**Beyond Resilience: Learning from the cultural economy**

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**Abstract**  
The aim of this paper has been to address the apparent paradox that culture has been the high profile victim of funding cuts in the period of austerity; at the same time culture has prospered. Is culture then the ‘poster child for resilience’?  
The paper seeks to de-couple the notion from neo-liberalism and austerity. It counters with an argument that resilience as a concept is relational, it does not have a unitary meaning and its forms will change depending on context (that is the cultural field, and the field of governance). Hence, the strange survival of culture is explained not by austerity, but by the dynamism of the cultural field. However, this disjunction between governance and culture also carried a number of risks and problems.
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Introduction

In the UK as in many nations, the cultural economy has been one of the few sectors of the economy that has weathered the storm of the global recession (Office for national statistics 2016). International economic performance has held up, and indeed grown; particularly in the Global South (UNCTAD 2010, UNESCO 2013). Even in the nations and cities of the North culture has held on. For many it is surprising to see the cultural economy taking its place as a basic industry in urban areas. Commonly accounting for between 5-10% or employment, and growing (Freeman 2007); plus, it is no longer ‘dependant’; in fact, it is a driver of local economies (Pratt 2011).

These facts run against the tide of how urban planners and policy makers conceive of cities and of culture (Pratt 2014). This paper addresses this disjuncture by addressing the question of how culture and why culture seems to have survived and thrived under conditions of economic austerity, and apparent state withdrawal from support. At face value the urban cultural economy is a poster child of ‘resilience’. This paper questions such an easy conclusion, and points to a deeper appreciation of the cultural can economy and cities, above and beyond the superficial manifestation of ‘resilience’ as an ability to ‘bounce back’ after an external shock’ (Christopherson, Michie et al. 2010).

The cultural economy (that is in its broad sense, including both for and not-for
profit activities) has been subjected to some substantive challenges. In the city of Newcastle, a zero-budget was set for culture (Clark-Jenkins 2013). This was clearly the logical conclusion of relentless local state budgetary constraints, and the symbolic role of culture being the first victim (as opposed to education, or social care; although these have followed). In the 2010-15 period funding for local authorities in the UK was cut by 20%, analyses indicate that the cultural budgets fell overall by 16% (Harvey 2016). Indicating that some authorities had ‘protected’ culture, others such as Newcastle had effectively sacrificed culture. At the national level the comprehensive spending review reduced the funding for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (including the Arts Council) by 29.6% for the period 2010-15 (House of Commons 2011; para 28). The headline figure disguises the fact that the Arts Council decided to cut its administration budget by 50%, thereby protecting nation funded organisations which suffered only 6.9% cuts (House of Commons 2011; para 12).

Was culture dead? Of course not, and the reason is in part because culture has changed, and the part of it that is wholly dependent on state funding has diminished. Culture is now a complex co-dependency of activities that go beyond traditional boundaries: of culture, or the for profit, and of paid work. The message here is not that cultural passions will sustain the sector through thick and thin, that is – as we will argue – a simplistic and inaccurate reading of the cultural economy. Rather, that culture survived because it was also adapted and innovated away from normative support and governance systems (that had in effect failed it long ago). As the Select Committee reports, ‘an emerging model of arts funding is for one-third of the income to come from state subsidy, one-third from box office, and the remainder from commercial
revenue sources

In Newcastle, as well as many other cities, a new cultural economy has been emergent, and its changed form, requires us to explore the new modes of governance and evaluation of its relative health. After seeking to clarify what we mean by resilience, we move to stressing governance as well as the unique structure of the cultural economy

The paper is not an apology for austerity, but an insight into the current conjuncture. However, in the midst of which we can see new arrangements. Culture is called on to be many things: to support idealist culture for the nation state, to be an instrument of social inclusion and to provide economic growth (Belfiore 2002). This call to be a hybrid object is the challenge. It links to arguments that suggest that policy making can be more effective in terms of managing from the middle in hybrid fields (especially where determining outcomes is subject to democracy).

**Resilience as a stance**

There is now an extensive literature on resilience in two broad sub-fields, those of economic development and those of environmental management. Both are marked by similar tensions between a dominant engineering or social physics conception of processes, and those of a social and institutional character: the former are dominant (Bristow 2010, Pike, Dawley et al. 2010, Davoudi, Shaw et al. 2012, Martin, Sunley et al. 2015, Pratt 2015). Moreover, resilience has been mobilised in debates regarding potential responses and
preferred responses to the politically imposed funding cuts to public services under the name of ‘austerity programmes’.

By discussing resilience in this way austerity, and the neo-liberal economic thought that seeks to justify it, resilience is naturalised, as if it were a physical process. Accordingly, resilience is presented as a stance - a static position to adopt - not a strategy. It is an atomistic response to an overwhelming threat that requires resistance, and the magical property of ‘bounce-back’. Overwhelmingly, such accounts are a-social and focused on the physical properties and capabilities of the subject of the threats using limited technocratic evaluations. The result is that ‘non-resilience’ is interpreted as a failure of governance, and the lack of a ‘can do’ attitude.

The characterisation of a resilient stance is of the ‘survivalist’, the responsibility to be prepared: to strengthen defences, to stock up to survive the shock, and then to bounce back. The same characterisation applies to humans as well as physical materials. Accordingly, there is a focus on ‘stress-testing’ and securing the robustness of systems, and a technocratic control.

Ironically, in this dominant interpretation of resilience whilst strength is highlighted the implicit assumption is that subjects (physical and human) are constructed as fragile, or have minimal flexibility. Flexibility is attained by relationship to the wider system through a signal and response feedback. The system is predefined, based upon an a priori definition processes, into sub-systems (process silos), the result being that questions of causality are shifted outside of the realm of calculation. It is not possible to question the threat, or how it might be mitigated at source; let alone redefine who and why it is
directed in such a way. Moreover, that the cycle of threat, attack and recovery is a natural cycle, one that will always return to, or aim to return to, its point or origin. There is little attention to growth, adaptation and learning.

These conceptual foundations both proscribe and justify responses to a threat, and sustain and support a ‘resilient stance’. They encourage humans to be part of a natural system that has to be resisted and not controlled, and one to which there is only one possible response.

The economic and physical planning system is put in a difficult position in these debates. The connection to the physical sciences, especially in environmental protection, as well as their philosophical legacy of systems thinking, opens an easy acceptance of the resilient stance (Davoudi, Shaw et al. 2012). This is reinforced by government agencies tasking planning bodies to be ‘resilient’, that is to adopt the stance.

It is not surprising that researchers working on planning and economic development questions have queried this a-social account, and its physicalist foundations. A body of counter-argument has developed; critically, the key point is the attention to causality and process: that is, recognising the social constitution of responses.

Alternative responses point to some less contentious, but important, issues such as the scale and spatial extent of threats and responses; whilst these would be accepted in principle from the normative position, what the critical position adds concerns governance across and between scales; questioning a simply technocratic hierarchy. However, the most telling criticism is that of
evolution and adaptation. Rhetorically, such terms fit with the lexicon of systems thinking, but the arguments concern the transformation of the subjects (the nodes of a system), not simply the relations and feedback. That is, it offers the focus on transformation and change to the subjects as a way of being ‘resilient’; that is not bending, and bounding back, but transforming and changing. Such a process might be characterised as an adaptation, evolution and potentially a learning one.

Supporting this counter position, Ron Martin and colleagues make a very useful intervention that helps to pull us back from the ‘resilience as stance’ position, and toward a ‘resilience as strategy’ one. They argue that resilience has a diversity of types of response, and a range of causes of those responses. Moreover, they state that these diversities of response and cause are rooted in three inter-related factors: composition, context and connection. Composition being about the particular configuration of the activity or industry; connection being the quality of relationships between actors, networks and institutions; and context, the embedding of these within wider local, regional and international institutions.

This position opens a more social, and change-focused, perspective; critically, although not directly on Martin’s (Martin, Sunley et al. 2015) agenda, it raises significant questions of governance. The remainder of this paper takes up this challenge. First, we interrogate the particularities of the object, the cultural economy; then we review what the challenges and possibilities of governance are. Second, we explore some examples of cultural transformation in practice.
The cultural field

The common assumptions and conceptions of the cultural field are partial, and temporally and institutionally bound; that is to say they are embedded and evolutionary. On one hand, it is normative to see the cultural field as ‘exceptional’; support and finance for the traditional cultural field is commonly justified by reference to social idealism. On the other hand, the transformation of the cultural economy and its for-profit dimensions can be viewed as like any other aspect of the economy. As we will outline here, both positions are flawed.

The cultural exceptionalism position is primarily a backward-looking one, to a period when cultural was state funded as part of an idealist nationalist project. The focus was on the maintenance and conservation of a particular idea of culture and its material forms; and of the communication of the cultural values to a wider public. Such a system was focused on consumption insulated from change, new production, and linked to public funding.

The emergence of the cultural economy is marked by a strong for profit and ‘production’ focus, in this sense a new economic sector; and to a lesser extent, the development of new not-for-profit art forms: these might be considered the socially-funded ‘innovation pool’ of the arts. Moreover, they should not be defined as ‘outside’ of the system; rather they should be included in within it.

These two systems of culture and economics have co-evolved and are better conceptualised as a totality: what has been termed a cultural production system. The cultural production system offers a more holistic and inter-related

The normative classification of the boundaries of the cultural field (or system) have been imposed by governance and funding systems, and are not internal to cultural production. In this sense, what we can observe is that in many respects the recent history of the cultural economy is that of which it has escaped the control of governance bodies. Illustrative of this has been the recalibration of governance and government that may take place. In 1997 the UK government created a new government Department (the Department of Culture, Media and Sport), and its status upgraded to that of a cabinet role (replacing and extending the old Department of National Heritage) in order to respond to the new object of policy (mainly the creative industries).

As we will note below, the traditional support for culture, based upon a welfare economics approach (Throsby 2010), is imperilled by the reduction in state funding. However, the support for the creative economy is mis-focused as it is patently not a normative economic object (the economy); it has a particular compositional (see above) and operational character. The operation of the creative economy is in part generated by its specific organisational structure; a bifurcated form with a few very large firms, and a vast majority not simply small firms, but comprised of micro-enterprises and the self-employed (Andres and Round 2015). Moreover, the enterprises are not of the familiar type; they are best described as serial project-based enterprises (Grabher 2002). That is, they are firms created for a single project, and dispersed and reformed for a subsequent project. Continuity is not a characteristic of the
individual firm or worker, rather change and transformation.

The organisational forms outlined above create needs for co-ordination; therefore, the role of network intermediaries are often critical to systemic continuity and change. This is a common weakness that is traded-off by the winner-takes-all character of the sector (Frank and Cook 1996). Namely, that due to the radical uncertainty that new products will find a market (indeed, the process of is making markets for products) the risk and uncertainty is high. Winners gain monopoly profits, but at a system level such gains cross-subsidise the ‘losers’. Finally, the whole system has a very fast turnover time where one product replaces another with unique speed (and hence, creates a need for hyper innovation). It is a system that at an individual level encourages immediacy, instead of planning for the future. Indeed, it can be argued that the production system form of governance enables such radical cross-subsidisation and an ability to hedge risks against the future.

As if this radical cultural production process was not extreme enough, the cultural economy draws heavily on the nor-for-profit for skills and ideas; as noted above, it is in effect an informal laboratory. These combined characteristics – in organisational form, process, and outcome – generate governance needs at odds with either traditional economic planning, or state funded culture. As we will reflect below, it is perhaps an irony that the cultural field has not been simply resilient, but has grown through the periods of austerity. This fact indicates that what the culture sector potentially offers is a lesson not of a resilient stance, but of a resilient, adaptive and evolutionary practice.
Resilience as a mode of Governance

The challenges and possibilities of governance are not a pre-given but are limited by the particular modality of governance at a specific time. Northern European and North American cities have been caused to adopt a broad set of neo-liberal assumptions about economic management, and the role of the state. In essence this has been mobilised through the establishment of a new range of justifications, and accountability tests, for policy actions. Neo-liberalism has played out in various ways under both the specifics of state institutions, and the particularities of the object of governance (culture in this case). An important aspect of such change is that of history and the evolution of responses as an adaptation to the past.

As indicated above the form of the cultural field and its justificatory regimes provided by the state to legitimate action have changed. What were previously idealist, and targeted at nation building, have become economic. In recent years there has been a flip of concern between that of consumption to production (narrowly defined). We have indicated above, that such a transformation did not overlap with the actual shifts in the cultural economy which correspond more closely to a hybrid form of production system. In so doing, the cultural economy has out-grown its traditional governance form. The creation of the DCMS in the UK (echoed in many countries, although not in the US) indicated one step change; as did another, the adoption of the term creative industries: again stressing that governance and its objects co-evolve.

The broader field of governance has not stood still, whilst reforming to accommodate new ‘objects’ of government is one step, another is the
transformation of governance itself. As I will show, these new forms have within them particular assumptions of what resilience is. In short, resilience is a mode of governance. Taking up Martin et al’s (Martin, Sunley et al. 2015) challenge we have already pointed to the particularity of composition, the creative sector; now we turn to the process of governance. Extending this idea, we now examine here the various reasons and responses to resilience encoded within neo-liberalism. The section has three parts that seek to develop this debate concerning objectives, scales and justifications.

**Objectives and means**

At their simplest level austerity politics and practice are linked to doing more with less, being efficient and saving money. However, austerity politics are simply the external manifestation of a more systematic mode of governance aimed at the repurposing of the state. Such re-purposing seeks to shrink state expenditure and substitute them with other funds. Thus resource reduction is accompanied by reorganisation, most significantly through contracting out services. Such transformations require a new regulatory control of minimum service standards, which are subject to dilution under the ‘Dutch auction’ of the tendering process (Peck 2012). What was once a social obligation now becomes a point of market equilibrium.

Aside from the erosion of funding, and the undermining of quality, and quality control, in favour of price the most insidious aspect of such a process is the atomistic assumptions of the smallest accounting unit. The potentiality of cross-subsidy to deal with risk and uncertainty is removed; such risk is resolved
onto the individual contractor who will be replaced if they ‘fail’. As such it creates a radically unstable system of short term, precarious employment and contracting; moreover, it creates institutions and organisations that are risk averse: that is fragile and brittle, hardly fit to ‘bounce back’.

Within such neo-liberal governance regimes, the focus is on the accounting framework limited to a specific time-period: developmental and adaptive approaches are undermined, as profits and returns are also atomised. Staff and product development, let alone training, research and development (unless delivered just-in-time) cannot be resourced.

On one hand, it is not surprising that under such circumstances that the stock ‘resilience’ response is to use ‘free labour’ of interns and volunteers, to seek out communities of practice, and of knowledge exchange (‘free innovation’): in short, to seek socially available benefits. It is ironic that the more fiercely marketised the cultural sector is, the more it seeks out the non-market sector to retain its resilience.

On the other hand, the more the private field is drawn into the state. The lack of funding leads to the search for various forms of sponsorship. Most ‘publicly funded cultural bodies’ are now substantially in receipt of sponsorship. Corporate sponsors seek publicity, but they also benefit from access to knowledge of cultural institutions.

Overall, what this process generates is a very dispersed constituency of ‘stakeholders’ with a variety of interests. There are the formal stakeholders providing money, but we have to consider the informal ones too; those who
provide labour (volunteers and interns). However, generally, only the former gets to be represented in policy making.

**Scale and scope**

The architecture of governance is apt to be transformed under neo-liberal imperatives to shrink and outsource, and further to be required to do more with less. In turn, the ability of organisations to respond and react is structured by this institutional transformation. Significantly, the inherited structure, with the DNA of previously cultural norms of delivery encoded in it, plays an important role.

Put simply, the normative objects of policy (culture in this case) are reflected in the institutional structures of government: they are isomorphic. Over time routinisation and accounting practices re-inforce departmental boundaries, professional expertise and practices further strengthen them until one develops a ‘silo’. (The analogy is with massive vertical grain silos) (Francesca and Sylvain 2010). The routinisation of decision making and policy action is internal to the silo/department and efficiencies and effectivities follow. Everything is fine if the delivery objectives and policy focus, let alone the policy object, remain the same.

Culture has suffered change in two ways. First, as we have seen budgetary reductions have in diminished culture departments, denuding them of expertise and capabilities. This has created new and complex interdependencies of funding regimes and governance responsibilities. As
noted above national portfolio organisations (NPO), which operate at the local level (for example orchestras or theatre) have been shielded from cuts (by cutting administration instead). Hence over the 2010-15 period whilst nationally cuts were 26.9% to the arts council, funding for NPOs increased by 17%. However, the proportion of funding derived from local government for NPOs fell from 8% to 5% (Harvey 2016). Hence the complex balance of (lack of) local authority funding to ‘unlock’ the national NPO funds.

Second, local and national cultural agencies’ scope of action, or desired action, now necessarily extends outside of ‘culture’ as previously defined: most obviously, this now includes the economic, but it extends much further than this especially into the social realm (Belfiore 2002). However, as noted above institutional constraints – as represented by the silo – can limit this.

The scale of an institution or policy agency is important here. Larger, national, institutions are able to attract investment and sponsorship as they advertising reach is sufficient to justify the stakeholder’s interests. Accordingly, budgets can be balanced (although they may be challenged in terms of satisfying particular stakeholder objectives). At a smaller scale sponsorship may be absent, but the free labour of volunteering can make a huge difference of operational budgets. Institutions that suffer most lie between these two extremes; for example, municipal museums (Babbidge 2000, House of Commons 2011).

Added to the crisis of funding discussed in the previous part, this mismatch of the institution with the object of governance, and particularly the need to work horizontally, presents a substantial block to governance. On one hand,
there is the challenge of cross-silo working; on the other, there is the challenge of working outside the institution, increasingly with external bodies (formal stakeholders, and informal groups) which incurs increased transactional costs.

The model of resilience implied in the neo-liberal approach is to network and unlock resources from elsewhere to do more with less. However, the necessary power and authority of decision making is lacking (or simply lies with the most economically powerful institution). The danger is the creation of an ever wider dispersed agency with little, or any, co-ordination or guidance which focuses on short-term interests. Alternatively, it generates the challenge of working across multi-disciplinary agencies where the power and legitimacy, and promotion, remains locked up in mono-disciplinary silos.

**Justifications**

Whilst the headline of neo-liberalism is one of reducing public spending, accompanied by the watchwords of austerity making do with less, arguably the key transformation in governance under neo-liberalism concerns the justificatory regime that is ushered in (Power 1997). By normalising the atomistic logic of the auditor, and the settlement of market equilibrium a whole sub-set of questions regarding quality are negated. This is particularly serious for the field of culture, where the value offer is central to its *raison d’etre*.

The first set justificatory changes relate to the conditions under which culture should be supported. The traditional role has been minimised to the point of
obliteration: idealist support for the humanistic values of culture, and the soft-power of particular values that sustain specific ideas of the nation state. These arguments were previously mobilised by philanthropists, and the designers of the welfare state, to underpin the allocation of resources to culture.

On one hand the emergence of a self-supporting (for the most part) vibrant economic force of the creative economy is a perfect exemplar of neo-liberal market values. However, as we have noted, the structure of the cultural economy was far from normal, and required support. The default support was in effect to ‘socialise’ the cultural system, that is to provide a ‘non-economic’ safety-net for free.

On the other hand, the traditional cultural core has been forced to seek funding elsewhere, or to socialise its labour. However, the process is more extensive. In order to justify the limited spending on culture a new justification was imposed on the sector, that of social impact. Institutions were required to prioritise social inclusion in order to be eligible for public funding. The ways that this was achieved was through a new technology of government practice: New Public Sector Management (NPSM)(Hood 1995).

NPSM was an approach to policy evaluation and budgetary control whereby long and short term management was linked to performance targets. The selection of targets was a major operational challenge, as data was not collected, nor feasible, on cultural meaning. Accordingly, the operational requirement required a proxy, one that was already available. For many museums for example, seeking to demonstrate how they were serving the widest community a measure of footfall at the entry of museums was used.
Clearly, enumerating of bodies crossing a threshold of a museum tells you something, but nothing about purpose, meaning and transformation. However, the NPSM system requires targets, and regular performance against them; funding is directly related to these indicators. Professionally, this puts museum directors and staff in a bind; they have a commitment to the older objectives, but they are evaluated by the new ones (Bishop 2012).

Neo-liberalism established and legitimated the need of a system to be monitored and audited, so as to justify (and ever-diminishing) funding is the need for data and evaluation techniques. On the later, we have a paradox in that the processes under investigation in the arts and culture are long term, slow processes, that yield results in decades, rather than years or months; however, these are monitored by annual budgetary systems that require a measure of return on investment each year, and the instant impact at the end of every project.

The data needs of the new cultural management system are significant, and for various reasons do not exist. First, as noted above, there is the problem of un-measurability of core ideas like ‘transformation’, or ‘insight’, and their replacement by poor proxies such as footfall through the gallery entrance hall. Second, as the mode of justification (in the old welfare system) previously did not require data, and relied upon ‘special pleading’ as regards to the value of culture, as a consequence data were not collected nor systematically developed. Those that were available focused on material flows (people and money), and not on ideas, knowledge and culture.

For some the solution to this problem is considered to lie in ‘big data’. This is
an attractive idea to neo-liberals and market economists who see the lack of perfect data as the reason for market failure. Big data thus promises to develop the perfect system (Andrejevic 2013). That is data produced for other purposes (usually harvested from social media) that might be used as a proxy for the variables that are really required.

A predictable technocratic response to the governance challenges in the cultural sector has come from the idea that ‘big data’ can be sourced to ‘fill the gaps’, and that it can be used to inform policy action. For some, the future is where governance could be replaced by an algorithm (Leszczynski 2016). The conclusion seems to be that correlation is far more important than causation. More significantly such proposition seems to feed into the idea that markets can be self-governing systems, and all that is hindering them is the availability of ‘perfect’ (or proxy) information upon which to allocate resources.

**Beyond resilience**

The cultural sector has suffered the most drastic funding cuts because of the adoption of neo-liberal inspired austerity measures. On one hand, culture is subject endlessly deferred execution via ‘salami cuts’; on the other the sector has not only survived, but grown and prospered (due to their organisational transformation, and through accessing new funding sources). In normative terms, this makes the cultural sector ‘super resilient’. However, I have argued that this would be a misinterpretation that failed to pay attention to the way that culture and its governance itself has been changing, and in many respects, de-coupling from the state (Mansfield 2014). This is not the ‘small state’ of neo-liberalism, but a parallel establishment of mutual aid. Neo-liberalism and
austerity did not produce this change; however, they have become part of a paradoxically linked dynamic. This is a theme that emerges from the paper: that resilience is relational, context matters.

It is not only context that matters, but also the nature of the ‘composition’ of the cultural sector, as well as the diversity of responses to austerity, and to reduce state expenditures. Hence, the rejection of the physicalist and engineering concept of resilience which are based upon strength defending fragility: this we termed the ‘resilience stance’. We contrasted this with a social and contextual notion of adaptability where resilience did not come from a protection, or a limited flexibility, rather it came from a re-configuration and re-organisation.

We showed that the cultural sector is characterised by a non-normative organisational structure that is not represented by the institutionalisation of, and by, large corporations; it is characterised instead by a large and dispersed network of not only small, but microenterprises, and the self-employed. Moreover, these enterprises and individuals are constantly re-organised on the basis of serial project contracting arrangements. The reason that these novel organisational forms have developed is in no small part as a response to the radical market uncertainty and risk that characterises the cultural field. So, in a sense, the cultural field is ‘born resilient’

Of course, the resilience of the cultural sector is not perfect and it has many weaknesses, especially in terms of long term growth and stability. The social and economic costs of constant-reinvention are high. However, the affective relationships that are generated via cultural labour encourage self-
exploitation; in fact, such an affective attitude is an entry requirement to the sector. Added to the human costs or burn out and self-exploitation, are the costs of networking and organisation. Thus, the strength of flexibility comes with the cost of network cultivation, and particularly mediation between different interests. In both cases the resilience is outsourced to flexible or freelance workers who bear the costs and risks of uncertainty.

We can highlight a number of other areas where the apparent resilience generates challenges. Public sector funding cuts to large scale institutions such as museums and galleries are routinely supplemented by charitable donations and sponsorship deals. In a sense this is resilient; but one that carries costs and new challenges in the form of the precise ‘deal’ (Pratt and Hutton 2013). The Tate Gallery has come under considerable criticism for example for accepting support from the oil company BP (Chong 2013). In the cultural field reputation and brand management are critically important, and fragile. So, sponsorship can produce other tensions labour reputation, or in other examples, control.

Another form of resilience that public institutions practice is the reduction of labour costs by the employment of volunteers and interns. This is a form of socialisation of the costs, and risks, of running an institution. Not all labour is substitutable in this way, and smaller institutions are disproportionately affected. However, once again, as the institution becomes more disperse, expertise and knowledge is leached away; and institutions develop a dependency on the informal cultural sector which presents further governance challenges.
Finally, the erosion of public policy expertise and departmental budgets has led to a diminished capacity of the public sector to co-ordinate, let alone plan for culture. Whereas in the past cultural agencies allocated and dispersed resources, and they were configured to achieve this; today the need is to co-ordinate and synchronise diverse cultural actors. In a core sense, the diminished, or closed, culture departments don’t have the capacity or skill. Moreover, such co-ordination would require a governance structure and public agency able to work horizontally, across the public agency, to exploit linkages to cognate areas of policy: for example, health, transport, economic development. It is precisely in these areas that we see initiatives developing that are a test to the institutional structures of governance and the silo mentality that comes with it (and is re-enforced by public sector management systems, targets and accountability).

A recent example is the emergence in many cities of the post of ‘Night Mayor’. This post has emerged in recognition of the growth and value of the ‘night-time economy’ to cities; but at the same time that governance structures are based upon a traditional day-time city, and day-time concerns. Night Mayors act to signal the import of the cultural economy (day and night), but critically to mediate between institutional structures and agencies that might not otherwise co-ordinate: police and licencing, and culture, planning and economic development. These examples point to the fact that resilience is an ongoing process and strategy, not simply a stance. Moreover, that resilience is not defined by austerity and reduction of state roles; it may in fact lead to a re-evaluation and resurgence of strategic action by the state. However, the ‘new actions’ are different in character and style from those in the past. Instead of
allocation of grants, the approach is one of facilitating of coordination and the support for capacity building. This is what we mean by beyond resilience.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this paper has been to reflect on the notion of resilience in relation to the field of culture. The paper sought to de-couple the notion from neo-liberalism and austerity. It countered with an argument that resilience as a concept is relational, it does not have a unitary meaning and its forms will change depending on context (that is the cultural field, and the field of governance). Moreover, that resilience as being relational is better understood in a network rather than hierarchy, it operates more in the horizontal than the vertical.

The paper noted that to a large extent the cultural field has an uneasy relationship with government. This is not because it is ‘difficult’, rather that state institutions are rigid and backward looking in terms of their object: culture. The cultural field has, in that last half century, been extremely dynamic in terms of its growth and continual ‘spill-overs’ across the for and not for profit, the formal and informal, and the boundaries of ‘accepted’ culture. On one hand, the resilience of culture has emerged, due to its rapidity of change, and the organisational forms adopted to facilitate such change. These transformations have outpaced the ability of cash-strapped and cowed public authorities to innovate. On the other hand, the resilience of culture has been achieved by the socialisation of risk through temporary and unpaid labour, and through outsourcing innovation and training: this is not sustainable.
This socialisation of risks is a challenge for culture and its governance. The key struggle will be to provide for long term training, innovation and capacity building. The second, and related area, of challenge concerns the coordination of fragmented and diverse individuals and groups that have been created as a result of the headlong permanent revolution of creativity. Sacrificial labour can only last so long, and it tends to be focuses and self-centred. Governance is required to provide an analysis and to identify the strategic weaknesses, and responses to them. This will be the real test of resilience in the cultural field.

References


