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Learning to Manage the Army

Edward Ward, Halford Mackinder and the Army Administration Course at the London School of Economics, 1907-1914

Peter Grant

In his recent article on the Army Administration Course at the London School of Economics (LSE), Sloan rightly hails the course as ‘a radical experiment in British military education.’¹ Sloan’s article is in many ways comprehensive and is especially good on the role played in the course by the LSE’s Director, Halford Mackinder. However, Sloan gives insufficient coverage to two respects. First is the highly significant contribution to the development of the course that was made by the Permanent Secretary at the War Office, Sir Edward Ward, second, is the far-reaching influence the course had on later thinking beyond the confines of the British Army. Sloan incorrectly describes Ward as the Under-Secretary of State for War, an error a number of other sources also make. Ward had assumed the permanent secretary role in 1901. Seen as a stage towards the establishment of separate business schools within British universities, this revolutionary course in educating military personnel in business and administrative topics at higher degree level also acted as a precursor for later business related university education alongside similar LSE-inspired courses for those in banking and the railways.

Often cited as the greatest of Britain’s peacetime holders of the post of Secretary of State for War, Richard Burton Haldane’s modernisation of the War Office was ‘little short of revolutionary.’² During the reforms of 1905 to 1912, Haldane relied on the assistance of a number of military experts and their contribution, most notably

- 1 Geoff Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten: A Radical Experiment in British Military Education’, *War in History*, 19 (3) (2012), p.351.
- 2 Simon Higgens, ‘How was Richard Haldane able to reform the British Army? An historical assessment using a contemporary change management model’, (MPhil Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010), p.68; K.W. Mitchinson, *Defending Albion: Britain’s Home Army 1908-1919* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.3. See also R. Blake,

Major-General Douglas Haig.³ One figure whose contribution to the Haldane Reforms has been underplayed (even totally forgotten) was the Permanent Secretary at the War Office during that period, Sir Edward Ward. Ward was a former army supply officer, it was his ingenuity that ensured the survival of the garrison and civilians of Ladysmith during the siege, and organiser of the Royal Military Tournament who, after retirement, went on to become Director General of Voluntary Organisations during the Great War.⁴ During the war Ward also headed the Camps Library that supplied books to the troops, was an extremely active Chairman of the Council of the RSPCA, Honorary Treasurer and member of the General Purposes Committee of the West Indian Contingent Committee (which looked after the welfare of West Indian and Bermudan troops), Assistant Inspector of Shells for the Ministry of Munitions and Commandant-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.

The Role of Sir Edward Ward

Haldane had great faith in Ward and gave him significant additional responsibilities. Ward was a key figure in many critical improvements to the War Office as he brought his organisational and managerial skills to bear. Haldane often relied on advice from key specialists and, in this case, his chosen specialist advisor was Ward who had first made proposals along similar lines in 1903-04 during the attempted reforms of Haldane's predecessor, H.O. Arnold-Foster, which envisaged the creation of an entirely new class of reserve officer.⁵ Teagarden suggests that Haldane's 'greatest asset as Secretary of State was his profound ignorance on military matters. He was therefore able to form an independent judgement.'⁶ However, Higgins debunks the idea of Haldane's complete ignorance on military matters suggesting this was a deliberate 'cover' in order to woo the top Generals to his way of thinking.⁷ From May 1906, Ward chaired the weekly Directors meetings with important operational issues discussed and actions decided. Like several other key Army officers, including Haig, Ward shared Haldane's views on the need for significant reform and reorganisation to turn the Army into a modern fighting force. Ward threw himself enthusiastically into these tasks, which included officer recruitment, plans for mobilisation and the

'Great Britain: The Crimean War to the First World War' in Michael Howard (ed.) *Soldiers and Governments* (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p.34.

- 3 Most recently in Gary Sheffield's *The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army* (London, Aurum Press, 2011), pp.58-60.
- 4 For a full examination of Ward's innovative military and managerial career, see: Peter Grant, *Philanthropy and Voluntary Action in the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2014).
- 5 The National Archives (TNA), WO 32/6384, Report of Ward Committee on Organisation and Establishment of Civil Departments 1903.
- 6 Ernest Teagarden, *Haldane at the War Office: A Study in Organization and Management* (New York, Gordon Press, 1976), p.26.
- 7 Higgins, 'Richard Haldane', pp.52-56, 71-72.

re-organisation of the Army Medical Department and that of the War Office itself. Between 1907 and 1909, Ward created the framework of the Imperial General Staff that came into existence in November 1909 and was Chairman of the Committee on Civil Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Sailors, a cause close to his heart and demonstrating his keen humanitarian concern.⁸ Another of Ward's achievements was the creation of the Officers Training Corps (OTC) that Haldane recognised as Ward's brainchild by making him the chair of the committee in August 1906.⁹ Ward was responsible for the compilation of the original 'War Book', which set out, in detail, the actions required on mobilization. Though it was later revised, it was on Ward's basic plan that subsequent versions were based and the fact that mobilization went so smoothly in 1914 was partly a testimony to Ward's organisational skills. In 1908-09, he worked with Haig, now Director of Staff Duties, on the production of 'a codified set of manuals dealing with administration and training' that became *Field Service Regulations Parts 1 and 2*. Williams noted that, 'It was very largely his [Ward's] hand which guided Mr Haldane in his efforts to create the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force between 1906 and 1908.' Though written in the 1960s, Williams, unlike many others, is not a Haig critic and so it is unlikely he deliberately overplayed Ward's contribution.¹⁰ In 1908, Ward authored the *Territorial Force Regulations* and became Honorary Colonel of the 2nd London Territorial Division. He was also Chairman of the County of London Territorial Force Association.

Between them, the Haldane reforms transformed the War Office into 'a form so effective that it remained substantially unchanged for seventy years...The new organisation was reminiscent of the board of directors in a modern service company.'¹¹ In other words, Haldane, Ward and their collaborators were bringing to bear innovative business techniques to the field of military management. This was in a period when modern management theory was in its infancy. The ideas of American Frederick Winslow Taylor were beginning to be known, and were included in the LSE Course. However, Ward's ideas in particular were closer to those of the French pioneer of modern management theory, Henri Fayol. Tadman suggests that:

8 Colonel G. Williams, *Citizen Soldiers of the Royal Engineers Transportation and Movements and the Army Service Corps 1859-1965* (Ashford, Royal Corps of Transport, 1965), p.33.

9 Peter Simkins, *Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1916* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988), p 12; Ian Worthington, 'Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officers Training Corps', *Military Affairs*, 43 (2) (April 1979), pp.90-96.

10 Williams, *Citizen Soldiers of the Royal Engineers*, p.26, 33.

11 Michael Tadman, 'The War Office: A Study of its Development as an Organisational System, 1870-1904', (PhD Thesis, King's College London, 1992), pp.240-256.

...these advances in their appreciation of management principles paralleled the work of the great theorists [notably Taylor and Fayol] quite closely, except for this vital difference – that they anticipated the published works by several decades.¹²

Fayol's ideas rather than Taylor's have stood the test of time. Wren concludes that:

...much of the present-day management literature has been built on Fayol's ideas and terminology that it is difficult to see the uniqueness of his insights. For his time and in the context of the paucity of management literature, his ideas were fresh, illuminating, and milestones on the path of the evolving discipline of management.¹³

Tadman directly links the thinking that characterised the reforms overseen by Lord Esher, Haldane and Ward as directly comparable to Fayol's principles of good management. Most of all Ward had the conviction, like Fayol, that future senior managers should receive specialist managerial education and training.¹⁴ Higgens too recognises the mechanisms of Haldane's reforms as mirroring modern management techniques by demonstrating that what was at work was a classic 'change management process' predicated upon Haldane's deep interest in Hegelian philosophy. Higgens concludes that Haldane 'understood the intellectual complexities of institutional change', it is clear that in his many, and varied roles Ward shared the same understanding.¹⁵

In all of the above tasks, Ward utilised his previous administrative experience from service in the field in Ashanti and South Africa as well as his organisation of the Royal Military Tournament, putting forward practical managerial solutions to issues that had eluded others. Hailed, as the 'Saviour of Ladysmith' for his organisation of supplies during the siege, Ward, as head of the Tournament, was responsible for the tripling of profits. Ward's belief in sound management and business training was prominent in many of the areas under his auspices. However, in one scheme in particular these principles were taken a stage further, again anticipating much of the later work of management theorists; this was the creation of the Army Administration Course at LSE.

12 Tadman 'The War Office', p.261.

13 Daniel Wren, *The History of Management Thought*, Second Edition (New York: John Wiley, 2005), p.218.

14 For further close similarities between Ward's and Fayol's ideas, see: Ward, *Supply and Transport on Active Service* (Dublin, Sibley and Co, 1893), p.11. Also see papers by two of his protégés from the LSE course: Oscar Striedinger, 'Army Organisation', *Army Service Corps Quarterly*, 3 (1909), pp.365-369, and, especially, Major E.E. Carter, 'The Science and Art of Army Administration', *Army Service Corps Quarterly*, 3 (1909), pp.370-379.

15 Higgens. 'Richard Haldane', abstract.

The Creation of the Army Administration Course

As part of Haldane's extensive reforms, one of the main aims was the creation of an administrative staff for the War Office and Army separate from the General Staff but with the same 'real and far-reaching' strategic control as the General Staff.¹⁶ The subsequent LSE course is, like the creation of the OTC, credited to Haldane, especially as he was a founder of the LSE.¹⁷ This is only partially correct; Ward was as much the initiator as Haldane. Ward had been an administrative officer himself for almost 30 years, so this was his specialist subject; Ward had espoused many of the principles behind the course as early as 1893 and he put forward the idea for the scheme in a memorandum entitled 'The need for a trained administrative staff' in February 1906.¹⁸ Clearly though, both men were of the same view on the topic and in the paper, 'Ward propounded the then revolutionary idea that modern soldiers needed training in modern administrative techniques.'¹⁹ Ward enclosed a draft for a three-year staff training course, of which six months were to be spent on accountancy, commercial methods, public administration and finance, production and trade, railway administration and transport and commercial and international law. The final scheme combined Haldane's aim with Ward's belief that management principles needed to be inculcated throughout the administration of both the War Office and the army. Ward was one of the first to apply business methods in Whitehall, some nine years before Lloyd-George utilised similar principles in his wartime coalition, and the first to introduce management training for civil servants and the armed forces.

Ward and Haldane's conviction that business methods were needed place them within the broader movement for national efficiency that gained credibility after the Boer War. This movement had been vindicated by the failures of the army in South Africa and the enquiries after it, which concluded that major changes were needed. During the Boer War itself, *The Times* correspondent, Leopold Amery demanded, 'nothing less than a revolution' in army organisation and administration. Britain needed an expert army, one in which:

16 Edward M Spiers *Haldane: An Army Reformer* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1980), p.151.

17 *Ibid.*

18 Ward, *Supply and Transport*, pp.18 and 25-26; TNA, WO 163/746, Minutes of proceedings of the Permanent Executive Committee of the War Office (5 January to 4 March 1904) and Important Treasury and War Office Decisions 1904-1906.

19 D.C. Watt, 'The London University Class for Military Administrators 1906-31: A Study of the British Approach to Civil-Military Relations', *LSE Quarterly*, 2 (2) (Summer 1988), pp.157-158.

...the whole caste system the whole idea of the Army as a sort of puppet show where smartness, guilt braid... must vanish and give place to something real, something business like.²⁰

Amery's comments gained official support in the recommendations of the Committee on the Reorganisation of the War Office in 1901, chaired by Clinton Dawkins, a partner in the American banking firm of J.P. Morgan.²¹ Guided mainly by their public experience the committee concluded that:

A general, if not a precise analogy, can be established between the conduct of large business undertakings and that of the War Office. There are certain well-defined principles of management in all well-conducted business corporations, and the more closely the War Office can be brought into conformity with such principles, the more successful will be its administration.²²

Among the ideas, the Committee considered transferable were the division of work into well-defined sections; adequate delegation and decentralisation of powers; effective systems that avoided excessive form filling and providing adequate, co-ordination between departments; all principles that remain pertinent in modern management practice.

The movement for national efficiency was led by the former Liberal Prime Minister Lord Rosebery, who had been advocating the need for Britain to be put on a business footing since the 1880s. Other prominent Liberals and left-of-centre figures including Haldane, Halford Mackinder, the polymath Director of LSE, closely associated with the development of geopolitical theory, and the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who along with Haldane had helped establish the LSE, supported it. Drawing on a wider political consensus was the dining club the 'Co-Efficients' formed by Leopold Amery and Beatrice Webb in November 1902 to air strategies that could be used to promote national efficiency. While it lasted, it disbanded in 1908 over disagreements around tariff reform; the grouping included those previously mentioned plus Sir Edward Grey, Clinton Dawkins, Bertrand Russell, H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw.²³

20 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson, (eds.), *The Leo Amery Diaries, 1896-1929*, (London, Hutchinson, 1980), p.33.

21 1901 [Cmd. 580 and 581] *Report of the Committee on War Office Organisation appointed by the Secretary of State for War, 1901*, p.xl.

22 [Cmd. 580] *Committee on War Office Organisation*, pp.2-3.

23 W. Funnell, 'National Efficiency, Military Accounting and the Business of War', *Critical Perspectives on Accounting*, 17 (6) (2006), pp.732-733.

Halford Mackinder and the Committee

Halford Mackinder had already introduced programmes at the LSE to serve the executives of the railway, banking and insurance industries as well as the Indian Civil Service. Ward had clearly already discussed the idea of a course with Mackinder and Sidney Webb because on the day he drafted his memo he lunched with Mackinder who then wrote to Webb saying 'it is practically certain that the scheme we blocked out together will go through.'²⁴ This is a further indication that Ward was at least as involved in the scheme's genesis as was Haldane. In support of the principle of a course, an article had appeared in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* the year before written by Captain H.A. Young of the Indian Ordnance Department. Young compared the army to, 'a vast business organisation' and said that what was needed were people who were, 'businessmen first, and officers last.'²⁵ The elements of the Geography syllabus for such a course had also been developed by the then Colonel H.S.G. Miles and A.J. Herbotson in the latter's article in the *Geographical Journal* and in a letter Sidney Webb described Ward's contribution to the course as 'indispensable'.²⁶

The scheme received the official go-ahead six months later and immediately thereafter, an advisory board was established under Ward's chairmanship. Its senior military member was Director of Staff Duties, Lieutenant-General H.D. Hutchinson who was replaced a year later by Douglas Haig when he took up that post. The other military members were Director of Supplies, Brigadier-General Frederick Clayton (later Inspector-General of Communications in France during the war); Director of Recruiting and Organization, Major-General H.S.G. Miles; Director of Fortifications and Works, Brigadier-General R.M. Ruck and Commandant of the Ordnance College at Woolwich, Colonel G.R. Townsend. Civilian members in addition to Mackinder and Webb were the General Manager of the London and North Western Railway, Sir Frederick Harrison, Sir Hugh Bell, a steel manufacturer from Middlesbrough, and the Governor of the Union of London and Smith's Bank Sir Felix Schuster. Others who later served on the committee included several who featured in prominent roles during the war including Generals Henry Wilson, in his

24 B.W. Blouet, *Halford Mackinder: A Biography* (College Station Texas, A&M University Press, 1987), p.131. Watt 'The London University Class', p.158. Kreis points out that railway workshop were one place where scientific management had made considerable progress in Britain before 1914. Steven Kreis, 'The Diffusion of an Idea: A History of Scientific Management in Britain, 1890-1945', (PhD Thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1990).

25 Captain H. Young, 'Practical Economy in the Army', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 50 (July to December 1906), pp.1281-1285.

26 A.J. Herbotson 'The Geographical Training of Army Officers in the Universities', *Geographical Journal*, 21 (1903), pp.465-6; Bodleian Library, *Papers of Percy Noble*, MSS Autogr, C. 17, No. 495, Letter from Webb to Ward, 23 December, 1910.

capacity as Commandant of the Staff College, Launcelot Kiggell, later Haig's Chief of Staff, and William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the majority of the war. Wilson was about the only senior officer to criticise the course because it would 'do an infinity of harm' to the Staff College and 'a complete separation of the Administrative and General Staff.'²⁷ Bell, Mackinder, Shuster and Webb served throughout the eight years of the course, Mackinder remaining on the Committee after his resignation from the Directorship of the LSE. Mackinder was persuaded to resign and take up politics full time by Leo Amery and Lord Milner. He subsequently became Unionist MP for Glasgow Camlachie from 1910 to 1922.²⁸ The committee members appear to have got on well and often dined together, Haig being a frequent, and perhaps unlikely, guest of the Webb's.²⁹

The Army Administration Course

Though Ward would have liked to have a period of business training that lasted a full three years it was unrealistic for officers to remove themselves from the prospects of promotion for this length of time and so the final agreement was for a six-month course.³⁰ The military correspondent of *The Times*, Charles a Court Repington, who also thought the course should be extended to selected General Staff officers, supported Ward.³¹ The first course ran from January to July 1907, with the second following from October 1907 to March 1908. Six further courses ran annually from October to March and in total 245 officers, mainly of the rank of Captain and Major, attended the course from all branches of the army with the exception of the cavalry. The absence of cavalry officers is not explained in any of the sources but may be connected with the structure of careers in that arm. Additionally, a small number of officers from the reserve list who attended at their own expense. This explains a proportion of the 'Other' listed in Table 1 opposite.

Addressing the opening day of the initial course Mackinder expressed the view that:

The Army is the greatest single business in this country... It is true, of course, that it is necessarily conducted on a different principle from ordinary city business. The Army is not conducted for profit, but to produce power. This power is used during peace time in order to maintain peace, and in war time to achieve victory.³²

27 Sloan 'Haldane's Mackindergarten', p.331.

28 Blouet, *Halford Mackinder*, p.138.

29 Spiers, *Haldane*, p.151.

30 Watt, 'The London University Class', pp.162-163.

31 'Military Notes, *The Times*, 30 October 1906, p.15.

32 1907 [Cmd. 3696] *Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the First Course at the London School of Economics, January to July, 1907, for the Training of Officers*

Table 1 Percentage of Participants in the LSE Army Administrative Course 1907-1914

Branch	Course 1	Course 2	Course 3	Course 4	Course 5	Course 6	Course 7	Course 8
ASC	39	43	47	37	32	26	23	31
Infantry	26	23	23	37	29	35	37	28
Artillery	16	13	17	13	10	9	10	6
Ordnance	10	10	10	10	19	19	13	10
Indian	3	3	3	–	6	9	10	9
RE	6	3	–	–	–	–	–	–
Other	–	3	–	–	3	–	7	6
Total numbers on each course	31	30	30	30	31	31	30	32

Mackinder noted that it was only recently that those in business had recognised the importance of professional training but that:

What the railways, and what the city, among its more enlightened representatives, is beginning to feel is that administration requires a training similar to the professional trainings, and that experience, in the face of German and other foreign competition, is showing that the old typically British way of blundering into the position of a responsible administrator will no longer do.³³

So there was recognition both of the novelty of this approach, professional training in management being in its infancy in business let alone in the army, and of the ‘threat’ that German efficiency posed with its highly trained specialist administrators.

Lectures were given on 14 subjects covering six broader areas: accounting and business methods, commercial law, statistics, transport, banking and economics. They were supplemented by numerous ‘observation visits’ to such enterprises as the offices of *The Times*, the Great Western Railway Works, the London Docks, the London Omnibus Works, the Railway Clearing House, the Houses of Parliament and Lloyds. Eminent experts in their fields who were drawn from business, the universities and government instructed students. Haldane was a frequent lecturer and several others were politically from the radical wing including Webb, who lectured on the organisation of trade unions, Hastings Lees-Smith, later a Labour Cabinet Minister (on economics) and the Fabian Socialist Graham Wallas, one of the seminal figures in the development of social science (on public administration).³⁴ Enjoyed by the students,

for the Higher Appointments on the Administrative Staff of the Army and for the charge of Departmental Services, p.11.

33 [Cmd. 3696] *Advisory Board Report 1907*, p 12.

34 Funnell, ‘National Efficiency’, p.736.

as one of them wrote ‘as a phrase-maker...[Wallas’ lectures in particular]...ranks with Bishop Wilberforce.’³⁵ The course therefore had a radically different content to both that of the staff officer course at the Army Staff College Camberley and the War Course at the Royal Naval War College, both of which focused on military strategy and tactics.³⁶

At the outset Mackinder told students that the ‘syllabuses are tentative, and not yet complete.’³⁷ As would be expected in a new course, the balance of topics adjusted as time went on. There was initially rather too much theory, too much history and insufficient reference to military problems and so the second course included some significant changes with increased time given to statistics, public administration and marine transportation at the expense of accounting and economic geography.³⁸ By the time of the third course a good balance appears to have been struck and the only, significant change to the curriculum thereafter was that Business Organisation, how to structure and organise enterprises for maximum efficiency, became increasingly important. This module included the recognition that ‘business organization is organization of the social organism.’³⁹ It emphasised the importance of process and the elimination of waste and, from 1912, included study of Frederick Taylor’s ideas, which had been published in his book *The Principles of Scientific Management* only the previous year. This introduced students to theories of management that were at the forefront of contemporary thinking. Examination questions covered a range of topics that became highly relevant in the future careers of the participants. Examples include comparing the financial resources of Britain, France and Germany in view of an outbreak of war (1907), the impact of conscription in wartime (1908), the pros and cons of local recruiting for the Army (1910) and the impact on the London market and unemployment in the event of a major war (1912 and 1913). As one graduate of the course wrote, it taught the importance of structure and process in business methods, ‘to consider ourselves as tiny cogs and parts of a vast plant of machinery, each mutually dependent, mutually working in a great common cause.’⁴⁰ This *esprit d’armee*, Airey, suggested, should supplement the already existing regimental spirit. The modular content of the course mirrors in several respects the content and structure of modern Business School syllabi, notably their Executive MBAs.

The course became affectionately known as ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’ and its immediate impact was to assist the LSE’s finances, allowing them to open a refectory

- 35 R.B. Airey, ‘The London School of Economics and the Army’, *Army Review*, IV (1913), p.472.
- 36 Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’ p.327; Andrew Lambert, ‘The Naval War Course: Some Principals of Maritime Strategy and the Origins of “The British Way in Warfare”’ in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.) *The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp.219-56.
- 37 *Advisory Board Report 1907* (Cd. 3696), p.12.
- 38 Watt, ‘The London University Class’, pp.164-165.
- 39 1912-13 [Cmd. 6285] *Report of Sixth Course, 5th October 1911 to 27th March 1912*, p.5.
- 40 Airey, ‘The London School of Economics’, p.468.

servicing all staff and students.⁴¹ It also had the significant result of widening the students' perspective on the world, including the fact that women too could be intellectuals. 'The atmosphere at Clare Market is valuable' Major Airey confirmed. It provided 'social intercourse with men, women and research students ... who are all so different from the average soldier.'⁴² Lawrence Dicksee, the course's main accountancy lecturer, was in no doubt that, the course significantly improved military efficiency and that it was responsible for the 'wonderful success of transport and supply' in the early part of the war.⁴³ Dicksee became the first Professor of Accounting at any British university, holding the post at the University of Birmingham. Those who went through the course became senior administrative officers during the war and had a profound influence upon the supply and management of the army. Examples include:

- G.M. Heath - Chief Engineer for 2nd Corps then 1st Army 1915-16. Engineer in Chief GHQ from November 1917.
- C.W. Gwynn - Director of Military Artillery with the Australian Army during the war. Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley 1926-31. Long has described him as 'One of the outstanding staff officers of the Army, and in peace a notable trainer of future senior commanders.'⁴⁴
- W.A.C. Denny - the first Director General of Military Intelligence of Canada. This appointment may also have been connected with Ward who had a strong link with the Canadian forces. He had been an Honorary Colonel of the Canadian Army Service Corps since 1904. He was a friend of Sam Hughes the Canadian Minister for Militia and Defence during the war and even helped organise Sidney and Beatrice Webb's holiday to that country.⁴⁵
- E.E. Carter - Director of Supplies at GHQ from 1915 until the end of the war. The history of the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) notes that, 'it was largely due to General Carter that the Army was better fed than any other' during the First World War.⁴⁶
- W.K. Tarver - Deputy Director at the War Office from March 1916. Inspector of the RASC from 1925-9 when he became Colonel Commandant of the RASC.
- C.D.R. Watts - Assisted in instruction on the LSE course in 1908-9. Director of

41 The nickname came from the student magazine 'The Clare Market Review'. Blouet, *Halford Mackinder*, p.132.

42 Airey, 'The London School of Economics', p.473.

43 L.R. Dicksee, *Business Methods and the War. (Four lectures.)*, (Cambridge, University Press, 1915), pp.71-2.

44 Gavin Long, 'Gwynn, Sir Charles William (1870-1963)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography*, Australian National University, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gwynn-sir-charles-william-6511/text11175>, accessed 30 October 2010.

45 M. Young, *Army Service Corps* (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2000), p.23; *Percy Noble Papers*, Nos. 145, 147 and 494.

46 Anon, *The Short History of the Royal Army Service Corps* (Aldershot, Gale and Polden, 1939), p.59.

Ordnance Services 1928-31. Colonel Commandant of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps from 1932.

- F.F. Ready - Adjutant-General in Mesopotamia. General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland District in 1926, before becoming GOC of the 1st Division at Aldershot Command in 1929 and then Quartermaster-General to the Forces in 1931.

One aspect of the war that gets unanimous praise is its logistical administration and part of the groundwork for this success was laid in the eight courses of 1907-14. When, after the war, the LSE tried to have it resurrected they commented that 'its value has been testified to be very satisfactory in the War just ended', and this was a major influence in the course's revival in 1924 under William Beveridge, the then Director of the LSE.⁴⁷ However, the course was finally discontinued in 1932 in the wake of economies during the Great Depression. Funnell has described the course as 'amongst the most innovative strategies to raise the commercial awareness and accounting expertise of army administrators' and demonstrates how it had a significant impact upon the efficient operation of the Ministry of Munitions.⁴⁸

Conclusion

In his inaugural speech in 1907 Mackinder had stated that what the devisors of the course had in mind was 'to do something more than merely teach and learn; we have to evolve a tradition.'⁴⁹ This view was clearly supported at the highest levels of the army as Funnell has commented:

the creation of an Advisory Board...on which sat some of the most senior officers of the various army departments, was a clear indication of the importance with which the army, the War Office and the government regarded the new Army Class.⁵⁰

The course demonstrates that many of the senior administrative officers and several of the senior commanders of the First World War, not least Douglas Haig, were well-versed in modern business management principles, including the latest thinking from the United States on scientific management. It ensured that Britain had a core group of middle-ranking officers with sound administrative training during and after the First World War.

47 Funnell, 'National Efficiency', p.738.

48 Funnell, 'National Efficiency', pp.719-720 and p.736.

49 *Report of the Advisory Board 1907* (Cd 3696), p.14.

50 Funnell, 'National Efficiency', p.736.

Sloan agrees with this assessment and suggests that the course may have influenced the thinking of Lloyd-George's government in appointing top civil executives like Sir Eric Geddes to key wartime posts.⁵¹ Stoddart has summarised the courses as providing 'a precedent for the later university training of Army and Air Force cadets in wartime... It was the beginning of the thinking soldiers' army' and Funnell has suggested that it was a 'revolutionary innovation in the education of British army officers and in the approach of the War Office to army administration.'⁵² There is a good case to be made that the LSE Army Class attempted, and was partially successful, in initiating a management revolution within the administration of the Army.

51 Sloan, 'Haldane's Mackindergarten', p.350.

52 D.R. Stoddart, 'Geography and War: The "New Geography" and the "New Army" in England, 1889-1914', *Political Geography*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1992), pp.95-97. Funnell, 'National Efficiency', p.736.