerns in contemporary sociology and social theory. Finally, the article seeks to push the debate forward by reflecting upon several issues that are not given sufficient attention by Bourdieu and Boltanski in their otherwise original and insightful enquiry into the complexities characterizing the daily production of ideology.

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Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to make a case for the enduring relevance of Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski's 'La production de l'idéologie dominante' ['The production of the dominant ideology'], which was originally published in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* (henceforth *ARSS*) in 1976.¹ More than three decades later, a re-edited version of this study was printed in book format as *La production de l'idéologie dominante* (Paris: Éditions Raisons d'agir, 2008 [1976]).² This new edition was accompanied by a detailed commentary, written by Luc Boltanski and entitled *Rendre la réalité inacceptable. À propos de « La production de l'idéologie dominante »* [*Making Reality Unacceptable. Comments on 'The Production of the Dominant Ideology'*] (Paris: Demopolis, 2008).³ In this commentary – which contains not only various revealing personal anecdotes, but also numerous important sociological insights – Boltanski provides an insider account of the genesis of one of the most seminal pieces he co-wrote with his intellectual father, Bourdieu.

Yet, the theoretical contributions made in *La production de l'idéologie dominante* (henceforth *PID*) and, to an even greater degree, those made in *Rendre la réalité inacceptable* (henceforth *RRI*) have been largely ignored in the Anglophone literature on contemporary French sociology.⁴ This article aims to fill this gap not only by drawing upon *PID* but also, more significantly, by offering a fine-grained examination of Boltanski's *RRI*,⁵ demonstrating that these two texts – which constitute forceful reminders of the fact that the 'dominant ideology thesis'⁶ is far from obsolete – are essential for understanding both the personal and the intellectual underpinnings of the tension-laden relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski. In addition, the following sections elucidate the extent to which the unexpected, and partly posthumous, reunion between 'the master' (Bourdieu) and his 'dissident disciple' (Boltanski)⁷ equips us with powerful conceptual tools, permitting us not only to illustrate the continuing centrality of 'ideology critique' but also, in a more fundamental sense, to shed new light on key concerns in contemporary sociology and social theory. The final section seeks to push the debate forward by reflecting upon several issues that fail to receive sufficient attention by Bourdieu and Boltanski in their otherwise original and insightful enquiry into the complexities characterizing the daily production of ideology.

1. A Scientific Project

PID was a *scientific* project.⁸ Bourdieu and Boltanski's conception of science as both an *inventive* and a *political* endeavour⁹ was based on the paradoxical assumption that it was vital 'to believe in science and not to believe in it'¹⁰, that is, to *defend* its enlightening mission and, at the same time, to *question* its epistemic claims to objectivity and

universality. Science is *inventive* in that it provides conceptual and methodological tools for the examination of reality, and it is *political* in that it can be used either to reinforce or to undermine the legitimacy of established ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns.

Aware of both its *innovative* and its *normative* functions, Bourdieu and Boltanski insisted on the empowering potential and progressive contributions of science, whilst rejecting the positivist faith in the possibility of epistemic objectivity and universalizability. Thus the two scholars embraced both a position of *scientific optimism*, aimed at challenging common-sense preconceptions about the world, and a position of *scientific pessimism*, oriented towards exposing the socially specific – that is, value-, power-, and interest-laden – functions of all forms of knowledge production.

Yet, just as it is crucial to draw a *functional* distinction between the constitutive tasks of science, it is imperative to draw a *typological* distinction between non-science and science. To be exact, we need to recognize the epistemological difference between *ideology* and *science*: the former is *distortive*, grounded in misperceptions, misconceptions, and misrepresentations; the latter is – at least potentially – *informative*, founded on logical descriptions, rational explanations, and methodical evaluations. It is the task of scientific analysis to penetrate beyond the deceptive – that is, ideologically filtered – appearances of ‘reality’ and to uncover the underlying structural mechanisms that govern both the characteristics and the developments of the ‘world’, including those of society.¹¹

2. A Non-Conventional Project

PID was a *non-conventional* project.¹² *ARSS*, in which *PID* was originally published, sought to bypass the orthodox logic of mainstream academic forums of discussion and dissemination, thereby enabling its founding figures to develop a sense of ownership and distinct intellectual identity. Those directly involved in the venture ‘found it difficult to publish [their] papers in official academic journals, with editorial committees, such as, for example [...], the *Revue française de sociologie*’¹³. The scholars in charge of editing these journals tended to regard themselves as ‘gatekeepers of norms [...] in the name of Science and of what they called Epistemology’¹⁴. The nepotistic and protectionist modes of functioning of established French academia in the 1970s did not leave much, if any, room for alternative ways of undertaking and circulating sociological research.

In such a counterproductive intellectual climate, for renegades such as Bourdieu and Boltanski, who were unwilling to subscribe to the stifling doxa pervading the academic game of middle-of-the-road social science, ‘*the idea of having [their] own journal – a place in which [they] could do what [they] wanted to do, write as [they] wished to write, develop the areas in which [they] were interested, describe and criticize at the same time, in short, do sociology*’¹⁵ – was both *intellectually and strategically attractive*. Such an endeavour would permit them to set their own agenda, with independent – that is, self-defined and autonomously applied – evaluative parameters, standards, and criteria.

In this respect, both *space* and *time* were significant considerations. To start with, ‘[t]he question of the *length* of the papers’¹⁶ was important: trying ‘to escape predefined

formats'¹⁷, *ARSS* provided the opportunity to publish unusually short, as well as extraordinarily long, articles. Furthermore, the issue of *timing* was critical: aiming to avoid the constraining logic of bureaucratic schedules, *ARSS* offered a discursive forum in which 'to publish quickly, for instance, a result of a survey [...], without having to await a committee's verdict for months'¹⁸.

As any experienced social scientist will be able to confirm, some research-based manuscripts are excellent at 2000 words, others at 8000 words, and others at 15,000 words or even longer; and some studies, especially empirical ones, if they do not get published until several years after their completion, will seem obsolete by the time they see the light of day in the public arena of scholarly discourse. Bourdieu's book series *Le sens commun*, published by Éditions de Minuit, was motivated by a similar rationale, enabling him and his collaborators to create unorthodox realms for the distribution of social-scientific findings. United in this mission, the relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski was characterized by a curious 'mixture of genuine friendship and interest'¹⁹, shaped by the contradictory – yet fruitful – confluence of collaboration and competition underpinning their collective effort to construct alternative spaces for critical reflection capable of bypassing the stifling logic of mainstream academic conventions.

3. *A Reflexive Project*

PID was a *reflexive* project.²⁰ Back in the early and mid-1970s, before the arrival of personal computer technology,²¹ most aspects concerning the writing and editing process²² were dealt with manually. Arguably, this lack of access to advanced IT equipment allowed for a more flexible, imaginative, and impromptu *modus operandi* than is the case in the perfectionist writing culture of the digital age.²³ Embarking upon the challenging task of developing ground-breaking research paradigms and sociological concepts, such as '*neutral places*'²⁴ and '*multipositionality*'²⁵, Bourdieu and his collaborators aimed to make cutting-edge contributions to the social sciences by 'really breaking with academic routines and constraints'²⁶. Immersed in this stimulating atmosphere of both individual and collective intellectual ambition, they took advantage of 'the possibility of working with new people, speaking other languages, and moving within new areas, in order to discover documents and ideas'²⁷.

The emerging project of developing a *reflexive sociology* had two major components, intimately related to Bourdieu's famous 'double epistemological rupture'²⁸: the break with both *scholastic* and *common-sense* conceptions of the world. The former is expressed in a categorical commitment to *empirical* research; the latter is articulated in an uncompromising devotion to *critical* research. The former is epitomized 'in the pleasure of *sociology*, which – dissimilar to established disciplines such as philosophy and literary studies – requires not only spending one's life reading books but also leaving the library'²⁹ and looking for inspiration, as well as data, in the '*real world of occurrences*'³⁰. The latter is central not only to the *interpretive* endeavour of calling doxic preconceptions and taken-for-granted assumptions into question, but also to the *explanatory* venture of shedding light on underlying social forces, notably power structures, whose existence largely escapes people's everyday grasp of the 'deceptive world of appearances'³¹. This uncovering mission – which is essential to Marxist forms of ideology

critique, including those developed within the intellectual tradition of the Frankfurt School – is particularly important to the challenge of examining the mechanisms of social domination imposed upon human actors within ‘totally commodified’ and ‘totally administered’ societies.³²

In a world entirely subordinated to a *market logic*, in which all relations would be converted into *contractual transactions* [...], *sociology* [...] would become simply *impossible*.³³

[...] nowadays, economic power has shifted towards other spheres, often with an international character, where the people in charge fail to recognize the *value of the social sciences* unless they are integrated into the *culture of management*, which represents the new common language of the globalized ‘elites’ [...].³⁴

A truly *reflexive* sociology, in the Bourdieusian sense, encourages critical actors to resist both the neo-liberalization and the neo-managerialization of society in general and of the social sciences in particular.

4. A *Work-in-Progress* Project

PID was a *work-in-progress* project.³⁵ From a distance, the launch of *ARSS* may be viewed as ‘a salient moment in the history of the social sciences in France’³⁶, in the sense that it marks the beginning of a new paradigm: ‘a current emerges, it manifests itself in its coherence, it invents an original form, it finds a readership, etc.’³⁷. During their period of intense collaboration, Boltanski learned important *conceptual* and *theoretical*, as well as *methodological* and *logistical*, lessons from Bourdieu: above all, his mentor’s attention to detail, that is, an obsessively meticulous mode of analytical and editorial functioning that most intellectuals of his calibre inevitably develop.

At the same time, within this dynamic cooperative and cohesive ‘work-in-progress culture’, there was no canonical hierarchy established between different tasks, let alone between those in charge of them. This is eloquently expressed in Boltanski’s following statement:

One of the numerous things that I learned from the patron [Bourdieu] – especially whilst working with him on the journal, maybe one of the most important ones – was the *attention to detail*, which goes hand in hand with the *refusal to establish a hierarchy between tasks*, as if some of them were significant and sophisticated and others largely irrelevant and unpleasant. There was no ‘school management’ [*intendance*] in our group. *We were the management ourselves, with this obsessive wish to control and reflect on everything* [...].³⁸

Perhaps it was the *eclectic* constitution of the group of scholars editing the journal that was the main reason behind the prolific research culture it produced among its members. It was shaped by ‘a multitude of interactions, taking place within rather different registers – economic, amicable, intellectual, strategic, material, etc.’³⁹ and creating ‘connections between different people’⁴⁰, most of whom – in line with the stereotype of ‘academic egos’ – were ‘sensitive, difficult’⁴¹, and each of whom had their own ‘writing style’⁴² and their own ‘obsessions’⁴³.

Owing to this heterogeneous – and, in many ways, tension-laden – composition of the team, the preparation of each collection of articles required ‘compatibilizing persons and things whose association could never be taken for granted’⁴⁴. Under such circumstances, ‘this collective work was demanding’⁴⁵, not only because of internal discrepancies but also due to a considerable *lack of human, material, and logistical resources*.⁴⁶ Given that 2000 copies of the first number of *ARSS* were sold out within only two weeks of its publication⁴⁷, however, the members of the group realized that their ‘work-in-progress project’ had swiftly turned into a serious academic venture with a potentially large-scale – that is, interdisciplinary and international – impact.

5. *An Autonomist Project*

PID was an *autonomist* project, that is, a collective undertaking situated outside the institutional mainstream of academia.⁴⁸ Far from (re-)telling the story of the emergence of *ARSS* for reasons of nostalgia or academic narcissism,⁴⁹ Boltanski – in his *RRI* – wishes to illustrate the *contingency* of the social conditions that undergird the production of knowledge, particularly in terms of the decisive influence of epistemic networks. For him, the challenge is ‘to uncover the *arbitrary* nature of the *constraints* that are presented and often accepted, nowadays, as inevitable and unstoppable’⁵⁰. The question that arises in this context, however, is the following: if this sort of *autonomist* research ‘was possible thirty years ago, why is it not possible, in a different form, today?’⁵¹ Boltanski’s response to this query is straightforward: as a result of the arrival of *neo-liberalism* and *neo-managerialism*, new ‘modes of control and administration’⁵² have emerged in recent decades. Whilst in the 1970s ‘[t]he techniques of modern management had not yet penetrated the academic and cultural worlds’⁵³, in the present era large parts of educational and intellectual life are colonized by systemic imperatives, especially by those imposed by the economy and the state through processes of commodification and bureaucratization.⁵⁴

As Boltanski cynically remarks, in the marketized and managerialized world of contemporary academia, the idea of publishing – largely or exclusively – in non-refereed journals is tantamount to professional suicide.⁵⁵ By contrast, at the time of the foundation of *ARSS*, Bourdieu’s and his collaborators’ ability to *escape* the intellectually stifling – if not, paralyzing – rhythm of a standardized ‘nine-to-five’ working day, aimed at meeting instrumentally driven targets in accordance with numerically defined benchmarks, was conducive to the emergence of a prolific research environment, shaped by the meaningful – that is, purposive, cooperative, and creative – activities of its participants.

[...] this slackness, this administrative carelessness, was precisely what opened a *space of liberty* in which creation became possible. *Within the margins, the marginalized were at ease*.⁵⁶

Of course, principles of the academic market existed, and one could know them. If one was prepared to pay a certain price, however, it was more or less possible to ignore them. They were not constantly on our minds. And this gave us courage. *There were multiple markets*, rather than one big market. And, *between the interstices of these markets*, there were *zones* in which not many things worked, but in which we, on condition that we did not have too high an expectation, *were more or less protected*.⁵⁷

In short, the founding figures of *ARSS* had succeeded in giving birth to a space of relative *autonomy*, capable of challenging not only the constraints of conventional academia but also, more fundamentally, the imperatives of a market- and target-driven society.

6. A Counter-Hegemonic Project

PID was a *counter-hegemonic* project.⁵⁸ To be sure, throughout his academic career, Boltanski has co-authored various studies⁵⁹, notably with Laurent Thévenot⁶⁰, Ève Chiapello⁶¹, Élisabeth Claverie⁶², and – perhaps, most significantly – with Pierre Bourdieu⁶³, but also with other scholars⁶⁴, in addition to having given quite a few interviews, which were eventually published⁶⁵. Unlike most of his other co-authored texts, however, the writing projects on which Boltanski collaborated with ‘the patron’ – in particular that of *PID* – were developed during long nights filled with seemingly endless work, either at his mentor’s house, in Antony, or at his mentor’s office, situated in the *Maison des sciences de l’homme*.⁶⁶ As explicitly acknowledged by Boltanski, Bourdieu took the lead in preparing most sections of this seminal text⁶⁷, which – initially – was supposed to be part of an edited volume on the origins and consequences of May 1968, which never saw the light of day.⁶⁸

One of the striking features of Bourdieu’s research group was its tripartite function as an *intellectual circle*, a *family enterprise*, and a *forum for political activists*.⁶⁹ In other words, it appeared to be a major source of scholarly creativity, social solidarity, and grassroots normativity. Within this atmosphere of intense imaginative, collaborative, and projective self-realization, the purpose of *PID* was to scrutinize ‘*the social philosophy of the “dominant fraction of the dominant class”*’⁷⁰. Paradoxically, it was the *eclectic* nature of the empirical material gathered for this enquiry – such as ‘extracts from works, cursory comments on exam scripts, statistics, biographical notes, diagrams, televised interviews, etc.’⁷¹ – which was aimed at ‘*demonstrating the coherence of a conception of the social world*’⁷². The question remains, then, what exactly Bourdieu and Boltanski had in mind when making use of the term ‘ideology’. In this respect, the following passage is revealing:

The concept of *ideology*, as it is understood in this work, is derived from the *ethnography of forms of classification and categorization*, as well as of *systems of thought that inform mythical and ritual practices*. One of the ideas underlying the text is that it is precisely because it [i.e. ideology] is contained within *largely implicit schemes*, capable of triggering an *infinity of discursive productions and practices* adjusted to different situations, that this *worldview* can, at the same time, draw upon *truisms based on common sense*, as if it did not serve any function apart from saying what goes without saying, and perform an efficient action oriented towards the *transformation of the social world* in a particular way. [...] In this sense, one could conceive of *ideology as an extension of Austrian performativity* [...].⁷³

On this account, ideology and, in parallel, ideology critique, possess several socio-ontological functions: (a) *classifying/declassifying*, (b) *mythologizing/demythologizing*, (c) *ritualizing/deritualizing*, (d) *naturalizing/denaturalizing*, (e) *concealing/uncovering*, (f) *mobilizing/demobilizing*, and (g) *normalizing/denormalizing*. Intrinsically ambivalent,

all of these functions are relevant to two diametrically opposed processes: *reinforcing* or *challenging*, *confirming* or *undermining*, *conforming* or *subverting*, *stabilizing* or *disrupting*, *strengthening* or *weakening*, *conserving* or *transforming* the status quo.⁷⁴

In *Marxian* terms, every ideology constitutes a symbolically mediated ‘superstructural reflection’ of a materially consolidated ‘infrastructural reality’. In *Wittgensteinian* terms, every ideology is tantamount to a grammatically organized ‘language game’ embedded in a socio-historically specific ‘life form’. In *Bourdieuian* terms, every ideology represents an interest-laden ‘doxa’ situated in a power-laden ‘field’. Irrespective of the particular definition that one may favour, every ideology can be characterized as a structured and structuring structure: as a *structured structure*, it is shaped by social interactions and by the ways in which its advocates attribute meaning to the world; as a *structuring structure*, it shapes social interactions, including its defenders’ interpretations of the world.

What is – both theoretically and practically – more significant, however, is that it is the task of *ideology critique* (*Ideologiekritik*) to facilitate ‘a *movement of deconstruction* [...], a *critical reappropriation of the social world*’⁷⁵, with the aim of *empowering* ‘those who suffer from the oppression of reality as it is, that is, as it is constructed by those who, in accordance with their interests, dominate it’⁷⁶. In brief, the attempt to deconstruct the production of the dominant ideology is inextricably linked to the challenge of creating *counter-hegemonic* imaginaries, capable of challenging both the epistemic validity and the social legitimacy of established orthodoxies and thereby contributing to the construction of emancipatory realities.

7. A Relationalist Project

PID was a *relationalist* project,⁷⁷ that is, a critical endeavour aiming to unearth the relational constitution of reality, shaped by dynamics of positioning and, hence, by struggles over access to material and symbolic resources available in a given society. With this relationalist presupposition in mind, it is the job of critical sociologists to examine the performative construction of the multiple places that human actors occupy within the social space. In this respect, the following epistemo-methodological remark is crucial:

*The place between ‘dominant ideology’ and ‘dominant class’ is examined in terms of the intermediary concept of neutral place, which lies at the heart of the text.*⁷⁸

Paradoxically, Bourdieu and Boltanski’s account of ideology stands *within* the Marxist tradition of social and political analysis, whilst seeking to go *beyond* it: although there is, inevitably, an intimate link between dominant ideologies and dominant classes, the former cannot be reduced to an epiphenomenal manifestation of the latter. Thus, rather than subscribing to the orthodox Marxist assumption that ‘[t]he ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas’⁷⁹, that is, that ‘the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’⁸⁰, the two French sociologists introduce the concept of *neutral place*, in order to suggest that the *construction of symbolic forms* – despite the fact that this process is subject to spatiotemporally contingent

conditions of production – enjoys a degree of *relative autonomy*, whose complexity is functionally related, but not reducible, to the class-specific workings of a given society.

An *ideology*, understood from the perspective of *social anthropology*, can be characterized as ‘*dominant*’ to the extent that the *schemes supporting it inspire the discourses and practices of the members of a society, without therefore being attributed to a ‘dominant class’*.⁸¹

Put differently, ideology – in the broad, anthropological sense – is neither *class-driven* nor *classless*; rather, it is both *class-immanent* and *class-transcendent*, that is, it is shaped by socio-economic power, whilst rising above its stratifying logic. Surely, class-divided societies generate class-specific ideologies. Yet, the sociological centrality of socio-economically defined stratification patterns does not eliminate the existence of *diverse* – notably, cultural, ethnic, philosophical, scientific, religious, or artistic – sets of principles and values, which are *irreducible* to mere vehicles of symbolic forms representing the interests of a particular social class.

In the 1970s, ‘the existence of social classes was still widely recognized, not only by sociologists, but also by political and administrative actors and, more generally, by the majority of ordinary people’⁸². To be clear, Boltanski does not posit that, from the late 20th century onwards, we have been witnessing the arrival of a ‘classless era’⁸³. He implies, however, that the analysis provided in *PID* is more relevant than ever in the face of at least three key characteristics of advanced liberal-capitalist societies: *heterogeneity*, *intersectionality*, and *subjectlessness*.

- (a) With regard to the issue of *heterogeneity*, the notion of the *fractions* of class⁸⁴ is vital to the attempt to do justice to the fact that classes are internally divided by values, resources, and interests.
- (b) With regard to the issue of *intersectionality*, the notion of the *relativity* of class⁸⁵ is essential to the insight that human behaviour is shaped not only by socio-economic resources but also, simultaneously, by numerous other sociological variables – such as ethnicity, gender, age, and ability –, each of which possesses an idiosyncratic logic of functioning and none of which is reducible to any other co-variable.
- (c) With regard to the issue of *subjectlessness*, the notion of the *non-intentionality* of class is fundamental to rejecting any kind of conspiracy theory by recognizing that the most homogenous social group cannot be reduced to a unified collective subject with a monolithic base and cohesive will power.

It is in the light of these three reservations, concerning reductive conceptions of class, that the notion of ‘neutral place’ plays a pivotal role in *PID*:

The concept of *neutral place* permits us to account for these places without having to advocate a conspiracy theory. Neutral places are more or less *instituted spaces* within which the *members of different fractions* can meet and have exchanges without having to abandon their characteristics [...].⁸⁶

One of the key objectives of *PID*, in this respect, is the idea of challenging various *apocalyptic announcements* – such as ‘the end of class’, ‘the end of politics’, ‘the end of history’, and – last but not least – ‘the end of ideology’.⁸⁷ The provocative claim that, in the late 20th century, relatively affluent societies have experienced the gradual ‘end of ideologies’⁸⁸ – combined with ‘the subsequent disappearance of social classes’⁸⁹ and ‘the end of history’⁹⁰, epitomized in ‘the collapse of the USSR’⁹¹ – seems to have been confirmed by tendencies towards ‘depoliticization’⁹², denoting a theme that, nowadays, plays an ‘eminent role in the nostalgic regrets of the reformist Left’⁹³. If there is one grand narrative that has outlived the postmodern announcement regarding the ‘end of metanarratives’⁹⁴, it is individualism.

[Contemporary] ‘society’, with its ‘*individualism*’ especially ‘among young people’, [is] *the result of a politics entirely oriented towards the end of politics*, understood as the bringing-into-line of critical movements that attempted to oppose the dominant ideology.⁹⁵

On this view, ‘the rise of individualism’⁹⁶ – which, arguably, constitutes ‘the last grand narrative’⁹⁷ – is ‘the result of the work of *fragmentation*, which has accompanied the *depoliticization* of social life’⁹⁸. It appears, then, that – with the exception of liberalism – the grand political ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries – particularly anarchism, communism/socialism, conservatism, and fascism – are ‘no longer necessary’⁹⁹ and, in fact, almost completely outdated, because they are out of touch with reality. What is left is a social universe governed by ‘the meritocratic ideal’¹⁰⁰ that ‘if one wants, one can’¹⁰¹. Presumably, such a world is shaped by ‘the *equality of chances*, that is, by *meritocratic measures* allowing for the *fair selection of individuals*, in terms of their efforts and their work and, consequently, in accordance with their *merits* and their personal *talents*’¹⁰². Unsurprisingly, the project of eugenics was central to the attempt – made by modernist elites, mainly between the 1850s and the 1950s – to radicalize the ideology of meritocracy in a Darwinian fashion, based on the idea that the evolutionary principle of ‘the survival of the fittest’ could be mobilized in the interest of humanity, rather than exclusively in the interest of a particular social group or class.¹⁰³

The paradigmatic shift from *Keynesianism* and *Fordism*, founded on ‘the development of the – integrated and more or less planned – large-scale industry’¹⁰⁴, to *neo-liberalism* and *post-Fordism*, expressed in ‘the prioritization of mobility, openness [...] and transformations’¹⁰⁵, involves a historical transition from relatively *regulated* to increasingly *deregulated* forms of capitalism. This ‘(neo-)liberal turn’¹⁰⁶ is ideologically motivated by ‘the critique of “corporatism” (understood as syndicalism), of the “blocked society” (understood as the state’s steering of the productive apparatus and of social policies)’¹⁰⁷.

In this context, Boltanski’s distinction between *two fundamental types of critique* is relevant:

- The historical impact of *social critique* – directed at pathological consequences of the rise of modernity, such as misery, inequality, and egoism – is reflected in the idea of a ‘*grand contractual politics*’¹⁰⁸, associated with the influence of the working class movement in general and of the Trade Unions in particular.

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- The historical impact of *artistic critique* – exposing the alienating effects of the emergence of modernity, such as inauthenticity and oppression – manifests itself in ‘the development of the “*autonomy*” of people at work and of their “*responsibilization*”’¹⁰⁹.

The paradigm of *social critique* is intimately related to what Boltanski characterizes as *the second spirit of capitalism*. This ‘second spirit’ is ‘centred on the big enterprise, governed by wage-earning directors, some of whom come from the *Grands corps de l’État*, on Taylorian modes of production, and on public policies of planning and the redistribution of wealth’¹¹⁰. The ‘invisible hand’ of the market was supposed to be controlled by the ‘visible hand’ of the state.¹¹¹

The paradigm of *artistic critique* is firmly embedded in what Boltanski refers to as *the new spirit of capitalism*¹¹². This ‘third spirit’ is based on ‘the consolidation of new forms of production (*network production*, the development of *subcontracting*, *externalization*, increase in so-called “*atypical*” *contracts of employment* and in the number of *workers in precarious situations*)’¹¹³. These societal tendencies are inextricably linked to individual and collective experiences of ‘the uncertainties of the market’¹¹⁴ and, more fundamentally, to ‘the establishment of a new type of relation between capitalism and the state’¹¹⁵, driven by processes of privatization, deregulation, decentralization, debureaucratization, and flexibilization.¹¹⁶

8. A Constructivist Project

PID was a *constructivist* project.¹¹⁷ Rejecting any kind of *essentialist determinism*, according to which the division between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ members in society may be ‘naturally’ or ‘biologically’ determined, *PID* makes a case for *social constructivism*, according to which patterns of stratification, since they are relationally contingent, are fairly arbitrary.

[...] the elites have always sought to justify their positions and their privileges, by insisting on the *natural character* – linked not only to *human nature* (which sounds a bit old-fashioned), but especially to human nature rooted in a *biological substrate* (which makes knowledge accessible to science and, thus, justifiable as supposedly inevitable) – of *hierarchy* and *inequalities*, portrayed as the mechanical product of differences in terms of skills, capacities, and talents.¹¹⁸

In its most extreme forms, such an essentialist-determinist understanding of society is combined with the Darwinian, or even eugenicist, presupposition that the progress of humanity is driven by the ineluctable selection process of ‘the survival of the fittest’. According to this account, it is because of, not despite, the constitutive societal – and, arguably, evolutionary – role of powerful actors that history moves forward. The contention that ‘it is evident that the world evolves thanks to its elites’¹¹⁹ goes hand in hand with the assumption that left-wing ‘egalitarianism’¹²⁰ leads to stifling ‘conformism’¹²¹, which obstructs the flourishing of ‘the most creative and most original forms of the human spirit’¹²², but which is advocated by those who are infused with resentment when realizing that ‘they cannot follow’¹²³.

The worldview described above is based on a combination of problematic ‘-isms’:

- (a) *essentialism*, because it presupposes that different human beings are marked by different unchangeable – that is, deeply ingrained – traits and characteristics;
- (b) *determinism*, because it suggests that both individual and societal developments are governed by these traits and characteristics;
- (c) *socio-biologism*, because it implies that the traits and characteristics determining human behaviour are both culturally and naturally constituted;
- (d) *historicism*, because it posits that the distribution of these traits and characteristics is of world-historical significance, shaping the development of the human species;
- (e) *evolutionism*, because it maintains that world-historical developments are embedded in an underlying storyline driven by progress;
- (f) *teleologism*, because it assumes that the totality of worldly occurrences, including human actions, is oriented towards the realization of an overarching goal and that history – literally – ‘makes sense’ in that it follows a predetermined direction;
- (g) *elitism*, because it endorses the view that individuals forming part of a selective group with distinct qualities are intellectually and culturally – that is, civilizationally – superior to those who are not part of it; and
- (h) *eugenicism*, because it subscribes to the belief that the genetic quality of the human world population is constantly improving, thereby ensuring that – in the long run – only those with desired qualities succeed in contributing positively to the reproduction of the species, whilst those with undesired traits are relegated to the fringes of society and will gradually disappear.

The positivist conviction that both human and non-human forms of existence are governed by underlying laws – which can be uncovered by virtue of logical, rational, and empirical enquiry – has been central to the development of the natural and social sciences, especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries.¹²⁴ According to this view, ‘economic, historical, and social nature dictates its laws’¹²⁵, enforcing them upon the development of humanity, as much as physical, biological, and chemical constellations impose their causal patterns and regularities upon all aspects of worldly reality. Applied to the interpretation of human inequalities, the positivist method can be employed in the attempt to attribute scientific validity to the belief in the existence of *evolutionary selection processes*, which – presumably – permeate the development of society. This creed, which lies at the heart of the bourgeois doxa of ‘entitlement’, has proved vital to the reproduction of dominant ideologies and, thus, to justifying both the material and the symbolic influence of self-legitimizing hegemonies.

Thus, the *dominant ideology* is, above all, what is *transmitted* in the places and, particularly, in the educational institutions of the *elite*, to which the *dominant classes* wish to send their children, so that they can acquire the (good) education and the (good) spiritual journey that will permit them, eventually, to play the role they are expected to play, to join the elites, and become intelligent bosses.¹²⁶

In other words, it is by virtue of their ‘class-doxa’ and their ‘class-habitus’, reproduced in ‘class-fields’, that the dominant groups in society manage to perpetuate the stratifying logic underlying their own destiny, as well as the fate of those who are excluded from the privileged sectors of vertically organized realities. ‘The dominant ideology, the dominant culture within the circles of power, these are, in essence, the ideology and the culture shaped and transmitted’¹²⁷ in and through ‘the neutral spaces’¹²⁸, which – as relationally constructed fields of distinguished interaction – provide precious opportunities for the most privileged members of society, thereby enabling them to accomplish the mission of their self-fulfilling prophecy.

9. A Critical Project

PID was a *critical* project.¹²⁹ In the contemporary era, one of the main problems faced by advocates of radical emancipatory practices is that *critique can be confiscated by dominant ideologies in order to reinforce the legitimacy of class-divided societies*. The dominant classes – ‘drawing upon the shared values of equality, equity, and transparency’¹³⁰ – have succeeded in (re-)appropriating seemingly progressive principles for their own purposes.¹³¹ Cracking the secret of dominant ideologies, *social critique can serve multiple functions*¹³², such as the following:

- It can challenge different forms of *ideological* organization, that is, of specific sets of taken-for-granted assumptions based on ‘doxa’¹³³ and on the seemingly ‘most indisputable and most easily shared common values’¹³⁴, which appear to possess ‘a quasi-sacred character’¹³⁵.
- It can challenge different forms of *political* organization, recognizing that liberal and media-centred democracies, although they are embedded in systems of social domination, are preferable to authoritarian regimes and dictatorships.¹³⁶
- It can challenge different forms of *economic* organization, notably capitalism. The transition from the ‘second’ to the ‘third’ spirit of capitalism is reflected in ‘the shift from a representation of society in terms of *social classes*, or at least socio-professional categories, to a representation in terms of *social success*, with the sliding from “workers” to “the poor” (the “new poor”) and, hence, to “the excluded”’¹³⁷.
- It can challenge different forms of *technological* organization, calling into question the naïve subscription of elites to the belief in the universally empowering force of ‘technical progress and the industrial greatness’¹³⁸.
- It can challenge different forms of *academic* organization, especially those dictated by the neo-liberalization and neo-managerialization of education and research.

It is this final point to which Boltanski, in the context of *PID*, attributes great importance. In the 1970s, the possibility of participating in a group of sociological scholars and investigators allowed for the enriching ‘experience of collective research’¹³⁹. By

contrast, ‘nowadays, it is common to end up in solitude’¹⁴⁰ and isolation when trying to embark upon an academic career. What has emerged in recent decades – applying to higher education and scholarly investigation in most Western societies – is ‘a mixed and strongly hierarchical space, composed of a set of academic institutions (among which the possibilities for the pursuit of research are very unevenly distributed)’¹⁴¹. In such a vertically organized, competitive, and target-driven environment, in which the allocation of material and symbolic resources is profoundly unequal, ‘the ambition and the freedom of research’¹⁴² suffer from the colonization of meaningful – that is, purposive, cooperative, and creative – activities by systemic imperatives. Under these circumstances, scientific enquiry is exposed to the ubiquitous influence of a state and an economy that function in accordance with the disempowering logic of instrumental rationality.

Increasingly common, then, is ‘[t]he experience of both *insecurity* – with the anxiety it provokes, not only in material but also, especially, in identity-related terms – and intense *competition* between applicants, accompanying this process of tests’¹⁴³, trials, and constant assessments.¹⁴⁴ Most contemporary researchers have – albeit, admittedly, to different degrees – ‘interiorized the institutional demands to which they are subject’¹⁴⁵, reproducing them and, to a large extent, taking them for granted, in order to be able to survive within an increasingly commodified and benchmark-oriented academic field.

It is, therefore, more and more difficult to find niches (in the sense of ‘ecological niches’) favourable to the emergence of nonconformist works. The alternative that presents itself most frequently is the one of *belonging at the cost of conformity* or the one of *anti-conformism, but at the cost of marginality*, which also means *without resources for research*.¹⁴⁶

Put differently, in the contemporary academic field, one has two options: *either* one is willing to play the game of position-taking, benchmarking, and competition over material and symbolic resources; *or* one refuses to follow the market-, target-, and impact-driven logic of neo-liberal education and research agendas. The price one has to pay for the first scenario is succumbing to *compliance* and *conformity*, involving a considerable loss of scholarly autonomy and intellectual integrity. The price one has to pay for the second scenario is the risk of *self-relegation* and *marginalization*, leading to a substantial deficit of room for effective agency within academic institutions, thereby undermining both the short-term and the long-term viability of one’s career as an investigator, whose professional performance depends largely on the ability to secure access to numerous sources of funding.

One of the essential ingredients of Bourdieu and Boltanski’s success story was to establish themselves as scholars who were sufficiently *integrated* into the academic system to benefit from its material and symbolic resources, whilst being sufficiently *marginalized* within the scientific community to develop their own agenda on the basis of a nonconformist sense of collective identity. For them, to be part of a ‘critical movement’¹⁴⁷ meant to ‘embrace the social sciences’¹⁴⁸ by bypassing ‘the bureaucratic and political control of the cultural institutions depending on the state’¹⁴⁹. Indeed, their theoretical and practical capacity to transcend the instrumental logic of the market and the state provided them with a sense of accomplishment:

[...] the *confidence* that we had in ourselves, not as individuals but as a collective [...], [was] a *victory* [...] [for] *critical thinking* [...], a *political victory* [...]; our critical work within correct conditions was already a victory – and like a *victory of the social sciences*.¹⁵⁰

In this light, social science constitutes a collective endeavour concerned with three essential critical tasks: (a) *uncovering*, (b) *distancing*, and (c) *historicizing*.

- (a) It aims to *uncover* the multiple underlying forces by which ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns are shaped or, in some cases, even determined – particularly those that involve mechanisms of asymmetrically distributed access to different forms of power.¹⁵¹
- (b) It aims to *distance itself* from its object of study, since even the most ‘immersive’ methodological approaches – such as ethnomethodology – require at least a minimal degree of epistemic exteriority: ‘no phenomenon can be described if one remains entirely inside the framework that sustains it’¹⁵².
- (c) It aims to *historicize* social reality by shedding light on the spatiotemporally contingent conditions underlying its quotidian construction. In Boltanski’s terms, ‘to write a *history of the present* [...] is the task of *sociology*’¹⁵³. It is from this contextualizing attitude that sociology derives its principal normative mission: *to question the givenness of empirical immanence by daring to think in terms of the beyondness of imaginative transcendence*. Sociology, therefore, involves the challenge of confronting ‘the possibility that the present may be something that it is not, that reality may be something that it is not and, consequently, of *relativizing* or *deconstructing* the present as it is’¹⁵⁴. The main assumption underpinning socio-historical constructivism can be summarized as follows: *what can be constructed can be deconstructed and, if necessary, reconstructed*. The constant confluence of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction processes is as central to the pursuit of sociology as it is to the daily production of society.¹⁵⁵

If ‘sociology is critical by vocation’,¹⁵⁶ then it needs to take issue with the misrepresentations of reality that are produced by dominant ideologies, which are designed to conceal the material and symbolic divisions within vertically structured societies.

10. An Emancipatory Project

PID was an *emancipatory* project.¹⁵⁷ As spelled out by Boltanski, the article was well received by many other scholars, especially by those who felt sympathetic towards Bourdieu’s research group: sociologists¹⁵⁸, linguists¹⁵⁹, historians¹⁶⁰, philosophers¹⁶¹, Hellenists¹⁶², anthropologists¹⁶³, sinologists¹⁶⁴, economists¹⁶⁵, artists¹⁶⁶, writers¹⁶⁷, and colleagues working for cultural centres and museums¹⁶⁸. This extensive interest in *PID* was a reflection of its interdisciplinary relevance to key debates across a wide spectrum in the humanities and social sciences.¹⁶⁹

Strongly influenced by the ‘counter-culture of 1968’¹⁷⁰, *PID* was a systematic attempt to challenge the hegemonic ideological, behavioural, and institutional codes generated by managerial elites ‘within the economic space’¹⁷¹, in which there was little room for

the negotiating power of trade unions. The defence of counter-hegemonic principles, practices, and life forms indicates ‘the possible recuperation of the positive aspects of social crisis, within the cultural world’¹⁷², that is, of ‘emancipatory dimensions’¹⁷³. Critical sociology, in the radical sense, may be conceived of as an oppositional force questioning the legitimacy of systems of domination.¹⁷⁴ In fact, one of the themes of *PID* ‘consists in opposing the conciliatory representations of liberal modernity on the basis of a genealogy’¹⁷⁵ capable of exposing the disempowering and pathological consequences of the spread of dominant ideologies.

11. An Undogmatic Project

PID was an *undogmatic* project.¹⁷⁶ Granted, ‘various themes that lie at the heart of contemporary social struggles are missing’¹⁷⁷ in this study. This is especially true in relation to issues concerning the problem of *intersectionality*, that is, the ways in which *key sociological variables* – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – *simultaneously structure ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns*.¹⁷⁸ Among the main reasons for this omission are, as pointed out by Boltanski, the following: (a) the *widespread machismo*, which permeated not only large parts of the working classes, but also academic circles¹⁷⁹; (b) the predominance of *class-focused analysis* in left-wing social and political thought¹⁸⁰; (c) the absence of adequate *conceptual approaches* capable of shedding light on the existence, let alone the complexity, of intersectional dynamics and mechanisms¹⁸¹.

The third point appears to be particularly important in this regard: ‘in the middle of the 1970s, [they] were not equipped with an analytical framework permitting [them] to interconnect different struggles’¹⁸². Of course, in hindsight, it is easy to take issue with this lack of investigative openness and conceptual imagination. Given the impact of the *politics of identity, difference, and recognition*¹⁸³ upon contemporary understandings of social change, however, it is difficult to conceive of critical approaches to relations of power and domination without facing up to the multi-layered constitution of interrelated and overlapping sociological variables shaping people’s positions in diverse – coexisting and, in many cases, interpenetrating – realms of interaction.¹⁸⁴ Thus it is imperative to account for ‘the existence of a multiplicity of belongings’¹⁸⁵ and ‘identity-based relations’¹⁸⁶, as reflected in the rise of a politics ‘demanding the recognition of specific modes of oppression’¹⁸⁷ and, hence, insisting on the *plurality, heterogeneity, irreducibility, and incommensurability* of contemporary social conflicts. Rather than bemoaning ‘the decline of the working class movement’¹⁸⁸, critical sociologists need to ‘take seriously the large number of emerging demands and struggles’¹⁸⁹, thereby acknowledging the manifold belongings and allegiances¹⁹⁰ that are not only constructed and reconstructed but also experienced by ‘the plural actor’¹⁹¹.

Undoubtedly, it remains crucial to conceive of *Ideologiekritik* as a form of *Sozialkritik*,¹⁹² that is, as a systematic questioning of discursive frameworks that, due to their distortive function, conceal the domination and ‘exploitation of human beings’¹⁹³ by specific interactional and structural forces. Indispensable to this reflexive endeavour is the transcendence of the binary distinction between ‘the “*multitude*” and the “*mass*” [...] (submissive, passive, gregarious, easily abused by the demagogues, [...] etc.)’¹⁹⁴, on

the one hand, and ‘the *elite subjects*, bestowed with a genuine interiority, with a Kantian autonomy and lucid consciousness’,¹⁹⁵ on the other. The power of social distinction remains distinctly powerful. It is the task of ideology critique to deconstruct it.¹⁹⁶

12. A Materialist Project

PID was a *materialist* project.¹⁹⁷ As such, its protagonists were determined to insist on the continuing centrality of class in advanced societies. Indeed, class has been back on the social and political agenda for several decades. It survived the ‘cultural turn’¹⁹⁸ in sociology, and – owing to the pivotal role it plays in the stratification of capitalist societies – it will outlive other paradigmatic shifts in the future. Contrary to the fashionable rhetoric about the alleged ‘end of class’ in the context of post-industrialism and, thus, in opposition to the assumption that society is, increasingly, ‘oriented towards a classless structure’¹⁹⁹, one of the key objectives of *PID* was to insist on the continuing relevance of socio-economic divisions, expressed in both material and symbolic stratification patterns, in advanced capitalist formations.²⁰⁰ In a Marxist-functional fashion, one may claim that the state – as a vital institutional component of the superstructure in class-divided societies – has always been, and will always continue to be, ‘the mediator of class struggle’²⁰¹.

Certainly, it is possible to conceptualize the separation between social classes in a large variety of ways. Notwithstanding the particular explanatory model to which one may subscribe, it is difficult to deny that stratified societies are characterized by – often highly complex – divisions between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ classes.²⁰² The normatively more significant issue, however, is that *those ‘at the bottom’ tend to be more aware of their class position than those ‘at the top’*.²⁰³ Put in more general terms, ‘dominated’ subjects tend to be more conscious of their position in the social space than their ‘dominant’ counterparts – regardless of whether their possibilities for action are defined primarily in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability. The Hegelian distinction between ‘a subject in itself’ and ‘a subject for itself’²⁰⁴ is crucial to each of these dimensions: actors’ awareness of their position in the social space is a precondition for their ability to transform it.

Arguably, different ‘spirits of capitalism’ are accompanied by different ‘spirits of class’. Under the influence of the *second spirit*, from the 1930s onwards, class was taken seriously by the state, as demonstrated in the rise of different welfare state regimes – notably the social-democratic, corporatist, and liberal ones.²⁰⁵ Under the impact of the *third spirit*, from the 1980s onwards, class became less central to the state, as illustrated in the increasing influence of neo-liberal and neo-managerial ideologies, coupled with the project of meritocracy, driven by the ambition ‘to guarantee the establishment of a social order [...] within which all positions will be equally accessible to everyone (the equality of chances), in accordance with a model of an open market’²⁰⁶.

There are, as noted by Boltanski, various interrelated reasons for the *revival of class* in recent years: first, the *fading trust in the state’s* capacity to pursue viable class politics; second, an increasing interest in a *more differentiated understanding of class*; and, third, the need to acknowledge the – aforementioned – *pivotal role of intersectionality*, obliging us to reflect on, and engage with, ‘new factors underlying inequality and new forms of exploitation’²⁰⁷. In the jungle world of multiple – interconnected and, in some respects,

competing – struggles, social actors have to learn ‘to envisage their own condition and their identity *under different relations* and, consequently, to participate in different forms of mobilization’²⁰⁸, as well as to cope with ‘the tensions or the contradictions between these different dimensions’²⁰⁹. If, however, even the most disempowered and exploited actors living on the fringes of society stop identifying with class²¹⁰, then it is time to rethink the role of the diverse motivational backgrounds triggering individual and collective struggles in the contemporary era.

13. A Historicist Project

PID was a *historicist* project.²¹¹ Irrespective of what one wishes to make of recent announcements concerning numerous purportedly ground-breaking developments – above all, with regard to ‘class’, ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, and ‘history’²¹² –, one paradigmatic transition appears to have been crucial:

[...] the shift from a regime of the legitimization of authority that is, in principle, founded on the *collective or popular will* to a regime that is, in fact, based on the *social sciences* – particularly, on economics, demography, political science, and sociology; together with the subscription to the idea of the end of history, that is, of politics, which has been replaced with a *managerial representation of power* transposed by the enterprise state, which is itself committed to *redefining the relations between capitalism and the state* [...].²¹³

Unsurprisingly, ‘critique has had to adjust itself’²¹⁴ to the new parameters underlying contemporary societal formations. The historical transition from *simple domination*, epitomized in *authoritarian regimes*, to *complex domination*, sustaining *capitalist-democratic regimes*, is crucial in this respect.²¹⁵ The ‘two great totalitarianisms’ of the 20th century – namely state socialism and fascism²¹⁶ – seem to have given way to the triumph of political and economic liberalism and, hence, to the victorious consolidation of ‘market democracy’²¹⁷ in large parts of the world. *PID* was ahead of its time in anticipating this socio-historical shift, especially in terms of capitalism’s capacity to convert both *critique* and *reform* – and, consequently, *change* – into vital ingredients of the recipe of its own success.

This mode of domination, which is guided by the imperative ‘*change in order to preserve*’, is conceived of in *PID* as a ‘progressive (or converted) conservatism’ in contrast to ‘avowed conservatism’.²¹⁸

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This paradigmatic turn is intimately interrelated with ‘the shift from Fordist management, associated with the second spirit of capitalism, to the “network” management, associated with the new “spirit”’²¹⁹. This novel societal constellation manifests itself in the emergence of *new ‘tests’ in the labour market*:

The new selection tests have been invoked, within a multitude of quotidian local, and each time unique, situations, thereby profoundly modifying people’s future [...].²²⁰

Paradoxically, the elites pressing for this kind of change in managerial culture are both conservative and progressive: they are *conservative*, in the sense that they tend to

promote *orthodox* values legitimizing their relatively powerful position in society; at the same time, they are *progressive*, in the sense that they tend to endorse *heterodox* principles aimed at converting change into the main currency of long-term material and ideological success.

The principal feature of the ‘elites’ whose texts and interventions are analysed in our article [...] [is] the advocacy of ‘change’. These elites regard themselves as radically cutting-edge and modernist. [...] the ‘fatality of the probable’ [...]: one has to want the change that announces itself because change is inevitable. Thus, one has to *want necessity*.²²¹

The ideological celebration of the doxa ‘*change in order to preserve*’²²² plays a pivotal role in advanced knowledge economies, in which ‘governance by “experts”’²²³ constitutes an integral element of a mode of domination whose secret lies in the orientation towards the future, rather than in the short-sighted concern with the present, let alone in the nostalgic celebration of the past.²²⁴

In a quasi-Habermasian fashion, Boltanski suggests that *emancipatory life forms emanate from social practices whose legitimacy is based on relatively evenly distributed, democratically controlled, and individually or collectively empowering – material and symbolic – resources for action:*

[...] within a given framework, an action is illegitimate when it can be characterized as *arbitrary*, that is, when it is possible to demonstrate that it depends on the will of an individual, a group, or an organization, capable of seizing the position of umpire, equipped with the power to intervene in the debate between opposed points of view, whilst seeking to determine what is and what counts.²²⁵

Emancipatory projects are viable only to the extent that the practices by which they are sustained distinguish themselves in terms of their *normative specificity* from the disempowering mechanisms permeating the social construction of reality founded on relations of domination. Critical actors, however, must not underestimate the integrative capacity of dominant ideologies. The *distortive but pragmatic realism* of the most influential players permits them to exercise hegemonic control over ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns attributing legitimacy to class-divided domains of interactionality. Put differently, *the powerful are realists:*

Thus, those who govern – drawing on the representations relating to a not-yet-realized, yet inevitable, future – are healthy realists, because they have the power to make happen what they predict, not only because they predict it (following the logic of a *self-fulfilling prophecy*) but also because they have a high level of information, as well as advanced performative resources, at their disposal.²²⁶

Hence, *ideology* may be described as a *self-fulfilling prophecy*, in the sense that ‘it invents things in order to do things’²²⁷ – and this is what makes it ‘effective’²²⁸. The ‘economy of discourse and justification’²²⁹ is never completely disconnected from its *social conditions of production* – neither in terms of its *roots* nor in terms of its *consequences*. Ideology, therefore, is both *embedded in* and *oriented towards* social practices; it is constructed by meaning-producing subjects acting upon, and in relation to, reality.²³⁰

14. A Power-Analytical Project

PID was a *power-analytical* project.²³¹ Seeking to go beyond the limited explanatory scope of the sociological approach to power relations presented in *PID*, Boltanski identifies two main types of domination: *simple domination* and *complex domination*. Before reflecting upon the latter, let us consider the former, of which – according to Boltanski – there are two sub-types.²³²

On the one hand, there are *radical forms of 'simple domination'*, in which people are 'partially or completely deprived of their elementary liberties'²³³ and in which 'profound asymmetries are maintained or created by exercising explicit and – notably, but not exclusively – physical violence'²³⁴. Extreme historical examples of this kind of domination are 'absolute slavery'²³⁵ as well as military – especially fascist – dictatorships. Indeed, these cases may be characterized as situations or regimes of '*oppression*'²³⁶, in which critique is not only marginalized but also systematically curbed and, possibly, even criminalized:

Within situations of oppression, the eventuality of critique is simply excluded, as can be the mere possibility of posing questions about what is happening ('here, we do not ask any questions'). With both critique and questioning expelled, justification has no place to exist either.²³⁷

Under these circumstances, the shift from the spread of *ideology* to the use of *violence*²³⁸ can be undertaken in order to defend the power of those individuals, or groups of individuals, who are in control and who seek to remain in control at all costs.

On the other hand, there are *moderate forms of 'simple domination'*, which are less extreme than their radical parallels, in the sense that, under their umbrella, 'critique appears, to some extent, possible'²³⁹, even if actors can never be sure about the *kind* of critique they are permitted to articulate, let alone about the *degree* to which they are allowed to formulate it – either in an open and uncensored, or in a clandestine and hidden, manner. In this scenario, the distinction between *official (officiel)* and *unofficial (officieux)* justifications²⁴⁰ plays a pivotal role in defining what can be said in public and what can be said only – or not even – in private.

In both cases, the maintenance of 'profound asymmetries'²⁴¹ (in terms of class, ethnicity, gender, age, ability, etc.) is central to preserving material and symbolic structures based on social domination, often through disempowering mechanisms of oppression and exploitation.²⁴² Perhaps most importantly, however, at the heart of all forms of 'simple domination' lies '*the refusal to change*'²⁴³, representing an authoritarian position that, in the most extreme-case scenarios, is defended in '*the state of war* against the perpetual enemy from within'²⁴⁴.

The *development of 'complex domination'*, by contrast, is vital to the efficient and legitimized performance of 'contemporary *capitalist-democratic* societies'²⁴⁵. In fact, '[t]he democratic market societies – that is, those compatible with the functioning of capitalism – have constructed their political ideal in opposition to [the] model of domination'²⁴⁶ that may be characterized as 'simple'. Complex forms of domination are subject to '*an imperative of justification*'²⁴⁷. As a consequence, 'critique can make itself heard'²⁴⁸.

More specifically, what emerges is ‘the establishment of a *new type of relation between institution and critique*’²⁴⁹, that is, ‘the incorporation of the latter into the routines of social life’²⁵⁰. On this account, critique constitutes a major driving force of, rather than an obstacle to, the dynamic development of advanced capitalist societies, which are capable of enduring symbolic and systemic adjustment processes if and where these are deemed necessary. Given the pivotal role played by critique, individual and collective actors have to undergo ‘*selection tests*’²⁵¹, which, in the grand scheme of things, serve to reinforce the multiple ‘profound asymmetries’²⁵² permeating intersectionally stratified societies. Although, under regimes of complex or managerial domination, the legitimacy of these asymmetries can be called into question, their existence tends to be defended not by virtue of ‘repressive violence’²⁵³ but ‘by other pacific means’²⁵⁴ – notably on the basis of ideological, behavioural, and institutional patterns of social regulation.

One of the principal problems arising from the discrepancy between ‘formal equality’ and ‘substantive equality’ is that, in most cases, the opportunities promised by advocates of the former do not match the outcomes envisaged by supporters of the latter. The hegemonic spirit pervading contemporary forms of capitalism follows ‘a *neo-liberal logic*’²⁵⁵, according to which it is possible to ‘*blame the victim*’²⁵⁶ and appeal to people’s ‘*individual responsibility*’²⁵⁷, instead of accounting for ‘the weight of the constraints that operate at a collective level’²⁵⁸. The various target-oriented strategies – including the ‘psychological technologies of the management of human resources’²⁵⁹ – are designed to make individuals function in accordance with the prescribed benchmark-driven logic of neo-liberal regimes of governance. In such an environment, radical critique is degraded to an appendage of a self-referential system that has succeeded in converting processes of argumentation and justification into self-fulfilling prophecies, thereby confirming the empirical validity of the normative parameters underlying social mechanisms of com-modified administration and administered commodification.

15. A Cutting-Edge Project

PID was a *cutting-edge* project.²⁶⁰ The *shift from ‘avowed conservatism’ to ‘progressive conservatism’* is reflected in the emergence of a new mode of domination, which consists in ‘changing in order to preserve, appealing to necessity and drawing upon a governance of experts’²⁶¹. Given its detailed analysis of this crucial feature of ‘progressive conservatism’, *PID* ‘is more timely than ever’²⁶². What needs to be added to the picture, however, is the emergence of neo-managerial forms of power and control, which are of paramount importance to the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. This new spirit is impregnated with the

demands [...] that emerged from the May movement, which prompted the management, in the 1980s, to attach great value to *workers’ individual initiative* and to advocate forms of ‘*autonomy*’, which quickly turned out to replace the control close to the framing of the first level with (less costly) *self-control* [...], *informational control mechanisms exercised at a distance*, demonstrating the return of a *sophisticated version of Taylorism* [...].²⁶³

Under the umbrella of this ‘new spirit’, it appears that the ‘ideological eloquence’²⁶⁴ of modern metanarratives is no longer required:

[...] the deepening of the new regime of governance, founded on the authority of experts and on the dispossession/resignation of representatives, has rendered ideological eloquence simply obsolete.²⁶⁵

In such a neo-managerial climate, it becomes evident that ‘jurisdictional, complex frameworks, controlled by systems of evaluation, built upon track records (*benchmarking*)’,²⁶⁶ become a taken-for-granted component of a new culture driven by micro-economic and neo-classical imperatives.²⁶⁷ The Humboldtian ideal of universal and comprehensive education, based on people’s wide-ranging exposure to key aspects of the natural and human sciences, seems to have been replaced by the increasing influence of business school models²⁶⁸, in which value rationality (*Wertrationalität*) is secondary to purposive rationality (*Zweckrationalität*).²⁶⁹ Ironically, it appears that *neo-managerialism* serves the therapeutic function of the collective experience of *psychoanalysis*:

Management has had a *liberating effect* on the practical aspects underlying the *new elites’ affairs*, which is *comparable* to the effect that the diffusion of *psychoanalysis* has had on their *sexual practices*.²⁷⁰

The arrival of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ marks the advent of a ‘new era of liberation’, regardless of how inflationary the meaning of this term may have become in the neo-managerial world of categorical flexibility and constant transformation. And yet, behind the euphemistic language of ‘openness’, ‘change’, and ‘dynamism’ lurk both *competitiveness*, as an ideal, and *competition*, as a reality. In the face of the increasing individualization of societies that are governed by neo-liberal regimes and, in many cases, hit by austerity programmes²⁷¹, it has become a given to ‘put everyone in competition with everyone else and, thereby, *fragment* realms whose only defensive resource would be *union*’²⁷². The gradual ‘withdrawal of the state’²⁷³ from the economy – that is, the end of Keynesian state-interventionism – signals the emergence of a new type of domination:

[...] this *new form of domination* [...], a *reorientation of the state’s modes of action*, permitting it to serve the interests of a type of capitalism that has itself been profoundly modified. Whilst capitalism’s ‘spirit’ has been changing, the state has had to change its own spirit too.²⁷⁴

It seems, then, that in the era of this ‘new spirit of capitalism’ – inextricably linked to the rise of neo-liberalism and neo-managerialism – ‘the “*end of ideologies*”, prophesied for the past fifty years, has become a reality’²⁷⁵. This is not to suggest that ideologies have become irrelevant, let alone that they have disappeared. Rather, this is to acknowledge that, when considering the role of the grand political ideologies that shaped large-scale social developments during the 19th and 20th centuries (namely, anarchism, communism/socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and fascism), only one of them can be declared to be – at least provisionally – triumphant in the contemporary era: *liberalism*. Given its victorious status, it may not come as a surprise that, ‘[i]f nowadays there remains a class conscious of itself, it is the dominant class, rather than any other class’²⁷⁶. On this view, the only class that, in the strict sense, remains both ‘a class in itself’ and ‘a class for itself’ (that is, a class that exists both *objectively*, regardless of its awareness of itself, and *subjectively*, depending on its awareness of itself) is

the ‘global dominant class’²⁷⁷. For it is not the – increasingly weakened and fragmented – *working class* but the – gradually more strengthened and self-confident – *dominant class* that dictates the parameters and agendas intended to reinforce the worldwide consolidation of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’.

16. A Normative Project

PID was a *normative* project.²⁷⁸ As such, it was motivated by the assumption that – as Bourdieu famously put it – ‘sociology is a martial art’²⁷⁹. Boltanski has serious misgivings about this metaphor, not only because, as he admits, he is not fond of sports, but also, more importantly, because he rejects the idea of associating the production of intellectual work with a strategic game based on competition.²⁸⁰ To his mind, the whole point of the pursuit of critical sociological research is to expose the instrumental imperatives by which powerful social fields – especially economic and political ones – are governed.

In order to do justice to this *normative* mission, sociology needs to be conceived of as a discipline that is (a) empirical, (b) investigative, (c) uncovering, (d) demystifying, and (e) reflexive.

- (a) As an *empirical* discipline, it is committed to ‘*doing research*’²⁸¹ founded on real-world investigations, such as field work, surveys, interviews, statistical analysis, or archival work²⁸² – to mention only a few methods of sociological enquiry.
- (b) As an *investigative* discipline, it is driven by ‘the *requirement of truth*’²⁸³, derived from the logical and methodical consideration of knowledge claims whose validity needs to be assessed in terms of plausibility and evidence.²⁸⁴
- (c) As an *uncovering* discipline, it is motivated by the ambition to *unearth underlying – value-, power-, and interest-laden – mechanisms*, which are covered under the appearance of ‘reality’, but which shape the development of the ‘world’ that lurks behind every form of sociality.²⁸⁵
- (d) As a *demystifying* discipline, it is concerned with *exposing* not only the *relative arbitrariness* of material and symbolic constellations in the social world, but also the *distorting effects* produced by daily routines allowing for the emergence of interactional patterns based on taken-for-grantedness.²⁸⁶
- (e) As a *reflexive* discipline, it is confronted with the self-critical challenge of undertaking an *epistemological break with both scholastic and ordinary understandings of the world*, whilst examining its own – relationally defined – position, as well as its own – normatively constituted – functions, in the social universe.

It is the task of critical sociology not only to question the apparent givenness of reality, but also to imagine viable ways of improving the conditions of existence for all members of humanity. Thus, if necessary, it needs to contribute to ‘*making reality unacceptable*’²⁸⁷ by grappling with ‘its contradictions, its opacities, and its asymmetries’²⁸⁸ and, hence, by insisting upon its inherent fragility, which is reflected in its transformability.²⁸⁹ Sociology, understood in these terms, is a ‘fight’²⁹⁰ in the sense that it seeks to participate in, and to throw its weight behind, the struggles that are aimed at empowering the disempowered in

the name and interest of a common humanity, rather than of group-specific minorities. In short, there is no human emancipation without its protagonists' capacity to overcome the arbitrary chains of social division and separation, which are both concealed and perpetuated by ideologically constituted modes of distortion, validation, and legitimization.

Summary

The concept of ideology has been widely discussed in the humanities and social sciences.²⁹¹ One of the main reasons why it would be no exaggeration to suggest that *PID* constitutes one of the most original contributions to late 20th-century French sociology is that it provides a remarkably astute account of the principal functions of dominant ideologies in advanced capitalist societies.²⁹² Indeed, both *PID* and *RRI* are forceful reminders of the fact that the 'dominant ideology thesis' – according to which 'the dominant ideology is the ideology of the dominant groups in society' – is far from obsolete. In addition to challenging the reductionist presuppositions underpinning Marxist-functional approaches to ideology, however, *PID* anticipates a number of crucial insights into the transformation of systems of domination, notably in relation to the capacity of neo-liberal regimes to function in accordance with the motto 'change in order to preserve'. Boltanski's commentary, *RRI*, is intellectually useful in sharpening our understanding of a Bourdieusian conception of *ideology critique*, which lies at the heart of the analysis developed in *PID*.²⁹³ The key insights gained from the previous study can be summarized as follows:

1. Ideology critique is *scientific* in the sense that it needs to make use of logical descriptions, rational explanations, and methodical evaluations in order to break with value-, power-, and interest-laden misperceptions, misconceptions, and misrepresentations.
2. Ideology critique is *non-conventional* in the sense that, in order to be genuinely radical, it needs to challenge the orthodox rationale pervading hegemonic patterns of cognition and action, which perpetuate systems of social domination.
3. Ideology critique is *reflexive* in the sense that it needs to undertake an epistemological rupture with *both* the 'scholastic attitude' of abstract philosophy, by engaging with empirical reality, *and* the 'naïve attitude' of concrete experience, by defending the epistemic superiority of research-based claims to validity.
4. Ideology critique is *work-in-progress* in the sense that – irrespective of how sophisticated and useful its conceptual and methodological tools for the study of sets of principles and values may be – it constitutes an open-ended process, with no indisputable conclusions, let alone ultimate revelations.
5. Ideology critique is *autonomist* in the sense that it seeks to free itself from the material and symbolic constraints that hegemonic systems of control and regulation impose upon processes of social integration.
6. Ideology critique is *counter-hegemonic* in the sense that its task is to contest the epistemic validity, as well as the social legitimacy, of dominant symbolic forms that emerge in relation to a given reality.
7. Ideology critique is *relationalist* in the sense that it exposes the assembled constitution of social reality, characterized by subjectless heterogeneity and

intersectionality, rather than by the monolithic force of an ontological epicentre determining all forms of human agency.

8. Ideology critique is *constructivist* in the sense that it insists that all social arrangements – including divisions between actors – are historically contingent and, hence, relatively arbitrary, rather than ‘naturally’ or ‘biologically’ determined.
9. Ideology critique is *critical* in the sense that it aims to shed light on the underlying structural forces by which purposive and discursive performances are shaped.
10. Ideology critique is *emancipatory* in the sense that it seeks to contribute to the construction of principles, practices, and life forms capable of liberating human actors from illegitimate sources of disempowerment.
11. Ideology critique is *undogmatic* in the sense that it faces up to a multiplicity of sociological variables – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability – which structure people’s sense of identity as well as their understanding of reality.
12. Ideology critique is *materialist* in the sense that it highlights the central role that class continues to play in the stratification of capitalist societies.
13. Ideology critique is *historicist* in the sense that it contextualizes the taken-for-granted nature of culturally specific systems that obstruct the possibility of social practices whose legitimacy is founded on relatively evenly distributed, democratically controlled, and – individually or collectively – empowering resources for action.
14. Ideology critique is *power-analytical* in the sense that it aims to provide nuanced accounts of all forms of social domination – regardless of whether they are simple or complex, authoritarian or democratic, dictatorial or liberal, repressive or tolerant, violent or structural, overt or subtle.
15. Ideology critique is *cutting-edge* in the sense that it succeeds in accounting for the adaptive and transformative capacities developed by efficient systems of domination.
16. Ideology critique is *normative* in the sense that it is concerned not only with the question of how things *are*, including the ways in which they are concealed by interest-driven frameworks of distortion, but also with the question of how things *ought to be*, comprising the ways in which they should be revealed by virtue of illuminating frameworks of interpretation and explanation.

Perspectives

Considering the aforementioned insights, the crucial question that remains is to what extent *PID* can be linked to key concerns in contemporary sociology and social theory. Following the structure of the preceding analysis, we may push the debate forward by reflecting upon several issues that fail to receive sufficient attention by Bourdieu and Boltanski in their otherwise original and insightful enquiry into the complexities characterizing the daily production of ideology:

1. *Scientific versus ordinary?* Rather than assuming that there is a clear-cut separation between ‘the scientific’ and ‘the ordinary’, we need to recognize that these two levels of cognitive engagement with reality form part of an epistemic continuum. Both scientific and ordinary types of knowledge are context-, meaning-,

perspective-, value-, power-, and interest-laden. For all claims to objective, normative, or subjective validity are raised by socially situated actors, whose symbolically mediated assertions are embedded in – implicitly or explicitly mobilized – frameworks of ideology.

2. *Orthodox versus heterodox?* Rather than suggesting that ‘the orthodox’ and ‘the heterodox’ are entirely divorced from one another, we need to conceive of them not only as interdependent but also as mutually overlapping. In order to be adaptable, orthodox ideologies need to be capable of incorporating elements from heterodox ideologies, and vice versa. In other words, the long-term viability of both orthodox and heterodox sets of assumptions and principles depends on their capacity to draw upon, and make use of, insights and convictions from competing interpretations of reality.
3. *Philosophical versus sociological?* Rather than artificially disconnecting ‘the philosophical’ and ‘the sociological’ from one another, we need to regard them as mutually inclusive. Philosophy without sociology is empty, and sociology without philosophy is blind. Research-inspired reflexivity requires knowledge-generating entities to overcome counterproductive disciplinary boundaries, thereby encouraging them to step outside of their epistemic comfort zones and to distrust the dogmatic celebration of self-fulfilling prophecies.
4. *Objective versus subjective?* Rather than insisting that the explanation of ‘the objective’ and the interpretation of ‘the subjective’ constitute two dissociated levels of enquiry, we need to take on the task of cross-fertilizing them. Factual forces ‘in themselves’ and self-conscious forces ‘for themselves’ form two irreducible components of the human world. Critical social science is a constant ‘work in progress’, suspicious of bold announcements concerning ultimate revelations and, instead, determined to shed light on the dynamic interplay between objective and subjective factors in spatiotemporally situated processes of human actualization.
5. *Autonomous versus heteronomous?* Rather than giving the misleading impression that ‘the autonomous’ and ‘the heteronomous’ designate two wholly distinctive spheres of social existence, we need to comprehend the extent to which they are intertwined. The most emancipatory spaces of autonomy cannot escape the influence of structural mechanisms reinforcing the power of heteronomy, just as the most repressive sources of heteronomy cannot annihilate the human need for a sense of autonomy. Ideologies can be mobilized *either* to conceal *or* to uncover the tension-laden composition of contradictory realities.
6. *Hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic?* Rather than presupposing that ‘the hegemonic’ and ‘the counter-hegemonic’ can be portrayed as always fulfilling diametrically opposed normative functions, we need to acknowledge that *both* can legitimize *either* emancipatory *or* repressive sets of practices. The fact that an ideology is hegemonic does not make it repressive, just as the fact that an ideology is counter-hegemonic does not make it emancipatory. The business of ideology is pursued by those who have an interest in disseminating their own sets of values and principles, irrespective of whether they are hegemonic or counter-hegemonic.

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7. *Substantial versus relational?* Rather than positing that ‘the substantial’ and ‘the relational’ denote two disconnected spheres of human existence, we need to explore the extent to which they are entangled. Social entities are unthinkable without social relations, just as social relations are inconceivable without social entities. The meaning of social entities is, by definition, relationally constituted. Notwithstanding the degree of their spatiotemporal contingency, there are no co-existential realities without underlying ontologies.
 8. *Natural versus social?* Rather than aiming to draw a straightforward distinction between ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’, we need to concede that the boundaries between these two spheres of existence are blurred. Our participation in society is confined by the objective constraints of the natural world, just as our immersion in nature is mediated by the normative parameters of the social world.
 9. *Descriptive versus normative?* Rather than drawing an unambiguous demarcation line between ‘the descriptive’ and ‘the normative’, we need to grapple with these two fundamental realms of investigation in relation to each other. Instead of reducing the purpose of sociological research to the target of providing mirror-like representations of human reality, we need to take on the challenge of generating evaluative accounts capable of assessing the legitimacy of relationally constituted constructions in terms of their existential value and discursive defensibility. Social arrangements are not only constructible and reconstructible, but also assessable and criticizable. Sociology without critique would be just as pointless as social life without criticism. Whether as sociologists or as ordinary actors, we cannot face up to the construction of reality without implicitly recognizing its ineluctable fragility and contestability.
 10. *Regressive versus progressive?* Rather than classifying particular belief systems or sets of practices *either* as totally ‘regressive’ and ‘backward-looking’ *or* as exclusively ‘progressive’ and ‘forward-looking’, we need to confront the complexity of society by taking note of the fact that its manifold components are tension-laden and contradictory. The illusion of typological purity is shattered in the face of the multi-layered constitution permeating both material and symbolic constructions of reality. Ideology critique can be emancipatory only to the extent that it allows for the critique of ideology critique. Truly critical critics are no less critical of themselves than they are of others, as well as of the circumstances that they may share, or may not share, with them.
 11. *Monocentric versus polycentric?* Rather than reducing the social universe to a sphere of interactions that are ultimately determined *either* by a ‘monocentric’ *or* by a ‘polycentric’ structuration of power, we need to account for its *intersectional* configuration, which – in a radical sense – is *centreless*. Composed of multiple – not always coherently organized – elements, the social world is devoid of an interactional epicentre. Given the diversity of interconnected sociological factors and given the historical indeterminacy derived from the civilizational force of human agency, the analysis of relationally constituted realities must be open to constant revision. The only acceptable dogma within critical sociological research is the commitment to de-dogmatization.

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12. *Material versus symbolic?* Rather than opposing ‘the material’ and ‘the symbolic’ to one another, we need to conceive of ‘infrastructural’ and ‘superstructural’ dimensions emerging within human life forms as two constitutive elements of the social world. In highly differentiated and asymmetrically structured societies, struggles over both material and symbolic resources remain central to the distribution of wealth, status, and power – and so do the ideologies designed to defend the interests of those involved in these struggles.
 13. *Contextual versus transcendental?* Rather than misrepresenting ‘the contextual’ and ‘the transcendental’ as diametrically opposed aspects of reality, we need to grasp their interrelatedness. The spatiotemporal contingency of social reality does not eliminate the force of universality, which, by definition, rises above the limited horizon of circumstantial determinacy. The fact that all social practices and social structures are embedded in particular historical settings does not contradict the fact that they possess both context-immanent and context-transcendent facets, which pervade their respective modes of functioning.
 14. *Fatalistic versus idealistic?* Rather than advocating either a ‘fatalistic’ or an ‘idealistic’ conception of the human world, we need to endorse a position of socio-ontological realism. There is no point in *hypostatizing* the influence of power, as if it constituted the determining force behind every social action, or in *denying* the existence of power, as if it could be removed from social life. Instead, it is imperative to take power seriously without overestimating or underestimating its sociological significance. *Socio-ontological idealism*, which portrays everyday life as a power-free realm of pristine intersubjectivity, is just as problematic as *socio-ontological fatalism*, which implies that all human actions are ultimately driven by struggles over access to material or symbolic resources. *Socio-ontological realism*, by contrast, permits us to recognize the simultaneous existence of the power-laden and the power-critical elements of social life.²⁹⁴
 15. *Traditional versus modern?* Rather than presuming that ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of attributing meaning to the world are located in two utterly detached domains of action and reflection, we need to do justice to the fact that present-day practices and belief systems cannot be properly understood in isolation from those of the past. Dominant ideologies can assert their hegemonic position to the degree that, if necessary, they prove to be capable not only of *shaping and controlling* social conditions, whose underlying functions they aim to obscure, but also of *responding and adapting to* real and potential social changes, whose direction they seek to influence and, if possible, even steer. In order to reinforce the privileged position of those who benefit from the asymmetrical arrangements of an established social order, the *modus operandi* endorsed by a dominant ideology needs to be converted into the *modus vivendi* of a given society. Its long-term viability, however, hinges on its ability to adjust to the shifting parameters of constantly changing realities.
 16. *Practical versus theoretical?* Rather than conceiving of ‘the practical’ and ‘the theoretical’ as two opposing elements of social life in general and of social research in particular, we need to consider them as two complementary parts of one and the same process: the construction of materially embedded and symbolically mediated

modes of existence. Critical social science engages with the relationally organized conditions of human reality in various ways; the point of emancipatory ideologies is to shape and, if necessary, to change them in accordance with human – that is, both theoretically and practically universalizable – interests.

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Notes

1. Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976).
2. Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]).
3. Boltanski (2008).
4. To be sure, neither Bourdieu and Boltanski's original article (*PID*) nor Boltanski's commentary (*RRI*) should be interpreted as 'disconnected' from the rest of the numerous writings produced by these two influential sociologists. What *PID* as well as *RRI* add to their widely known and thoroughly examined oeuvre, however, is that these two texts offer unparalleled insights into Bourdieu and Boltanski's understanding of 'ideology' in general and of 'ideology critique' in particular.
5. See Boltanski (2008). For an in-depth examination of Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]), see Susen (2014d).
6. On the 'dominant ideology thesis', see, for instance: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980); Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1990); Boltanski (2008); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Browne and Susen (2014); Conde-Costas (1991); Eagleton (2006 [1976]); Eagleton (2007 [1991]); Holloway and Susen (2013); Inglis (2013), esp. pp. 320–322; Inglis and Thorpe (2012), Chapter 3; Larrain (1991 [1983]); Marx and Engels (1953 [1845–1847]); Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]); Rehmann (2004); Reitz (2004); Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2012a); Susen (2013b), pp. 337–338, 340, 345, 349, and 352; Susen (2014a), esp. pp. 12–21; Susen (2015b); Weber (1995); Žižek (1989); Žižek (1994).
7. It goes beyond the scope of this article to offer a detailed analysis of the key points of convergence, divergence, and possible integration between Bourdieu's 'critical sociology' and Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique'. For a *Grundriß* of the main elements of this project, see Susen (2014 [2015]) and Susen (2015c). The intellectual connections between Bourdieu's 'critical sociology' and Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique' have been explored by various commentators. See, in particular: Bénatouïl (1999a); Bénatouïl (1999b); Callinicos (2006), pp. 4–5, 15, 51–82, and 155–156; Celikates (2009), pp. 136–157; de Blic and Mouchard (2000a); de Blic and Mouchard (2000b); Frère (2004), esp. pp. 92–93 and 97 n. 4; Nachi (2006), pp. 188–189; Nachi (2014); Robbins (2014); Susen (2007), pp. 223–224, 227 n. 25, 228 n. 50, 229 n. 51, 229 n. 52, and 271 n. 24; Susen (2011a), esp. pp. 450–458; Wagner (1999); Wagner (2000). On this debate, see also, for example: Boltanski (1990a), pp. 9–134; Boltanski (1990b), pp. 124–134; Boltanski (1998), esp. pp. 248–253; Boltanski (1999–2000), pp. 303–311; Boltanski (2002), pp. 276–281 and 281–284; Boltanski (2003), pp. 153–161; Boltanski (2008); Boltanski (2009), esp. pp. 39–82; Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), esp. pp. 633–640; Boltanski and Honneth (2009), pp. 81–86, 92–96, and 100–114; Boltanski, Honneth, and Celikates (2014 [2009]), pp. 561–565, 570–573, and 576–587; Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010), pp. 152–154 and 160–162;

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- Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), pp. 40, 41–43, 43–46, and 265–270; Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), pp. 364–365; Gautier (2001); Gautier (2011).
8. On this point, see Boltanski (2008), esp. pp. 11–13: ‘Élégie’ [‘Elegy’].
 9. See *ibid.*, p. 11.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 11 (my translation); original text: ‘croire à la science et ne pas y croire’.
 11. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 13 ‘On ne comprenait plus rien à la *réalité* et on avait le sentiment qu’elle nous dissimulait le *monde*. Et c’est pour ça qu’on faisait de la sociologie’ (italics added). [‘We no longer understood *reality*, and we had the feeling that it concealed the *world*. And this is why we were doing sociology’ (italics added).]
 12. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 15–23: ‘Naissance d’une revue: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1974–1976*’ [‘The birth of a journal: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 1974–1976*’].
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 15 (my translation); original text: ‘[...] on avait du mal à faire passer nos papiers dans les revues universitaires officielles, avec Comité, comme, par exemple (mais ce n’est qu’un exemple) la *Revue française de sociologie*’.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 16 (my translation); original text: ‘gardiens de normes [...] au nom de la Science et de ce qu’ils appelaient l’*Épistémologie*’.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 16 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘l’idée d’avoir notre propre revue, un endroit où on aurait pu faire ce qu’on veut, écrire comme on le souhaitait, développer les terrains qui nous intéressaient, décrire et critiquer tout à la fois, bref, faire de la sociologie’. On the rationale behind the formation of academic journals in the area of sociological thought, see, for instance, Susen and Turner (2011).
 16. Boltanski (2008), p. 16 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘[l]a question de la taille des papiers’.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 16 (my translation); original text: ‘échapper aux formats prédéfinis’.
 18. *Ibid.*, p. 16 (my translation); original text: ‘publier vite, par exemple un résultat d’enquête [...] sans attendre des mois le verdict d’un comité’.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 23 (my translation); original text: ‘un mélange d’amitié gratuite et d’intérêt’.
 20. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 25–38: ‘Portrait de groupe avec l’auteur en maquettiste’ [‘Group portrait with the author as a model maker’].
 21. See *ibid.*, p. 27: ‘On faisait tout à la main. C’était avant les ordinateurs de bureau [...]’.
 22. See *ibid.*, p. 28: ‘travail de rédaction’.
 23. On this point, see, for instance, Thompson (2005).
 24. See Boltanski (2008), p. 26: ‘*lieu neutre*’.
 25. See *ibid.*, p. 26: ‘*multipositionnalité*’.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 31 (my translation); original text: ‘vraiment être en rupture avec les routines et les contraintes universitaires’.
 27. *Ibid.*, p. 31 (my translation); original text: ‘l’occasion de travailler avec des gens nouveaux, de parler d’autres langages et également de se promener dans des endroits nouveaux, pour trouver des documents et des idées’.
 28. On the centrality of this point, see, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 135–137 and 262; Susen (2011a), esp. pp. 449–451; Susen (2011c), p. 376; Susen (2011e), pp. 49–51, 69, 75–76, and 82; Susen (2012b), pp. 689, 692, 695–698, 699–701, 710–711, and 713–715; Susen (2013c), pp. 206–206, 223–224, and 231–232 n. 22; Susen (2013d), pp. 333–335 and 339–341; Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 175–176, 178, 179–182, 182–185, 191, and 193–194.
 29. Boltanski (2008), p. 31 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘le plaisir de la sociologie qui, par rapport aux disciplines établies, comme la philosophie ou les études littéraires, exige non seulement de passer sa vie parmi les livres [...] mais aussi que l’on sorte de la bibliothèque’.
 30. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 31.
 31. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 31. See also Susen (2011a), pp. 450–451.
 32. On this point, see Susen (2011b), p. 187, 190, 198, and 200 n. 11.
 33. Boltanski (2008), p. 36 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘Dans un monde entièrement subordonné à une logique marchande, où toutes les relations prendraient la forme de transactions contractuelles [...], la sociologie [...] deviendrait simplement impossible’. On this point, see also *ibid.*, pp. 37–38: ‘[...] le fonctionnement des grands cabinets de consultants, dont le rôle s’est considérablement

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- accru au cours des vingt dernières années, es absolument fermé à l'investigation sociologique, sans parler d'instances comme la Banque mondiale, le FMI ou l'OMC'. [...] the *functioning of consultancy firms*, whose role has become increasingly significant over the past twenty years, is *absolutely closed to sociological investigation*, not to mention examples such as the *World Bank*, the *IMF*, or the *WTO*' (italics added)].
34. Ibid., p. 37 (italics added) (my translation); original text: '[...] aujourd'hui, le pouvoir économique s'est déplacé vers d'autres instances, ayant souvent un caractère international, dont les responsables ne reconnaissent la valeur des sciences sociales lorsqu'elles se trouvent intégrées à la culture du management, qui est le nouveau langage commun des «élites» globalisées, ou, ce qui revient pratiquement au même, à l'expertise économique ou financière, et qu'elles sont mises au service d'objectifs économiques déterminés d'en haut'.
 35. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 39–43: 'Un amoncellement de détails' ['A piling up of details'].
 36. Ibid., p. 39 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 'un moment saillant de l'histoire des sciences sociales en France'.
 37. Ibid., p. 39 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 'Un courant s'affirme, se manifeste dans sa cohérence, s'invente une forme originale, se trouve un public de lecteurs, etc.'
 38. Ibid., p. 39 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 'L'une des nombreuses choses que j'ai apprises du patron, particulièrement en travaillant avec lui à la revue, peut-être l'une des plus importantes, a été le respect du détail qui va de pair avec le refus d'établir une hiérarchie entre les tâches, comme si certaines étaient importantes et nobles et d'autres basses et ignobles. Chez nous, il n'y avait pas « d'intendance ». L'intendance, c'était nous, avec ce souci obsessionnel de tout contrôler, de tout penser [...]'
 39. Ibid., p. 40 (my translation); original text: '[...] une multitude d'interactions, dans des registres très différents – économiques, amicaux, intellectuels, stratégiques, matériels, etc. [...]'
 40. Ibid., p. 40 (my translation); original text: 'des liens avec des personnes différentes'.
 41. Ibid., p. 40 (my translation); original text: 'susceptibles, difficiles'.
 42. See *ibid.*, p. 40 (my translation); original text: 'avec chacune son écriture'.
 43. See *ibid.*, p. 40 (my translation); original text: 'ses obsessions'.
 44. Ibid., p. 40 (my translation); original text: 'rendre compatibles des personnes et des choses dont l'association n'allait jamais de soi'.
 45. Ibid., p. 41 (my translation); original text: 'ce travail collectif était exigeant'.
 46. See *ibid.*, p. 41: 'Un thème revient constamment : « nous sommes si peu ». Et c'est vrai que nous n'étions pas bien nombreux pour écrire, réécrire, relire, illustrer, « innover graphiquement » [...]'
 47. See *ibid.*, p. 42: 'À notre grande surprise, le premier numéro, tiré à 2000 exemplaires, fut épuisé en deux semaines [...]'
 48. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 45–48: '*Just do it ...*'.
 49. See *ibid.*, p. 45.
 50. Ibid., p. 45 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 'à dévoiler l'arbitraire de contraintes présentes et souvent acceptées, de nos jours, comme inévitables et comme imparables'.
 51. See *ibid.*, p. 45 (my translation); original text: 'Si cela fut possible il y a trente ans, pourquoi cela ne le serait-il pas, sous une autre forme, aujourd'hui?'
 52. Ibid., p. 45 (my translation); original text: 'les modes de contrôle et de gestion'.
 53. Ibid., p. 45 (my translation); original text: 'Les techniques du management moderne n'avaient pas encore pénétré le monde de l'Université et de la culture'.
 54. On this point, see Susen (2011e), pp. 58–60 and 77. See also, for example: Browne and Susen (2014), esp. pp. 217–218, 221–223, and 226; Holloway and Susen (2013); Susen (2007), pp. 61–73; Susen (2009), esp. pp. 85–87; Susen (2010c), pp. 110 and 112–113; Susen (2011d), pp. 46, 49, 50, 51, and 58; Susen (2012a).
 55. See Boltanski (2008), p. 48: 'Ouvrant à nouveau cette revue, je me demande avec étonnement: mais qui accepterait aujourd'hui de publier un article dans un endroit pareil? Et moi, est-ce que j'accepterai? Une revue en français, sans comité de lecture, tapée à la machine à écrire, collant côté à côté statistiques et petits mickeys, carrément critique – qui en voudrait pour sa carrière? Ce serait du suicide'.
 56. Ibid., p. 46 (italics added) (my translation); original text: '[...] ce laisser-aller, cette négligence gestionnaire était précisément ce qui ouvrait un espace de liberté où la création devenait possible. Dans les marges, les marginaux étaient à l'aise'.

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57. *Ibid.*, p. 47 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘Des lois du marché universitaire existaient certes, et on pouvait le savoir. Mais on pouvait aussi, à un certain prix, plus ou moins les ignorer. Elles n’étaient pas tout le temps présentes à l’esprit de tous. Et cela donnait du courage. Il y avait plusieurs marchés et non un grand marché. Et, entre les interstices de ces marchés, des zones, où pas grand-chose ne marchait, mais où l’on était, à condition de ne pas attendre grand-chose, plus ou moins protégés’.
58. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 49–55: ‘L’écriture de «La production de l’idéologie dominante»’ [‘The writing of “The production of the dominant ideology”’].
59. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 49.
60. See Boltanski and Thévenot (1983), Boltanski and Thévenot (1987), Boltanski and Thévenot (1989), Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), Boltanski and Thévenot (1999), Boltanski and Thévenot (2000), and Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
61. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), Boltanski and Chiapello (2005 [1999]), and Gadrey, Hatchuel, Boltanski, and Chiapello (2001).
62. See Boltanski and Claverie (2007) and Boltanski, Claverie, Offenstadt, and Van Damme (2007).
63. See Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975a), Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975b), Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976), Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]), and Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, and Chamboredon (1965).
64. See, for instance, Boltanski, Darré, and Schiltz (1984), and – more recently – Boltanski and Esquerre (2014).
65. See Basaure (2011), Boltanski and Honneth (2009), Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010), de Blic and Mouchard (2000a), and de Blic and Mouchard (2000b).
66. See Boltanski (2008), p. 49: ‘Avec le patron, le travail était différent. Cela se passait habituellement la nuit, tantôt chez lui, à Antony, tantôt dans son bureau de la Maison des sciences de l’homme [...]’.
67. See *ibid.*, p. 49: ‘Le patron avait eu l’initiative de cet article et c’est lui surtout qui a tenu la plume – ce que reconnaîtront facilement les lecteurs familiers avec son écriture –, écrivant directement ou intégrant et retravaillant les morceaux qui étaient de ma main’.
68. See *ibid.*, p. 50: ‘L’article était original, mais sa matière principale [...] était puisée dans un vaste chantier, entrepris cinq ans auparavant, avec pour objectif un grand livre collectif, dont le pivot était une réflexion sur Mai 1968m ses origines et ses conséquences, et la visée une théorie du pouvoir et du changement social, un livre si grand qu’il n’a jamais vu le jour [...]’.
69. See *ibid.*, p. 50: ‘[...] une forme d’organisation originale [...] tout à la fois du cénacle intellectuel, de l’entreprise familiale et du groupe militant’.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 52 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la philosophie sociale de la « fraction dominante de la classe dominante »’.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 52 (my translation); original text: ‘des extraits d’ouvrages, des images, des annotations en marge de copie d’examen, des statistiques, des notices biographiques, des diagrammes, des entretiens télévisuels, etc.’.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 52 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘montrer la cohérence d’une vision du monde social’.
73. *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘La notion d’idéologie qui est ici à l’œuvre est dérivée de l’ethnographie des formes de classification et de catégorisation et des systèmes de pensée qui informent les pratiques mythiques et rituelles. L’une des idées qui sous-tend le texte est que c’est précisément parce qu’elle est contenue dans des schèmes largement implicites, susceptibles d’engendrer une infinité de productions discursives et de pratiques ajustées à des situations différentes, que cette vision du monde peut, à la fois, se donner avec les évidences du bon sens, comme si elle ne faisait rien d’autre que de dire ce qui va de soi, et exercer une action efficace orientée vers le changement du monde social dans un sens déterminé. [...] En ce sens, on pourrait voir aussi dans cette façon de concevoir l’idéologie une extension de la performativité austinienne [...]’. On this point, see Austin (1962).
74. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2013c), esp. pp. 211–213 and 222–230; Susen (2013d), pp. 329, 332–333, and 349; Susen (2014d), esp. pp. 96–109; Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 2.
75. Boltanski (2008), p. 55 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘mouvement de déconstruction [...], une réappropriation critique du monde social’.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 55 (my translation); original text: ‘ceux qui subissent l’oppression de la réalité telle qu’elle est, c’est-à-dire telle que la font, à leur avantage, ceux qui le dominent’.

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77. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 57–72: ‘L’impeccabilité des lieux neutres’ [‘The impeccability of neutral places’].
 78. *Ibid.*, p. 55 (italics added, apart from ‘neutral place’ [‘*lieu neutre*’], which appears in italics in the original) (my translation); original text: ‘Le lien entre « idéologie dominante » et « classe dominante » est opéré par l’intermédiaire du concept de *lieu neutre* qui est au centre du texte’.
 79. See Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]), p. 192.
 80. See *ibid.*, p. 192.
 81. Boltanski (2008), p. 57 (my translation); original text: ‘Une idéologie, au sens de l’anthropologie sociale, peut en effet être dite « dominante » dans la mesure où les schèmes qui la soutiennent inspirent les discours et les pratiques des membres d’une société, sans être pour autant attribués à une « class dominante »’.
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 57 (my translation); original text: ‘[...] l’existence des classes sociales était encore très généralement reconnue, non seulement par les sociologues, mais aussi par les acteurs politiques ou administratifs et, plus généralement, par la plupart des personnes ordinaires’. On this point, see also *ibid.*, pp. 57–59.
 83. On this point, see, for example: Clark and Lipset (1996); Evans (1999); and Waters (1997).
 84. See Boltanski (2008), p. 59: ‘fractions de la classe dominante’.
 85. See *ibid.*, p. 64: ‘les classes sociales, mais aussi pour les catégories formées sur une base ethnique ou sur les genres’.
 86. *Ibid.*, p. 59 (italics added, apart from ‘neutral place’ [‘*lieu neutre*’], which appears in italics in the original) (my translation); original text: ‘La notion de *lieu neutre* permet de rendre compte de ces liens sans sacrifier une théorie du complot. Les lieux neutres sont des espaces, plus ou moins, institués, dans lesquels les membres de différentes fractions peuvent se rencontrer et échanger sans rien abandonner des caractères [...]’.
 87. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 63–66. On the ‘end of ideology’ thesis, see, for instance: Bell (2000 [1960]); Donskis (2000); Rubinstein (2009); Scott (1990); Simons and Billig (1994); Susen (2010a); Susen (2014d); Susen (2015a); Waxman (1968).
 88. Boltanski (2008), p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘fin des idéologies’.
 89. *Ibid.*, p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘la disparition prochaine des classes sociales’.
 90. *Ibid.*, p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘la « fin de l’histoire »’. On this point, see also, for instance: Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]), p. 53; Eagleton (1995), esp. p. 66; Fukuyama (1992), esp. pp. 276–277; Fukuyama (2002); Good and Velody (1998), pp. 5 and 9; Hammond (2011), pp. 305–306, 310, 312, and 315; Horrocks (1999), pp. 7 and 13; Kellner (2007), p. 119; Osamu (2002); Paulus (2001), p. 745; Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 4; Williams (2010), p. 309.
 91. Boltanski (2008), p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘l’effondrement de l’URSS’.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘dépolitisation’.
 93. *Ibid.*, p. 63 (my translation); original text: ‘un rôle éminent dans les déplorations nostalgiques de la gauche réformiste’.
 94. On ‘the end of metanarratives’, see, for example: Benhabib (1990), pp. 107–130; Benhabib (1993), pp. 103–127; Boisvert (1996), p. 47; Browning (2003), pp. 223–239; Butler (2002), pp. 13–14; Clark (2006), pp. 391–405; Coole (1998), pp. 107–125; Fraser and Nicholson (1994 [1988]), pp. 244–247; Friedrich (2012), pp. 31–78; Haber (1994), pp. 113–134; Hutcheon (2002), p. 204; Kellner (2007), pp. 102–126; Kumar (1995), pp. 131–137; Lyotard (1984 [1979]); Nola and Irzik (2003), pp. 391–421; Patton (2004), pp. 11874–11875; Pefanis (1991); Petit (2005), pp. 22–23 and 32; Pieters (2000), pp. 21–38; Raese (2011), pp. 169–173; Rojek and Turner (1998), esp. Introduction; Rorty (1985), pp. 161–175; Rouse (1991), pp. 141–162; Sim (2002), pp. 6, 27, 31, and 151–153; Smart (1992), pp. 169–176; Smith (2006); Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 4; Thompson (1993), pp. 325–338; Vakaloulis (2001), pp. 49–64; Wilterdink (2002), pp. 197 and 214; Zagorin (1999), pp. 1–24.
 95. Boltanski (2008), p. 63 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘[...] « la société », avec son « individualisme » particulièrement « chez les jeunes », [est] le résultat d’une politique tout entière orientée vers la fin de la politique entendue comme la mise au pas des mouvements critiques qui tentaient de s’opposer à l’idéologie dominante’.
 96. See *ibid.*, p. 64 (my translation); original text: ‘la « montée de l’individualisme »’.

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97. See *ibid.*, p. 64 (my translation); original text: ‘le dernier grand récit’.
 98. *Ibid.*, p. 64 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘le résultat du travail de fragmentation, qui a accompagné la dé-politisation de la vie sociale’.
 99. *Ibid.*, p. 65 (my translation); original text: ‘ne seront plus nécessaires’.
 100. *Ibid.*, p. 65 (my translation); original text: ‘l’idéal méritocratique’.
 101. *Ibid.*, p. 65 (my translation); original text: ‘«si on veut on peut»’.
 102. *Ibid.*, p. 66 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘l’égalité des chances, c’est-à-dire par des mesures méritocratiques permettant la sélection juste des individus, en fonction de leurs efforts et de leur travail et, par conséquent, selon leurs mérites et leurs dons personnels’.
 103. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 66: ‘[...] le projet eugéniste qui avait été pourtant un thème central des élites modernistes dans les pays occidentaux pendant un siècle, de 1850 à 1950, environ [...]’.
 104. *Ibid.*, p. 67 (my translation); original text: ‘la valorisation de la grande industrie intégrée et plus ou moins planifiée’.
 105. *Ibid.*, p. 67 (my translation); original text: ‘la valorisation de la mobilité, de l’ouverture [...] mutations [...]’.
 106. See *ibid.*, p. 67 (my translation); original text: ‘le tournant libéral’. On this point, see also, for example: Berberoglu (2010); Browne and Susen (2014); Davies (2014); Gane (2012); Harvey (2006); Holloway and Susen (2013); Marcos (1997); Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny (2005); Susen (2012a).
 107. Boltanski (2008), p. 67 (my translation); original text: ‘la critique du « corporatisme » (entendez, du syndicalisme), de la « société bloquée » (entendez le pilotage par l’État de l’appareil productif et les politiques sociales)’.
 108. *Ibid.*, p. 68 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la « grande politique contractuelle »’.
 109. *Ibid.*, p. 69 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘le développement de « l’autonomie » des personnes au travail et sur leur « responsabilisation »’.
 110. *Ibid.*, p. 70 (my translation); original text: ‘centré sur la grande entreprise gouvernée par des directeurs salariés souvent issus des Grands corps de l’État, sur les formes tayloriennes de production et sur la mise en place de dispositifs étatiques de planification et de redistribution des gains de productivité’.
 111. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 70–71; see also Browne and Susen (2014), pp. 221–222.
 112. See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). See also, for instance: Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Gadrey, Hatchuel, Boltanski, and Chiapello (2001); Schmidt (2007). In addition, see Susen and Turner (2014), pp. 12–15, 20, 37, 40, 57, 60, 68, 69, 71, 78, 79, 81–83, 96–97, 136, 142, 164, 166, 189, 195, 240, 268, 295–297, 299–291, 352, 359, 373, 449, 451–455, 466, 503–504, 517, 525–526, 528, 542–543, 572, 618–620, 653, 670–671, 686, 697, 701–704, 714, 717, 720, 722–723, 744, and 748–749.
 113. Boltanski (2008), pp. 70–71 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘le « nouvel esprit du capitalisme » associé à la mise en place de nouvelles formes de production (production en réseaux, développement de la sous-traitance, externalisation, multiplication des contrats de travail dits « atypiques » et du nombre des travailleurs en situation précaire’.
 114. *Ibid.*, p. 71 (my translation); original text: ‘les incertitudes des marchés’.
 115. *Ibid.*, p. 71 (my translation); original text: ‘l’établissement d’un nouveau type de la relation entre le capitalisme et l’État’.
 116. On this point, see Susen (2015a), Chapter 3 (section on globalization).
 117. On this point, see Boltanski (2008), esp. pp. 73–78: ‘Ce que l’on enseigne à Sciences po’ [‘What is taught at Sciences po’].
 118. *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘[...] les élites ont toujours cherché à justifier leurs positions et leurs privilèges, en affirmant le caractère naturel, lié non seulement à la nature humaine (ce qui fait un peu vieillot) mais surtout à une nature sociale enracinée dans un substrat biologique (ce qui en rend la connaissance accessible à la science et donc justifiable de façon supposée imparable), de la hiérarchie et des inégalités, présentées comme étant le résultat mécanique des différences d’aptitudes, de capacités, de dons.’
 119. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (my translation); original text: ‘il est évident que le monde évolue grâce à ses élites’.
 120. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (my translation); original text: ‘l’égalitarisme’.
 121. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (my translation); original text: ‘le conformisme’.
 122. *Ibid.*, p. 75 (my translation); original text: ‘les formes les plus créatives et les plus originales de l’esprit humain’.

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123. Ibid., p. 75 (my translation); original text: 'ne peuvent pas suivre'.
124. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 75. For useful and critical accounts of positivist accounts of scientific knowledge, see, for instance: Ayer (1946 [1936]); Ayer (1956); Benton and Craib (2001), pp. 13–49; Durkheim (1982 [1895]); Factor and Turner (1977), pp. 185–206; Hempel (1966); Keat (1971); Keat (1981); Keat and Urry (1982 [1975]); Newton-Smith (1981); Outhwaite (1987), pp. 5–18; Outhwaite (1996), pp. 47–70; Stockman (1983); Susen (2011e), pp. 69–82; Wellmer (1969).
125. Boltanski (2008), p. 76 (my translation); original text: 'la nature économique, historique et sociale dicte ses lois'.
126. Ibid., p. 77 (italics added) (my translation); original text: 'L'idéologie dominante est donc d'abord ce qui se transmet dans les lieux et, particulièrement, dans les institutions d'enseignement d'élite où les classes dominantes souhaitent envoyer leurs enfants pour qu'ils y acquièrent la (bonne) formation et le (bon) tour d'esprit qui leur permettront, à leur tour, de jouer le rôle que l'on attend d'eux, de rejoindre les élites, de devenir des chefs intelligents'.
127. Ibid., p. 76 (my translation); original text: 'L'idéologie dominante, la culture dominante dans les cercles du pouvoir, ce sont d'abord l'idéologie et la culture forgées et transmises [...]'.
See *ibid.*, p. 77.
129. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 79–95: 'Le rire de la critique' ['The laughter of critique'].
130. Ibid., p. 79 (my translation); original text: 'en prenant appui sur les valeurs partagées d'égalité, d'équité et de transparence'.
131. On this point, see Susen (2012b), pp. 705–708 and 715–717, as well as Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 187–189.
132. Cf. Susen (2010c).
133. On the Bourdieusian conception of *doxa*, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977 [1972]), pp. 3, 159, 163–171, and 222 n. 27; Bourdieu (1980), pp. 10, 17, 26, 28, 30, 34, 37, 43–45, 52, 90, 97, 111–115, 126, 153, 183, 193, and 244; Bourdieu (1984), p. 6; Bourdieu (1993 [1984]), p. 51; Bourdieu (1995), pp. 3–4; Bourdieu (1997), pp. 21–26, 118, 120, 123, 163, 168, 171, 206–214, 220, 224, and 273–275; Bourdieu (1998), pp. 7–9; Bourdieu (1999), p. 334; Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron (1968), pp. 30, 58, and 105; Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992), pp. 111–121; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a), pp. 73–74; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992b), p. 98; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c), pp. 120–121 and 128; Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d), p. 169. See also, for example: Accardo (1997), p. 49; Acciaiolli (2000 [1981]), pp. 94 and 101; Bohman (1999), p. 141; Bonnewitz (1998), pp. 80–82; Calhoun (1995), p. 151; Chauviré and Fontaine (2003), pp. 35–36 and 40; Cicourel (1993), pp. 90–91 and 105; Cronin (1997), pp. 209 and 212; de Fornel (2003), p. 223; Engler and Zimmermann (2002), p. 51; Holton (2000), pp. 87–93; Inglis (2013), pp. 319–322; Jenkins (1992), pp. 70–71; Lau (2004), p. 376; Mesny (1998), pp. 149–150, 154, 166, and 169; Mounier (2001), p. 179; Myles (2004), pp. 91–107; Ostrow (2000 [1981]), pp. 302–308; Papilloud (2003), p. 110; Pinto (1991); Pinto (1998), pp. 214, 216, and 243; Smith (2001), pp. 155–171; Susen (2007), pp. 24, 138–141, 146 n. 16, 153, 157, 159, 160, 178, 191, 215, 223, 224, 225, 226, 243, 251, 252, 253, 267, 309, and 312; Susen (2011c), pp. 371, 389, 399, and 402; Susen (2011e), pp. 50, 51, 55, 57, 76, and 82; Susen (2013c), pp. 204–205, 208, 209, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 227, 228, and 231 n. 18; Susen (2013d), pp. 332, 340, 341, 349, 355, 356, 364, and 372; Susen (2014 [2015]), pp. 321–324, 328, 333, and 335; Susen (2015c), pp. 166, 168, 169, 170, 175, 176, 182, 183, and 185; Wacquant (1999), p. 275; Wacquant (2002 [1993]), p. 34; Wacquant (2004), pp. 91–111; Wagner (2003), pp. 217–218.
134. Boltanski (2008), p. 79 (my translation); original text: 'des valeurs communes les plus incontestables et les mieux partagées'.
135. Ibid., p. 79 (my translation); original text: 'un caractère quasi sacré'.
136. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 79.
137. Ibid., p. 95 (italics added) (my translation); original text: '[...] marquer le passage d'une représentation de la société en termes de classes sociales, ou au moins de catégories socioprofessionnelles, à une représentation en termes de réussite sociale, avec le glissement de « travailleurs » vers « pauvres » (les « nouveaux pauvres ») puis vers « exclus »'.
138. Ibid., p. 80 (my translation); original text: 'au progrès technique et à la grandeur industrielle'.
139. Ibid., p. 82 (my translation); original text: 'expérience de la recherche collective'.
140. Ibid., p. 82 (my translation); original text: 'de nos jours, on termine, le plus souvent dans la solitude'.

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141. Ibid., p. 82 (my translation); original text: ‘un espace composite et fortement hiérarchisé formé d’un assemblage d’institutions universitaires (très inégalement favorables à la poursuite de recherches)’.
 142. Ibid., p. 82 (my translation); original text: ‘l’ambition et la liberté de la recherche’.
 143. Ibid., p. 83 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘L’expérience de la précarité, avec l’inquiétude non seulement matérielle mais surtout identitaire qu’elle suscite, et celle de la concurrence intense entre postulants qui accompagnent ce parcours d’épreuves [...]’.
 144. On this point, see, for example, Thévenot (2014).
 145. Boltanski (2008), p. 83 (my translation); original text: ‘intériorisé les exigences institutionnelles auxquelles ils ont été soumis’.
 146. Ibid., p. 83 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘Il est donc de plus en plus difficile de trouver des niches (au sens des « niches écologiques») favorables à l’émergence de travaux non conformistes. L’alternative qui se présente le plus fréquemment est celle de l’appartenance au prix de la conformité ou celle d’un anti-conformisme, mais au prix de la marginalité, ce qui veut dire aussi sans moyens de recherche’.
 147. Ibid., p. 84 (my translation); original text: ‘mouvement critique’.
 148. Ibid., p. 84 (my translation); original text: ‘aller vers les sciences sociales’.
 149. Ibid., p. 84 (my translation); original text: ‘le contrôle bureaucratique et politique des institutions culturelles dépendant de l’État’.
 150. Ibid., pp. 84–85 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la confiance que nous avons en nous-mêmes [...], une victoire [...], pensée critique [...], une victoire politique [...], notre travail critique dans ses conditions correctes était déjà une victoire – et comme une victoire des sciences sociales’.
 151. See *ibid.*, p. 85 (my translation); original text: ‘La sociologie se donnait donc pour tâche de mettre en lumière ces forces [...]’.
 152. Ibid., p. 87 (my translation); original text: ‘[...] aucun phénomène ne peut être décrit si l’on se tient entièrement à l’intérieur du cadre qui le soutient’. See also *ibid.*, p. 87: ‘La description analytique, aussi scrupuleuse et objective soit-elle, [...] la possibilité d’une extériorité [...]’. On this point, cf. Susen (2007), pp. 165–166: ‘Immersion makes us see the landscape of our immersion, but not its frontiers and even less so its surroundings’. See also *ibid.*, p. 207: ‘[...] field-specific immersion makes the agents blind and dogmatic when their field-view (*Feldanschauung*) is converted into their world-view (*Weltanschauung*)’.
 153. Boltanski (2008), p. 87 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘faire une histoire du présent, ce qui est la tâche de la sociologie’.
 154. Ibid., p. 88 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la possibilité que le présent soit autre qu’il n’est, que la réalité soit autre qu’elle n’est et, par conséquent, relativiser ou déconstruire le présent tel qu’il est’.
 155. A similar position is central to most versions of philosophical and sociological pragmatism. See, for instance, Susen (2013a), pp. 95–98. On the far-reaching relevance of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ to contemporary forms of social and political analysis, see, for instance, Susen and Turner (2014).
 156. Boltanski (2008), p. 88 (my translation); original text: ‘la sociologie est, par vocation, critique’.
 157. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 97–105: ‘La réception de « La production de l’idéologie dominante »’ [‘The reception of “The production of the dominant ideology”’]. On the concept of ‘emancipation’, see, for instance, Susen (2009) and Susen (2015b).
 158. Robert Castel and Michael Pollak.
 159. Pierre Encrevé.
 160. Roger Chartier and Joseph Goy.
 161. Jean-Claude Pariente, Louis Marin, and Jacques Bouveresse.
 162. Jean Bollack, Heinz Wissmann, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet.
 163. Isac Chiva, Emmanuel Terray, and Alban Bensa.
 164. Lucien Bianco.
 165. Alain Desrosières and Robert Boyer.
 166. Bernard Rancillac and Henri Cueco.
 167. Annie Ernaux.
 168. Pierre Gaudibert.

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169. On this point, see Boltanski (2008), pp. 97–98.
 170. See *ibid.*, p. 98: ‘Mai 1968 [...] la « contre-culture »’.
 171. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (my translation); original text: ‘dans l’espace économique’.
 172. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (my translation); original text: ‘la possible récupération des aspects « positifs » de la crise sociale, dans le monde culturel’.
 173. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (my translation); original text: ‘dimensions libératrices’.
 174. See *ibid.*, p. 100: ‘les sciences sociales, telles que nous les pratiquions, étaient l’ennemi désigné’.
 175. *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103 (my translation); original text: ‘en prenant à contre-pied les représentations irénistes de la modernité libérale, à en faire la généalogie’.
 176. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 107–119: ‘Les absents’ [‘The absent’].
 177. *Ibid.*, p. 107 (my translation); original text: ‘plusieurs thèmes qui sont aujourd’hui au cœur des luttes sociales brillent par leur absence’.
 178. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 108–119.
 179. See *ibid.*, pp. 113–115.
 180. See *ibid.*, pp. 113–115. See also *ibid.*, p. 118: ‘Les formes d’exploitation qui nous semblaient dominantes concernaient d’abord les travailleurs, français d’origine [...]’.
 181. See *ibid.*, pp. 113–115.
 182. *Ibid.*, p. 115 (my translation); original text: ‘au milieu des années 1970 nous ne disposons pas d’un cadre analytique permettant d’articuler les unes aux autres des luttes différentes’.
 183. See Susen (2010b), pp. 271–274. See also Susen (2010a), pp. 198–208, and Susen (2015a), Chapter 5.
 184. On this point, see Susen (2013b), esp. pp. 336–350.
 185. Boltanski (2008), p. 115 (my translation); original text: ‘l’existence d’une multiplicité d’appartenances’.
 186. *Ibid.*, p. 115 (my translation); original text: ‘des rapports identitaires’.
 187. *Ibid.*, p. 115 (my translation); original text: ‘qui réclamaient la reconnaissance des modes spécifiques d’oppression’.
 188. *Ibid.*, p. 116 (my translation); original text: ‘le déclin du mouvement ouvrier’.
 189. *Ibid.*, p. 116 (my translation); original text: ‘prendre au sérieux un grand nombre de revendications et de lutes émergentes’.
 190. *Ibid.*, p. 116 (my translation); original text: ‘la reconnaissance de la multi-appartenance des personnes’.
 191. On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Ladrière, Pharo, and Quéré (1993); Lahire (1998); Thévenot (2001); Thévenot (2006); Susen (2007), pp. 90–94; Susen (2010d); Susen (2012a), pp. 300 and 320 n. 90; Susen and Turner (2014).
 192. See Boltanski (2008), p. 108: ‘Pour le dire vite, le papier est écrit depuis un point de vue principal qui est celui de la critique sociale [...]’. On this point, see also Susen (2014d), pp. 96–109.
 193. Boltanski (2008), p. 112 (my translation); original text: ‘l’exploitation des êtres humains’.
 194. *Ibid.*, p. 110 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la thématique de la « foule » et de la « masse » – ‘la foule (soumise, passive, grégaire, facilement abusée par des démagogues, [...] etc.)’.
 195. *Ibid.*, p. 110 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘les sujets d’élites, dotés d’une véritable intériorité, d’une autonomie tout kantienne et d’une conscience lucide’.
 196. See esp. Bourdieu (1979). See also Susen (2011b), esp. pp. 176–184 and 193–199.
 197. On this point, see Boltanski (2008), esp. pp. 121–135: ‘L’existence des classes sociales comme cause à défendre’ [‘The existence of social classes as a cause to be defended’].
 198. See, for instance: Bonnell, Hunt, and Biernacki (1999); Eickelpasch (1997); Huyssen and Scherpe (1993); Jameson (1998); Janich (2006); Rademacher and Schweppenhäuser (1997); Rojek and Turner (2000); Susen (2015a), Chapter 3.
 199. Boltanski (2008), pp. 121–122 (my translation); original text: ‘la société s’orienter vers une structure sans classe’.
 200. On this point, see, for instance, Bouffartigue (2004). See also: Clark and Lipset (1996); Evans (1999); Giddens (1981 [1973]); Waters (1997).
 201. See Boltanski (2008), p. 126: ‘L’État est l’arbitre de la lutte entre les classes’.
 202. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 127–128.
 203. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 128: ‘[...] on admet que ceux qui sont en bas puissent se revendiquer comme une classe [...]’. On this claim, see also, for example, Susen (2014a), esp. pp. 9–10.

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204. On this point, see Boltanski (2008), p. 129. See also, for instance: Susen (2007), pp. 23, 52, 54, 91, 157, 162, and 305; Susen (2008a), p. 73; Susen (2012a), pp. 288–289; Susen (2015b), p. 1030.
205. On this point, see Esping-Andersen (1985) and Esping-Andersen (1990). See also, for instance: Marshall (1981); Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny (2005); Susen (2010b).
206. Boltanski (2008), p. 127 (my translation); original text: '[...] assurer l'établissement d'un ordre social [réellement méritocratique] dans lequel toutes les places seraient également accessibles à tous (l'égalité des chances), selon un modèle de marché ouvert'.
207. Ibid., p. 134 (my translation); original text: '[...] [prendre en charge] de nouveaux facteurs d'inégalité et de nouvelles formes d'exploitation'. Cf. Susen (2010b), pp. 271–274.
208. Boltanski (2008), p. 135 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: 'à envisager leur propre condition et leur identité *sous différents rapports* et, par conséquent, à participer à des formes de mobilités différentes'.
209. Ibid., p. 135 (my translation); original text: 'les tensions ou les contradictions entre ces différentes dimensions'.
210. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 134.
211. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 137–148: 'Le changement comme mode d'exercice d'une domination' ['Change as a mode of exercising domination'].
212. See *ibid.*, p. 137.
213. Ibid., p. 137 (italics added) (my translation); original text: '[...] le passage d'un régime de légitimation de l'autorité fondé, en principe, sur la volonté collective ou populaire à un régime de plus en plus nettement fondé, de fait, sur les sciences sociales et, particulièrement, sur l'économie, la démographie, la science politique et la sociologie ; avec l'adhésion à l'idée d'une fin de l'histoire, c'est-à-dire de la politique, à laquelle est substituée une représentation gestionnaire du pouvoir transposée de l'entreprise sur l'État, engageant elle-même une redéfinition des relations du capitalisme et de l'État [...]'.
214. Ibid., p. 138 (my translation); original text: 'la critique a dû s'ajuster'.
215. See *ibid.*, p. 138. See also Susen (2012b), pp. 705–708 and 715–717, as well as Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 187–189 and 194–196.
216. See Boltanski (2008), p. 142.
217. Ibid., p. 142 (my translation); original text: 'démocratie de marché'.
218. Ibid., p. 139 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: 'Cette modalité de la domination qui consiste à *changer pour conserver* est identifiée dans « La production... » comme « conservatisme progressiste » (ou « reconverti ») par opposition au « conservatisme déclaré »'.
219. Ibid., p. 148 (my translation); original text: 'avec le passage du management fordien, associé au second esprit du capitalisme, au management « en réseau » associé à son nouvel « esprit »'.
220. Ibid., p. 147 (my translation); original text: 'Les nouvelles épreuves de sélection ont pu alors être invoquées, dans une multitude de situations quotidiennes locales et chaque fois singulières, pour modifier profondément la destinée de personnes [...]'.
221. Ibid., p. 140 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: 'La caractéristique principale des « élites » dont les textes et les interventions sont analysés dans notre article [...] de prôner le « changement ». Ces élites se voulaient radicalement novatrices et modernistes. [...] la « fatalité du probable » [...] : il faut vouloir le changement qui s'annonce parce que le changement est inévitable. Il faut donc *vouloir la nécessité*'.
222. See *ibid.*, p. 139 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: '*changer pour conserver*'. On the same formulation, see *ibid.*, p. 159. On this point, see also, for instance: Nash (2014), p. 359; Susen (2014c), p. 698.
223. Boltanski (2008), p. 141 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: 'gouvernance par les « experts »'.
224. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 141.
225. Ibid., pp. 143–144 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: '[...] dans un tel cadre, une action est illégitime quand on peut la dire *arbitraire*, c'est-à-dire quand on peut montrer qu'elle ne dépend que de la volonté d'un individu, d'un groupe ou d'une organisation qui, s'agissant de déterminer ce qui est et ce qui vaut, s'institue lui-même en position d'arbitre doté du pouvoir de trancher le débat entre des points de vue opposés'.

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226. Ibid., p. 144 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘Ceux qui gouvernent ainsi, en prégnant appui sur les représentations qu’ils donnent d’un avenir non encore réalisé et pourtant fatal, sont bien portant des réalistes parce qu’ils ont le pouvoir de faire advenir ce qu’ils prédisent, non seulement du fait qu’ils le prédisent (dans la logique de la *self-fulfilling prophecy*) mais aussi parce qu’ils disposent d’un haut niveau d’information et de moyens élevés d’action sur la réalité’.
227. Ibid., p. 147 (my translation); original text: ‘elle se fait chose pour faire des choses’.
228. See *ibid.*, p. 147: ‘l’idéologie se rend efficace’.
229. Ibid., p. 163 (my translation); original text: ‘l’économie du discours et de la justification’.
230. See *ibid.*, p. 163: ‘l’idéologie s’est vraiment faite chose intervenant sur les choses’.
231. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 149–158: ‘Domination simple et domination complexe’ [‘Simple domination and complex domination’].
232. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 149–153.
233. Ibid., p. 150 (my translation); original text: ‘[les personnes sont] partiellement ou complètement privées des libertés élémentaires’.
234. Ibid., p. 150 (my translation); original text: ‘profondes asymétries sont maintenues ou créés en mettant en œuvre une violence explicite et, notamment, mais non exclusivement, physique’.
235. Ibid., p. 150 (my translation); original text: ‘l’esclavage absolu’.
236. Ibid., p. 150 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘*oppression*’.
237. Ibid., p. 150 (my translation); original text: ‘Dans des situations d’oppression, l’éventualité de la critique est simplement exclue, comme peut même l’être aussi la simple possibilité de poser des questions sur ce qui se passe (« ici, on ne pose pas de questions »). Critique et questionnement étant évacuées, la justification n’a pas non plus lieu d’être’.
238. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 150–151.
239. Ibid., p. 151 (my translation); original text: ‘la critique paraît, dans une certaine mesure, possible’.
240. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 151–152. Cf. Susen (2011d).
241. Boltanski (2008), p. 153 (my translation); original text: ‘des asymétries profondes’.
242. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 153.
243. Ibid., p. 153 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘*le refus du changement*’.
244. Ibid., p. 153 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘*l’état de guerre* contre un perpétuel ennemi de l’intérieur’.
245. Ibid., p. 149 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘sociétés *capitalistes-démocratiques* contemporaines’.
246. Ibid., p. 153 (my translation); original text: ‘Les sociétés démocratiques de marché, c’est-à-dire compatibles avec le fonctionnement du capitalisme, ont construit leur idéal politique en opposition avec ce modèle de domination’.
247. Ibid., pp. 153–154 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘un *impératif de justification*’.
248. Ibid., p. 154 (my translation); original text: ‘[...] la critique peut se faire entendre’.
249. Ibid., p. 154 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘l’instauration d’un nouveau genre de relation entre institutions et critique’.
250. Ibid., p. 154 (my translation); original text: ‘l’incorporation de celle-ci aux routines de la vie sociale’.
251. Ibid., p. 155 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘épreuves de sélection’.
252. Ibid., p. 155 (my translation); original text: ‘asymétries profondes’.
253. Ibid., p. 156 (my translation); original text: ‘une répression violente’.
254. Ibid., p. 156 (my translation); original text: ‘par d’autres moyens pacifiques’.
255. Ibid., p. 156 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une logique néolibérale’.
256. Ibid., p. 156 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘blâmer la victime’.
257. Ibid., p. 156 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘responsabilité individuelle’.
258. Ibid., p. 156 (my translation); original text: ‘le poids des contraintes qui s’exercent à un niveau collectif’.
259. Ibid., p. 157 (my translation); original text: ‘des technologies psychologiques de management des ressources humaines’.
260. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 159–171: ‘De l’idéologie dominante à la domination sans idéologie’ [‘From dominant ideology to domination without ideology’].

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261. Ibid., p. 159 (my translation); original text: ‘changer pour conserver en invoquant la nécessité et en prenant appui sur une gouvernance par les experts’.
262. Ibid., p. 159 (my translation); original text: ‘est plus que jamais d’actualité’.
263. Ibid., pp. 159–160 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘[...] des demandes [...] ayant émergé du mouvement de Mai, qui conduira le management, dans les années 1980, à valoriser l’initiative individuelle des travailleurs et à prôner des formes «d’autonomie» qui se révéleront assez vite destinées à substituer l’autocontrôle (moins coûteux) au contrôle rapproché par l’encadrement de premier niveau [...] techniques de contrôles informatiques à distance, marquant le retour d’une version sophistiquée du taylorisme’.
264. Ibid., p. 162 (my translation); original text: ‘l’éloquence idéologique’.
265. Ibid., p. 162 (my translation); original text: ‘l’approfondissement du nouveau régime de gouvernance fondé sur l’autorité des experts et sur la dépossession/démission des représentants, a simplement rendu l’éloquence idéologique obsolète’.
266. Ibid., p. 163 (my translation); original text: ‘les cadres juridictionnels, complexes, et contrôles par des dispositifs d’évaluation adossés à des palmarès (*benchmarking*)’.
267. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 163–165 and 168–170.
268. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 163–168, esp. p. 168.
269. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2012a), pp. 324–325 n. 165. See also Browne and Susen (2014), pp. 222–223.
270. Boltanski (2008), p. 169 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘Sur la pratique des affaires des nouvelles élites, le management a eu un effet libérateur un peu comparable à celui que la diffusion de la psychanalyse a pu exercer sur leurs pratiques sexuelles’.
271. See Browne and Susen (2014).
272. Boltanski (2008), p. 165 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘de mettre chacun en concurrence avec tous les autres et, par là, de fragmenter des univers dont la seule ressource défensive serait pourtant l’union’.
273. Ibid., p. 167 (my translation); original text: ‘retrait de l’État’.
274. Ibid., p. 167 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘[...] cette nouvelle forme de domination [...] une réorientation des modalités d’action de l’État de façon à lui permettre de servir les intérêts d’un capitalisme lui-même profondément modifié. Le capitalisme changeant «d’esprit», l’État a dû changer aussi le sien’.
275. Ibid., p. 166 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘la «fin des idéologies», prophétisée depuis cinquante ans, est bien devenue une réalité’.
276. Ibid., p. 166 (my translation); original text: ‘S’il reste aujourd’hui une classe consciente d’elle-même c’est, plus que tout autre, la classe dominante’.
277. Ibid., p. 168 (my translation); original text: ‘une classe dominante mondiale’.
278. On this point, see *ibid.*, esp. pp. 173–178 (my translation); original text: ‘Dévoiler le monde sous la réalité’ [‘Uncovering the world under reality’].
279. See *ibid.*, p. 173: ‘la sociologie est un sport de combat’.
280. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 173.
281. Ibid., p. 175 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘*faire de la recherche*’.
282. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 175.
283. Ibid., p. 176 (italics added) (my translation); original text: ‘une exigence de vérité’.
284. In this sense, it makes sense to distinguish between ‘*validity claims*’ in science and ‘*legitimacy claims*’ in politics. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 176: ‘[...] le discours politique nous semblait toujours trop rapide, trop séducteur, trop variable, trop léger, livre à l’opinion’.
285. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 176: ‘[...] la vocation de la sociologie [...] comme un combat pour le dévoilement de la réalité’.
286. On this point, see *ibid.*, pp. 176–177.
287. Ibid., p. 178 (italics in original) (my translation); original text: ‘*rendre la réalité inacceptable*’.
288. Ibid., p. 178 (my translation); original text: ‘ses contradictions, ses opacités et ses asymétries’.
289. See Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010), esp. p. 161.
290. Boltanski (2008), p. 178 (my translation); original text: ‘combat’.
291. On the concept of ideology, see, for instance: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1980); Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1990); Apel (1971a); Apel (1971b); Arnason (2000); Bohman (1986); Boltanski

- (2008); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008 [1976]); Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Conde-Costas (1991); Disco (1979); Eagleton (2006 [1976]); Eagleton (2007 [1991]); Gadamer (1971); Habermas (1971 [1968]); Hartmann (1970); Haug (1999); Honneth (2007); Inglis (2013), esp. pp. 320–322; Inglis and Thorpe (2012), Chapter 3; Jakubowski (1990 [1976]); Larrain (1991 [1983]); Lee (1992); Marx and Engels (1953 [1845–1847]); Marx and Engels (2000/1977 [1846]); Mongardini (1992); Overend (1978); Quiniou (1996); Rehmann (2004); Reitz (2004); Simons and Billig (1994); Susen (2014d); Susen (2015a), Chapter 2; Thompson (1984); Thompson (1990); Van Dijk (1998); Wacquant (2002 [1993]); Weber (1995); Wolff (2004); Žižek (1989); Žižek (1994).
292. On this point, see Susen (2014d), esp. pp. 96–109.
293. Of course, since the publication of *PID* in 1976, Boltanski has developed and revised his sociological positions on several levels, notably in relation to Bourdieu’s approach. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory has gone through different stages. We may distinguish *three phases* that are particularly relevant to his development as a scholar:
- The *initial phase* is based on the studies that Boltanski published in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. This period may be characterized as ‘Boltanski’s *Bourdieuian* phase’. See, for instance: Boltanski (1969); Boltanski (1970); Boltanski (1973); Boltanski (1975); Boltanski (1982); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975a); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975b); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu, Boltanski, Castel, and Chamboredon (1965); Bourdieu, Boltanski and De Saint Martin (1973).
 - The *middle phase* is based on the studies that Boltanski published during the 1980s and – particularly – during the 1990s. This period may be referred to as ‘Boltanski’s *post- or anti-Bourdieuian* phase’. See, for instance: Boltanski (1990a); Boltanski (1990b); Boltanski (1993); Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski (2004); Boltanski (2006); Boltanski and Chiapello (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (1983); Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999).
 - The *most recent phase* designates his latest stage, that is, that of ‘the Boltanski of the early 21st century’. This period may be described as ‘the phase of Boltanski’s *reconciliation with Bourdieu*’. See, in particular: Boltanski (2008); Boltanski (2009); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010).
- On this three-stage account of Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory, see Fowler (2014). See also Susen (2014b), p. 49, and Susen (2014c), pp. 613–621.
294. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 14, 22, 54, 115, 121–125, 217, 221–226, 227 n. 10, 239, 253, 267, 277, 304, and 312; Susen (2013c), pp. 229–230; Susen (2013d), pp. 327, 328, 333, 335, 354, 362, 372, and 373.

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